The World Crisis, Volume I (of VI)

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Title: The World Crisis, Volume I (of VI)
Author: Churchill, Winston S.
Language: English
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THE WORLD CRISIS

BY
THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
1911 TO 1915

TORONTO

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD.
AT MARTIN’S HOUSE

MCMXXIII

Printed in the United States of America

Published April, 1923

[Illustration]

------------------------------------------------------------------------

PREFACE

From October 25, 1911, to May 28, 1915, I was, in the words of the Royal
Letters Patent and Orders in Council, “responsible to Crown and
Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty.” This period comprised
the final stage in the preparation against a war with Germany; the
mobilisation and concentration of the Fleet before the outbreak; the
organisation of the Blockade; the gathering in 1914 of the Imperial
forces from all over the world; the clearance from the oceans of all the
German cruisers and commerce destroyers; the reinforcement of the Fleet
by new construction in 1914 and 1915; the frustration and defeat of the
first German submarine attack upon merchant shipping in 1915; and the
initiation of the enterprise against the Dardanelles. It was marked
before the war by a complete revision of British naval war plans; by the
building of a fast division of battleships armed with 15–inch guns and
driven by oil fuel; by the proposals, rejected by Germany, for a naval
holiday; and by the largest supplies till then ever voted by Parliament
for the British Fleet. It was distinguished during the war for the
victories of the Heligoland Bight, of the Falkland Islands and the
Dogger Bank; and for the attempt to succour Antwerp. It was memorable
for the disaster to the three cruisers off the Dutch Coast; the loss of
Admiral Cradock’s squadron at Coronel; and the failure of the Navy to
force the Dardanelles.

Many accounts of these matters have been published both here and abroad.
Most of the principal actors have unfolded their story. Lord Fisher,
Lord Jellicoe, Lord French, Lord Kitchener’s biographer, Lord Haig’s
Staff, and many others of less importance, have with the utmost fullness
and freedom given their account of these and other war-time events and
of the controversies arising out of them. The German accounts are
numerous and authoritative. Admirals von Tirpitz and Scheer have told
their tales. Sir Julian Corbett, the Official Historian, has in a
thousand pages recorded the conduct of the naval war during the whole of
my administration. Eight years have passed since I quitted the
Admiralty.

In all these circumstances I feel it both my right and my duty to set
forth the manner in which I endeavoured to discharge my share in these
hazardous responsibilities. In doing so I have adhered to certain strict
rules. I have made no important statement of fact relating to naval
operations or Admiralty business, on which I do not possess
unimpeachable documentary proof. I have made or implied no criticism of
any decision or action taken or neglected by others unless I can prove
that I had expressed the same opinion in writing _before the event_.

Many of the accounts which I have mentioned above enjoy the great
advantage of having been written some considerable time after the events
with which they deal, when the results of schemes and operations set on
foot in the early days of the war could be clearly seen, and when the
ideas and impressions of 1914 and 1915 could be reviewed in the broad
and certain experience and science of 1918 and after. There are no doubt
obvious conveniences in this way of treating the subject. Actors in
these great situations are able to dwell with certainty upon those of
their opinions and directions which have effectively been vindicated by
the subsequent course of the war, and they are not, on the other hand,
obliged to disturb the public mind by dwelling on any errors of neglect
or commission into which they may possibly have been betrayed. I have
followed a different method.

In every case where the interests of the State allow, I have printed the
actual memoranda, directions, minutes, telegrams or letters written by
me at the time, irrespective of whether these documents have been
vindicated or falsified by the march of history and of time. The only
excisions of relevant matter from the documents have been made to avoid
needlessly hurting the feelings of individuals, or the pride of friendly
nations. For such reasons here and there sentences have been softened or
suppressed. But the whole story is recorded as it happened, by the
actual counsels offered and orders given in the fierce turmoil of each
day. The principal minutes by which Admiralty business was conducted
embody in every case decisions for which, as the highest executive
authority in the department, I was directly responsible, and are in all
cases expressed in my own words. I am equally accountable, together with
the First Sea Lord at the time, for the principal telegrams which moved
fleets, squadrons and individual ships, all of which (unless the
contrary appears) bear my initials as their final sanction.

The number of minutes and telegrams published in these volumes is, of
course, only a fraction of the whole. Restricted space and the fear of
wearying the reader have excluded much. But lest it should be thought
that there have been any material suppressions, or that what is
published does not truly represent what occurred, or the way things were
done, I affirm my own willingness to see every document of Admiralty
administration for which I am responsible made public provided it is
presented in its fair context. Sometimes a dozen or even a score of
important decisions had to be taken in a single day. Complicated
directions and recommendations were given in writing as fast as they
could be dictated, and were acted upon without recall thereafter.
Nothing of any consequence was done by me by word of mouth. A complete
record therefore exists both of executive and administrative action.

If in the great number of decisions and orders which these pages recount
and which deal with so many violent and controversial affairs, mistakes
can be found which led to mishap, the fault is mine. If, on the other
hand, favourable results were achieved, that should be counted to some
extent as an offset. Where the decision lay outside my powers and was
taken contrary to my advice, I rest on the written record of my warning.
Should it be objected that in any of these matters, many of them so
highly technical, a landsman and layman could form no valuable opinion,
I point to the documents themselves. They can be judged as they stand,
but lest, on the other hand, it should be thought that I am seeking to
claim credit which is not mine, it must be remembered that throughout
this period I enjoyed the assistance, loyal, spontaneous and unstinted,
of the best brains of the Royal Navy, that every treasure of every
branch of the Admiralty and the Fleet was lavished upon my instruction,
and that I had only to apply my own reason and instinct to the arguments
of those who I believe stood in the foremost rank of the naval experts
of the world.

Taking a general view in after years of the transactions of this
terrific epoch, I commend with some confidence the story as a whole to
the judgment of my countrymen. It has long been the fashion to disparage
the policy and actions of the Ministers who bore the burden of power in
the fateful years before the War, and who faced the extraordinary perils
of its outbreak and opening phases. Abroad, in Allied, in neutral, and
above all, in enemy States, their work is regarded with respect and even
admiration. At home, criticism has been its only meed. I hope that this
account may be agreeable to those at least who wish to think well of our
country, of its naval service, of its governing institutions, of its
political life and public men; and that they will feel that perhaps
after all Britain and her Empire have not been so ill-guided through the
great convulsions as it is customary to declare.

Lastly, I must record my thanks to Vice-Admiral Thomas Jackson and
others who have aided me in the preparation and revision of this work,
especially in its technical aspect, and to those who have given me
permission to quote correspondence or conversations in which they were
concerned.

[Illustration: Winston S. Churchill]

LONDON, _January, 1923_.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE
I THE VIALS OF WRATH 1

II MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 19

III THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 38

IV ADMIRALS ALL 68

V THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 95

VI THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 125

VII THE NORTH SEA FRONT 149

VIII IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 179

IX THE CRISIS 203

X THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 228

XI WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 247

XII THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 281

XIII ON THE OCEANS 305

XIV IN THE NARROW SEAS 330

XV ANTWERP 355

XVI THE CHANNEL PORTS 391

XVII THE GRAND FLEET AND THE SUBMARINE ALARM 413

XVIII CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 442

XIX WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 479

XX THE BOMBARDMENT OF SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 502

XXI TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 522

APPENDIX A _Naval Staff Training_ 552

APPENDIX B _Tables of Fleet Strength_ 558

APPENDIX C _Trade Protection_ 562

APPENDIX D _Mining_ 566

APPENDIX E _First Lord’s Minutes_ 570

INDEX 579

TABLE OF MAPS

AT PAGE
I HOME WATERS 224

II THE ESCAPE OF THE “GOEBEN” 274

III ON THE OCEANS 328

IV ANTWERP AND THE BELGIUM COAST 360

V CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 476

VI THE 16TH DECEMBER, 1914 518

OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS

THE SEVENTEEN POINTS OF THE FIRST LORD 206

FACSIMILE OF ADMIRALTY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT DEVONPORT _facing page_ 474

CHAPTER I
THE VIALS OF WRATH
1870–1904

“To put on record what were their grounds of feud.”
HERODOTUS.

The Unending Task—Ruthless War—The Victorian Age—National
Pride—National Accountability—The Franco-German Feud—Bismarck’s
Apprehension—His Precautions and Alliances—The Bismarckian Period
and System—The Young Emperor and Caprivi—The Franco-Russian
Alliance, 1892—The Balance of Power—Anglo-German Ties—Anglo-German
Estrangement—Germany and the South African War—The Beginnings of
the German Navy—The Birth of a Challenge—The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance—The Russo-Japanese War—Consequences—The Anglo-French
Agreement of 1904—Lord Rosebery’s Comment—The Triple
Entente—Degeneration in Turkey and Austria—The Long Descent—The
Sinister Hypothesis.

It was the custom in the palmy days of Queen Victoria for statesmen to
expatiate upon the glories of the British Empire, and to rejoice in that
protecting Providence which had preserved us through so many dangers and
brought us at length into a secure and prosperous age. Little did they
know that the worst perils had still to be encountered and that the
greatest triumphs were yet to be won.

Children were taught of the Great War against Napoleon as the
culminating effort in the history of the British peoples, and they
looked on Waterloo and Trafalgar as the supreme achievements of British
arms by land and sea. These prodigious victories, eclipsing all that had
gone before, seemed the fit and predestined ending to the long drama of
our island race, which had advanced over a thousand years from small and
weak beginnings to a foremost position in the world. Three separate
times in three different centuries had the British people rescued Europe
from a military domination. Thrice had the Low Countries been assailed;
by Spain, by the French Monarchy, by the French Empire. Thrice had
British war and policy, often maintained single-handed, overthrown the
aggressor. Always at the outset the strength of the enemy had seemed
overwhelming, always the struggle had been prolonged through many years
and across awful hazards, always the victory had at last been won: and
the last of all the victories had been the greatest of all, gained after
the most ruinous struggle and over the most formidable foe.

Surely that was the end of the tale as it was so often the end of the
book. History showed the rise, culmination, splendour, transition and
decline of States and Empires. It seemed inconceivable that the same
series of tremendous events through which since the days of Queen
Elizabeth we had three times made our way successfully, should be
repeated a fourth time and on an immeasurably larger scale. Yet that is
what has happened, and what we have lived to see.

* * * * *

The Great War through which we have passed differed from all ancient
wars in the immense power of the combatants and their fearful agencies
of destruction, and from all modern wars in the utter ruthlessness with
which it was fought. All the horrors of all the ages were brought
together, and not only armies but whole populations were thrust into the
midst of them. The mighty educated States involved conceived with reason
that their very existence was at stake. Germany having let Hell loose
kept well in the van of terror; but she was followed step by step by the
desperate and ultimately avenging nations she had assailed. Every
outrage against humanity or international law was repaid by reprisals
often on a greater scale and of longer duration. No truce or parley
mitigated the strife of the armies. The wounded died between the lines:
the dead mouldered into the soil. Merchant ships and neutral ships and
hospital ships were sunk on the seas and all on board left to their
fate, or killed as they swam. Every effort was made to starve whole
nations into submission without regard to age or sex. Cities and
monuments were smashed by artillery. Bombs from the air were cast down
indiscriminately. Poison gas in many forms stifled or seared the
soldiers. Liquid fire was projected upon their bodies. Men fell from the
air in flames, or were smothered, often slowly, in the dark recesses of
the sea. The fighting strength of armies was limited only by the manhood
of their countries. Europe and large parts of Asia and Africa became one
vast battlefield on which after years of struggle not armies but nations
broke and ran. When all was over, Torture and Cannibalism were the only
two expedients that the civilised, scientific, Christian States had been
able to deny themselves: and these were of doubtful utility.

But nothing daunted the valiant heart of man. Son of the Stone Age,
vanquisher of nature with all her trials and monsters, he met the awful
and self-inflicted agony with new reserves of fortitude. Freed in the
main by his intelligence from mediæval fears, he marched to death with
sombre dignity. His nervous system was found in the twentieth century
capable of enduring physical and moral stresses before which the simpler
natures of primeval times would have collapsed. Again and again to the
hideous bombardment, again and again from the hospital to the front,
again and again to the hungry submarines, he strode unflinching. And
withal, as an individual, preserved through these torments the glories
of a reasonable and compassionate mind.

* * * * *

In the beginning of the twentieth century men were everywhere
unconscious of the rate at which the world was growing. It required the
convulsion of the war to awaken the nations to the knowledge of their
strength. For a year after the war had begun hardly anyone understood
how terrific, how almost inexhaustible were the resources in force, in
substance, in virtue, behind every one of the combatants. The vials of
wrath were full: but so were the reservoirs of power. From the end of
the Napoleonic Wars and still more after 1870, the accumulation of
wealth and health by every civilised community had been practically
unchecked. Here and there a retarding episode had occurred. The waves
had recoiled after advancing: but the mounting tides still flowed. And
when the dread signal of Armageddon was made, mankind was found to be
many times stronger in valour, in endurance, in brains, in science, in
apparatus, in organisation, not only than it had ever been before, but
than even its most audacious optimists had dared to dream.

The Victorian Age was the age of accumulation; not of a mere piling up
of material wealth, but of the growth and gathering in every land of all
those elements and factors which go to make up the power of States.
Education spread itself over the broad surface of the millions. Science
had opened the limitless treasure-house of nature. Door after door had
been unlocked. One dim mysterious gallery after another had been lighted
up, explored, made free for all: and every gallery entered gave access
to at least two more. Every morning when the world woke up, some new
machinery had started running. Every night while the world had supper,
it was running still. It ran on while all men slept.

And the advance of the collective mind was at a similar pace. Disraeli
said of the early years of the nineteenth century, “In those days
England was for the few—and for the very few.” Every year of Queen
Victoria’s reign saw those limits broken and extended. Every year
brought in new thousands of people in private stations who thought about
their own country and its story and its duties towards other countries,
to the world and to the future, and understood the greatness of the
responsibilities of which they were the heirs. Every year diffused a
wider measure of material comfort among the higher ranks of labour.
Substantial progress was made in mitigating the hard lot of the mass.
Their health improved, their lives and the lives of their children were
brightened, their stature grew, their securities against some of their
gravest misfortunes were multiplied, their numbers greatly increased.

Thus when all the trumpets sounded, every class and rank had something
to give to the need of the State. Some gave their science and some their
wealth, some gave their business energy and drive, and some their
wonderful personal prowess, and some their patient strength or patient
weakness. But none gave more, or gave more readily, than the common man
or woman who had nothing but a precarious week’s wages between them and
poverty, and owned little more than the slender equipment of a cottage,
and the garments in which they stood upright. Their love and pride of
country, their loyalty to the symbols with which they were familiar,
their keen sense of right and wrong as they saw it, led them to outface
and endure perils and ordeals the like of which men had not known on
earth.

But these developments, these virtues, were no monopoly of any one
nation. In every free country, great or small, the spirit of patriotism
and nationality grew steadily; and in every country, bond or free, the
organisation and structure into which men were fitted by the laws,
gathered and armed this sentiment. Far more than their vices, the
virtues of nations ill-directed or mis-directed by their rulers, became
the cause of their own undoing and of the general catastrophe. And these
rulers, in Germany, Austria, and Italy; in France, Russia or Britain,
how far were they to blame? Was there any man of real eminence and
responsibility whose devil heart conceived and willed this awful thing?
One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a
prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon world
fortunes. It has been well said, “there is always more error than design
in human affairs.” The limited minds even of the ablest men, their
disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their
transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem
itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so
changing in its aspect—all this must surely be considered before the
complete condemnation of the vanquished or the complete acquittal of the
victors can be pronounced. Events also got on to certain lines, and no
one could get them off again. Germany clanked obstinately, recklessly,
awkwardly towards the crater and dragged us all in with her. But fierce
resentment dwelt in France, and in Russia there were wheels within
wheels. Could we in England perhaps by some effort, by some sacrifice of
our material interests, by some compulsive gesture, at once of
friendship and command, have reconciled France and Germany in time and
formed that grand association on which alone the peace and glory of
Europe would be safe? I cannot tell. I only know that we tried our best
to steer our country through the gathering dangers of the armed peace
without bringing her to war or others to war, and when these efforts
failed, we drove through the tempest without bringing her to
destruction.

* * * * *

There is no need here to trace the ancient causes of quarrel between the
Germans and the French, to catalogue the conflicts with which they have
scarred the centuries, nor to appraise the balance of injury or of
provocation on one side or the other. When on the 18th of January, 1871,
the triumph of the Germans was consolidated by the Proclamation of the
German Empire in the Palace of Versailles, a new volume of European
history was opened. “Europe,” it was said, “has lost a mistress and has
gained a master.” A new and mighty State had come into being, sustained
by an overflowing population, equipped with science and learning,
organised for war and crowned with victory. France, stripped of Alsace
and Lorraine, beaten, impoverished, divided and alone, condemned to a
decisive and increasing numerical inferiority, fell back to ponder in
shade and isolation on her departed glories.

But the chiefs of the German Empire were under no illusions as to the
formidable character and implacable resolves of their prostrate
antagonist. “What we gained by arms in half a year,” said Moltke, “we
must protect by arms for half a century, if it is not to be torn from us
again.” Bismarck, more prudent still, would never have taken Lorraine.
Forced by military pressure to assume the double burden against his
better judgment, he exhibited from the outset and in every act of his
policy an extreme apprehension. Restrained by the opinion of the world,
and the decided attitude of Great Britain, from striking down a reviving
France in 1875, he devoted his whole power and genius to the
construction of an elaborate system of alliances designed to secure the
continued ascendancy of Germany and the maintenance of her conquests. He
knew the quarrel with France was irreconcilable except at a price which
Germany would never consent to pay. He understood that the abiding
enmity of a terrific people would be fixed on his new-built Empire.
Everything else must be subordinated to that central fact. Germany could
afford no other antagonisms. In 1879 he formed an alliance with Austria.
Four years later this was expanded into the Triple Alliance between
Germany, Austria and Italy. Roumania was brought into this system by a
secret alliance in 1883. Not only must there be Insurance; there must be
Reinsurance. What he feared most was a counteralliance between France
and Russia; and none of these extending arrangements met this danger.
His alliance with Austria indeed, if left by itself, would naturally
tend to draw France and Russia together. Could he not make a league of
the three Emperors—Germany, Austria, and Russia united? There at last
was overwhelming strength and enduring safety. When in 1887 after six
years, this supreme ideal of Bismarck was ruptured by the clash of
Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans, he turned—as the best
means still open to him—to his Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Germany,
by this arrangement, secured herself against becoming the object of an
aggressive combination by France and Russia. Russia on the other hand
was reassured that the Austro-German alliance would not be used to
undermine her position in the Balkans.

All these cautious and sapient measures were designed with the object of
enabling Germany to enjoy her victory in peace. The Bismarckian system,
further, always included the principle of good relations with Great
Britain. This was necessary, for it was well known that Italy would
never willingly commit herself to anything that would bring her into war
with Great Britain, and had, as the world now knows, required this fact
to be specifically stated in the original and secret text of the Triple
Alliance. To this Alliance in its early years Great Britain had been
wholly favourable. Thus France was left to nurse her scars alone; and
Germany, assured in her predominance on the Continent, was able to take
the fullest advantage of the immense industrial developments which
characterised the close of the nineteenth century. The policy of Germany
further encouraged France as a consolation to develop her colonial
possessions in order to take her thoughts off Europe, and incidentally
to promote a convenient rivalry and friction with Great Britain.

This arrangement, under which Europe lived rigidly but peacefully for
twenty years, and Germany waxed in power and splendour, was ended in
1890 with the fall of Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor was gone, and new
forces began to assail the system he had maintained with consummate
ability so long. There was a constant danger of conflagration in the
Balkans and in the Near East through Turkish misgovernment. The rising
tides of pan-Slavism and the strong anti-German currents in Russia began
to wash against the structure of the Reinsurance Treaty. Lastly, German
ambitions grew with German prosperity. Not content with the hegemony of
Europe, she sought a colonial domain. Already the greatest of military
Empires, she began increasingly to turn her thoughts to the sea. The
young Emperor, freed from Bismarck and finding in Count Caprivi, and the
lesser men who succeeded him, complacent coadjutors, began gaily to
dispense with the safeguards and precautions by which the safety of
Germany had been buttressed. While the quarrel with France remained open
and undying, the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was dropped, and later
on the naval rivalry with Britain was begun. These two sombre decisions
rolled forward slowly as the years unfolded. Their consequences became
apparent in due season. In 1892 the event against which the whole policy
of Bismarck had been directed came to pass. The Dual Alliance was signed
between Russia and France. Although the effects were not immediately
visible, the European situation was in fact transformed. Henceforward,
for the undisputed but soberly exercised predominance of Germany, there
was substituted a balance of power. Two vast combinations, each
disposing of enormous military resources, dwelt together at first side
by side but gradually face to face.

* * * * *

Although the groupings of the great Powers had thus been altered
sensibly to the disadvantage of Germany, there was in this alteration
nothing that threatened her with war. The abiding spirit of France had
never abandoned the dream of recovering the lost provinces, but the
prevailing temper of the French nation was pacific, and all classes
remained under the impression of the might of Germany and of the
terrible consequences likely to result from war.

Moreover, the French were never sure of Russia in a purely Franco-German
quarrel. True, there was the Treaty; but the Treaty to become operative
required aggression on the part of Germany. What constitutes aggression?
At what point in a dispute between two heavily armed parties, does one
side or the other become the aggressor? At any rate there was a wide
field for discretionary action on the part of Russia. Of all these
matters she would be the judge, and she would be the judge at a moment
when it might be said that the Russian people would be sent to die in
millions over a quarrel between France and Germany in which they had no
direct interest. The word of the Tsar was indeed a great assurance. But
Tsars who tried to lead their nations, however honourably, into
unpopular wars might disappear. The policy of a great people, if hung
too directly upon the person of a single individual, was liable to be
changed by his disappearance. France, therefore, could never feel
certain that if on any occasion she resisted German pressure and war
resulted, Russia would march.

Such was the ponderous balance which had succeeded the unquestioned
ascendancy of Germany. Outside both systems rested England, secure in an
overwhelming and as yet unchallenged, naval supremacy. It was evident
that the position of the British Empire received added importance from
the fact that adhesion to either Alliance would decide the predominance
of strength. But Lord Salisbury showed no wish to exploit this
favourable situation. He maintained steadily the traditional friendly
attitude towards Germany combined with a cool detachment from
Continental entanglements.

* * * * *

It had been easy for Germany to lose touch with Russia; but the
alienation of England was a far longer process. So many props and ties
had successively to be demolished. British suspicions of Russia in Asia,
the historic antagonism to France, memories of Blenheim, of Minden and
of Waterloo, the continued disputes with France in Egypt and in the
Colonial sphere, the intimate business connexions between Germany and
England, the relationship of the Royal Families—all these constituted a
profound association between the British Empire and the leading State in
that Triple Alliance. It was no part of British policy to obstruct the
new-born Colonial aspirations of Germany, and in more than one instance,
as at Samoa, we actively assisted them. With a complete detachment from
strategic considerations, Lord Salisbury exchanged Heligoland for
Zanzibar. Still even before the fall of Bismarck the Germans did not
seem pleasant diplomatic comrades. They appeared always to be seeking to
enlist our aid and reminding us that they were our only friend. To
emphasise this they went even farther. They sought in minor ways to
embroil us with France and Russia. Each year the Wilhelmstrasse looked
inquiringly to the Court of St. James’s for some new service or
concession which should keep Germany’s diplomatic goodwill alive for a
further period. Each year they made mischief for us with France and
Russia, and pointed the moral of how unpopular Great Britain was, what
powerful enemies she had, and how lucky she was to find a friend in
Germany. Where would she be in the councils of Europe if German
assistance were withdrawn, or if Germany threw her influence into the
opposing combination? These manifestations, prolonged for nearly twenty
years, produced very definite sensations of estrangement in the minds of
the rising generation at the British Foreign Office.

But none of these woes of diplomatists deflected the steady course of
British policy. The Colonial expansion of Germany was viewed with easy
indifference by the British Empire. In spite of their rivalry in trade,
there grew up a far more important commercial connexion between Britain
and Germany. In Europe we were each other’s best customers. Even the
German Emperor’s telegram to President Kruger on the Jameson Raid in
1896, which we now know to have been no personal act but a decision of
the German Government, produced only a temporary ebullition of anger.
All the German outburst of rage against England during the Boer War, and
such attempts as were made to form a European coalition against us, did
not prevent Mr. Chamberlain in 1901 from advocating an alliance with
Germany, or the British Foreign Office from proposing in the same year
to make the Alliance between Britain and Japan into a Triple Alliance
including Germany. During this period we had at least as serious
differences with France as with Germany, and sufficient naval
superiority not to be seriously disquieted by either. We stood equally
clear of the Triple and of the Dual Alliance. We had no intention of
being drawn into a Continental quarrel. No effort by France to regain
her lost provinces appealed to the British public or to any political
party. The idea of a British Army fighting in Europe amid the mighty
hosts of the Continent was by all dismissed as utterly absurd. Only a
menace to the very life of the British nation would stir the British
Empire from its placid and tolerant detachment from Continental affairs.
But that menace Germany was destined to supply.

* * * * *

“Among the Great Powers,” said Moltke in his Military Testament,
“England necessarily requires a strong ally on the Continent. She would
not find one which corresponds better to all her interests than a United
Germany, that can never make claim to the command of the sea.”

From 1873 to 1900 the German Navy was avowedly not intended to provide
for the possibility of “a naval war against great naval Powers.” Now in
1900 came a Fleet Law of a very different kind. “For the protection of
trade and the Colonies,” declared the preamble of this document, “there
is only one thing that will suffice, namely, a strong Battle Fleet.”

In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions,
only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet
of such a strength that, even for the most powerful naval adversary, a
war would involve such risks as to make that Power’s own supremacy
doubtful.

For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet
should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule,
a great naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its
forces against us. Even if it were successful in bringing against us a
much superior force, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so
considerably weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory that might
be achieved, his own supremacy would no longer be assured by a fleet of
sufficient strength.

For the attainment of this object, viz., protection of our trade and
colonies by assuring peace with honour, Germany requires, according to
the strength of the great naval Powers and with regard to our tactical
formations, two double squadrons of first-class battleships, with the
necessary attendant cruisers, torpedo boats, etc. Since the Fleet Law
provides for only two squadrons, the construction of third and fourth
squadrons is proposed. Two of these four squadrons will form one fleet.
The tactical formation of the second fleet should be similar to that of
the first as provided for in the Fleet Law.

And again:—

In addition to the increase of the Home Fleet an increase of the foreign
service ships is also necessary.... In order to estimate the importance
of an increase in our foreign service ships, it must be realised that
they represent the German Navy abroad, and that to them often falls the
task of gathering fruits which have ripened as a result of the naval
strength of the Empire embodied in the Home Battle Fleet.

And again:—

If the necessity for so strong a Fleet for Germany be recognised, it
cannot be denied that the honour and welfare of the Fatherland
authoritatively demand that the Home Fleet be brought up to the
requisite strength as soon as possible.

* * * * *

The determination of the greatest military Power on the Continent to
become at the same time at least the second naval Power was an event of
first magnitude in world affairs. It would, if carried into full effect,
undoubtedly reproduce those situations which at previous periods in
history had proved of such awful significance to the Islanders of
Britain.

Hitherto all British naval arrangements had proceeded on the basis of
the two-Power standard, namely, an adequate superiority over the next
two strongest Powers, in those days France and Russia. The possible
addition of a third European Fleet more powerful than either of these
two would profoundly affect the life of Britain. If Germany was going to
create a Navy avowedly measured against our own, we could not afford to
remain “in splendid isolation” from the European systems. We must in
these circumstances find a trustworthy friend. We found one in another
island Empire situated on the other side of the globe and also in
danger. In 1901 the Alliance was signed between Great Britain and Japan.
Still less could we afford to have dangerous causes of quarrel open both
with France and Russia. In 1902 the British Government, under Mr.
Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, definitely embarked upon the policy of
settling up our differences with France. Still, before either of these
steps were taken the hand was held out to Germany. She was invited to
join with us in the alliance with Japan. She was invited to make a joint
effort to solve the Moroccan problem. Both offers were declined.

In 1904, the war between Russia and Japan broke out. Germany sympathised
mainly with Russia; England stood ready to fulfil her treaty engagements
with Japan, while at the same time cultivating good relations with
France. In this posture the Powers awaited the result of the Far Eastern
struggle. It brought a surprise to all but one. The military and naval
overthrow of Russia by Japan and the internal convulsions of the Russian
State produced profound changes in the European situation. Although
German influence had leaned against Japan, she felt herself enormously
strengthened by the Russian collapse. Her Continental predominance was
restored. Her self-assertion in every sphere became sensibly and
immediately pronounced. France, on the other hand, weakened and once
again, for the time being, isolated and in real danger, became
increasingly anxious for an Entente with England. England, whose
statesmen with penetrating eye alone in Europe had truly measured the
martial power of Japan, gained remarkably in strength and security.
Japan, her new ally, was triumphant: France, her ancient enemy, sought
her friendship: the German fleet was still only a-building, and
meanwhile all the British battleships in China seas could now be safely
brought home.

* * * * *

The settlement of outstanding differences between England and France
proceeded, and at last in 1904 the Anglo-French Agreement was signed.
There were various clauses; but the essence of the compact was that the
French desisted from opposition to British interests in Egypt, and
Britain gave a general support to the French views about Morocco. This
agreement was acclaimed by the Conservative forces in England, among
whom the idea of the German menace had already taken root. It was also
hailed somewhat short-sightedly by Liberal statesmen as a step to secure
general peace by clearing away misunderstandings and differences with
our traditional enemy. It was therefore almost universally welcomed.
Only one profound observer raised his voice against it. “My mournful and
supreme conviction,” said Lord Rosebery, “is that this agreement is much
more likely to lead to complications than to peace.” This unwelcome
comment was indignantly spurned from widely different standpoints by
both British parties, and general censure fell upon its author.

Still, England and all that she stood for had left her isolation, and
had reappeared in Europe on the opposite side to Germany. For the first
time since 1870 Germany had to take into consideration a Power outside
her system which was in no way amenable to threats, and was not unable
if need be to encounter her single-handed. The gesture which was to
sweep Delcassé from power in 1905, the apparition “in shining armour”
which was to quell Russia in 1908, could procure no such compliance from
the independent Island girt with her Fleet and mistress of the seas.

Up to this moment the Triple Alliance had on the whole been stronger
than France and Russia. Although war against these two Powers would have
been a formidable undertaking for Germany, Austria and Italy, its
ultimate issue did not seem doubtful. But if the weight of Britain were
thrown into the adverse scale and that of Italy withdrawn from the
other, then for the first time since 1870 Germany could not feel certain
that she was on the stronger side. Would she submit to it? Would the
growing, bounding ambitions and assertions of the new German Empire
consent to a situation in which, very politely no doubt, very gradually
perhaps, but still very surely, the impression would be conveyed that
her will was no longer the final law of Europe? If Germany and her
Emperor would accept the same sort of restraint that France, Russia and
England had long been accustomed to, and would live within her rights as
an equal in a freer and easier world, all would be well. But would she?
Would she tolerate the gathering under an independent standard of
nations outside her system, strong enough to examine her claims only as
the merits appealed to them, and to resist aggression without fear? The
history of the next ten years was to supply the answer.

Side by side with these slowly marshalling and steadily arming
antagonisms between the greatest Powers, processes of degeneration were
at work in weaker Empires almost equally dangerous to peace. Forces were
alive in Turkey which threatened with destruction the old regime and its
abuses on which Germany had chosen to lean. The Christian States of the
Balkans, growing stronger year by year, awaited an opportunity to
liberate their compatriots still writhing under Turkish misrule. The
growth of national sentiment in every country created fierce strains and
stresses in the uneasily knit and crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
Balkan States saw also in this direction kinsmen to rescue, territory to
recover, and unities to achieve. Italy watched with ardent eyes the
decay of Turkey and the unrest of Austria. It was certain that from all
these regions of the South and of the East there would come a succession
of events deeply agitating both to Russia and to Germany.

To create the unfavourable conditions for herself in which Germany
afterwards brought about the war, many acts of supreme unwisdom on the
part of her rulers were nevertheless still necessary. France must be
kept in a state of continued apprehension. The Russian nation, not the
Russian Court alone, must be stung by some violent affront inflicted in
their hour of weakness. The slow, deep, restrained antagonism of the
British Empire must be roused by the continuous and repeated challenge
to the sea power by which it lived. Then and then only could those
conditions be created under which Germany by an act of aggression would
bring into being against her, a combination strong enough to resist and
ultimately to overcome her might. There was still a long road to travel
before the Vials of Wrath were full. For ten years we were to journey
anxiously along that road.

* * * * *

It was for a time the fashion to write as if the British Government
during these ten years were either entirely unconscious of the
approaching danger or had a load of secret matters and deep forebodings
on their minds hidden altogether from the thoughtless nation. In fact,
however, neither of these alternatives, taken separately, was true; and
there is a measure of truth in both of them taken together.

The British Government and the Parliaments out of which it sprang, did
not believe in the approach of a great war, and were determined to
prevent it; but at the same time the sinister hypothesis was continually
present in their thoughts, and was repeatedly brought to the attention
of Ministers by disquieting incidents and tendencies.

During the whole of those ten years this duality and discordance were
the keynote of British politics; and those whose duty it was to watch
over the safety of the country lived simultaneously in two different
worlds of thought. There was the actual visible world with its peaceful
activities and cosmopolitan aims; and there was a hypothetical world, a
world “beneath the threshold,” as it were, a world at one moment utterly
fantastic, at the next seeming about to leap into reality—a world of
monstrous shadows moving in convulsive combinations through vistas of
fathomless catastrophe.

CHAPTER II
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON
1905–1910

‘Enmities which are unspoken and hidden are more to be feared than
those which are outspoken and open.’

CICERO.

A Narrower Stage—The Victorian Calm—The Chain of Strife—Lord Salisbury
Retires—Mr. Balfour and the End of an Epoch—Fall of the
Conservative Government—The General Election of 1906—The Algeciras
Conference—Anglo-French Military Conversations—Mr. Asquith’s
Administration—The Austrian Annexations—The German Threat to
Russia—The Admiralty Programme of 1909—The Growth of the German
Navy—German Finance and its Implications—The Inheritance of the
New German Chancellor.

If the reader is to understand this tale and the point of view from
which it is told, he should follow the authors mind in each principal
sphere of causation. He must not only be acquainted with the military
and naval situations as they existed at the outbreak of war, but with
the events which led up to them. He must be introduced to the Admirals
and to the Generals; he must study the organisation of the Fleets and
Armies and the outlines of their strategy by sea and land; he must not
shrink even from the design of ships and cannon; he must extend his view
to the groupings and slow-growing antagonisms of modern States; he must
contract it to the humbler but unavoidable warfare of parties and the
interplay of political forces and personalities.

The _dramatis personæ_ of the previous Chapter have been great States
and Empires and its theme their world-wide balance and combinations. Now
the stage must for a while be narrowed to the limits of these islands
and occupied by the political personages and factions of the time and of
the hour.

In the year 1895 I had the privilege, as a young officer, of being
invited to lunch with Sir William Harcourt. In the course of a
conversation in which I took, I fear, none too modest a share, I asked
the question, “What will happen then?” “My dear Winston,” replied the
old Victorian statesman, “the experiences of a long life have convinced
me that nothing ever happens.” Since that moment, as it seems to me,
nothing has ever ceased happening. The growth of the great antagonisms
abroad was accompanied by the progressive aggravation of party strife at
home. The scale on which events have shaped themselves, has dwarfed the
episodes of the Victorian era. Its small wars between great nations, its
earnest disputes about superficial issues, the high, keen
intellectualism of its personages, the sober, frugal, narrow limitations
of their action, belong to a vanished period. The smooth river with its
eddies and ripples along which we then sailed, seems inconceivably
remote from the cataract down which we have been hurled and the rapids
in whose turbulence we are now struggling.

I date the beginning of these violent times in our country from the
Jameson Raid, in 1896. This was the herald, if not indeed the
progenitor, of the South African War. From the South African War was
born the Khaki Election, the Protectionist Movement, the Chinese Labour
cry and the consequent furious reaction and Liberal triumph of 1906.
From this sprang the violent inroads of the House of Lords upon popular
Government, which by the end of 1908 had reduced the immense Liberal
majority to virtual impotence, from which condition they were rescued by
the Lloyd George Budget in 1909. This measure became, in its turn, on
both sides, the cause of still greater provocations, and its rejection
by the Lords was a constitutional outrage and political blunder almost
beyond compare. It led directly to the two General Elections of 1910, to
the Parliament Act, and to the Irish struggle, in which our country was
brought to the very threshold of civil war. Thus we see a succession of
partisan actions continuing without intermission for nearly twenty
years, each injury repeated with interest, each oscillation more
violent, each risk more grave, until at last it seemed that the sabre
itself must be invoked to cool the blood and the passions that were
rife.

* * * * *

In July, 1902, Lord Salisbury retired. With what seems now to have been
only a brief interlude, he had been Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
since 1885. In those seventeen years the Liberal Party had never
exercised any effective control upon affairs. Their brief spell in
office had only been obtained by a majority of forty Irish Nationalist
votes. During thirteen years the Conservatives had enjoyed homogeneous
majorities of 100 to 150, and in addition there was the House of Lords.
This long reign of power had now come to an end. The desire for change,
the feeling that change was impending, was widespread. It was the end of
an epoch.

Lord Salisbury was followed by Mr. Balfour. The new Prime Minister never
had a fair chance. He succeeded only to an exhausted inheritance.
Indeed, his wisest course would have been to get out of office as
decently, as quietly, and, above all, as quickly as possible. He could
with great propriety have declared that the 1900 Parliament had been
elected on war conditions and on a war issue; that the war was now
finished successfully; that the mandate was exhausted and that he must
recur to the sense of the electors before proceeding farther with his
task. No doubt the Liberals would have come into power, but not by a
large majority; and they would have been faced by a strong, united
Conservative Opposition, which in four or five years, about 1907, would
have resumed effective control of the State. The solid ranks of
Conservative members who acclaimed Mr. Balfour’s accession as First
Minister were however in no mood to be dismissed to their constituencies
when the Parliament was only two years old and had still four or five
years more to run. Mr. Balfour therefore addressed himself to the duties
of Government with a serene indifference to the vast alienation of
public opinion and consolidation of hostile forces which were proceeding
all around him.

Mr. Chamberlain, his almost all-powerful lieutenant, was under no
illusions. He felt, with an acute political sensitiveness, the
ever-growing strength of the tide setting against the ruling
combination. But instead of pursuing courses of moderation and prudence,
he was impelled by the ardour of his nature to a desperate remedy. The
Government was reproached with being reactionary. The moderate
Conservatives and the younger Conservatives were all urging Liberal and
conciliatory processes. The Opposition was advancing hopefully towards
power, heralded by a storm of angry outcry. He would show them, and show
doubting or weary friends as well, how it was possible to quell
indignation by violence, and from the very heart of reaction to draw the
means of popular victory. He unfurled the flag of Protection.

Time, adversity and the recent Education Act had united the Liberals;
Protection, or Tariff Reform as it was called, split the Conservatives.
Ultimately, six Ministers resigned and fifty Conservative or Unionist
members definitely withdrew their support from the Government. Among
them were a number of those younger men from whom a Party should derive
new force and driving power, and who are specially necessary to it
during a period of opposition. The action of the Free Trade Unionists
was endorsed indirectly by Lord Salisbury himself from his retirement,
and was actively sustained by such pillars of the Unionist Party as Sir
Michael Hicks-Beach and the Duke of Devonshire. No such formidable loss
had been sustained by the Conservative Party since the expulsion of the
Peelites.

But if Mr. Balfour had not felt inclined to begin his reign by an act of
abdication, he was still less disposed to have power wrested from his
grasp. Moreover, he regarded a Party split as the worst of domestic
catastrophes, and responsibility for it as the unforgivable sin. He
therefore laboured with amazing patience and coolness to preserve a
semblance of unity, to calm the tempest, and to hold on as long as
possible in the hope of its subsiding. With the highest subtlety and
ingenuity he devised a succession of formulas designed to enable people
who differed profoundly, to persuade themselves they were in agreement.
When it came to the resignation of Ministers, he was careful to shed
Free Trade and Protectionist blood as far as possible in equal
quantities. Like Henry VIII, he decapitated Papists and burned hot
Gospellers on the same day for their respective divergencies in opposite
directions from his central, personal and artificial compromise.

In this unpleasant situation Mr. Balfour maintained himself for two
whole years. Vain the clamour for a general election, vain the taunts of
clinging to office, vain the solicitations of friends and the attempts
of foes to force a crucial issue. The Prime Minister remained immovable,
inexhaustible, imperturbable; and he remained Prime Minister. His clear,
just mind, detached from small things, stood indifferent to the clamour
about him. He pursued, as has been related, through the critical period
of the Russo-Japanese War, a policy in support of Japan of the utmost
firmness. He resisted all temptations, on the other hand, to make the
sinking of our trawlers on the Dogger Bank by the Russian Fleet an
occasion of war with Russia. He formed the Committee of Imperial
Defence—the instrument of our preparedness. He carried through the
agreement with France of 1904, the momentous significance of which the
last chapter has explained. But in 1905 political Britain cared for none
of these things. The credit of the Government fell steadily. The process
of degeneration in the Conservative Party was continuous. The storm of
opposition grew unceasingly, and so did the unification of all the
forces opposed to the dying regime.

Late in November, 1905, Mr. Balfour tendered his resignation as Prime
Minister to the King. The Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was
formed, and proceeded in January to appeal to the constituencies. This
Government represented both the wings into which the Liberal Party had
been divided by the Boer War. The Liberal Imperialists, so distinguished
by their talents, filled some of the greatest offices. Mr. Asquith went
to the Exchequer; Sir Edward Grey to the Foreign Office; Mr. Haldane
became Secretary of State for War. On the other hand the Prime Minister,
who himself represented the main stream of Liberal opinion, appointed
Sir Robert Reid, Lord Chancellor and Mr. John Morley, Secretary of State
for India. Both these statesmen, while not opposing actual war measures
in South Africa, had unceasingly condemned the war; and in Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. John Burns, both of whom entered the Cabinet, were found
democratic politicians who had gone even farther. The dignity of the
Administration was enhanced by the venerable figures of Lord Ripon, Sir
Henry Fowler, and the newly returned Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin.

The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Conservative landslide.
Never since the election following the great Reform Bill, had anything
comparable occurred in British parliamentary history. In Manchester, for
instance, which was one of the principal battle-grounds, Mr. Balfour and
eight Conservative colleagues were dismissed and replaced by nine
Liberals or Labour men. The Conservatives, after nearly twenty years of
power, crept back to the House of Commons barely a hundred and fifty
strong. The Liberals had gained a majority of more than one hundred over
all other parties combined. Both great parties harboured deep grievances
against the other; and against the wrong of the Khaki Election and its
misuse, was set the counter-claim of an unfair Chinese Labour cry.

* * * * *

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was still receiving the resounding
acclamations of Liberals, peace-lovers, anti-jingoes, and
anti-militarists, in every part of the country, when he was summoned by
Sir Edward Grey to attend to business of a very different character. The
Algeciras Conference was in its throes. When the Anglo-French Agreement
on Egypt and Morocco had first been made known, the German Government
accepted the situation without protest or complaint. The German
Chancellor, Prince Bülow, had even declared in 1904 that there was
nothing in the Agreement to which Germany could take exception. “What
appears to be before us is the attempt by the method of friendly
understanding to eliminate a number of points of difference which exist
between England and France. We have no objection to make against this
from the standpoint of German interest.” A serious agitation most
embarrassing to the German Government was, however, set on foot by the
Pan-German and Colonial parties. Under this pressure the attitude of the
Government changed, and a year later Germany openly challenged the
Agreement and looked about for an opportunity to assert her claims in
Morocco. This opportunity was not long delayed.

Early in 1905 a French mission arrived in Fez. Their language and
actions seemed to show an intention of treating Morocco as a French
Protectorate, thereby ignoring the international obligations of the
Treaty of Madrid. The Sultan of Morocco appealed to Germany, asking if
France was authorised to speak in the name of Europe. Germany was now
enabled to advance as the champion of an international agreement, which
she suggested France was violating. Behind this lay the clear intention
to show France that she could not afford in consequence of her agreement
with Britain, to offend Germany. The action taken was of the most
drastic character. The German Emperor was persuaded to go to Tangiers,
and there, against his better judgment, on March 31, 1905, he delivered,
in very uncompromising language chosen by his ministers, an open
challenge to France. To this speech the widest circulation was given by
the German Foreign Office. Hot-foot upon it (April 11 and 12) two very
threatening despatches were sent to Paris and London, demanding a
conference of all the Signatory Powers to the Treaty of Madrid. Every
means was used by Germany to make France understand that if she refused
the conference there would be war; and to make assurance doubly sure a
special envoy[1] was sent from Berlin to Paris for that express purpose.

France was quite unprepared for war; the army was in a bad state; Russia
was incapacitated; moreover, France had not a good case. The French
Foreign Minister, Monsieur Delcassé, was, however, unwilling to give
way. The German attitude became still more threatening; and on June 6
the French Cabinet of Monsieur Rouvier unanimously, almost at the
cannon’s mouth, accepted the principle of a conference, and Monsieur
Delcassé at once resigned.

So far Germany had been very successful. Under a direct threat of war
she had compelled France to bow to her will, and to sacrifice the
Minister who had negotiated the Agreement with Great Britain. The
Rouvier Cabinet sought earnestly for some friendly solution which, while
sparing France the humiliation of a conference dictated in such
circumstances, would secure substantial concessions to Germany. The
German Government were, however, determined to exploit their victory to
the full, and not to make the situation easier for France either before
or during the conference. The conference accordingly assembled at
Algeciras in January, 1906.

Great Britain now appeared on the scene, apparently quite unchanged and
unperturbed by her domestic convulsions. She had in no way encouraged
France to refuse the conference. But if a war was to be fastened on
France by Germany as the direct result of an agreement made recently in
the full light of day between France and Great Britain, it was held that
Great Britain could not remain indifferent. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
therefore authorised Sir Edward Grey to support France strongly at
Algeciras. He also authorised, almost as the first act of what was to be
an era of Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform, the beginning of military
conversations between the British and French General Staffs with a view
to concerted action in the event of war. This was a step of profound
significance and of far-reaching reactions. Henceforward the relations
of the two Staffs became increasingly intimate and confidential. The
minds of our military men were definitely turned into a particular
channel. Mutual trust grew continually in one set of military
relationships, mutual precautions in the other. However explicitly the
two Governments might agree and affirm to each other that no national or
political engagement was involved in these technical discussions, the
fact remained that they constituted an exceedingly potent tie.

The attitude of Great Britain at Algeciras turned the scale against
Germany. Russia, Spain and other signatory Powers associated themselves
with France and England. Austria revealed to Germany the limits beyond
which she would not go. Thus Germany found herself isolated, and what
she had gained by her threats of war evaporated at the Council Board. In
the end a compromise suggested by Austria, enabled Germany to withdraw
without open loss of dignity. From these events, however, serious
consequences flowed. Both the two systems into which Europe was divided,
were crystallised and consolidated. Germany felt the need of binding
Austria more closely to her. Her open attempt to terrorise France had
produced a deep impression upon French public opinion. An immediate and
thorough reform of the French Army was carried out, and the _Entente_
with England was strengthened and confirmed. Algeciras was a milestone
on the road to Armageddon.

* * * * *

The illness and death of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the beginning
of 1908 opened the way for Mr. Asquith. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
had been the First Lieutenant of the late Prime Minister, and, as his
chief’s strength failed, had more and more assumed the burden. He had
charged himself with the conduct of the new Licensing Bill which was to
be the staple of the Session of 1908, and in virtue of this task he
could command the allegiance of an extreme and doctrinaire section of
his Party from whom his Imperialism had previously alienated him. He
resolved to ally to himself the democratic gifts and rising reputation
of Mr. Lloyd George. Thus the succession passed smoothly from hand to
hand. Mr. Asquith became Prime Minister; Mr. Lloyd George became
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the second man in the Government. The
new Cabinet, like the old, was a veiled coalition. A very distinct line
of cleavage was maintained between the Radical-Pacifist elements who had
followed Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and constituted the bulk both of
the Cabinet and the Party on the one hand, and the Liberal Imperialist
wing on the other. Mr. Asquith, as Prime Minister, had now to take an
impartial position; but his heart and sympathies were always with Sir
Edward Grey, the War Office and the Admiralty, and on every important
occasion when he was forced to reveal himself, he definitely sided with
them. He was not, however, able to give Sir Edward Grey the same
effectual countenance, much as he might wish to do so, that Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman had done. The old chief’s word was law to the
extremists of his Party. They would accept almost anything from him.
They were quite sure he would do nothing more in matters of foreign
policy and defence than was absolutely necessary, and that he would do
it in the manner least calculated to give satisfaction to jingo
sentiments. Mr. Asquith, however, had been far from “sound” about the
Boer War, and was the lifelong friend of the Foreign Secretary, who had
wandered even further from the straight path into patriotic pastures. He
was therefore in a certain sense suspect, and every step he took in
external affairs was watched with prim vigilance by the Elders. If the
military conversations with France had not been authorised by Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, and if his political virtue could not be cited in
their justification, I doubt whether they could have been begun or
continued by Mr. Asquith.

Since I had crossed the Floor of the House in 1904 on the Free Trade
issue, I had worked in close political association with Mr. Lloyd
George. He was the first to welcome me. We sat and acted together in the
period of opposition preceding Mr. Balfour’s fall, and we had been in
close accord during Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s administration, in
which I had served as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. This
association continued when I entered the new Cabinet as President of the
Board of Trade, and in general, though from different angles, we leaned
to the side of those who would restrain the froward both in foreign
policy and in armaments. It must be understood that these differences of
attitude and complexion, which in varying forms reproduce themselves in
every great and powerful British Administration, in no way prevented
harmonious and agreeable relations between the principal personages, and
our affairs proceeded amid many amenities in an atmosphere of courtesy,
friendliness and goodwill.

* * * * *

It was not long before the next European crisis arrived. On October 5,
1908, Austria, without warning or parley, proclaimed the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces of the Turkish Empire had been
administered by her under the Treaty of Berlin, 1878; and the annexation
only declared in form what already existed in fact. The Young Turk
Revolution which had occurred in the summer, seemed to Austria likely to
lead to a reassertion of Turkish sovereignty over Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and this she was concerned to forestall. A reasonable and
patient diplomacy would probably have secured for Austria the easements
which she needed. Indeed, negotiations with Russia, the Great Power most
interested, had made favourable progress. But suddenly and abruptly
Count Aerenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, interrupted the
discussions by the announcement of the annexation, before the
arrangements for a suitable concession to Russia had been concluded. By
this essentially violent act a public affront was put upon Russia, and a
personal slight upon the Russian negotiator, Monsieur Isvolsky.

A storm of anger and protest arose on all sides. England, basing herself
on the words of the London Conference in 1871, “That it is an essential
principle of the law of nations that no Power can free itself from the
engagements of a Treaty, nor modify its stipulations except by consent
of the contracting parties,” refused to recognise either the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the declaration of Bulgarian independence
which had synchronised with it. Turkey protested loudly against a
lawless act. An effective boycott of Austrian merchandise was organised
by the Turkish Government. The Serbians mobilised their army. But it was
the effect on Russia which was most serious. The bitter animosity
excited against Austria throughout Russia became a penultimate cause of
the Great War. In this national quarrel the personal differences of
Aerenthal and Isvolsky played also their part.

Great Britain and Russia now demanded a conference, declining meanwhile
to countenance what had been done. Austria, supported by Germany,
refused. The danger of some violent action on the part of Serbia became
acute. Sir Edward Grey, after making it clear that Great Britain would
not be drawn into a war on a Balkan quarrel, laboured to restrain
Serbia, to pacify Turkey, and to give full diplomatic support to Russia.
The controversy dragged on till April, 1909, when it was ended in the
following remarkable manner. The Austrians had determined, unless Serbia
recognised the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to send an
ultimatum and to declare war upon her. At this point the German
Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, intervened. Russia, he insisted, should
herself advise Serbia to give way. The Powers should officially
recognise the annexation without a conference being summoned and without
any kind of compensation to Serbia. Russia was to give her consent to
this action, without previously informing the British or French
Governments. If Russia did not consent, Austria would declare war on
Serbia _with the full and complete support of Germany_. Russia, thus
nakedly confronted by war both with Austria and Germany, collapsed under
the threat, as France had done three years before. England was left an
isolated defender of the sanctity of Treaties and the law of nations.
The Teutonic triumph was complete. But it was a victory gained at a
perilous cost. France, after her treatment in 1905, had begun a thorough
military reorganisation. Now Russia, in 1910, made an enormous increase
in her already vast army; and both Russia and France, smarting under
similar experiences, closed their ranks, cemented their alliance, and
set to work to construct with Russian labour and French money the new
strategic railway systems of which Russia’s western frontier stood in
need.

* * * * *

It was next the turn of Great Britain to feel the pressure of the German
power.

In the spring of 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna,
suddenly demanded the construction of no less than six Dreadnought
battleships. He based this claim on the rapid growth of the German Fleet
and its expansion and acceleration under the new naval law of 1908,
which was causing the Admiralty the greatest anxiety. I was still a
sceptic about the danger of the European situation, and not convinced by
the Admiralty case. In conjunction with the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
I proceeded at once to canvas this scheme and to examine the reasons by
which it was supported. The conclusions which we both reached were that
a programme of four ships would sufficiently meet our needs. In this
process I was led to analyse minutely the character and composition of
the British and German Navies, actual and prospective. I could not agree
with the Admiralty contention that a dangerous situation would be
reached in the year 1912. I found the Admiralty figures on this subject
were exaggerated. I did not believe that the Germans were building
Dreadnoughts secretly in excess of their published Fleet Laws. I held
that our margin in pre-Dreadnought ships would, added to a new programme
of four Dreadnoughts, assure us an adequate superiority in 1912, “the
danger year” as it was then called. In any case, as the Admiralty only
claimed to lay down the fifth and sixth ships in the last month of the
financial year, i. e., March, 1910, these could not affect the
calculations. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and I therefore proposed
that four ships should be sanctioned for 1909, and that the additional
two should be considered in relation to the programme of 1910.

Looking back on the voluminous papers of this controversy in the light
of what actually happened, there can be no doubt whatever that, so far
as facts and figures were concerned, we were strictly right. The gloomy
Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912.
The British margin was found to be ample in that year. There were no
secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von Tirpitz made any untrue
statement in respect of major construction.

The dispute in the Cabinet gave rise to a fierce agitation outside. The
process of the controversy led to a sharp rise of temperature. The
actual points in dispute never came to an issue. Genuine alarm was
excited throughout the country by what was for the first time widely
recognised as a German menace. In the end a curious and characteristic
solution was reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the
economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight. However,
five out of the eight were not ready before “the danger year” of 1912
had passed peacefully away.

But although the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I were right in the
narrow sense, we were absolutely wrong in relation to the deep tides of
destiny. The greatest credit is due to the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Mr. McKenna, for the resolute and courageous manner in which he fought
his case and withstood his Party on this occasion. Little did I think,
as this dispute proceeded, that when the next Cabinet crisis about the
Navy arose our rôles would be reversed; and little did he think that the
ships for which he contended so stoutly would eventually, when they
arrived, be welcomed with open arms by me.

Whatever differences might be entertained about the exact number of
ships required in a particular year, the British nation in general
became conscious of the undoubted fact that Germany proposed to
reinforce her unequalled army by a navy which in 1920 would be far
stronger than anything up to the present possessed by Great Britain. To
the Navy Law of 1900 had succeeded the amending measure of 1906; and
upon the increases of 1906 had followed those of 1908. In a flamboyant
speech at Reval in 1904 the German Emperor had already styled himself,
“The Admiral of the Atlantic.” All sorts of sober-minded people in
England began to be profoundly disquieted. What did Germany want this
great navy for? Against whom, except us, could she measure it, match it,
or use it? There was a deep and growing feeling, no longer confined to
political and diplomatic circles, that the Prussians meant mischief,
that they envied the splendour of the British Empire, and that if they
saw a good chance at our expense, they would take full advantage of it.
Moreover it began to be realised that it was no use trying to turn
Germany from her course by abstaining from counter measures. Reluctance
on our part to build ships was attributed in Germany to want of national
spirit, and as another proof that the virile race should advance to
replace the effete overcivilised and pacifist society which was no
longer capable of sustaining its great place in the world’s affairs. No
one could run his eyes down the series of figures of British and German
construction for the first three years of the Liberal Administration,
without feeling in presence of a dangerous, if not a malignant, design.

In 1905 Britain built 4 ships, and Germany 2.

In 1906 Britain _decreased_ her programme to 3 ships, and Germany
_increased_ her programme to 3 ships.

In 1907 Britain _further decreased_ her programme to 2 ships, and
Germany _further increased_ her programme to 4 ships.

These figures are monumental.

It was impossible to resist the conclusion, gradually forced on nearly
every one, that if the British Navy lagged behind, the gap would be very
speedily filled.

* * * * *

As President of the Board of Trade I was able to obtain a general view
of the structure of German finance. In 1909 a most careful report was
prepared by my direction on the whole of this subject. Its study was not
reassuring. I circulated it to the Cabinet with the following covering
minute:—

_November 3, 1909._

Believing that there are practically no checks upon German naval
expansion except those imposed by the increasing difficulties of
getting money, I have had the enclosed report prepared with a view to
showing how far those limitations are becoming effective. It is clear
that they are becoming terribly effective. The overflowing expenditure
of the German Empire strains and threatens every dyke by which the
social and political unity of Germany is maintained. The high customs
duties have been largely rendered inelastic through commercial
treaties, and cannot meet the demand. The heavy duties upon
food-stuffs, from which the main proportion of the customs revenue is
raised, have produced a deep cleavage between the agrarians and the
industrials, and the latter deem themselves quite uncompensated for
the high price of food-stuffs by the most elaborate devices of
protection for manufactures. The splendid possession of the State
railways is under pressure being continually degraded to a mere
instrument of taxation. The field of direct taxation is already
largely occupied by State and local systems. The prospective inroad by
the universal suffrage Parliament of the Empire upon this depleted
field unites the propertied classes, whether Imperialists or
State-right men, in a common apprehension, with which the governing
authorities are not unsympathetic. On the other hand, the new or
increased taxation on every form of popular indulgence powerfully
strengthens the parties of the Left, who are themselves the opponents
of expenditure on armaments and much else besides.

Meanwhile the German Imperial debt has more than doubled in the last
thirteen years of unbroken peace, has risen since the foundation of
the Empire to about £220,000,000, has increased in the last ten years
by £105,000,000, and practically no attempt to reduce it has been made
between 1880 and the present year. The effect of recurrent borrowings
to meet ordinary annual expenditure has checked the beneficial process
of foreign investment, and dissipated the illusion, cherished during
the South African War, that Berlin might supplant London as the
lending centre of the world. The credit of the German Empire has
fallen to the level of that of Italy. It is unlikely that the new
taxes which have been imposed with so much difficulty this year will
meet the annual deficit.

These circumstances force the conclusion that a period of severe
internal strain approaches in Germany. Will the tension be relieved by
moderation or snapped by calculated violence? Will the policy of the
German Government be to soothe the internal situation, or to find an
escape from it in external adventure? There can be no doubt that both
courses are open. Low as the credit of Germany has fallen, her
borrowing powers are practically unlimited. But one of the two courses
must be taken soon, and from that point of view it is of the greatest
importance to gauge the spirit of the new administration from the
outset. If it be pacific, it must soon become markedly pacific, and
conversely.

W. S. C.

This is, I think, the first sinister impression that I was ever led to
record.

* * * * *

We have now seen how within the space of five years Germany’s policy and
the growth of her armaments led her to arouse and alarm most profoundly
three of the greatest Powers in the world. Two of them, France and
Russia, had been forced to bow to the German will by the plain threat of
war. Each had been quelled by the open intention of a neighbour to use
force against them to the utmost limit without compunction. Both felt
they had escaped a bloody ordeal and probable disaster only by
submission. The sense of past humiliation was aggravated by the fear of
future affronts. The third Power—unorganised for war, but inaccessible
and not to be neglected in the world’s affairs—Britain, had also been
made to feel that hands were being laid upon the very foundation of her
existence. Swiftly, surely, methodically, a German Navy was coming into
being at our doors which must expose us to dangers only to be warded off
by strenuous exertions, and by a vigilance almost as tense as that of
actual war. As France and Russia increased their armies, so Britain
under the same pressure increased her fleet. Henceforward the three
disquieted nations will act more closely together and will not be taken
by their adversary one by one. Henceforward their military arrangements
will be gradually concerted. Henceforward they will consciously be
facing a common danger.

Ah! foolish-diligent Germans, working so hard, thinking so deeply,
marching and counter-marching on the parade grounds of the Fatherland,
poring over long calculations, fuming in new found prosperity,
discontented amid the splendour of mundane success, how many bulwarks to
your peace and glory did you not, with your own hands, successively tear
down!

“In the year 1909,” writes von Bethmann-Hollweg, then the successor of
Prince von Bülow, “the situation was based on the fact that England had
firmly taken its stand on the side of France and Russia in pursuit of
its traditional policy of opposing whatever Continental Power for the
time being was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its naval
programme, had given a definite direction to its Eastern policy, and had
moreover to guard against a French antagonism that had in no wise been
mitigated by its policy in later years. And if Germany saw a formidable
aggravation of all the aggressive tendencies of Franco-Russian policy in
England’s pronounced friendship with this Dual Alliance, England on its
side had grown to see a menace in the strengthening of the German Fleet
and a violation of its ancient rights in our Eastern policy. Words had
already passed on both sides. The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with
distrust.” Such, in his own words, was the inheritance of the new German
Chancellor.

He was now to make his own contribution to the anxieties of the world.

CHAPTER III
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR
1911

On the idle hill of summer,
Sleepy with the sound of streams,
Far I hear the steady drummer
Drumming like a noise in dreams.

Far and near and low and louder,
On the roads of earth go by,
Dear to friends and food for powder,
Soldiers marching, all to die.
THE SHROPSHIRE LAD, XXXV.

Agadir—The _Panther_—The Alarm Bells of Europe—Sir Edward Grey’s
Warning—The Period of Silence—Situation in the Cabinet—Decision of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer—His Mansion House Speech—The
German Rejoinder—Naval Precautions—Effect of the Mansion House
Speech on German Policy—British Apprehensions of Attack—The Naval
Magazines—Vulnerable Points—The Military Situation—Sir Henry
Wilson—A Talk with the German Ambassador—Count Metternich—The Old
Diplomacy—Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, August
23—Sir Henry Wilson’s Forecast—Admiralty Views—Divergences Between
the Generals and Admirals—My Memorandum of August 13—The Twentieth
Day—The Fortieth Day—Plans for Army Expansion—Continued
Anxiety—My Letter to Sir Edward Grey, August 30—End of the
Crisis—Consequences in Germany—The Prime Minister Invites Me to Go
to the Admiralty—The Ninth Chapter of Deuteronomy.

In the spring of 1911 a French expedition occupied Fez. This action,
added to the growing discontent in Germany over the Moroccan question,
tempted the German Government at the beginning of July to an abrupt act.
The Brothers Mannesmann, a German firm at that time very active in
European financial circles, claimed that they had large interests in a
harbour on the Atlantic seaboard of the Moroccan Coast and in the
hinterland behind it. This harbour bore the name of Agadir. Herr von
Kiderlen-Wächter, the German Foreign Minister, raised this point with
the French. The French Government fully realised that the advantages
they were gaining in Morocco, justified Germany in seeking certain
colonial compensations in the Congo area. The German press on the other
hand was indignant at exchanging German interests in the moderate
climate of Morocco for unhealthy tropical regions of which they had
already more than enough. The questions involved were complicated and
intrinsically extremely unimportant. The French prepared themselves for
a prolonged negotiation. So far as the harbour and hinterland of Agadir
were concerned, there seemed to be no difficulty. They denied altogether
the existence of any German interests there. They said there was only a
sandy bay untouched by the hand of man; there was no German property on
the shore, not a trading establishment, not a house; there were no
German interests in the interior. But these facts could easily be
ascertained by a visit of accredited representatives of both countries.
Such a visit to ascertain the facts they professed themselves quite
ready to arrange. They also courted a discussion of the frontier of the
Congo territories.

Suddenly and unexpectedly, on the morning of July 1, without more ado,
it was announced that His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor had sent
his gunboat the _Panther_ to Agadir to maintain and protect German
interests. This small ship was already on its way. All the alarm bells
throughout Europe began immediately to quiver. France found herself in
the presence of an act which could not be explained, the purpose behind
which could not be measured. Great Britain, having consulted the atlas,
began to wonder what bearing a German naval base on the Atlantic coast
of Africa would have upon her maritime security, “observing,” as the
sailors say when they have to write official letters to each other, that
such a fact must be taken in conjunction with German activities at
Madeira and in the Canaries and with the food routes and trade routes
from South America and South Africa which converged and passed through
these waters. Europe was uneasy. France was genuinely alarmed. When
Count Metternich apprised Sir Edward Grey of the German action, he was
informed that the situation was so important that it must be considered
by the Cabinet. On July 5th, after the Cabinet, he was told that the
British Government could not disinterest themselves in Morocco, and that
until Germany’s intentions were made known their attitude must remain
one of reserve. From that date until July 21 not one word was spoken by
the German Government. There is no doubt that the decided posture of
Great Britain was a great surprise to the German Foreign Office. There
ensued between the Governments what was called at the time “the period
of silence.” Meanwhile the French and German newspapers carried on a
lively controversy, and the British press wore a very sombre air.

It was difficult to divine from the long strings of telegrams which day
after day flowed in from all the European Chancelleries, what was the
real purpose behind the German action. I followed attentively the
repeated discussions on the subject in the British Cabinet. Was Germany
looking for a pretext of war with France, or was she merely trying by
pressure and uncertainty to improve her colonial position? In the latter
case the dispute would no doubt be adjusted after a period of tension,
as so many had been before. The great Powers marshalled on either side,
preceded and protected by an elaborate cushion of diplomatic courtesies
and formalities, would display to each other their respective arrays. In
the forefront would be the two principal disputants, Germany and France,
and echeloned back on either side at varying distances and under veils
of reserves and qualifications of different density, would be drawn up
the other parties to the Triple Alliance and to what was already now
beginning to be called the Triple Entente. At the proper moment these
seconds or supporters would utter certain cryptic words indicative of
their state of mind, as a consequence of which France or Germany would
step back or forward a very small distance or perhaps move slightly to
the right or to the left. When these delicate rectifications in the
great balance of Europe, and indeed of the world, had been made, the
formidable assembly would withdraw to their own apartments with ceremony
and salutations and congratulate or condole with each other in whispers
on the result. We had seen it several times before.

But even this process was not free from danger. One must think of the
intercourse of the nations in those days not as if they were chessmen on
the board, or puppets dressed in finery and frillings grimacing at each
other in a quadrille, but as prodigious organisations of forces active
or latent which, like planetary bodies, could not approach each other in
space without giving rise to profound magnetic reactions. If they got
too near, the lightnings would begin to flash, and beyond a certain
point they might be attracted altogether from the orbits in which they
were restrained and draw each other into dire collision. The task of
diplomacy was to prevent such disasters; and as long as there was no
conscious or subconscious purpose of war in the mind of any Power or
race, diplomacy would probably succeed. But in such grave and delicate
conjunctions one violent move by any party would rupture and derange the
restraints upon all, and plunge Cosmos into Chaos.

I thought myself that the Germans had a certain grievance about the
original Anglo-French agreement. We had received many conveniences in
Egypt. France had gained great advantages in Morocco. If Germany felt
her relative position prejudiced by these arrangements, there was no
reason why patiently and amicably she should not advance and press her
own point of view. And it seemed to me that Britain, the most withdrawn,
the least committed of the Great Powers, might exercise a mitigating and
a modifying influence and procure an accommodation; and that of course
was what we tried to do. But if Germany’s intention were malignant, no
such process would be of the slightest use. In that event a very decided
word would have to be spoken, and spoken before it was too late. Nor
would our withdrawing altogether from the scene have helped matters. Had
we done so all our restraining influence would have vanished, and an
intenser aggravation of the antagonistic forces must have occurred.
Therefore I read all the papers and telegrams which began to pass with a
suspicion, and I could see beneath the calm of Sir Edward Grey a growing
and at some moments a grave anxiety.

The sultry obscurity of the European situation was complicated by the
uncertain play of forces within our own council chamber. There again in
miniature were reproduced the balances and reserves of the external
diplomatic situation. The Ministers who were conducting the foreign
policy of Britain, with the ponderous trident of sea power towering up
behind them, were drawn entirely from the Liberal Imperialist section of
the Government. They were narrowly watched and kept in equipoise by the
Radical element, which included the venerable figures of Lord Morley and
Lord Loreburn, on whose side the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had
usually leaned. It was clear that this equipoise might easily make it
impossible for Great Britain to speak with a decided voice either on one
side or the other if certain dangerous conditions supervened. We should
not, therefore, either keep clear ourselves by withdrawing from the
danger nor be able by resolute action to ward it off in time. In these
circumstances the attitude of the Chancellor of the Exchequer became of
peculiar importance.

For some weeks he offered no indication of what his line would be, and
in our numerous conversations he gave me the impression of being
sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. But on the morning of
July 21, when I visited him before the Cabinet, I found a different man.
His mind was made up. He saw quite clearly the course to take. He knew
what to do and how and when to do it. The tenor of his statement to me
was that we were drifting into war. He dwelt on the oppressive silence
of Germany so far as we were concerned. He pointed out that Germany was
acting as if England did not count in the matter in any way; that she
had completely ignored our strong representation; that she was
proceeding to put the most severe pressure on France; that a catastrophe
might ensue; and that if it was to be averted we must speak with great
decision, and we must speak at once. He told me that he was to address
the Bankers at their Annual Dinner that evening, and that he intended to
make it clear that if Germany meant war, she would find Britain against
her. He showed me what he had prepared, and told me that he would show
it to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey after the Cabinet. What
would they say? I said that of course they would be very much relieved;
and so they were, and so was I.

The accession of Mr. Lloyd George in foreign policy to the opposite wing
of the Government was decisive. We were able immediately to pursue a
firm and coherent policy. That night at the Bankers’ Association the
Chancellor of the Exchequer used the following words:—

I believe it is essential in the highest interests not merely of this
country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain
her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her
potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in
the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than
once in the past redeemed continental nations, who are sometimes too
apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from
national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace.
I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international
goodwill except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a
situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be
preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position
Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing
Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if
she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say
emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation
intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.

His City audience, whose minds were obsessed with the iniquities of the
Lloyd George Budget and the fearful hardships it had inflicted upon
property and wealth—little did they dream of the future—did not
comprehend in any way the significance or the importance of what they
heard. They took it as if it had been one of the ordinary platitudes of
ministerial pronouncements upon foreign affairs. But the Chancelleries
of Europe bounded together.

Four days later, at about 5.30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and I were walking by the fountains of Buckingham Palace.
Hot-foot on our track came a messenger. Will the Chancellor of the
Exchequer go at once to Sir Edward Grey? Mr. Lloyd George stopped
abruptly and turning to me said, “That’s my speech. The Germans may
demand my resignation as they did Delcassé’s.” I said, “That will make
you the most popular man in England” (he was not actually the most
popular at that time). We returned as fast as we could and found Sir
Edward Grey in his room at the House of Commons. His first words were:
“I have just received a communication from the German Ambassador so
stiff that the Fleet might be attacked at any moment. I have sent for
McKenna to warn him!” He then told us briefly of the conversation he had
just had with Count Metternich. The Ambassador had said that after the
speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer no explanation could be made
by Germany. In acrid terms he had stated that if France should repel the
hand offered her by the Emperor’s Government, the dignity of Germany
would compel her to secure by all means full respect by France for
German treaty rights. He had then read a long complaint about Mr. Lloyd
George’s speech “which to say the least could have been interpreted as a
warning to Germany’s address and which as a matter of fact had been
interpreted by the presses of Great Britain and France as a warning
bordering on menace.” Sir Edward Grey had thought it right to reply that
the tone of the communication which had just been read to him, rendered
it inconsistent with the dignity of His Majesty’s Government to give
explanations with regard to the speech of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. The First Lord arrived while we were talking, and a few
minutes later hurried off to send the warning orders.

They sound so very cautious and correct, these deadly words. Soft, quiet
voices purring, courteous, grave, exactly-measured phrases in large
peaceful rooms. But with less warning cannons had opened fire and
nations had been struck down by this same Germany. So now the Admiralty
wireless whispers through the ether to the tall masts of ships, and
captains pace their decks absorbed in thought. It is nothing. It is less
than nothing. It is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the
twentieth century. Or is it fire and murder leaping out of the darkness
at our throats, torpedoes ripping the bellies of half-awakened ships, a
sunrise on a vanished naval supremacy, and an island well guarded
hitherto, at last defenceless? No, it is nothing. No one would do such
things. Civilisation has climbed above such perils. The interdependence
of nations in trade and traffic, the sense of public law, the Hague
Convention, Liberal principles, the Labour Party, high finance,
Christian charity, common sense have rendered such nightmares
impossible. Are you quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong. Such a
mistake could only be made once—once for all.

The Mansion House speech was a surprise to all countries: it was a
thunder-clap to the German Government. All their information had led
them to believe that Mr. Lloyd George would head the peace party and
that British action would be neutralised. Jumping from one extreme to
another, they now assumed that the British Cabinet was absolutely
united, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of all others had been
deliberately selected as the most Radical Minister by the British
Government to make this pronouncement.[2] They could not understand how
their representatives and agents in Great Britain could have been so
profoundly misled. Their vexation proved fatal to Count Metternich, and
at the first convenient opportunity he was recalled. Here was an
Ambassador who, after ten years’ residence in London, could not even
forecast the action of one of the most powerful Ministers on a question
of this character. It will be seen from what has been written that this
view was hard on Count Metternich. How could he know what Mr. Lloyd
George was going to do? Until a few hours before, his colleagues did not
know. Working with him in close association, I did not know. No one
knew. Until his mind was definitely made up, he did not know himself.

It seems probable now that the Germans did not mean war on this
occasion. But they meant to test the ground; and in so doing they were
prepared to go to the very edge of the precipice. It is so easy to lose
one’s balance there: a touch, a gust of wind, a momentary dizziness, and
all is precipitated into the abyss. But whether in the heart of the
German State there was or was not a war purpose before England’s part
had been publicly declared, there was no such intention afterwards.

After the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and its sequel the
German Government could not doubt that Great Britain would be against
them if a war was forced upon France at this juncture. They did not
immediately recede from their position, but they were most careful to
avoid any fresh act of provocation; and all their further conduct of the
negotiations with France tended to open in one direction or another
paths of accommodation and of retreat. It remained extremely difficult
for us to gauge the exact significance of the various points at issue,
and throughout the months of July, August and September the situation
continued obscure and oppressive. The slight yet decisive change which
came over the character of German diplomacy, was scarcely perceptible,
and at the same time certain precautionary military measures which were
taken behind the German frontiers, so far as they were known to us, had
the effect of greatly increasing our anxiety. In consequence the
atmosphere in England became constantly more heavily charged with
electricity as one hot summer’s day succeeded another.

