Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery - From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization

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Title: Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery - From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization
Author: Buckle, E.
Language: English
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Transcriber’s note:

Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected
together at the end of the last chapter.

Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,

From the Formation of the Corps to The Present Time,
with Some Account of Its Internal Organization.

By the late

CAPTAIN E. BUCKLE,

Assist. Adj.-Gen., Bengal Artillery.

Edited By J. W. Kaye, Late Lieut. Bengal Artillery.

London:
Wm. H. Allen & Co., 7, Leadenhall Street.

1852.

Printed by
Cox (Brothers) and Wyman, Great Queen Street,
Lincoln’S-Inn Fields.

TO
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR GEORGE POLLOCK, G.C.B.
OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,
THIS MEMOIR
OF THE SERVICES OF A CORPS
OF WHICH HE IS SO DISTINGUISHED A MEMBER,
IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED BY
HIS SINCERE FRIEND AND ADMIRER,
THE EDITOR.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

ADVERTISEMENT BY THE EDITOR.

The circumstances under which the greater portion of this Memoir was
written, are set forth so truthfully in the following passages, taken
from an Indian periodical, that I cannot do better than transcribe
them:—

“It was well known for some years before Captain Buckle, driven
homewards by the pressure of ill-health, resigned the important
regimental office which he had held so creditably to himself and so
advantageously to his corps, that he had long been collecting materials
for a Memoir of the Bengal Artillery, and had been engaged, in brief
intervals of leisure, in their arrangement and reproduction in the form
of an elaborate work of military history. In the immediate circle of his
own private friends it was known, moreover, how deep was the interest
that he took in the progress of this work; how laboriously he pursued
his investigations into the past history of his regiment; and what
gratification it afforded him, in the midst of much that was necessarily
dull and thankless, to exhume, out of a mass of long-buried records, or
a heap of printed volumes with the damp of years upon them, some
neglected historical fact, some forgotten statistics, or some
illustrative anecdote which had never reached the ears of the present
generation. It was emphatically a labour of love. It was the recreation,
after hours of office drudgery, of the last few years of his sojourn in
India,—of the last few years of his life. His health had been for some
time perceptibly failing; and for many months before he finally
determined to turn his back upon Dum-Dum, he had suffered under one of
the most distressing and most fatal disorders of the country. Like many
others, who have been buoyed up by such delusive hopes, he thought that
he could weather it out a little longer. Intervals of seeming
convalescence gave him new confidence and courage; and he was
disinclined to anticipate the date at which he had originally designed
to visit Great Britain. But the hot weather of 1846 tried him severely;
his disorder was aggravated; and at last he reluctantly determined to
strike his tent, and to seek renewed health beneath the milder sun of
his native country. He embarked on board the steamer leaving Calcutta in
September; and it was hoped that the sea-breeze would check the progress
of his malady; but as the vessel steamed down the bay, he grew worse and
worse, and on the 19th of that month, off the island of Ceylon, he
rendered back his soul to his Maker.

“It was, we believe, one of his last expressions of earthly solicitude,
that the manuscript of the Memoir of the Bengal Artillery, on which he
had been so long and anxiously employed, should be given over to his
executor, an old brother officer and most esteemed friend, to be dealt
with as might seem best to him. It was the known wish of the deceased,
that the work should be published: indeed, the thought of laying before
the world a fitting memoir of the distinguished regiment to which he was
attached, had often, in hours of sickness and weariness, been a solace
and a stimulant to him. It is an ambition worthy of any soldier, to be
the historian of his corps.”[1]

The manuscript was placed in my hands by Captain Buckle’s executor, and
I undertook to see it safely through the press. The Memoir was brought
down by the author to the close of the Afghan war; but during the
interval which had elapsed since he laid down the pen, the Sikhs had
crossed the Sutlej, and the battles of Moodkhee, Ferozshuhur, Aliwal,
and Sobraon had been fought. It seemed desirable that some record of
these engagements should be added to the Memoir, and I attempted to
supply what was wanting to complete the work. But whilst the sheets
containing the annals of this campaign were passing through the press,
the second Sikh war broke out, and the further necessity of bringing
down the chronicle to the close of that memorable campaign which
resulted in the annexation of the Punjab, was imposed upon the editor.
Others would have done this more effectively and more expeditiously. My
qualifications for the due performance of the work intrusted to me were
mainly the cheerfulness with which, both from respect for the memory of
the deceased author and affection for the regiment of which I was once a
member, I undertook the labours it entailed; and such aptitude as may be
supposed to result from a life spent in literary pursuits. For the three
last chapters I alone am responsible. I am indebted to others for the
information they contain; but if any errors should appear in them, they
must be laid to the account of my misuse of the materials placed at my
disposal.

That, valuable and interesting as are many of the details of this
Memoir, it would have been more interesting and more valuable if Captain
Buckle had lived to complete it, is no mere conjecture of mine. The
marginal pencil notes which appear on the face of the manuscript,
indicate the writer’s intention of furnishing fuller information on many
important points already touched upon, and of supplying many additional
details which in the progress of the work had escaped his notice, but
which subsequent inquiries, or, in some instances, the suggestions of
friends, had enabled him to introduce, and which would have been
introduced had he lived to superintend the passage of his Memoir through
the press. It is certain, too, that the details in the concluding
chapters would have been more accurate and more complete. I have
followed the original manuscript, as far as it went, with scarcely the
alteration of a word; and I have endeavoured, in the concluding
chapters, as nearly as possible to retain the manner of the original
work.

Some apology is due for the delay which has occurred in placing the
Memoir before the public. This has been occasioned partly by the
necessity of obtaining original information relative to the events of
the Sikh campaign, and partly by the pressure of other literary
engagements which have absorbed the editor’s time. In the record of the
great victory of Goojrat, the history of the achievements of the Bengal
Artillery has a fitting termination; and I can hardly regret the delay
which has enabled me to chronicle, however inefficiently, the services
of so many of my distinguished cotemporaries in the course of the last
few memorable years.

J. W. K.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st Company in
Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation of 1st
Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company raised—Campaigns of Colonel
Calliaud, Major Adams, &c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company
raised—Major Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to
brigades—Artillery Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of
Ordnance—Practice-ground near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of Artillery
raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the Establishment—Artillery
formed into a Brigade, _p._ 1–53.

CHAPTER II.

Reduction of Golundaz Battalion—Formation of Regiment into Two
European Battalions with Ten Battalions of Lascars—Goddard’s
Expedition—Popham’s Capture of Gwalior—Insurrection at
Benares—Attacks on Pateeta, Luteefpoor, and Siege of
Bidgegurh—Colonel Pearse’s Expedition to the Coast—Reduction of
Golundaz Companies—Transport Train, Foundry, Powder-works—Reduction
in Establishment—Pay—Artillery formed into One European Battalion of
Ten Companies—Lascar Battalions abolished—Battalion Guns—Artillery
formed into Three European Battalions, Lascars into Thirty
Companies, _p._ 54–106.

CHAPTER III.

Artillery, one of the brigades of the army—An Infantry Officer,
Brigade-Major—Succeeded by an Artillery Officer—Dress—School
orders—School—Inoculation—Companies numbered by seniority—Method of
exploding mortar-shells on reaching the ground—Fire in
the arsenal—Death of Colonel Pearse—Lieut.-Colonel G.
Deare, Commandant—War in the Carnatic—Second Battalion of
Artillery sent—Sattimungulum—Bangalore—Retreat from
Seringapatam—Nundydroog—Savendroog—Attack on fortified camp at
Seringapatam—Return to Bengal, _p._ 107–162.

CHAPTER IV.

Matériel organization, and its successive changes—Guns
and carriages first used—Royal pattern—Madras
pattern—Ammunition-carriages—Tumbrils—Horse Artillery
ammunition-carriage—Elevating-screws—Ordnance in
use—Siege-carriages—Howitzer and Mortar combined
carriage—Gribeauval’s pattern—French caisson—Hardwicke’s
pattern—Horse Artillery guns—Mountain-train
carriages—Siege-carriages and ordnance—Royal pattern (block
trail)—Gun and Ammunition carriages introduced, _p._ 163–198.

CHAPTER V.

Reorganization in 1796 of the army—Successive additions to Artillery
companies—Ceylon—Seringapatam—Introduction of Horse
Artillery—Egypt—Deficiency of Artillery—Organization of
1801–2—Composition of the regiment—Foreign service—Sieges of
Sarsnee, Bidgygurh, and Cutchwarah, _p._ 199–248.

CHAPTER VI.

Lord Lake’s Campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding Golundaz—Increase
of Horse Artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France and
Java—Bundlecund Campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval pattern carriages
introduced—Additional Golundaz companies—Head-quarters removed to
Dum-Dum, _p._ 249–311.

CHAPTER VII.

Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment of
Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance General Officers
debarred the General Staff—Conceded to them—Guns formed into
Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun
Carriage Agency—Ordnance Commissariat Department—Commandants’
position improved—Model Department—Select Committee formed—Reduction
of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion system introduced into
Bengal—Burmese War—Siege of Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment, _p._
312–391.

CHAPTER VIII.

Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of Colonel given
to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations in uniform—Shekawuttee
Campaign—Establishment of Retiring Fund—The Afghan Campaign—Capture
of Ghuznee—Services of the Artillery—March to Bamean—Our disasters
at Caubul—Nichol’s troop—The Army of Retribution—Pollock’s
force—Honours to the Artillery, _p._ 392–451.

CHAPTER IX.

State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle of
Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The Battle of Punniah—The Gwalior
contingent—Honours conferred on the Artillery—The Ordnance
Commissariat remodelled—The Artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the
Regiment—Increase of horse-batteries, _p._ 452–466.

CHAPTER X.

The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the Artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures taken for its
prevention—The Artillery reinforced—Affair at Buddowal—Battle of
Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours conferred on the Artillery—The
Occupation of Lahore, _p._ 467–516.

CHAPTER XI.

Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling
of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall of
Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours to the
Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks, _p._ 517–571.

MEMOIRS

THE BENGAL ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st Company in
Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation of 1st
Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company raised—Campaigns of Colonel
Calliaud, Major Adams, &c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company
raised—Major Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to
Brigades—Artillery Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of
Ordnance—Practice-ground near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of Artillery
raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the Establishment—Artillery
formed into a Brigade.

Adepts in natural history, from a few fossil bones and teeth, are able
to delineate the animal to which they belonged, and from comparing the
analogy of the parts, to clothe their skeleton with appropriate
covering, thus making, as it were, the animal kingdom of by-gone ages
pass in review before the present generation.

A similar talent would be necessary, effectively to rake up the early
history of a regiment. Old records preserved in public offices form the
fossil bones; and the “fleshy tenement” with which these are to be
clothed must be culled from many a quarter ere the “animal” can be
completed; and when this is done, there still remains the difficult task
of giving him life and spirit, or, to drop the metaphor, of rendering
the record useful and entertaining.

Much difficulty besets the undertaking; and, though we are conscious of
our want of ability to do full justice to the present task, yet, as we
believe that a good deal of information not generally known, and
collected from sources inaccessible to the majority, is contained in the
following pages, and which will be acceptable for its own sake, without
reference to the form in which it appears, we have been induced to give
publicity to our rough notes.

The first company of Bengal Artillery was raised in 1749; the orders
were received, it is believed, from Bombay, then the chief presidency. A
company was ordered, at the same time, at each presidency, in the Court
of Directors’ general letter of 17th June, 1748. A copy of the warrant
for that at Madras will be found in the “Artillery Records” for October,
1843, and for Bombay in one of a series of papers entitled “Three Years’
Gleanings,” which appeared in the _E. I. United Service Journal_ in
1838, and some extracts from which are made hereafter in these pages:
the entire warrants are too voluminous for insertion. A similar one was
most probably sent to Bengal, but all records perished when Calcutta was
taken.

Admiral Boscawen was requested to supply such aid in raising the
companies as he could spare from the fleet, for gunners; and the master
gunner was appointed to the Bombay company. The companies were to be
completed as early as possible, and all the gun-room’s crew, who were
qualified, were to be included.

The “gun-room’s crew” appears to have been the denomination given to a
certain number of men set apart for the duties of the artillery; their
officers were called gunners, gunners’ mates, &c., and combined the
magazine duties with the more properly-called duties of artillerymen.

The new company was to consist of one captain, one second captain, one
captain-lieutenant, and three lieutenant-fireworkers; four serjeants,
four corporals, three drummers, and one hundred gunners; the established
pay was as noted below:—

Captain and chief engineer £200 per annum.
2nd captain and 2nd engineer 150 per annum.
Captain-lieutenant, and director of laboratory 100 per annum.
1st lieutenant fireworker 75 per annum.
2nd lieutenant fireworker 60 per annum.
3rd lieutenant fireworker 50[2] per annum.
Serjeant 2_s._ per diem.
Corporal 1_s._ 6_d._ per diem.
Gunner 1_s._ per diem.

The want of artillery during the wars on the coast from 1746 to 1754,
and the impossibility of forming a sufficient number on the spot,
induced the Court of Directors to obtain and send out two companies of
Royal Artillery to Bombay; and, when the war broke out in 1756, three
companies more were sent, with the reinforcements under Clive, to
Bombay, and were afterwards distributed among the presidencies.

With Colonel Aldercron’s regiment (39th Foot,—“primus in Indis”) at
Madras, there were also forty artillerymen, on its arrival in 1754;
these he considered part of his regiment, and they were most probably
borne on its rolls, and allotted to the duties of the field-pieces
attached.

At Madras, attention seems to have been earlier paid to the military
establishment than in Bengal. A field train had been organized in 1755,
to which Lieutenant Jennings was appointed adjutant (this officer was
afterwards transferred to the Bengal presidency), but in Bengal in 1756,
on the war with France breaking out, the whole force amounted to only
300 European troops, including the company of artillery raised in 1749.

In 1756 the company of artillery was commanded by Captain Witherington,
and stationed in Fort William, with detachments at the smaller
factories, such as Dacca, Balasore, Cossimbazar, Patna, &c. On the siege
of Fort William by Sooraj-ul-Dowlah, only forty-five artillerymen were
in the garrison, and these, with their commanding officer, perished in
the Black Hole.

The character of Capt. Witherington is sketched in Mr. Holwell’s
interesting “Narrative” as “a laborious active officer, but confused.
There would have been few objections to his character, diligence, or
conduct, had he been fortunate in having any commander-in-chief to have
a proper eye over him, and take care that he did his duty.” One point,
however, is clear—that whatever his talents or character may have been,
he perished at his post, whilst others deserted theirs.

An instance of devotion highly honourable is also recorded by Mr.
Holwell of a man named Leech, an artificer, most probably of the
artillery, “and clerk of the parish, who had made his escape when the
Moors entered the fort, and returned just as it was dark to tell me he
had provided a boat, and would insure my escape if I would follow him
through a passage few were acquainted with, and by which he had entered.
I thanked him in the best terms I could, but told him it was a step I
could not prevail on myself to take, as I thereby should very ill repay
the attachment the gentlemen and garrison had shewn me; that I was
resolved to share their fate, be it what it would, but pressed him to
secure his escape without loss of time, to which he gallantly replied
that ‘then he was resolved to share mine, and would not leave me.’”[3]

The remnants of the company were probably collected together at Fultah,
and joined the force with which Clive afterwards avenged our disgrace on
its reaching the Hooghly. In the arrangements made for retaking
Calcutta, it was intended that the guns sent from Madras on the
_Marlborough_ should have been worked by the artillerymen of Aldercron’s
regiment. This plan was, however, frustrated by the colonel refusing to
allow them to go, unless he accompanied with his regiment, or, in other
words, unless the command of the expedition was vested in him. The want
of artillerymen was therefore supplied by a detail from the Madras
company under Lieutenant Jennings. The actual strength is not known; but
as in February 1757, in the attack on the Nawab’s troops near Omichund’s
garden, we find from Orme that Clive mustered about 100 artillerymen,
and as not more than 20 or 30 of the old company can be supposed to have
escaped, it must have been at least half a company.

The expedition reached Fultah on the 20th December, 1756, and met with
but little opposition (a night attack on the troops landed near Fort
Marlborough being the chief) in the progress to Calcutta, which was
retaken, after a short cannonade from the shipping, on the 2nd January,
1757.

To protect Calcutta from the incursions of the Nawab’s army, Clive
formed a fortified camp, with outposts around it, about a mile north of
the town, and half a mile from the river, on the spot now called
Chitpore. This situation was well chosen, as it was impossible for the
enemy, when coming from the northward, to enter Calcutta without passing
between the camp and salt-water lake (then more extensive than at
present), within sight of the camp. Towards the end of January the field
artillery was completed by the arrival of the _Marlborough_,[4] which
had the greatest part on board.

On the 3rd February the Nawab’s army passed along the Dum-Dum road,
leaving it near the turning at the Puckah-bridges, and spreading
irregularly over the plain to the eastward of the Mahratta ditch, the
Nawab’s own camp being pitched in Omichund’s garden, the ground now
called “Nunden Bagh.”

Surrounded by so numerous an enemy, Clive would soon have been
straitened for provisions. To prevent this inconvenience, and to alarm a
timorous enemy, he resolved to surprise their camp before daylight, and
for this purpose he marched out from his camp—the artillery, 100 men,
and six 6–pounder guns in the rear; the ammunition on lascars’ heads,
guarded by sailors; the sipahis and European battalion leading. At dawn,
they came upon the enemy’s advanced posts, placed in the ditches of the
Dum-Dum road, whom they easily dispersed, and continued their march
parallel to the Mahratta ditch until they came opposite Omichund’s
garden, when the fog, usual at that season, came on and obscured every
thing before them; they proceeded onwards, however, the field-pieces in
the rear firing round shot obliquely outwards, until they reached a
causeway which ran from the ditch towards the lake, and on which was a
barrier; mounting the causeway, the troops wheeled and marched along it,
which brought them under the fire of their own guns, and caused
considerable confusion. In order to avoid this, Clive ordered all the
troops to cross the causeway and lie down till the firing from the rear
could be stopped. Some guns from the ramparts of the Mahratta ditch also
opened on them, and made great havoc, so that Clive was forced to
continue his march until he reached the Bally-a-ghat road, when, turning
to his right, he marched up the Boitaconnah and Salt Bazaar to the old
fort, abandoning two of his guns, whose carriages broke down, and in the
evening regained his camp by the road along the river.

This expedition, though ill-planned, produced the desired effect on the
Nawab, who eagerly desired to enter into terms of accommodation with the
British, whose activity he feared.

In March, the reinforcements arrived from Bombay, and an attack on the
French settlement of Chandernagore was resolved on; it was attacked both
by land and from the river, the chief attack being made by the ships of
war; the artillery had but a comparatively small part to play.

The political events which followed, and the intrigues which led to our
subsequent hostilities with Sooraj-ul-Dowlah, it is not our province to
detail. We purpose only to relate events with which the corps is
connected, and accordingly we next join Clive on the 21st June at
Cutwah. With his little army, we find 100 artillerymen, eight 6–pounder
guns, and two howitzers, commanded by Captain Jennings. In the council
of war which sat, Captain Jennings’s vote was given for an immediate
attack (as recorded in the Life of Clive, while in Sir Eyre Coote’s
evidence before the Secret Committee, the names and votes of the members
are found very differently recorded. Sir Eyre Coote’s is more probably
the correct list, as he spoke from memoranda); the majority were for
delay, but Clive, after dissolving the council, followed the dictates of
his own bold spirit, and directed the army to cross the river, which was
done, and by midnight of the 22nd, the army had reached Plassey.

The next day the battle took place; it was chiefly a distant cannonade.
The guns were placed three on each flank of the Europeans, and the
remainder about 200 yards in advance of the left division of sipahis,
sheltered by some brick-kilns, to check the fire of the enemy’s guns,
manned by the French party, and posted at a tank in front. The shot from
the British guns which missed those opposed to them, took effect on the
bodies of cavalry and infantry in the rear. The cannonade was sustained
till noon, when rain falling damaged the enemy’s ammunition, and forced
them to slacken their fire. The English fire continued, and Major
Kirkpatrick, advancing with a party, drove the French from the tank, and
the English guns were pushed on.

Meer Jaffier, with his troops, at this time advanced, intending to join
the British, but was opposed and driven back by a party and the fire of
a field-gun, under Mr. Johnston, a volunteer.

The whole of the guns now cannonaded the enemy’s camp from the high
banks of the tank; the enemy came out, and Clive advanced, posting half
his troops and guns at a smaller tank in advance, and the rest on a
rising ground about 200 yards to their left; the French field-pieces
renewed their fire, and the enemy’s cavalry prepared to charge, but were
always driven back by the quick firing of the English field artillery;
the enemy beginning to draw off, the whole British army advanced, and
driving them from a redoubt and mound, part of the intrenchment of their
camp, about five in the afternoon completed the victory which laid the
foundation of our Eastern empire.

The volunteer, Mr. Johnston, above noticed, was one of the fugitives
collected at Fultah. His name is mentioned among those saved at Dacca;
he not improbably belonged to the artillery, and was employed as a clerk
in some confidential office, for, in a letter dated in 1765, from
himself to Lord Clive, he endeavours to exculpate himself from a charge
of disclosing confidential transactions from his office, preferred
against him by Governor Drake. In this letter, he mentions his having
been “remanded to the artillery, his former” occupation, and serving
with the army till 1765, when he returned to Calcutta; the date of his
removal is, however, uncertain.[5]

A detachment was sent forwards towards Patna, under Major Coote,
consisting of 230 Europeans, 300 sipahis, 50 lascars, and two
6–pounders, but much delay occurred in starting, owing to the
debaucheries ensuing on the plunder gained at Plassey. It was protracted
by a mutinous spirit on the way, so that the French party had, by the
time they arrived, rendered their position at Patna too strong, and the
detachment returned to Cossimbazaar in September. The remainder of the
army was removed to Chandernagore.

Towards the close of the year 1757, a second advance, with a stronger
party, and Clive at its head, was made, and an arrangement satisfactory
to the British having been concluded, he returned to Moorshedabad in
May, 1758.

His first care was to organize the army, and in doing this, the coast
army was taken as a model; a company of artillery was raised in Fort
William, 29th June, from the men who had served at Plassey. Lieutenant
Jennings was promoted to its captaincy, and this may be considered as
the first company of the present establishment, and bears at present,
after many changes of numbers in the successive formations of the
regiment, the denomination of 1st company, 4th battalion.

A second company was raised at Cossimbazaar on the 19th September, the
party mentioned above as being left there most probably having been
incorporated in it: Captain Broadbridge or Broadburn, from the Royal
Artillery, was its captain.

The company of Royal Artillery[6] which came from Bombay accompanied
Colonel Forde’s detachment to Masulipatam in April, 1759, and aided in
that brilliant operation, but did not return with the detachment after
the campaign. Since that period no Royal Artillery have served in
Bengal, except in 1798, when a company was in Fort William; but this
probably was a temporary arrangement, the company coming to Bengal _en
route_ to Ceylon.

In 1759, a combination having been entered into against the British, the
English troops, aided by Meer Jaffier, marched towards Patna, against
the Shahzadah; Patna was taken, a garrison left, and Clive returned to
Calcutta, Colonel Calliaud having joined him first at Berhampoor, with
300 Europeans, 1,000 sipahis, 50 artillerymen, and 6 guns. The
artillerymen, there is reason to suppose, belonged to the 2nd company.

The battalion of sipahis left at Patna with two 6–pounders and 70
Europeans, under Lieutenant Cochrane, was defeated in an engagement into
which they were forced, in assisting our ally Ramnarain against the
Emperor’s forces, in January, 1760.

The conduct of the European troops is spoken of as highly creditable.
The European officers of the sipahis all fell, and the sipahis were cut
to pieces or dispersed. The English who remained fought their way back
to the city under Doctor Fullerton. “Other English officers may have
been present,” says the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, “whose names
I know not, who ranged them in order, and as one of their guns was to be
left behind on the field of battle, they found means to render it of no
avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye; the other being
in good condition, they took it with them, together with its ammunition;
and that handful of men had the courage to retire in the face of a
victorious army, without once shrinking from their ranks; during their
journey, the car of ammunition chanced to receive some injury, the
Doctor stopped unconcernedly, and after having put it in order, he
bravely pursued his route again.”

Lieutenant Buck, of the artillery, was killed in this action.

Calliaud’s advance having been delayed by his allies, he did not engage
the enemy till the 22nd February, near Sooraj, and the same cause
prevented his following up the advantage.

The 50 artillerymen of the 2nd company were engaged in this action, and
the carriages of four of their guns broke down during the engagement,
causing some delay in repairing them.

After his defeat, the Emperor fled, and endeavoured to double back and
surprise Moorshedabad ere Calliaud could overtake him. In this, however,
he failed; the British pursued in boats, and coming up with him, he
struck across the Currukpoor hills. The British disembarked and followed
him. After a difficult march, the Emperor emerged from the hills, about
30 miles from Moorshedabad. The English and Jaffier had, however,
joined, and on their attacking him, he set fire to his camp and fled.

To secure Patna, a detachment of 200 Europeans, a battalion of sipahis,
and four field-pieces, marched from Moorshedabad, under Captain Knox, in
May, 1760, and, marching with the utmost rapidity, reached it in
thirteen days. Crossing the river, this little band attacked and
defeated the army of the Naib of Purneah, who had come to the Emperor’s
assistance, near Mozufferpore, on the 27th May.

A third company of artillery was formed on the 26th May, 1760,[7] in
Fort William, promoting Captain-Lieutenant Kinch; but there is reason to
believe he remained with the second company, until Captain Broadbridge’s
death, in 1761, gave him the command.

Colonel Calliaud having been succeeded by Major Carnac, returned to
Calcutta; the latter pursued the Emperor’s forces to Gyah Maunpoor,
where he overtook and completely routed him in January, 1761. Mr. Law,
the head of the French party, was captured in this engagement.

The 2nd company of artillery, under Captain Broadbridge and
Captain-Lieutenant Kinch, shared in these transactions, and remained as
part of the garrison of Patna.

It forms no part of our plan to enter into the history of such
occurrences as those which led to the dismissal of the members of
council from the Company’s service, and placed Mr. Ellis in charge of
the factory at Patna; or to examine whether our subsequent misfortunes
are attributable to his mismanagement. For information on such points we
must refer the reader to the histories of the times.

Many points of difference arose with the Nawab, Meer Cossim, which led
to various misunderstandings; they were brought to a crisis by the
British, on Mr. Ellis’s order, surprising and seizing Patna, on the 26th
June, 1763. Mr. Amyatt was attacked and killed near Moorshedabad, by
order of Cossim Ali, whom he had left only two days before, having been
deputed to him at Monghyr by the Council, and this brought on open war.

The energy shewn at first was, however, suffered to die away, and the
troops in Patna dispersing for plunder, the late governor of the city
rallied his men, and, being joined by a reinforcement from Monghyr,
attacked and drove out the British, who, spiking their guns, retired to
Bankipore, and afterwards fled in boats to their factory at Manjee, near
Chuprah; where the whole, and among them the company of artillery, were
taken prisoners.

The prisoners taken were sent to Monghyr, and there confined with others
captured at Cossimbazar, which factory was plundered about the same
time.

On the news of these disasters, the English army, under Major Adams,
moved from their cantonments at Ghyrettee early in July. The first
company of artillery was with this force, under the command of Captain
Jennings.

In the present day it would scarcely be deemed possible to march a force
at the season in which this army moved through Bengal—in the middle of
the rains, when the whole land is a swamp, and every stream full to
overflowing; yet, in spite of the difficulties presented, this gallant
band, about 800 Europeans (including the artillery) and 2,000 sipahis,
forced its way, and came in contact with Meer Cossim’s troops at
Gheriah, near Sooty, on the 2nd August.

A severe action was fought, lasting nearly four hours, and at one time
two of the British guns were taken possession of by the enemy; victory
at length decided in favour of the British.

The artillery lost one officer, killed during the action, Lieutenant
Kaylor.

Undaunted by his defeat, Meer Cossim again disputed the advance of the
British at the pass of Oudenullah, a little to the south of Rajmahl,
where the road is confined between the river and spurs of hills. This
pass had been intrenched with walls and towers at short distances, and
several strong posts raised on eminences along its front. The army was
detained before these intrenchments for nearly a month. At length, by an
attack on the hill forming the right of the lines, and a feint on the
river end, they were carried with severe loss on 5th September,
Captain-Lieutenant Green, of the artillery, acting as field engineer.
Meer Cossim left his troops the next night, and retired to Monghyr in
haste, thence carrying his prisoners with him to Patna.

[Illustration]

In October Monghyr was invested, breached, and capitulated. Meer Cossim,
driven into a paroxysm of rage by this event, directed the massacre of
all his English prisoners. In this horrid act he found a ready tool in
Sumroo, the German,[8] whose widow, the Begum Sumroo, has rendered his
name notorious in history. All were massacred save Mr. Fullerton, the
surgeon, who, in the exercise of his profession, appears to have gained
a place in the esteem and affections of Meer Cossim.

Whether Captain Kinch and his subalterns perished in the attack on Patna
or in this massacre we are unable to say, but in one or other he fell.
The bodies of all were thrown into a large well, over which a tomb has
been since built, but no record of the names of those who perished
exists on it.[9]

After avenging the fate of their comrades by the reduction of Patna, the
army followed Meer Cossim, who threw himself on the protection of the
Nawab of Oude, as far as the banks of the Carumnassa. Here Major Adams
left them, and the command devolved on Major Jennings, of the artillery.
The force was cantoned on the frontier of the Nawab’s territories, in
the expectation that he would give up Meer Cossim, and also to watch the
Emperor’s troops, which, under the pretence of preparing an expedition
against the Boondelas, remained in the vicinity of Allahabad.

In the month of December, 1763, a fourth company of artillery was raised
in the field, probably at Patna.

In February, 1764, an alarming state of dissatisfaction shewed itself in
the English army, still in its cantonments at Sant. The troops were
dissatisfied with the rewards bestowed upon them for having regained the
provinces from Meer Cossim. The English battalion seized the park and
marched towards the Carumnassa. The sipahis were also in motion; but by
the exertions of Major Jennings and the other officers, the English and
sipahis were nearly all induced to return. The French and foreigners, to
the number of 150, went off, under Serjeant Delamar, to Allahabad. Few
of the artillery joined in this affair.

The seeds of this mutinous disposition still remained when Major Carnac
arrived in March and assumed the command. Provisions were scarce; and
though the Government instructions were to carry the war into the
Nawab’s territories (whose hostility was now open), he agreed with his
officers, that, in the then temper of the troops, it would not be safe
to proceed.

On the enemy’s forces crossing the river, the English fell back and
encamped under Patna, where, on the 3rd May, 1764, they were attacked.
Sumroo, with a large body of the Nawab’s cavalry and infantry, assailed
the front. The engagement lasted till sunset, when the enemy withdrew
with a heavy loss; and although he hung about the neighbourhood till the
end of the month, did not venture on another action.

A detachment, under Colonel Munro (whose army had joined Major Carnac’s
at Patna), marched after one of the sipahi battalions, which had
deserted, with four guns. Colonel Munro sent on 100 Europeans, one
sipahi battalion, and two guns. This force overtook them at Chuprah, and
coming on them while asleep, took them all prisoners. Colonel Munro, on
receiving them, considered that strong measures were necessary to check
the spirit of insubordination which had arisen, and accordingly selected
fifty of the worst for execution. Twenty-four were blown from the guns
at Patna and other stations. On this occasion it was that the grenadiers
claimed precedence in death—an anecdote familiar to all acquainted with
the early history of our Indian army.

The whole army now advanced towards the Soane. The advance was covered
by Colonel Champion with a detachment and four guns, who was attacked by
large bodies of the enemy’s horse near Mooneah, at the junction of the
Soane and Ganges, whom they beat off, and Colonel Munro coming up
crossed the river immediately. The march to Arrah was a good deal
harassed, and the guns frequently called into play to keep off the
enemy’s horse.

At Buxar, on the 22nd October, they came up with the enemy, and on the
following morning, about 8 o’clock, the enemy marched out to attack
them. The British were drawn up in line with their guns, twenty
field-pieces and seventy-one artillerymen of the 1st company, on the
flanks of battalions. The enemy were repulsed, and about 12 o’clock they
retired slowly, blowing up their tumbrils of ammunition. One hundred and
thirty-three pieces of artillery, mostly with English carriages, and
among them twenty-seven which had been lost the previous year at Patna,
were the trophies on this occasion.

In the acknowledgment of this victory, written by Mr. Vansittart and his
council, 16th November, 1764, to Munro, he was requested “to return
thanks to the field-officers and commandant of artillery (Major
Jennings) for their care and diligence in preserving the disposition for
attack, and taking every advantage over the enemy.”

Captain Winwood and Lieutenant Duff of the artillery are mentioned “as
meriting particular notice, and having gained great honour.”

A detachment of two battalions failed in November, in an attempt to take
the fortress of Chunar; in January, 1765, however, Sir Robert Fletcher
succeeded in gaining possession of it, and in February he breached
Allahabad, when the garrison evacuated it. On the 3rd May a battle was
fought near Korah,[10] against the vizier, aided by the Mahrattas; these
latter were quickly dispersed by the fire of the artillery, and they
separated from the vizier and retired towards the Jumna with
precipitation. These events placed the southern part of the Dooab under
British rule.

The army was this year (1765) divided into three brigades, and the
companies of artillery attached one to each, while the remaining company
was stationed in Fort William.[11]

─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────
1st Brigade │1st Company │Monghyr.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
2nd ditto │2nd ditto │Allahabad.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
3rd ditto │4th ditto │Bankipore.
─────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Ditto │3rd ditto │Fort William.
─────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────

In addition to the guns with the park, each battalion of infantry was
equipped with two six-pounders or three-pounders, worked by the men of
the regiment, assisted by native officers and lascars from the
artillery.

A major was this year allowed to the artillery, to command the corps,
and a practice-ground formed at Sulkeah.

In 1766 the alarming mutiny on the part of the officers of the army,
caused by the reduction of allowances, broke out, and was only
suppressed by the firmness and decision of Lord Clive and Colonel Smith.
The part taken in this by artillery officers cannot now be fully traced;
but Captain Duff, Captain-Lieutenant Clifton, and Lieutenant Black,
appear to have taken prominent parts. Many, we learn from the army-list,
were dismissed about that time, most probably on account of the mutiny;
others resigned. Nearly all, in every branch of the army, were, however,
restored to the service, and placed in the position they would have
held, had they remained in it.

Insubordinate as the conduct of a large portion of the officers of the
army was on this occasion, and deservedly as it has been stigmatized,
yet it must be borne in mind that they failed of success by
conscientiously not admitting the soldiery to a knowledge of or
participation in the measures they had taken to secure the batta, though
solicited by the latter to accept of their support, as soon as it was
known that Government had resolved to persist in enforcing their
resolution to deprive them of their allowance.

In 1768 a lieutenant-colonel and a major were added to the regiment,
and, in consequence of the Court of Directors being desirous of
obtaining, not only cadets but officers from Woolwich, Major Pearse was
nominated to command the corps, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He
was, however, superseded by Captain Martin, to whom the command was
given by the Indian Government, and again by Major Kindersley, whose
commission as major was antedated by the local government, on the
vacancy being caused by Captain Fleming’s removal to the engineers, from
which he came. On the death, however, of Major Kindersley, which
occurred in 1769, he succeeded to the command of the regiment.

The application for a supply of officers and cadets from the Royal
Artillery originated in a difficulty of finding candidates, the
artillery service being neither so lucrative, nor holding out the same
prospects, as the infantry. In the Secret Committee’s letter of 30th
September, 1765, to the Court of Directors, it is stated that “it would
be of the utmost benefit to our plan that you should send out, every
year, six or seven gentlemen from the academy at Woolwich for artillery
officers; this being a service which suffers extremely for want of
persons properly instructed in the business, since no officer who knows
the benefit of the infantry service here will choose to quit it for any
advantages the artillery offers.”[12]

On the death of Major Kindersley, 28th October, 1769, Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearse succeeded to the command of the regiment, and, as its
organization is much indebted to that officer, it is fortunate that we
are able to quote from letters to his early friends his record of the
state in which he found it:—

“When I first came into command of the corps I was astonished at the
ignorance of all who composed it. It was a common practice to make any
midshipman who was discontented with the India ships an officer of
artillery, from a strange idea that a knowledge of navigation would
perfect an officer of that corps in the knowledge of artillery. They
were almost all of this class, and their ideas consonant to the elegant
military education which they had received. But, thank God! I have got
rid of them all but seven.”

The strange idea above referred to appears to have affected the Home
Government at a still earlier period, as, on the first formation of
artillery companies, “such assistance as the fleet could spare” was
given. To this idea are we indebted for many terms which have hung about
the corps till the present day: our tindals, lascars, serangs, cossibs,
all came from the naval nomenclature, and their etymology would most
probably be found in the Portuguese dialect, which has retained its
influence on shipboard; from the same fountain of “English (not)
undefiled” must have been drawn the “bankshall,” a name by which our
gun-sheds are known throughout the regiment, but a term of considerable
mystification to the uninitiated.

In March, 1770, a fifth company of artillery was raised in Fort William,
and in May the companies were formed into a battalion, to which an
adjutant was allowed. In September the lascars were divided into 28
companies, of which seven (consisting of 2 serangs, 2 tindals, and 100
lascars each) were attached to each of the three companies, with the
brigades, and to one of those in Fort William.

The embodying the companies of artillery into one battalion must have
increased the efficiency of the army, by introducing uniformity of
system into their management, and a more effectual supervision than
could have existed in their scattered state.

The regiment at this time, supposing no change had occurred in the
strength of companies, would have consisted of—

─────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬──────────────────────
│ By calculation │By returns of 1772[13]
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Lieut.-Col. Comm. │ 1│ 1
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Major. │ 1│ 1
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Adjutant. │ 1│
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Captains. │ 5│ 4
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
2nd Captains. │ 5│ 4
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
1st Lieutenants. │ 5│ 16
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
2nd Lieutenants. │ 5│ 16
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Fireworkers. │ 5│ 11[14]
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Serjeants. │ 20│ 30
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Corporals. │ 20│ 20
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Drummers. │ 20│ 18
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Bombardiers. │ 40│ 340
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Gunners. │ 120│ 〃
─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Matrosses. │ 300│
──────────┬──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
Lascars. │Serangs. │ 56│ 48
──────────┼──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
〃 │Tindals. │ 56│ 200
──────────┼──────────┼──────────────────────┼──────────────────────
〃 │Privates. │ 2800│ 2350
──────────┴──────────┴──────────────────────┴──────────────────────

Of the officers of the corps a description was given in Colonel Pearse’s
letter, above quoted. It was written in 1775, and refers to the period
now described. An extract from one written in 1772 contains a very
graphic picture of a _fast_ man of those days, specimens of whom long
continued:—

“To be a gentleman you must learn to drink by all means—a man is
honoured in proportion to the number of bottles he can drink: keep a
dozen dogs, but in particular if you have not the least use for them and
hate hunting and shooting. Four horses may barely suffice; but if you
have eight, and seven of them are too vicious for the syce to feed, it
will be much better.

“By no means let the horses be paid for; and have a palanquin covered
with silver trappings—get 10,000 rupees in debt, but 20,000 would make
you an honester man, especially if you are convinced that you will never
have the power to pay. Endeavour to forget whatever you have
learnt—ridicule learning of all sorts—despise all military
knowledge—call duty a bore—encourage your men to laugh at orders—obey
such as you like—make a joke of your commanding officer for giving those
orders you do not like, and, if you obey them, let it be seen that it is
merely to serve yourself.

“These few rules will make you an officer and a gentleman, and they are
the first lessons which young men take when they arrive in this
country.”

With officers of this stamp, and the class of men from whom the
Company’s European troops were then recruited, we cannot suppose that
much discipline existed. Drunkenness—the bane of the European soldier in
India—was rife, and its natural consequences, disease and death,
followed. To this cause, too, must be added the want of good barracks
and internal economy, which of late years have gone far to remove the
idea of the climates of India being deadly to the European constitution.

The lascars were employed in dragging and assisting the Europeans to
work the guns; a detail also was detached with each infantry regiment,
to assist in working the guns attached to it, for two 6–pounders formed
part of the equipment of each battalion, and thirty sipahis were set
apart for their service. These duties, with those of the park, would
account for the number of lascars being so large in comparison with the
establishment of the present day. They were in many respects native
artillerymen, and in the subsequent successive changes from lascars to
golundaz and back again, the change was often rather in name, and
increase and decrease of pay, than of the men themselves.

They were a most efficient and useful body—a class on whom, perhaps,
more of the hard work of the service and fewer of its substantial
rewards have fallen than any other of the native army. At all times
accompanying the European artillery, they have borne a part in every
expedition which has left the shores of India. On land and on board
ship, hard service has been their lot, and all who have been brought
into contact with them join in testifying to the willingness, courage,
and patience they have exhibited.

A large body of artificers was also at this time attached to the corps;
these, with the quartermaster’s establishment, completed the regiment as
to its _personnel_.

The _matériel_ appears to have been as bad as possible. At this time
Colonel Pearse complains that “the fuzees burnt from nineteen to
forty-eight seconds, though of the same nature; the portfires were
continually going out; the tubes would not burn; the powder was
infamous; the cartridges were made conical, and, when necessary to prime
with loose powder, a great quantity was required to fill the vacant
cavity round the cartridge; the carriages flew to pieces with common
firing in a week.” The contractor who furnished the carriages, and the
laboratory in which the fuzees were made, appear to have been beyond his
control: “I have no more to do with it than his Holiness at Rome,” are
his words. The iron guns were all very indifferent: “two 12–pounders
burst on the ramparts in 1770 in firing the morning and evening gun, and
one 12–pounder on a rejoicing day, in firing salutes.”

It was under such circumstances that Colonel Pearse took command, and
set himself to work to improve the state of the regiment. To weed the
inefficient from the officers; to teach the remainder and the new-comers
their duty; to introduce an efficient internal economy and discipline
into the ranks, and to obtain a proper control over the _matériel_ of
the regiment, were his first duties. That his endeavours were in some
degree successful may be gathered from his correspondence, for in 1772
he writes,—“Now I have got all the laboratory implements with me at
practice, and am going to teach my officers what they never saw.”
Steadily he pursued his object through difficulties and disappointments,
and was rewarded, ere his death, by seeing the corps raised to a high
state of discipline and efficiency. At a review of it by General
Clavering in November, 1774, he expressed himself as delighted with the
corps, and astonished at its performance, being superior to any thing he
could have expected in India, and so much to his satisfaction, that
Colonel Pearse, in a letter to an old friend, writes, “the performances
at the review would not have been a disgrace to dear old Woolwich.”

The years 1771–2 afforded leisure to attend to the discipline of the
corps, for it seems not to have been called on for any field service. In
1773 the expedition under Captain Jones proceeded against the hill fort
of Delamcotta, situated on the pass by which the Durla river, which runs
into the Teestah, emerges from the mountains, and not far from the
present sanatarium, Darjeeling. Lieutenant R. Bruce, of the artillery,
was present at the attack, but with what portion of the corps is
unknown.

This year the army was again called into the field to check the
Mahrattas, but after a cannonade across the Jumna at Ramghat, near
Delhi, they retired, and our army went into cantonments at Sultanpoor,
Oude.

In 1774 a portion of the army under Colonel Champion was sent to assist
the vizier in his attack on the Rohillas. An action was fought on the
23rd April, in which the 2nd company of artillery was present. In his
report Colonel Champion says, “The Rohillas made repeated attempts to
charge; but our guns being so much better served than theirs, kept so
constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance, and where they
were closest was the greatest slaughter.” Captain W. A. Baillie was
wounded in this action. Lieutenant G. Deare, Lieutenant B. Doxat, and
Lieutenant W. W. Hussey were also present.

The action was followed by much severe marching and exposure in the hot
and rainy season, in the jungles of the Pillibeet district. While
encamped near Pillibeet, a report reached Colonel Champion of four
crores of rupees being concealed in the fort; and in a letter to
Government he suggests “the propriety of examining into the truth of the
report, in duty both to the Company and to the army:” a naïve
suggestion, which, considering the British were there as allies of the
vizier, the Government negatived. However, as a compensation to the
army, the vizier granted a donation of 10½ lacs, which was divided among
the 2nd brigade in August, 1779, agreeably to a scale laid down by a
committee of officers. This scale gave a sipahi two-thirds of a European
soldier’s share,—a proportion which has been adhered to ever since in
distributing prize-money. The scale there fixed is here given:—

─────────────────────────────────┬──────
Colonel. │19,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Lieut.-Colonel. │16,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Major. │13,700
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Captain. │ 6,850
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Subaltern. │ 3,425
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Cadet. │ 1,000
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Conductor. │ 300
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Serj.-Major. │ 90
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Serjeants. │ 60
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Corporals. │ 45
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Privates. │ 30
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Commandants. │ 300
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Soobahdars. │ 131
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Jemadars, Serangs. │ 65
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Havildars, Tindals. │ 40
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Naicks. │ 30
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Privates, Lascars, Black Doctors.│ 20
─────────────────────────────────┼──────
Bheesties, &c. │ 10
─────────────────────────────────┴──────

In 1775 an alteration took place in the arrangements for the _matériel_
of the army; a Board of Ordnance was formed, and magazines established,
at the principal fixed stations of the army.

The Board consisted of the “Governor-General as president, the
Commander of the Forces, the members of the Supreme Council, the
Commissary-General of Comptrol; the Commandant of Artillery; the Chief
Engineer; the Commissary of Stores, and the Military Store-keeper, as
members; with a secretary, and such assistants as might be found
necessary.”

To this Board returns of all ordnance and military stores were to be
made by commanding officers of garrisons and cantonments, artillery
officers, and all others in charge; all contracts for the supply of
stores, proofs of ordnance and powder, plans for new construction of
ordnance, reports of powder-works, laboratory and arsenal, were to be
submitted: in short, the general control of the stores for the army was
vested in this Board.

Magazines were established at the fixed stations of Berhampore,
Dinapore, and Chunar; a commissary, a deputy-commissary, and two
conductors were appointed to them, and placed under the control of the
Board; they were to be paid by the Board-office, and receive
instructions for carrying on their duties and office from the Board,
independent of any other control but that consistent with the general
regulations of the army, which required that they should be subordinate
to the commanding officer in the field or fixed stations, and the
commanding officer of the artillery under whose immediate control they
were placed.

To the commissaries were intrusted the ordnance stores, camp equipage,
&c., for the use of corps; and an officer of the department was to
accompany the army, when moving on service, to superintend their issues.
A return was to be made monthly of all receipts and issues; and no issue
was to be made without the orders of the Board, or commanding officer.

Carriages for the ordnance were to be constructed in Fort William by the
military storekeeper. No repairs of magnitude involving large contingent
bills were to be made in the field, but the articles required supplied
on indent.

The establishments for the magazines were furnished by a reduction of
the artificers and lascars attached to the artillery; the lascars were
reduced to a small number, and the surplus applied to the magazines.

2 Serangs, }
4 Tindals, } on the peace establishment;
100 Lascars, }
──────────────────────────────────────────
7 Serangs, }
16 Tindals, } on the war establishment;
400 Lascars, }

were the number retained with the regiment.

The appointment of this Board appears to have interfered with the
control which the commandant of artillery had previously exercised over
his department, and Colonel Pearse attributed its formation to a
personal motive, on the part of General Clavering, to lower him. In
writing to an old friend, after other complaints he goes on to say:
“General Clavering instituted a Board of Ordnance, and made me a member
of it; took all my authority away, and made me a cipher. I was hurt, and
complained, as he had put into the Board a Lieutenant-Colonel Dow, the
translator of a miserable history of Hindustan, and the author of two
wretched plays. This man is commissary-general, and, as such, controller
of military accounts. He uniformly attacked me and my department, and I
defended myself and officers. This created disputes, and, as I was
wounded, I was warm; and thus, because my opinions were always contrary
to Dow’s (and D—— is the general’s tongue, brains, head, and heart), it
was as bad as attacking the general himself.”

Of the working of the cumbrous machinery of the Board of Ordnance, in
its original formation and in the successive changes which have been
made from time to time, in the vain attempts to obtain energy and
celerity from a body of men without individual power or responsibility,
it will often, in the course of these pages, be necessary to speak, for
to the want of arrangement on their part must be attributed, in many
instances, the inefficient state of the siege-trains with the armies.

At this time the head-quarters of the regiment were quartered in Fort
William, moving out during the cold months to a practice-ground at
Sulkeah, nearly opposite the western mouth of the Circular Canal: the
powder-works were between the canal and Cossipoor. The dress of the
regiment consisted of a blue coat, faced with scarlet, and cut away in
the fashion of the time; white cloth waistcoat and breeches, with
buckles at the knees; and gaiters, or half-spatterdashes, as they were
called; red leathern belt, with swivels; black silk stock; buff gloves,
and regimental hat, supposed to be a plain cocked, in the fashion of
George the Second’s time. The hair was worn greased, powdered, and tied
in a queue, false hair being substituted when the natural was not long
enough.

The hours for parades, and, in fact, for every thing, were early:
parades were before gun-fire in the cold season; dinners were in the
middle of the day, not only in private houses, but on public occasions;
and invitations were given on a scale of hospitality only practicable in
a small society. The orderly book was the common channel of invitation
used by the Governor-General and officer commanding the garrison. Many
such entries as the following will be found in it:—“The Honourable the
Governor-General requests to be favoured with the company of officers
and gentlemen belonging to the army now in the garrison of Fort William
and the Chitpoor cantonment and the presidency on Monday next to dinner,
at the Court House, and in the evening to a ball and supper. The
Governor-General requests that gentlemen will not bring any servants to
dinner, nor their hookahs to the ball at night.”

Or, “Lieutenant-Colonel Wilding presents his compliments to all the
officers in Fort William, staff of the garrison, and surgeons, and
requests their company to breakfast, and dinner at half-past two
o’clock.”

A good account of the manners and habits of the people at this period
would be interesting, and probably materials for the purpose could be
found, were a qualified person to undertake the task:[15] they are only
noticed above incidentally, as likely to affect the discipline of the
regiment. The early dinner was too much followed by a long sederunt over
the bottle, and the absence of ladies’ society gave a tone of grossness
to the habits, which are happily much improved in modern days.

This year a number of memorials were presented to the Board by artillery
officers, as to the relative rank of cadets; and it was decided that
those appointed expressly to the artillery should have the full benefit
of the Court of Directors’ order, that all cadets appointed in India
were to rank below those of the same year appointed in England, but that
the time of service was to date from arrival in Bengal; and all those
who were in the infantry, and entered as cadets in the artillery, were
to rank above all who were cadets in the artillery at the same time.
This, and the circumstance of several who resigned in the mutiny of 1766
being allowed to return to their original standing, will partly account
for the supersessions which will appear on consulting the gradation
list.

At the conclusion of the year 1775 three companies of artillery, to be
commanded by European officers, were ordered to be raised for the Nawab
of Oude and attached to the brigade of disciplined troops raised for his
service; officers were nominated to them, and struck off the strength of
the regiment; but whether the companies were ever raised seems doubtful.
In the following year they were directed to be formed into a battalion,
under command of Major Patrick Duff, and then to be transferred to the
regular army, and fresh ones raised of native artillery in August, 1777.
If the companies first ordered had been European, it is difficult to say
what became of them, because the sixth, seventh, and eighth companies
were raised by minutes of council, July 13th and 24th, 1778; the two
former, however, may have been raised from the men of the Oude
companies.

The artillery, in 1775, appear first to have used Dum-Dum as a
practice-ground, and to have been encamped there, when, their tents
being wanted for the use of a brigade marching to Patna, they were
ordered into Fort William, and their practice cut short with one
fortnight instead of two months. In the following year, however, in
December, they marched out with their tents and stores, and began the
practice (as the orders record) by firing “a royal salute, and after
that one of 19 guns, for the Company.”

It is not easy to ascertain what Dum-Dum was previous to its occupation
by the artillery. The first mention made of it is by Orme, in the
account of the action near Omichund’s garden, in 1757. He speaks of
Clive crossing “the Dum-Dum road:” this road, however, was only a
cutcha-bund[16] leading to Dum-Dum, the name of the place now occupied
by Dum-Dum House, the origin of which building is enveloped in mystery.
It is said to have been built by a Mr. or Colonel Home,[17] but who he
was, or the date, cannot be ascertained. Supernatural aid has been
called into play, and the mound on which it stands is reported to have
been raised by some spirit of the ring or camp, in the course of a
single night, and to this day visions of ghosts haunt the grounds.

At the practice season the officers inhabited the house, and the men’s
tents were pitched in the compound, and the natives in the “Montague
lines,” the ground now occupied by the Nya Bazaar, called after
Lieutenant Montague, the adjutant who marked them out. The name is known
to the present day.

It was not until 1783 that the cantonment was marked out by Colonel
Duff, who is said to have made, or rather widened, the road from
Shambazar to Barasut,[18] and to have planted the avenue of mulseery
trees now running along the southern end of the small exercising-ground.

Many villages were scattered over the ground occupied by the cantonment;
their sites were purchased up, from time to time, by Government; the
last, that of Deiglah, in 1820.

From 1775 to 1778 the corps does not appear to have been called into the
field, and Colonel Pearse occupied himself in improving its internal
economy. A regimental school for the instruction of the native officers
and gunners was established in 1775—an institution which, with all the
faults which still exist in it, has been of much use, both in teaching
the elements of knowledge and affording a rational employment to some of
the many hours which hang heavily on the soldier.

That the corps had attained a respectable proficiency in its peculiar
duties we may believe from an extract of one of his letters, dated
March, 1777: “I have had my corps reviewed twice; first by the governor,
who was excessively pleased, and thanked us in orders; and next by the
general, who also thanked us. It was our good performance forced the
general’s thanks; he would have been better pleased to have found
fault—first, because we pleased the governor; and next, because I
commanded and had disciplined them myself.” ... “Not one circumstance
had I to lessen the pleasure I received from the good performance of my
corps, as a battalion of infantry, as a battalion of artillery with
sixteen cannons, and as a body of artillery on service in their
batteries; for we went through all these exercises equally well. The
Saturday following, General Clavering reviewed us, and what gave me most
satisfaction was, to hear that he had said in private he had reviewed
most of the King’s regiments, and never saw any perform better.”

In May, 1778, General Leslie’s force marched from Culpee, on its
expedition to assist the Bombay Government; it consisted of six infantry
and one cavalry corps, some European artillery, and the 1st company of
golundaz, raised for the Nawab’s service. A short account of this
detachment will be given when we come to speak of its return, in 1784.

The formation of the three native or golundaz companies for the Oude
service was most probably recommended by Colonel Pearse, and the
experiment answered so well that in August, 1778, a new organization of
the artillery was ordered, in which the golundaz were to form a
considerable part.

Hitherto, as want dictated, company after company of artillery had been
added to the establishment; but the artillery was now formed into an
independent brigade of one European regiment and three native
battalions. The European consisted of seven field and one mounted, or
garrison, company, and the native battalions of eight companies each:
the former was to be completed by drafts of fifty men from each of the
three European infantry regiments (and possibly the Oude companies), and
the latter by all fit for the service who might volunteer from the two
native companies, with the temporary (Oude) brigade and their lascars,
from the lascars of European companies and with the guns of infantry
regiments, and from the eight companies of lascars at the Presidency.

The lascars were all reduced.

The European regiment, exclusive of garrison company, consisted of seven
companies:—

────────────────────┬────
Lieut.-Colonel. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Adjutant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Master. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Serjt.-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Qr.-Master Serjt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Drill Serjeant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Drill Corporals. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Drum-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Fife-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Serjeants. │ 42
────────────────────┼────
Corporals. │ 42
────────────────────┼────
Drummers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Bombardiers. │ 56
────────────────────┼────
Gunners. │ 168
────────────────────┼────
Matrosses. │ 361
────────────────────┴────

The three golundaz battalions consisted of eight companies each, in all—

────────────────────┬────
Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Jemadars. │ 48
────────────────────┼────
Havildars. │ 192
────────────────────┼────
Naicks. │ 192
────────────────────┼────
Drummers. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Fifers. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Golundaz. │2400
────────────────────┼────
Soobahdars Commt. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Ditto Adjutant. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Havildars Major. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Adjutant. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Master. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Serjt.-Major. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Qr.-Master Serjt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Native Doctors. │ 9
────────────────────┼────
Sircars. │ 24
────────────────────┼────
Armourers, Master. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Ditto Workmen. │ 9
────────────────────┼────
Chucklers. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Watermen. │ 24
────────────────────┴────

The European commissioned officers of the artillery brigade were—

────────────────────┬────
Lt.-Col. Commt. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Colonel. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 3
────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 10
────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 7
────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 45
────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 21
────────────────────┼────
Major of Brigade. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Aide-de-Camp. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Adjutants. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Quarter-Masters. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Head Surgeon. │ 1
────────────────────┼────
Surgeons. │ 2
────────────────────┼────
Assist.-Surgeons. │ 6
────────────────────┼────
Paymaster. │ 1
────────────────────┴────

The staff and artificers of the field-train will be referred to shortly,
when another formation of the corps renders it necessary to advert to
the subject.

In the above formation we find the great error which has pervaded the
service ever since—the supposition that companies of Native do not
require as many officers as companies of European artillery; and while
the establishment of officers of the latter was fixed at a proportion
which shews that the wants of the branch were then better understood
than they have been in later times, the former was left ridiculously
unprovided with officers.

The officers of a company of artillery should be proportioned to the
number of guns it is intended to man. No officer can do justice to more
than two pieces; and as the companies were then adapted to eight
field-pieces, four officers, with a fifth to command the whole, is the
number which ought to have been _present_ in the field. On this subject,
however, it will be necessary to dwell more, as the successive changes
pass under review.

CHAPTER II.

The formation detailed in the preceding chapter was not destined to
remain, for in March, 1779, Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote arrived
from England with the commission of commander-in-chief, and soon after
his arrival it was rumoured that he had brought authority to disband the
golundaz.

From representations grounded in error and party views, alarm had been
taken by the Court of Directors and the Government at the supposed
danger of teaching the natives the use of artillery, and in August the
golundaz were ordered to be disbanded, the men having the option allowed
them of entering infantry regiments or joining the lascars.

To this corps, having been raised at his suggestion and disciplined by
himself, Colonel Pearse was much attached, and, both on public grounds
and private feelings, was averse to its being broken up. He
unfortunately had many enemies in high rank in Calcutta;—the consequence
of the feelings of rancour which had so long disturbed the settlement,
and which were still kept up by Mr. Francis’s and General Clavering’s
faction and Warren Hastings’s adherents. Among these was Colonel Watson,
commanding the engineers, who vowed the overthrow of the golundaz, and,
having considerable influence, urged Sir Eyre Coote to proceed in this
ill-judged measure.

Those readers, who may recollect the golundaz at Cawnpore under Major
Hay, may well conceive how deeply it must have wounded Colonel Pearse to
see a similar corps sacrificed to jealousy and party views; and there is
every reason to suppose that Colonel Pearse’s golundaz were equal to
Major Hay’s, which is saying every thing, for there never was a corps
better disciplined than the latter.

Colonel Pearse determined that the golundaz should not be reduced, if
any exertions on his part could save them; and accordingly, as soon as
the rumours reached him, addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief,
in which he urged the necessity of employing native artillery, from the
impossibility of keeping up sufficient European artillery for the
service of our extended empire, liable to be attacked at both
extremities, and at such a distance as to preclude the possibility of
assistance. He combated the argument of danger from native artillerymen
deserting and teaching their art to the golundaz of native powers, by
proving that, at that time and previously, the native states had
artillerymen not inferior to ours in the mere gun exercise and
preparation of common stores, and that, were this not the case, the
desertion of a few European artillerymen would render all precautions
useless; that in reality for many years past there were thirty men
nominally infantry, but in reality artillerymen attached to each
battalion, for the service of the two field guns, which arrangement
entailed the possibility of all the evils now feared, though without the
advantages which a regular corps of native artillery would give. He
deprecated the system of battalion guns as useless, the guns being
without officers to manage them so as to produce the best effect, by
attending to the advantages of ground and selection of ammunition best
adapted to the occasion; the two European artillerymen detached with
each battalion for this purpose being ignorant of the higher—the more
scientific parts of the profession, which knowledge is confined in
general to the officers; that it ruined the discipline of these men,
who, though they went out good men, returned, in general, drunken
vagabonds; that the lascars sent, though of the artillery, were only
employed in dragging the guns, and were unarmed and undisciplined, but
that they served for menial offices, which made them desirable to
captains commanding the infantry battalions. He recommended that the
guns should be collected in small brigades, or batteries, and brought to
the points wanted, instead of being frittered away along the line; that
the discipline of the men working them, from being under their own
officers, would be better preserved, and that cannon would be better
looked after, and their fire produce more effect in action, by being
under the exclusive command of an officer bred up to the profession. He
concluded by urging that, even should the artillery desert and take
service with native powers, there was in reality little to fear, for
though the country powers have infantry formed like ours, they are
inferior in every respect: their irregularity of pay is the grand
foundation of it; their want of sufficient instruction and of the
essential knowledge of our discipline, will long keep them so; and such
as their sipahis are to ours their artillery will be to our artillery,
though the men should desert in equal proportion, which he did not think
would occur, particularly if the golundaz had a small increase of pay
over the infantry, which was the case in all other services.

On the receipt of the order, Colonel Pearse again attempted to prevent
this ill-judged measure, by a respectful representation to Government,
in which he pointed out that the European artillery numbered but 370 in
all, of whom only 150 were at the presidency; that two ships of the
season had come in without a single recruit; that it would therefore be
impossible to complete the corps till the next year, and that, even, was
doubtful, from the scarcity of recruits, his Majesty’s regiments being
filled by pressing; that if an attack was made, the European artillery
were insufficient even for the defence of Fort William, much more were
they unable to furnish the detachments which would be necessary; that
the golundaz were good artillerymen; the name and service the highest in
repute among the natives; and that they would not, even if the pay were
equal, enter the ranks of the lascars; so that raw and ignorant men must
be enlisted for that class, who would require instruction, and, till
they were taught, the presidency would be almost destitute of artillery.
He submitted that, under these circumstances, the execution of the order
should be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be consulted, lest
any ill consequences should follow the immediate execution of it.

Colonel Pearse’s endeavours were, however, looked upon by Sir Eyre Coote
as arising from a spirit of insubordination, which never had a place in
his breast; and they drew forth a severe and cutting letter from the
commander-in-chief, taxing him with unmilitary and unprecedented
conduct, tending to sap subordination and obedience to its foundation,
and telling him that he was called upon for obedience and not for an
opinion, and that he was in nowise answerable for the results.

It must, however, be stated, in justice to Colonel Pearse, that, during
the command of General Stibbert, several important military transactions
occurred, and General Stibbert being absent in the field, Colonel Pearse
obtained permission from him, as commander-in-chief, to address the
Government direct on urgent occasions; and it was in the spirit of this
permission, considering the disbanding the golundaz as a measure fraught
with danger, that Colonel Pearse addressed the representation to
Government.

To the commander-in-chief’s letter Colonel Pearse replied, regretting he
had fallen under his displeasure, and detailing circumstances, such as
the rumour of a body of Mahrattas being in the neighbourhood of Burdwan;
the arrival of the ships without any recruits, of which he believed the
commander-in-chief to have been in ignorance when the order was
dictated, and which seemed to call for the exercise of some discretion
on his part, in carrying into execution an order which would cramp the
means of defence; that he had, in the exercise of what he deemed a sound
discretion, stated the facts to Government, who could at once determine
whether orders might with safety be instantly carried into execution, or
whether they should be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be
consulted; he deprecated any unguarded expressions, if such there were,
in his former letter, being construed into a want of respect; and
concluded by begging that the step he had taken might be considered as
founded in error of judgment, and not in want of obedience; and
entreated the commander-in-chief to overlook his error, and entertain a
more favourable opinion of him than that expressed in the letter with
which he had been honoured.

The appeal to Government was ineffectual, and the minutes of Council of
23rd November, 1779, “ordered that the native officers of the golundaz
corps, at the presidency, be paid up to the end of this month and
immediately discharged from the service; that the commandant of
artillery be directed to repeat the offers already made to the men, and
those who still decline to accept of them be immediately discharged.”

Those who feared the native powers training up good artillerymen by
means of deserters from the British service, do not appear to have
considered that without the material which is provided and kept up at a
heavy expense, the best artillerymen would be useless; and that,
although artillerymen are _taught_ the preparation of stores, still very
few have that intimate knowledge which only results from constantly
handling and making them up; and which is, in reality, found in a much
greater degree in the magazine workmen—a class who come and go at their
pleasure, and appear to be little thought of, although the practical
information they could carry to an enemy would be worth more than
hundreds of mere well drilled artillerymen.

The Court of Directors, however, must be excepted, for in their warrant
(17th June, 1748) they direct that “no Indian, black, or person of a
mixed breed, nor any Roman Catholic, of what nation soever, shall, on
any pretence, be admitted to set foot in the laboratory, or any of the
military magazines, either out of curiosity, or to be employed in them,
or to come near them, so as to see what is doing or contained therein.”
And to such an extent did this fear then carry them, that another
paragraph runs: “And if any person belonging to the company of artillery
marry a Roman Catholic, or his wife become a Roman Catholic after
marriage, such person shall immediately be dismissed from the company of
artillery, and be obliged to serve the remainder of his time in one of
the other companies, or be removed to another of the Company’s
settlements, to serve it out there, if the Council think fit,” &c. And
again, in their military letter to Bombay (6th April, 1770), they say:
“As it is very essential that the natives should be kept as ignorant as
possible, both of the theory and practice of the artillery branch of the
art of war, we esteem it a very pernicious practice to employ the people
of the country in working the guns; and, if such practice is in use with
you, we direct that in future you attach European artillerymen to the
service of the guns which may belong to sipahi corps, and that no native
be trusted with any part of this important service, unless absolute
necessity should require it.”

With these views it is not to be wondered at that the Home Government
should have directed the golundaz to be reduced; but Indian experience
might even then have taught that no more dangerous ally can be found for
a native army than a large and imperfectly-equipped artillery. A native
power will hardly bear the heavy _continued_ expense required to keep it
efficient; or, if the state should supply the means, the want of
integrity in its agents will divert them from their proper course; and
consequently, in the hour of emergency, the army is forced to fight a
pitched battle to protect the unwieldy train of cannon, which becomes an
incumbrance instead of a support: so it had been at Plassey and Buxar,
and so it has been in every general action since. Assye, Argaum,
Laswaree, Mahidpoor, would have been avoided, had there been no
artillery in the native armies; unencumbered, they could have evaded the
British; but the necessity of protecting their trains, and, perhaps, the
confidence which their presence inspired, induced them to try the result
of a battle.

Instead of discouraging native powers from organizing large parks of
artillery, our policy should have been the reverse, resting confident
that native parsimony and dishonesty would insure inefficiency in that
branch.

In the new organization of the artillery now ordered, it was formed into
two European battalions of five companies each, and to each company was
attached a battalion of six companies of lascars, under the command of
the same officer; they were to perform the whole duty dependent on the
corps of artillery, and to be instructed in the usual services of
artillery, with the exception “of pointing and loading guns and
mortars.” They were dressed in uniform, and armed with a light pike, so
constructed as to form a cheveux-de-frise.

ORGANIZATION of 1779.

──────────────────────────────┬────────┬──────────┬──────┬────────────────────
│ per │ per │Total.│ On returns 1 Feb.
│Company.│Battalion.│ │ 1780.
──────────────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┬─────────
Colonel Commandant. │ │ │ 1│Effective.│Invalids.
─────────┬────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
EUROPEAN.│Lieutenant-Colonels.│ │ 1│ 2│ 2│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Majors. │ │ 1│ 2│ 2│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Captains. │ 1│ 5│ 10│ 10│ 1
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Captain-Lieutenants.│ 1│ 5│ 10│ 9│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieutenants. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 29│ 2
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 30│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Adjutants. │ │ 1│ 3│ 4│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Aides-de-Camp. │ │ │ 1│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serjeant-Majors. │ │ 1│ 2│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Qr.-Master │ │ 1│ 2│ │
│ Serjeants. │ │ │ │ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drill Serjeants. │ │ 1│ 2│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drill Corporals. │ │ 2│ 4│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Pay Serjeants. │ 1│ 5│ 10│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serjeants. │ 6│ 30│ 60│ 44│ 17
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Corporals. │ 6│ 30│ 60│ 41│ 10
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Drummers. │ 3│ 15│ 30│ 31│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Bombardiers. │ 8│ 40│ 80│ 529│ 43
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Gunners. │ 24│ 120│ 240│ 〃│ 〃
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Matrosses. │ 53│ 265│ 530│ 〃│ 〃
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
LASCARS. │Serangs Commandant. │ │ 1│ 10│ 3│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Serangs. │ 1│ 6│ 60│ 53│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Tindals. │ 2│ 12│ 120│ 106│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Cossibs. │ 2│ 12│ 120│ 87│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Lascars. │ 50│ 300│ 3000│ 2272│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Sircars. │ 1│ 10│ 10│ 8│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Native Doctors. │ 2│ 20│ 20│ 16│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Doolies. │ 3│ 30│ 30│ │
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Havildars. │ 1│ 10│ 10│ 8│
─────────┼────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼──────┼──────────┼─────────
〃 │Bheesties. │ 6│ 60│ 60│ 48│
─────────┴────────────────────┴────────┴──────────┴──────┴──────────┴─────────

The regiment was to be commanded by a colonel, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearse was to hold the rank of lieutenant-colonel commandant, “until the
lieutenant-colonel in the army next above him was disposed of by
promotion or otherwise; and then, in conformity with the custom in
Bengal, and the concurrence of the Court of Directors, to be promoted to
the rank of colonel;” the promotion of the additional lieutenant-colonel
and major, to complete the new establishment, to take place on the
arrival of the recruits of the season.

The brigade-majorship was abolished, and his duties performed by a
regimental adjutant.

These changes were not completed until April, 1780, as far as relates to
the European portion. The golundaz were discharged in December, 1779,
very few taking service in the ranks of the lascars.

The golundaz considered themselves belonging to the most honourable
branch of the army, and were unwilling to enter an inferior service; the
difference of pay was another, and a stronger reason, and we accordingly
find, that from 2,438 golundaz of all ranks who were on the rolls of the
regiment in November, 1779, in December 1,783 took their discharge. The
returns for the next months are incomplete, and it therefore cannot now
be ascertained what became of the remaining 650 men; but it is probable
some were those who were entertained from the lascars in 1778, and had
less objection to return.

It has been said before, that a company of golundaz from the Oude
Brigade accompanied General Leslie’s detachment. The force marched from
Culpee in May, 1778, on what appeared to many the wild expedition of
crossing India and effecting a diversion in favour of the Bombay
Government, heavily pressed by the Mahrattas.

After crossing the Jumna, the force was soon brought into contact with
the enemy; the Boondeelas met them at M’how, near Chatterpoor, but they
were beaten, with the loss of their guns; all of which that were
serviceable were taken on by General Leslie, who found his own train of
four 12–pounders, twelve 6–pounders, and two howitzers insufficient.

Leslie remained in Bundelcund until October, when his death devolved the
command on Colonel Goddard, who pushed on to Hoshungabad, which place he
reached on 30th November, and remained at until the middle of January,
awaiting a reply from Bombay.

That the sipahis looked on this service with some dread and dislike we
may conclude from the desertions which took place, and which called
forth strong reprehension from Colonel Goddard in the orders of 1st
November; after pointing out the ingratitude for all the former
indulgences they had received, and the unmilitary nature of their
conduct, in quitting their colours in their present situation, with the
daily expectation of being engaged with an enemy, he concluded with the
following high compliment to the golundaz:—

“The commanding officer, with much pleasure, excepts the corps of
artillery in the foregoing observations. Their steadiness, fidelity, and
military conduct claim his particular thanks; and he desires the
commanding officer will assure himself that he will make proper mention
of their merits to the Honourable the Governor-General in Council.”

Leaving Hoshungabad on 16th January, this gallant band continued their
route through an unknown country until, on the 9th February, 1780,
Colonel Goddard received a letter from the Bombay field deputies,
directing his return to Bengal, in consequence of a treaty they had
negotiated with the Mahrattas. This mandate he declined obeying, urging
that his orders were from the Supreme Government, and he continued his
march to Surat, which he reached on the 25th February.

The following are the Artillery officers who served with the force:—

Major W. A. Baillie, on the returns till April,
1781—retired in 1802.

Captain — Sears, joined detachment in March, 1781—returned in
1784.

Lieutenant R. Bruce, promoted to Captain in 1781 and joined
Major Popham’s detachment.

Lieutenant A. Forbes, died in 1779.

Lieutenant L. Kempt, returned in 1784.

Lieutenant — Hamilton, ditto.

Lieutenant J. Harris, died October 15, 1780.

Lieutenant W. Rattray, returned in 1784.

Lieutenant H. Cotes, died in 1782 in China, whither he must have
gone sick.

Lieutenant A. Rattray, joined detachment October, 1779—died at
sea 1782.

Lieut. Fireworker McLean, joined detachment March, 1781—returned in
1784.

Lieut. Fireworker Boyce, joined detachment December, 1782—returned sick
in March, 1783.

In January, 1780, this force took the field again, and, crossing the
Taptee, attacked the fortress of Dubhoy, in Guzerat, on the 19th, and
took possession of the province; on the 10th February the army was
before Ahmedabad, and stormed it on the 15th, and it was intended to
have attacked the combined camps of Holkar and Scindia at night; but
intimation that the Mahrattas were willing to treat prevented its being
carried into execution; evasion followed, and all attempts to bring them
to action were fruitless, till on the 3rd April, marching at 2 A.M.,
Colonel Goddard, with four European companies, four grenadier sipahi
battalions, and twelve field-pieces, entered the camp at dawn, and
quickly threw the Mahrattas into confusion; they attempted to take up a
position near, but on being again attacked, fled and dispersed. In this
attack Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the artillery, led the first line.

The detachment returned to Surat, and in October, 1780, moved against
Bassein, a fort on the mainland opposite the northern extremity of
Bombay Island. The detachment was increased by a body of Europeans from
Madras. A battery was opened on the 16th November of six guns and six
mortars, at 900 yards, and a second of nine heavy guns at 500 yards on
9th December, together with twenty mortars to bombard the works; on the
10th, the breach being practicable, the enemy offered to surrender, but
some demur taking place, the fire was renewed, and on the 11th they
yielded at discretion.

From Bassein, in the middle of January, 1781, the detachment marched for
the Bore ghat, and reached it on the 8th February. Holkar and the Poonah
armies were encamped on the top, but Goddard struck awe into them by
storming the pass the night of his arrival, and by 5 A.M. the next day
gained complete possession. It was not deemed advisable to carry the war
further into the Mahrattas’ territories, so the detachment remained
holding the ghats until the middle of April, when they descended without
disturbance, but were a little harassed by the enemy in the three days’
march to the coast, during which Lieutenant W. Rattray, of the
artillery, was wounded.

The detachment continued in the Bombay Presidency until the cold
weather, 1783, when it set out on its return to Bengal, under Colonel
Charles Morgan (Brigadier-General Goddard having sailed sick for
England), and reached Caunpoor in April, 1784.

The European artillerymen who returned with it were posted to the
company at Caunpoor, and the golundaz were also cantoned at that
station. All the lascars entertained previous to 1783 were retained in
the service, the worst from the battalions being discharged to make room
for them. The remainder were discharged.

The orders which were issued by Government, on this occasion, will be
noticed when the return of Colonel Pearse’s detachment is mentioned, and
in the mean time it is necessary to look back a little, to relate the
part the regiment took in other operations then going on.

With the detachment under Captain Popham, collected in 1779, for the
purpose of reinforcing Colonel Goddard, was a portion of the 2nd company
1st battalion, being under the command of Captain Mayaffre, Lieutenants
Legertwood and Vernon. The original destination of this force being
changed, it was employed in aiding the Ranee of Gohud against the
Mahrattas. In February, 1780, it crossed the Scind, and in April
besieged Lahar. From want of a sufficient battering train, the breach
made was imperfect, and on this, as on many future occasions, the want
of _matériel_ was supplied by the spirit of the troops. Lahar was
successfully stormed on the 21st April. To this succeeded, on the 3rd
August, the dazzling enterprise of the escalade of Gwalior. In this
attack the advance of two companies of sipahis was followed by twenty
Europeans, artillerymen of Captain Mayaffre’s detachment.

Captain Popham’s detachment was replaced towards the end of the year by
one under Colonel Carnac, with which was the 1st company 2nd battalion
of artillery, with the officers noted in the margin.[19] The detachment
pushed on to Seronje, where, surrounded by a powerful enemy, and their
supplies cut off, they were reduced to great distress, and would have
perished, had not the bold resolution of attacking Scindia’s camp by
night, on 24th March, 1781, been taken and successfully carried out,
rewarding the victors with guns, elephants, and grain, the “spolia
opima” of an Indian camp.