Hitherto as Home Secretary I had not had any special part to play in
this affair, though I had followed it with the utmost attention as a
Member of the Cabinet. I was now to receive a rude shock. On the
afternoon of July 27th, I attended a garden party at 10 Downing Street.
There I met the Chief Commissioner of Police, Sir Edward Henry. We
talked about the European situation, and I told him that it was serious.
He then remarked that by an odd arrangement the Home Office was
responsible, through the Metropolitan Police, for guarding the magazines
at Chattenden and Lodge Hill in which all the reserves of naval cordite
were stored. For many years these magazines had been protected without
misadventure by a few constables. I asked what would happen if twenty
determined Germans in two or three motor cars arrived well armed upon
the scene one night. He said they would be able to do what they liked. I
quitted the garden party.

A few minutes later I was telephoning from my room in the Home Office to
the Admiralty. Who was in charge? The First Lord was with the Fleet at
Cromarty; the First Sea Lord was inspecting. Both were, of course,
quickly accessible by wireless or wire. In the meantime an Admiral (he
shall be nameless) was in control. I demanded Marines at once to guard
these magazines, vital to the Royal Navy. I knew there were plenty of
marines in the depôts at Chatham and Portsmouth. The admiral replied
over the telephone that the Admiralty had no responsibility and had no
intention of assuming any; and it was clear from his manner that he
resented the intrusion of an alarmist civilian Minister. “You refuse
then to send the Marines?” After some hesitation he replied, “I refuse.”
I replaced the receiver and rang up the War Office. Mr. Haldane was
there. I told him that I was reinforcing and arming the police that
night, and asked for a company of infantry for each magazine in
addition. In a few minutes the orders were given: in a few hours the
troops had moved. By the next day the cordite reserves of the navy were
safe.

The incident was a small one, and perhaps my fears were unfounded. But
once one had begun to view the situation in this light, it became
impossible to think of anything else. All around flowed the busy life of
peaceful, unsuspecting, easygoing Britain. The streets were thronged
with men and women utterly devoid of any sense of danger from abroad.
For nearly a thousand years no foreign army had landed on British soil.
For a hundred years the safety of the homeland had never been
threatened. They went about their business, their sport, their class and
party fights year after year, generation after generation, in perfect
confidence and considerable ignorance. All their ideas were derived from
conditions of peace. All their arrangements were the result of long
peace. Most of them would have been incredulous, many would have been
very angry if they had been told that we might be near a tremendous war,
and that perhaps within this City of London, which harboured confidingly
visitors from every land, resolute foreigners might be aiming a deadly
blow at the strength of the one great weapon and shield in which we
trusted.

I began to make inquiries about vulnerable points. I found the
far-seeing Captain Hankey, then Assistant Secretary to the Committee of
Imperial Defence, already on the move classifying them for the War Book,
which project had actually been launched.[3] I inquired further about
sabotage and espionage and counter-espionage. I came in touch with other
officers working very quietly and very earnestly but in a small way and
with small means. I was told about German spies and agents in the
various British ports. Hitherto the Home Secretary had to sign a warrant
when it was necessary to examine any particular letter passing through
the Royal Mails. I now signed general warrants authorising the
examination of all the correspondence of particular people upon a list,
to which additions were continually made. This soon disclosed a regular
and extensive system of German paid British agents. It was only in a
very small part of the field of preparation that the Home Secretary had
any official duty of interference, but once I got drawn in, it dominated
all other interests in my mind. For seven years I was to think of little
else. Liberal politics, the People’s Budget, Free Trade, Peace,
Retrenchment and Reform—all the war cries of our election struggles
began to seem unreal in the presence of this new preoccupation. Only
Ireland held her place among the grim realities which came one after
another into view. No doubt other Ministers had similar mental
experiences. I am telling my own tale.

I now began to make an intensive study of the military position in
Europe. I read everything with which I was supplied. I spent many hours
in argument and discussion. The Secretary of State for War told his
officers to tell me everything I wanted to know. The Chief of the
General Staff, Sir William Nicholson, was an old friend of mine. I had
served with him as a young officer on Sir William Lockhart’s staff at
the end of the Tirah Expedition in 1898. He wrote fine broad
appreciations and preached a clear and steady doctrine. But the man from
whom I learned most was the Director of Military Operations, General
Wilson (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson). This officer had
extraordinary vision and faith. He had acquired an immense and, I
expect, an unequalled volume of knowledge about the Continent. He knew
the French Army thoroughly. He was deeply in the secrets of the French
General Staff. He had been Head of the British Staff College. For years
he had been labouring with one object, that if war came we should act
immediately on the side of France. He was sure that war would come
sooner or later. All the threads of military information were in his
hands. The whole wall of his small room was covered by a gigantic map of
Belgium, across which every practicable road by which the German armies
could march for the invasion of France, was painted clearly. All his
holidays he spent examining these roads and the surrounding country. He
could not do much in Germany: the Germans knew him too well.

One night the German ambassador, still Count Metternich, whom I had
known for ten years, asked me to dine with him. We were alone, and a
famous hock from the Emperor’s cellars was produced. We had a long talk
about Germany and how she had grown great; about Napoleon and the part
he had played in uniting her; about the Franco-German War and how it
began and how it ended. I said what a pity it was that Bismarck had
allowed himself to be forced by the soldiers into taking Lorraine, and
how Alsace-Lorraine lay at the root of all the European armaments and
rival combinations. He said these had been German provinces from remote
antiquity until one day in profound peace Louis XIV had pranced over the
frontier and seized them. I said their sympathies were French: he said
they were mixed. I said that anyhow it kept the whole thing alive.
France could never forget her lost provinces, and they never ceased to
call to her. The conversation passed to a kindred but more critical
subject. Was he anxious about the present situation? He said people were
trying to ring Germany round and put her in a net, and that she was a
strong animal to put in a net. I said, how could she be netted when she
had an alliance with two other first-class Powers, Austria-Hungary and
Italy? _We_ had often stood quite alone for years at a time without
getting flustered. He said it was a very different business for an
island. But when you had been marched through and pillaged and oppressed
so often and had only the breasts of your soldiers to stand between you
and invasion, it ate into your soul. I said that Germany was frightened
of nobody, and that everybody was frightened of her.

Then we came to the Navy. Surely, I said, it was a great mistake for
Germany to try to rival Britain on the seas. She would never catch us
up. We should build two to one or more if necessary, and at every stage
antagonism would grow between the countries. Radicals and Tories,
whatever they might say about each other, were all agreed on that. No
British Government which jeopardised our naval supremacy could live. He
said Mr. Lloyd George had told him very much the same thing; but the
Germans had no thought of naval supremacy. All they wanted was a Fleet
to protect their commerce and their colonies. I asked what was the use
of having a weaker Fleet? It was only another hostage to fortune. He
said that the Emperor was profoundly attached to his Fleet, and that it
was his own creation. I could not resist saying that Moltke had
pronounced a very different opinion of Germany’s true interest.

I have recorded these notes of a pleasant though careful conversation,
not because they are of any importance, but because they help to show
the different points of view. I learned afterwards that the Chancellor
of the Exchequer in similar circumstances had spoken more explicitly,
saying that he would raise a hundred millions in a single year for the
British Navy if its supremacy were really challenged.

Count Metternich was a very honourable man, serving his master
faithfully but labouring to preserve peace, especially peace between
England and Germany. I have heard that on one occasion at Berlin in a
throng of generals and princes, some one had said that the British Fleet
would one day make a surprise and unprovoked attack upon Germany.
Whereupon the Ambassador had replied that he had lived in England for
nearly ten years, and he knew that such a thing was absolutely
impossible. On this remark being received with obvious incredulity, he
had drawn himself up and observed that he made it on the honour of a
German officer and that he would answer for its truth with his honour.
This for a moment had quelled the company.

It is customary for thoughtless people to jeer at the old diplomacy and
to pretend that wars arise out of its secret machinations. When one
looks at the petty subjects which have led to wars between great
countries and to so many disputes, it is easy to be misled in this way.
Of course such small matters are only the symptoms of the dangerous
disease, and are only important for that reason. Behind them lie the
interests, the passions and the destiny of mighty races of men; and long
antagonisms express themselves in trifles. “Great commotions,” it was
said of old, “arise out of small things, but not concerning small
things.” The old diplomacy did its best to render harmless the small
things: it could not do more. Nevertheless, a war postponed may be a war
averted. Circumstances change, combinations change, new groupings arise,
old interests are superseded by new. Many quarrels that might have led
to war have been adjusted by the old diplomacy of Europe and have, in
Lord Melbourne’s phrase, “blown over.” If the nations of the world,
while the sense of their awful experiences is still fresh upon them, are
able to devise broader and deeper guarantees of peace and build their
houses on a surer foundation of brotherhood and interdependence, they
will still require the courtly manners, the polite and measured phrases,
the imperturbable demeanour, the secrecy and discretion of the old
diplomatists of Europe. This is, however, a digression.

On August 23rd, after Parliament had risen and Ministers had dispersed,
the Prime Minister convened very secretly a special meeting of the
Committee of Imperial Defence. He summoned the Ministers specially
concerned with the foreign situation and with the fighting services,
including of course the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There were also the
principal officers of the Army and the Navy. I was invited to attend,
though the Home Office was not directly concerned. We sat all day. In
the morning the Army told its tale: in the afternoon, the Navy.

General Wilson, as Director of Military Operations, stated the views of
the General Staff. Standing by his enormous map, specially transported
for the purpose, he unfolded, with what proved afterwards to be extreme
accuracy, the German plan for attacking France in the event of a war
between Germany and Austria on the one hand and France and Russia on the
other. It was briefly as follows:—

In the first place the Germans would turn nearly four-fifths of their
strength against France and leave only one-fifth to contain Russia. The
German armies would draw up on a line from the Swiss frontier to
Aix-la-Chapelle. They would then swing their right wing through Belgium,
thus turning the line of fortresses by which the eastern frontiers of
France were protected. This enormous swinging movement of the German
right arm would require every road which led through Belgium from
Luxembourg to the Belgian Meuse. There were fifteen of these roads, and
three divisions would probably march along each. The Belgian Meuse
flowed parallel to the march of these divisions and protected their
right flank. Along this river were three important fortified passages or
bridgeheads. First, nearest Germany, Liège; the last, nearest France,
Namur; and midway between the two, the fort of Huy. Now arose the
question, Would the Germans after seizing these bridgeheads confine
themselves to the eastern side of the Belgian Meuse and use the river
for their protection, or would they be able to spare and bring a large
body of troops to prolong their turning movement west of the Belgian
Meuse and thus advance beyond it instead of inside it? This was the only
part of their plan which could not be foreseen. Would they avoid the
west side of the Belgian Meuse altogether? Would they skim along it with
a cavalry force only, or would they march infantry divisions or even
army corps west of that river? When the time came, as we now know, they
marched two whole armies. At that date, however, the most sombre
apprehension did not exceed one, or at the outside two, army corps.

Overwhelming detailed evidence was adduced to show that the Germans had
made every preparation for marching through Belgium. The great military
camps in close proximity to the frontier, the enormous depôts, the
reticulation of railways, the endless sidings, revealed with the utmost
clearness and beyond all doubt their design. Liège would be taken within
a few hours of the declaration of war, possibly even before it, by a
rush of motor cars and cyclists from the camp at Elsenborn. That camp
was now (August, 1911) crowded with troops, and inquisitive persons and
ordinary country-folk were already being roughly turned back and
prevented from approaching it.

What would Belgium do in the face of such an onslaught? Nothing could
save Liège, but French troops might reach Namur in time to aid in its
defence. For the rest the Belgian army, assuming that Belgium resisted
the invader, would withdraw into the great entrenched camp and fortress
of Antwerp. This extensive area, intersected by a tangle of rivers and
canals and defended by three circles of forts, would become the last
refuge of the Belgian monarchy and people.

The position of Holland was also examined. It was not thought that the
Germans would overrun Holland as they would Belgium, but they might find
it very convenient to march across the curiously shaped projection of
Holland which lay between Germany and Belgium, and which in the British
General Staff parlance of that time was called “the Maestricht
Appendix.” They would certainly do this if any considerable body of
their troops was thrown west of the Belgian Meuse.

The French plans for meeting this formidable situation were not told in
detail to us; but it was clear that they hoped to forestall and rupture
the German enveloping movement by a counter-offensive of their own on
the greatest scale.

The number of divisions available on both sides and on all fronts when
mobilisation was completed were estimated as follows:—

French 85
German 110

It was asserted that if the six British divisions were sent to take
position on the extreme French left, immediately war was declared, the
chances of repulsing the Germans in the first great shock of battle were
favourable. Every French soldier would fight with double confidence if
he knew he was not fighting alone. Upon the strength of Russia General
Wilson spoke with great foresight, and the account which he gave of the
slow mobilisation of the Russian Army swept away many illusions. It
seemed incredible that Germany should be content to leave scarcely a
score of divisions to make head against the might of Russia. But the
British General Staff considered that such a decision would be
well-founded. We shall see presently how the loyalty of Russia and of
the Tsar, found the means by prodigious sacrifices to call back to the
East vital portions of the German Army at the supreme moment. Such
action could not be foreseen then, and most people have forgotten it
now.

There was of course a considerable discussion and much questioning
before we adjourned at 2 o’clock. When we began again at three, it was
the turn of the Admiralty, and the First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson,
with another map expounded his views of the policy we should pursue in
the event of our being involved in such a war. He did not reveal the
Admiralty war plans. Those he kept locked away in his own brain, but he
indicated that they embodied the principle of a close blockade of the
enemy’s ports. It was very soon apparent that a profound difference
existed between the War Office and the Admiralty view. In the main the
Admiralty thought that we should confine our efforts to the sea; that if
our small Army were sent to the Continent it would be swallowed up among
the immense hosts conflicting there, whereas if kept in ships or ready
to embark for counterstrokes upon the German coast, it would draw off
more than its own weight of numbers from the German fighting line. This
view, which was violently combated by the Generals, did not commend
itself to the bulk of those present, and on many points of detail
connected with the landings of these troops the military and naval
authorities were found in complete discord. The serious disagreement
between the military and naval staffs in such critical times upon
fundamental issues was the immediate cause of my going to the Admiralty.
After the Council had separated, Mr. Haldane intimated to the Prime
Minister that he would not continue to be responsible for the War Office
unless a Board of Admiralty was called into being which would work in
full harmony with the War Office plans, and would begin the organisation
of a proper Naval War Staff. Of course I knew nothing of this, but it
was destined soon to affect my fortunes in a definite manner.

I thought that the General Staff took too sanguine a view of the French
Army. Knowing their partisanship for France, I feared the wish was
father to the thought. It was inevitable that British military men,
ardently desirous of seeing their country intervene on the side of
France, and convinced that the destruction of France by Germany would
imperil the whole future of Great Britain, should be inclined to
overrate the relative power of the French Army and accord it brighter
prospects than were actually justified. The bulk of their information
was derived from French sources. The French General Staff were resolute
and hopeful. The principle of the offensive was the foundation of their
military art and the mainspring of the French soldier. Although
according to the best information, the French pre-war Army when fully
mobilised was only three-fourths as strong as the German pre-war Army,
the French mobilisation from the ninth to the thirteenth day yielded a
superior strength on the fighting front. High hopes were entertained by
the French Generals that a daring seizure of the initiative and a
vigorous offensive into Alsace-Lorraine would have the effect of
rupturing the carefully thought out German plans of marching through
Belgium on to Paris. These hopes were reflected in the British General
Staff appreciations.

I could not share them. I had therefore prepared a memorandum for the
Committee of Imperial Defence which embodied my own conclusions upon all
I had learned from the General Staff. It was Dated August 13, 1911. It
was, of course, only an attempt to pierce the veil of the future; to
conjure up in the mind a vast imaginary situation; to balance the
incalculable; to weigh the imponderable. It will be seen that I named
the _twentieth_ day of mobilisation as the date by which “the French
armies will have been driven from the line of the Meuse and will be
falling back on Paris and the South,” and the _fortieth_ day as that by
which “Germany should be extended at full strain both internally and on
her war fronts,” and that “opportunities for the decisive trial of
strength may then occur.” I am quite free to admit that these were not
intended to be precise dates, but as guides to show what would probably
happen. In fact, however, both these forecasts were almost literally
verified three years later by the event.

I reprinted this memorandum on the 2nd of September, 1914, in order to
encourage my colleagues with the hope that if the unfavourable
prediction about the twentieth day had been borne out, so also would be
the favourable prediction about the fortieth day. And so indeed it was.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CONTINENTAL PROBLEM

MEMORANDUM BY MR. CHURCHILL

_August 13, 1911._

The following notes have been written on the assumption ... that a
decision has been arrived at to employ a British military force on the
Continent of Europe. It does not prejudge that decision in any way.

It is assumed that an alliance exists between Great Britain, France,
and Russia, and that these Powers are attacked by Germany and Austria.

1. The decisive military operations will be those between France and
Germany. The German army is at least equal in quality to the French,
and mobilises 2,200,000 against 1,700,000. The French must therefore
seek for a situation of more equality. This can be found either before
the full strength of the Germans has been brought to bear or after the
German army has become extended. The first might be reached between
the ninth and thirteenth days; the latter about the fortieth.

2. The fact that during a few days in the mobilisation period the
French are equal or temporarily superior on the frontiers is of no
significance, except on the assumption that France contemplates
adopting a strategic offensive. The Germans will not choose the days
when they themselves have least superiority for a general advance; and
if the French advance, they lose at once all the advantages of their
own internal communications, and by moving towards the advancing
German reinforcements annul any numerical advantage they may for the
moment possess. The French have therefore, at the beginning of the
war, no option but to remain on the defensive, both upon their own
fortress line and behind the Belgian frontier; and the choice of the
day when the first main collision will commence rests with the
Germans, who must be credited with the wisdom of choosing the best
possible day, and cannot be forced into decisive action against their
will, except by some reckless and unjustifiable movement on the part
of the French.

3. A prudent survey of chances from the British point of view ought to
contemplate that, when the German advance decisively begins, it will
be backed by sufficient preponderance of force, and developed on a
sufficiently wide front to compel the French armies to retreat from
their positions behind the Belgian frontier, even though they may hold
the gaps between the fortresses on the Verdun-Belfort front. No doubt
a series of great battles will have been fought with varying local
fortunes, and there is always a possibility of a heavy German check.
But, even if the Germans were brought to a standstill, the French
would not be strong enough to advance in their turn; and in any case
we ought not to count on this. The balance of probability is that by
the twentieth day the French armies will have been driven from the
line of the Meuse and will be falling back on Paris and the south. All
plans based upon the opposite assumption ask too much of fortune.

4. This is not to exclude the plan of using four or six British
divisions in these great initial operations. Such a force is a
material factor of significance. Its value to the French would be out
of all proportion to its numerical strength. It would encourage every
French soldier and make the task of the Germans in forcing the
frontier much more costly. But the question which is of most practical
consequence to us is what is to happen after the frontier has been
forced and the invasion of France has begun. France will not be able
to end the war successfully by any action on the frontiers. She will
not be strong enough to invade Germany. Her only chance is to conquer
Germany in France. It is this problem which should be studied before
any final decision is taken.

5. The German armies in advancing through Belgium and onwards into
France will be relatively weakened by all or any of the following
causes:—

By the greater losses incidental to the offensive (especially if they
have tested unsuccessfully the French fortress lines);

By the greater employment of soldiers necessitated by acting on
exterior lines;

By having to guard their communications through Belgium and France
(especially from the sea flank);

By having to invest Paris (requiring at least 500,000 men against
100,000) and to besiege or mask other places, especially along the
seaboard;

By the arrival of the British army;

By the growing pressure of Russia from the thirtieth day;

And generally by the bad strategic situation to which their
right-handed advance will commit them as it becomes pronounced.

All these factors will operate increasingly in proportion as the
German advance continues and every day that passes.

6. Time is also required for the naval blockade to make itself felt on
German commerce, industry, and food prices, as described in the
Admiralty Memorandum, and for these again to react on German credit
and finances already burdened with the prodigious daily cost of the
war. All these pressures will develop simultaneously and
progressively. [The Chancellor of the Exchequer has drawn special
attention to this and to the very light structure of German industry
and economic organisations.]

7. By the fortieth day Germany should be extended at full strain both
internally and on her war fronts, and this strain will become daily
more severe and ultimately overwhelming, unless it is relieved by
decisive victories in France. If the French army has not been
squandered by precipitate or desperate action, the balance of forces
should be favourable after the fortieth day, and will improve steadily
as time passes. For the German armies will be confronted with a
situation which combines an ever-growing need for a successful
offensive, with a battle-front which tends continually towards
numerical equality. Opportunities for the decisive trial of strength
may then occur.

8. Such a policy demands heavy and hard sacrifices from France, who
must, with great constancy, expose herself to invasion, to having her
provinces occupied by the enemy, and to the investment of Paris, and
whose armies may be committed to retrograde or defensive operations.
Whether her rulers could contemplate or her soldiers endure this trial
may depend upon the military support which Great Britain can give; and
this must be known beforehand, so that the French war-plans can be
adjusted accordingly, and so that we may know, before we decide, what
they would be prepared to do.

9. The following measures would appear to be required to enable Great
Britain to take an effective part in the decisive theatre of the war:—

Men
(Approximate).

The four divisions of the expeditionary army, with
their auxiliary troops, should be sent on the
outbreak of war to France 107,000

To these should be added the two remaining
divisions as soon as the naval blockade is
effectively established 53,000

And the 7th Division from South Africa and the
Mediterranean (as soon as the colonial forces in
South Africa can be embodied) 15,000

And 5,000 additional Yeomanry cavalry or light
horse, with 10,000 volunteer cyclist Territorials 15,000

As we should be allies of Russia, the Anglo-Indian
Army could be drawn upon so long as two native
regiments were moved out of India for every
British regiment. Lord Kitchener has stated that
it would be possible in so grave a need, to
withdraw six out of the nine field divisions from
India, and this should be done immediately. This
force could be brought into France by Marseilles
by the fortieth day 100,000
———————
Thus making a total force of 290,000
———————

This fine army, almost entirely composed of professional soldiers,
could be assembled around (say) Tours by the fortieth day, in rear of
the French left (instead of being frittered into action piecemeal),
and would then become a very important factor in events. The Russian
army would also by then be engaged in full force on the eastern
frontiers of Germany and Austria, and the power of the three allies
should then be sufficient either to hold the Germans in a position of
growing difficulty or, if desirable, to assume the offensive in
concert.

10. To provide meanwhile for the security of Great Britain, for
unforeseeable contingencies, and for sustaining the expeditionary army
with a continuous supply of volunteer drafts, it would be necessary on
the outbreak—

(_a_) To embody the whole Territorial force.

(_b_) To call for volunteers for Home defence from all persons
possessing military experience.

(_c_) To raise a compulsory levy of 500,000 men for Home defence.

This levy should be formed upon the cadres of the Territorial
divisions, so as to enable a proportion of the Territorial army to be
released at the end of the sixth month. The question of sending any
part of the compulsory levy _by compulsion_ to the Continent would not
arise until after this force had been trained. The steady augmentation
of British military strength during the progress of the war would,
however, put us in a position by the end of the twelfth month to
secure or re-establish British interests outside Europe, even if,
through the defeat or desertion of allies, we were forced to continue
the war alone.

No lesser steps would seem adequate to the scale of events.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

The Conference separated. Apprehension lay heavy on the minds of all who
had participated in it.

The War Office hummed with secrets in those days. Not the slightest
overt action could be taken. But every preparation by forethought was
made and every detail was worked out on paper. The railway time-tables,
or graphics as they were called, of the movement of every battalion—even
where they were to drink their coffee—were prepared and settled.
Thousands of maps of Northern France and Belgium were printed. The
cavalry manœuvres were postponed “on account of the scarcity of water in
Wiltshire and the neighbouring counties.” The press, fiercely divided on
party lines, overwhelmingly pacific in tendency, without censorship,
without compulsion, observed a steady universal reticence. Not a word
broke the long drawn oppressive silence. The great railway strike came
to an end with mysterious suddenness. Mutual concessions were made by
masters and men after hearing a confidential statement from the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

In the middle of August I went to the country for a few days. I could
not think of anything else but the peril of war. I did my other work as
it came along, but there was only one field of interest fiercely
illuminated in my mind. Sitting on a hilltop in the smiling country
which stretches round Mells, the lines I have copied at the top of this
chapter kept running through my mind. Whenever I recall them, they bring
back to me the anxieties of those Agadir days.

From Mells I wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey. It speaks
for itself.

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey._

_30 August, 1911._

Perhaps the time is coming when decisive action will be necessary.
Please consider the following policy for use if and when the Morocco
negotiations fail.

Propose to France and Russia a triple alliance to safeguard (_inter
alia_) the independence of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.

Tell Belgium that, if her neutrality is violated, we are prepared to
come to her aid and to make an alliance with France and Russia to
guarantee her independence. Tell her that we will take whatever
military steps will be most effective for that purpose. But the
Belgian Army must take the field in concert with the British and
French Armies, and Belgium must immediately garrison properly Liège
and Namur. Otherwise we cannot be responsible for her fate.

Offer the same guarantee both to Holland and to Denmark contingent
upon their making their utmost exertions.

We should, if necessary, aid Belgium to defend Antwerp and to feed
that fortress and any army based on it. We should be prepared at the
proper moment to put extreme pressure on the Dutch to keep the Scheldt
open for _all_ purposes. If the Dutch close the Scheldt, we should
retaliate by a blockade of the Rhine.

It is very important to us to be able to blockade the Rhine, and it
gets more important as the war goes on. On the other hand, if the
Germans do not use the “Maestricht Appendix” in the first days of the
war, they will not want it at all.

Let me add that I am not at all convinced about the wisdom of a close
blockade, and I did not like the Admiralty statement. If the French
send cruisers to Mogador and Saffi, I am of opinion that we should
(for our part) move our main fleet to the north of Scotland into its
war station. Our interests are European, and not Moroccan. The
significance of the movement would be just as great as if we sent our
two ships with the French.

Please let me know when you will be in London; and will you kindly
send this letter on to the Prime Minister.

My views underwent no change in the three years of peace that followed.
On the contrary they were confirmed and amplified by everything I
learned. In some respects, as in the abolition of the plan of close
blockade and the sending of the Fleet to its war station, I was able to
carry them out. In other cases, such as the defence of Antwerp, I had
not the power to do in time what I believed to be equally necessary. But
I tried my best, not, as has frequently been proclaimed, upon a foolish
impulse, but in pursuance of convictions reached by pondering and study.
I could not help feeling a strong confidence in the truth of these
convictions, when I saw how several of them were justified one after the
other in that terrible and unparalleled period of convulsion. I had no
doubts whatever what ought to be done in certain matters, and my only
difficulty was to persuade or induce others.

* * * * *

The Agadir crisis came however peacefully to an end. It had terminated
in the diplomatic rebuff of Germany. Once more she had disturbed all
Europe by a sudden and menacing gesture. Once more she had used the
harshest threats towards France. For the first time she had made British
statesmen feel that sense of direct contact with the war peril which was
never absent from Continental minds. The French, however, offered
concessions and compensations. An intricate negotiation about the
frontiers of French and German territory in West Africa, in which the
“Bec de Canard” played an important part, had resulted in an agreement
between the two principals. To us it seemed that France had won a
considerable advantage. She was not, however, particularly pleased. Her
Prime Minister, Monsieur Caillaux, who had presided during those anxious
days, was dismissed from office on grounds which at the time it was very
difficult to appreciate here, but which viewed in the light of
subsequent events can more easily be understood. The tension in German
governing circles must have been very great. The German Colonial
Secretary, von Lindequist, resigned rather than sign the agreement.
There is no doubt that deep and violent passions of humiliation and
resentment were coursing beneath the glittering uniforms which thronged
the palaces through which the Kaiser moved. And of those passions the
Crown Prince made himself the exponent. The world has heaped unbounded
execrations upon this unlucky being. He was probably in fact no better
and no worse than the average young cavalry subaltern who had not been
through the ordinary mill at a public school nor had to think about
earning his living. He had a considerable personal charm, which he
lavished principally upon the fair sex, but which in darker days has
captivated the juvenile population of Wieringen. His flattered head was
turned by the burning eyes and guttural words of great captains and
statesmen and party leaders. He therefore threw himself forward into
this strong favouring current, and became a power, or rather the focus
of a power, with which the Kaiser was forced to reckon. Germany once
more proceeded to increase her armaments by land and sea.

“It was a question,” writes von Tirpitz, “of our keeping our nerve,
_continuing to arm on a grand scale_, avoiding all provocation, and
waiting without anxiety _until our sea power was established_[4] and
forced the English to let us breathe in peace.” Only to breathe in
peace! What fearful apparatus was required to secure this simple act of
respiration!

Early in October Mr. Asquith invited me to stay with him in Scotland.
The day after I had arrived there, on our way home from the links, he
asked me quite abruptly whether I would like to go to the Admiralty. He
had put the same question to me when he first became Prime Minister.
This time I had no doubt what to answer. All my mind was full of the
dangers of war. I accepted with alacrity. I said, “Indeed I would.” He
said that Mr. Haldane was coming to see him the next day and we would
talk it over together. But I saw that his mind was made up. The fading
light of evening disclosed in the far distance the silhouettes of two
battleships steaming slowly out of the Firth of Forth. They seemed
invested with a new significance to me.

That night when I went to bed, I saw a large Bible lying on a table in
my bedroom. My mind was dominated by the news I had received of the
complete change in my station and of the task entrusted to me. I thought
of the peril of Britain, peace-loving, unthinking, little prepared, of
her power and virtue, and of her mission of good sense and fair play. I
thought of mighty Germany, towering up in the splendour of her imperial
state and delving down in her profound, cold, patient, ruthless
calculations. I thought of the army corps I had watched tramp past, wave
after wave of valiant manhood, at the Breslau manœuvres in 1907; of the
thousands of strong horses dragging cannon and great howitzers up the
ridges and along the roads around Wurzburg in 1910. I thought of German
education and thoroughness and all that their triumphs in science and
philosophy implied. I thought of the sudden and successful wars by which
her power had been set up. I opened the Book at random, and in the 9th
Chapter of Deuteronomy I read—

=Hear, O Israel; Thou art to pass over Jordan this day, to go in to
possess nations greater and mightier than thyself, cities great and
fenced up to heaven.=

=2. A people great and tall, the children of the Anakims, whom thou
knowest, and of whom thou hast heard say, Who can stand before the
children of Anak!=

=3. Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he which
goeth over before thee; as a consuming fire he shall destroy them, and
he shall bring them down before thy face: so shalt thou drive them
out, and destroy them quickly, as the Lord hath said unto thee.=

=4. Speak not thou in thine heart, after that the Lord thy God hath
cast them out from before thee, saying, for my righteousness the Lord
hath brought me in to possess this land: but for the wickedness of
these nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee.=

=5. Not for thy righteousness or for the uprightness of thine heart,
dost thou go to possess their land; but for the wickedness of these
nations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee, and
that he may perform the word which the Lord sware unto thy fathers,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.=

It seemed a message full of reassurance.

CHAPTER IV
ADMIRALS ALL

“Concerning brave Captains
Our age hath made known.”
RUDYARD KIPLING.

At the Admiralty—The State of Business—Immediate Measures—The Two
Leading Sailors—Lord Fisher of Kilverstone—His Great Reforms—His
Violent Methods—The Schism in the Fleet—Difficulties of His
Task—The Bacon Letters—Our Conference at Reigate Priory—A Fateful
Decision—Lord Fisher’s Correspondence—Sir Arthur Wilson, the First
Sea Lord—Deadlock Concerning the War Staff Policy—Formation of a
New Board of Admiralty—The Command of the Home Fleets—Sir Arthur
Wilson’s Retirement—A Digression Forward—Captain Pakenham’s
Sea-going Record—Rear-Admiral Beatty—The Naval Secretary—Prince
Louis of Battenberg Becomes Second Sea Lord—The War Staff—Military
Education and Staff Training—Captains of Ships and Captains of
War—Fifteen Years and Only Thirty Months.

Mr. McKenna and I changed guard with strict punctilio. In the morning he
came over to the Home Office and I introduced him to the officials
there. In the afternoon I went over to the Admiralty; he presented his
Board and principal officers and departmental heads to me, and then took
his leave. I knew he felt greatly his change of office, but no one would
have divined it from his manner. As soon as he had gone I convened a
formal meeting of the Board, at which the Secretary read the new Letters
Patent constituting me its head, and I thereupon in the words of the
Order-in-Council became “responsible to Crown and Parliament for all the
business of the Admiralty.” I was to endeavour to discharge this
responsibility for the four most memorable years of my life.

The state of Admiralty business was as follows:—The Estimates and plans
for the financial year 1912–13 were far advanced: the programme had been
settled and the designs of the vessels only awaited final approval. We
were to lay down three battleships, one battle-cruiser, two light
cruisers (“Dartmouths”), one smaller light cruiser (a “Blonde”), the
usual flotilla of twenty destroyers and a number of submarines and
ancillary craft. The Estimates embodying this policy had to be passed by
the Cabinet at the latest by the end of February, and presented to the
House of Commons in the utmost detail in March.

But a great uncertainty hung over all these plans. A continued
succession of rumours and reports from many sources, and of hints and
allusions in the German Press, foreshadowed a further German naval
increase. This, following upon all that had gone before and coming at a
moment when relations were so tense, must certainly aggravate the
situation. It would inevitably compel us to take important additional
counter-measures. What these counter-measures would have to be, could
not be decided till the text of the new German Navy Law was known to us.
It was clear, however, from the information received, that it was not
only to be an increase in new construction but in the number of
squadrons or vessels maintained in a state of instant and constant
readiness.

In addition to these complications were a number of naval questions of
prime importance which I conceived required new treatment. First, the
War Plans of the Fleet, which up to that moment had been based upon the
principle of close blockade. Second, the organisation of the fleets with
a view to increasing their instantly ready strength. Third, measures to
guard against all aspects of surprise in the event of a sudden attack.
Fourth, the formation of a Naval War Staff. Fifth, the concerting of the
War Plans of the Navy and the Army by close co-operation of the two
departments. Sixth, further developments in design to increase the gun
power of our new ships in all classes. Seventh, changes in the high
commands of the Fleet and in the composition of the Board of Admiralty.

To all these matters I addressed myself in constant secret consultations
with the principal persons concerned in each. For the present, however,
I arrived at no important decisions, but laboured continually to check
and correct the opinions with which I had arrived at the Admiralty by
the expert information which on every subject was now at my disposal.

With the agreement of the Sea Lords I gave certain directions on minor
points immediately. The flotilla of destroyers sanctioned in the 1911–12
Estimates would not have been let out to contract till the very end of
the financial year. We now accelerated these twenty boats (the “L’s”) by
four months, and thus, though we could not possibly foresee it, they
were almost all fully commissioned just in time for the great review and
mobilization of the Fleet which preceded the outbreak of war. I gave,
moreover, certain personal directions to enable me “to sleep quietly in
my bed.” The naval magazines were to be effectively guarded under the
direct charge of the Admiralty. The continuous attendance of naval
officers, additional to that of the resident clerks, was provided at the
Admiralty, so that at any hour of the day or night, weekdays, Sundays,
or holidays, there would never be a moment lost in giving the alarm; and
one of the Sea Lords was always to be on duty in or near the Admiralty
building to receive it. Upon the wall behind my chair I had an open case
fitted, within whose folding doors spread a large chart of the North
Sea. On this chart every day a Staff Officer marked with flags the
position of the German Fleet. Never once was this ceremony omitted until
the War broke out, and the great maps, covering the whole of one side of
the War Room, began to function. I made a rule to look at my chart once
every day when I first entered my room. I did this less to keep myself
informed, for there were many other channels of information, than in
order to inculcate in myself and those working with me a sense of
ever-present danger. In this spirit we all worked.

I must now introduce the reader to the two great Admirals-of-the-Fleet,
Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, whose outstanding qualities and
life’s work, afloat and at the Admiralty, added to and reacted upon by
the energies and patriotism of Lord Charles Beresford, had largely made
the Royal Navy what it was at this time. The names of both Fisher and
Wilson must often recur in these pages, for they played decisive parts
in the tale I have to tell.

I first met Lord Fisher at Biarritz in 1907. We stayed for a fortnight
as the guests of a common friend. He was then First Sea Lord and in the
height of his reign. We talked all day long and far into the nights. He
told me wonderful stories of the Navy and of his plans—all about
Dreadnoughts, all about submarines, all about the new education scheme
for every branch of the Navy, all about big guns, and splendid Admirals
and foolish miserable ones, and Nelson and the Bible, and finally the
island of Borkum. I remembered it all. I reflected on it often. I even
remembered the island of Borkum when my teacher had ceased to think so
much of it. At any rate, when I returned to my duties at the Colonial
Office I could have passed an examination on the policy of the then
Board of Admiralty.

For at least ten years all the most important steps taken to enlarge,
improve or modernise the Navy had been due to Fisher. The water-tube
boiler, the “all big gun ship,” the introduction of the submarine
(“Fisher’s toys,” as Lord Charles Beresford called them), the common
education scheme, the system of nucleus crews for ships in reserve, and
latterly—to meet the German rivalry—the concentration of the Fleets in
Home Waters, the scrapping of great quantities of ships of little
fighting power, the great naval programmes of 1908 and 1909, the advance
from the 12–inch to the 13.5–inch gun—all in the main were his.

In carrying through these far-reaching changes he had created violent
oppositions to himself in the Navy, and his own methods, in which he
gloried, were of a kind to excite bitter animosities, which he returned
and was eager to repay. He made it known, indeed he proclaimed, that
officers of whatever rank who opposed his policies would have their
professional careers ruined. As for traitors, i. e., those who struck at
him openly or secretly, “their wives should be widows, their children
fatherless, their homes a dunghill.” This he repeated again and again.
“Ruthless, relentless and remorseless” were words always on his lips,
and many grisly examples of Admirals and Captains eating out their
hearts “on the beach” showed that he meant what he said. He did not
hesitate to express his policy in the most unfavourable terms, as if to
challenge and defy his enemies and critics. “Favouritism,” he wrote in
the log of Dartmouth College, “is the secret of efficiency.” What he
meant by “favouritism” was selection without regard to seniority by a
discerning genius in the interests of the public; but the word
“favouritism” stuck. Officers were said to be “in the fish-pond”—unlucky
for them if they were not. He poured contempt upon the opinions and
arguments of those who did not agree with his schemes, and abused them
roundly at all times both by word and letter.

In the Royal Navy, however, there were a considerable number of officers
of social influence and independent means, many of whom became hostile
to Fisher. They had access to Parliament and to the Press. In sympathy
with them, though not with all their methods, was a much larger body of
good and proved sea officers. At the head of the whole opposition stood
Lord Charles Beresford, at that time Commander-in-Chief of the Channel
or principal Fleet. A deplorable schism was introduced into the Royal
Navy, which spread to every squadron and to every ship. There were
Fisher’s men and Beresford’s men. Whatever the First Sea Lord proposed
the Commander-in-Chief opposed, and through the whole of the Service
Captains and Lieutenants were encouraged to take one side or the other.
The argument was conducted with technicalities and with personalities.
Neither side was strong enough to crush the other. The Admiralty had its
backers in the Fleet, and the Fleet had its friends in the Admiralty:
both sides therefore had good information as to what was passing in the
other camp. The lamentable situation thus created might easily have
ruined the discipline of the Navy but for the fact that a third large
body of officers resolutely refused, at whatever cost to themselves, to
participate in the struggle. Silently and steadfastly they went about
their work till the storms of partisanship were past. To these officers
a debt is due.

There is no doubt whatever that Fisher was right in nine-tenths of what
he fought for. His great reforms sustained the power of the Royal Navy
at the most critical period in its history. He gave the Navy the kind of
shock which the British Army received at the time of the South African
War. After a long period of serene and unchallenged complacency, the
mutter of distant thunder could be heard. It was Fisher who hoisted the
storm-signal and beat all hands to quarters. He forced every department
of the Naval Service to review its position and question its own
existence. He shook them and beat them and cajoled them out of slumber
into intense activity. But the Navy was not a pleasant place while this
was going on. The “Band of Brothers” tradition which Nelson had handed
down was for the time, but only for the time, discarded; and behind the
open hostility of chieftains flourished the venomous intrigues of their
followers.

I have asked myself whether all this could not have been avoided;
whether we could not have had the Fisher reforms without the Fisher
methods? My conviction is that Fisher was maddened by the difficulties
and obstructions which he encountered, and became violent in the process
of fighting so hard at every step. In the government of a great fighting
service there must always be the combination of the political and
professional authorities. A strong First Sea Lord, to carry out a
vigorous policy, needs the assistance of a Minister, who alone can
support him and defend him. The authority of both is more than doubled
by their union. Each can render the other services of supreme importance
when they are both effective factors. Working in harmony, they multiply
each other. By the resultant concentration of combined power, no room or
chance is given to faction. For good or for ill what they decide
together in the interests of the Service must be loyally accepted.
Unhappily, the later years of Fisher’s efforts were years in which the
Admiralty was ruled by two Ministers, both of whom were desperately and
even mortally ill. Although most able and most upright public men, both
Lord Cawdor and Lord Tweedmouth, First Lords from 1904 to 1908, were
afflicted with extreme ill-health. Moreover, neither was in the House of
Commons and able himself, by exposition in the responsible Chamber, to
proclaim in unquestioned accents the policy which the Admiralty would
follow and which the House of Commons should ratify. When in 1908 Mr.
McKenna became First Lord, there was a change. Gifted with remarkable
clearness of mind and resolute courage, enjoying in the prime of life
the fullest vigour of his faculties, and having acquired a strong
political position in the House of Commons, he was able to supply an
immediate steadying influence. But it was too late for Fisher. The
Furies were upon his track. The opposition and hatreds had already grown
too strong. The schism in the Navy continued, fierce and open.

The incident which is most commonly associated with the end of this part
of his career is that of the “Bacon letters.” Captain Bacon was one of
the ablest officers in the Navy and a strong Fisherite. In 1906 he had
been serving in the Mediterranean under Lord Charles Beresford. Fisher
had asked him to write to him from time to time and keep him informed of
all that passed. This he did in letters in themselves of much force and
value, but open to the reproach of containing criticisms of his
immediate commander. This in itself might have escaped unnoticed; but
the First Sea Lord used to print in beautiful and carefully considered
type, letters, notes and memoranda on technical subjects for the
instruction and encouragement of the faithful. Delighted at the cogency
of the arguments in the Bacon letters, he had them printed in 1909 and
circulated fairly widely throughout the Admiralty. A copy fell at length
into hostile hands and was swiftly conveyed to a London evening
newspaper. The First Sea Lord was accused of encouraging subordinates in
disloyalty to their immediate commanders, and Captain Bacon himself was
so grievously smitten in the opinion of the Service that he withdrew
into private life and his exceptional abilities were lost to the Navy,
though, as will be seen, only for a time. The episode was fatal, and at
the beginning of 1910 Sir John Fisher quitted the Admiralty and passed,
as every one believed, finally into retirement and the House of Lords,
crowned with achievements, loaded with honours, but pursued by much
obloquy, amid the triumph of his foes.

As soon as I knew for certain that I was to go to the Admiralty I sent
for Fisher: he was abroad in sunshine. We had not seen each other since
the dispute about the Naval Estimates of 1909. He conceived himself
bound in loyalty to Mr. McKenna, but as soon as he learned that I had
had nothing to do with the decision which had led to our changing
offices, he hastened home. We passed three days together in the comfort
of Reigate Priory.

Although my education had been mainly military, I had followed closely
every detail of the naval controversies of the previous five years in
the Cabinet, in Parliament, and latterly in the Committee of Imperial
Defence; and I had certain main ideas of what I was going to do and
what, indeed, I was sent to the Admiralty to do. I intended to prepare
for an attack by Germany as if it might come next day. I intended to
raise the Fleet to the highest possible strength and secure that all
that strength was immediately ready. I was pledged to create a War
Staff. I was resolved to have all arrangements made at once in the
closest concert with the military to provide for the transportation of a
British Army to France should war come. I had strong support from the
War Office and the Foreign Office: I had the Prime Minister and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer at my back. Moreover, every one who knew the
crisis through which we had passed had been profoundly alarmed. In these
circumstances it only remained to study the methods, and to choose the
men.

I found Fisher a veritable volcano of knowledge and of inspiration; and
as soon as he learnt what my main purpose was, he passed into a state of
vehement eruption. It must indeed have been an agony to him to wait and
idly watch from the calm Lake of Lucerne through the anxious weeks of
the long-drawn Agadir crisis, with his life’s work, his beloved Navy,
liable at any moment to be put to the supreme test. Once he began, he
could hardly stop. I plied him with questions, and he poured out ideas.
It was always a joy to me to talk to him on these great matters, but
most of all was he stimulating in all that related to the design of
ships. He also talked brilliantly about Admirals, but here one had to
make a heavy discount on account of the feuds. My intention was to hold
the balance even, and while adopting in the main the Fisher policy, to
insist upon an absolute cessation of the vendetta.

Knowing pretty well, all that has been written in the preceding pages, I
began our conversations with no thought of Fisher’s recall. But by the
Sunday night the power of the man was deeply borne in upon me, and I had
almost made up my mind to do what I did three years later, and place him
again at the head of the Naval Service. It was not the outcry that I
feared; that I felt strong enough at this time to face. But it was the
revival and continuance of the feuds; and it was clear from his temper
that this would be inevitable. Then, too, I was apprehensive of his age.
I could not feel complete confidence in the poise of the mind at 71. All
the way up to London the next morning I was on the brink of saying “Come
and help me,” and had he by a word seemed to wish to return, I would
surely have spoken. But he maintained a proper dignity, and in an hour
we were in London. Other reflections supervened, adverse counsels were
not lacking, and in a few days I had definitely made up my mind to look
elsewhere for a First Sea Lord. I wonder whether I was right or wrong.

For a man who for so many years filled great official positions and was
charged with so much secret and deadly business, Lord Fisher appeared
amazingly voluminous and reckless in correspondence. When for the
purposes of this work and for the satisfaction of his biographers I
collected all the letters I had received from the Admiral in his own
hand, they amounted when copied to upwards of 300 closely typewritten
pages. In the main they repeat again and again the principal naval
conceptions and doctrines with which his life had been associated.
Although it would be easy to show many inconsistencies and apparent
contradictions, the general message is unchanging. The letters are also
presented in an entertaining guise, interspersed with felicitous and
sometimes recondite quotations, with flashing phrases and images, with
mordant jokes and corrosive personalities. All were dashed off red-hot
as they left his mind, his strong pen galloping along in the wake of the
imperious thought. He would often audaciously fling out on paper
thoughts which other people would hardly admit to their own minds. It is
small wonder that his turbulent passage left so many foes foaming in his
wake. The wonder is that he did not shipwreck himself a score of times.
The buoyancy of his genius alone supported the burden. Indeed, in the
process of years the profuse and imprudent violence of his letters
became, in a sense, its own protection. People came to believe that this
was the breezy style appropriate to our guardians of the deep, and the
old Admiral swept forward on his stormy course.

To me, in this period of preparation, the arrival of his letters was
always a source of lively interest and pleasure. I was regaled with
eight or ten closely-written double pages, fastened together with a
little pearl pin or a scrap of silken ribbon, and containing every kind
of news and counsel, varying from blistering reproach to the highest
forms of inspiration and encouragement. From the very beginning his
letters were couched in an affectionate and paternal style. “My beloved
Winston,” they began, ending usually with a variation of “Yours to a
cinder,” “Yours till Hell freezes,” or “Till charcoal sprouts,” followed
by a P.S. and two or three more pages of pregnant and brilliant matter.
I have found it impossible to re-read these letters without sentiments
of strong regard for him, his fiery soul, his volcanic energy, his deep
creative mind, his fierce outspoken hatreds, his love of England. Alas,
there was a day when Hell froze and charcoal sprouted and friendship was
reduced to cinders; when “My beloved Winston” had given place to “First
Lord: I can no longer be your colleague.” I am glad to be able to
chronicle that this was not the end of our long and intimate
relationship.

* * * * *

Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord, received me with his customary
dignified simplicity. He could not, of course, be wholly unaware of the
main causes which had brought me to the Admiralty. In conversation with
the other Sea Lords when the well-kept secret of my appointment first
reached the Admiralty, he said: “We are to have new masters: if they
wish us to serve them, we will do so, and if not, they will find others
to carry on the work.” I had only met him hitherto at the conferences of
the Committee of Imperial Defence, and my opinions were divided between
an admiration for all I heard of his character and a total disagreement
with what I understood to be his strategic views. He considered the
creation of a War Staff quite unnecessary: I had come to set one up. He
did not approve of the War Office plans for sending an army to France in
the event of war: I considered it my duty to perfect these arrangements
to the smallest detail. He was, as I believed, still an advocate of a
close blockade of the German ports, which to my lay or military mind the
torpedo seemed already to have rendered impossible.[5] These were large
and vital differences. He on his side probably thought we had got into
an unnecessary panic over the Agadir crisis, and that we did not
properly understand the strength and mobility of the British Fleet nor
the true character of British strategic power. He was due to retire for
age from the Service in three or four months, unless his tenure had been
extended, while I, for my part, came to the Admiralty with a very clear
intention to have an entirely new Board of my own choosing. In these
circumstances our association was bound to be bleak.

This is, however, the moment for me to give an impression of this
striking naval personality. He was, without any exception, the most
selfless man I have ever met or even read of. He wanted nothing, and he
feared nothing—absolutely nothing. Whether he was commanding the British
Fleet or repairing an old motor-car, he was equally keen, equally
interested, equally content. To step from a great office into absolute
retirement, to return from retirement to the pinnacle of naval power,
were transitions which produced no change in the beat of that constant
heart. Everything was duty. It was not merely that nothing else
mattered. There was nothing else. One did one’s duty as well as one
possibly could, be it great or small, and naturally one deserved no
reward. This had been the spirit in which he had lived his long life
afloat, and which by his example he had spread far and wide through the
ranks of the Navy. It made him seem very unsympathetic on many
occasions, both to officers and men. Orders were orders, whether they
terminated an officer’s professional career or led him on to fame,
whether they involved the most pleasant or the most disagreeable work;
and he would snap his teeth and smile his wintry smile to all complaints
and to sentiment and emotion in every form. Never once did I see his
composure disturbed. He never opened up, never unbent. Never once, until
a very dark day for me, did I learn that my work had met with favour in
his eyes.

All the same, for all his unsympathetic methods, “Tug,” as he was
generally called (because he was always working, i. e., pulling,
hauling, tugging), or alternatively “old ’Ard ’Art,” was greatly loved
in the Fleet. Men would do hard and unpleasant work even when they
doubted its necessity, because he had ordered it and it was “his way.”
He had served as a midshipman in the Crimean War. Every one knew the
story of his V.C., when the square broke at Tamai in the Soudan, and
when he was seen, with the ammunition of his Gatling exhausted, knocking
the Dervish spearmen over one after another with his fists, using the
broken hilt of his sword as a sort of knuckle duster. Stories were told
of his apparent insensibility to weather and climate. He would wear a
thin monkey-jacket in mid-winter in the North Sea with apparent comfort
while every one else was shivering in great coats. He would stand
bareheaded under a tropical sun without ill effects. He had a strong
inventive turn of mind, and considerable mechanical knowledge. The
system of counter-mining in use for forty years in the Navy, and the
masthead semaphore which continued till displaced by wireless
telegraphy, were both products of his ingenuity. He was an experienced
and masterly commander of a Fleet at sea. In addition to this he
expressed himself with great clearness and thoroughness on paper, many
of his documents being extended arguments of exact detail and widely
comprehensive scope. He impressed me from the first as a man of the
highest quality and stature, but, as I thought, dwelling too much in the
past of naval science, not sufficiently receptive of new ideas when
conditions were changing so rapidly, and, of course, tenacious and
unyielding in the last degree.

After we had had several preliminary talks and I found we were not
likely to reach an agreement, I sent him a minute about the creation of
a Naval War Staff, which raised an unmistakable issue. He met it by a
powerfully reasoned and unqualified refusal, and I then determined to
form a new Board of Admiralty without delay. The Lords of the Admiralty
hold quasi-ministerial appointments, and it was of course necessary to
put my proposals before the Prime Minister and obtain his assent.

_Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister_.

H.M.S. _Enchantress_,
PORTSMOUTH.
_November 5, 1911._

The enclosed memorandum from Sir A. Wilson is decisive in its
opposition, not only to any particular scheme, but against the whole
principle of a War Staff for the Navy. Ottley’s[6] rejoinder, which I
also send you, shows that it would not be difficult to continue the
argument. But I feel that this might easily degenerate into personal
controversy, and would, in any case, be quite unavailing. I like Sir
A. Wilson personally, and should be very sorry to run the risk of
embittering relations which are now pleasant. I therefore propose to
take no public action during his tenure.

If Wilson retires in the ordinary course in March, I shall be left
without a First Sea Lord in the middle of the passage of the
Estimates, and his successor will not be able to take any real
responsibility for them. It is necessary, therefore, that the change
should be made in January at the latest.

I could, if it were imperative, propose to you a new Board for
submission to the King at once. The field of selection for the first
place is narrow; and since I have, with a good deal of reluctance,
abandoned the idea of bringing Fisher back, no striking appointment is
possible. I may, however, just as well enjoy the advantage of
reserving a final choice for another month. At present, therefore, I
will only say that Prince Louis is certainly the best man to be Second
Sea Lord, that I find myself in cordial agreement with him on nearly
every important question of naval policy, and that he will accept the
appointment gladly.... I should thus hope to start in the New Year
with a united and progressive Board, and with the goodwill of both the
factions whose animosities have done so much harm.

Meanwhile I am elaborating the scheme of a War Staff.

_Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister._

_November 16, 1911._

I have now to put before you my proposals for a new Board of
Admiralty, and the changes consequent thereupon. Having now seen all
the principal officers who might be considered candidates for such a
post, I pronounce decidedly in favour of Sir Francis Bridgeman as
First Sea Lord. He is a fine sailor, with the full confidence of the
Service afloat, and with the aptitude for working with and through a
staff, well developed. If, as would no doubt be the case, he should
bring Captain de Bartolomé as his Naval Assistant, I am satisfied that
the work of this office would proceed smoothly and with despatch. I
have discussed the principal questions of strategy, administration and
finance with him, and believe that we are in general agreement on
fundamental principles. If you approve, I will write to Sir Francis
and enter more fully into these matters in connection with an
assumption by him of these new duties.

This appointment harmonises, personally and administratively, with
that of the new Second Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, of whom I
have already written to you, and of whose assistance I have the
highest expectations. Rear-Admiral Briggs, the Controller and Third
Sea Lord, has, after a year, just begun to acquire a complete
knowledge of his very extensive department, and I do not think it
necessary to transfer him at the present time. He will be the only
naval member of the old Board to remain. Rear-Admiral Madden is, in
any case, leaving on January 5, and I am advised from all quarters,
including both the proposed First and Second Sea Lords, that the best
man to fill his place is Captain Pakenham. This officer, who is very
highly thought of for his intellectual attainments, has also the rare
distinction of having served throughout the Russo-Japanese War,
including the battle of the Tsushima.

The Home Fleet, which becomes vacant, has not, unhappily, any
candidate of clear and pre-eminent qualifications. Admiral Jellicoe is
not yet sufficiently in command of the confidence of the Sea Service,
to justify what would necessarily be a very startling promotion. I
shall, however, be taking the perfectly straightforward and
unexceptionable course in placing Vice-Admiral Sir George Callaghan,
the present Second in Command, who has been in almost daily control of
the largest manœuvres of the Home Fleet, and who has previously been
Second in Command in the Mediterranean, in the place of Sir F.
Bridgeman. Sir John Jellicoe will be his Second in Command, and we
shall thus be able to see what fitness he will develop for the
succession.

It appears to me not merely important but necessary that these changes
should operate without delay. The draft Estimates have all arrived for
discussion, and a month of the most severe work, governing the whole
future policy of the next two years, awaits the Board of Admiralty.
This task can only be satisfactorily discharged if it is undertaken by
men who come together with consenting minds, and who will find
themselves responsible to the Cabinet and to Parliament for the
immediate consequences of their decisions. I would therefore ask you
to authorise me to approach all parties concerned without delay, and
unless some unexpected hitch occurs I shall hope to submit the list to
the King not later than Wednesday next. The New Board would thus be
fully constituted before the end of the present month.

Afloat the decisive appointment was that of Sir John Jellicoe to be
second in command of the Home Fleet. He thus in effect passed over the
heads of four or five of the most important senior Admirals on the
active list and became virtually designated for the supreme command in
the near future.

The announcement of these changes (November 28) created a considerable
sensation in the House of Commons when, late at night, they became
known. All the Sea Lords, except one, had been replaced by new men. I
was immediately interrogated, “Had they resigned, or been told to go?”
and so on. I gave briefly such explanations as were necessary. At this
time I was very strong, because most of those who knew the inner history
of the Agadir crisis were troubled about the Fleet, and it was well
known that I had been sent to the Admiralty to make a new and a vehement
effort.

Sir Arthur Wilson and I parted on friendly, civil, but at the same time
cool terms. He showed not the least resentment at the short curtailment
of his tenure. He was as good-tempered and as distant as ever. Only once
did he show the slightest sign of vehemence. That was when I told him
that the Prime Minister was willing to submit his name to the King for a
Peerage. He disengaged himself from this with much vigour. What would he
do with such a thing? It would be ridiculous. However, His Majesty
resolved to confer upon him the Order of Merit, and this he was finally
persuaded to accept. On his last night in office he gave a dinner to the
new Sea Lords in the true “band of brothers” style, and then retired to
Norfolk. I could not help thinking uncomfortably of the famous Tenniel
cartoon, “Dropping the Pilot,” where the inexperienced and impulsive
German Emperor is depicted carelessly watching the venerable figure of
Bismarck descending the ladder. Nevertheless I had acted on high public
grounds and on those alone, and I fortified myself with them.

As will be seen in its proper place, Sir Arthur Wilson came back to the
Admiralty three years later, and worked with Lord Fisher and me during
the six months of our association in the war. When Lord Fisher resigned
in May, 1915, I invited Sir Arthur to take up the duties of First Sea
Lord and he consented to do so. On learning, however, a few days later
that I was to leave the Admiralty, he wrote to Mr. Asquith refusing to
undertake the task under any other First Lord but me. Here is his
letter:—

_May 19, 1915._

DEAR MR. ASQUITH,—

In view of the reports in the papers this morning as to the probable
reconstruction of the Government, I think I ought to tell you that
although I agreed to undertake the office of First Sea Lord under Mr.
Churchill because it appeared to me to be the best means of
maintaining continuity of policy under the unfortunate circumstances
that have arisen, I am not prepared to undertake the duties under any
new First Lord, as the strain under such circumstances would be far
beyond my strength.

Believe me,
Yours truly,
A. K. WILSON.

At that time I hardly seemed to have a friend in the official or
Parliamentary world. All the press were throwing the blame of the
Dardanelles entanglement and of many other things upon me, and I was
everywhere represented as a rash, presumptuous person with whom no Board
of Admiralty could work. Sir Arthur had never previously given me any
sign of approval, though, of course, we had laboured together day after
day. I was, therefore, astounded to learn what he had done. It came as
an absolute surprise to me: and I do not mind saying that I felt as
proud as a young officer mentioned for the first time in dispatches. I
thought it my duty, however, to try to overcome his objections, as I
knew the Prime Minister wanted him to take the post. But it was all in
vain. He stuck to his opinion that he could do it with me and with
nobody else. I felt deeply touched. There was nothing to be touched
about, he observed, “You know all the moves on the board. I should only
have to put the brake on from time to time. I could not possibly manage
with anyone else.” And that was the end of it. He continued working in a
subordinate position at the Admiralty till the end of the war. I hardly
ever saw him afterwards; but I have preserved a memory which is very
precious to me.

The new Fourth Sea Lord was an officer of singular firmness of
character. He possessed a unique experience of naval war. Since Nelson
himself, no British naval officer had been so long at sea in time of war
on a ship of war without setting foot on land. Captain Pakenham had been
fourteen months afloat in the battleship _Asahi_ during the war between
Russia and Japan. Although this vessel was frequently in harbour, he
would not leave it for fear she might sail without him; and there alone,
the sole European in a great ship’s company of valiant, reticent,
inscrutable Japanese, he had gone through the long vigil outside Port
Arthur, with its repeated episodes of minefields and bombardments, till
the final battle in the Sea of Japan. Always faultlessly attired, with
stiff white collar and an immovable eye-glass, he matched the Japanese
with a punctilio and reserve the equal of their own, and finally
captivated their martial spirit and won their unstinted and outspoken
admiration. Admiral Togo has related how the English officer, as the
_Asahi_ was going into action at the last great battle, when the heavy
shells had already begun to strike the ship, remained impassive alone on
the open after-bridge making his notes and taking his observations of
the developing action for the reports which he was to send to his
Government; and acclaiming him, with Japanese chivalry, recommended him
to the Emperor for the highest honour this warlike and knightly people
could bestow.

The unique sea-going record in time of war on a ship of war which
Captain Pakenham brought to the Admiralty has been maintained by him to
this day, and to fourteen months of sea-going service with the Japanese
Fleet, he may now add fifty-two months constant service with the
Battle-Cruisers, during which time it is credibly reported that he never
on any occasion at sea lay down to rest otherwise than fully dressed,
collared and booted, ready at any moment of the night or day.

A few weeks after my arrival at the Admiralty I was told that among
several officers of Flag rank who wished to see me was Rear-Admiral
Beatty. I had never met him before, but I had the following impressions
about him. First, that he was the youngest Flag Officer in the Fleet.
Second, that he had commanded the white gunboat which had come up the
Nile as close as possible to support the 21st Lancers when we made the
charge at Omdurman. Third, that he had seen a lot of fighting on land
with the army, and that consequently he had military as well as naval
experience. Fourth, that he came of a hard-riding stock; his father had
been in my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, and I had often heard him
talked of when I first joined. The Admiral, I knew, was a very fine
horseman, with what is called “an eye for country.” Fifth, that there
was much talk in naval circles of his having been pushed on too fast.
Such were the impressions aroused in my mind by the name of this
officer, and I record them with minuteness because the decisions which I
had the honour of taking in regard to him were most serviceable to the
Royal Navy and to the British arms.

I was, however, advised about him at the Admiralty in a decisively
adverse sense. He had got on too fast, he had many interests ashore. His
heart it was said was not wholly in the Service. He had been offered an
appointment in the Atlantic Fleet suited to his rank as Rear-Admiral. He
had declined this appointment—a very serious step for a Naval Officer to
take when appointments were few in proportion to candidates—and he
should in consequence not be offered any further employment. It would be
contrary to precedent to make a further offer. He had already been
unemployed for eighteen months, and would probably be retired in the
ordinary course at the expiration of the full three years’ unemployment.

But my first meeting with the Admiral induced me immediately to
disregard this unfortunate advice. He became at once my Naval Secretary
(or Private Secretary, as the appointment was then styled). Working thus
side by side in rooms which communicated, we perpetually discussed
during the next fifteen months the problems of a naval war with Germany.
It became increasingly clear to me that he viewed questions of naval
strategy and tactics in a different light from the average naval
officer: he approached them, as it seemed to me, much more as a soldier
would. His war experiences on land had illuminated the facts he had
acquired in his naval training. He was no mere instrumentalist. He did
not think of _matériel_ as an end in itself but only as a means. He
thought of war problems in their unity by land, sea and air. His mind
had been rendered quick and supple by the situations of polo and the
hunting-field, and enriched by varied experiences against the enemy on
Nile gunboats, and ashore. It was with equal pleasure and profit that I
discussed with him our naval problem, now from this angle, now from
that; and I was increasingly struck with the shrewd and profound
sagacity of his comments expressed in language singularly free from
technical jargon.

I had no doubts whatever when the command of the Battle-Cruiser Squadron
fell vacant in the spring of 1913, in appointing him over the heads of
all to this incomparable command, the nucleus as it proved to be of the
famous Battle-Cruiser Fleet—the strategic cavalry of the Royal Navy,
that supreme combination of speed and power to which the thoughts of the
Admiralty were continuously directed. And when two years later (February
3, 1915) I visited him on board the _Lion_, with the scars of victorious
battle fresh upon her from the action of the Dogger Bank, I heard from
his Captains and his Admirals the expression of their respectful but
intense enthusiasm for their leader. Well do I remember how, as I was
leaving the ship, the usually imperturbable Admiral Pakenham caught me
by the sleeve, “First Lord, I wish to speak to you in private,” and the
restrained passion in his voice as he said, “Nelson has come again.”
Those words often recurred to my mind.

So much of my work in endeavouring to prepare the Fleet for war was
dependent upon the guidance and help I received from Prince Louis of
Battenberg, who, taking it as a whole, was my principal counsellor, as
Second Sea Lord from January, 1912, to March, 1913 (when Sir Francis
Bridgeman’s health temporarily failed), and as First Sea Lord
thenceforward to the end of October, 1914, that it is necessary to give
some description of this remarkable Prince and British sailor. All the
more is this necessary since the accident of his parentage struck him
down in the opening months of the Great War and terminated his long
professional career.

Prince Louis was a child of the Royal Navy. From his earliest years he
had been bred to the sea. The deck of a British warship was his home.
All his interest was centred in the British Fleet. So far from his
exalted rank having helped him it had hindered his career: up to a
certain point no doubt it had been of assistance, but after that it had
been a positive drawback. In consequence he had spent an exceptionally
large proportion of his forty years’ service afloat usually in the less
agreeable commands. One had heard at Malta how he used to bring his
Cruiser Squadron into that small, crowded harbour at speed and then in
the nick of time, with scarcely a hundred yards to spare, by dropping
his anchors, checking on his cables and going full speed astern, bring
it safely into station. He had a far wider knowledge of war by land and
sea and of the Continent of Europe than most of the other Admirals I
have known. His brother, as King of Bulgaria, had shown military
aptitudes of a very high order at the Battle of Slivnitza, and he
himself was deeply versed in every detail, practical and theoretic, of
the British Naval Service. It was not without good reason that he had
been appointed under Lord Fisher to be Head of the British Naval
Intelligence Department, that vital ganglion of our organisation. He was
a thoroughly trained and accomplished Staff Officer, with a gift of
clear and lucid statement and all that thoroughness and patient industry
which we have never underestimated in the German race.

It was recounted of him that on one occasion, when he visited Kiel with
King Edward, a German Admiral in high command had reproached him with
serving in the British Fleet, whereat Prince Louis, stiffening, had
replied “Sir, when I joined the Royal Navy in the year 1868, the German
Empire did not exist.”

The part which he played in the events with which I am dealing will be
recorded as the story unfolds.

Our first labour was the creation of the War Staff. All the details of
this were worked out by Prince Louis and approved by the First Sea Lord.
I also resorted to Sir Douglas Haig, at that time in command at
Aldershot. The general furnished me with a masterly paper setting forth
the military doctrine of Staff organisation and constituting in many
respects a formidable commentary on existing naval methods. Armed with
these various opinions, I presented my conclusions to the public in
January, 1912, in a document of which the first two paragraphs may be
repeated here. They were, as will be seen, designed so far as possible
to disarm the prejudices of the naval service.

1. In establishing a War Staff for the Navy it is necessary to observe
the broad differences of character and circumstances which distinguish
naval from military problems. War on land varies in every country
according to numberless local conditions, and each new theatre, like
each separate battlefield, requires a special study. A whole series of
intricate arrangements must be thought out and got ready for each
particular case; and these are expanded and refined continuously by
every increase in the size of armies, and by every step towards the
perfection of military science. The means by which superior forces can
be brought to decisive points in good condition and at the right time
are no whit less vital, and involve far more elaborate processes than
the strategic choice of those points, or the actual conduct of the
fighting. The sea, on the other hand, is all one, and, though ever
changing, always the same. Every ship is self-contained and
self-propelled. The problems of transport and supply, the infinite
peculiarities of topography which are the increasing study of the
general staffs of Europe, do not affect the naval service except in an
occasional and limited degree. The main part of the British Fleet in
sufficient strength to seek a general battle is always ready to
proceed to sea without any mobilisation of reserves as soon as steam
is raised. Ships or fleets of ships are capable of free and continuous
movement for many days and nights together, and travel at least as far
in an hour as an army can march in a day. Every vessel is in instant
communication with its fleet and with the Admiralty, and all can be
directed from the ports where they are stationed on any sea points
chosen for massing, by a short and simple order. Unit efficiency, that
is to say, the individual fighting power of each vessel and each man,
is in the sea service for considerable periods entirely independent of
all external arrangements, and unit efficiency at sea, far more even
than on land, is the prime and final factor, without which the
combinations of strategy and tactics are only the preliminaries of
defeat, but with which even faulty dispositions can be swiftly and
decisively retrieved. For these and other similar reasons a Naval War
Staff does not require to be designed on the same scale or in the same
form as the General Staff of the Army.

2. Naval war is at once more simple and more intense than war on land.
The executive action and control of fleet and squadron Commanders is
direct and personal in a far stronger degree than that of Generals in
the field, especially under modern conditions. The art of handling a
great fleet on important occasions with deft and sure judgment is the
supreme gift of the Admiral, and practical seamanship must never be
displaced from its position as the first qualification of every
sailor. The formation of a War Staff does not mean the setting up of
new standards of professional merit or the opening of a road of
advancement to a different class of officers. It is to be the means of
preparing and training those officers who arrive, or are likely to
arrive, by the excellence of their sea service at stations of high
responsibility, for dealing with the more extended problems which
await them there. It is to be the means of sifting, developing, and
applying the results of actual experience in history and present
practice, and of preserving them as a general stock of reasoned
opinion available as an aid and as a guide for all who are called upon
to determine, in peace or war, the naval policy of the country. It is
to be a brain far more comprehensive than that of any single man,
however gifted, and tireless and unceasing in its action, applied
continuously to the scientific and speculative study of naval strategy
and preparation. It is to be an instrument capable of formulating any
decision which has been taken, or may be taken, by the Executive in
terms of precise and exhaustive detail.

I never ceased to labour at the formation of a true General Staff for
the Navy. In May, 1914, basing myself on the report of a Committee which
I had set up a year before, I drafted a fairly complete scheme for the
further development of Staff training. I quote a salient passage:[7]

It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required to
secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers
and the definite processes by which Staff Officers are trained. The
first may be called “Military Education,” and the second “War Staff
Training.” They require to be treated separately and not mixed
together as in the report of the Committee. Both must again be
distinguished from all questions of administration, of material, and
of non-military education and training. The _application_ of fighting
power can thus be separated from its development. We are not now
concerned with the forging of the weapon, but only with its use.

‘As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer
must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His
interest must be awakened. He must be put in touch with the right
books and must be made to feel the importance of the military aspect
of his profession....’

But it takes a generation to form a General Staff. No wave of the wand
can create those habits of mind in seniors on which the efficiency and
even the reality of a Staff depends. Young officers can be trained, but
thereafter they have to rise step by step in the passage of time to
positions of authority in the Service. The dead weight of professional
opinion was adverse. They had got on well enough without it before. They
did not want a special class of officer professing to be more brainy
than the rest. Sea-time should be the main qualification, and next to
that technical aptitudes. Thus when I went to the Admiralty I found that
there was no moment in the career and training of a naval officer, when
he was obliged to read a single book about naval war, or pass even the
most rudimentary examination in naval history. The Royal Navy had made
no important contribution to Naval literature. The standard work on Sea
Power was written by an American Admiral.[8] The best accounts of
British sea fighting and naval strategy were compiled by an English
civilian.[9] ‘The Silent Service’ was not mute because it was absorbed
in thought and study, but because it was weighted down by its daily
routine and by its ever complicating and diversifying technique. We had
competent administrators, brilliant experts of every description,
unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine sea-officers, brave
and devoted hearts: but at the outset of the conflict we had more
captains of ships than captains of war. In this will be found the
explanation of many untoward events. At least fifteen years of
consistent policy were required to give the Royal Navy that widely
extended outlook upon war problems and of war situations without which
seamanship, gunnery, instrumentalisms of every kind, devotion of the
highest order, could not achieve their due reward.

Fifteen years! And we were only to have thirty months!

CHAPTER V
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW
1912

‘The young disease, that must subdue at length,
Grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength.’
POPE, _Essay on Man_.

The Morrow of Agadir—Mission of Sir Ernest Cassel—The New German
Navy Law—The Haldane Visit to Berlin—An Imperial Mare’s
Nest—The Opening of the Reichstag—A Speech at Glasgow—The
_Luxus Flotte_—Mr. Haldane Returns—Attempt to reach a
Settlement—Correspondence with Lord Fisher—Fisher’s
Vision—The Navy Estimates—The Naval Holiday—Efforts at
Goodwill—Consequences of German Naval Power—Von Tirpitz’
Illusions—Anglo-French Naval Conversations—The Entente
strengthened—Von Tirpitz’ Unwisdom—Organisation of the
Navy—The New Structure—With the Fleet—The _Enchantress_ in
Portland Harbour—The Safeguard of Freedom.

I have shown how forward the Chancellor of the Exchequer was during the
crisis of Agadir in every matter that could add to the strength of the
British attitude. But as soon as the danger was passed he adopted a
different demeanour. He felt that an effort should be made to heal any
smart from which Germany might be suffering, and to arrive at a common
understanding on naval strength. We knew that a formidable new Navy Law
was in preparation and would shortly be declared. If Germany had
definitely made up her mind to antagonise Great Britain, we must take up
the challenge; but it might be possible by friendly, sincere and
intimate conversation to avert this perilous development. We were no
enemies to German Colonial expansion, and we would even have taken
active steps to further her wishes in this respect. Surely something
could be done to break the chain of blind causation. If aiding Germany
in the Colonial sphere was a means of procuring a stable situation, it
was a price we were well prepared to pay. I was in full accord with this
view. Apart from wider reasons, I felt I should be all the stronger in
asking the Cabinet and the House of Commons for the necessary monies, if
I could go hand in hand with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and testify
that we had tried our best to secure a mitigation of the naval rivalry
and failed. We therefore jointly consulted Sir Edward Grey, and then
with the Prime Minister’s concurrence we invited Sir Ernest Cassel to go
to Berlin and get into direct touch with the Emperor. Sir Ernest was
qualified for this task, as he knew the Emperor well and was at the same
time devoted to British interests. We armed him with a brief but
pregnant memorandum, which cannot be more tersely summarized than in von
Bethmann-Hollweg’s own words[10]: ‘Acceptance of English superiority at
sea—no augmentation of the German naval programme—a reduction as far as
possible of that programme—and on the part of England, no impediment to
our Colonial expansion—discussion and promotion of our Colonial
ambitions—proposals for mutual declarations that the two Powers would
not take part in aggressive plans or combinations against one another.’
Cassel accepted the charge and started at once. He remained only two
days in Berlin and came at once to me on his return. He brought with him
a cordial letter from the Emperor and a fairly full statement by von
Bethmann-Hollweg of the new German Navy Law. We devoured this invaluable
document all night long in the Admiralty, and in the morning I wrote as
follows to Sir Edward Grey:—

_January 31, 1912._

Cassel returned last night, having travelled continuously from Berlin.
At 10 a.m. on Monday he saw Ballin, who went forthwith to the German
Chancellor, and in the afternoon he saw Ballin, Bethmann-Hollweg and
the Emperor together. They all appeared deeply pleased by the
overture. Bethmann-Hollweg, earnest and cordial, the Emperor
‘enchanted, almost childishly so.’ The Emperor talked a great deal on
naval matters to Cassel, the details of which he was unable to follow.
After much consultation the Emperor wrote out with Bethmann-Hollweg
paper, ‘A,’ which Ballin transcribed. The second paper, ‘B,’ is
Bethmann-Hollweg’s statement of the impending naval increases,
translated by Cassel. Cassel says they did not seem to know what they
wanted in regard to colonies. They did not seem to be greatly
concerned about expansion. ‘There were ten large companies in Berlin
importing labour _into_ Germany.’ Over-population was not their
problem. They were delighted with Cassel’s rough notes of our ideas.
They are most anxious to hear from us soon....

Such is my report.

OBSERVATIONS.

It seems certain that the new Navy Law will be presented to the
Reichstag, and that it will be agreed to, even the Socialists not
resisting. The naval increases are serious, and will require new and
vigorous measures on our part. The spirit may be good, but the facts
are grim. I had been thinking that if the old German programme had
been adhered to, we should have built 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against their
six years’ programme of 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2. If their new programme
stands, as I fear it must, and they build 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, we cannot
build less than 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4. This maintains 60 per cent.
superiority in Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Cruisers over Germany
only. It will also be 2 keels to 1 on their additional 3 ships.

The creation of a third squadron in full commission is also a serious
and formidable provision. At present, owing to the fact that in the
six winter months the first and second squadrons of the High Sea Fleet
are congested with recruits, there is a great relief to us from the
strain to which we are put by German naval power. The addition of the
third squadron will make that strain continual throughout the year.
The maintenance in full commission of 25 battleships, which after the
next four or five years will all be Dreadnoughts, exposes us to
constant danger, only to be warded off by vigilance approximating to
war conditions. A further assurance against attack is at present found
in the fact that several of the German Dreadnoughts are very often the
wrong side of the Kiel Canal, which they cannot pass through and must
therefore make a long _détour_. The deepening of the Canal by 1913
will extinguish this safety signal.[11] The fact that the defenders
are always liable to be attacked while only at their ordinary average
strength by an enemy at his selected moment and consequent maximum
strength, means that our margins would have to be very large. Against
25 battleships we could not keep less than 40 available within
twenty-four hours. This will involve additional expense.

The German increase in personnel must also be met. I had intended to
ask Parliament for 2,000 more men this year and 2,000 next. I expect
to have to double these quotas. On the whole the addition to our
estimates consequent upon German increases will not be less than three
millions a year. This is certainly not dropping the naval challenge.

I agree with you that caution is necessary. In order to meet the new
German squadron, we are contemplating bringing home the Mediterranean
battleships. This means relying on France in the Mediterranean,[12]
and certainly no exchange of system[13] would be possible, even if
desired by you.

The only chance I see is roughly this. They will announce their new
programme, and we will make an immediate and effective reply. Then if
they care to slow down the ‘tempo’ so that their Fleet Law is
accomplished in twelve and not in six years, friendly relations would
ensue, and we, though I should be reluctant to bargain about it, could
slow down too. All they would have to do, would be to make their
quotas biennial instead of annual. Nothing would be deranged in their
plan. Twelve years of tranquillity would be assured in naval policy.
The attempt ought to be made.

We laid these matters before the Cabinet, who decided that a British
Cabinet Minister should go to Berlin and selected Mr. Haldane for that
purpose. The ex-Emperor in his Memoirs makes a ridiculous story out of
this:—

‘... a keen dispute had arisen among Ministers—especially between
Churchill and Grey—as to who should go to Berlin, in the event of the
achievement of the object of making Germany abandon the further
development of her fleet, and affix his name to this great historical
document. Churchill considered himself the right man for the job,
seeing that he was the head of the Navy, but Grey and Asquith would
not allow their colleague to reap the glory. Thus for a time, Grey
stood in the foreground—another proof that some political purpose
rather than the number of ships was the leading factor. After a while,
however, it was decided that it was more fitting to Grey’s personal
and official importance that he should appear only at the termination
of the negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and ... “to
get his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part of the
festivities and fireworks,” which, in good German, means to enjoy the
“Bengal light illumination.” As it had been decided that in any event
Churchill was not to get this, it was necessary to choose somebody for
the negotiations who was in close accord with Asquith and Grey and
who, possessing their complete confidence, was willing to conduct the
negotiations as far as the beginning of the “fireworks”; one,
moreover, who was already known at Berlin and not a stranger to
Germany. Churchill certainly qualified to this extent, for he had
attended the Imperial manœuvres in Silesia and Wurtemberg on several
occasions as a guest of the Emperor.’

On this it may be observed that there never was any question of my going
to Berlin to negotiate about the Navy; nor did I at this time wish to
go. All the British ministers concerned worked together in the utmost
accord. After full discussions we authorized Sir Ernest Cassel to send
the following telegram:—

_Sir E. Cassel to Herr Ballin (drafted by Sir E. Cassel, the First
Lord, Mr. Haldane, Sir Edward Grey)._

_February 3, 1912._

Spirit in which statements of German Government have been made is most
cordially appreciated here. New German programme would entail serious
and immediate increase of British naval expenditure which was based on
assumption that existing German naval programme would be adhered to.

If the British Government are compelled to make such increase, it
would make negotiations difficult if not impossible.

If, on the other hand, German naval expenditure can be adapted by an
alteration of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious
increase unnecessary to meet German programme, British Government will
be prepared at once to pursue negotiations on the understanding that
the point of naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is
a fair prospect of settling it favourably.

If this understanding is acceptable, the British Government will
forthwith suggest the next step, as they think that the visit of a
British Minister to Berlin should in the first instance be private and
unofficial.

All being acceptable, the Secretary of State for War accompanied by Sir
Ernest Cassel, started accordingly on February 6 for Berlin.

I had undertaken some weeks earlier to make a speech in support of the
Home Rule Bill in Belfast. Violent hostility to this project developed
in the inflammable capital of Ulster. Being publicly committed, I had no
choice but to fulfil my engagement, though to avoid unnecessary
provocation the meeting-place was changed from the Ulster Hall to a
large tent which was erected in the outskirts of the city. Threats of
violence and riot were loudly proclaimed on every side and nearly 10,000
troops were concentrated in the area to keep the peace. I had planned,
if all went well at Belfast, to go on the next day to Glasgow to inspect
some of the shipbuilding works along the Clyde, and to make a speech on
the Naval position, which should state very plainly our root intentions
and be the necessary counterpart of the Haldane mission. As I was
waiting for the train for Ireland to leave the London railway station, I
read in the late edition of the evening papers the German Emperor’s
speech on the opening of the Reichstag announcing Bills for the increase
both of the Army and the Navy. The new Navy Law was still a secret to
the British and German nations alike, but knowing as I did its scope and
character and viewing it in conjunction with the Army Bill, I sustained
a strong impression at this moment of the approaching danger. One
sentence, full of German self-revelation, stood out vividly. ‘It is my
constant duty and care to maintain and to strengthen on land and water,
the power of defence of the German people, _which has no lack of young
men fit to bear arms_.’ It was indeed true. One thought of France with
her declining birthrate peering out across her fortresses into the wide
German lands and silently reflecting on these ‘young men fit to bear
arms’ of whom there was indeed ‘no lack.’ My mind, skipping over the day
of Irish turmoil and the worry of the speech that lay before me, fixed
upon Glasgow as the place where some answer to this threat of
continental domination might perhaps be provided. Once again Europe
might find a safeguard against military overlordship in an island which
had never been and never would be ‘lacking in trained and hardy mariners
bred from their boyhood up to the service of the sea.’

Accordingly, after the Irish ordeal was over, I said at Glasgow:—

‘The purposes of British naval power are essentially defensive. We
have no thoughts, and we have never had any thoughts of aggression,
and we attribute no such thoughts to other great Powers. There is,
however, this difference between the British naval power and the naval
power of the great and friendly Empire—and I trust it may long remain
the great and friendly Empire—of Germany. The British Navy is to us a
necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to them
more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British
existence. It is existence to us; it is expansion to them. We cannot
menace the peace of a single Continental hamlet, no matter how great
and supreme our Navy may become. But, on the other hand, the whole
fortunes of our race and Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during
so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement, would perish and be
swept utterly away if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is
the British Navy which makes Great Britain a great Power. But Germany
was a great Power, respected and honoured all over the world, before
she had a single ship....

‘If to-day our position is eminently satisfactory we owe much to the
foresight and resolution of Mr. McKenna.... Whatever is needed for the
safety of the country will be asked for by the Government, and granted
by the representatives of the nation with universal assent. There is
no need for anxiety in regard to our shipbuilding capacity. There is
no chance whatever of our being overtaken in naval strength unless we
want to be....

‘But what of the men ? We have to-day 135,000 men in the active
service ratings of the Navy. The great bulk of them are long-service
men who have begun as boys and have been trained as a lifelong
profession to the naval service. We have no difficulty in recruiting
for the Navy ... and there is no doubt whatever of our ability to make
any increases which may be necessary, and which I think will be
necessary, in the _personnel_ of the Navy. We have great reserves of
seamen in this country. There are measures which may be taken to make
a greater use of our reserves than has hitherto been found possible,
and I have given directions for that part of the subject to be
carefully studied by the naval experts upon whom I rely. Our reserves,
both from the Royal Navy and from the Mercantile Marine, are a great
resource, _and this island has never been, and never will be, lacking
in trained and hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the
service of the sea_.

‘Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whining here, no signals
of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up.
We will face the future as our ancestors would have faced it, without
disquiet, without arrogance, but in stolid and inflexible
determination. We should be the first Power to welcome any retardation
or slackening of naval rivalry. We should meet any such slackening not
by words but by deeds.... If there are to be increases upon the
Continent of Europe, we shall have no difficulty in meeting them to
the satisfaction of the country. _As naval competition becomes more
acute, we shall have not only to increase the number of the ships we
build, but the ratio which our naval strength will have to bear to
other great naval Powers_, so that our margin of superiority will
become larger and not smaller as the strain grows greater. Thus we
shall make it clear that other naval Powers, instead of overtaking us
by additional efforts, will only be more outdistanced in consequence
of the measures which we ourselves shall take.’

This speech created a considerable outcry in Germany, which was
immediately re-echoed by a very large proportion of our own Liberal
press. It appeared that the word “luxury” had a bad significance when
translated into German. The ‘_Luxus Flotte_’ became an expression passed
angrily from lip to lip in Germany. As I expected, on my return to
London I found my colleagues offended. Their congratulations upon
Belfast were silenced by their reproaches about Glasgow. Mr. Haldane
returned two days later from Berlin, and the Cabinet was summoned to
receive an account of his mission. Contrary to general expectation,
however, the Secretary of State for War declared that so far from being
a hindrance to him in his negotiations, the Glasgow speech had been the
greatest possible help. He had in fact used almost identical arguments
to von Bethmann-Hollweg the day before. He had told the Chancellor that
if Germany added a third squadron we should have ‘to maintain five or
even six squadrons in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the
Mediterranean to strengthen them’; that if ships were added to the
existing programme we should ‘proceed at once to lay down two keels to
each of the new German additions’; and that for the sake of the Navy
‘people would not complain of the addition of another shilling to the
income tax.’ He described how he had read the operative passages in my
speech himself to the Emperor and Von Tirpitz in proof and confirmation
of what he had himself been saying during their previous discussions.
This settled the matter so far as I was concerned. It was only another
instance of the very manly and loyal part which Mr. Haldane took at all
times and on every question connected with the preparedness of this
country for war with Germany.

Mr. Haldane brought back with him the actual text of the new German Navy
Law, or “Novelle” as it was called. This had been handed to him by the
Emperor during the course of the discussion. It was an elaborate
technical document. Mr. Haldane had had the prudence to refuse to
express any opinion upon it till it had been examined by the Admiralty
experts. We now subjected this document to a rigorous scrutiny. The
result more than confirmed my first unfavourable impression.

‘The main feature in the new law,’ I reported to the Cabinet on
February 14, ‘is the extraordinary increase in the striking force of
ships of all classes immediately available throughout the year.
Whereas formerly we reckoned against 17 battleships, 4 battle
cruisers, and 12 small cruisers in the active battle fleet,
demobilised to a great extent during the winter months, we must in
future prepare against 25, 12 and 18, which are not to be subject to
anything like the same degree of temporary demobilisation.... Full
permanent crews are to be provided for all, or nearly all, torpedo
boat destroyers, now aggregating 115, and working up to an authorised
total of 144, instead of for half the number as at present. There is
to be an increase on the already large provision of £750,000 in this
year’s Estimates for submarines. The numbers are not stated, but from
the fact that 121 additional executive officers are required for this
service alone by 1920, we may infer that between 50 and 60 submarines
are to be added.[14] We know nothing of the rate at which this
construction is to be achieved. The increases in personnel are also
important. Under their existing law, the Germans are working to a
total of 86,500 in 1917 by annual increments of 3,500. The new law
adds 15,000 officers and men, and raises the total in 1920 to
101,500.’

On March 9 I pointed out that the fundamental proposition of the
negotiations from the Admiralty point of view had been that the
existing Germany Navy Law should not be increased, but, if possible,
reduced, whereas on the contrary a new law was certainly to be enacted
providing for large and progressive increases not only in 1912 but in
the five following years. Practically four-fifths of the German Navy
were to be placed permanently upon a war footing. The German
Government would be able to have available at all seasons of the year
twenty-five, or perhaps twenty-nine, fully commissioned battleships,
‘whereas at the present time the British Government have in full
commission in Home Waters only twenty-two, even counting the Atlantic
Fleet.’

Thus on the fundamental proposition we encountered an unyielding
attitude. Nevertheless we persevered and the discussion was
transferred to the question of a mutual declaration against aggressive
plans. Here Sir Edward Grey offered the following formula: ‘England
will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive
policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and
forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which
England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that
has such an object.’ The German Government considered this formula
inadequate and suggested through their Ambassador the following
additional clause: ‘England will therefore observe at least a
benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany’; or, ‘England
will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is
forced upon Germany.’

This last condition would have carried us far beyond our original
intention, and might well have been held to deprive us of the power to
come to the aid of France in a war ‘forced,’ or alleged to be
‘forced,’ upon Germany as the result of a quarrel between Austria and
Russia. It would certainly have been regarded as terminating the
Entente. Moreover, even if we had taken this step the new German Navy
Law was not to be withdrawn. At the most it was to be modified. Thus a
complete deadlock was reached at an early stage. Still, so important
did we think it to create at least a friendly spirit, and so desirous
were we of placating Germany and gratifying her aspirations, that we
still persisted in an endeavour to come to an arrangement beneficial
to Germany in the colonial sphere. These negotiations were still
progressing and had almost reached a conclusion definitely
advantageous to Germany, when the war broke out.

* * * * *

Lord Fisher did not like the idea of a naval programme. On February 13,
1912, he wrote:—

‘I can’t support you at all in any way whatever for any two years’ or
more programme. Some d——d fool has got hold of you to have made you
say that! THE GREAT SECRET IS TO PUT OFF TO THE VERY LAST HOUR THE
SHIP (big or little) _that you mean to build_ (or PERHAPS NOT BUILD
HER AT ALL!). You see all your rival’s plans fully developed, their
vessels started beyond recall, and then in each individual answer to
each such rival vessel you plunge with a design 50 per cent. better!
knowing that your rapid shipbuilding and command of money will enable
you to have your vessel fit to fight as soon if not sooner than the
rival vessel. Sometimes, as in one famous year, you can drop an
armoured ship and put the money into acceleration of those building
because you have a new design coming along, so don’t be a d——d ass and
deliberately lay down a ship which you know is obsolete by some sudden
vast step in old Watts’ brain! “_Sufficient for the year is the
programme thereof._” For God’s sake get that written up somewhere for
you to look at when you get out of bed in the morning! and do please
tell me the name of the born fool who hoaxed you. Is it...? He has
just got a gold medal in America for advocating smaller battleships I
believe.... You know Archbishop Whately proved that Napoleon Bonaparte
never existed!...

‘We are asses now for not building a 16–inch gun as Sir E. Wilmot told
you in the letter I sent you—but you can’t help yourself any more than
you can help deliberately laying down ships for the Line of Battle
that go less than 30 knots—there are certain things my beloved Winston
that even God Almighty can’t help! (let alone you!). He for instance
can’t help two added to two being four!...

‘_The most damnable thing in the world is a servile copyist!_ One of
the four Nelsonic attributes is “_Power of Initiative_”! and
“_Plunge_” is the watchword of “_Progress_”! but I sicken you with my
reiteration, so good-bye.’

I replied on February 19:—

‘I am delighted to see your handwriting again. I had begun to fear the
well of truth and inspiration was running dry. Do not, however, shut
your mind against a programme. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and I
have been agreed on this policy ever since 1909, and I am quite
certain that it can be developed so as to secure the greatest
advantages without any sacrifice of elasticity. Such a programme as I
have in mind will cover the whole period of the existing German Navy
Law. It will deal only with the numbers of capital ships. It will be
framed on certain clearly defined assumptions. It will be capable both
of expansion and of diminution, of retardation and acceleration. It
will not necessarily be embodied in an Act of Parliament. It will
probably have to be revised after four years. It will recite certain
definite facts of the existing shipbuilding situation, particularly in
relation to Germany and Austria. It will be measured in relation to
these facts so as to secure ample margins of superiority both in new
construction and in establishment over those Powers. Unforeseen
contingencies will be met by additions, but it would always be open
within certain limits for England and Germany to agree upon
proportionate reductions. The programme of minor construction will be
entirely flexible and expressed only in terms of money.

‘At present we suffer every disadvantage: a panic and a row every
year, spasmodic building, hopeless finance, total lack of foresight in
regard to the labour market, and no means of bargaining with our
competitors. At present we have nothing to put against their threats.
Nothing, in my opinion, would more surely dishearten Germany, than the
certain proof that as the result of all her present and prospective
efforts she will only be more hopelessly behindhand in 1920. She would
know it was not bluff because if a Liberal Government could propose
it, a Tory Government would _a fortiori_ carry it farther. The vast
financial reserves of which John Bull can dispose would come into
view, and would weigh in the balance with a direct and real weight. It
is the uncertainty as to whether we shall throw up the sponge or not,
on which the German Navy has lived and fattened. The standard will be
60 per cent. preponderance in new construction against the present
law, and two keels to one for all increases above it. Sixty per cent.
preponderance in men, 20 to 12 in destroyers, at least 2 to 1 in
armoured cruisers, protected cruisers and their equivalents,
submarines and small fry generally. This is no new idea of mine. I
have been working it out ever since I came to the Admiralty, and am
absolutely convinced that it is the only way of securing economy,
efficiency and moral effect. Whether the plan when made should be
published is a political question. How Navy Estimates should be
financed is for the Treasury and the House of Commons to decide. What
the Admiralty are concerned with is the maintenance of proper margins
of superiority, the power to look ahead, and the power within certain
prescribed limits to manœuvre.

‘Hopwood[15] and Sir Marcus Samuel are hard at it over oil.’

This letter mollified the admiral. On the 25th February, 1912, he
wrote:—

‘I hasten to reply to your letter of February 19th just arrived,
because if your Programme (which has my enthusiastic admiration) _is
not embodied in an Act of Parliament_ then all my objections vanish!
An Act of Parliament (The Naval Defence Act) _made_ us build 20
cruisers that had only 48 hours coal supply. _Can I ever forget that!_
but Providence came along and made them useful as “_Minelayers_.”
However ocean “tramps” at £10 a ton would have been cheaper and more
effective. Sir W. White built the “_County Class_” and forgot the
guns, but Providence came along and has made them useful for commerce
protectors with their 6–inch guns and big coal supply and good
speed—however a few “Mauretanias” would be far more effective than a
hundred “Countys”![16]

‘I can only pray that your Programme will be officially published—for
_it is sure to leak out_! It will add immensely to your reputation and
influence and the moral effect will be prodigious!

‘The _Key Note_ is 2 keels to 1 for all increases above the present
German Law! _2 to 1 in Armoured Cruisers is also vital!_

‘You don’t say a word of your visit to Jellicoe—_but he does_! He is
“_much impressed with your grasp of the whole business_,” and as
Jellicoe very seldom indeed gives praise I think you must have talked
well! as well as that night we stumbled over the dockyard stores at
Devonport returning from the _Lion_ and the _Monarch_! (It’s a pity we
didn’t have a shorthand writer!)

‘_Don’t make any mistake about big submarines being obligatory_!...

‘Big risks bring big success! (It was Napoleon, wasn’t it? “_Risk
nothing, get nothing!_”) Increased surface speed is _above all_ a
necessity, and broadside torpedo discharges and the bigger gun will
come automatically with the above two essentials, and they (_the Big
Submarines_) will be Destroyers with all the advantages of the present
Destroyers and—as well—the power of submergence during daylight
attacks. Battle tactics will be revolutionised and England’s power
will be multiplied not sevenfold but manifold! and with a radius of
action of 6,000 miles ... but it wants an Isaiah to proclaim this
vision!

‘For God’s sake trample on and stamp out protected Cruisers and hurry
up Aviation....’

For a specimen of Fisher’s genius I commend these last few lines. Ten
years of submarine development, spurred on by war on the greatest scale,
were required to overtake in exact sequence the processes of that
amazing vision in technical affairs. The consequences to Great Britain
were, however, not so satisfactory as he forecasted.

* * * * *

Early in March, while the new German Navy Law was still unannounced, it
was necessary to present our Estimates to the House of Commons. It would
of course have been a breach of faith with the German Emperor to let any
suggestion pass my lips that we already knew what the text of the Navy
Law was. I was therefore obliged to make my first speech on naval
matters on a purely hypothetical basis: ‘This is what we are going to do
if no further increases are made in the German Fleet. Should unhappily
the rumours which we hear prove true, I shall have to present a
Supplementary Estimate to the House, etc.’

In this speech I laid down clearly, with the assent of the Cabinet, the
principles which should govern our naval construction in the next five
years, and the standards of strength we should follow in capital ships.
This standard was as follows: Sixty per cent. in Dreadnoughts over
Germany as long as she adhered to her present declared programme, and
two keels to one for every additional ship laid down by her. Two
complications of these clear principles were unavoidable. First, the two
‘Lord Nelsons’ although not Dreadnoughts were stronger in many ways,
particularly in armour and subdivision, than the original _Dreadnought_
herself. Although projected earlier, they had actually been completed
later. Acting on the advice of the Naval Staff, I counted these
throughout as ‘Dreadnoughts.’ On the other hand, any ships provided by
the Dominions were to be additional to anything we might build
ourselves. Otherwise the efforts of the Dominions would not have
resulted in any accession to our naval strength, and consequently these
efforts might have been discouraged. Proceeding on these lines I set out
the six years of British construction at 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against a
uniform German construction of 2. These numbers were well received by
the House of Commons. We were not sure whether the Germans would adhere
to an offer made to Mr. Haldane to drop one of the three extra ships
embodied in their new Navy Law. This, however, proved ultimately to be
the case and was at any rate a tangible result of the Haldane mission.
In Tirpitz’ words: ‘He (Haldane) next came out with a proposal of a
certain delay in the building of the three ships; could we not
distribute them over twelve years?... He only wanted a token of our
readiness to meet England, more for the sake of form.... Haldane himself
proposed that we should retard the rate of our increase “in order to
lubricate the negotiations,” or that we should at least cancel the first
of the three ships. He outlined in writing of his own accord the same
principle which I had previously fixed upon in my own mind as a possible
concession. I _therefore sacrificed the ship_.’

We therefore ‘sacrificed’ two hypothetical ships, and our programmes,
which would have been increased to 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4, were ultimately
declared at 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4. The splendid gift of the _Malaya_ by the
Federated Malay States raised the figure of the first year from 4 to 5.

In announcing these decisions to Parliament later in the same month I
made publicly and definitely those proposals for a Naval Holiday which
were fruitless so far as Britain and Germany were concerned, but the
principle of which has since been adopted by the English-speaking
peoples of the world:—

‘Take, as an instance of this proposition I am putting forward for
general consideration, the year 1913. In that year, as I apprehend,
Germany will build three capital ships, and it will be necessary for
us to build five in consequence.

‘Supposing we were both to take a holiday for that year and introduce
a blank page into the book of misunderstanding; supposing that Germany
were to build no ships that year, she would save herself between six
and seven millions sterling. But that is not all. In ordinary
circumstances we should not begin our ships until Germany had started
hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore
automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential
super-Dreadnoughts. That is more than I expect they could hope to do
in a brilliant naval action. As to the indirect results within a
single year, they simply cannot be measured, not only between our two
great brother nations, but to all the world. They are results
immeasurable in their hope and brightness. This then is the position
which we take up—that the Germans will be no gainers over us so far as
naval power is concerned by any increases they may make, and no
losers, on the basis I have laid down, by any diminution.’

By the beginning of April it became certain that no general arrangement
for a naval holiday could be effected with Germany. The Emperor sent me
a courteous message through Sir Ernest Cassel expressing his great
regret, but adding that such arrangements would only be possible between
allies. Herr Ballin wrote at this same time to Sir Ernest:—

‘I entirely share your opinion of C.’s (Churchill’s) speech, and
believe that it is simply the unusual feature of frankness and honesty
which flustered the whole world, and especially the leading parties
here, and has caused a torrent of indignation in the Press. It is not
easy to become all at once accustomed to such a complete change from
the mystery mongering hitherto prevalent; up to now, it was thought
that language was given to British and German Navy Ministers to
conceal their thoughts. Suddenly, some one makes a new departure, and
everybody asks disconcertedly, “What does this man want?”

‘A few friendly lines addressed to you about the report I sent would
have a happy effect. [A complaint which we were reputed to have made
about an alleged clandestine visit of certain German ships to the
Shetland Islands.]... If he wishes it, C. can make use of this
opportunity in a few quite unofficial lines addressed to you, to brush
away the shadows which were created in high quarters here by the
“luxury fleet” (luxus flotte) and the absence of warmth in his last
speech. This will be a great help in the political negotiations. It
would be too pitiful if, owing to misunderstanding and sentiment, the
great work of arrangement were to be hindered ... etc., etc.’

In compliance I therefore wrote the following letter for the Emperor’s
eye:—

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Ernest Cassel, April 14, 1912._

I am deeply impressed by the Emperor’s great consideration. I only
mentioned the incident to Ballin as an example to show the kind of
anxieties and the strain to which the naval situation gives rise. I am
very glad to know that it was free from all sinister significance: and
I take this opportunity of saying again that we have been throughout
equally innocent of any offensive design. I suppose it is difficult
for either country to realise how formidable it appears to the eyes of
the other. Certainly it must be almost impossible for Germany, with
her splendid armies and warlike population capable of holding their
native soil against all comers, and situated inland with road and
railway communications on every side, to appreciate the sentiments
with which an island State like Britain views the steady and
remorseless development of a rival naval power of the very highest
efficiency. The more we admire the wonderful work that has been done
in the swift creation of German naval strength, the stronger, the
deeper and the more preoccupying those sentiments become. Patience,
however, and good temper accomplish much; and as the years pass many
difficulties and dangers seem to settle themselves peacefully.
Meanwhile there is an anxious defile to be traversed, and what will
help more perhaps than anything else to make the journey safe for us
all, is the sincere desire for goodwill and confidence of which
Ballin’s letter and its enclosure are a powerful testimony.

* * * * *

The growth of the German Navy produced its inevitable consequences. The
British Fleet for safety’s sake had to be concentrated in Home Waters.
The first concentration had been made by Lord Fisher in 1904. This had
effected the reduction of very large numbers of small old vessels which
were scattered about the world ‘showing the flag’ and the formation in
their place of stronger, better, more homogeneous squadrons at home.
This measure was also a great and wise economy of money. A few months
later the British battleships were recalled from China. The more distant
oceans had thus been abandoned. But now a further measure of
concentration was required. We saw ourselves compelled to withdraw the
battleships from the Mediterranean. Only by this measure could the
trained men be obtained to form the Third Battle Squadron in full
commission in Home Waters. It was decided by the Cabinet that we must
still maintain a powerful force in the Mediterranean, and ultimately,
four battle cruisers and an armoured cruiser squadron were accordingly
based on Malta. It was further decided that a Dreadnought battle
squadron should also be developed in the Mediterranean by the year 1916
equal in strength to that of the growing Austrian battle fleet. These
decisions were taken with the deliberate object of regaining our
complete independence. But the withdrawal—even if only for a few
years—of the battleships from the Mediterranean was a noteworthy event.
It made us appear to be dependent upon the French Fleet in those waters.
The French also at the same time redisposed their forces. Under the
growing pressure of German armaments Britain transferred her whole
Battle Fleet to the North Sea, and France moved all her heavy ships into
the Mediterranean. And the sense of mutual reliance grew swiftly between
both navies.

It is astonishing that Admiral Von Tirpitz should never have
comprehended what the consequences of his policy must be. Even after the
war he could write:—

‘In order to estimate the strength of the trump card which our fleet
put in the hands of an energetic diplomacy at this time, one must
remember that in consequence of the concentration of the English
forces which we had caused in the North Sea, the English control of
the Mediterranean and Far-Eastern waters had practically ceased.’

The only ‘trump card’ which Germany secured by this policy was the
driving of Britain and France closer and closer together. From the
moment that the Fleets of France and Britain were disposed in this new
way our common naval interests became very important. And the moral
claims which France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by
Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were enormously
extended. Indeed my anxiety was aroused to try to prevent this necessary
recall of our ships from tying us up too tightly with France and
depriving us of that liberty of choice on which our power to stop a war
might well depend.

When in August, 1912, the Cabinet decided that naval conversations
should take place between the French and British Admiralties, similar to
those which had been held since 1906 between the General Staffs, I set
forth this point as clearly as possible in a minute which I addressed to
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and we did our utmost to
safeguard ourselves.

_August 23, 1912._

_Sir Edward Grey,
Prime Minister._

The point I am anxious to safeguard is our freedom of choice if the
occasion arises, and consequent power to influence French policy
beforehand. That freedom will be sensibly impaired if the French can
say that they have denuded their Atlantic seaboard, and concentrated
in the Mediterranean on the faith of naval arrangements made with us.
This will not be true. If we did not exist, the French could not make
better dispositions than at present. They are not strong enough to
face Germany alone, still less to maintain themselves in two theatres.
They therefore rightly concentrate their Navy in the Mediterranean
where it can be safe and superior and can assure their African
communications. Neither is it true that we are relying on France to
maintain our position in the Mediterranean.... If France did not
exist, we should make no other disposition of our forces.

Circumstances might arise which in my judgment would make it desirable
and right for us to come to the aid of France with all our force by
land and sea. But we ask nothing in return. If we were attacked by
Germany, we should not make it a charge of bad faith against the
French that they left us to fight it out alone; and nothing in naval
and military arrangements ought to have the effect of exposing us to
such a charge if, when the time comes, we decide to stand out.

This is my view, and I am sure I am in line with you on the principle.
I am not at all particular how it is to be given effect to, and I make
no point about what document it is set forth in. But [consider] how
tremendous would be the weapon which France would possess to compel
our intervention, if she could say, ‘On the advice of and by
arrangement with your naval authorities we have left our Northern
coasts defenceless. We cannot possibly come back in time.’ Indeed [I
added somewhat inconsequently], it would probably be decisive whatever
is written down now. Every one must feel who knows the facts that we
have the obligations of an alliance without its advantages, and above
all without its precise definitions.

W.S.C.

The difficulty proved a real one. The technical naval discussions could
only be conducted on the basis that the French Fleet should be
concentrated in the Mediterranean, and that in case of a war in which
both countries took part, it would fall to the British fleet to defend
the Northern and Western coasts of France. The French, as I had
foreseen, naturally raised the point that if Great Britain did not take
part in the war, their Northern and Western coasts would be completely
exposed. We however, while recognising the difficulty, steadfastly
declined to allow the naval arrangements to bind us in any political
sense. It was eventually agreed that if there was a menace of war, the
two Governments should consult together and concert beforehand what
common action, if any, they should take. The French were obliged to
accept this position and to affirm definitely that the naval
conversations did not involve any obligation of common action. This was
the best we could do for ourselves and for them.

I commend these discussions and the document I have printed above to
German eyes. The German Naval Minister exults in a policy which has had
the effect of uniting in common defence against Germany, in spite of
themselves, two powerful Fleets till then rivals. The British Ministers
so far from welcoming this consolidation of forces in the opposite
balance to Germany, are anxious to preserve their freedom of action and
reluctant to become entangled with continental Powers. Germany was, in
fact, forging a coalition against herself, and Britain was seeking to
save her from the consequences of her unwisdom. It is not often that one
can show so plainly the workings of events. But all was lost on Admiral
von Tirpitz.

This sincere, wrongheaded, purblind old Prussian firmly believed that
the growth of his beloved navy was inducing in British minds an
increasing fear of war, whereas it simply produced naval rejoinders and
diplomatic reactions which strengthened the forces and closed the ranks
of the Entente. It is almost pathetic to read the foolish sentences in
which on page after page of his Memoirs he describes how much
Anglo-German relations were improved in 1912, 1913 and 1914 through the
realisation by the British people of Germany’s great and growing naval
power. He notices that the violent agitations against German naval
expansion which swept England in 1904 and again in 1908 were succeeded
by a comparatively calm period in which both Powers were building
peacefully and politely against each other. This he thinks was a proof
that his treatment was succeeding, and that all friction was passing
away—another dose or two and it would be gone altogether. The violent
agitations in England were, however, the symptom of doubt and
differences of opinion in our national life about whether the German
menace was real or not, and whether the right measures were being taken
to meet it. As doubts and differences on these points were gradually
replaced by general agreement among the leading men in all parties to
meet a grave danger, the agitations subsided. The excitement in the
Press and in Parliament, the warning speeches and counter-speeches were
not intended for foreign consumption. England was not trying to make an
impression upon Germany. She was trying to make up her own mind: and in
proportion as this mind arrived at solid and final conclusions, silence
was again restored. But it was not the silence of sleep. With every
rivet that von Tirpitz drove into his ships of war, he united British
opinion throughout wide circles of the most powerful people in every
walk of life and in every part of the Empire. The hammers that clanged
at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which
Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown. Every threatening
gesture that she made, every attempt to shock or shake the loosely knit
structure of the Entente made it close and fit together more tightly.
Thus Tirpitz:—

‘British statesmen naturally did not stress the fact in their
conversations with Germans that it was mainly the presence of our
nearly completed fleet in the North Sea that had produced their
respectful tone, and had lessened the probability of a British attack.
Of course they only spoke of their peaceful inclinations and not so
much of the facts which strengthened these inclinations.’ And again
(p. 192): ‘Seventeen years of fleet-building had, it is true, improved
the prospects of an acceptable peace with England.’

Is it possible to be further from the truth than this? There never had
been any probability or possibility of a British attack on Germany. Why
should we attack Germany for building ships when we could ourselves
build more ships quicker and cheaper? Why incur the guilt, cost and
hazard of war, when a complete remedy was obvious and easy? But the
‘respectful tone’ was that of men who felt how serious the position had
become, and were anxious to avoid any responsibility for causing a
crisis. It was not restraint imposed by fear of the ‘nearly completed
fleet in the North Sea,’ but the calm resulting from resolve to be
prepared.

* * * * *

The organisation of a Fleet differs throughout from that of an Army.
Armies only keep a small proportion of their soldiers in regular
service. These form the framework of the battalions, train the recruits
and keep guard in times of peace. When the order is given to mobilise,
all the men who have been already trained but are living at home in
civil life are called up as they are wanted: and then and not till then
the Army is ready to fight.

Navies on the other hand were in the main always ready. The British Navy
had all its best ships fully and permanently manned with whole-time men
(called active service ratings). Measured by quality nearly the whole of
its power was therefore constantly available. Measured even by numbers
nearly three-quarters of the ships could go into action without calling
out the Reserves. Only the oldest and most obsolete ships were manned in
time of war by the Naval Reserve, i.e. men who had left the Navy and had
returned to civil life. These obsolete vessels were the only part of the
Fleet which had to be ‘mobilised’ like the armies of Europe.

Thus mobilisation, which is the foundation of all great armies, plays
only a very small part in fleets. Every ship that really counted was
always ready to steam and fight as soon as an order reached her.

The organisation of the British Home Fleets when I came to the Admiralty
seemed to a mind accustomed to military symmetry to leave much to be
desired. The terminology was misleading and confused. The word
‘Division’ was used in three different senses, sometimes tactical and
sometimes administrative. The battle units were uneven in numbers. The
degree of readiness and efficiency of the different squadrons was not
apparent from the classes in which they were grouped. In consultation
with Sir Francis Bridgeman, Prince Louis and Admiral Troubridge, the
first Chief of the new War Staff, I designed a new and symmetrical
organisation for the Fleets.

All the ships available for Home Defence were divided into the First,
Second and Third Fleets, comprising eight battle squadrons of eight
battleships each, together with their attendant cruiser squadrons,
flotillas and auxiliaries. The First Fleet comprised a Fleet Flagship
and four battle squadrons of ships ‘in full commission’ manned entirely
with active service ratings, and therefore _always ready_. To form this
Fleet it was necessary to base the former ‘Atlantic Fleet’ on Home Ports
instead of on Gibraltar, and to base the battleships hitherto in the
Mediterranean on Gibraltar instead of Malta. By this concentration an
additional battle squadron of strong ships (_King Edwards_) was _always
ready_ in Home waters. The Second Fleet consisted of two battle
squadrons, also fully manned with active service ratings but having
about 40 per cent. of these learning and requalifying in the gunnery,
torpedo and other schools. This Fleet was termed, ‘in active commission’
because it could fight at any moment; but to realise its highest
efficiency, it required to touch at its Home Ports, and march on board
its balance crews from the schools. In all these six battle squadrons,
containing with their cruiser squadrons every modern and middle-aged
ship in the Navy, there was not to be found a single reservist. No
mobilisation was therefore necessary to bring the whole of this force
into action. The Third Fleet also consisted of two battle squadrons and
five cruiser squadrons of our oldest ships. These were only manned by
care and maintenance parties and required the Reserves to be called out
before they could put to sea. In order to accelerate the mobilisation of
the leading battle squadrons and certain cruisers of the Third Fleet a
special class of the Reserve was now formed called the ‘Immediate
Reserve,’ who received higher pay and periodical training, and were
liable to be called up in advance of general mobilisation.

Germany was adding a third squadron to the High Sea Fleet, thus
increasing her _always ready_ strength from 17 to 25. We in reply, by
the measures set out above and various others too technical for
description here, raised our _always ready_ Fleet from 33 battleships to
49, and other forces in like proportion. On mobilisation the German
figures would rise to 38; and the British at first to 57, and
ultimately, as the new organisation was completed, to 65.

The reader will not be able to understand the issues involved in the
completion and mobilisation of the Fleets on the eve of the war unless
this organisation is mastered.

* * * * *

We made a great assembly of the Navy this spring of 1912 at Portland.
The flags of a dozen admirals, the broad pennants of as many commodores
and the pennants of a hundred and fifty ships were flying together. The
King came in the Royal Yacht, the Admiralty flag at the fore, the
Standard at the main, and the Jack at the mizzen, and bided among his
sailors for four days. One day there is a long cruise out into mist,
dense, utterly baffling—the whole Fleet steaming together all invisible,
keeping station by weird siren screamings and hootings. It seemed
incredible that no harm would befall. And then suddenly the fog lifted
and the distant targets could be distinguished and the whole long line
of battleships, coming one after another into view, burst into
tremendous flares of flame and hurled their shells with deafening
detonations while the water rose in tall fountains. The Fleet
returns—three battle squadrons abreast, cruisers and flotillas disposed
ahead and astern. The speed is raised to twenty knots. Streaks of white
foam appear at the bows of every vessel. The land draws near. The broad
bay already embraces this swiftly moving gigantic armada. The ships in
their formation already fill the bay. The foreign officers I have with
me on the _Enchantress_ bridge stare anxiously. We still steam fast.
Five minutes more and the van of the Fleet will be aground. Four
minutes, three minutes. There! At last. The signal! A string of bright
flags falls from the _Neptune’s_ halyards. Every anchor falls together;
their cables roar through the hawser holes; every propeller whirls
astern. In a hundred and fifty yards every ship is stationary. Look
along the lines, miles this way and miles that, they might have been
drawn with a ruler. The foreign observers gasped.

These were great days. From dawn to midnight, day after day, one’s whole
mind was absorbed by the fascination and novelty of the problems which
came crowding forward. And all the time there was a sense of power to
act, to form, to organise: all the ablest officers in the Navy standing
ready, loyal and eager, with argument, guidance, information; every one
feeling a sense that a great danger had passed very near us; that there
was a breathing space before it would return; that we must be even
better prepared next time. Saturdays, Sundays and any other spare day I
spent always with the Fleets at Portsmouth or at Portland or Devonport,
or with the Flotillas at Harwich. Officers of every rank came on board
to lunch or dine and discussion proceeded without ceasing on every
aspect of naval war and administration.

The Admiralty yacht _Enchantress_ was now to become largely my office,
almost my home; and my work my sole occupation and amusement. In all I
spent eight months afloat in the three years before the war. I visited
every dockyard, shipyard and naval establishment in the British Isles
and in the Mediterranean and every important ship. I examined for myself
every point of strategic importance and every piece of Admiralty
property. I got to know what everything looked like and where everything
was, and how one thing fitted into another. In the end I could put my
hand on anything that was wanted and knew thoroughly the current state
of our naval affairs.

I recall vividly my first voyage from Portsmouth to Portland, where the
Fleet lay. A grey afternoon was drawing to a close. As I saw the Fleet
for the first time drawing out of the haze a friend reminded me of ‘that
far-off line of storm-beaten ships on which the eyes of the grand Army
had never looked,’ but which had in their day ‘stood between Napoleon
and the dominion of the world.’ In Portland harbour the yacht lay
surrounded by the great ships; the whole harbour was alive with the
goings and comings of launches and small craft of every kind, and as
night fell ten thousand lights from sea and shore sprang into being and
every masthead twinkled as the ships and squadrons conversed with one
another. Who could fail to work for such a service? Who could fail when
the very darkness seemed loaded with the menace of approaching war?

For consider these ships, so vast in themselves, yet so small, so easily
lost to sight on the surface of the waters. Sufficient at the moment, we
trusted, for their task, but yet only a score or so. They were all we
had. On them, as we conceived, floated the might, majesty, dominion and
power of the British Empire. All our long history built up century after
century, all our great affairs in every part of the globe, all the means
of livelihood and safety of our faithful, industrious, active population
depended upon them. Open the sea-cocks and let them sink beneath the
surface, as another Fleet was one day to do in another British harbour
far to the North, and in a few minutes—half an hour at the most—the
whole outlook of the world would be changed. The British Empire would
dissolve like a dream; each isolated community struggling forward by
itself; the central power of union broken; mighty provinces, whole
Empires in themselves, drifting hopelessly out of control and falling a
prey to others; and Europe after one sudden convulsion passing into the
iron grip and rule of the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system
meant. There would only be left far off across the Atlantic unarmed,
unready, and as yet uninstructed America to maintain, single-handed, law
and freedom among men.

Guard them well, admirals and captains, hardy tars and tall marines;
guard them well and guide them true.

CHAPTER VI
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN

‘For a scrutiny so minute as to bring an object under an untrue angle
of vision, is a poorer guide to a man’s judgment, than the most rapid
and sweeping glance which sees things in their true proportions.’

KINGLAKE.

The Big Punch—The 15–inch Gun—An Anxious Decision—The Design of a
Battleship—Gun-power and Speed—The Argument for the Fast
Division—The Fifth Turret—Liquid Fuel—The Oil Problem—Financial
Entanglements—The Royal Commission on Oil Supplies—The
Anglo-Persian Convention—A Golden Reward—The Fast Division at
Jutland—Swifter Destroyers—Cruiser Design—Correspondence with Lord
Fisher—The Light Armoured Cruisers—The _Arethusa_.

Until I got to the Admiralty I had never properly appreciated the
service which Mr. McKenna and Lord Fisher had rendered to the Fleet in
1909 by their big leap forward from the 12–inch to the 13·5–inch gun. To
illustrate this I set out the weight of the shell fired by the principal
guns in the British and German navies:—

The 1–inch gun fires a 1–pound shot.
The 2–inch gun fires a 6–pound shot.
The 3–inch gun fires a 12– or 15–pound shot.
The 4–inch gun fires a 28 to 32–pound shot.
The 5–inch gun fires a 50–pound shot.
The 6–inch[17] gun fires a 100–pound shot.
The 7·5–inch gun fires a 200–pound shot.
The 9·2–inch gun fires a 380–pound shot.
The 10–inch gun fires a 500–pound shot.
The British 12–inch gun fires a 850–pound shot.
The German 12–inch gun fires approximately a 1,000–pound shot, but this is
asking a lot of the gun.
The 13·5–inch gun fired a 1,250–pound shot; and its later marks fired a
1,400–pound shot.

The increase of 1½ inch in the calibre of the gun was enough to raise
the British shell from 850 pounds to 1,400 pounds. No fewer than twelve
ships were actually building on the slips for the Royal Navy armed with
these splendid weapons, quite unsurpassed at that time in the world, and
firing a projectile nearly half as heavy again as the biggest fired by
the German Fleet.

I immediately sought to go one size better. I mentioned this to Lord
Fisher at Reigate, and he hurled himself into its advocacy with
tremendous passion. ‘Nothing less than the 15–inch gun could be looked
at for all the battleships and battle-cruisers of the new programme. To
achieve the supply of this gun was the equivalent of a great victory at
sea; to shrink from the endeavour was treason to the Empire. What was it
that enabled Jack Johnson to knock out his opponents? It was the big
punch. And where were those miserable men with bevies of futile pop-guns
crowding up their ships?’ No one who has not experienced it has any idea
of the passion and eloquence of this old lion when thoroughly roused on
a technical question. I resolved to make a great effort to secure the
prize, but the difficulties and the risks were very great, and looking
back upon it one feels that they were only justified by success.
Enlarging the gun meant enlarging the ships, and enlarging the ships
meant increasing the cost. Moreover, the redesign must cause no delay
and the guns must be ready as soon as the turrets were ready. No such
thing as a modern 15–inch gun existed. None had ever been made. The
advance to the 13·5–inch had in itself been a great stride. Its power
was greater; its accuracy was greater; its life was much longer. Could
the British designers repeat this triumph on a still larger scale and in
a still more intense form? The Ordnance Board were set to work and they
rapidly produced a design. Armstrongs were consulted in deadly secrecy,
and they undertook to execute it. I had anxious conferences with these
experts, with whose science I was of course wholly unacquainted, to see
what sort of men they were and how they really felt about it. They were
all for it. One did not need to be an expert in ballistics to discern
that. The Director of Naval Ordnance Rear-Admiral Moore was ready to
stake his professional existence upon it. But after all there could not
be absolute certainty. We knew the 13·5–inch well. All sorts of new
stresses might develop in the 15–inch model. If only we could make a
trial gun and test it thoroughly before giving the orders for the whole
of the guns of all the five ships, there would be no risk; but then we
should lose an entire year, and five great vessels would go into the
line of battle carrying an inferior weapon to that which we had it in
our power to give them. Several there were of the responsible
authorities consulted who thought it would be more prudent to lose the
year. For, after all, if the guns had failed, the ships would have been
fearfully marred. I hardly remember ever to have had more anxiety about
any administrative decision than this.

I went back to Lord Fisher. He was steadfast and even violent. So I
hardened my heart and took the plunge. The whole outfit of guns was
ordered forthwith. We arranged that one gun should be hurried on four
months in front of the others by exceptional efforts so as to be able to
test it for range and accuracy and to get out the range tables and other
complex devices which depended upon actual firing results. From this
moment we were irrevocably committed to the whole armament, and every
detail in these vessels, extending to thousands of parts, was redesigned
to fit them. Fancy if they failed. What a disaster. What an exposure. No
excuse would be accepted. It would all be brought home to me—‘rash,
inexperienced,’ ‘before he had been there a month,’ ‘altering all the
plans of his predecessors’ and producing ‘this ghastly fiasco,’ ‘the
mutilation of all the ships of the year.’ What could I have said?
Moreover, although the decision, once taken, was irrevocable, a long
period of suspense—fourteen or fifteen months at least—was unavoidable.
However, I dissembled my misgivings. I wrote to the First Sea Lord that
‘Risks have to be run in peace as well as in war, and courage in design
now may win a battle later on.’

But everything turned out all right. British gunnery science proved
exact and true, and British workmanship as sound as a bell and punctual
to the day. The first gun was known in the Elswick shops as ‘the hush
and push gun,’ and was invariably described in all official documents as
‘the 14–inch experimental.’ It proved a brilliant success. It hurled a
1,920–pound projectile 35,000 yards; it achieved remarkable accuracy at
all ranges without shortening its existence by straining itself in any
way. No doubt I was unduly anxious; but when I saw the gun fired for the
first time a year later and knew that all was well, I felt as if I had
been delivered from a great peril.

In one of those nightmare novels that used to appear from time to time
before the war, I read in 1913 of a great battle in which, to the
amazement of the defeated British Fleet, the German new vessels opened
fire with a terrible, unheard-of 15–inch gun. There was a real
satisfaction in feeling that anyhow this boot was on the other leg.

The gun dominated the ship, and was the decisive cause of all the
changes we then made in design. The following was in those days the
recipe in very unexpert language for making a battleship:—

You take the largest possible number of the best possible guns that can
be fired in combination from one vessel as a single battery. You group
them conveniently by pairs in turrets. You put the turrets so that there
is the widest possible arc of fire for every gun and the least possible
blast interference. This regulates the position of the turrets and the
spacing between them. You draw a line around the arrangement of turrets
thus arrived at, which gives you the deck of the ship. You then build a
hull to carry this deck or great gun platform. It must be very big and
very long. Next you see what room you have got inside this hull for
engines to drive it, and from this and from the length you get the
speed. Last of all you decide on the armour.

All these calculations and considerations act and react upon one another
at every stage, and the manner in which the Royal Corps of Constructors
can juggle with these factors, and the facility with which the great
chiefs and masters of battleship design like Sir Philip Watts and Sir
Eustace Tennyson-D’Eyncourt and their faithful confederate Sir Henry
Oram, the Chief Engineer, were able to speak on these matters were
marvellous beyond belief. In a few hours, or at most in a few days, one
could be told the effect of an alteration in any one set of conditions
upon every other set of conditions. On this vast process of juggling and
higgling we now embarked.

From the beginning there appeared a ship carrying ten 15–inch guns, and
therefore at least 600 feet long with room inside her for engines which
would drive her 21 knots and capacity to carry armour which on the
armoured belt, the turrets and the conning tower would reach the
thickness unprecedented in the British Service of 13 inches. For less
armour you could have more speed: for less speed you could have more
armour, and so on within very considerable limits. But now a new idea
began to dawn. Eight 15–inch guns would fire a simultaneous broadside of
approximately 16,000 lb. Ten of the latest 13·5–inch would only fire
14,000 lb. Therefore, we could get for eight 15–inch guns a punch
substantially greater than that of ten 13·5–inch. Nor did the
superiority end there. With the increased size of the shell came a far
greater increase in the capacity of the bursting charge. It was not
quite a geometric progression, because other considerations intervened;
but it was in that order of ideas. There was no doubt about the punch.
On the other hand, look at the speed. Twenty-one knots was all very well
in its way, but suppose we could get a much greater speed. Suppose we
could cram into the hull a horse-power sufficient to drive these
terrific vessels, already possessing guns and armour superior to that of
the heaviest battleship, at speeds hitherto only obtained by the lightly
armoured 12–inch gun battle-cruisers, should we not have introduced a
new element into naval war?

And here we leave the region of material. I have built the process up
stage by stage as it was argued out, but of course all the processes
proceeded in simultaneous relation, and the result was to show a great
possibility. Something like the ship described above could be made if it
were wanted. Was it wanted? Was it the right thing to make? Was its
tactical value sufficient to justify the increase in cost and all the
changes in design? We must turn for the answer to the tactical sphere.

Here I felt able to see a little more clearly. As cannot be too often
repeated, war is all one; and the same principles of thought which are
true in any form are true _mutatis mutandis_ in every other form.
Obviously in creating an Army or an Air Force or a squadron of
battleships you must first of all have regard to their highest tactical
employment, namely, decisive battle. Let us, therefore, first of all
visualise the battle. Let us try to imagine what its conditions will be;
what we shall have to meet and what would help us most to win. The first
naval idea of our supreme battle at this time was that it would be
fought about something: somebody would want to be going somewhere and
somebody else would try to stop him. One of the Fleets would be
proceeding in a certain direction and the other Fleet would come along
and try to prevent it. However they might approach, the battle would
soon resolve itself into two lines of ships steaming along parallel and
bringing all their broadsides to bear upon each other. Of course if one
Fleet is much stronger than the other, has heavier guns and shoots
better, the opposite line begins to get the worst of it. Ships begin to
burn and blow up and fall out of the line, and every one that falls out
increases the burden of fire upon the remainder. The Fleet which has
more ships in it also has a tail which overlaps the enemy, and a good
many ships in this tail can concentrate their fire upon the rear ships
of the enemy, so that these unlucky vessels have not only to fight the
ships opposite to them, but have to bear the fire of a number of others
firing obliquely at them from behind. But smashing up the tail of an
enemy’s Fleet is a poor way of preventing him from achieving his
objective, i.e. going where he wants to go. It is not comparable to
smashing up his head. Injuries at the head of the line tend to throw the
whole line into confusion, whereas injuries at the tail only result in
the ships dropping astern without causing other complications. Therefore
the Admiralissimo will always try to draw a little ahead if he possibly
can and bring his van nearer and nearer to the enemy and gradually, if
he can, force that enemy to turn off, so that he can then curl round
him. This well-known manœuvre is called ‘Crossing the T,’ and Admiral
Togo had used it in the battle of the Sea of Japan.

If the speeds of the Fleets are equal, how can this be done? The heads
of both lines will be abreast and the fire will only be given and
returned ship for ship.

But suppose you have a division of ships in your Fleet which go much
faster than any of your other ships or of your enemy’s ships. These
ships will be certainly able to draw ahead and curl round the head of
the enemy’s line. More than that, as they draw ahead they will repeat in
a much more effective fashion the advantage of an overlapping tail,
because the ships at the head of the enemy’s line will have to bear the
fire of the overlapping ships as well as the fire of those which are
lying opposite to them, and therefore two or three ships might be firing
on every one of the leading ships of the enemy, thus smashing to pieces
the head of the enemy’s line and throwing his whole formation into
confusion.

Here then in simple outline is the famous argument for the Fast
Division. A squadron of ships possessing a definite superiority of speed
could be so disposed in the approaching formation of your own Fleet as
to enable you, whichever way the enemy might deploy, to double the fire
after certain interval upon the head of his line, and also to envelop it
and cross it and so force him into a circular movement and bring him to
bay once and for all without hope of escape.

Hitherto in all our battle plans this rôle had been assigned to the
battle-cruisers. Their speed would certainly enable them to get there.
But we must imagine that they would also be met by the enemy’s
battle-cruisers, whereupon, as they say in the reports of the House of
Commons ‘debate arising,’ they might easily fight a separate action of
their own without relation to the supreme conflict. Further, the
battle-cruisers, our beautiful ‘Cats,’ as their squadron was
irreverently called,[18] had thin skins compared to the enemy’s
strongest battleships, which presumably would head his line. It is a
rough game to pit battle-cruisers against battleships with only seven or
nine inches of armour against twelve or thirteen, and probably with a
weaker gun-power as well.[19]

Suppose, however, we could make a division of ships fast enough to seize
the advantageous position and yet as strong in gun-power and armour as
any battleship afloat. Should we not have scored almost with certainty
an inestimable and a decisive advantage? The First Sea Lord, Sir Francis
Bridgeman, fresh from the command of the Home Fleet, and most of his
principal officers, certainly thought so. The Fast Division was the
dream of their battle plans. But could we get such ships? Could they be
designed and constructed? And here we came back again to Sir Philip
Watts and Sir Henry Oram and the Ordnance Board and the Royal Corps of
Naval Constructors.

At this stage the War College were asked to work out on the tactical
board the number of knots superiority in speed required in a Fast
Division in order to ensure this Division being able to manœuvre around
the German Fleet as it would be in the years 1914 and 1915.

The answer was that if the Fast Division could steam in company 25 knots
or better, they could do all that was necessary. We therefore wanted 4
or 5 knots additional speed. How were we to get it? With every knot the
amount of horse-power required is progressively greater. Our new ship
would steam 21 knots, but to steam 25 to 26 she wanted 50,000
horse-power. Fifty thousand horse-power meant more boilers, and where
could they be put? Why, obviously they could be put where the fifth
turret would go, and having regard to the increased punch of the 15–inch
gun we could spare the fifth turret.

But even this would not suffice. We could not get the power required to
drive these ships at 25 knots except by the use of oil fuel.

The advantages conferred by liquid fuel were inestimable. First, speed.
In equal ships oil gave a large excess of speed over coal. It enabled
that speed to be attained with far greater rapidity. It gave forty per
cent. greater radius of action for the same weight of coal. It enabled a
fleet to refuel at sea with great facility. An oil-burning fleet can, if
need be and in calm weather, keep its station at sea, nourishing itself
from tankers without having to send a quarter of its strength
continually into harbour to coal, wasting fuel on the homeward and
outward journey. The ordeal of coaling ship exhausted the whole ship’s
company. In war-time it robbed them of their brief period of rest; it
subjected everyone to extreme discomfort. With oil, a few pipes were
connected with the shore or with a tanker and the ship sucked in its
fuel with hardly a man having to lift a finger. Less than half the
number of stokers was needed to tend and clean the oil furnaces. Oil
could be stowed in spare places in a ship from which it would be
impossible to bring coal. As a coal ship used up her coal, increasingly
large numbers of men had to be taken, if necessary from the guns, to
shovel the coal from remote and inconvenient bunkers to bunkers nearer
to the furnaces or to the furnaces themselves, thus weakening the
fighting efficiency of the ship perhaps at the most critical moment in
the battle. For instance, nearly a hundred men were continually occupied
in the _Lion_ shovelling coal from one steel chamber to another without
ever seeing the light either of day or of the furnace fires. The use of
oil made it possible in every type of vessel to have more gun-power and
more speed for less size or less cost. It alone made it possible to
realise the high speeds in certain types which were vital to their
tactical purpose. All these advantages were obtained simply by burning
oil instead of coal under the boilers. Should it at any time become
possible to abolish boilers altogether and explode the oil in the
cylinders of internal combustion engines, every advantage would be
multiplied tenfold.

On my arrival at the Admiralty we had already built or building 56
destroyers solely dependent on oil and 74 submarines which could only be
driven by oil; and a proportion of oil was used to spray the coal
furnaces of nearly all ships. We were not, however, dependent upon oil
to such an extent as to make its supply a serious naval problem. To
build any large additional number of oil-burning ships meant basing our
naval supremacy upon oil. But oil was not found in appreciable
quantities in our islands. If we required it we must carry it by sea in
peace or war from distant countries. We had, on the other hand, the
finest supply of the best steam coal in the world, safe in our mines
under our own hand.

To change the foundation of the Navy from British coal to foreign oil
was a formidable decision in itself. If it were taken it must raise a
whole series of intricate problems all requiring heavy initial expense.
First there must be accumulated in Great Britain an enormous oil reserve
large enough to enable us to fight for many months if necessary without
bringing in a single cargo of oil. To contain this reserve enormous
installations of tanks must be erected near the various naval ports.
Would they not be very vulnerable? Could they be protected? Could they
be concealed or disguised? The word ‘_camouflage_’ was not then known.
Fleets of tankers had to be built to convey the oil from the distant
oilfields across the oceans to the British Isles, and others of a
different pattern to take it from our naval harbours to the fleets at
sea.

Owing to the systems of finance by which we had bound ourselves, we were
not allowed to borrow even for capital or ‘once for all’ expenditure.
Every penny must be won from Parliament year by year, and constituted a
definite addition to the inevitably rising and already fiercely
challenged Naval Estimates. And beyond these difficulties loomed up the
more intangible problems of markets and monopolies. The oil supplies of
the world were in the hands of vast oil trusts under foreign control. To
commit the Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed ‘to take arms against a
sea of troubles.’ Wave after wave, dark with storm, crested with foam,
surged towards the harbour in which we still sheltered. Should we drive
out into the teeth of the gale, or should we bide contented where we
were? Yet beyond the breakers was a great hope. If we overcame the
difficulties and surmounted the risks, we should be able to raise the
whole power and efficiency of the Navy to a definitely higher level;
better ships, better crews, higher economies, more intense forms of war
power—in a word, mastery itself was the prize of the venture. A year
gained over a rival might make the difference. Forward, then!

The three programmes of 1912, 1913 and 1914 comprised the greatest
additions in power and cost ever made to the Royal Navy. With the
lamentable exception of the battleships of 1913—and these were
afterwards corrected—they did not contain a coal-burning ship.
Submarines, destroyers, light cruisers, fast battleships—all were based
irrevocably on oil. The fateful plunge was taken when it was decided to
create the Fast Division. Then, for the first time, the supreme ships of
the Navy, on which our life depended, were fed by oil and could only be
fed by oil. The decision to drive the smaller craft by oil followed
naturally upon this. The camel once swallowed, the gnats went down
easily enough.

A decision like this involved our national safety as much as a battle at
sea. It was as anxious and as harassing as any hazard in war. It was war
in a certain sense raging under a surface of unbroken peace. Compare it
with the decision to attempt to force the Dardanelles with the old
surplus vessels of a fleet which had already proved its supremacy. The
oil decision was vital; the Dardanelles decision was subsidiary. The
first touched our existence; the second our superfluities. Having
succeeded in the first, it did not seem difficult when the time came to
attempt the second. I did not understand that in war the power of a
civilian Minister to carry through a plan or policy is greatly
diminished. He cannot draw his strength year by year from Parliament. He
cannot be sure of being allowed to finish what he has begun. The
loyalties of peace are replaced by the jealous passions of war. The
Parliamentary safeguards are in abeyance. Explanation and debate may be
impossible or may be denied. I learnt this later on.

I shall show presently the difficulties into which these decisions to
create a fast division of battleships and to rely upon oil led me into
during the years 1913 and 1914. Nor can I deny that colleagues who could
not foresee the extra expense which they involved had grounds of
complaint. Battleships were at that time assumed to cost two and a
quarter millions each. The _Queen Elizabeth_ class of fast battleships
cost over three millions each. The expenditure of upwards of ten
millions was required to create the oil reserve, with its tanks and its
tankers, though a proportion of this would have been needed in any case.
On more than one occasion I feared I should succumb. I had, however, the
unfailing support of the Prime Minister. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
whose duty it was to be my most severe critic was also my most friendly
colleague. And so it all went through. Fortune rewarded the continuous
and steadfast facing of these difficulties by the Board of Admiralty and
brought us a prize from fairyland far beyond our brightest hopes.

An unbroken series of consequences conducted us to the Anglo-Persian Oil
Convention. The first step was to set up a Royal Commission on Oil
Supply. Lord Fisher was invited and induced to preside over this by the
following letter:—

_Mr. Churchill to Lord Fisher._

_June 11, 1912._

We are too good friends (I hope) and the matters with which we are
concerned are too serious (I’m sure) for anything but plain language.

This liquid fuel problem has got to be solved, and the natural,
inherent, unavoidable difficulties are such that they require the
drive and enthusiasm of a big man. I want you for this, viz. to crack
the nut. No one else can do it so well. Perhaps no one else can do it
at all. I will put you in a position where you can crack the nut, if
indeed it is crackable. But this means that you will have to give your
life and strength, and I don’t know what I have to give in exchange or
in return. You have got to find the oil: to show how it can be stored
cheaply: how it can be purchased regularly and cheaply in peace; and
with absolute certainty in war. Then by all means develop its
application in the best possible way to existing and prospective
ships. But on the other hand, your Royal Commission will be advisory
and not executive. It will assemble facts and state conclusions. It
cannot touch _policy_ or action. That would not be fair to those on
whom I must now rely. Nor would you wish it. Its report must be secret
from the public, and its work separate from the Admiralty. I cannot
have Moore’s position[20] eclipsed by a kind of Committee of Public
Safety on Designs. The field of practical policy must be reserved for
the immediately responsible officers. Research however authoritative
lies outside. All this I know you will concur in.

Then as to _personnel_. I do not care a d——n whom you choose to assist
you, so long as (1) the representative character of the Committee is
maintained, and (2) the old controversies are not needlessly revived.
Let us then go into names specifically.

Further, ‘Step by step’ is a valuable precept. When you have solved
the riddle, you will find a very hushed attentive audience. But the
riddle will not be solved unless you are willing—for the glory of
God—to expend yourself upon its toils.

I recognise it is little enough I can offer you. But your gifts, your
force, your hopes, belong to the Navy, with or without return; and as
your most sincere admirer, and as the head of the Naval Service, I
claim them now, knowing well you will not grudge them. You need a
plough to draw. Your propellers are racing in air.

Simultaneously with the setting up of this Commission we pursued our own
Admiralty search for oil. On the advice of Sir Francis Hopwood and Sir
Frederick Black[21] I sent Admiral Slade with an expert Committee to the
Persian Gulf to examine the oil fields on the spot. These gentlemen were
also the Admiralty representatives on the Royal Commission. To them the
principal credit for the achievement is due. At the later financial
stage the Governor of the Bank of England, afterwards Lord Cunliffe, and
the director of the Anglo-Persian and Royal Burmah Oil Companies were
most serviceable. All through 1912 and 1913 our efforts were unceasing.

Thus each link forged the next. From the original desire to enlarge the
gun we were led on step by step to the Fast Division, and in order to
get the Fast Division we were forced to rely for vital units of the
Fleet upon oil fuel. This led to the general adoption of oil fuel and to
all the provisions which were needed to build up a great oil reserve.
This led to enormous expense and to tremendous opposition on the Naval
Estimates. Yet it was absolutely impossible to turn back. We could only
fight our way forward, and finally we found our way to the Anglo-Persian
Oil agreement and contract which for an initial investment of two
millions of public money (subsequently increased to five millions) has
not only secured to the Navy of a very substantial proportion of its oil
supply, but has led to the acquisition by the Government of a
controlling share in oil properties and interests which are at present
valued at scores of millions sterling and also to very considerable
economies, which are still continuing, in the purchase price of
Admiralty oil.

All forecasts in this speculative market are subject to revision. The
figures set out below are recent and authoritative.[22]

On this basis it may be said that the aggregate profits, realised and
potential, of this investment may be estimated at a sum not merely
sufficient to pay for all the programme of ships, great and small of
that year and for the whole pre-war oil fuel installation; but are such
that we may not unreasonably expect that one day we shall be entitled
also to claim that the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913 and 1914,
the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were added to
the British Navy without costing a single penny to the taxpayer.

Such is the story of the creation of a Fast Division of five famous
battleships, the _Queen Elizabeth_, _Warspite_, _Barham_, _Valiant_ and
_Malaya_, all oil-driven, each capable of steaming a minimum of 25
knots, mounting eight 15–inch guns and protected by 13 inches of armour.
It is permissible to look ahead and see what happened to these ships in
the Battle of Jutland. Let us take the accounts of the enemy.

Says Tirpitz (vol. II, p. 284): ‘In the further course of the fight,’
i.e. after the destruction of the _Indefatigable_ and _Queen Mary_, ‘the
English were strongly reinforced by five[23] of their newest ships of
the Queen Elizabeth class, only completed during the war; these vessels,
driven exclusively by oil-fuel, possessed such a high speed that they
were able to take part in the cruiser engagement—they attached
themselves to the English cruisers and joined in the battle at long
range.’

The First Gunnery Officer of the _Derfflinger_ is more explicit:

Meanwhile we saw that the enemy were being reinforced. Behind the
battle cruiser line approached four big ships. We soon identified
these as of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class. There had been much talk in
our fleet of these ships. They were ships of the line with the
colossal armament of eight 15–inch guns, 28,000 tons displacement and
a speed of twenty-five knots. Their speed, therefore, was scarcely
inferior to ours (twenty-six knots), but they fired a shell more than
twice as heavy as ours. They engaged at portentous range ... (p.
164).[24]

As we were altering course to N.N.W. we caught sight of the head of
our Third Squadron, the proud ships of the _König_ class. Everyone now
breathed more freely. While we had been engaged by the English Fifth
Battle Squadron with its 15–inch guns in addition to the Battle
Cruiser Squadron we had felt rather uncomfortable. (p. 167).

After the gradual disappearance of the four battle cruisers we were
still faced with the four powerful ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron,
_Malaya_, _Valiant_, _Barham_, and _Warspite_.

These ships cannot have developed very high speed in this phase of the
battle, for they soon came within range of our Third Squadron, and
were engaged by the ships at the head of the line, particularly the
flagship, the _König_. In this way the four English battleships at one
time and another came under the fire of at least nine German ships,
five battle cruisers and from four to five battleships. According to
my gunnery log, we were firing after 7.16 p.m. at the second
battleship from the right, the one immediately astern of the leader.
At these great ranges I fired armour-piercing shell.

The second phase passed without any important events as far as we were
concerned. In a sense this part of the action, fought against a
numerically inferior but more powerfully armed enemy, who kept us
under fire at ranges at which we were helpless, was highly depressing,
nerve-racking and exasperating. Our only means of defence was to leave
the line for a short time when we saw that the enemy had our range. As
this manœuvre was imperceptible to the enemy, we extricated ourselves
at regular intervals from the hail of fire. (p. 173).

We may now turn to the smaller vessels.

There was no difficulty whatever in settling the design of the
destroyers. The Admiralty had vacillated about destroyers in previous
years. In 1908 they built large fast 33–knot _Tribals_ burning oil, and
then, worried by the oil problem and shocked at the expense, reverted
for two years to 27–knot coal-burning flotillas (_Acastas_ and
_Acherons_). I was too late to stop the last bevy of these inferior
vessels, but I gave directions to design the new flotilla to realise 35
knots speed without giving up anything in gun-power, torpedoes or
seaworthiness. I proposed to the Board that if money ran short we should
take sixteen of these rather than twenty of the others. Building slow
destroyers! One might as well breed slow racehorses.

The cruisers were much more difficult. The duties of a British cruiser
are very varied: now scouting for the Battle Fleet; now convoying
merchantmen; now fighting an action with another cruiser squadron; now
showing the flag in distant or tropical oceans. In an effort to produce
a type which would combine all these requirements, the purity of design
had been lost and a number of compromise ships, whose types melted into
one another, were afloat or building. They ranged from the strong,
heavily gunned and well armoured vessels like the _Minotaur_ through
lighter but still armoured variants of the ‘County’ class cruisers down
to unarmoured but large ships like the _Dartmouths_ (the ‘Town’ class),
and the little vessels of 3,350 tons like the _Blonde_. Altogether there
were nine distinct classes. It was time to classify and clarify thought
and simplify nomenclature on this subject. The large armoured cruisers
were already superseded by the battle-cruiser. They still remained a
very powerful force, numbering no less than thirty-five vessels. We
would call them ‘Cruisers.’ All the rest should be called ‘Light
Cruisers.’ For the future we would build only battle-cruisers (or fast
battleships) and light cruisers. The future evolution of the battle
cruiser was well defined and depended on the numbers and character of
any that might be laid down by Germany. Our lead in battle cruisers (9
to 4) and the creation of the fast division of battleships made it
possible to delay decision on this type; but the light cruiser was
urgent and even vital. We required a very large number of small fast
vessels to protect the Battle Fleet from torpedo attack, to screen it
and within certain limits to scout for it. After hearing many arguments,
I proposed to the Board that we should concentrate on this type, to
exclude all consideration of the requirements of the distant seas, and
to build vessels for attendance on the Battle Fleets in home waters and
for that duty alone.

Now arose the question of design. Should the new light cruiser be the
smallest of the cruisers or the biggest of the destroyers? We had
already in existence a few unarmoured light cruisers carrying 4–inch
guns called the _Blondes_. We had also an experimental destroyer of
enormous size, nearly 2,000 tons and about 36 knots speed, called the
_Swift_. In between these were eight hybrid vessels called ‘Scouts’
representing weakness and confusion of thought: they had neither speed
to run nor guns to fight; they steamed only 24 knots and mounted only a
litter of 12–pounders; they carried no armour, but they ate up men and
money. Whatever happened we must avoid a feeble compromise like that. I
therefore called for designs of an improved _Swift_ and an improved
_Blonde_. The main object of both these types was to rupture a torpedo
attack on the Battle Fleet, scout for it, and otherwise protect it. But
destroyers were now being freely armed with 4–inch guns firing a 32–lb.
shell capable of inflicting very serious injury on an unarmoured vessel.
We must therefore have some protection, if not to keep out the shell at
any rate to keep the bulk of the explosion outside the vessel. We must
also have high speed and guns sufficient to punish even the biggest
destroyers cruelly.

The constructors and engineers toiled and schemed, and in a few weeks
Sir Philip Watts and Sir Henry Oram, _par nobile fratrum_, produced two
joint alternative designs, the super-_Blonde_ and the super-_Swift_.
Both these vessels showed far higher qualities than anything previously
achieved for their size and cost; but both were dependent upon oil only.
I remitted these designs to a conference of Cruiser Admirals. I could
feel opinion turning to the super-_Blonde_. I wrote to Fisher on the
12th January, 1912:—

_January 12, 1912._

In sustained rumination about super-_Swifts_, two types emerging.

(1) The super-_Swift_. 37 knots. Six 4–inch—600 tons of oil. £250,000.
I want her to be superior at every point to all T.B.D.’s. Speed she
has, and stronger armament, and superior stability. But it is alleged
by Briggs[25] (_Advocatus Diaboli_—a very necessary functionary) that
she will be as flimsy as the destroyers, and a bigger target. So I
have tried to find her a thicker skin—not much, but enough to flash
off a 12–pounder or even a 4–inch shell. I can get from Admiral Watts
2–inch tensile steel round all vitals with great strengthening of the
general structure of the vessel for 160 tons, £2,200, and
three-quarters of a knot speed. The speed would come back as the oil
was used up. I think it is a great advance. What do you feel?

(2) Do you know the _Active_? She is a _Blonde_. The super-_Active_,
or _Frenzy_, _Mania_, and _Delirium_ type, now in question, will be
3,500 tons, 30 knots, 40,000 h.p., ten 4–inch guns and 290 tons of
armour distributed in 2–inch plates round vitals. She is therefore
much smaller than the _Dartmouths_, £65,000 cheaper (£285,000 as
against £350,000), about the same price or size as the _Actives_, but
4·7 knots faster (? in smooth water) and with 2–inch protection as
against nothing.