The difficulties being removed, the detachment fell back towards
Gwalior, and met Colonel Muir’s brigade coming to their assistance at
Antree, on 4th April. The detachments then moved into cantonments.

When Captain Popham’s detachment was broken up, Captain Mayaffre with
his company (2nd company 1st battalion) was stationed at Mirzapoor, and
on the massacre of the force placed by Warren Hastings over the Rajah of
Benares, on the 16th August, 1781, an order was sent to him, as senior
officer at Mirzapoor, to march, with the company of artillery, remaining
four companies of Popham’s battalion, and the French Rangers (sending
his guns and stores by water to Chunar), upon Ramnagur, _viâ_ Chunar,
and wait further orders; and also by Major Popham, with a caution to
avoid hostilities, and attend to the safety of the whole party until
Major Popham should arrive.

On receiving the order from Warren Hastings, on 17th August, Captain
Mayaffre immediately set out, replying, that he would march, “observing
his directions in every respect, and otherwise acting to the best of his
judgment for the good of the service.”

Colonel Blair, commanding at Chunar, was also directed to send four
6–pounders, two tumbrils of ammunition, an 8 and 10–inch mortar with 100
shells and 200 fuzes each, with powder, &c. to Chota Mirzapoor on the
20th, where Captain Mayaffre was expected to be. These were intended to
have been used from an open space on the shore opposite, selected by
Major Popham to bombard Ramnagur, and there is little doubt that a place
so particularly ill-adapted for defence against such a mode of attack
would have proved an easy conquest.

On reaching Ramnagur, however, without waiting for the arrival of Major
Popham or further orders, without plan, without inquiry, and contrary to
the advice of the officers with him, Captain Mayaffre, on the morning of
the 20th August, marched precipitately into the narrow streets, where,
in an instant, the leading party was annihilated. Captain Mayaffre, and
Captain-Lieut. Doxat, with thirty-three of the Rangers, fell at once,
and the detachment was forced to retreat with a loss of 107 killed and
72 wounded, two field-pieces and a howitzer remaining in the enemy’s
possession.

It is most probable that Captain Mayaffre was urged to his precipitate
and rash attack by the recollection of the successful enterprise against
Gwalior, in which he had shared the preceding year; the hope of
acquiring reputation led him to disregard the maxims of prudence,
forgetting that, although he staked his own life upon the issue, he also
hazarded his Government’s safety unnecessarily.

This failure raised the whole country in arms, and rendered Mr.
Hastings’s flight to Chunar imperative—a flight which gave rise to the
memorable but oft misquoted distich—

Ghora per howdah, hat’hee per zeen,
Juldee bagh gee’a, Warren Hasteen.

Lieuts. F. W. Grand[20] and Sand, doing duty with Major Popham’s
detachment, accompanied W. Hastings to Chunar.

Active measures were taken to collect troops, and on the 3rd September a
party was sent out to surprise the enemy’s camp, which was formed at
Pateeta (about seven miles from Chunar), but being retarded by the bad
bullocks and drivers with the two 6–pounders which accompanied it, at
daylight it found the enemy, to the number of 4,000 infantry and 400
cavalry and six guns, drawn up; the fire of our artillery and infantry
was, however, so quick and effective, that the enemy fled, leaving four
guns, among which was the one left by Captain Mayaffre at Ramnagur, in
our possession.

With the enemy’s guns, was all the usual apparatus of artillery, such as
portfires, tubes, chain-shot, quilted grape, equal or nearly equal to
the production of an European laboratory; the artillery, however, was
not equal to the stores: one gun, a modern cast, was pretty good; the
others old and indifferent; the carriages of all much worn and bad.

The conduct and activity of Lieut. Baillie, of the artillery, was
particularly acknowledged by the commanding officer.

On the 10th September, a brigade from Caunpoor, under Major Crabb,
arrived, with which were thirty European artillerymen (1st company 2nd
battalion), four 6–pounders and 1 howitzer, under Captain Hill.

The enemy had collected in force at the strong holds of Pateeta and
Luteefpoor, the former seven miles, the latter fourteen miles from
Chunar, and from information received, it was deemed advisable to drive
them from those positions, rather than attack Ramnagur; two detachments
were therefore got ready, one under Major Crabb, and the other under
Major Popham; the former, accompanied by four 6–pounders and one
howitzer, under Lieut. Baillie, with the ammunition, carried on
bullocks, marched, on the night of 15th September, by a route through
the hills, to take Luteefpoor in reverse, under the guidance of a
native, named Bandoo Khan, who had proposed the plan of attack; and as
the chief difficulties of this march were caused by the guns, it will
not be out of place to give an abstract of Major Crabb’s interesting
journal of the expedition:—

“15th.—The stores and ammunition being ready by ten P.M., the detachment
marched at that hour, but was very shortly brought up at a nullah, the
water in which was deep, and the limber ammunition-boxes forced to be
taken off and carried over on the lascars’ heads: a delay of two hours.
The road led along a plain through low jungle, a ghat with sharp
turnings caused a long delay, and it was sunrise ere the guns reached
the top. A low thick jungle continued for about a coss, and was
succeeded by an extensive plain, slightly cultivated and with two small
villages. About a coss in advance, two hours’ delay was caused by a
narrow deep nullah, and three-fourths of a coss further, a second, with
rocky beds and banks, occupied an hour and a half in crossing. The road
led along the bank under a high hill, for about a mile, full of rocks.
Recrossed the river with more difficulty than before; the banks very
high, and forced to cut a road for the guns, and it was two P.M. ere all
were over; the jungle thick, ground broken, hills on both sides. Came
upon a small nullah, its bed full of rocks and the opposite sides a
steep pass; the cattle were knocked up, and the sipahis were put on to
the drag-ropes to aid them; over by four P.M., and then no water to be
found nearer than a lake three miles in front, which they reached by
sunset and halted, after twenty hours’ marching and about six coss from
Chunar.

“17th.—Under arms at four A.M.; marched through a thick jungle, crossed
a small river by a steep and narrow road, up a long steep pass with a
deep gully on the right, the ascent very difficult from large smooth
stones, on which the cattle could not retain their footing; the sipahis
again at the drag-ropes, and by ten A.M. the top was gained. A large
level but rocky plain, studded with large trees, now opened; about a
mile further a river, bed full of large rocks, and the guns were moved
with much labour.—One P.M.; after moving over rocky ground, the country
opened, and about a coss from the river, an extensive plain near the
village of Korada; several villages scattered over the plain, whose
inhabitants fled. The country was cultivated, chiefly rice khets. At
sunset encamped: computed distance, six coss.

“18th.—Started three A.M., over a plain full of deep holes, difficult
and dangerous for the cattle; before daylight, entered a thick jungle
with many deep dry nullahs—forced to cut roads for guns; no trace of a
road. About two P.M., entered a large plain with several small villages,
whose inhabitants fled. At three P.M., encamped by a large lake, and set
smiths and carpenters to mend yokes and pintles of two guns, broken:
distance, five coss.

“19th.—Marched at four A.M., at first over a plain, then through swamps
and rice-fields; the high banks retarded the detachment much. Passed a
large deserted village, Muddoopoor; had the intelligence that the
Rajah’s troops were in front, with guns, at the village of Loorah;
encamped: day’s march, three coss.

“20th.—Moved at daylight, for one coss through jungle, in parts thick;
by sunrise, the advance guard was clear of jungle, and saw the enemy
drawn up, about 2,000 in number, in a good situation, guns on their
right, immediately opposite the road out of the jungle, on a rising
ground, and with a small bank thrown up in front. Tope and village of
Loora on their left, and a deep morass in front. The enemy’s guns opened
on the troops emerging into the plain, and fired briskly until all had
cleared the jungle and formed, the advanced guard returning it from one
gun. When formed, the detachment advanced as quickly as the ground would
admit, firing the 6–pounder until near enough for small-arms. A party
was detached to the (enemy’s) right, under Lieut. Polhill, to carry the
guns, and the enemy fled, leaving their guns, 150 dead, and 20 wounded,
and made for Luteefpoor, distant about four coss, through the jungle.
The ammunition was destroyed and the guns spiked and buried, there being
no means to carry them off. The road to Luteefpoor ran through the
jungle, rugged and steep, and no water; pursued them to the pass of
Succroot, about a coss from Loora, and halted to bury the dead and
collect the wounded, amounting to thirty-four; two and a half coss.

“21st.—Marched at four A.M., road good but jungly for two coss; a dry
nullah, descent rugged and ascent still more so; road narrow and
winding, full of large stones and rocks; the guns were lifted over
these, and gained the summit with much labour. The fort visible about
three miles off; the road now along the side of hill was worse than
ever; from the bottom of hill to fort very narrow though level, through
thick jungle; at noon, entered town of Luteefpoor, which had been
evacuated and plundered by the Rajah’s people while the detachment was
getting down the hill; six pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition
were found; three pieces were taken on the hills, intended to defend the
entrance from Pateeta.

“The fort of Luteefpoor stands in a bottom, surrounded on three sides by
high steep hills, with thick jungle close up to the ditch, which is deep
on the Pateeta side, where, too, the wall is of stone with loopholes; on
the other sides it is part stone and part mud; the guns, on wooden
swivels in the centre of bastions; the citadel has a high stone wall,
with deep ditch and loopholes, in many places much cracked.”

In concluding his report, Major Crabb says, “Lieut. Fireworker Baillie,
of artillery, in particular I beg leave to recommend to your notice, for
the very great attention he shewed in his particular department.”

The other detachment under Major Popham marched against Pateeta on the
16th, but, on arriving, he found it so strong, that he sent back for the
two battering-guns and one mortar, originally intended for Ramnagur;
these reached him, and Captain Hill either accompanied these or was with
the original detachment. After five days’ firing he made no impression;
he ordered a storm, which took place successfully on the 20th, about the
same time that Major Crabb defeated the enemy at Loora Succroot.

After these defeats the Rajah fled to Bidjegurh, through the hills, and
was followed by Major Popham.[21]

On the 4th November, a battery of two 18–pounders opened against the
fort, but probably from the rapidity of the firing, one of the guns
burst, and it became necessary to send back to Chunar for others; in the
mean time a mine was opened, which it was hoped would be ready to be
sprung on the 6th.

On the 11th the place was taken, and the spoil divided among the captors
on the spot, giving a large amount of prize-money to officers of all
ranks,—a proceeding highly disapproved of by the Governor-General,
though not unwarranted by his instructions. All attempts, and there were
several subsequently made to recover the amount for the use of
Government, were ineffectual. The total value of the prize was estimated
at twenty-five lacs.[22]

The officers in the margin[23] took a part in these exciting
proceedings, and those marked§ shared in the prize-money of Bidjegurh.
Lieut. Balfour claimed a share for bringing up the heavy ordnance, but
they probably arrived too late, and his claim was not allowed.

The misfortunes which had occurred in the Madras Presidency in the war
with Hyder Ali, and particularly by the defeat of Colonel Baillie’s
detachment and retreat of Colonel Munroe, rendered assistance from the
Supreme Government necessary: a detachment, consisting of two European
companies of artillery (5th company 1st battalion, and 4th company 2nd
battalion), with their battalions of lascars, and 350 European infantry,
was prepared, and sailed in October, 1780, under the command of Sir Eyre
Coote. The detachment reached Madras early in November, and shared in
the relief of Wandewash and Cuddalore in January and February, 1781, in
the unsuccessful attack on the fortified pagoda at Chillambram, and the
victory near Porto Novo.

Another detachment, under the command of Colonel Pearse, of the
artillery, consisting of one European (5th company 2nd battalion), and
one Native (2nd golundaz) company of artillery, with their lascars, and
three additional companies raised for the service, one company of
gentlemen volunteers, about forty or fifty, and six battalions of native
infantry, and 16 field-pieces, followed by land.

The golundaz company raised for this service was most probably formed
from the remnants of the old golundaz battalions, reduced in the
preceding year; so soon had the inexpediency of that measure forced
itself into notice.

Much delay occurred in preparing camp equipage, and it was not until the
middle of January, 1781, that Colonel Pearse joined the detachment at
Midnapoor.

Before starting, he complained of the inadequacy of his artillery
(twelve 6–pounders, two 12–pounders, and two howitzers), and indented
for six more 6–pounders; but whether these were furnished is not known.

Soon after the detachment started, we find Colonel Pearse complaining of
the absurdity of the Board of Ordnance expecting regular and minute
returns of all articles expended in a train while on service with the
same punctuality as within a settled cantonment; and pointing out that
all stores issued to a train on service should be struck off the Board’s
books, and an account rendered when the service was over.

The detachment reached Ganjam in March, where it suffered severely from
cholera, then a new disease, and which gave an impression that the water
had been poisoned.

In April they had reached Vizianagram, Ellore on 20th May, Pulicat on
1st August, and joined Sir E. Coote’s army at St. Thomas’s Mount on the
3rd August, 1781.

Immediately after their arrival, the Bengal division was broken up and
divided among the other brigades; an ill-judged and rash measure,
causing much desertion, which resulted from ill-feeling on the part of
Sir Eyre Coote towards Colonel Pearse, partly, perhaps, on account of
the correspondence regarding the golundaz, but chiefly, no doubt, from
Colonel Pearses being a friend of Warren Hastings, against whom he
expressed himself very strongly in a letter to the Supreme Government in
March, 1781, objecting to Colonel Pearses detachment accounts being kept
separate, as likely to cause expense and unnecessary staff appointments;
to his being entrusted with permanent authority in any shape, as unjust
to himself, and assuming a privilege (on the Governor-General’s part) in
military details, which cannot be vindicated; and complaining that the
instructions given Colonel Pearse were a direct indignity offered to his
authority. He concludes by observing, “that he sees the newspapers are
replete with promotions and arrangements in the military department in
Bengal, without any reference to him as commander-in-chief: he protests
against the whole as irregular, unmilitary, and entailing enormous
unnecessary expense, and has the satisfaction of committing to record in
this place, that he ascribes these encroachments on the authority of the
commander-in-chief to the Governor-General, who now unites in his person
the whole powers of Government.”

The officers and companies of the regiment employed in this service were
as follows, as well as can be gleaned from the records. Unfortunately,
from July, 1780, to April, 1781, the returns are left blank, and these
companies are not included in the returns until their rejoining in 1785.

No. 2.

4th Company 2nd Battalion.

Captain Elliott, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Woodburn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Wilkinson, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Holland, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Groat, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Turton, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Dunn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker McDonald, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Neish, rejoined May, 1784.

No. 5.

5th Company 1st Battalion.

Captain Hussey, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Carnegie, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Maud, died August, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Douglas, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Exshaw, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker J. Green, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Robinson, rejoined June, 1784.

The above sailed with Sir Eyre Coote’s detachment.

No. 10.

5th Company 2nd Battalion and 2nd Golundaz.

Captain C. R. Deare, rejoined June, 1784.
Captain-Lieutenant E. Montague, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Horsburgh, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Blundel, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant W. Bruce, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Tomkyns, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant J. Walker, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker McDermott, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Hardwicke, rejoined November, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Nelly, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker Barton, rejoined December, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker Macbeagh, died August, 1781.

Commandant’s Company of Volunteers.

Captain-Lieutenant W. Harris, rejoined June, 1784.

Staff to Colonel Pearse.

Captain-Lieutenant C. Green, Aide-de-Camp, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Herbert, Quarter-Master, died December, 1781.
Lieutenant Brown, Adjutant, rejoined May, 1784.

Joined Detachment at Madras.

Lieutenant Constable, December, 1783, went on sick leave and
joined detachment.
Lieutenant Addison, March, 1783.
Lieutenant Flemyng, March, 1783, returned June, 1784, with
5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant Nash, November, 1781, returned June, 1784, with
5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant Fireworker Hollingsbury, 1782.
Lieutenant Syme, died June, 1784.

On the 16th August, 1781, the army marched from the Mount, and reached
Tripassore on the 18th, and took possession of it after only three days’
siege. 27th.—Engaged Hyder Ali’s army on the spot where Baillie had been
defeated, and were forced to retire to the Mount from want of
provisions. On the 19th September the army again took the field, and on
the 23rd the Fort of Pollom surrendered to it. Hyder’s army was in
sight; the two next days were spent in collecting grain, and on the
27th, Sir E. Coote went out to reconnoitre, and found the enemy’s whole
force in camp near Cuppoor, about five miles off. He then advanced to
attack them, Colonel Pearse commanding the left wing, which, from having
to pass through much broken ground, bore the heaviest part of the
action. Hyder endeavoured to turn it, but his attempts were frustrated
by Colonel Pearse’s movements, and his cavalry driven back by discharges
of grape. The two wings were much separated, and Colonel Pearse was at
one time nearly captured, from his horse taking fright and running away
with some of Hyder’s horsemen, who charged through an interval in the
line; in endeavouring to get back, he was followed by a horseman, whom
his aide-de-camp shot. The action lasted from three till dark, and it
was eleven p.m. before the army had encamped at Cuppoor, on Hyder’s
ground.

In October, the army marched into the Pollams, and a detachment of six
battalions with two 6–pounders from the artillery, the whole under the
command of Captain Owen, were sent to secure provisions and intercept a
convoy of Hyder’s. Captain Owen conceived the quixotic design of
storming the fort of Chittoor, but, unluckily, Hyder marched suddenly
and attacked him, on the 23rd October, in his camp, and drove him back
with heavy loss. One of the guns fell into the enemy’s hands, but was
retaken by a gallant effort made by Captain Moore, with forty Bengal
grenadiers, whom an artilleryman informed of the loss.

After this, the whole army moved against Chittoor, on the 7th November.
On the 8th, a battery of two guns and two howitzers fired from a hill
against the fort, but without effect. On the 19th, a battery of two
18–pounders was formed on the banks of an artificial lake, within three
hundred yards of a ruinous round tower, in which a breach was made
before night, and the enemy offered to capitulate. Their terms were
refused, and firing renewed, and the next day, the troops being ready to
storm, the fort surrendered.

Hyder had, in the mean time, taken Poloor, in which were four
18–pounders, and surprised Polipett, where the baggage was left under
charge of a battalion with three 6–pounders, and carried off all, and
moved against Tripassore.

The army marched to relieve Tripassore, and arrived just in time, as a
breach was just made. After destroying the works, they moved into
Poonamalee on the 30th November.

Early in January, 1782, the army marched to the relief of Vellore, and
on the 9th, encamped near Hyder’s troops. On the 10th, Hyder attacked
the rear, while the main body was moving through the dry bed of a lake.
Beyond this was a wet one, and the main body crossed this also, but the
carts and followers were in the swamp when Hyder reached the bank of the
dry lake. Colonel Pearse, who was commanding the rear, formed up three
battalions, and his guns, consisting of one 12–pounder, one howitzer, and
six 6–pounders, which checked the enemy, who opened a cannonade from
upwards of twenty heavy guns, but, with little effect. The position was
held for upwards of an hour, until the baggage had all crossed, when
Colonel Pearse crossed also, and joined Sir Eyre Coote, and after a
little desultory firing Hyder withdrew.

Having thrown his convoy into Vellore, Sir Eyre Coote returned on the
13th, and on reaching his old ground, at the swamp, was again attacked.
The passage was covered by a heavy cannonade from the 12 and
18–pounders, and when across, Hyder fell back, but made another attempt
at sunset, which was beaten off. The succeeding days were spent in
manœuvres on both sides, without coming to an action.

The detachment was engaged in no further service of any consequence
until the unsuccessful and mismanaged attack on Cuddalore, in June,
1783, in which Colonel Pearse was wounded, whence they returned to
Madras, and remained encamped till April of the next year,—the death of
Hyder Ali, and conclusion of a peace with Tippoo, rendering their
further services unnecessary.

On the 22nd April the detachment made their first march homewards, and
the European artillery accompanied them as far as Musulipatam, where,
about the middle of May, they embarked with guns and stores, and reached
Calcutta in June, 1784. The strength of each company on its return is
annexed.[24] There must, however, have been some recruits sent during
the service; but as from the day of their quitting Bengal, the companies
were struck off the strength of the regiment, it is impossible to trace
their actual loss. Captain Hussey and Lieutenant Brown appear to have
suffered from wounds, for in Mem. C. 19th July, 1784, on Lieutenant
Browns promotion to Captain-Lieut., “The Board observes that this
promotion occasions the number of artillery officers to exceed the
establishment, which they have been induced to admit, in consequence of
the peculiar situations of Captain Hussey and Lieutenant Brown, by the
wounds they received while on service in the Carnatic.”

The following order was issued by Government the 5th July, 1784:—“The
Board having received ample testimony from the late Sir Eyre Coote, from
Colonel Pearse, and from the President and Council of Fort St. George,
of the uniform good conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, and the
officers and men of the artillery, who have served under his command in
the Carnatic, have much pleasure in expressing to this part of the
Bengal detachment, the high sense they entertain of their gallant
behaviour, and the important service which they have rendered to the
Company, during the course of the war.

“The Board trust that this special mark of their approbation will be
remembered as an animating example to the Bengal troops, whenever the
public service may call for similar exertions.”

The golundaz company, when the Europeans embarked, continued its march
with the detachment, and the whole reached Ghyretti in January, 1785,
where Warren Hastings honoured them with a visit, and testified the
approbation of Government, in general orders, which after expressing
thanks to the commander and troops, for “their gallant behaviour, and
useful services in the defence of the Company’s territories,” direct
that, “as a lasting mark of their approbation, a pair of honorary
standards be bestowed on each sipahi regiment; on each soobadar a gold,
and on each of the jemadars, a silver medal, with such device, motto,
and description as shall be judged applicable to the occasion; and
medals of the same sort to the officers of the golundaz company; also
similar badges of inferior value, to such of the men, warrant officers
and privates, as have served with the detachment from the commencement
of the expedition until its return to the provinces.

“The Governor-General and council further direct, that in acknowledgment
of the services of the two great detachments, which have served in the
Carnatic, and the West of India, an additional pay of two rupees per
month be granted to each non-commissioned officer and private of the
European corps, and one rupee per month to each non-warrant officer and
sipahi of the native corps, composing those detachments, who were
originally attached to the same, on the march to their respective
destinations, and returned with them.”

The Governor-General likewise issued an order on the occasion of his
visiting the detachment, and one of the last acts of his government was
a proposal in Council that “a sword should be given to Col. Pearse and
the two officers next in command; that all officers holding commands in
the detachment of infantry battalions should be confirmed in them,
notwithstanding the general rules of appointment, and that the names of
all the officers be entered on record, for such future marks of the
favour of Government as the rules of the service may admit;” and to
these propositions the Council readily agreed.

It was also ordered, that the lascars of the artillery who were with
these detachments should receive medals, in like manner as the sipahi
regiments.

[Illustration]

We are not sure whether medals for these services can now be found; we
have been able to obtain a medal, the reverse of which is illegible,
which we are induced to believe was given to one of these detachments,
probably Colonel Goddard’s, and the fort in the distance, representing
Ahmedabad: a drawing of it is annexed. We have also been informed by an
old native officer, that the medal was of the same pattern for both
detachments.

The 1st golundaz company, which marched with Colonel Leslie’s
detachment, was raised in 1777; the 2nd, which marched with Colonel
Pearse, in 1780; and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th were raised in 1782, at the
Presidency, Chunar, and Dinapore. But the same feeling, before spoken
of, prevented their retention, and accordingly, in August, 1784, the 3rd
and 4th golundaz companies were reduced, with the option to the men of
the former of entering the lascars, and the latter, the 9th or 14th
regiments, which were at the same station. In March, 1785, the 5th
company followed, the native officers being allowed the option of
half-pay at Chunar, or three months’ gratuity and discharge, and the
men, after completing the 2nd company, of enlisting in the infantry.

In 1779, the necessity of a train of draught-bullocks for the artillery
was pressed on the Government by Sir Eyre Coote, and 4,000 were directed
to be kept at certain stations for this purpose: they were to be from
four to six years old, of fifty inches high, and to be condemned at
twelve years old, and able to draw ordnance, as in annexed
statement.[25] The commanding officers of artillery and of trains were
to be inspectors of all bullocks received into the service, and
responsible that none but proper cattle were admitted, and they were to
be marked in the presence of an artillery officer. They were reduced to
600 at Caunpoor, 400 at Futteygurh, and 250 at Chunar, by Mem. of
Council, 14th February, 1785, and the contract given to Sir Charles
Blunt.

A gun-foundry existed at this time, for, in 1781, we find that “two
12–pounders and ten 6–pounders were ordered to be cast (if none
available) for the use of the ship ‘Betsey,’ Captain Giddes, going with
opium to China.” It was probably under the commissary of stores.

Powder-works also existed on the banks of the river, near Cossipoor. The
gun-carriages were all constructed by the commissary of stores at Fort
William.

On the reduction of the artillery brigade, Captain C. R. Deare, the
major of brigade, was appointed regimental adjutant, but the
brigade-majorship was restored in April, 1781, to be again, however,
reduced to a regimental adjutant in 1785. Captain G. Deare resigned it
in October, 1784, and Captain C. R. Deare was appointed.

In July, 1784, the adjutancy to the train in the field was abolished,
but each company in the field appears to have had an adjutant and
quarter-master attached to it.

In March, 1785, at the recommendation of Colonel Ironside, commanding at
Caunpoor, tatties were first allowed to the European troops at Caunpoor.

Colonel Pearse at this time resumed command of the corps, Colonel Duff
having temporarily held it while he was employed with the army on the
coast; and earned the acknowledgments of the Council and General Orders,
for the state of discipline it was in.

In this year many reductions were made in the army, by abolishing staff
appointments, fixing the rate of pay and allowances to all classes, and
laying the foundation of a code of regulations to guide all.

The commissaries of ordnance were reduced from five to two, and the
deputies from eight to four; the brigade-majorship of artillery was
altered to an adjutancy; the general command of artillery in the field
was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Duff; his station was not fixed, but he
was to move as his judgment prompted, was to inspect the field magazines
and report on their state, but in these tours he was to exercise no
command (though entitled by seniority) in the stations which he visited.

The following was the rate of pay allowed to all classes of the
regiment:—

──────────────┬────────┬──────────────┬────────┬────────┬──────────────
│Colonel │Lieut.-Colonel│ Major │Captain │Captain-Lieut.
│Commdt. │ │ │ │
──────────────┼────────┼──────────────┼────────┼────────┼──────────────
Full Batta. │ 750│ │ │ │
Half Batta. │ │ 300│ 225│ 90│ 90
Offreckonings.│ 150│ 150│ 150│ 36│ 36
Table │ 1,200│ │ │ │
Allowance. │ │ │ │ │
Writers, &c. │ 645│ 105│ │ │
Pay. │ 310│ 248│ 186│ 140│ 90[26]
House-Rent. │ 120│ 120│ 120│ 90│ 90
──────────────┼────────┼──────────────┼────────┼────────┼──────────────
Total. │ 3,175│ 923│ 681│ 356│ 306
──────────────┴────────┴──────────────┴────────┴────────┴──────────────

──────────────┬───────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────
│ Lieutenant. │ Lieutenant Fireworker.
──────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
Half Batta │ 60│ 45
Gratuity │ 24│ 24
Pay │ 101│ 91
House-rent │ 60│ 60
──────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
│ 245│ 220
──────────────┴───────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────

─────────────────────────────────────
Serjeant 20
Corporal 17
Bombardier 16
Drummer 15
Gunner 15
Matross 10
Serang 21 0 0
1st Tindal 14 5 3
2nd Tindal 11 5 3
Lascar 5 12 0
Serang Commandant 51 0 0
Jemadar 20/8, Drummer 11, Havildar
14, Naick 11/4, Golundaz 7 rupees.
─────────────────────────────────────

The scale of pay differs but little from the present day; but the
subject will more properly be touched on when the effect of placing the
army in certain stations on half batta in 1828 comes to be noticed.

In conjunction with the reductions above noticed, on the 30th January,
1786, it was resolved in Council to incorporate the two battalions of
artillery into one, of ten companies; but that the establishment of
commissioned and non-commissioned officers attached to them should
remain as at present until vacancies and casualties reduced them to the
necessary establishment; but afterwards (March), all in excess to the
latter were permitted to reside wherever they pleased within the
Company’s territories, drawing the pay and half batta of their ranks,
and, such as were entitled to them, the gratuity and additional
allowance.

────────────────────┬─────────┬─────────
│Necessary│Temporary
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Colonel. │ │ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieut-Col. Commt. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Majors. │ 1│ 2
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Captains. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Capt-Lieutenants. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieutenants. │ 20│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 30│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Serjeants. │ 60│ 60
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Corporals. │ 60│ 60
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drummers. │ 30│ 30
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Bombardiers. │ 80│ 80
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Gunners. │ 240│ 240
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Matrosses. │ 530│ 530
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Adjutant. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Quarter-Master. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Surgeons. │ 2│ 2
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Assist-Surgeons. │ 6│ 6
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Serjeant-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Qr.-Master Serjeant.│ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drum-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Fife-Major. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Pay Serjeants. │ 10│ 10
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drill Serjeant. │ 1│ 1
────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────
Drill-Corporals. │ 2│ 2
────────────────────┴─────────┴─────────

In making these arrangements, the original numbering was restored to
companies. Lascars were to be attached to each company; in the field, 1
serang, 6 tindals, 6 cossibs, and 156 lascars; and in the provinces, 1
serang and half the number of tindals and lascars. The battalions of
lascars were broken up. Two six-pounders were attached to each infantry
regiment, with 5 European artillerymen, and 24 lascars to point and work
them. The remainder of the lascars were paid up and discharged, and
grants of waste land in the Rhotas district given to all who would
settle on them.

A slight alteration was made in two months, viz. substituting golundaz,
1 havildar or naik, and 6 golundaz in lieu of the European artillerymen,
who were in the first instance furnished by reducing the 1st and 2nd
golundaz companies, the companies which marched with Goddard and Pearse,
and the sole remnants of the golundaz battalions; the men were divided
among the regiments, and in April directed to be enrolled as privates;
the commissioned officers were retained in the service, and stationed, 1
soobodar at Caunpoor, and 1 jemadar at Futteygurh, Chunar, Dinapoor,
Berhampoor, and Barrackpoor, to be employed at the discretion of the
commanding officer.

As, however, in the case of the organization in 1779, the Home
authorities appear to have entered upon the same subject at the same
time as the Indian, and in consequence, the above arrangement was hardly
completed when the order of the Court of Directors (sess. 85) was
received, and published in Minutes of Council, 2nd June, 1786,
re-forming the whole military establishment, and directing the artillery
to be formed into three battalions of five companies each; each company
to consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenant-fireworkers; 4
serjeants, 4 corporals, 8 gunners, 56 matrosses, 2 drummers, 2
puckalies. The lascars to consist of 30 companies, each having 1 serang,
2 first tindals, 2 second tindals, 56 lascars, 1 puckalie.

Each infantry regiment, when in the field, to be equipped with 1
European non-commissioned officer, and 8 privates, for pointing the
guns, and 2 tindals and 28 lascars, to work them, while with each
brigade there were to be, in addition to the battalion guns, 4 guns
attached to the grenadiers, making a total of 16 guns, exclusive of the
field train, and one company of European artillery and four of lascars.

An additional company of artillery was raised for service at Fort
Marlborough, but not brought on the establishment.

Colonel Pearse, although a colonel and the officer next in seniority in
the Company’s service to the commander-in-chief, was declared available
to command a battalion, thus lowering him from the command of a brigade,
which the artillery had hitherto been, to that of a battalion, a command
below what his rank entitled him to. This indignity was not, however,
long continued, for in August he was appointed to the general command of
the artillery stationed at the Presidency, and allowed an aide-de-camp.

The lascars lately broken up and dispersed among the regiments were
withdrawn, to reform the companies, the first 6 of which were stationed
at Caunpoor, the next 4 at Futteygurh, next 4 at Dinapoor, next 4 at
Berhampoor, 6 with first battalion, and 6 with third battalion, at the
Presidency; the tindals lately discharged were re-entertained; all
lascars in excess of the establishment were discharged, and none in
future were to be entertained, except such as were _seamen_ or _boatmen_
by profession; and in March, 1787, 5 feet 6 inches was the standard
fixed for them.

The artillery companies were stationed, 10 at the Presidency, 1 at
Berhampoor, 1 at Dinapoor, 2 at Caunpoor, and 1 at Futteygurh, and the
companies were enrolled in the battalions according to the seniority of
their captains at first; this, however, was shortly altered, by making
the first and second battalions change numbers.

The regiment now stood, according to this arrangement—

──────────────────────────────┬─────────────┬──────────────────
│Establishment│Actual
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Colonel. │ │ 1
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lieut-Colonels. │ 3│ 2
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Majors. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Captains. │ 15│ 15
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Capt-Lieutenants. Lieutenants.│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 30│ 30
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Adjutants. │ 3│ 3 non-eff.
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Quarter-Masters. │ 3│ 3 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serj-Major. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Qr.-Master Serj. │ 3│ 3
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drill Serjeants. │ 3│ non-effect.
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drill-Corporals. │ 5│ 〃 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drum-Major. │ 3│ 2
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Fife-Major. │ 3│ 1
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serjeants. │ 60│ 71
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Corporals. │ 60│ 59
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Gunners. │ 120│ 825
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Matrosses. │ 840│ 〃 〃
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Drummers. │ 30│ 32
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Serangs. │ 30│ 27
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
1st Tindals. │ 60│ 60
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
2nd Tindals. │ 60│ 54
──────────────────────────────┼─────────────┼──────────────────
Lascars. │ 1680│ 1679
──────────────────────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────────

The right hand line is actual strength, taken from the returns of the
regiment for August, 1786.

CHAPTER III.

Although so recent, the formation with which the last chapter closed was
soon modified. In April, 1787, the artillery was constituted one of the
brigades of the army,—a change made probably with the view of placing
Colonel Pearse on an equality with other officers of his rank, though
junior to him in standing. But a curious circumstance is connected with
this formation, in the nomination of an infantry officer, “Lieutenant
Peter Cullen, brigade-major to Colonel MacLeod, to act as brigade-major
to the artillery, with the rank of captain, conformably to the orders of
the Court of Directors, until a vacancy happens in that staff-line in
the infantry to which he is to succeed.” The reason of this appointment
is, however, clearly shewn in a subsequent order: “The Honourable
Captain T. Maitland, H. M.’s 72nd regiment, is appointed major of
brigade, to do duty under Colonel MacLeod vice Lieutenant Cullen.” In
March, 1788, however, Captain Grace, of the artillery, succeeded to this
appointment.

Several changes took place at this period in the army, at which we need
only glance. The colonels were detached from their brigades, and placed
in a situation similar to that of general officers of divisions and
brigades in the present day; tent allowance was given to officers in all
situations; fuzils and spontoons were superseded with infantry officers
by swords; the dress of the army was altered, as was that of the
artillery, and it is amusing to find that what is ordered in 1844 should
be little more than reverting to the orders of 1786; for what is the
order directing white covers to be worn on caps, but the principle of
“White hats may be worn on the line of march, or black hats with white
linen folded round them?” though, in truth, there may be little doubt
whether the round hat so prepared was not a far preferable head-dress to
the present shako.

The formation of a regimental school was an object of much interest with
Colonel Pearse; as early as 1770 some orders were issued on the subject;
but we learn from subsequent orders, in 1778, that these had “for
various causes been neglected and forgotten, but that the commanding
officer now resolves to carry them into execution;” and accordingly,
rules are laid down for conducting the school duties,—the amount each
man is to pay for being taught, what stoppages are to be carried to the
school fund, and, finally, that any deficiency is to be borne, half by
the commanding officer, and half by the captains. Again, in the year
1787, “Colonel Pearse, having the welfare of his soldiers at heart, and
being desirous to do for their benefit any thing that lies in his power,
has thought proper to establish a school for their instruction; that, by
teaching them to read, he may enable them to learn their duty as
Christians from books of their religion, and as soldiers, from the
orders and regulations laid down for their guidance. It is his intention
to visit it from time to time, and by his authority, to make it
seriously a matter of attention.” Then follow some rules for the school,
and as an encouragement to the non-commissioned officers to qualify
themselves, he directs that every “serjeant employing a man to write and
read for him shall pay him 6 rupees a month, or to write for him, 4
rupees a month, and he shall not read on parade, or be excused his
duties.” The number allowed to attend the school from each company was
limited, and the order has remained so nominally till late years,
although, in reality, none wishing for instruction have been refused;
but of late years the recruits for the regiment have been from a better
class, and a very large proportion are able to read and write when they
join the regiment. This may be partly caused by the more general
diffusion of education in all classes, or from the crowded state of all
lines in England, impelling a class to enlist who formerly found
occupation in other professions.

As another instance of the interest which Colonel Pearse took in the
welfare of his corps may be quoted the following order; it shews, too,
how just were his views on questions of duty and discipline: “The rules
of duty, as laid down, may seem extremely rigorous to those who do not
properly consider the consequence; Colonel Pearse hopes that there are
not any; but lest there should be, he desires that they will carefully
remember that military discipline can only be really made easy by being
enforced with precision in every part, however minute it may appear;
that strictness with mildness will make the soldiers love their officers
as their parents, and create in their minds a desire to be highest in
esteem, and an emulation to deserve the preference, and the fear of
losing it; then it will habituate the officers to regard the soldiers as
the object of their attention, and lead them to watch over their morals
with that pleasing anxiety which naturally arises from the desire to
produce superior excellence in those who are immediately under them; and
lastly, that in the corps in which these principles are most
conspicuous, courts-martial and punishments are very rare; the lash is
only heard when it falls on the really worthless and abandoned, whom the
rest shun and detest for having brought disgrace upon them, and who are,
of course, discharged soon after.”

Vaccination had not at this time been introduced, but, to lessen the
danger from small-pox, inoculation on a large scale appears to have been
first tried on Europeans in India this year. In February, 1787, 1
officer, 20 artillery, 26 infantry, and 53 children of artillerymen and
lascars, were admitted into the artillery hospital at Dum-Dum, and
inoculated; the party were left under the charge of Captain Rattray when
the regiment marched into Fort William, and a report of the result was
published in orders in April, from which it appeared that 90 took the
infection and recovered; of the remainder who did not take it, some had
been previously inoculated in England, but without such effect as to
induce the supposition that they had had the small-pox; from the result
above detailed, there is, however, little doubt but that they must have
taken it.

In September, a general order having been issued directing the companies
of artillery to be numbered in the different battalions, Colonel Pearse
searched into the records of the corps as far back as 1770, at which
time only 5 companies existed, and ascertained the exact seniority of
each company; he laid a plan before Lord Cornwallis, which was approved
of and published. Hitherto, the companies had stood on the returns
agreeably to the seniority of their captains, or the order for field
duty; this led to constant changes, for on the promotion, for instance,
of a captain to a majority, his company would be given to the captain
just promoted, and the company would be moved from the first to the last
in the battalion. In the accompanying tabular arrangement these
successive changes could not all be shewn, though it is believed that it
will be found essentially correct; however, from this period there can
be no doubt of the identity of the different portions of the regiment,
and for the valuable materials from which it has been arranged, the
author is indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant, for many years
assistant adjutant-general of artillery, and at a time when documents,
which have since crumbled away, were accessible.

In March, 1789, Lord Cornwallis attended at Dum-Dum, to witness the
results of some experiments carried on by Lieutenant Hill, with a view
to insure the ignition of the powder in a shell on the moment of its
touching the ground; the success seems to have been complete, for “Lord
Cornwallis has been pleased to desire Colonel Pearse to communicate to
Lieutenant Hill, that his lordship has received the utmost satisfaction
from the experiments this day carried on before him, and from the
successful endeavours of Lieutenant Hill to fire the powder within
shells the instant they touch the ground. Colonel Pearse adds his own
hearty congratulations on this success, and feels the utmost pleasure
that what has so long been sought for by artillerists, has at length
been discovered by an officer of the Bengal Artillery under his
command.”

[Illustration]

Lieutenant Hill’s plan, from an incidental notice in the third number of
the _East-India Military Repository_, seems to have been the same as
that of an Englishman named W. Wilton, which was tried at Woolwich in
1784. The wood of a common fusee is partly cut away to about half its
thickness on both sides, and the space filled up by two small wedges of
brass; a washer of leather being placed under them, a hole is drilled
through them and the fusee, a brass or copper wire is inserted, and
riveted firmly on both sides. The wire, when heated, becomes as brittle
as glass, and the shock of the shell touching the ground breaks it off;
the little wedges fall into the shell, and the fire finds two lateral
vents into the powder. “A fusee similar to Mr. Wilton’s (_East-India
Military Repository_), with the leaden pins (four small ones to give
additional security to the brass wedges), was produced by the conductor
of the Expense Magazine, _amongst several other kinds_ said to have been
invented by the late Colonel Hill, of the Bengal Artillery. These
specimens are now in the model-room at Dum-Dum, but we have never seen
any invention for the purpose more simple or more perfect than Mr.
Wilton’s fusee.” Of eight shells fired with the fusees at Woolwich, in
1784, six ignited at the moment of the shell touching the ground.

At the beginning of this month a fire broke out in the Arsenal, at
night, consuming the workshops, and all they contained, “except a number
of carriages of different kinds, which, by the unparalleled efforts of
the officers and soldiers, were preserved from the flames.” Colonel
Pearse was present, and his presence stimulated their exertions to the
utmost, but there is reason to believe that his own end was hastened by
the exposure to this night, under the influence of mercury, as we find
was the case from his own correspondence. Early in April he gave over
the command of the garrison to the next senior officer, and proceeded
down the river for a change of air, in the hope of restoring himself to
health, but without the desired effect, and on the 15th June he ended
his life; a garrison order by the Governor-General thus announces it:—

“It is with the utmost concern that Earl Cornwallis has occasion to
prepare the mournful duties of a last tribute of military honour to the
remains of Colonel Pearse, in whose demise the army has lost a zealous
and most respectable officer.

“On the corpse being brought into garrison the colours are to be lowered
half-staff, and to remain so until the corpse is interred.

“The brigade of artillery is to furnish the funeral party, which is to
consist of such part of the late Colonel Pearses own battalion as is in
the garrison, completed to the strength of a battalion, and commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare; the remainder of the brigade, with the 4th
battalion European infantry, are to attend the interment with their
side-arms, in such disposition as the senior officer present may
direct.”

He was buried in the great burial-ground of Calcutta, and a handsome
pillar of the Corinthian order raised to his memory at Dum-Dum.

The inscription given below is cut on a tablet let into the base of the
pillar:—

COLONEL PEARSE’S MONUMENT.

[Illustration:

TO THE MEMORY OF

THOMAS DEANE PEARSE,

COLONEL COMMANDANT OF ARTILLERY,

THIS COLUMN IS

ERECTED BY THE OFFICERS OF THE BRIGADE

IN TESTIMONY OF THEIR RESPECT,

MDCCXC.]

In Colonel Pearse the regiment lost a commandant devoted to its welfare;
of a high order of talent, fitted, in no common degree, for command,
fond of his profession, and anxious for distinction in it, his whole
energies were directed to the performance of his duties; his intercourse
with his officers and men was marked by an earnest desire for their
happiness and comfort, and an endeavour to raise the tone of manners and
habits to be found existing in both ranks. Although a personal friend of
Warren Hastings, his influence never seems to have been used for any
private end; the good of the service was emphatically his guide; from
his duty he never swerved, and in it he was influenced always by
high-souled and chivalrous feelings. That he would have won for himself
high honours, had an opportunity been afforded, who can doubt who has
carefully considered his conduct when in command of the detachment to
the coast; and that he had not opportunity must be in part attributed to
the prejudice or jealousy of Coote.

For twenty years he commanded the regiment, and under his eye it grew
from infancy to maturity, and passed through many trials, yet always
winning for itself thanks and praises; to his exertions in instructing
all parties in the details of their duties, it owed its excellence, and
long as the regiment may last, and high as its fame may rise, the name
of Pearse ought always to be gratefully associated with it.

The command of the artillery brigade now devolved upon
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Deare (who joined the corps as a 2nd lieutenant
when Pearse commanded it); he was at this time at Cawnpoor, commanding a
battalion, and the duties of the brigade were carried on till he could
join by “the brigade-major, Captain Grace, referring for advice to
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commissary of stores, and brother to the
commandant.”

There being a paucity of artillery officers, such officers as chose to
volunteer from the line and were approved of by the commandant of
artillery were appointed. The following, this year, joined the corps
from the infantry:—Lieutenants Drummond, Jones, H. Green, Clements
Brown, Winbolt, Matthews, and Hopper; others joined in a similar manner
previously, but their names have not been ascertained, though from a
correspondence three years afterwards, we find Lieutenants Macalister
and R. Browne were among them.

From the return of the two great detachments from Western India and the
coast in 1785, the corps does not appear to have been called on to take
the field; but this calm was soon to be at an end, and the Carnatic once
again became the field of battle. Tippoo inherited with his dominions
all his father’s hatred and jealousy of the British, and from the time
of his succession it was evident that he would take the earliest
favourable opportunity to renew the war; with such feelings on his part,
and jealousy and fear on the part of the British, peace could not long
remain.

The war having recommenced with Tippoo in the Carnatic, assistance was
called for from the Bengal Government, and in January, 1790, the whole
of the second battalion of artillery was directed to be in readiness to
embark for Madras on the shortest notice; and to economize the store of
gunpowder, its issue was prohibited, save for service and artillery
practice; country powder was ordered to be purchased by agents, and
supplied for all other purposes.

The men of the 2nd battalion, unequal to the fatigues of field service,
were removed to the 1st and 3rd battalions, and their places supplied by
volunteers from them; twelve companies of lascars were attached, and the
whole marched from Dum-Dum on the 5th February, and embarked on the 16th
on the “Houghton” and “Chesterfield” Indiamen, and sloop “Lucnow,”
except a detachment of one-half of the 2nd company, which marched with
the infantry of the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, and
which was afterwards joined at Masulipatam by a complete company in
addition, from the 1st battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Deare was at this time commissary of stores in Fort
William, but giving over charge of the arsenal to Lieutenant Humphries,
secretary to the Military Board, he took command of his battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commandant; Lieutenant Johnson,
adjutant; Lieutenant Balfour, quartermaster; and Conductor Johnson.

──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────
Lascar │ │ │ │ │Lieutenant- │Non-com.
Companies.│Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Fireworkers.│Officers
│ │ │ │ │ │and Men.
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
1, 7 │ 1 │ 2 │Ellwood │Horsburgh │Butler │ 74
│ │ │ │Macpherson │C. Brown │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
│ 2 │ 2 │ │Nash │Feade │ 37
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
3, 4, 13 │ 3 │ 2 │Horsford │Tomkyns │Winbolt │ 74
│ │ │ │Nelly │H. Green │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
2, 5 │ 4 │ 2 │Smith │Wittit │Dowell │ 74
│ │ │ │Clarke │Matthews │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────
6, 15, 16 │ 5 │ 2 │Sampson │Hardwicke │Dunn │ 71
│ │ │ │Cranch │Jones │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────

The 2nd battalion was probably selected for this service from its being
complete at the presidency; but the officers of the other battalions
seem to have thought they had been wronged by a departure from the
regular roster, and accordingly Major Greene, 5 captains, and 20
subalterns appealed to Lord Cornwallis, that their juniors, or others
out of turn, should not be sent. Lord Cornwallis, in general orders,
commented on their proceedings, exculpating the subalterns on the plea
of inexperience, but blaming the seniors for attempting to dictate to
Government on such a point.

Lieutenant-Colonel Deare, his staff the 1st, 5th, and a quarter of the
2nd company, under Lieutenant Nash; the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 13th, and 16th
companies of lascars, with one-half the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on board the “Houghton,” while Major Woodburn,
with the 3rd, 4th, and a quarter of the 2nd company, under
Lieutenant-Fireworker Feade; the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 15th companies
of lascars, with the remainder of the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on the “Chesterfield;” a party, however, of 150
lascars from 2nd and 5th companies, with Lieutenants Horsburgh and
Wittit, proceeded in the “Lucnow.”

The former ships had a fair passage for that season, and reached Madras
before the end of March; the companies landed, and the headquarters,
with 1st, 3rd, and 5th companies, immediately marched for Conjeveram,
where, on the 30th March, they joined Colonel Musgrave’s detachment, _en
route_ to Trichinopoly, the rendezvous of the grand army, and arrived
there on the 29th April; the 4th company remained at Conjeveram.

The “Lucnow” was delayed in the river till 6th March, and did not leave
the pilot till the 10th; their passage was so slow, that on the 3rd
April it became necessary to reduce the allowance of water to each man;
however, on the 19th April she reached Madras; the detachment of the 2nd
company was landed and marched to the Mount, where it joined the part
under Lieutenants Nash and Feade; Lieutenant Horsford marched for
Trichinopoly, to join his company, and Lieutenant Wittit, with the
lascars, set out for Wallajabad, where he arrived on the 2nd May, and
gave them over to Captain Smith, commanding the Bengal artillery, with
the force at that station, under Colonel Kelly.

The King’s ships being all withdrawn, an armament, consisting of four
Company’s ships and two coasting vessels, was fitted out under command
of Commodore Mitchell, who was knighted for his conduct in this
expedition, succeeded in capturing two privateers, equal in size to
small frigates, and in engaging and beating off two large frigates and
another stout ship.

At this time a circumstance occurred which caused the relative
precedence of the different arms of the service in the King’s and
Company’s service to be set at rest by general orders.

Lieutenant Wittit, being for picket duty with a party of artillerymen,
was proceeding to take the right of the party from H. M.’s 74th
regiment, when the adjutant on duty directed him to parade on the left;
to this he objected, but on being told it was Colonel Kelly’s positive
order, he reluctantly obeyed, and reported the circumstance to his
commanding officer, Captain Smith, and Captain Speediman, commanding the
artillery at the station. In forwarding the statement, Captain Smith
mentioned a case having occurred in Bengal, between Captain Montague and
Colonel MacLeod, of H.M.’s 73rd regiment, and requested that it might be
referred to Earl Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief, which was done, and
his lordship decided that “H.M.’s cavalry takes post of the Company’s
cavalry, H.M.’s artillery of the Company’s artillery, and H.M.’s
infantry of the Company’s infantry; but the artillery takes post of the
infantry, without considering the service to which they belong.”

The relative precedence of the troops of the three presidencies was also
decided at the same time: the Bengal troops are always to be on the
right; the Madras and Bombay to take the right of each other in their
own presidency, but to draw lots for the post when they meet on neutral
ground.

The main body of the army was now assembled, to the number of 15,000
fighting men, at Trichinopoly; to each European battalion were attached
two 12–pounders, and to each native battalion two 6–pounder guns, while
a park of four iron and four brass 18–pounders, and four howitzers, for
field service, accompanied, together with a large train of battering
guns.

General Meadows arrived and reviewed the army on the 24th May, and on
the 26th it commenced its march, the plan of the campaign being to enter
Mysore by the Guzelhutty Pass, securing a communication by occupying, as
a line of posts and depôts, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Carrore, Erroad, and
Sattimungulum.

On the 15th June, the army reached Carrore, which they found evacuated,
and, to lighten their march, deposited the iron and two of the brass
18–pounders, two of the howitzers, and about 1,200 sick in the fort.

Daropooram was taken; Coimbatore evacuated by the end of July; Erroad
was taken early in August, but want of carriage was even thus early
felt; officers were all directed to double up in their tents, and the
battering guns, stores, and convalescents were left in Coimbatore. In
the attack on Erroad the Bengal Artillery was employed under Colonel
Deare. Dindigul and Palacatcherry were taken, and Sattimungulum
surrendered to a detachment under Colonel Lloyd, with which was Captain
Sampson’s company of artillery; in the two former, the artillery of the
coast were employed, and at Dindigul Colonel Moorhouse, an officer much
respected, met his death.

It has been said that a detachment of the 2nd company 2nd battalion
marched with Colonel Cockerell’s division from Bengal; they joined the
division at Balasore on the 24th March, and a complete company, in
addition, from the 1st battalion, was sent by sea, and overtook them on
the 20th June at Masulipatam; the officers were as follows:—

──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬────────────┬─────────
Lascar │Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant- │ No. of
Companies.│ │ │ │ │Fireworkers.│Privates.
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼─────────
11, 12 │ 2 │ 2 │Montagu │Douglas │Briscoe │ 37
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼────────────┼─────────
23, 29, 30│ 5 │ 1 │Barton │Hinde │Tulloh │ 74
│ │ │ │Toppin │Hill │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────┴────────────┴─────────

With the former were four 6–pounders and eight tumbrils, with spare
carriages, and with the latter were ten 6–pounders and two 12–pounders.

The division reached Conjeveram on the 1st August. The 2nd company 2nd
battalion, now completed by the other half joining, was attached, to the
1st brigade; the 5th company 1st battalion to the 2nd brigade, and a
Madras company to the 3rd or reserve, Major Woodburn commanding the
artillery.[27] This division marched under Colonel Kelly, by Wandiwash
to Arnee, which place they had reached by the end of August, and were
thus ready to penetrate the valley of Baramahl.

Thus far the campaign had been successful; a line of communication had
been established, and the main body and centre division were ready to
fall on Tippoo’s dominions from two points—the Baramahl Valley and the
Guzelhutty Pass.

The advanced division, under Colonel Lloyd, with which were the 1st,
3rd, and 5th companies of the 2nd battalion artillery was at
Sattimungulum, the main body, under General Meadows, at Coimbatore, 60
miles in rear, and the rear division under Colonel Stewart at
Palacatcherry, 30 miles in rear of the main body, while Colonel Kelly’s
with the centre army was at Baramahl.

Such were the positions of the British army, when, on the 11th
September, Tippoo with his whole force descended by the Guzelhutty Pass.
His movements had been unknown; want of intelligence, partly caused by
the numbers of cavalry who enveloped Tippoo’s movements, and partly from
want of arrangements, was a prevailing misfortune in these campaigns,
and the first intelligence of this movement was received by Colonel
Lloyd on the 12th from some battalions sent out to collect grain.

On the 13th, a cavalry party sent out to reconnoitre, fell in with the
advance of Tippoo’s army, and falling back on their supports, kept the
enemy at bay till he drew off, and then returned to camp. Tippoo soon
followed, but Colonel Floyd took up a position which confined his attack
to a cannonade, commencing with three pieces, which he advanced under
cover of the hedges, and which, from being at a distance, and the supply
of ammunition with the British being short, were not at first molested,
he gradually increased them until, by 2 o’clock, there was a semicircle
of 15 pieces playing with much execution on the British line; but it may
be as well to extract, from a letter of Lieutenant Hardwicke, who was in
the action with Captain Sampson’s company, to Lieutenant Wittit:—“The
enemy advanced so fast, that the camp was struck a second time, and all
baggage thrown into a place of security. The line formed and advanced,
and about 10 o’clock the enemy’s guns opened upon us, and by 11 o’clock
we had taken our position and returned the fire. The enemy extended his
line so as to form a crescent, and opened guns to bear upon us in every
situation, and so well were they served that every shot did
execution. * * * On the right of our line an 18, two 12, and two
6–pounders kept up a smart fire, against which the enemy returned a most
galling one. About 12 o’clock our commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles
Deare,[28] received a shot in his breast, and expired immediately. Half
an hour afterwards, Captain Sampson, our second in command, while
speaking to me, received a very dangerous wound in the head, from a
stone which a shot, that at this moment killed my horse, had raised;
whole files of the grenadiers were swept away; half our gun bullocks
fell; and the desertion of all the drivers increased the confusion. The
cannonade continued till the close of day, and before it was quite dark
we could perceive they were drawing off their guns. The two 12–pounders
were rendered useless very early in the day by the axletrees giving way;
the 18–pounder limber received a shot and blew up; both my 6–pounders
were so damaged by shot that one only could travel; except the left of
the line, every part of the ordnance suffered much, and it appeared
impossible to bear such a cannonade till relief could come from the
grand army; to stand another day seemed likely to lessen our means of
getting off, and while we had guns to defend ourselves in a retreat,
that measure was thought most advisable.”

The day had been disastrous, many killed and wounded, and three guns
disabled, but Colonel Floyd reported that the “rest of the guns fired
with excellent aim, but sparingly, for the stock of ammunition was not
great. H. M.’s regiments and the artillery did themselves justice with
their accustomed valour.”

A council of war followed at night, and, as might be expected (for when
did a council of war ever recommend an energetic plan?), a retreat to
Coimbatore, sacrificing baggage and followers, was resolved on. It
certainly does appear strange, with a fort at hand and the main army
within 60 miles, the resolution of holding the fort till help arrived
was not determined on.

The intention of abandoning the followers got abroad, and they all fled,
so that no artificers could be found to repair the damaged carriages;
however, the experience of the officers, with the aid of the Europeans,
supplied the deficiency, and by 1 A.M. of the 14th they were in a
serviceable state; by 4 A.M. the army was in retreat, but from the loss
of bullocks one 18, two 12, and three 6–pounders were left behind.

Crossing the “Bavani” in basket-boats, the retreat commenced unmolested,
but “about 10 o’clock (and here we again quote Lieutenant Hardwicke’s
letter) we could discern the enemy’s line of march, and at 1 o’clock
they opened their guns upon us, moving parallel with our line and taking
advantage of every situation which gave them a view of the line. About 3
o’clock their infantry and horse crowded on the rear, an advantage the
nature of the country or badness of the road gave them; they enfiladed
us from behind hedges, buildings, &c., and at 5 o’clock they appeared in
all quarters and advanced with a ‘ding’ in crowds. The battalions
reserved their fire, and gave it almost on the point of the bayonet with
surprising effect; some faced to the rear and resisted the attacks
there. * * * A 6–pounder and two tumbrils were, however, here lost, but
it was astonishing the havoc the remaining 6–pounder in that quarter
made at this time; so severe did they feel our fire, that theirs
slackened, and a charge made by the whole of our cavalry gave a turn to
the fate of the day. Night closed on the bloody scene, and we continued
our march till 9 o’clock. By the lights in the enemy’s camp we could
tell they were not far off, and it was thought prudent, weakened as we
were by two such days’ fatigue, to continue our march; we accordingly
set off again at 3 o’clock, and directed our route towards the hills,
expecting to meet a reinforcement from the general; we crept along all
the day, suffering almost as much from fatigue, heat, and want of
sustenance, as we had before from the enemy. * * * We lost in all six
guns and the greatest part of our baggage. Lieutenant Horsborough was
slightly wounded in the head, and Lieutenant Winbolt in the arm.”

The artillery lost in these actions—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 corporal, 6
lascars killed, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 10 Europeans, and 15 lascars
wounded.

The whole army was now collected at Coimbatore, and on it moving
forwards, Tippoo made an unsuccessful attempt on the place.

On Colonel Kelly’s death, on the 24th September, the centre army fell
under Colonel Maxwell’s command, and entered the Baramahl valley; but
the operations of this division only once brought them into contact with
the enemy, on the 12th of November, on which occasion the good position
taken up, and the correct fire of a gun, prevented an attack by the
overwhelming numbers opposed.

A junction took place with the main army on the 10th November, and both
armies followed Tippoo, to relieve Trichinopoly, and after some
desultory operations, the campaign concluded.

In November and December Lieutenants Jones and Nash, of the artillery,
died, and Lieutenants T. Green, Exshaw, McLeod, Drummond, and Buchan
came round from Bengal to join the battalion.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Deare’s death, Captain Montague was promoted to a
majority, but directed to remain with the 2nd battalion; Lieutenant
Glass to a company, and joined; Colonel Duff was ordered round to
command the Bengal artillery, and arrived about the middle of December.
These promotions were made subject to the Court of Directors’ approval,
because Colonel Duff had memorialized to be allowed to command the
artillery brigade as senior officer. The regimental formation having
taken place, his claim was not allowed by the Indian Government, but
referred home, where it was finally negatived, and these promotions
confirmed, in the Courts letter, 4th August, 1791.

On the 12th December Lord Cornwallis arrived, and assumed command of the
army; fresh energy was instilled into every department, and by the 5th
February the march commenced.

The park consisted of eleven 18–pounders, six 12–pounders, and eight
mortars, with an ample supply of ammunition and stores.
Lieutenant-Colonel Giels (Madras artillery) commanded artillery of right
wing; Major Moorhouse, left wing; Major Woodburn, heavy park; Major
Montague, of the advance.

The plan of the campaign was to penetrate Mysore by the line of Vellore,
Ambore, and Bangalore; and to meet the British, Tippoo moved off from
Pondicherry (where he had been intriguing with the French), and was
ready to oppose them by the usual routes; but Lord Cornwallis, marching
in the direction of Ambore, turned suddenly to the north, and gained the
foot of the Mooglee pass on the 17th February, and by the 21st the whole
army had ascended, and were encamped in Mysore before Tippoo could
oppose them; the ghat presented but few difficulties; the heavy guns,
with the aid of men and elephants, gave little trouble.

On the 24th marched for Bangalore, in three columns: the artillery on
the right, infantry in the centre, and cavalry on the left; to keep the
enemy’s cavalry at a distance, the European regiments were equipped with
the iron 12–pounders from the park, and on several occasions their
services were found very useful on the march to Bangalore, before which
the army took up their position on the 5th March. On the next day the
cavalry went out on a _reconnaisance_, in which they were worsted by
Tippoo’s troops, and but for the opportune arrival of Major Gowdie and
Major Montague, with assistance, and contrary to orders, our loss would
have been severe. On the 7th the pettah was attacked and carried, and
Tippoo’s endeavour to retake it repulsed; the fort was now attacked; on
the 12th, a 10–gun, a 2–gun, a mortar battery, and a 9–gun battery in
the ditch of the pettah were commenced, and opened on the 15th; on the
16th a breach appeared, but two guns, an 18–pounder and a 24–pounder,
were disabled. On the night of the 17th a 4–gun battery was erected
against the gateway. “So just was the aim of our artillery,” Major Dirom
says, “that on the 18th, notwithstanding the strength of the wall, the
breach was considered practicable by several qualified to judge from the
experience of several years’ service; another parallel, however, was
laid out and completed within 200 yards, and its batteries armed.

“On the 19th, the 4–gun battery opened; this and the others kept up a
constant cannonade on the breach and neighbouring towers, replied to
sharply by musketry from covert way and outworks; to keep which down,
additional batteries were erected in the advanced parallel, and were
ready by daylight.

“On the 20th the fire widened the breach, and rendered it easier of
access, although its defences were still numerous, and at dusk a working
party opened a sap from the advanced battery to the crest of the glacis;
the enemy employed in attempting to stockade the breach.”

On the 21st the enemy meditated an attack on the British camp, but,
being met, retreated; they however advanced again in the evening.

At 11 o’clock at night the storming party prepared to move forward, and
for about an hour previous a heavy cannonade was kept up on the breach,
and as this intimidated the defenders from remaining there, it was kept
up with blank cartridges while the storming party advanced; the party
gained the top of the breach without very much opposition, and wheeled
off to the right and left, overcoming a considerable resistance at
different points.

The whole of the Bengal artillery (six companies) it is believed were
employed in this service. The casualties, from 7th to 21st March,
amounted to only 8 Europeans and 2 gun lascars killed; and the following
extract from the general orders of the 22nd March records the
satisfaction they gave. “The judicious arrangements made by Colonel
Duff, in the artillery department, his exertions and those of the other
officers and soldiers of that corps in general, in the service of the
batteries, are entitled to his lordship’s perfect approbation; to which
he desires to add, that he thinks himself much obliged to
Lieutenant-Colonel Giels (Madras establishment) for the able manner in
which he conducted the fire during the day of the 21st.”

The army remained in Bangalore till the 4th May, during which time every
exertion was used to collect carriage,—every expedient that could be
suggested was tried: private cattle were obtained by leaving behind camp
equipage and every necessary; a reward was given to camp-followers of 1½
rupees for every 24–pounder, and 1 rupee for every 18–pounder shot they
would carry to Seringapatam; every nerve was strained, that an attack
might be made at once upon the capital; the train was put in order, but
beyond bullocks for 52 field-pieces and a few howitzers, sufficient for
only 15 battering-guns could be collected. Thus equipped, on the 4th the
army marched, and after much difficulty, from the state of the carriage
cattle, reached Arakerry, on the river Cavery, a few miles below
Seringapatam, on the 13th May; the river was found unfordable, and no
place nearer than Caniambaddy, eight miles above the fort, could be
found. Tippoo, with his army, was encamped about six miles off, with his
right to the river, and left to a rugged mountain. While attempting to
render the ford passable, on the 14th, the army halted, and Lord
Cornwallis conceived the idea of attacking Tippoo by a night march, and
cutting him off from a retreat on Seringapatam. The attempt was made,
but a heavy storm overtaking the army soon after it started, the way was
lost, and the troops got entangled, so that they were forced to halt
till daylight; the effect of a surprise was lost; the enemy, however,
were defeated with loss. The artillery had Lieutenant Macpherson, one
European, and four lascars wounded; but the chief part were probably
left behind, under Colonel Duff, with the camp, heavy guns, and stores.
Lieutenant Macpherson died of his wounds on the 21st May.

On the 20th the army had reached the ford at Caniambaddy, but in such a
state, from deficiency of food, carriage, and material, and the state of
the weather, that Lord Cornwallis found it would be impossible to move
the battering-train from where it was, and that he must give up the hope
of taking Seringapatam for the present. On the 22nd, three 24–pounders
and eight 18–pounders were burst, all the stores were buried or
destroyed, and the whole of the public grain distributed among the
troops, and the whole army were in motion on their melancholy retreat on
the 26th May; they moved slowly back to Bangalore, which they reached on
the 11th July, putting all their spare tumbrils and stores into
Bangalore (Lieutenant Douglas was appointed commissary of ordnance). The
army moved lightly on the 15th, to cover the passage of a convoy from
below the ghats. Ossoor surrendered and Captain Glass’s (2nd company 2nd
battalion) company of artillery was thrown into it, with a battalion of
Bengal volunteers as a garrison. This company, with heavy guns, was
employed in September in escorting a convoy to Bangalore.

In September, a detachment under Major Gowdie was sent against
Nundydroog, a hill fort, which, if left in the enemy’s possession, would
have given trouble to the army on their advance to Seringapatam, for
which every thing was now nearly ready. With Major Gowdie’s detachment
was a detachment of artillery under Major Montague, four iron
12–pounders and two small mortars. This detail was probably from the 5th
company 1st battalion, as Lieutenant T. Hill’s name is mentioned during
the subsequent operations, and to that company he belonged.

On the road to Nundydroog the hill fortress of Raymanghur was taken.
“The indefatigable exertion of Major Montague in getting four 6–pounders
and two mortars on a rock which completely flanked the proposed point of
attack, his firing with great effect, and throwing shells with much
judgment,” are acknowledged by Major Gowdie, as contributing to the
early capture of the place.

From Raymanghur the division proceeded against Nundydroog, a hill
fortress of great strength, situated on ground most difficult of
approach, where, on the 29th, they were joined by two 24–pounder guns
and four mortars, with a quantity of stores.

With astonishing labour and exertion, Major Montague, on the night of
the 2nd October, got two 24–pounders into the battery by means of ropes
fastened round posts driven into the ground, and trees, and all the
resources which an artillery officer must bring into play in such
circumstances; and on the 4th, this and a mortar battery from the pettah
opened, but the height was too great, for the mortars, and the guns were
unable to make any impression on the solid blocks of stone of which the
walls were formed; regular approaches were resolved on, and an 8–gun
battery (18–pounders) got ready up the hill, into which, on the 11th
October, the guns were drawn by two elephants each, aided by four
drag-ropes and crowds of men. On the 12th this battery opened with
excellent effect, and soon silenced all the guns in its direction,
except one on the south-east angle, which did much mischief; a traverse
was raised against this, and an advanced battery for two 6–pounders;
into this, with infinite labour, a 12–pounder was also conveyed, and the
angle gave way to a few well-directed shots by Major Montague, and the
troublesome gun came tumbling down the rock. The ammunition running
short, the fire was slack until the 16th, when a fresh supply arrived
from Bangalore.

The breach being now practicable, on the 18th the army moved up, and on
that evening the assault took place. An artillery officer, with a party
of men and a small mortar, to be used as a petard for blowing open the
gate of the inner wall, accompanied the storming party. The resistance,
though great at first, was not continued, and the place was won without
a heavy loss.

Lieutenant T. Hill, of the artillery, was wounded, during the siege, in
the thigh by the bursting of a shell, and Lieutenant Cranch slightly in
the shoulder.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart’s division now proceeded against Savendroog,
a hill fortress on a rocky mountain, half a mile high, and eight or ten
miles in circumference; on the 10th December, the division was within
three miles of it, the Commander-in-Chief covering the siege with the
main army; the hill was surrounded by a deep belt of jungle, composed of
bamboos and trees, interspersed with large masses of rock; a narrow path
was the only road, and this was rendered difficult from barriers. A road
for the guns was with great labour formed through this forest, and they
were transported with much difficulty through; the enemy offered little
or no interruption, confident in the strength of their post and the
fearful ally, malaria, which haunted the jungle, and, which Tippoo
affirmed, would destroy one-half of the army, while he would slaughter
the other. On the 17th December, two batteries opened, one of three
18–pounders, at 800 yards, at an elevation of 23°, and the other of
three 12–pounders and two 18–pounders, at 700 yards; the artillery was
under Major Montague, but we are unable to ascertain what company.

The wall being formed of solid slabs of stone fastened together by iron
rivets, and the guns firing at an elevation, the effect of the
12–pounders did not at first answer the expectations formed. Two 2–gun
batteries were pushed on to within 250 yards, and the 12–pounders were
replaced by 18–pounders drawn from the main army, and their continued
fire soon opened a breach in the upper wall. On the 20th, the breach was
reconnoitred, and Major Montague not considering it sufficiently open,
kept up an incessant and well-directed fire upon it all day, and before
dark the breach was widened, and the outer wall shattered to its
foundation.

On the 21st the storm took place; the signal was to be given when the
fogs, which daily rise from the low ground and ascend the hill, should
wrap the fortress in their sombre mantle, hiding from the besieged the
besiegers’ intentions. At about 11 o’clock A.M. the signal-guns were
fired, and the enemy moved down to defend the breach, but the batteries
opened a deadly fire of grape, under cover of which the storming party
advanced, and rapidly drove the enemy back, entering the citadel with
them, and gaining possession of the place. Major Montague’s successful
exertions in bringing his guns into battery, and his professional skill
in directing their fire, again earned the praises of the
Commander-in-Chief in Government Orders.

Other fortresses fell—Ramghurry, Sheriaghurry, and Outredroog, with
little resistance; Lieutenant Shipton, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Charles
Brown and Butler, were present at their taking; but now all attention
was turned to the main object of the campaign, the siege of
Seringapatam.

During the operations above detailed, convoys of stores and ordnance had
been arriving, and every care taken to put the _matériel_ of the army on
the best possible footing; every thing was collected in Bangalore, and
the train under Colonel Duff arrived there on the 12th January, 1792, in
high order; “the draught cattle were in such high order” (to quote from
a letter of that period), “that they literally came in with the heavy
guns on a gallop.”

The train consisted of—

4 24–pounders,
24 18–pounders,
4 12–pounders,
60 6–pounders,
3 8–inch howitzers,
4 5½-inch howitzers,
6 5½ and 4⅕ mortars,
1 8–inch mortar,
60 6–pounder tumbrils,
206 store tumbrils,
9 spare carriages,
225 carts.

The Bengal Artillery during the last few months had been weakened by the
loss of officers: Captain Smith and Lieutenant Horsborough died in
October, 1791, at Bangalore, and Captain Sampson early in January, 1792;
but Captains Howell and Burnett supplied their vacancies.

On the 1st February, the army marched from Bangalore, the troops on the
right, the battering-train in the centre, and the baggage on the left;
the cattle and the carriages were so good that the train moved without
difficulty, and on the 5th February, the army came in sight of
Seringapatam. Tippoo had drawn his army into a fortified camp on the
north side of the Cavery; Lord Cornwallis, on the 6th, reached
Seringapatam, and resolved to attack the enemy that night. The army
marched at 7 o’clock in the evening, in three divisions, for this
purpose, leaving their artillery in camp, protected by the cavalry,
quarter, and rear-guards, under the command of Colonel Duff. No guns
accompanied the army; but with Lord Cornwallis’s division were Major
Montague (Captain Ross, Royal Artillery), and subalterns, and 50
European artillerymen; with General Meadows, Captain Howell, 2
subalterns, and 50 European artillerymen; 150 lascars went with each
division to carry the scaling-ladders; and with Lieutenant-Colonel
Maxwell were 2 subalterns, 30 European artillerymen, and 50 lascars. In
spite of the opposition and the difficulties the nature of the ground
presented, the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief were carried out,
and the morning of the 7th found the British army in possession of the
camp; but several attempts were made by Tippoo to dislodge them from
some of the redoubts they had taken, particularly the one called,
hitherto, the Sultan’s redoubt, but from this day Sibbald’s, in
compliment to the gallant man who, with a very small force, held it this
day against Tippoo’s repeated attacks. In this defence, the life of a
valuable officer of the Bengal Artillery, Lieutenant Buchan, was lost,
one to whose resources in the hour of emergency its successful defence
was indebted.

The detachment with Major Montague was actively employed in securing the
field-artillery in the enemy’s camp; instead of spiking the guns, Major
Montague directed that they should be thrown off their carriages and the
wheels rolled different ways, by which means the guns taken were secured
without being damaged, and the parts afterwards easily collected:
upwards of sixty guns were thus taken.[29] The chief loss fell on the
lascars, of whom eight were killed and twenty-two wounded or missing.

The fortress was now invested by the combined armies, and preparations
made for the siege; in this Lieutenant Hind, of the Bengal Artillery,
with 300 lascars assisted, collecting and preparing materials for
gabions and fascines; but a treaty formed with Tippoo rendered these
useless, and in May the army broke up.

The artillery marched to the coast, where Colonel Duff left them, and
sailed for England in the “Dutton,” Indiaman, with General Meadows: the
rest embarked in the “Ardesir,” “Mary,” “Hero,” and “Juliana Maria,” and
reached Bengal early in July.

The following tabular statement, compiled from the Prize-money
Distribution Statements, will shew more clearly the officers who were
present in these campaigns, as each officer had not been mentioned at
the time of his joining.

───────────┬──────────────────┬──────────────┬─────────────────────────
│ │Proportion of │
Rank. │ Name. │ Shares for │ Remarks.
│ │ Companies. │
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┬────┬────┼─────────────────────────
〃 │〃 │ 90│ 91│ 91½│〃
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼─────────────────────────
Colonel │P. Duff Staff │ │full│full│
Lieut.-Col.│C. R. Deare Staff │ ¾│ │ │killed at Sattimungalum.
Major │W. Woodburn Staff │full│full│full│
Major │E. Montague Staff │full│full│full│
Captain │P. Cranell Staff │full│full│full│died at Madras.
Captain │T. Hardwicke Staff│full│full│full│
───────────┼──────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼─────────────────────────
Captain │T. Ellwood │full│full│full│
Captain │G. Howell │ │ ¾│full│
Captain │A. Glass │ │full│full│
Captain │J. Horsford │full│full│full│
Captain │J. Smith │ │full│ │
Captain │G. F. Sampson │full│full│ │
Captain │J. Burnett │ │ │full│
Captain │C. Wittit │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Horsborough │full│full│ │
Lieutenant │D. McPherson │full│ ½│ │
Lieutenant │H. Douglas │ │ ¼│full│
Lieutenant │J. R. Exshaw │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │T. Greene │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Tomkyns │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │J. Nelly │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │E. Clarke │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │T. Hardwicke │full│full│full│
Lieutenant │H. Balfour │full│full│ │
Lieutenant │W. Shipton │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │T. Hill │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │J. P. Drummond │ │ │full│
Lieutenant │T. Dowell │ │full│full│
Lieutenant │R. Tulloh │ │ │full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Dunn │ ½│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. McLeod │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Buchan │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│A. Mathews │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│W. Winbolt │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│H. Green │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│W. Feade │ │full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│E. Butler │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│Charles Brown │full│full│full│
Lt.-Firewk.│J. J. Briscoe │full│full│full│
Cadet │J. P. Keeble │ │ │full│Inf. Invalided Lt.Co.
│ │ │ │ │1820.
Cadet │P. Fortnham │ │ │full│resigned Aug 1800.
Cadet │J. Gore │ │ │full│Inf., died at sea 97–8.
───────────┴──────────────────┴────┴────┴────┴─────────────────────────

During these campaigns the following officers lost their lives, either
in action or from disease:—Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, killed;
Captains Smith and Sampson; Lieutenants Macpherson and Buchan, killed.
Lieutenants Horsborough, Nash, and Jones, and several others, were
forced to seek health in a sea-voyage.