Now if all this bears test, how about chucking the two _Dartmouths_
and the _Blonde_ in the programme, and substituting four _Frenzies_,
all of a kind, the gain being one additional ship, four 30–knot
cruiserlets or cruiserkins, and the cost being an extra £170,000. What
is your view?

Fisher wrote on the 16th January:—

‘Of course there can be no moment’s doubt that you ought to chuck the
two _Dartmouths_ and the _Blonde_ and take four _Frenzies_ in lieu. I
hope you won’t hesitate!’

He did not approve of them, however.

‘You are forced,’ he said, ‘by the general consensus of opinion to
have these useless warships and this therefore is your wisest choice.
I say to you deliberately that _aviation_ has entirely dispensed with
the necessity for this type. What you do want is the super-_Swift_—all
oil—and don’t fiddle about armour; it really is so VERY silly! There
is only ONE defence and that is SPEED! for all small vessels (_except
those_ who go under water).

‘The super-_Swift_ is MAINLY wanted for the submarine. The submarine
has no horizon. The _Swift_ tells her where the enemy is and then
flees for her life with 40 knots speed!

‘The super-_Lion_, the super-_Swift_ and the super-Submarine—_all else
is wasted money_!

‘The luxuries of the present are the necessities of the future. Our
grandfathers never had a bath-room.... _You have got to plunge for
three years ahead!_ And _THE ONE_ thing is to keep Foreign Admiralties
running after you! It’s Hell for _them_!

‘The Germans are going to have a motor battleship before us and a
cruiser that will make the circuit of the world without having to
replenish her fuel!

‘_What an Alabama!_

‘The most damnable person for you to have any dealings with is a Naval
Expert! Sea fighting is pure common sense. The first of all its
necessities is _SPEED_, so as to be able to fight—

_When_ you like
_Where_ you like
and _How_ you like.

Therefore the super-_Lion_, the super-_Swift_ and the
super-_Submarine_ are the only three types for fighting (_speed_ being
THE characteristic of each of these types). AVIATION has wiped out the
intermediate types. No armour for anything but the super-_Lion_ _and
there restricted_! Cost £1,995,000; speed _over 30 knots_; all oil; 10
“_improved_” guns; and you’ll make the Germans “_squirm_”!

And again:

‘_You had better adopt 2 keels to 1! You have it now._ It will be
safe; it will be popular; it will head off the approaching German
naval increase. Above all remember Keble in _The Christian Year_.

‘“The dusky hues of glorious War!”

‘There is always the risk of a (bad Admiral) before a second A. K.
Wilson comes along to supersede him! How that picture of old _‘ard
‘eart_ (as the sailors call him) rises before me now!... Three big
fleets that had never seen each other came from three different
quarters to meet him off Cape St. Vincent—in sight of Trafalgar. When
each was many hundreds of miles away from him he ordered them by
“wireless” exactly what to do, and that huge phalanx met together at
his prescribed second of time without a signal or a sound and steamed
a solid mass at 14 knots and dropped their anchors with one splash!
Are we going to look at his like again?

‘So you had better have 2 keels to 1!

‘“The dusky hues of glorious War.” What a hymn for _The Christian
Year_ by a Saint like Keble!’

On the 14th January he wrote:—

‘I yesterday had an illuminating letter from Jellicoe.... He has all
the Nelsonic attributes.... He writes to me of new designs. His _one,
one, one_ cry is SPEED! _Do lay that to heart!_ Do remember the
receipt for jugged hare in Mrs. Glasse’s Cookery Book! “_First catch
your hare!_”... Also he advocates the “improved” gun and the far
bigger ship and (it) will COST LESS.

‘“_It’s your money we want_,” as those Tariff Reform asses say!...
Take my advice—_2 keels to 1!_’

The Cruiser Admirals however plumped for the Super-_Blonde_. Meanwhile,
between the hammer and the anvil, Sir Philip Watts had scraped together
another inch of armour, making 3 inches in all, and Sir Henry Oram
guaranteed 30 or even 31 knots of speed.

Now for the guns. The proverbial three alternatives presented
themselves. We could have ten 4–inch (32–lb. shell) or five 6–inch
(100–lb. shell), or we could compromise on a blend of the two. The
Cruiser Admirals’ Committee finally agreed on a compromise. Six 4–inch
guns were to be mounted on the superstructure forward and two 6–inch on
the main deck aft. It was denied that this arrangement was a compromise.
It must be judged in relation to what the ship would have to do. When
advancing to attack destroyers she could fire a large number of 32–lb.
shots, each sufficient to wound them grievously; when retreating from a
larger cruiser she could strike back with her two 6–inch guns. I
personally insisted upon the two 6–inch. The Navy would never recognise
these vessels as cruisers if they did not carry metal of that weight.
The ultimate evolution of this type in subsequent years was to a uniform
armament of five 6–inch.

We must now admit that this was right, but they were big guns to put in
so small a ship, and many doubted whether the platform would be
sufficiently stable. For the value then of the two _Dartmouths_ and one
_Blonde_ which had been previously proposed, plus something scraped from
other incidentals of the programme, plus a hope that the Chancellor of
the Exchequer would not be too severe, we were able to lay down no less
than eight of these new vessels. I presented them to Parliament in the
following words:—

‘They are described as Light Armoured Cruisers, and they will in fact
be the smallest, cheapest and fastest vessels protected by vertical
armour ever projected for the British Navy. They are designed for
attendance on the Battle Fleet. They are designed to be its eyes and
ears by night and day; to watch over it in movement and at rest. They
will be strong enough and fast enough to overhaul and cut down any
torpedo boat destroyer afloat, and generally they will be available
for the purposes of observation and reconnaissance.’

Judged by its popularity in peace and war this type may claim success.
In the three programmes of 1912, 1913 and 1914, 8, 8, and 6 of them were
built respectively, and after the war began no fewer than 18 more were
built. The first eight fired their torpedoes from the deck as if they
were destroyers. I put the greatest pressure on the constructors to give
them underwater torpedo tubes, but they could not manage it in 1912. In
1913 this had been achieved, and was continued in all other vessels of
this class. Such were the advantages of speed in Light Cruisers that not
one of these vessels, nor the C Class, nor D Class which were their
successors, although frequently engaged with the enemy, was ever sunk by
gunfire. The first of these vessels from which the class was named was
the _Arethusa_, and under the broad pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt she
established on an unchallengeable foundation the glories claimed of old
for that ship.

Come, all you gallant seamen bold,
Whose hearts are cast in honour’s mould;
I will to you a tale unfold
Of the saucy _Arethusa_.

Such were the characteristics of the new vessels with which we proceeded
to equip the Royal Navy in the programme of 1912.

CHAPTER VII
THE NORTH SEA FRONT

‘The greatest impediment to action is not discussion, but the want of
that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action.’

PERICLES.

Our First Line of Defence—The Great Change of Front—Close Blockade and
an Oversea Base—The New War-Plans: Distant Blockade—Manœuvre
Experiments, 1912 and 1913—Prowling Squadrons—The Perils of
Surprise—The Limits of Precaution—A Bolt from the Blue—Cordons—The
Limits of German Morality—The Invasion Problem and the
Expeditionary Force—The Invasion Committee—First Lord’s Notes—The
South and East Fronts Compared—Raid or Invasion—Impossibility of
Close Blockade—The Patrol Flotillas—The Coastal Watch—A Bolt from
the Grey—Possible German Objectives for Raids—Assumptions and
Conclusions—Difficulties of Preparation—The Initial Dangers the
Greatest—Letter to a Friend—The Other Side.

The traditional war policy of the Admiralty grew up during the prolonged
wars and antagonisms with France. It consisted in establishing
immediately upon the outbreak of war a close blockade of the enemy’s
ports and naval bases by means of flotillas of strong small craft
supported by cruisers with superior battle fleets in reserve. The
experience of 200 years had led all naval strategists to agree on this
fundamental principle, ‘Our first line of defence is the enemy’s ports.’

When the torpedo was invented, the French tried to frustrate this
well-known British policy by building large numbers of torpedo-boats,
and the Admiralty, after some years, retorted by building torpedo-boat
destroyers. These destroyers fulfilled two conditions: first, they were
large enough to keep the seas in most weathers and to operate across the
Channel for sufficient periods; secondly, their guns were heavy enough
to destroy or dominate the French torpedo-boats. Thus, in spite of the
advent of the torpedo, we preserved our power to maintain stronger
flotillas in close proximity to the enemy’s naval bases. Meanwhile, all
along the South Coast of England a series of fortified torpedo-proof
harbours in the neighbourhood of our great naval establishments afforded
safe, close, and convenient stations for our battle fleets and other
supporting vessels when not actually at sea.

When early in the present century our potential enemy for the first time
became not France, but Germany, our naval strategic front shifted from
the South to the East Coast and from the Channel to the North Sea. But
although the enemy, the front, and the theatre had changed, the sound
principle of British naval strategy still held good. Our first line of
defence was considered to be the enemy’s ports. The Admiralty policy was
still a close blockade of those ports by means of stronger flotillas
properly supported by cruisers and ultimately by the battle fleets.

It was not to be expected that our arrangements on this new front could
rapidly reach the same degree of perfection as the conflicts of so many
generations had evolved in the Channel; and so far as our naval bases
were concerned, we were still in the process of transition when the
great war began. More serious, however, was the effect of the change on
the utility of our destroyers. Instead of operating at distances of from
20 or 60 miles across the Channel with their supporting ships close at
hand in safe harbours, they were now called upon to operate in the
Heligoland Bight, across 240 miles of sea, and with no suitable bases
for their supporting battle fleet nearer than the Thames or the Forth.
Nevertheless, the Admiralty continued to adhere to their traditional
strategic principle, and their war plans up till 1911 contemplated the
close blockade of the enemy’s ports immediately upon the declaration of
war. Our destroyers were constructed with ever increasing sea-keeping
qualities and with a great superiority of gun power. The Germans, on the
other hand, adhered to the French conception of the torpedo boat as a
means of attack upon our large ships. While we relied in our destroyer
construction principally on gun power and sea-keeping qualities, they
relied upon the torpedo and high speed in fair weather opportunities.
But the much greater distances over which our destroyers had now to
operate across the North Sea immensely reduced their effectiveness.
Whereas across the Channel they could work in two reliefs, they required
three across the North Sea. Therefore only one-third instead of one-half
of our fighting flotillas could be available at any given moment.
Against this third the enemy could at any moment bring his whole force.
In order to carry out our old strategic policy from our Home bases we
should have required flotillas at least three and probably four times as
numerous as those of Germany. This superiority we had not got and were
not likely to get.

Therefore from shortly before 1905 when the French agreement was signed,
down to the Agadir crisis in 1911, the Admiralty made plans to capture
one or other of the German islands. On this it was intended to establish
an oversea base at which from the beginning of the war our blockade
flotillas could be replenished and could rest, and which as war
progressed would have developed into an advanced citadel of our sea
power. In this way, therefore, the Admiralty would still have carried
out their traditional war policy of beating the enemy’s flotillas and
light craft into his ports and maintaining a constant close blockade.

These considerations were not lost upon the Germans. They greatly
increased the fortifications of Heligoland, and they proceeded to
fortify one after another such of the Frisian Islands as were in any way
suitable for our purposes. At the same time a new and potent factor
appeared upon the scene—the submarine. The submarine not only rendered
the capture and maintenance of an oversea base or bases far more
difficult and, as some authorities have steadfastly held, impossible,
but it threatened with destruction our cruisers and battleships without
whose constant support our flotillas would easily have been destroyed by
the enemy’s cruisers.

This was the situation in October, 1911, when immediately after the
Agadir crisis I became First Lord and proceeded to form a new Board of
Admiralty. Seeing that we had not for the time being the numerical force
of destroyers able to master the destroyers of the potential enemy in
his home waters, nor the power to support our flotillas with heavy
ships, and having regard also to the difficulty and hazard in all the
circumstances of storming and capturing one of his now fortified
islands, we proceeded forthwith to revise altogether the War Plans and
substitute, with the full concurrence of our principal commanders
afloat, the policy of distant blockade set up in the Admiralty War
Orders of 1912.

The policy of distant blockade was not adopted from choice, but from
necessity. It implied no repudiation on the part of the Admiralty of
their fundamental principle of aggressive naval strategy, but only a
temporary abandonment of it in the face of unsolved practical
difficulties; and it was intended that every effort should be made, both
before and after a declaration of war, to overcome those difficulties.
It was rightly foreseen that by closing the exits from the North Sea
into the Atlantic Ocean, German commerce would be almost completely cut
off from the world. It was expected that the economic and financial
pressure resulting from such a blockade would fatally injure the German
power to carry on a war. It was hoped that this pressure would compel
the German fleet to come out and fight, not in his own defended waters,
but at a great numerical disadvantage in the open sea. It was believed
that we could continue meanwhile to enjoy the full command of the seas
without danger to our sea communications or to the movement of our
armies, and that the British Isles could be kept safe from invasion.
There was at that time no reason to suppose that these conditions would
not continue indefinitely with undiminished advantage to ourselves and
increasing pressure upon the enemy. So far as all surface vessels are
concerned, and certainly for the first three years of the war, these
expectations were confirmed by experience.

Under these orders the Fleet was disposed strategically so as to block
the exits from the North Sea by placing the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow
and drawing a cordon of destroyers across the Straits of Dover supported
by the older battleships and protected by certain minefields. These
conclusions stood the test of the war. They were never departed from in
any important respect by any of the Boards of Admiralty which held
office. By this means the British Navy seized and kept the effective
control of all the oceans of the world.

They did not, however, secure the command of the Baltic, nor the
absolute control of the North Sea. We could no longer hope to prevent
the enemy from sallying out of his harbours whenever he chose. What use
would he make of this liberty, at the outset or during the progress of a
war? By what means could we restrict him most effectually?

We sought to probe these questions in the naval manœuvres of 1912 and
1913.

In 1912 the newly-formed Admiralty War Staff prepared, as an experiment,
a plan for an immense cordon of cruisers and destroyers, supported by
the Battle Fleet, from the Coast of Norway to a point on the East Coast
of England. To a military eye this system appeared unsound, and indeed
outside the Admiralty it was generally condemned by naval opinion. I
quoted Napoleon’s scathing comment in 1808: ‘Est-ce qu’on a adopté le
système des cordons? Est-ce qu’on veut empêcher le contrebande de passer
au l’ennemi? Qui est-ce qui peut conseiller au Roi de faire des cordons?
Après dix années de guerre doit-on revenir à ces bêtises-là?’ The cordon
system was however tried, and was completely exposed and broken down. We
then fell back upon a system of what I may call ‘prowling squadrons and
occasional drives,’ that is to say, we recognised that we could not
maintain any continuous control of the North Sea. The best we could do
was to sweep it in strength at irregular intervals and for the rest
await the action of the enemy. This clearly involved a considerable risk
of raiding forces which might amount to ten or twenty thousand men
slipping through and disembarking on our coast. I therefore called for
careful individual study to be made of all the different points where
such forces could be landed, and what would be the best plans for the
Germans to make in each case. At the manœuvres of 1913 Sir John Jellicoe
adopted several of these plans for raiding the British coast and put
them into execution. He achieved so considerable a measure of success
that I thought it necessary to stop the manœuvres on the third day lest
we might teach the Germans as well as ourselves.

But before there could be any question of employing the war policy on
which the Admiralty had decided, there was a preliminary period to be
traversed of the most momentous and critical character. This period
raised another set of problems before which the inconveniences of raids,
or even an attempt at serious invasion, paled in gravity. Of all the
dangers that menaced the British Empire, none was comparable to a
surprise of the Fleet. If the Fleet or any vital part of it were caught
unawares or unready and our naval preponderance destroyed, we had lost
the war, and there was no limit to the evils which might have been
inflicted upon us except the mercy of an all-powerful conqueror. We have
seen in recent years how little completely victorious nations can be
trusted to restrain their passions against a prostrate foe. Great
Britain, deprived of its naval defence, could be speedily starved into
utter submission to the will of the conqueror. Her Empire would be
dismembered; her dominions, India and her immense African and island
possessions would be shorn off or transferred to the victors. Ireland
would be erected into a hostile well-armed republic on the flank of
Great Britain; and the British people, reduced to a helpless condition,
would be loaded with overwhelming indemnities calculated to shatter
their social system, if, indeed, they were not actually reduced, in Sir
Edward Grey’s mordant phrase, to the position of ‘the conscript
appendage of a stronger Power.’ Less severe conditions than have since
been meted out to Germany would certainly have sufficed to destroy the
British Empire at a stroke for ever. The stakes were very high. If our
naval defence were maintained we were safe and sure beyond the lot of
any other European nation; if it failed, our doom was certain and final.

To what lengths, therefore, would the Germans go to compass the
destruction of the British Fleet? Taking the demonic view of their
character which it was necessary to assume for the purposes of
considering a war problem, what forms of attack ought we to reckon with?
Of course, if Germany had no will to war, all these speculations were
mere nightmares. But if she had the will and intention of making war, it
was evident that there would be no difficulty in finding a pretext
arising out of a dispute with France or Russia, to create a situation in
which war was inevitable, and create it at the most opportune moment for
herself. The wars of Frederick and of Bismarck had shown with what
extraordinary rapidity and suddenness the Prussian nation was accustomed
to fall upon its enemy. The Continent was a powder magazine from end to
end. One single hellish spark and the vast explosion might ensue. We had
seen what had happened to France in 1870. We had seen what neglect to
take precautions had brought upon the Russian fleet off Port Arthur in
1904. We know now what happened to Belgium in 1914, and, not less
remarkable, the demand Germany decided to make upon France on August 1,
1914, that if she wished to remain neutral while Germany attacked
Russia, she must as a guarantee hand over to German garrisons her
fortresses of Verdun and Toul.

Obviously, therefore, the danger of a “bolt from the Blue” was by no
means fantastic. Still, might one not reasonably expect certain
warnings? There would probably be some kind of dispute in progress
between the great Powers enjoining particular vigilance upon the
Admiralty. We might hope to get information of military and naval
movements. It was almost certain that there would be financial
perturbations in the Exchanges of the world indicating a rise of
temperature. Could we therefore rely upon a week’s notice, or three
days’ notice, or at least twenty-four hours’ notice before any blow
actually fell?

In Europe, where great nations faced each other with enormous armies,
there was an automatic safeguard against surprise. Decisive events could
not occur till the armies were mobilised, and that took at least a
fortnight. The supreme defence of France, for instance, could not
therefore be overcome without a great battle in which the main strength
of the French nation could be brought to bear. But no such assurance was
enjoyed by the British Fleet. No naval mobilisation was necessary on
either side to enable all the modern ships to attack one another. They
had only to raise steam and bring the ammunition to the guns, But beyond
this grim fact grew the torpedo menace. So far as gunfire alone was
concerned, our principal danger was for our Fleet to be caught divided
and to have one vital part destroyed without inflicting proportionate
damage on the enemy. This danger was greatly reduced by wireless, which
enabled the divided portions to be instantly directed to a common
rendezvous and to avoid action till concentration was effected. Besides,
gunfire was a game that two could play at. One could not contemplate
that the main strength of the fleets would ever be allowed to come
within range of each other without taking proper precautions. But the
torpedo was essentially a weapon of surprise, or even treachery; and all
that was true of the torpedo in a surface vessel applied with tenfold
force to the torpedo of a submarine.

Obviously there were limits beyond which it was impossible to safeguard
oneself. It was not simply a case of a few weeks of special precautions.
The British Navy had to live its ordinary life in time of peace. It had
to have its cruises and its exercises, its periods of leave and refit.
Our harbours were open to the commerce of the world. Absolute security
against the worst conceivable treachery was physically impossible. On
the other hand, even treachery, which required the co-operation of very
large numbers of people in different stations and the setting in motion
of an immense and complicated apparatus, is not easy to bring about. It
was ruled by the Committee of Imperial Defence, after grave debate, that
the Admiralty must not assume that if it made the difference between
victory and defeat, Germany would stop short of an attack on the Fleet
in full peace without warning or pretext. We had to do our best to live
up to this standard, and in the main I believe we succeeded. Certainly
the position and condition of the British Fleet was every day considered
in relation to that of Germany. I was accustomed to check our
dispositions by asking the Staff from time to time, unexpectedly, ‘What
happens if war with Germany begins to-day?’ I never found them without
an answer which showed that we had the power to effect our main
concentration before any portion of the Fleet could be brought to
battle. Our Fleet did not go for its cruises to the coast of Spain until
we knew that the German High Seas Fleet was having its winter refits.
When we held Grand Manœuvres we were very careful to arrange the coaling
and leave which followed in such a way as to secure us the power of
meeting any blow which could possibly reach us in a given time. I know
of no moment in the period of which I am writing up to the declaration
of war in which it was physically possible for the British Fleet to have
been surprised or caught dispersed and divided by any serious German
force of surface vessels. An attempt in full peace to make a submarine
attack upon a British squadron in harbour or exercising, or to lay mines
in an area in which they might be expected to exercise, could not wholly
be provided against; but in all human probability its success would only
have been partial. Further, I do not believe that such treachery was
ever contemplated by the German Admiralty, Government or Emperor. While
trying as far as possible to guard against even the worst possibilities,
my own conviction was that there would be a cause of quarrel accompanied
by a crisis and a fall in markets, and followed very rapidly by a
declaration of war, or by acts of war intended to be simultaneous with
the declaration, but possibly occurring slightly before. What actually
did happen was not unlike what I thought would happen.

Early in 1912, the Prime Minister set up again, under his own
chairmanship, the Invasion Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence. This was virtually the Committee which had assembled during the
Agadir crisis in the previous August, and henceforth down to the
outbreak of the war it continued to meet not infrequently. I asked that
Mr. Balfour, who had retired from the leadership of the Unionist party,
should be added to the Committee. This was effected.

The main question before us was the possibility of the invasion of Great
Britain by Germany; but incidentally many other aspects of a war with
Germany were patiently and searchingly examined. The position which I
stated on behalf of the Admiralty was briefly as follows:—

Once the Fleet was concentrated in its war station, no large army could
be landed in the British Isles. ‘Large Army’ was defined for this
purpose as anything over 70,000 men. More than that we guaranteed to
intercept or break up while landing. Less than that could be dealt with
by the British Regular Army, provided it had not left the country. But
the War Office proposed to send the whole Expeditionary Force of six
Divisions out of the country immediately upon the declaration of war,
and to have it all in France by the thirteenth or fourteenth day. The
Admiralty were unable to guarantee—though we thought it very
unlikely—that smaller bodies of perhaps twenty or thirty thousand
Germans might not slip across the North Sea. These would have to be met
at once by well-trained troops. The Territorial Force would not be
capable in the very early days of their embodiment of coping with the
invaders. Some regular troops ought, therefore, to be left in the
country till we saw how matters went at sea, and could measure our real
position with more certainty. It would be a disastrous mistake to begin
sending six Divisions, and then because of a successful raid have to
interrupt the whole process and disentangle two or more Divisions from
the troops in transit to make head against the raiders. We therefore
argued that four Divisions only should be sent in the first instance,
and that two should be left behind till we knew how we stood at sea. The
presence of these two Divisions at home, together with the Territorial
Force, would make it not worth while for the Germans to invade except
with an army large enough to be certainly caught in transit by the
Fleet. Only an army of a certain size at home could give the Navy a
sufficiently big target on salt water. ‘You could not,’ as Sir Arthur
Wilson pithily observed, ‘expect the Navy to play international football
without a goalkeeper.’ The War Office, on the other hand, continued to
demand the immediate dispatch of the whole six Divisions.

This controversy was never finally settled till the war began. It
certainly afforded the means of exploring every imaginable aspect of the
conditions which would arise in the first few weeks of war. Further than
that no man could see. When the actual test came, both the War Office
and the Admiralty abandoned their respective contentions simultaneously.
Lord Kitchener decided to send only four Divisions immediately to
France, while I on behalf of the Admiralty announced at the great War
Council on the 5th August that as we were fully mobilised and had every
ship at its war station, we would take the responsibility of guarding
the island in the absence of the whole six Divisions. We thus completely
changed places. The Admiralty were better than their word when it came
to the point, and the War Office more cautious than their intentions.
Surveying it all in retrospect, I believe Lord Kitchener’s decision was
right. But it was taken freely and not under duress from the Admiralty.

While the discussions of the Invasion Committee were at their height
during the spring and summer of 1913, I prepared a series of papers in
support of the Admiralty view, but also designed to explore and
illuminate the situations that might arise. They show the hopes and
fears we felt before the event, what we thought the enemy might do
against us, and the dangers we hoped to avoid ourselves. They show the
kind of mental picture I was able to summon up in imagination of these
tremendous episodes which were so soon to rush upon us. My intention
also was to stimulate thought in the Admiralty War Staff, and to expose
weak points in our arrangements. For this purpose I entered into an
active discussion and correspondence with several of the ablest Admirals
(notably Admiral Beatty, Admiral Lewis Bayly, and Sir Reginald
Custance), seeking to have the whole matter argued out to the utmost
limit possible. I caused war games to be played at the War College in
which, aided by one or the other of my naval advisers, I took one side,
usually the German, and forced certain situations. I also forecasted the
political data necessary to a study of military and naval action on the
outbreak of war.

Various papers which I prepared in 1913 were the result of this process
of study and discussion. The first, entitled ‘Notes by the First Lord of
the Admiralty,’ deals with the problem of raid and invasion in general
terms, and shows the conditions which would prevail in a war with
Germany. The second propounds the issues to be faced by the War Staff.
The third records my written discussion of the problem with the First
Sea Lord, while the sittings of the Invasion Committee were proceeding.
The fourth and fifth were entitled ‘The Time-Table of a Nightmare’ and
‘A Bolt from the Grey,’ imaginative exercises couched in a half serious
vein, but designed to disturb complacency by suggesting weak points in
our arrangements and perilous possibilities. Space forbids the inclusion
of these last. The first three have been subjected to a certain
compression.

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY

It is much harder for the British Navy to stop raids or an invasion
from Germany to-day than it was fifteen years ago from France. The
tension between England and France had in the course of successive
generations led to the development of a sea front opposite to France
of great military strength. The line Berehaven, Queenstown, Pembroke,
Falmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Portsmouth, Newhaven, Dover, Sheerness,
and Chatham, covers with suitable defences every point of strategic
significance, comprises three great naval bases and dockyards, and two
torpedo-proof war harbours (Portland and Dover). In close proximity to
this line are our three principal military establishments, the
Curragh, Salisbury and Aldershot.

From the British military harbours and bases on this line close
observation of all French Channel ports where transports could be
assembled can be maintained by a superior British naval force.
Cherbourg and Havre can be controlled from Portland, and Calais and
Boulogne from Dover. Flotillas and light craft employed on this
service of observation would have their own home base close at hand,
and a high proportion could be constantly maintained on duty. The
proximity of the battle fleets in the numerous well-protected
harbours, where every necessity is supplied, ensures the effective
support of the flotillas against any serious attempt to drive them
off.

Very different is the situation on the sea front against Germany. With
the exception of Chatham, no naval base or military harbour exists.
Chatham itself has no graving docks for the later Dreadnoughts, and
the depth of the Medway imposes serious limitations of tides and
seasons upon great vessels using the dockyard. Harwich affords
anchorage only to torpedo-craft [and light cruisers], and is lightly
defended. The Humber and the Tyne are unsuitable for large battle
fleets, and are but lightly defended. Rosyth will not be ready even as
a war repairing-base till 1916 at the earliest. Defences are being
erected at Cromarty, and a temporary floating base is in process of
creation at that point.[26] Only improvised emergency arrangements are
contemplated for Scapa Flow, and the Shetlands are quite unprotected.
The only war bases available for the fleet along the whole of this
front are Rosyth, Cromarty, and Scapa—the more remote being preferred,
although the least defended. The landing places along the coast are
numerous, extensive, and evenly distributed; the strategic objectives
open to an enemy are numerous and important. The Shetlands are a
strategic position of the highest consequence, totally undefended and
ungarrisoned. The same is true of the Orkneys. Edinburgh and Glasgow,
Newcastle, Hull, and Harwich are all points of primary importance. No
large military garrisons comparable to those on the southern front
exist.

But the comparison of the new conditions with the old becomes most
unfavourable when we extend our view from the British to the German
coast. It is difficult to find any sea front of greater natural
defensive strength than the German North Sea coast. Intricate
navigation, shifting and extensive sandbanks and currents, strong
tides, frequent mists and storms, make the Heligoland Bight a very
difficult theatre for oversea operations. The deep re-entrant widening
into a broad debouch, flanked at each side by lines of islands and
sustained in the centre by Heligoland, confers the greatest possible
natural advantages upon the defence. To these have been added, and are
being added, everything that military art can devise. Heligoland is an
almost impregnable fortress and an advanced torpedo and airship
station. Borkum and Sylt are both heavily defended by batteries,
minefields, and strong garrisons, and both can be commanded by fire
from the mainland. Into this great defended area, with its wide
debouch facing towards us, access is given from the Ems, the Elbe, the
Weser, the Jade and from the Kiel Canal communicating with the Baltic,
and open for Dreadnoughts at the present year. Within this area are
all the naval establishments of Germany. A fleet or transports
assembled at either end of the Kiel Canal have the widely separated
alternatives of emerging either from the Heligoland Bight or from the
Baltic for offensive purposes. There would be no difficulty on the
declaration of war in assembling unperceived at Hamburg, Kiel,
Wilhelmshaven, and other ports, the shipping necessary to transport at
least 20,000 men; enough to transport 10,000 men is always in those
ports. Large garrisons exist in the neighbourhood, amply sufficient to
supply whatever military force was required. The Germans possess
to-day large ships of the liner class suitable for transport in a way
which the French never did. The rigour with which agents suspected of
sending information have been pursued during the last five or six
years has made it difficult to arrange for the transmission of
intelligence. Consular officers are marked men; and it is to be
expected that their communications by the usual postal and telegraphic
channels will be delayed if hostilities are imminent. Although the
sources from which information may be obtained have been increased in
numbers during recent years, and are still being increased as
opportunity offers, yet the Admiralty are not prepared to make any
confident assertion that a force of upwards of 20,000 men could not be
collected in time of peace, and embarked without their knowledge. As a
matter of fact, very considerable embarkations of a test character
have been carried out without our having any knowledge until some days
after the event.

The continuous development of the mine and the torpedo makes it
impossible to establish a close watch with heavy ships on the exits
from the Heligoland Bight. To do so for a long period of time would
mean a steady and serious wastage of valuable units from the above
causes, and, if prolonged, would effectually alter the balance of
naval power. On the other hand, torpedo craft, which cannot keep at
sea like great vessels, and must every three or four days return to
port for rest and replenishment, have no base nearer than Harwich, 240
miles away. The operation of controlling the debouches from the
Heligoland Bight by means of flotillas would require twice the number
of oversea torpedo craft that we now possess. The watch would have to
be maintained in three reliefs: one on duty, one in transit, and one
at rest, and therefore only a third of the existing vessels would be
available at any given time. Such a force could be overwhelmed by a
sudden attack of two or three times their numbers by a well-chosen
blow, opportunities for which would frequently recur. Unless,
therefore, we were to take by storm some fortified German island which
could be held as a base, or were permitted to use Dutch or Danish
territory, the closing of the debouches of the Heligoland Bight by a
close flotilla cordon is, in the opinion of the Admiralty,
impracticable at present.

The development of submarines of ocean-going capacity may be expected
to modify this situation in our favour.

The problem of controlling the alternative debouches from the Baltic
by watching over the Skaw or the Belts presents many of the features
that have been found so unfavourable in regard to the Heligoland
Bight. Nothing effective could be done, or still less maintained, with
our present forces without using the territory of Norway or Denmark,
or both. It must be borne in mind that the enemy have the option of
striking with their whole force on either line.

* * * * *

On the assumption that a close blockade, either of the Heligoland
Bight or of the exits from the Baltic, is not possible, the Admiralty
cannot guarantee that individual vessels will not frequently slip
through the cruiser squadrons patrolling the wide area of the North
Sea. The North Sea comprises an area of more than 125,000 square
miles. The number of cruisers available is less than 30, of which a
large proportion will always be recoaling. The aid that can be given
at a distance from the British shore by torpedo craft would be partial
and fleeting. The weather is frequently thick; on a third of the days
in the year the visibility is not more than 4 miles; on a quarter of
the days in the year it is not more than 2 miles. There are about five
days fog per month during the year. April averages ten days fog. At
night it is frequently impossible to see a ship without lights at more
than a few hundred yards distance, and often not at that. It is no
exaggeration to say that the main risk which a single fast ship would
run, steaming at night without lights, would be that of collision,
which chance may be very well accepted. It will be easy to demonstrate
this by experiments at the forthcoming manœuvres. If, therefore, close
and certain observation becomes impossible, there is a very good
chance of an indefinite succession of individual transports reaching
the British coasts without being intercepted by the controlling
cruiser squadrons.

Let us now consider what arrangements exist or are possible along the
line of the British coasts to detect and attack such vessels.

Four flotilla cruisers, seventy-four destroyers and torpedo-boats, and
eighteen submarines are placed under the command of the Admiral of
Patrols for the defence of the East Coast from the Shetlands to Dover;
less than 100 vessels and more than 600 miles of sea front. It is
quite impossible with such a small force to maintain a regular patrol,
or still less a line of observation. These flotillas are not intended
for observation, but to attack. To employ them on the former service,
for which their numbers are wholly insufficient, would speedily
exhaust them: at least half would have to be resting and refuelling.
It is not possible with the forces available for the patrol flotillas
to prevent enemy vessels from reaching the British coast. Our
dispositions are intended to make it certain that they will be
attacked in force with the least possible delay.

A curious distinction attaches to the work of naval coast defence.
Usually the line of observation lies in advance of the line of
resistance. In coast defence the line of observation is in rear of the
line of resistance. So far as the patrol flotillas are concerned, the
British coasts are themselves the only true and certain line of
observation. The approach of an enemy may be undetected by the
cruising squadrons or by the patrolling flotillas. But it ought to be
certain that his first contact with the coast at any point is reported
to the Admiral of Patrols, and that that officer will have his
available forces massed at convenient points from which an attack can
be at once delivered. The Admiral of Patrols must treat his problems
selectively and recognise that absolute certainty is out of reach,
that his flotillas are for fighting purposes, and that their rôle of
scouting is secondary. It is of very little use reporting the approach
of an enemy when one has not the forces with which to strike him. The
patrol flotillas are therefore kept in hand at the best strategic
points, neither scattered nor exhausted, and a system of land
observation by outposts, cyclists, aircraft and signal stations, all
connected by telephone, ought to be perfected, from which accurate
information can be transmitted to the points where the patrol
flotillas are massed.

Dalesvoe (Shetlands), Fort Ross, Firth of Forth, North Shields,
Grimsby, and Yarmouth are the bases of the patrol flotillas, and a
force of fourteen or fifteen vessels would, on the average, be
available for each. It is upon this disposition that the Admiralty
rely to interrupt the disembarkation of any considerable force. It is
of vital importance that the watching of the coast-line from the shore
should be taken up from the earliest moment and in advance of general
mobilisation. The effectiveness of the work of the patrol flotillas
and consequently the restriction of possible landings depend upon
early information being received of any disembarkation. The size of
any raiding party that could be landed will, of course, be accurately
proportionate to the delay. It would no doubt be impossible or
undesirable to put the whole system of coast watches into operation in
the precautionary period. No doubt the arrangements made after war had
actually begun would be much more thorough, and larger numbers of
cyclists and watchers would be available. But a system of watching
likely landing-places ought to be devised which could be brought
silently into operation as soon as the precautionary period is
declared or, if necessary, immediately before, just in the same way as
the watch over the magazines and other vital points can
unostentatiously be improved.

It may well be, therefore, that the coast watch should be set up in
two stages: the first secret, and the second open. For the first the
police and selected cyclists from the Territorial Force would appear
to be the only resources. It ought to be possible to organise a pretty
effective watch with these, and to make arrangements which could be
actually rehearsed in time of peace in connection with the work of the
patrol flotillas. It is not so much armed force which is required as
vigilant watching by persons who know what to look for and where to
report their information. Aerial squadrons along the coast-line or
airships would appear to be of the greatest value. The new naval
aeroplane stations which are being constructed will be of service for
this purpose. After war has been declared, or general mobilisation
ordered, the full arrangements devised by the War Office could come
into force in their entirety, but it is imperative that the
precautionary period in advance of mobilisation should be provided
for.

_March 29, 1913._

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
(_Address to the Admiralty War Staff_)

The problem of oversea attack requires to be examined under three
heads:—

(1.) Absolute surprise to-morrow (19th April): everything going on as
usual—Bolt from the Blue.

Objectives of raiders—to prevent the Expeditionary Force being sent to
help France, and incidentally, if possible, to damage naval arsenals
and dockyards.

(2.) The whole expeditionary army has gone to India or some other
distant theatre of war. The war has been going on some time: the
Territorials have been embodied, but great numbers have been allowed
to proceed on leave. The Second Fleet has been completed to full
strength by the closing of the schools. The Immediate Reserve has been
called out; and the whole of the First and Second Fleets are in those
harbours which enable them to reach their actual war stations as
quickly as possible. The patrol flotillas are mobilised in their war
stations. The forts are manned, and the coastal look-out is active.
But this has been going on for several months while complete peace
continues in Europe. The tension has begun to be somewhat relaxed, and
we have settled down to our ordinary way of life, while at the same
time taking special precautions and having our forces so disposed that
they are easily and readily available on the slightest sign of danger.
This may be called “Bolt from the Grey.” The only adequate objective
of the enemy in this case would be invasion in such force as to
overcome the comparatively feeble military establishment on foot in
the United Kingdom.

(3.) War with Germany has begun. All the fleets are fully mobilised
and in active operation against the enemy according to the war plans
of the Admiralty. The objectives open to the enemy would be minor
raids to destroy naval arsenals and dockyards: the seizure of bases
for flotilla action (this last may occur also in 1 and 2), and threats
or attempts to invade in force to distract or divide the British fleet
simultaneously with bringing about a great fleet action.

All these three situations with their variants deserve patient
examination.

2. The first condition governing the dimensions of oversea attack from
Germany is the number of troops available—

(i.) Instantly;

(ii.) In twenty-four hours; and

(iii.) At any time after a general mobilisation is complete.

* * * * *

5. A second great limiting condition is the shipping available in
German ports. For all phases after the war has become open, whether
under 1, 2, or 3, ample shipping is available of every class required,
and the matter need not be further considered. But in case 1, the
invading force is limited by the amount of suitable shipping available
instantly at the right ports, and secondly, by what is available after
24 hours: in case 2 by the amount of shipping available instantly.
After that, when war has actually begun, there is no difficulty in
finding the ships or the men; the only difficulty is to get them
across.

6. The third condition is the time taken to embark, transport, and
land the various forces at different points concurrently and
alternatively. This requires separate calculations in every case.
These are complicated by the hours of daylight and darkness, the
tides, the weather, and other uncertain features. Each case must be
worked out separately, and risked on its merits.

7. The last consideration is the distance of the practicable objective
from the landing-point. Here again each case must be considered
individually:—

Harwich is invaluable because it threatens London, and is
unquestionably the best place for so doing. In no other way could you
react so instantaneously upon British public opinion. On the other
hand, once the invaders were turned out, the actual damage done would
be small.

Immingham is a purely local injury not worth touching before war
breaks out, and afterwards belonging to the ‘driblets’ phase.

Blyth or the Tyne are striking places for Newcastle, involving
considerable moral effect and immense permanent damage, not of a vital
character.

The Tay (Dundee) is valuable as affording a good landing-place and
ample supplies for a large army (if it could get there), within
effective striking distance of Glasgow and the Clyde.

Cromarty, as long as it is undefended by land and if undefended by
ships, would be a good place of disembarkation for a large force, but
they would be isolated in barren country with great natural
difficulties between them and any real vulnerable point. Cromarty and
the Invergordon oil tanks might, however, be the object of a minor
raid in the ‘driblets’ phase, if undefended.

Balta Sound, in the Shetlands, and those islands generally would be of
the greatest value as a flotilla base to the Germans. Until they were
expelled from them, which would be costly both in ships and men, all
attempts to blockade the North Sea would be rendered futile.

On the West Coast there are numerous undefended landing-places in
sheltered waters suitable for the disembarkation of a large force (if
it could get there). Oban, 60 miles away from the Clyde, deserves
special attention. The mouth of the Clyde itself, which is lightly
defended by land and has only three submarines at Lamlash, is suitable
both for the landing of a large force and also for a raid on an
arsenal. The same may be said of Barrow.

This would seem to exhaust the principal serviceable landing-places
which should be considered, but there may be others.

W. S. C.

_April 18, 1913._

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
(_Addressed to the First Sea Lord._)

(MARGINAL NOTES BY FIRST SEA LORD.)

The following assumptions appear to me, as at present advised, to be
justified:—

[Sidenote: Should like to limit this to two or three ports at most.]

1. That not more than 20,000 men could be collected and embarked in
German North Sea Ports without our knowing it before the expedition
actually sailed; but that up to that number might actually put to sea
before we were warned.

[Sidenote: 3_b_ answers this, otherwise the assumption is risky.]

2. That no military expedition of upwards of 10,000 men could reach
the British coast before the general alarm was given.

[Sidenote: (_b_) The latter should, I think, be assumed.]

3. That the intention of the German Government to attack us would
either (_a_) be discovered or (_b_), more probably, formally declared
while the expedition was in transit.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

4. That, having regard to the time taken in transit, three to six
hours’ warning would have been given throughout the country, along the
coasts, and at all ports, and preparations advanced accordingly.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

5. That any expedition arriving at a port must expect to encounter
resistance from whatever forces or defences are on the spot after
three hours’ alarm notice; but that no one place can be considered
more certain than another, and that only the ordinary preparations
prescribed under our existing mobilisation arrangements have been made
at each particular place.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

6. That any German expedition seeking to seize a port defended or
otherwise must be provided with an escort sufficient to overcome the
local defences and to beat off the British torpedo craft or cruisers
known to be in the vicinity.

[Sidenote: Assuming that some kind of diplomatic discussion had preceded
the Declaration of War it is to be hoped that Admiralty will
have begun concentrating, but we cannot be sure.]

7. That the moment chosen will be one when the British Battle Fleet is
on the south-west or west coasts of Great Britain or Ireland.

[Sidenote: Our own flotillas should be able to clear the road.]

8. That the return of the Battle Fleet to the North Sea will be
obstructed by mines and submarines, and at night by flotilla attacks.

[Sidenote: Attempt may be made, but in the case of Harwich (the most
probable) there will be 2nd Fleet ships from Nore, also Nore
Flotilla, besides patrol vessels to deal with.]

9. That pending the return of the Battle Fleet the German Navy will
have the command of the North Sea, and that so long as it holds the
command of the North Sea it can continue, though at considerable risk,
to pass individual vessels, in addition to the original 20,000 men,
into the defended harbour which has been seized. The maximum time
which in the most unfavourable circumstances would elapse before the
return of the British Fleet to the North Sea and consequent resumption
of British naval superiority is therefore a vital matter, [Sidenote:
The time-table given in your “Bolt from the Blue” is quite sufficient,
and cannot be varied to any appreciable extent.] and should be worked
out in as many variants as possible by the staff.

10. That the British Fleet when it has returned to the North Sea,
whether northabout or through the Straits of Dover, may have to fight
a general battle at once with the whole strength of the enemy;
[Sidenote: It is almost hopeless to forecast what may happen during
this critical time. No escorts could then be spared.] and that during
the preliminaries, the progress, and the aftermath of this battle
attempts may be made either to reinforce the original landing or to
make further landings at other points on the British coasts.

[Sidenote: Resident Germans may certainly be expected to co-operate
locally. There are always a number of officers over here
map-making.]

11. That sabotage, i.e. acts of treachery before a declaration of war,
are improbable, but that they may occur simultaneously with the first
military hostilities, and that in any case they are not included in
the present phase of the inquiry which deals essentially with military
operations.

W. S. C.

_April 26, 1913._

[Sidenote: Certainly.]

1. It is useless labour to work out in detail a series of
_conventional_ operations. It is only necessary to work out real
operations, i.e. the sort of operations an enemy might be expected to
attempt. The numbers of these are limited: there are only four types.

[Sidenote: Except local co-operation (_see_ A. 11).]

2. First, sabotage, by which is meant acts of treachery perpetrated by
persons or vessels in disguise before any declaration of war.
Instances of these acts are given by Captain Hankey in his paper. They
are an important study, but they do not touch the problems we are now
examining, and they are therefore excluded for the present.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

3. Secondly, a military raid on Blyth for the purpose of destroying
Elswick.

We have hitherto assumed 10,000 men for Blyth-Newcastle; either more
or less may be required. The force must be numerous enough to make its
way in the face of sporadic opposition by unmobilised territorials and
by the population, from Blyth to Elswick; to seize and destroy
effectively the Elswick Works and the ships in the Tyne. It seems
improbable that less than 10,000 men would be sufficient.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

4. Thirdly, a raid of not less than 20,000 men on Harwich, with the
object of stopping the regular army from going to France.

* * * * *

The Harwich operation is essentially—

(_a._) The secret concentration and embarkation of 20,000 men.

(_b._) The destruction of the floating and land defences of Harwich
by the escorting hostile squadron.

(_c._) The disembarkation of 20,000 men with a proportion of
artillery before the British Fleet can arrive in sufficient
force to give battle.

5. Fourthly, a landing in the Firth of Tay.

This is not worth doing unless the force landed is at least 35,000
men. It is assumed that war has begun before the enemy actually
completed their embarkation; that the British Fleet has been forced to
concentrate to the southward [Sidenote: It is almost hopeless to
forecast what may happen during this critical time. No escorts could
then be spared.] in order to fight a general battle with the German
Fleet; that in consequence the northern waters of the North Sea are
denuded of ships; and that the passage of fifteen or twenty
independent transports to a fixed rendezvous, as suggested, will not
be obstructed by any naval force which could not be overcome by the
German warship escort. [Sidenote: I doubt if much in the way of escort
could be spared. The enemy must be prepared to meet our entire
superior force in North Sea.] In this case the forts are fully manned
and the whole coast is alarmed and vigilant. The enemy’s transports
must be escorted and protected by cruisers or old battleships; the
opposition of the forts must be beaten down, and any resistance by
local territorials on land must be overcome and quelled. The objective
of the invaders is Glasgow and the Clyde. The whole six divisions of
the expeditionary force have left England for a distant war.
[Sidenote: On the whole this seems a very risky undertaking, but by no
means impossible, and on the assumption above, quite worth trying.]

The question to be resolved is whether these are all the operations
which need be considered at the present time. Are they practicable?
[Sidenote: First three certainly.] And if so, to what extent?
[Sidenote: With limitations.] How could they be achieved? [Sidenote:
As described.] What are the circumstances most favourable to their
success? [Sidenote: Knowledge that we intend to send army to France,
the strongest inducement, amounting almost to military necessity.]
What are the measures which should be taken in each case?

[Sidenote: _Navy_—
Provide sea defences for Blyth.
Strengthen existing ones (notably Harwich) on East Coast.
Man them on the principle of a ship in commission with
nucleus crew.
Provide _local_ submarine defence flotillas at the principal
East Coast ports.

_Army_—
Adhere rigidly to the Committee of Imperial Defence
recommendations (1908), as accepted by His Majesty’s
Government, [i.e. retain two divisions at home.]]

The times and conditions which I have prescribed are illustrative of
the problem; and before any attempt is made to work out these cases in
detail the conditions should be formulated exactly.

W. S. C.

_April 24, 1913._

These papers are sufficient to show that we did not ignore the dangers
that lay before us or neglect the attempt to penetrate their mysteries.
It is easy to underrate the difficulty of such work in days of peace.

In time of war there is great uncertainty as to what the enemy will do
and what will happen next. But still, once you are at war the task is
definite and all-dominating. Whatever may be your surmises about the
enemy or the future, your own action is circumscribed within practical
limits. There are only a certain number of alternatives open. Also, you
live in a world of reality where theories are constantly being corrected
and curbed by experiment. Resultant facts accumulate and govern to a
very large extent the next decision.

But suppose the whole process of war is transported out of the region
of reality into that of imagination. Suppose you have to assume to
begin with that there will be a war at all; secondly, that your
country will be in it when it comes; thirdly, that you will go in as a
united nation and that the nation will be united and convinced _in
time_, and that the necessary measures will be taken before it is _too
late_,—then the processes of thought become speculative indeed. Every
set of assumptions which it is necessary to make, draws new veils of
varying density in front of the dark curtain of the future. The life
of the thoughtful soldier or sailor in time of peace is made up of
these experiences—intense effort, amid every conceivable distraction,
to pick out across and among a swarm of confusing hypotheses what
actually will happen on a given day and what actually must be done to
meet it before that day is ended. Meanwhile all around people, greatly
superior in authority and often in intelligence, regard him as a
plotting knave, or at the best an overgrown child playing with toys,
and dangerous toys at that.

Therefore the most we could do in the days before the war was to attempt
to measure and forecast what would happen to England on the outbreak and
in the first few weeks of a war with Germany. To look farther was beyond
the power of man. To try to do so was to complicate the task beyond
mental endurance. The paths of thought bifurcated too rapidly. Would
there be a great sea battle or not? What would happen then? Who would
win the great land battle? No one could tell. Obviously the first thing
was to be ready; not to be taken unawares: to be concentrated; not to be
caught divided: to have the strongest Fleet possible in the best station
under the best conditions in good time, and then if the battle came one
could await its result with a steady heart. Everything, therefore, to
guard against surprise; everything, therefore, to guard against
division; everything, therefore, to increase the strength of the forces
available for the supreme sea battle.

But suppose the enemy did not fight a battle at sea. And suppose the
battle on land was indeterminate in its results. And suppose the war
went on not for weeks or months, but for years. Well, then it would be
far easier to judge those matters at the time, and far easier then, when
everybody was alarmed and awake and active, to secure the taking of the
necessary steps; and there would be time to take them. No stage would be
so difficult or so dangerous as the first stage. The problems of the
second year of war must be dealt with by the experience of the first
year of war. The problems of the third year of war must be met by
results observed and understood in the second, and so on.

I repulse, therefore, on behalf of the Boards of Admiralty over which I
presided down to the end of May, 1915, all reproaches directed to what
occurred in 1917 and 1918. I cannot be stultified by any lessons arising
out of those years. It is vain to tell me that if the Germans had built
in the three years before the war, the submarines they built in the
three years after it had begun, Britain would have been undone; or that
if England had had in August, 1914, the army which we possessed a year
later, there would have been no war. Every set of circumstances involved
every other set of circumstances. Would Germany in profound peace have
been allowed by Great Britain to build an enormous fleet of submarines
which could have no other object than the starvation and ruin of this
island through the sinking of unarmed merchant ships? Would Germany have
waited to attack France while England raised a powerful conscript army
to go to her aid?

Every event must be judged in fair relation to the circumstances of the
time, and only in such relation.

In examining the questions with which this chapter has been concerned, I
was accustomed to dwell upon the dangers and the darker side of things.
I did this to some extent intentionally, in order to create anxiety
which would lead to timely precautions. Every danger set forth we tried
to meet. Many we met. More never matured, either because they were
prevented by proper measures, or because the Germans were less
enterprising than I thought it prudent to assume. I will end on a more
robust note.

The following letter was written by me on November 1, 1913, to a
friend—a high naval authority—who had delivered a pessimistic lecture at
the War College.

Do you not think you are looking at the problem from a weak and
one-sided point of view which sees only the dangers which menace us
and is blind to all the far greater dangers which surround the weaker
fleet?

Taking your hypothesis that the German Fleet come out to fight with
every unit they can bring into line, why should it be supposed that we
should not be able to defeat them? A study of the comparative fleet
strength in the line of battle will be found reassuring.

Why are our Second Fleet ships, which do not require a single
reservist, to be considered less ready than German ships dependent on
mobilised men?

Why should it be supposed that a British Fleet is bound to fight the
German Fleet at the exact time and place the German Fleet desires?

Why should we not, if we wish, refuse battle until any detached
division has joined up?

Why should we be forced to follow the enemy on to his selected ground
(presumably, from your paper, off our coasts) when a movement across
his communications would not only place us in healthy waters but cut
him from his only hope of retreat and fuel?

Why should the British Battle Fleets have to fly the North Sea when
the Germans apparently can move about in perfect safety?

All this drift of mind is pusillanimous. Put yourself for a few
moments in the position of the Admiral Commanding the weaker fleet. If
he goes out to fight ‘with every unit,’ he knows he must expect to be
attacked by a force at least three to two superior in numbers,
superior in addition in strength, and superior by far ship for ship
and squadron for squadron, in quality.

He knows he will have to move with his weaker force into waters which
(to him) will appear ‘infested’ by 70 or 80 British submarines and
over 200 sea-going torpedo craft. He knows that he must sooner or
later, and sooner much rather than later, return to German ports to
coal; and that if he is cut off either by the British Fleet or by the
British submarines, or preferably by both, he runs the gravest risk of
being not merely defeated but destroyed. If he tries to reduce his
inferiority in the line of battle by attempting diversions in the
shape of landings, he knows he will have to send transports crowded
with men through waters commanded by an unfought superior enemy and
swarming with torpedo craft, any one of which will send 5,000 or 6,000
men to the bottom.

If he succeeds by great good fortune, probably at a heavy sacrifice,
in landing 15,000 or 20,000 men, he knows that is perfectly useless
unless it can be reinforced by three or four times as many.

He knows that if his raid is not successfully supported within a very
few days those already on shore will have been killed or captured, and
he will have to begin all over again.

Lastly, he knows what people at manœuvres so often forget, viz., that
cannons kill men and smash ships and that battles produce decisions
against which there is no appeal.

He knows that it will pay his enemy to lose ship for ship with him in
every class, and that when this melancholy process has run its full
course that enemy would still have on the water a fleet in being not
less numerous than that with which Germany had begun the war.

If, knowing all this, the ‘naturally offensive character of the
German’ leads him to come out and stake everything on a pitched
battle, surely that ought to be a cause to us of profound
satisfaction.

The second hypothesis—the war of harassments—is more indeterminate,
and both sides may look about for some means of waiting on each other
without undue risk, till decisive periods supervene. For after all a
ship can only fight another ship when she meets her.

CHAPTER VIII
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE

The Oil Reserves and Supply—The Anglo-Persian Agreement—The 1914
Estimates—The Rise of Naval Expenditure—The Canadian Ships—The
Conflict over the Estimates—The Admiralty Case—A New Year’s
Declaration—Final Stage of the Estimates—The European Calm and the
Anglo-German Détente—Renewed Efforts for an Anglo-German Naval
Agreement—British Party Strife and Irish Feuds—Aggravation of the
Irish Struggle—Faction—The Curragh Episode—Parliamentary
Fury—Appeals to Reason—The Buckingham Palace Conference—Visits of
the British Squadrons to Kiel and Kronstadt—The Crime of
Sarajevo—The Sunlit World—Origin of the Test Mobilisation—The
Great Review.

During the whole of 1913 I was subjected to an ever-growing difficulty
about the oil supply. We were now fully committed to oil as the sole,
motive power for a large proportion of the Fleet, including all the
newest and most vital units. There was great anxiety on the Board of
Admiralty and in the War Staff about our oil-fuel reserves. The Second
Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, vehemently pressed for very large increases
in the scales contemplated. The Chief of the War Staff was concerned not
only about the amount of the reserves but about the alleged danger of
using so explosive a fuel in ships of war. Lastly, Lord Fisher’s Royal
Commission, actuated by Admiralty disquietude, showed themselves
inclined to press for a reserve equal to four years’ expected war
consumption. The war consumption itself had been estimated on the most
liberal scale by the Naval Staff. The expense of creating the oil
reserve was however enormous. Not only had the oil to be bought in a
monopoly-ridden market, but large installations of oil tanks had to be
erected and land purchased for the purpose. Although this oil-fuel
reserve when created was clearly, whether for peace or war, as much an
asset of the State as the gold reserve in the Bank of England, we were
not allowed to treat it as capital expenditure: all must be found out of
the current Estimates. At the same time, the Treasury and my colleagues
in the Cabinet were becoming increasingly indignant at the naval
expense, which it might be contended was largely due to my precipitancy
in embarking on oil-burning battleships and also in wantonly increasing
the size of the guns and the speed and armour of these vessels. On the
one hand, therefore, I was subjected to this ever-growing naval
pressure, and on the other to a solid wall of resistance to expense. In
the midst of all lay the existence of our naval power.

I had thus to fight all the year on two fronts: on one to repulse the
excessive and, as I thought, extravagant demands of the Royal Commission
and of my naval advisers, and on the other to wrest the necessary
supplies from the Treasury and the Cabinet. I had to be very careful
that arguments intended for one front did not become known to my
antagonists on the other. I wrote to Lord Fisher that to prescribe a
four years standard of reserves would be the death-blow to the oil
policy of which he was the champion. I was forced to enter into
arguments of extreme technical detail with the Second Sea Lord and the
War Staff both as to the probable consumption per month of oil in the
opening phases of a naval war, and secondly upon the number of months’
supply that should be in the country in each individual month. I had
extreme difficulties with the Board of Admiralty in regard to the
reductions which I thought necessary in both scales, and I feared for
some time that I should lose the services of the Second Sea Lord. This,
however, was happily averted and we finally agreed upon reduced scales
which were in the end accepted by all concerned. These conclusions stood
the test of war.

The reduced scales estimated a total consumption in the first ten months
of war of 1,000,000 tons. The actual consumption was 800,000. At the end
of the ten months we held 1,000,000 tons in reserve, or another twelve
months’ supply at the current rate of expenditure, apart from further
purchases which proceeded ceaselessly on the greatest scale.

During this year (1913) also I carried through the House of Commons the
Bill authorising the Anglo-Persian Oil Convention. This encountered a
confusing variety of oppositions—economists deprecating naval
expenditure; members for mining constituencies who were especially
sensible of the danger of departing from the sound basis of British
coal; oil magnates who objected to a national inroad upon their
monopolies; Conservatives who disapproved of State trading; partisan
opponents who denounced the project as an unwarrantable gamble with
public money and did not hesitate to impute actual corruption. There was
always a danger of these divergent forces combining on some particular
stage or point. However, we gradually threaded our way through these
difficulties and by the Autumn the Convention was the law of the land.
We now at any rate had an oil supply of our own.

All our financial commitments, fomented by rising prices and the
ever-increasing complexity and refinement of naval appliances, came
remorselessly to a head at the end of 1913 when the Estimates for the
new year had to be presented first to the Treasury and then to the
Cabinet. Knowing that the conflict would be most severe, I warned all
Admiralty departments to be well ahead with their financial work and to
prepare justification for the unprecedented demands we were obliged to
make. We set forth our case in a volume of some eighty pages in which we
analysed minutely each vote and marshalled our reasons. The main burden
of this task fell upon the Financial Secretary, Dr. Macnamara, whose
long experience of Admiralty business was invaluable.

We failed to reach any agreement with the Treasury in the preliminary
discussions, and the whole issue was remitted to the Cabinet at the end
of November. There followed nearly five months of extreme dispute and
tension, during which Naval Estimates formed the main and often the sole
topic of conversation at no less than fourteen full and prolonged
meetings of the Cabinet. At the outset I found myself almost in a
minority of one. I was not in a position to give way on any of the
essentials, especially in regard to the Battleship programme, without
departing from the calculated and declared standards of strength on
which the whole of our policy towards Germany depended. The Cabinet had
decided in 1912 to maintain equality in the Mediterranean with the
Austrian Fleet, four Dreadnoughts of which were steadily building.
Moreover, the issue was complicated by the promised three Canadian
Dreadnoughts. The Canadian Government had stipulated that these should
be additional to the 60 per cent. standard. We had formally declared
that they were indispensable, and on this assurance Sir Robert Borden
was committed to a fierce party fight in Canada. As it was now clear,
owing to the action of the Canadian Senate, that these ‘additional’
‘indispensable’ ships would not be laid down in the ensuing year, I was
forced to demand the earlier laying down of three at least of the
battleships of the 1914–15 programme. This was a very hard matter for
the Cabinet to sanction. By the middle of December it seemed to me
certain that I should have to resign. The very foundations of naval
policy were challenged, and the controversy was maintained by
Ministerial critics specially acquainted with Admiralty business, versed
in every detail of the problem and entitled to be exactly informed on
every point. The Prime Minister, however, while appearing to remain
impartial, so handled matters that no actual breach occurred. On several
occasions when it seemed that disagreement was total and final, he
prevented a decision adverse to the Admiralty by terminating the
discussion; and in the middle of December, when this process could go on
no longer, he adjourned the whole matter till the middle of January.

I wrote to him on December 18:—

‘Your letter is very kind, and I appreciate _fully_ all the
difficulties of the situation. But there is no chance whatever of my
being able to go on, if the quota of capital ships for 1914–15 is
reduced below four. Even the _Daily News_ does not expect that. I base
myself on (1) my public declarations in Parliament; (2) the 60 per
cent. standard (see Minute of the Sea Lords); (3) the Cabinet decision
on the Mediterranean; and (4) my obligations towards Mr. Borden. You
must in this last aspect consider broad effects.

‘If on a general _révirement_ of Naval Policy the Cabinet decide to
reduce the quota, it would be indispensable that a new exponent should
be chosen. I have no doubts at all about my duty.

‘My loyalty to you, my conviction of your superior judgment and
superior record on naval matters, prompt me to go all possible lengths
to prevent disagreement in the Cabinet. But no reduction or
postponement beyond the year of the four ships is possible to me.

‘I gathered that the final decision was to stand over till we
reassemble in January. But there is no hope of any alteration in my
view on this cardinal point, or of the view of my naval advisers.’

To the First Sea Lord I wrote on December 26:—

‘I could not in any circumstances remain responsible if the declared
programme of four ships were cut down. But my responsibility is
greater than anyone else’s, and I hold my naval colleagues perfectly
free to review the situation without regard to the action which I
should take in the circumstances which may now be apprehended.’

Prince Louis, however, assured me that he and the other Sea Lords would
not remain in their appointments in the situation described. My two
political colleagues, Dr. Macnamara and Mr. Lambert, the Civil Lord,
were both stalwart Radicals, but there was no doubt that they also would
have declined responsibility. They had both been at the Admiralty for
six or seven years, and their devotion to the interests of the Navy and
of the National Defence was unquestionable. We thus all stood together.

During the interval of the Christmas holidays, which I spent in the
south of France, I restated the Admiralty case in the light of all the
discussions which had taken place. The closing passages of this Document
may be reproduced.

THE GENERAL SITUATION

No survey of British naval expenditure and no controversy arising out
of it can be confined to our naval strength. It must also have regard
to our military weakness compared to all the other European States
that are building Navies. Even the modest establishments which
Parliament has regarded as necessary have not been and are not being
maintained. In 1913, when the five Great Powers of Europe have added
over 50 millions to their military expenditure, when every Power in
the world is increasing the numbers and efficiency of its soldiers,
our regular army has dropped by 6,200 men. The Special Reserve is
20,000 short, and the Territorials are 65,000 short. Only the belief
that the naval strength of the country is being effectively maintained
prevents a widespread, and in important respects a well justified,
alarm. If at any time we lose the confidence which the country has
given to our naval administration in the last 5 years, the public
attention cannot fail to be turned into channels which, apart from
raising awkward questions, will lead directly to largely increased
expenditure.

Our naval standards and the programmes which give effect to them must
also be examined in relation not only to Germany but to the rest of
the world. We must begin by recognising how different the part played
by our Navy is from that of the Navies of every other country. Alone
among the great modern States we can neither defend the soil upon
which we live nor subsist upon its produce. Our whole regular army is
liable to be ordered abroad for the defence of India. The food of our
people, the raw material of their industries, the commerce which
constitutes our wealth, has to be protected as it traverses thousands
of miles of sea and ocean from every quarter of the globe. Our
necessary insistence upon the right of capture of private property at
sea exposes British merchant ships to the danger of attack not only by
enemy’s warships but by converted armed-merchantmen. The burden of
responsibility laid upon the British Navy is heavy, and its weight
increases year by year.

All the world is building ships of the greatest power, training
officers and men, creating arsenals, and laying broad and deep the
foundations of future permanent naval development and expansion. In
every country powerful interests and huge industries are growing up
which will render any check or cessation in the growth of Navies
increasingly difficult as time passes. Besides the Great Powers, there
are many small States who are buying or building great ships of war
and whose vessels may by purchase, by some diplomatic combination, or
by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these Powers
need, like us, Navies to defend their actual safety or independence.
They build them so as to play a part in the world’s affairs. It is
sport to them. It is death to us.

These possibilities were described by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords
last year. It is not suggested that the whole world will turn upon us,
or that our preparations should contemplate such a monstrous
contingency. By a sober and modest conduct, by a skilful diplomacy we
can in part disarm and in part divide the elements of potential
danger. But two things must be remembered. First, that our diplomacy
depends in a great part for its effectiveness upon our naval position,
and that our naval strength is the one great balancing force which we
can contribute to our own safety and to the peace of the world.
Secondly, we are not a young people with a scanty inheritance. We have
engrossed to ourselves, in times when other powerful nations were
paralysed by barbarism or internal war, an immense share of the wealth
and traffic of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and
our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid
possessions, often seems less reasonable to others than to us.

Further, we do not always play the humble rôle of passive
unassertiveness. We have intervened regularly—as it was our duty to
do, and as we could not help doing—in the affairs of Europe and of the
world. We are now deeply involved in the European situation. We have
responsibilities in many quarters. It is only two years ago that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer went to the Mansion House and delivered a
speech which to save Europe from war, brought us to the very verge of
it. I have myself heard the Foreign Secretary say to my predecessor
that he had received so stiff a communication from the German
Ambassador, that the Fleet must be placed in a condition of readiness
to be attacked at any moment. The impression which those events
produced in my mind is ineffaceable. I saw that even a Liberal
Government, whose first and most profound resolve must always be to
preserve peace, might be compelled to face the gravest and most
hateful possibilities. All Governments in England will not be Liberal
Governments; all Foreign Secretaries will not have the success of Sir
Edward Grey. We have passed through a year of continuous anxiety and,
although I believe the foundations of peace among the Great Powers
have been strengthened, the causes which might lead to a general war
have not been removed and often remind us of their presence. There has
not been the slightest abatement of naval and military preparation. On
the contrary, we are witnessing this year increases of expenditure by
the Continental Powers beyond all previous experience. The world is
arming as it has never armed before. Every suggestion of arrest or
limitation has been brushed aside. From time to time awkward things
happen, and situations occur which make it necessary that the naval
force at our immediate disposal, now in this quarter now in that,
should be rapidly counted up. On such occasions the responsibilities
which rest on the Admiralty come home with brutal reality to the
Minister at its head, and unless our naval strength is solidly, amply
and unswervingly maintained, with due and fair regard to the opinions
of the professional advisers of the Government, I could not feel that
I was doing my duty if I did not warn the country of its danger.

The memorandum and the interval for reflection produced a certain change
in the situation, and on my return to England in the middle of January,
I was informed by several of my most important colleagues that they
considered the Admiralty case on main essentials had been made good. The
conflict, however, renewed itself with the utmost vigour. We continued
to pump out documents and arguments from the Admiralty in a ceaseless
stream, dealing with each new point as it was challenged. I telegraphed
to Sir Robert Borden acquainting him with the crisis that was developing
about the three ships to be accelerated in lieu of the Canadian
Dreadnoughts, informing him of my intention to resign if unsuccessful,
and invoking his aid by a full exposition of the Canadian point of view.
This he most readily gave, setting forth in a masterly telegram the
embarrassed position in which his Government would stand in their naval
effort if no additional measure were taken by us to cover their interim
default.

Meanwhile, echoes of the controversy had found their way into the
newspapers. As early as January 3, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in
an interview with the _Daily Chronicle_, had deplored the folly of
expenditure upon armaments, had pointedly referred to the resignation of
Lord Randolph Churchill on the subject of economy, and had expressed the
opinion that the state and prospects of the world were never more
peaceful. The Liberal and Radical press were loud in their economy
chorus, and a very strong movement against the Admiralty developed among
our most influential supporters in the House of Commons. However,
Parliament soon reassembled. The Irish question began to dominate
attention. Eager partisans of the Home Rule cause were by no means
anxious to see the Government weakened by the resignation of the entire
Board of Admiralty. We were already so hard pressed in the party
struggle that the defection even of a single Minister might have
produced a serious effect. No one expected me to pass away in sweet
silence. The prospect of a formidable naval agitation added to the Irish
tension was recognised as uninviting. In order to strengthen myself with
my party, I mingled actively in the Irish controversy; and in this
precarious situation the whole of February and part of March passed
without any ground given or taken on either side.

At last, thanks to the unwearying patience of the Prime Minister, and to
his solid, silent support, the Naval Estimates were accepted practically
as they stood. In all these months of bickering we had only lost three
small cruisers and twelve torpedo-boats for harbour defence. Estimates
were presented to Parliament for 52½ millions. We had not secured this
victory without being compelled to give certain general assurances with
regard to the future. I agreed, under proper reserves, to promise a
substantial reduction on the Estimates of the following year. When the
time came, I was not pressed to redeem this undertaking.

* * * * *

The spring and summer of 1914 were marked in Europe by an exceptional
tranquillity. Ever since Agadir the policy of Germany towards Great
Britain had not only been correct but considerate. All through the
tangle of the Balkan Conferences British and German diplomacy laboured
in harmony. The long distrust which had grown up in the Foreign Office,
though not removed, was sensibly modified. Some at least of those who
were accustomed to utter warnings began to feel the need of revising
their judgment. The personalities who expressed the foreign policy of
Germany seemed for the first time to be men to whom we could talk and
with whom common action was possible. The peaceful solution of the
Balkan difficulties afforded justification for the feeling of
confidence. For months we had negotiated upon the most delicate
questions on the brink of local rupture, and no rupture had come. There
had been a score of opportunities had any Power wished to make war.
Germany seemed, with us, to be set on peace. Although abroad the
increase of armaments was proceeding with constant acceleration,
although the fifty million capital tax had been levied in Germany, and
that alarm bell was ringing for those that had ears to hear, a distinct
feeling of optimism passed over the mind of the British Government and
the House of Commons. There seemed also to be a prospect that the
personal goodwill and mutual respect which had grown up between the
principal people on both sides might play a useful part in the future:
and some there were who looked forward to a wider combination in which
Great Britain and Germany, without prejudice to their respective
friendships or alliances, might together bring the two opposing European
systems into harmony and give to all the anxious nations solid
assurances of safety and fair play.

Naval rivalry had at the moment ceased to be a cause of friction. We
were proceeding inflexibly for the third year in succession with our
series of programmes according to scale and declaration. Germany had
made no further increases since the beginning of 1912. It was certain
that we could not be overtaken as far as capital ships were concerned. I
thought that the moment was opportune to renew by another method the
conversations about a naval agreement if not a naval holiday which had
been interrupted in 1912. I therefore suggested to the Foreign Secretary
that I should meet Admiral von Tirpitz if a convenient opportunity
presented itself, and I set out in the following minute some of the
points which I thought might be discussed and which, though small, if
agreed upon would make for easement and stability.

_May 20, 1914._

Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.

In Madrid at Easter, Sir Ernest Cassel told me that he had received
from Herr Ballin a statement to this effect: ‘How I wish that I could
get Churchill here during the Kiel Week. Tirpitz will never allow the
Chancellor to settle any naval questions, but I know he would like to
have a talk with his English colleague on naval matters, and I am sure
that if the subject of limiting naval armaments were ever approached
in a businesslike way, some agreement would be reached.’ On the same
day I received a telegram from the Admiralty, saying that the Foreign
Office particularly wished a British squadron to visit German ports
simultaneously with other naval visits. Personally I should like to
meet Tirpitz, and I think a non-committal, friendly conversation, if
it arose naturally and freely, might do good, and could not possibly
do any harm. Indeed, after all I have said about a Naval Holiday, it
would be difficult for me to repulse any genuine desire on his part
for such a conversation. The points I wish to discuss are these:—

1st. My own Naval Holiday proposals and to show him, as I can easily
do, the good faith and sound reasons on which they are based. I do not
expect any agreement on these, but I would like to strip the subject
of the misrepresentation and misunderstanding with which it has been
surrounded, and put it on a clear basis in case circumstances should
ever render it admissible.

2nd. I wish to take up with him the suggestion which he made in his
last speech on Naval Estimates of a limitation in the size of capital
ships. Even if numbers could not be touched, a limitation in the size
would be a great saving, and is on every ground to be desired. This
subject could only be satisfactorily explored by direct personal
discussion in the first instance.

3rd. I wish to encourage him to send German ships to foreign stations
by showing him how much we wish to do the same, and how readily we
shall conform to any dispositions which have the effect of reducing
the unwholesome concentration of fleets in Home Waters. Quite apart
from the diplomatic aspect, it is bad for the discipline and
organisation of both navies, and the Germans fully recognise this.

4th. I wish to discuss the abandonment of secrecy in regard to the
numbers and general characteristics (apart from special inventions) of
the ships, built and building, in British and German dockyards. This
policy of secrecy was instituted by the British Admiralty a few years
ago with the worst results for us, for we have been much less
successful in keeping our secrets than the Germans. I should propose
to him in principle that we gave the Naval Attachés equal and
reciprocal facilities to visit the dockyards and see what was going on
just as they used to do in the past. If this could be agreed upon it
would go a long way to stopping the espionage on both sides which is a
continued cause of suspicion and ill-feeling.

I hope, in view of the very strong feeling there is about naval
expenditure and the great difficulties I have to face, my wish to put
these points to Admiral von Tirpitz if a good opportunity arises, and
if it is clear that he would not resent it, may not be dismissed. On
the other hand, I do not wish to go to Germany for the purpose of
initiating such a discussion. I would rather go for some other reason
satisfactory in itself, and let the discussion of these serious
questions come about only if it is clearly appropriate....

For the present I suggest that nothing should be done until the
Emperor’s invitation arrives; and, secondly, until we hear what
Tirpitz’s real wish is.

W. S. C.

Sir Edward Grey was apprehensive that more harm than good might result
from such a discussion, and I do not myself pronounce upon the point;
but I am anxious to place the letter on record as a proof of my desire
while maintaining our naval position to do all that could be done to
mitigate asperity between the British and German Empires.

* * * * *

The strange calm of the European situation contrasted with the rising
fury of party conflict at home. The quarrel between Liberals and
Conservatives had taken on much of that tense bitterness and hatred
belonging to Irish affairs. As it became certain that the Home Rule Bill
would pass into law under the machinery of the Parliament Act, the
Protestant counties of Ulster openly developed their preparations for
armed resistance. In this they were supported and encouraged by the
whole Conservative party. The Irish Nationalist leaders—Mr. Redmond, Mr.
Dillon, Mr. Devlin and others—watched the increasing gravity of the
situation in Ulster with apprehension. But there were elements behind
them whose fierceness and whose violence were indescribable; and every
step or gesture of moderation on the part of the Irish Parliamentary
Party excited passionate anger. Between these difficulties Mr. Asquith’s
Government sought to thread their way.

From the earliest discussions on the Home Rule Bill in 1909 the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had always advocated the exclusion of
Ulster on a basis of county option or some similar process. We had been
met by the baffling argument that such a concession might well be made
as the final means of securing a settlement, but would be fruitless till
then. The time had now arrived when the Home Rule issue had reached its
supreme climax, and the Cabinet was generally agreed that we could not
go farther without providing effectually for the exclusion of Ulster. In
March, therefore, the Irish leaders were informed that the Government
had so resolved. They resisted vehemently. They had it in their power at
any time to turn out the Government, and they would have been powerfully
reinforced from within the Liberal Party itself. There is no doubt that
the Irish leaders feared, and even expected, that any weakening of the
Bill would lead to its and their repudiation by the Irish people.
Confronted, however, with the undoubted fact that the Government would
not shrink from being defeated and broken up on the point, they yielded.
Amendments were framed which secured to any Ulster county the right to
vote itself out of the Home Rule Bill until after two successive General
Elections had taken place in the United Kingdom. There could be no
greater practical safeguard than this. It preserved the principle of
Irish unity, but it made certain that unity could never be achieved
except by the free consent of the Protestant North after seeing a Dublin
Parliament actually on trial for a period of at least five years.

These proposals were no sooner announced to Parliament than they were
rejected with contumely by the Conservative opposition. We, however,
embodied them in the text of the Bill and compelled the Irish Party to
vote for their inclusion. We now felt that we could go forward with a
clear conscience and enforce the law against all who challenged it. My
own personal view had always been that I would never coerce Ulster to
make her come under a Dublin Parliament, but I would do all that was
necessary to prevent her stopping the rest of Ireland having the
Parliament they desired. I believe this was sound and right, and in
support of it I was certainly prepared to maintain the authority of
Crown and Parliament under the Constitution by whatever means were
necessary. I spoke in this sense at Bradford on March 14th.

It is greatly to be hoped that British political leaders will never
again allow themselves to be goaded and spurred and driven by each other
or by their followers into the excesses of partisanship which on both
sides disgraced the year 1914, and which were themselves only the
culmination of that long succession of biddings and counter-biddings for
mastery to which a previous chapter has alluded. No one who has not been
involved in such contentions can understand the intensity of the
pressures to which public men are subjected, or the way in which every
motive in their nature, good, bad and indifferent, is marshalled in the
direction of further effort to secure victory. The vehemence with which
great masses of men yield themselves to partisanship and follow the
struggle as if it were a prize fight, their ardent enthusiasm, their
glistening eyes, their swift anger, their distrust and contempt if they
think they are to be baulked of their prey; the sense of wrongs mutually
interchanged, the extortion and enforcement of pledges, the infectious
loyalties, the praise that waits on violence, the chilling disdain, the
honest disappointment, the cries of ‘treachery’ with which every
proposal of compromise is hailed; the desire to keep good faith with
those who follow, the sense of right being on one’s side, the harsh
unreasonable actions of opponents—all these acting and reacting
reciprocally upon one another tend towards the perilous climax. To fall
behind is to be a laggard or a weakling, not sincere, not courageous; to
get in front of the crowd, if only to command them and to deflect them,
prompts often very violent action. And at a certain stage it is hardly
possible to keep the contention within the limits of words or laws.
Force, that final arbiter, that last soberer, may break upon the scene.

The preparations of the Ulster men continued. They declared their
intention of setting up a provisional Government. They continued to
develop and train their forces. They imported arms unlawfully and even
by violence. It need scarcely be said that the same kind of symptoms
began to manifest themselves among the Nationalists. Volunteers were
enrolled by thousands, and efforts were made to procure arms.

As all this peril grew, the small military posts in the North of
Ireland, particularly those containing stores of arms, became a source
of preoccupation to the War Office. So also did the position of the
troops in Belfast. The Orangemen would never have harmed the Royal
forces. It was more than probable that the troops would fraternise with
them. But the Government saw themselves confronted with a complete
overturn of their authority throughout North-East Ulster. In these
circumstances, military and naval precautions were indispensable. On
14th March it was determined to protect the military stores at
Carrickfergus and certain other places by small reinforcements, and as
it was expected that the Great Northern Railway of Ireland would refuse
to carry the troops, preparations were made to send them by sea. It was
also decided to move a battle squadron and a flotilla from Arosa Bay,
where they were cruising, to Lamlash whence they could rapidly reach
Belfast. It was thought that the popularity and influence of the Royal
Navy might produce a peaceable solution, even if the Army had failed.
Beyond this nothing was authorised, but the Military Commanders, seeing
themselves confronted with what might well be the opening movements in a
civil war, began to study plans of a much more serious character on what
was the inherently improbable assumption that the British troops would
be forcibly resisted and fired upon by the Orange army.

These military measures, limited though they were, and the possible
consequences that might follow them, produced the greatest distress
among the officers of the Army, and when on 20th March the
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland and other Generals made sensational
appeals to gatherings of officers at the Curragh to discharge their
constitutional duty in all circumstances, they encountered very general
refusals.

These shocking events caused an explosion of unparalleled fury in
Parliament and shook the State to its foundations. The Conservatives
accused the Government of having plotted the massacre of the loyalists
of Ulster, in which design they had been frustrated only by the
patriotism of the Army. The Liberals replied that the Opposition were
seeking to subvert the Constitution by openly committing themselves to
preparations for rebellion, and had seduced not the Army but its
officers from their allegiance by propaganda. We cannot read the debates
that continued at intervals through April, May and June, without
wondering that our Parliamentary institutions were strong enough to
survive the passions by which they were convulsed. Was it astonishing
that German agents reported and German statesmen believed that England
was paralysed by faction and drifting into civil war, and need not be
taken into account as a factor in the European situation? How could they
discern or measure the deep unspoken understandings which lay far
beneath the froth and foam and fury of the storm?

In all these scenes I played a prominent and a vehement part, but I
never doubted for a moment the strength of the foundation on which we
rested. I felt sure in my own mind that, now that the sting was out of
the Home Rule Bill, nothing in the nature of civil war would arise. On
the contrary I hoped for a settlement with the Conservative Party not
only upon the Home Rule Bill with Ulster excluded, but also on other
topics which ever since 1909 had been common ground between some of
those who were disputing so angrily. I felt, however, that the Irish
crisis must move forward to its climax, and that a reasonable settlement
could only be reached in the recoil.

On the 28th April I closed a partisan reply to a violent attack with the
following direct appeal to Sir Edward Carson:—

‘I adhere to my Bradford speech ... but I will venture to ask the
House once more at this moment in our differences and quarrels to
consider whither it is we may find ourselves going.... Apart from the
dangers which this controversy and this Debate clearly show exist at
home, look at the consequences abroad.

‘Anxiety is caused in every friendly country by the belief that for
the time being Great Britain cannot act. The high mission of this
country is thought to be in abeyance, and the balance of Europe
appears in many quarters for the time being to be deranged. Of course,
foreign countries never really understand us in these islands. They do
not know what we know, that at a touch of external difficulties or
menace all these fierce internal controversies would disappear for the
time being, and we should be brought into line and into tune. But why
is it that men are so constituted that they can only lay aside their
own domestic quarrels under the impulse of what I will call a higher
principle of hatred?...

‘Why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir Edward Carson)
say boldly, “Give me the Amendments to this Home Rule Bill which I ask
for, to safeguard the dignity and the interests of Protestant Ulster,
and I in return will use all my influence and goodwill to make Ireland
an integral unit in a federal system”?’

These words gave the debate an entirely new turn. The Prime Minister
said the next day, ‘The First Lord’s proposal was made on his own
account, but I am heartily in sympathy with it.’ Mr. Balfour declared
that it had ‘the promise and the potency of a settlement which would
avoid this final and irreparable catastrophe of civil war.’ Later, Sir
Edward Carson, after laying stress on the gravity of the crisis and the
weakening it entailed on the position of Great Britain abroad, declared
that he would not quarrel with the matter or the manner of my proposal,
and that ‘he was not very far from the First Lord.’ If Home Rule passed,
his most earnest hope would be that it might be such a success that
Ulster might come under it, and that mutual confidence and good will
might arise in Ireland, rendering Ulster a stronger unit in the federal
scheme. These potent indications were not comprehended on the Continent.

During the whole of May and June the party warfare proceeded in its most
strident form, but underneath the surface negotiations for a settlement
between the two great parties were steadily persisted in. These
eventuated on the 20th July in a summons by the King to the leaders of
the Conservative, Liberal and Irish parties to meet in conference at
Buckingham Palace. When this conference was in its most critical stage I
wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey: the wording is curious in
view of the fact that I had then no idea of what the next forty-eight
hours was to produce. On this I am content to rest so far as the Irish
question before the war is concerned.

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey_

_July 22, 1914._

... Failing an Irish agreement there ought to be a British decision.
Carson and Redmond, whatever their wishes, may be unable to agree
about Tyrone; they may think it worth a war; and from their point of
view it may be worth a war. But that is hardly the position of the
forty millions who dwell in Great Britain; and their interests must,
when all is said and done, be our chief and final care. In foreign
affairs you would proceed by two stages. First you would labour to
stop Austria and Russia going to war; second, if that failed, you
would try to prevent England, France, Germany and Italy being drawn
in. Exactly what you would do in Europe, is right in this domestic
danger, with the difference that in Europe the second step would only
hope to limit and localise the conflict, whereas at home the second
step—if practicable and adopted—would prevent the local conflict.

The conference therefore should labour to reduce the difference to the
smallest definite limits possible. At that point, if no agreement had
been reached, the Speaker should be asked to propose a partition; and
we should offer the Unionist leaders to accept it if _they_ will....

I want peace by splitting the outstanding differences, if possible
with Irish acquiescence, but if necessary over the heads of both Irish
parties.

* * * * *

At the end of June the simultaneous British naval visits to Kronstadt
and Kiel took place. For the first time for several years some of the
finest ships of the British and German Navies lay at their moorings at
Kiel side by side surrounded by liners, yachts and pleasure craft of
every kind. Undue curiosity in technical matters was banned by mutual
agreement. There were races, there were banquets, there were speeches.
There was sunshine, there was the Emperor. Officers and men fraternised
and entertained each other afloat and ashore. Together they strolled arm
in arm through the hospitable town, or dined with all good will in mess
and wardroom. Together they stood bareheaded at the funeral of a German
officer killed in flying an English seaplane.

In the midst of these festivities, on the 28th June, arrived the news of
the murder of the Archduke Charles at Sarajevo. The Emperor was out
sailing when he received it. He came on shore in noticeable agitation,
and that same evening, cancelling his other arrangements, quitted Kiel.

Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the impression of those
July days. The world on the verge of its catastrophe was very brilliant.
Nations and Empires crowned with princes and potentates rose
majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the
long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an
immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other
glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A
polite, discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its
web of connections over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation
by an ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient to
adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words
counted, and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after
all to achieve world security and universal peace by a marvellous system
of combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and
counter-checks on violent action ever more complex and more delicate?
Would Europe thus marshalled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one
universal and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in
undreamed of abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in
hand to give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.

But there was a strange temper in the air. Unsatisfied by material
prosperity the nations turned restlessly towards strife internal or
external. National passions, unduly exalted in the decline of religion,
burned beneath the surface of nearly every land with fierce if shrouded
fires. Almost one might think the world wished to suffer. Certainly men
were everywhere eager to dare. On all sides the military preparations,
precautions and counter precautions had reached their height. France had
her Three Years’ military service; Russia her growing strategic
Railways. The Ancient Empire of the Hapsburgs, newly smitten by the
bombs of Sarajevo, was a prey to intolerable racial stresses and
profound processes of decay. Italy faced Turkey; Turkey confronted
Greece; Greece, Serbia and Roumania stood against Bulgaria. Britain was
rent by faction and seemed almost negligible. America was three thousand
miles away. Germany, her fifty million capital tax expended on
munitions, her army increases completed, the Kiel Canal open for
Dreadnought battleships that very month, looked fixedly upon the scene
and her gaze became suddenly a glare.

* * * * *

In the autumn of 1913, when I was revolving the next year’s Admiralty
policy in the light of the coming Estimates, I had sent the following
minute to the First Sea Lord:—

_October 22, 1913._

First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.
Secretary.

We have now had manœuvres in the North Sea on the largest scale for
two years running, and we have obtained a great deal of valuable data
which requires to be studied. It does not therefore seem necessary to
supplement the ordinary tactical exercises of the year 1914–15 by
Grand Manœuvres. A saving of nearly £200,000 could apparently be
effected in coal and oil consumption, and a certain measure of relief
would be accorded to the Estimates in an exceptionally heavy year.

In these circumstances I am drawn to the conclusion that it would be
better to have no Grand Manœuvres in 1914–15, but to substitute
instead a mobilisation of the Third Fleet. The whole of the Royal
Fleet Reserve, and the whole of the Reserve officers could be
mobilised and trained together for a week or ten days. The Third Fleet
ships would be given the exact complements they would have in war, and
the whole mobilisation system would be subjected to a real test. The
balance Fleet Reservists could be carefully tested as to quality, and
trained either afloat or ashore. I should anticipate that this would
not cost more than £100,000, in which case there would still be a
saving on the fuel of the manœuvres. While the Third Fleet ships were
mobilised the First Fleet ships would rest, and thus plenty of
officers would be available for the training of the reservists on
shore, and possibly, if need be, for their peace training afloat. This
last would, of course, reveal what shortage exists. A very large staff
would be employed at all the mobilising centres to report upon the
whole workings of the mobilisation. The schools and training
establishments would be closed temporarily according to the
mobilisation orders, and the whole process of putting the Navy on a
war footing, so far as the Third Fleet was concerned, would be carried
out. I should not propose to complete the Second Fleet, as we know all
about that.

At another time in the year I should desire to see mobilised the whole
of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and put them afloat on First
Fleet ships for a week as additional to complements.

Please put forward definite proposals, with estimates, for carrying
out the above policy, and at the same time let me have your opinion
upon it.

W. S. C.

Prince Louis agreed. The necessary measures were taken and the project
was mentioned to Parliament on the 18th March, 1914. In pursuance of
these orders and without connection of any kind with the European
situation, the Test Mobilisation began on the 15th July. Although there
was no legal authority to compel the reservists to come up, the response
was general, upwards of 20,000 men presenting themselves at the naval
depots. The whole of our mobilisation arrangements were thus subjected
for the first time in naval history to a practical test and thorough
overhaul. Officers specially detached from the Admiralty watched the
process of mobilisation at every port in order that every defect,
shortage or hitch in the system might be reported and remedied. Prince
Louis and I personally inspected the process at Chatham. All the
reservists drew their kits and proceeded to their assigned ships. All
the Third Fleet ships coaled and raised steam and sailed for the general
concentration at Spithead. Here on the 17th and 18th of July was held
the grand review of the Navy. It constituted incomparably the greatest
assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world.
The King himself was present and inspected ships of every class. On the
morning of the 19th the whole Fleet put to sea for exercises of various
kinds. It took more than six hours for this armada, every ship decked
with flags and crowded with bluejackets and marines, to pass, with bands
playing and at 15 knots, before the Royal Yacht, while overhead the
naval seaplanes and aeroplanes circled continuously. Yet it is probable
that the uppermost thought in the minds both of the Sovereign and those
of his Ministers there present was not the imposing spectacle of British
majesty and might defiling before their eyes, not the oppressive and
even sultry atmosphere of continental politics, but the haggard,
squalid, tragic Irish quarrel which threatened to divide the British
nation into two hostile camps.

One after another the ships melted out of sight beyond the Nab. They
were going on a longer voyage than any of us could know.

CHAPTER IX
THE CRISIS
July 24–July 30

Prepare, prepare the iron helm of war,
Bring forth the lots, cast in the spacious orb;
The Angel of Fate turns them with mighty hands,
And casts them out upon the darkened earth!
Prepare, prepare!
[BLAKE.]

Cabinet of Friday, July 24—Fermanagh and Tyrone—The Austrian Ultimatum
to Serbia—Seventeen Points to remember—The Naval Position—The
Mission of Herr Ballin—Sunday, July 26—The Fleet held together—The
Admiralty Communiqué—The Cabinet and the Crisis—The Policy of Sir
Edward Grey: Cardinal Points—Belgium and France—Was there an
Alternative?—Justice to France—Naval Preparations of July 27 and
28—The Precautionary Period—The Turkish Battleships—What the
German Admiralty knew—German Agents—The Decisive Step—Passage of
the Straits of Dover by the Fleet, July 30—The Fleet in its War
Station—The King’s Ships at Sea.

The Cabinet on Friday afternoon sat long revolving the Irish problem.
The Buckingham Palace Conference had broken down. The disagreements and
antagonisms seemed as fierce and as hopeless as ever, yet the margin in
dispute, upon which such fateful issues hung, was inconceivably petty.
The discussion turned principally upon the boundaries of Fermanagh and
Tyrone. To this pass had the Irish factions in their insensate warfare
been able to drive their respective British champions. Upon the
disposition of these clusters of humble parishes turned at that moment
the political future of Great Britain. The North would not agree to
this, and the South would not agree to that. Both the leaders wished to
settle; both had dragged their followers forward to the utmost point
they dared. Neither seemed able to give an inch. Meanwhile, the
settlement of Ireland must carry with it an immediate and decisive
abatement of party strife in Britain, and those schemes of unity and
co-operation which had so intensely appealed to the leading men on both
sides, ever since Mr. Lloyd George had mooted them in 1910, must
necessarily have come forward into the light of day. Failure to settle
on the other hand meant something very like civil war and the plunge
into depths of which no one could make any measure. And so, turning this
way and that in search of an exit from the deadlock, the Cabinet toiled
around the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone. One had hoped that the
events of April at the Curragh and in Belfast would have shocked British
public opinion, and formed a unity sufficient to impose a settlement on
the Irish factions. Apparently they had been insufficient. Apparently
the conflict would be carried one stage further by both sides with
incalculable consequences before there would be a recoil. Since the days
of the Blues and the Greens in the Byzantine Empire, partisanship had
rarely been carried to more absurd extremes. An all-sufficient shock
was, however, at hand.

The discussion had reached its inconclusive end, and the Cabinet was
about to separate, when the quiet grave tones of Sir Edward Grey’s voice
were heard reading a document which had just been brought to him from
the Foreign Office. It was the Austrian note to Serbia. He had been
reading or speaking for several minutes before I could disengage my mind
from the tedious and bewildering debate which had just closed. We were
all very tired, but gradually as the phrases and sentences followed one
another impressions of a wholly different character began to form in my
mind. This note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such
as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading proceeded it
seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could accept
it, or that any acceptance, however abject, would satisfy the aggressor.
The parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and
squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by
perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe.

I always take the greatest interest in reading accounts of how the war
came upon different people; where they were, and what they were doing,
when the first impression broke on their mind, and they first began to
feel this overwhelming event laying its fingers on their lives. I never
tire of the smallest detail, and I believe that so long as they are true
and unstudied they will have a definite value and an enduring interest
for posterity; so I shall briefly record exactly what happened to me.

I went back to the Admiralty at about 6 o’clock. I said to my friends
who have helped me so many years in my work[27] that there was real
danger and that it might be war.

I took stock of the position, and wrote out to focus them in my mind a
series of points which would have to be attended to if matters did not
mend. My friends kept these as a check during the days that followed and
ticked them off one by one as they were settled.

1. First and Second Fleets. Leave and disposition.
2. Third Fleet. Replenish coal and stores.
3. Mediterranean movements.
4. China dispositions.
5. Shadowing cruisers abroad.
6. Ammunition for self-defensive merchantmen.
7. Patrol Flotillas. Disposition.
Leave.
Complete.
35 ex-Coastals.
8. Immediate Reserve.
9. Old Battleships for Humber. Flotilla for Humber.
10. Ships at emergency dates.
Ships-building for Foreign Powers.
11. Coastal Watch.
12. Anti-aircraft guns at Oil Depots.
13. Aircraft to Sheerness. Airships and Seaplanes.
14. K. Espionage.
15. Magazines and other vulnerable points.
16. Irish ships.
17. Submarine dispositions.

I discussed the situation at length the next morning (Saturday) with the
First Sea Lord. For the moment, however, there was nothing to do. At no
time in all these last three years were we more completely ready.

The test mobilisation had been completed, and with the exception of the
Immediate Reserve, all the reservists were already paid off and
journeying to their homes. But the whole of the 1st and 2nd Fleets were
complete in every way for battle and were concentrated at Portland,
where they were to remain till Monday morning at 7 o’clock, when the 1st
Fleet would disperse by squadrons for various exercises and when the
ships of the 2nd Fleet would proceed to their Home Ports to discharge
their balance crews. Up till Monday morning therefore, a word
instantaneously transmitted from the wireless masts of the Admiralty to
the _Iron Duke_ would suffice to keep our main force together. If the
word were not spoken before that hour, they would begin to separate.
During the first twenty-four hours after their separation they could be
reconcentrated in an equal period; but if no word were spoken for
forty-eight hours (i.e. by Wednesday morning), then the ships of the 2nd
Fleet would have begun dismissing their balance crews to the shore at
Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham, and the various gunnery and torpedo
schools would have recommenced their instruction. If another forty-eight
hours had gone before the word was spoken, i.e. by Friday morning, a
certain number of vessels would have gone into dock for refit, repairs
or laying up. Thus on this Saturday morning we had the Fleet in hand for
at least four days.

[Illustration]

The night before (Friday), at dinner, I had met Herr Ballin. He had just
arrived from Germany. We sat next to each other, and I asked him what he
thought about the situation. With the first few words he spoke, it
became clear that he had not come here on any mission of pleasure. He
said the situation was grave. ‘I remember,’ he said, ‘old Bismarck
telling me the year before he died that one day the great European War
would come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.’ These
words, he said, might come true. It all depended on the Tsar. What would
he do if Austria chastised Serbia? A few years before there would have
been no danger, as the Tsar was too frightened for his throne, but now
again he was feeling himself more secure upon his throne, and the
Russian people besides would feel very hardly anything done against
Serbia. Then he said, ‘If Russia marches against Austria, we must march;
and if we march, France must march, and what would England do?’ I was
not in a position to say more than that it would be a great mistake to
assume that England would necessarily do nothing, and I added that she
would judge events as they arose. He replied, speaking with very great
earnestness, ‘Suppose we had to go to war with Russia and France, and
suppose we defeated France and yet took nothing from her in Europe, not
an inch of her territory, only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that
make a difference to England’s attitude? Suppose we gave a guarantee
beforehand.’ I stuck to my formula that England would judge events as
they arose, and that it would be a mistake to assume that we should
stand out of it whatever happened.

I reported this conversation to Sir Edward Grey in due course, and early
in the following week I repeated it to the Cabinet. On the Wednesday
following the exact proposal mooted to me by Herr Ballin, about Germany
not taking any territorial conquests in France but seeking indemnities
only in the colonies, was officially telegraphed to us from Berlin and
immediately rejected. I have no doubt that Herr Ballin was directly
charged by the Emperor with the mission to find out what England would
do.

Herr Ballin has left on record his impression of his visit to England at
this juncture. ‘Even a moderately skilled German diplomatist,’ he wrote,
‘could easily have come to an understanding with England and France, who
could have made peace certain and prevented Russia from beginning war.’
The editor of his memoirs adds: ‘The people in London were certainly
seriously concerned at the Austrian Note, but the extent to which the
Cabinet desired the maintenance of peace may be seen (as an example)
from the remark which Churchill, almost with tears in his eyes, made to
Ballin as they parted: “My dear friend, don’t let us go to war.”’

I had planned to spend the Sunday with my family at Cromer, and I
decided not to alter my plans. I arranged to have a special operator
placed in the telegraph office so as to ensure a continuous night and
day service. On Saturday afternoon the news came in that Serbia had
accepted the ultimatum. I went to bed with a feeling things might blow
over. We had had, as this account has shown, so many scares before. Time
after time the clouds had loomed up vague, menacing, constantly
changing; time after time they had dispersed. We were still a long way,
as it seemed, from any danger of war. Serbia had accepted the ultimatum,
could Austria demand more? And if war came, could it not be confined to
the East of Europe? Could not France and Germany, for instance, stand
aside and leave Russia and Austria to settle their quarrel? And then,
one step further removed, was our own case. Clearly there would be a
chance of a conference, there would be time for Sir Edward Grey to get
to work with conciliatory processes such as had proved so effective in
the Balkan difficulties the year before. Anyhow, whatever happened, the
British Navy had never been in a better condition or in greater
strength. Probably the call would not come, but if it did, it could not
come in a better hour. Reassured by these reflections I slept
peacefully, and no summons disturbed the silence of the night.

At 9 o’clock the next morning I called up the First Sea Lord by
telephone. He told me that there was a rumour that Austria was not
satisfied with the Serbian acceptance of the ultimatum, but otherwise
there were no new developments. I asked him to call me up again at
twelve. I went down to the beach and played with the children. We dammed
the little rivulets which trickled down to the sea as the tide went out.
It was a very beautiful day. The North Sea shone and sparkled to a far
horizon. What was there beyond that line where sea and sky melted into
one another? All along the East Coast, from Cromarty to Dover, in their
various sally-ports, lay our patrol flotillas of destroyers and
submarines. In the Channel behind the torpedo proof moles of Portland
Harbour waited all the great ships of the British Navy. Away to the
north-east, across the sea that stretched before me, the German High Sea
Fleet, squadron by squadron, was cruising off the Norwegian coast.

At 12 o’clock I spoke to the First Sea Lord again. He told me various
items of news that had come in from different capitals, none however of
decisive importance, but all tending to a rise of temperature. I asked
him whether all the reservists had already been dismissed. He told me
they had. I decided to return to London. I told him I would be with him
at nine, and that meanwhile he should do whatever was necessary.

Prince Louis awaited me at the Admiralty. The situation was evidently
degenerating. Special editions of the Sunday papers showed intense
excitement in nearly every European capital. The First Sea Lord told me
that in accordance with our conversation he had told the Fleet not to
disperse. I took occasion to refer to this four months later in my
letter accepting his resignation. I was very glad publicly to testify at
that moment of great grief and pain for him that his loyal hand had sent
the first order which began our vast naval mobilisation.

I then went round to Sir Edward Grey, who had rented my house at 33,
Eccleston Square. No one was with him except Sir William Tyrrell of the
Foreign Office. I told him that we were holding the Fleet together. I
learned from him that he viewed the situation very gravely. He said
there was a great deal yet to be done before a really dangerous crisis
was reached, but that he did not at all like the way in which this
business had begun. I asked whether it would be helpful or the reverse
if we stated in public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he
and Tyrrell were most insistent that we should proclaim it at the
earliest possible moment: it might have the effect of sobering the
Central Powers and steadying Europe. I went back to the Admiralty, sent
for the First Sea Lord, and drafted the necessary communiqué.

The next morning the following notice appeared in all the papers:—

BRITISH NAVAL MEASURES ORDERS TO FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS

NO MANŒUVRE LEAVE

We received the following statement from the Secretary of the
Admiralty at an early hour this morning:—

Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated at
Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave for the present. All
vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in
proximity to their balance crews.

On Monday began the first of the Cabinets on the European situation,
which thereafter continued daily or twice a day. It is to be hoped that
sooner or later a detailed account of the movement of opinion in the
Cabinet during this period will be compiled and given to the world.
There is certainly no reason for anyone to be ashamed of honest and
sincere counsel given either to preserve peace or to enter upon a just
and necessary war. Meanwhile it is only possible, without breach of
constitutional propriety, to deal in the most general terms with what
took place.

The Cabinet was overwhelmingly pacific. At least three-quarters of its
members were determined not to be drawn into a European quarrel, unless
Great Britain were herself attacked, which was not likely. Those who
were in this mood were inclined to believe first of all that Austria and
Serbia would not come to blows; secondly, that if they did, Russia would
not intervene; thirdly, if Russia intervened, that Germany would not
strike; fourthly, they hoped that if Germany struck at Russia, it ought
to be possible for France and Germany mutually to neutralise each other
without fighting. They did not believe that if Germany attacked France,
she would attack her through Belgium or that if she did the Belgians
would forcibly resist; and it must be remembered, that during the whole
course of this week Belgium not only never asked for assistance from the
guaranteeing Powers but pointedly indicated that she wished to be left
alone. So here were six or seven positions, all of which could be
wrangled over and about none of which any final proof could be offered
except the proof of events. It was not until Monday, August 3, that the
direct appeal from the King of the Belgians for French and British aid
raised an issue which united the overwhelming majority of Ministers and
enabled Sir Edward Grey to make his speech on that afternoon to the
House of Commons.

My own part in these events was a very simple one. It was first of all
to make sure that the diplomatic situation did not get ahead of the
naval situation, and that the Grand Fleet should be in its War Station
before Germany could know whether or not we should be in the war, _and
therefore if possible before we had decided ourselves_. Secondly, it was
to point out that if Germany attacked France, she would do so through
Belgium, that all her preparations had been made to this end, and that
she neither could nor would adopt any different strategy or go round any
other way. To these two tasks I steadfastly adhered.

Every day there were long Cabinets from eleven onwards. Streams of
telegrams poured in from every capital in Europe. Sir Edward Grey was
plunged in his immense double struggle (_a_) to prevent war and (_b_)
not to desert France should it come. I watched with admiration his
activities at the Foreign Office and cool skill in council. Both these
tasks acted and reacted on one another from hour to hour. He had to try
to make the Germans realise that we were to be reckoned with, without
making the French or Russians feel they had us in their pockets. He had
to carry the Cabinet with him in all he did. During the many years we
acted together in the Cabinet, and the earlier years in which I read his
Foreign Office telegrams, I thought I had learnt to understand his
methods of discussion and controversy, and perhaps without offence I
might describe them.

After what must have been profound reflection and study, the Foreign
Secretary was accustomed to select one or two points in any important
controversy which he defended with all his resources and tenacity. They
were his fortified villages. All around in the open field the battle
ebbed and flowed, but if at nightfall these points were still in his
possession, his battle was won. All other arguments had expended
themselves, and these key positions alone survived. The points which he
selected over and over again proved to be inexpugnable. They were
particularly adapted to defence. They commended themselves to sensible
and fair-minded men. The sentiments of the patriotic Whig, the English
gentleman, the public school boy all came into the line for their
defence, and if they were held, the whole front was held, including much
debatable ground.

As soon as the crisis had begun he had fastened upon the plan of a
European conference, and to this end every conceivable endeavour was
made by him. To get the great Powers together round a table, in any
capital that was agreeable with Britain there to struggle for peace, and
if necessary to threaten war against those who broke it, was his plan.
Had such a conference taken place, there could have been no war. Mere
acceptance of the principle of a conference by the Central Powers would
have instantly relieved the tension. A will to peace at Berlin and
Vienna would have found no difficulties in escaping from the terrible
net which was drawing in upon us all hour by hour. But underneath the
diplomatic communications and manœuvres, the baffling proposals and
counter-proposals, the agitated interventions of Tsar and Kaiser, flowed
a deep tide of calculated military purpose. As the ill-fated nations
approached the verge, the sinister machines of war began to develop
their own momentum and even to take control themselves.

The Foreign Secretary’s second cardinal point was the English Channel.
Whatever happened, if war came, we could not allow the German Fleet to
come down the Channel to attack the French ports. Such a situation would
be insupportable for Great Britain. Every one who counted was agreed on
that from a very early stage in our discussions. But in addition we
were, in a sense, morally committed to France to that extent. No bargain
had been entered into. All arrangements that had been concerted were, as
has been explained, specifically preluded with a declaration that
neither party was committed to anything further than consultation
together if danger threatened. But still the fact remained that the
whole French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. Only a few cruisers and
flotillas remained to guard the Northern and Atlantic Coasts of France;
and simultaneously with that redisposition of forces, though not
contingent upon it or dependent upon it, we had concentrated all our
battleships at home, and only cruisers and battle-cruisers maintained
British interests in the Mediterranean. The French had taken their
decision on their own responsibility without prompting from us, and we
had profited by their action to strengthen our margin in the Line of
Battle at home. Whatever disclaimers we had made about not being
committed, could we, when it came to the point, honourably stand by and
see the naked French coasts ravaged and bombarded by German Dreadnoughts
under the eyes and within gunshot of our Main Fleet?

It seemed to me, however, very early in the discussion that the Germans
would concede this point to keep us out of the war, at any rate till the
first battles on land had been fought without us; and sure enough they
did. Believing as I did and do that we could not, for our own safety and
independence, allow France to be crushed as the result of aggressive
action by Germany, I always from the very earliest moment concentrated
upon our obligations to Belgium, through which I was convinced the
Germans must inevitably march to invade France. Belgium did not bulk
very largely in my sentiments at this stage. I thought it very unlikely
that she would resist. I thought, and Lord Kitchener, who lunched with
me on the Tuesday (28th), agreed, that Belgium would make some formal
protest and submit. A few shots might be fired outside Liége or Namur,
and then this unfortunate State would bow its head before overwhelming
might. Perhaps, even, there was a secret agreement allowing free passage
to the Germans through Belgium. How otherwise would all these
preparations of Germany, the great camps along the Belgian Frontier, the
miles and miles of sidings, the intricate network of railways have been
developed? Was it possible that German thoroughness could be astray on
so important a factor as the attitude of Belgium?

Those wonderful events which took place in Belgium on Sunday and Monday
and in the week that followed could not be foreseen by us. I saw in
Belgium a country with whom we had had many differences over the Congo
and other subjects. I had not discerned in the Belgium of the late King
Leopold the heroic nation of King Albert. But whatever happened to
Belgium, there was France whose very life was at stake, whose armies in
my judgment were definitely weaker than those by whom they would be
assailed, whose ruin would leave us face to face alone with triumphant
Germany: France, then schooled by adversity to peace and caution,
thoroughly democratic, already stripped of two fair provinces, about to
receive the final smashing blow from overwhelming brutal force. Only
Britain could redress the balance, could defend the fair play of the
world. Whatever else failed, we must be there, and we must be there in
time. A week later every British heart burned for little Belgium. From
every cottage labouring men, untrained to war but with the blood of an
unconquered people in their veins, were hurrying to the recruiting
stations with intent to rescue Belgium. But at this time it was not
Belgium one thought of, but France. Still, Belgium and the Treaties were
indisputably an obligation of honour binding upon the British State such
as British Governments have always accepted; and it was on that ground
that I personally, with others, took my stand.

I will now examine the alternative question of whether more decided
action by Sir Edward Grey at an early stage would have prevented the
war. We must first ask, At what early stage? Suppose after Agadir or on
the announcement of the new German Navy Law in 1912 the Foreign
Secretary had, in cold blood, proposed a formal alliance with France and
Russia, and in execution of military conventions consequential upon the
alliance had begun to raise by compulsion an army adequate to our
responsibilities and to the part we were playing in the world’s affairs;
and suppose we had taken this action as a united nation; who shall say
whether that would have prevented or precipitated the war? But what
chance was there of such action being unitedly taken? The Cabinet of the
day would never have agreed to it. I doubt if four Ministers would have
agreed to it. But if the Cabinet had been united upon it, the House of
Commons would not have accepted their guidance. Therefore the Foreign
Minister would have had to resign. The policy which he had advocated
would have stood condemned and perhaps violently repudiated; and with
that repudiation would have come an absolute veto upon all those
informal preparations and non-committal discussions on which the
defensive power of the Triple Entente was erected. Therefore, by taking
such a course in 1912 Sir Edward Grey would only have paralysed Britain,
isolated France and increased the preponderant and growing power of
Germany.

Suppose again that now after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the
Foreign Secretary had proposed to the Cabinet that if matters were so
handled that Germany attacked France or violated Belgian territory,
Great Britain would declare war upon her. Would the Cabinet have
assented to such a communication? I cannot believe it. If Sir Edward
Grey could have said on Monday that if Germany attacked France or
Belgium, England would declare war upon her, might there not still have
been time to ward off the catastrophe? The question is certainly
arguable. But the knowledge which we now have of events in Berlin tends
to show that even then the German Government were too deeply committed
by their previous action. They had before their eyes the deliberate
British announcement that the Fleet was being held together. That at
least was a serious if silent warning. Under its impression the German
Emperor, as soon as he returned to Berlin, made on this same Monday and
succeeding days strong efforts to bring Austria to reason and so to
prevent war. But he could never overtake events or withstand the
contagion of ideas. However this may be, I am certain that if Sir Edward
Grey had sent the kind of ultimatum suggested, the Cabinet would have
broken up, and it is also my belief that up till Wednesday or Thursday
at least, the House of Commons would have repudiated his action. Nothing
less than the deeds of Germany would have converted the British nation
to war. To act in advance of those deeds would have led to an exposure
of division worse than the guarded attitude which we maintained, which
brought our country into the war united. After Wednesday or Thursday it
was too late. By the time we could speak decisive words of warning, the
hour of words had certainly passed for ever.

It is true to say that our Entente with France and the military and
naval conversations that had taken place since 1906, had led us into a
position where we had the obligations of an alliance without its
advantages. An open alliance, if it could have been peacefully brought
about at an earlier date, would have exercised a deterring effect upon
the German mind, or at the least would have altered their military
calculations. Whereas now we were morally bound to come to the aid of
France and it was our interest to do so, and yet the fact that we should
come in appeared so uncertain that it did not weigh as it should have
done with the Germans. Moreover, as things were, if France had been in
an aggressive mood, we should not have had the unquestioned right of an
ally to influence her action in a pacific sense: and if as the result of
her aggressive mood war had broken out and we had stood aside, we should
have been accused of deserting her, and in any case would have been
ourselves grievously endangered by her defeat.

However, in the event there was no need to moderate the French attitude.
Justice to France requires the explicit statement that the conduct of
her Government at this awful juncture was faultless. She assented
instantly to every proposal that could make for peace. She abstained
from every form of provocative action. She even compromised her own
safety, holding back her covering troops at a considerable distance
behind her frontier, and delaying her mobilisation in the face of
continually gathering German forces till the latest moment. Not until
she was confronted with the direct demand of Germany to break her Treaty
and abandon Russia, did France take up the challenge; and even had she
acceded to the German demand, she would only, as we now know, have been
faced with a further ultimatum to surrender to German military
occupation as a guarantee for her neutrality the fortresses of Toul and
Verdun. There never was any chance of France being allowed to escape the
ordeal. Even cowardice and dishonour would not have saved her. The
Germans had resolved that if war came from any cause, they would take
and break France forthwith as its first operation. The German military
chiefs burned to give the signal, and were sure of the result. She would
have begged for mercy in vain.

She did not beg.

The more I reflect upon this situation, the more convinced I am that we
took the only practical course that was open to us or to any British
Cabinet; and that the objections which may be urged against it were less
than those which would have attended any other sequence of action.

* * * * *

After hearing the discussions at Monday’s Cabinet and studying the
telegrams, I sent that night to all our Commanders-in-Chief the
following very secret warning:—

_July 27, 1914._

This is not the Warning Telegram, but European political situation
makes war between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance Powers by no
means impossible. Be prepared to shadow possible hostile men of war
and consider dispositions of H.M. ships under your command from this
point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. No unnecessary person
is to be informed. The utmost secrecy is to be observed.

On Tuesday morning I sent the following minute to the First Sea Lord, to
which he replied marginally the same day:—

_July 28, 1914._

[Sidenote: Will go North with Fleet.]

1. It would appear that the minesweepers should be quietly collected
at some suitable point for attendance on the Battle Fleet, should it
move.

[Sidenote: Done.]

2. Let me have a short statement on the coal position and what
measures you propose.

[Sidenote: Yes.]

3. I presume _Firedrake_ and _Lurcher_ will now join their proper
flotilla.

[Sidenote: Have been ordered away.]

4. All the vessels engaged on the coast of Ireland should be
considered as available on mobilisation, and on receipt of the warning
telegram should move to their war stations without the slightest
delay.

[Sidenote: Will be done as soon as F.O. concur.]

5. It would certainly be desirable that _Triumph_ should be quietly
mobilised and that she should be ready to close the China flagship
with available destroyers. The position of the German heavy cruisers
in China waters makes it clear that this can be done. Please examine
and report what disadvantages this mobilisation would entail. We can
then discuss whether it is worth while taking them in the present
circumstances. [Sidenote: Should concentrate at Hong Kong at once.]
The China Squadron must be capable of concentrating as soon as the
warning telegram is sent and before a main action is necessary.
Without the _Triumph_ the margin of superiority is small and any
reinforcement from other stations would be slow.

[Sidenote: Decided “No” at Conference.]

6. You should consider whether the position of the _Goeben_[28] at
Pola does not justify the detachment of the _New Zealand_ to join the
Mediterranean flag.

[Sidenote: Settled personally with O. of I.G.S.]

7. Yesterday, after consultation with the Prime Minister, I arranged
personally with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the better
guarding of magazines and oil tanks against evilly-disposed persons
and attacks by aircraft. These measures have now been taken. See
attached letter from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and my
reply. You should direct the Director of Operations Division to obtain
full detailed information from the War Office of what has been done,
and in the event of any place being overlooked, to make the necessary
representations.

[Sidenote: Done.]

8. Director of the Air Division should be asked to report the exact
positions of the aircraft which were concentrated yesterday in the
neighbourhood of the Thames Estuary, and further to state what is
being done to reach a complete understanding between the [Sidenote: L.
B.] aircraft and the military authorities in charge of the aerial gun
defences at various points. This is of the utmost importance if
accidents are to be avoided.

W. S. C.

The official ‘warning telegram’ was despatched from the Admiralty on
Wednesday, the 29th. On this same day I obtained from the Cabinet the
authority to put into force the ‘Precautionary Period’ regulations. The
work of Ottley and of Hankey and generally of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, was now put to the proof. It was found in every respect
thorough and comprehensive, and all over the country emergency measures
began to astonish the public. Naval harbours were cleared, bridges were
guarded, steamers were boarded and examined, watchers lined the coasts.

First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Director of Air Department.

_July 29, 1914._

In the present stage of aeronautics, the primary duty of British
aircraft is to fight enemy aircraft, and thus afford protection
against aerial attack. This should be made clear to air officers,
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Admiral of Patrols, in order that
machines may not be needlessly used up in ordinary scouting duties.
After the primary requirement is well provided for, whatever aid is
possible for coastal watch and extended defence scouting should be
organised. But the naval aircraft are to regard the defence against
attack from the air as their first and main responsibility. They must
be carefully husbanded.

W. S. C.

_July 28, 1914._

Director Intelligence Division.

Please mark off on my ‘Table of Battleship Strength’ all British and
German Dreadnought battleships available for war (a) in the next
month, and (b) at the end of three months. You should include the two
Turkish ships in your calculation. Let me also have a similar table
about battle-cruisers.

W. S. C.

Our war arrangements comprised an elaborate scheme for dealing with
vessels under construction. In 1912 measures had been taken to keep it
perpetually up to date. The principle was that for the first three
months of a war all efforts should be concentrated on finishing ships
that could be ready in the first six months, other vessels whose dates
of completion were more remote being somewhat retarded. This ensured the
greatest possible superiority in the early months, and would give us
time to see what kind of a war it was and how it went, before dealing
with more distant contingencies. The plan of course covered all ships
building in Great Britain for foreign Powers. Of these there were two
battleships building for Turkey, three flotilla leaders for Chili, four
destroyers for Greece, and three monitors for Brazil. There were also
other important ships, including a Chilian and a Brazilian battleship
and a Dutch cruiser, which would not be ready till much later. The
Turkish battleships were vital to us. With a margin of only seven
Dreadnoughts we could not afford to do without these two fine ships.
Still less could we afford to see them fall into bad hands and possibly
be used against us. Had we delivered them to Turkey, they would, as the
event turned out, have formed with the _Goeben_ a hostile force which
would have required a force of not less than five British Dreadnought
battleships or battle-cruisers to watch them. Thus the British numbers
would have been reduced by three instead of being increased by two. One
of the Turkish battleships (the _Reshadieh_) which Armstrongs were
building on the Tyne when the crisis began, was actually complete. The
Turkish crew, over 500 strong, had already arrived to take her over and
were lying in their steamer in the river. There seemed to be a great
danger of their coming on board, brushing aside Messrs. Armstrongs’
workmen and hoisting the Turkish flag, in which case a very difficult
diplomatic situation would have been created. I determined to run no
risks, and on the 31st July I sent written instructions that adequate
military guards were to be placed on board this vessel and that in no
circumstances was she to be boarded by the Turks. It has sometimes been
made a ground for reproach against me that the requisition of these
ships was one of the causes which brought Turkey into the war three
months later. We now know that negotiations were taking place from the
24th July onwards between the Germans and the leaders of the Committee
of Union and Progress for an alliance between Germany and Turkey, and
that such Alliance was actually signed on August 2.

It is interesting to read in the German Official History what they knew
about our preparations at this time.

‘At 6.20 p.m. on July 28 the following telegram was received in Berlin
from the German Naval Attaché:—

“Admiralty are not publishing ships’ movements. 2nd Fleet remains
fully manned. Schools closed in naval bases; preliminary measures
taken for recall from leave. According to unconfirmed news 1st Fleet
still at Portland, one submarine flotilla left Portsmouth. It is to be
assumed that Admiralty is preparing for mobilisation on the quiet.”

“He telegraphed later on the same day as follows:—

“As already reported by telegram, the British Fleet is preparing for
all eventualities. In broad outline the present distribution is as
follows: 1st Fleet is assembled at Portland. The battleship
_Bellerophon_ which was proceeding to Gibraltar for refit has been
recalled. The ships of the 2nd Fleet are at their bases: they are
fully manned. The schools on shore have not reopened. Ships of the 2nd
and 3rd Fleets have coaled, completed with ammunition and supplies,
and are at their bases. In consequence of the training of reservists,
just completed, latter can be manned more quickly than usual and with
more or less practised personnel, the _Times_ says, within 48 hours.
The destroyer and patrol flotillas and the submarines are either at or
_en route_ for their stations. No leave is being granted, officers and
men already on leave have been recalled.

“In the naval bases and dockyards great activity reigns; in addition
special measures of precaution have been adopted, all dockyards,
magazines, oil tanks, etc., being put under guard. Repairs of ships in
dockyard hands are being speeded up. A great deal of night work is
being done.

“The Press reports that the Mediterranean squadron had left
Alexandria; it is said that it will remain at Malta.

“All ships and squadrons have orders to remain ready for sea.

“Outwardly complete calm is preserved, in order not to cause anxiety
by alarming reports about the Fleet.

“Movements of ships, which are generally published daily by the
Admiralty, have been withheld since yesterday....

“The above preparations have been made on the Admiralty’s independent
initiative. The result is the same, whoever gave the orders.”’

The German Naval Attaché thus showed himself extremely well informed. As
I have already mentioned in an earlier chapter, the general warrant to
open the letters of certain persons which I had signed three years
before as Home Secretary, had brought to light a regular network of
minor agents, mostly British, in German pay in all our naval ports. Had
we arrested them, others of whom we might not have known, would have
taken their place. We therefore thought it better, having detected them,
to leave them at large. In this way one saw regularly from their
communications, which we carefully forwarded, what they were saying to
their paymasters in Berlin during these years, and we knew exactly how
to put our hands upon them at the proper moment. Up to this point we had
no objection to the German Government knowing that exceptional
precautions were being taken throughout the Navy. Indeed, apart from
details, it was desirable that they should know how seriously we viewed
the situation. But the moment had now come to draw down the curtain. We
no longer forwarded the letters and a few days later, on a word from me
to the Home Secretary, all these petty traitors, who for a few pounds a
month were seeking to sell their country, were laid by the heels. Nor
was it easy for the Germans to organise on the spur of the moment others
in their places.

The most important step remains to be recounted. As early as Tuesday,
July 28, I felt that the Fleet should go to its War Station. It must go
there at once, and secretly; it must be steaming to the north while
every German authority, naval or military, had the greatest possible
interest in avoiding a collision with us. If it went thus early it need
not go by the Irish Channel and northabout. It could go through the
Straits of Dover and through the North Sea, and therefore the island
would not be uncovered even for a single day. Moreover, it would arrive
sooner and with less expenditure of fuel.

[Illustration]

At about 10 o’clock, therefore, on the Tuesday morning I proposed this
step to the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff and found them
wholeheartedly in favour of it. We decided that the Fleet should leave
Portland at such an hour on the morning of the 29th as to pass the
Straits of Dover during the hours of darkness, that it should traverse
these waters at high speed and without lights, and with the utmost
precaution proceed to Scapa Flow. I feared to bring this matter before
the Cabinet, lest it should mistakenly be considered a provocative
action likely to damage the chances of peace. It would be unusual to
bring movements of the British Fleet in Home Waters from one British
port to another before the Cabinet. I only therefore informed the Prime
Minister, who at once gave his approval. Orders were accordingly sent to
Sir George Callaghan, who was told incidentally to send the Fleet up
under his second-in-command and to travel himself by land through London
in order that we might have an opportunity of consultation with him.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleets._

_July 28, 1914. Sent 5 p.m._

To-morrow, Wednesday, the First Fleet is to leave Portland for Scapa
Flow. Destination is to be kept secret except to flag and commanding
officers. As you are required at the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral 2nd
Battle Squadron is to take command. Course from Portland is to be
shaped to southward, then a middle Channel course to the Straits of
Dover. The Squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights
during the night and to pass outside the shoals on their way north.
_Agamemnon_ is to remain at Portland, where the Second Fleet will
assemble.

We may now picture this great Fleet, with its flotillas and cruisers,
steaming slowly out of Portland Harbour, squadron by squadron, scores of
gigantic castles of steel wending their way across the misty, shining
sea, like giants bowed in anxious thought. We may picture them again as
darkness fell, eighteen miles of warships running at high speed and in
absolute blackness through the Narrow Straits, bearing with them into
the broad waters of the North the safeguard of considerable affairs.

Although there seemed to be no conceivable motive chance or mischance
which could lead a rational German Admiralty to lay a trap of submarines
or mines or have given them the knowledge and the time to do so, we
looked at each other with much satisfaction when on Thursday morning
(the 30th) at our daily Staff Meeting the Flagship reported herself and
the whole Fleet well out in the centre of the North Sea.[29]

The German Ambassador lost no time in complaining of the movement of the
Fleet to the Foreign Office. According to the German Official Naval
History, he reported to his Government on the evening of the 30th that
Sir Edward Grey had answered him in the following words:—

‘The movements of the Fleet are free of all offensive character, and
the Fleet will not approach German waters.’

‘But,’ adds the German historian, ‘the strategic concentration of the
Fleet had actually been accomplished with its transfer to Scottish
ports.’ This was true. We were now in a position, whatever happened, to
control events, and it was not easy to see how this advantage could be
taken from us. A surprise torpedo attack before or simultaneous with the
declaration of war was at any rate one nightmare gone for ever. We could
at least see for ten days ahead. If war should come no one would know
where to look for the British Fleet. Somewhere in that enormous waste of
waters to the north of our islands, cruising now this way, now that,
shrouded in storms and mists, dwelt this mighty organisation. Yet from
the Admiralty building we could speak to them at any moment if need
arose. The king’s ships were at sea.

CHAPTER X
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY
July 31–August 4

‘The meteor flag of England
Shall yet terrific burn;
Till danger’s troubled night depart,
And the star of peace return.’
CAMPBELL.

Cabinet Tension—The Opposition Leaders—The Naval Reserves—British
Decision to close the Chanel to German Warships—Germany declares
War upon Russia—General Mobilisation of the Navy—Sir John Jellicoe
appointed Commander-in-Chief—German Invasion of Luxemburg and
Belgium—Monday, August 3, in the House of Commons—British
Ultimatum to Germany—Nation and Empire—Situation in the
Mediterranean—Menace of the _Goeben_—Admiralty Instructions to Sir
Berkeley Milne—August 4. The _Goeben_ found—Cabinet veto on
Hostilities—Italian Declaration of Neutrality—First Escape of the
_Goeben_—Awaiting the Signal—‘Commence hostilities against
Germany.’

There was complete agreement in the Cabinet upon every telegram sent by
Sir Edward Grey and in his handling of the crisis. But there was also an
invincible refusal on the part of the majority to contemplate British
intervention by force of arms should the Foreign Secretary’s efforts
fail and a European war begin. Thus, as the terrific week wore on and
the explosion became inevitable, it seemed probable that a rupture of
the political organism by which the country had so long been governed
was also rapidly approaching. I lived this week entirely in the official
circle, seeing scarcely anyone but my colleagues of the Cabinet or of
the Admiralty, and moving only to and fro across the Horse Guards
between Admiralty House and Downing Street. Each day as the telegrams
arrived showing the darkening scene of Europe, and the Cabinets ended in
growing tension, I pulled over the various levers which successively
brought our naval organisation into full preparedness. It was always
necessary to remember that if Peace was preserved every one of these
measures, alarmist in their character and involving much expense, would
have to be justified to a Liberal House of Commons. That assembly once
delivered from the peril, would certainly proceed upon the assumption
that British participation in a Continental struggle would have been
criminal madness. Yet it was not practicable often to divert the main
discussions of the Cabinet into purely technical channels. It was
therefore necessary for me to take a peculiar and invidious personal
responsibility for many things that had to be done when their turn came.
I had also to contemplate a break up of the governing instrument. Judged
by reports and letters from members, the attitude of the House of
Commons appeared most uncertain.

On Thursday evening I entered into communication with the Unionist
leaders through Mr. F. E. Smith.[30] I informed him of the increasing
gravity of the European situation and of the military preparations which
were everywhere in progress in Europe. I stated that no decision had
been reached by the Cabinet, and that I had received letters from one or
two Unionists of influence protesting vehemently against our being drawn
into a Continental war. I asked him to let me know where he and his
friends stood on the supreme issue. He replied at once that he himself
was unreservedly for standing by France and Belgium. After consulting
with Mr. Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson and others who were gathered at
Sir Edward Goulding’s house at Wargrave, he sent me the following
written assurance, which I showed to Mr. Asquith the next morning
(Saturday).

_Mr. F. E. Smith to Mr. Churchill._

_July 31, 1914._

I have spoken to my friends of whom you know and I have no doubt that
on the facts as we understand them—and more particularly on the
assumption (which we understand to be certain) that Germany
contemplates a violation of Belgian neutrality—the Government can rely
upon the support of the Unionist Party in whatever manner that support
can be most effectively given.

Saturday, _August 1, 1914_.

Secretary,
First Sea Lord.

It seems certain that the order to mobilise will be issued after
Cabinet this morning. Have everything in readiness.

Examination service should be put into force simultaneously.

W. S. C.

At the Cabinet I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet
Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations. I based this
claim on the fact that the German Navy was mobilising and that we must
do the same. The Cabinet, who were by no means ill-informed on matters
of naval organisation, took the view after a sharp discussion that this
step was not necessary to our safety, as mobilisation only affected the
oldest ships in the Fleet, and that our main naval power was already in
full preparedness for war and the Fleet in its war station. I replied
that though this was true, we needed the Third Fleet ships, particularly
the older cruisers, to fulfil the rôles assigned to them in our war
plan. However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent.

On Saturday evening I dined alone at the Admiralty. The foreign
telegrams came in at short intervals in red boxes which already bore the
special label ‘Sub-Committee,’ denoting the precautionary period. The
flow was quite continuous, and the impression produced on my mind after
reading for nearly an hour was that there was still a chance of peace.
Austria had accepted the conference, and intimate personal appeals were
passing between the Tsar and the Kaiser. It seemed to me, from the order
in which I read the series of telegrams, that at the very last moment
Sir Edward Grey might succeed in saving the situation. So far no shot
had been fired between the Great Powers. I wondered whether armies and
fleets could remain mobilised for a space without fighting and then
demobilise.

I had hardly achieved this thought when another Foreign Office box came
in. I opened it and read ‘Germany has declared war on Russia.’ There was
no more to be said. I walked across the Horse Guards Parade and entered
10 Downing Street, by the garden gate. I found the Prime Minister
upstairs in his drawing-room: with him were Sir Edward Grey, Lord
Haldane and Lord Crewe; there may have been other Ministers. I said that
I intended instantly to mobilise the Fleet notwithstanding the Cabinet
decision, and that I would take full personal responsibility to the
Cabinet the next morning. The Prime Minister, who felt himself bound to
the Cabinet, said not a single word, but it was clear from his look that
he was quite content. As I walked down the steps of Downing Street with
Sir Edward Grey, he said to me, ‘You should know I have just done a very
important thing. I have told Cambon that we shall not allow the German
fleet to come into the Channel.’ I went back to the Admiralty and gave
forthwith the order to mobilise. We had no legal authority for calling
up the Naval Reserves, as no proclamation had been submitted to His
Majesty in view of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the
Fleet men would unquestioningly obey the summons. This action was
ratified by the Cabinet on Sunday morning, and the Royal Proclamation
was issued some hours later.

Another decision and a painful one was required. Sir George Callaghan’s
command of the Home Fleets had been extended by a year, and was now due
to end on the 1st October. It had been announced that he would then be
succeeded by Sir John Jellicoe. Further, our arrangements prescribed
that Sir John Jellicoe should act as second-in-command in the event of
war. The First Sea Lord and I had a conference with Sir George
Callaghan, on his way through London to the North on the 30th. As the
result of this conference we decided that if war came, it would be
necessary to appoint Sir John Jellicoe immediately to the chief command.
We were doubtful as to Sir George Callaghan’s health and physical
strength being equal to the immense strain that would be cast upon him;
and in the crash of Europe it was no time to consider individuals. Sir
John Jellicoe left London for the Fleet with sealed instructions,
directing him on the seals being broken to take over the command. On the
night of August 2, when we considered war certain, we telegraphed to
both Admirals apprising them of the Admiralty decision. It was naturally
a cruel blow to Sir George Callaghan to have to lay down his charge at
such a moment, and his protests were re-echoed by practically all the
principal Admirals who had served under him and by Sir John Jellicoe
himself. It was also a grave matter to make a change in the command of
the Fleets at this juncture. However, we did what we thought right, and
that without an hour’s delay. Sir John Jellicoe assumed command on the
evening of August 3, and received almost immediately an order from the
Admiralty to proceed to sea at daylight on the 4th.

The Cabinet sat almost continuously throughout the Sunday, and up till
luncheon-time it looked as if the majority would resign. The grief and
horror of so many able colleagues were painful to witness. But what
could any one do? In the luncheon interval I saw Mr. Balfour, a
veritable rock in times like these, and learned that the Unionist
leaders had tendered formally in writing to the Prime Minister their
unqualified assurances of support.

I returned to the Admiralty. We telegraphed to our Commanders-in-Chief:—

To-day, August 2, at 2.20 the following note was handed to the French
and German Ambassadors. [_Begins_] The British Government would not
allow the passage of German ships through the English Channel or the
North Sea in order to attack the coasts or shipping of France
[_ends_].

Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.

The French Naval Attaché, the Comte de Saint-Seine had been summoned.
The following is the précis of our conversation:—

_August 2, 1914._

The First Lord in the presence of the First Sea Lord and Chief of the
War Staff, informed the French Naval Attaché of the Cabinet’s decision
and the note on naval matters handed to M. Cambon at 2.20 p.m., August
2.

In order to prepare for the possibility of an alliance being concluded
between the Governments, but without prejudging the question, the
following preliminary steps are to be taken:—

The package containing the secret signal books to be distributed and
opened but not used.

Mutual regulations for the entry of allied ships into each other’s
ports to be issued now.

The officers in command of the Mediterranean and China Stations will
be given permission to enter into communication with the French Senior
Officers in command on their stations.

Certain staff questions were discussed, but the First Lord clearly
pointed out that these involved no question of policy which would have
to be decided by Parliament.

The general direction of the naval war to rest with the British
Admiralty.

The direction of the allied fleets in the Mediterranean to rest with
the French, the British Admiral being junior.

In the event of the neutrality of Italy being assured, France would
undertake to deal with Austria assisted only by such British ships as
would be required to cover German ships in that sea, and secure a
satisfactory composition of the allied fleet.

The arrangement come to locally on the China Station would be carried
out under the general direction of the British Admiral.

British naval bases would be at the disposal of the French.

Should any portion of the German main fleet make its way South towards
the Mediterranean, it would be followed by a superior British force.

The Attaché was asked to communicate the above at once to his
Government by telegraph and obtain full knowledge and authority for a
further discussion on details to-night.

Meanwhile events were influencing opinion hour by hour. When the Cabinet
met on Sunday morning we were in presence of the violation of the Grand
Duchy of Luxemburg by the German troops. In the evening the German
ultimatum to Belgium was delivered. The next day arrived the appeal of
the King of the Belgians that the guaranteeing Powers should uphold the
sanctity of the Treaty regarding the neutrality of Belgium. This last
was decisive. By Monday the majority of Mr. Asquith’s colleagues
regarded war as inevitable. Discussion was resumed on Monday morning in
a different atmosphere, though it seemed certain that there would be
numerous resignations.

Before the Cabinet separated on Monday morning, Sir Edward Grey had
procured a predominant assent to the principal points and general tone
of his statement to Parliament that afternoon. Formal sanction had been
given to the already completed mobilisation of the Fleet and to the
immediate mobilisation of the Army. No decision had been taken to send
an ultimatum to Germany or to declare war upon Germany, still less to
send an army to France. These supreme decisions were never taken at any
Cabinet. They were compelled by the force of events, and rest on the
authority of the Prime Minister. We repaired to the House of Commons to
hear the statement of the Foreign Secretary. I did not know which of our
colleagues had resigned or what the composition of a War Government
would be. The aspect of the assembly was awed but resolute. No one could
mistake its intention. Sir Edward Grey made his statement with the
utmost moderation. In order that there should be no ground for future
reproaches, he informed the House that the Germans were willing to
comply with the British demand that no German warships should be sent
into the English Channel. The sombre march of his argument carried this
weighty admission forward in its stride. When he sat down he was
possessed in an overwhelming measure of the support of the assembly.
Neither he nor I could remain long in the House. Outside, I asked him
‘What happens now?’ ‘Now,’ he said, ‘we shall send them an ultimatum to
stop the invasion of Belgium within 24 hours.’

Some of the Ministers still clung to the hope that Germany would comply
with the British ultimatum and would arrest the onrush of her armies
upon Belgium. As well recall the avalanche, as easily suspend in
mid-career the great ship that has been launched and is sliding down the
ways. Germany was already at war with Russia and France. It was certain
that in 24 hours she would be at war with the British Empire also.

All through the tense discussions of the Cabinet one had in mind another
greater debate which must begin when these were concluded. Parliament,
the nation, the Dominions, would have to be convinced. That the cause
was good, that the argument was overwhelming, that the response would be
worthy, I did not for a moment doubt. But it seemed that an enormous
political task awaited us, and I saw in the mind’s eye not only the
crowded House of Commons, but formidable assembly of the people
throughout the land requiring full and swift justification of the
flaming action taken in their name. But such cares were soon dispersed.
When the Council doors had opened and Ministers had come into the outer
air, the British nation was surging forward in its ancient valour, and
the Empire had sprung to arms.

‘Men met each other with erected look,
The steps were higher that they took,
Friends to congratulate their friends made haste;
And long inveterate foes saluted as they passed.’[31]

* * * * *

Meanwhile in the Mediterranean a drama of intense interest and as it
ultimately proved of fateful consequence, was being enacted.

The event which would dominate all others, if war broke out, was the
main shock of battle between the French and German armies. We knew that
the French were counting on placing in the line a whole army corps of
their best troops from North Africa, and that every man was needed. We
were informed also that they intended to transport these troops across
the Mediterranean as fast as ships could be loaded, under the general
protection of the French Fleet, but without any individual escort or
system of convoys. The French General Staff calculated that whatever
happened most of the troops would get across. The French Fleet disposed
between this stream of transports and the Austrian Fleet afforded a good
guarantee. But there was one ship in the Mediterranean which far
outstripped in speed every vessel in the French Navy. She was the
_Goeben_. The only heavy ships in the Mediterranean that could attempt
to compete with the _Goeben_ in speed were the three British
battle-cruisers. It seemed that the _Goeben_, being free to choose any
point on a front of three or four hundred miles, would easily be able to
avoid the French Battle Squadrons and, brushing aside or outstripping
their cruisers, break in upon the transports and sink one after another
of these vessels crammed with soldiers. It occurred to me at this time
that perhaps that was the task she had been sent to the Mediterranean to
perform. For this reason as a further precaution I had suggested to the
First Sea Lord as early as July 28 that an additional battle cruiser,
the _New Zealand_, should be sent to reinforce our squadron. When it
came to the pinch a few days later, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, the
French Commander-in-Chief, adopted a system of convoys; and on August 4
he prudently delayed the embarkation of the troops until he could
organise adequate escorts. But of this change of plan the Admiralty was
not advised.

On July 30 I called for the war orders of the Mediterranean command and
discussed them fully with the First Sea Lord. These orders, issued in
August, 1913, had had to take into consideration a variety of political
contingencies, viz. Great Britain at war with Germany only, with Germany
and Austria only, or with Germany, Austria and Italy; and Great Britain
and France allied together against each or any of the three aforesaid
opponents. The course to be followed differed somewhat in each case.
Briefly, if Britain found herself single-handed against the whole Triple
Alliance, we should temporarily have to abandon the Mediterranean and
concentrate at Gibraltar. In all other cases the concentration would be
at Malta, and if the French were allies our squadrons would join them
for a general battle. It now seemed necessary to give the
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean some more specific information
and directions.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean._

_July 30, 1914._

It now seems probable should war break out and England and France
engage in it, that Italy will remain neutral and that Greece can be
made an ally. Spain also will be friendly and possibly an ally. The
attitude of Italy is however uncertain, and it is especially important
that your Squadron should not be seriously engaged with Austrian ships
before we know what Italy will do. Your first task should be to aid
the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and
if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships,
particularly _Goeben_, which may interfere with that transportation.
You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French
Admiral. Except in combination with the French as part of a general
battle, do not at this stage be brought to action against superior
forces. The speed of your Squadrons is sufficient to enable you to
choose your moment. You must husband your force at the outset and we
shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean.

These directions on which the First Sea Lord and I were completely in
accord, gave the Commander-in-Chief guidance in the general conduct of
the naval campaign; they warned him against fighting a premature
single-handed battle with the Austrian Fleet in which our battle
cruisers and cruisers would be confronted with Austrian Dreadnought
Battleships; they told him to aid the French in transporting their
African forces, and they told him how to do it, viz., ‘by covering and,
if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships,
particularly _Goeben_.’ So far as the English language may serve as a
vehicle of thought, the words employed appear to express the intentions
we had formed.

Sir Berkeley Milne accordingly replied on July 31 that he would keep his
forces concentrated in readiness to assist the French Fleet to protect
the transports, and he rightly left our trade in the Eastern
Mediterranean to shift for itself. In this posture he awaited permission
to consult with the French Admiral. This permission could not be given
him till August 2 at 7.6 p.m., when I telegraphed as follows to our
Commanders-in-Chief all over the world:—

‘Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise attacks. You
can enter into communication with the French Senior Officer on your
station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to
become ally of France against Germany.’

Earlier that same day the following, initialled both by the First Sea
Lord and myself, was also sent to Sir Berkeley Milne from the
Admiralty:—

‘_Goeben_ must be shadowed by two battle-cruisers. Approaches to
Adriatic must be watched by cruisers and destroyers. Remain near Malta
yourself. It is believed that Italy will remain neutral, but you
cannot yet count absolutely on this.’

At 12.50 a.m. on August 3, I emphasised the importance of the _Goeben_
compared with all other objectives by a further telegram, which I
drafted myself, to Sir Berkeley Milne:—

‘Watch on mouth of Adriatic should be maintained, but _Goeben_ is your
objective. Follow her and shadow her wherever she goes and be ready to
act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent.’

Early on the morning of August 4 we were delighted by the following news
from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty:—

‘_Indomitable_, _Indefatigable_ shadowing _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ 37·44
North 7·56 East.’

We replied:—

‘Very good. Hold her. War imminent.’

(This to go now.)

‘_Goeben_ is to be prevented by force from interfering with French
transports.’

(This to await early confirmation.)

I then sent the following minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward
Grey:—

MEMORANDUM

(_Most Urgent._)
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.

German battle-cruiser _Goeben_ and fast light cruiser _Breslau_ have
been found west of Sicily and are being shadowed by British
battle-cruisers _Indomitable_ and _Indefatigable_. It would be a great
misfortune to lose these vessels as is possible in the dark hours. She
is evidently going to interfere with the French transports which are
crossing to-day.

The following telegram has already been sent:—

‘Good. Hold her. War imminent.’

We wish to add this:—

‘If _Goeben_ attacks French transports you should at once engage her.’

An immediate decision is required.

W. S. C.

Sir Edward Grey agreed to this and so did the Prime Minister, but the
latter asked that it should be mentioned to the Cabinet, which was
meeting almost immediately, for their confirmation. On this I sent,
before going to the Cabinet, the following:—

‘If _Goeben_ attacks French transports you should at once engage her.
You should give her fair warning of this beforehand.’

The Cabinet, however, adhered formally to the view that no act of war
should be committed by us before the expiration of the ultimatum. The
moral integrity of the British Empire must not be compromised at this
solemn moment for the sake of sinking a single ship.

The _Goeben_ of course did not attack the French transports. In fact,
though this we did not know at the time, she was steaming away from the
French transport routes when sighted by the _Indomitable_ and
_Indefatigable_. Even if, however, she had attacked transports, the
decision of the British Cabinet would have prevented our battle-cruisers
from interfering. This decision obviously carried with it the still more
imperative veto against opening fire on the _Goeben_, if she did not
attack French transports, during the hours when we had her in our power.
I cannot impeach the decision. It is right that the world should know of
it. But little did we imagine how much this spirit of honourable
restraint was to cost us and all the world.

In consequence of the Cabinet decision, the First Sea Lord sent by my
directions the following telegram from the Admiralty:—

_Admiralty to all ships, August 4_, 2.5 p.m.

The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight Greenwich
Mean Time, August 4. No act of war should be committed before that
hour, at which time the telegram to commence hostilities against
Germany will be dispatched from the Admiralty.

Special addition to Mediterranean, _Indomitable_, _Indefatigable_.

This cancels the authorisation to _Indomitable_ and _Indefatigable_ to
engage _Goeben_ if she attacks French transports.

At about the same time I received the following minute from the First
Sea Lord:—

_August 4._

First Lord.

In view of the Italian declaration of neutrality, propose to telegraph
to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acquainting him and enjoining
him to respect this rigidly and not to allow a ship to come within six
miles of the Italian coast.

Considering how disastrous it would be if any petty incident occurred
which could cause trouble at this fateful moment with Italy and
approving of the First Sea Lord’s precaution, I replied in writing:—

_August 4._

So proceed. Foreign Office should intimate this to Italian Government.

W. S. C.

Thereupon at 12.55 p.m. the following telegram was sent by the Admiralty
to the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean:—

Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to respect this
neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of His Majesty’s ships to
come within six miles of Italian coast.

This certainly as it turned out was destined to complicate the task of
catching the _Goeben_; but not, as it will appear, in a decisive manner.

During the afternoon I sent the following minute to the Chief of the
Staff and the First Sea Lord.

_August 4, 1914._

I presume you have fully informed French Admiralty of our intentions
and that the closest co-operation has been established at all points
with the French Fleet. If not, this should be done immediately.

W. S. C.

On this the Chief of the Staff sent the following telegram to all
stations: ‘You can enter into the closest co-operation with the French
officers on your station.’

Throughout this long summer afternoon three great ships, hunted and
hunters, were cleaving the clear waters of the Mediterranean in tense
and oppressive calm. At any moment the _Goeben_ could have been smitten
at under 10,000 yards range by sixteen 12–inch guns firing nearly treble
her own weight of metal. At the Admiralty we suffered the tortures of
Tantalus.

At about 5 o’clock Prince Louis observed that there was still time to
sink the _Goeben_ before dark. In the face of the Cabinet decision I was
unable to utter a word. Nothing less than the vital safety of Great
Britain could have justified so complete an overriding of the authority
of the Cabinet. We hoped to sink her the next day. Where could she go?
Pola seemed her only refuge throughout the Mediterranean. According to
international law nothing but internment awaited her elsewhere. The
Turks had kept their secret well. As the shadows of night fell over the
Mediterranean the _Goeben_ increased her speed to twenty-four knots,
which was the utmost that our two battle-cruisers could steam. She
increased her speed still further. We have since learned that she was
capable for a very short time of an exceptional speed, rising even to
twenty-six or twenty-seven knots. Aided by this, she shook off her
unwelcome companions and vanished gradually in the gathering gloom.

We shall return to this story in due course.

* * * * *

At 5.50 p.m. we sent the following message:—

_Admiralty to all ships._

General message. The war telegram will be issued at midnight
authorising you to commence hostilities against Germany, but in view
of our ultimatum they may decide to open fire at any moment. You must
be ready for this.

Now, after all the stress and convulsion of the preceding ten days,
there came to us at the Admiralty a strange interlude of calm. All the
decisions had been taken. The ultimatum to Germany had gone: it must
certainly be rejected. War would be declared at midnight. As far as we
had been able to foresee the event, all our preparations were made.
Mobilisation was complete. Every ship was in its station: every man at
his post. All over the world, every British captain and admiral was on
guard. It only remained to give the signal. What would happen then? It
seemed that the next move lay with the enemy. What would he do? Had he
some deadly surprise in store? Some awful design, long planned and
perfected, ready to explode upon us at any moment NOW? Would our ships
in foreign waters have been able to mark down their German antagonists?
If so, morning would witness half a dozen cruiser actions in the outer
seas. Telegrams flowed in from the different naval stations round our
coasts reporting the movements of vessels and rumours of sighting of
enemies. Telegrams still flowed in from the Chancelleries of Europe as
the last futile appeals of reason were overtaken by the cannonade. In
the War Room of the Admiralty, where I sat waiting, one could hear the
clock tick. From Parliament Street came the murmurs of the crowd; but
they sounded distant and the world seemed very still. The tumult of the
struggle for life was over: it was succeeded by the silence of ruin and
death. We were to awake in Pandemonium.

I had the odd sense that it was like waiting for an election result. The
turmoil of the contest seemed finished: the votes were being counted,
and in a few hours the announcement would be made. One could only wait;
but for what a result! Although the special duties of my office made it
imperative that I, of all others, should be vigilant and forward in all
that related to preparation for war, I claim, as these pages show, that
in my subordinate station I had in these years before the war done
nothing wittingly or willingly to impair the chances of a peaceable
solution, and had tried my best as opportunity offered to make good
relations possible between England and Germany. I thank God I could feel
also in that hour that our country was guiltless of all intended purpose
of war. Even if we had made some mistakes in the handling of this awful
crisis, though I do not know them, from the bottom of our hearts we
could say that we had not willed it. Germany it seemed had rushed with
head down and settled resolve to her own undoing. And if this were what
she had meant all along, if this was the danger which had really menaced
us hour by hour during the last five years, and would have hung over us
hour by hour until the crash eventually came, was it not better that it
should happen now: now that she had put herself so hopelessly in the
wrong, now that we were ready beyond the reach of surprise, now that
France and Russia and Great Britain were all in the line together?