The services of the native troops, including the artillery lascars, on
this occasion, were rewarded by a medal, and six months’ batta was given
to all the officers and troops.

[Illustration]

────────────────────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────┬────
│1788│1789│1790│1791│1792│1793│1794│1795
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Strength on 1st Nov.│ 969│ 980│1176│1155│1162│1083│ 844│ 755
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Died │ 51│ 80│ 133│ 146│ 102│ 83│ 65│ 65
Deserted │ 3│ 6│ 7│ 11│ 14│ 10│ 10│ 8
Discharged │ 25│ 30│ 9│ 7│ 10│ 11│ 5│ 7
Invalided │ 26│ 15│ 21│ 25│ 35│ 31│ 15│ 37
────────────────────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────┼────
Total │ 105│ 131│ 170│ 189│ 161│ 135│ 95│ 117
────────────────────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────┴────

It will not be uninteresting at this period to examine the casualties of
the regiment, with a view to ascertaining the relative health enjoyed in
those days and at present: fortunately, the long rolls of the regiment
are tolerably perfect at this period, and the following is an abstract,
giving an average of 138 casualties per annum to a strength of 1,016, or
about 13 per cent. per annum,—almost the same proportion of casualties
as have taken place from the same causes during the last three years:
their amount is 368, and the strength of the regiment in Europeans maybe
taken as 3,000. The average, however, of a longer period will be more
favourable to modern times, as the losses during the Afghanistan war,
the destruction of the 1st troop, and the mortality from disease at
Sukkhur, all tend to swell these years beyond their predecessors; but
this subject will be adverted to hereafter, when abstracts of longer
periods have been made.

In August, 1793, five companies of artillery, the 2nd and 4th of 1st
battalion, the 1st of 2nd battalion, and the 4th and 5th of 3rd
battalion, under command of Major Bruce, sailed for the coast, forming
part of an expedition against Pondicherry. The troops do not appear to
have been employed, and the artillery returned in October.

The allowances of officers of similar rank and in similar commands, at
this time and fifty years later, form a contrast much in favour of the
liberality of the old scale.

The allowances to Major Bruce in │The allowances to a Major similarly
1793 were fixed at │ placed in 1843 would be
│
Pay as Major Rs. 180 0 0│Pay as Major Rs. 182 10 0
Batta as Colonel 1,200 0 0│Batta as Major 456 9 0
½ Table allowance 600 0 0│Tentage as Major 120 0 0
Field allowance 120 0 0│Horse allowance 30 0 0
————— —— —│Command allow. 300 0 0
Total 2,100 0 0│ ————— —— —
│ Total 1,089 3 0

But it must be allowed that the juniors of the army are in much better
circumstances than they were then.

The whole of the officers employed were to receive full batta at Madras,
and the difference of full and double full batta to be audited to them
in Bengal.

A detachment of 105 Europeans and 230 lascars, under Captain Frazer,[30]
embarked in October on board Commodore Mitchell’s fleet as marines, and
served for nearly a year. Their good conduct, and the unanimity which
prevailed between them and the crews of the different ships, were
eulogized by the Commander-in-Chief in General Orders on their return.

The regiment was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert
Abercrombie, in February, and by the Governor-General, Sir John Shore,
in March, 1794, and elicited, on both occasions, praises for its
appearance, discipline, and performance of exercises and evolutions.

From the General Orders of 9th June of this year, we learn that, “at the
recommendation of the commandant of artillery and chief engineer, the
Rev. W. Paul Limerick, chaplain, was appointed teacher of mathematics to
the corps of artillery and engineers, with the allowance of 500 rupees
per mensem, formerly received by W. Burroughs in a similar situation.”

A detail under Captain Carnegie accompanied the force commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine, which proceeded to Chittagong in February
and returned in June; and a detachment of 36 matrosses proceeded in
June, under Captain Howell to Bencoolen, and were lost on the passage.
Another detachment of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies, 2nd battalion,
proceeded to the coast, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hussey, returning,
however, in October.

The only portion of the regiment which was engaged in active service
this year, 1794, was the 3rd battalion, three companies of which were
employed with the army under Sir R. Abercrombie, in Rohilcund, in the
short campaign against Gholam Mohummud, who had murdered his brother,
and usurped the government of the district of Rampoor.

The following are the companies and officers employed:—

Major C. Green, Commanding.

──────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────┬───────────────────────
Lascar │Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
Companies.│ │ │ │ │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
1, 9, 20│ 1│ 3│Hardwicke│Watkins & │C. Brown
│ │ │ │Macleod │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
8, 17, 28│ 2│ 3│Mordaunt │Baker, A. │Hoffer, Tilfer
│ │ │ │Dunn │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
18, 19, 25│ 3│ 3│Macintyre│W. Shipton │
──────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┴────────────┼───────────────────────
│ │ │Lt.-Firew. Clem. Brown│F. Maynard (doubtful).
│ │ │was Adj. │
──────────┴────────┴──────────┴──────────────────────┴───────────────────────

On the 26th October, the line (consisting of one European regiment, ten
native, two weak regiments of native cavalry, and the artillery above
mentioned and 28 pieces of ordnance) was under arms before daylight. The
Commander-in-Chief and staff rode forwards to reconnoitre the enemy,
whom they found some miles in advance, near Bittowrah. The line came up,
the artillery in the intervals, and the Rohillas pressing forwards, the
reserve was brought up into line; they moved so fast, that the artillery
attached to the reserve were unable to keep up, and fell into the rear.
The enemy at this time were in the jungle on the front and flanks, and
some lamentable error committed by Captain Ramsay, commanding the
cavalry on the right, wheeled it to the left, and brought it upon the
infantry, throwing both into confusion, which was instantly taken
advantage of by the enemy, who charged in a most daring and gallant
manner (though suffering severely from the fire of grape, which was well
directed, and caused great havoc), cutting up the regiments on the right
fearfully. Lieutenant Tilfer and the artillerymen and lascars at the
guns were cut down to a man. The confusion was great for a time; and the
enemy in part reached the centre and rear. However, by strenuous
exertions, the tide of victory was stayed, and turned in favour of the
British, but not without a heavy loss, as is attested by a monument at
the village of Futteygunge, erected by the order of the Governor-General
in Council to the memory of Colonel Burrington and fourteen British
officers who fell in the action, among whom were Captain Mordaunt,
Lieutenant Baker, and Lieutenant-Fireworker Tilfer, of the artillery.

One serjeant, 2 gunners, and 20 matrosses, and 27 lascars also fell; and
from the casualties being all in the same company (2nd company 3rd
battalion), it was probably on the right where the confusion occurred.

The officers of the army considered that Rampoor ought to have been
plundered, and probably made their opinion known, for in this case, as
in the similar one of 1774, as a sort of compensation for plunder, the
Nawab presented to the Governor-General for distribution among the
troops engaged 11 lacs of rupees, and one lac for the families of the
officers who fell. The division was made on a scale drawn up by the
junior auditor-general, giving each person engaged a sum equal to 328
days’ batta of his rank; the amount of the shares is annexed.

Colonels Rs. 16,400 0 0
Lieut.-Colonels 13,120 0 0
Majors 9,840 0 0
Captains 3,936 0 0
Lieutenants 2,624 0 0
Lt.-Fireworkers 1,968 0 0
Conductors 1,312 0 0
Serjeants 218 0 8
Gunners 109 0 0
Serangs 54 10 8
Tindals 43 11 0
Lascars 21 13 10

The lac of rupees devoted to the families of deceased officers was
divided—40,000 to Colonel Burrington’s; 20,000 to Captain Bolton’s
widow; and 10,000 to Captain Mawbey’s children; the remainder was
reserved for such purpose as the Governor-General might determine
hereafter.

In September, 1795, a complete company of European artillery (5th
company 1st battalion), with two companies (29th and 30th) of lascars,
attached under command of Captain Barton, embarked for Madras, and a
second (5th company 2nd battalion), under Captain Clark, soon followed.
The following officers joined the force under General Stewart in the
expedition against the Dutch possessions in Ceylon:—

Fifth company 1st battalion, Captain Barton, Lieutenants Humphries and
Winbolt, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Clarke and Graham. Fifth company 2nd
battalion, Captain Clark.

The first service they were engaged in was the siege of Trincomalee, in
January, 1796, in which the artillery suffered both from climate and
fatigue, and from a daring, and for a time successful attack the enemy
made on the batteries, spiking the guns, and killing some of the
artillerymen. The fort capitulated after a siege of three weeks.

Jaffna next surrendered, and the troops then proceeded to Negumbo, where
they landed in February, 1796, and meeting no resistance, General
Stewart marched on towards Colombo, a portion of the artillery
accompanying his force. During this march, though the road ran through a
jungle, and was intersected by many rivers, the army was unmolested by
the Dutch. Not even at the Matwal river, a strong natural position which
they had taken up, did they offer any resistance, but retired in the
night, alleging afterwards as a reason their fear of a landing being
effected from the shipping in their rear. The English passed the river
without opposition; but the following morning were attacked unexpectedly
before daylight by a party of Malays, under Colonel Raymond, a Frenchman
in the Dutch service thoroughly ashamed of his associates: the attack
was beaten off, and Colombo in a day or two capitulated.

The Indian Government granted medals to the native troops employed in
this service, probably more as a reward for embarking on service beyond
seas, than for the arduousness of its nature. A sketch of the medal is
given on the opposite page.

[Illustration:

CEYLON MEDALS.]

The year 1796 is a memorable one in the annals of the Indian army, its
constitution having been entirely remodelled, and many advantages
granted it at that time, placing it on a footing of respectability which
it had not held before; but the subject will be reverted to in a future
chapter.

The artillery was converted into a regiment of three battalions, of five
companies each, with thirty companies of lascars attached.

The command of the regiment was vested in the senior colonel, and a
brigade-major was allowed as his staff officer.

The chief alteration from the organization of 1786 consists in the
addition of three colonels and fifteen captain-lieutenants, and the
reduction of fifteen lieutenant-fireworkers. The allowance of officers
per company was five, and the rank of captain-lieutenant was a
compensation for the necessarily slower promotion in a large than a
small seniority regiment, thus keeping the artillery on a level with the
infantry of the army.

──────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────
│ per │ per │ Total. │ Returns
│ Company. │Battalion.│ │Dec. 1796.
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 2
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieut.-Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Majors. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captains. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenants. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 29
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 14
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serjeants. │ 4│ 20│ 60│ 50
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Corporals. │ 4│ 20│ 60│ 59
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Drummers. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Gunners. │ 8│ 40│ 120│ 120
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Matrosses. │ 56│ 280│ 840│ 512
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serangs. │ 1│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
1st Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
2nd Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lascars. │ 56│ 560│ 1680│ 1733
──────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────

CHAPTER IV.

Having traced the _personnel_ of the regiment up to this point, let us
take a retrospective survey and endeavour to track out the _matériel_;
this cannot be satisfactorily done in the early stage; the absence of
records and drawings renders it almost impossible; little more than a
general idea can be given, and in this even there must be some
guesswork; occasionally restoring (as the geologists say) a carriage
from a few points found scattered in the reports of committees, or
incidentally alluded to in other documents.

During Clive’s early wars, 6–pounder guns seem to have been generally in
use, mixed occasionally with howitzers and 3–pounders, and when
battalion guns a few years later became the system, two 3–pounders were
with most native battalions. In his organization of the army in 1765,
this became the establishment, and with the European companies of
artillery there were six 6–pounders and two (probably 5½ inch)
howitzers: 12–pounders as field-guns were introduced later.

The carriages at this time were probably of a double-cheek pattern, and
from the histories of the actions, we find they were weak and often
breaking down. When Colonel Pearse came into the command of the
regiment, it will be recollected that he found great fault with them:
“They flew to pieces with common firing in a week;” and his sweeping
condemnation was probably quite just.

About 1770, it is believed that Colonel Pearse succeeded in introducing
the carriage then in use in England, adapting its limber to
bullock-draught (Plate No. 1). It is clumsy and ugly certainly, and with
its wooden axle[31] not very strong; doubtless it was an improvement on
the old one. This appears to have been the pattern till the beginning of
this century; minor improvements and alterations were made from time to
time as experience pointed out their necessity, but no radical change.
An iron was probably substituted for the wooden axletree, during or at
the close of the war with Hyder. Iron axles first appear on the ledgers
of the arsenal of Fort William in 1782–3; the ledger of the preceding
year is missing, and in the antecedent years they are not mentioned. At
this time too the number is so small (2) as to lead to the supposition
that the introduction was an experiment just being tried. The entry in
the ledger is not sufficiently detailed to determine whether the
axletrees in question are for siege or field-carriages; but as we find
Colonel Deare alluding to four siege-carriages with iron axles sent
round to Bangalore as having stood well, it is probable that about this
time they became generally in use.

During the wars with Hyder, the Bengal artillery was brought into
contact with that of the Madras Presidency, and comparisons were of
course made as to the relative efficiency of the _matériel_ of the two
corps, which doubtless led to the adoption of some improvements by both.

The campaigns with Tippoo in 1790–1–2 again took a large portion of
Bengal artillery into the field with the Madras regiment, and the
general superiority of the Madras carriages for light field-pieces was
admitted by our most experienced officers. A committee, composed of
Majors Woodburne and Montague,[32] Captains Horsford, Howell, and Glass,
all officers who had served during these campaigns, was appointed in
1793, and continued sitting until 1796, to report on, and suggest
improvements to, the ordnance carriages and equipments.

This committee declared that the Bengal 6–pounder carriages were much
too heavy and unwieldy for field service, but that the weight and
construction of the limber was by far the most objectionable part. The
extension of the pintle behind the axletree lengthened the draught
nearly three feet between the wheels; the height of the wheels threw the
weight nearly all on the rear axletree, increasing the draught, and
frequently rendering it impossible to turn the carriage without
unlimbering the gun. The pintle being fixed, tore the trail-transom to
pieces in travelling over rough ground; and the position of the
elevating screw-boxes in the centre transom weakened it: these
objections rendered it often impossible to keep up with infantry in
cases of emergency when guns would have been of the greatest use; this
happened frequently in the late war, when guns, mounted on the Madras
pattern carriage did not meet the same difficulties.

The committee therefore without hesitation proposed the introduction of
the Madras carriage, with exception to the wheels and elevating-screw,
the Bengal wheels and the royal 3–pounder screw being considered better.

The Military Board, on the suggestion of the commandant of artillery
(Colonel Deare), recommended that the Madras Government should be
requested to send round musters of their 6–pounders, and 5½-inch
howitzer-carriages, and Lord Cornwallis approved of the plan. Colonel
Deare was also requested to correspond with Colonel Giels (who had
commanded the Madras Artillery in the campaign) on the subject of any
defects which he might consider to exist in the carriages in question.
This correspondence has not fallen in our way, and it seems doubtful
whether the Madras carriage was at this time introduced. Up to 1801 no
pattern seems to have been permanently fixed on, or else the Madras
pattern had intermediately fallen into disrepute, for, as will be
hereafter noticed, some modification of the Bengal pattern was at this
time preferred.

The Madras pattern alluded to is believed to have been a block trail—the
trail divided in two pieces, with the cheeks on each cut out from the
solid timber; the trail was very long and the limber had a projection
with a limbering-hook at the end (Plate No. 2). The chief faults in this
construction were the waste of timber in cutting out the trail and
cheeks; the unnecessary length of the trail, which, although it rendered
the recoil easier, yet made the draught heavier; and this was again
increased by the projection in rear of the limber. Another, and a
serious evil, arose from the lever with which the weight of the carriage
acted on the cattle in draught, the axle of the limber being the
fulcrum. This pattern, however, considerably modified, became the
galloper or horse-artillery carriage in Bengal.

It is, however, worthy of notice, how nearly the principle of this
carriage corresponds with that of the royal pattern introduced twenty
years later, and now the standard of all India; had the fantail been cut
off, and the limbering-hook attached to the axle-bed, there would have
been little difference; and it is strange that this was not done, for
the objection had been seen and noticed in the siege-carriages, and a
remedy adopted, not indeed by giving the hook to the axle-bed, but by
lowering the limber-wheels and fixing a moveable pintle on the bolster.

The _matériel_ equipment was again submitted to the consideration of a
committee early in 1801; Lieutenant-Colonel MacIntyre was the president,
and Major Gordon, Captains Grace, Wittit, and Johnson, members. By this
time a muster-carriage for the horse artillery had been made up on the
general principle of the Madras pattern, by Major Glass, and in Colonel
Greene’s letter of instructions to the committee, he says it is “well
adapted for the purpose, and can be used with equal efficacy with a line
of infantry;” its particular construction was recommended to the
committee’s consideration, “but at the same time, as many
field-carriages are wanted immediately, and cannot be delayed so long as
required to complete carriages on that pattern,” he advised “the
adoption of the 6–pounder as altered by Colonel Duff, in preference to
the present field-carriage, for the service in the line of infantry, it
being much lighter, and having been found on trial sufficiently strong.”

The committee gave the preference to the pattern then in use, that is,
apparently, the old one with a few alterations, such as making the
axletree equally thick all through, the cheek-bolts through the
axle-bed, the elevating screw-box being removed from the centre transom
and placed a little in front, and its shoulders working in gudgeons
fitted to the cheeks; and their recommendation was adopted by the board,
who ordered the 6–pounder carriages then wanted to be made of this
construction.

An experiment was also made at this time with iron[33] cheeks for a
horse artillery gun-carriage; the wooden ones were, however, preferred,
but unfortunately no record appears of the reasons on which the iron
cheeks were disapproved; it would be interesting, now that the question
of iron carriages has been agitated; it is one of the many instances
which a research into the history of artillery shews perhaps more than
any other science, “the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be;
and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new
thing under the sun.”

Another instance may be given. In 1840, Major Timbrell made a pair of
flat twisted chain traces for pole-horses, and being found very
convenient, the experiment was tried on a larger scale. Captain Brind’s
troop was equipped with them, as also was another on the march to join
the Army of Reserve in 1842, but they failed from the difficulty of
insuring perfectly good workmanship. In December, 1800, “the commissary
of stores is ordered to have a set of flat chains made up in the arsenal
as soon as possible, for the traces of the (experimental horse
artillery) harness.”

At this time then there were two patterns of light field-carriages in
use,—one a beam-trail with the galloper-guns; the other a double-cheek
with the foot artillery and battalion guns. In the accompanying
sketches, Plate No. 3 represents the galloper-carriage, while the foot
artillery retained a double-cheek pattern, modified from No. 1.

We must now follow the ammunition-carriages up to the same point, and in
so doing less difficulty exists, as the changes which have taken place
are more marked.

The earliest record we have shews us Clive carrying his ammunition on
lascars’ heads, their fidelity and steadiness insured by a detachment of
Europeans with their muskets in the rear, to shoot deserters. This plan,
of course, could only be adopted when the distance intended to be gone
over was very small.

Tumbrils are early mentioned, both in our armies and those of native
powers, and there is reason to believe that they differed but slightly
from those which are now found in magazines, and generally used in the
transport of treasure; they were larger and more unwieldy, and required
many bullocks to draw them.

The committee in 1793 condemned them as too high, too heavy, liable to
overturn, and the ammunition in them, from the absence of partitions,
was shaken and broken[34] on rough ground; they were also unnecessarily
large for the quantity of ammunition intended to be carried in them.

They recommended the introduction of one which was built under their
orders, and which corresponds very nearly in measurement with that still
existing (Plate No. 5), subdivided for the reception of the ammunition,
and capable of containing 90 rounds of 12–pounder, or 150 of 6–pounder
ammunition; the box was easily removable, and fitted with a seat in
front for the driver and his bundle; to counterbalance his weight, the
centre of gravity of the box was a little thrown back; and probably this
very precaution has caused the chief fault which can be found with this
carriage, a tendency to fall back in going up hills; it travels lightly
and easily to the cattle, and is well adapted for bullock-draught.

During the last war with Tippoo, the heavy tumbril, drawn by many
bullocks,—five to eight pair, was found very inconvenient with the
galloper-guns, either keeping the guns in the rear, or leaving them
without ammunition if they kept up with their corps. As a remedy,
Colonel Blaquiere, of H.M.’s 25th dragoons, proposed a carriage
“consisting of a sort of double limber, with four wheels of equal
height, drawn by four horses, and driven by two men riding the near
horses.” Its advantages were, “the means of carrying six additional men,
the power of substituting the limber for that of the gun, if the latter
was wounded, or to avoid the necessity of shifting the ammunition when
the supply in the gun limber was expended.”

This ammunition-carriage was adopted for the Bengal horse artillery and
galloper-guns, and is represented in the sketch (Plate No. 6). We must
here again remark how nearly the present principle was approached, the
gun and ammunition limbers similar, and the ammunition divided into
several boxes; but still the fault already noticed in the gun-carriage,
the unnecessarily long projection to which the limbering-hook was
attached, was continued. This fault probably caused this pattern, both
gun and ammunition-carriage, to be discarded, and it was not until
twenty years had passed that the simple alterations necessary were
introduced.

The light field-carriages then at this period (end of 1801), were the
beam-trail gun and ammunition-carriage with limber for the gallopers,
and the double-cheek carriage and ammunition-tumbril for the foot
artillery.

As the elevating-screw is an important item in a carriage, a few lines
to trace its progress will not be amiss. The earliest screw was fixed
horizontally, and ran through a quoin, which, by its action, was forced
in or out, depressing or elevating the gun; it was a cumbrous machine,
and could scarcely have worked smoothly. This must have fallen into
disuse between 1780 and 1790. At this latter date, a capstan-headed
screw fixed in the centre transom had superseded it. A good deal of
attention was given to the elevating-screw about this period, and many
plans appear to have been proposed, among other officers, by Lieutenants
Toppin and Taylor, as we learn from a minute by Colonel Deare; but what
they were, it is not easy to say.

The action of the screw was found to injure the centre transoms, and it
was therefore placed a little in advance, the trunnions of the plate in
which the screw worked resting on gudgeons fixed in each cheek; this
gave the screw a power of self-adjustment to the movement of the gun,
and most probably contemporary with this was the introduction of screws
fixed to the neck of the cascable of the gun.

Another pattern, and which probably followed, was one placing the screw
under an elevating-board on which the gun rested.[35]

In the sketch (Plate No. 6) the general character of the screws is
shewn.

A cursory notice must now be taken of the ordnance in use with the
regiment. In the early times, 6–pounders were chiefly used; they were
afterwards mixed with 3–pounders with the native corps, and 6–pounders
with the artillery companies; the former most probably of 3¾, and the
latter of 4¾ cwt. A heavier 6–pounder (6½ cwt.) superseded this light
gun, and was in general use to the end of the century. This gun Major
Woodburne’s committee proposed replacing again by a lighter one.

During the wars with Hyder and Tippoo, brass 18–pounders constantly
accompanied the armies, and were used in all the actions; and in the
campaigns of 1791–2, iron 12–pounders were attached to the European
regiments, and found very useful in keeping the hordes of cavalry at a
respectful distance; brass 12–pounders had previously been attached to
the artillery and to European regiments.

The relative merits of light and heavy guns has been a _vexata quæstio_
from the earliest date, nor is it entirely set at rest up to the present
day, though general opinion has decided in favour of a _via media_,
rejecting both extremes. Still some members of the profession maintain
that, by a judicious disposition of metal, a light gun may be made as
effective as a heavy, while others, on the contrary, run into the other
extreme, and would introduce guns heavier even than those at present in
use. Late experiments at Woolwich on a 9–pounder of 10 cwt., nearly
similar to the Bengal pattern, strengthen the opinion that the two
extremes should be avoided.

A curious experiment was tried at Dum-Dum in 1787, with a view to
deciding the point at issue; and it furnishes some data which, combined
with practical experience, would tend to prove that a medium gun will
give a range so slightly below that of a heavier one, that the increase
would be dearly purchased by the increased difficulty of draught. A
6–pounder was cast, weighing 10 cwt. and 24 lbs., and fired a certain
number of rounds, after which a portion equal to a calibre in length was
cut off, and the firing continued; this process was carried on,
diminishing the gun, calibre by calibre, until it weighed only 3 cwt. 3
qrs. and 2 lbs., the elevation and charge of powder being in all cases
the same. The result was, that of the first sixteen lengths, the seventh
carried the furthest,—2,305 yards, the gun weighing 8 cwt. 2 qrs. 20
lbs.; at the fourteenth length the gun threw 2,098 yards, the gun
weighing 6 cwt. 1 qr. 3 lbs.; and at the seventeenth length, 2,106
yards, the gun weighing 4 cwt. 3 qrs. 23 lbs.

It would have been more satisfactory had the first graze, as well as the
extreme range, as has been the case, been given; however, it appears
that 200 yards are gained by nearly doubling the weight of the gun, and
the conclusion would be in favour of the very light gun, were it not
that experience shews that a light gun shakes its carriage very much,
and therefore that what is gained in metal is lost in strengthening the
carriage to bear the shock; it is also found that a gun giving a long
point-blank range does not give a proportional extreme range; and the
result has been to make 6–pounders of the present day 6 cwt. in weight.
The best test perhaps is a range of 800 yards, with the least elevation
for a field-gun.

One other point now only remains to be noticed to bring up the
_matériel_ to the end of the last century,—the pattern of
siege-carriages. From the faults found with it by the committee in 1793,
we can make a tolerable guess at it; the lowness and narrowness of the
wheels, the projection of the pintle behind, to make room for a large
store-box, and the height of the limber-wheels are complained of; and it
therefore must have been something similar to that represented in sketch
No. 8; in all probability, up to this time little alteration had taken
place in the pattern in use.

While preparing the siege-train for Seringapatam, at Bangalore, in 1792,
Colonel Duff made considerable alterations in the siege-carriages; he
cut off the projection from the limbers, and placed a pintle on a
bolster on the axle-bed, carried the draught-chain back to the
gun-carriage, and cut travelling trunnion-beds in the cheeks, to divide
the weight better on the axles, and make the carriage travel easier; in
fact, rendered the carriages very nearly what are now known as the “old
pattern.” All the alterations were continued by the committee, and they
directed that the carriage should be five, and the limber-wheels three
feet high, to enable them to turn under the cheeks when limbered up.
Minor improvements were added: the draught-chain was made in pieces, so
as to allow of a portion of the cattle being taken off in sharp
turnings, or on ground where all could not act; and a carriage was then
built, which, with slight changes (reducing the gun-wheels two inches)
in 1801 by Colonel MacIntyre’s committee, became the standard, and
remained so till 1823.

A fancy existed to obtain the use of a mortar from an howitzer, by
fitting its carriage with a sliding transom, on withdrawing which, the
howitzer could be elevated to 45°, its cascable resting on an additional
transom fixed underneath. Major Green constructed a carriage of this
kind in 1796, which was experimented on at Dum-Dum, and spoken
favourably of, but eventually not found to answer, and therefore
discarded.

Whether the result of imitation, or of half-informed mechanical taste,
we find Lena Sing Majeetiah, commandant of the Punjab artillery,
indulging in a similar fantasy: a carriage adapted for the double
purpose. It is scarcely possible that such a one could be useful; the
shock acting vertically on the axle, would be too severe for any
moderate dimensions to bear; this was found in Major Green’s carriage,
and the proposed remedy was shortening the axle, which would, while
strengthening, have rendered it very likely to overturn.

To preserve the connection of the subject, it may be as well here to
notice the successive changes of ordnance and carriages up to about the
present time, instead of referring to each as the record of the regiment
reaches the date of its occurrence. The object is rather to give a
general idea of the carriages and guns in use at different eras, and to
mark the strong, rather than to note the more minute and trifling,
changes which are always taking place. To do the latter would require
more space than can be afforded, and after all the reader might rise
from the perusal, his mind crowded with a heap of minutiæ, leaving no
other impression than that at different times a carriage had been
shortened in one direction and lengthened in another, the wheels
heightened or lowered—now all of the same height, and then those of the
limber reduced—a hook added from the front or taken from the rear. This
is not our object, we wish to shew the principal features of the
subject, so as to point out the stages through which our present
excellent _matériel_ has been attained.

The galloper-gun and ammunition-carriages, as well as those in use with
the foot artillery at the beginning of the century, were destined to be
superseded by the Gribeauval pattern, about 1810, one carriage answering
for horse and foot, with the exception of some difference in the limber.
The carriage was a double-cheek one, limbered up on a moveable pintle on
the bottom of a limber, with two low wheels; the foot artillery limber
had an arched axle with the pintle on the top. [Plates Nos. 10 and 11.]

These carriages had a tendency to overturn, on any but the smoothest
ground; the low wheels made the draught heavy, and were also difficult
to keep in order; yet this pattern held its position as the standard
until 1823, when a thorough reform in the ordnance department took
place.

Early in the century, the French “caisson” was introduced as the
ammunition-carriage, and continued with slight changes until superseded
by the royal pattern. It was a long waggon with low wheels in front, on
the axle of which a pintle was fixed, working in a socket in a
compartment of the body of the carriage, and enabling the front wheels
to turn. This formation caused many accidents; the powder getting shaken
out of the cartridges, came in contact with the pintle, and an explosion
ensued; the construction was therefore altered by fixing the pintle to
the carriage and the socket on the axle-bed. [Plate No. 12.]

The faults of this carriage were the liability to overturn; the danger
from explosion, the whole ammunition being in one large box; and the
inconvenience, when embarking on board ship or crossing rivers, of
having to unpack it all.

An attempt to remedy this was made in 1801 by the partial introduction
of “Hardwicke’s pattern” ammunition-carriage, consisting of two tumbrils
connected by a bent iron perch. It proved, however, a perfect failure,
and never came into general use, so that the caisson continued as the
standard until superseded by the royal pattern; the last, probably,
which existed in use was in Captain Wood’s troop, 1st company 3rd
battalion, at Meerut, us late as 1828.

In 1801, on its formation, the experimental horse artillery was armed
with two 3–pounders and four 6–pounders; the 3–pounders in 1806 gave
place to two 5½-inch howitzers, and two of the 6–pounders were at a
later period (when the number of troops had been increased) withdrawn,
and their place supplied by 12–pounders of a pattern proposed by General
Horsford of 8¾ cwt. The lines of this gun were drawn at Woolwich, but,
at the same time, it was said that a gun of such light metal must prove
insufficient.

The armament of troops and field-batteries continued of these three
calibres until the new arrangements, introducing the 9 and 6–pounder
guns and 24 and 12–pounder howitzers, in 1828 and the following years.

The breaking out of hostilities with Nepal in 1814 called for a new
species of carriages adapted to carry 3–pounders and 4⅖-inch howitzers
in a hilly country. Lightness, strength, and a facility of being taken
to pieces and put together were the points sought to be combined in the
“mountain-train” carriages planned by Sir J. Horsford. They were not,
however, much used during the war, for in general it was found that
elephants could convey 6–pounders in the hills easier than men could the
smaller pieces; and the former, being so much more effective, were,
nearly in all cases, used. The mountain-train carriages were found too
slight, and quite unequal to bear the rough usage artillery meets with
even from the hands of its friends; they required a degree of petting
which appears not always to have been shewn them. During a retreat in
the Nepal country, several which had, for convenience and from the loss
of their bearers, been limbered up to other carriages drawn by cattle,
went to pieces in crossing the terrain at the foot of the hills. The
fault was laid on the officers in charge, and not on the weakness of the
carriages, by Sir John Horsford; but there will always be great
difficulty in preventing these carriages experiencing the same
treatment, if put together before entering the hills.

No. 14 is a sketch of the mountain-train pattern, which has remained
unaltered up to the present day, excepting some changes introduced by
Major Backhouse in the mountain-train of the late Shah Sujah, but which
have not been made generally known. Some changes are now probable, as a
mountain-train 12–pounder howitzer has been substituted for the old
4⅖-inch howitzer. This new piece weighs 3 cwt., and its lines are drawn
on the principles of the 12–pounder howitzer; the charge is 12 oz. of
powder (an increase of 4 oz.), which, with the increased length, makes
it a much more effective piece.

The siege-carriages underwent little change during this time. From their
solid nature they have been always less liable to injury than
field-carriages; and, consequently, attention has been less forced to
them by the repairs of daily accidents; less temptation has therefore
offered to introduce improvements and alterations, and the pattern
established in 1801 remained in use till 1823; indeed, at the present
time there are many carriages of that kind in magazines.

In 1823 a new pattern siege-carriage (No. 15) was introduced; not,
however, differing essentially from the old one; uniformity in axles,
beds, limbers, &c., and improvements in minutiæ, were the chief
alterations.

A new kind of carriage was also introduced at this time for the iron
howitzers, which superseded the brass 8–inch as a siege-piece; the trail
was much shorter than that of siege-carriages, and furnished with small
truck-wheels, to ease the recoil. [Plate No. 16.]

Iron mortars and mortar-beds also superseded the brass mortars of 8–inch
and upwards, and their wooden beds. No alteration has been made in any
of these articles.

In 1823, a general reform in the ordnance equipment in Bengal took
place, and, with the changes above noted, the block trail pattern was
introduced for the light field-carriages. The ammunition-carriage was
made with a limber exactly similar to that of the gun, and the
ammunition was divided into six boxes, two on the limber, and four on
the body of the carriage, easily removable; the wheels, axles, and beds
were made similar, and pains were taken to render all parts as uniform
as possible, so that one set might answer for the repairs of all.

On their first introduction into Bengal, in the attempts to lighten the
carriages as much as possible, some were made too weak, especially those
for the 24–pounder howitzers, and slight alterations were made from time
to time to obviate this defect.

At this time, the elevating-screws of the guns were fixed to the
cascable neck, while those of the howitzers were capstan-headed. In
1834, Captain Timbrell suggested the adoption of the fixed screw with
all, and several howitzer-carriages were altered accordingly; in doing
this, however, it became necessary to pierce the beams to receive the
screw further to the rear than before, filling up the former hole with a
plug: this double piercing weakened the beam so much, that with the
increased action from the fixed screw, many broke down, and the change
was discontinued at that time; the subject, however, was agitated for
many years, and many trials made, and the result has been the retention
of the original method.

The advantages of the fixed screw consist in its uniting the gun and
carriage, and thereby preventing its jumping, in travelling or firing;
greater facility of mending it, and an increased power in limbering up;
it is also more economical, as a less depth of beam is required, the
fixed screw adjusting itself by means of trunnions, while the
capstan-headed requires a horizontal hump on the beam to receive it. On
the other hand, the capstan-headed screw is supposed to strain the
carriage less; to us, however, the advantages seem to be on the side of
the fixed screw, and from the result of the experiments tried, there
appears no doubt but that when applied to a new, _not an altered_, beam,
the howitzer-carriages are strong enough to bear it.

In these ordnance arrangements, the European horse and all the foot
artillery batteries were armed with 9–pounder guns and 24–pounder
howitzers, while the native horse had 6–pounders; and this continued
until 1834, when, under instructions from the Court of Directors, the
whole of the horse artillery were armed with 6–pounder guns and
12–pounder howitzers.

In 1836, at the recommendation of Sir Henry Fane, then
Commander-in-Chief, a special board of artillery officers from the three
presidencies was convened at Calcutta, for the purpose of assimilating
the ordnance equipment and arrangements throughout India. They sat for
about two years, and during that time musters of the carriages they
recommended for general adoption were built. This carriage, the “Indian
pattern,” was much like those in use with the Madras Artillery, and may
be shortly described as having contracted cheek, narrow axles, and metal
naves: the carriage was heavier than the Bengal pattern.

The proceedings of the board were transmitted to England and returned in
1841, with the orders of the Court of Directors (among other points),
that if the pattern carriage had given satisfaction, it should be
adopted throughout all India. In the interim, however, the Afghan war
had taken place, and the carriages of the Bengal and Bombay presidencies
been severely tried. The former stood the test of the service in that
most difficult country, while the latter, constructed on a plan nearly
similar to the Madras one, proved utterly worthless. These
circumstances, and the failure of some 6–pounder carriages of the
“Indian pattern,” with the Bombay horse artillery, during the short
affair at Hykulzie, rendered the strength of the pattern doubtful, and
after calling for reports from all who had been engaged in these
campaigns, the Supreme Government in 1842 finally decided on adopting
the Bengal block trail as the pattern for Indian light field-carriages.

This appears an appropriate place in which to detail the different means
of draught adopted from time to time, and the arrangement will have the
advantage of presenting the subject in one view, and saving the reader
the trouble of searching for it through different periods.

To the end of the last century, bullocks were the only draught cattle in
use for artillery purposes; they were attached to the carriage by yokes,
most probably similar to those which may now be seen in every native
hackery, and traces made of raw hide: these latter, during Lord
Cornwallis’s campaigns, were superseded by draught-chains, the whole
chain in one long piece, very cumbrous and inconvenient. This pattern
was early modified, we believe, by making the lengths for siege ordnance
for three or four pairs of bullocks; but it was not until about 1825
that a separate chain was allotted to each pair, facilitating the
lengthening, or reducing the line of draught greatly. The yoke was
attached by a swivel playing loosely on the pole, with a neck which
passed through the upper part of the yoke, and was fastened with a nut.
The yoke, at this period we think, consisted of two bars, and has
remained up to the present day with little alteration. An attempt was
made to supersede it by a single bar yoke with short stanchions, and
chains to confine the bullocks in their places, by General Hardwicke,
about 1781. This was supposed to be an improvement on the native yoke,
and more economical than the pattern in use; but an important point
having been overlooked, viz. the native yoke-bar being fixed immoveably
to the pole, while the H. P. yoke was moveable on its swivel, the result
was not satisfactory, as the bullocks were continually in danger of
suffocation, from the bar twisting and tightening the chain round their
necks. The double band yoke was therefore retained, and it was fitted on
the pole with a clip-band, which, by embracing the upper bar, saved the
necessity of piercing it for the reception of the swivel, and added much
to its strength.

About 1801, horses were first used for the draught of guns in India.
Experimental horse artillery was formed, and two galloper-guns were
attached to each cavalry regiment. The original plan has been followed
with little variation up to the present time; each horse of the team was
ridden, and the guns were worked by the men who rode the horses. The
chief advantages of this system are economy, greater exertion to be got
out of the horses in a difficulty, and a smaller number of men and
horses exposed to an enemy’s fire; its disadvantages are, the horses
being overweighted, and a liability, from the paucity of numbers, of a
gun being crippled in action by a few casualties. It may, however, after
many years’ experience, be pronounced a system combining with economy a
very considerable degree of efficiency.

The bullocks, much improved by the arrangements of 1809, which
transferred them to the care of the artillery, continued the sole
draught animal of the foot artillery until 1818, when an experimental
12–pounder battery was horsed with a limited number of an inferior
description of cattle: yet, under these disadvantages, so superior did
this battery prove, that others were soon afterwards similarly equipped,
and their numbers gradually increased until 1827, when it was decided
that all the light field-batteries should be horsed; so convinced had
the local Government and the Court of Directors become of the utility of
the measure. But scarcely were the orders issued, when one of those
extraordinary changes, so often to be met with in Indian arrangements,
consequent on the change in the head of the Government, took place, and
in 1828 the horses were ordered to be sold, and their place to be
supplied with bullocks. Against this arrangement, destructive of the
efficiency of the regiment, the representations of the commandant of
artillery were of no avail; and the remonstrances of a general officer,
unwilling to be left with an inefficient field-artillery, were met by
the reply that the change had been resolved on “not only from motives of
economy, but from a conviction that the number and efficiency of the
horse artillery rendered the maintenance of horse field-batteries
unnecessary;” as if the duties and use of the two branches of the arm
were not quite distinct and incompatible with one another!

The horse-batteries being thus extinguished, for many years there was
not a foot field-battery that could be considered efficient for service;
fortunately it was a period of profound peace, or the twelve troops of
horse artillery would have proved but a “broken reed” to rest upon as
the whole effective field-artillery of an army mustering, perhaps,
80,000 men, and scattered over a country twelve hundred miles in length,
with hostile powers bordering on it in all directions.

In 1835, attempts were made to turn the enduring powers of the camel to
gun-draught. Arguing on the fact that the animal had in former times
been employed in draught, and that in the present day he is used in the
plough in the Hurrianah and other sandy districts, Major Pew made many
experiments, and at length succeeded so far, that Government authorized
a battery to be fitted for this draught at Dehli, and it was placed
under the command of Captain W. Anderson. Its first performances, when
with the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, appeared to promise well—so
well, indeed, that on the formation of the Army of the Indus, it was
attached to it under the command of Captain A. Abbott. In the field,
however, it did not keep up its character; while the ground was smooth
and sandy, the camels worked well, but in moist or slippery soil they
were continually liable to accidents, and in ground intersected by
trenches they were peculiarly awkward; at all times they were found
deficient in muscular exertion, weight constituting their sole power of
traction; and when the work became hard, and food scarce, they knocked
up completely and suddenly, without any warning; and on the army moving
from Candahar towards Ghuznee, the camels were replaced by the horse and
yaboo of the country. A second battery, which proceeded to Scinde in
1843, fared no better. A third, stationed at Nusseerabad, seems to
answer for cantonment duties, but we believe has not been tried in any
other way. The result of the experiments appears to be, that though the
camel will answer as gun-draught in particular localities, he will not
do for a battery which is liable to move in all directions.

The war in Afghanistan forced on the Government the necessity of
improving their field-artillery, and as a commencement, a battery on the
frontier was supplied with cast horses from the horse artillery and
cavalry; but on the apparent termination of the war in 1840, with a view
to economy, these horses were withdrawn and replaced, with much delay,
with bullocks, leaving the frontier, on which our dubious friends the
Sikhs could in a week have mustered 100,000 men and 200 pieces of
artillery, with no other artillery than one or two 6–pounder troops of
horse artillery, and this battery ill equipped with bullocks and drivers
from the Commissariat; and such was its state when the Afghan reverses
broke upon India like a clap of thunder.

In 1841, the orders of the Court of Directors were received, to
supersede bullocks entirely by horses, camels, and elephants, which were
supposed likely to form cheap and efficient field-batteries, horses were
given to a few, and one was furnished with elephants. We believe no one
expected that this latter would answer. The awkward line of traction,
the great power of the animal, and the fear of his becoming unmanageable
under fire, were the obvious objections; to which might be added the
disadvantage of the whole power of draught being concentrated in one
animal, in case of this one being wounded, and which his great bulk
rendered extremely probable. After two years’ experience, the elephant
was rejected from field-artillery; but it was proposed to use his
strength more advantageously in the movement of siege-guns, where
several of the objections would not apply, particularly that of being
exposed to an enemy’s fire. During the recent campaign on the Sutlej,
elephants were used in siege-guns, and also in a battery of iron
12–pounders; but although this battery was provided with spare limbers,
with bullocks for carrying it into action, yet, by some mismanagement,
the elephants were used at Sobraon, and, as had been anticipated, took
fright at the first shot which passed over them, and ran off to the rear
with the limbers, proving clearly the soundness of the opinion
originally pronounced against their use for field-artillery.

We believe, too, that they are to be given up for siege-artillery, but
not, we think, on such sound grounds; their adoption was an experiment;
the harness intended for field-guns was transferred to siege, without
alteration, and, as might have been expected, proved too weak: whether a
stronger pattern, which was recommended, was used in the hurried march,
by which the heavy guns were brought up from Dehli to the Sutlej, and
how that answered; whether the animals proved themselves unequal to the
work, or whether, as a means of instituting a fair comparison, a gun
drawn by bullocks accompanied the elephants, and moved with greater ease
or difficulty, we know not; but we think it is a pity that the animal
has not been fairly tried, or if so, that the experiments have not been
recorded and published for general information.

CHAPTER V.

Reorganization in 1796 of the army—Successive additions to artillery
companies—Ceylon—Seringapatam—Introduction of horse
artillery—Egypt—Deficiency of artillery—Organization of
1801–2—Composition of the regiment—Foreign service—Sieges of
Sarsnee, Bidgygurh, and Cutchwarah.

The supercession which the officers of the Indian army suffered by those
of H.M.’s service; the slowness of promotion; the absence of any
furlough regulations enabling them from time to time to visit their
native country without giving up their profession; the want of a
provision on which to retire, together with other disabilities, had
engendered much discontent[36] in the army, and rendered it absolutely
necessary that the defects in its constitution should be remedied, lest
the whole machine should be rendered unfit for the duties required from
it; and with this view, Lord Cornwallis prepared a plan on his voyage to
England, and submitted it to the Home Government; previously, however,
many representations had been made by the armies of the three
presidencies, and they selected from their own officers in England
agents to superintend their interests, and urge on H. M.’s ministers and
the Court of Directors their claims to be placed on a liberal footing.

Captain Burnett on this occasion represented the Bengal Artillery, and
in the Committee combated the views of Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Dundas,
of uniting the artillery of the three presidencies into one corps, and
then incorporating it with the Royal Artillery.

In the remarks on Lord Cornwallis’s propositions by Sir Henry Crosby
(president of the Home Committee), we find that the Bengal Artillery
officers declared that “an union of the army of the three presidencies
promises no advantage to the service in general, nor any fair one to the
respective officers of each presidency in particular: it would but
render the officers less acquainted with the language, manners,
religion, and customs of the natives of their respective corps
(lascars), who, in Bengal and on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar,
are scarce less different from each other than all are from Europeans,
and in the adjustment of individual rank would create, perhaps,
insurmountable difficulties.

“Every officer now in the Company’s service commenced his career at a
particular presidency, and took, as was reasonable and inevitable, his
chance of quick or slow promotion, according to the casualties of his
own establishment. These casualties of natural death, of actual service,
and of increased or diminished establishments, have made such an
alteration in the general proportion of promotion, that he who went with
General Goddard an old lieutenant to Bombay, would, in the event of an
union of the three presidencies, find himself superseded by one whom he
left a cadet on that establishment: the Bengal officers therefore could
never agree, nor would the liberality of the officers of the other
presidencies wish that all should be melted into one mass mutually
interchangeable, without first equalizing the rank of the officers of
each establishment by a reference to their original appointments as
cadets; and the difficulties of such a reference, with its consequent
effects, need not be pointed out.

“They have likewise declared that an incorporation with the King’s
artillery will be a sacrifice of their dearest interests.” But that in
“the event of a general transfer of the Bengal army to the King’s
service, the three battalions of artillery on that establishment should
be completed, agreeably to seniority, to a full complement of officers
of all ranks above that of lieutenant-fireworker, and established to the
same number of battalions of artillery, supposing each battalion in the
two services to contain the same number of companies, if not in
proportion to the number of companies in the King’s service in the time
of war; and, being thus completed, that they may be then transferred,
and always remain independent; that the officers in the battalions do
afterwards rise by regular gradation, as vacancies occur in either
battalion, agreeably to the present practice, without being, in either
case, subject to removal to other corps, or to exchange with, or
supercession from, officers in any other corps whatsoever; and that
these three battalions, so transferred, be not relieved from Europe or
any other quarter, at this present, or any future time, or in any manner
whatsoever, but be stationed in Bengal as heretofore.”

It was also urged that an incorporation of the artillery would tend to
augment the mutual discontents, which had so long subsisted between the
King’s and Company’s troops in India, in this branch, in proportion as
the evil was removed from the other branches of the service; for as the
incorporation would certainly be directly contrary to the wishes of all
the Company’s artillery officers, so it was believed that those of
H.M.’s service would not be less averse to it, seeing that they were to
admit strangers to a participation of their rights in return for a very
distant and precarious advantage. Each would therefore consider the
other as an intruder, jealousies and animosities would be the inevitable
consequence of such a contest of opposite interests and inclinations,
while the public service could not fail of being deeply injured by the
constant operation of such destructive passions.

The contemplated transfer of the artillery (and European infantry) to
the King’s army was looked upon as highly prejudicial, not only to the
interests of that branch, but to the Company’s army at large, as tending
to lower the respectability of the portion left, and on this account was
strongly opposed by the whole of the agents from the armies of the three
presidencies, and eventually their exertions were successful; the whole
army was left with the Directors (perhaps more from the Ministry not
being strong enough to carry the point, or sufficiently at leisure to
organize the details immediately necessary), its organization was
however considerably altered, and the service of the East-India Company
materially improved; furlough and retiring rules were introduced, a
larger proportion of field-officers given, and a general code of
regulations made.

It is only necessary here to notice these as they affected the
artillery. The organization detailed at the conclusion of the last
chapter took place, and many officers[37] obtained brevet rank to
equalize their ranks with the rest of the army, and a very fair
proportion of officers was given to each company; viz. a captain,
captain-lieutenant, two lieutenants, and a lieutenant-fireworker.
Seventy-four non-commissioned officers and gunners are not sufficient
when they are liable to be much detached, and when vacancies cannot be
filled by ready-trained men.

The artillery being found numerically insufficient for the duties
required from it, in October, 1798, it was increased by an addition of
two non-com. officers, two gunners, and[38] four matrosses per company,
and a detail of golundaz of one jemadar, three havildars, three naiks,
and forty privates to each of the eleven companies in Bengal (the other
four companies were at Ceylon and Madras, and they were added to these
early next year); thus adding upwards of nine hundred men. These were
raised by selecting the best-qualified men from age, size, and good
conduct, from the lascars, and enlisting in general Mahommedans, “under
an express stipulation, on oath, previous to their being enrolled,” of
“their engaging to embark on board of ship whenever the service shall
require their proceeding by sea;” their age was limited from twenty to
twenty-eight years, and their height from five feet seven inches to five
feet ten inches. The required number was soon raised, and were so well
drilled and disciplined by the following February, that the
Commander-in-Chief on inspecting them “expressed his pleasure and
surprise at the creditable state into which they had been so rapidly
brought.”

This admixture of natives with Europeans was injudicious, for although
at first sight it might be supposed that the effect would have been the
same on the native artilleryman as on the lascar, and that he would have
acquired, from constant contact with Europeans, a portion of their
hardness of character, and lost his own prejudices, yet it must be
remembered that the lascar was looked upon as an inferior grade, and
never took an equal part in the duties of the gun as was intended with
the native artillerymen, and therefore the European never felt his own
credit or safety entrusted to the former, while with the latter both
were intimately connected; distrust and jealousy were the result, and
the admixture was found to work so ill, that it was soon discarded; it
being found that, valuable as native artillerymen are alone, they became
worse than useless when mixed with Europeans.

As the opinion of so practical and experienced a man as the late Sir
John Horsford on this point will bear considerable weight, we quote it.
“The European saw a native made a constituent part of that detail of the
posts of the gun, of which he was one; he viewed this native with
jealousy, and diffident of his ability (perhaps without reason) to serve
the vent, or manage the portfire, he positively refused to stand between
the wheels, as either sponge-man or loader, urging, in spite of
reasoning on the matter, that ‘it was hard to be blown away by a black
fellow.’ The native, on the other hand, perceiving the European hostile
to him, and suspicious of mischief, refused in his turn to take the
sponge-staff or be server; declaring that he might be ‘blown away by the
design or carelessness of the European.’ Discord, recrimination, and
hatred were the consequences.

“But this was not all, the ‘component part’ looked around and saw itself
a miserable handful of men isolated, and put down in a company composed
of men of different language and country, and dissimilar habits and
religion, unsupported by number and marked as an inferior body, by
having no rank amongst them higher than that of a jemadar. They saw
themselves considered as so many shreds and patches on the coat of a
European company, and pointed at by the sipahis as a laughing-stock:
lastly, that in the eyes of their own officers they were viewed as
unprofitable interlopers, who brought no promotion in return for the
trouble of disciplining them.”

The regiment at this time (1799) therefore was constituted as below:—

───────────────────────┬───────────┬───────────┬───────────┬───────────
│ per │ per │ Total. │ Returns
│ Company. │Battalion. │ │Feb. 1799.
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Lieut.-Colonels. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Majors. │ │ 1│ 3│ 3
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Captains. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Lieutenants. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 29
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 13
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Serjeants. │ 5│ 25│ 75│ 73
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Corporals. │ 5│ 25│ 75│ 73
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Drummers. │ 2│ 10│ 30│ 30
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Gunners. │ 10│ 50│ 150│ 146
───────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Matrosses. │ 70│ 350│ 1050│ 751
──────────┬────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Golundas. │Jemadars. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 10
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │Havildars. │ 3│ 15│ 45│ 28
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │Naicks. │ 3│ 15│ 45│ 27
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │Golundas. │ 40│ 200│ 600│ 358
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
Lascars. │Serangs. │ 1│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │1st Tindals.│ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │2nd Tindals.│ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────┼────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────
〃 │Lascars. │ 70│ 70│ 2100│ 2055
──────────┴────────────┴───────────┴───────────┴───────────┴───────────

1,380 Europeans, 705 golundaz, and 2,250 lascars, or a total of
4,335.[39] The infantry of the army at this period amounted to
40,000,[40] so that the artillery was in the proportion of one to every
nine infantry soldiers, a proportion less than that usually considered
sufficient in European armies, but considerably greater than has been
preserved in the successive changes which have taken place in this
regiment, and which we shall remark on as these changes come to be
detailed.

In January, 1797, Major-General Duff being expected from England, whose
arrival would supersede Colonel Deare in command of the artillery, it
was declared this latter officer’s tour for command in the field as
colonel of the artillery, and in March (29) General Duff assumed the
command of the regiment.

General Duff joined the regiment in September, 1762, and was present at
the battle of Buxar, where his conduct elicited the laudatory mention of
his name in the Government reply to Major Munro. He does not appear to
have been again employed on active service for some years; as a major he
was selected to command the battalion of artillery raised for the Nawab
of Oude in 1776, and on its reduction he commanded the artillery at
Futteygurh. In 1780 he attained his lieutenant-colonelcy, and commanded
the regiment during Colonel Pearse’s absence on service in the Carnatic.
In 1788, he went to England, and returning in 1791–2, was appointed to
command the Bengal Artillery of the army under Lord Cornwallis, in which
capacity he was present during the last campaign, and prepared the
battering-train against Seringapatam. At the conclusion of the war, he
again returned to England, in consequence of the Court of Directors (to
whom a reference had been made) refusing to allow him to command a
battalion and the brigade of artillery. The refusal may have originated
in his rank of colonel, as the promotion, in the place of
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare (killed at Sattimungulum), was delayed
until the reply came from home; or from his junior officer Colonel G.
Deare having been intermediately appointed. Whatever the cause was, it
had ceased to operate in 1797, as he was then appointed to the command.
He did not, however, hold it long, for the following month he was
appointed to command at the Presidency, and Colonel Hussey succeeded to
the regiment.

Major-General Duff was a man of a powerful frame of body; anecdotes of
his strength are told to the present day; on one occasion, a leopard
sprung suddenly upon him, but seizing the animal by the throat, they
rolled over and over, the general never relinquishing his grasp until
the animal was fairly powerless, when he was easily put an end to. On
another occasion, finding a sentry asleep over the park, he took a
6–pounder[41] off its carriage and carried it under his arm (_doorbien
ke mooafik_, as an old native officer, at that time his orderly,
described it) “like a telescope.”

Major-General Duff returned to Europe in December, 1797—Major-General G.
Deare succeeding him in the command at the Presidency, and as the
vice-president of the Military Board, in the absence of the
Commander-in-Chief; Colonel Hussey, the commandant of artillery, acting
in the latter capacity till his arrival.

Colonel Hussey had but a short tenure of the command, for his promotion
to major-general being known in India in September, 1798, it was
declared in orders, “that Colonel Hussey having attained the rank of
major-general, came under the influence of the Minutes of Council, 5
June, 1797,” and “Lieutenant-Colonel C. Green, the senior officer of
artillery, under the rank of a general officer,” was ordered to “conduct
the regimental duties and details, until further orders.”

The unsettled state of the great Mahratta powers, and the threatening
aspect of Zeman Shah, with whom the deposed Nawab of Oude, Vizier Ali,
had been corresponding, rendered the assembly of an army of observation
necessary to the defence of British India; a considerable force was
assembled under Sir James Craig at Anopsheher, with which were five
companies of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodburn; but this force
appears to have been very ill equipped with ammunition, a circumstance
noticed by Sir J. Craig to Lord Mornington:—“Our proportion of musket
ammunition is 120 rounds per man, and that for the small-arms of the
cavalry is 40; with this, I certainly would not venture to stir a step
from the Ganges, and how we are to gut up more, in the time in which I
think it is probable that it may be requisite for us to do so, I know
not: I have written in strong terms to the Commander-in-Chief on the
subject. For our artillery, we have 300 rounds; but that is, if
possible, still less equal to what we ought to have, at least, in a
depôt to which we could have a much more ready access than we have to
Chunar or Allahabad. The latter should be our grand depôt, in which
should be lodged a quantity of stores of every species, equal to every
possible emergency; while a field-depôt, fed continually from it, should
move successively from post to post as we advance, and be always at hand
to renew our deficiencies.”

The unprovided state in which the army in advance had been left, is an
instance how ill the machinery of the Military Board had worked. A
divided responsibility produced its never-failing result. No one member
feeling it his particular duty to provide for the contingencies which
might occur, the whole was left to chance, and the nearest magazine, on
which the brigades at Cawnpoor and Futteygurh were dependent, was
Chunar. Had there been one head to the Ordnance department, this would
not have happened. In this instance, from Zeman Shah retiring, no harm
occurred, but far from taking warning and being better provided for the
future, we shall find that when, in 1805, Lord Lake sat down before
Bhurtpoor, there was the same want of equipment, and that time it
resulted in our lamentable failure.

While one portion of the regiment was in the field on the northern
frontier, another was called on to form part of the army against Tippoo
Sultan, whose proceedings had latterly been of so hostile a nature, that
self-defence forced the British Government to curb his ambitious and
dangerous designs.

The army was collected from all the presidencies. Bengal furnished three
battalions of native volunteers and four companies of European
artillery, with their lascars (eight companies) attached.[42] One of
these companies (5th company 2nd battalion) was taken from Ceylon;
another (3rd company 1st battalion) had been despatched with
Lieutenant-Colonel Errskine’s force to Ganjam the preceding year, and
thence to Hyderabad; and the two remaining ones, the 1st and 2nd of the
3rd battalion, sailed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montague
towards the end of the year, and reached Madras in January, 1799.

The army under Lieutenant-General Harris was put in motion on the 3rd
February, and entered Mysore on the 5th March. The artillery of the
right wing, with which was the battering-train, consisting of four
24–pounders, thirty 18–pounders, eight 12–pounders, two brass 8–inch and
eight 5½ mortars, was under Lieutenant-Colonel Montague’s command.

On the 6th March the right brigade, under Colonel Montresor, was
attacked at Seedaseer, but Tippoo’s troops were driven off. On the 27th
the grand army was attacked at Malavelly, but the loss was trifling, and
on the 5th April the army encamped before Seringapatam, on which night
and the following day the outposts of the army were engaged, in which
action Lieutenant Brooke, of the artillery, was wounded.

Tippoo made no further attempts, but retired within the fort, against
which approaches and batteries were commenced and carried on, the S.W.
angle being the point selected for attack. Batteries were thrown up on
both sides the river; and on the 4th May, the breach being practicable,
the place was stormed.

But little personal record is to be found of the part the artillery took
in this exploit; that their fire was well directed and kept up, the
general orders of the day testify. “The merit of the artillery corps is
so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the
Commander-in-Chief can only desire Colonel Smith[43] to assure the
officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels
most fully their claim to approbation” are the words; but in the routine
of a siege on a large scale, their unremitting duty in the batteries
leaves less to record than on many other occasions far less harassing
and dangerous. Although their casualties were few, one took place which
was deeply regretted: “Lieutenant-Colonel Montague’s arm was shattered
near the shoulder on the 2nd May while in the battery, and required
immediate amputation; for some days he appeared to be going on in a fair
way; a contusion, however, on his chest, occasioned by the same shot,
produced mortification, which caused his death on the 10th May. In him
the regiment lost an officer of whom they may be deservedly proud. His
talents, improved by a regular military education, and his long
experience in active service, rendered him invaluable. In the early part
of his career, his skill in his profession, his zeal and indefatigable
activity, having been displayed on various occasions, he was afterwards
selected for every important service. With General Goddard, with Sir
Eyre Coote, and at the siege of Cuddalore, he was particularly
distinguished, and in the campaigns of Lord Cornwallis he not only
confirmed but increased his established reputation. He was called forth
on the projected expedition against the Isle of France and Manilla, and
finally was chosen to command the Bengal Artillery destined for the
glorious enterprise against Seringapatam.”[44]

Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Montague “was the fourth son of Admiral J.
Montague, and brother of the late Captain James Montague, who commanded
the ship _Montague_ on the glorious 1st June, in which action he was
killed by a cannon-shot while closely engaged with two of the enemy’s
ships, the _Impétueux_ of 74, and _Le Républicain_ of 110 guns.

“Being originally designed for the army, he was placed in the academy at
Woolwich, from whence he was sent out as a cadet to Bengal in the year
1770. On his arrival in Calcutta, there being a superabundance of
officers, he was placed in a separate corps formed for the cadets of
that year, and called the Select Picquet. In this situation he attended
chiefly to his improvement in military knowledge and discipline, and
from the gracefulness of his person, as well as an uncommon activity, he
was soon distinguished by a superior skill and address in the
performance of all military duties.

“After serving twelve months in this corps, he attached himself to the
artillery. While he was a lieutenant-fireworker, by the strict attention
he paid to his duty, the interest he took in his profession, and the
ardour with which he pursued every branch of it, he greatly improved
himself in the knowledge of tactics, and his practice was proportionably
advanced by being on several occasions employed on actual service.

“About the year 1781 he was promoted to the command of a company. He was
sent to join General Goddard, who was employed to demolish various forts
in the Rohilla country, several of which were defended with the most
obstinate bravery. In attacking one of them he was wounded by an arrow
while attempting to force the gates, which, entering just below the eye,
penetrated obliquely through part of the jaw, and almost reached the
opposite cheek. Without a moment’s hesitation, he broke the arrow off
close to the iron barb, and continued at the head of his corps till the
object of the attack was accomplished. The barb remained in his face
several days, and was at length extracted with great skill by Dr. Brinch
Harwood,[45] now professor of anatomy in the University of Cambridge. In
these active scenes Captain Montague completely established his military
character, gained the confidence and recorded approbation of his
commanding officer, and greatly advanced the good opinion and regard
which General Goddard had already entertained for him.[46]

“In the year 1782, Captain Montague was called forth to join Sir Eyre
Coote on the coast of Coromandel. Captain Montague was in every
engagement, and in services where so much real military merit was
displayed, it is no common praise to say he was always peculiarly
distinguished. He obtained the rank of major, and at Cuddalore, in 1784,
he was appointed to command the artillery of one of the wings of the
army, and there manifested his superior judgment by taking post on an
eminence which produced the greatest advantages, and it was honourably
acknowledged by a French officer of rank who was stationed to oppose
him. On his return to Bengal, he was employed in Oude until the
memorable expedition of the Marquis Cornwallis to Seringapatam. On this
important service Major Montague was selected to attack the stupendous
fortresses of Nunder-droog and Ramali-droog.

“The chief engineer having reported Nunderdroog to be a fortress of
uncommon strength, his lordship ordered Major Montague to proceed with
his best train of artillery from Bangalore to join the army encamped
about half-way to the place of attack. The expedition with which he
performed that duty excited the astonishment, as it called forth the
applause, of Lord Cornwallis; and though he was the youngest artillery
officer with the army, he was entrusted with the conduct of the
artillery employed in the reduction of that important fortress. His
skill, courage, and talents were crowned with complete success, and the
thanks of the Commander-in-Chief expressed in the strongest terms the
sense he entertained of his eminent services. The manner, also, in which
he was entrusted with the command of the artillery employed against
Severn-droog, manifested the great confidence which the Marquis
Cornwallis possessed in his military enthusiasm and professional
abilities.[47]

“In the year 1794, Major Montague was advanced to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, and was third on the list of the artillery officers
when he was chosen to direct the artillery attached to the Bengal army,
and which was destined to join General Harris, commander-in-chief, in
the late glorious enterprise against Seringapatam, where this gallant
and most distinguished officer found his most honourable grave.

“If it is true, as has been asserted, that the commander of the
artillery, Colonel Smith, a brave and deserving officer, had, from a
long succession of illness, become too infirm to be continually in the
trenches, the executive duty must have necessarily devolved upon
Lieut.-Colonel Montague, who was next in command. But be that as it may,
it is certain that three days previous to the capture of Seringapatam, a
cannon-ball shattered his arm, while he was in the trenches, in such a
manner as to require immediate amputation, and it was taken off within
an inch of the shoulder. In this state, however, such was his zealous,
active, and unconquerable spirit, he insisted on being carried into the
trenches, where he continued to the last to encourage by his presence
the troops, who adored him. During three or four days, it was hoped and
believed that he was in a fair way of recovery; but having by the same
shot received a contusion in his chest, it turned to a mortification,
and carried him off on the eighth day after he had received his wound.

“Thus fell Lieut.-Colonel Edward Montague, in the forty-fifth year of
his age, lamented as he was beloved by the whole army; leaving a
widow[48] and three orphans, the youngest of whom was born a fortnight
before his glorious but lamentable death. He served the Honourable
East-India Company with zeal, fidelity, and superior military talents,
during an honourable course of twenty-nine years; had been in more
engagements than usually happens even to an active soldier, and had been
noticed with the most flattering distinction by every commanding officer
under whom he had served. On this last occasion his being only mentioned
in the general list of killed and wounded, without a single word of
regret or eulogium, causes the mingled emotions of grief and
astonishment[49] in the minds of his afflicted family and friends.

“In private life he was not less distinguished than in his public
services. He was benevolent and generous, possessing at the same time
the most frank and candid disposition. He was an affectionate husband, a
tender father, and a dutiful son. He loved his country with a patriotic
ardour, and he died in the contest to extend its dominion and its glory.

“He will live long in the remembrance of all who knew him; and it
remains for the nation whom he served so well, and for whom he died too
soon, to transmit his name to the times that are to come.” (_Asiatic
Annual Register_, 1800.)

[Illustration]

After the fall of Seringapatam, one of the Bengal companies (5th company
2nd battalion) returned to Ceylon, and one (3rd company 1st
battalion)[50] to Cawnpoor with the 10th regiment native infantry, and
the remaining two companies (1st and 2nd company 3rd battalion)
continued with the brigades in Mysore, and were present at the
occupation of Bednore and Hurryhur and pursuit of Doondia Khan, under
Major-General Wellesley: they returned to Bengal in September, 1801.
Medals of the annexed pattern were granted to all the native troops
engaged in the expedition.

The following regimental order was issued by Colonel Green, R. O.,
September 19, 1801:—“Colonel Green feels a particular pleasure in
congratulating Captain Tomkyns, the officers and soldiers of his
detachment, upon their safe return from a long and arduous service, to
join the regiment he has the honour to command, and he deems it his
duty, in justice to the meritorious zeal and professional exertions
shewn by the Bengal artillery during the late various campaigns in
Mysore and in the pursuit of Doondia Khan, to thank him and them thus
publicly and in the name of the corps to whose general reputation the
good conduct of the detachment has so highly contributed: at the same
time that Colonel Green has to lament their diminution in point of
numbers since they quitted Bengal, it must reflect additional credit on
them that, however thus weakened by casualties incidental to long
warfare, they have ever manifested a cheerful, patient, and steady
adherence to the active performance of those services they have been
called upon for, under many trying and fatiguing exigencies; they are in
consequence most justly entitled to the character of good and veteran
soldiers, and as such, will ever merit his warmest support and good
offices.”

The 5th company 2nd battalion returned to Ceylon, and when the Kandian
insurrection broke out, in 1802, marched with General MᶜDouall’s army
from Columbo, and assisted in the capture of Kandy; it remained as part
of the garrison when the general returned in April to Columbo.

The following month the general came back, and trusting in the
professions of the king, and thinking all was settled, again retired,
taking with him the whole force except 200 men, H.M.’s 19th regiment,
500 Malays, and a detachment of artillery, Major Davies commanding the
whole, and Lieutenant Humphreys the artillery.

Their position was attacked 23–4th of June, 1803, and the following day
Major Davies capitulated, under the conditions that he was to march off,
with arms and ammunition. The garrison retired to the river at
Allemgonath, and halted, intending to pass the next day, but the
Kandians set upon them, and, worn out with fatigue and hunger, they laid
down their arms, and delivered themselves up as prisoners. The Europeans
were immediately murdered, except nine of the officers; about 500 Malays
and lascars were made prisoners; six 6–pounders, three howitzers, and a
5½ inch howitzer were lost.[51]

Lieutenant Humphreys was kept a prisoner for a time, but in September,
on some solemn festival, was brought out and executed by order of the
king. The native prisoners were mutilated by cutting off their noses and
ears.

Reinforcements arrived, and the war was successfully prosecuted; most of
the ordnance and many of the lascars were recaptured, and in October,
1804, the company, and the 5th company 1st battalion, returned to
Bengal. On its departure the following order was issued:—

“The governor cannot allow Captain Edward Clarke, of the Bengal
artillery, to leave this island, with the detachment under his command,
without expressing his thanks to that officer for the useful and active
services which he has rendered to the government of Ceylon during a
period of more than eight years.

“He requests Captain Clarke to communicate to the non-commissioned
officers and privates of the artillery, and to the detachment of
lascars, his approbation of their conduct, and his wishes for their
future prosperity.”

In following out the services of these companies, we have anticipated a
little, and it is now therefore requisite to go back a few years.
Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, coupled, as it had been, with intrigues
with Tippoo Sultan, alarmed Government as to his views on India, and
rendered it necessary to take some steps in self-defence, to check his
career of conquest.

Lord Nelson had destroyed the French fleet in the Bay of Aboukir; an
army from England, under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, had effected a landing
in Egypt, and to co-operate with the latter, Lord Wellesley prepared
detachments from the three presidencies, which, landing at Cossier or
Suez, were to hem in the French army, deprived of all communication with
France between the two armies. Towards this detachment, Bengal
contributed a detachment of horse and foot artillery. H.M.’s 10th
regiment of foot, and 1,200 sipahi volunteers.

Horse artillery, which had for some time been used in European warfare,
was now about being introduced into India. It appears to have been first
used by the Russians in the campaigns of 1757–8–9 against the Prussians,
whose light cavalry often found themselves, at the time they felt sure
of success, opposed by batteries of cannon, although no infantry were
present. Frederick the Great introduced it into his army in 1759, and
took great pains to exercise and instruct them himself in his camp near
Landstruth, and soon found the arm of essential use.

The Austrians followed the example about 1780, and since that period it
has been introduced into all European armies, though with considerable
variation in the weight and calibre of the guns, and in the manner of
mounting the gunners.

Some experimental horse artillery was raised, and part of it accompanied
the expedition to Egypt; it was however embarked almost as soon as
raised, so that no time was allowed for its acquiring any experience.
From the returns, a portion of the Governor-General’s body-guard was
attached to it, and altogether but 36 horses.

───────────────┬───────────────┬──
European. │Brevet-Captain.│ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Act. Conductor.│ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Sergeants. │ 3
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Corporals. │ 3
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Farriers. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Gunners. │ 6
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Matrosses. │14
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
Body-Guard. │Jemadar. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Havildars. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Naiks. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Troopers. │22
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Lascars. │11
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Syees. │27
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Grass-cutters. │27
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
Golundaz. │Havildars. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Naiks. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Privates. │20
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
Lascars. │1st Tindals. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Lascars. │40
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Syees. │ 9
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Grass-cutters. │ 9
───────────────┴───────────────┴──

With a quartermaster’s and train-artificer’s establishment:
Brevet-Captain Clement Brown commanded it.

The foot artillery, under Captain-Lieutenant Flemyng, consisted of—

───────────────┬───────────────┬──
European. │Captain-Lieut. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Lieutenants. │ 2
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Sergeants. │ 4
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Corporals. │ 4
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Gunners. │ 6
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Matrosses. │24
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
Golundaz. │Jemadar. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Havildars. │ 3
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Naiks. │ 3
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Privates. │40
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
Lascars. │Serang. │ 1
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │1st Tindals. │ 3
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 6
───────────────┼───────────────┼──
〃 │Lascars. │93
───────────────┴───────────────┴──

Lieutenants Drummond and Starke were with this detachment.

A bounty of one month’s pay and full batta was given to each native
officer and soldier who embarked, and all possible attention was paid to
the laying in the stock of provisions and water under their own
inspection.

The foot artillery embarked on 27th November, reached Trincomalee on the
13th November, and Bombay on the 27th March, 1801; the horse artillery
embarked in February.

The first division of transports reached Cossier on the 17th May; the
disembarkation immediately took place, and on the 21st June the army
commenced its march across the desert in successive small detachments,
following each other at intervals, on account of the scarcity of water;
mussuls were sent forward with each detachment, and returned for the use
of the succeeding one; much suffering was experienced in this march; the
extreme heat and want of water killed many men and horses; but it was
observed in this, as in subsequent cases, that Europeans bore the
exposure and drought better than natives.

The guns of the foot artillery were drawn by bullocks brought from
Bombay; and the horse artillery joined the army which was collected at
Ghennah about the middle of July, and the whole embarked in jermes, or
country boats, on the 31st, and sailed down the Nile. The stream was
rapid, and they floated successively past towns and ruins, pyramids and
other monuments of mystic Egypt; and on the 7th August reached Gizah,
and on the 8th and following days disembarked and encamped on the Isle
of Roda, where they remained till the 28th, awaiting orders from General
Hutchinson; on their reception they once more embarked, and arrived at
Rosetta[52] on the 31st August,—too late to participate in any of the
service.

The detachment remained in Egypt till May, 1802, when it marched from
Gizeh (near Cairo) to Suez, detachments following each other
successively, and completed it in five marches, losing only three
Europeans by the way. On the 5th June the head-quarters embarked on
H.M.S. _Victor_, and reached Calcutta towards the end of July.

The foot artillery, under command of Lieutenant Starke (Lieutenant
Drummond[53] having returned to Calcutta on sick leave in September,
1801, and Captain-Lieutenant Flemyng most probably having sailed direct
for England from the same cause, for he does not appear to have returned
to India, nor to have been in Egypt in October, 1801, and he
subsequently retired in England in December, 1802), returned in the
_Commerce_, and the men composing the detachment rejoined their
companies in Fort William on the 1st August, 1802. The horse artillery
disembarked on the 4th August, and rejoined the remainder of the
experimental horse artillery.

[Illustration]

The services of these detachments were acknowledged by the
Governor-General on their landing, in Orders, from which the following
is an extract:—“Under a grateful impression of the important aid derived
to the common cause of our country by the able and successful conduct of
the expedition from India to Egypt, his Excellency is pleased to order,
that honorary medals be conferred on all the native officers,
non-commissioned officers, troopers, sipahis, golundaz, and gun-lascars
who have been employed on the service in Egypt.”

The insufficiency of the artillery in India had early attracted Lord
Mornington’s attention; in June, 1799, we find him writing to Mr.
Dundas—“Our artillery throughout India is very deficient. * * * I cannot
too strongly press the necessity of attention to the artillery in India:
if you do not send out ample supplies of proper men and officers for
this useful corps, it will soon fall to ruin; it is already on the
decay,—a larger annual supply of cadets, and a reduction of the export
of writers would tend to recruit it.”

The Court of Directors had previously (July 5th, 1797) “advised the
Government of their intention to send out properly-qualified cadets for
the artillery, and prohibited the transfer of any infantry officers” to
that branch, and “with a view to promote emulation in the cadets for the
artillery or engineer corps who are educated at Woolwich,” the Court
“resolved (5th March, 1800) to make it a standing regulation, that those
who by their progress in the different studies are first reported
qualified to proceed to India, shall have precedence in rank in the
general list of cadets appointed for the respective presidencies;” and
this order was highly approved by the Governor-General in his minute on
establishing the College of Fort William.

In July, 1800, Lord Wellesley writes again to Mr. Dundas,—“Every
augmentation of native troops in India should be accompanied by a due
augmentation of the European force, artillery as well as infantry.

“The Company’s European artillery are everywhere extremely weak. The
fixed establishment of this corps is defective at all the presidencies,
and the numbers wanting to complete even that defective establishment
are now so considerable that I intend without delay to reduce one of the
Company’s European regiments in Bengal for the purpose of augmenting the
artillery of this presidency. * * * But the best remedy I may be able to
apply will be insufficient, on account of the great deficiency of
officers of artillery: some companies have now no more than one
commanding officer doing duty with them. This deficiency proceeds, in a
great measure, from the original deficiency of the establishment in
point of commanding officers, and partly from the neglect of a regular
supply of cadets.”