The First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff came in with French
Admirals who had hurried over to concert in detail arrangements for the
co-operation of the two Fleets in the Channel and in the Mediterranean.
They were fine figures in uniform, and very grave. One felt in actual
contact with these French officers how truly the crisis was life or
death for France. They spoke of basing the French Fleet on Malta—that
same Malta for which we had fought Napoleon for so many years, which was
indeed the very pretext of the renewal of the war in 1803. ‘_Malta ou la
guerre!_’ Little did the Napoleon of St. Helena dream that in her most
desperate need France would have at her disposal the great Mediterranean
base which his strategic instinct had deemed vital. I said to the
Admirals, ‘Use Malta as if it were Toulon.’

The minutes passed slowly.

Once more now in the march of centuries Old England was to stand forth
in battle against the mightiest thrones and dominations. Once more in
defence of the liberties of Europe and the common right must she enter
upon a voyage of great toil and hazard across waters uncharted, towards
coasts unknown, guided only by the stars. Once more ‘the far-off line of
storm-beaten ships’ was to stand between the Continental Tyrant and the
dominion of the world.

It was 11 o’clock at night—12 by German time—when the ultimatum expired.
The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night
air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were
gathered a small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks,
pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace
the sound of an immense concourse singing ‘God save the King’ floated
in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the
first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across
the room. The war telegram, which meant ‘Commence hostilities against
Germany,’ was flashed to the ships and establishments under the White
Ensign all over the world.

I walked across the Horse Guards’ Parade to the Cabinet room and
reported to the Prime Minister and the Ministers who were assembled
there that the deed was done.

CHAPTER XI
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY
August 4–August 22 1914

‘The Time to visualise what will fall under the harrow of war is
before the harrow is set in motion. Afterwards comes in Inevitableness
with iron lips, and Fatalism with unscrutinising gaze, and Us with
filmed eyes, and Instinct with her cry, “Do not look too closely,
seeing one must keep one’s senses!”’

MARY JOHNSTON, ‘_Cease Firing_,’ Chapter XXIX.

British Strategy—The Great War Council, August 5—Four Divisions or
Six—Changes in the Cabinet—Lord Kitchener: Secretary of State for
War—Organisation of the British Armies—Lord Kitchener’s Task—The
Royal Naval Division—Departure of the German and Austrian
Ambassadors—The Board of Admiralty in War—Responsibilities of the
First Lord—Procedure—The German Method—Relative Naval Strength—The
Prospects of Battle—British Command of the Sea—Paralysis of the
German Mercantile Marine—Frustration of the German Attack on
Trade—The _Goeben_ at Messina on August 5—Knowledge and
Dispositions of Sir Berkeley Milne—Orders to the _Indomitable_—The
Southern Exit—No Contact with the French—The _Goeben_ and
_Breslau_ leave Messina—Rear-Admiral Troubridge’s Successive
Decisions—Second Escape of the _Goeben_—Explanations—A Sinister
Fatality—Final Abandonment of the Pursuit—Transportation of the
British Army to France—Instructions to Sir John Jellicoe—Covering
Movements of the Fleet—Safe Passage of the Army—The Deadly Hush.

The entry of Great Britain into war with the most powerful military
Empire which has ever existed was strategically impressive. Her large
Fleets vanished into the mists at one end of the island. Her small Army
hurried out of the country at the other. By this double gesture she
might seem to uninstructed eyes to divest herself of all her means of
defence, and to expose her coasts nakedly to the hostile thrust. Yet
these two movements, dictated by the truest strategy, secured at once
our own safety and the salvation of our Allies. The Grand Fleet gained
the station whence the control of the seas could be irresistibly
asserted. The Regular Army reached in the nick of time the vital post on
the flank of the French line. Had all our action been upon this level,
we should to-day be living in an easier world.

* * * * *

The differences which had prevailed about entering the war were
aggravated by a strong cross-current of opinion, by no means operative
only in the Cabinet, that if we participated it should be by naval
action alone. Men of great power and influence, who throughout the
struggle laboured tirelessly and rendered undoubted services, were found
at this time resolutely opposed to the landing of a single soldier on
the Continent. And, if everything had not been prepared, if the plan had
not been perfected, if it had not been the only plan, and if all
military opinion had not been industriously marshalled round it—who
shall say what fatal hesitancy might not have intervened?

On the afternoon of August 5 the Prime Minister convened an
extraordinary Council of War at Downing Street. I do not remember any
gathering like it. It consisted of the Ministers most prominently
associated with the policy of our entering the war, the chiefs of the
Navy and the Army, all the high military commanders, and in addition
Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts. Decision was required upon the
question, How should we wage the war that had just begun? Those who
spoke for the War Office knew their own minds and were united. The whole
British Army should be sent at once to France, according to what may
justly be called the Haldane Plan. Everything in that Minister’s eight
years’ tenure of the War Office had led up to this and had been
sacrificed for this. To place an army of four or six divisions of
infantry thoroughly equipped with their necessary cavalry on the left of
the French line within twelve or fourteen days of the order to mobilise,
and to guard the home island meanwhile by the fourteen Territorial
Divisions he had organised, was the scheme upon which, aided by
Field-Marshals Nicholson and French, he had concentrated all his efforts
and his stinted resources. It was a simple plan, but it was a practical
plan. It had been persistently pursued and laboriously and minutely
studied. It represented approximately the maximum war effort that the
voluntary system would yield applied in the most effective and daring
manner to the decisive spot; and mobilisation schemes, railway graphics,
time-tables, the organisation of bases, depots, supply arrangements,
etc., filling many volumes, regulated and ensured a thorough and
concerted execution. A commander whose whole life led up to this moment
had been chosen. All that remained to be done was to take the decision
and give the signal.

At this point I reported on behalf of the Admiralty that our
mobilisation being in every respect complete and all our ships in their
war stations, we would waive the claim we had hitherto made in all the
discussions of the Committee of Imperial Defence that two Regular
Divisions should be retained in Great Britain as a safeguard against
invasion, and that so far as the Admiralty was concerned, not four but
the whole six divisions could go at once; that we would provide for
their transportation and for the security of the island in their
absence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the Royal Navy.

Discussion then turned upon the place to which they should be
dispatched. Lord Roberts inquired whether it was not possible to base
the British Army on Antwerp so as to strike, in conjunction with the
Belgian armies, at the flank and rear of the invading German hosts. We
were not able from an Admiralty point of view to guarantee the sea
communications of so large a force on the enemy side of the Straits of
Dover, but only inside the Anglo-French flotilla cordon which had
already taken up its station. Moreover, no plans had been worked out by
the War Office for such a contingency. They had concentrated all their
thought upon integral co-operation with the French left wherever it
might be. It was that or nothing.

Another discussion took place upon how far forward the British
Expeditionary Force should be concentrated. Some high authorities,
dwelling on the fact that the mobilisation of the British army had begun
three days later than the French, were for concentrating it around
Amiens for intervention after the first shock of battle had been taken.
But in the end Sir John French and the forward school had their way and
it was felt that we must help France in the way the French Staff thought
would be most effective.

* * * * *

When I next went to the Cabinet after the declaration of war, I found
myself with new companions. During the previous seven years Lord Morley
had always sat on the left of the Prime Minister, and I had always sat
next to Lord Morley. Many a wise and witty admonition had I received
pencilled in scholarly phrase from my veteran neighbour, and many a
charming courtesy such as he excelled in had graced the toilsome path of
business. He had said to me on the Sunday of Resolve, ‘If it has to be,
I am not the man to do it. I should only hamper those like you who have
to bear the burden.’ Now he was gone. In his place sat Lord Kitchener.
On my left also there was a fresh figure—the new Minister of
Agriculture, Lord Lucas. I had known him since South African War days,
when he lost his leg: and to know him was to delight in him. His open,
gay, responsive nature, his witty, ironical, but never unchivalrous
tongue, his pleasing presence, his compulsive smile, made him much
courted by his friends, of whom he had many and of whom I was one. Young
for the Cabinet, heir to splendid possessions, happy in all that
surrounded him, he seemed to have captivated Fortune with the rest.

Both these two men were marked for death at the hands of the enemy, the
young Minister grappling with his adversary in the high air, the old
Field Marshal choking in the icy sea. I wonder what the twenty
politicians round the table would have felt if they had been told that
the prosaic British Cabinet was itself to be decimated in the war they
had just declared. I think they would have felt a sense of pride and of
relief in sharing to some extent the perils to which they were to send
their countrymen, their friends, their sons.

* * * * *

At the Council of War on August 5 Lord Kitchener had not yet become
Secretary of State for War, but I knew that his appointment was
impending. The Prime Minister, then also Secretary of State for War,
could not possibly be burdened with the continuous flow of
inter-departmental work proceeding between the War Office and the
Admiralty and requiring to be transacted between Ministers. He therefore
invited Lord Kitchener to undertake ministerial charge of the War
Office, and the Field-Marshal, who had certainly not sought this post in
any way, had no choice but to accept.

My relations with Lord Kitchener had been limited. Our first meeting had
been on the field of Omdurman, when as a lieutenant in the 21st Lancers
I had been sent back to report verbally to the Commander-in-Chief the
position of the advancing Dervish Army. He had disapproved of me
severely in my youth, had endeavoured to prevent me from coming to the
Soudan Campaign, and was indignant that I had succeeded in getting
there. It was a case of dislike before first sight. On my side, I had
dealt with his character and campaigns in two bulky volumes conceived
throughout in a faithful spirit of critical impartiality. It was twelve
years before I saw him again, when we were formally introduced to each
other and had a brief talk at the Army Manœuvres in 1910. I got to know
him a little at the Malta Conference in 1912, and thenceforward we used
to talk over Imperial Defence topics when from time to time we met. On
these occasions I had found him much more affable than I had been led to
expect from my early impressions or from all I had heard about him. In
the week before the war we had lunched and dined together two or three
times, and we had discussed all the possibilities so far as we could
foresee them. I was glad when he was appointed Secretary of State for
War, and in those early days we worked together on close and cordial
terms. He consulted me constantly on the political aspects of his work,
and increasingly gave me his confidence in military matters. Admiralty
and War Office business were so interlaced that during the whole of the
first ten months we were in almost daily personal consultation. I cannot
forget that when I left the Admiralty in May, 1915, the first and, with
one exception, the only one of my colleagues who paid me a visit of
ceremony was the over-burdened Titan whose disapprobation had been one
of the disconcerting experiences of my youth.

* * * * *

As is well known, the British armies on mobilisation consisted of a
highly organised expeditionary force of six Regular Divisions of
Infantry and a Cavalry Division. In addition there were two Regular
Infantry Divisions, the 7th and 8th, which had to be collected from
their garrisons all over the Empire or formed out of troops surplus to
the Expeditionary Force at home; and it was decided also to employ two
divisions, half British and half native, from India. Behind these
trained forces, unquestionably of a very high order, stood fourteen
Territorial Divisions and thirteen Mounted Brigades to whom the defence
of Britain must be confided. These were little trained, lightly equipped
with artillery, but composed of farsighted and intelligent men who had
not waited for the hour of danger to make their country’s cause their
own. In six months or, as some thought, in a shorter period, such troops
could be made to play their part.

Lord Kitchener now came forward to the Cabinet, on almost the first
occasion after he joined us, and in soldierly sentences proclaimed a
series of inspiring and prophetic truths. Every one expected that the
war would be short; but wars took unexpected courses, and we must now
prepare for a long struggle. Such a conflict could not be ended on the
sea or by sea power alone. It could be ended only by great battles on
the Continent. In these the British Empire must bear its part on a scale
proportionate to its magnitude and power. We must be prepared to put
armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years. In
no other way could we discharge our duty to our allies or to the world.

These words were received by the Cabinet in silent assent; and it is my
belief that had Lord Kitchener proceeded to demand universal national
service to be applied as it might be required, his request would have
been acceded to. He, however, proposed to content himself with calling
for volunteers, and in the first instance to form six new regular
divisions. It would have been far better to have formed the new
volunteers upon the cadres of the Territorial Army, each of which could
have been duplicated or quadruplicated in successive stages. But the new
Secretary of State had little knowledge of and no faith in the British
territorial system. The name itself was to him a stumbling-block. In the
war of 1870 he had been present at a battle on the Loire, probably Le
Mans, in which the key of the position, confided to French territorial
troops, had been cast away, entailing the defeat of the whole army. He
dwelt on this incident to me on several occasions, and I know it had
created fixed impressions in his mind. Vain to explain how entirely
different were the characters of the troops forming the French and
British territorial forces—the former aged conscripts in their last
periods of service; the latter keen and ardent youths of strong military
predilections. They were territorials, and that was the end of it.

This at the very outset aggravated the difficulties of his already
gigantic task. He set himself to create the cadres first of six, then of
twelve, and ultimately of twenty-four ‘Kitchener Army’ divisions, at the
same time that the recruits were pouring in upon him by the hundred
thousand. That this vast feat of improvisation was accomplished must
certainly rank among the wonders of the time.

The arguments against compulsory service, cogent as they no doubt were,
were soon reinforced by the double event of overwhelming numbers of
volunteers and of a total lack of arms and equipment. Apart from the
exiguous stores held by the Regular Army, there was literally nothing.
The small scale of our military forces had led to equally small
factories for war material. There were no rifles, there were no guns;
and the modest supplies of shells and ammunition began immediately to
flash away with what seemed appalling rapidity. Many months must elapse,
even if the best measures were taken, before new sources of supply even
on a moderate scale could be opened up. One was now to learn for the
first time that it took longer to make a rifle than a gun; and rifles
were the cruellest need of all. We had nothing but staves to put in the
hands of the eager men who thronged the recruiting stations. I ransacked
the Fleet and the Admiralty stores and scraped together another 30,000
rifles, which literally meant another 30,000 men in the field. Afloat
only the Marines would have their rifles; Jack must, in the last resort
trust to his cutlass as of old.

At the moment when Lord Kitchener began the formation of his first six
new army divisions and before the great rush of recruits had begun, I
offered him the Royal Naval Division, which he gladly accepted. Before
the war we had foreseen the fact that the Navy would on mobilisation
have many thousands of men in their depots for whom there would be no
room in any ship of war that we could send to sea. I had therefore
proposed to the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1913 the formation of
three brigades, one composed of Marines and the other two of men of the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and of the Royal Fleet Reserve. These
brigades it was intended to use to assist in home defence in the early
stages of a war. The cadres were therefore easily formed from the
available resources. The Marine Brigade was already virtually in
existence, and it was clear that all three would be ready for action
long before any of the new troops that were being raised. The Naval
Volunteers, who longed to serve afloat, accepted the new task with many
heartburnings but with boundless loyalty. Alas, for most of them it
proved a fateful decision. Few there were of that gallant company that
survived unscathed. As for their deeds, they will not be forgotten in
the history even of these crowded times.[32]

* * * * *

It fell to my lot to prescribe the arrangements for the departure of the
German Ambassador and, eight days later, of his Austrian Colleague.
Accordingly on the morning of August 5 I sent my Naval Secretary Admiral
Hood in uniform to the German Embassy desiring to know in what manner we
might facilitate Prince Lichnowsky’s wishes and convenience. While the
German mob were insulting and even pelting the departing French and
British Ambassadors, we set ourselves to work with meticulous care to
secure the observance of every propriety and courtesy towards those for
whom we were responsible. Prince Lichnowsky has given his own record of
his ceremonious treatment, which appeared to make a marked impression
upon his mind.

To Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Ambassador, I wrote as follows:—

_August 13, 1914._

‘My Naval Secretary Admiral Hood, who brings this letter, is
instructed to put himself at your disposal in arranging for the
comfort and convenience of your journey by sea. If there is any way in
which I can be of service to you at this time, you will not I hope
fail to command me.

Although the terrible march of events has swept aside the ancient
friendship between our countries, the respect and regard which spring
from so many years of personal association cannot pass from the hearts
of your English friends.’

The Austrian Ambassador asked that a ship might be provided to take him
direct to Trieste, and that consideration might be shown to a number of
unhappy Austrian non-combatants long resident in London who now had to
fly the country. I therefore arranged that upwards of 200 persons should
embark in the Ambassador’s ship. I felt sure that in taking these
measures I was acting in accord with what British dignity required.

* * * * *

The position of the Admiralty in relation to the Fleet, and of the First
Lord in relation to his naval colleagues under conditions of war
requires explanation. The control of the main armies was divided between
the War Office and General Headquarters, but in the Admiralty these
functions were inevitably combined to a far larger extent. The Naval
Commander-in-Chief, living with his actual fighting Fleet and always
ready at a few hours’ notice to lead it personally into full battle,
stood much nearer to the event than his military counterpart. The staff
which he could accommodate upon his flagship, the volume of business
which he could transact, were necessarily limited by physical
conditions. Everything must be ready to move at the shortest notice into
extreme danger, and Staff, office, organisation, Commander-in-Chief,
might vanish out of existence in an instant. The first duty of the
Commander-in-Chief was to keep his mind and body fit for the supreme
task of personally commanding the mighty array of ships when in contact
with the enemy. The vigilant guarding of the Fleet from danger, its
training for battle, its organisation, its efficiency and the direct
personal conduct of individual operations were all concentrated in one
man. But this was enough. It was the duty of the Admiralty so far as
possible to shield him from all further responsibilities or anxieties,
to lap him round with securities and assistance and to bear all other
parts of the great load of war themselves.

The Admiralty itself was also in direct contact with the event. It not
only exercised administrative control over the Navy and over the whole
of the preparations for strengthening and developing the Fleet; it not
only determined the strategic distribution of our naval power in every
theatre; but from its wireless masts or by cable it issued information
often of a vital character to ships in many instances actually in
contact with the enemy. It was the only place from which the supreme
view of the naval scene could be obtained. It was the intelligence
centre where all information was received, where alone it could be
digested, and whence it was transmitted wherever required. It moved the
fleets, squadrons and flotillas out of harbour when information pointed
to enemy’s activities being probable. It specified the minimum forces
which should be employed in any operation, while leaving the
Commander-in-Chief free to add to them at his discretion. Apart from
actual battle or the tactical conduct of particular operations, in which
the Admiralty never interfered, it decided every important question
arising out of the conduct of the naval war. Robed in the august
authority of centuries of naval tradition and armed with the fullest
knowledge available, the Board of Admiralty wielded unchallenged power.

As these conditions arose naturally and inevitably and will certainly be
reproduced in one form or another should there be a future war, it is of
high importance to pierce beneath the corporate responsibility of this
organism and lay bare how the machine actually worked. In practice it
resolved itself, and could only resolve itself, into the intimate
comradeship and co-operation of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord,
with the Chief of the Staff, not at this time a member of the Board,
standing at their side. By the Letters Patent and Orders in Council
constituting his office, the First Lord is responsible to Crown and
Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty. In virtue of this he
delegates to an eminent sailor the responsibility for its technical and
professional conduct. But he cannot thus relieve himself either in
theory or in fact. He is held strictly accountable for all that takes
place; for every disaster he must bear the blame. The credit of
victories rightly goes to the commanders who gain them; the burden of
defeat or miscarriage must be shouldered by the Admiralty, and the
censures of the nation fall primarily upon its Head.

How then is a civilian Minister appointed for political or parliamentary
reasons and devoid of authoritative expert knowledge, to acquit himself
of his duty? Clearly it depends upon the character, temperament and
capacity both of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord. They must settle
it between themselves, and if they cannot agree wholeheartedly on the
momentous problems with which they are confronted in swift succession,
another combination must be chosen by the Sovereign on the advice of the
Prime Minister. I interpreted my duty in the following way:—I accepted
full responsibility for bringing about successful results, and in that
spirit I exercised a close general supervision over everything that was
done or proposed. Further, I claimed and exercised an unlimited power of
suggestion and initiative over the whole field, subject only to the
approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord on all operative orders.
Right or wrong, that is what I did, and it is on that basis that I wish
to be judged.

In practice the difficulties were less than would be imagined. Indeed,
over long periods of unending crisis and tension the machine worked very
smoothly. The Second, Third and Fourth Sea Lords dropped back upon the
outbreak of war into the positions the ‘Supply Boards’ had occupied in
the great naval wars of the past. They were the providers of men, of
ships and of stores. They took no part, or only a very occasional part,
in strategic decisions. It was the responsibility of the First Sea Lord
to keep the Second Sea Lord fully informed of what was in progress in
order that the latter could replace him temporarily at a moment’s
notice. In practice, however, both Prince Louis and Lord Fisher worked
more closely with the Chief of the Staff, and these two presented
themselves to me always in full accord.

The constitutional authority of the Board of Admiralty was exercised at
that time in accordance with long custom by two Members of the Board,
sitting together with the Secretary of the Admiralty. Thus the Admiralty
War Group at the beginning of the struggle consisted of the First Lord,
the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Staff and the Secretary. To these
were added, when the First Sea Lord wished and on particular occasions,
the Second Sea Lord and certain special advisers, of whom more anon. We
met every day and sometimes twice a day, reviewed the whole position and
arrived at a united decision on every matter of consequence. The
execution was confided to the Chief of the Staff. The Secretary
registered, recorded, and, apart from the orders given by the War Staff,
took the consequential action. Besides our regular meetings the First
Sea Lord and I consulted together constantly at all hours. Within the
limits of our agreed policy either he or I gave in writing authority for
telegrams and decisions which the Chief of the Staff might from hour to
hour require. Moreover, it happened in a large number of cases that
seeing what ought to be done and confident of the agreement of the First
Sea Lord, I myself drafted the telegrams and decisions in accordance
with our policy, and the Chief of the Staff took them personally to the
First Sea Lord for his concurrence before dispatch. In addition to these
urgent executive matters, the regular flow of Admiralty papers passed
upwards from the First Sea Lord or other Lords to me for decision by
minute; and I further, by minutes and memoranda, initiated discussion
and action over the whole area of naval business.

The advantages and disadvantages of these methods must be judged by
their general results; but it is instructive to compare them with those
which we now know prevailed at the German Admiralty. On the outbreak of
war, the Naval Secretary of State von Tirpitz, himself an admiral, found
himself cut off entirely from the strategical and quasi-tactical control
of the fleets, to such an extent that he declares ‘he did not know the
naval war plans.’ He was confined to purely administrative business, and
thus charged, he was carried off as an adjunct to the Emperor’s suite at
Great Headquarters. The Naval Staff, headed in the first instance by von
Pohl, alone had the ear of the Emperor and received from the lips of the
All-Highest indications of his Imperial pleasure. The position of
Admiral von Tirpitz was therefore most unhappy. The Naval Staff warded
him off the Emperor as much as possible, and persuaded the Emperor to
repulse his efforts to break in. The Emperor, oppressed with the whole
burden of the State, gave to the Staff from time to time directions and
uttered passing expressions which thereafter operated with irresistible
authority. It is to this state of affairs that Admiral von Tirpitz
ascribes the paralysis which gripped the German Fleet through the first
critical months of the naval war. This it was, according to him, that
lost the opportunity of fighting the supreme battle under the least
unfavourable conditions, enabled the control of the seas to pass into
our hands practically without a struggle, and secured the uninterrupted
transport of our armies to the Continent. If our solution of the
difficult problem of naval war direction was imperfect, so also was that
of our enemy.

* * * * *

A study of the tables and diagrams set out in the Appendix[33] shows
that our known margin of superiority in Home Waters was smaller then
than at any subsequent moment in the war. The Grand Fleet as
concentrated in its Northern war station on August 1, 1914, comprised 24
vessels classified as ‘Dreadnoughts’ or better. In addition the battle
cruiser _Invincible_ was at Queenstown watching the Atlantic, the two
_Lord Nelsons_ were with the Channel Fleet, and three battle cruisers
were in the Mediterranean. The Germans actually mobilised 16 ships
similarly classed.[34] We could not be absolutely certain, though we
thought it unlikely, that they might not have ready two, or even three,
more; and these of the greatest power. Happily, every British ship was
ready and in perfect order. None was under repair. Our strength for an
immediate fleet action was 24 to a certain 16 and a possible 19. These
figures do not, as the tables in the Appendix reveal, do justice to the
full material strength of the British Fleets as a whole, still less to
the gun-power of the British Line of Battle, which after the
Dreadnoughts comprised eight King Edwards markedly superior to the next
eight Germans. But apart from all that may be said on this, and of the
confidence which it inspired, the fact remains that from five to eight
Dreadnoughts was all the certain numerical superiority we had. There was
not much margin here for mischance, nor for the percentage of mechanical
defects which in so large a Fleet has to be expected, and no margin
whatever for a disaster occasioned by surprise had we been unready. To a
superficial observer who from the cliffs of Dover or Portland had looked
down upon a Battle Squadron of six or seven ships, lying in distant
miniature below, the foundation upon which the British world floated
would have presented itself in a painfully definite form. If the
intelligence and courage of British seamen were not all that we believed
them to be; if the workmanship which had built these great vessels were
not honest and thorough; if our seamanship or our gunnery had turned out
to be inferior; if some ghastly novelty or blunder supervened, the
battle might be very even.

It is easy to understand how tense were the British naval expectations.
If the German Navy was ever to fight a battle, now at the beginning was
its best chance. The German Admiralty knew, of course, what ships we had
available, and that we were mobilised, concentrated and at sea. Even if
they assumed the extraordinary fact that every one of our Dreadnoughts
was ready and that not one of them had developed a defect, they could
fight to German eyes a battle 16 against a maximum 27—heavy odds from
their point of view, still heavier when the survey was extended to the
whole of the Fleets, but yet odds far less heavy than they would have to
face after six months, after twelve months or at any later period. For
look at the reinforcements which were approaching these two opposing
Fleets. They must assume that, in addition to completing our own
vessels, we should requisition every battleship building for a foreign
Power in our yards, and on this basis seven great ships must join the
Grand Fleet within three months, and twelve great ships within six
months, against which only three in three months and five in six months
could be reckoned on their side, leaving the balance in three months at
34 to 19 and in six months at 39 to 21; and this took no account of
three battle-cruisers in the Mediterranean and one (_Australia_) in the
Pacific which obviously we could bring home if necessary.

Here then, was the least unfavourable moment for Germany; here was the
best chance they would ever see. Was it not also the strategic moment?
Might they not assume that the transportation of the British Army to
France would be a grave preoccupation for the Admiralty? Was it not
clear that a victory, even a partial victory, would be more fruitful at
this juncture than at any other? Forty-two fast German merchant cruisers
needed only a breathing space to get loose and to arm upon the seas,
requiring afterwards to be hunted down one by one. Might not above all
the interruption and delay in the transportation of the Army be of real
effect in the supreme trial of strength on land? The German Staff
believed in a short war. They were staking everything upon a supreme
trial of strength on land. Why should not the German Fleet be hurled in
too and play its part for what it was worth in the supreme decision? To
what other use could it ever be put?

We therefore looked for open battle on the sea. We expected it and we
courted it. The news that the two Navies were approaching each other to
take a decision in blue water would have been received in the Fleet with
unaffected satisfaction, and at the Admiralty with composure. We could
not send our Grand Fleet into the minefields and submarine-infested
areas of the Heligoland Bight. But had battle been offered by the enemy
under any conditions which did not put us at a serious disadvantage, it
would have been at once accepted.

In fact, however, the sober confidence of the Admiralty was based upon
calculations of relative naval strength, the soundness of which was not
disputed by the German Naval Staff. Even von Tirpitz, the advocate of
action, writes (p. 356): ‘Against an immediate fight was the fact that
the whole English Fleet was ready for battle when the war broke out
owing to the test mobilisation, whereas only our active squadrons were
ready.’ ‘Great Britain,’ says the Official German Naval History, ‘...
had secured extensive military advantages by her test mobilisation and
her subsequent measures, regardless of the uneasiness necessarily
provoked thereby ... which advantage Germany could not counter or
overtake.’ The German Staff felt that even if this was the best chance
for a trial of strength, it was still a chance so hazardous and even so
forlorn that it was not worth taking; and their Battle Fleet remained
hoarded up in harbour for an ignominious day, imposing upon the British,
no doubt, a continued and serious expenditure of our resources for naval
purposes, gaining for Germany substantial advantages of a secondary
character, but not exercising any decisive influence upon the whole
course of the war.

So we waited; and nothing happened. No great event immediately occurred.
No battle was fought. The Grand Fleet remained at sea: the German Fleet
did not quit the shelter of its harbours. There were no cruiser actions.
A German minelayer sowing a minefield off Harwich was chased and sunk by
a flotilla of destroyers led by the _Amphion_; and the _Amphion_
returning, was blown up on the German minefield. Otherwise silence
unbroken by cannon brooded over the broad and narrow waters. But during
that silence and from its first moment the sea-power of Great Britain
ruled unchallenged throughout the world. Every German cruiser in foreign
waters vanished into the immense spaces of the sea; every German
merchant ship, from the earliest moment when the entry of Britain into
the war became apparent, fled for neutral harbours. Seven out of eight,
potential commerce destroyers, were bottled up without ever a shot being
fired. German seaborne trade outside the Baltic ceased to exist from the
night of August 4. On the other hand, after a few days of hesitation the
swarming mercantile marine of Britain, encouraged by a Government
insurance of no more than six per cent., began to put to sea; and even
before the main armies had met in battle on the Continent, the whole
vast ocean traffic of the British Empire was proceeding with the utmost
activity. By the end of August the rate of insurance had already fallen
to six per cent. and the Admiralty was able to announce that of the
forty-two German liners from whom attacks on trade were to be
apprehended, eleven were tied up unarmed in harbours of the United
States watched outside territorial limits by British cruisers, six had
taken refuge in other neutral harbours, where they were either
dismantled or observed, fourteen were in German ports gripped by the
blockade, six were held as prizes in British hands, and only five
remained unaccounted for and unlocated. The fate of these five will be
recounted later.

All fell out in these respects, therefore, in broad accordance with the
views set forth in my memorandum on commerce protection of August 23,
1913, revised in April, 1914, which is printed in full in the Appendix
for the benefit of the thorough.[35] None of those gloomy prophecies
which had formed the staple of so many debates and articles, that our
merchant ships would be hunted from the seas by German raiders, that
scores of additional British cruisers would be required for commerce
protection, that British merchant ships once safe in harbour would not
venture to sea, materialised; and they might be relegated to the limbo
of exploded alarms. The three great naval dangers which had bulked most
largely in our minds in the years before the war—first, the danger of
surprise of the Fleet; second, the Mine danger; third, the paralysis of
our seaborne trade—rolled away behind us like giant waves which a ship
has finally surmounted.

More than a hundred years had passed since the British Navy had been
called upon to face an emergency of the first magnitude. If a hundred
years hence, in similar circumstances, it is found equally ready, we
shall have no more reason to complain of our descendants than they have
reason to complain of us.

* * * * *

It is time to return to the Mediterranean.

Admiral Souchon, the German Commander, having outdistanced our shadowing
cruisers in the darkness of the night, pursued his course to Messina,
where he arrived with the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ on the morning of
August 5. He had already received, as we now know, a telegram sent from
Nauen at 1.35 a.m. on the preceding day by the German Admiralty. This
message gave him all-important information. It stated that an alliance
had been concluded between Germany and Turkey, and directed him to
proceed to Constantinople immediately. Of this treaty we knew nothing.
All our reports were of an entirely different tenor; nor was it till
long afterwards that we learnt the true attitude of Turkey at this hour.

On arrival at Messina the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ began to coal from
German colliers. This occupied the whole of the day, the whole of the
night and the greater part of the next day, the 6th. Exactly thirty-six
hours elapsed before the _Goeben_ moved. Meanwhile the light cruiser
_Gloucester_, watching off the Southern exit of the Straits of Messina,
reported at 3.35 p.m. on August 5 to Sir Berkeley Milne that the
strength of the wireless signals she was taking in indicated that the
Goeben must be at Messina.

The British Commander-in-Chief had left the Malta Channel in his
flagship the _Inflexible_ after midnight of August 4, and at about 11
a.m. on August 5 he had assembled all his three battle cruisers and two
light cruisers off Pantellaria island, midway between Sicily and the
African coast.[36] According to his own published account[37] he had
learned on the 4th that the German mail steamer _General_ was remaining
at Messina at the disposition of the _Goeben_. He therefore believed
throughout the whole of the 5th that ‘the _Goeben_, _Breslau_ and
_General_ were all at Messina.’ His belief was correct.

One of his battle cruisers, the _Indomitable_, had to coal. He sent her
to Biserta. This was an important decision. Considering that he believed
that the _Goeben_ was at Messina, and that he intended himself to watch
to the Northward with two battle cruisers, some authorities have held
that it would have been a sensible precaution to let this third ship
coal at Malta, where facilities were certain and instant, and whence she
could so easily move to close the Southern exit from Messina, or join
Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the mouth of the Adriatic, as that officer
had been led to expect.[38] By sending the _Indomitable_ to coal at
Malta, he could have placed two battle cruisers watching the Northern
exit and one at the Southern. But the Commander-in-Chief decided to keep
all three battle cruisers together in his own hand and to patrol off the
Western end of Sicily between Sardinia and Biserta. The Southern exit
was therefore left completely open to the _Goeben_: and a severe action
was reserved for Rear-Admiral Troubridge if, as seemed likely, she ran
up the Adriatic.

At 5 p.m. on the 5th Sir Berkeley Milne received the signal sent by the
_Gloucester_ at 3.35 p.m. reporting the presence of the _Goeben_ at
Messina. Here was certain confirmation of his belief. He was at this
moment about 100 miles West of Sicily. He continued however to cruise
with his two ships between Sicily and Sardinia, and as late as the
evening of August 6, his orders to the _Indomitable_ were still to join
him thereabouts. He did this because he considered that placing all
three battle cruisers in this position was his surest way of carrying
out the instructions of the Admiralty telegram of July 30 about aiding
the French in the transport of their African army. That it was one
method of carrying out these orders cannot be disputed, and the Admiral
has set out in his book the reasons which led him to adopt it. The
superior speed of the Goeben made it necessary, he states, if he were to
intercept her, that he should stand a long way off and have timely
notice of her approach. To place his whole force in this way between her
and the French transports was, he argues, the best chance of catching
the _Goeben_ if she tried to attack them. He reported his intended
dispositions late on the 4th to the Admiralty, whose only comment upon
them was, ‘Watch over the Adriatic should be maintained for the double
purpose of preventing the Austrians from coming out or the Germans from
entering.’ The exceedingly prompt manner in which the _Goeben_ had been
found, although in the open sea, on the 4th had given the Admiralty the
feeling that the Admiral on the spot had a grip of the situation and
needed no further directions.

Sir Berkeley Milne had not, however, succeeded in communicating with the
French Admiral, although he had made repeated attempts by wireless and
had sent the _Dublin_ to Biserta with a letter. He did not know where
the French Fleet or the French transports were. He did not tell the
Admiralty this. The Admiralty for their part, after the general telegram
of August 4 enjoining immediate consultation with the French, assumed
that the two Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean were acting in
concert. They did not therefore ask the French for any information, nor
was any volunteered by the French Admiralty. Any inquiry addressed to
Paris would have elicited the fact that the French had changed their
plans and that no transports were yet at sea. All parties were on this
point to some extent in fault.

Meanwhile the British Ambassador in Rome was endeavouring to tell the
Admiralty as soon as the pressure on the wires allowed that the _Goeben_
was at Messina. The news did not reach London till 6 p.m. on August 5.
The Admiralty passed it without comment, though with some delay, to Sir
Berkeley Milne, who already knew from other sources. It is a fair
criticism on the Admiralty that they did not immediately they knew the
_Goeben_ was at Messina authorise the British ships to follow her into
the Straits. The point was not put to me either by the First Sea Lord or
the Chief of the Staff, and as I had not myself been concerned in
initiating or drafting the telegram about rigidly respecting Italian
neutrality, it was not specially in my mind. Had it been put to me I
should at once have consented. This was no petty incident and the prize
was well worth the risk of vexing the Italians. In fact, permission to
chase through the Straits was given by the Admiralty unasked to Sir
Berkeley Milne, as soon as it was realised that the _Goeben_ was
escaping unblocked to the Southward. It was then too late.

In pursuance of the orders he had received from Germany, Admiral Souchon
with the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, having at length completed coaling and
made his will, steamed out of Messina harbour at 5 p.m. on August 6,
cleared for action and with his bands playing. He no doubt expected to
encounter at least one and possibly two of the British battle cruisers
as soon as he was outside territorial waters. In view of the fact that,
as he was aware, his position must have been accurately known to the
British Commander-in-Chief for many hours, this assumption was not
unreasonable. Unhappily, as has been described, every one of the three
British battle cruisers was otherwise engaged. Thus when the German
Admiral rounded the Southern point of Italy and turned Eastward, the
only three antagonists whose combination of power and speed he had to
dread were already far astern.

Still there was the British armoured cruiser squadron watching the
Adriatic. This squadron consisted of four good ships, viz. _Defence_,
_Warrior_, _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Black Prince_. It was commanded by
Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who had also under his orders eight destroyers,
and was being joined by the light cruiser _Dublin_ and two more
destroyers from Malta. It is necessary to restate the facts of this
officer’s action.

On the assumption—which was dominant—that the _Goeben_ would make for
Pola, Admiral Troubridge was well placed for meeting her. It was not
until he heard from the _Gloucester_ that she had turned South and was
persistently steering on a South-Easterly course that any new decision
was required from him. He received no orders to quit his station from
Sir Berkeley Milne. He was in constant hope of receiving a battle
cruiser. But Admiral Troubridge decided to act on his own
responsibility. Eight minutes after midnight of August 6 (i.e. 0.08,
August 7) he gave orders to his four cruisers and his eight destroyers
to steam Southward at full speed for the purpose of intercepting the
_Goeben_. He also signalled to the _Dublin_ (Captain John Kelly) at that
moment coming from Malta to join him with the two extra destroyers, to
head her off. He reported his decision to the Commander-in-Chief. Thus
at midnight August 6–7 sixteen British vessels were converging upon the
_Goeben_ and _Breslau_ and were in positions from which they could
hardly fail to intercept the enemy shortly after daylight. At 3.50 a.m.,
however, after further reflection and having received no orders or reply
from Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge became convinced that he
could not hope to engage the _Goeben_ under the advantageous conditions
of the half light of dawn, and that in an action fought in broad waters
in full daylight, his four ships would be sunk one after another by the
_Goeben_, who all the time would keep outside the range—16,000 yards—of
the British 9.2–inch guns. This is thought by some naval officers to be
an extreme view. The limited ammunition of the _Goeben_ would have had
to have been wonderfully employed to have sunk all four British armoured
cruisers _seriatim_ at this long range.[39] Moreover, if the _Goeben_
and _Breslau_ had become involved in an action, it is hard to believe
that none of the sixteen British cruisers and destroyers which were
available could have closed in upon them and attacked them with gun or
torpedo. All the destroyers were capable of reaching the enemy and could
have found their opportunity to attack. It would have been indeed a
prodigious feat on the part of the Germans to dispose of so many
antagonists at once. However, the Admiral came to the conclusion that
the _Goeben_ was ‘a superior force’ which by his instructions, passed to
him by the Commander-in-Chief, he was not to engage. And in this
conclusion he has been sustained by a British naval court-martial.

He thereupon desisted from his attempt to intercept the _Goeben_, turned
his ships and destroyers and entered the harbour of Zante about 10 a.m.
preparatory to resuming his watch in the Adriatic. The _Dublin_ and her
two destroyers having asked and been refused permission to make a
daylight attack, had attempted to intercept the _Goeben_ before dawn,
but did not succeed in finding her in the darkness.

By 6 o’clock therefore on the morning of August 7 the _Goeben_, already
the fastest capital unit in the Mediterranean, was steaming on an
unobstructed course for the Dardanelles, carrying with her for the
peoples of the East and Middle East more slaughter, more misery and more
ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship.

Thus of all the British vessels which were or could have been brought
within effective distance, none did anything useful excepting only the
two light cruisers _Dublin_ and _Gloucester_, commanded, as it happened,
by two brothers. The _Dublin_ (Captain John Kelly) as we have seen did
all in her power to place herself athwart the enemy’s course and to
fight him by night or day; and the _Gloucester_ (Captain W. A. Howard
Kelly) hung on to the heels of the _Goeben_ till late in the afternoon,
in extreme danger and with the utmost tenacity, and only relinquished
the chase under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

Various explanations have been offered for the failure to bring the
_Goeben_ to action after the declaration of war, and every telegram sent
by the Admiralty was searched to find phrases which could justify or
palliate what had occurred. For instance, it was pleaded that the
sentence in the Admiralty telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of July 30,
‘Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces
except in combination with the French as part of a general battle,’
justified Admiral Troubridge in refraining from attacking the _Goeben_
with his four armoured cruisers. On this it may be observed that this
sentence is clearly shown by the context to refer to the Austrian Fleet
against whose battleships it was not desirable that our three battle
cruisers should be engaged without battleship support. Secondly it was
contained in a telegram giving the Commander-in-Chief general directions
for the strategic conduct of the naval campaign in the Mediterranean. It
was not intended by the Admiralty to govern tactical action. The words,
however, acquired a more particular significance when they were
repeated—as they were—by the Commander-in-Chief to his subordinate
Admiral Troubridge. But even so it ought not to have been treated as a
veto upon British ships ever engaging superior forces however needful
the occasion. This was an unreasonable reading of the Admiralty
instructions. On such a reading both the _Gloucester_ and the _Dublin_
were guilty of disobedience. On such a reading, pedantically construed,
no individual British ship in the Mediterranean would have been allowed
to fight a vessel stronger by a single gun. Nobody ever honestly
supposed that such doctrines were being laid down by the Admiralty.
Moreover, the self-same telegram specifically emphasised the importance
of bringing the _Goeben_ to action and singled out that vessel
particularly among all the hostile forces in the Mediterranean. No such
conception of his duty was taken by either of the Captains Kelly. Nor
was it the view of Sir Berkeley Milne himself; for he disapproved
strongly of Admiral Troubridge’s abandonment of the chase.

Again it has been urged that the sentence, ‘Your first task should be to
aid the French in the transportation of their African army,’ imposed
upon Sir Berkeley Milne the duty of placing _all three_ of his battle
cruisers west of Sicily. Thus wrested from their context and from the
whole series of Admiralty telegrams, these directions have been made to
serve as an explanation. Against them must be read the full text. On
July 30, ‘Your first task should be to aid the French in the
transportation of their African army _by covering and if possible
bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly
“Goeben.”_‘[40] And again, on August 2, ‘_Goeben_ must be shadowed by
two battle cruisers.’ And again on August 3, ‘_Goeben_ is your
objective. Follow her and shadow her _wherever she goes_, and be ready
to act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent.’ And
again on August 4, ‘Good. Hold her. War imminent.’

Certainly if the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had in reliance
upon these dominant and reiterated instructions managed to put one
battle cruiser each side of the Straits of Messina, instead of all on
one side, and if in consequence he had brought the _Goeben_ to action,
as would have been inevitable, and if he had thus protected the French
transports in the most effectual manner by fighting the _Goeben_, no one
could have found fault with him on the score that he had exceeded his
orders.

The reader is now in a position to form his own judgment on this affair.
I have indicated plainly the point on which the Admiralty was in fault,
namely, in not spontaneously lifting the prohibition to enter Italian
waters the moment we learned the _Goeben_ was at Messina. The conduct of
Rear-Admiral Troubridge was subsequently investigated by a Court of
Inquiry composed of the three Commanders-in-Chief of Portsmouth,
Devonport and Chatham. As the result of their report, he was tried by
court-martial at Portland in September and honourably acquitted of all
blame. His career in the Navy was, however, at an end, the general
feeling of the Service not accepting the view that the four armoured
cruisers and other vessels at his disposal ought not to have fought the
_Goeben_. In view of his acquittal he was appointed to take charge of
the naval guns which we sent with a mission to Serbia. In this capacity
his work was distinguished and successful. He gained the confidence and
respect of the Serbians and their Government, and he proved on numerous
occasions that whatever might be thought of his reasons for not
attacking the _Goeben_, want of personal courage was not among them.

After studying the reports of Sir Berkeley Milne and other officers
concerned, the First Sea Lord recorded the opinion that Admiral Milne
had taken the best measures with the force at his disposal, that his
dispositions were the proper ones, and that they were successful
inasmuch as they prevented the Germans from carrying out their primary
rôle of interrupting French troops crossing from Africa. On this I find
that my sole comment was (August 27): ‘The explanation is satisfactory;
the result unsatisfactory.’ Thereafter on August 30, 1914, the Admiralty
issued a statement that: ‘The conduct and dispositions of Sir Berkeley
Milne in regard to the German vessels _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ have been
the subject of the careful examination of the Board of Admiralty with
the result that their Lordships have approved the measures taken by him
in all respects.’

In all this story of the escape of the _Goeben_ one seems to see the
influence of that sinister fatality which at a later stage and on a far
larger scale was to dog the enterprise against the Dardanelles. The
terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate. If my first thoughts on July 27 of sending
the _New Zealand_ to the Mediterranean had materialised; if we could
have opened fire on the _Goeben_ during the afternoon of August 4; if we
had been less solicitous for Italian neutrality; if Sir Berkeley Milne
had sent the _Indomitable_ to coal at Malta instead of Biserta; if the
Admiralty had sent him direct instructions when on the night of the 5th
they learned where the _Goeben_ was; if Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the
small hours of August 7 had not changed his mind; if the _Dublin_ and
her two destroyers had intercepted the enemy during the night of the
6th–7th—the story of the _Goeben_ would have ended here. There was,
however, as it turned out, one more chance of annulling the doom of
which she was the bearer. That chance, remote though it was, the Fates
were vigilant to destroy.

[Illustration: THE ESCAPE OF THE “GOEBEN”]

EXPLANATION

M MILNE WITH TWO BATTLE-CRUISERS, TWO LIGHT
CRUISERS.

T TROUBRIDGE WITH FOUR ARMOURED CRUISERS, EIGHT
DESTROYERS.

D LIGHT CRUISER DUBLIN AND TWO DESTROYERS
JOINING TROUBRIDGE.

G GOEBEN AND BRESLAU SHADOWED BY GLOUCESTER.

X POSITIONS AT MIDNIGHT, AUGUST 6TH–7TH.

TIME TABLE

0.8 A.M., 5th. MILNE LEAVES MALTA FOR MERIDIAN
OF 10°E.

1.15 A.M., 5th. ORDERS RECEIVED TO COMMENCE
HOSTILITIES AGAINST GERMANY

5.0 A.M., 5th. GOEBEN ARRIVED MESSINA.

11.0 A.M., 5th. INFLEXIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE,
INDOMITABLE, DUBLIN,
WEYMOUTH, CHATHAM RENDEZVOUS
OFF PANTELLARIA. DUBLIN SENT
TO MALTA TO COAL AND THEN
TAKE 2 DESTROYERS TO
TROUBRIDGE; INDOMITABLE SENT
TO BIZERTA TO COAL. MILNE
WITH INFLEXIBLE,
INDEFATIGABLE, WEYMOUTH AND
CHATHAM STEERS FOR MERIDIAN
10°E.

3.35 P.M., 5th. GLOUCESTER REPORTS GOEBEN AT
MESSINA.

7.30 A.M., 6th. MILNE LEAVES HIS PATROL LINE
AND STEAMS EAST.

5.0 P.M., 6th. GOEBEN LEAVES MESSINA.

10.45 P.M., 6th. GOEBEN TURNS SOUTH-EAST.

0.8 A.M., 7th. TROUBRIDGE RESOLVES TO
INTERCEPT HER AND STEERS
SOUTH.

3.51 A.M., 7th. TROUBRIDGE TURNS INTO ZANTE.

NOON, 7th. MILNE ARRIVES MALTA.

4.40 P.M., 7th. GLOUCESTER OFF MATAPAN, GIVES
UP, BY ORDERS, HER TENACIOUS
CHASE.

At 1 a.m. on August 8 Sir Berkeley Milne, having collected and coaled
his three battle cruisers at Malta, set out at a moderate speed on an
Easterly course in pursuit of the _Goeben_. At this juncture the Fates
moved a blameless and punctilious Admiralty clerk to declare war upon
Austria. The code telegram ordering hostilities to be commenced against
Austria was inadvertently released without any authority whatever. The
mistake was repaired a few hours later; but the first message reached
Sir Berkeley Milne at 2 p.m. on August 8 when he was half-way between
Sicily and Greece. His original war orders, had prescribed that in the
event of a war with Austria he should in the first instance concentrate
his fleet near Malta, and faithful to these instructions he turned his
ships about and desisted from the pursuit of the _Goeben_. Twenty-four
hours were thus lost before orders could reach him to resume it. But the
_Goeben_ herself had come to a standstill. Admiral Souchon was cruising
irresolutely about the Greek islands endeavouring to make sure that he
would be admitted by the Turks to the Dardanelles. He dallied thirty-six
hours at Denusa and was forced to use his tell-tale wireless on several
occasions. It was not till the evening of the 10th that he entered the
Dardanelles and the Curse descended irrevocably upon Turkey and the
East.

* * * * *

From the 9th to the 22nd of August the Army was crossing the Channel.
This was a period of great anxiety to us. All the most fateful
possibilities were open. We were bound to expect a military descent upon
our coasts with the intention of arresting or recalling our Army, or a
naval raid into the Channel to cut down the transports, or a
concentrated submarine attack upon these vessels crowded with our
troops. The great naval battle might begin at any moment, either
independently or in connection with any of these operations. It was a
period of extreme psychological tension.

In continued anxiety lest some capital mistake should be made through a
different sense of proportion prevailing in the Fleet and at the
Admiralty, I drew up the following appreciation which with the
concurrence of the First Sea Lord was sent officially to Sir John
Jellicoe.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets. August 8, 1914. Sent
10.15 p.m._

1. To-morrow, Sunday, the Expeditionary Force begins to cross the
Channel. During that week the Germans have the strongest incentives to
action. They know that the Expeditionary Force is leaving, and that
the mobilisation and training of the Territorial Army is incomplete.
They may well argue that a raid or raids now upon the East Coast would
interrupt, confuse and probably delay the departure of the Army, and
further that it might draw the Grand Fleet rapidly South to interfere
with the landing.

2. Alternatively, or simultaneously, they may attempt to rush the
Straits and interrupt the passage of the Army. It seems in the last
degree improbable that if they did so they would use their modern
Battle Fleet. Their principle has been, according to all we know about
them, to aim at a general battle with the British Fleet when by
attrition and accident our margin of superiority has been reduced.
They may be assumed to know our general dispositions in the South, and
the strong and numerous Submarine flotillas of which we and the French
dispose. They must apprehend that the Straits are mined. Since the
distance across the Channel can be covered in 6 to 8 hours, 3 hours’
notice of their approach would enable every transport to reach safety.
To force the Straits and enter the Channel with their best ships means
the certain loss of units which it is vital to them to preserve if
they are ever to fight a general battle. And this sacrifice, with all
its hazards, would lead them only into an Anglo-French lake, lined
with fortified harbours and infested with torpedo craft, at the end of
which lies the Atlantic Ocean, and the Grand Fleet—wherever it
is—certainly between them and home. If this plan were followed by the
Germans, we should mine the Straits of Dover heavily behind them, and
leave you to engage them at your convenience.

3. A far more probable German plan would be (A) to send a fast
division to rush the Straits and attack the transports, while at the
same time (B) making raids on the East Coast to create a diversion.
Our dispositions in the Channel and its approaches provide fully for
(A). With regard to (B), it is not considered that more than 10,000
men can be spared from Germany at present for raids. Such raid or
raids would inconvenience the military arrangements, but the Army is
ready to meet the raiders if they land. Their Lordships would wish to
emphasise that _it is not part of the Grand Fleet’s duty to prevent
such raids, but to deal with the enemy’s Battle Fleet_. The enemy’s
older ships will possibly be used to cover either one or more raids.
Their main Battle Fleet may be in rear to support them. They may
expect you to come direct to prevent the raid, and therefore may lay
one or more lines of mines across your expected course, or use their
Submarines for the same purpose. Whereas if you approach from an
Easterly or North-Easterly direction, i.e. behind them, you would cut
the German Battle Fleet from its base, the landed raiders from all
reinforcements, and you would approach by a path along which the
chance of meeting mines would be sensibly reduced. In our view
therefore you should ignore the raid or raids, and work by a
circuitous route so as to get between the enemy’s fleet, or covering
force, and home. It would seem undesirable to come South of latitude
57° until news of a raid has been actually received; and even then the
possibility of the German Battle Fleet being still in the Heligoland
Bight, i.e. behind you, cannot be excluded.

This appreciation of the situation is not intended to hamper your
discretion to act according to circumstances.

The naval dispositions by which the passage of the Army was covered have
been fully described in the Official History of the War and in other
Service works. The northern approaches to the Straits of Dover were
patrolled by cruiser squadrons and by flotillas from Harwich and the
Thames. The Straits of Dover were minutely watched by the British and
French Destroyer flotillas of the Dover cordon and by the Submarine
flotillas of Commodore Keyes. Behind these there was constituted on
August 7 the Channel Fleet, comprising nineteen battleships of the 5th,
7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, now all fully mobilised. This fleet,
having assembled under the command of Admiral Burney at Portland,
cruised in readiness for battle at the western end of the Channel at
such distances from the Dover cordon as its commander might judge
convenient. The western entrance to the Channel was guarded by other
cruiser squadrons.

During the first few days of the transportation no great numbers of
troops were crossing the Channel, but from the 12th to the 17th the bulk
of the Army was in transit, and the strategic tension reached its
climax. Until this period was reached the Grand Fleet was kept in its
northern station and was even permitted to cruise northwards of the
Orkneys, but on August 12 Admiral Jellicoe was directed to re-enter the
North Sea and to cruise southward into a position of effective
proximity.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets._
_August 12, 1914._

We cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt at a landing during
this week on a large scale supported by High Sea Fleet. In addition to
the possibilities explained in Admiralty appreciation of situation
sent you 8th, extraordinary silence and inertia of enemy may be
prelude to serious enterprises. Our view remains as expressed in
appreciation, and even if larger landing forces were employed the
general principles of action would remain unaltered except that the
urgency of interrupting the landing would of course be greater. You
ought however to be nearer the theatre of decisive action, as we
originally contemplated, and now that you have shaken off the
submarine menace, or as soon as you can do so, it would appear
necessary to bring the Fleet to the Eastward of the Orkneys passing
either N. or S. of the Shetlands keeping well out of sight of land and
stopping traffic if necessary. Cruiser sweeps to the South and
South-east should be made as convenient. Acknowledge this immediately
on receipt.

During the three days of heaviest transportation, August 15, 16 and 17,
the Heligoland Bight was closely blockaded by submarines and destroyers,
supported between the Horn Reef and the Dogger Bank by the whole of the
Grand Fleet. Thus battle in open water was offered to the German Navy
during the three days when their inducements to fight were at their
maximum. But except for an occasional submarine, no sign betrayed the
existence of the enemy’s naval power.

All went well. Not a ship was sunk, not a man was drowned: all
arrangements worked with the utmost smoothness and punctuality. The Army
concentration was completed three days in advance of Sir John French’s
original undertaking to General Lanrezac;[41] and with such secrecy was
the whole of this vast operation enshrouded, that on the evening of
August 21, only a few hours before the British cavalry patrols were in
contact with the Germans, General von Kluck, commanding the First German
Army in Belgium, received from the Supreme Command no better information
than the following:—

‘A landing of British troops at Boulogne and their advance from about
Lille must be reckoned with. It is believed that no landing of British
troops on a big scale has yet taken place.’[42]

Three days later the whole British Army was fighting the battle of Mons.

The silence at sea was accompanied by a suspense on land. Except for the
overrunning and trampling down of Liége, and a French raid into Alsace,
only the covering troops of the great armies were in contact. There was
a long, stifling pause before the breaking of the storm. All over Europe
millions of men, pouring along the roads and railroads, flowing across
the Rhine bridges, draining from the farthest provinces of the wide
Russian Empire, streaming northwards from Southern France and Northern
Africa, were forming in the immense masses of manœuvre or the lines of
battle. There was plenty to fill the newspapers; but to those who
understood what was coming, the fortnight with which this chapter is
concerned seemed oppressed by a deathly hush.

CHAPTER XII
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE
August 20–September 6, 1914

‘For while the dagger gleam’d on high
Reel’d soul and sense, reel’d brain and eye.’
SCOTT, ‘The Lady of the Lake,’ Canto V-XVI.

Germany’s Choice: Prudence or Audacity—Her Dangerous Compromise—The
French Offensive School—One View of French Strategy—Plan XVII—Its
Complete Failure—The Despatch of the Sixth Division—The Morrow of
Mons—Fears for the Channel Ports—The Lloyd George of Agadir—The
British Base Shifted to St. Nazaire—Some expedients—The Retreat—A
Press Communiqué—The Eve of the Marne—The Russian Pressure—Lord
Kitchener’s Journey to Paris—Correspondence with Sir John French—A
Day on the Aisne—The Sea Flank Project—Lord Kitchener’s Wise
Restraint.

Prudence and audacity may be alternated but not mixed. Having gone to
war it is vain to shrink from facing the hazards inseparable from it. At
the outset of the war Germany had a choice between a prudent and an
audacious strategy. She could either have fallen, as she did, upon
France with her main strength and held off Russia meanwhile, or have
fallen upon Russia with ample forces and stood on the defensive against
France. If she had taken the second course she would have said to France
and to Europe: “This is an Eastern quarrel. Let us endeavour to limit
the area of the conflict. We are going to rescue our ally Austria from
Russia. We have no dispute with France. We have no intention of invading
French territory. Unless you attack us, we shall not touch you: if you
attack us, we shall have to defend ourselves. As for Belgium, it is
sacred to us.” The German Government would then have appealed to England
to help to localise the struggle, and a well-meaning effort would most
probably have been made with that object. France would therefore have
had to choose between deserting her ally and invading Germany in cold
blood, alone. Neither Belgium nor England would have entered the war. By
the winter the Russian armies would have been torn to pieces in the
East, and France brought to a standstill before barbed wire and
entrenchments on German soil in the West. France would therefore have
appeared the aggressor, who had made a treaty with Russia in order to
get back her lost provinces, and then in pursuance of this treaty had
flagrantly invaded Germany and had been arrested by the defenders of the
Fatherland. On the other hand, the moment Russia was beaten,
overwhelming German forces could be brought to bear on France. And if in
this second stage the Germans had chosen to violate the neutrality of
Belgium, Britain, if she had intervened at all, would have intervened
divided and too late. All these tremendous political-strategic
considerations were present in the minds of British Ministers, and Mr.
Lloyd George in particular would never believe, until the mass invasion
of Belgium was an actual fact, that the Germans would be so unwise as to
ignore them. Ludendorff, however, tells us that the German General Staff
rejected such a plan for one decisive reason, namely, that it involved a
long war. This answer seems insufficient.

Germany had long and deliberately committed herself to the alternative
plan of the invasion of France through Belgium with the intention of
destroying the French armies in a few weeks. This was a decision of
extreme hazard and audacity; flying in the face of world opinion, openly
assuming the rôle of the aggressor, committing a hideous wrong against
Belgium, incurring probably Belgian resistance and possibly, as they
must apprehend, British intervention. But having embarked on such an
audacious adventure, the Germans failed to concentrate wholly upon it.
In order to secure victory in a few weeks in France before England could
develop her strength, they must be prepared to endure serious injuries
in the East. The German force opposing Russia was therefore rightly cut
down to the absolute minimum. But to carry their plan through in its
integrity more territory should have been yielded to the Russian
invaders, and in no circumstances should any reinforcements have been
transferred from the West to the Eastern front until the decision in the
West had been reached.

* * * * *

I had throughout the greatest misgivings of an impulsive offensive by
the French based, not on calm calculations of numbers, distances and
times, but upon ‘the psychology of the French nation,’ ‘the best
traditions of the French Army,’ ‘the natural _élan_ of the _poilu_.’ I
knew, of course, that the offensive school held the dominance in France.
One could see its reflection in the language of our military men, though
these were strongly anchored to modern realities by unpleasant
recollections of the Boer War. Without knowing with any certainty or
exactness the French plan, I dreaded, whenever I reflected on the
problem, an impetuous onset followed by a shattering shock.

As between the two nations, France and Germany, it would be natural for
the stronger to be left to take the offensive and invade the weaker.
Four or five marches from the frontier the task of the invader becomes
very difficult and may be made more difficult still. The defenders have
superior communications from flank to flank and from front to rear; they
fall back on carefully-chosen, well-prepared positions and on ample
magazines of munitions and supplies. The invader finds himself in a
hostile country, surrounded by spies, with bridges and roads, especially
lateral roads, broken and disorganised, and important junctions defended
by fortresses still in the hands of the enemy. He is thus forced to
deliver the first great battle on ground selected and prepared by his
opponent. It is surely at this moment, and after this first shock has
been sustained under the best conditions, that the opportunity for the
offensive energy of the weaker Power presents itself.

If the Germans invaded France it seemed to me in those days that the
French would be wise to act as follows:—

They should entrench themselves conveniently along or near their
frontier, constructing a vast system of field fortifications, open and
concealed, sham and real, according to every device known at that time;
and in these positions they should await the first shock of the Germans.
I believed that the Germans did not appreciate the tremendous power of
modern weapons, particularly the rifle. I based this on what I had seen
of their methods in their manœuvres of 1906 and 1909 and on what I had
learned about rifle fire in the South African War. The Germans were the
challengers; they were the stronger, but not, in my opinion, strong
enough for the continuous storming and reduction of well-fortified
positions held by French regular armies or by British troops. I did not,
of course, contemplate that the French would dig one uniform line along
the whole length of their frontier. They would naturally treat the
problem selectively, here resisting with their utmost strength, there
allowing the enemy to penetrate and bulge into unpromising country or
into some well-considered tactical area only to be brought up by lines
fifteen to twenty miles in rear. They would not hesitate to sell the
Germans piece by piece a certain amount of ground for disproportionate
losses. The universal tactical object to be pursued in this first phase
should be to force the Germans to expose themselves in the open to the
rifle and artillery fire of well-trained Frenchmen.

It would be reasonable to hope that a process of this kind, continued
for three or four days along the whole front, would have resulted in far
heavier losses to the Germans than to the French, and that a larger
proportion of the German than of the French armies would have been
deployed and extended. One hoped in this way to see the French take toll
of the manhood of the German nation at the outset of the war, as the
British Army did on a small scale at Mons and Le Cateau. This would in
no way have excluded tactical action by means of counter-attacks
wherever opportunities presented themselves. Meanwhile at least
two-fifths of the French armies should have been held back in a great
mass of manœuvre, north-east of Paris. With this mass of manœuvre I
hoped the British Army would have been associated. This general
disposition should not have been compromised by any effort to proceed to
the relief of Belgium, except with cavalry and small detachments to
encourage the Belgians and to gain time. I was, of course, firmly
persuaded, in common with the British General Staff, that the main
German encircling movement would take place through Belgium and would
comprise considerable forces west of the Belgian Meuse. I hoped that if
this movement eventuated and prolonged itself in great strength, the
French would find an opportunity of using the greater part of their
armies of manœuvre against it after the Germans had been well punished
along the whole front. At any rate, that is the sort of way in which I
thought then, before the event, and think still, the French Command
might best have safeguarded the vital interests of France.

Very different, however, were the ideas of General Joffre. The famous
‘Plan XVII’ consisted in a general offensive in an easterly and
north-easterly direction by four French armies, with the last remaining
army in reserve behind their centre. It was based upon an ardent faith
that the French right would penetrate deeply into Alsace and Lorraine
and an obstinate disbelief that the French left would be turned by a
German movement west of the Meuse through Belgium. Both these
calculations were to be completely falsified by the first events of the
war. From the very earliest days it was clear that the views which the
British General Staff had consistently held, since 1911, of a great
German turning movement through Belgium, probably on both sides of the
Belgian Meuse, were correct. Why should the Germans with their eyes open
throw first Belgium and then the British Empire into the scales against
them unless for an operation of supreme magnitude? Besides, there were
the evidences of their long preparations—camps, railways and railway
sidings—which the British Staff under Sir John French and Sir Henry
Wilson had so minutely studied. Lastly, reported with much accuracy from
day to day, there came the enormous troop movements on the German right,
towards and into Belgium on both sides of the Meuse. Before the end of
the first week in August General Lanrezac, the Commander of the left
French Army (the Fifth), was raising loud cries of warning and alarm
about the menace to his left, and indeed his rear, if he carried out the
rôle assigned to him and attacked as ordered in a north-easterly
direction. By the end of the second week the presence of the
accumulating masses of the German right could no longer be denied by the
French High Command, and certain measures, tardy and inadequate, were
taken to cope with it. Nevertheless, after the raid of a corps and a
cavalry division into Alsace on the 13th August, General Joffre began
his offensive into Lorraine with the two armies of the French right, the
centre armies conforming a few days later; and up till the evening of
the 18th General Lanrezac and the left French army were still under
orders to advance north-east. Three days later this same army was
defending itself in full battle from an attack from the north and
north-west. It had been compelled to make a complete left wheel. The
main shock began on the 20th, when the two armies of the French right
battered themselves in vain against the strongly-prepared German
defences. By the 21st the French centre armies were definitely stopped,
and by noon on the 23rd General Lanrezac and the French army of the left
were outflanked and beaten. Meanwhile our small army, thrust hurriedly
forward towards Mons to shield the French left, found itself in presence
of not less than four army corps with numerous cavalry constituting the
swinging fist and sabre of the German encircling advance. By the evening
of the 23rd ‘Plan XVII’ had failed in every single element. The French
armies of the right were thrown back into France and were entirely
occupied in defending themselves. Their armies of the centre and the
left were in full retreat towards Paris and the south, and the British
Army, isolated and beset by overwhelming numbers, was in the direst
peril of complete destruction. So much for ‘Plan XVII.’

* * * * *

The utmost secrecy had naturally been maintained by the French about
their general plan. The existence of their nation was at stake. Neither
the British Cabinet nor what was left of the War Office were in a
position to understand what was passing. I do not know how far Lord
Kitchener was specially informed. I think it very improbable that he
shared the secrets of the French Headquarters to the extent of being
able to measure what was happening on the front as a whole. If he shared
them, he did not show it by any remark which escaped him. He knew, of
course, all there was to be known about the situation of our own army,
and a good deal about the forces contiguous to it.

As the shock drew near, Prince Louis and I felt it our duty at the
Admiralty to free Lord Kitchener’s hands in every respect and to bear to
the full our burden of responsibility. I therefore wrote to him on the
22nd August as follows:

The Admiralty are confident of their ability to secure this country
against invasion or any serious raid. If you wish to send the 6th
Division abroad at once, we should not raise any objection from the
naval standpoint. The situation, now that both the Navy and the
Territorials are mobilised and organised, is entirely different from
those which have been discussed in the Invasion Committee, of the
C.I.D.[43]; and if you want to send the last Regular Division, the
First Sea Lord and I are quite ready to agree, and so far as possible
to accept responsibility.

He replied:

‘It is very doubtful if the division now crossing[44] will get up in
time to take part in the battle now impending on the Sambre. As soon
as I can I will let you know about the 6th Division going over. If I
send it we have practically nothing left.’

Late on the evening of August 23 I had a talk with Lord Kitchener. We
knew the main battle had been joined and that our men had been fighting
all day; but he had received no news. He was darkly hopeful. The map was
produced. The dense massing of German divisions west of the Belgian
Meuse and curling round the left flank of the Anglo-French line was
visible as a broad effect. So was the pivot of Namur, in front of which
this whole vast turning movement seemed precariously to be hinged. He
had in his mind a great French counterstroke—a thrust at the shoulder,
as it were, of the long, straining, encircling arm which should lop it
off or cripple it fatally. He said of the Germans, ‘They are running a
grave risk. No one can set limits to what a well-disciplined army can
do; but if the French were able to cut in here,’ he made a vigorous
arrow N.W. from Namur, ‘the Germans might easily have a Sedan of their
own on a larger scale.’ I had a pleasing vision of the first phase of
Austerlitz, with the Austrians stretching and spreading their left far
out to the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz, while Napoleon remained
crouched for his spring at the Pratzen plateau. But had France a
Napoleon? One had marched through Charleroi ninety-nine years before.
Was there another? And were the Germans like the Austrians and Russians
of Austerlitz? However, we went anxiously but hopefully to our slumbers.

At 7 o’clock the next morning I was sitting up in bed in Admiralty House
working at my boxes, when the door of my bedroom opened and Lord
Kitchener appeared. These were the days before he took to uniform, and
my recollection is that he had a bowler hat on his head, which he took
off with a hand which also held a slip of paper. He paused in the
doorway and I knew in a flash and before ever he spoke that the event
had gone wrong. Though his manner was quite calm, his face was
different. I had the subconscious feeling that it was distorted and
discoloured as if it had been punched with a fist. His eyes rolled more
than ever. His voice, too, was hoarse. He looked gigantic. ‘Bad news,’
he said heavily and laid the slip of paper on my bed. I read the
telegram. It was from Sir John French.

‘My troops have been engaged all day with the enemy on a line roughly
east and west through Mons. The attack was renewed after dark, but we
held our ground tenaciously. I have just received a message from
G.O.C. 5th French Army that his troops have been driven back, that
Namur has fallen, and that he is taking up a line from Maubeuge to
Rocroi. I have therefore ordered a retirement to the line
Valenciennes-Longueville-Maubeuge, which is being carried out now. It
will prove a difficult operation, if the enemy remains in contact. I
remember your precise instructions as to method and direction of
retirement if necessity arises.

‘I think that immediate attention should be directed to the defence of
Havre.’

I did not mind it much till I got to Namur. Namur fallen! Namur taken in
a single day—although a French brigade had joined the Belgians in its
defence. We were evidently in the presence of new facts and of a new
standard of values. If strong fortresses were to melt like wisps of
vapour in a morning sun, many judgments would have to be revised. The
foundations of thought were quaking. As for the strategic position, it
was clear that the encircling arm was not going to be hacked off at the
shoulder, but would close in a crushing grip. Where would it stop? What
of the naked Channel ports? Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne! ‘Fortify Havre,’
said Sir John French. One day’s general battle and the sanguine advance
and hoped-for counterstroke had been converted into ‘Fortify Havre.’ ‘It
will be difficult to withdraw the troops if the enemy remains in
contact’—a disquieting observation. I forget much of what passed between
us. But the apparition of Kitchener _Agonistes_ in my doorway will dwell
with me as long as I live. It was like seeing old John Bull on the rack!

When I met the Admirals later, at ten, they were deeply perturbed about
these Channel ports. They had never taken the War Office view of the
superiority of the French Army. They saw in this first decisive shock
the confirmation of their misgivings. Some one suggested we should at
any rate make sure of the Cotentin peninsula, as an ample place of arms,
girt on three sides by the sea, from which the British armies of the
future might proceed to the rescue of France. Fortify Havre indeed!
Already we looked to Cherbourg and St. Nazaire.

_British Admiralty to French Admiralty._

_August 24th, 1914._

* Admiralty think it most important to naval interests to defend
Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne as long as possible. We release Admiral
Rouyer’s armoured cruiser squadron to co-operate in the land defences
of these three places. We will reinforce him if necessary with a
battle squadron. French flotilla bases and naval stores at Calais and
Boulogne can be transferred to Dover, and all preparations for that
should be immediately worked out.... We wish also to receive without
delay French views about land defences of Dunkirk, Boulogne, Calais
and Havre and what military prospects are of holding on to all of
them. We will, of course, assist in any way in our power.

Lastly we are considering shifting all military stores of British
Expeditionary Force now at Boulogne to Cherbourg. We wish to know
French views on the necessity for this as the result of the present
battle becomes more clear....

_First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet._

_August 24th, 1914._

* Personal. News from France is disappointing and serious results of
battle cannot yet be measured, as it still continues over enormous
front.

I have had the telegrams about it repeated to you.

We have not entered the business without resolve to see it through and
you may be assured that our action will be proportioned to the gravity
of the need.

I have absolute confidence in final result.

No special action is required from you at present, but you should
address your mind to a naval situation which may arise where Germans
control Calais and French coasts and what ought to be the position of
Grand Fleet in that event.

I had not seen the Chancellor of the Exchequer, except at Cabinets,
since the fateful Sunday before the war. I had been buried in the
Admiralty and he in the Treasury. I sustained vague general impressions
of a tremendous financial crisis—panic, bankruptcies, suspension of the
Bank Act, moratoriums, paper money—like a distant tumult. I realised
that he, aided by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading, was riding the
storm and regaining effective control of events. But I did not attempt
to follow and appreciate the remarkable sequence of decisions by which
an unprecedented, unimaginable situation was met. Now, however, with
this fateful news, I felt intensely the need of contact with him, and I
wanted to know how it would strike him and how he would face it. So I
walked across the Horse Guards Parade and made my way to the tunnel
entrance of the Treasury Board Room. It must have been about 10 o’clock
in the morning and, as I opened the door, I saw the room was crowded.
One of that endless series of conferences with all the great business
and financial authorities of Britain, by means of which the corner was
turned, was in progress. He saw me at once: I beckoned with my finger
and he came out. We went into a little room scarcely bigger than a
cupboard which adjoined, and I told him what had happened. I was
relieved and overjoyed at his response. He was once again the Lloyd
George of Agadir. Not since the morning of the Mansion House speech,
three years before, had I seen him so strong and resolute for our
country or so sure of its might.

_First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet_

_August 25th, 1914._

* British retirement on French frontier successfully and skilfully
effected. Army now in strong position, well supported. Our casualties
reported not severe considering continued engagement with two German
corps and two cavalry divisions. Enemy was well punished and lost
heavily. Main battle has still to be fought. General impression better
this morning. Hope all is well with you.

Then came the days of retreat. We saw that the French armies of the
right were holding their own, but all the centre and left was marching
southwards towards Paris as fast as possible, while our own five
divisions[45] were for several days plainly in the very jaws of
destruction. At the Admiralty we received requests to shift the base of
the whole army from Havre to St. Nazaire; and with this complicated
business we had to cope. The process of retreat continued day after day.
A seemingly irresistible compulsion was pressing and forcing backwards
the brave armies of France. Why should it stop? Would they ever be able
to turn? If France could not save herself, nothing could save her.

Casting about for help in this bitter time, I ventured to make the
suggestions which follow. But it was not found possible, in view of all
the difficulties, to give effect to them.

_Mr. Churchill to Lord Kitchener._

_August 28th, 1914_.

Here is an idea which deserves examination. The Siberian troops would,
if used against Germany and Austria, have to come south at an awkward
moment and derange the communications (so I am told). On the other
hand, it would probably be easy to send them to Archangel, and it is
(roughly) only six days from Archangel to Ostend.

If a couple of Russian Corps d’Armée were transported round this
route, it would be possible to strike at the German communications in
a very effective manner.

It is an interesting idea, though I dare say it would not greatly
commend itself to the Russians. Don’t trouble to answer.

_Prime Minister._
_Sir Edward Grey._
_Lord Kitchener._

_September 5, 1914._

I hear from many sources of the keen and widespread desire of
individual Americans to take part in the war on our side. It has been
stated that 50,000 or 60,000 Americans have volunteered, including a
number of Virginians. I also hear that wealthy Americans are anxious
to subscribe to the equipment of a force. There is no doubt that a
large number of American citizens of quality and character are anxious
to fight on our side. The value and advantage of such aid cannot be
overrated from any point of view. I am ignorant of the law on these
subjects: but Foreign Legions have played their part in many wars. It
ought to be possible to organise in Canada an American volunteer force
amounting to at least a Division, which could go into action as such.
Nothing will bring American sympathy along with us so much as American
blood shed in the field. What is wanted now is that there should be an
announcement made that we will accept the services of Americans who
come to Canada or England and volunteer; that they will be formed into
units in which they can serve together with their friends and
comrades; that they will be able to choose their own regimental
officers; and that the British Government will bear the whole expense
of equipment and transportation; and that they shall share in every
way the perils and fortunes of our troops.

I believe there is a source of fighting manhood here of the highest
possible quality, whose very employment would produce beneficial
reactions in every direction. The problem is how to set up the
rallying flag in Canada, and so indicate where those who wish to help
us can go to join.

W. S. C.

Personally I was hopeful that the wave of invasion would spend its fury,
and as I had indicated in my memorandum of three years before, I
believed that if the French forces had not been squandered by
precipitate action on the frontiers, an opportunity of striking the
decisive blow would occur about the fortieth day. In order to encourage
my colleagues I reprinted this memorandum and circulated it to the whole
Cabinet on September 2, pointing out that I had never counted upon a
victorious issue at the frontiers, had always expected that the French
armies would be driven into retreat by the twentieth day, but that, in
spite of this, there were good hopes of success. But I had no means of
measuring the forces by which this result would be achieved, except by
the most general processes.

Meanwhile the impression of an overwhelming disaster was conveyed to
England through a hundred channels. Newspaper correspondents made their
way in the confusion to the very fringe of the German advance.
Stragglers by the thousand and even detachments from the British Army,
appeared in a desperate condition far to its rear and on its flanks. In
spite of the censorship, the reports in the papers were alarming, while
rumour far exceeded anything that was printed. Acute distress was
manifested. In these circumstances, at the request of Lord Kitchener and
the Prime Minister, I drafted on Sunday, September 4, the following
communiqué, which was universally accepted as coming from the Army, and
I hope and believe gave comfort without concealing the truth.

It is now possible to make another general survey, in continuation of
that issued on August 30, of the operations of the British Army during
the last week.

No new main trial of strength has taken place. There have indeed been
battles in various parts of the immense front which in other wars
would have been considered operations of the first magnitude, but in
this war they are merely the incidents of the strategic withdrawal and
contraction of the allied forces necessitated by the initial shock on
the frontiers and in Belgium, and by the enormous strength which the
Germans have thrown into the western theatre while suffering heavily
through weakness in the eastern.

The British Expeditionary Army has conformed to the general movement
of the French forces and acted in harmony with the strategic
conceptions of the French General Staff. Since the battle at Cambrai
[Le Cateau] on August 26, where the British troops successfully
guarded the left flank of the whole line of French Armies from a
deadly turning attack supported by enormous force, the 7th French
Army[46] has come into operation on our left, and this, in conjunction
with the 5th Army on our right, has greatly taken the strain and
pressure off our men. The 5th French Army in particular on August 29
advanced from the line of the Oise River to meet and counter the
German forward movement, and a considerable battle developed to the
south of Guise. In this the 5th French Army gained a marked and solid
success, driving back with heavy loss and in disorder three German
Army Corps—the 10th, the Guard, and a reserve corps. It is believed
that the Commander of the 10th German Corps was among those killed. In
spite of this success, however, and all the benefits which flowed from
it, the general retirement to the south continued, and the German
Armies, seeking persistently after the British troops, remained in
practically continuous contact with our rearguards. On August 30 and
31 the British covering and delaying troops were frequently engaged,
and on September 1 a very vigorous effort was made by the Germans,
which brought about a sharp action in the neighbourhood of Compiègne.
This action was fought principally by the 1st British Cavalry Brigade
and the 4th Guards Brigade and was entirely satisfactory to the
British. The German attack, which was most strongly pressed, was not
brought to a standstill until much slaughter had been inflicted upon
them and until ten German guns had been captured. The brunt of this
creditable affair fell upon the Guards Brigade, who lost in killed and
wounded about 300 men.[47]

After this engagement our troops were no longer molested. Wednesday,
September 2, was the first quiet day they had had since the battle of
Mons, on August 23. During the whole of this period marching and
fighting had been continuous, and in the whole period the British
casualties had amounted, according to the latest estimates, to about
15,000 officers and men. The fighting having been in open order upon a
wide front, with repeated retirements, has led to a large number of
officers and men, and even small parties, missing their way and
getting separated, and it is known that a very considerable number of
those now included in the total will rejoin the colours safely. These
losses, though heavy in so small a force, have in no wise affected the
spirit of the troops. They do not amount to a third of the losses
inflicted by the British force upon the enemy, and the sacrifice
required of the Army has not been out of proportion to its military
achievements. In all, drafts amounting to 19,000 men have reached our
Army or are approaching them on the line of communications, and
advantage is being taken of the five quiet days that have passed since
the action of September 1 to fill up the gaps and refit and
consolidate the units.

The British Army is now south of the Marne and is in line with the
French forces on the right and left. _The latest information about the
enemy is that they are neglecting Paris and are marching in a
south-easterly direction towards the Marne and towards the left and
centre of the French line._[48] The 1st German Army is reported to be
between La Ferté sous Jouarre and Essises Viffort. The 2nd German
Army, after taking Rheims,[49] has advanced to Chateau-Thierry and to
the east of that place. The 4th German Army is reported to be marching
south on the west of the Argonne between Suippes and Ville sur Tourbe.
All these points were reached by the Germans on September 3. The 7th
German Army has been repulsed by a French Corps near D’Einville. It
_would therefore appear that the enveloping movement upon the
Anglo-French left flank has been abandoned by the Germans, either
because it is no longer practicable to continue such a great extension
or because the alternative of a direct attack upon the Allied line is
preferred_. Whether this change of plan by the Germans is voluntary or
whether it has been enforced upon them by the strategic situation and
the great strength of the Allied Armies in their front, will be
revealed by the course of events.

There is no doubt whatever that our men have established a personal
ascendancy over the Germans and that they are conscious of the fact
that with anything like even numbers the result would not be doubtful.

At this time I knew, of course, that another supreme battle was
impending. My principal fear was that the French would turn too soon and
make their new effort before the German thrust had reached its full
extension. I was glad therefore to learn on September 3 that the French
Government were quitting Paris, as it showed a resolve to treat the
capital just as if it were an ordinary tactical feature to be fought
round or through as might be convenient in a purely military sense. It
also showed a determination to continue the war whatever might happen to
Paris. We were now at the thirty-fifth day of mobilisation. The Germans
must be strung out in their pursuit and far ahead of supplies, munitions
and drafts. The great mass of Paris with its circle of forts must
either, like a breakwater, divide the oncoming German waves, or by
compelling them to pass wholly to the east of it serve as a secure flank
for the French.

And at this culminating moment the Russian pressure began to produce
substantial effects. Honour must ever be done to the Tsar and Russian
nation for the noble ardour and loyalty with which they hurled
themselves into the war. A purely Russian treatment of their military
problem would have led the Russian armies into immediate withdrawals
from their frontiers until the whole of their vast mobilisation was
completed. Instead of this, they added to a forward mobilisation an
impetuous advance not only against Austria but into Germany. The flower
of the Russian army was soon to be cut down in enormous and fearful
battles in East Prussia. But the results of their invasion were gathered
at the decisive point. The nerve of the German Headquarters failed. On
August 25 two army corps and a cavalry division of the German right were
withdrawn from France. On August 31 Lord Kitchener was able to telegraph
to Sir John French: ‘Thirty-two trains of German troops were yesterday
reported moving from the western field to meet the Russians.’[50]

Awful was the responsibility of General Joffre and the French High
Command for the decision which must now be taken. To turn too late was
to risk the demoralisation of the armies. To turn too soon was to court
another and this time a final defeat. And how compute the balance of all
the agonies and pressures simultaneously operating and reciprocally
interacting which should determine the dread issue? Whatever the
mistakes of the opening phase, however wrong the tactical and strategic
conceptions which had induced them, immortal glory crowns the brows of
those who gave the fateful signal, and lights the bayonets of the heroic
armies that obeyed it.

On September 6, being the thirty-seventh day of mobilisation, all the
French armies between Verdun and Paris, together with the British Army
and the French forces in Paris and to the north of Paris, turned upon
their pursuers and sprang at their throats. The Battle of the Marne had
begun.

* * * * *

I may now be permitted to descend to a small scale of events, and to
refer to an incident which has caused both stir and controversy.

By the 27th August the Cabinet had formed the opinion that great
friction had arisen between Sir John French and General Lanrezac and
also between the British and French Head-quarters. Actually the
difference was with General Lanrezac, who Sir John French considered had
not given him due notice of his intention to retire after the battle on
the 22nd and 23rd. We were concerned with the apparent intention of the
British Army to retire and refit behind the French left. Their losses so
far reported to us did not exceed 10,000 men. We could not measure the
exhaustion of the troops nor the extent of the disorganisation
inseparable from continued fighting and retreating. We accordingly
decided to send Lord Kitchener at once to see the British and French
Commanders-in-Chief and make sure that nothing that Britain could do
should be left undone.[51] If Lord Kitchener had gone in plain clothes
no difficulty would have risen, but his appearance in Paris in the
uniform of a Field-Marshal senior to the Commander-in-Chief at that dark
and critical moment, wounded and disconcerted Sir John French deeply and
not unnaturally. I laboured my utmost to put this right and to make it
clear that the Cabinet and not Lord Kitchener were responsible.

ADMIRALTY,
_September 4, 1914_.

_Mr. Churchill to Sir John French._

I have wanted so much to write to you and yet not to bother you with
reading letters. Still, I suppose there are moments when you can find
the leisure to read a few lines from a friend. The Cabinet was
bewildered by your telegram proposing to retire from the line, coming
on the top of a casualty list of 6,000, and your reports as to the
good spirit of the troops. We feared that you and Joffre might have
quarrelled, or that something had happened to the Army of which we had
not been informed. In these circumstances telegraphing was useless,
and a personal consultation was indispensable if further
misunderstandings were to be avoided.

I am sure it would be wise to have some good officer on your staff
like, say, Major Swinton, who could without troubling you unduly give
us a clear and complete impression of what is taking place day by day.
Our only wish is to sustain and support you. We are at a point where
losses will only rouse still further the spirit of the nation,
provided they are incurred, as yours have been, in brilliant and
successful action. But we ought to be kept in a position to form a
true and connected impression of the course of events.

For my own part, I am only anxious that you shall be sustained and
reinforced in every way, and I look forward confidently to seeing you
ere long at the head of a quarter of a million men, and in the spring
of half a million.

I enclose you a paper which I wrote three years ago, which seems to
have been borne out by the course of events, and which I hope will
continue to be confirmed.

In case any further difficulties arise, and you think I can be of any
use, you have only to send for me, and subject to the naval situation
I could reach you very quickly by motor-car or aeroplane.

It is hard sitting here day after day with so many friends engaged.
The resolution of the nation is splendid. It is a different country to
the one you left....

God guard you and prosper our arms.

FRANCE,
_September 6, 1914_.

_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill._

Thank you very much for your kind and encouraging letter. It was a
keen pleasure to hear from you and to read your words.

I have had a terribly anxious time and the troops have suffered
severely, but they are simply _glorious_!

I think you have heard me say that I would be ready to take on any
enemy in Europe half as strong again. I say that more than ever _now_!
I can’t find words to say all I think of them.

There has been some extraordinary misunderstanding at home as to my
relations with General Joffre, the French C-in-C. We have been on the
very best terms all through, and he has spoken most kindly of the help
he has received from us. I can’t understand what brought Kitchener to
Paris. I am writing to you as one of my greatest friends and I know
you’ll let me write freely and privately. His visit was really most
unfortunate. He took me away from the front to visit him in Paris on a
very critical day when I should have been directing the operation most
carefully, and I tell you between ourselves _strictly_ that when I
returned to my Head-quarters I found a very critical situation
existing (8 p.m.!) and authoritative orders and directions badly
needed. It was the day when the Guards and a Cavalry Brigade were so
heavily engaged.

I do beg of you, my dear Friend, to add one more to all the many great
kindnesses you have done me and _stop this interference_ with field
operations.

In reply I sent further explanations which, aided as they were by
victory, proved acceptable.

_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill_.

GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS,
BRITISH FORCES,
_September 10, 1914_.

Thank you, my dear Friend, with all my heart for your truly kind reply
to my letter, and also for your previous letter of the 4th. I fear I
was a little unreasonable about K. and his visit, but we have been
through a hard time and perhaps my temper isn’t made any better by it!
However, as usual, you have poured balm into my wounds—although they
may have been only imaginary—and I am deeply grateful.

Since I wrote to you last the whole atmosphere has changed and for 5
solid days we have been pursuing instead of pursued, and the Germans
have had simply _hell_. This very day we have captured several
hundred, cut off a whole lot of transport and got 10 or 12 guns—and
the ground is strewn with dead and wounded Germans. Something like
this happened yesterday and the day before. But this is nothing to
what they have lost in front of the 5th and 6th French armies, which
have been much more strongly opposed. They are indeed fairly on the
run and we are following hard.

What a wonderful forecast you made in 1911. I don’t remember the
paper, but it has turned out almost as you said. I have shown it to a
few of my Staff.

I was afraid of Joffre’s strategy at first and thought he ought to
have taken the offensive much sooner, but he was quite right.

* * * * *

I felt it vitally important to my whole structure of thought on this war
problem to see for myself with my own eyes what was passing at the front
and what were the conditions of this new war, and to have personal
contact with Sir John French. Reflection and imagination can only build
truly when they are checked point by point by direct impressions of
reality. I believed myself sufficiently instructed to derive an immense
refreshment of judgment from personal investigation without incurring
the opposite danger of a distorted view through particular experiences.
But it was not until the armies came to a standstill along the line of
the Aisne, that I felt justified in asking Lord Kitchener to allow me to
accept the repeated invitations of Sir John French. He gladly gave his
permission and I started the next morning. On the 16th September the
Duke of Westminster drove me from Calais to the British Head-quarters at
La Fère-en-Tardenois. We made a fairly wide detour as we had no exact
information as to where the flanks of the moving armies actually lay,
and it was not until nightfall that we fell in with the left flank of
the British line. Sir John had all his arrangements ready made for me,
and the next day between daylight and dark I was able to traverse the
entire British artillery front from the edge of the Craonne Plateau on
the right to the outskirts of Soissons on the left. I met everybody I
wanted to meet and saw everything that could be seen without unnecessary
danger. I lunched with “The Greys” then commanded by that fine soldier
Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson. I had a long talk with Sir Henry Rawlinson on
a haystack from which we could observe the fire of the French artillery
near Soissons. I saw for the first time what then seemed the prodigy of
a British aeroplane threading its way among the smoke puffs of searching
shells. I saw the big black German shells, “the coal boxes” and “Jack
Johnsons” as they were then called, bursting in Paissy village or among
our patient, impassive batteries on the ridge. I climbed to a wooded
height beneath which the death-haunted bridge across the Aisne was
visible. When darkness fell I saw the horizon lighted with the quick
flashing of the cannonade. Such scenes were afterwards to become
commonplace: but their first aspect was thrilling. I dined with the
young officers of the Head-quarters Staff and met there, for the last
time alas, my brilliant, gallant friend Hugh Dawnay. Early next morning
I opened with Sir John French the principal business I had to discuss,
namely, the advantages of disengaging the British Army from its position
on the Aisne and its transportation to its natural station on the sea
flank in contact with the Navy. I found the Field Marshal in the most
complete accord, and I undertook to lay his views before Lord Kitchener
and the Prime Minister, who I knew would welcome such a development. I
started home immediately and reached London the next morning.

Contact with the Army was always a great encouragement to every one who
visited France. In the field, in spite of the newly-dug graves and
hurrying ambulances, there was not the same sense of tragedy as hung
around our windows in Whitehall. But I could not share the universal
optimism of the Staff. It was firmly believed and loudly declared on
every side that if all available reinforcements in officers and men were
sent to the Army without delay, the war would be finished by Christmas.
Fierce were the reproaches that the War Office were withholding vitally
needed officers, instructors and material for the purpose of training
vast armies that would never be ready in time. I combated these views to
the best of my ability, being fully convinced of Lord Kitchener’s
commanding foresight and wisdom in resisting the temptation to meet the
famine of the moment by devouring the seed-corn of the future. I
repeated the memorable words he had used to the Cabinet that ‘The
British Empire must participate in the land war on the greatest scale
and that in no other way could victory be won.’ Taking a complete
survey, I consider now that this prudent withholding from the Army in
the field in the face of every appeal and demand the key-men who alone
could make the new armies, was the greatest of the services which Lord
Kitchener rendered to the nation at this time, and it was a service
which no one of lesser authority than he could have performed.

CHAPTER XIII
ON THE OCEANS

Expeditions against the German Colonies—The Imperial
Reinforcements—The Admiralty at Full Strain—General situation in
the Outer Seas—The Price of Concentration at Home—The _Königsberg_
and the _Emden_ in the Indian Ocean—The Convoy System—General
situation in the Pacific—British dispositions—Japan Declares War
on Germany—Overwhelming Forces of the Allies—Difficulty of their
Task—Fox and Geese—Problem of Admiral von Spee—Limitations on his
Action—Plight of Cruisers without Bases—Tell-tale Coal—The
Admiralty Problem—The Capture of Samoa—The great Australasian
Convoy—The Capture of New Guinea—Depredations of the
_Emden_—Concentration against the _Emden_—Public Dissatisfaction
on Admiralty Statement—Sailing of the Australasian Convoy to
Colombo—The Canadians cross the Atlantic—First Imperial
Concentration Complete.

On an August morning, behold the curious sight of a British Cabinet of
respectable Liberal politicians sitting down deliberately and with
malice aforethought to plan the seizure of the German colonies in every
part of the world! A month before, with what horror and disgust would
most of those present have averted their minds from such ideas! But our
sea communications depended largely upon the prompt denial of these
bases or refuges to the German cruisers; and further, with Belgium
already largely overrun by the German armies, every one felt that we
must lose no time in taking hostages for her eventual liberation.
Accordingly, with maps and pencils, the whole world was surveyed, six
separate expeditions were approved in principle and remitted to the
Staffs for study and execution. An enterprising Captain had already on
the outbreak of war invaded the German colony of Togoland. We now
proposed, in conjunction with the French, to attack the Cameroons—a much
more serious undertaking. General Botha had already declared his
intention of invading German South-West Africa. The New Zealand and
Australian Governments wished at once to seize Samoa and the German
possessions in the Pacific. An Anglo-Indian expedition was authorised
for the attack of German East Africa. The Staff work in preparation for
the military side of this last expedition was by no means perfect, and
resulted in a serious rebuff. The transportation of the expeditionary
forces simultaneously in all these different directions while the seas
were still scoured by the German cruisers threw another set of
responsibilities upon the Admiralty.

From the middle of September onwards we began to be at our fullest
strain. The great map of the world which covered one whole wall of the
War Room now presented a remarkable appearance. As many as twenty
separate enterprises and undertakings dependent entirely upon sea power
were proceeding simultaneously in different parts of the globe.[52]
Apart from the expeditions set forth above, the enormous business of
convoying from all parts of the Empire the troops needed for France, and
of replacing them in some cases with Territorials from home, lay heavy
upon us. It was soon to be augmented.

It had been easy to set on foot the organisation of the three Naval
Brigades and other Divisional troops for the Royal Naval Division; but
at a very early stage I found the creation of the artillery beyond any
resources of which I could dispose. We could, and did, order a hundred
field guns in the United States, but the training, mounting and
equipping of the artillerymen could not and ought not to be undertaken
apart from the main preparation of the Army. My military staff officer,
Major Ollivant, at this stage had a very good idea which provoked
immediately far-reaching consequences. He advised me to ask Lord
Kitchener for a dozen British batteries from India to form the artillery
of the Royal Naval Division, letting India have Territorial batteries in
exchange. I put this to Lord Kitchener the same afternoon. He seemed
tremendously struck by the idea. What would the Cabinet say? he asked.
If the Government of India refused, could the Cabinet overrule them?
Would they? Would I support him in the matter? And so on. I had to leave
that night for the North to visit the Fleet, which was lying in Loch
Ewe, on the west coast of Scotland. Forty-eight hours later, when I
returned, I visited Lord Kitchener and asked him how matters were
progressing. He beamed with delight. ‘Not only,’ he said, ‘am I going to
take twelve batteries, but thirty-one; and not only am I going to take
batteries, I am going to take battalions. I am going to take thirty-nine
battalions: I am going to send them Territorial divisions instead—three
Territorial divisions. You must get the transports ready at once.’ After
we had gloated over this prospect of succouring our struggling front, I
observed that I could now count on the twelve batteries for the Royal
Naval Division. ‘Not one,’ he said. ‘I am going to take them all
myself’; and he rubbed his hands together with every sign of glee. So
the Naval Division was left again in the cold and had to go forward as
infantry only.

This new development involved a heavy addition to our convoy work, and
the situation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans must now be examined by
the reader.

When war began the Germans had the following cruisers on foreign
stations: _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Emden_, _Nürnberg_, _Leipzig_
(China); _Königsberg_ (East Africa and Indian Ocean); _Dresden_,
_Karlsruhe_ (West Indies). All these ships were fast and modern, and
every one of them did us serious injury before they were destroyed.
There were also several gunboats: _Geier_, _Planet_, _Komet_, _Nusa_ and
_Eber_, none of which could be ignored. In addition, we expected that
the Germans would try to send to sea upwards of forty fast armed
merchantmen to prey on commerce. Our arrangements were, however, as has
been narrated, successful in preventing all but five from leaving
harbour. Of these five the largest, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, was
sunk by the _Highflyer_ (Captain Buller) on August 26: the _Cap
Trafalgar_ was sunk on September 14 by the British armed merchant
cruiser _Carmania_ (Captain Noel Grant) after a brilliant action between
these two naked ships; and the three others took refuge and were
interned in neutral harbours some months later. Our dispositions for
preventing a cruiser and commerce-raider attack upon our trade were from
the outset very largely successful, and in the few months with which
this volume deals, every one of the enemy ships was reduced to complete
inactivity, sunk or pinned in port.

Nevertheless, it is a fair criticism that we ought to have had more fast
cruisers in foreign waters, and in particular that we ought to have
matched every one of the German cruisers with a faster ship as it was
our intention to do.[53] The _Karlsruhe_ in the West Indies gave a
chance to our hunting vessels at the outbreak of war, and the
_Königsberg_ in the Indian Ocean was sighted a few days earlier. But our
ships were not fast enough to bring the former to action or keep in
close contact with the latter till war was declared. As will be seen,
nearly every one of these German cruisers took its prey before being
caught, not only of merchant ships but of ships of war. The
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ sank the _Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_, the
_Königsberg_ surprised and destroyed the _Pegasus_, and the _Emden_ sank
the Russian cruiser _Zemchug_ and the French destroyer _Mousquet_.
Certainly they did their duty well.

The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the outbreak of war was
to be as strong as possible in home waters in order to fight a decisive
battle with the whole German Navy. To this end the foreign stations were
cut down to the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships
abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light cruisers and
the whole of my administration had been occupied in building as many of
them as possible. None, of the _Arethusas_ had, however yet reached the
Fleet. We therefore grudged every light cruiser removed from home
waters, feeling that the Fleet would be tactically incomplete without
its sea cavalry. The principle of first things first, and of
concentrating in a decisive theatre against the enemy’s main power, had
governed everything, and had led to delay in meeting an important and
well-recognised subsidiary requirement. The inconvenience in other parts
of the globe had to be faced. It was serious.

Nowhere did this inconvenience show itself more than in the Indian
Ocean. After being sighted and making off on the 31st of July, the
_Königsberg_ became a serious preoccupation on all movements of troops
and trade. Another fast German cruiser, the _Emden_, which on the
outbreak of war was on the China station, also appeared in the middle of
September in Indian waters, and being handled with enterprise and
audacity began to inflict numerous and serious losses upon our
mercantile marine. These events produced consequences.

By the end of August we had already collected the bulk of the 7th
Division from all the fortresses and garrisons of the Empire. During
September the two British Indian divisions with additional cavalry (in
all nearly 50,000 men) were already crossing the Indian Ocean. On top of
this came the plans for exchanging practically all the British infantry
and artillery in India for Territorial batteries and battalions, and the
formation of the 27th, 28th and 29th Divisions of regular troops. The
New Zealand contingent must be escorted to Australia and there, with
25,000 Australians, await convoys to Europe. Meanwhile the leading
troops of the Canadian Army, about 25,000 strong, had to be brought
across the Atlantic. All this was of course additional to the main
situation in the North Sea and to the continued flow of drafts,
reinforcements and supplies across the Channel. Meanwhile the enemy’s
Fleet remained intact, waiting, as we might think, its moment to strike;
and his cruisers continued to prey upon the seas. To strengthen our
cruiser forces we had already armed and commissioned twenty-four liners
as auxiliary cruisers, and had armed defensively fifty-four merchantmen.
Another forty suitable vessels were in preparation. In order to lighten
the strain in the Indian Ocean and to liberate our light cruisers for
their proper work of hunting down the enemy, I proposed the employment
of our old battleships (_Canopus_ class) as escorts to convoys.

Besides employing these old battleships on convoy, we had also at the
end of August sent three others abroad as rallying points for our
cruisers in case a German heavy cruiser should break out: thus the
_Glory_ was sent to Halifax, the _Albion_ to Gibraltar and the _Canopus_
to the Cape de Verde station. Naval history afforded numerous good
examples of the use of a protective battleship to give security and
defensive superiority to a cruiser force—to serve, in fact, as a
floating fortress round which the faster vessels could manœuvre, and on
which they could fall back. These battleships also gave protection to
the colliers and supply ships at the various oceanic bases, without
which all our cruiser system would have broken down. The reader will see
the system further applied as the war advances.

At the beginning of September I decided that the whole convoy system in
the Indian Ocean must be put on a regular basis.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson.

_September 5, 1914_.

There is no use in our sending escorts which are weaker than the
enemy’s ship from which attack is to be apprehended. Armed merchant
cruisers can in no case be counted on except as an additional
reinforcement. Single troopships may be escorted by one war vessel, if
that vessel is stronger than the _Königsberg_. No convoys of
transports are to go across the Indian Ocean or Red Sea unless
escorted by at least two war vessels, one of which must be stronger
than the _Königsberg_. In large convoys of over six vessels a third,
and in very large convoys a fourth, warship should be added. Military
needs must give way to the limitations of escort. Six ships, including
the _Fox_, are available; and it ought to be possible to organise
fortnightly if not 12–day convoys from Bombay.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, should be directed to submit, by
telegraph, a scheme for such convoys. All transports which may want
convoy must be held over till the next is ready.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

_September 15, 1914._

In order to accelerate the despatch of the third Division from India
to France, and the seven battalions to German East Africa, it is
proposed that the transports now conveying the Territorial Division to
Egypt shall go on to Bombay. It has also been decided to exchange
thirty-one batteries of [British] Indian regular artillery for service
in Europe with an equal number of Territorial batteries which are to
embark shortly from home. The ships carrying the Territorial batteries
will also go on to Bombay and be available as additional transport.

Please concert these measures with the War Office. It is most
important that these double convoys each way should hit off our
fortnightly escorts which are the governing consideration.

Pray let me have a scheme showing how all this movement can be fitted
in with the greatest speed and smoothness.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson.

_September 18, 1914._

In addition to the 2 Divisions now coming from India and the
expedition for German East Africa, we must expect the following:—

(_a_) A third Indian Division.

(_b_) 31 batteries of field artillery from India, to be exchanged
for an equal amount of Territorial artillery from home.

(_c_) 39 battalions of British infantry from India, to be exchanged
for an equal number of Territorial battalions from home.

(_d_) As many more Indian troops as India in these circumstances
finds it convenient to despatch.

(_e_) Reinforcements to make good wastage of Indian troops in the
field.

These later movements are not all finally settled and approved, but it
is certain that from now till Christmas we shall require to maintain
regular fortnightly convoys. We cannot delay till then the work of
hunting down _Königsberg_ and _Emden_ by our own fast cruisers, nor
can we keep these vessels employed indefinitely on duties for which
they are unsuited. It is necessary that 3 old battleships, including
_Ocean_ from Gibraltar, should proceed at once to the East Indies
Station to relieve, as they arrive, first _Dartmouth_ and _Chatham_,
and next _Black Prince_. _Minerva_ should go on to India with the
transports she is now escorting to Egypt, and the East Indies convoy
force should be as follows:—

SUEZ: 2 _Majestics_[54] and _Minerva_.

BOMBAY: 1 _Majestic_, _Swiftsure_, and _Fox_.

These escorts should sail every fortnight to exchange transports at
the rendezvous 500 miles east of Aden. Modern ships would be released
for other duties as these came on the spot.

(2) In the Mediterranean the French should be asked to supply 4 old
battleships and 2 old armoured cruisers for convoy duty between
Marseilles and Port Said, and asked to arrange fortnightly sailings
via Malta to fit in with the Indian convoy service. We will escort all
transports from England to Malta at times which will enable the French
convoys to take them up _en route_.

(3) The force at the Dardanelles must be raised to a strength
sufficient to fight the Turco-German fleet. As soon, therefore, as the
French escort becomes available, _Indomitable_ should join
_Indefatigable_. Defence should also be ordered there from Malta.
_Weymouth_ should come home. The four destroyers from the Canal should
rejoin their flotilla at the Dardanelles.

(4) In view of the above, I agree that Fox should remain with the
Indian convoy and that _Dartmouth_ should take the three transports to
Mombassa, afterwards hunting _Königsberg_.

(5) The whole of this should be co-ordinated and worked out into a
regular time-table of sailings, to which the military must adhere,
sending more or less transports, according to their convenience. It
must be clearly understood that no intermediate sailings are possible.

W. S. C.

The position in the Pacific was also complicated.

When I went to the Admiralty at the end of 1911, arrangements were made
to form the China squadron of the _Defence_, the _Minotaur_, and an
armoured cruiser of the County class. These two first-named ships were
in themselves a very satisfactory disposition against the powerful
German armoured cruisers, _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. They were
approximately equal to the Germans in modernity, size and speed, but of
heavier metal, firing a broadside of 2,520 pounds as against 1,725
pounds of their rivals.

But as time passed and the pressure upon us grew more severe, we had in
1913 to bring one of these ships (_Defence_) back to the Mediterranean.
In order to fill the gap with the least possible inroad upon our home
strength, Prince Louis being First Sea Lord, we devised a frugal scheme
by which the _Triumph_—one of the two battleships which had been built
for and bought from Chili to prevent their falling into Russian hands at
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War—was made to serve as a depot ship
manned on mobilisation from the crews of the river gunboats on the
Yangtse and the West River. Her sister (the _Swiftsure_) shortly
afterwards became the flagship in the East Indies. These two ships had
the good speed for battleships of their date of 20·1 knots. They carried
four 10–inch and no less than fourteen 7·5–inch guns. They were not
heavily armoured, and according to our ideas they were a compromise
between the battleship and the armoured cruiser. Differing in conception
at many points from the standard types of the Royal Navy, these vessels
did not fit homogeneously into any of our battle squadrons, and were
conveniently employed on special duties. Without the _Triumph_ Admiral
Jerram’s squadron (_Minotaur_ and _Hampshire_ with the light cruiser
_Yarmouth_) would on the outbreak of war have had little or no margin,
though the _Minotaur_ was the strongest of all our armoured cruisers.
But once the _Triumph_ was mobilised, our superiority, except in speed,
was overwhelming, and we could afford to see how greater matters went at
home before deciding whether to reinforce the China station or not.

In the first hours of the crisis, my thoughts had turned to the China
station. As early as the 28th July I proposed to the First Sea Lord the
discreet mobilisation of the _Triumph_ and the concentration of the
China squadron upon her; and this was accordingly effected in good time.
Five thousand miles to the southward was the Australian squadron,
consisting of the battle-cruiser _Australia_, and the two excellent
modern light cruisers _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_. The _Australia_ by
herself could, of course, defeat the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_,
though by running different ways one of the pair could have escaped
destruction. Our last look round the oceans before the fateful signal,
left us therefore in no immediate anxiety about the Pacific.

On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers _Montcalm_ and
_Dupleix_ and the Russian light cruisers _Askold_ and _Zemchug_, in the
Far East, were placed under British command, thus sensibly increasing
our predominance. A few days later an event of the greatest importance
occurred. The attitude of Japan towards Germany suddenly became one of
fierce menace. No clause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty entitled us to
invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became evident before the war had
lasted a week that the Japanese nation had not forgotten the
circumstances and influences under which they had been forced, at the
end of the Chinese War, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves
resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in the Far
East. On the 15th, Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding
within seven days the unconditional surrender of the German naval base
Tsing Tau [Kiaochau], couching this demand in the very phrases in which
nineteen years before they had been summoned to leave Port Arthur at the
instance of Germany. In reply the German Emperor commanded his servants
to resist to the end; and here, as almost in every other place where
Germans found themselves isolated in the face of overwhelming force, he
was obeyed with constancy.

The advent of Japan into the war enabled us to use our China squadron to
better advantage in other theatres. The _Newcastle_ was ordered across
the Pacific, where our two old sloops (the _Algerine_ and _Shearwater_)
were in jeopardy from the German light cruiser _Leipzig_. The _Triumph_
was sent to participate with a small British contingent in the Japanese
attack upon the fortress of Tsing Tau. General arrangements were made by
the British and Japanese Admiralties whereby responsibility for the
whole of the Northern Pacific, except the Canadian Coast, was assumed by
Japan.

The table following sets forth the rival forces in the western Pacific
at the outbreak of war. Even without the ships employed by Japan or the
great Japanese reserves which lay behind them, the superior strength of
the Allies was overwhelming. But the game the two sides had to play was
by no means as unequal as it looked. It was indeed the old game of Fox
and Geese. The two powerful German cruisers _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_, with their two light cruisers, formed a modern squadron
fast and formidable in character. Our battle-cruiser _Australia_ could
catch them and could fight them single-handed. The _Minotaur_ and the
_Hampshire_ could just catch them and, as we held, could fight them with
good prospects of success; but it would be a hard fought action. If the
_Triumph_ were added to _Minotaur_ and _Hampshire_, there was no risk at
all in the fight but almost insuperable difficulty in bringing the enemy
to action. Among the light cruisers, the _Yarmouth_, _Melbourne_,
_Sydney_ and the Japanese _Chikuma_ could both catch and kill _Emden_ or
_Nürnberg_. Of our older light cruisers _Fox_ and _Encounter_ could have
fought _Emden_ or _Nürnberg_ with a chance of killing or at least of
crippling them before being killed: but neither was fast enough to catch
them. Our remaining cruisers could only be used in combination with
stronger vessels. With our forces aided by two French and two Russian
ships and by the Japanese to the extent which will be described, the
Admiralty had to protect all the expeditions, convoys and trade in the
Pacific. To wit—

WARSHIPS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC[55]

AUGUST TO OCTOBER, 1914

German. British. Japanese.[56] French. Russian.

Battle-cruisers _Australia_ _Ibuki_
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----

Battleships _Triumph_
-------
-------
-------
-----

Armoured _Scharnhorst_ _Minotaur_ _Montcalm_
Cruisers
----------- -------- --------
----- -------- -----
--------
_Gneisenau_ _Hampshire_ _Dupleix_
--------- --------- -------
--------- -----
-----

Fast Light _Emden_ _Yarmouth_ _Chikuma_
Cruiser
_Nürnberg_ _Melbourne_
_Sydney_
_Philomel_

Older Light _Encounter_ _Askold_
Cruisers
_Pioneer_ _Zemchug_
_Pyramus_
_Psyche_

_Ships on fixed patrolling beats not available for offensive action_:--

Armed Merchant _Prince _Empress of
Cruisers Eitel_ Asia_
_Friedrich_ _Empress of
Japan_
_Cormoran_ _Empress of
Russia_
_Himalaya_

Gunboats _Geier_ _Cadmus_ _Kersaint_
_Clio_ _Zélée_

The New Zealand convoy to Australia.

The Australian and New Zealand convoy from Australia to Europe.

The convoy of the British Far Eastern garrisons to Europe.

The convoy of Indian troops to relieve our Far Eastern garrisons.

The expedition to Samoa.

The expedition to New Guinea.

All these were in addition to the general trade, which continued
uninterruptedly.

Admiral von Spee, the German Commander in the Pacific, had therefore no
lack of objectives. He had only to hide and to strike. The vastness of
the Pacific and its multitude of islands offered him their shelter, and,
once he had vanished, who should say where he would reappear? On the
other hand, there were considerable checks on his action and a limit,
certain though indefinite, to the life of his squadron. With the
blockade of Tsing Tau he was cut from his only base on that side of the
world. He had no means of docking his ships or executing any serious
repairs, whether necessitated by battle or steaming. The wear and tear
on modern ships is considerable, and difficulties multiply with every
month out of dock. To steam at full speed or at high speed for any
length of time on any quest was to use up his life rapidly. He was a cut
flower in a vase; fair to see, yet bound to die, and to die very soon if
the water was not constantly renewed. Moreover, the process of getting
coal was one of extraordinary difficulty and peril. The extensive
organisation of the Admiralty kept the closest watch in every port on
every ton of coal and every likely collier. The purchase of coal and the
movement of a collier were tell-tale traces which might well lay the
pursuers on his track. His own safety and his power to embarrass us
alike depended upon the uncertainty of his movements. But this
uncertainty might be betrayed at any moment by the movement of colliers
or by the interception of wireless messages. Yet how could colliers be
brought to the necessary rendezvous without wireless messages? There
existed in the Pacific only five German wireless stations, Yap, Apia,
Nauru, Rabaul, Angaur, all of which were destroyed by us within two
months of the outbreak of war. After that there remained only the
wireless on board the German ships, with which it was very dangerous to
breathe a word into the ether. Such was the situation of Admiral von
Spee.

The problem of the Admiralty was also delicate and complex. All our
enterprises lay simultaneously under the shadow of a serious potential
danger. You could make scare schemes which showed that von Spee might
turn up with his whole squadron almost anywhere. On the other hand, we
could not possibly be strong enough every day everywhere to meet him. We
had, therefore, either to balance probabilities and run risks, or reduce
our movements and affairs to very narrow limits. Absolute security meant
something very like absolute paralysis; yet fierce would have been the
outcry attendant either upon stagnation or disaster. We decided
deliberately to carry on our affairs and to take the risk. After all,
the oceans were as wide for us as for von Spee. The map of the world in
the Admiralty War Room measured 20 feet by 30. Being a seaman’s map, its
centre was filled by the greatest mass of water on the globe: the
enormous areas of the Pacific filled upwards of 300 square feet. On this
map the head of an ordinary veil-pin represented the full view to be
obtained from the masts of a ship on a clear day. There was certainly
plenty of room for ships to miss one another.

As has been stated, the British China squadron mobilised and
concentrated at Hong-Kong, and the Australian Navy at Sydney. Admiral
von Spee was at Ponape in the Caroline Islands when Great Britain
declared war upon Germany. From Hong-Kong and Sydney to Ponape the
distances were each about 2,750 miles. Although Japan had not yet
entered the war, the German Admiral did not attempt to return to
Kiaochau, as this might have involved immediate battle with the British
China Squadron. He proceeded only as far as the Ladrone Islands
(German), where the _Emden_ from Kiaochau, escorting his supply ships,
met him on August 12. He sent the _Emden_ into the Indian Ocean to prey
on commerce and turned himself eastward towards the Marshall Islands. On
August 22 he detached the _Nürnberg_ to Honolulu to obtain information
and send messages, to cut the cable between Canada and New Zealand, and
to rejoin him at Christmas Island on September 8. Here he was in the
very centre of the Pacific.

The Admiralty knew nothing of these movements beyond a report that he
was coaling at the Caroline Islands on August 9. Thereafter he vanished
completely from our view. We could know nothing for certain. The theory
of the Admiralty Staff, however, endorsed by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson,
who was making a special and profound study of this theatre, was that he
would go to the Marshall Islands and thereafter would most probably work
across to the west coast of South America, or double the Horn on his way
back to Europe. This theory, and the intricate reasoning by which it was
supported, proved to be correct. In the main, though we could by no
means trust ourselves to it and always expected unpleasant surprises, it
was our dominant hypothesis. It is on this basis that the operations in
the Pacific should be studied.

As early as August 2 the New Zealand Government—ever in the van of the
Empire—had convinced themselves that war was inevitable, and had already
made proposals for raising forces and striking at the enemy. The
Operations Division of the War Staff proposed in consequence the capture
of Samoa and the destruction of the wireless station there; and this was
recommended to me by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff as a
feasible operation. By August 8 New Zealand telegraphed that if a naval
escort could be furnished the expedition to attack Samoa could start on
August 11. The staff concurred in this, holding that the _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ were adequately covered by the Australian squadron. I
assented the same day. It was arranged that the expedition should meet
the battle-cruiser _Australia_ and the French cruiser _Montcalm_ at or
on the way to Noumea.

Another expedition from Australia to attack German New Guinea had also
been organised by the Government of the Commonwealth. The uncertainty
about the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ invested all movements in those
waters with a certain hazardous delicacy. It was thought, however, that
the light cruisers _Melbourne_[57] and _Sydney_ could convoy the
Commonwealth New Guinea expedition northward, keeping inside the Barrier
Reef, and that before they came out into open waters the New Guinea
convoy could be joined by _Australia_ and _Montcalm_, who would by then
have completed the escort of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa. We
thought it above all things important that these expeditions, once they
had landed and taken possession of the German colonies, should be
self-sufficing, and that no weak warships should be left in the harbours
to support them. Any such vessels, apart from the difficulty of sparing
them, would be an easy prey for the two large German cruisers.

Samoa was occupied on the 30th August. The wireless station at Nauru was
destroyed on the 10th September. The Australian contingent was picked up
by the battle-cruiser _Australia_ on September 9 and arrived at Rabaul
safely two days later.

We had now to provide for the Australian convoy to Europe which was due
to leave Sydney on September 27 for Port Adelaide, where they would be
joined by the New Zealand contingent and its own escort as well as by
the ‘Australian Fleet’ (_Australia_, _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_) as soon
as they were free from the New Guinea expedition. Our original proposal
for the escort of the Australian Army was, therefore, _Australia_,
_Sydney_ and _Melbourne_, with the small cruisers from New Zealand. To
cover the Commonwealth during the absence of all her Fleet, it was
arranged that the _Minotaur_, together with the Japanese _Ibuki_ and
_Chikuma_, should come south to New Britain Islands.

In the middle of September the New Zealand contingent was due to sail
for Adelaide. The _Australia_ and her consorts were still delayed in New
Guinea, where some delay was caused by the German resistance. Great
anxiety was felt in New Zealand at the prospect of throwing their
contingent across to Australia with no better escort than the two P
class cruisers. They pointed out the dangers from the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_, which on September 14 had been reported off Samoa. The
Admiralty view was that it was most improbable the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ could know of the contemplated New Zealand expedition, still
less of the date of its sailing; that in order to deliver an attack in
New Zealand waters they would have to steam far from their coaling bases
north of the Equator, and would indeed have to be accompanied by their
colliers, greatly reducing their speed and hampering their movements. In
these circumstances the Admiralty foresaw but little danger to the New
Zealand convoy in the first part of their voyage, were unable to provide
further protection for this stage, and expressed the opinion that the
risk should be accepted. To this decision the New Zealand Government
bowed on September 21, and it was settled that the New Zealand convoy
should sail on the 25th. Meanwhile, however, renewed exploits by the
_Emden_ in the Bay of Bengal created a natural feeling of alarm in the
mind of the New Zealand and Australian public; and without prejudice to
our original view, we decided to make arrangements to remove these
apprehensions.

On the 24th news arrived that the New Guinea expedition had successfully
overcome all opposition, and we then determined on the following change
of plans, viz. _Minotaur_ and _Ibuki_ to go to Wellington and escort the
New Zealanders to Adelaide, while _Australia_ and _Montcalm_, after
convoying the auxiliaries and weak warships back from New Guinea to
within the shelter of the Barrier Reef, should hunt for the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ in the Marshall Islands, whither it seemed
probable they were proceeding. This decision altered the composition of
the escort of the Australian convoy, and their protection across the
Pacific and Indian Oceans was to an important extent confided to a
vessel which flew the war flag of Japan. This historic fact should be an
additional bond of goodwill among the friendly and allied nations who
dwell in the Pacific.

Meanwhile the depredations of the _Emden_ in the Bay of Bengal
continued. On the 22nd she appeared off Madras, bombarded the Burma
Company’s oil tanks, and threw a few shells into the town before she was
driven off by the batteries. This episode, following on the disturbance
of the Calcutta-Colombo trade route and the numerous and almost daily
sinkings of merchant ships in the Bay of Bengal, created widespread
alarm, and on October 1 I sent the following minute to the First Sea
Lord, proposing, _inter alia_, a concentration on a large scale in
Indian waters against the _Emden_. This concentration would comprise
_Hampshire_, _Yarmouth_, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_, _Chikuma_ (Japan),
_Zemchug_ and _Askold_ (Russian), _Psyche_, _Pyramus_ and _Philomel_—a
total of ten—and was capable of being fully effective in about a month.

_October 1, 1914._

Secretary.
Chief of Staff.
First Sea Lord.

Three transports, empty but fitted for carrying cavalry, are delayed
in Calcutta through fear of _Emden_. This involves delaying transport
of artillery and part of a cavalry division from Bombay. The Cabinet
took a serious view, and pressed for special convoy. Have you any
ship? I should be very sorry to interrupt the offensive operations
against _Emden_ for the sake of convoying three empty transports. I
was inclined to recommend that the three should put to sea at night
with lights out and steer wide of the track. It is 100 to 1 that they
would get round safely, and a 1,000 to 1 that two out of the three
would get round safely. Let me have your proposals at once. It is
clear that the transports have got to go.[58]

* * * * *

Now that _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ have been located in the
Society Islands there is no need for _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_ to
remain in Australasian waters. _Sydney_ should immediately be ordered
to join _Hampshire_, _Yarmouth_ and _Chikuma_ in the _Emden_ hunt, and
_Melbourne_ should come there with the Australasian convoy. As soon as
_Zemchug_ and _Askold_ have finished with their convoy, they should
return and join _Hampshire_. This will give seven ships searching for
_Emden_ and avoid the necessity of moving one of the three Light
Cruisers now hunting _Königsberg_. Numbers are everything, and the
extirpation of these pests is a most important object.

What is the use of _Psyche_, _Pyramus_ and _Philomel_ in New Zealand
waters after the convoy has started? There is nothing but the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ to be considered, and they are
sufficiently dealt with by—

(1) _Australia._

_Montcalm._

(2) First Japanese Squadron.

(3) Second Japanese Squadron.

On the other hand, these three vessels, together with _Pioneer_, would
be good for searching for _Emden_ in company with the faster and more
powerful ships. I propose, therefore, that they should accompany the
Australian and New Zealand convoys home to Indian waters, and should
then join up with the seven Cruisers which will then be under
_Hampshire_ in hunting _Emden_, making a total of ten vessels
available a month from now. The necessary arrangements to enable them,
in spite of their limited fuel capacity, to get to Colombo can easily
be made. In the event of _Emden_ being captured before this
concentration is complete, all these vessels should be sent to assist
in the hunt for _Königsberg_, or, conversely, if _Königsberg_ is
caught, the three Light Cruisers should turn over to the _Emden_. It
is no use stirring about the oceans with two or three ships. When we
have got Cruiser sweeps of 8 or 10 vessels ten or fifteen miles apart
there will be some good prospect of utilising information as to the
whereabouts of the _Emden_ in such a way as to bring her to action.
Such large and decisive measures are much the cheapest and most
satisfactory in the end.

W. S. C.

And again on October 15.

_Sydney_ should escort Australians and thereafter hunt _Emden_.

This shot as will presently be seen went home.

* * * * *

The press and the public were not in a position to understand all that
the Admiralty were doing nor to appreciate the general results achieved.
All they saw at this time was that a few German cruisers were apparently
doing whatever they chose upon the oceans and sinking British
merchantmen day after day. A great deal of discontent began to make
itself heard and felt. I therefore prepared a note for publication in
the hopes of placating our critics.

_October 24, 1914._

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following statement in regard
to the capture and destruction of British merchant ships by German
warships:—

Eight or nine German cruisers are believed to be at large in the
Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. Searching for these
vessels and working in concert under the various Commanders-in-Chief
are upwards of 70 British (including Australian), Japanese, French,
and Russian cruisers, not including auxiliary cruisers. Among these
are a number of the fastest British cruisers. The vast expanses of sea
and ocean and the many thousand islands of the archipelagos offer an
almost infinite choice of movement to the enemy’s ships. In spite of
every effort to cut off their coal supply, it has hitherto been
maintained by one means or another in the face of increasing
difficulties.

The discovery and destruction of these few enemy cruisers is therefore
largely a matter of time, patience, and good luck. The public should
have confidence that the Commanders-in-Chief and the experienced
captains serving under them are doing all that is possible and taking
the best steps to bring the enemy to action. They have so far been
also occupied in very serious and important convoy duty, but this work
has somewhat lessened and the number of searching cruisers is
continually augmented.

Meanwhile, merchant ships must observe Admiralty instructions, which
it is obviously impossible to specify, and use all the precautions
which have been suggested. On routes where these instructions have
been followed, they have so far proved very effective. On the other
hand, where they have been disregarded captures have been made. The
same vastness of sea which has so far enabled the German cruisers to
avoid capture will protect the trade.

The only alternative to the methods now adopted would be the
marshalling of merchantmen in regular convoys at stated intervals. So
far it has not been thought necessary to hamper trade by enforcing
such a system. The percentage of loss is much less than was reckoned
on before the war. Out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade
only 39 have been sunk by the enemy, or just under 1 per cent. in all.

The rate of insurance for cargoes, which on the outbreak of war was
fixed at 5 guineas per cent., has now been reduced to 2 guineas per
cent. without injury to the solvency of the fund. For hulls, as apart
from cargoes, the insurance has also been considerably reduced.
Between 8,000 and 9,000 foreign voyages have been undertaken to and
from United Kingdom ports, less than five per thousand of which have
been interfered with, and of these losses a large number have been
caused by merchant vessels taking everything for granted and
proceeding without precautions as if there were no war.

On the other hand, the German oversea trade has practically ceased to
exist. Nearly all their fast ships which could have been used as
auxiliary cruisers were promptly penned into neutral harbours or have
taken refuge in their own. Among the comparatively few German ships
which have put to sea, 133 have been captured, or nearly four times
the number of those lost by the very large British mercantile marine.

In these circumstances, there is no occasion for anxiety and no excuse
for complaint. On the contrary, the more fully the facts concerning
our oversea trade and its protection by the Royal Navy can be
disclosed, and the more attentively they are studied, the greater will
be the confidence and satisfaction with which the situation can be
viewed.

The various changes of plan necessary to meet the natural anxieties of
the New Zealand Government entailed a delay of three weeks in the
sailing of the Australian convoy. This, Lord Kitchener declared, made no
difference, as they could continue their indispensable training equally
well in Australia. By October 25, when the convoy was about to sail, the
rebellion in South Africa introduced another disturbing element. It was
decided by the Cabinet on that date to make arrangements for the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to come via the Cape instead of
via the Suez Canal, so as to be available in South Africa if need be.
Alternative arrangements of a complicated nature were therefore
prepared. On the 30th, however, in view of later advices from South
Africa, it was arranged for the whole convoy to proceed together to
Colombo and for the decision about the last part of the route to be
delayed until then. The convoy started on November 1 under the escort of
the _Minotaur_, _Ibuki_, _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_.

Before they reached Colombo the Sydney found her quarry and the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was more needed in Egypt than at
the Cape. But this will appear in its proper place.

* * * * *

It remained to carry the Canadian Army across the Atlantic. Upwards of
25,000 volunteers of a very high individual quality, partially trained
in Valcartier camp, were embarked in the St. Lawrence in a convoy of
thirty-one ships, to which were added two ships carrying the
Newfoundland contingent and a British battalion from Bermuda.
Rear-Admiral Wemyss with a squadron of light cruisers was entrusted with
the actual duties of escort, but the essential protection of the convoy
was secured by far more distant and powerful agencies. All the Cruiser
Squadrons of the Grand Fleet were spread in two lines between the coasts
of Norway and Scotland to guard against a sortie by the German fast
vessels, and the Grand Fleet itself remained at sea in their support to
the northward. The North American Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hornby
covered the German merchant cruisers which were lurking in New York
Harbour. Two old battleships, the _Glory_ and the _Majestic_, were
ordered to meet the convoy at a rendezvous well off the beaten track,
and Admiral Hornby himself in the _Lancaster_ accompanied them the first
portion of the route. Lastly, the _Princess Royal_ was detached from the
Grand Fleet to meet the convoy in mid-Atlantic and thus guard against
any German battle-cruiser which might conceivably have slipped through
the wide areas patrolled by Sir John Jellicoe. The movements of the
_Princess Royal_ were kept secret from everybody, and even the Canadian
Government, in spite of their natural anxiety, were denied this
reassurance.

The convoy sailed on October 3 and ten days later safely approached the
mouth of the English Channel. The intention had been to disembark the
Canadian troops at Portsmouth, where all arrangements had been made for
them. But on the very day they were due to arrive a German submarine was
reported off Cherbourg and another was sighted off the Isle of Wight by
the Portsmouth Defence Flotilla. On this we insisted, whatever the
military inconvenience, on turning the whole convoy into Plymouth.
During October 14 this armada bearing the first flower of the martial
spirit of Canada was safely berthed in Plymouth Sound.

[Illustration:

GENERAL SITUATION OVERSEAS EARLY IN OCTOBER 1914.

The chart includes battleships, battle-cruisers, cruisers, light
cruisers, sloops and armed merchant cruisers.

Armoured vessels are shown in capitals, but otherwise no attempt has
been made to discriminate between classes.

Allied vessels have been included where their presence affects the
situation. They are distinguished by having the initial letter of
their nationality placed after their names.

F. French.
J. Japanese.
R. Russian.
]

With this event, all the initial movements in the Imperial concentration
had been completed. They had comprised the transportation of the
equivalent of 5 divisions from India to Europe and their replacement by
3 divisions of Territorials from England; the collection of the 7th and
8th divisions from all the garrisons and fortresses of the British
Empire with consequential replacements from home and from India; the
transportation of approximately two divisions from Canada to England;
and lastly—though this was not finished till December—that of
approximately two divisions from Australia and New Zealand to Egypt. The
effect of this concentration was to add a reinforcement of 5 British
regular divisions (7th, 8th, 27th, 28th and 29th) and 2 Anglo-Indian
divisions to the regular forces immediately available to support the 6
regular divisions with which we had begun the war, raising our Army in
France by the end of November to approximately 13 divisions of highly
trained long-service troops. In addition the 4 Canadian and Australian
divisions were completing their training in England and Egypt, and were
held to be in a more advanced state of preparation than the 10 divisions
of Territorials which remained in England or the 24 divisions of the New
Armies which Lord Kitchener was raising. The whole business of
transportation by sea while all the enemy’s cruisers were still at large
had been conducted without accident of any kind or without the loss of a
single ship or a single life.

CHAPTER XIV
IN THE NARROW SEAS

‘This battle fares like to the morning’s war,
When dying clouds contend with growing light,
What time the shepherd, blowing of his nails,
Can neither call it, perfect day nor night.
Now sways it this way, like a mighty sea,
Forced by the tide to combat with the wind;
Now sways it that way, like the selfsame sea,
Forced to retire by fury of the wind:
Some time the flood prevails, and then the wind;
Now one the better, then another best;
Both tugging to be victors, breast to breast,
Yet neither conquerors nor conquered:
So is the equal poise of the fell war.’
HENRY VI. PART III.

Action of August 28 in the Heligoland Bight—Fate of the German Light
Cruisers—Paralysis of German Naval Enterprise—The Ostend
Demonstration—The Royal Naval Air Service—The Air Situation at the
Outbreak of War—The Admiralty take Charge at Home—The Zeppelin
Menace and the ‘Hornets’—Offence the true Defence—Beginning of the
Dunkirk Guerrilla—Samson’s Aeroplanes—The Armoured Cars—First dawn
of the Tank idea—General Joffre’s request—The Omnibus Brigade—An
Embarrassing Responsibility—The Sinking of the _Aboukir_, _Hogue_
and _Cressy_.

I now have to chronicle a brilliant episode which came at a most timely
moment and throughout which we enjoyed the best of good luck. My
insistent desire to develop a minor offensive against the Germans in the
Heligoland Bight led to conferences with Commodore Tyrwhitt, who
commanded the light cruisers and destroyers of ‘The Harwich Striking
Force,’ and Commodore Keyes, the head of the Submarine Service also
stationed at Harwich. On August 23 Commodore Keyes called personally
upon me at the Admiralty with a proposal for ‘a well-organised drive
commencing before dawn from inshore close to the enemy’s coast.’ On the
24th I presided at a meeting in my room between him and Commodore
Tyrwhitt and the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff.

The plan which the two Commodores then outlined was at once simple and
daring. Since the first hours of the war our submarines had prowled
about in the Heligoland Bight. They had now accumulated during a period
of three weeks accurate information about the dispositions of the enemy.
They knew that he was in the habit of keeping a flotilla of destroyers
attended by a couple of small cruisers, cruising and patrolling each
night to the North of Heligoland, and that these were accustomed to be
relieved shortly after daylight by a second flotilla which worked on a
much less extended beat. They proposed to take two flotillas of our best
destroyers and two light cruisers from Harwich by night and reach just
before dawn a point inside the Northern Coast of the Heligoland Bight
not far from the island of Sylt. From this point they would make a
left-handed scoop inshore, falling upon and chasing back the outcoming
flotilla if they met it, and then would all turn together in a long line
abreast Westward towards home to meet and if possible destroy the
incoming German flotilla. Six British submarines in two divisions would
take part in the operation so as to attack the German heavy ships should
they come out, and two battle-cruisers (the _Invincible_ and _New
Zealand_) then stationed at the Humber would act as support.

Such was in short the plan proposed by these officers and approved by
the First Sea Lord. Action was fixed for the 28th. As soon as Sir John
Jellicoe was informed of these intentions, he offered to send in further
support three battle-cruisers and six light cruisers. He did more. He
sent Sir David Beatty. The result was a success which far exceeded the
hopes of the Admiralty, and produced results of a far-reaching character
upon the whole of the naval war.

At dawn on the 28th, Admiral Tyrwhitt’s flotillas, led by the _Arethusa_
and _Fearless_, reached their point of attack and, in the words of
Admiral Scheer, ‘broke into the Heligoland Bight.’ The enemy was taken
by surprise. The weather near the land was increasingly misty. The
Heligoland batteries came into action, but without effect. The German
battleships and battle-cruisers could not cross the bar of the outer
Jade owing to the tide till 1 p.m. Only the German light cruisers on
patrol or close at hand in the Elbe or the Ems could come to the aid of
their flotillas. A confused, dispersed and prolonged series of combats
ensued between the flotillas and light cruisers and continued until
after four o’clock in the afternoon. During all this time the British
light forces were rampaging about the enemy’s most intimate and
jealously guarded waters.

Very little, however, turned out as had been planned. Owing to a
mischance, arising primarily from a fault in Admiralty staff work, the
message apprising Commodores Keyes and Tyrwhitt of the presence of
Admiral Beatty with his additional battle cruisers and light cruisers,
did not reach them in time; nor was Admiral Beatty aware of the areas in
which the British submarines were working. Several awkward
embarrassments followed from this and might easily have led to
disastrous mistakes. However, fortune was steady, and the initial
surprise together with the resolute offensive carried us safely through.
The German light cruisers precipitately proceeding to the assistance of
their flotillas and animated by the hopes of cutting off our own, ran
into the British battle-cruisers. Admiral Beatty, in spite not only of
the risk of mines and submarines, but also—for all he could know—of
meeting superior forces, had with extraordinary audacity led his
squadron far into the Bight. Two enemy cruisers (the _Ariadne_ and the
_Köln_) were smashed to pieces by the enormous shells of the Lion and
the _Princess Royal_: a third (the _Mainz_) was sunk by the light
cruisers and destroyers. Three others (the _Frauenlob_, _Strassburg_ and
the _Stettin_) limped home with many casualties. One German destroyer
was sunk. The rest in the confusion and light mist escaped, though
several were injured.

The good news trickled into the Admiralty during the day, but for some
time we were very anxious about the _Arethusa_. A feed-pipe had been
smashed by a shell and her steaming power was reduced to seven or eight
knots. However, she returned unmolested to the Thames.

Not a single British ship was sunk or, indeed, seriously injured; and
our casualties did not exceed thirty-five killed and about forty
wounded, in spite of the fact that, in the words of the German
Lieutenant Tholens, ‘The English ships made the greatest efforts to pick
up the survivors.’[59] Two hundred and twenty-four Germans, many
desperately wounded, were rescued in circumstances of much danger by
Commodore Keyes on the destroyer _Lurcher_, and brought to England.
Considerably more than a thousand Germans, including the Flotilla
Admiral and the Destroyer Commodore, perished. A son of Admiral von
Tirpitz was among the prisoners. Much more important, however, than
these material gains was the effect produced upon the morale of the
enemy. The Germans knew nothing of our defective Staff work and of the
risks we had run. All they saw was that the British did not hesitate to
hazard their greatest vessels as well as their light craft in the most
daring offensive action and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt
as we should have felt had German destroyers broken into the Solent and
their battle-cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab. The results of this
action were far-reaching. Henceforward the weight of British naval
prestige lay heavy across all German sea enterprise. Upon the Emperor
the impression produced was decisive. Thus Scheer (p. 57): ‘The
restrictions imposed on the Battle Fleet were adhered to.’ And still
more explicit, von Tirpitz (p. 357): ‘... August 28th, a day fateful,
both in its after effects and incidental results, for the work of our
navy.... The Emperor did not want losses of this sort.... Orders were
issued by the Emperor ... after an audience to Pohl, to which I as usual
was not summoned, to restrict the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief
of the North Sea Fleet: the loss of ships was to be avoided, fleet
sallies and any greater undertakings must be approved by His Majesty in
advance,’ etc. On von Tirpitz protesting against ‘this muzzling policy’
... ‘there sprang up from that day forth an estrangement between the
Emperor and myself, which steadily increased.’

The German Navy was indeed ‘muzzled.’ Except for furtive movements by
individual submarines and minelayers not a dog stirred from August till
November. Meanwhile our strength, both offensive afloat and defensive in
our harbours, was steadily and rapidly increasing.

The news of this naval action reached the French and British armies in
the dark hour before the dawn of victory and was everywhere published to
the retreating troops.[60]

* * * * *

As the German armies pressed forward towards Paris they turned the back
of their right shoulder increasingly towards the sea. The Belgian Army
making a sortie from Antwerp struck towards the German lines of
communication and endeavoured to hamper and delay the great advance. In
order to help the Belgians and to take some pressure off our own
hard-pressed Army, the Admiralty, in consultation with Lord Kitchener,
attempted to make a diversion. A brigade of Marines was disembarked,
covered by warships (Aug. 26), at Ostend in the hopes that it would
attract the attention of the enemy and give him the impression that
larger forces would follow from the sea.

_Telegram to Belgian Government._

25. 8. 14.

‘In order to delay southward German advance and to create diversion
favourable to the forward movement of the Belgian Army, Admiralty wish
to send a brigade of Marines, 3,000 strong, to Ostend at daylight,
26th, covered by battleships and cruisers accompanied by an aeroplane
squadron. This brigade will push out reconnaissances to Bruges,
Thourout, and Dixmude, and will remain at Ostend to cover the
disembarkation of a larger force should circumstances render that
desirable. Do you agree? If so, please send the necessary instructions
to your local authorities. Publicity is useful in this case. The
impression to be produced is that a considerable British army is
landing.’

_Orders to General Aston._

25. 8. 14.

‘1. At daylight to-morrow, if circumstances allow, you will disembark
such portions of your brigade as have arrived at Ostend and occupy the
town. You will push out reconnaissances of cyclists to Bruges,
Thourout, and Dixmude. You will establish yourself at Ostend, forming
an entrenched picket line around the town in such a way as to enable
you to cover the debarkation of a Division of the Army. A squadron of
aeroplanes will reach you before noon, having previously made an
aerial reconnaissance of the country within 30 miles of Ostend. The
aeroplanes will be placed under your orders.

‘2. The object of this movement is to create a diversion, favourable
to the Belgians, who are advancing from Antwerp and to threaten the
western flank of the German southward advance. It should therefore be
ostentatious. You should not advance inland from Ostend without
further orders, but some enterprise may be permitted to the patrols.
Information about the enemy will be supplied you personally at the
Admiralty.

‘The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable force of
the enemy were attracted to the coast. You will be re-embarked as soon
as this is accomplished.’

To give further publicity I announced in the House of Commons that a
British force had begun landing at Ostend. The Marines remained on shore
for the best part of a week and were then withdrawn. The old battleships
and cruisers which covered them were no doubt in more danger from
submarines than we thought at the time, but no mishap occurred; nor was
there any loss ashore or afloat. There was no means at the time of
knowing whether this petty operation exercised any appreciable influence
on German movements. We now know that it was certainly a factor. The
Head of the Operations Branch of the German General Staff in his
narrative shows that the news of this landing reached Main Headquarters
on August 30. He says:—

‘One day countless British troops were said to have landed at Ostend
and to be marching on Antwerp; on another that there were about to be
great sorties from Antwerp. Even landings of Russian troops, 80,000
men, at Ostend were mentioned. At Ostend a great entrenched camp for
the English was in preparation.’

General Dupont, the French Director of Military Intelligence, goes much
further and ranks the Belgian sortie as a culminating element in the
German decision to make a general retreat, taken on September 10.[61]

An unbroken chain of events drew the Admiralty again to the Belgian
Coast; and to explain this a digression is necessary.

Before the war the British air force was divided into the Royal Flying
Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, the former of which were to be
concerned with aeroplanes and the latter with hydro-aeroplanes, or
seaplanes as I christened them for short. The War Office claimed on
behalf of the Royal Flying Corps complete and sole responsibility for
the aerial defence of Great Britain. But owing to the difficulties of
getting money, they were unable to make any provision for this
responsibility, every aeroplane they had being earmarked for the
Expeditionary Force. Seeing this and finding myself able to procure
funds by various shifts and devices, I began in 1912 and 1913, to form
under the Royal Naval Air Service flights of aeroplanes as well as of
seaplanes for the aerial protection of our naval harbours, oil tanks and
vulnerable points, and also for a general strengthening of our exiguous
and inadequate aviation. In consequence I had in my own hand on the eve
of the war fifty efficient naval machines, or about one-third of the
number in possession of the Army. The War Office viewed this development
with disfavour, and claimed that they alone should be charged with the
responsibility for home defence. When asked how they proposed to
discharge this duty, they admitted sorrowfully that they had not got the
machines and could not get the money. They adhered however to the
principle.

When the war began the situation foreseen arose. The whole of the
military aeroplanes went to France at once with the Expeditionary Force,
and not a single squadron or even an effective machine remained to guard
British vulnerable points from German aerial attack. The Admiralty was,
however, found provided with a respectable force of its own which
immediately took over the protection of our dockyards and patrolled our
shores in connection with the coast watch.

As the Germans overran Belgium and all the Channel ports were exposed,
the danger of air attacks upon Great Britain became most serious and
real. Zeppelins had already cruised over Antwerp, and it was known that
London was in range of the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Cologne. To
meet this danger there was nothing except the naval aeroplanes the
Admiralty had been able to scrape and smuggle together. On September 3
Lord Kitchener asked me in Cabinet whether I would accept, on behalf of
the Admiralty, the responsibility for the aerial defence of Great
Britain, as the War Office had no means of discharging it. I thereupon
undertook to do what was possible with the wholly inadequate resources
which were available. There were neither anti-aircraft guns nor
searchlights, and though a few improvisations had been made, nearly a
year must elapse before the efficient supplies necessary could be
forthcoming. Meanwhile at any moment half a dozen Zeppelins might arrive
to bomb London or, what was more serious, Chatham, Woolwich or
Portsmouth.

I rated the Zeppelin much lower as a weapon of war than almost any one
else. I believed that this enormous bladder of combustible and explosive
gas would prove to be easily destructible. I was sure the fighting
aeroplane, rising lightly laden from its own base, armed with incendiary
bullets, would harry, rout and burn these gaseous monsters. I had
proclaimed this opinion to the House of Commons in 1913, using the
often-quoted simile of the hornets.

I therefore did everything in my power in the years before the war to
restrict expenditure upon airships and to concentrate our narrow and
stinted resources upon aeroplanes. I confined the naval construction of
airships to purely experimental limits, and in April, 1915, when the
slow progress and inferior quality of our only rigid experimental
airship were manifest, I gave orders that it should be scrapped, the
plant broken up and the labour and material devoted to increasing the
output of aeroplanes. Had I had my way, no airships would have been
built by Great Britain during the war (except the little ‘Blimps’ for
teasing submarines). After I left the Admiralty this policy was
reversed, and forty millions of money were squandered by successive
Boards in building British Zeppelins, not one of which on any occasion
ever rendered any effective fighting service. Meanwhile the alternative
policy of equipping the Fleet with aerial observation by flying
aeroplanes off warships or off properly constructed carriers lagged
pitifully with the result that at the Battle of Jutland we had no
British airships and only one aeroplane in the air.

The hornet theory, at one time so fiercely derided, was, of course,
ultimately vindicated by the war. Zeppelins were clawed down in flames
from the sky over both land and sea by aeroplanes until they did not
dare to come any more. The aeroplane was the means by which the Zeppelin
menace was destroyed, and it was virtually the only means, apart from
weather and their own weakness, by which Zeppelins were ever destroyed.

However, although my thought was perfectly sound in principle and the
policy following from it was unquestionably right, we were not in a
position at the beginning of the war to produce effective results.
Aeroplane engines were not powerful enough to reach the great heights
needed for the attack of Zeppelins in the short time available. Night
flying had only just been born; the location of aircraft by sound was
unknown; the network of telephones and observation points was
non-existent. And here was the danger, certainly real and not easy to
measure, literally on top of us.

It was easy to order the necessary guns, searchlights, etc., and set on
foot the organisation which should produce and employ them. But it was
no use sitting down and waiting for a year while these preparations were
completing. Only offensive action could help us. I decided immediately
to strike, by bombing from aeroplanes, at the Zeppelin sheds wherever
these gigantic structures could be found in Germany and secondly, to
prevent the erection of any new Zeppelin sheds in the conquered parts of
Belgium or France. Here again the policy was right. Our resources were,
however, feeble and slender. Compared to the terrific developments at
the end of the war, they were pitiful. Still, they were all we had, and
all that our knowledge of aviation at that time could bestow.
Deficiencies in material had to be made good by daring. All honour to
the naval airmen, the pioneers of the aerial offensive, who planned and
executed in these early months the desperate flights over hostile
territory in an element then scarcely known, which resulted in the raids
on Düsseldorf and Cologne on the Rhine, Friedrichshaven on Lake
Constance, and Cuxhaven in the Heligoland Bight. Altogether in the first
twelve months of the war six Zeppelins were destroyed in the air or in
their sheds by the offensive action of a handful of British naval
airmen; and few were destroyed by any other agency except accident.

In order to strike at the Zeppelin sheds in Germany and to prevent the
erection of new ones in Belgium, it was necessary to start from as near
the enemy’s line as possible. Extracts from my own minutes, principally
to Captain Sueter, the enterprising and energetic Director of the Air
Division, give as good an account as any other.

_September 1, 1914._

Director of Air Division.
Chief of Staff.

The largest possible force of naval aeroplanes should be stationed in
Calais or Dunkirk. Reports have been received, and it is also
extremely probable, that the Germans will attempt to attack London and
other places by Zeppelin airships, of which it is said a considerable
number exist. The close proximity of the French coast to England
renders such an attack thoroughly feasible. The proper defence is a
thorough and continual search of the country for 70 to 100 miles
inland with a view to marking down any temporary airship bases, or
airships replenishing before starting to attack. Should such airships
be located they should be immediately attacked. Commander Samson, with
Major Gerrard as second in command, will be entrusted with this duty;
and the Director of Air Division will take all steps to supply them
with the necessary pilots, aeroplanes and equipment.

_September 3, 1914._

Secretary.
Director of Air Division.
Third Sea Lord.

Aerial searchlights must immediately be got ready for use in
conjunction with the aerial guns. Propose me without delay the
quickest means of meeting this need, with estimates of time and money.
At least thirty or forty aerial searchlights are required.
‘Vernon’[62] should co-operate. Drastic and energetic action is
required.

2. Let me have a return on one sheet of paper showing all
anti-aircraft guns, regular or improvised, available afloat and
ashore, at the present time; and what deliveries may be expected in
the next two months. Let me have also any suggestions for increasing
their number. No one can doubt that aerial attack upon England must be
a feature of the near future.

_September 5, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of Air Division.

There can be no question of defending London by artillery against
aerial attack. It is quite impossible to cover so vast an area; and if
London, why not every other city? Defence against aircraft by guns is
limited absolutely to points of military value....

Far more important than London are the vulnerable points in the Medway
and at Dover and Portsmouth. Oil-tanks, power-houses, lock-gates,
magazines, airship sheds, all require to have their aerial guns
increased in number. Portsmouth in particular requires attention now
that enemy’s territory has come so near.

Aerial searchlights must be provided in connection with every group of
guns....

But, after all, the great defence against aerial menace is to attack
the enemy’s aircraft as near as possible to their point of departure.
Director of Air Division has already received directions on this. The
principle is as follows:—

(_a_) A strong oversea force of aeroplanes to deny the French and
Belgian coasts to the enemy’s aircraft, and to attack all Zeppelins
and air bases or temporary air bases which it may be sought to
establish, and which are in reach.

(_b_) We must be in constant telegraphic and telephonic communication
with the oversea aeroplane squadrons. We must maintain an intercepting
force of aeroplanes and airships at some convenient point within range
of a line drawn from Dover to London, and local defence flights at
Eastchurch and Calshot.

(_c_) A squadron of aeroplanes will be established at Hendon, also in
telephonic communication with the other stations, for the purpose of
attacking enemy aircraft which may attempt to molest London. Landing
grounds must be prepared in all the parks; railings must be removed,
and the area marked out by a large white circle by day and by a good
system of lighting at night. It is indispensable that airmen of the
Hendon flight should be able to fly by night, and their machines must
be fitted with the necessary lights and instruments.

Agreeably with the above, instructions must be prepared for the
guidance of the Police, Fire Brigade, and civil population under
aerial bombardment. This will have to be sustained with composure.
Arrangements must be concerted with the Home Office and the Office of
Works for the extinction of lights upon a well-conceived plan, for the
clearance and illumination in the parks, in order that the defending
aeroplanes can have freedom of action, etc.