It is probable that men were allowed to volunteer from the European
regiments for the artillery at once, for the returns of the regiment
shew that 277 men joined “from other corps” in the months of July,
August, and September, 1801, but the 2nd European regiment was not
reduced until the February following. At the same time, two companies
were added to each battalion of artillery, and the strength raised to 1
captain, 1 captain-lieutenant, 2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenant-fireworkers,
5 sergeants, 5 corporals, 2 drummers, 10 gunners, and 80 matrosses; the
companies, however, remained incomplete, for upwards of 800 men were
deficient.

This increase was reluctantly sanctioned by the Home authority, for we
find Mr. Dundas writing to the Court of Directors, 30th June, 1801, on
the subject of the liquidation of their debts:—“Mr. Wright observes,
that if the addition to the artillery could be postponed, it would save
£54,000; but I consider the addition to your artillery establishment to
be of such deep importance to the security of your extended Indian
empire, that I do not think the saving suggested should be adopted.” The
authority was therefore given, and Lord Wellesley, in writing to General
Lake, says, “in issuing the order for the reduction of the 2nd European
regiment, I request your Excellency to annex to it the order for the
augmentation of the artillery, as directed by the Honourable Court. The
improvement of our artillery is a point of such importance, that I am
resolved not to postpone it under any circumstances whatever.”

The augmentation was accordingly carried into effect; the companies were
levelled, so as to divide the old gunners and matrosses equally among
the companies, and they were filled up as well as they could be from the
volunteers who joined; and the regiment consisted, at the beginning of
1802, of three battalions, of seven companies each, with thirty
companies of lascars: neither lascars nor golundaz details being added
with the six additional companies; and the golundaz details, all except
nine, were reduced in the following November.

ORGANIZATION OF 1802.

──────────────────────────────┬─────────┬──────────┬─────────┬─────────
│ │ │ │ On the
│ per │ per │ │ returns
│Company. │Battalion.│ Total. │ 1st
│ │ │ │ April,
│ │ │ │ 1802.
──────────┬───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
EUROPEANS.│Colonels. │ -│ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieut.-Colonels │ -│ 1│ 3│ 3
│Commandant. │ │ │ │
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Majors. │ -│ 1│ 3│ 3
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Captains. │ 1│ 7│ 21│ 21
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 1│ 7│ 21│ 21
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieutenants. │ 2│ 14│ 42│ 28
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Lieut.-Fireworkers.│ 2│ 14│ 42│ -
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Serjeants. │ 5│ 35│ 105│ 96
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Corporals. │ 5│ 35│ 105│ 106
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Gunners. │ 10│ 70│ 210│ 187
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Matrosses. │ 80│ 560│ 1680│ 891
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Drummers. │ 2│ 14│ 42│ 46
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
GOLUNDAZ. │Jemadars. │ 1│ 5│ 15│ 15
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Havildars. │ 3│ 15│ 45│ 45
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Naicks. │ 3│ 15│ 45│ 45
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Privates. │ 40│ 200│ 600│ 575
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
LASCARS. │Serangs. │ 1│ 10│ 30│ 30
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │1st Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 2│ 20│ 60│ 60
──────────┼───────────────────┼─────────┼──────────┼─────────┼─────────
〃 │Lascars. │ 70│ 700│ 2100│ 2113
──────────┴───────────────────┴─────────┴──────────┴─────────┴─────────

The men composing the corps of horse artillery were borne on the rolls
of the companies.

The remonstrances of Lord Mornington having thus obtained a numerical
increase to the corps, and the Court’s step of obtaining educated cadets
from Woolwich having prepared men to fill the vacancies in the
commissioned grades (the first of whom had arrived the preceding year),
a new era may be considered as opening in the history of the regiment,
and it may not be uninteresting to consider the state of the corps at
this time.

Of the officers in its early years we have seen sketches in some of
Pearse’s letters already quoted, and from the specimens who lived on
into this century, and of whom many anecdotes are current among the
present seniors of the regiment, they appear to have been deficient not
only in the scientific knowledge necessary for their profession, but
many were without even the ordinary education of gentlemen of that
period; boatswains and gunners in their original calling, they never
rose to the manners and acquirements which are expected in commissioned
officers; they therefore shewed to great disadvantage when contrasted
with the lately-arrived cadets, who to the usual liberal education of
gentlemen had superadded a course of study at Woolwich fitting them for
the attainment of the higher degrees of their professional knowledge. At
the time, too, when they were studying, Indian affairs had awakened
great attention; the wars with Hyder and Tippoo had just been brought to
a conclusion, and all England rang with applause at the gallant and
successful storming of Seringapatam and the expedition to Egypt; their
minds were filled with these subjects, and themselves, on their arrival,
either partaking in or watching the meteor-like career of Lake, how
could they fail receiving a high tone, and infusing it into those who
immediately followed, and thus laying the foundation of a permanent
improvement in the commissioned grades.

But while we must consider many of the old hands deficient in some
qualities requisite to the formation of good officers, let us not forget
the habits of the times in which they lived, nor that these men proved
themselves good and brave soldiers in the many hard services in which
they were employed; “per mare, per terras” might have been their motto.
In the wars of Bengal and the Carnatic they filled their part with
credit, and many are the names from among them which have been handed
down to our respect and esteem both as good soldiers and men of high
talent and conduct. Pearse, Montague, Hutchinson, Duff, of the old
hands, and others, such as Horsford, Clement Brown, Pennington, who
living long into this century may fairly claim no small share in giving
a tone to the present corps, are all names which we should not willingly
allow to be forgotten; and although we may laugh at the anecdotes of the
Hindes, Paschauds, and Greenes, and be tempted to rate the moderns
highly when we look to the bright halo with which the Mahrattas, Nepal,
Ava, and Affghanistan campaigns have encircled the heads of those whom
we delight to honour, let us not forget those who shared in the wars
with Hyder and Tippoo, and in the earlier campaigns in which the
foundation of our Indian empire was laid. “Vixerunt fortes ante
Agamemnona, multi.”

The ranks were filled with men of an indifferent class; the great demand
caused by European wars rendered it difficult to recruit for the
Company’s service, and, as a natural consequence, the worst men were
enlisted. The Regimental Orders, as might be expected, record many
courts-martial and the infliction of punishments to preserve order;
still, however, when any portion was sent on service, they never forgot
what was expected from them, and always supported the national character
by their conduct in the field.[54]

A very mistaken notion as to the composition of the regiment has long
prevailed, and is still repeated by those ignorant of the facts of the
case; it is often affirmed that a large majority of the regiment is
Irish, but from a reference to the long rolls at the period of which we
are writing, we find the respective numbers as stated below,[55] and at
a period six years anterior to it (1795), the proportion of Irish was
still less, the English being 437 and the Irish 284. At the present time
(1845) the English and Irish are nearly equal. We purpose noticing the
constitution of the regiment in this point from time to time at
different epochs, and also adding the casualties wherever we are able to
ascertain them, and this we trust will form a valuable addition to our
knowledge of the statistics of Indian mortality.

Having detailed the formation of 1802, we must revert to the preceding
year to bring up the record of the services of portions of the regiment.

In November, 1801, two complete companies were ordered for foreign
service, to embark on the _Dover Castle_ and _Asia_ Indiamen.

───────────────────────┬───────────────────────┬───────────────────────
Lascar Companies. │4, 1 │5, 3
Company. │9 │5
Battalion. │18 │12
Captains. │A. Fraser │C. Wittit
Captain Lieutenants. │A. Hinde │P. Paschaud
Lieutenants. │Fuller │A. Dunn
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.│C. H. Palmer │S. S. Hay
───────────────────────┴───────────────────────┴───────────────────────

The former company proceeded to Macao, and returned the following
November, but does not appear to have been engaged in any active service
during the expedition. The latter had a much longer absence; for,
reaching Goa in January, 1802, it was sent on to Bombay, and thence to
Guzerat in May, Surat in June, and back to Bombay in October; in
December it was stationed at Tannah, having been detained by the Bombay
Government.[56] In August, 1803, it participated in the successful
attack on Baroach, and then continued with the Bombay army, under
Major-General Jones, and joined the army before Bhurtpore in 1805,
towards the conclusion of the siege; returned to Bombay in 1806, and
reached Fort William in the _Sir William Pulteney_ in July, 1806, after
an absence of nearly five years, reduced to 33 men.

Captain C. Wittit, Captain-Lieutenant Paschaud, and
Lieutenant-Fireworker S. Hay returned to the presidency in March, 1803.
Lieutenant Drummond joined the company in December, 1802, and left in
September following. Captain Watkins and Lieutenant T. D. Smith joined
it at a later period. Lieutenant Dunn appears to have remained with it
throughout.

Other portions of the regiment were called into the field, at the end of
1802, against a powerful zemindar, Bulwunt Sing, who was in possession
of three forts, Sarsnee, Bidgegurh, and Cutchowrah, in the neighbourhood
of Hattrass; these forts were situated in the districts ceded in 1801 by
the Vizier of Oude and Nawab of Furruckabad, to maintain the stipulated
British force. Mustering 20,000 followers, he trusted he could
successfully resist the demand for his jumma, he therefore tendered a
lower sum; this, of course, was refused, and as he appeared determined
not to yield the point, a force was collected against him, which
gradually increased to 4 battalions of infantry, 4 troops of cavalry,
and detachments from 3 companies of artillery, with four 18–pounders,
two 4⅖-inch howitzers, and ten 6–pounders.

Major Gordon, Commandant.

────────┬──────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│ Lascar │Captains.│Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.
│ │Companies.│ │ │
────────┼──────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
1 │ 2 │4, 23, 28 │E. │ │
│ │ │Constable│ │
3 │ 2 │7, 21, 22 │W. │R. Best │
│ │ │Shipton │ │
│ │ │J. │ │A. Mathews
4 │ 2 │ 14, 16 │Robinson │ │T. D. Boyle
│ │ │T. Green │ │
────────┴──────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────────────┴────────────

The trenches were opened against Sarsnee on the 27th December, and a
battery erected on the 4th January, 1803, but at such a distance that
the rownee was not breached; a storm was nevertheless made on the 15th,
which proved unsuccessful.

Lieutenant Boyle was dangerously wounded by a cannon-ball on the 8th,
and died on the 24th of January.

Reinforcements under the Commander-in-Chief arrived, and the siege was
renewed; the approaches being advanced 200 yards, the town was taken on
the 8th February, and on the 11th the garrison abandoned Sarsnee and
fled to Bidgegurh; thither the army moved on the 13th; batteries were
ready on the 21st February, and by the 27th a practicable breach was
effected; during the night, however, the enemy were discovered
evacuating the fort, and next morning it was taken possession of by the
British.

Whilst proceeding round the fort in the morning, most probably with a
view to ascertain the ordnance and stores, Major (Lieutenant-Colonel)
Gordon was killed, along with several sipahis and lascars, by the
accidental explosion of a powder-magazine. In reporting his death, the
Commander-in-Chief says that he felt “particularly indebted for his
exertions, directed by uncommon zeal and ability.”

The Governor-General, in the order published to the army, “deeply
regrets the severe loss which the public service had sustained by the
death of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon;” he also notified his “high
approbation of the gallantry and steadiness displayed by the troops, and
of the readiness with which they submitted to extreme labour under
circumstances of peculiar hardship from the unusual severity of the
weather.”

The force next moved to Cutchowrah, which, after some attempts at
treachery and delay, was given up. Major T. Green had command of the
artillery, and the troops then broke up and returned to their
cantonments, small garrisons being left in Sarsnee and Bidgegurh.

In the contemporary accounts of these sieges we meet with no intimation
of excessive rain having fallen, which, no doubt, adds exceedingly to
the fatigues and hardships incidental to troops in trenches, and we are
therefore rather at a loss to understand what the excessive hardships
caused by the season, adverted to in the general orders, were; the heat
in the month of March, in the provinces, is not overpowering, and we
cannot help smiling when we recollect that within a few months these
very troops were to form part of that army which Lake, contemning the
seasons, led, in the hottest parts of successive years, through the
Dooab and Rajasthan.

CHAPTER VI.

Lord Lake’s campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding golundaz—Increase
of horse artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France and
Java—Bundlecund campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval pattern carriages
introduced—Additional golundaz companies—Head-quarters removed to
Dum Dum.

The conduct of the Mahrattas having rendered hostilities unavoidable,
the Governor-General determined to carry them on upon such a scale as
would completely destroy their power, and, at the same time, eradicate
the French party from the Dooab, where Mr. Perron, nominally a commander
of Scindia’s disciplined brigades, had in reality established a small
independent principality of his own.

To carry out his intentions, the Governor-General assembled forces in
the Dukhun, Guzerat, Cuttack, Mirzapoor, Allahabad, and in the Dooab;
with all of which, except the first, were portions of the Bengal
Artillery.

The main army (in Bengal) was under the personal command of the
Commander-in-Chief, General Lake; the corps composing it were put in
motion early in August, 1803, and collected, on the 13th, at Arowl, on
the Kali Muddee. They reached Coel on the 28th of the same month.

The following artillery were attached to it:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Commandant. Lieutenant Brown, Brigade Major.
Lieutenant Butler, Brigade Quarter-Master.

────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│ Lascar │Captains. │Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.
│ │Companies.│ │ │
────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
1 │ 1 │19, 24, 26│T. Greene │ │
2 │ │ 2, 15 │Raban │Winbolt │
3 │ │ 6, 8 │Nelly │ │
1 │ 2 │4, 23, 28 │Constable │ │
2 │ │ 3, 13 │Hutchinson│ │
3 │ 2 │7, 21, 22 │W. Shipton│Best │Morris
4 │ │ 14, 16 │J. │ │A. Mathews
│ │ │Robinson │ │
────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────

On the 29th August, General Lake attacked Perron’s army, drawn up behind
a jheel, with their right resting on Aligurh. The attack was made by the
cavalry and gallopers, and the enemy drew off towards Agra. Mr. Perron
was left in charge of the fort, with instructions to defend it to the
last extremity.

General Lake determining to storm the fort on the 4th September, during
the night preceding two batteries of four 18–pounders each, under
Captains Greene and Robinson, were erected by Colonel Horsford at a
village in the vicinity and at Perron’s country house, to cover the
advance to the party.

Before daylight the storming party, under Colonel Monson, moved out to
within 400 yards of the fort, and there awaited the morning gun, the
signal for the advance; on its being fired, they moved on, covered by a
heavy fire from the supporting batteries. The fort had been alarmed, and
the gates were closed. The ladders proved too short. A 6–pounder was
sent for to burst the gate open, but proving insufficient, a 12–pounder
was substituted, which succeeded after four or five rounds. During this
delay, the party was exposed to a heavy fire, by which many were
wounded; among others, Captain Shipton, who commanded the guns;
notwithstanding this, he continued to advance with the party. The second
and third gates were stormed, but at the fourth, his gun was again
required, this gate resisted its fire, but the wicket being forced, the
party entered, and obtained possession of the fortress, capturing 281
pieces of ordnance of all kinds.

The artillery lost but 2 Europeans and 4 lascars killed, 7 Europeans and
1 lascar wounded, in addition to Captain Shipton. The services of the
artillery were acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief in his report to
the Governor-General:—“To Captain Shipton, of the artillery, who had
charge of the guns which forced the gate, and who, though wounded, still
remained at his post, I feel myself much indebted. To Colonel Horsford,
who commanded the artillery, as well as Captains Greene and Robinson,
who commanded the covering batteries, I feel myself under infinite
obligations, and indeed the whole corps merit my warmest praise for the
gallantry displayed on this occasion as well as in every other in which
they have been engaged.” The Governor-General in General Orders, 15th
September, 1803, “desires that his particular approbation may be
signified to Captain Shipton, of the artillery, and also to
Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford, Captains Robinson and Greene;” and also
says, “it is with the greatest satisfaction that the Governor-General
expresses his approbation of the bravery, discipline, and steadiness of
the corps of artillery who were employed on this occasion.”

A small detachment of half a corps, with one gun, under Lieutenant
Winbolt, at this time in the cantonment of Shekoabad or Etawah, were
attacked by a large body of horse, under a Mr. Fleury. The first attack,
on the 2nd September, was beaten off, but being renewed on the 4th
September, after several hours’ resistance, the party capitulated, and
were allowed to march off to Cawnpoor with their guns and arms.
Lieutenant Winbolt was wounded in this affair.

The army reached the Jumna, near Delhi, on the 11th, and found the
Mahrattas posted behind intrenchments, with their park of artillery in
front, the whole covered by long grass. The Commander-in-Chief moved on
to reconnoitre with the cavalry, and directed the artillery and infantry
to follow; the front alone was accessible, and the cavalry were exposed
to a heavy cannonade. They moved to the rear to avoid this, and to cover
the advance of the line, but the enemy mistaking it for a retreat, moved
out from their intrenchments. The cavalry opened to allow the infantry
to pass through, who attacked in line, the cavalry forming as a support
in their rear. The advance was made under a tremendous fire of round and
grape, without returning a shot until close, when, firing a volley, they
charged, broke into open column, and allowed the cavalry and gallopers
to pass through and complete the victory.

Colonel Horsford was employed covering the left with four guns and a
battalion from a threatened attack by a body of Seik cavalry.

The loss of the artillery consisted of 3 Europeans and 1 lascar killed,
1 subaltern, 13 Europeans, and 16 lascars wounded. Lieutenant
Mathews[57] lost his leg by a cannon-shot; 67 brass and iron guns, 37
tumbrils of ammunition (besides 24 blown up), and 2 tumbrils of
treasure, were captured on this occasion. The iron guns were of European
manufacture, the brass nearly all cast in India on French models; the
carriages were all fitted with elevating screws, strong and neat, and of
the French pattern; the tumbrils stout, but clumsy; some with modern
draught-chains, others with a trace of raw hide.

General Lake wrote to the Governor-General:—“To Colonel Horsford and
every officer of the corps of artillery I feel myself infinitely
indebted for their meritorious exertions on this occasion;” and in the
general orders of the Governor-General of 1st February we find,—“To
Colonel Horsford and the artillery the Governor-General in Council
repeats the public testimony of approbation which that meritorious corps
has uniformly deserved in every exigency of the service.”

The officers present were the same as at Aligurh, with the exception of
Captain-Lieutenant Best, who was left in charge of the ordnance in that
fortress.

The Governor-General in Council deemed “it to be the duty of the
Government to anticipate the sanction of His Majesty and the Honourable
the Court of Directors for the distribution of the treasure captured, as
a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British
Government viewed the exemplary valour, discipline, zeal, and firmness
displayed by the army;” and directed that “the general principles of
this order should constitute the proceedings of the Governor-General in
Council with respect to all prize-money captured during the progress of
the war.”

The heavy artillery and stores intended for the siege of Agra were
embarked on the Jumna in boats, the army marching down along the western
banks. On the 7th October they reached Agra, and cut off all
communication with the country, and on the 10th the enemy’s battalions
outside the fort were driven from the ravines and glacis, with a loss of
600 men and 26 guns. In this affair Lieutenants Beagham and J. Hay (who
together with Lieutenant W. Parker joined the army a little previously)
are mentioned as having distinguished themselves.

“The intrepidity and courage evinced by Lieutenant Beagham, of the
artillery, employed in the assault, calls for his Excellency’s warmest
approbation and thanks.”

“Lieutenant Hay, of the artillery, who went with a detachment of that
corps to bring off the enemy’s guns, merits my approbation for his
successful exertions in this service.”

The siege commenced, and by the 17th a breaching battery of eight
18–pounders and four howitzers, with an enfilading battery of four
12–pounders on its left and another of two 12–pounders on its right,
were ready and commenced firing, and on the 20th the fort capitulated.

Seventy-six brass and 86 iron guns, 20 tumbrils, with two lacs of rupees
and ammunition, &c. were captured; among them was the celebrated great
gun of Agra, which lay on the banks of the Jumna until some twenty years
afterwards it was broken up and sold, an attempt to carry it down the
Jumna having failed, as also a fine brass 72–pounder, now in the barrack
square at Dum-Dum.

General Lake wrote:—“I attribute the early surrender of Agra to the
great impression our breaching battery made on the walls, which opened
yesterday within 350 yards, and which would have caused a practicable
breach in a few hours more battering.

“To Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, * * * as well as to every
officer of the * * * corps, I feel myself under great obligations for
their unremitted exertions on this occasion, and to which I principally
attribute my early success against this place.”

Twenty-four lacs of rupees of prize-money were on this occasion divided
among the troops, in accordance with the principle of the General Order
1st November, 1803, above quoted.

On the 27th October the army marched from Agra, and on the 31st (having
previously left their baggage and heavy guns under a guard at Futtypoor
Sicoree) had nearly come up with the Mahrattas. In the evening, General
Lake moved on again with the cavalry, directing the infantry to follow
at three o’clock next morning, and after a march of twenty-five miles
overtook the Mahrattas at sunrise, near Laswaree, amounting to about
9,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, with 72 guns. As they appeared to be
in some confusion, he was tempted to make an attack at once, without
waiting for the artillery and infantry.

The enemy retarded this movement by cutting a bund and flooding the
road, and availed themselves of the time gained to form their line, the
right resting on Laswaree and the left on Mohalpoor, the front covered
by the guns, and, as at Delhi, the country around covered with long
grass. The cavalry charged boldly through the guns several times, the
gunners falling down as they passed and reopening on their return, while
the infantry plied them with musketry from behind an intrenchment formed
of the baggage-hackeries: the guns could not be secured from want of
infantry.

The loss having been great, and the men and horses much fatigued, the
cavalry were withdrawn to wait the arrival of the infantry, the enemy
having been effectually stopped and crippled. By noon the infantry
reached the banks of the nullah, but some slight rest was necessary
after a march of twenty-five miles; and as the enemy offered to
surrender their guns on certain terms, a favourable answer was returned,
though preparations were made for renewing the attack when the
stipulated time should expire.

The enemy threw back their right, so as almost to encircle Mohalpoor,
their whole front bristling with guns. The British infantry prepared to
attack in two columns, the right, under Major-General Ware, against
Mohalpoor, the left, under Major-General St. John, against the enemy’s
right, covered by the cavalry. All the guns which had come up were
formed with the gallopers into four distinct batteries to support these
attacks. The whole advanced under a heavy fire from the enemy’s
artillery, which were well and quickly served, and by four P.M. had
entirely routed the enemy, capturing elephants, camels, 1,600 bullocks,
72 guns, 5,000 stand of arms, 44 colours, 64 tumbrils of ammunition and
3 of treasure, and 57 carts with stores.

In this brilliant action the artillery suffered but little,—4 Europeans
and 3 lascars killed, and 6 Europeans and 5 lascars wounded: the brunt
fell upon the other branches.

From Laswaree the army returned towards Agra, sending in the wounded and
captured stores, and remained in the neighbourhood till the end of the
month, when Colonel White, with a proportion of artillery, was detached
to aid the Bundelcund force in the siege of Gwalior. The main army soon
after moved to a position near the Biana Pass, where the horse artillery
troop (formed from the experimental horse artillery), under Captain
Clement Brown, with Lieutenants Starke and Young, joined; but we must
make a slight retrospect to bring up the proceedings of the other forces
to this point.

The detachment of artillery, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s force,
destined for Bundelcund, consisted of—

Major C. Wittit, Commandant.

────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.
────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
1 │ 3 │Tomkyns │Feade │Richards.
────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────┼────────────
2 │ │ │Dowell │M. Brown.
│ │ │ │W. Hopper.
────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────────────┴────────────

The force reached the banks of the Caine, near Tiroha, on the 23rd
September, and on the 10th October crossed, and, after a long march over
a rough country, came in sight of Shumsheer Bahadur’s troops. A distant
cannonade was all that occurred, the enemy made off as fast as he could,
and the force proceeded against Culpee, which surrendered on the 4th
December, as soon as a battery opened against it.

Its next move was to Gwalior, where the whole or a portion joined
Colonel White, with whose detachment were Captain Green, Lieutenants
Hay, Morris, Swiney, and Pollock. Batteries were opened, and on the 5th
February, 1804, Gwalior had once again fallen into our possession.

The following General Order was issued on its capture: “The
Commander-in-Chief is particularly happy to notice the valuable services
of the artillery employed at Gwalior; and the great effect produced by
the fire of the batteries under circumstances peculiarly unfavourable
reflects the highest credit on the abilities of Captain Green, and on
the officers and men under his command.”

The detachments under Major-General Deare, of the artillery, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, at Mirzapoor and Sumbulpoor, were equally
successful, though not so brilliantly employed; their exertions
frustrated the Mahrattas’ hopes of plundering Mirzapoor and Benares.

The Balasore force met with complete success; they had chiefly, however,
to contend against the difficulty of moving guns through a swampy, heavy
country; the different towns surrendered with but little opposition. The
fort of Barabutty alone required batteries to be erected against it;
they were ready on the 13th October, and the defences being taken off,
and the enemy’s guns silenced, the storming party advanced, accompanied
by some artillerymen, under Lieutenant G. Faithfull, with a 6–pounder,
for the purpose of blowing open the gate. In passing the bridge, the
party was exposed for 40 minutes to a heavy fire of musketry ere the
gate could be forced, it was so blocked up with masses of stone: these
removed, the attack was soon successful. Lieutenant Faithfull was
wounded, though not dangerously, and his conduct, as well as that of
Captain-Lieutenant Hetzler, was praised in General Orders by the
Governor-General:—“He trusts that Lieutenant Faithfull, of the
artillery, will be speedily restored to the public service, in which his
courage and resolution has already been distinguished.

“The Governor-General expresses his sense of the conduct of Captain
Hetzler, of the Bengal artillery.”

To bring up the events of the campaign in all quarters, we must here
turn briefly to the force in Guzerat, with which was the 5th company 3rd
battalion. This force marched on the 21st August; at Bargood they met
with but a feeble resistance on the 24th, and on the 26th a battery of
two 18–pounders was completed against the fort of Baroach, and opened.
By the 29th a breach was made, but the storm was delayed till 3 P.M., in
hopes of profiting by the assistance of the _Fury_ gun-vessel (on board
which was a detail of Bengal artillery), and an armed boat, which were
hourly expected, but which were prevented by the shallowness of the
water; the storming party therefore advanced at the given signal (two
6–pounders fired in quick succession), and overcoming a vigorous
resistance, gained possession of the fort.

With this company Captain-Lieutenant Dunn and Lieutenant Drummond appear
to have been.

The main army, with the Commander-in-Chief, remained encamped near Biana
until the 9th February, when they moved in the direction of Jeypoor, to
which town a detachment under Colonel Monson was sent from Dowsah on the
18th April; on the 10th May, a second detachment, under Colonel Don, was
sent against Tonk Rampoorah from Nurwalee; and on the 18th May, the main
army broke up, and retraced its steps towards Agra, suffering much from
the extreme heat of the weather ere it reached its destination in June.

Lieutenant-Colonel Don’s force arrived before Rampoor on the 14th May,
and to avoid exciting the enemy’s suspicions and inducing him to block
up the gateways really intended to be attacked, took up its position on
the opposite side of the fort. At two A.M. on the next morning, the
storming party advanced, headed by a 12–pounder, to blow the gates open,
and followed by another, to keep in check a body of the enemy’s cavalry;
while Captain Raban, with one 12–pounder and four 6–pounders, took up a
position from which he was enabled to fire upon any point of the works
which the enemy might man to meet the attack; a picquet of the enemy was
driven in, the first gate was blown in by the gun, the second was found
open, and the third and fourth were also blown in; the storming party
entered, and the town was taken possession of.

Thanks were given to Captain Raban and every officer and soldier of the
detachment; the 2nd company 1st battalion, or a portion of it, was
employed on this duty.

Hitherto the operations of the army had been perfectly successful, but
we have now to recount two failures, in both of which, but particularly
in that in Bundelcund, the artillery suffered heavily.

The Bundelcund force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, had been
protecting that province from Holkar’s incursions, and was encamped in
May, 1804, near Kooch. A detachment of seven companies of native
infantry, under Captain N. Smith, and fifty European artillery, from
the 1st and 2nd companies 3rd battalion, under Captain-Lieutenant
Feade and Lieutenant Morris, were sent against a small fort, named
Baillah, in the neighbourhood. The guns having opened on the 21st May,
the killidar offered to surrender on the following morning if the
firing was directed to cease; his offer was accepted, but availing
himself of the respite, he immediately despatched intelligence to
Ameer Khan, who was in the vicinity, and requested him to fall on the
detachment, which he did the next morning with 8,000 cavalry, and cut
up two companies of the infantry, and the whole of the artillery,[58]
with their officers, and took possession of the guns,[59] except one,
which, with the remaining five companies, made good their retreat to
Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett’s head-quarters. This officer, alarmed at
the reports he received, and unequal to the emergency in which he was
placed, immediately retreated to Betwah; which movement caused much
annoyance to the Commander-in-Chief, as it opened Bundelcund to
Holkar, and left him undistracted to turn his whole force against
Colonel Monson’s detachment in Rajasthan. Lord Lake would have ordered
the command of this force to have been previously made over to
“Lieutenant-Colonel Wittit, of the artillery, a most excellent
officer; but for his ill-health;” this was very indifferent; so much
so, indeed, that he died on the 27th May. In him the regiment lost a
most valuable officer; as a subaltern he had served with his company
in Lord Cornwallis’s campaigns on the coast, and was considered by Sir
John Horsford one of the most superior officers in the regiment.

Colonel Martindell, after some changes, was appointed to the command of
the force, and in June succeeded in capturing Mahobar, and defeating the
Ram Rajah and Nagahs, and with this the campaign closed.

We must now follow Colonel Monson’s force, with which was the 2nd
company 2nd battalion of artillery, commanded by Captain Hutchinson and
Lieutenant Winbolt, in its unfortunate retreat. Advancing, after the
capture of Hinglaizgurh to the Mokundra Pass, with the object of
co-operating with Colonel Murray’s force from Guzerat, on the 7th July
Colonel Monson received intelligence of Holkar’s having crossed the
Chumbul, and moved to meet him; but almost immediately learning that
Colonel Murray had fallen back on the Myhie, he retired to the pass on
the 8th, beating off the attacks of the enemy. Fearful, however, of the
enemy getting behind him, he commenced his retreat on Kotah. On the 12th
he was again attacked, and again beat Holkar off; he pushed on for the
Janee Nuddee, but the rain falling heavily, he did not reach the ghat
till the morning of the 13th, and then finding the rivulet not fordable,
he was obliged to halt till the 15th; the state of the roads was such
that the guns sunk deep in the mud, several were abandoned, and most of
the ammunition destroyed. On the 17th the Chumbul was reached; the
Europeans were passed over on elephants, and sent on to Rampoorah, while
the main body crossed over in detachments wherever fords could be found.
On the 24th there was another severe contest with the enemy, and it was
not until the 27th that the last battalion, with Colonel Monson, reached
Rampoorah; but here this unhappy detachment found no rest,—want of
provisions forced them to push on, and after leaving a garrison under
Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, they again moved (they were
however reinforced by two battalions, four guns, and some irregular
cavalry, under Major Frith) to the Bunass. On the 22nd August they
reached its banks, and found it so swollen that the largest elephants
could scarcely pass; three boats only could be found, and in them the
treasure was sent across. On the 23rd the enemy appeared in force, and
on the 24th, the river having run off a little, the baggage was got
over, Monson covering the retreat by an attack on the enemy, which was
at first successful, but the enemy rallying, forced him back, with the
loss of his last gun; the baggage was abandoned, and, harassed by the
enemy’s cavalry, the broken army reached Koosialgurh during the night;
from hence they moved in a square to the Biana Pass, where they hoped
for some respite; but Holkar, bringing his guns to bear, forced them to
continue their flight, and parties of broken and disordered fugitives
were all of Monson’s army that arrived at Agra.

In crossing the Bunass on the 24th Lieutenant Winbolt, of the artillery,
was drowned. He was an officer of high promise, and one who stood high
in the opinion of Sir J. Horsford, in whose company he had served on the
coast in the campaigns of 1790–1–2.

To check Holkar, the army was called out again; the horse artillery and
other troops from Cawnpoor marched on Agra on the 3rd September, and
towards the end of the month the camp was formed between Agra and
Secundra. Holkar was too wary to be led into a general action, and
moving northwards with his main body, he was followed by Lord Lake, who
reached Delhi and relieved the siege on the 15th October. Holkar moved
towards Parriput, and crossed the Jumna into the Upper Dooab; Lake (with
the horse artillery, cavalry, and reserve brigade, under Colonel Don)
crossed near Delhi on the 31st, and leaving all private wheel-carriages
and all baggage that could possibly be spared, pushed on, determined to
give Holkar no rest. This rapid movement relieved Colonel Burn, who,
with some nujeebs, was shut up in the ruined fort of Shamlee by Holkar.
Following closely, Lord Lake came in sight of him near Meerut, but he
fled with all speed, by the route of Hassur to Futteygurh. On the 16th,
Lake was within sixty miles of Futteygurh, and starting again at night,
he made great exertions to come up with him. Just as he mounted his
horse, news came of the decisive victory gained by Major-General Fraser
over the Mahrattas at Deig, an inspiriting omen to his own troops. At
dawn on the 17th, they reached the skirts of the enemy’s camp; the
horses were at their picquets, the men sleeping beside them, when their
sleep was either broken or rendered final by discharges of grape poured
in upon them from the horse-artillery guns; the dragoons charged, and
the enemy took to flight,—Holkar among the first. The blowing up of a
tumbril had first alarmed him, but he was persuaded it was the morning
gun being fired at Futteygurh; but the firing continuing, the cry of
“Lord Lake’s army” arose, and a general flight followed; some took
refuge in trees, and might have escaped, but from their indiscretion in
firing on our troops, who, thus taught in what direction to look, soon
brought them down with their pistols. The pursuit continued for upwards
of 10 miles, which, added to the previous march of 58, made a total of
68 miles in 24 hours, and when it is recollected that this had been
preceded by 350 miles in a fortnight, it may be considered one of the
most surprising feats on record, and speaking more powerfully to the
state of efficiency of the regiments so employed, than words can do.

The services of the horse artillery were acknowledged by Lord Lake; in
writing to the Governor-General, he says: “I have great satisfaction in
reporting to your lordship the very meritorious conduct of Captain Brown
and the corps of horse artillery under his command, who, by the rapidity
of their movements, were able to do great execution. Captain Brown’s
great attention in the management of his corps, and his zeal and
activity when called into action, have on every occasion merited my best
acknowledgments.” And in the General Order, November 18th, he returned
his thanks “to Captain Brown, and officers and men of the horse
artillery, for their highly meritorious and intrepid behaviour in the
engagement of yesterday.”

The officers with the horse artillery were Captain C. Brown, Lieutenants
H. Starke and J. Young. The wounded were 1 European, 1 Indian, and 4
horses; the killed 1 lascar and 7 horses.

The main body of the army, which had been left at Delhi on the 1st
November, moved in the direction of Govindhur, and on the 13th attacked
the Mahratta army under the walls of Deig, gained a complete victory,
and captured 87 guns, all mounted on field-carriages, and fitted with
elevating screws and every apparatus; among them were six of the
18–pounders presented to the Mahrattas in 1791, and (which must have
been a pleasing circumstance to Colonel Monson, who fell into the
command on the death of Major-General Fraser) fourteen of the guns, nine
tumbrils, and four casts of those which had been lost in his disastrous
campaign.

In this action the artillery lost 4 Europeans and 5 natives killed; 6
Europeans and 19 natives wounded: Captain Butler had a horse killed
under him.

Lord Lake followed Holkar from Futtehgurh on the 20th; crossed the Jumna
near Muttra, on the 28th; sent on the captured guns to Agra, and ordered
out a battering-train, which joining him on the 10th, he moved towards
Deig, and on the 13th took up a position. Trenches were opened during
the night, and a breach being ready by the 23rd, the place was carried
by storm. Captain Raban accompanied the storming party with a detail of
artillery to spike the guns, and distinguished himself by the way in
which he performed this duty.

Lieutenant Groves, of the artillery, was killed on the 20th December,
and Lieutenant T. D. Smith wounded; 100 guns were taken, together with
many tumbrils.

The details of this siege, as well as those of Bhurtpoor, Gunnourie,
Komona, and Adjegurh, are so fully recorded in that valuable publication
the _East-India Military Repository_, that it would only unnecessarily
swell this work, were more than the briefest allusion made, compatible
with our object.

For this siege six or eight 18–pounders, four 8–inch and four 5½-inch
mortars were all the siege ordnance available.

The insufficient provision of ordnance and stores for siege purposes
will henceforth often strike the reader; and the question why—possessed,
as Bengal is, of an inland navigation from one extremity of the
presidency to the other, offering every facility for a speedy and cheap
conveyance of stores—ample materials had not been pushed forward to meet
our wants, must continually recur. The suddenness of the campaign cannot
be admitted as a valid reason; the war had been deliberately entered on
eighteen months before, and it was known that the enemy possessed many
strongholds which required battering-trains for their reduction. The
first campaign had given us Agra, a place admirably situated for a
depôt, with reference to the scene of war, to which an adequate
equipment should have been forwarded; but it was not done, and the want
was severely felt in the course of this campaign. If ample supplies are
not available against a fortified place, and it is absolutely necessary
to reduce it, men’s lives must be substituted for shot and shells; in
some cases, no doubt, _time_ is most precious, and it may be a matter of
calculation whether time or men can best be spared; but when near our
own frontier, there can be no excuse for the improvidence which has
failed to provide the requisite stores, and by that means to take from
the commander the choice between expenditure of his troops or of the
munitions of war.

In most we must attribute the blame to the cumbrous and inefficient
machinery of the Military Board, in whose province lies the supervision
of the magazines; but the Board, composed of many members, becomes a
screen for individual responsibility, and this must always be the case
until each member is vested with the sole control of the details of his
own department, subject only to a discussion in the Board of the general
question, that each may have the benefit of his colleagues’ opinions,
and be made aware of what is going on in other departments, that all may
work in concert.

The opinion above given of the inefficient state of our siege-trains is
fully borne out by that recorded by the Marquis of Hastings in his
“Summary,” when, speaking of Hattrass, he says, “One of my earliest
military cares on arriving in India had been to satisfy myself why we
had made so comparatively unfavourable a display in sieges.” The details
at once unfolded the cause: it is well known that nothing can be more
insignificant than shells thrown with long intervals; and we never
brought forward more than four or five mortars where we undertook the
capture of a fortified place. Hence the bombardment was futile, so that
at last the issue was to be staked on mounting a breach and fighting
hand to hand with a soldiery skilful as well as gallant, in defending
the prepared intrenchments. This was not the oversight of the Bengal
Artillery officers, for no men can be better instructed in the theory,
or more careful in the practice of their profession than they are; it
was imputable to a false economy on the part of government. The outlay
for providing for the transport of mortars, shells, and platforms in due
quantity would certainly have been considerable, and it was on that
account forborne; the miserable carriages of the country, hired for the
purpose, where a military exertion was contemplated, were utterly
unequal to the service, and constantly failed under the unusual weight
in the deep roads through which they had to pass. Therefore we never sat
down before a place of real strength furnished with the means which a
proper calculation would have allotted for its reduction.

These remarks have been particularly brought out by studying the details
of the attack on Bhurtpoor, which next employed Lord Lake’s army, but
which we shall not enter into, referring the reader to the same
authority as mentioned when speaking of the siege of Deig, and
contenting ourselves with a very concise account of the operations.

The army marched from Deig to Bhurtpoor; trenches were opened on the 4th
of January, 1805; batteries were erected, a breach effected, and an
unsuccessful storm attempted, on the 9th; other batteries were raised
and a fresh breach made, but the enemy were so active in stockading it
every night, that a second attack could not be made until the 21st:
this, also, was unsuccessful. During the storm, the British cavalry were
forced to turn out to keep off Holkar. On the 23rd, a convoy, slenderly
escorted, was plundered; a second and a larger one was successfully
brought in on the 28th, containing, among other stores, 8,000 18–pounder
shot. On the 6th February the army changed ground; Meer Khan crossed the
Jumna on the 7th, and was pursued by Major-General Smith, with all the
cavalry and horse artillery, who came up with and defeated him at
Afzulgurh, near Moradabad, on the 2nd of March; the scattered remains of
this army recrossed the Ganges, and Major-General Smith returned to camp
on the 23rd, after a march of 700 miles.

The siege had been still carried on; the Bombay army joined on the 10th
February, but the troops, although nearly exhausted, petitioned to be
allowed to finish the operation; the artillery were particularly eager,
for, though few in number, and fatigued beyond conception by working the
guns without a relief since the commencement of the siege, the thoughts
of being deprived of their post distressed them exceedingly, and they
entreated permission to be allowed to discharge the duties of their
station alone.

Regular approaches were made, and the batteries pushed on to within 400
yards of the walls, but the means of arming them were very insufficient;
six 18–pounders, four heavy mortars, four light mortars, and two
12–pounders to take off the defences, appear to have been the extent of
ordnance preparations brought against a place six or eight miles in
circumference! On the morning of the 21st, a sally made by the enemy was
driven back, and in the afternoon a storm was attempted, covered by the
artillery guns drawn out on the plain, but without success. A fourth
attack was made the following day, but it equally failed. The siege was
still continued, but the enemy offering to give up the fortress on
certain terms, it was accepted, and the army finally broke up from its
melancholy camp at Bhurtpoor on the 21st April, and after remaining a
short time on the banks of the Chumbul, watching Scindiah, retired to
Agra the following month.

During the siege, the artillery lost Lieutenant Percival, killed on 9th
January; Lieutenant Gowing, killed on 22nd February; Captain Nelly,
wounded on 21st February; Captain Pennington, wounded on 22nd February;
and Lieutenant Swiney, wounded on 21st February.

From this melancholy detail it is cheering to turn to the successful
proceedings of Captain Hutchinson, of the artillery, who, it will be
recollected, was left during Monson’s retreat in command of Rampoorah,
and whose judicious application of a small force led to the most
brilliant results.

On the 17th January, 1805, he marched with his company, 2nd company 2nd
battalion (or a portion of it), 320 sipahis, a few irregulars, and two
6–pounders, against Gemeena; reaching it as the moon rose on the 18th,
he instantly commenced the attack. The road to the gate was blocked up
by loaded hackeries, their wheels removed, and thus the approach of the
guns was prevented; the hackeries were set fire to, steps were cut in
the side of the ramparts, and the sipahis mounted; their only officer,
Lieutenant Purvis, being wounded. Captain Hutchinson supplied his place,
and aided by Corporals Cross and Hislop, mounted the ramparts; a hole
was made through the parapet, and the assailants increasing in number,
the enemy were driven back on the gate; but the wicket being forced open
by the butt ends of the muskets, the place was captured with but little
loss.

Lord Lake, reporting the above to Lord Wellesley, says, “The enterprise
and gallantry this meritorious officer has on every occasion manifested
during his command at Rampoorah has never been more conspicuous than on
the present occasion, where he appears to have accomplished a most
arduous and dangerous undertaking, with a spirit and perseverance which
reflects on him the highest credit.”

On the 22nd February, he went against Bommongaon, a mud fort, with high
ramparts and a ditch; the gates built up and remarkably well defended by
a garrison of 300 men. His party consisted of his own company and 160
sipahis, with two 6–pounders and two howitzers; these light guns made no
impression, but on the 24th two 12–pounders arrived, and by the evening
a practicable breach was effected, but the assault being delayed till
morning, the garrison made off in the night.

On the 25th February he moved to Karawul, a large walled town, with a
number of bastions, four small guns, and 1,100 men as a garrison; he
placed his two 12–pounders and one 6–pounder in battery within 300 yards
of the walls; his battery was formed with empty tumbrils and
ammunition-boxes filled with earth, finished up with bags of grain; his
two howitzers and remaining 6–pounder were placed in a similar manner in
another direction. By the afternoon of the 26th a breach was made, which
he immediately stormed.

Captain Hutchinson was not unmindful of the deserts of his subordinates;
he says: “I should be proud if his Excellency General Lake would notice
Corporals Cross[60] and Hislop; they are soldiers who have distinguished
themselves more than once, and there are not two better or braver men in
the 2nd company 2nd battalion of artillery.”

His next exploit was against Darrara, a fort with a broad and deep ditch
and high ramparts, the gate defended by a ditch and covered with an
outwork. Captain Hutchinson placed his garrison in two batteries, one at
35 yards from the counterscarp, one still nearer, and by noon on the
21st March, a breach was effected; the storming party, headed by six
artillerymen, whom it would be injustice not to name,—Corporals Cross
and Hislop, Gunners Campbell and Johnstone, Matrosses Muller and
Hudson,—moved to the attack, and after overcoming a severe opposition,
succeeded in gaining possession of the fort; of the enemy between 60 and
70 were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners. Of the artillerymen,
Johnstone was killed, and Hudson shot through the body and arm, after
which he charged and killed three of the enemy.

But we must once more return to Lord Lake’s army, whom we left at Agra.
The rainy season limited their repose. Holkar’s restless spirit urged
him to collect his scattered followers, at the head of whom, equipped
with 60 guns, he approached Muttra in October; Lord Lake followed, and
Holkar moved to the north. It soon became a perfect chase. Holkar fled
into the Punjab; Lake crossed the Sutlej on the 7th December, and was on
the point of engaging him on the banks of the Beas on the 25th, but was
prevented by positive instructions from the Governor-General, who
probably wished to avoid embroiling himself with the Seikhs. A treaty
was therefore reluctantly entered into, and the army returned slowly to
Dehli.

Captain Pennington was commissary of ordnance with this force; Captain
C. Brown, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Frith and Boileau, were with the horse
artillery, and Captain T. Greene, Lieutenants Hay and Rodber, with the
1st company 1st battalion.

In closing the account of these glorious campaigns, it will not be out
of place here to record the names of the officers sharing in them, and
we fortunately have a memorandum, in Sir John Horsford’s writing, of
those entitled to share in the prize-money, which gives the necessary
information.

_1st Campaign._

Lieut.-Col. Horsford,│
Capt. Butler, │
Capt. T. Greene, │
Capt. Raban, │
Capt. Nelly, │
Capt. Constable, │
Capt. Hutchinson, │
Capt. W. Shipton, │
Capt. Best, │
Capt. J. Robinson, │
Capt. Mathews, │
Lieut. M. Browne, │
Lieut. Morris, │
─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
Lieut. S. Hay, │ Agra and Laswaree only.
Lieut. Beagham, │ 〃
Lieut. W. Parker. │ 〃

_2nd Campaign._

Lieut.-Col. Horsford,│
Capt. C. Brown, │
Capt. Raban, │
Capt. Nelly, │
Capt. Hutchinson, │
Capt. Best, │
Capt. Butler, │
Capt. Paschaud, │
Capt. Mathews, │
Lieut. M. Browne, │
Lieut. H. Starke, │
Lieut. Swiney, │
Lieut. Young, │
Lieut. Grove, │
Lieut. Gowing, │
Lieut. Pollock, │
Lieut. Parker, │
Lieut. Hay, │
Lieut. Percival, │
Lieut. T. D. Smith, │
─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
Capt. Hinde, │Bhurtpoor from January to April.
Capt. Dunn, │ 〃
Capt. Pennington, │ 〃
Lieut. W. H. Frith, │ 〃

The paucity of British troops in the ceded provinces induced several of
the zemindars to resist the revenue authorities, and, among others,
Doondia Khan, who possessed two strong mud forts in the vicinity of
Aligurh. The failure of the attacks on Bhurtpoor added to their
contumacy, but the want of power to punish, rendered it necessary to
pass it over for the time, and be content with some show of submission,
which Doondia Khan made to Major-General Smith on his return from
Afzulgurh to Bhurtpoor.

Causes of complaint continued to arise, and towards the end of 1806, the
collector reported he had strengthened Komona with a new outwork and
attacked a neighbouring zemindar.

All efforts at accommodation proving useless, a force was collected in
August, 1807, under Major-General Dickens, and proceeded against Komona
on the 12th of October. With this force were—

────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┬───────────────────────
Company.│Battalion.│Captain-Lieutenant.│ Lieutenants.
────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────
3 │ 1 │ Lindsay │MᶜQuake, Harris, Pryce,
────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────
2 │ 2 │ 〃 │Forrester, and Parlby.
────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┴───────────────────────

Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford was also present, commanding a brigade, but
also specially directing the artillery.

An assault was made on the 18th November, but proved unsuccessful, owing
to the determined opposition the enemy made, and the way in which he
defended the breach, with mines, powder-bags, burning choppahs, &c. The
assailants were beat back with heavy loss, but the enemy deserted the
place during the night.

Lieutenants Harris and MᶜQuake, acting as engineers, were wounded; 5
Europeans and 9 natives killed; 10 Europeans and 10 lascars, of the
artillery, were wounded.

From Komona the force proceeded to Gunnouree on the 22nd November, and
carried on the attack of that fort until the 11th December, when the
enemy evacuated it.

For the detail of these operations we would refer the reader to the
fourth volume of the _East-India Military Repository_.

The strength of the artillery, as fixed in 1802, having proved itself
quite insufficient for the duties of the Presidency, in August, 1805,
five companies of golundaz were raised; they were formed from the
“component parts” which remained on the alteration in 1802. These
companies were added without any officers, but in the following year
(19th June, 1806) a lieutenant-colonel and major were added to each
battalion.

The regiment, therefore, at this period consisted of—

──────────────────────────┬────
Colonels. │ 3
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Colonels │ 6
──────────────────────────┼────
Majors. │ 6
──────────────────────────┼────
Captains. │ 21
──────────────────────────┼────
Capt.-Lieutenants. │ 21
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieutenants. │ 42
──────────────────────────┼────
Lieut.-Fireworkers. │ 42
─────────┬────────────────┼────
Horse. │Serjeants. │ 4
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Corporals. │ 4
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Gunners. │ 10
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Trumpeters. │
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Matrosses. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Foot. │Serjeants. │ 105
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Corporals. │ 105
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Gunners. │ 210
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Drummers. │ 42
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Matrosses. │1680
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Golundaz.│Native Officers.│ 10
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Havildars. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Naicks. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Drummers. │
─────────┼────────────────┼────
Lascars. │Privates. │ 500
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Serangs. │ 40
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │1st Tindals. │ 81
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │2nd Tindals. │ 81
─────────┼────────────────┼────
〃 │Lascars. │2750
─────────┴────────────────┴────

The staff are omitted in this abstract, as they would only tend to swell
the headings, and their number is trifling.

In July three additional companies of golundaz were added of similar
strength.

In Bundelcund disturbances still continued, and during several years a
force continued to find employment in that district. In February, 1806,
Gohud was taken, and in January, 1807, Chumar, near Kooch. The General
Orders on the capture of the latter, notice “the professional ability
and zealous emulation displayed by Captain Hopper, of the
artillery * * * employed on that service in preparing the way * * * for
which all are entitled to his lordship’s particular praise and thanks.”

Captain Turton and Lieutenant G. Faithfull also appear to have been in
this campaign.

The following year, towards the conclusion, the force again took the
field to reduce Adjeegurh, which Luchmun Dowlah refused to yield,
agreeably to stipulation.

A portion marched against Heerapoor, with which were Major Brooke,
Lieutenants Granishaw and C. H. Campbell, of the artillery; after
ascending the pass on the 19th December, with much difficulty, the fort
was reconnoitred, and batteries formed of fascines and sand-bags on the
20th, and by 3 P.M. a breach was made; a fire was kept up at intervals
during the night, the enemy made a feeble attack on an outpost, and
evacuated the fort during the night.

The report of the Governor-General’s agent to the secretary to
Government said, “The exertions of the pioneers and their officers, and
those of Captain Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and Campbell, the
Europeans and lascars of the artillery, in preparing the batteries and
serving and laying the guns, could not be surpassed.”

Captain Brooke’s services were also acknowledged in orders by
Major-General Martindell.

On the 22nd January the force was brought into contact with the enemy,
who, surrounded in the strong position of Rugowley, made a desperate
resistance, and, although driven to a corner, rendered it necessary to
withdraw the troops from the attack.

Major Brooke, Captain-Lieutenant Ferris, Lieutenants D. Macleod,
Granishaw, Campbell, and Marshall, were present in this action.

On the 27th January the army took up their position before Adjeegurh; a
battery was erected on the plain, but the distance was found to have
been miscalculated, probably from the overhanging appearance which forts
built on hills assume, and it was found necessary to occupy the spur up
which the road ran to the gate. Much labour was required to convey the
heavy guns to their positions, and it was not until the morning of the
11th February that they opened their fire; it continued during the 12th
and the morning of the 13th, when the whole of a wall came down; the
killidar then came out, and the fort was given up.

“To the artillery the heavy duties of the siege more particularly fell;
their exertions were great, and vied with the natural objects they had
to encounter. Their fire was inimitably well directed, and the
commanding officer must ever feel himself indebted to the officers and
men who conducted it.

“The judgment, zeal, and energy of Captain Brooke, commanding the
artillery, his personal and unremitting exertions, were so conspicuous
during the siege, that to do ample justice to the merits of that
valuable officer, the commanding officer cannot convey in terms too
strong his high sense of approbation and approval.”

A small force was also employed this year in reducing Bhowanee, a fort
in the Hurrianah country. The inhabitants had been in the habit of
plundering all travellers, and at length ventured on the baggage of a
British detachment. The chief met a representation by a peremptory
denial of reparation in terms of insolence. The force in Rewaree, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, moved out towards the end of August, and
arriving on the 27th, allowed the enemy twenty-four hours to consider.
The terms were absolutely rejected, and on the 28th batteries were
quickly erected; their fire opened the following morning, and by noon a
breach was made, and the place carried by assault after a vigorous
resistance.

“To Captain Mason, in the general command of the artillery, the very
able arrangement of that officer’s department throughout, but
particularly in conducting the duties of the breaching-batteries, with
the very heavy and well-directed fire that was so rapidly kept up, in
covering the advance and approach of the storming party to the points of
attack, entitles Captain Mason to every commendation, and reflects great
credit on the officers and men under his command.”

This detachment order was republished in the Government General Order,
detailing the service.

We have been unable to ascertain what portion of the regiment, and what
officers, were on this occasion employed.

We must now advert to two important additions which were made to the
regiment in the course of this year. In August the Governor-General,
adverting to the original establishment of the experimental horse
artillery, the success of which on various occasions in the field has
fully confirmed the judgment which was formed of the superior efficiency
of a corps of that description for service in India, determined to make
a considerable augmentation to the corps, and place it on a permanent
establishment. It was accordingly directed to be increased to three
troops; the officers and men to be drawn from the foot artillery.

──────────────────┬──────────┬──────────
│per Troop.│ Total
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captains. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Capt.-Lieutenants.│ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenant. │ 3│ 9
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Adjutant. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Riding Master. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serj.-Major. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
R. R. Sergeant. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Qr.-Master Serj. │ │ 1
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serjeants. │ 6│ 18
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Corporals. │ 6│ 18
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Gunners. │ 10│ 30
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Matrosses. │ 80│ 240
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Trumpeters. │ 2│ 6
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Farriers. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Native Farriers. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Native Doctors. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Serangs. │ 1│ 3
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Tindals. │ 2│ 6
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lascars. │ 24│ 72
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Horses. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Syces. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┼──────────┼──────────
Grass-cutters. │ 145│ 438
──────────────────┴──────────┴──────────

The senior captain exercised the command over the whole, in addition to
the command of his own troop, subject to the orders of the commandant of
artillery.

In December orders were issued for the formation of a corps of
ordnance-drivers. Hitherto the drivers for the ordnance carriages had
been hired as required, and discharged when the service was over; this
system had worked so ill, and its faults had been so strongly brought to
light in the late campaigns, that it was now resolved to introduce a
better plan. An organized corps was raised, sufficient to provide a
driver to every two bullocks, and divided into companies, which were
attached to companies of artillery, in the same manner as the lascars,
with whom they were assimilated as much as possible. They were clothed
in uniform, and were not to be discharged except by the authority of the
commandant of artillery or officers commanding the principal stations of
the army.

Raised from the middle castes,—the Gwalas and Aheeas chiefly,—and
attached to the service by the regular pay, the pension when worn out,
and the treatment they received, this proved a valuable addition to the
regiment.

In November two companies of independent golundaz were raised, to take
the duties of Prince of Wales’ Island.

We have omitted to state that in May, 1808, Colonel Carnegie resigned
the command of the regiment and sailed for England. He was succeeded by
Colonel Horsford, who had, with so much credit to himself, been
commanding the artillery in the field. Colonel Horsford originally
entered the corps as a private; he was born of a good family, and well
educated, but his friends wishing him to enter the church, he evaded it
by enlisting in the Honourable Company’s service, and coming to Bengal
as a private in the artillery, under the assumed name of Rover, and in
1778 he was a serjeant in Captain Thelwall’s, or the 1st, company.

Inquiries having been made for him, it is said he was suspected by
Colonel Pearse, who had employed him in copying some papers, from his
pointing out an error in a Greek quotation; his appearance answering to
the description may also have furnished a clue. Colonel Pearse tried him
by calling out his name suddenly as he was leaving the room; the test
was successful; his confusion betrayed his identity, and he was promoted
to a cadetship in the regiment, and continued to rise by seniority. He
was employed in the campaigns against Tippoo in 1791–2 and 1799,
establishing for himself a high name, both as a practical and scientific
artillery officer; his advent to the command of the regiment was hailed
with universal pleasure and satisfaction, for much benefit was expected
to the corps by the manner in which he would exercise his authority,
increased as it was by the great personal influence which his character
had established.

In 1810 the regiment was again called on to take part in an expedition,
beyond seas. In the preceding year a force, chiefly of Madras troops,
was sent against the Isle of France, and occupied Rodriguez; it was
reinforced by Bengal troops, and directed against the remaining islands
in 1810.

The 6th company 1st battalion of artillery sailed on the expedition, but
had little opportunity of gaining distinction. Bourbon was occupied in
July, and the force sailing for the Isle of France, landed at an
unexpected point, and moved forward with rapidity and decision. Fort
Malartic was carried by assault, and the town surrendered in December.

[Illustration]

The officers in the margin[61] accompanied the artillery; and the native
troops were decorated with a medal, not so much for the service,
probably, as for the purpose of stimulating the native army to embark
with alacrity for service beyond seas.

In this year the regiment furnished a portion for a far more serious
conflict, in which native troops were once again brought into personal
contest with Europeans, an event which had not occurred since the
destruction of the French power in the Carnatic; we refer to the
expedition to Java.

The artillery detachment was as follows:—

Major Caldwell, Commandant. Lieut. J. Scott,
Adjutant.

───────────────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────
Company. │7 │1
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Battalion. │1 │2
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lascar Companies. │15, 16 │19, 24
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Captains. │W. Richards │J. Dundas
│ │H. Faithful
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Captain Lieutenants. │J. D. Smith │J. Farrington
│ │Cameron
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lieutenants. │Harris │
───────────────────────┼─────────────┼─────────────
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.│Archer │Farnabie
│ │W. Bell
───────────────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────

3rd Independent Golundaz.

The detachment embarked on the 11th March, and reached Malacca in April,
where the Madras division joined; the expedition remained inactive till
the 11th June, almost the only event being the burning of one of the
Bengal store-ships laden with powder; and this occurred fortunately
without doing any damage to the fleet. Lieutenant Archer died on the
voyage.

On the 4th August the fleet anchored near Chillingching; the troops were
landed, and took possession of Batavia without opposition on the 8th; an
attempt by the enemy to drive them out the following night failed; and
on the 10th the British advanced and drove the enemy from their
intrenched camp at Weltervreeden. Captain Noble, with the Madras horse
artillery, performed the chief artillery duties on this occasion.

The enemy having concentrated their force in the strong lines around
Fort Cornelis, a battering-train was landed, and trenches were opened at
about 800 yards from the position. These the enemy flooded by cutting
dams on the 19th; on the 20th batteries for twelve and eight 18–pounders
and nine howitzers and mortars were commenced; on the 21st the enemy
opened a heavy fire on the unfinished batteries; but nevertheless the
guns were mounted by the 22nd, when the enemy made a vigorous sally, and
overcoming the unarmed working parties, who were not even protected by a
guard, succeeded for a moment in capturing the batteries; but they were
quickly driven back. On the 23rd and 24th a heavy fire was kept up by
the enemy from twenty-four 32–pounders on the batteries and trenches;
but although, on the 24th the fire of the nearest redoubt was repeatedly
silenced, and towards evening several of the enemy’s guns were
dismounted by the fire from the batteries, yet it became evident that
without regular approaches the place could not be carried (unless by a
_coup de main_), and this would require time, labour, and exposure in a
baneful climate, which was to be avoided by all means.

Lieutenant Farnabie was killed by a stray shot while standing in the
trench, and Captain Richards was wounded by some cartridges taking fire
in the battery during these two days.

It was determined to storm the lines on the 26th. To occupy the enemy, a
party, covered with nine guns, took post behind a rising ground on the
right, and opened their fire, while the main column, under Major-General
Gillespie, attacked the left, and after sustaining a severe loss,
finally succeeded in carrying the lines,—capturing 6,000 prisoners and
280 pieces of fine brass ordnance.

In the orders issued to the army after this exploit, no mention is made
of the artillery; and this omission has been attributed to a dislike
said to have been taken to the Bengal artillery. That some such feeling
was supposed to exist, we may conclude from the following passage, which
appears in a letter from an engineer officer on the island to Colonel
Horsford, written in October:—“You will see that the artillery were left
out in the thanks to the army on the 26th August; but allow me to say,
and that _decidedly_, that had it not been from the fire of our
18–pounders on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, I believe not a man would have
returned from the storm of the 26th without some remembrance, as the day
before the storm 130 men and 4 officers were killed and wounded by our
batteries; the consequence was, that their artillerymen positively
refused to work at the batteries, and hardly a gun was fired by the
enemy during the storm, although they had plenty of time; in short, I
declare to you that I scarcely ever saw a more destructive fire kept up
than by our batteries; indeed the killed and wounded in a hospital four
miles to the south of Cornelis showed it, as well as the number of guns
that were dismounted. I was constantly in the batteries. * * * The
effect of our artillery, when they did fire, was so conspicuous, that at
a _practice_ I never saw better firing, _especially_ of three guns on
the right of the twelve-gun battery, commanded by Lieutenant Cameron. I
declare to you I never witnessed anything like it, for every shot he
fired went into the enemy’s embrasures; the consequence was, that in an
hour and a half the redoubt which was opposed to it was silenced.”

In Sir Samuel Achmuty’s report to Lord Minto, the following mention is
made of the ordnance branches:—“I have the satisfaction to assure you
that both the artillery and engineers were actuated by the same zeal in
performing their respective duties which has been so conspicuous in all
ranks and departments, though, from deficiency of the means at their
disposal, their operations were unavoidably embarrassed with uncommon
difficulties.”

From Cornelis, General Jansens fled to Bintenzorg, and thence to
Samarang, near which town he took up a position, Jattoo, on high and
rugged hills, defended by thirty pieces of artillery, and the road cut
off by cheveux de frise; he was attacked on the 16th of September by a
detachment of 1,200 men, under Colonel Gibbs, with whom were 110
artillerymen and six guns; with the artillery were Major Caldwell,
Lieutenants Scott, Farrington, Cameron, and Ralfe. Two of the guns were
sent to the right with a force to seize on a hill which overlooked the
enemy’s left, while the remainder were placed in a position in front to
throw their shot across the valley into the enemy’s position. As soon as
the two detached guns opened their fire, the advance rushed on; the
enemy were surprised and fled, doing little execution with their
artillery, which was all taken.

This was the last effort of General Jansens; he fled to Salatiga and
capitulated; Fort Ludovick was surrendered, and the war, as far as the
Dutch were concerned, may be said to have ended; but to avoid returning
to Java again, we will here notice such other affairs as occurred during
the time the British held possession of the island. But before
continuing the narrative, we will here insert a sketch of the medal
granted to the native troops employed in the expedition; and we may also
state that medals were for this service granted to officers in H.M.’s
service, but to none under the rank of commanding officer of a corps, or
holding an important staff office.

[Illustration]

The next service on which this force was employed was the expedition
under Gillespie to the Palmsbury river, in April, 1822, in which were
Captain S. Shaw, Lieutenants Hill and Delafosse.

In June, they again started for Samarang. Major Butler, who had
previously come round, commanded the artillery; Lieutenants Farrington,
Cameron, and Hill accompanied. They reached Djocjocarta on the 17th of
June, and prepared for the attack of the “kraken,” or fortified
residence of the Sultan of Mataram, three miles in circumference, armed
with many guns, and defended by a broad wet ditch with drawbridges, by
17,000 regular troops, and an armed population of 100,000. The enemy
were kept on the alert by a heavy fire till three in the morning of the
20th, they were then allowed a respite, and two hours before daylight
the troops moved to the assault and carried the works. Major Butler, one
drummer, and eleven rank and file of the artillery, were wounded.

In the Orders, we find, “The Commander of the Forces performs a pleasing
task in recognizing the valuable services of Major Butler, commanding
the artillery, who has uniformly displayed his wonted zeal and
indefatigable exertion; the Commander of the Forces is therefore happy
in the opportunity of bearing public testimony to the professional
superiority and valuable acquirements of this excellent officer;” and
Lieutenant Cameron’s conduct is also spoken of.

Other expeditions[62] took place during the time we held possession of
the island, in which, Captain-Lieutenant Shaw, Lieutenant Farrington,
Lieutenants Cameron, Harris, and Delafosse, took part; in those against
the town of Boni, in 1814, and against Macassar, in 1816, Lieutenant
Farrington is mentioned in Orders, and attention drawn to his exertions.

Bundlecund still continued the seat of war; Gopal Sing, availing himself
of the natural fastnesses of the country, evaded our troops continually.
He was overtaken near Perereea in February (and Lieutenant Timbrell is
mentioned on this occasion), but escaping, he fled to the hills, from
whence he came out the following month, and before assistance could be
sent, burned the cantonment of Tiroha, maintaining a harassing and
desultory warfare, which, without producing any marked events, kept the
troops constantly on the move during that and the following year; and it
was only brought to a close by the siege of Callingur, in February,
1812; after which, Gopal Sing returned to his allegiance.

Callingur is a fort situated on one of those detached rocky eminences
abounding in Bundlecund, and which require little aid from art, as they
are almost natural fortifications. The rock at the summit forms a
natural scarp, of from ten to twenty feet high, and the whole side of
the hill is very difficult of access. The only entrance is in the centre
of the northern wall, and the approach to it is by a steep pathway
winding up the face of the hill; this gained, a succession of gates bar
the entrance to the fort.

The force under Colonel Martindell assembled on the 19th January; on the
21st occupied a small hill, within 800 yards, which promised to be the
most favourable point for attack. The 22nd, 23rd, and 24th were employed
in clearing the jungle and making a road for the guns, and, on the 25th,
two 18–pounders were, with great labour, got up. In the night, two more
guns and two mortars followed, and were placed in battery: two other
batteries were erected at the foot of the hill, against the main
gateway, and the whole being ready by the 28th, opened with great
effect. The enemy’s guns were immediately dismounted, and the bastion
opposed to the guns on the hill demolished.

The town was taken this day; and the batteries continuing to play till
the 2nd of February, the breach was supposed practicable, and a party
advanced to storm it, but finding a perpendicular ascent of twenty feet,
their ladders crushed and broken by the showers of large stones the
enemy rolled down, the party were forced to retire with heavy loss: the
killadar, however, was glad to come to terms, and capitulated on the 8th
February.

Major Fuller commanded the artillery in this siege, and their exertions
were acknowledged in General Orders:—“The Governor-General deems it his
duty to express his concurrence in the honourable testimony borne to the
distinguished services of the artillery and engineer departments by
Colonel Martindell.”

The neighbouring districts of Boglecund and Rewah were, during the next
year, the scenes of petty warfare, similar to what had taken place in
Bundlecund; marked by no features of great importance, yet involving
much exertion on the part of the troops, particularly the artillery
employed, from the mountainous and rugged features of the country and
the number of nullahs and rivers intersecting it. We have but few
records of this campaign, and are therefore unable to give the details,
interesting as they would be to those who are acquainted with the
country, and can, from the present state of the Heerapoor, Bisramgunge,
and Bundry ghats, easily imagine the difficulties they presented at the
time of which we are now writing.

About this period an alteration took place in the _matériel_ of the
regiment, by the introduction of the Gribeauval pattern of gun-carriage
and the long caisson for ammunition, a description of which will be
found in the fourth chapter. The _matériel_ and the means of draught
occupied much attention at this period, and there is every reason to
believe that the recently organized driver corps and the gun bullocks
about this period, under the particular care and attention of
Lieutenant-Colonel Grace, commanding the artillery in the field, were in
a most efficient state. The bullocks were carefully selected and
trained, fairly worked and well looked after, and the consequence was,
that we find the gun bullocks condemned as past their work, selling,
from the high condition they were in, for the purpose of slaughter, at a
higher rate than the good young cattle bought to replace them were
costing.

As the next war in which the army was engaged proved how insufficient
the strength of the regiment was, and caused a considerable addition to
the native portion of it, we propose here to notice the additions to the
end of 1815, although the war commenced the preceding year: by so doing,
we shall avoid breaking the thread of the narrative of the Goorkha war.

The last additions we have noticed were two companies of independent
golundaz, added in 1809; a third company was raised in February, 1812,
and a fourth in August, 1814; in 1815 four additional companies of
golundaz were raised to meet the wants of the service; so that the
regiment now consisted of 1 horse brigade of three troops, 3 European
battalions of 7 companies each, and 1 Native battalion of 16 companies,
together with lascars (42 companies) and ordnance-drivers (26
companies); but these additions to the numerical strength of the
regiment had been made without any corresponding increase to the ranks
of the commissioned officers. This was peculiarly galling; for while
struggling with the difficulties of their position, the officers had the
mortification of seeing the numbers of the infantry increased by whole
regiments at a time, bringing fair promotion with the augmentations,
while, in their own branch, from 1802 to 1815, the troops and companies
had increased from 21 to 40, yet, with the exception of the field
officers added in 1806, not an officer had been given: the infantry had
during that time risen from 25 to 31 regiments.

An important change in the location of the regiment took place in 1813.
The head-quarters had hitherto been in Fort William, and moved out to
Dum-Dum during the cold months for practice and exercise; this year,
barracks having been completed, Dum-Dum was permanently occupied as the
head-quarters of the artillery,—a change, no doubt, adding much to the
comfort of all ranks, for there can be no comparison as to the comfort
and health of men cooped up within the narrow limits of a fortress, and
those occupying an airy roomy cantonment,—even if a cantonment
surrounded with swamps, as Dum-Dum is; and in spite of which it is now
one of the most salubrious of stations for European troops. As it had
been used as a practice-ground for upwards of thirty years, many
bungalows of different degrees of stability had sprung up,—chiefly, we
believe, of mat and thatch; and as the officers doubtless were not idle
while the barracks were building, we may believe that they found plenty
of accommodation ready for them; and houses, of a more durable nature,
soon began to spring up, some on new sites, others replacing the
temporary habitations. A mess-house, we believe, had been previously
built by Government; occupying the site of the centre room of the
present building, which, by gradual additions and alterations, has
reached its present handsome proportions. These were chiefly made in
1824–5, in 1836, and in 1841–2, when the verandah was raised and the
portico added. The last improvement was made in 1845, when the roof, put
on twenty years before, requiring to be renewed, the centre rooms were
raised several feet. The other houses in the cantonment have hardly
undergone less change: brick walls first replaced the mats, and then
puckah roofs superseded the thatch; the usual additions of rooms and
verandahs taking place. The very last of the old bungalows was recently
transformed into a puckah house, and, save the old avenue, which all
declare to have been exactly in its present state when they landed half
a century ago, there is little in the present cantonment which can be
recognized by those who first occupied it permanently. The barracks had
an upper story placed on them about 1830; the church was built in 1819;
and a year or two ago a racket-court, for the men of the regiment, was
built: the officers erected one for themselves in 1834.

For many years Dum-Dum was a very favourite station; its mess, its
amateur theatre, its band, and, at one time, its pack of fox-hounds,
rendered it a place of resort to many from Calcutta and the neighbouring
stations; but the gradual change in the location of the artillery has
necessarily reduced the numbers there, and the heavy tax upon the means
of living, caused by the station being placed on half-batta in 1829,
causes all who can to avoid it; and consequently hardly any are to be
found there save the staff of the regiment of the station and the
battalions quartered there, with the young men just arrived from England
and awaiting their dispatch to the provinces.

CHAPTER VII.

Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment of
Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance General Officers
debarred the General Staff—Conceded to them—Guns formed into
Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun
Carriage Agency—Ordnance Commissariat Department—Commandants’
position improved—Model department—Select Committee formed—Reduction
of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion system introduced into
Bengal—Burmese war—Siege of Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment.

The overbearing conduct of the Nepaulese having forced the British into
war, Lord Hastings prepared to carry it on with vigour, and bring it to
as speedy a termination as possible; and with this view no preparations
were spared which the most consummate foresight and consideration could
suggest. A nearly simultaneous attack on four different points,
necessitating the Goorkhas to spread their forces and resources along
their whole extensive frontier, was the plan originally adopted, and
carried out with some alterations, suggested by an increased knowledge,
or forced upon us by those obstacles and failures which must ever attend
upon extended combinations.

Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, with about 6,000 native infantry and a
small train of artillery, was to attack the western or extreme right of
the Goorkha territories,—the districts in the neighbourhood of the
present hill station, Simlah.

Major-General Sir R. R. Gillespie, with about 1,000 Europeans and 2,500
native troops, with artillery, was to penetrate the valley of Deyrah,
and, after dislodging the Goorkhas from their positions in it, to attack
Gurhwal; this done, another force was to attack Kumaon from Rohilcund.

Major-General J. S. Wood, further to the eastward, was to penetrate by
Bootwul to Palpa: about 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 native troops, with a
small artillery, composed this force.

Major-General Marley was to operate on the east, or left, against their
capital at Katmandro, by the passes between the Gunduck and Bagmuttee
rivers: a moderate train of artillery, 1,000 Europeans, and 7,000 native
troops, formed this division.

With all these forces were portions of the regiment, which we shall
enumerate as we notice the actions of each division.

The first which came in contact with the enemy was Gillespie’s. This
force marched from Meerut, and entered the Dhoon by the Kheeree pass,
and seized Deyrah on the 22nd October, 1814: the horse artillery under
Major Pennington accompanied this division.[63]

Colonel Mawbey having been sent forward to seize Nalapanee (Kalunga),
found it so much stronger than was expected, that he fell back, and the
whole force advanced; one end of the ridge was seized on the 30th, and
under cover of this party a hasty battery was raised during the night to
receive ten field guns, about 600 yards from the fort; at daylight they
opened their fire, and four columns were to have advanced to the
assault, but by some misunderstanding only two advanced; the enemy,
throwing open a wicket, pushed out a gun, took them in flank, and forced
them to retire. A fresh attack by three companies of H.M.’s 53rd was
equally fruitless, and, rendered impatient by the repulse, Gillespie
rushed on at the head of a small party of dismounted dragoons from his
own regiment, the 8th Royal Irish: in this attack he fell. The force now
retired to Deyrah, and awaited till the 24th November the arrival of
siege guns[64] from Delhi. On the 25th operations were recommenced; a
battery for the 18–pounders was raised at about 300 yards, and by the
27th the wall was brought down. The enemy made a spirited sally on the
battery, but were driven back by discharges of case shot. The assault
was attempted, and failed, and a gun was run up by Lieutenant Luxford,
who volunteered, and was shot in the attempt to clear the breach. The
troops would not advance.

Open force having thus failed, a successful attempt to cut off the
supply of water was made, while shells were continually poured into the
fort. Cooped up in so small a space, without shelter, their execution
was great, and on the 30th the brave garrison evacuated the place,
leaving to their victors a scene which none could look on without
shuddering.

With the siege guns, parts of the 5th and 6th companies 3rd battalion
arrived, with the officers noted in the margin.[65] The horse artillery
also remained, “as the professional advice and opinion of so able an
officer as Major Pennington on the subject of artillery as affected by
local circumstances, could not fail of being of the greatest use to
Captain-Lieutenant Battine.”

The artillery losses were not severe: Lieutenant Luxford was the only
officer killed; and in reporting it Colonel Mawbey said, “Lieutenant
Luxford, of the horse artillery, is so severely wounded that I have no
hopes of his recovery. This excellent officer had gone to the foot of
the breach in command of an howitzer and 12–pounder gun, which I sent in
hopes, with the assistance of shrapnell shells, of lessening the
astonishing exertions made by the Goorkhas.”

A detachment being left near the Jumna, the main body marched for Nahun
by the plains on the 5th December, and on the 20th Major-General
Martindell assumed the command. His first efforts were not successful. A
combined attack on the enemy’s positions on the heights by columns under
Majors Ludlow and Richards, was beaten back, the former with much loss,
and the division took up its position before Nahun.

Major-General Ochterlony’s division was accompanied by the 4th company
3rd battalion artillery, and early in November attacked Nalagurh. The
place was breached, and the garrison capitulated on the 5th November, on
which occasion the Major-General considered it his “particular duty to
express his obligations to Major McLeod and officers and men who manned
the batteries.”[66]

The next object was the attack of Ramgurh, and some manœuvring was
necessary. The news of the failures at Kalunga arriving, gave fresh
confidence to the Goorkhas, and made the British cautious. Sir David
waited for reinforcements till near the end of the year. Light guns
arriving, the force moved, and manœuvred to place itself in rear of the
Goorkha position, who, to meet it, changed their front, and occupied the
heights of Maloun, exposing Ramgurh, which was the immediate object of
the movement. With incredible labour and perseverance, two 18–pounders
were carried up the hills and placed in battery about 700 yards from the
fort by the 12th November. Their fire was ably directed by Captain
Webbe, and the walls having crumbled away under it, the garrison were
glad to capitulate on the 17th, and were suffered to join their comrades
in Maloun.

Before following this division to its victorious conclusion, we shall
find it more convenient to glance at the proceedings of the other
forces, which were acting against the Goorkha line of frontier.

Major-General J. S. Wood’s division left Gorukpoor late in December: the
5th company 2nd battalion artillery was attached to it.[67] In January
it entered the Teraie, and, coming suddenly on a stockade at Jeilgurh,
carried it at once, in which operation Captain McDowall was wounded.
Fearing that he could not retain the stockade if attacked, Major-General
Wood retired to Nichloul, and, though reinforced by more troops,
remained inactive till the end of the season, when he made an attempt
with his guns on Bootwul, and retired to Gorukpoor.

To the eastward, Major Bradshaw, with the advance of Major-General
Marley’s army, on the 25th November attacked and carried the post of
Burhurwa, on the Baghmuttee, on which the Goorkhas evacuated the Teraie,
and Major Bradshaw occupied posts at Boragurhee, Sumunpoor, and Pursa.

Major-General Marley, with the main army, arrived on the 12th December:
the 6th company 2nd battalion, and detachment, were with this force, and
the artillery officers noticed in the margin,[68] and a small train of
heavy guns, some field and mountain train guns, and wall pieces. The
force moved in four columns; the main one towards the Bicheea-koh and
Hetounda passes; the second towards Hurheehurpoor; the third by the
Sookturdurree pass and Joorgooree; while the fourth was kept in
Jusspoot. The end of the month of December found the main body at
Puchroutee Tuppah, with the posts of Pursa and Sumunpoor twenty miles on
the left and right flanks of the army, the posts in the same state they
had been three weeks previously, and no steps taken to strengthen them.
They were garrisoned by about 500 men each, and Pursa had, in addition,
a single 6–pounder, commanded by Lieutenant Mathison. On the night of
the 17th January, 1815, both posts were attacked by the Goorkhas; the
party at Sumunpoor was taken by surprise and cut to pieces; that at
Pursa was a little better prepared, and, aided by Mathison’s gun,
defended themselves for some time; but the enemy, availing themselves of
the shelter the trees afforded, picked off nearly every artilleryman.
Mathison then proposed to charge the enemy, but the sepoys refused, and
a retreat was attempted, Lieutenant Mathison serving the gun by himself,
when all his men were killed or wounded, by which the enemy were kept
back; the gun being lost, the retreat became a flight, and had the enemy
followed, all must have perished.

Lieutenant Mathison, in his report, says, “I cannot refrain from
particularly mentioning the persevering bravery displayed by Matross
William Levey, who, though wounded by a musket-ball through one leg and
one arm, yet gallantly continued to keep his station until the
priming-pouch was blown away from his side, and his wounds becoming too
painful to endure, obliged him to sit down. ‘Sillaree,’ gun-lascar of
the 42nd company, is also deserving of particular mention; who, although
wounded in both hand and foot, continued alone to assist me to the last,
and was the person who seized and carried away with him the silver spear
planted by the enemy close to the gun at the commencement of the action,
and now in the possession of Major-General Marley.”

In the orders of the day, the Major-General “expressed his best thanks
to Lieutenant Mathison for his gallant conduct in defending his gun till
every man, European and native, fell around it, and all the ammunition
was expended.”

The artillery in this unhappy affair lost 4 Europeans and 6 natives
killed, and 6 Europeans and 11 natives wounded; and it is probable that
many of the wounded died afterwards. Want of foresight in not
strengthening the position, and want of proper information of the
enemy’s movements, seem to have been the chief causes of this
catastrophe: we may add another,—the detaching a single gun. Two guns
mutually support each other, and in case of a misfire occurring, the
second gun is ready to pour in its fire, should it be attempted to carry
the first by a rush; and we have heard it said that Lieutenant Mathison
declared on this occasion, that had he had another gun he could have
beaten off the enemy. A general order has since prohibited the practice
by declaring that never less than two are to be detached.

After this, Major-General Marley gave up all idea of penetrating the
hills; he strengthened the post of Baragurhee, and never again entered
the forest. On the 10th February he left his division, and Major-General
G. Wood arrived on the 20th, but the season passed away in inactivity.

In February detachments of irregulars under Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner
and Major Hearsey advanced on Almorah from Kasheepore and Pilheebheet,
and were followed by a small division of regulars under Colonel Nicolls,
with which was a detachment of European artillerymen under Lieutenants
C. H. Bell and R. B. Wilson, with ten pieces of artillery. On the 5th
April the force entered the hills, and heard of the defeat of the
irregulars before Almorah; on the 23rd, a detachment from it overtook
Hastee-Dull with his troops, near Gunnanath; an action followed, in
which the Goorkhas were beaten and their leader slain. On the 25th the
whole force attacked the breastworks on the Seetolee heights, and,
following up their success, drove the enemy into Fort Almorah, and
formed a lodgment on the ridge. “With considerable exertion on the parts
of the officers of artillery, Lieutenants Bell and Wilson, the small
mortars were laid in the battery, and opened at six in the evening, and
the larger ones (8–inch) at midnight.” Several shells were thrown into
the fort, which compelled the garrison to remain concealed; many
Goorkhas and Cassiahs having quitted the fort, it was supposed that the
garrison had fled, but during the night a sharp attack on the outposts
proved that they had determined to make a last effort; this failing, on
the 27th they evacuated the fort.

In Colonel Nicolls’s report he says, “I feel much indebted to
Lieutenants Bell and Wilson for their activity in laying and bringing
these mortars into use so soon,” and in the General Orders the
Governor-General records that these officers “are mentioned in terms of
strong commendation.”

This well-executed expedition materially affected the aspect of the war;
in the language of the Goorkha chief, it “broke the camel’s back,” it
separated the extremities of the frontier, and prevented reinforcements
being sent from Katmandoo to Maloun, and it stood out in brilliant
contrast with the other events of the campaign; but we must now return
to the divisions employed against Nahun and Maloun.

Major-General Martindell’s force, which we left in front of Nahun,
remained inactive till February; its subsequent operations were marked
by vacillation; with great labour, 18–pounders were carried up the
hills, and, after the time and labour thus expended, no further result
was obtained than levelling a stockade, which was found to be of no use
to the general plan of the campaign. Operations were commenced against
Jythuck, and a position taken up on the ridge on the 1st April, although
opposed by the enemy; this advantage was followed up, and Punchul Point
seized; other positions were taken up, which straitened the enemy’s
post, and would have eventually forced him to evacuate the fort, had not
the operations at Maloun caused the Goorkhas to leave the province. To
these operations we must now turn.

We left Major-General Ochterlony in possession of Ramgurh, with his
forces interposed between the enemy on the Maloun ridge and Belaspore.
Great exertions were made by the artillery in moving the ordnance up the
heights; but on the 10th March a battery was raised against Taragurh; on
the 11th a breach was practicable, and the enemy fled; Chumba was
attacked and breached by the 16th, and the garrison capitulated; other
forts were reduced, and the detachments joined the main body which was
in front of the Goorkha lines. These extended from the forts of Maloun
to Soorujgurh, all the peaks crowned with stockades, except those of
Ryla and Deothul, the former, convenient for future operations against
Soorujgurh, the latter, in the heart of the Goorkha line, within 1,000
yards of Maloun. The main attack was against Deothul, while a second was
made on Kyla, while other columns moved, as if against Maloun, to
distract the enemy.

Five columns were prepared, and on the night of the 14th April, Kyla was
occupied, and on a signal made, two other detachments moved to that
point; this done, two other columns moved on at night and occupied
positions till daylight, when they attacked Deothul from opposite sides:
with these columns were two field-guns, to assist in holding the height
when gained, as considerable efforts were expected from the enemy. The
position was carried after a severe contest, and much desultory fighting
continued till evening; but on the morning of the 16th the Goorkhas,
2,000 in number, made a furious attack on the hill; the artillerymen
were nearly all killed at their guns, and at one time, Lieutenant
Cartwright, with one artilleryman only, was left; but, aided by
Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Engineers, and Lieutenant Armstrong of the
Native Infantry, they kept up a fire which tended materially to check
the Goorkha onset; and reinforcements and ammunition arriving
opportunely from Ryla, their efforts slackened, and they were driven
back by a charge headed by Major Lawrie.

A road was made for heavy artillery to Deothul, and with incredible
labour the 18–pounders were placed in battery against Maloun early in
May; but news of the fall of Almorah having arrived, the Goorkhas urged
their chief, Ummer Sing, to yield, and on his refusing, they left him,
and he was forced to capitulate on the 5th May.

The exertions of the artillery in this campaign were acknowledged in the
following General Orders. “The unwearied alacrity, the labour, the
conspicuous gallantry, and the skill, displayed by the whole of the
artillery, engineers, and pioneer departments throughout the course of
the service, have been pointed out to the special notice of the
Governor-General, and His Excellency accordingly expresses his earnest
sense of the meritorious conduct exhibited by Major McLeod, commanding
the artillery, and by Captain Webbe, of the same corps.”

Early in the following year it became evident that the court of Nepal
intended evading the treaty they had agreed to, and the force was
assembled again in the neighbourhood of Dinapore, and placed under Sir
D. Ochterlony’s command, with the object of occupying the capital.

In addition to the former artillery, the 7th company 2nd battalion, and
3rd company 3rd battalion, with the following officers,[69] joined the
force. On the 10th February the main body entered the Sal forest, and
took up a position at Bicheea-koh; four days were spent in reconnoitring
and inquiry, when it was discovered that the regular road, which was
fortified, might be turned by some very difficult passes in the
Chooriaghati range; on the 14th, at night, a battalion (3rd) marched,
and entering a ravine, called Baleekola, followed its course five or six
miles, then striking up a water-course, came to a steep acclivity of 300
feet in height; the advance clambered up, and were followed by the
brigade, and the heights were gained. The other brigade (4th) marched by
the direct road on the 15th, and the Goorkhas, hearing that the ghat was
turned, retreated on Muckwanpore with but little resistance. Lieutenant
Walcote of the artillery was wounded severely in reconnoitring the
stockaded position. On the 27th the two brigades united at Mukwanpore; a
reconnoitring party came in contact with the enemy, and Lieutenant
Pickersgill with difficulty regained the camp; but reinforcements
proceeding from each side brought on a general action, which was eagerly
contested; the artillery came into full play, and the effect of the guns
upon the enemy’s masses moving on the opposite ridge considerably aided
in the victory gained.

The only other action was that in which Colonel Kelly’s brigade was
engaged in the attack on Hurryhurpore Hill. The infantry were engaged
from six to eleven, when “two 6–pounders and two 5½-inch howitzers being
brought up on elephants, in a few minutes decided the affair, and left
us in possession of an almost natural redoubt.” “Amongst the wounded you
will see Captain Lindsay; although his wounds are not severe, I fear I
shall lose his active service for a time, which I lament exceedingly,
having found Captain Lindsay a most zealous, able officer, both as an
artillerist and engineer,” are the words of Colonel Kelly in reporting
the affair.

With this campaign the war ended; the pride of the Nepalese was
effectually humbled for the time, on finding a British force in full
march on their capital, and they were compelled to execute the treaty;
but since that period they never ceased to look forward to the arrival
of the time when an opportunity of revenge might offer.

The services of the native troops were rewarded by a medal to all native
officers who had served within the hills, and to such of the native
infantry officers and privates as had distinguished themselves by their
gallantry or energy. This medal we have never seen, though by the
records we observe several were given to the native branches of the
regiment. The sketch here given is copied from one which appeared in the
East-India United Service Journal, in 1837.

[Illustration]

In the early part of the present century the attention of the Ordnance
department in England was turned towards a weapon which had long been in
use with the native armies in India—the rocket; and, under Sir William
Congreve’s superintendence, rockets of a large size and great power of
flight had been manufactured and used with much success in the
bombardment of Boulogne and Copenhagen. Experience suggested improvement
in details, and the results seemed so satisfactory, that a troop
equipped with cars for firing volleys and tripods for single rockets was
added to the corps of Royal Artillery, and employed with considerable
effect at the battles of Leipsic and Waterloo. Acting upon this example,
and considering that it would be advantageous to beat our Indian enemies
at their own weapons, the Government decided this year on adding a
rocket troop to the Bengal Artillery. It was ordered in September, and
consisted of European artillerymen mounted on camels, and volley-cars
drawn by horses. Its strength is detailed in the margin.[70]

Captain Whish, Lieutenants G. N. Campbell and G. Brooke, and
Lieutenant-Fireworker Cartwright were posted to this troop, and it was
soon in a state of efficiency. It was attached to the horse brigade,
which was at this time commanded by Major Pennington, who was retained
in the command, although “his promotion to the rank of major rendered
him in excess to the establishment of officers attached to it, at the
recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in
consideration of his general merits as an officer and his particular
qualifications for the command of the corps of horse-artillery, which
had attained such an eminent degree of discipline under his
superintendence.”

The dress of the regiment in January underwent some change; the
dress-jacket had embroidered button-holes on its scarlet facings; the
breastplate was gilt, with the Company’s arms embossed in silver; the
pantaloon continued to be worn as dress with the Hessian boots; but
trousers or overalls were worn on all duties; the chako was introduced,
displacing the bearskin cap. There are pictures in existence which give
a good idea of the dress at particular periods, and in them all the
changes may be traced.

A large portion of the regiment was this year called into the field
against Diaram, the zemindar of Hattrass, whose fort and territory had
been ceded by Scindia to the British in 1803, at which time no terms
were made exempting Diaram from the general laws in force in the
Company’s territories; but, in the expectation that, finding no
necessity for armed followers, his force would gradually have dissolved
and his fort gone to ruin, the Government took no steps to break it up
at once. Mistaking this forbearance, in spite of several warnings, he
persisted in a course of aggrandizement and opposition to the civil
officers, which drew down on him the powerful hand of Government, who
determined that no ill-timed economy should interfere with the rapid and
complete reduction of his power. Lord Hastings directed the preparations
to be made on such a scale to convince all that our failures heretofore
were caused not from a want of skill or resources, but from our failing
to bring them forward, and being more lavish of the blood of our troops
than the _matériel_ of our magazines.

For this siege two troops of horse artillery and the rocket-troop, seven
companies of European, and four of native artillery, and eighteen
companies of lascars, moved from different points and collected before
Hattrass, together with a battering train of six 24–pounders, fourteen
18–pounders, four 8–inch howitzers, six 10–inch mortars, fourteen 8–inch
mortars, and twenty-two 5½-inch mortars; total, 20 guns, 8 howitzers,
and 42 mortars. The general command of the artillery was held by

Major-General Sir J. Horsford; Captain C. H. Campbell, M. B.; Major
Pennington, commanding horse artillery; Lieutenant Lumsden, adjutant and
quarter-master; Majors Mason, McLeod, and Butler, fort adjutants.

─────────┬──────────┬────────────────────┬────────────┬───────────────────────
Troop. │Captains. │Captain-Lieutenant. │Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
1 │ Boileau │ │G. Gowan │Morland, Pennington
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
│ │ │Hyde │
3 │J. Brooke │Rodber │MacAlister │
│ │ │Sconce │
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
Rocket │ Whish │ │G. Brooke │Cartwright
─────────┴──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────┴───────────────────────

─────────┬──────────┬────────────────────┬────────────┬───────────────────────
Company. │Battalion.│Captain-Lieutenants.│Lieutenants.│Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
2 │ 2 │Fraser │Croxton │G. R. Scott
│ │ │ │R. B. Wilson
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
3 │ 2 │Curphy │Pereira │Hele, Vanrenen
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
4 │ 2 │Pryce │Carne │Sanders, Crommelin
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
6 │ 2 │Lindsay │Roberts │Coulthard
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
4 │ 3 │ │L. Lawrence │Smith, Whinfield
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
6 │ 3 │Battine │Fordyce │R. Dickson, Delafosse
─────────┼──────────┼────────────────────┼────────────┼───────────────────────
7 │ 3 │Tollemache │Timbrell │Wood, E. P. Gowan
─────────┴──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────┴───────────────────────

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies of golundaz battalion; 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th,
12th, 18th, 20th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 44th,
and 45th companies of gun lascars.

The force assembled on the 11th February, and from that time till the
21st was employed in collecting and preparing _matériel_ for the siege
and waiting for the train; on its arrival, three batteries were erected
against the kuttra, which opened on the 22nd, and continued firing
during the 23rd: a breach was effected, and during the night the enemy
left the kuttra.

On the 25th, batteries were commenced against the fort, three armed with
guns, and two with mortars from the kuttra, and on the right, two guns,
and three mortar batteries, one of the latter of sixteen 5½-inch
mortars; the trenches were pushed up to within 50 yards of the ditch, a
rocketbattery was erected between the kuttra and fort; much delay
occurred from want of fuses or from those sent turning out bad, so that
fresh had to be driven and materials sent for from Agra; the time was
employed in completing the batteries and approaches; a slight fire was
kept up till the 2nd March, when preparations being all made, the
bombardment commenced, at a signal from the rocketbattery, by a general
salvo. “The effect and sight (an eye-witness writes) was beautiful, and
was only excelled by a spectacle which took place about 5 in the
afternoon. While in the battery watching the flight of a shell, it
scarcely touched the ground before an explosion took place, the most
awful and grand I ever beheld—a powder-magazine had been exploded. It is
hardly possible to give an accurate description of it; it was more like
an immense column of red smoke, forming itself like an enormous chattah
in rolls, continually changing form as it ascended to an incredible
height: several fragments fell in the trenches and hurt some people.”
Another writes, “The effect of our shells and the ruins they have
occasioned, are indescribable; the house and zenana of Diaram is a
complete riddle—shot and shell holes in every direction; the mortality
is great, men and horses lying in the gateway and works.”

For the details of this operation, the first in India in which artillery
was used on a large scale, we would refer our readers to a journal of
the siege, which appeared in the East-India United Service Journal, in
1837, and content ourselves with adding the orders issued on the
occasion.

Major-General Marshall’s order says, “The science and skill displayed by
the engineers and artillery department were eminently conspicuous, and
the bombardment and explosion of the enemy’s principal magazine, which,
without derogating from the merits of others, must be allowed to have
given us almost immediate possession of the place, will long be regarded
as the most memorable among the brilliant events of the last fortnight,
and as demonstrative of the extent and soundness of that judgment and
penetration which, in the avowed anticipation of the very consequences,
enabled the army, by the provision of adequate means, to insure them.
The practice of the artillery has answered the expectations of that high
authority to which the Major-General has ventured to allude in the
forgoing observations. Another motive for them is to bring forward and
illustrate the fact more closely, that where the means are equal to the
science and practical knowledge known to pervade every branch of this
army, the results must invariably be rapid and successful, even against
such strong and formidable forts as Hattrass proved to be.” * * *

We cannot refrain from quoting the order issued to the artillery by
Major-General Sir John Horsford; the more so, as it proved the last he
was permitted to pen to the corps, his valuable life having terminated
suddenly, soon after returning to Cawnpoor from this service:—

“Major-General Sir John Horsford, commanding the artillery brigaded
before Hattrass, performs with pleasure the last exercise of his command
in conveying to the horse and foot artillery and rocket-troop his
congratulations on the brilliant services which their united exertions
have effected for the state, Government having through their means
principally been placed in possession of Hattrass, the rapid reduction
of which has caused the surrender of the important fortress of Morsaum
and eleven other forts.

“The acknowledgments of Major-General Marshall, commanding the army, and
the favourable sentiments entertained by the army at large, must be much
more satisfactory to the artillery than any tribute of praise which Sir
John Horsford could bestow in confirmation of their meritorious
services.

“But the Major-General considers public acknowledgments due to Major
Mason, commanding the foot artillery, who, with Majors MacLeod and
Butler, superintended in turn the several batteries. He begs to offer
his best thanks to Major Mason and the experienced field-officers above
mentioned, for their several important services.

“The Major-General duly appreciates the labour and exertions of every
officer and man employed in the batteries before the kuttra and fort,
and more particularly the heavy duty all had to perform on the 2nd
instant during the general bombardment. To the officers commanding
batteries, and to their juniors doing duty under them, the
Major-General’s notice is particularly due. The state of the fort after
its capture evinced to all that the means employed for its reduction had
been directed by hands well acquainted with their use. Where every
officer was equally zealous, the Major-General hopes he will be excused
for not naming all who deserve his praise and thanks.

“The mature judgment of Major Pennington was displayed on every occasion
which offered itself.

“The spirit and conduct of the officers and men of the horse artillery
throughout the service deserve the Major-General’s warmest approbation.

“The zeal evinced by Captain Whish, the officers and men of the
rocket-troop, require the Major-General’s notice in public orders.

“The Major-General’s personal feelings are much gratified by the
important consequences which have resulted from the unanimity which
prevailed amongst every branch of the artillery to forward the objects
of the service. The preparations which were made caused much to be
expected from their exertions, and the Major-General is satisfied that
the expectations of the most sanguine have been realized. It is a source
of great pleasure for the Major-General to reflect that the last period
of his service with a corps in which he has long served, should be
distinguished by events which call forth the admiration of all who
witnessed them, and by services which conspicuously increase the credit
and the established high character of the regiment of Bengal Artillery.”

From Hattrass Sir John Horsford returned to Cawnpoor, and on the 20th
April closed his honourable career. His death was sudden, and it is
believed was occasioned by a disease of the heart. To his public
character the Governor-General bore testimony in the following
order:—“The Governor-General cannot direct the succession in the
regiment of artillery without expressing his deep concern at the loss
the Honourable Company’s service has suffered by the death of
Major-General Sir John Horsford, K.C.B. The ardent spirit, the science,
and the generous zeal of that admirable officer, were in no less degree
an advantage to the public interest than an honour to himself. It is
consolatory to think that when sinking under the malady which so early
deprived his country of an energy incessantly devoted to her glory, he
had the consciousness of having just displayed with signal triumph the
skill and superiority of the corps which he had so materially
contributed to fashion and perfect.”

The part Sir John Horsford had borne in some of the severest service the
regiment had been engaged in, his thorough knowledge of the profession,
his high talents and commanding character, gave him great influence in
the regiment, and secured for his opinions great weight with the
authorities; and, had he been spared to exercise the command for a few
years more, the regiment would undoubtedly have been placed on a far
more efficient footing than it hitherto had been. From the time of
Pearse’s death to Horsford’s succession to the command, no man of talent
or influence had been at its head; and the consequence was, that while
the other branches of the army were increased on a scale more adequate
to their wants, the artillery was added to by driblets, kept in the
lowest state, and its organization made a subject of continual
experiment.

Just before his death, Sir John Horsford submitted to the Marquis of
Hastings a memoir, pointing out the faults which had thus been
committed, and detailing the principles upon which the corps of
artillery ought to be formed; going on from these principles through all
the details, he presented a complete scheme of a regiment of artillery
adapted to the wants of Bengal. His character insured attention to the
subject, and the result was, that in the following year the corps was
reorganized, not indeed upon the scale Sir John Horsford proposed, but
upon the most efficient it had yet been.

Major-General Hardwicke was appointed commandant in succession to
Major-General Sir John Horsford.

We must pause at this point for a time to consider a circumstance which
was of great importance to the regiment,—the question of general
officers of the ordnance branch being eligible to the general staff of
the army. In the arrangements for remodelling the army in 1796, no doubt
existed on the point. In the Minutes of Council, 5th June, 1797, it was
directed that the artillery regimental command was to be held by the
senior officer present, “not being a general officer,” and several
artillery general officers had been employed on the general staff; such
was the state of the case up to 1814, when the Court of Directors
thought proper to annul the existing orders, for reasons which may be
briefly thus stated:—

1st. That the services of the artillery and engineer generals are
required by the state in their own departments.

2nd. That the practice, though not the theory (so to speak), of His
Majesty’s service excludes ordnance generals from any employment on the
staff.[71]

To the first, it might be replied, that even supposing one artillery and
one engineer general are wanted at the heads of the corps, it is no
reason why the others should not be employed on the general staff during
the period they are not required with their own. That till now a general
officer was never allowed to serve in this position; and if while
debarred from the general staff and holding the regimental command on
the regimental allowances, his position would be a very unfavourable
one, as contrasted with that of a general officer of cavalry or
infantry.

To the second we would say, that if true, some compensation would be
found to the Royal Ordnance general officers in the numerous regimental
superiorities they enjoy in Europe over regiments of the line; such as
rising regimentally to colonelcies, the greater proportion of field
officers, higher pay, the use of a horse, superior regimental rank,
ordnance staff offices, and many other points which it would require
more space than we can afford to go fully into; but, in reality, Royal
Ordnance officers were not excluded, and at the time of publication of
the order there were twelve or fifteen of them employed on the home and
foreign staff of the army.

Feeling that their prospects were much blighted by being thus debarred
from those honourable and lucrative commands to which every officer
hopes (though few live) to succeed, the officers of the ordnance corps
in Bengal (and also in Madras and Bombay) memorialized the Court of
Directors, praying for a revision of the orders in question, and their
reply was published in August, 1817. The Court did not enter into the
question; they refused the point at issue, but directed that general
officers of artillery and engineers in command of their regiments should
be placed on a similar footing as to allowances with other general
officers serving on the army staff. But although at this time the
representations of the ordnance officers had no effect, there is little
doubt that they were subsequently reconsidered and their justice
admitted, for in the general remodelling of the military system in 1824,
“an additional general officer on the Honourable Company’s establishment
was authorized for the staff of each presidency, and the generals of
artillery and engineers were rendered eligible to the staff, the command
of those corps devolving on the senior colonels or field-officers.”

The comparative efficiency of guns collected into batteries kept in
order and directed by officers of the artillery, and of the same
scattered as battalions and galloper-guns, had been proved so strongly
in favour of the former, that the Government now resolved on following
up the practice of European powers. The gallopers from six native
regiments were directed to be embodied into two troops of native horse
artillery at Meerut and Cawnpoor, and placed under the command of
Captains G. Gowan and Biggs in July, and those of the two remaining
regiments were some months later withdrawn and formed into a third troop
at Nagpoor under Lieutenant George Blake, and subsequently Captain
Rodber. The horses and troopers accompanied the guns; and as the best
horses had generally been given to the galloper-guns, these troops were
exceedingly well provided with draught cattle. For officers the
foot-artillery was again indented on, but this time not without an
augmentation, for, “adverting to the number of officers withdrawn from
the foot to the horse artillery, and to the total inadequacy of the
number of officers which would remain with the battalions of foot
artillery, and for the numerous and important duties required of them,
the Governor-General was pleased to determine that the officers actually
attached to the horse artillery should be struck off the strength of the
foot artillery, and the vacancies supplied by promotion;” and
accordingly one major and six captains were now (25th October) added to
the corps.

Before adverting to the campaigns which the Marquis of Hastings’s grand
combinations against the Pindarees caused, we will notice the additions
made to the regiment previous to its reorganization in October, 1818,
and detail its strength when that change had taken place, and then
succinctly refer to those well-planned operations which with very little
bloodshed rooted out the Pindarees, and humbled the Mahratta power.

In continuation of the system of collecting guns in batteries, an
experimental horse field-battery was formed in November, and placed
under Captain Battine with the 6th company 3rd battalion. The battery
consisted of eight guns and eight waggons (two 12–pounders, two 5½-inch
howitzers, and four 6–pounders), and ninety-six horses were allowed to
drag it; these horses were led by “Syce drivers,” a class of syces
placed on the same footing as lascars with respect to pay, clothing, and
pension.

The rocket-troop was modified as to the numbers of its men and cattle,
but camels were still continued with it, nor was it till 1822 that they
were superseded by horses, and two additional companies of independent
golundaz were raised for the Islands and Bengal. Colonel Sherwood was
appointed acting commandant during Major-General Hardwicke’s absence on
sick leave.

The regiment now was composed of the horse artillery, consisting of
seven troops, including the rocket-troop; three European battalions of
seven companies each, twelve regular and six irregular companies of
golundaz, forty-five lascar and twenty-six driver companies. The new
organization directed it to consist of seven troops of horse artillery,
three European battalions, of eight companies each, one native battalion
of fifteen companies, with a company of lascars attached to each
company, European or native (39), and seventeen bullock and two horse
field-batteries, each of eight pieces, with a driver company to each.

The officers were allotted to the different portions of the regiment in
the following proportion:—

──────────────────────┬──────────────────────┬─────────────────┬───────
Horse Artillery. │3 European Battalions.│Native Battalion.│Total.
──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┼─────────────────┼───────
1 Colonel │ 3│ ...│ 4
2 Lieutenant-Colonels│ 6│ ...│ 8
2 Majors │ 6│ 1│ 9
7 Captains │ 24│ 13│ 44
28 1st Lieutenants │ 48│ 4│ 80
— 2nd Lieutenants │ 48│ 4│ 2
──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┴─────────────────┴───────

The rank of 2nd captain was abolished, and that of 2nd lieutenant
substituted for lieutenant-fireworker; serangs of gun-lascars were made
jemadars; serang-major, soobahdar; 1st and 2nd tindals, havildars and
naiks; gunners were styled bombardiers, and matrosses, gunners.

──────────────────────────┬────────────────────┬───┬───
European Troop or Company.│Serjeants. │ 7│ 6
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Corporals. │ 6│ 5
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Bombardiers. │ 10│ 10
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Trumpeters. │ 2│ 2
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Farriers. │ 2│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Rough-riders. │ 2│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Gunners. │ 80│ 80
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Jemadars, Havildars.│ 1│ 12
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Naiks. │ 2│ 2
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Lascars. │ 24│ 70
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
Native Troop or Company. │Soobahdars. │ 1│ 1
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Jemadars. │ 1│ 2
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Havildars. │ 6│ 8
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Naiks. │ 6│ 8
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Trumpeters. │ -│ 2
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Rough-riders. │ -│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Farriers. │ -│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Troopers. │ 90│100
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Staff-Serjeants. │ -│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Jemadars, Havildars.│ 1│ 12
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Naiks. │ 2│ 2
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Lascars. │ 24│ 70
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Sirdars. │ 4│ -
──────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───┼───
〃 │Drivers. │ 85│ -
──────────────────────────┴────────────────────┴───┴───

The whole regiment consisted of

ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENT.

│ │ │ │Returns
│ │ │ │ Dec.
│ │ │ │ 1818.
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │Colonels. │ 4│ 4
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │Lieutenant-Colonels. │ 8│ 8
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │Majors. │ 9│ 9
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │Captains. │ 44│ 44
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │1st Lieutenants. │ 80│ 75
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
│ │2nd Lieutenants. │ 52│ 43
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
HORSE ARTILLERY.│EUROPEAN.│Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ 7
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 52│ 46
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Bombardiers and Gunners. │ 320│ 321
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Farriers, Rough-riders, │ 24│ 13
│ │Trumpeters. │ │
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Native Officers. │ 6│ 6
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ NATIVE. │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 56
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Troopers. │ 270│ 246
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Farriers, Rough-riders, │ 18│ 12
│ │Trumpeters. │ │
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 21│ -
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 168│ -
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
FOOT ARTILLERY. │EUROPEAN.│Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ 23
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 264│ 249
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Bombardiers and Gunners. │ 2160│ 1469
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 48│ 37
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 45│ 39
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Staff. │ -│ -
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 240│ 245
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Privates. │ 1500│ 1632
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 30│ 32
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │LASCARS. │Native Officers. │ 39│ 49
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 156│ 190
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Privates. │ 2730│ 3261
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │DRIVERS. │Sirdars. │ 76│ 129
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Drivers. │ 1615│ 2640
────────────────┴─────────┴──────────────────────────┴────────┴────────

Forming a total of 8,094, including lascars, and excluding drivers.

The infantry of the army at this period amounted to about 64,000 men, or
nearly in the proportion of eight infantry to one artilleryman, bringing
the relative numbers of the two branches pretty much to what they were
in 1796, at which time the infantry were 7½ to one artilleryman.

In a preceding page we have alluded to the operations of the
Governor-General for the purpose of rooting out the Pindaree hordes by
whom Central India was overrun, and the Company’s provinces yearly
threatened, and in some instances plundered. Their numbers may have
reached some 20,000 horse, undisciplined, and prepared to run rather
than fight, and were scattered about in small durras or bands, so that
no large bodies of troops would have been necessary to overcome them had
it not been for the tacit protection afforded these freebooters by the
Mahratta powers, and whose attitude was such, that preparations were
forced to be made on a scale sufficient to meet their armies, and this
called a far larger portion of the armies of India into the field than
would otherwise have been required.

The Bengal divisions took the field about November, 1817. The masterly
position taken up by Lord Hastings, with the centre division of the
grand army threatening Scindeah’s capital, his park and magazines, in
case he ventured to move from Gwalior to join the Mahratta confederacy,
completely paralyzed him; but the Peshwah and Nagpoor rajah being unawed
by any sufficient body of troops at hand, attacked the residents at
their courts, and it was only by the heroic exertions of the small
escorts, and which have immortalized the names of Poonah and
Seetabuldee, that the posts were made good till reinforcements could
arrive.

Many portions of the regiment were employed with the five divisions of
Bengal troops, and in operations extending over so great a space, must
necessarily have undergone much severe marching; but as the actual
service was partial, and we do not pretend to enter into a detailed
account of the whole campaigns, we shall only refer to the occasions on
which they came in contact with the enemy.

We have already mentioned that the galloper-guns of the cavalry
regiments were incorporated into troops of horse artillery; the
gallopers of two regiments employed on the Nerbudda were formed into a
troop under Lieutenant G. Blake, and, with a squadron of native cavalry,
detached by Colonel Adams to Nagpoor on the first news of the expected
attack on the residency, to share in the noble defence of Seetabuldee;
they arrived too late, but they joined Brigadier Doveton’s force on the
16th December, and were employed in the action fought against the Arabs,
who formed the chief strength of the Nagpoor army.

In the battle of Mahidpoor, fought by Sir T. Hyslop’s army on the 21st
December against Holkar and the Peshwah’s forces, one Bengal Artillery
officer was present—Lieutenant Sotheby, commanding the golundaz company
of the Russell brigade.

Major-General Brown was detached with a column from the grand army
against Jawud, and on the 20th January, 1818, attacked the troops of
Holkar, drawn up under the walls, and drove them into the fort by a
charge of cavalry, supported by a fire of shrapnell from two guns of the
2nd troop horse artillery under Lieutenant Mathison,[72] silencing the
enemy’s guns. This success was followed up by an immediate attack; the
guns of Captain Biggs’s native troop were drawn up on the right and left
to destroy the defences of the entrance, while a 12–pounder, under
Mathison, was dragged up by the European artillery and pioneers to blow
open the gate, and which was not effected until the third round, during
which time the party were exposed to a heavy and galling fire.

In the field orders issued on this occasion, “the major-general desired
to express his particular satisfaction at the manner in which the
artillery under Captain Biggs and Lieutenant Mathison was served, and at
the soldier-like manner in which Lieutenant Mathison took up his
12–pounder to force open the gate.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Pennington, in writing to Lieutenant Mathison on this
occasion, said, “Accept my best thanks for the great credit you brought
the horse artillery by the ability and gallantry you displayed in the
attack on Jeswunt Rao Bhao and his town, and my cordial congratulations
on your personal safety.”

The next action we have occasion to notice was that of
Lieutenant-Colonel Adams at Seonee on the 16–17th April, in which
Captain Rodber’s troop (who had been appointed to the troop lately
engaged at Nagpoor under Lieutenant Blake) did good service.

The Peshwah’s army flying from Brigadier Doveton’s division, was
intercepted by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, who immediately attacked with
the cavalry and horse artillery, driving the enemy from position to
position.[73] “Great praise,” says Colonel Blacker, “has been given to
the horse artillery on this occasion, and, from a comparison of several
accounts of this affair, whatever loss was sustained by the enemy is
chiefly attributable to their fire. The ground was unfavourable for
cavalry, yet the guns, by admirable exertion, were advanced and the
cavalry may be said to have only covered them.”[74] It must be borne in
mind, too, that these exertions were preceded by a march of unparalleled
length. Captain Rodber was sent from Nagpoor to join Colonel Adams’s
force, and in a letter written many years afterwards, he says, “I could
not have gone less than ninety miles. At 1 A.M., on the 16th April, I
commenced my march (after going the previous day eighteen miles over an
execrable road, large loose stones and hills) to join Colonel Adams at
Hingun ghat; on the road I received a letter, informing me that Colonel
Adams had marched and encamped at Alundaboo; this information obliged me
to retrace my road for some distance; I reached the colonel’s camp
between 2 and 3 P.M. (I am quite positive to the time exactly); I could
not have gone less than fifty-six miles, as I pushed on. At 8 P.M., same
day, I mounted again, and moved with the detachment in pursuit of the
Peshwah, and was not dismissed till between 12 and 1 next day. About six
of the last miles were over a succession of wooded heights covered with
large loose stones, and hollows deep and wide enough to hide both gun
and horses in. From what we see of roads in any part of India I have
visited, no notion can be formed of the ways here; in a march sometimes
you have to cross seven or eight nullahs with swampy bottoms and
difficult approaches.”

In the same letter Captain Rodber, speaking of this service, says, “I
dined with Jenkins (at Nagpoor) the night before I marched, and late
some of his hurkarus came in and reported that the Peshwah’s army had
got round Colonel Adams, and was in full march on Nagpoor, said to have
eighty guns, and 10,000 Arabs, and a number of horse. It was not for me
to say a word about my little party marching into the very jaws of this
host, but I thought it very inconsiderate allowing me to move. I
remember one morning, when quite dark, a trooper from the advance guard
coming into the line, and declaring he heard the noise of horses’ feet,
and when I had satisfied myself of the fact, I put all in the most
defensible position, firmly believing it was the van of the Peshwah’s
army; it proved, however, a large body of the Nizam’s horse, sent to me
by the colonel; I do not know that I ever felt greater relief.”

Major-General Marshall’s division occupied Sagur in March, 1818, and a
portion of the force moved out against Dhamoney, a small fortress about
thirty miles distant, at the head of a ravine or valley leading to the
Dussan river, the neighbouring country being very rugged and broken. The
detachment took possession of the town on the 20th March, and by the
24th had raised batteries against the fort, in which two 24–pounders,
four 18–pounders, one 12–pounder, and two 5½-inch howitzers, were
placed; a mortar-battery also was completed to the rear. These opened on
the 24th March, and after six hours’ firing the killidar surrendered.
The 4th company 2nd battalion artillery was employed in this
service,—Captain Hetzler, Captain Lindsay, Captain-Lieutenant Coulthard,
Lieutenants Carne, W. Bell, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Saunders, Crommelin,
and Patch.

This force then marched, _viâ_ Dumoh, to Jubbulpoor, and proceeded
against “Mundlah,” on the Nerbudda, and by the 25th, batteries had been
formed for thirty-two pieces of artillery; they were immediately armed,
and by the next day a breach was open, which was successfully stormed.

The artillery operations were directed by Captain Hetzler. The following
officers were present:—Captain Lindsay, Lieutenants Dickson, Carne,
Saunders, Patch, D’Oyley, Kirby, and Crommelin.

Lieutenant-Colonel Adams’s division was employed against the fortress of
Chandah in May, 1818. Both Bengal and Madras artillery were with him; of
the former, the three native troops of horse artillery, under Captain
Rodber, Lieutenant Twemlow, the 5th company 2nd battalion, Captain
MacDowell, Lieutenant Crawford, acting field engineer, Lieutenant
Walcott, commissary of ordnance.

On the 9th May the force arrived, and on reconnoitring, it was found to
be nearly six miles in circumference, and mounting eighty guns; the
ordnance available for the attack consisted of three 18–pounders, four
brass 12–pounders, six howitzers, and twelve 6–pounders. On the night of
the 13th, a battery was raised on an eminence to the south of the fort,
from which four pieces of ordnance, to divert the enemy’s attention,
played on the town with shells and hot shot, while materials were being
collected, and a thorough reconnoissance made. The south-east angle was
finally determined on for the breach. On the 17th, the four 12–pounders
were placed in battery to destroy the flanking defences, as well as the
howitzers and three 6–pounders. During the night of the 18th, the three
18–pounders were placed in a breaching battery within 250 yards of the
place, and opened their fire on the 19th. By 4 P.M., the breach was
practicable; the assault was, however, delayed till the following
morning, but a fire was kept up at intervals during the night to prevent
the enemy retrenching the breach, which they attempted. In the morning
the assault took place; the storming party was accompanied by a detail
of artillerymen with spikes and sponges for spiking or turning the
enemy’s guns. The storming party were completely successful, and
obtained possession of the town and fort after overcoming a very serious
resistance.

In noticing this action, the General Order says: “The rapid demolition
of the enemy’s defences, and the speed with which a breach was effected,
would sufficiently testify the service of * * * Lieutenant Crawford,
Bengal Artillery, acting as engineer, in indicating the positions for
the batteries, even had not Lieutenant-Colonel Adams professed his
obligations to those officers so warmly.”

“Captain Rodber, Captain MacDowell, * * * and Lieutenant Walcott, seem
to have highly deserved the praise their commander bestows upon them.
Indeed, the efforts of all the officers and men of the artillery appear
to have been highly laudable.”

The Sagur troops under Brigadier-General Watson, in October, 1818, again
took the field against Urjun Sing, Rajah of Gunakota, who refused to
give up his fort, agreeably to treaty. It was situated about thirty
miles from Sagur, on the banks of the Sonar, at a point where a small
nullah ran into it, so that the river and nullah formed ditches on two
sides, while the third, in which was the gateway, had a well-formed
artificial ditch; but it was not a place of any strength. On the 23rd
October, a battery of fourteen mortars and four howitzers was formed on
the opposite bank of the Sonar, near the city of Hardynugger, and opened
its fire on the fort. An accident occurred next day in the battery,
which caused several casualties. The shells for expenditure had been
placed in the rear of the mortars covered by paulins, and by some
mischance[75] a spark got among and ignited them, upwards of one hundred
blowing up. On the 26th, a breaching battery was ready, and opened from
two 24–pounders, four 18–pounders, and two 12–pounders, to which two
more 24–pounders were added on the 29th. The battery was 900 yards from
the wall, but a breach was soon accomplished, and the enemy capitulated
without standing an assault.

The 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion artillery were present, with
Captain Hetzler, Captain-Lieutenant Coulthard, Lieutenants Pew,
Saunders, D’Oyley, Patch, Kirby, and Crommelin.

In June a detachment from the 4th company 2nd battalion, with
Lieutenants Carne and Saunders, were sent with a column against the fort
of Satunwaree; a breach was effected by the 18–pounders on the 8th June,
and assaulted, but unsuccessfully; the place, however, was evacuated
during the night.

The unsuccessful assault led to a report that the breach had not been
sufficiently cleared, and charges were preferred against Lieutenant
Carne for bad practice of the artillery, for serving out an excess of
liquor to the men on duty, leading to their intoxication, and for being
intoxicated himself. Of the first and third he was acquitted by a
general court-martial, and partially of the second; the fact probably
was, that the men, being much exposed and overworked under the burning
sun of June, a small quantity of liquor, which in other circumstances
would have been taken with perfect impunity, flew to their heads.

The Nagpoor subsidiary force, under Major-General Doveton, marched
against Assurghur to receive charge of it from Scindia’s killidar, but
the killidar, according to the native custom, pretended to have received
no orders, and it therefore became necessary to proceed against it; all
the available trains were sent for, including those from Sagur and
Hoshunabad, and when collected, amounted to the number detailed in the
margin;[76] but the siege commenced with those with the force. Many
difficulties were experienced in carrying on the approaches up the steep
sides of the hills; an accident, though fortunately attended with but
little loss, occurred, by the magazine in rear of the breaching battery,
containing 130 barrels of powder, exploding on the 21st March. Towards
the end of the month, half of the 5th company 2nd battalion under
Lieutenant Debrett arrived with the Hoshunabad train, and on the 31st,
the Sagur force, with the 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion and 22
heavy guns; from this time the siege was pressed with vigour, and on the
9th April the garrison surrendered, having made a very stout resistance.
Lieutenant-Colonel Crossdill, of the Madras Artillery, commanded the
artillery. Captains Coulthard and Pew, Lieutenants Debrett and Counsell,
appear to have been present at this siege; the latter officer was
slightly wounded.

Having thus brought our history to the close of the Pindaree war and its
consequent service, we may notice such internal changes as were going on
in the regiment and ordnance department generally, following their
chronological occurrence until held service shall again call for our
attention.

Originally the gun-carriages were constructed by a contractor in Fort
William, under the inspection of the commissary of stores; in 1800, the
system was altered, and an agency for this purpose was formed with a
superintendent on a staff salary of Rs. 1,200 per mensem and his
military pay and allowances. The agency was established at Cossipoor,
and connected with it was another for the supply of seasoned timber. In
1814, a second agency was found necessary to meet the wants of the
department, now scattered over a very extended space, and established at
Allahabad, under Major Clement Brown. In 1817, it was transferred to
Futteygurh; this agency was dependent on a half-wrought _matériel_ yard
at Cawnpoor. The Honourable Company’s timber-yards at Cossipoor and
Cawnpoor were annexed to the gun-carriage agencies in 1823 and 1825
respectively, and in the year 1829, the Cossipoor agency was
incorporated with that at Futteygurh.

In May, 1818, the ordnance commissariat officers were organized into a
department upon the principles which had governed the previous formation
of an army commissariat department; it was made one generally of
seniority, and a provision was made for a certain number of warrant
officers in the grade of deputy commissary, as well for two other ranks
above that of conductor.

To carry out the reorganization of the regiment, adverted to in a former
page, in November, the 8th company to each European battalion was added;
a draught of 100 men from the European regiment was taken for this
purpose. Two companies of golundaz (11th and 12th[A]) and five companies
(41st to 45th[77]) of gun lascars were reduced. The driver companies
were reduced to nineteen, two for the horse, and seventeen for the
bullock batteries; nine were reduced (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th,
10th, and 12th), and transferred to the commissariat; each company was
fixed at four sirdars and eighty-six drivers, and the batteries
consisted of eight pieces. The lascar companies were strengthened by the
addition of one havildar and fourteen privates to each company, with
European battalions, and by one havildar with the companies attached to
the 4th battalion.

The field-train establishments, which in 1809 were placed entirely under
the control and care of commanding officers of artillery at Agra and
Cawnpoor, were now transferred to the magazines, and kept in order by
the commissaries under the general control of the commanding officer of
artillery.

The horse field-batteries were increased to three, and considered part
of the permanent establishment, making the number, fourteen bullock and
three horse-batteries. Another bullock-battery was shortly added, on
Mhow becoming a Bengal station.

The Governor-General, adverting to the important, responsible, and
laborious duty which the recent signal alterations in the constitution
of the artillery have imposed on the commandant, and considering the
staff salary at present allowed to him, when not a general officer, to
bear no proportion to the extent and variety of his command, was pleased
to sanction a personal allowance, in addition, of Rs. 500 per mensem;
and also, on the same principle, the commanding officer of artillery in
the field was allowed to draw 600, and all field commanding divisions,
300. The major of brigade was raised to an assistant adjutant-general of
the regiment, and a brigade-major permanently sanctioned in the field.

A model department was formed at Dum-Dum under Captain Parlby, and the
establishment for bouching guns and preparing tangent-scales was
attached to it. In this department a very valuable collection of models
was made up, and which, on the breaking up of the establishment in 1829,
were transferred to the expense magazine, and thence to the regimental
mess in 1839, the regiment having added a room for their reception.

A permanent select committee was formed, consisting of certain
regimental and staff officers of artillery, at Dum-Dum and in the
neighbourhood, to whom every question involving change in the _matériel_
equipment of the department was to be submitted in the first instance,
and their opinion was to be forwarded to assist Government in coming to
a decision, and they were soon fully occupied with the important
questions of windage, brass ordnance, and patterns of light
field-carriages.

In August the lascars of the regiment were very much reduced; the use of
drag-ropes as a means of moving guns, except for trifling distances, or
out of a difficulty, was given up, and with that, the necessity of such
strong bodies of lascars with artillery companies ceased. They were
reduced to a detail of one havildar, two naiks, and twenty-four
privates, to each troop and European company, and taken away entirely
from the native battalions; the men thus struck off from the regiment
were formed into sixteen companies of store lascars, each consisting of
one subahdar, one jemadar, four havildars, four naiks, and eighty
privates, and were posted to the different magazines. But this
arrangement was not found to answer, and the lascar companies were, on
the war breaking out in 1824, increased to forty privates, partly,
perhaps, from the insufficiency of Europeans to keep the companies up to
their proper strength.

An interpreter was allowed to the regiment at head-quarters, and
attached to the golundaz companies at Dum-Dum.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. MacLeod was appointed commandant on Major-General
Hardwicke’s sailing for Europe in December, and with Colonel MacLeod the
command of the artillery in the field ceased; the brigade-majorship was
also abolished, and Captain Tennant, who held it, was appointed
assistant secretary to the Military Board.

In February five companies were added to the golundaz battalion, raising
its number to twenty companies, to meet the exigency of the war with
Ava. In June, to meet the deficiency of Europeans, three additional
companies of lascars of eighty-four men each were raised; four privates
were added to each golundaz company, and the lascar companies increased,
as above mentioned, to forty men each, those who had been transferred to
the store lascars being taken back again.

In May, a fundamental change took place in the Indian army; the
battalions were formed into regiments, and the officers of all branches
of the service were placed on the same footing as to the chances of
promotion, by the regiments being of equal strength in this particular.
This new organization caused a considerable degree of promotion
throughout the army, and in this the artillery shared. The officers of
the regiment continued, as previously, to rise in one general gradation
list, and the regiment was to be composed of

────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────┬────────────────
3 brigades of horse artillery, │each consisting of│ 3 European and
│ │ 1 Native troop.
────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────
5 battalions of European foot artillery;│each consisting of│ 4 companies.
────────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┼────────────────
1 battalion of Native foot artillery │each consisting of│20 companies.
────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────┴────────────────

The rocket-troop was to form one of the troops of a brigade.

Lascar details were attached to the troops, and a company to each
European company, and a driver company to each field-battery.

These changes, however, were not even nominally carried into effect
until the middle of the next year, owing to the scattered state of the
regiment, the occupation the Burmese war gave, and the difficulty in
obtaining a sufficient supply of European recruits to meet the demand.
In reality, some of the troops of horse artillery were not formed until
the end of 1826; we therefore shall not in this place give a tabular
statement of the strength of the regiment, but reserve it until we
arrive at the year 1826, when a reorganization of the native battalion
made another change, and the state of the regiment, before and after its
alteration, will then be seen at one glance.

The aggression of the Burmese on our frontiers, and the contempt with
which they treated all remonstrances, forced the Indian Government
reluctantly to declare war in 1824. Unfortunately, little was known of
the country, and a most injudicious plan of operations was drawn out,
which, by seizing Rangoon and the numerous native craft the maritime
capital was expected to furnish, embarking the troops in them, and
sailing up the Irawaddy in the rainy season, and threatening Amerapoora,
was to terminate the war in one campaign. With this intention the
expedition sailed in April, and was joined by the Madras portion early
in May at Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands.

Two companies of the Bengal Artillery with their lascars accompanied the
expedition.

Major Pollock, Commandant; Lieutenant Laurenson, Adjutant; Lieutenant B.
Brown, Deputy Quarter-master General.

────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────┬──────────┬────────────┬────────────
Company.│Battalion.│afterwards│Company.│Battalion.│ Captains. │Lieutenants.
────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────────┼────────────
│ │ │ │ │ │G. R. Scott,
7 │ 3 │ │ 3 │ 5 │Timbrell │ Rawlinson,
│ │ │ │ │ │ R. G.
│ │ │ │ │ │ MacGregor.
────────┼──────────┼──────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────────┼────────────
│ │ │ │ │ │ Counsell,
8 │ 3 │ │ 4 │ 5 │Biddulph[78]│ E. Blake,
│ │ │ │ │ │ O’Hanlon,
│ │ │ │ │ │ McDonald.
────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────┴──────────┴────────────┴────────────

On the 10th May the fleet reached Rangoon, and, overcoming a very faint
resistance by a few broadsides from the _Liffey_, the troops landed and
took possession. They found it deserted by its inhabitants, and
incapable of affording either subsistence or the means of advancing. No
choice was left; nothing could be done till the cold weather, except
shelter themselves against the approaching rainy season, to which the
Bengal monsoon is but as summer showers in comparison. During this
season, the troops suffered much from exposure, from bad and
insufficient supplies, harassment by the enemy, and continual petty
attacks on stockades, so that when the season for operations arrived, it
found an army of invalids, instead of one fit to take the field.

The Burmese recalled their army under Bundoola from Arracan, and it
arrived in the vicinity of Rangoon in November. Rangoon was invested,
but, awaiting reinforcements and supplies, Sir Archibald Campbell
offered little opposition, contenting himself with strengthening his own
position and placing all his artillery in battery, to bear on the
enemy’s trenches. Things remained thus till the 5th December, when the
guns all opening, the columns moved out under cover of their fire,
attacked and overcame the enemy’s left; Bundoola, however, rallied
again, and pushed on his attack on the Shevé-da-gon pagoda. On the
morning of the 7th the attack was renewed; every gun that would bear on
the enemy was opened, and continued firing till noon, when the infantry
moving out, completely routed the enemy. He rallied in a strong position
at Kokaing, from which, on the 13th, he was with difficulty dislodged,
and in which action the regiment lost a fine young officer, Lieutenant
O’Hanlon, who, volunteering with the body-guard, was shot in a gallant
charge, made to cover a column hard pressed by the enemy.

This action cleared the vicinity of Rangoon of the enemy, and
reinforcements, stores, and supplies arriving, health was restored to
the army, and preparations for an advance were strenuously made. Among
the reinforcements, were a troop of horse artillery and half the
rocket-troop, “corps which excited great hopes, and never disappointed
them.”

────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬───────────────
Troop. │ Brigade. │ Captains. │Lieutenants.│Sub-Lieutenant.
────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼───────────────
│ │ │Thompson, │
1 │ 1 │Lumsden │Timmings, │
│ │ │C. Grant. │
────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼───────────────
2 │ 2 │Graham │Paton, │Allen.
│ │ │G. Campbell │
────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴───────────────

But, leaving the force at this point, let us trace the steps of the
other divisions, and then return to the Rangoon column, on which the
chief exertions of the war fell.

The small advanced party at Ramoo, unsupported by the force at
Chittygong, fell an easy prey to Bundoola’s force, which gradually
closed on and cut it up; a detail of artillery, with two 6–pounders
under Lieutenant J. W. Scott, formed part. Lieutenant Scott, severely
wounded, was placed on an elephant and carried into Chittygong, whither
the few who escaped fled.

After this reverse, the force at Chittygong was strengthened and formed
into a division, under Major-General Morrison, for the purpose of
driving the Burmese out of Arracan, crossing the Yemidong mountains and
joining the Rangoon force about Prome. With it were two companies of
artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Commandant; Lieutenant
Kirby, Adjutant.

────────────┬────────────┬────────────┬────────────
Company. │ Battalion. │ Captains. │Lieutenants.
────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────
│ │ │Lawrence,
│ │ │Fenning,
3 │ 2 │Rawlings │Lewin,
│ │ │Greene,
│ │ │Dyke.
────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────
│ │ │Cardew,
4 │ 2 │Hall │Fordyce,
│ │ │Gaitskell,
│ │ │Hotham.
────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────

Lieutenant J. W. Scott was attached to the
pioneers.

This column marched in the cold weather slowly, for it experienced much
difficulty both from the wild and swampy country it traversed, and from
the breadth of the rivers it had to cross, which, from its route being
as near the coast as possible, were complete estuaries. Transporting the
guns and stores over these deep and rapid streams required no small
exertions from the artillery, as also in traversing the swampy delta of
the Koladine river, leading to the capital. No opposition was offered
until the army reached the Padhna pass, on the 25th March, 1825; there
the advanced guard was fired upon, and it became necessary to drive the
enemy from the heights. On the 28th, the army debouched into an open
plain, under a line of hills, covering the town of Arracan. The foot of
these hills was a swampy thicket, the upper part cleared from jungle and
strengthened by a breastwork. Without much reconnoissance, the guns were
pushed on into battery under the hills, and a general assault took
place. It was unsuccessful; such as effected their way through the
tangled thicket at the foot were driven back by the musketry and volleys
of stones of the defenders. The guns were abandoned for the time, and
withdrawn under cover of the night. During the night of the 31st, some
troops with two 9–pounders on elephants ascended the ridge to the right
of the enemy’s position, moved along the crest at daylight, and bringing
the guns into play, the enemy fled, leaving the city at our mercy. And
here the operations of this army may be said to terminate; disease,
engendered by the pestilential locality, soon raged most fearfully, and
converted the town into a large cemetery. Small detachments were sent
against Ramree; Lieutenant Hotham, with two guns, engaged in the attack,
which was at first unsuccessful; it was, however, finally occupied, as
was Aeng, a station on the pass leading through the hills.

In the following cold season reinforcements were sent, among them the
4th company 4th battalion, Lieutenants Rutherfurd and Buckle, and it was
intended that the force should attempt the passage of the hills, and for
that purpose it was partially collected at Amherst Island; but the
difficulties and want of transport were too great, and the idea was
abandoned. Arracan was evacuated, and the troops located at Ackyab, an
island at the mouth of the Koladine and Myoo rivers, Cheduba, Ramree,
and Sandoway, and finally withdrawn in 1826.

That the passage of the hills was possible, there is no doubt; two
regiments from Prome succeeded in the attempt by the Aeng pass, while
Lieutenant B. Browne; Lieutenant Brady, of artillery; and Captain Trant,
deputy quarter-master general, reached Arracan by another, early in
1826.

In 1823, a squadron of gun-boats was sent to cruise on the Burrampooter,
probably with the intention of protecting that frontier from threatened
incursions of the Burmese. Captain Timbrell, Lieutenants Bedingfield and
Burton, were with this flotilla.

On the Sylhet frontier detachments of the 6th battalion were with the
army, Captain J. Scott, Captain C. Smith, Lieutenants Brind and Lane,
Lieutenant Turton, adjutant; but this force never came in contact with
the enemy. The country proved impassable.

Lieutenant Huthwaite was with a detail of native artillery employed
against Munneypoor, and engaged in the successful attack on the enemy’s
blockaded position at Daoudputlee.

Let us now return to the Rangoon army. Such preparations as
circumstances admitted of being made, the army advanced on the 11th
February, 1825, in two columns, one by land and one by water: the main
portion of the artillery was with the former; with the latter,
Lieutenant Paton and some of the rocket-troop were placed in the _Diana_
steamer. The inadequacy of the supplies of the land column may be easily
imagined when it is stated that it was with the utmost difficulty
Captain Lumsden obtained four bullocks for his forge-cart!—its value,
however, was repeatedly acknowledged, and its aid gladly sought, almost
daily, to repair public carriages of every department.

To the water column was intrusted the operations of dislodging Bundoola
from his strong position at Donabeu, while the land column pushed on as
rapidly as possible for the capital. The enemy were driven from their
stockade below Donabeu, but on approaching that position, it was found
far more formidable than represented. The attack on it proved
unsuccessful, and Sir Archibald was forced to retrograde to assist in
its capture. On the 1st April, the attack was renewed by land and by
water; from the latter, a brisk cannonade and effectual flights of
rockets were poured in, and the batteries on the land side were equally
effectual; the rockets, however, then failed; the heat and shaking they
had been exposed to in the march rendered them nearly or worse than
useless. One, however, is claimed as having decided the day, by killing
Bundoola. His energy alone kept the enemy together, and after his death
they fled from the stockades during the night. The march was resumed,
and Prome occupied by the army for the rainy season. Here Lieutenant
Thompson died on the 11th May.

During the rains, Lieutenant Timmings came round to Dum-Dum for his own
health, and returned in October, carrying back with him reinforcements
in men and horses for the artillery; Lieutenants G. Graham, Daniell,
Begbie, and Brady also accompanied him.

The enemy rallied, and towards the middle of October had nearly
surrounded Prome with stockades. On the 2nd December, Sir Archibald
Campbell attacked and defeated them, following up his success the next
day. The horse artillery were pushed on in advance through nullahs and
over rocks, to obtain a position bearing well on the enemy at Nassadee,
and during the cannonade an howitzer missing fire twice, Captain Lumsden
directed the shell to be withdrawn; this was done, but the fuze having
ignited, the shell burst, just as it reached the muzzle, killing a
lascar, wounding a gunner and Captain Lumsden; but he immediately
rallied, and continued, in spite of his wound, directing the operations
of his battery. Six guns, manned by the 3rd company 5th battalion, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, Captain Biddulph, and Lieutenant Laurenson,
were also engaged in this successful attack.

The enemy retired on Melloon, a stockaded position on the opposite bank
of the river, there about 500 yards wide. Negotiations commenced on
their part, and an armistice was concluded, to last till the 18th
January, 1826. The ratified treaty not having been received, at midnight
preparations for the attack commenced; batteries for the guns were got
ready; boats in waiting for the troops, and at 11 A.M., when the fog
cleared up, the whole of the guns, mortars, rockets, heavy and light,
opened with a salvo. The range was hit at once, and shot, shells, and
rockets flew into all parts of the stockades, the interior of which,
from their being planted on the side of a rising ground, was distinctly
visible. The “hurtling of this iron shower” continued for about an hour
and a half, when the storming columns crossed in the boats of the
flotilla, and were soon masters of the place.

The rocket practice was particularly efficient, scarce a rocket failed;
a strong contrast to the rockets carried by land, which had proved
worthless on several occasions: those used at Melloon were brought up
with the flotilla, and perhaps never has there been an occasion since
the invention of the weapon where they were more successful, or their
effects could be so distinctly seen, as when blazing and roaring, their
long trails of smoke marking their course, they plunged into the
stockades of Melloon and raked them from side to side in their eccentric
courses after grazing.

The army pressed on, allowing no respite. “Officers’ chargers were put
in requisition to drag the guns of the invaluable horse brigade;” horses
of the rocket-troop were similarly employed, and their place supplied by
Burmah ponies. The horse artillery, body-guard, and H.M.’s 13th light
infantry now formed the advance guard, and on the 9th February came up
with the enemy at Pagahen-Meen; the guns immediately opened, and the
enemy were soon broken, but, in pursuing them too rashly, the 13th
regiment got entangled in the difficult ground, and the main body coming
up, in endeavouring to debouch from a defile, got wedged together,
artillery, rockets, guns, and carriages. Of this confusion and delay the
enemy took advantage and rallied, and had they not been held in check by
the gallant conduct of the horse artillery, body-guard, and the 13th,
much mischief might have been done. The confusion was soon remedied, and
a complete victory rewarded the troops.

This was the last action. The enemy, thoroughly humbled, now opened
negotiations in earnest, which were soon concluded. A deputation
proceeded to the “Golden Fort,” at Amerapoora, and returned with the
ratified treaty of peace. Among those selected for this distinguished
duty was Captain Lumsden, than whom and his gallant troop, none had
borne a more honourable and useful part during these laborious
campaigns.

A silver medal, of the annexed pattern, was awarded to all the native
troops engaged in the war, either in Rangoon, Arracan, or Sylhet.

[Illustration]

Among the General Orders we find, “The Governor-General entertains the
highest sense of the efficient services and honourable exertions of
Captains * * * Timbrell of the artillery;” and “the services of the
Bengal * * * foot artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, and of
the Bengal rocket-troop and horse artillery, under Captains Graham and
Lumsden, demand also the special acknowledgments of Government.”

Early in 1825, British interference[79] in the state of Bhurtpoor became
necessary, and Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, the agent to the
Governor-General at Delhi, exercising the authority vested in him,
ordered the assembly of a force for the purpose. It was disapproved by
the Governor-General, and many portions of the regiment had in
consequence the _désagrémens_ of a useless march in the months of April,
May, and June.

In the cold weather, however, affairs in Bhurtpoor continuing the same,
and those in Ava more satisfactory, the project was resumed, and a force
ordered to collect at Agra and Muttra, in November, under the command of
Lord Combermere, who had just been appointed to the chief command in
India.

For this army the whole of the available artillery was drawn together
and the provinces were denuded. The field batteries were thrown into the
magazines, and their bullocks appropriated to the siege-trains, and yet
when collected, the whole were barely sufficient to work the guns in
battery, without one single relief. In like manner the magazines from
Cawnpore to Kurnal poured forth all their munitions of war, but this
afforded only 114 siege-pieces, with about 1,000 rounds of shot per gun,
and 500 shells per mortar and howitzer, with a proportion of shrapnell
and case.[80] A reserve was formed at Allahabad to be pushed on as
opportunity offered.

The _personnel_ consisted of five and a-half troops of European, and two
of native horse artillery, nine companies of European, and five of
native foot artillery,[81] forming a total of about 1,200 Europeans, and
700 native artillerymen, with 500 lascars, but of these only 1,100 were
foot artillery, barely sufficient to man the guns, even when augmented
by a body of horse artillery recruits, who, just drafted into that
branch on the augmentation, were not qualified for the duties of mounted
artillerymen.

The following officers were present:—

Brigadier MᶜLeod, C. B., Commanding; Captain Tennant, Assistant
Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Dashwood, Aide-de-Camp.

Brigadier C. Brown, Commanding Horse Artillery; Lieutenant Winfield,
Major of Brigade.

Brigadier R. Hetzler, Commanding Foot Artillery and Park; Lieutenant
Johnson, Major of Brigade.

_Horse Artillery._

Lieutenant-Colonel Stark, Commanding 2nd Brigade.
Major Whish, Commanding 1st Brigade.
Captain J. Scott, Commanding 3rd Brigade.

Capt. Hyde,
Capt. N. Campbell,
Capt. Farrington,
Capt. Blake,
Capt. R. Roberts,
Capt. W. Bell,
Capt. Wood,
Lieut. Moreland,
Lieut. Nicholl,
Lieut. Pennington, Adjutant 3rd Brigade
Lieut. Bingley,
Lieut. Mackay, Adj. 1st Brig.
Lieut. Cullen,
Lieut. Maidman,
Lieut. MacLean,
Lieut. Ewart,
Lieut. MᶜMorine,
Lieut. Garbett, Adj. 2nd Brig.
Lieut. Wakefield,
Lieut. Alexander,
Lieut. W. Anderson,
Lieut. Wiggins,
Lieut. Backhouse,
2nd Lieut. Pillans,
2nd Lieut. Grote,
2nd Lieut. Boileau.

_Foot Artillery._

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, Commanding 6th Battalion.
Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs, Commanding 3rd Battalion.

Major Battine,
Capt. Pereira, Commissary,
Capt. Curphey,
Capt. Pew,
Capt. Woodroofe,
Capt. Brooke, Commissary,
Capt. Oliphant,
Lieut. R. C. Dixon,
Lieut. Huthwaite,
Lieut. Sanders, Adj. 3rd Bat.
Lieut. Hughes,
Lieut. Rotton,
Lieut. A. Abbott,
Lieut. Torckler,
Lieut. Cautley,
Lieut. Garrett,
Lieut. Horsford, Adj. 4th Bat.
Lieut. Wade,
Lieut. Clerk, Adj. 6th Bat.
Lieut. Mowatt,
Lieut. McGregor,
Lieut. Edwards, Adj. 1st Bat.
Lieut. Ellis,
2nd Lieut. J. Abbott,
2nd Lieut. Bazely,
2nd Lieut. Duncan,
2nd Lieut. Todd,
2nd Lieut. Sage.

The trains and stores were collected at Agra and Muttra, and started, in
two divisions, on the 9th December. On the 17th they were united before
Bhurtpoor, and the grand park formed. The cavalry and horse artillery
had preceded the army and secured the bund of the lake, just as the
enemy were about to cut it, to flood the ditch of the fortress.

The laboratory tents were pitched on the 16th, and the preparation of
the platforms and stores commenced upon. On the 23rd, the first battery
was armed, and it opened its fire on the 24th; daily the approaches,
parallels, and batteries were extended, under a fire from the enemy
always hot, and generally well directed. In addition to
breaching-batteries, a mine was driven under the N.E. bastion, and
sprung, but without effect, on the 7th January, the charge being too
small. The gun breach was by this time practicable, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Stark and his adjutant ascended it; the firing was
directed to be continued, to improve it, but the shot buried themselves,
pounding the earth into fine dust. On the 9th a depôt of ammunition,
formed to supply the batteries, was blown up by a shot from the enemy
passing through a tumbril; the whole was consumed with a fearful
explosion; but although the enemy kept up a heavy fire all night, from
every gun which would bear upon the spot, clearly indicated by the
burning stores, the casualties were few. A mine was sprung in the
counterscarp opposite the gun breach, making the descent into the ditch
easy. On the 12th, a mine was commenced under the long-necked bastion;
it was ready and loaded by the 18th January, and the firing it was to be
the signal for the assault. A heavy fire was kept up from all the
batteries on the morning of the 18th; the mine was sprung, and scarcely
had the heavy mass of dust and smoke cleared away, when the columns
moved out to the assault and were shortly in possession of the place.

The artillery casualties in this siege were remarkably few; the labours
undergone by both officers and men in the batteries for twenty-six days
were extreme, but borne with the utmost cheerfulness and good temper.
The ammunition expended was,

24–pounder round shot 18,331
24–pounder shrapnell 345
24–pounder case 639
18–pounder round shot 22,533
18–pounder shrapnell 524
18–pounder case 391
Shells, 13–inch 236
Shells, 10–inch 4,506
Shells, 8–inch 13,720
Shells, 8–inch shrapnell 119

Grand Total 61,446

The average rate of firing was forty-eight rounds per gun, and twelve
per mortar per diem; the greatest, 142 and 20. Nine 24–pounders, sixteen
18–pounders, one 10–inch and seven 8–inch mortars, were rendered
unserviceable, and the carriages of six 8–inch (brass) howitzers broke
down during the siege.[82]

General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief:—“To Brigadier MacLeod, C.B.,
in the general command of the artillery, and Brigadiers Hetzler and
Brown, commanding the siege and field artillery respectively, the
Commander-in-Chief feels greatly indebted for their highly creditable
exertions, as, also, to the whole of the officers and men of the
artillery, for the excellent display of scientific correctness in the
batteries, as well as for their commendable endurance of fatigue which
the nature of the service necessarily exposed them to.”

The Commandant issued the following regimental order:—“The Commandant
begs to offer to officers and men of that part of the regiment engaged
in the field under his more immediate command his best thanks for their
conduct and exertions during the siege, which have, in General Orders
to-day published, obtained the approbation of the Right Honourable the
Commander-in-Chief; and to Brigadiers Hetzler, C.B., and C. Brown, he
has more especially to tender his acknowledgments for the assistance he
has derived from them in their respective commands.”

“To Captain Tennant, the assistant adjutant-general of the arm, he feels
much indebted for his able assistance on this and many other occasions,
for which he is entitled to his warmest acknowledgments and thanks. To
Lieutenant Dashwood, his aide-de-camp, he also tenders his best thanks
for his conspicuously useful exertions.”

In a former page we stated our intention of reserving a tabular
statement of the organization of 1824, until we reached the year 1827,
when a fresh arrangement of the native artillery took place; we have now
reached that period, for the year 1826 has little to be recorded, except
that in November four companies of golundaz and three of lascars (those
raised in 1824) were reduced.

In September, 1827, an additional battalion of officers was added to the
regiment, and the native artillery divided into two battalions, of eight
companies each, denominated the 6th and 7th battalions.

────────────────┬─────────┬──────────────────────────┬────┬────┬────────
│ │ │ │ │ On
│ │ │1824│1827│Returns,
│ │ │ │ │1st Dec.
│ │ │ │ │ 1827
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │Colonels. │ 9│ 10│ 10
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │Lieutenant-Colonels. │ 9│ 10│ 10
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │Majors. │ 9│ 10│ 10
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │Captains. │ 45│ 50│ 50
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │1st Lieutenants. │ 90│ 100│ 100
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
│ │2nd Lieutenants. │ 45│ 50│ 50
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
HORSE ARTILLERY.│EUROPEAN.│Brigade Staff. │ 27│ 27│ 27
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 207│ 207│ 218
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Trumpeters, Farriers, │ 54│ 54│ 57
│ │Rough-riders. │ │ │
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Gunners. │ 720│ 720│ 732
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 6│ 6│ 7
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Brigade Staff │ 6│ 6│ 6
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 36│ 36
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Trumpeters, Farriers, │ 28│ 28│ 28
│ │Rough-riders. │ │ │
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Troopers. │ 270│ 270│ 270
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │LASCARS. │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 36│ 36│ 36
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 288│ 288│ 288
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
FOOT ARTILLERY. │EUROPEAN.│Battalion Staff. │ 43│ 46│ 46
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 424│ 424│ 436
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 40│ 40│ 40
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Gunners. │1620│1600│ 1600
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ NATIVE. │Native Officers. │ 60│ 48│ 50
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Battalion Staff. │ 3│ 6│ 6
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 320│ 256│ 293
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Buglers. │ 40│ 32│ 32
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Privates │2080│1664│ 1700
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │LASCARS. │Native Officers. │ 20│ 20│ 21
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Non-commissioned Officers.│ 80│ 80│ 82
────────────────┼─────────┼──────────────────────────┼────┼────┼────────
〃 │ 〃 │Lascars. │ 800│ 800│ 921
────────────────┴─────────┴──────────────────────────┴────┴────┴────────

CHAPTER VIII.

Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of Colonel given
to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations in uniform—Shekawuttee
campaign—Establishment of Retiring Fund.

At the conclusion of the Burmese war, the horses from the Sylhet local
corps were transferred to Dum-Dum, for the purpose of being attached to
a battery, and in the early part of 1827, the undersized stud horses,
which had hitherto been sold to the public, were directed to be admitted
into the service for the light field-batteries, as Government had
decided on horsing them all, the uselessness of bullocks for the purpose
having been thoroughly proved. The number of batteries was, in July,
1827, fixed at twelve. The arrangement was immediately commenced on,
and, by the end of the year, six batteries were in an effective state,
and the remainder would soon have been ready. It will, however, scarcely
be credited that in April, 1828, these orders were countermanded, and
bullocks directed to be retained and the horses of the batteries so
equipped sold off.

It is difficult to penetrate the veil of mystery which shrouds the acts
of the Council Chamber, so as to ascertain the real author of such
vacillating policy; the reasons which induced the equipment of 1827, and
which were the accumulated experience of years, were equally cogent in
1828, and that they were sound, every one who has had experience of
Indian warfare will vouch. That there is no reason to suppose the change
was made consequent on orders from home, we may conclude, for in 1834,
we find the Court of Directors “satisfied of the superiority of horses
over bullocks for light field-artillery,” directing “their gradual
substitution,” an order to which no attention was paid by the then
Governor-General. Under these circumstances, rumour, with her hundred
tongues, is perhaps not wrong in attributing it to a “malignant
influence,” which for a quarter of a century opposed every suggestion
for the improvement of the prospects or efficiency of the ordnance
branch. A late military member of the Council of India, long secretary
to Government in the military department, who, repeating the one
argument, equally applicable against every advance, “We won India with
bullocks, and why should we not keep it with bullocks?” supported the
late Lord W. Bentinck in putting aside the Court’s orders of 1834, and
Lord Auckland in paying a slow and partial obedience to them when
repeated in 1841.

Cotemporary with this retrograde movement, was the reduction of the
field-batteries from eight to six pieces each, a good arrangement, had
it been accompanied by a proportionate increase in their numbers; but
this was not done, and it therefore reduced, by one fourth, the
field-artillery, already far too low, in reference to the other branches
of the army. The gun contract was at this time transferred from the
senior artillery officer at the station to the officer commanding the
battery, a very judicious change, as it placed the power in the hands of
the person most properly responsible for the efficiency of the battery,
and left to the superior officer his proper duty of supervision
unfettered by personal considerations.

The rocket-troop was converted into a gun-troop; but, that the use of
the weapon might not be forgotten, a proportion of rockets was directed
to be attached to each field-battery. For this purpose, the Commandant
submitted a proposition to add a car, capable of carrying 120 6–pounder
rockets, to each field-battery, and capable of manœuvring in line with
it; but after the pattern car had been prepared, the subject was,
somehow or other, allowed to fall into oblivion, probably, we believe,
from the supplies of rockets having been countermanded; and thus for
many years neither officers nor men had any opportunities of accustoming
themselves to their use. From 1828 till 1840, when at the headquarters
of the regiment their use was resumed previous to despatching a supply
to China, and at Kurnal and Ferozepore, where, in 1842, some which were
sent for service in the passes of Affghanistan were used, not a rocket
was fired.

Another reduction followed, causing great excitement in the army at
large, but which pressed more heavily on the artillery than any other
branch. We refer to the orders of December, 1828, placing certain
stations on half-batta; of these, Allahabad, Benares, Dinapore, and
Dum-Dum, were artillery stations, and the latter, that of the
head-quarters of the regiment, the artillery being a European regiment,
and therefore considered not liable to be called on for sudden
movements: the officers were placed on half-tentage likewise.

That the reduction in allowances was such as to bear heavily on
individuals, especially in the lower grades, the marginal statement[83]
will show, and this, moreover, was subject to another tax of 4½ per
cent., the exchange between sonat and sicca rupees, the former being the
coin in which the military accounts are kept, while the latter was that
current in Calcutta, and in which the troops were actually paid. The
head-quarters of the regiment being at Dum-Dum, the mess, band, library,
and other regimental institutions, were there, and officers were
naturally fond of being stationed there, for various reasons; such as
its gaiety and amusements, and the opportunities it offered for studying
their profession or improving their prospects in the service.

From these circumstances, the regimental head-quarters generally had in
a time of peace a large number of officers of the higher ranks present,
and this contributed to render it a desirable station. But all this was
reversed by the half-batta order; instead of thronging to the
head-quarters, the station was avoided by all ranks, and the discipline
of the regiment suffered much in after years from the difficulty of
keeping sufficient officers of standing for the common routine duties of
the place and instruction of the young officers joining the regiment.
The want of a sufficient body of officers at Dum-Dum of known talents
and experience is also felt when vacancies suddenly occur in any of the
important artillery situations dependent on it for the temporary
arrangement in cases of exigency. We refer to the arsenal, foundry,
powder-works, expense magazine, acting assistant quarter-master, and
ordnance secretary in the Military Board; in several of these situations
much difficulty has at times been experienced, and has only been met by
doubling-up the duties of two appointments on several occasions in one
person.

The regiment (and the army) memorialized strongly on the occasion, but
without effect, though some years afterwards the hardship was partially
ameliorated by the grant of full tentage to the artillery, it having
been clearly shown that the officers of no branch of the army are
subject to such sudden and repeated movements, and these as individuals,
and not with the aids and conveniences which the officers of a wing or
detachment of infantry find by combining their means. In the margin[84]
is noted the receipts of officers at half-batta stations, as sanctioned
in 1835, and since continued. Recently, a further modification of the
order, limiting its effects to stations within two hundred miles of each
presidency, has taken place, and as the saving caused by it is now
reduced to so very a trifle, and its weight laid so unequally on the
different branches of the army, a strong feeling of hope exists that the
order will finally be totally repealed.

Further reductions followed; two troops and companies were struck off
from each regiment of cavalry and infantry, and with them two
lieutenants and one ensign. Although the reduction of the companies
neither was nor could be made applicable to the artillery, yet the three
subalterns per battalion, or thirty in all, were reduced, the twenty
first lieutenants remaining supernumerary till absorbed, and thus
stopping the promotion of the second lieutenants about four years. The
results of this were not felt for some time, because the actual number
of officers present with the regiment continued much the same, and the
number of cadets sent out to replace casualties was not altered, the
supernumerary list continued long, and it was even attempted to retain
the cadets unpromoted until vacancies occurred; but we believe that the
Government law officers decided that it would not be legal, and they
were accordingly all promoted to commissions.

With the reduction above noticed, was coupled what was thought a boon,
at the time, but which in fact has proved the cause of much
supersession by the royal service,—the promotion of all
lieutenant-colonels commandant to the rank of colonel. Every
lieutenant-colonel in H.M.’s service in India who happened to be
senior in that rank to any one of the lieutenant-colonels commandant
now promoted, was also breveted with the rank of colonel, and as in
each presidency there are no less than four distinct gradation-lists
leading to this rank, viz., artillery, engineers, cavalry, and
infantry, each of which has had its fortunate period, the confusion
and supersession which followed may easily be imagined. It was brought
to a crisis by Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, a lieutenant-colonel of
1827 (a cadet of 1794), obtaining his regimental colonelcy in four
years, and, of course, all lieutenant-colonels of H. M.’s service
senior to him were also promoted, and the anomalies became so
stupendous, that an alteration was made in the plan, and the Bengal
native infantry, as the largest body, was made the guide; but this
destroys the only chance the other branches had of ever retrieving in
the higher grade the slow promotion they may have had in the lower,
and gives the royal service, with its promotion by purchase and
regimentally to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, a fearful
advantage[85] over the Company’s service, which has been increased by
the power exercised by the Commander-in-Chief in India to grant
brevets of major-general to such colonels in India as H.M.’s brevet to
Company’s officers may supersede. The rank thus given is of a double
nature, and may be made use of or laid aside at pleasure, allowing
them to be lieutenant-colonels or major-generals, as most convenient,
and thus enabling them to reap the benefits of high rank without its
drawback—removal from lucrative commands in India.

In 1828, the uniform of the officers of the horse artillery was changed;
the jack-boots and leather breeches were superseded by the overalls, and
the equipments and horse furniture of a similar pattern to those worn by
light cavalry were adopted; but the uniform of the non-commissioned
officers and gunners remained unchanged. For actual hard work on
horseback, such as is riding in the guns, few will deny that the boots
and breeches are the most serviceable dress, but they are inconvenient
when dismounted, and ill-adapted for exposure to wet, and at no time can
they be indued in a hurry. The foot artillery about the same time
discarded their short jacket faced with scarlet and embroidered with
gold, for the present plain but handsome uniform: the second epaulette
to the subaltern ranks was ordered in 1833. The undress remained a blue
jacket with scarlet cuffs and collar, unrelieved by a button or atom of
lace until 1841, when a row of studs down the front, and gilt
shoulder-scales, were added; the latter adding as much to its appearance
as they detracted from its comfort.

Several years now passed away void of internal change or external
employment. Such universal quiet reigned, that it appeared as if swords
and spears might be most usefully turned into ploughshares and
reaping-hooks, and the army looked round in vain for employment. Central
India was at rest, Nepal not likely to disturb the quiet, and the
Punjab, under the strong rule of Runjeet Sing, seemed removed from the
chance of inimical contact with the Indian Government.

Suddenly rumours sprung up of disturbances in Rajasthan, which, by
degrees, assumed a more determined aspect, and Maun Sing, of Joudpoor,
was mentioned as the delinquent, and an army was about to assemble
against him, but, humbling himself, he averted his ruin, and a portion
of the force was sent against the robber tribes of Shekawut.

With the force were three troops of horse artillery, eight companies of
foot, and a siege-train of twenty-six pieces.

Brigadier Parker commanded the artillery; Captain Sanders, commissary of
ordnance; but the force met with no opposition, and after destroying
many of the robbers’ strongholds, returned to cantonments.

The reductions which took place in 1828 by this time began to tell, as
the supernumeraries were absorbed; and to provide even a small number of
officers for the foot artillery, the subalterns of the horse artillery
were reduced to two per troop; a very inadequate number when the Indian
contingencies are borne in mind.

For many years the officers of the Bengal army had been accustomed to
procure the retirement of their seniors by the donation of a sum of
money, varying in amount according to the value of the step and the
abilities of the donors. The custom, it is true, was contrary to the
orders of the Court of Directors, but they were aware of and permitted
it. In the artillery the same custom prevailed; and this year it was
systematized by the establishment of a fund by monthly contributions
from all captains and subalterns to provide for two retirements
annually. Its advantages have been most apparent in its working, and the
principle of a mutual insurance tontine, on which it was formed, has
rendered it more effective even than was expected. The other branches of
the army were not successful in establishing funds of the sort; but the
question being much agitated, led to a memorial, from Lieutenant-Colonel
Powel, of the Bombay army, to the Court of Directors, praying that the
system might be put a stop to, on the plea of its interfering with the
seniority system of the Company’s army. It was met by several
counter-memorials, and, on replying to the whole together, the Court
gave the proceedings their sanction, by declaring that, although they
would not cancel the orders forbidding purchase, they would hold them in
abeyance, unless there appeared such a probability of the pension-list
being overloaded, that their interference would be necessary, and that
of this, due warning should be given.

These years passed off without any portion of the army being called on
to take the field, if we except a slight _émeute_ among the Bheels in
the neighbourhood of Mhow, in 1837, to check which, a small body of
troops with two horse artillery guns, from the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
under Lieutenant Kinleside, were detached; but towards the end of the
next, a storm appeared to be gathering in the north-west. The Persians
besieged Heerat, and were only foiled in their attempt by the steady
persevering gallantry and resources of Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of
the Bombay Artillery, who, throwing himself into the fortress, inspired
its defenders with a portion of his own dauntless spirit. Persia was
supposed to be egged on by Russian intrigue, and India to be its
ultimate object. Self-defence called upon the Indian Government to check
these designs, and having vainly endeavoured by negotiation to render
Affghanistan under Dost Mahomed a barrier, the Government resolved to
espouse the cause of its exiled sovereign, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, with
the hopes that, when replaced on the throne of his forefathers, he would
prove a stanch friend. To carry this plan out, an army was assembled
after the rains, at Ferozepore; but information arriving of the
Persians, baffled by Pottinger’s cool resolution, having decamped from
before Heerat, the plan of the campaign was altered. In fact, our end
was gained; and had it not been for the very unnecessary connection with
Shah Soojah as a reason for our interference, and which would have stood
better on the simple plea of self-preservation, not a soldier need have
moved from Ferozepore. But before entering on the eventful campaigns
which followed this step, let us glance at events in other parts of
India which necessitated the assembly of a force in Bundlecund, though
the campaign was a bloodless one.

The Jhansee raj having lapsed through the failure of direct heirs, the
widow of a former Raja endeavoured to place, as the adopted son of the
previous ruler, a boy on the throne. A disturbance arose, which ended in
the murder of the minister supported by the British authority. This act
of the Bhaiee was called in question by the Governor-General’s agent;
his authority was treated with disrespect, and he found it necessary to
call in the aid of a regiment and a couple of guns. At these, the
insurgents, who had seized the fort, laughed, and on his attempting a
parley with them, attacked and wounded his elephant and chuprassees, and
forced him precipitately to retreat. Reinforcements and a battering
train were sent for from Sagur; but the country had been so denuded of
troops to form the army of the Indus, that, had it not been for the Mhow
troops just being relieved from Bombay, a very insufficient force could
have been collected. A train of four 18–pounders and four 8–inch
mortars, with as much ammunition as carriage could be obtained for, was
got ready, and, in the absence of available artillery officers, the
commissary of ordnance at Sagur, Lieutenant Buckle, who had offered his
services, started in charge of it early in December, and after a march
of twelve days, rendered difficult and fatiguing by the badness of the
roads, the steep banks and rocky beds of the rivers and nullahs which
abounded, and the broken rocky ghats leading from table-land into
Bundlecund, reached Jhansee on the 18th December.

The troops collected by degrees, and the artillery, when reinforced from
Cawnpoor, amounted to that detailed in the margin.[86] The engineer park
was placed in the charge of the commissary of ordnance, the field
engineer, Major Smith, having joined dak, and the preparation of
_matériel_ instantly commenced.

Continual communications passed between the Bhaiee and the agent, which
were warlike to the last, and, as she had collected bands of Nagas,
resistance was expected; but on the preparations being completed, the
force moving down to invest the fort, carrying their train and the stock
of gabions and fascines which had been prepared, she fled during the
night, and the fort was taken possession of without firing a shot.

The labour of conveying the heavy ordnance over a broken country was the
chief difficulty, but this was not much felt, owing to the season of the
year.

The army of the Indus assembled at Ferozepore, and a meeting took place
between the Governor-General and Runjeet Sing. The news of the Persians
breaking up from before Heerat determined Government on sending only one
division of the army, accompanied by the troops which were being raised
for Shah Soojah, under British officers, into Affghanistan. The
artillery for the Shah’s service consisted originally of two troops of
horse artillery, to which were afterwards added a mountain train and
some body-guard guns. Captain W. Anderson was intrusted with the
formation of the horse artillery, and though but little time was allowed
him, and many difficulties arose from the demand for men and horses for
the other branches, his exertions succeeded in overcoming them, and he
marched in good time from Dehli, with his two troops fully equipped,
but, of course, untrained. His endeavours were well seconded by his two
subalterns, Lieutenants Cooper and Turner. The Shah’s guns were in
Lieutenant Warburton’s charge, and the mountain train was organized by
Captain Backhouse, but not until 1840.

The regular artillery, with this division from Bengal, consisted of

Major Pew, commanding; Captain Day, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant
Backhouse, M.B.

────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬────────────────────────────────
Company.│Brigade.│Battalion.│Captains.│ Lieutenants.
────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼────────────────────────────────
2 │ 2 │ │Grant │Duncan, J. Anderson.
4 │ 3 │ │Timmings │Mackenzie, Hawkins, E. Kaye.
2 │ │ 6[87] │A. Abbott│Dawes, R. Shakespear, Warburton.
4 │ │ 2 │Garbett │J. Abbott, Walker, Green.
────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴────────────────────────────────

Captain Todd, of the artillery, who had been employed in Persia, was
attached to the political department.

The army commenced its march on the 10th December, and met with no
difficulties until the 16th March, 1839, when they entered the Bolan
pass, a pass as terrible to the Indian, as that of Avernus to the
classical, imagination. Here the toils of the campaign began, and, as
usual in such cases, a double share fell to the artillery. The horses,
overweighted and ill-fed, with difficulty dragged the carriages through
its stony lengths; the camels and bullocks, over-driven to keep pace
with the column, and escape the new danger arising from the matchlocks
of the Murrees and Brahoos perched on the rocks, stumbled and fell, many
never to rise again: store-carts and baggage were lost by these
accidents.

The difficulties of procuring provisions were increased after clearing
the pass by the arrival of the Bombay column, though the country became
easier until reaching the Kojuck pass; narrow, steep, and in places
blocked up by large rocks, it was with the greatest difficulty, and by
incredible perseverance, that the heavy and light artillery were got
through this obstacle. Great loss of baggage occurred here from the
deaths of camels. At this point, the camel battery, which had hitherto
got on very well, showed symptoms of knocking up; the animal’s
conformation, from want of power of muscular exertion, being quite
unfitted for draught in situations of difficulty. All at length reached
Candahar towards the end of April, but the horses of the horse artillery
and cavalry so worn, that a long rest was necessary to fit them for
work; the troops, too, required rest and food, and the halt continued
till the end of June, though not entirely without employment, for the
camel battery took part in the expedition against Girisk, and two guns
of the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant E. Kaye, were detached
with the Shah’s troops against refractory chiefs in Tezeen.

From Candahar a mission was sent to Heerat; Captain Todd was placed at
the head of it, and Lieutenants J. Abbott and R. Shakespear were his
assistants. Of the results of this mission, or of his assistants, to
Khiva; of the difficulties and dangers endured and overcome by Abbott as
the pioneer, and the success which crowned Shakespear, in following his
path, nothing need be said in this place. Their own accounts have
already been published.

On the army moving forward, the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, 2nd company 6th
battalion, with No. 6 light field battery, alone accompanied it. The
Shah’s artillery, the 4th troop 3rd brigade, the 4th company 2nd
battalion, and the heavy guns, remained at Candahar. On the 21st July
the fortress of Ghuznee was reached, reconnoitred the next day, and the
artillery placed in position, by 3 A.M. of the 23rd, to cover the
assault which was ordered at dawn. On the gate being blown in by two
bags of powder, every gun opened to cover the advance of the storming
party, which was perfectly successful, and, by 5 o’clock, the place was
in our possession.

The exertions of the troops were rewarded by a medal from Shah Soojah,
and which is remarkable for one thing—being the first given in India to
all engaged. Hitherto, these decorations had been granted to the native
troops alone; but on this occasion the medal was given to all, without
any distinction whatever. It was suspended from a crimson and green
ribbon.

[Illustration]

The army continued its march to Cabul without opposition. Deserted by
his followers, Dost Mahomed fled, leaving his guns at Maidan a spoil to
the invaders; and himself narrowly escaping from a band of officers,
among whom was Lieutenant Backhouse, of the artillery, who, under Major
Outram, followed him closely, but were misled by the arch traitor Haji
Khan Kokur.

But while the main army was thus employed, a small column, chiefly of
irregulars, with Colonel Wade, escorted the Shah-Zada by the Khyber pass
to his father’s capital. With this column were two howitzers, manned by
a detachment of the 4th company 2nd brigade, and commanded by Lieutenant
Barr: Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery, was attached to the prince’s
suite. This column met with no opposition, except on first entering the
Khyber pass, where they were engaged with the Afreedis at Koulsir, and
again at Alee Musjid. The names of Lieutenants Barr and Maule are both
mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Wade’s despatches on the occasion.

The main army reached Cabul on the 6th August, and Colonel Wade’s column
on the 3rd September. The Bombay column returned in October, and,
picking up four of the Shah’s horse artillery guns, under Lieutenant
Cooper, proceeded against Khelat. Reaching it on the 13th November, the
troops advanced to the assault under cover of the fire from the guns,
which drove the enemy from the neighbouring heights; the guns were now
directed against the gates, and, these being forced, the place was soon
won. In his despatch, General Wiltshire says, “To Lieutenants Forster
and Cooper I feel greatly indebted for the scientific and steady manner
in which the service of dislodging the enemy from the heights and
afterwards effecting an entrance into the fort was performed.”

The main army left Cabul for Hindustan in October, 1839; the 2nd company
6th battalion with No. 6 battery alone remained. The camel draught had
proved so useless for such a country, that horses were now directed to
be substituted, and so promptly was this order carried out by Captain
Abbott, that within fifteen days after receiving it, half the battery
was equipped, and marched against the Ghilzies, under Lieutenant Dawes,
moving upwards of 400 miles ere it returned. The other half of the
battery was employed in the following January in the Koh-i-daman under
Captain Abbott. Pushoot held out, and the 9–pounders being placed in
battery at daylight, a breach was formed on both sides of the outer
gate, but an inner one existing, against which the guns could not be
brought to bear, bags of powder were tried without avail, and the troops
were forced to withdraw; but the enemy fled during the night. “To
Captain Abbott,” Colonel Orchard wrote, “the highest praise is due, for
the manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties devolving on
him, as well as the great service rendered by him yesterday.”

We have now to notice perhaps the most extraordinary march ever
performed by artillery,—that of a native troop of horse artillery across
the Hindoo Kosh to Bamian; extraordinary both from obstacles overcome,
and the circumstance of the men of this troop being natives of
Hindostan. The 4th troop 3rd brigade was ordered for this trip in
September, 1839, and, Captain Timmings having just died, it was under
the command of a subaltern, Lieutenant M. Mackenzie, with whom was
Lieutenant E. Kaye.

The valley of Bamian lies about N. W. from Cabul, distant only 112
miles; but it is separated from the valley in which the capital is
situate by a broad belt of stupendous mountains, the highest range of
which exceeds in altitude 12,000 feet. The troop entered upon its
mountain road near the village of Urghundee, and while toiling up the
first laborious ascent (steep in itself, but rendered still more
difficult by huge stones and fragments of rock), it was met by Major
Thomson, of the engineers, and some other officers,[88] who were just
returning from an excursion to Bamian. Major Thomson immediately
declared the road to Bamian to be impracticable for guns,—that the
passes in advance were still more difficult in their nature than that of
Urghundee, and said that he would, immediately on arrival at Cabul,
report to the envoy that it would be useless to attempt to reach Bamian.
The troop, however, continued its march, and, the passage of the
Urghundee ghât accomplished, descended into the beautiful valley of the
Cabul river, along the banks of which the route continued for three
marches, passing Julraiz and Sir-i-Chushmeh. The road was at times
difficult, being frequently in the rocky bed of the stream, and always
ascending, gradually becoming steeper and more toilsome.

The summit of the Oonai pass is said to be 11,400 feet in elevation; at
this great elevation, even in September, the cold was intense. The
passage of the range was a work of great toil, as the ascents and
descents were numerous. The summit of the range is in general a
table-land, gradually sloping towards the north-west; not one continuous
table-land, but intersected by numerous deep glens, running parallel to
each other, with steep precipitous sides, difficult to ascend or
descend. On the 21st, a small mud fort, named Youatt, was reached, and
on the 23rd the troop, after crossing several spurs from the range just
surmounted, descended to the banks of the Helmund, beyond which towered
the snow-capped peaks of Koh-i-Baba.

In consequence of the report received from Major Thomson of the
impracticable nature of the road to Bamian, the envoy had sent
instructions for three guns and all the ammunition-waggons to return to
Cabul, the other three guns to halt until elephants sent from Cabul
should arrive; it was then intended that the three guns should be
dismounted and carried over the remaining passes on elephants. These
instructions were received at Youatt, but the neighbourhood being
entirely destitute of forage, it was considered advisable to move the
troop on to Gurden Dewaal, on the river Helmund. Having arrived there,
the troop halted, and Lieutenant Mackenzie went forward and examined the
pass over the Hindoo-Koosh range. This officer having considered the
passage practicable, forwarded a report to that effect to head-quarters,
and requested permission to proceed with the whole of the troop.
Permission was at length received, and on the 30th the march was
resumed. The foot of the Irak pass was attained in three difficult
marches, the ascent being constant and fatiguing. The passage was
commenced immediately, nearly all the guns and carriages being pulled up
by hand (the horses being taken out); at this work, the artillery and
infantry soldiers and some 200 Hazarehs were employed during the whole
day, and it was not until dark that the entire battery had reached the
foot of the western face of the mountain, which was found to be
considerably steeper than that up which the ascent led. On the following
day the march was resumed through a deep and dreary defile, abounding in
rocks, and the precipices enclosing it so steep and lofty, that the
sun’s rays scarcely ever penetrated to its lowest depths. Through this
tortuous glen the troop wound its way, until, after many an interruption
from rocky ledges of dangerous descent, the small valley of Meeanee Irak
was reached on the 4th of October, and vegetation and human habitations
were once more seen.

The whole of the 5th was occupied in passing the Kuski ghât, over a
range of no great elevation (a spur only of the Hindoo-Koosh) but of
great difficulty. The ascent was occasionally so steep (at an angle of
45°) that the men working at the drag-ropes could not keep their
footing; horses, of course, were out of the question. The ascent was,
however, accomplished in the afternoon, and the descent by the edge of a
precipice, where a false step would have insured instant destruction,
commenced. This, too, was effected, but night found the troop in a
defile so narrow, and enclosed by such steep walls, that it seemed to be
but a fissure in the mountain, caused by some convulsion of nature.
Nothing further could be done till daylight; early on the morning of the
6th of October, the troop crossed the last intervening ridge and entered
the valley of Bamian at Zohauk. Next day the troop reached Bamian, and
encamped close to some mud forts, which were destined now, for the first
time, to become the dwelling-places of British officers and soldiers.

This march to Bamian has been dwelt upon somewhat longer than is
altogether suitable to the pages of a work of this nature; but, within a
smaller space it would have been scarcely practicable to give an idea of
the service performed. It was certainly one of the most arduous
undertakings ever accomplished by horse-artillery.[89]

Nor less singular the position of the troop after its arrival; in the
midst of a belt of mountains more than 200 miles in width, separated
from Cabul by the highest range, impassable by troops during some months
in the year, and in a valley scarcely ever exceeding 500 yards in
breadth (generally much less), and only a few miles long. As might have
been expected, the horses had suffered, though not in a very great
degree, from the severity of the march, the cold, and the great scarcity
of forage. The two latter evils continued to press upon the troop for
many months, until the returning summer brought the green crops and more
genial weather. The carriages of the troop had, however stood the hard
work over rocky roads admirably, and a most favourable report was made
on them by Lieutenant Mackenzie.

On the 15th of October, the troop went into winter quarters in a large
mud fort.

With the exception of a movement to Syghan, at the beginning of
November, in which sixty horse-artillery troopers, acting as cavalry,
took part, and an attack on Mahomed Ali Beg’s fort in December, when two
small mortars and a 3–pounder mountain-gun, mounted on ponies, were sent
with the troopers, the long dreary winter season passed over quietly—the
soldiers of the artillery and infantry being employed for some time in
throwing up intrenchments, connecting the various forts in possession of
the British. This was done at the suggestion of Dr. Lord, the political
agent, there having been some probability of a coalition among the Usbeg
powers to support the ex-Ameer. Had such an event occurred during the
winter, the Bamian detachment would have been thrown entirely on its own
resources, as no help could come from Cabul, while, on the other hand,
the roads from Toorkhistan were open. The cold was intense during the
winter, the thermometer at sunrise being often as low as 12° below zero.
All the rivers were frozen over.

On the 1st of March, 1840, Captain H. Garbett (who had been posted to
the troop on the decease of Captain Timmings) joined, and took command
of all the troops at Bamian; he had been obliged to walk 100 miles
through the snow, as the mountains were now only passable by men.

On the 14th of March, two guns of the troop were present in a small
affair with the Hazarehs at Fouladee, about six miles from Bamian. A mud
fort had to be captured, and the surrounding hills to be cleared of a
considerable body of Hazarehs; the gateway was knocked down by a few
round shot, and the fort was then carried by the infantry, while a few
rounds of shrapnels cleared the neighbouring hills of the Hazarehs. The
whole affair did not last much above half an hour. The artillery lost
one European laboratory-man, one syce, and one horse killed, and one
trooper wounded. Dr. Lord admitted the chiefs of the refractory tribe to
terms, and affairs resumed their wonted peaceful aspect.

In July, however, there seemed to be every prospect of hostilities being
renewed; Dost Mahomed, who had for months been a prisoner at Bokhara,
had effected his escape to Kooloom, and the Usbegs began to arm in his
cause. The British infantry had been pushed forward to Bajgah,
twenty-five miles northward of Syghan, and had come into contact with
the unfriendly tribes. At the beginning of August, a small affair
occurred near Kamurd, in which two companies of infantry suffered a very
severe loss. On the 4th of August, two guns of horse-artillery were sent
to Syghan,[90] more as a demonstration than with any other object, as
the roads to Kamurd and Bajgah, across the Dundan-Shikun and
Nal-i-Ferish passes, were totally impracticable. The Dost was now
advancing from Kooloom, accompanied by the Wallee of that place, at the
head of about 10,000 men, and every prospect of his force increasing
daily.

On the 13th of September, Brigadier Dennie arrived from Cabul with
reinforcements, which had been despatched on hearing of the Ameer’s
advance. The force at Bamian, besides the troop, consisted now of the
35th native infantry, the Goorkah regiment, a resallah of irregular
cavalry, and 400 janbaz, or Afghan horse. The Afghan infantry had been
disarmed and sent to Cabul.

On the 17th, in the evening, the Dost’s piquets entered the Bamian
valley at Soorukdhurrah, about four miles distant, and on the following
morning the brigadier having received information which led him to
believe that merely the advanced guard of the enemy had arrived, took
out a small detachment of only eight companies, and engaged the whole
Usbeg force, who were completely routed and driven from the field in
great confusion. Two guns of the troop, under Lieutenant Mackenzie, were
present in this affair. The Usbegs fell back almost immediately when the
guns opened on them, abandoning in succession three positions in which
they attempted to make a stand, but from which they were instantly
dislodged by the guns advancing. Thus in the valley itself, where the
main body of the enemy was, the contest was decided by the
horse-artillery, but on the heights the infantry were engaged with some
other parties of the enemy, mostly foot-men. The cavalry pursued the
Usbegs for some miles up the defile of Soorukdhurrah. The enemy has been
variously computed at from 5,000 to 10,000 men in the field.

Four guns of the troop accompanied Brigadier Dennie in his subsequent
pursuit of the enemy, but the movements of the Usbegs had been too rapid
to allow it to be effectual; but the results were most happy, as it
induced the Ameer to leave the Usbeg camp, and forced the Wallee to
abandon his cause. The rest is well known: the Dost threw himself into
the Kohistan of Cabul, and the theatre of war being thus changed, the
British troops were recalled from Bamian, and on the 8th October
(exactly a year and a day after its arrival), the troop marched in
progress to Cabul with Colonel Dennie. At the commencement of the
following year the troop returned to India with the escort in charge of
the captive Ameer.

In the expedition to the Kohistan, under Brigadier Sale, Captain A.
Abbott and his battery, and Lieutenant Warburton with two of the Shah’s
bodyguard guns, were employed. The fort of Tootundurra was carried with
little loss, a fact attributed “in a great measure to the dread inspired
by the excellent practice of the artillery under the able direction of
Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and Warburton.”

In breaching Julga in October, these same guns were again employed, and
Captain A. Abbott and Lieutenant Warburton are reported as having
distinguished themselves in the service of the artillery.

In November the detachment was engaged with the Dost’s followers at
Purwundurrah, and two guns of No. 6 battery, under Lieutenant Dawes,
covered the successful attack on the heights after the shameful flight
of the cavalry.

At this period, a brigade marched from the provinces under Colonel
Shelton, to relieve part of the Cabul force; with it was Captain
Nicholl’s (1st company 1st brigade) troop of horse artillery—Lieutenants
Waller and Stewart, subalterns—and the newly-formed mountain-train under
Captain Backhouse and Lieutenant Green. The brigade advanced as far as
Jellalabad, when rumours arising of the disaffection of the Sikhs in the
rear, it returned by forced marches to Jumrood, but, finding its
presence not required, again marched without rest to Jellalabad. By the
difficulty and rapidity of this march the horses of the troop were much
knocked up, and their distress was much increased by the officer
commanding the brigade having insisted, in spite of Captain Nicholl’s
remonstrances, on the troop marching in rear of the infantry, checking
the natural pace of the horse, and subjecting the troop to continual
halts. Two of its guns, under Captain Nicholl, were employed in February
in reducing forts in the Nazian valley, as also was the mountain-train.

While the artillery with the Cabul force was thus employed, that at
Candahar was not inactive. In April, 1840, Captain W. Anderson, with one
of his troops of horse-artillery and a body of the Shah’s troops,
marching in the direction of Ghuznee, fell in with a large body of
insurgent Ghilzies, and defeated them near Tazee, on the Tornuek river.
The enemy made a firm stand, twice charged our line, and were driven
back by the steadiness of the troops and the well-sustained fire of the
guns under Lieutenant Cooper.

Colonel Wymer’s detachment was attacked at Ealmee on the 19th May, on
its route to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, by a large body of Ghilzies. Two of the
Shah’s horse-artillery guns under Lieutenant Hawkins were present, “and
opened upon the enemy’s dense masses of attack at about 900 yards, with
beautiful precision and effect, causing them to break into three
columns, which still continued the attack,” but were driven back by the
steady fire of the line, though they continued their efforts from five
till nearly ten at night. “Too much cannot be said of the scientific and
destructive manner in which the artillery practice was conducted by
Lieutenant Hawkins, which created awful havoc in the ranks of the enemy,
to the admiration of the troops present.”

In July, Lieutenant Cooper, with two guns, accompanied Captain Woodburn
against Uctar Khan, in the neighbourhood of Girisk. The enemy attacked
the left “with great boldness, but were repulsed by the well-directed
fire of the guns, and three companies on the left; failing in this, they
attacked the right, but were again met by a most destructive fire from
the guns and five companies which were on the right.” The rear was then
attacked, but a gun being reversed, and the rear rank of the infantry
facing about, the enemy were driven off, after standing three rounds of
case shot.

“Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments for the rapidity and
admirable manner in which he brought his guns to play upon the enemy;
and I had frequent opportunities of noticing the precision of his
practice. His guns are never in difficulty,” are Captain Woodburn’s
words in his official report, in which also he speaks in another place
of the “admirable conduct of the artillery.”

In August, this same officer, with four guns, when attached to Captain
Griffin’s force, was again in action with the enemy near Khawind, and
again rendered effectual assistance, and earned the praises of his
superiors for himself and his details.

On the arrival of Shah Soojah at Cabul, a grand durbar was held, and a
new order of chivalry was instituted,—that of the “Dur-i-Dooranee,” or
Pearl of the Dooranee Empire, consisting of three ranks, similar to
those of the Bath. The annexed is a representation of the star of the
order. It was conferred on several artillery officers at various times
previous to Shah Soojah’s death.

[Illustration]

Hitherto we have had the gratifying task of recounting the exploits of a
victorious army; a darker page must now follow; but though success no
longer brightens the narrative, we have still the consolation of knowing
that those parts of the regiment employed, heroically performed their
duty in scenes of no common trial, and that their exertions, in a cause
which from the first was evidently hopeless, only ceased when the cold
hand of death laid them low in the dark defiles of the Koord Kabool and
Jugdulluck.

In October, the Eastern Ghilzies occupied the passes between Bhootkhak
and Jellalabad. Brigadier Sale, with a brigade, was sent to clear them;
No. 6 battery and the mountain-train accompanied. Lieutenant Dawes with
the two 9–pounders was with the advance-guard, on whom, in forcing the
Kabool pass, the chief brunt fell. In the Tezeen valley, all the guns
were brought into action, in a succession of skirmishes which lasted
till dusk, with much effect. The march was now a daily struggle; two
guns, sometimes commanded by Lieutenant Dawes, sometimes by Captain
Backhouse (part of whose train, under Lieutenant Green, had returned
with the 37th regiment of native infantry to Cabul), on the rear-guard,
were engaged daily; at Jugdulluck a severe struggle ensued, and its
favourable conclusion was insured by the guns seizing an unoccupied
position, which took the enemy’s line in reverse; the rear-guard was,
however, suddenly attacked and the baggage seized; “soon, however, by
the praiseworthy exertions, and cool and soldier-like orders and example
of Captain Backhouse, * * * confidence was restored and the rear-guard
extricated from the defile.”

“I have been much pleased,” continues the report, “with the address and
able arrangements of Captain Abbott, who has twice commanded the
advance-guard.”

The insurrection burst out on all sides; myriads of Ghilzies, &c.,
re-occupied the passes in the rear, and cut off all communication with
Cabul, forcing Sir Robert Sale to seek the safety of his brigade by
occupying Jellalabad. The Kohistanees rose in Charekar, and murdered
Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery. Candahar was surrounded. Ghuznee
fell. The Khyberees sealed the mouth of their pass. Colonel Wild’s[91]
attempt to force it failed, and the last act of the tragedy was
completed in the annihilation of the Cabul garrison on its fatal and
ill-judged retreat. The details of these sad events have been so
graphically described, that we need here do no more than record the
losses of the regiment, and extract from the accounts of eye-witnesses
their testimony to the admirable conduct of that noble troop, the 1st
troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, both during the siege and the
retreat.

After detailing the disastrous action of the 23rd November, Captain
Melville says, “Here, amidst so much that was condemnable, let me again
bear just and heartfelt testimony to the behaviour of that brave, though
small, body of men, whose conduct on this, and every other occasion
during the war, was that of a band of heroes, and who, preferring death
to dishonour, met their fate, nobly fighting to the last for the gun
they had so ably served. I allude to the horse-artillery; when Sergeant
Mulhall and six gunners, whose names I feel deep sorrow I cannot here
record, sword in hand awaited the advance of the foe, and it was not
until they saw themselves alone in the midst of thousands of the enemy,
that they dashed at full gallop, cutting their way through them, down
the hill; and though surrounded by cavalry and infantry, yet they
managed to bring their gun safely to the plain, where, however, only
three of them being alive, and they desperately wounded, they were
obliged to leave it, and contrived to reach cantonments.” Again, during
the retreat, he says, “On reaching the extremity of the (Khoord Cabool)
pass, the horse-artillery, that noble branch of the service, whose
courage, even in extremity, never failed, and who supported all their
misfortunes cheerfully, halted, and, turning a gun on the pass, awaited
the debouchment of our troops and the arrival of the enemy’s. This soon
happened, and we received them with some well-directed rounds of
grape.” * * * After their guns and horses were lost, “the artillerymen,
those few that remained, formed in the ranks of the 44th, and gallantly
supported on foot that deathless reputation they had gained when urging
their steeds into the heart of the battle.”

Lieutenant Eyre, speaking of the siege, says, “The gunners, from first
to last, never once partook of a full meal or obtained their natural
rest; of the hardships and privations undergone, it would be difficult
to convey an adequate idea.” * * * “On the retreat from Cabul, owing to
the starved condition of the horses, which disabled them from pulling
the guns through the deep snow and rugged mountain-passes, the guns
were, one by one, spiked and abandoned. In the Khoord Cabool pass, a
whole gun’s crew perished rather than desert their charge; on nearing
Jugdulluck, some horse-artillerymen, headed by Captain Nicholl, acting
as dragoons, charged and routed a party of the enemy’s cavalry.”

“Throughout the last struggle, up to Gundamuck, all eye-witnesses concur
in testifying to their stubborn valour.”

Of his troop, Captain Nicholl, Lieutenant Green (who joined it on the
loss of the mountain-train early in the retreat), and Lieutenant
Stewart, were killed; Lieutenants Eyre and Waller, both of whom were
wounded during the siege, were given over, with their families, by the
orders of Major-General Elphinstone, to Akbar Khan; 8 non-commissioned
officers and gunners were killed in Cabul, 30 in the Khoord Cabool pass,
26 between that and Jugdulluck, 32 in reaching Gundamuck, 3 were taken
prisoners at the close, 3 left wounded at Cabul, and 3 doing duty with
No. 6 battery and the mountain-train at Jellalabad. Sergeant Mulhall was
killed at Gundamuck on the 13th January, 1842.

The regiment raised a monumental column to the memory of this gallant
troop, on the base of which, on one marble slab, the circumstances under
which they fell are narrated, and on another, the names of every
non-commissioned officer and gunner are inscribed.

Previous to the insurrection breaking out, the 3rd company[92] 2nd
battalion moved from Ferozepore to relieve the 4th company at Candahar;
it dropped down the Indus to Sukkur, and marched to Quettah, where it
arrived on the 27th November, 1841, and remained, on account of the
communications with Candahar being closed. Here it was employed in
throwing up defences and field-works, for the protection of the
cantonment, whenever the frost and snow intermitted. The only building
available for their barracks becoming unsafe, during the winter they
were forced to occupy their tents, and the severity of the weather in
which they were exposed to this insufficient shelter, may be judged of
by the fact of 180 camels of the company having perished from it. In the
second advance of Major-General England, and the successful attack on
the heights of Hykulzye, this company shared; a party under Lieutenant
Cornish assisting in working the guns of Captain Leslie’s troop of
Bombay Horse Artillery, and with that force it joined the head-quarters
of the Candahar army on 10th May.

Before this junction occurred, the Candahar force had been on more than
one occasion moved out to clear the neighbourhood of the insurgents. In
January, they came up with them on the Urghandab, and after driving them
from their position, the horse-artillery and cavalry pursued them some
distance. In the report of this action, Captain W. Anderson’s name was
brought to the favourable notice of Government.

In March, the army again took the field, and on the 9th the
horse-artillery under Captain Anderson got within range, and opened on
the enemy with good effect; they broke and fled too rapidly for the
infantry to come up with them. While the main body was absent, an attack
was made on the city, but without success: part of the 4th company 2nd
battalion was present with the garrison.

On the 25th March, the insurgents were attacked near Baba Wala by
Colonel Wymer. The well-directed fire of two guns under Lieutenant
Turner soon drove in on the pass a large body of the enemy, and they
were finally put to flight by the arrival of the main body under
Major-General Nott. In his report, Colonel Wymer writes, “I trust that I
may be permitted to bring to the Major-General’s notice the admirable
practice of the artillery under Lieutenant Turner’s guidance, every shot
from which told with beautiful effect on the dense masses of the enemy.”

A small garrison, with which was one-half the 3rd company 2nd battalion
artillery, under Lieutenant Walker, had been left in Khelat-i-Ghilzie in
November, 1841; the insurrection isolated them from the Candahar force,
and for several months they underwent very great hardships; an
insufficient supply of firewood exposed them to cold, barracks without
doors, and piercing cold winds, bread and water for rations for days
together, and an enemy at the gates; under these privations the
artillerymen never grumbled nor lost their good temper, but continued to
work as if they had been highly fed. The enemy gradually closed in round
the fort, and on the night of the 21st May commenced a simultaneous
attack on two points; at one point, there were two 6–pounders, under
Lieutenant Walker, at the other only one. The enemy came on in a
determined manner, crossing the ditch by means of scaling-ladders, and
some even reached the parapets; so closely were the artillery assailed,
that at one time they were forced to turn to their small-arms to assist
in driving them off; towards morning the attack ceased, and the little
garrison was left in quiet possession of their fort, and in the course
of a few days Colonel Wymer arrived from Candahar with a force to
relieve them.

This service was rewarded by a medal to all engaged, the handsomest of
any by which the campaigns in Afghanistan are marked.

[Illustration]

Brigadier Sale’s force, on reaching Jellalabad, immediately occupied
themselves in rendering its defences tenable, collecting provisions,
preparing ammunition, and mounting their guns on the most advantageous
positions. In availing himself of the resources of the country, and
keeping up our communications, Captain MacGregor’s services were most
conspicuous and successful, and perhaps to his exertions it may mainly
be attributed that the “illustrious garrison” were enabled to hold out,
and earn for themselves the undying honour they have gained. The
exertions also of Captain Abbott, Captain Backhouse, and Lieutenant
Dawes, are honourably recorded in the records of that siege, records
which have been so fully published that little is left to us beyond
extracting a few passages; and we shall first refer to the report of the
construction of the works. “With the exception of a few of the larger
bastions, all the batteries were prepared by the artillerymen
themselves, both Captain Abbott’s company and Captain Backhouse’s
mountain-train, under the superintendence of their own officers; besides
this, a party of Captain Abbott’s artillerymen was always ready to
assist in the works generally, and they were most ably superintended by
Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid as constant as it was
valuable, and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men and
detachment of the 6th infantry Shah Soojah’s force, not only prepared
the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages
done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several
of the most useful and laborious operations executed.” * * *

“Captain MacGregor, political agent, gave me,” writes Brigadier Sale,
“the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures
our dâk communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of
grain collected. * * * Captain Abbott made the artillery dispositions in
the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to and economize our
resources, in the way of gun and musket ammunition.”

“The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been
excellent, and has been equalled by that of the mountain-train. Captains
Abbott and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves
excellent ordnance officers.”

The siege, or rather blockade, continued from November to April. The
greatest want at times prevailed of everything but grain; but the men
preserved their cheerfulness under all privations, the native
artillerymen of the 2nd company 6th battalion vying with the Europeans
of H. M.’s light infantry in setting an example of good discipline and
patient and cheerful endurance of hardship and danger. In April, Akbar
Khan collected a large body of troops in the neighbourhood, both to
overwhelm the garrison and meet the army advancing to its succour
through the Khyber. This body the garrison attacked on the morning of
the 6th April, and completely overthrew, capturing standards and
baggage, and four of the guns lost by the Cabul force. In the action,
No. 6 battery, with which, in addition to Captain Abbott and Lieutenant
Dawes, were Captains Backhouse and MacGregor, as volunteers, was most
effective; moving rapidly to the front, it covered the advance of the
infantry, and held in check a large body of cavalry which threatened the
flank. This success was most complete, and the garrison achieved its
safety by its own prowess. Its gallantry was rewarded by a medal to all
engaged; the corps were permitted to wear a “mural crown,” with the word
“Jellalabad” on their appointments, and a donation of six months’ batta
was granted as a compensation for the various losses suffered, and at
the close of the campaign the rank of major, with the companionship of
the Bath, was bestowed on Captains Abbott, Backhouse, and MacGregor.

[Illustration]

On the news of the insurrection reaching India, steps were taken for
despatching a force to aid the troops in Affghanistan. Major-General
Pollock, C.B., of the artillery, was selected for its command, and
joined it at Peshawur in February. The artillery with it was very
insufficient. A troop of horse-artillery and half a light field battery,
a second troop (Captain Delafosse’s), and the remainder of the field
battery, did not join until after the entrance to the Khyber was won.

──────┬────────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────┬───────────────────────
Troop.│Brigade.│Company.│Battalion.│Captains.│ Lieutenants.
──────┼────────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────┼───────────────────────
3 │ 1 │ │ │Delafosse│Richardson, Money,
│ │ │ │ │Abercrombie.
3 │ 2 │ │ │Alexander│A. Fitzgerald, Larkins.
│ │ 2 │ 2 │ │L. Smith, Douglas.
│ │ 4 │ 6 │ │A. Christie, Robertson.
──────┴────────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────┴───────────────────────

Captain Lane, commissary of ordnance, Lieutenant Pollock, aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, military secretary, Captain H. M.
Lawrence, political agent.

On the 5th April, the attack was made on the Pass; the guns were
directed on the barriers raised to defend the entrance; two columns
attacked the heights on either side, and the main body carried the Pass
when the way had been opened by the fire of the guns. The arrangements
of General Pollock were admirable. The attack was completely successful;
and the enemy evacuated Ali-Musjid at our approach. Captains Alexander
and Lawrence, Lieutenants Shakespear and Pollock, are mentioned in the
despatches.

Jellalabad was reached, but the enemy had disappeared, and here the
force halted, pending the receipt of orders for an advance on Cabul, and
till arrangements for carriage could be made to enable them to carry out
the order. This halt was not altogether inactive; in July, No. 6
battery, with Captains Abbott and Dawes, was engaged with Brigadier
Monteith’s force in the Shinwaree valley with much credit. Captain
MacGregor accompanied the brigade, and “when opportunity offered itself,
served with the guns.”

While the force remained halted, a supply of rockets reached the
artillery, which had been forwarded by dâk banghy from Allahabad, under
the impression that the weapon was particularly calculated to be
serviceable in the passes at points where artillery could not be used at
all, or without the greatest difficulty. The expectation was not
realized,—the rockets being too delicate to bear the shaking they
underwent; this, together with the expansion of the iron case and the
contraction of the composition from the heat to which they were exposed,
rendered them nearly useless on reaching their destination.

Towards the end of August the arrangements were completed, and the force
moved on; the artillery strengthened by No. 6 battery and the
mountain-train, which had formed part of the “illustrious garrison.” On
the 24th, the enemy were driven by General Pollock from Mammoo Khel, in
which action the services of Captains Abbott and MacGregor, and
Lieutenant Pollock are mentioned. On the 8th September, some fighting
occurred near Jugdulluck, and on the 10th, the enemy assaulted the
rear-guard on all sides, but “were checked by the very effective fire of
the guns, ably directed by Captain Lawrence (political agent), who
volunteered his services, and by Lieutenant Abercrombie.” The brigades
were collected in the Tezeen valley, for which purpose Major-General
Pollock halted on the 12th, and on the 13th were attacked by the whole
of Akbar Khan’s troops, who were defeated with much loss. Two of the
guns, a 24 and 12–pounder howitzer, lost on the retreat, were here
recaptured. The rear-guard was hard pressed in defending the entrance to
the pass as the troops moved on, and the effective services of Captains
Alexander and Lawrence, and Lieutenant Douglas, in the use of the guns
at this period, are acknowledged. In the despatches of Major-General
Pollock, the names of Major Delafosse, Captains Abbott, Backhouse,
Alexander, MacGregor, Lieutenants Fitzgerald, Shakespear, and Pollock,
are mentioned with applause.

On the 15th, the force reached Cabul, and on the 16th possession was
taken of the Bala Hissar, under a salute from Major Delafosse’s troop.

Major-General Nott, after being joined by Major-General England’s force,
as related in a previous page, continued to hold Candahar, pending final
instructions. Towards the end of May the enemy, collecting in numbers,
endeavoured to carry the town, when Major-General Nott moved out against
them. Both Captain Anderson’s troops were engaged in this affair with
credit. Early in August, Candahar was evacuated: one column with the
baggage retired by the Kojuck pass; with this was Lieutenant Cooper’s
troop of horse-artillery and the 3rd company 2nd battalion artillery
under Lieutenant Walker. In its route to Sukkur this force met with
little or no opposition.

The main force marched on the 8th August. The artillery consisted of
Major Sotheby, commandant; Lieutenant Brougham, adjutant, S. S. Horse
Artillery, Captain W. Anderson, Lieutenants Turner and Hawkins; 3rd
company, 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Cornish, four 18–pounder guns
attached.

On the 31st August, within forty miles of Ghuznee, the governor, with
about 12,000 men, moved out to meet the British, but he was defeated
with the loss of guns, tents, &c. Major Sotheby was mentioned in the
despatch, which concluded by saying, “I cannot close this despatch
without expressing my admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct,
rapid movements, and correct practice, of Captain Anderson’s troop of
horse-artillery; nothing could exceed it, and I beg to bring this
officer and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the
particular notice of his Lordship, as officers who have on many
occasions rendered me most essential service.”

Ghuznee yielded without opposition; its walls and bastions were
destroyed—the gates of Somnath and the Zubber Jung rewarded the
conquerors and graced their triumphant march to Cabul, which they
reached on the 17th, after defeating the enemy at Beni Badam and Mydam
on the 14th and 15th, in which actions “the artillery” are reported as
having “distinguished themselves,” and the names of Captain Anderson and
Lieutenant Turner are particularly mentioned.

A body of Kuzzilbash horse, despatched under Sir R. Shakespear towards
Bamean, to aid the prisoners, met them on their return, they having
effected their escape; of the artillery, Lieutenants Eyre, Waller, and
Warburton; Sergeants MacNee and Cleland; gunners A’Hearne, Kean, and
Walton, were the sole survivors.

A force was sent against Istaliff on the 30th September, in which the
mountain-train under Captain Backhouse, and two 18–pounders under
Lieutenant Cornish, were employed. Lieutenants Richardson and Pollock
accompanied the force, and the former was slightly wounded.

The combined armies now turned homewards, meeting with many difficulties
from the exhausted state of the cattle and the obstacles in the passes;
so much so, that the four 18–pounders which had originally marched with
the Army of the Indus were burst in the passes and their carriages
burnt. Daily skirmishes took place, and in passing a ravine near Alee
Musjid just at dusk, a rush was made by the Afredis on a small
detachment of artillery with a gun of the mountain-train under
Lieutenant A. Christie. He was killed, and the gun carried off, but
afterwards recovered.

Of the trophies, the Zubber Jung was burst at Cabul; the Kazee travelled
with difficulty as far as Lundi-khana, in the Khyber, where, upsetting
into a ravine, it was burst and abandoned; the Somnath gates alone
reached Hindustan, travelling on a spare 18–pounder carriage; but they
were fated, even after 800 years of absence, not to pass their kindred
threshold; they got no further than Agra in the attempt, and were there
deposited in the armoury of the magazine.

The troops were received on their return by the Army of Reserve at
Ferozepore, assembled in case its aid should have been wanted, and
medals bestowed for the different services, bearing the inscriptions of
Candahar—Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—and Cabul,
1842; the obverse of all was similar, and this, and all the medals since
that for Ghuznee, were worn on a particoloured ribbon of light tints,
called “the ribbon of India,” ill fitted for a military decoration.

[Illustration]

For these distinguished services General Pollock was rewarded with the
first class of the order of the Bath, and received the thanks of both
Houses of Parliament. He was subsequently appointed a member of the
Supreme Council of India, and on being compelled to quit the country on
account of ill-health in 1846–7, a pension of £1,000 per annum was
bestowed upon him by the East-India Company, with the unanimous
approbation of the Court of Proprietors. The freedom of the city was
also voted him by the corporation of London.

Of the artillery officers who served under Generals Pollock and Nott,
the following received honorary distinctions:—Captains Anderson,
Alexander, Lane, and Lawrence, were gazetted brevet-majors; and Majors
Delafosse, Sotheby, and Anderson, companions of the Bath.

Before closing this account of the war in Afghanistan, it should be
mentioned, that in the political department several artillery officers
were greatly distinguished. The names of Captains Todd and MacGregor are
associated with important historical events at Herat and Jellalabad;
whilst Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear (who was
subsequently knighted for these services) will be remembered for their
enterprising and perilous journeys to Khiva and the Caspian for the
purpose of liberating the Russian slaves confined in the former place.

CHAPTER IX.

State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle of
Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The battle of Punniah—The Gwalior
contingent—Honours conferred on the artillery—The ordnance
commissariat remodelled—The artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the
regiment—Increase of horse-batteries.

In the following year (1843) the attention of the Supreme Government was
directed towards a new quarter. The death of the Maharajah Junkojee Rao
Scindiah was followed by alarming disturbances at Gwalior. The army
became dominant in the State. The Regent, who had been nominated to
preside over the Durbar, during the minority of the adopted son of the
deceased ruler, was incompetent to control the rebellious soldiery; the
widow of the late king took part against the minister, and the
hostilities, which commenced with a bed-chamber intrigue, ended in a
civil war. Such, indeed, became the anarchy and confusion at Gwalior,
that the British Resident quitted Scindiah’s court, and the
Governor-General, though not contemplating immediate interference, began
to watch with some anxiety the progress of events at the Mahratta
capital. As the year advanced, the Ranee’s party, at the head of which
was the Dadur Khasgeewallah, a man whose temper and designs were
notoriously hostile to the British, became stronger and stronger. Such
of the officers, in the service of the Maharajah, as were known to be
friendly to the paramount state, were ill-treated and dismissed. Covert
hostility began to rise into open defiance; and it now became apparent,
that from the other side of the Sutlej, the Sikhs were watching, with
undisguised satisfaction, the excitement at Gwalior, and waiting to take
advantage of any disaster that might befall us, to declare themselves on
the side of the Mahrattas.

As the cold weather approached, the aspect of affairs became more and
more threatening. To bring about a satisfactory settlement by mere
diplomacy, appeared difficult, if not impossible; and Lord Ellenborough
determined on assembling an army on the banks of the Jumna. The force
assembled at Agra, in the month of November, under the personal command
of Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, and was called the “Army of
Exercise.” At the same time a left wing was formed, under the command of
General Gray, to operate upon Gwalior from the Bundlekhund country,
whilst the main army advanced from Agra. On the 16th of December, Sir
Hugh Gough commenced his march. Affairs were growing worse, and armed
intervention was inevitable. When at length, the Khasgeewallah was given
up, with the hope of arresting the progress of the British, the Army of
Exercise was in full march upon Gwalior, and was not to be stayed.

The artillery division of the Army of Exercise was commanded by
Brigadier G. E. Gowan, Captain J. H. Macdonald being his assistant
adjutant-general. Colonel J. Tennant was appointed, with the rank of
brigadier, to the command of the foot-artillery; Lieutenant and
Brevet-Captain A. Huish, acting as major of brigade; and Captain E. F.
Day, as commissary of ordnance. The components of the horse-artillery
force were the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, commanded by Captain C. Grant,
with Lieutenants Clifford and P. Christie, as subalterns; the 3rd troop
2nd brigade, commanded by Brevet-Major Alexander, with Brevet-Captain A.
Fitzgerald (adjutant of the brigade, who had volunteered to do
subaltern’s duty with the troop), and Lieutenant Wintle; and the 2nd
troop 3rd brigade, with which were Brevet-Major Lane (commanding),
Brevet-Captain C. Mills, and Lieutenant Moir. The foot-artillery
consisted of the 1st company 1st battalion (with No. 10 light
field-battery) under Brevet-Major Saunders; Lieutenants Bruce, Milligan,
and Sladen, subalterns; and the 1st company 4th battalion, commanded by
Captain B. Brown, with Lieutenants Holland and Remington. In addition to
these were the heavy batteries, consisting of six 18–pounders and four
8–inch howitzers, manned by the reserve companies of the 4th battalion
(European) and the 6th golundauze; the former under Lieutenant-Colonel
Farrington, with Lieutenant Whiteford, adjutant; and the latter under
Lieutenant-Colonel Denniss, with Lieutenant Warner, adjutant.

The artillery with the left wing was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Biddulph (Captain Austin, major of brigade), and was composed of the 1st
troop 3rd brigade, commanded by Captain F. Brind, Lieutenants Coxe and
Bourchier, subalterns; the 3rd troop 3rd brigade, under Captain George
Campbell, with whom was Lieutenant Humfrays; and the 6th company 6th
battalion, with No. 16 light field-battery, under Lieutenant W.
Olpherts.

On the arrival of the advanced columns at Dholpore, they were met by the
Khasgeewallah, whose surrender, now become a matter of fact, was
regarded as a prelude to a general compliance with the terms dictated by
the Governor-General. The bulk of the siege-train was therefore halted,
and eventually ordered back to Agra.

On the 27th of December information was obtained that the enemy had
advanced to Choundah, a village within eight miles of the position
occupied by the “Army of Exercise” at Hurgonah, and arrangements were
made next day to attack them on the 29th. On the morning of that day,
the army advanced upon the village of Maharajpore. It was believed that
the enemy were some miles distant; but, as the British troops ascended
the rising ground, the Mahratta batteries opened suddenly upon our
advancing columns; and as our own heavy artillery was in the rear, it
was no easy matter to silence the destructive fire kept up by the enemy,
with a spirit and a precision which could scarcely be excelled by the
best gunners in the service of any European state.

Our light field-batteries were overmatched by the heavy metal of the
Mahratta ordnance; but their steadiness under fire was never exceeded,
and the determined resolution with which they carried on the unequal
contest, elicited the highest praise. Captain Grant’s troop of
horse-artillery came into action about half-past eight o’clock, when it
engaged one of the enemy’s batteries, drawn up on the left of the
village of Maharajpore. Here it was joined by Major Alexander’s troop,
when “both advanced to within 500 yards of the enemy, and soon drove him
from his guns, which were taken possession of by the 3rd brigade of
infantry. On following up the enemy, the two troops were suddenly
exposed to a cross fire, from two of the enemy’s batteries, which had
hitherto been concealed; one in front, and the other on our left flank.
Captain Grant was ordered to oppose the former, and Major Alexander the
latter, which was soon after stormed and taken by the 3rd brigade of
infantry; upon which Major Alexander followed up the retreating enemy
with great effect, and Major Lane, with the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
joined them in the pursuit. In the mean time, Captain Grant had advanced
to within 600 yards of the Choundah position, and was opposed singly to
the fire of a heavy battery of 12 guns, for upwards of half an hour, and
I regret to say, sustained a considerable loss in men and horses. So
well chosen,” adds Brigadier Gowan, from whose report to the
Commander-in-Chief these details are taken, “was the enemy’s position,
that even on horseback, I could only discern the muzzles of their guns,
which in weight of metal, as well as in number, were very superior to
the troop’s. More than once, however, the enemy were driven by our fire
from their guns, but being unsupported at the time, except by a weak
troop of cavalry, no advantage of this could be taken, and he returned
to his guns.”

In another letter, addressed to the assistant adjutant-general of
artillery, Brigadier Gowan, with reference to the other details of field
artillery, says, “Major Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advanced
with the 4th brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, forming the left
column, and Nos. 17 and 10 light field-batteries, with the 4th and 5th
brigades of infantry, respectively forming the centre column of attack.
These came into action on the opposite side of the village of
Maharajpore from that on which we were first engaged.... The conduct of
officers and men was highly satisfactory, and everything I could
desire.”

Nothing could have exceeded the resolute courage with which the Mahratta
batteries were defended, alike by infantry and artillerymen, or the
precision with which the guns were served by the latter. “I never
witnessed,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief, “guns better served, nor a
body of infantry apparently more devoted to the protection of their
regimental guns, held by the Mahratta corps as objects of worship.” “The
fire of the enemy,” wrote Brigadier Gowan, “was remarkably accurate, and
was maintained with a smartness which surprised me. At one time they got
the range of Captain Grant’s troop so exactly, that nearly every shot
fell between the guns and waggons of the battery.”

It was only by the steady gallantry of the British infantry, who charged
the enemy’s batteries in the face of destructive showers of grape and
round shot, that their position at last was carried. Her Majesty’s 39th
and 40th regiments headed the columns. Nothing could have been more
gallant than the attack, more obstinate than the resistance. The enemy’s
golundaz stood to be bayoneted in their batteries, and only yielded up
their guns with their lives.

It is probable that, if in this engagement better use had been made of
the artillery, the loss that fell upon the British army would have been
much less severe. Brigadier Tennant, who commanded the foot-artillery,
had brought up four 8–inch howitzers in line with H. M.’s 39th, but he
was not permitted to advance. Had he been allowed, as was his expressed
desire, to move up within 800 yards’ distance, where he could see the
enemy’s position more distinctly, and therefore operate with greater
precision, he might, it was the opinion of those present, have knocked
the Mahratta batteries to pieces, and enabled the infantry columns to
advance in comparative safety to the attack.

On the same morning of the 29th of December, General Gray, who, with the
left wing of the army, had been advancing upon Gwalior from the Sindh
river, came up with the enemy at Punniah, a village a few miles to the
south of the capital. Here the Mahratta batteries were strongly posted,
as at Maharajpore, on commanding ground, and in gorges flanking one
another. The 3rd Buffs, who led the column sent forward to attack the
enemy’s position, were supported by Captain Brind’s troop of
horse-artillery, 1st troop 3rd brigade, which “opened upon the guns to
the left of Mangore, whilst Major Geddes, with Captain Campbell’s troop,
3rd battalion 3rd brigade, and two guns of Captain Brind’s, opened upon
the battery of seven guns in rear of Mangore; and their practice was
beautiful, silencing all but one of the enemy’s guns, which was served
with the greatest accuracy to the last moment. Lieutenant Olpherts, with
four guns of No. 16 light field-battery, took up a position south of
Mangore, and opened on the enemy as they retreated up the hills, with
good effect. Lieutenant Tombs, with two guns of light field-battery
attached to the rear-guard, fired with great precision several shots
upon the enemy’s left.”[93] The Mahrattas made a gallant defence, but
were driven from their guns with considerable loss; and night closed
upon their total dispersion.

In these engagements on the 29th of December, the artillery lost at
Maharajpore, 1 2nd lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; and 1
serjeant, and 21 gunners, wounded; besides syces, ordnance-drivers, and
a considerable number of horses. At Punniah, the loss was much smaller,
only one man and one horse having been killed. The officer who fell at
Maharajpore, was Lieutenant Leathes. He was posted with the rear-guard,
and had ridden forward, it would seem, to watch the progress of the
action, when coming too close to the Mahratta batteries, a round shot
carried off his head.

For services rendered during this campaign, Colonel Gowan received the
companionship of the Bath; Majors Geddes, Sanders, Alexander, and Lane,
were promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel by brevet, and Captains
Brown, Grant, Brind, Campbell, and Macdonald, were gazetted as
brevet-majors. In the political transactions with which these military
operations were connected, Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, of the
artillery, took a conspicuous part. He acted as an aide-de-camp to the
Commander-in-Chief, during the battle of Maharajpore, and was thanked in
his Excellency’s despatch. Captain Macdonald also received the thanks of
the Commander-in-Chief. On the subsequent settlement of the affairs of
Gwalior, four batteries were raised for service with the new Gwalior
contingent; and placed under the command of Lieutenants Eyre, Warburton,
T. H. Smyth, and Hawkins; Brevet-Captain Frank Turner being appointed
brigade major.

In honour of these victories, a bronze star, with “Maharajpore” or
“Punniah” in the centre, was struck, and distributed to the troops
engaged.

Early in the year 1844, the 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery,
and the 4th company 6th battalion of foot, which formed part of the
relief ordered to Scinde, had their fidelity severely tried by the
conduct of two native infantry regiments who refused to cross the
Sutlej, on the plea that their just allowances had been withdrawn. The
artillery, consisting of a native troop and a native company, who must
have come under the operation of the same order, do not appear to have
taken a leading part in the mutinous movement.

In the autumn of this year (1844), a reorganization of the ordnance
commissariat department was ordered by the Supreme Government. Instead
of a principal commissary of ordnance, resident, as heretofore, in Fort
William, an inspector of magazines, with his head-quarters at Allahabad,
was appointed; and the arsenal of Fort William was placed under the
charge of the deputy principal commissary of ordnance.

In the beginning of the year 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge, then
Governor-General, directed his attention to the state of the artillery,
and, in conjunction with Sir George Pollock, the military member of
council, introduced several important improvements. “The number of
regular horse field-batteries had been gradually increased to five.[94]
These were at first equipped with 89 horses, which allowed six horses
each for six guns and six waggons, one spare per team, and five for the
staff; the gun-teams were subsequently allowed eight horses to each. In
1845, the number of batteries was increased to nine, and the complement
of horses to each fixed at 120, which gave eight horses to each gun and
waggon, and allowed a team for the forge-cart, with six saddle-horses,
including one spare and one spare draught-horse per team. On the
frontier or on service, ten additional horses were sanctioned.[95]

“In July, 1845, a new organization of the whole of the Indian artillery
took place, by which the corps in Bengal received a nominal increase,
but a practical decrease, except in the establishment of officers. The
five European battalions of five companies each, were formed into six
battalions of four companies each, and the two golundaz battalions of
ten companies, into three battalions of six companies each, causing a
total reduction of one European, and two native companies.

“One important advantage was, however, obtained by the increase of
European officers, the want of which had been seriously felt on various
previous occasions. The relief thus granted could not of course be felt
immediately, but its beneficial effect is now becoming manifest.

“This gave an establishment of three brigades and nine battalions, each
having a complement of officers similar to the infantry, with the
exception that an additional captain was allowed to the latter, which
has not been accorded to the artillery, although greatly wanted.”

The important subject of elephant-draught at this time engaged the
attention of the Governor-General. These animals had been long in use
with the light post-guns in Arracan and other places, and an
experimental elephant-battery had been recently established at Dum-dum.
But Sir Henry Hardinge now turned his thoughts towards the application
of this description of draught to heavy ordnance, convinced that, for
the transport of siege-guns, artificers’ carts, &c., elephants would be
found more serviceable and more economical than bullocks. During the
Sikh campaign, the services of the former were tested, especially on the
march to and from Kote Kangra; and the result more than justified the
expectations of the Governor-General.

CHAPTER X.

The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures taken for its
prevention—The artillery reinforced—Affair at Buddowul—Battle of
Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours conferred on the artillery—The
occupation of Lahore.

As the year 1845 drew towards its close, the state of affairs in the
Punjab demanded the most anxious attention of the Governor-General.
Eager to maintain peace, but at the same time determined to be prepared
for war, Sir Henry Hardinge had noiselessly increased the strength of
the frontier army, and had himself proceeded, in September, to the
North-west, apparently on an ordinary tour of inspection. In July, 1844,
there had been between Meerut and Ferozepore 24,000 men, and 66
field-pieces. This force he had, with as little ostentation as possible,
increased to 45,500 men, and 98 field-guns. The most important position
was Umballah. As it was from this point that any attack from beyond the
Sutlej must have been met, the Governor-General, by December, 1845, had
placed there, in the front line, 32,470 men, and 66 field-guns, where
before, in July, 1844, there had only been 13,530 men, and 48
field-guns. But all these preparations were made in the manner least
calculated to alarm or to irritate the Sikhs, and it was hoped that, in
spite of the boastings of the turbulent soldiery, they would be
restrained by their own intestine feuds from advancing to the attack of
their neighbours. The middle of December, however, saw them preparing to
cross the river; and the great event, which had for many years been
talked of in every cantonment in India, was now on the eve of
accomplishment; the war in the Punjab was about to commence.

We come now to speak more in detail of the disposition of the artillery
at this time. At the commencement of the war, there were stationed at
Ferozepore, the 5th troop 1st brigade, under Captain E. F. Day; the 3rd
troop 3rd brigade, under Brevet-Major George Campbell; the 4th company
6th battalion, with No. 19 light field-battery, under Captain J.
Fordyce; and the 2nd company 7th battalion, with No. 6 light
field-battery, under 1st Lieutenant A. G. Austen (Captain Boileau,
lately posted, not having joined), in all 12 horse-artillery guns and
howitzers (6 and 12–pounders), and 12 foot-artillery guns and howitzers
(9 and 24–pounders). Besides these troops and companies, there was a
reserve company (the 2nd company 2nd battalion) for the service of heavy
guns and rockets. The whole were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade.

At Loodianah were posted the 1st troop 1st brigade, under Captain F.
Dashwood; and the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain H. Garbett (total
12 guns); the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes.

But the largest force of artillery was posted at Umballah, under
Lieutenant-Colonel George Brooke, of the 1st brigade horse-artillery. At
that station were the 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain D’Arcy Todd;
the 3rd troop 1st brigade, under Captain G. H. Swinley; the 1st troop
3rd brigade, under Major F. Brind; the 3rd company 4th battalion, under
Captain Jasper Trower; and the 2nd company 6th battalion, under Captain
R. Horsford; Nos. 7 and 9 light field-batteries being attached to these
two companies. There were also at Umballah, the 2nd and 4th companies
(reserve) 4th battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Denniss.[96]

Thus the Sirhind division of artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooke, numbered forty-two horse-artillery and twenty-four
foot-artillery guns and howitzers. The four 9–pounder batteries were
horsed; but No. 19, at Ferozepore, having only lately been changed from
a bullock-battery, and being incomplete in harness, was obliged to take
the field with bullock-draught. The Governor-General was at this time at
Umballah; and he had with him on escort duty, two horse-artillery guns,
under 1st Lieutenant George Moir, of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade
horse-artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, then at Muttra.

The Sikhs crossed the Sutlej on the 11th and 12th. On the latter day Sir
Hugh Gough marched from Umballah to Rajpoora, with the head-quarters of
the Sirhind division, a distance of 18 miles; and on the 13th, Sir John
Littler moved his troops into camp, to protect the cantonments of
Ferozepore; one regiment being detached with three guns, from No. 6
battery, under Lieutenant Tulloch, to defend the city. On the same day,
he brigaded his force; Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade,
being temporarily appointed a brigadier of artillery; Lieutenant
Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd brigade, being his brigade-major.

On the 13th, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief being then
only a few miles distant from each other, and in constant communication,
the Army of the Sutlej was formed into brigades and divisions.
Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke was appointed brigadier to command the
artillery; consisting of all the troops and companies before mentioned,
as stationed at Ferozepore, Loodianah, and Umballah, as well as the two
guns under Lieutenant Moir, from the escort of the Governor-General.
Brevet-Captain Murray Mackenzie, adjutant of the 1st brigade, was
appointed major of brigade to the artillery, and Brevet-Captain Warner,
adjutant of the 4th battalion, commissary of ordnance.

On the 13th, the troops at Loodianah received orders from Sir H.
Hardinge to march to Busseean, a distance of twenty-eight miles; and at
the same time, the two horse-artillery guns from Muttra, and the 5th
cavalry, which formed part of the Governor-General’s escort, were sent
thither to join them. The object of this movement was to cover Busseean,
full as it was of supplies for the British army, which, but for the
interposition of the Loodianah force, would in all probability have been
destroyed by the enemy. By this movement also, the force under the
Commander-in-Chief, marching up from Umballah, was augmented by 4,000
men and 12 guns.

On the 15th the troops halted, and on the following day moved on to
Wudnee, of which place a Sikh garrison was in possession. On their
refusal to furnish supplies to the force, the two troops of artillery
were brought into position before the town—a movement which had the
desired effect. Here the Umballah force, with the main body of the
artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, joined the troops from Loodianah.

On the 17th the army made a short march of ten miles to Chirruck, where
the troops suffered much from scarcity of water.

On the 18th the whole force moved to Moodkee. During the march a message
was received from Major Broadfoot, who was reconnoitring in front, to
the effect that the Sikhs were in possession of the fort and village of
Moodkee, and that a portion of their cavalry were in advance of that
place. The horse-artillery and cavalry were immediately ordered to form
line to the front; the enemy’s pickets, however, had abandoned their
advanced position, and Moodkee opened its gates at the sight of a few
guns.

It was half-past two o’clock before the army was encamped. The horses
had been picketed, and men and officers were about to seek some
refreshment after the fatigues of the march, when Major Broadfoot
brought intelligence that the enemy was within three miles of our lines.
The Governor-General himself rode down the front of the artillery camp,
and the guns were quickly in motion.

The camp of the British army was, at this time, formed on a tract of
cultivated ground immediately to the west of Moodkee. In front, for
about a mile, extended ploughed fields, beyond which there stretched a
dense jungle of low brushwood and stunted trees. Through this the Sikh
columns were now advancing. The horse-artillery, with cavalry on the
flanks, moved rapidly across the ploughed fields. The dust caused by the
march of the Sikh columns rose densely against the blue sky above the
brush-jungle; but when the enemy perceived that the British line was in
motion, they halted in the jungle to make their arrangements for the
battle. The horse-artillery proceeded in line across the fields, but
halted before entering the jungle. The light field-batteries, which had
been directed to follow, with the infantry columns, came up soon after
the action commenced; and in a short time 30 horse-artillery and 12
field-battery guns were in full play.

Our fire soon told upon the enemy, who were hidden in a thick jungle,
and their position only indicated by the smoke from their guns. Soon,
apparently, some of the Sikh pieces were either silenced or withdrawn,
for their fire gradually slackened. Brigadier Brooke, in his official
despatch, reports, that “the line of artillery kept up a heavy fire on
the enemy, nearly silencing their guns;” and the Commander-in-Chief
corroborates this statement, saying, that the enemy “opened a very
severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied
to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was
soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and
well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of
the enemy.”

Rather more than half an hour after the commencement of the action, the
Commander-in-Chief directed Colonel Geddes to take two troops of
horse-artillery, and to proceed with the 4th light cavalry and 9th
irregulars to the left, to oppose a demonstration of the Sikhs from
their right flank. The 1st and 4th troops of the 3rd brigade (under
Major Brind and Captain Garbett), being on the left of the line, were
those which accompanied Colonel Geddes. The two troops with the cavalry
moved rapidly into the jungle towards the left front, and came into
action against some Sikh cavalry and infantry, who had apparently been
creeping round with the intention of turning our left flank. Colonel
Geddes, who was the senior officer on the left, perceiving this body of
the enemy retiring before the fire of our guns, directed the 9th
irregular cavalry to charge. This was accordingly done. As the cavalry
moved forward, the guns ceased firing, and again advanced through the
jungle, which at every step grew denser and denser, and much impeded the
movements of the horse-artillery.

At the same time that this occurred on the left, a similar movement was
made from our right to turn the enemy’s left flank, and to check their
cavalry, who were endeavouring to circle round our right. The 1st[97]
and 3rd troops 1st brigade, under Captains Dashwood and Swinley, and
Captain Trower’s battery, were pushed forward to support the 3rd
dragoons and a brigade of native cavalry, who were now ordered to charge
the enemy’s left flank. The 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain Todd,
and Captain Horsford’s battery, still remained in the centre, covering
the advance of the infantry brigades. After the brilliant and successful
charges of our cavalry on both flanks, the troops and batteries detached
to the right and left were ordered to close in to the centre, in order
to support the attack of the infantry. It was nearly dusk. The early
evening of a winter day had set in whilst the action still raged
furiously. The jungle at every pace grew denser, and it was with
difficulty that the guns could force their way through the brushwood.
Captain Swinley’s troop, in covering the advance of an European
regiment, suffered much from a close discharge of grape and musketry,
and one gun, having lost all its horses, was temporarily disabled. The
1st troop 1st brigade sustained great loss from the close fire of the
enemy’s artillery and infantry. Captain Dashwood, who commanded the
troop, was, at this period of the action, with his staff-serjeant and
several of his men, struck down by grape. Lieutenant Pollock, of the 3rd
troop 1st brigade, also received a mortal wound; and Captain Trower was
shot at the head of his battery by a Sikh soldier concealed in a bush.
At this time darkness was rapidly covering the field, and the artillery,
being within a few paces of the enemy’s line, were suffering much from
their galling fire. But at length the Sikh line gave way before the
advance of the British infantry, who, supported by a part of the
artillery, pursued for a considerable distance the retreating enemy;
but, as the Commander-in-Chief observed in his despatch, “night saved
them from worse disaster.”

The action commenced at half-past three in the afternoon, and, as the
day was one of the shortest of the year, the rapid closing in of night
prevented the British force from taking full advantage of its success.
The Sikhs saved a portion of their ordnance, some of their guns being
apparently withdrawn early in the action. It is supposed that they had
in all from thirty to forty guns engaged, of which seventeen fell into
our hands.

The artillery suffered more in this action from grape and musketry than
from the round shot of the enemy, which did comparatively little
mischief. Only one or two waggons were blown up, and in fact scarcely
any loss was sustained until the troops and field-batteries were pushed
up through the jungle close to the enemy’s fire. It was then that
Captains Dashwood and Trower, and Lieutenant R. H. Pollock (son of
Major-General Sir George Pollock, G.C.B.), received their death-wounds.
The first was struck down by grape, receiving two wounds, one on the arm
and the other on the foot, the latter of which proved mortal. Lieutenant
Pollock had his knee smashed by a musket-ball, and being for a long time
exposed to the cold night air, lying in a waggon, though the limb was
amputated immediately upon his arrival in camp, sunk on the 19th.
Captain Trower, as we have said, was shot by a Sikh concealed in the
jungle; the ball passed through his body, and he died during the night.
There were several Sikhs—Akalis and others—lying concealed behind the
bushes, who waited until our troops came close upon them, to pick out
our officers. The total loss of artillery was (_killed_) 2 European
officers, 4 serjeants, 13 rank and file, 5 syces and grass-cutters, 3
drivers, and 45 horses;—and (_wounded_) 4 European officers, 1 native
officer, 2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 11 lascars, 2 drivers, 7 syces,
and 25 horses. The officers killed and wounded were, Captain Jasper
Trower, killed; Lieutenant R. Pollock, killed; Captain F. Dashwood,
severely wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. V. Cox, slightly wounded; 1st
Lieutenant C. A. Wheelwright, wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. Bowie, slightly
wounded. Captain Dashwood died soon afterwards.

The morning of the 19th[98] was devoted to the mournful duty of bringing
in the wounded and burying the dead. The artillery sent out limbers and
cattle to bring in the captured ordnance. Whilst thus employed, our
working parties were disturbed and obliged to retire towards camp, by
some bodies of the enemy’s horse, who had returned to the field probably
with the same intention. As large bodies of the enemy’s horse were still
hovering about, the Commander-in-Chief drew up his troops again,
prepared, if necessary, to renew the action; but nothing, at this time,
worthy of note in our memoir, occurred.

On the night of the 20th, two 18–pounder guns and two 8–inch howitzers
arrived in camp from Umballah, under Brigadier Denniss and Captain
Warner, commissary of ordnance. Short as the time was, ammunition was
prepared for the howitzers, which were thus enabled to accompany the
force on the following morning. The 18–pounders were, however, left
behind in camp at Moodkee.

An hour before daybreak on the 21st, the army broke ground. The main
body of the artillery moved in rear of the centre column under General
Gilbert. Two troops of horse-artillery were, however, detached, one with
the column under Brigadier Wallace, and the other was attached to
Major-General Sir H. Smith’s division. The distance from Moodkee to
Ferozeshuhur, where, according to intelligence received in camp, the
main body of the enemy were posted,[99] is not above twelve miles; but
the army moved slowly, led by the infantry columns, and a very
considerable detour was made to the left, in order that a junction with
the Ferozepore division, under Sir John Littler, might be made, at a
sufficient distance from the intrenched position of the enemy. Although
the communication with Ferozepore had been lately interrupted, as the
Sikhs had interposed between that station and the headquarters force,
instructions had been sent to the major-general to move out of his camp
at Ferozepore on the morning of the 21st, so as to form the desired
junction. The Governor-General’s despatches had been duly received; and
Sir John Littler, with 5,900 men and 21 guns, marched early on the 21st
to Misrèe-wallah, a village a short distance from the Sikh position.
This movement was skilfully accomplished by the general, who left the
whole of his camp standing, and threw out the usual mounted picquets in
front, thus deceiving that portion of the Sikh force under Tej Singh
which had been employed in watching him. The sirdar, ignorant of
Littler’s march, remained in front of the empty camp during the whole of
the day, and did not learn the general’s movement until the next
morning. The junction of the two forces was effected about half-past one
P.M.; and “dispositions were made for an united attack upon the enemy’s
intrenched camp.” About 4 o’clock the British troops moved forward under
their veteran commanders; Sir Hugh Gough leading the right wing, and Sir
Henry Hardinge, who, after the battle of Moodkee, had chivalrously
volunteered his services as second in command, placing himself at the
head of the left.

The nature of the ground was somewhat similar to that at Moodkee,
covered with thick jungle, and, as on that day, the sun was rapidly
sinking when the action commenced. It was the shortest day of the year,
and but a few hours of daylight remained. The line of attack was formed,
Sir John Littler on the left, Brigadier Wallace in the centre, and
General Gilbert on the right. Sir Harry Smith’s division, the reserve,
was in the second line. The cavalry was in reserve and on both flanks.

The artillery was thus posted—Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd
brigade, was with Sir John Littler. He had under his command the 5th
troop 1st brigade, under Captain E. F. Day—3rd troop 3rd brigade, under
Major G. Campbell—4th company 6th battalion (bullock-battery attached)
and three guns of No. 6 horse field-battery—the other three guns having
been left with a detachment to protect the city of Ferozepore. Captain
D’Arcy Todd’s troop—the 2nd of the 1st brigade, was on the left of
Brigadier Wallace’s division; and Captain G. H. Swinley’s, the 3rd troop
of the 1st brigade, was on the extreme right of the line, beyond her
Majesty’s 29th foot. The 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain Garbett,
and the 1st troop 1st brigade, now under Captain C. E. Mills, with
Lieutenant Moir’s two guns, were on the left of Gilbert’s division.
Major Brind’s troop was with Sir Harry Smith’s in the second line; but
just as the action commenced was moved up to the first line, and took
post to the right of Captain Garbett’s troop. These three troops, the
1st and 4th of the 3rd brigade, and the 1st of the 1st, were under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes. To the left of these were two
horse field-batteries under Captain Horsford and Lieutenant Atlay, and
the heavy howitzers and rockets under Brigadier Denniss and Captain
Warner.

The action commenced on the left, Colonel Huthwaite pushing forward with
his two troops of horse-artillery and his light field-batteries, to the
attack of the enemy’s position. The heavy guns and rockets and 9–pounder
batteries next came into action, and almost immediately afterwards the
horse-artillery in the centre and on the right. The action now became
general with the artillery on both sides. The roar of the ordnance was
tremendous. The British had 65 pieces in action—but, with the exception
of two heavy howitzers, all light guns. The enemy had upwards of 100
guns in battery, and most of them of large calibre; whilst even those of
smaller dimensions, being of much heavier metal than our own
field-pieces, were fired with increased charges and carried greater
distances.

The ground in front of our line was, in the first positions taken up,
covered with jungle as at Moodkee, but afterwards, as we neared the
enemy, became clear and open. After a few rounds, the horse-artillery in
the centre of the line were advanced to a closer distance, and the
troops moved through the jungle at a rapid pace, the shot from the
enemy’s guns tearing up the ground on all sides, but as yet causing
little loss.

As before mentioned, the detachment of artillery under Colonel Huthwaite
on the left, commenced the action. Pushing the guns forward from one
position to another, until within grape distance, he had for a time
completely silenced the batteries opposed to him. Meanwhile the infantry
on his left moved forward to the attack, but the movement was not
successful. Subsequently, however, the 9th foot and 26th light infantry
(with a portion of the 14th N.I.), under Brigadier Wallace, carried the
enemy’s battery.

Meanwhile the other troops and batteries, from their different positions
in line, had advanced through the jungle. The 2nd troop 1st brigade,
under Captain Todd, being on the left of Brigadier Wallace, approached
the artillery attached to Littler’s division. Major Brind’s troop, the
1st of the 3rd, after advancing to a great distance, was despatched to
the right to join Captain Swinley’s, which had accompanied the 29th
foot. Two troops under Colonel Geddes, after several positions, emerged
from the jungle and came into a clear open space in front of the
southern face of the enemy’s intrenchments, and within reach of their
grape-shot; and now the artillery fire ceased, the infantry were moved
forward and (forming line) advanced to the storm. The batteries in front
were carried at the point of the bayonet, notwithstanding the most
determined resistance, and the great loss sustained, just as the line
reached the battery, by the explosion of a large under-ground magazine,
which had all the effect of a mine.

The sun had now set, and darkness was rapidly falling on the field. The
obscurity was much increased by the dust and the smoke from the
batteries and the exploding magazines. From the frequency of these
explosions, and the quantity of earth thrown up by them, it was at first
supposed that the enemy’s position had been mined; but they were nothing
more than under-ground magazines, which, some by accident, some by
design, were now exploded, adding to the confusion and din of the fight.

Several regiments having penetrated the batteries, reached the Sikh
tents, many of which were now on fire. Here the troops became partially
broken and entangled; nothing could be distinguished clearly amidst the
smoke and obscurity. It was difficult to ascertain in which direction
lay friend or foe. Shots were falling thick on all sides, and even now
the troops of horse-artillery, halting unemployed before the Sikh
position, suffered material loss. Two waggons of Captain Mills’ troop
exploded simultaneously—giving at first a momentary impression that the
mines extended even so far from the enemy’s batteries. The 3rd dragoons,
who had charged from the right of the line on the batteries immediately
opposed to them, carrying everything before them in their course, now at
length emerged from the enemy’s position in scattered parties. It was
now dark. All our infantry were engaged. The reserve, under Sir Harry
Smith, had been called up and had penetrated beyond the batteries, most
of which had been captured; and one brigade had even reached the village
of Ferozeshuhur. Yet all opposition had not ceased, and the enemy still
held a great portion of their intrenchments. Amidst, however, the
darkness and intricacies of the camp, it was impossible then to push our
success further. It was advisable, therefore, to withdraw our shattered
regiments, which within the Sikh position were exposed to hidden
dangers, without any compensating advantage.

Accordingly, a bivouac was formed within two or three hundred yards of
the batteries. Here were collected, under Gilbert and Wallace, the 9th,
29th, 31st, and 80th regiments of foot, and the 1st European light
infantry. The 1st troop of 1st brigade, and 4th troop 3rd brigade, under
Colonel Geddes, joined this division of infantry, near which the
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief remained throughout the night.
The 2nd troop 1st brigade, now under Lieutenant Mackinnon (Major Todd
having fallen in the action), and some field-battery guns, under Captain
Horsford, soon afterwards came up to the ground. The 5th troop 1st
brigade, 3rd troop 3rd brigade, and 9–pounder batteries attached to the
4th company 6th battalion, and 2nd company 7th battalion, bivouacked a
short distance to the left. The 3rd troop 1st brigade, 1st troop 3rd
brigade, with some field-battery guns, bivouacked during the night near
Misrèe-wallah, which was occupied by British troops of all arms.

The night passed wearily away in cold and watching; the enemy,
occasionally firing, allowed our harassed troops little rest. One gun
was particularly troublesome during the greater part of the night, until
the Governor-General ordered its capture by the 80th foot and 1st
Europeans. Other guns were playing during the night with little or no
effect. The uproar in the Sikh position was tremendous; the shouting was
incessant, and the beating of drums, the sounding of bugles, and the
firing of matchlocks and musketry continued, with short intervals, until
daybreak. Frequently their drums beat to arms, and it was supposed that
the enemy were preparing to attack us. Accordingly, a few guns were got
into position and held ready with grape; but nothing came of these
indications.

About midnight the troops, having originally bivouacked as they came
upon the ground, were formed up in order; the guns in front, and the
infantry in two lines in their rear. At length day broke, and the Sikh
position was now comparatively quiet. The uproar had gradually
diminished, and it was generally supposed that the enemy had begun to
abandon their intrenchments. At first a thick mist shrouded all
surrounding objects; but the beams of the rising sun soon dispelled it,
and the three troops of horse-artillery, under Captain Mills, Lieutenant
Mackinnon, and Captain Garbett, pushed forward and again opened on the
Sikh position.

But there was no longer the determined resistance which had marked the
contest of the previous day. It is true that some batteries of heavy
metal replied to our fire for a time, and did some little mischief, a
few of our waggons being blown up; but the enemy’s fire soon grew
feeble. The infantry, who were close in rear of the guns, formed into
line, and with a hearty cheer sprang forward. Soon the intrenchments,
here most insignificant, were gained and passed; and the British line
swept through the camp, meeting with but little opposition. The
horse-artillery, after ceasing their fire, limbered up and accompanied
the infantry line under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes. There was
no check to the progress of our troops. No steady resistance was offered
by the enemy. The village of Ferozeshuhur was carried as the line
advanced. There was a smart skirmishing fire in front, but it was
evident that many of the Sikh battalions had already fled, and that our
advance expedited the retreat of the others. The line having passed the
village of Ferozeshuhur, leaving it to the left, and having reached the
extremity of the enemy’s position, halted. Upwards of seventy of the
Sikh guns, and the whole of their _matériel_ and camp equipage, fell
into our hands. And thus apparently the battle terminated.

But such in reality was not the case. We now come to a period of the
engagement sufficiently difficult to describe. Orders had been given to
allow a certain number of men to fall out for the purpose of procuring
water, and arrangements were also being made for securing the captured
ordnance. It was generally believed that the contest had ceased, when
suddenly to the left of the British line, and extending over a
considerable arc of the horizon, a dense cloud of dust was seen rising
from the jungle. The sirdar, Tej Singh, who had been uselessly watching
Sir John Littler’s empty camp, had now marched from his position before
Ferozepore to join the main army under Lal Singh, whom he supposed to be
still in possession of the intrenched position. But to his surprise he
found himself in the presence of the victorious British army.

Our ammunition was getting scarce.[100] The horse-artillery was at this
time in three separate bodies. Two troops (and a part of a
field-battery, under Lieutenant Austen) were with Colonel Huthwaite on
the left of the field. The troops commanded by Major Brind and Captain
Swinley were, early in the morning, with Sir Harry Smith’s division; and
Colonel Geddes commanded three troops with headquarters. Colonel
Huthwaite moving through the jungle on the left of the village, came
unexpectedly on the Sirdar Tej Singh. He immediately opened upon the
Sikh force, and drew down a heavy fire. This was the commencement of the
affair. Major Brind, in command of his own troop and that of Captain
Swinley, soon after became engaged with the enemy on the left front of
the village. His fire was answered by about thirty pieces of all kinds
from the Sikh batteries. The three troops under Colonel Geddes were also
directed to move forward to the attack. The artillery under Colonel
Huthwaite, being entirely unsupported, and his ammunition failing, was
compelled to fall back, as the enemy was within a few hundred yards, and
appeared to be moving round his flanks. At the same time the two troops
of horse-artillery under Major Brind, being exposed to an enfilading
fire from some heavy guns of the enemy, were obliged to retire upon the
village where the supports were posted. About this period, Colonel
Geddes, after sustaining a very heavy fire, finding his ammunition
expended and that he was entirely unsupported, was compelled to fall
back upon the hollow square which, in the mean time, had been formed by
the infantry on the right front of the village. The greater number of
the guns were now placed on the prolongation of one of the sides of the
square. Some were in the village, and three guns of the 4th troop 3rd
brigade were posted in one of the angles of the square immediately
fronting the direction of Tej Singh’s advance. There was now a pause—the
army quietly waiting the expected attack of the Sikh sirdar. Most of our
guns were now without, or nearly without, ammunition, only a few rounds
of grape remaining. Near the village to the left of the large square
were several Sikh ammunition-carts, and the Commander-in-Chief directed
the artillery to seize as much of the enemy’s ammunition as time would
admit of, to replenish the exhausted boxes. But unfortunately most of
the guns, being on the right of the square, were too far removed to
avail themselves of this opportunity. The three guns, however, which
were in the angle, procured each some fifteen or sixteen rounds, which
proved of material assistance. Meantime the Sikh line under Tej Singh
continued to advance. At length, when he had arrived some six hundred
yards from the British position, Major Brind’s troop in the village, and
the three guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade in the angle of the square,
opened upon the enemy, and drew down a furious cannonade from some forty
field-guns. Those of our guns which were on the right of the square,
besides being short of ammunition as before mentioned, were placed with
their left flank towards the enemy, and therefore could not, even had
they ammunition, take part in the conflict. From their position they
suffered much from the enfilading fire of the enemy, as did also the
regiments on that side of the square. For some twenty minutes, the few
guns which we had opposed to the enemy kept up this unequal contest.
Whilst the Sikh artillery were playing upon our position, the sirdar
appeared to be gradually crossing our front. It was about this time that
the Commander-in-Chief changed the front of the line, bringing a portion
of it within shelter of the village. The fire of the artillery on our
side now entirely ceased. Major Brind, who had been in the village with
two troops, was directed to join the entire mass of the artillery which
was on the extreme right, in column with the cavalry—as did also the
three guns of the 4th troop of the 3rd brigade, which had expended all
their ammunition, including that which they had captured from the Sikhs.
But by this time the Sikh fire was gradually lessening, and the sirdar
appeared to be withdrawing from the field.

It was after the change of front had been effected, and whilst the
artillery and cavalry, in a mass of contiguous columns (the cavalry on
the right, left in front), were moving round the right of the village,
that orders were given to the latter to form line to the right
preparatory to charging. The cavalry accordingly, whilst the artillery
halted, moved forward in line, and made a demonstration against the
enemy—which was the last offensive movement made on either side.

During this movement of the cavalry, the artillery halted, to be able,
if necessary, to support the former. But on the cavalry re-forming and
again forming column, the march was resumed, and orders[101] were
received by the senior officer, Brigadier Harriott, to escort the whole
of the field-artillery into Ferozepore for the purpose of refilling
their ammunition-boxes. But the action was now entirely over, and the
Sikh sirdar was making the best of his way towards the river.

In this action the artillery lost 31 killed, including officers; and 77
wounded (exclusive of lascars, &c.). Major D’Arcy Todd had his head
carried away by a cannon-shot on the 21st; Captain J. F. Egerton, at the
time attached to the quarter-master general’s department, was cut down
on the 22nd, near the village of Ferozepore, whilst carrying a message.
He lingered more than a month under very severe sabre-cuts, and died on
the 23rd of January, 1846. 1st Lieutenant P. C. Lambert, a very
promising young officer of horse-artillery, was killed by a cannon-shot
on the 22nd. The wounded officers were Captain W. K. Warner, commissary
of ordnance (slightly), Captain M. Mackenzie, brigade major (slightly),
1st Lieutenant R. M. Paton (slightly), and 1st Lieutenant E. Atlay
(slightly).

The artillery had several pieces disabled at different periods of the
action, and some six or seven limbers or waggons were blown up.

The exhaustion of the ammunition with the field-artillery at
Ferozeshuhur was a matter of too pregnant and suggestive a nature to be
lost, in the way of warning, upon the sagacious practical mind of the
Governor-General, who, soon after the conclusion of the war, addressed
himself to the remedy of the evil which had threatened such serious
consequences during the campaign. It was obvious that the guns had gone
into the field with a scanty supply of ammunition, and that the Indian
system, which allowed a smaller number of rounds than is sanctioned by
the regulations of the royal army, was unequal to the exigencies of such
trying service.[102] To remedy this for the future, it was recommended
by Lord Hardinge, that there should be allotted to each gun of every
troop and battery, whether a 6–pounder or a 9–pounder, two
ammunition-waggons, giving to each 6–pounder 224 rounds, and to each
9–pounder 168 rounds. One waggon, it was proposed should always be close
at hand with each gun in action, and the other in reserve, the whole
supply of ammunition being under the charge of the officer commanding
the troop or battery. The Military Board, whilst concurring in the
expediency of the proposed increase of ammunition, suggested that the
six waggons with the troop or battery, should be under the charge of the
officer commanding; and the six spare waggons in magazine, a proposal
which was readily concurred in by the Governor-General.

On the 24th of December the army moved to Sultan-Khan-Wallah, and
thence, in a few days, to Hurruff, with an advanced division at
Mulloowal. On the 1st of January the army was again brigaded. Colonel
Gowan, C.B., was appointed to the command of the artillery division;
Captain Edward Christie was nominated deputy assistant adjutant-general;
Captain Warner, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. H. Maxwell, deputy
assistant quartermaster-general (originally appointed at Wudnee).
Lieutenant-Colonels Biddulph, Brooke, and Dennis, were appointed
brigadiers; with Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and Lieutenant Kaye, as
brigade majors. Great exertions were now made, in anticipation of the
renewal of the struggle, to strengthen our ordnance force, especially by
the addition of a siege-train. To the artillery formerly specified were
accordingly added three troops of horse-artillery from Meerut, and one
from Muttra—the 1st troop 2nd brigade, under Captain Turton—the 2nd
troop 2nd brigade, under Major Grant—the 3rd troop 2nd brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander; and the 2nd troop 3rd brigade (two guns of
which had been previously with the army), under Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane;—also, the 1st company 4th battalion, under Captain Waller, with
twelve 9–pounder iron guns, reamed out to 12–pounders, and drawn by
elephants, with some reserve companies of the 3rd and 6th battalion,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The horse-artillery from Meerut, and
Captain Waller’s guns, joined the army early in January, and the
remainder at a later period.

On the 12th of January the head-quarters of the army changed ground to
Bootawallah, with its extreme flanks resting on Mukkoo and Attaree. On
the 13th and 14th there was an interchange of a few distant rounds
between the British and Sikh artillery, which led to no results. On the
18th, a force under Sir Harry Smith was detached towards Dhurrum Khote.
The artillery which accompanied this division, consisted of the 1st and
3rd troops of the 2nd brigade, and No. 6 horse field-battery, under
Colonel Lawrenson. The 1st troop 1st brigade, under 1st Lieutenant J.
Mill, followed with Brigadier Wheeler, who was sent to the reinforcement
of Sir Harry Smith, but did not take part in the affair of Buddowal. It
was on the 21st that this incident occurred, in which the artillery
assisted in covering the retirement of Sir Harry Smith to Loodianah. A
few store-carts, which were in the rear with the baggage, fell into the
hands of the enemy.

A week after this, the battle of Aliwal was fought. Reinforced by a body
of troops under Brigadier Wheeler, which joined the division on the 26th
of January, Sir Harry Smith made his arrangements to attack the enemy’s
position at daybreak on the 28th. “My order of advance,” writes the
general, in his well known despatch, “was the cavalry in front, in
contiguous columns of squadrons of regiments; two troops of
horse-artillery, in the intervals of brigades: the infantry in
contiguous columns of brigades, at intervals of deploying distance;
artillery in the intervals, followed by two 8–inch howitzers, on
travelling carriages, brought into the field by the indefatigable
exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, horse-artillery.” About 10 o’clock
the enemy’s batteries opened on our advancing columns, and the action
soon became general. All arms distinguished themselves greatly on this
memorable occasion:—“Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s and Captain Turton’s
troops of horse-artillery, under Major Lawrenson, dashed almost among
the flying infantry, committing great havoc, until about 800 or 1,000
men rallied under the high bank of a nullah, and opened a heavy but
ineffectual fire from below the bank.” “I immediately,” adds Sir Harry
Smith, “directed the 30th native infantry to charge them, which they
were able to do upon their left flank, while in a line in rear of the
village. This native corps nobly obeyed my orders, and rushed among the
Avitabile troops, driving them from under the bank, and exposing them
once more to the deadly fire of twelve guns within three hundred yards.
The destruction was very great, as may be supposed, by guns served as
these were. Her Majesty’s 53rd moved forward in support of the 30th
native infantry, by the right of the village. The battle was won; our
troops advancing with the most perfect order to the common focus, the
passage of the river. The enemy, completely hemmed in, were flying from
our fire, and precipitating themselves in disordered masses into the
ford and boats, in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our 8–inch
howitzers soon began to play upon their boats, when the ‘debris’ of the
Sikh army appeared upon the opposite and high bank of the river, flying
in every direction, although a sort of line was attempted, to
countenance their retreat, until all our guns commenced a furious
cannonade, when they quickly receded. Nine guns were on the verge of the
river by the ford. It appears as if they had been unlimbered to cover
the ford. These, being loaded, were fired once upon our advance. Two
others were sticking in the river; one of them we got out; two were seen
to sink in the quicksands; two were dragged to the opposite bank, and
abandoned. These and the one in the middle of the river were gallantly
spiked by Lieutenant Holmes, of the 11th irregular cavalry, and Gunner
Scott, of the 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, who rode into the
stream, and crossed for the purpose, covered by our guns and light
infantry.”

The highest praise has been bestowed by Sir Harry Smith on the
artillery, for its conduct throughout these operations,—“The guns
literally being,” he says, “constantly ahead of everything.” “I would
beg,” he continues, in his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, “to call
his Excellency’s marked attention to Major Lawrenson, commanding the
artillery; in Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, Captain Turton, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, the service has officers of the very first
order; and I am equally satisfied with Captain Boileau, in command of
the 9–pounder battery, and with Lieutenant Mill, in charge of four light
guns. The two 8–inch howitzers did right good service, organized,
equipped, and brought into the field by the exertions and determination
to overcome all difficulties of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, equally well
served and brought forward always with the infantry by Lieutenant
Austen.” Lieutenant Tombs, who was present as acting aide-de-camp to the
general, also received the thanks of Sir Harry Smith.

In this engagement the artillery lost 3 men and 30 horses, _killed_; 15
men and 9 horses, _wounded_; 5 men and 12 horses, _missing_.

We come now to the crowning action of Sobraon. It was on the night of
the 7th of February that the long-expected siege-train arrived from
Delhi, with four companies of foot-artillery, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The Commander-in-Chief, overjoyed by this
accession to his strength, determined upon the immediate attack of the
enemy’s intrenched position. But short time was allowed to the artillery
to prepare ammunition for the heavy ordnance. On the 8th, the artillery,
which had been detached with Sir Harry Smith, rejoined head-quarters: on
the 9th, the plan of operations was sketched out for the following day.
A little before midnight the heavy ordnance moved out of camp to the
advanced position of Rodawallah, there to be joined by Brigadier
Ashburnham’s brigade of infantry, to which was added the 62nd foot,
which, owing to some mistake, did not reach that post till near
gun-fire. The following account of the Sikh intrenchments and of the
plan of attack is taken from the _Calcutta Review_:—

“The Sikhs had taken up one of the falsest positions possible; viz. with
their rear resting on the Sutlej; yet, by dint of much labour, some
foreign science, and the ingenuity natural to a military people, they
contrived to convert it into one of the strongest fortifications against
which troops were ever led;—being nothing less than a series of vast
semicircular intrenchments, the outer one of which was two miles and a
half from end to end, and three quarters of a mile in depth; the whole
surrounded by a deep ditch and ‘bristling’ with sixty-seven pieces of
artillery. A bridge of boats united this formidable camp to another on
the opposite bank of the Sutlej; where also were planted some heavy
guns, whose range swept easily across the river.

“Sir Hugh Gough’s plan of attack was as follows:—The heavy guns were to
commence operations by a cannonade upon the intrenchment, into which,
crowded as it was with upwards of 30,000 men, their fire was expected to
carry confusion and dismay. Sir Robert Dick’s division, on the extreme
left of the British line, was then to advance and storm the right, or
western corner of the Sikh position; General Gilbert’s division on the
centre, and Sir H. Smith’s division on the right, were simultaneously to
make false attacks, with the view of diverting the enemy’s attention
from the real attack of Sir Robert Dick. Brigadier Cureton, with a
brigade of cavalry and a troop of horse-artillery, was directed to
threaten the ford of Huríkí Puttun, about a mile distant from the
eastern corner of the intrenchment, on the opposite bank of which the
enemy’s cavalry were posted.

“Agreeably to this plan, at about 7 o’clock A.M., the artillery opened;
the fog rolled off as it were a curtain, and the surprised Khalsa at
once heard and saw that the avenger had come upon them. In an instant
the Sikh drums beat to arms; and many rounds had not been fired from the
British guns before an answering thunder from the intrenchment told that
the works were manned and the struggle had begun.”

Owing to the delay above mentioned, it was not until a little after
sunrise that the heavy guns were placed in position. Opposite the
enemy’s centre was a mortar-battery, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood. On the prolongation of the right flank of the enemy’s
intrenchment, at a distance of 1,300 yards, were placed three batteries
of heavy ordnance—six 18–pounders under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Lawrenson—six 10–inch howitzers under Brigadier Dennis—and eight 8–inch
howitzers under Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite. Further to the left of
these batteries, and slightly in advance, were the rockets, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes; Brigadiers Biddulph and Brooke superintended
these batteries; the first on the right, the second on the left. The
attack was commenced by Major Grant’s howitzer-troop. The surprise was
most complete. The Sikh position, which up to this time had been wrapped
in profound silence, now became a scene of uproar and commotion. Their
drums beat to arms; and they began to busy themselves in preparations
for the engagement. The 12–pounder reamers, manned by the men of the 5th
troop 1st brigade, under the command of Captain Day, were the next to
open. These, after a short interval, were followed by the heavy
batteries. Then, to use the words of the Commander-in-Chief’s despatch,
“The whole of our artillery fire was developed. It was most spirited and
well directed. I cannot speak in terms too high of the judicious
disposition of the guns, their admirable practice, or the activity with
which the cannonade was sustained; but notwithstanding the formidable
calibre of our iron guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way
in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have
been visionary to expect that they could, within any limited time,
silence the fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of
earth, plank, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered either by
redoubts or epaulements, or within a treble line of trenches.”

As already mentioned, but a short time had been allowed for the
preparation of ammunition for the heavy guns; to this and to the great
distance at which they were posted from the enemy’s works, is to be
attributed their inability to silence the Sikh fire. But the practice
both of guns and rockets was considered highly effective. It had been
proposed by the commanding officers of artillery, to place the guns in
battery nearer the enemy’s intrenchments; and had this been done, some
satisfactory results might have been obtained.[103] But the
Commander-in-Chief was unwilling to hazard the delay which the formation
of the necessary parapets would have occasioned. Hence, at the time when
Sir Robert Dick, who was on the extreme left, was ordered to advance to
the attack, the ammunition of the heavy guns had been well nigh
expended.

“The attack,” says the writer in the _Calcutta Review_, “was led by
Brigadier Stacy with her Majesty’s 10th and 53rd regiments, and the 43rd
and 59th native infantry, supported on the flanks by Captains Horsford’s
and Fordyce’s batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s troop of
horse-artillery. Beyond all comparison this was the finest attack of the
campaign. The artillery galloped up and delivered their fire within 300
yards of the enemy’s batteries, and the infantry charged home with the
bayonet, and carried the outworks without firing a single round.”—“a
forbearance,” says the Governor-General, “much to be commended, and most
worthy of constant imitation.” As it was the finest attack, so also did
it meet with the most determined hand-to-hand resistance which the
Khalsa soldiers had yet opposed to the British. Like lightning, the real
plan of the attack seemed to flash on the minds of all the desperate men
in that intrenchment; and, disregarding the distant feints of Gilbert’s
and Smith’s divisions on their left and centre, they rushed to the right
to repel the real danger that was upon them. In vain, Stacy’s brigade
tries to withstand the mass which every moment is growing denser; in
vain, Wilkinson’s brigade comes up to the support; in vain, Ashburnham’s
reserve swells the furious tide of the assault. It was like the meeting
of two mighty rivers, one swifter and one deeper than the other;—and as
the swifter for a moment penetrates its duller neighbour’s stream, then,
yielding to the overpowering waters, is rolled back and swept away; so
would the conquered trenches of the Sikhs have been wrested again from
the brave division of the British, had not Sir Hugh, with the intuitive
quickness of a general’s eye, marked the crisis and the struggle,
foreseen its issue, and ordered up Gilbert’s and Smith’s divisions to
the rescue. They advanced; the enemy beheld it, and, returning
tumultuously to the posts they had abandoned, poured upon these new
enemies, from every foot of the intrenchment, a destructive fire of
grape, round shot, and musketry. In spite, however, of a loss,
unprecedented in so short a time,—Sir H. Smith’s division losing 489,
and General Gilbert’s 685 men, in about half an hour, these two
indomitable divisions persevered in storming what proved to be the
strongest part of the enemy’s position; and the intrenchment being thus
carried by the British at three different points, the gunners, who drew
their swords when they could no longer fire, were bayoneted beside the
guns they had so murderously served,—while the cavalry and infantry,
driven from three sides into a confused and disordered mass, but
fighting to the last, were inch by inch forced to retreat where alone
retreat was possible. Preferring death to surrender, they recklessly
plunged into the river. The bridge, of which they were so proud, and to
which they had so confidently trusted, broke down under the first party
of flying horsemen, and became impassable; while the Sutlej, having
risen seven inches in the night, had flooded the ford. “In their efforts
to reach the right bank,” says the graphic narrative of the
Commander-in-Chief, “through the deepened water, they suffered from our
horse-artillery a terrible carnage.[104] Hundreds fell under this
cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the
perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay, were
such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous
conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of the
action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mangling
every wounded soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune
of war left at their mercy.” “Sixty-seven pieces of cannon, upwards of
200 camel swivels, numerous standards, and vast munitions of war,” were
left in possession of the victors.

The loss of artillery in this action was not very severe; Lieutenant
Faithfull, of the 1st troop 2nd brigade, was killed by a cannon-shot.
Major Grant was wounded in the arm. The total of killed and wounded in
the different troops and batteries, was (_killed_), 1 European officer,
3 rank-and-file, 3 syces, and 17 horses; (_wounded_), 1 European
officer, 1 sergeant, 33 rank-and-file, 5 lascars, 5 syces, and 23
horses.

The following officers were especially named by the
Commander-in-Chief:—Brigadiers Gowan, Biddulph, Brooke, Denniss; Captain
Christie, deputy assistant adjutant-general; Captains Pillans and
Warner, commissaries of ordnance; Lieutenant Maxwell, deputy assistant
quartermaster-general; Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and Lieutenant Kaye,
brigade majors; Lieutenant-Colonels Wood, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander,
and Lane; Majors Lawrenson, Grant, Brind, and Campbell; Captains Day,
Turton, Swinley, Fordyce, Horsford, Waller, and Lieutenant Holland.

It should be mentioned in this place, that, on the death of Major
Broadfoot, the political agent on the north-western frontier, Major H.
M. Lawrence, of the artillery, then political agent at Catmandoo, was
summoned from Nepaul to take charge of our relations with the Punjab,
and to execute the congenial policy of the Governor-General. The summons
was responded to with remarkable despatch, and, within a fortnight from
its receipt, he had joined the camp of the Governor-General. He was
present at the battle of Sobraon.

We subjoin here a complete list of the honours conferred on the
artillery:—

To be A.D.C. to the Queen:—Lieut.-Col. Gowan, C.B.

To be Lieut.-Cols.:—Majors F. Brind, G. Campbell, H. M. Lawrence, C.
Grant, and G. S. Lawrenson.

To be Majors:—Captains H. Garbett, R. Horsford, E. F. Day, G. H.
Swinley, J. Fordyce, W. S. Pillans, F. Boileau, R. Waller, and E.
Christie.

To be Companions of the Bath:—Lieut.-Cols. Biddulph, Brooke,
Denniss, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander, Lane, Lawrence, and
Lawrenson.

Immediately after this action, the British army crossed the Sutlej, and
marched upon Lahore. Indeed, the firing had scarcely ceased, when the
Governor-General despatched a staff officer to Khoondah ghaut, directing
Sir John Littler to commence the passage of the river at that point.
Captain Garbett’s troop of horse-artillery and two native infantry
regiments were ferried across the Sutlej, and thus, both banks being in
possession of the British army, an excellent bridge of boats was thrown
across, and the passage of the river was effected without opposition.
Thus closed the first Sikh war—one of the most memorable and glorious in
the annals of our eastern empire. Upon the history of the subsequent
treaties, this memoir need not enter. In April, 1846, the greater part
of the army returned to India, leaving a strong body of troops to occupy
Lahore.

CHAPTER XI.

In accordance with the treaties entered into with the Sikh government,
the Jullundur Doab, and the hill country immediately bordering upon it,
became a portion of the British territory. Within the latter stood the
celebrated fortress of Kote Kangra, the killedar of which refused to
deliver up possession of the place to the British authorities, declaring
that, unless the Maharajah Runjeet Singh himself appeared before the
gates, he would not surrender the keys. “The fort of Kangra is one of
those which is strong from its position: it is built near the conflux of
the Bub Gunja with the Beeas; and is bounded, for the most part, by
precipices nearly perpendicular; and where the declivities are less
formidable, the aid of masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render
the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable under European
engineers. * * * The occupants of the fort were believed to amount to
about 500, principally Akalis, and their guns were said to be ten in
number.”[105]

It now, of course, became necessary to reduce this fortress to
subjection. Accordingly, a force, under Colonel Wheeler, was sent
against it. It consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th native
infantry, with a wing of the 63rd, and a siege-train composed of three
18–pounder guns, two 8–inch howitzers, and six mortars, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, with Captain Swinley’s troop (3rd troop 1st
brigade), and Captain Fitzgerald’s (2nd company 7th battalion), and
Captain Christie’s (4th company 6th battalion) batteries. The march was
one of the most arduous character. It seemed impossible that heavy guns
could be transported up the precipitous defiles which led to the fort.
“With our heavy guns,” writes an officer of the force, “we had to cross
the river Gooj no less than fifty-six times between the Beeas and Kote
Kangra; and the last day we crossed it, rain having fallen on the hills,
it swelled to a roaring torrent. Frequently the guns got completely
fixed between enormous boulders of rock, so as to defy all the ingenuity
both of artillery officers and engineers; when the united strength of
men, horses, and bullocks, aided by two elephants dragging had failed,
one fine old mukhna (a male elephant, with tusks like a female) was
always called for. Coming forward with an air of pitying superiority—his
look seeming to express clearly, ‘What! can’t you do it without me?’ he
would look carefully at the gun in every direction, and when he had
found the point where his power could be best applied, he put his head
to it, and gave it a push, as if to weigh the opposition; then followed
another mightier push; and if that did not suffice, a third, given with
tremendous force, almost invariably raised the gun out of its fixed
position, and sent it on. He would then retire with the air of
Coriolanus, when he said to Aufidius, ‘Alone I did it!’—a more valuable
ally than Coriolanus, because he said nothing, and was always willing.”
Such, indeed, were the difficulties of the march, that the enemy,
believing that our heavy ordnance could never be brought under the walls
of the fort, determined to hold out. The same opinion of the
impracticability of the road was entertained by many of our own
officers. “The brigadier,” says the writer above quoted—Colonel Jack, of
the 30th native infantry—“was recommended to leave his 18–pounders on
the other side of the river Beeas; he, however, determined to take them
on as far as possible, and, by extraordinary management and exertion, he
succeeded in taking them all the way. They turned out, as the Europeans
quaintly remarked, to be the really influential _politicals_.”

On the 25th of May this tremendous march—one of which it has been
rightly said, that it “reflects everlasting credit on the artillery”—had
been successfully accomplished. Preparations were commenced for the
erection of batteries and the planting of the guns in position; but
siege operations were rendered unnecessary by the unconditional
surrender of the fortress. A portion of the artillery force, including
the heavy guns, remained at Kote Kangra throughout the greater part of
the year, being finally withdrawn in December. The return march of the
heavy ordnance was little less difficult than the ascent; but on this,
as on the former occasion, the elephant-draught was found to be
admirably adapted to the required service. “From the experience of this
march,” says Lieutenant Clifford in an elaborate report, “I am
satisfied, that from their intelligence, docility, and strength,
elephants are admirably adapted for the draught of heavy ordnance
through a mountainous country; and I doubt whether the heavy guns could
possibly have been taken up to Kangra and back without the assistance of
these animals; for though bullocks answered sufficiently well for the
draught of carts and lighter carriages, the number requisite to move a
siege-gun could not have been used at many of the windings and
declivities met with during this march, to say nothing of the difficulty
of guiding bullocks over narrow, dangerous roads, in which the elephants
appeared to show a sense of the necessity of caution. Throughout the
march, ten elephants were immediately attached to the four guns; viz.
two in draught with each piece, accompanied by two spare.”

The year 1847 was one of almost uninterrupted tranquillity. During the
first quarter of the following year little occurred to break the quiet
that reigned in the Punjab; but in the month of April, affairs began to
wear a more threatening aspect. The refusal of Moolraj, the Dewan of
Mooltan, to give up that fortress to the British officers commissioned
to transfer it to the hands of another chief, and the murder of those
officers (Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson) by the people of the
garrison, led, in the course of that year, to the celebrated siege of
that stronghold. Before, however, we dwell upon this important event, it
should be mentioned that, in the month of May, some disturbances having
been created in the Manjha country by a Sikh Ghooroo (Bhaee Maharaj),
two guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade (which had marched from Loodianah
to Lahore early in the month), under Lieutenant A. Bunny, accompanied
the detachment sent in pursuit of the rebels; and subsequently, the
entire troop, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, proceeded on a similar
service.

The operations of Lieutenant (now Major) Edwardes having brought him
before the walls of Mooltan, it became matter of discussion between the
Commander-in-Chief and the Resident at Lahore (Sir F. Currie),[106]
whether a regular force should be sent against the fortress at that
time, or delayed to a later period. Eventually, the Resident took upon
himself the responsibility of ordering the advance of the force; and
Major-General W. S. Whish, commandant of the Lahore division, an old and
experienced artillery officer, proceeded in command of it.

The artillery with this force was commanded by Major Garbett. Lieutenant
J. Mill was appointed major of brigade. The 4th troop of the 1st
brigade, under Captain Murray Mackenzie, marched down with the Lahore
column, along the left bank of the Ravee. The 4th troop 3rd brigade,
under Captain John Anderson,marched with the Ferozepore column along the
right bank of the Sutlej. The 2nd company 2nd battalion, the 3rd and 4th
companies of the 3rd battalion, and the 6th company 7th battalion, under
the command of Major E. F. Day, went by water down the Sutlej with the
heavy ordnance. Lieutenant Peter Christie was appointed commissary.
These details set out towards the close of July. The land column reached
Mooltan before the end of August. On the 4th of September the
siege-train arrived. On the 5th, General Whish, in the name of the
Maharajah and the Queen of England, called upon the garrison to
surrender. No answer being returned to the summons, the engineer
officers were called upon to submit their plans for the attack of the
place. It was finally determined to commence regular siege operations;
and on the morning of the 7th, the first parallel was commenced. It had
previously been in contemplation to attempt the seizure of the place by
a coup-de-main; and on the 6th, our mortar batteries had commenced
playing on the town. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, there was some slight
skirmishing. At daybreak on the 10th, some of our guns were got into
position, and a tolerably heavy fire was maintained throughout that day.
On the following day orders were issued for an attack upon a position
which the enemy maintained in advance of the city. The column named for
this service was accompanied by 4th troop 1st brigade of
horse-artillery, under Captain Mackenzie. The attack took place on the
morning of the 12th, and was highly successful, though attended with
considerable loss. Among the officers wounded, was Lieutenant Bunny, of
the horse-artillery: General Whish had a horse shot under him. This
successful attack placed all the defensible points on this side the city
in our hands, and by enabling the heavy guns to be advanced to within
600 yards of the city walls, would have considerably shortened the
operations of the siege, but the defection of Shere Singh, which took
place on the 14th, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. This
circumstance, combined with other causes, the most prominent of which
was the numerical inefficiency of the force employed to carry on the
various duties of the siege, embracing the formation of trenches and
batteries, the protection of the camp and lines of ammunition, as well
as the thorough investment of the place, induced the general most
unwillingly to suspend operations until the arrival of reinforcements
should enable him to proceed with the siege.

In the meanwhile the standard of revolt had been raised in the countries
beyond the Indus, and on the banks of the Chenab. The Sikh troops at
Bunnoo had mutinied and murdered their officers; and Chuttur Singh, a
chief of considerable note, headed the insurrection in the Hazareh.
Towards this point the eyes of Shere Singh were directed. He was the son
of Chuttur Singh, and after his defection, did not long remain with
Moolraj, but marched northward to join the rebels, taking with him 5,000
men, 12 guns and howitzers, and 80 zumbooruks. It was now no longer an
isolated case of rebellion in remote provinces. The whole Sikh nation
appeared to be rising up in arms against us. The very troops which had
been despatched by the Durbar to assist General Whish in his operations,
had joined the insurgent force, and it was doubtful whether we had a
single friend, Sikh or Mahomedan, in the country. It became necessary,
therefore, to take the field on a more extended scale, and the
Commander-in-Chief determined to place himself at the head of the army.

It was thus that in vain General Whish applied to Simla for
reinforcements. All the available troops were required for the campaign,
which appeared inevitable, on the Chenab. Accordingly orders were sent
to the Bombay Government to afford the necessary assistance. Here for a
time we must quit that division of our army, and follow the movements of
the Commander-in-Chief.

In October, 1848, orders were issued for the assembly of the army of the
Punjab, under the personal command of Lord Gough; Brigadier Tennant was
nominated to the command of the artillery, with the rank of
brigadier-general; Brevet-Captain Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd
brigade horse-artillery, was appointed deputy assistant
adjutant-general; Lieutenant H. Tombs, deputy assistant
quartermaster-general; Captain Hogge, commissary of ordnance, and
Lieutenant P. Christie (with General Whish at Mooltan), deputy
commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts was subsequently
nominated aide-de-camp to the brigadier-general. Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooke, C.B., 2nd brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant C. V. Cox, his
adjutant, were respectively appointed brigadier and brigade-major of
horse-artillery; and Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, C.B., 1st brigade
horse-artillery, and Lieutenant E. Kaye, his adjutant, were nominated to
the same situations in the foot-artillery.

The artillery division was constituted as follows: Head-quarters and 4th
troop (at Mooltan) 1st brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters and 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 4th troops 2nd brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters,
1st, 2nd, and 4th troops (at Mooltan) 3rd brigade horse-artillery; 1st
company 1st battalion (No. 10 horse field-battery); 3rd company 1st
battalion (No. 17 horse field-battery); 2nd company 2nd battalion (at
Mooltan); 3rd and 4th companies 3rd battalion (at Mooltan);
head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies 4th battalion; 2nd company
7th battalion (No. 6 horse field-battery); 3rd company 7th battalion
(No. 5 horse field-battery); and 6th company 7th battalion (at Mooltan).

The several components of the army crossed the river Sutlej near
Ferozepore, at different times—the majority during the month of October,
or early in November; but some of the corps and the artillery train,
with No. 6 field-battery, and some reserve companies, did not move
across the bridge till the middle of November. Brigadier Huthwaite was
intrusted with the equipment and preparation of the train and park, and
all arrangements regarding a plentiful supply of ammunition.

Some regiments of cavalry and troops of horse-artillery had been early
pushed forward, under command of General Cureton; and Brigadier-General
Campbell followed him across the Ravee with his division of infantry and
some field-batteries. The Commander-in-Chief followed with General
Gilbert’s division.

At the time that our troops crossed the frontier, the Rajah Shere Singh
was in force on both banks of the Chenab, with his advanced parties
pushed forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally even to
the banks of the Ravee. These, however, fell back before the advancing
columns under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell, and the Rajah
abandoned the town of Ramnuggur, and placed the principal part of his
force on the right bank of the river, but still holding the left with
large masses of cavalry, and some smaller bodies of infantry. The town
of Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two
miles from the river, from which it is divided by a low tract of waste
_cander_ land, subject to occasional inundation, and intersected by a
few easy nullahs. Nearly midway between the town and the river was a
small but dense grove of trees, around which hovered the advanced bodies
of the Sikh army.

On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell were
within an easy march of Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined
by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day the first collision took
place between the army of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere
Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to the loss of some
valuable lives without any corresponding advantages to ourselves. Lord
Gough was on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General
Campbell was that day in command. However, as the work was entirely
confined to the cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was the
actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to drive Shere Singh
completely across the river. The Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned,
hovering between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry and two troops
of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s) were pushed forward rapidly to
dislodge them. The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far in
advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled with Sikh infantry, and
were received with a heavy musketry fire, which caused them considerable
loss. Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish, and also
the brave old General Cureton. Nor was this all; one of our troops of
horse-artillery (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the
river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries, and was
compelled to retreat with the loss of a gun, which stuck against the
bank of a nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the unpropitious
commencement of the campaign. The Sikhs were certainly compelled to
confine themselves to the right bank, but no doubt the same object might
have been gained without so great an expenditure of life.

Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery, and Penny’s
brigade of infantry, were moving up as rapidly as possible. After
crossing the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main road for the
purpose of attacking a fort of some strength, called Jhubber, into which
a rebel sirdar, Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he
proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two guns of No. 6
field-battery, with small detachments of infantry and irregular cavalry,
proceeded in advance against the fort, while the main body followed. The
garrison, however, refused to surrender to the nine-pounders, and the
walls were too strong for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight
of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw open their gates,
and yield themselves prisoners. Some small pieces of ordnance were
captured in the fort, which, together with the neighbouring village,
were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.

On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance, anxiously awaited by Lord
Gough, joined head-quarters at Ramnuggur, and that very night several
pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and also farther to the
right and higher up the stream, while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all
the cavalry, Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of
horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up the stream to find
a ford whereby to effect a passage, and so turn the enemy’s
position.[107] This Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine
miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell found himself under the
necessity of moving nearly as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect
the passage. This of course occasioned considerable delay.

On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of shots between our
batteries and those of the enemy on the opposite bank; but the distance
was too great to allow of any effect being produced. On the night of the
second, our batteries were advanced to within 400 yards of the river’s
edge; but in the morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn back a
great part of his camp, though he had left some batteries near the
river, between which and ours some desultory firing took place. In the
afternoon heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river. This was
Thackwell, who had been attacked while resting after several long
marches.

There was nothing more than a cannonade from either side. Shere Singh
tried to dislodge Thackwell, but could effect nothing by his fire,
while, on the other hand, he himself was soon driven from the field by
three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 1st
troop 3rd brigade, under Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two
field-batteries (No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of No. 10
under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no pursuit; being ignorant of the
strength of the enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops being
somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become more closely engaged. The
enemy suffered considerably, but our loss was trifling, and principally
in the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10 heavy field-battery,
was severely, and Lieutenant J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade
horse-artillery, slightly wounded.

As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered by the
indefatigable General Gilbert, as he rode from our batteries to the
river’s edge, that the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A ford
was immediately sought for, and soon discovered; Thackwell, reinforced
from head-quarters,[108] pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered
a thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider it prudent to
follow them. He accordingly encamped at Hailah, his camp equipage and
baggage having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur. About the 8th or
9th he was again reinforced. The remainder of the horse-artillery, under
Brigadier Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17 heavy
field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the 1st company 4th brigade with
four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C.
Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly all the force; two
brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s
battery (No. 6), and the park, being all now left at head-quarters. His
camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive and for the most part
uncultivated plain. In his front was the broad belt of jungle before
mentioned, which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks of the
Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into the Dooab. At the further edge
of this belt lay Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the
western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank being at
Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards the river. After the 5th
December, each force remained inactive for a considerable period, save
that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties of horse through the
jungle, who annoyed Thackwell by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.

On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed across the river,
head-quarters, Mountain’s brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular
cavalry (with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left at
Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his staff, crossed the Chenab,
and were then joined by No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant
Robertson. On the 1st January, the head-quarters force moved to Janu-ke
(about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah), when the artillery train and park
joined from Ramnuggur, at which place a bridge-head had been
constructed, armed with two 24–pounders and the guns of No. 6 heavy
field-battery.

On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under Madwell changed ground,
and effected a junction at Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road
from Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance of the Chenab. Here
it was supposed that the force would remain for a considerable time, and
no doubt such was the original intention; but Attock, long defended by
the gallant Herbert, fell, and Chutter Singh was known to be in full
march to join his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson, the
Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the
advisability of overthrowing the latter before reinforced by his father.
His lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels, readily
consented: he reviewed his army, ordered up two corps of native infantry
from Ramnuggur, on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee, and on
the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.

The strongest part of the enemy’s position was supposed to be his left,
at Russool, on the extremity of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the
river Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee was pretty free
from jungle, but along the base of the sand ridge, and in front of the
whole of the Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering all
military operations (especially movements of cavalry or artillery) most
difficult and hazardous; and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It
was Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool with his right
(Gilbert’s division), while General Campbell should operate upon
Lallianwallah and Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much counter
advice offered to him on the night of the 12th, that he was induced to
forego his intention of attacking the enemy on the following morning.
The force, however, marched from camp on the 13th, and the line of
contiguous columns at first bore steadily down towards the enemy, the
right directed on Russool. After a time, the right was brought more
forward, so that the direction of our march became parallel to the
enemy’s line, and Lord Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s
department to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going too
near the enemy, and, at the same time, without the necessity of
retracing our steps towards Dhingee. This was somewhat difficult, as the
army had just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao, between
which and Chillianwallah there was no water. At Chillianwallah, on a
mound, or small hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of this,
however, we were not aware, till a small party of our cavalry came upon
it unexpectedly, and was fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was _forced_ to
fight the action on that day.

Our cavalry (with exception of 3rd and 9th irregulars, under Hearsay,
our rear-guard) was divided between the two extreme flanks. Gilbert’s
division formed the right wing, Campbell’s the left, and Penny’s brigade
was in reserve.

The 1st troop 2nd brigade, 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 2nd troop 3rd
brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, were with the cavalry on the
right; Captain Dawes’s, H.F.B. (No. 17), was with Gilbert; No. 5,
H.F.B., and three guns of No. 10 (the other three guns being on
rear-guard), were, under Major Mowatt, with Campbell. The 2nd troop 2nd
brigade, 4th troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were under
Lieutenant-Colonel Brind. The heavy guns (consisting of six 18–pounders
and four 8–inch howitzers), under Major Horsford (the respective
batteries commanded by Majors Ludlow and Sir R. C. Shakespear), were in
the centre of the line. These were all drawn by elephants, which were,
however, exchanged for bullocks before the action commenced. Brigadiers
Brooke and Huthwaite were, with their respective brigades, on the march,
but during the action with the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. The army
moved in line of contiguous columns of brigades, at first directed
towards the enemy’s position, but subsequently changing front to the
left, parallel to the Sikh line, our right towards it. As soon as the
Sikh post on the mound at Chillianwallah had been discovered, line was
formed from the columns. The outpost was of course soon driven in; after
which, Lord Gough again changed front,—to his right this time, so as to
bring our front again opposite the Sikh line. The army halted, arms were
piled, and the quarter-masters proceeded to mark out ground for
encampment. But the Sikhs, determined to bring matters to an issue under
cover of the jungle, brought up some light pieces, and fired upon us. As
it was evidently impossible to encamp within reach of their guns, which
the denseness of the jungle enabled them to move up unobserved by us,
and as we could not encamp elsewhere from want of water, without
retracing our steps, which would have borne too much the appearance of
retreating, Lord Gough was _compelled_ to fight, and that, too, under
peculiar disadvantages, as he knew little or nothing of the ground in
his front, nor did the thick jungle admit of his reconnoitring. He was
forced, too, to abandon his original plan of attacking Russool, as we
had now got opposite their centre; the enemy, too, had frustrated all,
by moving out of their position into the jungle in front of it.

The enemy’s position was a very extensive one, and Lord Gough was forced
to lengthen his own line. The consequence was, that our left and right
wings were at a considerable distance apart. The cavalry on the right
was divided into two parties; the one under Brigadier Pope comprised the
14th dragoons, a wing of the 9th lancers, the 1st light cavalry, and a
wing of the 6th; with these were Huish’s troop (1st troop 2nd brigade)
and half of Christie’s (3rd troop 2nd brigade), under Colonel Grant.
Further to the right, and somewhat to the rear, so as to cover the right
flank of our army, were a wing of 9th lancers and a wing of 6th light
cavalry, with Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade), and half of 3rd
troop 2nd brigade, under a subaltern. To the left of Brigadier Pope was
Gilbert’s division, with Dawes’s battery; and left of these again the
heavy guns. Campbell’s division and the remaining cavalry, with which
were three troops of horse-artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind,
were far removed to the left, and could not be seen from the centre of
the line. The action commenced with the heavy guns. It would have been
well had they had the battle to themselves a little longer. They
produced soon a very considerable effect on the enemy’s fire. In the
words of the Commander-in-Chief, “After about an hour’s fire, that of
the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to
justify an advance. I then ordered my left division to advance.”
Campbell soon became closely engaged. Lord Gough then deemed it
necessary to push forward his right wing, and the heavy guns were
ordered to cease firing. The Commander-in-Chief soon received
intelligence of a great misfortune having happened to Pennycuick’s
brigade (one of Campbell’s division)—the 24th regiment of foot
especially suffered severe loss.[109] The other brigade, consisting of
61st foot and two native corps, had, however, made a more successful
advance. The reserve under Penny was now ordered forward to support
Gilbert’s division; but this consisted of but two native regiments (one
having been left on rear-guard). Sir W. Gilbert’s division, well
supported by Dawes’s brigade, met with but little loss, with the
exception of the 30th and 56th native infantry, which corps suffered
severely. But further on the right, Pope’s brigade of cavalry, and the
horse-artillery under Colonel Grant, were driven back with much loss.
The cavalry, it seems, had formed line on the right of the guns, and
were then ordered to advance through the jungle. From some unexplained
causes, they had only just come within sight of the enemy, when the
brigade—notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to stop the
movement—retreated, not, however, without loss, for the Sikh cavalry
hung closely on their heels. Unfortunately, the men did not retreat
directly to the position from whence they had advanced, but, obliquing,
came in front of the guns (some of which were unlimbered) and galloped
through them, the Sikhs mixed up with them, or close behind; so that our
men could not fire without slaying our own cavalry. The consequence was,
many of the gunners were cut down at their guns, and six of the pieces
fell into the enemy’s hands (two were afterwards recovered by Lieutenant
C. Cookworthy, of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, who, after the action, took
limbers and horses, and sought for his division). Major Christie
received several severe sword and spear wounds, of which he died on the
15th. The other three guns and the cavalry retreated through the jungle,
until they reached an open space, near which stood the Chief and his
staff. Here the guns drew up, and the cavalry rallied, with the
exception of a small party, which continued its flight as far as the
field hospital, established on the mound near Chillianwallah.

The Sikh cavalry, who had followed in pursuit, halted at the edge of the
jungle, and a few rounds from our remaining pieces soon forced them to
retire. Colonel Lane, who commanded on the extreme right, had also been
attacked by cavalry, but he had repulsed them with a grape fire from his
guns. Meantime our cavalry and artillery on the left had made a
successful advance, and Campbell, at the head of the 61st foot and some
native infantry, had swept all before him, taking several batteries.
Gilbert too, in his advance, had overthrown everything, capturing a
great quantity of ordnance. The enemy was everywhere driven from his
ground and forced back upon his positions, and our troops, somewhat
shattered, remained in possession of the field. But night had now come
on, and, seeing the great loss that we had met with, the difficulty of
the ground, and that our men were weary and exhausted, the
Commander-in-Chief, after consultation with Campbell, considered it
expedient to bivouac on the edge of the jungle, at the foot of the mound
at Chillianwallah. Unfortunately, this caused the loss of nearly all the
guns which we had taken from the enemy—most of them were recovered by
them in the night—four of our own too, were carried off, and we secured
only thirteen of the enemy’s. Whether the Sikhs claimed the victory, or
whether it was in exultation at the trophies gained—some colours besides
the guns—or whether it was merely to inform their friends that they
still held Russool, they fired a salute that night from the summit of
the ridge.

Our loss in this action was severe. Of the artillery, Major Christie, as
before mentioned, died of his wounds, as also did Lieutenant Manson, of
the 4th troop 2nd brigade; Captain Dawes and 1st Lieutenant Dundas were
wounded. The total loss of _killed_ was 2 serjeants, 14 rank-and-file, 1
lascar and 1 syce; _wounded_, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank and file,
8 lascars, and 1 syce; _missing_, 2 rank and file, and 6 syces.

The morning of the 14th set in wet and gloomy, and the Chief then issued
orders to pitch camp upon ground marked out immediately in rear of the
mound, fronting the enemy’s position. Whatever intentions Lord Gough may
have half-formed of resuming the attack on the 14th, the heavy fall of
rain which commenced that evening and continued during several following
days, induced him to abandon them. He immediately set about
strengthening his position, and the sad task of collecting and burying
his dead. And so the British and Sikh armies sat down in sight of each
other, with scarcely four miles of ground between their respective
camps.

Such was the battle of Chillianwallah; a victory, certainly, insomuch as
we remained in possession of the field of battle; but a failure,
inasmuch as Lord Gough did not accomplish his object—to drive Shere
Singh across the Jhelum, and to completely overthrow him before Chuttur
Singh could form a junction with his son.

A month of inactivity succeeded. Our position was a bad one; it covered
no road, did not protect the country in our rear, nor guard our
communications; neither did it in any way confine the enemy. Our
communication with Dhingee was exceedingly precarious; supplies and
forage, as well as water, were scarce. We should have felt the want of
the latter severely, had it not been for several heavy falls of rain,
which filled some dry hollows. As considerable reinforcements were in
progress to join Shere Singh, it seemed not at all improbable that he
might venture to attack us in our camp. The Commander-in-Chief therefore
strengthened our position as much as possible. A good deal of jungle
which might conceal the enemy’s designs was cut down; several trenches
were dug in front of the line, to afford temporary protection to
picquets; the heavy ordnance was placed in battery at the mound to sweep
all the ground in front,—and subsequently, a square redoubt was erected
to strengthen our right flank, which approached the sand-ridge, and was
more liable to attack than any other part. This redoubt was at first
armed with some spare field-pieces, drawn by bullocks, but afterwards by
the 3rd company 2nd brigade horse-artillery,[110] to which Captain
Kinleside, of No. 5 heavy field-battery, had been appointed—Major Ludlow
succeeding him in command of the battery. The right flank of our camp
was thrown back nearly at right angles. In it were two troops of
horse-artillery under Colonel Grant. Fordyce’s troop (2nd company 2nd
brigade) of 9–pounders was at the angle, and afterwards placed in a
small battery a short distance to the front. Dawes was in the front face
with Gilbert, sending out two guns on picquet; the heavy ordnance at the
mound; No. 5, with Campbell’s division near the village; No. 10, in rear
with Penny. Beyond the village were three troops of horse-artillery
under Colonel Brooke (when the 3rd troop 2nd brigade was removed to the
redoubts, the number with him was reduced to two). Our left, beyond the
village, was slightly retired in an oblique direction. The park was in
rear of the mound. As the enemy became stronger and more threatening,
several changes took place. The whole of the left was thrown back so as
to unite the village of Mojawalla in rear of camp—with the front face,
and our right flank was also connected with the village by a rear
face—thus our camp formed an irregular quadrilateral figure, or
rhomboid, and four pieces of heavy ordnance were placed near Mojawalla.
But it was some time before our camp had assumed this form.

The enemy almost daily received accessions of strength. Chuttur Singh
joined the Sikh force, and salutes were common in their camp. Reports
were frequent of their intention to attack, but little credit was given
to them. The Chief, however, considered it prudent to be prepared; half
the men, and latterly all, were ordered to sleep in their clothes, and a
signal (three guns from the mound) was agreed upon, at which all the
troops should turn out. The enemy occasionally made some demonstration.
Sometimes his whole line turned out, but more frequently he brought
small parties into the jungle, below Russool, and then attacked our
right wing, which was frequently on the alert. But the Sikhs gave us the
greatest annoyance by capturing our baggage-cattle. This they did
frequently, and we were obliged to send out very strong parties of
cavalry to protect them. Our horse-artillery, too, had very fatiguing
work, guns being frequently out with detachments sent to protect convoys
of grain, &c. These had to make long, harassing marches, and latterly it
became necessary to send out parties of cavalry and horse-artillery to
reconnoitre the country in our right rear.

Thus wearily passed the time, news from Mooltan being most anxiously
looked for. At length we had the pleasure to fire a royal salute for its
capture and to discuss the circumstances of the successful siege. What
those circumstances were, should be here briefly recorded:—On the 26th
of December the Bombay troops joined General Whish under the walls of
Mooltan. The force now amounted to 17,000 men, with sixty-four pieces of
artillery. The time for renewed action had arrived, and Whish was ready
to commence operations. Indeed, on the morning of the 26th, before the
Bombay division had come up, he had issued an order, expressing his hope
that within twenty-four hours after their arrival, “all the enemy’s
posts that are a requisite preliminary to the commencement of a regular
attack on the citadel,” would be carried; and in the course of the
following day they were in our possession. In these operations, four
guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain
Anderson, and four guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade, under Captain
Mackenzie, were engaged; the former with the centre column, and the
latter with the right column. On the following day Whish, reporting
these operations to the adjutant-general, wrote, “I hope to-morrow
morning to have an 8–inch mortar-battery of six pieces playing on the
citadel, at five or six hundred yards’ distance.”

On the 30th the general reported that our batteries were in full play,
and that already a shell from a mortar, laid by Lieutenant Newall, had
exploded the principal magazine in the citadel. Whish had been with the
rocket troop at Hatrass, when the great magazine had been blown up
there, and now he wrote that the sight of the Mooltan explosion was
“awfully grand, and precisely similar to that at the siege of Hatrass,
on the 1st of March, 1817.” “I hope,” he added, “that the consequence
may be the same; in which case the enemy would abandon the fort
to-night; otherwise I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow.” The
batteries at this time in operation, as reported in the general’s
letter, were six 8–inch mortars, three 10–inch ditto, four 5½-inch ditto
(opened on the 28th), six 18–pounders (opened on the Kooneeh-Boorj), two
8–inch mortars, two 10–inch ditto, and two 24–pounders (with the mortars
in the first line, opened on the 29th). Five more 8–inch mortars were
then laid down.

Seldom or never in any part of the world has a city been exposed to such
a terrific shelling as the doomed city of Mooltan. The well served
ordnance did tremendous execution upon both houses and inhabitants; and
soon the ruined streets were choked with the mutilated bodies of the
dead. The effect was highly creditable to the skill of both artillery
and engineers. On the first day of the new year (1849) the breaches in
the city walls appeared to be practicable, and the assault was fixed for
the following day. It was on the 2nd of January that the city of Mooltan
was carried by the British troops. The gallantry of the infantry column,
on this occasion, will never be overlooked by the general historian; but
it does not come within the scope of this memoir to record it. Mooltan
was carried at the point of the bayonet, but the citadel still remained
in the hands of Moolraj.

The batteries now, therefore, opened again, with tremendous effect, on
the fortress. The possession of the city had enabled Whish to advance
his guns, and he had erected new batteries of heavy ordnance to bear
upon the citadel. On the 7th a battery of seven 18–pounders was
completed and armed, and a mortar battery for three 10–inch howitzers.
On the 8th a battery for six 24–pounders and six 18–pounders was
commenced. “The object of this battery,” wrote the general, “is to keep
down the fire of the citadel opposite to it, and eventually to breach at
the north-east angle.” On the following day a shell from the enemy’s
position ignited the seven 18–pounder battery, which was constructed of
fascines and sand-bags, and burnt it down, in spite of every effort to
extinguish the flames. The engineers in the mean time were sapping up to
the foot of the glacis; and the enemy, alarmed by our near approach,
were thinking of making terms for themselves. The interior of the
citadel had become a ruin; and further resistance was, indeed, hopeless.
The garrison declared that they could no longer hold out against the
terrible shelling, which was destroying them. Moolraj was at the last
gasp. All his efforts to rally his followers were in vain. They told him
that he must either sally out at the head of his men and cut his way
through the besiegers, or abandon his post and trust himself to the
clemency of the victors. So the Dewan began to sue for terms. The answer
of the British general was, that nothing would satisfy him but an
unconditional surrender. So on the morning of the 22nd of January the
garrison laid down their arms, and Moolraj came into the British camp.

The operations had lasted nearly four weeks, throughout which time the
artillery were continually engaged—keeping up an incessant fire of shot
and shell, from guns, howitzers, and mortars—first upon the city, and
then upon the citadel of Mooltan. The practice is admitted to have been
excellent. It was, said General Whish, with the enthusiasm of an old
artillery officer, “the theme of admiration with all.”[111] The officers
of the Bengal division especially named in his official despatch were
Majors Garbett and Day; Captains Daniel, Anderson, Master, and
Mackenzie; Lieutenant Mill (brigade-major), and Lieutenant Peter
Christie (commissary of ordnance).

The following officers were present at the siege of Mooltan:—

_Majors_—H. Garbett, E. F. Day; _Captains_—J. H. Daniell, J. Anderson,
E. V. Master, M. Mackenzie; _Lieutenants_—W. Hay, G. Moir, F. W.
Swinhoe, F. Alexander, H. Francis, R. Mecham, D. J. Newall, A. Bunny, W.
Miller, J. F. Raper, J. Thompson, H. T. Bishop; _2nd Lieutenants_—F. R.
Debudé, J. Hunter, C. T. Graham, F. C. Simons, M. C. Sankey, J. G.
Worthington, W. F. Quayles, E. W. Day;—Lieutenant John Mill,
brigade-major; Lieutenant P. Christie, commissary of ordnance;
Lieutenant W. K. Footes, brigade quarter-master.

In the course of the operations, the casualties in the Bengal artillery
amounted to 1 European officer (Lieutenant James Thompson), 2 havildars,
and 10 rank and file, _killed_; with 4 European officers (Lieutenants
Bunny, Hunter, Sankey, and Graham), 3 havildars, and 62 rank and file,
_wounded_. These include all the casualties since the raising of the
siege. Lieutenant Bunny was wounded in September, and Lieutenant Sankey
in November, 1848; the other two officers in the course of the January
siege.

Before quitting the subject of these memorable operations, we must
insert the following memorandum of the artillery practice at Mooltan, by
Lieutenant Newall, which affords much interesting information relative
to the details of the siege:—

“During the siege of Mooltan, the Bengal artillerymen were so few,
that it was found impossible to afford a relief in the batteries
without withdrawing gunners from the troops of horse-artillery. A
relief, however, was thus effected daily between 3 and 4 P.M., which
was found the most convenient hour, as it afforded time to the
relieving officer to ascertain his range, &c. before nightfall, and
to prepare and fix his ammunition for expenditure during the night.
It was convenient, also, for the men in other respects.

“In the howitzer batteries, it was the practice to receive the
charge ready weighed out from the magazine; but in the mortar
batteries the charges were invariably weighed out in battery. The
bursting charges of all shells were received in battery ready
weighed out in small bags, and the shells were always filled by
means of a funnel, and fuzes prepared and set by means of a
fuze-bench in the battery. Live shells were never sent down to
battery from the magazine, as no advantage in point of time was to
be gained thereby, the preparing of shells being found in the hands
of expert men to fully keep pace with the working of the ordnance.
The practice was thus rendered very much more satisfactory, as the
length of the fuze could be altered according to circumstances; such
as the variation of strength of powder, which was found to be most
dependent on the state of the weather, and even of the ordnance,
which as the day advanced would gradually warm, contracting the
dampness of the powder, and rendering necessary an alteration in the
length of fuze. The effects of the howitzers employed in breaching
was a subject of satisfaction and astonishment to all; indeed it is
doubtful whether the natural mounds of the fort would have been
practically breached without their aid. Even against the brickwork
their effects were conspicuous. These shells, made to burst at the
moment of contact with the walls, afterwards during their passage
through the revêtement, and ultimately with a longer fuze in the
earth beyond it, would probably (against such masonry) have alone
effected practicable breaches without the assistance of heavy guns.

“At a distance of 150 yards, both the 8–inch and 10–inch howitzers
were employed in breaching a scarp wall, part of which was invisible
from the battery, and only reached by a plunging fire, obtained by
very small charges, and succeeded admirably. At a distance of
thirty-five yards, 8–inch howitzers were similarly employed with a
charge of 8 oz., a very low velocity being requisite to prevent the
shell from burying itself too far in the soft earth. Of the effects
of the vertical fire, nothing could have afforded a clearer proof
than the ruinous appearance presented by the interior of the fort on
its surrender; and the explosion of the great magazine, which took
place within one hour of its site being indicated to the batteries,
was a subject of congratulation to the Bengal artillery employed,
bearing testimony as it did to the accuracy of their practice.

“On the 9th January, 600 shells were fired from an 8–inch mortar
battery of six pieces in twenty-four hours, and the mortars did not
suffer. No new feature, however, presented itself from the
employment of these pieces, nor from that of the heavy guns, which,
however, vied with the mortars and howitzers in utility. Doubtless
it is by a judicious combination of the three that such powerful
effects are produced,—but it may be worth inquiring whether, in the
siege-trains employed against fortresses in the East, built as they
generally are of old and often crazy materials, a greater proportion
of howitzers might not be used with advantage, in cases where no
particular object exists to curtail the transport of the shells,
which is doubtless great. In addition to what has been above stated
of the effects of these most useful pieces in mining the defences
and in counter-battery, which was conspicuous throughout the siege,
it may be remarked that one shell was often found sufficient to
silence the fire from an embrasure of the enemy for a whole day.
Rack-lashing platforms were used by the Bengal artillery throughout
the siege for the guns and howitzers, and were found to answer most
satisfactorily, and the small Bengal mortar platforms, consisting of
three sleepers, upon which seven strong planks, each four feet long,
were pegged transversely, were made up in the park, and thus taken
down to the batteries, where they were expeditiously laid, and stood
the firing both of the 8–inch and 10–inch mortars without renewal
during the siege; the only difference being, that from the 10–inch
mortars other sleepers were laid transversely beneath, to prevent
the platforms sinking.”

Having now reduced Mooltan, and captured the Dewan, General Whish
determined to move forward, with all possible despatch, to reinforce the
Commander-in-Chief. Leaving, therefore, a British garrison in Mooltan,
he commenced his march, with the head-quarters, on the 29th January; an
advanced brigade, with a troop of horse-artillery, having broken ground
two days before. The main body of the Bengal division was accompanied by
a siege-train of twelve pieces. The march which he then accomplished,
though it has been unaccountably slurred over in the published papers,
is one of the most memorable upon record. It was not only distinguished
by the energy and rapidity which marked the general’s movements, but by
its effect upon the issue of the entire campaign. Had not Whish, with
his leading column, reached Ramnuggur, as he did, on the 13th of
February, Shere Singh would have ravaged the Rechna Doab, and the
campaign would have been a long and desultory one.[112]

Whilst the troops under the Commander-in-Chief were patiently awaiting
the coming of General Whish, which would enable them to resume the
offensive, the enemy seemed at one time inclined to become the
assailant, but by some unaccountable freak of madness chose to abandon
his strong position, and take to the open country. His probable object
was more readily to procure food. In the second week of February, about
half the Sikh army changed ground to its left, and took possession of
the Khuri defile, running through the sand-ridge. His advanced parties
held Noor Jumal and Dingee, and occasionally even the villages of Burra
and Chota Omrao, between our camp and Dingee. They were now on both
sides of us; but as our camp was now formed, we were well prepared for
an attack. On the 11th, the signal-guns were fired, and our whole army
turned out. The enemy was threatening us on both sides; but to our rear,
his line had advanced from Khuri, even beyond the villages of Omrao, and
could be plainly seen at the edge of the jungle from Mojawalla. Cavalry
and horse-artillery were sent out to meet him on this side. The former
threw out a chain of videttes, which the Sikhs did not attempt to break.
It was not Shere Singh’s object to attack us in camp, but to draw us out
into the jungle. After a demonstration of about four hours, the Sikhs
withdrew into their camps.

Early on the morning of the 12th, it was discovered, to our surprise,
that the enemy had abandoned his position at Russool. His rear-guard was
then quickly leaving the sand-ridge. On the 13th, he withdrew also from
Khuri. At first we were rather perplexed to ascertain in what direction
he had proceeded, but it was soon ascertained that his march was towards
Goojerat. Thus he had completely turned our right flank, and our
remaining at Chillianwallah was consequently no longer prudent; but, on
the contrary, there was the utmost need that we should make a
corresponding movement, as it seemed to be the design of the enemy to
cross the Chenab, and march straight upon Lahore. Luckily this was
frustrated. On the 15th, the army marched to Lussooria, which we had so
fruitlessly quitted only a month before. From this it had been intended
to cross the river at Ramnuggur, and endeavour to outstrip the enemy in
the race to Lahore. But, fortunately, General Whish had now reached
Ramnuggur, and, seeing the danger, should the enemy be able to cross the
Chenab, he pushed forward the 53rd foot (which had come out from
Lahore), with two guns of No. 6 field-battery, and some other troops, to
guard the fords near Wuzeerabad, and Markham’s brigade, with two guns of
4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery,—those lower down. Thus Shere
Singh was foiled, and his army remained encamped near the town of
Goojrat, the centre of a richly-cultivated province.

From Lussooria our army moved towards the enemy, slowly, to enable the
Mooltan troops to join. On the 16th, they marched to Sadoolapore; on the
17th, to Kunjur; and after a halt, they reached Shahdiwaol on the 20th.
By this time all Whish’s force had joined, except Markham’s brigade, and
two guns—4th troop 3rd brigade—watching the fords. The brigade, however,
crossed before the action.

The accession of strength in artillery which Whish brought us, was as
follows:—4th troop 1st brigade horse-artillery, under Captain M.
Mackenzie; 4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery (2 guns absent), under
Captain J. Anderson; a troop of horse-artillery of the Bombay army (the
horse field-battery of Bombay was on rear-guard duty), and four
18–pounders, and four 10–inch howitzers, under Major Day.

Our march from Lussooria had been through most beautiful cultivation. We
had marched in a line of contiguous columns, encamping in the same
order.

On the 21st, our artillery was thus disposed:—On the extreme right,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Warner’s troop, 1st troop 3rd brigade
(attached to Lockwood’s cavalry brigade), with Whish’s division;
Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s troops, under Major H. Garbett, with
Gilbert’s division; Fordyce’s troop, and Dawes’s battery.

In the centre, Major Horsford; four 18–pounders and two 8–inch
howitzers, under Major Sir R. Shakespear; two 18–pounders, and two
8–inch howitzers, under Captain J. D. Shakespear.

Major Day; two 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain
Master; two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers under Captain Austin.

On their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Kinleside’s and Lane’s
troops, with Campbell’s division—No. 5 (Major Ludlow’s), and 10 (under
Lieutenant Robertson), horse field-battery, commanded by Major Mowatt,
with the cavalry on the extreme left,—Huish’s and Duncan’s troops.

This time we had everything in our favour—a beautiful, level, open
country, with no obstructions, a richly-cultivated plain, dotted with a
few villages and trees. It was a bright sunny day: before nine the
action was commenced. The enemy’s camp was close to Goojrat, but he
moved out about a mile to oppose us, occupying the villages of Burra and
Chota Kalrha, in front of his centre and left. But we were not aware at
first that he had any troops in them. As soon as he perceived our line,
he fired three signal-guns. Our line then halted, while the
Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred and made his dispositions. But little
delay was, however, necessary—all was so clear—and we had marched from
camp in battle order. The action soon commenced.

“At half-past seven o’clock,” says the Commander-in-Chief, in his
official despatch, “the army advanced with the precision of a parade
movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which
exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I
halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my
artillery, covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the
enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed.[113] The Sikh guns were
served with their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and resolutely
maintained its position. But the terrific force of our fire obliged
them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back.”

In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, General Gilbert says,—“Having
received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to
show their position, I immediately advanced a troop of horse-artillery
(Fordyce’s), and Dawes’s field-battery, which constantly drew a very
heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy
had established on either side of the village of Kalrha, by which they
were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light
companies, were still further pushed forward. The heavy guns on our
centre at this time opened a very destructive fire.”

Of the artillery with his division, General Whish observes,—“Both troops
(Anderson’s and Mackenzie’s) began a spirited cannonade, and continued
it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour,
until the enemy’s guns in our front were silenced.”

Nos. 5 and 10, light field-batteries, were attached to the infantry
division, under General Campbell. Of these, the General writes:—“I
cannot find language to express my sense of the calm, steady, and
admirable manner in which these two batteries were commanded and worked
by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow, and
Lieutenant Robertson. The infantry of the 3rd division had not occasion
to fire a shot. The enemy were driven from their different positions,
and from the field, by the fire of these two field-batteries, aided by
that of the Bombay troop.”

In the meanwhile, Huish’s and Duncan’s troops on the left, and Warner’s
on the right, acted in conjunction with the cavalry on our flanks. Of
the former, General Thackwell thus writes:—“To oppose the enemy’s guns,
I ordered Captain Duncan to move his troop of horse-artillery to the
front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600
yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish’s
troop, and both did considerable execution upon the enemy. These troops
[the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers] made a most
brilliant charge upon the enemy. At the same time I advanced the guns
and cavalry towards the enemy’s line. The fire of the guns soon put the
Gowcherras to retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on the
right, caused their whole force to seek safety in flight.” Brigadier
Lockwood says:—“At the commencement of the action, I directed Captain
Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy near a village in
our front. But as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I
changed position, left back, and the horse-artillery ceased firing. The
enemy’s horsemen now appeared in great force on our right, threatening
to turn our flank. So I changed front to the right. Captain Warner’s
guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them; but
they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular
cavalry moved round by a circuitous route and got completely into our
rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns, with a squadron of
the 16th dragoons, who, in conjunction with Major Christie’s corps of
irregular cavalry, drove them off. About this time a large _gole_ of
horse came on towards me, but as they turned at once from the fire of
the guns, I refrained from advancing after them.”

The two troops of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Colonel Brind were in
reserve at the commencement of the action, but soon afterwards were
brought to the front, for the purpose of enfilading one of the enemy’s
batteries.

After detailing the attacks on the villages of Burra and Chota Kalrha,
which were taken in the most spirited manner by Brigadiers Penney and
Hervey, Lord Gough continues, in his published despatch: “The heavy
artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up
successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had
retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the
horse-artillery and light field-batteries, which I strengthened, by
bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse-artillery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general
superintendence of the whole of the horse-artillery), broke the ranks of
the enemy at all points.”

The battle was now over, and the pursuit commenced, the whole of the
horse-artillery accompanying. The action was almost entirely an
artillery fight. For about two hours and a half that arm alone was
engaged. It was before the terrible fire of eighty-eight guns that the
Sikh army abandoned the field.

In his official despatch, the Commander-in-Chief thus writes:—“To
Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm, the artillery,
to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious
victory of Goojrat, I am indeed most grateful. Conspicuous as the
artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over the
enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown
than in this battle. The heavy batteries manœuvred with the celerity of
light guns; and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious
selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed fire of
the troops of horse-artillery and light field-batteries merit my warmest
praise.”

At the two villages alone were the infantry seriously engaged. Penney’s
(late Godby’s) and Hervey’s brigades were sent to take them, and were
somewhat surprised to find them occupied by some considerable parties.
Our left wing scarcely fired a shot. The cavalry was hardly engaged at
all. The Scinde horse made one charge. All the horse-artillery suffered
severely, especially the 4th troop 1st brigade, the 2nd troop 2nd
brigade, and the 4th troop 3rd brigade. Captain Anderson, of the
last-mentioned troop, was killed, as was also Lieutenant Day, of No. 10
horse field-battery.

The artillery loss was greater than that of any other branch in
proportion to its numbers.

The artillery division lost in _killed_, 2 officers, 1 sergeant, 20 rank
and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, and 3 syces; _wounded_, 1 European
officer (Sir Richard Shakespear), 1 native officer, 4 sergeants, two
trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, and 7 syces:
_total_, killed and wounded, 111.

The enemy did not attempt to rally at the town of Goojrat, as it was
supposed they would, but fled precipitately at once, leaving camp,
baggage, and a vast quantity of material and artillery in the hands of
the victors. It was almost to be regretted that they did not wait on
their ground a little longer; their loss, except in the two villages,
was from the artillery alone, and they suffered but little that
afternoon in the pursuit.

The broken Sikh army fled across the Jhelum, with a few hundred Afghan
cavalry, who had left their mountains, hoping for some opportunity to
avenge themselves on their old enemies. Sir W. Gilbert, with two
divisions of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, was ordered in
pursuit.

The artillery branch consisted of the 2nd troop 2nd brigade and the 4th
troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, Blood’s troop horse-artillery,
Dawes’s horse-battery, the Bombay horse brigade, and four reserve
companies, with a well-equipped train, adapted to elephant-draught, the
whole under Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., with Brigade-Major Kaye as his
staff officer. The brilliant success which attended Gilbert’s rapid
pursuit is well known. No further opportunity was given to our troops to
gain distinction in the field. The march was an arduous one, the country
most difficult, especially for heavy ordnance; but perseverance overcame
all. The Sikhs soon saw the futility of further opposition; the sirdars
surrendered,—their army was disarmed, and disbanded at Hoormuch and
Rawul-pindee,—and Gilbert drove the Afghans across the Attock, and into
the rugged mountains of the Khyber; and thus ended the second Sikh war.

The under-named artillery officers were mentioned in general orders:—

Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Tennant; Lieutenant
Olpherts, A.D.C.; Captain Abercrombie, D.A.A.G.A.; Brigadiers
Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigade Majors Kaye and
Cox; Captain Hogge, commissary, and Lieutenant Christie,
deputy-commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant-Colonel Grant; Majors
Garbett, Horsford, Day; Lieutenant-Colonel Brind; Major Mowatt;
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B.; Majors Ludlow, Fordyce; Captains J.
D. Shakespear, F. K. Duncan, L. P. Master, R. R. Kinleside, A.
Huish, Major Sir R. Shakespear; Captains E. G. Austen, M. Mackenzie,
W. K. Warner, M. Dawes; Lieutenants A. Robertson, H. Tombs (deputy
assistant quartermaster-general), E. B. Johnson (deputy
judge-advocate-general).

The following honorary distinctions were conferred:—

To be a Knight-Commander of the Bath.—Major-General Whish.

To be Commanders of the Bath.—Colonel Tennant, Lieutenant-Colonels
Grant, Brind.

To be Lieutenant-Colonels.—Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day, Mowatt,
Ludlow, Fordyce, Sir R. Shakespear.

To be Majors.—Captains J. D. Shakespear, Duncan, Master, Kinleside,
Huish, Austen, Mackenzie, Warner, Dawes, Hogge, Abercrombie.

Also to be Majors on promotion to Captains regimentally.—Lieutenant
E. Kaye, C. V. Cox, A. Robertson, P. Christie, H. A. Olpherts, H.
Tombs, E. B. Johnson.

Brigadier-General Tennant was subsequently created a K.C.B.

In commemoration of the victories of the Punjab, a medal was struck, of
which the following is a transcript:—

[Illustration]

A vote of thanks was passed by both Houses of Parliament and by the
Court of Proprietors to the armies engaged in these operations, and the
eminent services of General Whish and Brigadier Tennant, of the
artillery, were especially named. To the splendid working of the
artillery the highest military authorities in the country mainly
attributed the brilliant termination of the war: and we know not how
this record of the services of the corps can be more fitly brought to a
close than with the following well-merited tribute paid to the artillery
by Lord Hardinge in the House of Lords, on the 24th of April, 1849:—

“It was, it appeared, to the skilful employment of the artillery that
they were indebted for this victory; and great as the result had been
with so small a loss of men, he (Viscount Hardinge) felt that that arm
of the service was most admirably conducted on that occasion. This
argued most admirable conduct on the part of the artillery; and it
would appear, by most of the accounts received, that so effectually
had this arm of the service been employed, that the Sikh artillery,
though managed as usual with great bravery, was, notwithstanding all
their efforts, perfectly silenced; so that it was not necessary for
the British infantry to fire in line, with the exception of two
regiments of Europeans and four regiments of Native Infantry. With the
exception of those regiments, not a regiment of their infantry fired a
musket-shot, so considerable was the service rendered by the Indian
artillery. That force was certainly a most splendid one, and second he
would say to none; and it had been mainly instrumental in obtaining
for Lord Gough one of his best and most splendid triumphs. The
statement made by his Lordship, in his despatch, was, that the heavy
artillery—eighteen-pounders—were actually manœuvred and handled with
the facility of field-guns. He (Viscount Hardinge) had seen the same
thing done with those eighteen-pounders during the campaign of the
Sutlej. Two elephants were harnessed to each eighteen-pounder, and
they carried the guns with the greatest facility over every sort of
ground without any assistance and without causing any delay or
impediment to the infantry. That practice was first resorted to in the
campaign of 1846, when the heavy guns were brought up from Delhi, a
distance of 300 miles, and were carried on every occasion without any
trouble, and he believed that had never before been seen in India. The
able officer who commanded the artillery in the late battle had been
mentioned,—he referred to Brigadier-General Tennant, who had been so
much praised by Lord Gough; and he (Viscount Hardinge) wished to say
that he had the honour of knowing him, and he was ably seconded by
another excellent officer. Seeing the great importance of artillery in
modern warfare, and seeing, also, that its value had been so signally
manifested in India, he would remind their Lordships at the same time
that a committee was sitting elsewhere to investigate the state of the
Ordnance Department; and he trusted that their Lordships would not
allow that valuable arm of the service, which took so much time to
create, and which when created was so valuable, to be reduced below a
scale of proper strength and efficiency. In Bengal alone, the regular
army had 200 pieces of artillery ready to be moved, comprising 120
nine-pounders, and the remainder three and six-pounders, and that was
exclusive of all the artillery that belonged to local and irregular
corps. Besides that, there was during the campaign more than 100
pieces of heavy artillery, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders,
actually on the Sutlej, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun. They
were all complete and ready for action, and all that was required was
the actual necessity for their movement. That was a state of readiness
that was very much to be admired, and he hoped they would never
consent to cripple that noble arm of their service.”

* * * * *

_Note to page 435._—It is stated at page 435, that a monumental column
was raised (at Dum-Dum) to the memory of Captain Nicholl and the
officers and men of the 1st troop 1st brigade, who perished so
gloriously on the retreat from Caubul. As this sheet is going through
the press, I learn that the column has been blown down during a
_typhaun_, and that it is the intention of the regiment not to restore
it, but to place, in its stead, a monumental slab in the Dum-Dum church.
I trust that I shall be pardoned for saying that I believe such a
resolution, if carried into effect, will be greatly regretted by many of
the relatives of the brave men to whom the column was dedicated, and by
some, at least, of the original promoters of the testimonial.—_Editor._

* * * * *

ERRATA.

In the preface, page x, line 4, _for_ “Sikhs crossed the Punjab,” _read_
“Sikhs crossed the Sutlej.”

Page 130, line 8 from bottom (Colonel Deare’s Epitaph), _for_ “Royal
Artillery,” _read_ “Bengal Artillery.”

Page 371, line 8, _for_ “G. R. MacGregor,” _read_ “R. G. MacGregor.”

Page 409, last line of text, _for_ “Walrek,” _read_ “Walker.”

ILLUSTRATIONS TO CHAPTER IV.

FIELD-CARRIAGES.

[Illustration:

No. 1.—_Page 164._]

[Illustration:

No. 2.—_Page 168._]

[Illustration:

No. 3.—_Page 172._]

AMMUNITION-WAGGONS.

[Illustration:

No. 5.—_Page 173._]

[Illustration:

No. 6.—_Page 174._]

ELEVATING-SCREWS.—_Page 176._

[Illustration:

Fig. 3]

[Illustration:

Fig. 4]

[Illustration:

Fig. 5]

[Illustration:

Fig. 6]

[Illustration:

Fig. 7]

[Illustration:

Fig. 8]

[Illustration:

Fig. 9]

SIEGE-CARRIAGES.

[Illustration:

No. 8.—_Page 179._]

COLONEL DUFF’S PATTERN.—_Page 179._

[Illustration]

[Illustration:

Nos. 10 and 11.—_Page 182._]

[Illustration]

[Illustration:

No. 12.—_Page 183._]

HARDWICKE’S PATTERN.—_Page 183._

[Illustration]

HORSFORD’S MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.—_Page 184._

[Illustration]

MOUNTAIN-TRAIN CARRIAGES.

[Illustration:

No. 14.—_Page 185._]

[Illustration:

No. 15.—_Page 186._]

[Illustration:

No. 16.—_Page 186._]

AMMUNITION-CARRIAGE (1823).—_Page 187._

[Illustration]

INDEX.

Abbott, A. Capt. 195;
Lieut. 386;
Capt. 415, 426, 432, 440, 442, 444, 445, 446, 451

—— J. Lieut. 386, 409, 411

Abercrombie, Sir Ralph, 229

—— Sir Robert C. C. 154, 156

—— Lieut. 407, 443, 446, 471;
Capt. 526, 571

Achmuty, Sir Samuel, 300

Adams, Major, 20, 23;
Col. 352, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359

Adamson, Lieut. 23

Addison, Lieut. 90

Agnew, Mr. 522

A’Hearne, Gunner, 448

Ahmuty, Lieut. 214

Aldercron, Col. 4, 8

Alexander, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 443, 444, 446, 451;
Major, 457, 462;
Lieut.-Col. 499, 503, 513, 514, 515

Allen, Sub-Lieut. 373

Amyatt, Mr. 19

Anderson, W. Capt. 195;
Lieut. 385;
Capt. 427, 437, 447, 448, 451

—— J. Lieut. 409;
Capt. 523, 550, 554, 561, 562, 564, 569

Archer, Lieut. 297

Armstrong, Lieut. N.I. 326

Ashburnham, Brig. 504, 510

Atlay, E. Lieut. 497, 483

Auckland, Lord, 394

Austen, Lieut. 468, 492, 504

—— E. G. 571

Austin, Capt. 455, 499, 514, 533, 562

Backhouse, Major, 185;
Lieut. 385;
Capt. 400, 413, 427, 431, 440, 441, 442, 446, 448

Baillie, Capt. 31, 39;
Major, 69;
Lieut.-Col. 70, 73;
Col. 84, 90

—— Lieut. 77, 82, 83, 84

Baker, Lieut. 156

—— O. Lieut. 327

Balfour, H. Lieut. 84, 150;
Capt.-Lieut. 214

Ball, Lieut.-Col. 290

Barr, Lieut. 413, 414

Barton, Lieut. 89;
Capt. 127, 159, 166;
Major, 204

Battine, Capt.-Lieut. 316, 334, 346;
Major, 385

Bayle, Lieut. 214

Bazely, 2nd Lieut. 386

Beagham, Lieut. 256, 284

Beatson, 217

Bedingfield, Lieut. 376

Begbie, Lieut. 378

Bell, C. H. Lieut. 322, 323

—— W. Lieut. 296, 357;
Capt. 385;
Maj. 407

Best, R. Capt.-Lieut. 246, 250, 255, 284

Biddulph, Capt. 371, 379, 455;
Lieut.-Col. 499;
Brig. 507, 514, 515

Biggs, Capt. 327, 345, 353;
Lieut.-Col. 385

Bingley, Lieut. 385

Bishop, Lieut. 554

Black, Lieut. 30

Blacker, Col. 354

Blaquiere, Col. 174

Blair, Col. 74

Blake, E. Lieut. 371

—— G. Lieut. 319, 345, 352, 354;
Capt. 385

Blood, Capt. 570

Blundel, Lieut. 89

Blunt, Sir Charles, 99

Boileau, Lieut. 283;
Capt.-Lieut. 303, 314;
Capt. 333

—— F. 2nd Lieut. 385;
Capt. 468, 503, 515

Bolton, Capt. 158

Bourchier, Lieut. 455

Boyce, Lieut. 69

Boyle, J. D. Lieut. 264

Bowie, Lieut. 479

Bradshaw, Major, 319

Brady, Lieut. 376, 378

Brind, F. Capt. 171;
Lieut. 376;
Capt. 455, 461, 462;
Major, 469, 483, 485, 492, 493, 494, 495, 514, 515;
Lieut.-Col. 538, 540, 541, 562, 567, 571

Briscoe, Lieut. 127, 151

Broadbridge, or }
Broadburn, } Capt. 15, 18, 19

Broadfoot, Major, 472, 473, 514

Brooke, Lieut. 214, 215;
Capt. 288, 289, 290, 314, 317;
Lieut.-Col. 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 499, 507, 514, 515, 527, 534,
538, 547, 567, 571

—— G. Lieut. 331

Brougham, Lieut. 436, 447

Broughton, Lieut.-Col. 261

Brown, B. Lieut. 371, 376;
Capt. 455, 462

—— Chas. Lieut. 146, 151, 156

—— Clement, Lieut. 119, 121;
Brev.-Capt. 231, 242, 250;
Capt. 260, 271, 272, 283, 284;
Major, 364;
Brig. 385

Brown, J. Lieut. 23

—— M. Lieut. 260, 284

—— Lieut. 89, 94

Browne, R. Lieut. 119, 214

Bruce, R. Lieut. 69;
Major, 153;
Lieut.-Col. 204

—— W. Lieut. 89

Buchan, Lieut. 134, 148, 151

Buck, Lieut. 17, 327

Buckle, Lieut. 376, 407;
Capt. 509

Bunny, Lieut. 522, 524, 554, 555

Burn, Col. 270

Burnett, Lieut. 31;
Capt. 147, 150, 200;
Major, 204

Burrington, Col. 158

Burroughs, W. 155

Burton, Lieut. 376

Butler, Lieut. 121, 146, 250;
Capt. 273;
Major, 302, 303, 333

Caldwell, Capt.-Lieut. 214;
Major, 296, 301

Cameron, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 300, 301, 302, 303

Campbell, A. 7

—— C. H. Lieut. 288;
Capt.-Lieut. 289, 314, 333

—— G. N. Lieut. 331, 373, 385

—— G. 455, 461, 462;
Brev.-Major, 468, 483, 513, 514, 515

—— Gunner, 282

—— Sir Archibald, 372, 379

Cardew, Lieut. 374

Carnac, Major, 19, 25;
Col. 73

Carne, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361

Carnegie, Lieut. 88;
Capt. 155;
Major, 204;
Col. 293

Cartwright, Capt. 317, 326, 331, 333

Cautley, Lieut. 386

Chesney, Lieut. and Adj. 316

Champion, Col. 26, 38, 39

Christie, A. Lieut. 432, 443, 449

Christie, P. Lieut. 454, 523, 527, 554

—— E. Capt. 499, 514, 515, 518, 533, 540, 543, 566

Clark, Lieut. 121;
Capt. 159

Clarke, E. Lieut. 150, 159;
Capt. 214, 228, 229

Cleland, Serg. 448

Clerk, Lieut. 386

Clifford, Lieut. 454, 521

Clifton, Capt.-Lieut. 29

Cochrane, Lieut. 16

Cockerell, Lieut.-Col. 121, 126

Collier, Capt.-Lieut. 214

Combermere, Lord, 383

Constable, Lieut. 89;
Capt. 246, 250, 284

Cookworthy, Lieut. 543

Cooper, Lieut. 409, 414, 428, 429, 447

Cornish, Lieut. 436, 449

Cotes, H. Lieut. 69

Coulthard, Lieut. 334;
Capt.-Lieut. 357, 361, 363

Counsell, Lieut 319, 363, 371

Cox, C. V. Lieut. 455, 479, 527, 571

Crabb, Major, 77, 78, 83

Cranch, Lieut. 121, 144

Cranell, Capt. 150

Crawford, Lieut. 318, 354, 355, 358, 359

Crommelin, Lieut. 334, 357, 358, 361

Cross, Corp. 280, 282

Crossdill, Lieut.-Col. 363

Croxton, Lieut. 319, 334

Cruikshanks, Lieut. and Adj. 317

Cureton, Brig. 506, 529, 530

Curphy, Capt. 385

Curtis, Lieut. 314

Cullen, Lieut. 107, 385

Daniell, Lieut. 378;
Capt. 554

Dashwood, F. Lieut. A.-D.-C. 385, 389;
Capt. 469, 475, 476, 478, 479

Davies, Major, 227

Dawes, Lieut. 409, 415, 426, 431, 440;
Capt. 444, 534, 538, 540, 542, 544, 547, 562, 564, 570, 571

Day, E. F. Capt. 409, 454, 468, 483, 507, 514, 515;
Major, 523, 554, 561, 562, 571

—— E. W. Lieut. 554, 569

Deare, C. Capt. 89, 99, 100, 130;
Lieut.-Col. 150, 151, 165, 167, 210

—— G. Lieut. 39;
Capt 99;
Lieut.-Col. 119, 121, 122, 126;
Col. 130, 134, 204, 209, 210;
Major-Gen. 211, 261

De Brett, Lieut. 318, 363

Debudé, Lieut. 554

Deckers, Lieut. 23

Delafosse, Lieut. 302, 303, 334;
Capt. 443;
Major, 446, 451

Delamar, Serg. 24

Denniss, Lieut. 327;
Lieut.-Col. 455, 470, 480, 483, 499, 507, 515

Dickson, Lieut. 334, 358

Dirom, Major, 137

Dixon, C. B. Lieut. 316

—— R. C. Lieut. 385

Don, Col. 264, 270

Douglas, Lieut. 89, 127, 141, 150, 154, 214, 443, 446

Dow, Lieut.-Col. 43

Dowell, Lieut. 121, 151, 154;
Capt.-Lieut. 260

D’Oyley, Lieut. 358, 361

Doxat, Lieut. 39;
Capt.-Lieut. 75

Drummond, Lieut. 119, 134, 151, 214, 231, 233, 245, 263

Duff, Lieut. 27;
Capt. 29;
Major, 47;
Col. 48, 100, 101, 135, 139, 140, 146, 148, 149, 150, 170,
179;
Major-Gen. 204, 209, 210, 242

Duncan, Lieut. 386, 409;
Capt. 562, 565, 571

Dundas, J. Capt. 296

Dunn, Lieut. 88, 151;
Capt. 214, 284

—— A. Lieut. 156, 214, 244, 245, 263

Dyke, Lieut. 374

Edwards, Lieut. 386

Egerton, Capt. 496

Elliot, Capt. 88;
Lieut.-Col. 95

Ellis, Lieut. 386

Ellwood, Capt. 150

Erskine, Lieut.-Col. 155, 214

Ewart, Lieut. 295, 385

Exshaw, Lieut. 89, 134, 150

Eyre, Lieut. 434, 435, 448, 463

Faithful, G. Lieut. 262, 288

—— H. Capt. 296

Faithfull, Lieut. 513

Farnabie, Lieut. 296, 298

Farrington, Capt.-Lieut. 296, 301, 302, 303, 385;
Lieut.-Col. 455

Fawcett, Lieut.-Col. 260, 265

Feade, Lieut. 121, 122, 123, 151;
Capt.-Lieut. 260, 265

Fenning, Lieut. 374

Ferris, Capt.-Lieut. 289

Fitzgerald, A. Lieut. 443, 446;
Brev.-Capt. 454, 518

Fleming, Capt. 30

Flemyng, Lieut. 90, 231;
Capt.-Lieut. 233

Floyd, Col. 129, 131

Footes, Lieut. 554

Forbes, A. Lieut. 69

Forde, Col. 15

Fordyce, T. D. Lieut. 295;
Capt. 317

Fordyce, Lieut. 334, 374

—— J. Capt. 468, 510, 514, 515, 547, 562, 564;
Major, 571

Forrester, Lieut. 285

Fortnham, P. Inf. Cadet, 151

Francis, Lieut. 554

Fraser, A. Capt. 244, 334

Frazer, Capt. 154

Frith, Lieut. W. H. 283

—— Major, 268

Fuller, Lieut. 244;
Major, 306

Fulton, Lieut. 319

Gaitskell, Lieut. 374

Garbett, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 409, 422, 469, 483, 489, 515, 523, 554, 562, 571

Gardiner, Lieut.-Col. 322

Garrett, Lieut. 386

Geddes, Lieut. 327;
Major, 461, 462;
Lieut.-Col. 469;
Col. 474, 475, 483, 485, 488, 490, 492, 493, 507, 514, 515

Gibbs, Col. 300

Giddes, Capt. 99

Gillespie, Lieut. 84

Glass, A. Lieut. 73, 135;
Capt. 141, 150, 166, 214;
Major, 169

Goddard, Col. 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 97, 103, 201, 217;
Gen. 218, 219

Gordon, Major, 169, 204, 246, 247

Gore, J. Inf. Cadet, 151

Gowan, Lieut. 303, 314, 317, 334

—— G. Lieut. 333;
Capt. 345;
Col. 454, 458, 459, 462, 498;
Brig. 514, 515

Gowing, Lieut. 279, 284

Gowdie, Major, 136, 141, 142

Graham, Lieut. 159, 214;
Capt.-Lieut. 295

—— C. 317, 373, 382

—— George, Lieut. 378

—— C. T. Lieut. 554, 555

Grace, Capt. 108, 119, 169, 214;
Lieut.-Col. 307

Grand, F. W. Lieut. 76

—— J. E. Lieut. 84

Granishaw, Lieut. 288, 289

Grant, C. Lieut. 373;
Capt. 409, 454, 457, 459, 462;
Major, 499, 507, 513, 514, 515;
Lieut.-Col. 538, 540, 542, 547, 562, 571

Green, Capt.-Lieut. 21

—— J. Lieut.-Fireworker, 89

—— C. Capt.-Lieut. 89;
Major, 156, 180, 181;
Lieut.-Col. 204, 211, 226, 233

—— H. Lieut. 119, 121, 151

—— T. Lieut. 134, 150, 214;
Capt. 246, 248, 250, 251, 252

—— Charles, Lieut. 409, 427, 431, 435

Groat, Lieut. 88

Grote, Lieut. 385

Grove, Lieut. 284

Groves, Lieut. 273

Hall, Capt. 317, 374

Hardwicke, Lieut. 89, 121, 129, 132;
Capt. 150, 156;
Gen. 191, 342, 347, 368

Hamilton, Lieut. 69

Hardinge, Lord, 464, 465, 466, 467, 482, 498, 512

Harris, Lieut. 69;
Capt.-Lieut. 89, 285, 286, 296, 303

Hart, Lieut. 73

Havelock, Col. 530

Hawkins, Lieut. 409, 428, 447, 463

Hay, Major, 55

—— Lieut. 214, 244, 245, 256, 261, 283, 284

—— W. Lieut. 554

Hearsey, Major, 322, 534, 535, 538

Hele, Lieut. 334

Herbert, Lieut. Qr.-Mast. 89, 536

Hetzler, Lieut. 214;
Capt.-Lieut. 262, 263;
Capt. 357, 358, 361;
R. Brig. 385, 388, 389

Hill, Capt. 77, 83, 84;
Col. 115;
Lieut. 113, 114, 127, 142, 144, 151, 302

Hind, Lieut. 149

Hinde, Lieut. 127, 154, 242;
Capt.-Lieut. 244;
Capt. 284

Hislop, Corp. 280, 282

Hockler, Lieut. 23

Hogge, Capt. 527, 571

Holland, Lieut. 88, 455, 514;
Major, 204

Hollingsbury, Lieut. 90

Holmes, Lieut. 503, 535

Home, Col. 48

Hopper, Lieut. 119, 156, 260;
Capt. 287

Horsborough, Lieut. 89, 133, 147, 150, 151

Horsburgh, Lieut. 121, 122

Horsford, Capt. 121, 123, 150, 166;
Major, 204;
Lieut.-Col. Commt. 250;
Col. 251, 252, 254, 255, 257, 267, 269, 284, 285, 293;
Sir J. Major-Gen. 333, 337, 338, 340, 341

—— R. H. Lieut. 386;
Capt. 469, 476, 483, 488, 510, 514, 515;
Major, 538, 562, 571

Hotham, Lieut. 374, 375

Howell, Capt. 147, 148, 150, 155, 166

Hudson, Matross, 282

Hughes, Lieut. 386

Huish, A. Capt. 454, 533, 540, 562, 565, 571

Humfrays, Lieut. 455

Humphrays, Lieut. 154, 227, 228

Humphries, Lieut. 121, 159

Hunter, Lieut. 354

Hunter, J. Lieut. 554, 555

Hussey, W. W. Lieut. 39;
Capt. 88, 94;
Lieut.-Col. 155;
Col. 210, 211

Hutchinson, Capt. 250, 267, 268, 279, 280, 282, 284

Huthwaite, Lieut. 377, 386;
Lieut.-Col. 469, 471, 482, 484, 485, 492, 507, 514, 515, 527, 528,
535, 538, 570, 571

Hyde, Capt. 385

Ironside, Col. 22, 100

Jack, Col. 520

Jennings, Lieut. 8, 11, 15;
Capt. 20, 23, 24, 27

Johnson, Conductor, 121

—— Lieut. 121;
Capt. 169;
Lieut. Brig.-Major, 385

—— E. B. Lieut. 571

Johnstone, Gunner, 282

Jones, Capt. 38

—— Lieut. 119, 121, 134, 151;
Major-Gen. 245

Kaye, E. Lieut. 409, 411, 416, 499, 514, 527, 570, 571

Kaylor, Lieut. 21

Kean, Gunner, 448

Keeble, Cadet, 151

Kelly, Col. 123, 124, 127, 128, 134, 328, 329

Kempt, L. Lieut. 69, 319

Kennedy, Lieut. 314

Kinch, Lieut. 15, 18, 19;
Capt. 23

Kindersley, Major, 30, 31

Kinleside, Lieut. 404;
Capt. 533, 547, 562, 571

Kirby, Lieut. 358, 361, 374

Kirkpatrick, Major, 12

Knox, Capt. 18

Lane, Lieut. 376;
Capt. 407, 443, 451;
Brev.-Major, 455, 457, 458, 462;
Lieut.-Col. 470, 499, 501, 503, 504, 510, 513, 514, 530, 543, 562,
571

Larkins, Lieut. 443

Laurence, L. Lieut. 334, 374

Laurenson, Lieut. 371, 379;
Major, 501, 503;
Lieut.-Col. 507, 514, 515

Lawrence, H. M. Capt. 432, 444, 445, 451;
Major, 514, 515

Lawrie, Major, 326

Leathes, Lieut. 462

Legertwood, Lieut. 72, 73

Leslie, Gen. 50, 67

—— Col. 98, 219

—— Capt. 436

Levey, W. Matross, 320

Lewin, Lieut. 374

Lindsay, Capt.-Lieut. 285;
Capt. 319, 328, 329, 334, 357, 358;
Lieut.-Col. Commdt. 374

Lloyd, Col. 126, 128

Ludlow, Major, 317, 538, 547, 562, 565, 571

Lumsden, Lieut. 314, 333;
Capt. 373, 379, 382

Luxford, Lieut. 314, 315, 316

Lyons, Lieut. 316

Macalister, Lieut. 119

Macbeagh, Lieut. 89

Mackay, Lieut. 385

Mackenzie, M. Lieut. 409, 416, 418, 421, 424;
Brev.-Capt. 471, 496;
Capt. 514, 522, 523, 524, 550, 554, 561, 562, 564, 571

Mackinnon, Lieut. 488, 489

Mackintyre, Capt. 156;
Lieut.-Col. 169, 180;
Major, 204

MacLean, Lieut. 385

Macklewaine, Capt. 73

MacLeod, Col. 107, 108, 124

MacNee, Serg. 448

Macpherson, Lieut. 121, 140, 151

Maidman, Lieut. 385

Maitland, Hon. Capt. 108

Manson, Lieut. 544

Marshall, Lieut. 289;
Major-Gen. 336, 357

Martin, Capt. 30, 562

Mason, Capt. 291, 317;
Major, 319, 333, 338

Master, Capt. 554

Mathison, Lieut. 319, 320, 321, 352, 353

Matthews, Lieut. 119, 121;
A. 151, 250, 246, 254;
Capt. 284

Maud, Lieut. 88

Maule, Lieut. 426, 432

Mawbey, Capt. 158;
Col. 314, 316

Maxwell, Col. 134, 148

—— H. H. Lieut. 499, 514

Mayaffre, Capt. 72, 73, 74, 75, 76

Maynard, F. Lieut. 156

McDermott, Lieut. 89

McDonald, Lieut. 88

—— Lieut. 371;
Major, 462

MᶜDouall, Gen. 227

McDowall, Capt. 318, 358, 360

McGregor, G. Capt. 439, 442, 444, 445, 446, 451

—— R. G. Lieut. 371, 386

McLean, Lieut. 69

McLeod, A. Lieut. 151, 156;
Major, 317, 327, 333, 338;
Lieut.-Col. 368;
Brig. C.B. 388

—— D. Lieut. 289

MᶜMorine, Lieut. 385

McPherson, D. Lieut. 150

McQuake, Lieut. 285, 286;
Capt.-Lieut. 314

Mecham, R. Lieut. 554

Miles, Capt. 534

Mill, Lieut. 500, 523, 554

Miller, W. Lieut. 554

Milligan, Lieut. 455

Mills, Brev.-Capt. 455;
Capt. 483, 487, 489

Moir, Lieut. 455, 470, 471, 483, 554

Montague, E. Lieut. 48;
Capt.-Lieut. 89;
Capt. 124, 127, 134, 135, 136;
Major, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 166;
Lieut.-Col. 204, 214, 215, 216, 217

—— J. Capt. 217, 219, 220;
Major, 221, 222;
Lieut.-Col. 223, 242

Montresor, Col. 215

Moore, Capt. 91

Mordaunt, Capt. 156, 157

Moorhouse, Col. 126;
Major, 135

Moreland, Lieut. 314, 333, 385

Morgan, Charles, Col. 71

Morris, Lieut. 250, 261, 265, 284

Mowatt, Major, 558, 562, 565, 571

Muir, Col. 73

Mulhall, Serg. 433, 435

Muller, Matross, 282

Murray, Col. 267

Musgrave, Col. 123

Nash, Lieut. 90, 121, 122, 123, 134, 151

Neish, Lieut. 88

Nelly, Lieut. 89, 121, 150;
Capt. 250, 279, 284

Newall, Lieut. 550, 554, 555

Nicholl, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 426, 427, 434, 435

Nicolls, Col. 322, 323

Noble, Capt. 297

O’Hanlon, Lieut. 371, 372

Oliphant, Capt. 385

Olpherts, H. Lieut. 527, 571

—— W. Lieut. 456, 461

Owen, Capt. 91

Palmer, C. H. Lieut. 244

Parker, W. Lieut. 256, 284;
Lieut.-Col. 385;
Brig. 403

Parlby, Lieut. 285, 303, 314;
Capt. 366

Paschaud, Capt.-Lieut. 242, 245, 284

Patch, Lieut. 357, 358, 361

Paton, Lieut. 373, 377, 497

Pearse, Major, 30;
Lieut.-Col. 31, 33, 36, 37, 38, 42, 49, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66,
72, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 100, 103, 107, 109, 110,
112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 164, 209, 242, 294, 341

Pennington, Lieut. 214, 242;
Capt. 279, 283, 284;
Major, 314, 316, 331, 333, 339;
Lieut.-Col. 353

—— Lieut. Fireworker, 333;
Lieut. 385

Percival, Lieut. 279, 284

Pereira, Lieut. 295, 319, 334;
Capt. 385

Perry, Lieut. 23

Pew, Major, 194, 361, 363, 385, 409

Pickersgill, Lieut. 328

Pillans, Lieut. 385;
Capt. 514, 515

Playfair, Lieut. 314

Polhill, Lieut. 81

Polier, Major, 22

Pollock, George, Lieut. 261, 284;
Capt. 327;
Major, 371;
Lieut.-Col.
379, 382;
Major-Gen. 443, 446, 450, 464, 465, 478

Pollock, R. H. Lieut. 443, 444, 445, 446, 449, 476, 478, 479

Popham, Major, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82, 83, 84

Pryce, Lieut. 285;
Capt.-Lieut. 334

Purvis, Lieut. 280

Quayles, Lieut. 554

Raban, Capt. 250, 264, 265, 273, 284

Ralfe, Lieut. 301

Raper, J. F. Lieut. 554

Rattray, Lieut. 69, 71;
Capt. 112, 166;
Major, 204

Rawlins, Lieut. 295;
Capt. 374

Rawlinson, Lieut. 371

Raymond, Col. 160

Read, Lieut. 23

Reid, Brev.-Capt. 461

Remington, Lieut. 455

Richards, Lieut. 214, 260;
Capt. 296, 298;
Major, 317

Richardson, Lieut. 407, 443, 449

Roberts, R. Lieut. 319, 334;
Capt. 385

Robertson, Lieut. 432, 443, 535, 562, 565, 571

Robinson, Lieut. 89;
Capt. 246, 250, 251, 252, 284

Rodber, Lieut. 283;
Capt. 314, 333, 345, 354, 355, 356, 358

Rosat, Lieut. 31

Ross, R. Capt. 148

Rotton, Lieut. 386

Russell, Lieut. 31

Rutherford, Lieut. 376

Sage, Lieut. 386

Salmon, Lieut. 407

Sampson, Capt. 121, 126, 147, 150, 151

Sand, Lieut. 76, 84

Sanders, Lieut. 334, 386, 403, 462

Sankey, M. C. Lieut. 554, 555

Saunders, Lieut. 357, 358, 361;
Brev.-Major, 455

Sconce, Lieut. 314, 333

Scott, Capt.-Lieut. 73;
Major, 204

—— J. Lieut. 296, 319, 373, 374, 376, 385

—— G. R. Lieut. 334, 371

Sears, Capt. 69

Shakespear, R. Lieut. 409, 411, 444, 446, 448, 451, 462;
Capt. 534, 538, 562, 569;
Major, 571

—— J. D. Capt. 562, 571

Shaw, S. Capt. 302, 303

Sherwood, Capt. 347

Shipton, Lieut. 84, 146, 151, 156;
Capt. 246, 250, 251, 252, 284

Simons, F. C. Lieut. 554

Sladen, Lieut. 455

Smith, Capt. 121, 123, 124, 147, 150, 151

—— C. Lieut. 316, 334;
Capt. 376

—— L. Lieut. 443

—— N. Capt. 265

—— J. D. Lieut. 245, 273, 284, 296

Smyth, Lieut. 407, 463

Sotheby, Lieut. 352;
Capt. 436, 447, 451

Speediman, Capt. 124

Starke, Lieut. 231, 260, 272, 284;
Capt. 314;
Lieut.-Col. 385, 387

Stewart, Lieut. 426, 435

Swiney, Lieut. 261, 279, 284

Swinhoe, W. Lieut. 554

Swinley, Capt. 469, 475, 483, 485, 492, 514, 515, 518

Syme, Lieut. 90

Tennant, Lieut.-Col. 113;
Lieut. 316;
Capt. 368, 385, 389;
Col. 454;
Brig. 460;
Brig.-Gen. 526, 564, 568, 571

Thelwall, Capt. 294

Thompson, Lieut. 373, 378;
Major, 416, 554

Tilfer, Lieut. 156, 157

Timbrell, Major, 171, 187;
Lieut. 304;
Capt. 317, 334, 371, 376, 382

Timmings, Lieut. 373, 378;
Capt. 409, 416, 422

Todd, Lieut. 386;
Capt. 410, 411, 451, 469, 483, 485, 488, 496

Tollemache, Capt.-Lieut. 334

Tombs, Lieut. 461, 504, 527, 571

Tomkyns, Lieut. 89, 121, 150;
Capt. 214, 226, 260

Toppin, Lieut. 127, 175;
Capt.-Lieut. 214

Torckler, Lieut. 386

Trant, Capt. 376

Trower, Capt. 469, 476, 477, 478, 479

Tulloh, Lieut. 127, 151, 154, 471

Turner, Lieut. 409, 437, 438, 447, 448;
Brev.-Capt. 463

Turton, Lieut. 88;
Capt. 288

—— J. Lieut. 377;
Capt. 501, 503, 513, 514

Twemlow, Lieut. 318, 358

Vanrenen, Lieut. 319, 334

Vernon, Lieut. 72

Wade, Lieut. 386;
Col. 413, 414

Wakefield, Lieut. 385

Walcote, Lieut. 328

Walcott, Lieut. 319, 358

Walker, J. Lieut. 89

—— R. Lieut. 409, 438, 447

Waller, Lieut. 426, 435, 448;
Capt. 499, 500, 514, 515

Walton, Gunner, 448

Warburton, Lieut. 409, 426, 448, 463

Warner, Lieut. 455;
Brev.-Capt. 471, 480, 483, 496, 499, 514, 530, 533, 562, 565, 566,
571

Watkins, Lieut. 156;
Capt. 245

Watson, J. E. Lieut. 533

Webbe, Capt. 317, 318, 327

Wheelwright, Lieut. 479

Whinfield, Lieut. 334, 385

Whish, Capt.-Lieut. 314, 331, 333, 339;
Major, 385;
Major-Gen. 523, 524, 526, 527, 550, 552, 553, 557, 558, 560, 561,
562, 564, 571

White, Col. 260, 261

Whiteford, Lieut. 455

Wiggins, Lieut. 385

Wilding, Lieut.-Col. 45

Wilkinson, Lieut. 88, 510

Wilson, R. B. Lieut. 322, 323, 334

Wilton, W. Lieut. 114, 115

Winbolt, Lieut. 119, 151, 159;
Capt.-Lieut. 250, 252, 253, 267, 269

Wintle, Lieut. 455

Winwood, Lieut. 15;
Capt. 27

Witherington, Capt. 5

Wittit, Lieut. 121, 122, 123, 124;
Capt. 150;
Major, 170, 244

—— C. Capt. 245, 260, 266

Wood, Lieut. J. 7;
Capt. 183

—— H. Lieut. 334;
Capt. 385;
Lieut.-Col. 500, 504, 507, 514, 518

Woodburn, Lieut. 88;
Major, 127, 150, 166, 176;
Lieut.-Col. 204, 212

Woodroofe, Capt. 385

Worthington, J. G. Lieut. 554

Young, J. Lieut. 260, 272, 284;
Lieut.-Col. 343

FOOTNOTES:

-----

Footnote 1:

_Calcutta Review._

Footnote 2:

There were probably some perquisites or other sources of emolument.

Footnote 3:

The following was copied from an inscription in charcoal, on the wall
of a small mosque on the declivity of a hill, about a mile from
Chunar, and the same distance from the Ganges, in October, 1780:—

“This is the place of confinement of Ann Wood, wife to Lieutenant John
Wood, taken prisoner by Jaffir Beg, Commandant to Sir Roger Dowler,
taken out of the house at Calcutta where so many unhappy gentlemen
suffered; the said Jaffir Beg obtained promotion of Segour Dowler for
his long service, Fouzdar of Chunar Gur.”

“I, Alexander Campbell, was taken, along with the unfortunate lady, at
eleven years old, by the same persons who afterwards made me an
eunuch; my only employment was to attend this lady, which I did in
this place four years. 1762, May 3rd, the said Jaffir Beg sent to
acquaint the lady that if she did not consent to live with him the 4th
of the said month, she should be strangled, and by my hands. The 3rd,
at midnight, we jumped out of this window and got to the river side,
where I hired boat for fifty gold rupees, to carry us safe to
Chinsurah, where we arrived on the 11th. The first news we heard was
that Lieutenant Wood died for grief; soon as she heard this, she fell
sick, and died the 27th of the month.”

“Mr. Drake behaved with the greatest imprudence, he did deserve to be
shot! shot! shot!

“Alexander Campbell, I am now in Dowlah’s service.”

“N.B.—Mrs. Wood’s apartment, and which is all the house consists of,
is 9 feet 5 inches by 8 feet 9 inches, and 7 feet 9 inches high; the
window, 18 inches.”

“Mrs. Bowers was a young woman, and inhabitant of Calcutta when it was
taken by the Moors in the year ——, where upwards of —— British
subjects were confined in the dungeon; she concealed herself until
night in one of the warehouses in the factory, from whence she made
her escape on board a small vessel lying in the river opposite the old
fort.”—_Hickey’s Gazette_, 1780.

Neither of these names is mentioned by Holwell.

Footnote 4:

It is probable that Captain (afterwards Sir R.) Barker was in this
vessel; he was transferred from the Royal to the Bengal Artillery, but
appears to have been employed in line commands, and never to have
joined the regiment.

Footnote 5:

This man was afterwards a member of council, and a bitter opponent of
Clive.

Footnote 6:

This was rather a detachment of Royal, Bombay, and Bengal Artillery;
Lieutenants Winwood and Kinch, of the Bengal Artillery, seem to have
been with it, but nothing very distinct can be ascertained.

Footnote 7:

This date is doubtful.

Footnote 8:

His real name was Walter Reinhart, but he was called Sombre from the
darkness of his countenance, and this was easily changed into Sumroo.
Franklyn says:—“Major Polier, at Delhi, to Colonel Ironside, at
Belgaum, in May, 1776, writes—‘His name is Balthazar ——; the rest I
have forgot. Sombre is ‘son nomme de guerre.’ He is a deserter of
ours; he enlisted at Calcutta before the taking of the place, I think,
in one of the Swiss companies, commanded by a young officer, I suppose
Vussarot or Ziegler, and deserted shortly after. This anecdote is not
generally known, and might serve, should he ever fall into our hands,
for a valid plea to hang him, which could not well be done otherwise
without straining a point, as he certainly only executed the commands
of his infamous master, and his life might have been endangered by
non-compliance.’”

Footnote 9:

Six subalterns of artillery, including a commissary and adjutant,
appear to have perished: Lieutenants Hockler, J. Brown, Deckers,
Perry, Adamson, and J. Read.

Footnote 10:

This was _not_ the battle of _Korah_, for which the 1st and 10th
regiments of N. I. wear an honorary distinction; that took place in
1778, between the English and some of the Nawab’s troops, on their
being disbanded.

Footnote 11:

────────────────────┬──────┬──────
│ Per │Total
│Comp. │
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Major. │ │ 1
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Captain. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Capt.-Lieut. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
1st Lieut. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
2nd Lieut. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Lieut. Fireworkers. │ 3│ 12
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Serjeants. │ 6│ 24
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Corporals. │ 6│ 24
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Drummers. │ 3│ 12
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Bombardiers. │ 8│ 32
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Gunners. │ 24│ 96
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Matrosses. │ 53│ 212
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Adjut. & Qr.-Master.│ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Deputy Comr. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Conductors. │ 2│ 8
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Serj.-Major. │ 1│ 4
────────────────────┼──────┼──────
Qr-Mast. Serjt. │1[114]│ 4

Footnote 12:

In consequence of this want, the recent mutiny and perhaps the
inefficiency of some of the officers of the corps. Russell, Baillie,
and Thelwall came into the corps from Madras; Rosat and Burnett from
H.M.S. _Folly_, from Bencoolen.

Footnote 13:

With a staff of 1 surveyor of stores, 1 regimental adjutant, 5
adjutants and quarter-masters, and 12 conductors.

Footnote 14:

Cadets.

Footnote 15:

Since writing the above, the want is being supplied by some spirited
articles in the Calcutta Quarterly [Review].

Footnote 16:

The Cutcha road was formed (of its present breadth) in 1782–3.—Colonel
Green’s Letter, 21st October, 1801.

Footnote 17:

Was there not a member of council of that name?

Footnote 18:

In all probability this formed the regular road to Berhampore.

Footnote 19:

Captain Macklewaine, Captain-Lieutenant Scott, Lieutenants Legertwood,
Hart, Glass, and Baillie.

Footnote 20:

Lieutenant F. W. Grand was a younger brother of the Mr. Grand whose
name is connected with Sir Philip Francis, from the latter having
seduced his wife, who afterwards was married to Talleyrand. Lieut. G.
commanded two 6–pounders attached to the two companies of Popham’s
regiment acting as a bodyguard to Hastings.

Lieutenant Sand probably commanded two guns with the remaining
companies of the wing of the regiment.

Footnote 21:

The Governor-General noticed Lieutenant Baillie’s conduct in General
Orders of 8th September and 19th October, 1781; on the latter occasion
the order says: “The strong recommendation which Major Crabb has given
Lieutenant Fw. Baillie for his distinguished attention and activity in
the management of the artillery under his charge, affords the
Governor-General a second occasion of acknowledging the services of
that officer on the same campaign, and publishing his thanks for it.”

Footnote 22:

Major Popham received 2,94,000; Major, 44,956; Captain, 22,478;
Subaltern, 11,239; Serjeant, 200; Soobadar, 300; Jemadar, 140;
Havildar, 100; Naick, 80; Sipahi, 50.

Footnote 23:

Captains Mayaffre and J. Hill,§ Lieutenants Gillespie§ and B. Bruce,§
Lieutenant Fireworkers E. F. Baillie, H. Balfour, W. Shipton,§ J. E.
Grand, R. Sands.§

Footnote 24:

───┬────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬─────────┬───────────
No.│Company.│Battalion.│Serjeants.│Corporals.│Drummers.│Gunner, &c.
───┼────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼─────────┼───────────
2│ 4│ 2│ 6│ 6│ 2│ 61
5│ 5│ 1│ 6│ 7│ 2│ 55
10│ 5│ 2│ 7│ 6│ 3│ 56
───┴────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴─────────┴───────────

Footnote 25:

24–pounder 12 pair
18–pounder 9 pair
12–pounder 6 pair
6–pounder 3 pair
3–pounder 2 pair
8–inch Howitzer 7 pair
5½-inch Howitzer 5 pair
4½-inch Howitzer 3 pair
Wagon 7 pair
Tumbril 5 pair

Footnote 26:

When quarters were not furnished.

Footnote 27:

Four 18–pounders, eight 12–pounders, twenty 6–pounders, two
3–pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers.

Footnote 28:

In the Calcutta burying-ground is a tomb to the memory of
Lieut.-Colonel and Mrs. Deare. She died a few days before him. The
inscription on the tomb is as follows:—

HERE REST THE REMAINS OF
MRS. CATHERINE DEARE,
WHO DIED AT CALCUTTA 6TH SEPT. 1791,
AGED XXXIV YEARS:
IN MEMORY OF HER AND HER HUSBAND,
LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES RUSSELL DEARE,
WHO FELL BY A CANNON-SHOT ON THE 13TH OF THE SAME MONTH,
WHILE COMMANDING THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,
IN AN ACTION FOUGHT
BETWEEN A DETACHMENT OF THE BRITISH FORCES
AND THOSE OF TIPPOO SULTAN,
NEAR SATTIMUNGULUM,
AGED XL YEARS.
THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED BY HIS BROTHER,
COLONEL GEORGE DEARE.

Footnote 29:

Among them two brass 6–pounders which had been lost at Sattimungalum.

Footnote 30:

Lieutenants Douglas, Hinde, Dowell, Tulloh, and Humphrays.

Footnote 31:

A bar of iron was however let into the axle.

Footnote 32:

Major Woodburne and Captain Howell going away, were succeeded by
Captains Barton and Rattray.

Footnote 33:

A letter from Colonel Green to the Secretary of the Military Board,
July, 1801, says, “As the two 6–pounders, with brass cheeks, the Board
were pleased to direct the agent to make up for the service of the
horse artillery experiment, carrying on under my control, to replace
those sent to Egypt, will take some time, &c.” These carriages were
proved by Major Wittit, when ready, and some alterations suggested. It
is probable some mistake between brass and iron has crept into the
report from which the extract was taken, or else both brass and iron
were tried.

Footnote 34:

At this time serge had not been introduced it is supposed, and
cartridges were made of paper—that now called cannon-cartridge, or
packing.

Footnote 35:

Another was a crutch in which to receive the needle.

Footnote 36:

So great had been the alarm at one time, excited by the desperate
projects (of some officers), that Sir John Murray, the commandant of
Fort William, without communicating his precautionary proceedings to
the Governor-General, placed the fortress in a state of defence,
relying on the unshaken steadiness of the artillery; (_Life of Lord
Teignmouth_, vol. i. p. 351) ... and but for the firmness of the
artillery at Calcutta, and the manly resistance of several officers at
Cawnpore, the army would have dictated to the Government their own
terms.—_Idem_, _L. M. to Lord C._, p. 371.

Footnote 37:

Major-Gen. Duff,
Col.-Gen. Deare,
Lieut.-Col. Bruce,
Lieut.-Col. C. Green,
Lieut.-Col. Woodburn,
Lt.-Col. Montague,
Major Scott,
Major Rattray,
Major Mackintyre,
Major Burnett,
Major Holland,
Major Barton,
Major Carnegie,
Major Gordon,
Major Horsford.

Footnote 38:

Ten had been added in December, 1797.

Footnote 39:

The lascars can scarcely be called artillerymen; it is true that they
fill certain _numbers_ at the gun, but the greater portion were
employed on the drag-ropes.

Footnote 40:

3 King’s Regiments 3,000
2 Companies European Regiment 2,500
17 Native Regiments 35,360
——————
40,860
——————

Footnote 41:

The 6-pounder of that day was probably four hundred weight and a half.

Footnote 42:

Lieut.-Colonel Montague, Commandant; Lieutenant Drummond, Adjutant;
Lieutenant R. Browne, Quarter-Master.

───────────────────────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────
Lascar Companies. │6, 20 │11, 27 │18, 25 │10, 17
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Company. │3 │5 │1 │2
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Battalion. │1 │2 │3 │3
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captains. │Grace │Clarke │Tomkyns │Glass
│Dunn │ │ │
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Captain-Lieutenants. │Caldwell │Collier │Toppin │Balfour
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenants. │Pennington│Hetzler │ │A. Dunn
│Green │Douglas │ │
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Lieutenant-Fireworkers. │Bayle │Graham │Hay │Ahmuty
│Richards │ │ │Brooke
───────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Non-Com. Officers and │56 │63 │69 │72
Gunners. │ │ │ │
───────────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────

Footnote 43:

Royal Artillery.

Footnote 44:

Beatson’s Seringapatam.

Footnote 45:

His brother was one of the council of revenue at Dinagepoor in 1766.

Footnote 46:

There is some unaccountable error in the above. Goddard left Culpee in
May, 1778, with Leslie’s force. He was employed in 1781 at the
Bhoreghat against the Mahrattas, who may have been mistaken for
Rohillas. The detachment with Sir Eyre Coote sailed from Calcutta in
October, 1780. Montague appears on the returns of one of these
companies, but from the circumstantial account of his wound, we must
suppose he went round and joined Goddard, and returned in the end of
1781. The regimental returns are blank from July 1780 to April 1781,
and the companies absent on service are not included till their
return. We had thought that Lieutenant Montague was quarter-master to
the artillery in 1781.—E. B.

Footnote 47:

The following conversation took place between the deputy
adjutant-general and Major Montague as the latter passed headquarters
on his march: “Lord C. has it in contemplation to give Colonel Smith
the command of the artillery to be employed against Severn-droog, and
he wishes to know if that circumstance will be any impediment to your
exertions.” The major replied, “that he did not expect to take the
command; that his only wish was to be employed, and that his lordship
might rely on his utmost exertions for the public service under
Smith.” The deputy adjutant-general did not think that answer
sufficiently explicit; and said, “Lord C. wished to know whether Major
M. could act with more effect when independent of Colonel Smith, than
when under his command?” The major answered, “that he could certainly
carry a plan of his own into execution in the same time that it would
require to suggest and explain it to another.” The deputy
adjutant-general therefore concluded that Major M.’s real opinion was
that he should prefer to conduct the business by himself, and informed
him that his lordship was disposed to give Colonel Smith an
opportunity of knocking down the walls of the place where he had been
so long confined in a former war; but as it might be attended with
some risk to the service, he was at length determined to appoint Major
M. to command and conduct the artillery against that important place,
as the capture of it was absolutely necessary to the further progress
of the campaign.

Footnote 48:

He married a Miss Fleetwood at Masulipatam in 1792, when on his return
to Bengal from the first campaign against Tippoo.

Footnote 49:

The note in a former page may serve to explain this neglect, as the
commanding officer of artillery was the same Colonel Smith to whom he
had been preferred at Severn-droog.

Footnote 50:

Minute by Governor-General, January 19, 1800.—“The conduct of the
artillery and lascars attached to the regiment during the time of its
absence from these provinces is equally entitled to commendation.”

Footnote 51:

Captain Humphreys at the time of the massacre was seized by a junior
assistant surgeon who rolled with him down the steep where the dead
were flung; they remained concealed three or four days, but being
discovered were taken before the king and separately confined.

Footnote 52:

On the march from Rosetta to Alexandria the axletree of one of the
limbers broke, and for want of a forge-cart the detachment was
detained eighteen hours on the desert without water or provisions; had
a forge-cart been there, two hours would have sufficed.—Captain Brown
to Colonel Green, 2nd April, 1803.

Footnote 53:

Returned to India on sick certificate September, 1801.—Letter from
Military Board to Military Secretary, 26th September, 1801.

Footnote 54:

The uniform at this time consisted of the bearskin cap, long coat,
with scarlet facings and embroidered button-holes, and grey trowsers
with a red cord down the seam.

Footnote 55:

English 516, Irish 484, Scotch 74, Welsh 19, Foreigners 211, no
description 32.

Footnote 56:

Letter of John Duncan, 10th November, 1802, to Supreme Government.

Footnote 57:

Lieutenant Mathews was appointed fort adjutant at Agra the following
year, and afterwards deputy commissary of ordnance at Futteygurh, and
on his promotion to a captaincy was retained. “At the particular
recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, in consideration of the
peculiar services of Lieutenant Mathews, who lost his leg and thigh in
the battle of Delhi, the Governor-General is pleased to determine that
Captain Mathews shall be exempted from the operation of the General
Orders of 14th November, declaring the situation of deputy commissary
of ordnance to be incompatible with the rank of regimental captain.”

“This exemption is admitted as a mark of attention and indulgence to a
deserving officer, who has suffered severely in the execution of his
duty on active service against the enemy.”—General Orders of May 15,
1806.

Footnote 58:

In moving for the production of papers in the House of Commons on this
occurrence, Sir Philip Francis said it had cost “two complete
companies of sipahis, some cannon, and fifty European artillerymen,
every man of whom were cut to pieces: the loss of the sipahis is to be
lamented, that of the artillerymen is invaluable.” A most infelicitous
expression for the author of Junius.

Footnote 59:

Two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder, two howitzers, and tumbrils.

Footnote 60:

Cross was appointed to the Ordnance Commissariat Department, and at
the present moment is living at Penang, having, after a long,
laborious, and honourable career, been allowed to retire on a pension
with the rank of captain.

Footnote 61:

Capt.-Lieutenant A. Graham; Lieutenant T. Pereira; Lieut.-Fireworker
Ewart, I. Rawlins, H. C. Baker, T. D. Fordyce.

Footnote 62:

In this year the Java Light Cavalry, with H. A. attached, was formed;
Capt.-Lieutenant Boileau, Lieutenant Gowan, and Lieutenant Parlby
accompanied it; but we believe this corps was never engaged.

Footnote 63:

1st Troop,—Major Pennington; Lieutenants Gowan, Kennedy, Campbell,
Moreland.

2nd Troop,—Capt. Starke; Capt.-Lieutenants Whish, Boileau; Lieutenants
Playfair, Curtis, Lumsden, Sconce.

3rd Troop,—Captain Brooke; Capt.-Lieutenant Rodber; Lieutenants
Parlby, Hyde, Luxford.

Captain-Lieutenant McQuake was quarter-master to the reserve.

Footnote 64:

Four 18-pounders, 2,400 shot; two 8-inch mortars, 400 shells.

Footnote 65:

Capt.-Lieutenant Battine; Lieutenants Tennant, Lyons, C. Smith, C. G.
Dixon; Chesney, adjutant.

Footnote 66:

Major McLeod, commandant; Lieutenant Cruikshanks, adjutant; Captains
Webbe, G. Brooke, Mason, Fordyce, Cartwright, C. Graham, Timbrell, and
Hall and E. P. Gowan, who joined at Nahun.

Footnote 67:

Captain McDowall; Lieutenants De Brett, Crawford, Twemlow.

Footnote 68:

Major Mason, commandant; Lieutenant Walcott, adjutant; Capt. Lindsay;
Lieutenants Roberts, Kempt, Blake, Mathison, Counsell, Vanrenen,
Fulton, Pereira, Scott, Croxton.

Footnote 69:

Captains Pollock and Biggs; Lieutenants Marshall, Denniss, Geddes,
Buck, and O. Baker.

Footnote 70:

1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 lieutenant-fireworker, 10 non-commissioned
officers, 80 troopers, 5 sirdars, 60 surwans, 70 camels, 20 horses, 4
cars, 20 bouches à jeu, and 960 rockets.

Footnote 71:

The subject is fully gone into in “Considerations on behalf of the
Officers of the Indian Artillery and Engineer Corps,” by
Lieutenant-Colonel James Young, of the artillery. Published in 1816.

Footnote 72:

During the most severe part of this affair, a circumstance occurred
truly creditable to the character of this officer, and fully
substantiated by the testimony of an eye-witness. An European horse
artilleryman fell deadly wounded, and on his comrades attempting to
carry him to the rear, he entreated them to desist, adding, “I know I
must die, and I only wish to shake Lieutenant Mathison by the hand
before I die.” His wish was immediately gratified, and he expired
uttering “God bless you.”

Footnote 73:

The artillery were in front, and the first gun that opened was a
Madras horse-artillery gun under Lieutenant Hunter, which killed the
enemy’s beenee-wala, or quarter-master-general, upon which they took
to flight. One of Captain Hunter’s two guns sticking on the stump of a
tree, Lieutenant Crawford moved on with the other, accompanying
Captain Rodber’s guns.

Footnote 74:

Lieutenant Crawford says, “After a five-mile gallop we pulled up,
having no troops near but about 80 of the 5th cavalry, and so dead
beat were we all with the long march and gallop, that the Peshwah and
those with him, being fresh, got off easily.”

Footnote 75:

The explosion of a shell we believe.

Footnote 76:

2 24-pounder guns
22 18-pounder guns
4 12-pounder guns
3 12-pounder guns brass
16 6-pounder guns
14 —— -pounder guns gallopers
4 10-inch mortars
8 8-inch mortars
9 5½-inch mortars
6 8-inch howitzers
7 5½-inch howitzers
4 4⅖-inch howitzers

Footnote 77:

The 6th independent company of golundaz, and 40th company of gun
lascars were reduced on their return from Ceylon in March, 1819.

Footnote 78:

Joined in December, 1824.

Footnote 79:

Maharajah Bulwunt Sing succeeded his father in 1824, and was dethroned
by his cousin, Durjun Sal in March, 1825.

Footnote 80:

16 24-pounders,
20 18-pounders,
4 12-pounders,
12 8-inch howitzers,
2 13-inch mortars,
12 10-inch mortars,
46 8-inch mortars.

Footnote 81:

─────────────┬─────────────
2nd company,│ 1st brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company,│ 2nd brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company,│ 3rd brigade
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│1st battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
1st company│3rd battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
2nd company,│4th battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
3rd company,│6th battalion
─────────────┼─────────────
4th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
5th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
13th company,│ 〃
─────────────┼─────────────
17th company,│ 〃
─────────────┴─────────────

Footnote 82:

The daily expenditure of ammunition and artillery details of this
siege will be found in the East-India United Service Journal for 1837.

Footnote 83:

R. A. P. R. A. P.

Lieut.-Colonel 1,032 4 0 752 14 0 per mensem.
Major 789 3 0 580 14 6 per mensem.
Captain 433 10 0 354 13 0 per mensem.
1st Lieutenant 265 12 0 209 14 0 per mensem.
2nd Lieutenant 213 5 0 167 10 6 per mensem.

Footnote 84:

R. A. P.

Lieutenant-Colonel per mensem 827 14 0
Major 580 14 6
Captain 392 5 0
1st Lieutenant 234 14 0
2nd Lieutenant 192 10 6

Footnote 85:

The effect is clearly shown in the brigading the late army of the
Sutlej, where the army, consisting of fifteen cavalry and thirty-seven
infantry regiments, formed into six divisions and sixteen brigades,
was thus commanded:—

Cavalry regiments 3 Queen’s, 12 Company’s
Infantry regiments 8 Queen’s, 29 Company’s
Division Commanders 4 Queen’s, 2 Company’s
Brigade regiments 7 Queen’s, 9 Company’s

Of the cavalry, although four-fifths were Company’s regiments, the
division and three of the brigade commands fell to H.M.’s service.

Footnote 86:

1st company, 3rd battalion, and field-battery.
Detail of golundaz, and 2 6-pounders.
Gwalior contingent battery.
6 18-pounders.
2 8-inch howitzers.
4 8-inch mortars.

Major Bell.
Captain Lane.
Lieut. Buckle, commissary of ordnance.
Lieut. Richardson.
Lieut. Kinleside.
Lieut. Abercrombie.
Lieut. Salmon, adjutant.
Lieut. J. H. Smyth, Gwalior contingent.

Footnote 87:

(No. 6 battery.)

Footnote 88:

Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Salter of the cavalry, and Lieutenant
Sturt of the engineers (since killed in action).

Footnote 89:

The highest point surmounted, the Irak pass, was 12,400 feet above the
sea.

Footnote 90:

A good practicable road across the mountains had, ere this, been made.

Footnote 91:

The 4th company 6th battalion, with Lieutenants A. Christie and
Robertson, formed part of this force. Captain Lawrence, as political
agent, accompanied it, and procured four guns from the Seiks, which,
however, were of little use, as their carriages broke down.

Footnote 92:

Captain Sotheby, Lieutenants Cornish and Brougham.

Footnote 93:

From the report of Brevet-Captain Reid, assistant
quartermaster-general. The latter portion of the extract is adopted
word for word by General Gray in his despatch.

Footnote 94:

This, and the following paragraphs distinguished by inverted commas,
are taken verbatim from a very valuable article on the “Bengal
Artillery” in the _Calcutta Review_, No. xviii.

Footnote 95:

The following extract from a minute by Sir Henry Hardinge, dated
January 20, 1845, relates to this important subject. “In reference to
the 4-horse field-batteries, it appears to me essential that
9-pounders should be drawn by eight horses instead of six; that a
battery of six pieces should therefore have, when ordered on field
service, a complement of 120 horses, instead of 98; and considering
the immediate result of a few weeks’ campaigning, the number ought to
be 130 horses. When not under orders for field service, the number may
remain at 98. On this matter, and every other relating to the
artillery, the Governor-General requests the Honourable Sir George
Pollock to make the arrangements which his experienced judgment may
decide, so as to secure the utmost efficiency; for in all these
matters, efficiency will be found to be true economy.” [The number of
horses would seem to have been raised in the first instance from 89 to
98.]

Footnote 96:

On the deaths of Captains Dashwood and Todd, Captain Mills (of the
political department) commanded the 1st troop 1st brigade at
Ferozeshuhur, and Lieutenant Mackinnon commanded the 2nd troop in the
same action; Captain Waller commanded the latter at Sobraon.

Footnote 97:

Two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade accompanied this troop
throughout the action.

Footnote 98:

During the night of the 18th and the morning of the 19th the
ammunition-boxes of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries were
replenished, as far as practicable, from the spare waggons attached to
each troop and battery. The two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade,
which had originally marched from Muttra merely on escort duty, being
unprovided with spare ammunition, borrowed a few rounds from other
guns, but not sufficient to complete.

Footnote 99:

Ferozeshuhur is a small village between Moodkee and Ferozepore, and
about five miles south of the high-road from the latter place to
Loodianah.

Footnote 100:

Sir Hugh Gough has stated in his despatch, that the ammunition of the
artillery had been completely exhausted in this protracted engagement.
And an able writer in the _Calcutta Review_ (No. XI.) has made a
similar assertion, which, however, is not quite correct as to the time
indicated, as all the troops of horse-artillery present were engaged
with Tej Singh. The author of the article on the “Sikh invasion of
British India” adds, “We believe the complement of a horse-artillery
gun on service is 300 rounds.” This is not quite accurate. Each
6-pounder gun carries with it 128 rounds of all sorts; and each
12-pounder howitzer has 80 rounds. The troops of horse-artillery from
Umballah and Loodianah had each two spare 6-pounder waggons, and one
howitzer waggon, making up the complement to 166⅖ rounds per gun, and
140 per howitzer. The Ferozepore troops brought out with them no extra
waggons, and the two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade had no spare
ammunition at all.

Footnote 101:

The order was given to the brigadier, without authority from the
Commander-in-Chief.

Footnote 102:

“The royal waggons carry 146 rounds a gun, the Indian waggons, I
believe, only contain 96 rounds. In the royal service, the (6-pounder)
gun and waggon carry 194 rounds a gun. The extra waggons in the royal
service have 29 rounds a gun, and in the Indian service only 19 rounds
a gun. The waggon in the Indian service is, I have no doubt, best
adapted to the country and the draught animals, but if a battery of
five guns had ten waggons (and the howitzer one waggon), the number of
rounds a gun would be about 220. The 9-pounder field batteries, I
understand, take into action 139 rounds a gun. The royal 9-pounder
takes 166.”—_Minute of Lord Hardinge, Feb. 2, 1847._

Footnote 103:

In a memorandum on this subject left by Captain Buckle, the author
says:—“At Sobraon, the heavy guns, which had been waited for nearly a
month, were placed on the plain about 1,300 yards from the
intrenchments, instead of in batteries prepared for them at half that
distance, and the facilities for which were great in the abundance of
men and material, and in the softness of the soil. They might easily
have been erected during the night of the 9-10th of February, had
previous arrangements been made; and had this been done, the enemy’s
intrenchments, instead of being nearly uninjured, would have been
swept away by the storm of shot poured upon them. As it was, the
effect of the fire was greater on the defenders of the works than upon
the works themselves; and quite as much as was expected by those
competent to form an opinion, considering the greatness of the
distance, and the shortness of time during which they fired. And for
the selection of the distance we are credibly informed that the
artillery are not responsible.”

Footnote 104:

“For the severe punishment inflicted on the Sikhs during their retreat
across the river, we are indebted to the singular forethought and cool
calculating judgment of the Governor-General. Owing to the paucity of
artillerymen, men had been taken from the horse-artillery to serve the
heavy guns in the field; and the troops—three if not four—to which
they belonged, were _left behind in camp_. The services of these
troops would have been lost to the army on the 10th February, had not
Sir Henry Hardinge, while the battle was yet raging, ascertained that
the ammunition of the heavy guns was nearly expended, and deduced,
from this misfortune, the more than _fortunate_ conclusion, that the
horse-artillerymen would soon be again available for their proper
duties. He accordingly sent back orders to the troops left in camp to
move down without delay to _Rhodawallah_; and they _were_ brought down
_by their drivers alone_, to that post, where they found their own
artillerymen waiting for them, and were galloped into action. The
anecdote is not generally known, but is worthy of record as highly
characteristic of a mind peculiarly happy in the arrangement of
_details, whose judicious combination alone produces military
success.”—Reviewer._ [Colonel Alexander’s, Major Campbell’s, and
Captain Turton’s troops were on the right; Colonel Lane, with Sir R.
Dick’s division. Major Grant, as before mentioned, had commenced the
action with his 24-pounder howitzers. The officers and men of the 2nd
troop 1st brigade, 3rd troop 1st brigade, 5th troop 1st brigade, and
1st troop 3rd brigade, were employed with the heavy batteries,
rockets, and reamers. The 1st troop 1st brigade had remained with
Wheeler near Loodhianah.]—_Editor._

Footnote 105:

MacGregor’s “History of the Sikhs.”

Footnote 106:

Colonel Lawrence had by this time proceeded to Europe for the recovery
of his health.

Footnote 107:

Thackwell marched without baggage or camp equipage.

Footnote 108:

A brigade had been sent across previously by pontoons a few miles up
the river, but too late to take part in the action of Sadoolapore.

Footnote 109:

With regard to Pennycuick’s brigade, the Commander-in-Chief says in
his official despatch: “In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed
to state that they behaved heroically, and but for their too hasty
and, consequently, disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct
of the left brigade, which, left unsupported for a time, had to charge
to their front and right wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of
horse-artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind,
judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.”

Footnote 110:

This troop had been on the detachment system experimentally, but,
after Chillianwallah, when new guns were given, it reverted to the old
system.

Footnote 111:

The following remarks by Major Siddons on the artillery practice at
Mooltan, taken from his admirable report of the siege, will be read
with interest:—“The artillery practice was most excellent, and the
exertions of officers and men indefatigable. It is impossible to
over-rate the service rendered by the 8-inch and 10-inch howitzers.
The walls are mostly of mud, or brick and mud; and it so happened that
the part selected for the breach was very defective—a mere facing over
the old wall. In this the 24-pounder shot brought down large masses;
but where the wall was sound the shot buried themselves, whereas the
shells penetrated and then acted as small mines. Against a mud fort,
an howitzer must therefore be considered far preferable to a gun,
though of course the latter would be more effective against a
well-built stone wall. The inconvenience to howitzers is the
difficulty of preserving the cheeks of the embrasures. The iron
howitzer might, perhaps, with advantage be lengthened.”

Footnote 112:

As another opportunity is not likely to occur, it may be mentioned
here that General Whish was instrumental in introducing some important
improvements in the internal organization of the artillery. He was the
first, when in temporary command of the horse-artillery (April, 1821),
to establish regimental libraries for the use of the men. In 1836, he
so far reformed the horse-artillery system, as to render it
unnecessary that the guns should be accompanied into action by their
waggons,—a change, however, which was reversed in 1845. He was also,
in 1841, instrumental in the abolition of winkers, as a portion of the
harness of the horses.

Footnote 113:

“The batteries engaged in action by those attached to the 1st and
2nd divisions, advancing to within about six hundred yards; and
the heavy guns within eight hundred or one thousand yards of the
enemy’s artillery, on which they opened their fire about nine
o’clock A.M.”—_Brigadier-General Tennant’s Despatch to the
Commander-in-Chief._

Footnote 114:

Non-effective—1 pay serjeant, 1 drill serjeant, 1 major serjeant, 1
park serjeant, 1 drill corporal, 3 camp colour-men, a bullock
serjeant, and overseer of bildars in time of service.

The ordnance with each company appears to have consisted of six light
6-pounders and two howitzers; to assist in working these and the
field-pieces with sipahi battalions, a large body of lascars were
attached to each company.

Heavy guns and mortars were supplied from magazines at the
head-quarters of brigades to the extent available and required for any
particular service.

PRINTED BY COX (BROTHERS) AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transcriber’s note:

1. Several tables with more columns than rows were rotated 90° left so
they would fit portrait format.

2. All items in the ERRATA were corrected in the text.

3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.

4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as
printed.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Memoir of the Services of the Bengal Artillery - From the Formation of the Corps to the Present Time, with Some Account of Its Internal Organization" ***

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