The whole of the points dealt with in this minute are to be elaborated
and put into precise detail this afternoon by a Committee composed as
follows:—

Third Sea Lord (in the Chair).

Director of Air Division.

Director of Naval Ordnance.

And a representative of the War Office from either the Master General
of the Ordnance or Home Defence Department.

I expect to receive not later than to-morrow a definite programme for
action within the lines of this minute.

The whole matter is of the highest urgency.

_September 5, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Air Division.

In order to discharge adequately the responsibilities which we have
assumed for the aerial defence of England, it is necessary that we
should maintain an aerial control over the area approximately 100
miles radius from Dunkirk. To do this, we must support the aeroplanes
which are stationed on the French coast with sufficient armed motor
cars and personnel to enable advanced subsidiary aeroplane bases to be
established 30, 40 and 50 miles inland.

According to all accounts received, the Germans, in so far as they
have penetrated this region, have done it simply by bluff. Small
parties of Uhlans, taking advantage of the terror inspired by their
atrocities in Belgium, have made their way freely about the country,
and have imposed themselves upon the population. We require, in the
first instance, 200 or 300 men with 50 or 60 motor cars, who can
support and defend our advanced aerial bases. I should propose to draw
these by suitable volunteers from the Marine Brigade. They should be
placed under the orders of Commander Samson, and should operate from
Dunkirk. It will be necessary first to obtain permission from the
French authorities. This, after consultation with Lord Kitchener, I am
taking steps to do. We ought to be able to make it quite impossible
for parties of 15 or 20 Uhlans to make their way with safety through
this area. During the next week the Germans will presume on their
immunity, and will be found in occupation of numbers of places where
they cannot possibly maintain any effective force. The advantage of an
aeroplane reconnaissance is that the approach of any serious body of
troops can be discovered while it is still at least two days’ march
away. There ought, therefore, to be no difficulty in chopping these
small parties of the enemy without our force getting into any trouble.

Propose me plans for immediate action on these lines in detail.

_October 2, 1914._

Secretary.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of the Air Division.

The experiments with regard to projectiles for use against aircraft
must be worked out on the most generous scale, eight or ten different
lines being pursued simultaneously, the necessary funds being
provided. It is perfectly useless in time of war to go through
successively the whole series of experiments appropriate to peace-time
administration. Let me have a report on the projectiles available. We
must have means of attacking Zeppelins, not only with shells from
guns, but with incendiary bullets or grenades from aeroplanes.

The needs and activities of the naval aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of
Dunkirk led directly to the development of the armoured car, and the
armoured car led directly to the birth of the tank, which was in essence
only an armoured car capable of crossing trenches. Almost immediately
after the German inroad into Belgium, I received accounts of the
remarkable work done by a Belgian motor-car, hastily equipped with
armour and a machine gun, in shooting down and driving back the numerous
Uhlans with which the enemy were seeking to overrun the country.
Commander Samson was prompt to realise and seize the advantage of
armoured cars for the purpose of protecting his aeroplane operations and
also on their own account. In view of the reports received from him and
other sources, I gave, during the latter part of August and September,
successive orders for the formation of armoured-car squadrons under the
Admiralty; and as all this arose out of the aeroplane squadron stationed
at Dunkirk, the formation of the armoured-car squadrons was entrusted to
Commodore Sueter. In this task this officer displayed great energy, and
in a very short time no less than seven or eight squadrons were called
into being, based on the purchase of all the Rolls-Royce cars that were
available and rapidly improvised armour protection.

The first few cars had scarcely begun to show their advantages in
Commander Samson’s guerrilla from Dunkirk when the difficulty which
ultimately led to the creation of the tank manifested itself. The German
cavalry sought to protect themselves against the attack of the armoured
cars by digging trenches across the road.

To meet this, I gave the following directions:—

_September 23, 1914._

Colonel Ollivant.
Director of Air Division.
Royal Naval Division Administration.

It is most important that the motor transport and armed motor-cars
should be provided to a certain extent with cars carrying the means of
bridging small cuts in the road, and an arrangement of planks capable
of bridging a ten- or twelve-feet span quickly and easily should be
carried with every ten or twelve machines. A proportion of tools
should also be supplied.

Let me have proposals at once.[63]

Other conditions, however, swept down upon us very quickly, and by the
middle of October, after the events to be narrated in the next chapters,
the trench lines on both sides reached the sea and became continuous
over the whole front. Thus at the moment when the new armoured-car force
was coming into effective existence at much expense and on a
considerable scale, it was confronted with an obstacle and a military
situation which rendered its employment practically impossible. The
conclusion was forced naturally and obviously upon me, and no doubt upon
others, that if the armoured car on which so much money and labour had
been spent could not move _round_ the enemy’s trenches and operate
against an open flank of his army, some method should be devised which
would enable it to traverse and pass _over_ the trenches themselves.
This subject will, however, be dealt with in its proper place.

The air was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car
was the child of the air; and the tank its grandchild.

But besides all this the undefended condition of the Channel ports
against any serious effort by the enemy inspired the Admiralty with
lively alarm. The danger of the Germans taking Dunkirk, Calais and
Boulogne stared us in the face for many anxious weeks. On September 3 I
minuted to the First Sea Lord:—

‘With the Germans along the French coast, modified dispositions will
become necessary. The danger from aerial attack must not be
underrated. The possibility of the Germans taking very heavy guns to
Calais after taking the town, and getting submarines down from the
Elbe to operate from Calais as a base, should also be considered. We
could of course stop any surface craft, but submarines might slip
through secretly and be a great nuisance when once established.

On the 10th September I went to Dunkirk myself and was to some extent
reassured. I made the following note at the time for the information of
those concerned:—

‘_September 11, 1914._

‘The First Lord visited Dunkirk and Calais on the 10th instant, and
conferred with the Governors of both places.

‘Dunkirk is being defended on a considerable scale, and has already
developed substantial strength. Lines of defence are constructed on a
radius of 4 to 6 miles approximately from the enceinte of the town,
which are armed by over 400 pieces of artillery and held by 18,000
men. These works, which are strongly executed, can be further
protected by large inundations both of fresh and salt water. The fresh
water inundations are now accumulating; the salt can be turned on at
any time in two days. The place should certainly require a siege in
form to reduce it, and it is getting stronger every week. The First
Lord promised the assistance of warships if required to cover the
flanks. The anchorage at Dunkirk gives sufficient water for the
_Majestic_ class, and is certainly close to the shore. The high
sandhills would require the fire to be indirect, but otherwise there
would be no difficulty. There is nothing to cause disquietude in the
measures taken for the defence of Dunkirk. It seems probable that they
are sufficient to make it not worth while for the enemy to undertake
the reduction of the fortress.

‘Calais is simply an enceinte rather larger in extent than that of
Dunkirk, and protected by a few well-executed outlying fieldworks. All
that can be said about Calais is that it could not be taken by a _coup
de main_. It is garrisoned by 7,000 troops, but it could certainly not
be counted on to hold out for more than a few days against a
determined attack.’

In the third week of September Marshal Joffre telegraphed to Lord
Kitchener asking whether a Brigade of Marines could not be sent to
Dunkirk to reinforce the garrison and to confuse the enemy with the
idea of British as well as French forces being in this area. Lord
Kitchener asked me whether the Admiralty would help in this matter.
I agreed to send the brigade if he would also send some Yeomanry
Cavalry for its local protection. He sent a regiment. I was thus
led, though by no means unwillingly, into accepting a series of
minor responsibilities of a very direct and personal kind, which
made inroads both upon my time and thought and might well—though I
claim they did not—have obscured my general view. I formed a small
administration to handle the business, in which Colonel Ollivant[64]
was the moving spirit. On his suggestion we took fifty motor
omnibuses from the London streets so as to make our Marines as
mobile as possible, and very soon we had British detachments
ostentatiously displaying themselves in Ypres, Lille, Tournai and
Douai. Many risks were run by those engaged in these petty
operations, first under General Aston and subsequently when his
health had failed, under General Paris. No mishap occurred either to
the Marines or to the Yeomanry. They played their part in the
general scheme without loss or misadventure. It was, however, with
sincere relief that a month later, on the arrival of the leading
troops of Sir John French’s Army in the neighbourhood, I transferred
these detachments to the Commander-in-Chief, and divested myself of
anxieties which though subsidiary were burdensome.

Looking back with after-knowledge and increasing years, I seem to have
been too ready to undertake tasks which were hazardous or even forlorn.
Taking over responsibility for the air defence of Great Britain when
resources were practically non-existent and formidable air attacks
imminent was from a personal point of view “some love but little
policy.” The same is true of the Dunkirk guerrilla. Still more is it
true of the attempt to prolong the defence of Antwerp which will be
related in the next chapter. I could with perfect propriety, indeed with
unanswerable reasons, have in every one of these cases left the burden
to others. I believed, however, that the special knowledge which I
possessed, and the great and flexible authority which I wielded in this
time of improvisation, would enable me to offer less unsatisfactory
solutions of these problems than could be furnished in the emergency by
others in less commanding positions. I could at that time give
directions over a very large and intricate field of urgent and swiftly
changing business which were acted upon immediately by a great variety
of authorities who otherwise would have had no common connecting centre.
So I acted for the best, with confidence in the loyalty of my
colleagues, in the goodwill of the public, and, above all, in my own
judgment which I seemed to see confirmed from day to day by many
remarkable events.

* * * * *

This chapter, which began with good luck and success, must end, however,
with misfortune. The original War Orders had been devised to meet the
situation on the outbreak of hostilities. They placed the pieces on the
board in what we believed to be the best array, and left their future
disposition to be modified by experience. Under these orders the 7th
Cruiser Squadron in the Third Fleet, consisting of the old cruisers of
the _Bacchante_ class (_Bacchante_, _Euryalus_ (flagship), _Cressy_,
_Aboukir_, _Hogue_), was based on the Nore ‘in order to ensure the
presence of armoured ships in the southern approaches of the North Sea
and eastern entrance to the Channel, and to support the 1st and 3rd
Flotillas operating in that area from Harwich.’ The object of these
flotillas was ‘to keep the area south of the 54th parallel clear of
enemy torpedo craft and minelayers.’ The Cruiser Force was ‘to support
them in the execution of these duties and also, with the flotillas, to
keep a close watch over enemy war vessels and transports in order that
their movement may be reported at the earliest moment.’

This very necessary patrol had accordingly been maintained day after day
without incident of any kind happening, and we had now been six weeks at
war. In war all repetitions are perilous. You can do many things with
impunity if you do not keep on doing them over and over again.

It was no part of my duty to deal with the routine movements of the
Fleet and its squadrons, but only to exercise a general supervision. I
kept my eyes and ears open for every indication that would be useful,
and I had many and various sources of information. On September 17,
during my visit to the Grand Fleet, I heard an expression used by an
officer which instantly arrested my attention. He spoke of ‘the
live-bait squadron.’ I demanded what was meant, and was told that the
expression referred to these old cruisers patrolling the narrow waters
in apparently unbroken peace. I thereupon reviewed the whole position in
this area. I discussed it with Commodore Tyrwhitt and with Commodore
Keyes. The next morning I addressed the following minute to the First
Sea Lord:—

_September 18, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

The force available for operations in the narrow seas should be
capable of minor action without the need of bringing down the Grand
Fleet. To this end it should have effective support either by two or
three battle cruisers or battleships of the Second Fleet working from
Sheerness. This is the most efficiently air and destroyer patrolled
anchorage we possess. They can lie behind the boom, and can always be
at sea when we intend a raid. Battle cruisers are much to be
preferred.

The _Bacchantes_ ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such
ships is not justified by any services they can render. The narrow
seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small
number of good modern ships.

The _Bacchantes_ should go to the western entrance of the Channel and
set Bethell’s battleships—and later Wemyss’ cruisers—free for convoy
and other duties.

The first four _Arethusas_ should join the flotillas of the narrow
seas.

I see no sufficient reason to exchange these flotillas now that they
know their work with the northern ones.

As the “M” boats are delivered they should be formed into a separate
half-flotilla and go north to work with the Grand Fleet.

The _King Alfred_ should pay off and be thoroughly repaired.

Prince Louis immediately agreed and gave directions to the Chief of the
Staff to make the necessary redistribution of forces. With this I was
content, and I dismissed the matter from my mind, being sure that the
orders given would be complied with at the earliest moment. Before they
could take effect, disaster occurred.

Pending the introduction of the new system, the Admiralty War Staff
carried on with the old. The equinoctial weather was, however, so bad
that the destroyer flotillas were ordered back to harbour by the Admiral
commanding the _Bacchante_ squadron. That officer, however, proposed to
continue his patrol in the Dogger area with the cruisers alone. The
Admiralty War Staff acquiesced in the principle of these arrangements
but on the 19th instructed him to watch instead the Broad Fourteens:—

‘The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for
destroyers to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to watch Broad
Fourteens.’

This routine message did not of course come before me. It was not sent,
however, by the War Staff without proper consideration. In the short
steep seas which are the features of gales in these narrow waters, a
submarine would be at a serious disadvantage and could only observe with
extreme difficulty and imperfection. The rough weather which drove in
our destroyers was believed to be an important protection against enemy
submarines.

Both Admiral and Admiralty, therefore, were in agreement to leave the
cruisers at sea without their flotilla. If the weather moderated, it was
intended that one of Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flotillas should join them
there on the morning of the 20th. The sea, however, continued so high on
the 20th that the flotilla, led by the _Fearless_, had to turn back to
Harwich. Thus all through the 19th, 20th and 21st the three cruisers,
the _Aboukir_, _Cressy_ and _Hogue_, were left to maintain the watch in
the narrow waters without a flotilla screen. The Admiral in the
_Euryalus_ had to return to harbour on the 20th to coal his ship. He
left the squadron in command of the senior captain after enjoining
special precautions. There was no more reason to expect that they would
be attacked at this time than at any other. On the contrary, rumours of
German activity to the northward had brought the whole Grand Fleet out
in a southerly sweep down to the line between Flamborough Head and the
Horn Reef. Nor was there any connection between the orders to these
cruisers and the movement of the Marine Brigade from Dover to Dunkirk
which took place on the 20th. The cruisers were simply fulfilling their
ordinary task, which from frequent repetition had already become
dangerous and for which they were not in any case well suited.

As soon as the weather began to abate on the 21st, Commodore Tyrwhitt
started off again for the Broad Fourteens with eight destroyers, and was
already well on his way when the morning of the 22nd broke. As the sea
subsided, the danger from submarines revived. The three cruisers,
however, instead of going to meet their destroyers, steamed slowly
northward without zigzagging and at under ten knots, as no doubt they
had often done before. Meanwhile a single German submarine, becoming
more venturesome every day, was prowling southward down the Dutch coast.
At 6.30 a.m., shortly after daylight, the _Aboukir_ was struck by a
torpedo. In twenty-five minutes this old vessel capsized. Some of her
boats were smashed by the explosion, and hundreds of men were swimming
in the water or clinging to wreckage. Both her consorts had hurried with
chivalrous simplicity to the aid of the sinking ship. Both came to a
dead standstill within a few hundred yards of her and lowered all their
boats to rescue the survivors. In this posture they in their turn were
both sunk, first the _Hogue_ and then the _Cressy_, by the same
submarine. Out of over 2,000 men on board these three ships, only 800
were saved, and more than 1,400 perished. The ships themselves were of
no great value: they were among the oldest cruisers of the Third Fleet
and contributed in no appreciable way to our vital margins. But like all
Third Fleet ships, they were almost entirely manned with reservists,
most of whom were married men; and they carried also young cadets from
Osborne posted for safety to ships which it was thought would not be
engaged in the great battles. This cruel loss of life, although small
compared to what the Army was enduring, constituted the first serious
forfeit exacted from the Navy in the war. It greatly stimulated and
encouraged the enterprise of the German submarines. The commander of the
fatal boat (Lieutenant Weddigen) was exultingly proclaimed as a national
hero. Certainly the destruction with his own fingers of fourteen hundred
persons was an episode of a peculiar character in human history. But, as
it happened, he did not live long to enjoy his sombre fame. A storm of
criticism was directed at the Admiralty, and naturally it was focussed
on me. ‘Here was an instance of the disaster which followed from the
interference of a civilian Minister in naval operations and the
overriding of the judgment of skilful and experienced Admirals.’ The
writer[65] of a small but venomous brochure which was industriously
circulated in influential circles in London did not hesitate to make
this charge in the most direct form,[66] and it was repeated in
countless innuendoes throughout the British Press. I did not, however,
think it possible to make any explanation or reply.

I caused the most searching inquiries to be made in the Admiralty into
the responsibility for this tragic event. The necessary Court of Inquiry
was convened. The Court found that the responsibility for the position
of the cruisers on that day was attributable to the Admiralty War Staff
telegram of the 19th which has been already quoted. The First Sea Lord
held that this was a reflection upon the Admiralty by a subordinate
Court; but it seemed to me that the criticism was just and that it
should stand. It was, however, by no means exhaustive. One would expect
senior officers in command of cruiser squadrons to judge for themselves
the danger of their task, and especially of its constant repetition; and
while obeying any orders they received, to represent an unsatisfactory
situation plainly to the Admiralty instead of going on day after day,
and week after week, until superior authority intervened or something
lamentable happened. One would expect also that ordinary precautions
would be observed in the tactical conduct of squadrons. Moreover,
although the impulse which prompted the _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ to go to
the rescue of their comrades in the sinking _Aboukir_ was one of
generous humanity, they could hardly have done anything more unwise or
more likely to add to the loss of life. They should at once have steamed
away in opposite directions, lowering boats at the first opportunity.

I remitted all these matters to Lord Fisher when two months later he
arrived at the Admiralty; but he laconically replied that ‘most of the
officers concerned were on half pay, that they had better remain there,
and that no useful purpose would be served by further action.’

CHAPTER XV
ANTWERP

‘If Hopes were dupes, Fears may be liars,
It may be in yon smoke conceal’d,
Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers,
And but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves vainly breaking
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent flooding in the main.’
CLOUGH.

The Battle of the Marne—The Race for the Sea—Antwerp, the True
Flank—Admiralty Concern about Antwerp—The Neutrality of the
Scheldt—Opening of the Siege of Antwerp, September 28—Lord
Kitchener’s Plans—Belgian Decision to Evacuate Antwerp—Conference
at Lord Kitchener’s House, Midnight, October 2—British Ministers
urge further Resistance—My Mission to Antwerp—French Aid
Promised—The Situation in Antwerp, October 3—My Proposals to the
Belgian and British Governments—Progress of the German
Attack—Strange Contrasts—Acceptance of my Proposals by British and
Belgian Governments—Chances of Success—Relief Approaching—Fighting
of October 5—The Belgian Night Attack Fails—The Front broken in,
October 6—Arrival of the British Naval Brigades—Arrival of Sir
Henry Rawlinson—Decisions of British and Belgian Council of War,
Night of October 6—The Personal Aspect—Five Days Gained.

It is not possible to understand the British attempt to prolong the
defence of Antwerp without seeing the episode in its true setting. The
following is a simple way of reviewing the military operations in the
West up to the point which this account has now reached.

The German armies swept through Belgium intending to turn and drive back
the French left and left centre. At the same time after a diversion in
Alsace the French centre struck forward on either side of Metz at the
German left and left centre. The French hoped that this counter-stroke
would rupture the German line and paralyse the turning movement through
Belgium. However, after the whole fronts had been in collision for
several days of intense battle, it appeared that the French
counter-stroke had not ruptured the German line, and that the turning
movement through Belgium had succeeded in driving back the French left.
Thus by the twentieth day the French right was thrown on to the
defensive and their three armies of the left and left centre and the
British army were in full retreat southward towards Paris. The Germans
therefore were completely successful in the first main shock.

But henceforward the French right stood like a rock in front of Nancy
under General de Castelnau, and at the Trouée des Charmes under General
Dubail, and the Germans sustained a series of bloody checks. Meanwhile
the French left and centre by retreating for five marches extended the
pursuing Germans to the utmost while falling back themselves on their
own reserves and supplies. And by September 6 (the 37th day) the French
armies turned and assumed the offensive on the whole front of 120 miles
from Paris to Verdun. In addition a new French army under General
Maunoury had come into existence to the north of Paris which attacked
the German right, and all the time the resistance of the Nancy army (de
Castelnau) and of the army of General Dubail on its right continued
unbreakable. Thus from September 6 the whole of the French and German
armies and the British Expeditionary Force were locked in general battle
on a front of over 180 miles, with practically every division and all
their reserves on both sides thrown in.

This battle, which lasted for four days, was the greatest of the war.
The Germans aimed not at the capture of Paris or Verdun or Nancy, but at
the final destruction of the French military power. Had they succeeded
in breaking the French front between Paris and Verdun or in falling upon
its rear from the direction of Nancy, nearly half the French Army,
certainly more than a million men, would have been cut off in the Verdun
angle. The rest, whatever happened in the neighbourhood of Paris, would
have had to retreat to the southward and would never again have been
numerous enough to form a complete front. Compared with stakes like
these, the entry into Paris by the German right flank or the capture of
the Channel Ports by a couple of German corps were insignificant and
rightly discarded by the German Headquarters. Once the French Army was
cut in half and finally beaten, everything would fall into their hands.
They therefore directed all their available troops to the battlefield,
ignored the Channel Ports, and compelled von Kluck, commanding their
right army, to skirt Paris and close in to their main battle front. How
near they were to success will long be debated and never decided. But
certainly they were within an ace. No military reproach lies upon their
disregard of other objectives: but only upon any failure to disregard
them. It is not to their neglect to enter Paris or seize Calais that
their fatal defeat was due, but rather to the withdrawal of two German
army corps to repel the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

The soul of the French nation triumphed in this death struggle, and
their armies, defeated on the frontier, turned after the long marches of
retreat, and attacked and fought with glorious and desperate tenacity.
British attention has naturally been concentrated upon the intense
military situation developed before and around Paris, in which our own
army played a decisive part; and the various pressures which operated
upon von Kluck have now been minutely exposed. Attacked on his right
flank and rear by Maunoury’s army while advancing to the main
battlefield, he was compelled to counter-march first two of his corps
and then his two remaining corps in order to make head against the new
danger. Thus a gap of 30 miles was opened in the German line between von
Kluck and von Bülow. Into this gap marched the battered but reanimated
British army. The tide had turned. But the whole of this great situation
about Paris was itself only complementary to the battle as a whole. The
gaze of the military student must range along the whole line of the
French armies, the defeat of any one of which would have been fatal.
Most of all his eye will rest upon the very centre of the Paris-Verdun
line, where Foch though driven back maintained his resistance. ‘My
centre cedes. My right recoils. Situation excellent. I attack.’ But all
the four French armies between Paris and Verdun fought with desperate
valour, while Dubail and de Castelnau round the corner maintained their
superb defence. And thus, weakened by its rapid advance, the whole
German line came to a standstill. And as this condition was reached, the
penetration by the British and by the Fifth French army on the British
right, of the gap in the German line between von Bülow and von Kluck
determined both these commanders in succession to retreat, and thus
imposed a retrograde movement upon the whole of the invading hosts. ‘The
most formidable avalanche of fire and steel ever let loose upon a
nation’ had spent its force.

From the moment when the German hopes of destroying the French armies by
a general battle and thus of ending the war at a single stroke had
definitely failed, all the secondary and incidental objectives which
hitherto they had rightly discarded became of immense consequence. As
passion declined, material things resumed their values. The struggle of
armies and nations having failed to reach a decision, places recovered
their significance, and geography rather than psychology began to rule
the lines of war. Paris now unattainable, the Channel Ports—Dunkirk,
Calais and Boulogne—still naked, and lastly Antwerp, all reappeared in
the field of values like submerged rocks when the tidal wave recedes.

The second phase of the war now opened. The French, having heaved the
Germans back from the Marne to the Aisne, and finding themselves unable
to drive them further by frontal attacks, continually reached out their
left hand in the hopes of outflanking their opponents. The race for the
sea began. The French began to pass their troops from right to left.
Castelnau’s army, marching behind the front from Nancy, crashed into
battle in Picardy, striving to turn the German right, and was itself
outreached on its left. Foch’s army, corps after corps, hurried by road
and rail to prolong the fighting front in Artois; but round the left of
this again lapped the numerous German cavalry divisions of von der
Marwitz—swoop and counter-swoop. On both sides every man and every gun
were hurled as they arrived into the conflict, and the unceasing
cannonade drew ever northwards and westwards—ever towards the sea.

Where would the grappling armies strike blue water? At what point on the
coast? Which would turn the other’s flank? Would it be north or south of
Dunkirk? Or of Gravelines or Calais or Boulogne? Nay, southward still,
was Abbeville even attainable? All was committed to the shock of an
ever-moving battle. But as the highest goal, the one safe inexpugnable
flank for the Allies, the most advanced, the most daring, the most
precious—worth all the rest, guarding all the rest—gleamed Antwerp—could
Antwerp but hold out.

Antwerp was not only the sole stronghold of the Belgian nation: it was
also the true left flank of the Allied front in the west. It guarded the
whole line of the Channel Ports. It threatened the flanks and rear of
the German armies in France. It was the gateway from which a British
army might emerge at any moment upon their sensitive and even vital
communications. No German advance to the sea-coast, upon Ostend, upon
Dunkirk, upon Calais and Boulogne, seemed possible while Antwerp was
unconquered.

My own feeling at the outbreak of the war had been that if the right
things were done, Antwerp ought to hold out for two or even three
months, that is to say, until we knew the result of the main collision
of the armies on all the fronts—French, Russian, Austrian. I rested my
thought on Metz and Paris in 1870–71, Plevna in 1878, Port Arthur in
1904. The fall of Namur unsettled these foundations. Still Antwerp, even
apart from its permanent fortifications, was a place of great strength,
fortified by rivers and inundations, and defended by all that was best
in the Belgian nation and by practically its whole Field Army.

I was from the beginning very anxious to do everything that could be
done out of our slender resources to aid the Belgian King and nation to
maintain their stronghold, and such small items as the Admiralty could
spare in guns and ammunition were freely sent. The reports which we
received from Antwerp and the telegrams of the Belgian Government
already at the beginning of September began to cause me deep concern. So
also did the question of the Scheldt, whose free navigation both for
troops and munitions seemed vital to the Belgian people.

I thought that Antwerp should be made to play its part in the first
phase of the war by keeping as many German troops as possible out of the
great battle. If the Belgian Army defending the city could be
strengthened by British troops, not only would the defence be
invigorated, but the Germans would be continually apprehensive of a
British inroad upon them from this direction, the deadliness of which
Lord Roberts’s strategic instinct had so clearly appreciated. It was
true that we had no troops in England fit to manœuvre in the field
against the enemy. But the defence of the fortified lines of Antwerp was
a task in which British Territorial troops might well have played their
part. Accordingly on September 7 I sent a memorandum to the Prime
Minister, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Kitchener emphasising the importance
of Antwerp, particularly from the naval standpoint:—

[Illustration: ANTWERP and the Belgian Coast 1914]

‘The Admiralty view the sustained and effective defence of Antwerp as
a matter of high consequence. It preserves the life of the Belgian
nation: it safeguards a strategic point which, if captured, would be
of the utmost menace.’

In order to save Antwerp, two things were necessary: first, effective
defence of the fortress line; and second, free uninterrupted
communication with the sea. The first was tolerably well provided for by
the Belgian Army which could easily be reinforced by British Territorial
troops. But the second essential, the free communication with the sea,
was a larger matter, and in it were involved our relations with the
Dutch. I proposed that we should request the Dutch Government to give a
free passage up the Scheldt to Antwerp for whatever troops and supplies
were needed. I pointed out further that it was impossible to try to
supply an army at Antwerp by Ostend and Ghent; that the appeals which
the Belgians were then making to us to send 25,000 troops to co-operate
with an equal number of Belgian troops for the purpose of keeping open
the line Antwerp-St. Nicholas-Ghent-Bruges-Ostend was a counsel of
despair.

‘It involves practically a flank position for a line of supply
protected by forces large enough to be hit hard and perfectly
powerless against any determined German attack which it is thought
worth while to deliver. At any moment a punch up from Brussels by a
German division or larger force would rupture the line, and drive the
troops trying to hold it to be disarmed on neutral Dutch territory or
into the sea.’

I dwelt on the disadvantages to the Allies of a neutrality which kept
the Rhine open for Germany and closed the Scheldt to Antwerp.

As these questions are still of some delicacy I have thought it better
to summarise rather than reprint my memorandum. But I draw the reader’s
attention to the date—September 7.

I still think that strong representations to the Dutch Government might
well have induced them to grant this relief to Antwerp and the Belgian
nation in their agony. The original guarantee of Belgian neutrality was
given to the Government of the Netherlands, and it would have been a
natural and legitimate demand that they should put no needless obstacle
in the way of its fulfilment. The sympathies of Holland for the
sufferings of Belgium were naturally restrained by the fear of sharing
her fate. But a neutral Holland was of far more use to Germany than a
hostile, a conquered, or even an allied Holland. Once Holland was
attacked by or allied to Germany we could close the Rhine, and if we
were in alliance with Holland, the Texel and other Dutch islands of
enormous strategic importance would become available for the forward
action of the British Navy. We should in fact have that oversea base
without which a British naval offensive was impossible. I do not
therefore believe that if Holland had agreed to open the Scheldt for the
succour of Antwerp, Germany would have declared war upon her. There
would have been a long argument about interpretations of neutrality in
which the Germans, after their behaviour, would have started at a great
disadvantage. I still think that if Holland could have said to Germany
‘the English are threatening us with a blockade of the Rhine if we do
not open the Scheldt,’ Germany would have accepted the lesser of two
evils.

The Foreign Secretary did not, however, feel able to put this grave
issue to the Dutch Government. Neither did Lord Kitchener wish to use
the British Territorial Divisions in the manner proposed, and while
adhering to my own opinion I certainly do not blame him. He would not
send any Territorials into Antwerp, nor was anything effective done by
the Allies for the city during the whole of September. From the moment
when German Main Headquarters had extricated and reformed their armies
after the failure at the Marne, the capture of Antwerp became most
urgently necessary to them. Accordingly on the afternoon of September 9,
as is now known, the German Emperor was moved to order the capture of
that city. Nothing was apparent to the Allies until the 28th. The
Belgian and German troops remained in contact along the fortress line
without any serious siege or assaulting operations developing. But on
the 28th the Germans suddenly opened fire upon the forts of the Antwerp
exterior lines with 17–inch howitzers hurling projectiles of over a ton.

Almost immediately the Belgian Government gave signs of justified alarm.
British intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were seriously
undertaking the siege of Antwerp, that their operations were not
intended as a demonstration to keep the Belgian troops occupied or to
protect the lines of communication. Information had come from Brussels
that the Emperor had ordered the capture of the town, that this might
cost thousands of lives, but that the order must be obeyed. Large bodies
of German reserve troops were also reported assembling near Liége. In
view of all these reports it was evident that the rôle of our small
British force of marines, omnibuses, armoured cars, aeroplanes, etc.,
operating from Dunkirk was exhausted. They had no longer to deal with
Uhlan patrols or raiding parties of the enemy. Large hostile forces were
approaching the coastal area, and the imposture whereby we had remained
in occupation of Lille and Tournai could be sustained no longer.

Lord Kitchener was disquieted by the opening of the bombardment upon the
Antwerp forts. He immediately sent (on September 29) a staff officer,
Colonel Dallas, into the city to report direct to him on the situation.
On the evening of October 1 this officer reported that:—

‘The Belgian War Minister considered the situation very grave. Did not
think that resistance to the German attack could be maintained by
defensive measures only within the fortress. That the only way to save
Antwerp from falling was by a diversion from outside on the German
left flank. That the French had offered a division and that he looked
forward to co-operation by an English force also if that could be
arranged.’

The minister had also said

‘That a Belgian cavalry division and some volunteers, and possibly two
divisions of the Belgian Field Army would be able to assist in the
operation which would be most effective in the neighbourhood of
Ghent.’

The Commander of the Antwerp fortress also considered the situation
grave, and while Colonel Dallas was with him a message arrived to say
that Fort Ste. Catherine had fallen, that the German troops had pressed
forward between it and the adjoining work, and had occupied the Belgian
infantry trenches at this point.

Colonel Dallas further reported that according to the Belgian
headquarters the German Army in Belgium comprised—‘Siege army,
consisting of the 3rd Reserve Army Corps, 1 division of marines, 1
Ersatz reserve division, 1 brigade of _Landsturm_, 2 regiments of
pioneers, 1 regiment of siege artillery.’ And that ‘The troops of the
Military Government of Brussels consist of a weak _Landwehr_ brigade and
some Bavarian _Landsturm_, number unknown.’

The Belgian Field Army was about 80,000 strong, in addition to which
there were some 70,000 fortress troops. Four divisions of the Belgian
Army were defending the southern portion of the outer perimeter of the
Antwerp defences, with the 5th Division in reserve, and one weak
division was at Termonde. A cavalry division of about 3,600 sabres was
south-west of Termonde guarding communications between Antwerp and the
coast. Ghent was held by some volunteers.

On the night of October 1, Sir F. Villiers reported that

‘On southern section of the outer line of forts German attacks
continued to-day, and in the afternoon the enemy’s troops disabled
fort Wavre, Ste. Catherine and adjoining works, and occupied Belgian
trenches at this point.’

The Belgian troops were, however, still holding out on the Belgian side
of the River Nethe.

Lord Kitchener now showed himself strongly disposed to sustain the
defence or effect the relief of Antwerp, and to use the regular forces
he still had in England for this purpose, provided the French would
co-operate effectively. Early in the afternoon of October 2 he moved Sir
Edward Grey to send the following telegram to the British Ambassador at
Bordeaux:—

‘The French Government should be informed that military advisers here
consider that in view of the superior forces Germany has in the field
there, the dispatch of a French Territorial division with the
additions proposed in ten days’ time, together with the force we are
prepared to send, would not be able effectively to force the Germans
to raise the siege of Antwerp.

‘Unless something more can be done they do not advise the dispatch of
the force. We are sending some heavy artillery with personnel to
assist Belgians.

‘Situation at Antwerp is very grave, and French Government will fully
realise the serious effect on the campaign that would be entailed by
its loss.

‘Unless the main situation in France can be decided favourably in a
short time, which would enable us to relieve Antwerp by detaching a
proper force, it is most desirable that General Joffre should make an
effort and send regular troops to region of Dunkirk, from which post
they could operate in conjunction with our reinforcements to relieve
Antwerp.

‘We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by themselves
to raise the siege of Antwerp, and we cannot send them to co-operate
with any but French regulars.

‘If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable action in
France in two or three days the relief of Antwerp may be made the
outcome of that, but if not, unless he now sends some regular troops
the loss of Antwerp must be contemplated.’

All he was able to send to Antwerp was the following:—

‘Be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French forces
arriving quickly to relieve Antwerp. The matter has not been decided,
as the Territorial division offered by France in ten days’ time would,
in my opinion, be quite incapable of doing anything towards changing
the situation at Antwerp. I have represented this. Unless a change is
made, I consider it would be useless to put in our little force
against the very superior German forces in the field round Antwerp.’

He then entered in some detail upon the few guns he was sending, giving
particular directions about the use of the two 9·2’s.

Up to this point I had not been brought into the affair in any way. I
read, of course, all the telegrams almost as soon as they were received
or dispatched by Lord Kitchener, and followed the situation constantly.
I warmly approved the efforts which Lord Kitchener was making to provide
or obtain succour for Antwerp, and I shared to the full his anxieties. I
saw him every day. But I had no personal responsibility, nor was I
directly concerned. My impression at this time was that the situation at
Antwerp was serious but not immediately critical; that the place would
certainly hold out for a fortnight more; and that meanwhile Lord
Kitchener’s exertions or the influence of the main battle in France
would bring relief. So much was this the case that I proposed to be
absent from the Admiralty for about eighteen hours on the 2nd–3rd
October.

I had planned to visit Dunkirk on October 3 on business connected with
the Marine Brigade and other details sent there at General Joffre’s
request. At 11 o’clock on the night of the 2nd I was some twenty miles
out of London on my way to Dover when the special train in which I was
travelling suddenly stopped, and without explanation returned to
Victoria Station. I was told on arrival I was to go immediately to Lord
Kitchener’s house in Carlton Gardens. Here I found shortly before
midnight besides Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, the First Sea Lord,
and Sir William Tyrrell of the Foreign Office. They showed me the
following telegram from our Minister, Sir Frederick Villiers, sent from
Antwerp at 8.20 p.m. and received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2:—

The Government have decided to leave to-morrow for Ostend, acting on
advice unanimously given by Superior Council of War in presence of the
King. The King with field army will withdraw, commencing with advanced
guard to-morrow in the direction of Ghent to protect coast-line, and
eventually it is hoped to co-operate with the Allied armies. The Queen
will also leave.

It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems
most unlikely that when the Court and Government are gone resistance
will be so much prolonged.

Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly
critical situation. I have seen both Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who maintain that no other course was possible, in
view of danger that the King’s Government and field army will be
caught here.

I saw that my colleagues had received this news, which they had already
been discussing for half an hour, with consternation. The rapidity with
which the situation had degenerated was utterly unexpected. That the
great fortress and city of Antwerp with its triple line of forts and
inundations, defended by the whole Belgian Field Army (a force certainly
equal in numbers to all the German troops in that neighbourhood), should
collapse in perhaps forty-eight hours seemed to all of us not only
terrible but incomprehensible. That this should happen while
preparations were in progress both in France and England for the relief
or succour of the city, while considerable forces of fresh and good
troops undoubtedly stood available on both sides of the Channel, and
before General Joffre had even been able to reply to Lord Kitchener’s
telegram, was too hard to bear. We looked at each other in bewilderment
and distress. What could have happened in the last few hours to make the
Belgians despair? Our last telegram from Colonel Dallas, received that
afternoon, had said: ‘Situation unchanged during night and Germans have
not made further progress. Great slaughter of Germans reported and
corresponding encouragement to Belgians, who are about to undertake
counter-attack in neighbourhood of Fort Ste. Catherine.’ And now a
message at 10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and impending fall!

Those who in years to come look back upon the first convulsions of this
frightful epoch will find it easy with after knowledge and garnered
experience to pass sagacious judgments on all that was done or left
undone. There is always a strong case for doing nothing, especially for
doing nothing yourself. But to the small group of Ministers who met that
midnight in Lord Kitchener’s house, the duty of making sure that Antwerp
was not cast away without good cause while the means of saving it might
well be at hand was clear. I urged strongly that we should not give in
without a struggle: and we decided unitedly upon the following telegram
to Sir F. Villiers:—

_October 3, 1914_, 12.45 a.m.

The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till
the course of the main battle in France is determined. We are trying
to send you help from the main army, and, if this were possible, would
add reinforcements from here. Meanwhile a brigade of Marines will
reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one
further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make the difference.
We hope Government will find it possible to remain and field army to
continue operations.

On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Government to hold
out against their considered judgment without a full knowledge of the
local situation was present in every mind, and even if the forces for
the relieving army were to come into view, there was much to be arranged
and decided before precise dates and definite assurances could be given.
We were confronted with the hard choice of having either to take
decisions of far-reaching importance in the utmost haste and with
imperfect information, or on the other hand tamely to let Antwerp fall.

In these circumstances, it was a natural decision that some one in
authority who knew the general situation should travel swiftly into the
city and there ascertain what could be done on either side. As I was
already due at Dunkirk the next morning, the task was confided to me:
Lord Kitchener expressed a decided wish that I should go; the First Sea
Lord consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence. It was then
about half-past one in the morning. I went at once to Victoria Station,
got into my train which was waiting, and started again for Dover. A few
minutes before I left, Lord Kitchener received the answer to his
telegram of the 2nd from the British Ambassador in Bordeaux. Sir Francis
Bertie said that before he could carry out the instructions sent him
about Antwerp, he had received a letter from the French Foreign Minister
stating that with the shortest delay possible two Territorial Divisions,
complete with artillery and cavalry, would be sent to Ostend for the
relief of the fortress. This was to be without prejudice to what the
French Government expected to do very soon in respect of ‘a contemplated
combined movement, French, British and Belgian, on the extreme left of
General Joffre’s armies which indirectly would have the effect of
causing German troops in the neighbourhood of Antwerp to retreat, and so
effect its relief.’ The French Government, he said, could not go back on
their decision to employ Territorials. The French Foreign Minister
declared that the Territorials were good troops, better in some respects
than some of the Regulars, and that they were sending two divisions
complete, with artillery and cavalry, instead of one. Sir Francis Bertie
added that the French Government had received reports from its Attaché
in Antwerp stating that ‘though the military situation there was not
good, it could not be regarded as really bad. The Germans had suffered
severe losses in the attacks which they had made on some of the outer
works. Those attacks had not been simultaneous, which fact indicated
that the Germans were not in great force, had only a limited siege train
and not more than two army corps before Antwerp.’

Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m. October 3) by Sir Edward
Grey to the Belgian Government saying that I would arrive on the morning
of the 3rd.

‘It is hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is fully
acquainted with our views, may have the honour of an audience with the
King before a final decision as to the departure of the Government is
taken.’

On this the Belgian Council of War, sitting at dawn on the 3rd,
suspended the order for the evacuation of the city.

‘I communicated at once with Minister of War,’ telegraphed Sir F.
Villiers, October 3, 6.37 a.m. ‘He summoned a meeting of Ministers,
who, after deliberation, informed me that, awaiting arrival of First
Lord they had decided to postpone departure. Audience with King for
Mr. Churchill will be arranged for at as early an hour as possible.’

* * * * *

Lord Kitchener now threw himself into the task of concentrating and
organising a relieving Army. He telegraphed at 9.40 a.m. on October 3
asking the French War Minister to make all preparations to send the
proposed two divisions with cavalry and artillery complete as soon as
possible and to let him know how soon they could be dispatched. He was
asked in reply whether he would prefer one Territorial Division with a
complete brigade of _Fusiliers Marins_. He replied that he preferred the
two divisions, and that the question of time was of the greatest
importance and urgency. He was told, however, that it had been decided
to send the _Fusiliers Marins_ after all. He replied that whichever was
most convenient to the French should be sent, so long as it was sent
with the least delay possible. He telegraphed to his Staff Officer in
Antwerp, Colonel Dallas, at 2.15 p.m. October 3:—

‘What force in your opinion would suffice? Give full details of what
troops are most required to deal with the situation in co-operation
with the Belgian Field Army.

‘The French Government say they will send two divisions with full
complement of cavalry and artillery, but I do not yet know when they
will be available. If a corps of our troops, under Sir John French,
together with the 7th Division, and cavalry division from here, [were]
concentrated at Lille in order to attack the right flank of the main
German Army and drive it back, would this action, if accomplished in
about four or five days, in your opinion, relieve the situation at
Antwerp quickly enough to prevent the fall of the place, or must any
troops employed to relieve Antwerp be sent there via Zeebrugge, and,
if so, can you give me approximately the longest time we can have to
get troops there, so that I can inform the French Government?’

At 7.35 on the same afternoon the composition of the French contingent
was received from the British Ambassador:—

‘87th Territorial Division from Havre, under General Roy, consisting
of 12 battalions of infantry, 2 groups of artillery (90–millimetre
guns), 2 squadrons of reserve cavalry (Dragoons), now being formed at
Dunkirk, 1 engineer company, headquarters and staff and usual services
attached to a division.

‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade, under command of Rear-Admiral Ronarc’h,
will be composed of two regiments of Fusiliers Marins (6,000), 86
mitrailleuses manned by seamen (260), 1 regiment of Zouaves (2,000).
Total of contingent about 23,000 men.

‘The Havre division will embark there on 5th October, and should be
landed at Dunkirk 7th October.

‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade will be sent to Dunkirk by land instead
of by sea. It will arrive at Dunkirk at about same time as the
Territorial division, namely, 7th October.’

* * * * *

I did not reach the city till after 3 p.m., and after consulting with
Colonel Dallas I was visited by the Belgian Prime Minister. Monsieur de
Broqueville was a man of exceptional vigour and clarity both of mind and
speech. He had been called to the helm of the Belgian State at the
moment of the decision not to submit to wrongful aggression. He
explained to me the situation with precision. General de Guise, the
commander of the fortress, added his comments. The outer forts were
falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enormous German
howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their foundations, to destroy
their defenders even in the deepest casemates, and to wreck the
platforms of the guns. Now the forts of the inner line were being
similarly attacked, and there was no conceivable means of preventing
their destruction one after another at the rate of about a fort a day.
The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long
entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for
whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns, ammunition,
searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was scanty. The water
supply of the city had been cut off. There were many rumours of German
sympathisers in its large population. At any moment the front might be
broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in progress.
But this was only half the danger. The life and honour of the Belgian
nation did not depend on Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was
disastrous; to lose the army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred
by a severe interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was
by a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the
sea-coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division were staving
off the Germans from this only remaining line of retreat. But the
pressure was increasing and the line of the Dendre was no longer intact.
If Ghent fell before the Belgian Army made good its retreat, nothing
would be saved from the ruin.

In these circumstances they had decided first to withdraw to what was
called the entrenched camp on the left bank of the Scheldt, that is to
say, towards their right; and, secondly, in the same direction through
Ghent towards the left flank of the Allied armies. These orders had been
suspended in consequence of the telegram from the British Government.

I then exposed Lord Kitchener’s plan and stated the numbers of the
French and British troops already available for the assistance of the
Belgian Army. I emphasised the importance of holding the city and
delaying the Germans as long as possible without compromising the
retreat of the army. I pointed out that the issue of the battle for the
seaward flank still hung in the balance, and that the main armies were
drawing nearer to Belgium every day. I asked whether the relieving
forces mentioned, if actually sent, would influence their decision. They
replied that this was a new situation; that had this help been
forthcoming earlier, events might have taken a different course. Even
now, if their line of retreat were safeguarded by the arrival of Allied
troops in the neighbourhood of Ghent, they were prepared to continue the
resistance. I thereupon drew up, with their approval and agreement, the
following telegram to Lord Kitchener:—

_Antwerp, October 3, 1914_, 6.53 p.m. (_received_ 9.45 p.m.)

‘Subject to confirmation on both sides, I have made following
arrangement with M. de Broqueville, Prime Minister:—

‘Every preparation to be made by Belgian Government now for a
resistance of at least ten days, and every step taken with utmost
energy. Within three days we are to state definitely whether we can
launch big field operation for their relief or not, and when it will
probably take effect. If we cannot give them a satisfactory assurance
of substantial assistance within three days, they are to be quite free
to abandon defence if they think fit. In this case, should they wish
to clear out with field army, we (although not able to launch the big
operation) are to help their field army to get away by sending
covering troops to Ghent or other points on line of retreat. Thus,
anything they will have lost in time by going on defending Antwerp
with all their strength will be made up to them as far as possible by
help on their way out.

‘Further, we will meanwhile help their local defence in all minor
ways, such as guns, marines, naval brigades, etc.

‘I have put the terms high to avoid at all costs our undertaking
anything we could not perform, and also to avoid hurry in our saying
what troops we can spare for big operations. You will be able, as your
telegram No. 7 (to Colonel Dallas) indicates, to do much better than
this, and to give decided promise within three days, but the vital
thing is that Belgian Government and army should forthwith hurl
themselves with revived energy into the defence.

‘Attack is being harshly pressed at this moment, and half measures
would be useless, but Prime Minister informs me that they are
confident they can hold out for three days, pretty sure they can hold
out for six, and will try ten.

‘This arrangement, if adopted, will give time necessary for problem to
be solved calmly.

‘Two thousand marines are arriving this evening.

‘I am remaining here till to-morrow.

‘I have read this telegram to Belgian Prime Minister, who says that we
are in full agreement, subject to ratification by Council of Ministers
which is now being held.

‘If you clinch these propositions, pray give the following order to
the Admiralty: Send at once both naval brigades, minus recruits, via
Dunkirk, into Antwerp, with five days’ rations and 2,000,000 rounds of
ammunition, but without tents or much impedimenta.

‘When can they arrive?’

I had been met on arrival by Admiral Oliver, the Director of the Naval
Intelligence Division. This officer had been sent by the Admiralty on
September 29 to see what could be done to disable the large quantity of
merchant shipping which lay in the Scheldt, so that if the city fell it
could not be used by the Germans for embarking troops to invade England.
He was a great stand-by in this time of stress. Night and day he
laboured on the ships. With the assistance only of a Belgian sapper
officer, four privates and a Belgian boy scout, he inserted explosive
charges between the cylinders of thirty-eight large vessels, and by this
means ruptured the propelling machinery so that not one of them was fit
to go down the Scheldt during the whole of the German occupation.

While waiting for the reply from London that afternoon and also the next
morning, I went out and examined the front: a leafy enclosed country,
absolutely flat; a crescent of peering German kite balloons; a
continuous bombardment; scarcely anything in the nature of an infantry
attack; wearied and disheartened defenders. It was extremely difficult
to get a clear view and so understand what kind of fighting was actually
going on. We were, however, at length able to reach the actual
inundations beyond which the enemy was posted. Entrenching here was
impossible for either side, owing to the water met with at a foot’s
depth. The Belgian pickets crouched behind bushes. There was at that
moment no rifle fire, but many shells traversed the air overhead on
their way to the Belgian lines.

Although the artillery fire of the Germans at Antwerp was at no time
comparable to the great bombardments afterwards witnessed on the Western
Front, it was certainly severe. The Belgian trenches were broad and
shallow, and gave hardly any protection to their worn-out and in many
cases inexperienced troops. As we walked back from the edge of these
inundations along a stone-paved high road, it was a formidable sight to
see on either hand the heavy shells bursting in salvoes of threes and
fours with dense black smoke near or actually inside these scanty
shelters in which the supporting troops were kneeling in fairly close
order. Every prominent building—château, tower or windmill—was
constantly under fire; shrapnel burst along the roadway, and half a mile
to the left a wooded enclosure was speckled with white puffs. Two or
three days at least would be required to make sound breastworks or
properly constructed and drained trenches or rifle pits. Till then it
must be mainly an affair of hedges and of houses; and the ineffective
trenches were merely shell traps.

Antwerp presented a case, till the Great War unknown, of an attacking
force marching methodically without regular siege operations through a
permanent fortress line behind advancing curtains of artillery fire.
Fort after fort was wrecked by the two or three monster howitzers; and
line after line of shallow trenches was cleared by the fire of field
guns. And following gingerly upon these iron footprints, German
infantry, weak in numbers, raw in training, inferior in quality, wormed
and waddled their way forward into ‘the second strongest fortress in
Europe.’

As the fire of the German guns drew ever nearer to the city, and the
shells began to fall each day upon new areas, the streams of country
folk escaping from their ruined homes trickled pitifully along the
roads, interspersed with stragglers and wounded. Antwerp itself
preserved a singular calm. The sunlit streets were filled with people
listening moodily to the distant firing. The famous spires and galleries
of this ancient seat of wealth and culture, the spacious warehouses
along the Scheldt, the splendid hotels ‘with every modern convenience,’
the general air of life, prosperity and civilisation created an
impression of serene security wholly contradicted by the underlying
facts. It was a city in a trance.

The Marines did not arrive until the morning of the 4th, and went
immediately into the line. When I visited them the same evening they
were already engaged with the Germans in the outskirts of Lierre. Here,
for the first time, I saw German soldiers creeping forward from house to
house or darting across the street. The Marines fired with machine-guns
from a balcony. The flashes of the rifles and the streams of flame
pulsating from the mouth of the machine-guns lit up a warlike scene amid
crashing reverberations and the whistle of bullets.

Twenty minutes in a motor-car, and we were back in the warmth and light
of one of the best hotels in Europe, with its perfectly appointed tables
and attentive servants all proceeding as usual!

* * * * *

The reply of the British Government reached me on the morning of the
4th, and I sent it at once to Monsieur de Broqueville.

_Lord Kitchener to First Lord._

‘Am arranging Expeditionary Force for relief of Antwerp as follows:—

‘_British Force._

‘7th Division, 18,000 men, 63 guns, under General Capper. Cavalry
Division, 4,000 men, 12 guns, under General Byng, to arrive at
Zeebrugge 6th and 7th October. Naval detachment, 8,000 men already
there, under General Aston, also Naval and Military heavy guns and
detachments already sent. Head-quarter Staff will be subsequently
notified.

‘_French Force._

‘Territorial Division, 15,000 men, proper complement of guns and 2
squadrons, General Roy, to arrive Ostend 6th to 9th October. Fusilier
Marins Brigade, 8,000 men, under Rear-Admiral Ronarc’h. Grand total,
53,000 men. Numbers are approximately correct.’

Also one from Prince Louis, 10.30 a.m.:—

‘The Naval Brigades will embark at Dover at 4 p.m. for Dunkirk, where
they should arrive between 7 or 8 o’clock. Provisions and ammunition
as indicated in your telegram.’

Monsieur de Broqueville replied:—

_Anvers, le 4 octobre_, 1914n.

J’ai l’honneur de vous confirmer notre accord sur les points envisagés
tantôt.

Comme je vous l’ai dit dès notre première conversation, nous
entendons, coûte que coûte, conserver Anvers. C’est pour nous un
devoir national de premier ordre.

Je tiens à vous répéter aussi que, si nous avons été sérieusement
affectés de ne pas voir nos puissants garants répondre plus tôt à nos
demandes de secours, notre volonté de lutter jusqu’à la mort n’a pas
été affaiblie un seul instant. L’appui des 9,000 fusiliers de marine
envoyés par votre Gouvernement hier et demain est pour la conservation
de la place d’Anvers un appui précieux.

Plus précieux encore est l’envoi de la 7^e division, appuyée par la
3^e division de cavalerie.

Il serait d’extrême importance que ces troupes soient dirigées sur
Gand avec le maximum de célérité: les heures ont en ce moment une
exceptionnelle valeur.

Les hautes autorités militaires et le Gouvernement tout entier,
consultés par moi, acceptent avec une véritable satisfaction l’entente
qui s’est établie entre nous.

Le Gouvernement a appris avec un sentiment de véritable gratitude que,
s’il venait à être fait prisonnier, le Gouvernement de la
Grande-Bretagne ne traiterait pas sans son assentiment des questions
intéressant le sort de la Belgique au moment où se négociera la paix.

Je me félicite tout particulièrement des relations si sympathiques que
je viens d’avoir avec l’éminent homme d’Etat envoyé ici par la grande
nation si hautement appréciée et aimée par la Belgique.

The matter had now passed into the region of pure action. Could Antwerp
resist the enemy’s attack long enough to enable the French and British
relieving force to come to her aid? Secondly, if this succeeded, could
nine or ten Allied divisions at Antwerp and Ghent hold the Germans in
check until the left wing of the main armies, advancing daily from the
south, could join hands with them? In that case the Allied lines in the
west might be drawn through Antwerp, Ghent and Lille. All this turned on
a few days, and even on a few hours.

Judged by the number of troops available on both sides, the chances of
the Allies appeared good. On paper they were nearly twice as strong as
the enemy. But the Belgian Army had been left without aid or comfort too
long. The daily destruction of their trusted forts, the harsh and
unceasing bombardment of a vastly superior artillery, their
apprehensions for their line of retreat, the cruel losses and buffetings
they had suffered since the beginning of the war, had destroyed their
confidence and exhausted their strength.

The prime and vital need was to maintain the defence of Antwerp against
the unceasing artillery attack to which its whole southern front was
exposed. The position behind the river was capable of being made a
strong one. It was, potentially, stronger in many respects than the line
of the Yser, along which a fortnight later this same Belgian Army, in
spite of further losses and discouragements, was to make a most stubborn
and glorious defence. But despondency in the face of an apparently
irresistible artillery, and the sense of isolation, struck a deadly
chill.

Meanwhile, however, help was hurrying forward. The Marines were already
in the line. Armoured trains with naval guns and British bluejackets
came into action on the morning of the 4th. The two Naval Brigades
reached Dunkirk that night, and were due to enter Antwerp on the evening
of the 5th. At the special request of the Belgian Staff they were to be
interspersed with Belgian divisions to impart the encouragement and
assurance that succour was at hand.

The British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, carried daringly
across the water upon personal orders from Prince Louis in the teeth of
submarines, began to disembark at Ostend and Zeebrugge from the morning
of the 6th onward. The French division was embarking at Havre. Admiral
Ronarc’h and his 8,000 Fusiliers Marins were already entrained for
Dunkirk. If only Antwerp could hold out....

Meanwhile, also, it must be remembered, Sir John French was secretly
withdrawing the British Army from the Aisne and moving round behind the
French front to the neighbourhood of St. Omer with the intention of
striking at Lille and beating in the German right. Every day that large
German forces were detained in front of Antwerp helped and covered the
detrainment and deployment of his army and increased its chances of
success. But every day became graver also the peril to the Belgian Army
of being cut off if, after all, the Germans should be the victors in the
main battle.

The anxieties and uncertainties of this tremendous situation had to be
supported by the Belgian chiefs in addition to those of the actual
German attack battering on the crumbling Antwerp front and its exhausted
defenders. That they were borne with constancy and coolness, that the
defence was prolonged for five momentous days, and that although the
Antwerp front was broken in before effective help could arrive, the
Belgian Field Army was safely extricated, was a memorable achievement.

The attitude of the King and Queen through these tense and tragic days
was magnificent. The impression of the grave, calm soldier King
presiding at Council, sustaining his troops and commanders, preserving
an unconquerable majesty amid the ruin of his kingdom, will never pass
from my mind.

Meanwhile Lord Kitchener and Prince Louis continued to give the
necessary orders from London.

I now found myself suddenly, unexpectedly and deeply involved in a
tremendous and hideously critical local situation which might well
continue for some time. I had also assumed a very direct responsibility
for exposing the city to bombardment and for bringing into it the
inexperienced, partially equipped and partially trained battalions of
the Royal Naval Division. I felt it my duty to see the matter through.
On the other hand, it was not right to leave the Admiralty without an
occupant. I therefore telegraphed on the 4th to the Prime Minister
offering to take formal military charge of the British forces in Antwerp
and tendering my resignation of the office of First Lord of the
Admiralty. This offer was not accepted. I have since learned that Lord
Kitchener wrote proposing that it should be. But other views prevailed:
and I certainly have no reason for regret that they did so. I was
informed that Sir Henry Rawlinson was being sent to the city and was
requested to do my best until he arrived.

October 5 was a day of continuous fighting. The situation fluctuated
from hour to hour. I print the telegrams of this day in their sequence:—

10.18 a.m., _October 5_.

I telegraphed to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Line of the Nethe is intact. Marine Brigade holding important sector
north-west of Lierre, has been briskly engaged during the night, with
about seventy casualties so far. It seems not unlikely that the German
attack will be directed on this point, as passage of river is easier
there. I am making sure that they are properly supported by detachment
of artillery. General Paris is doing very well.

‘Later. Infantry attack indicated now appears to be developing.’

12.22 p.m.

‘It is my duty to remain here and continue my direction of affairs
unless relieved by some person of consequence, in view of the
situation and developing German attack. Prospects will not be
unfavourable if we can hold out for next three days. We have a good
deal of ground to sell, if it is well disputed, even if Nethe River is
forced.’

4.45 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to First Lord:—

‘I expect Rawlinson will reach Antwerp to-day. It is most necessary
that Belgians should not give way before the forces now on the sea
arrive for their support. You know date of arrival of troops at Ostend
and Zeebrugge. I cannot accelerate anything owing to difficulties of
navigation. Prince Louis is doing all he can. Are any of the guns we
sent in action? Our 9·2 on line to Lierre ought to be useful. I hope
Belgians realise the importance of holding Termonde so that relieving
force may act promptly on the German left flank. The arrival of our
troops should be kept very secret; by moving at night a surprise might
be possible in the early morning.’

4.45 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Attack has been pressed. Marines have stood well, with some loss,
but, on their right, a regiment has fallen back under shell fire, and
some German infantry to west of Lierre are across Nethe. General Paris
has ordered four Belgian battalions and his reserve battalion to join
another Belgian brigade to drive them back and reoccupy positions.
This is now in progress. Every effort is being made to gain time. At 9
p.m. to-night I am to attend Council of Ministers. I can get no news
of time of arrival of naval brigades. They will be wanted to-morrow
for certain.’

7 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to First Lord:—

‘I hear the Marine Fusilier Brigade had not arrived as expected at
Dunkirk to-day by train. I have in consequence telegraphed to French
Government as follows:—

‘“As the Marine Fusilier Brigade is moving by train, and their arrival
at Antwerp is urgently required, please ask Minister of War to
continue their journey by train to Antwerp.”

‘You might, I think, inform Belgian authorities, so as to have
facilities for this force of 8,000 to proceed to wherever you think
they would be most usefully employed without stopping at Ostend, and
if they have not passed Dunkirk they might be warned of their
destination.’

6.46 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘We now hold all our positions along the Nethe, our counter-attack
having been successful. Germans will probably throw bridges in night
at Lierre. On outskirts of Lierre we are in contact with Germans. I
have just returned from advanced trenches and find marines cheerful
and well dug in.

‘General Paris does not think that he has lost more than 150 men
killed and wounded.

‘I presume you keep Sir John French informed.’

7.15 p.m.

Admiralty to First Lord:—

‘Sir H. Rawlinson just leaving Dunkirk for Antwerp via Bruges, where
he stays to-night. Dunkirk reports naval brigades arrive Antwerp 1
a.m. Tuesday. First six transports, containing 10,000 troops, 2,000
horses, should arrive Zeebrugge from 4 a.m. onwards; 9,000 troops,
2,500 horses, arrive partly at Ostend, mainly at Zeebrugge, Wednesday
morning; 2,500 cavalry, 2,500 horses, arrive partly Ostend, partly
Zeebrugge, Thursday morning.’

8.45 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to Colonel Dallas:—

‘You have been appointed as General Staff Officer on Expeditionary
Force. Warn everybody to keep movement of troops absolutely secret.
Try and bring off a complete or partial surprise on enemy’s left; for
this purpose movements of troops from sea-coast should be as much as
possible at night. Am sending flying squadron, which will, I hope,
protect troops from too inquisitive enemy’s aircraft. Sir Henry
Rawlinson has been appointed to chief command and will shortly arrive
Antwerp.

‘All movements going as arranged.’

In the evening I went to General Paris’ Headquarters on the Lierre road
for the purpose of putting him in command of the other two Naval
Brigades about to arrive. The fire along this road was now heavier.
Shrapnel burst overhead as I got out of the car and struck down a man at
my feet. As we discussed around the cottage table, the whole house
thudded and shook from minute to minute with the near explosions of
shells whose flashes lit the window panes. In such circumstances was it
that General Paris received from the representative of the Admiralty the
command of the Royal Naval Division which he was destined to hold with
so much honour until he fell grievously wounded in his trenches after
three years’ war. This was the most important military command exercised
in the great war by an officer of the Royal Marines.

The general result of the fighting on the 5th raised our hopes. The
counter-attack by one British and nine Belgian battalions drove the
enemy back. All the positions that had been lost were regained, and the
line of the Nethe was almost re-established. At midnight at the Belgian
headquarters General de Guise received in my presence by telephone a
favourable report from every single sector. The enemy had, however,
succeeded in maintaining a foothold across the river, and it seemed
certain they would throw bridges in the night. General de Guise
therefore resolved to make a further counter-attack under the cover of
darkness in the hope of driving the enemy altogether across the river.
At 1 a.m. I telegraphed as follows:—

_Antwerp, October 6_, 1 a.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener and Sir E. Grey:—

‘All well. All positions are held along the Nethe. I hope you will not
decide finally on plan of operations till I can give you my views. I
have met Ministers in Council, who resolved to fight it out here,
whatever happens.

‘No 9·2’s have arrived yet, even at Ostend.’

It was 2 o’clock before I went to bed. I had been moving, thinking and
acting with very brief intervals for nearly four days in Council and at
the front in circumstances of undefined but very direct responsibility.
Certainly the situation seemed improved. The line of the Nethe was
practically intact and the front unbroken. The Naval Brigades, already a
day behind my hopes, were arriving in the morning. By land and sea
troops were hastening forward. All the various personalities and powers
were now looking the same way and working for the same object. France
and Britain, the Admiralty and the War Office, the Belgian Government
and the Belgian Command were all facing in the same direction. Rawlinson
would arrive to-morrow, and my task would be concluded. But what would
the morrow bring forth? I was now very tired, and slept soundly for some
hours.

All through the night the fighting was continual, but no definite
reports were available up till about 9 o’clock. At the Belgian
Headquarters I was told that the Belgian night attack had miscarried,
that the Germans were counter-attacking strongly, that the Belgian
troops were very tired and the situation along the Nethe obscure.
General Paris and the Marine Brigade were also heavily engaged. The
Naval Brigades had arrived and detrained and were now marching to their
assigned positions in the line. But where was the line? It was one thing
to put these partially trained and ill-equipped troops into a trench
line, and quite another to involve them in the manœuvres of a moving
action. Solidly dug in with their rifles and plenty of ammunition, these
ardent, determined men would not be easily dislodged. But they were not
capable of manœuvre. It seemed to me that they should take up an
intermediate position until we knew what was happening on the front.
General Paris was involved in close fighting with his brigade, and had
not been able to take over command of the whole force. It was necessary,
therefore, for me to give personal directions. I motored to the Belgian
Headquarters, told General de Guise that these new troops must have
fixed positions to fight in, and would be wasted if flung in piecemeal.
I proposed to stop them about four miles short of their original
destination as a support and rallying line for the Belgian troops who
were falling back. He agreed that this was wise and right, and I went
myself to see that the orders were carried out.

The moment one left the city gates the streams of wounded and of
fugitives betokened heavy and adverse fighting. Shells from the enemy’s
field artillery were falling frequently on roads and villages which
yesterday were beyond his range. We were by no means sure at what point
the flow of refugees would end and the wave of pursuers begin. However,
by about midday the three Naval and Marine Brigades were drawn up with
the Belgian reserves astride of the Antwerp-Lierre road on the line
Contich-Vremde.

In this position we awaited the next development and expected to be
almost immediately attacked. The Germans to our relief did not molest
the retirement of the three Belgian divisions. They waited to gather
strength and to bring up and use again the remorseless artillery upon
which they were mainly relying. As no German infantry appeared and no
heavy bombardment began, the Naval Brigades moved forward in their turn
and took up positions nearer to where the enemy had halted. I remained
in the line on the Lierre road. Here at about 5 o’clock Sir Henry
Rawlinson joined me.

The General took, as might be expected, a robust view of the situation,
and was by no means disposed to give up the quarrel either on the
Antwerp front or on the line of communications, which were already being
more severely pressed. In fact I found in this officer, whom I had known
for many years, that innate, instinctive revolt against acquiescing in
the will of the enemy which is an invaluable quality in military men.
These sentiments were also shared by Colonel Bridges, former British
military attaché in Belgium, who had arrived from Sir John French. At 7
o’clock a Council of War was held in the Palace under the presidency of
the King. We affirmed the readiness and ability of the British
Government to execute punctually and fully the engagements into which we
had entered two days earlier. But the Belgian chiefs were convinced that
even if the Antwerp front along the line of the Nethe could be restored,
the danger to their communications had become so great that they must
without delay resume the movement of their army to the left bank of the
Scheldt, which had been interrupted three days previously. Here they
conceived themselves able to join hands with any Anglo-French relieving
force while at the same time securing their own retreat on Ghent, which
they had already on September 4 reinforced by a brigade. It was not for
us to contest their view, and events have shown that they were right.
The arrangements set out in the following telegram were made:—

_Antwerp, October 6_, 10.37 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Germans attacked our position along the Nethe early this morning.
Belgian troops on the right of Marine brigade were overpowered.
General retirement with some loss was effected to a lightly entrenched
position on the line Contich-Vremde, where enemy are not for the
moment pressing. Germans will be enabled to bombard city to-morrow
owing to lost ground. In view of this and of complete exhaustion and
imminent demoralisation of Belgian Army, Rawlinson, who has arrived,
has, with my full agreement and that of Belgian General Staff, ordered
a general retirement to inner line of forts. The three naval brigades
will hold intervals between forts and be supported by about a dozen
Belgian battalions. On this line, which is very strong against
infantry attack, our troops can certainly hold out as long as the city
will endure bombardment. Had naval brigades arrived 24 hours earlier,
we could probably have held line of the Nethe. They have not been
engaged, and marines have not lost more than 200 men.

‘This evening Rawlinson and I attended a council of war presided over
by the King. We suggested an attempt to re-establish Anglo-Belgian
forces on line of the Nethe by employing 7th Division in a
counter-attack in 48 hours’ time, but they had all clearly made up
their minds that their army was not in a fit condition to co-operate
in any offensive movement. Accordingly we have arranged with them:—

‘(1.) That while the town endures bombardment General Paris with naval
division and Belgian support will defend inner line forts to the
utmost.

‘(2.) That the rest of the Belgian Field Army shall be immediately
withdrawn across the Scheldt to what they call the entrenched camp of
the left bank. This area is protected by the Scheldt, various forts
and entrenchments, and large inundations, and here they hope to find
time to recover and reform. From this position they will aid to the
best of their ability any relieving movement which may be possible
from the west.

‘(3.) Rawlinson will organise relieving force at Ghent and Bruges and
prepare to move forward as soon as possible.

‘But I shall hope to-morrow to convince you that it should be
strengthened for the operation.

‘We are all agreed that in the circumstances there is no other course
open.

‘I return with Rawlinson to-night to Bruges, and early to-morrow
morning shall be in London.

‘Aviation park and heavy guns will be moved from Antwerp.’

General Rawlinson and I left the city together that night, and after an
anxious drive over roads luckily infested by nothing worse than rumour,
I boarded the _Attentive_ at Ostend and returned to England.

So far as the personal aspect of this story is concerned, I cannot feel
that I deserve the reproaches and foolish fictions which have been so
long freely and ignorantly heaped upon me. I could not foresee that the
mission I undertook would keep me away from the Admiralty for more than
forty-eight hours, or that I should find myself involved in another set
of special responsibilities outside the duties of the office which I
held. No doubt had I been ten years older, I should have hesitated long
before accepting so unpromising a task. But the events occurred in the
order I have described; and at each stage the action which I took seemed
right, natural and even inevitable. Throughout I was held in the grip of
emergencies and of realities which transcended considerations of praise
or blame.[67]

But, after all, it is by the results and as a whole that the episode
will be judged; and these as will be shown were certainly advantageous
to the Allied cause.

After the departure of the Belgian Field Army the further defence of the
remaining lines of Antwerp was left to the fortress troops, the 2nd
Belgian Division, and the three British Naval Brigades, who held on
their front the equivalent of more than five complete German divisions,
to wit: the 5th Reserve, 6th Reserve, 4th Ersatz and Marine Division,
and the 26th, 37th, and 1st Bavarian Landwehr Brigades.

At midnight on the 7th the Germans, having advanced their artillery,
began to bombard the city and the forts of the inner line. The forts
melted under the fire, and a great proportion of the civil population
fled through the night, lighted by conflagrations, over the bridges of
the Scheldt to the open country, along the roads towards Ghent or into
Holland. The enemy’s attack was pressed continuously, and the enceinte
of the city was considered to be untenable by the evening of the 8th.
The Belgian Division and the British Naval Brigades evacuated Antwerp
that night, crossed the Scheldt safely, and began their retreat by road
and rail on Ghent and Ostend. Two naval airmen,[68] as a Parthian shot,
blew up after long flights a Zeppelin in its shed at Düsseldorf and
bombed the railway station at Cologne. German patrols, after many
precautions, entered Antwerp towards evening on the 9th, and on the 10th
the stouthearted Governor, who had retired to one of the surviving
forts, capitulated.

The resistance of the city had been prolonged by five days.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XVI
THE CHANNEL PORTS

The Purpose of the Antwerp Effort—The Belgian Army effects its
Retreat—Loss and Gain—Ten Precious Days—Onslaught of the German
Reinforcements—The Struggle for the Channel Ports—Labours of the
Admiralty—Achievements of the Transport Department—Correspondence
with Sir John French—General Joffre requests Naval Support—Admiral
Hood’s Operations on the Belgian Coast—Commodore Tyrwhitt destroys
the German Torpedo Boats—The German Armies reach Salt
Water—Beginning of the Battle of the Yser—The Inshore
Squadron—‘One Flank the Germans cannot turn’—Further
Correspondence with Sir John French—The Crisis of the Battle—The
German Advance Stemmed—Effect of Antwerp on the Main Decision.

The object of prolonging the defence of Antwerp was, as has been
explained, to give time for the French and British Armies to rest their
left upon that fortress and hold the Germans from the seaboard along a
line Antwerp-Ghent-Lille. This depended not only upon the local
operations but on the result of the series of outflanking battles which
marked the race for the sea. A decisive victory gained by the French in
the neighbourhood of Peronne, or by the British beyond Armentières and
towards Lille would have opened all this prospect. High French
authorities have concluded that a more rapid and therefore no doubt more
daring transference of force from the right and centre of the French
front to its left, ‘looking sixty kilometres ahead instead of
twenty-five,’ and generally a more vigorous attempt to outflank the
Germans following immediately upon the victory of the Marne and the
arrest of the armies at the Aisne, might well have shouldered the
Germans not only away from the sea, but even out of a large part of
occupied France. In the event, however, and with the forces employed,
the French and British did not succeed in turning the enemy’s flank. The
battles at Albert, La Bassée and Armentières produced no decisive
result; Peronne and Lille could not be reached and the fighting lines
continued simply to prolong themselves to the north-west. The retention
of Antwerp would have rewarded the victory of the main armies with a
prize of the utmost value. Its extended resistance diminished the
consequences of their failure. Everything at Antwerp had depended on a
victory to the southward. And this victory had been denied.
Nevertheless, as will now be shown, the effort was fruitful in a
remarkable degree.

The fall of Antwerp released the besieging army. A marine division
marched into the city on the 10th.[69] The rest of the German divisions
were already streaming south and west in hot pursuit, and hoped for
interception of the Belgian Army. But a surprise awaited them.

On the night of the 9th the German forces who had crossed the Dendre
river had come in contact with French Fusiliers Marins at Melle and
Meirelbeke, and during the 10th they found themselves in presence of
British regular troops of unknown strength, whose patrols were feeling
their way forward from Ghent to meet them. The 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division had come upon the scene in accordance with the fourth
condition of the Anglo-Belgian agreement of October 4. The British,
French and Belgian forces from Ghent thus threatened the left flank of
any serious German cutting-off movement northwards to the Dutch
frontier.

Uncertain of the size of the army by which they were confronted, and
mystified by the indefinite possibilities of landings from the sea, the
Germans paused to collect their strength. They knew that the bulk of the
British Army had already left the Aisne. Where was it? Where would it
reappear? What were these British regulars, who stood so confidently in
their path? On the 12th when they considered themselves strong enough to
advance upon Ghent, the whole of the Belgian Field Army had passed the
dangerous points in safety, only one single squadron being intercepted.
Of this complicated operation the victorious Germans became spectators.

Only weak parties of Germans ventured beyond Lokeren during the night of
the 9th–10th to molest the retreat of the Antwerp troops. The 2nd
Belgian Division and two out of the three Naval Brigades came through
intact. But the railway and other arrangements for the rear brigade were
misunderstood, and about two and a half battalions of very tired troops,
who through the miscarriage of an order had lost some hours, were led
across the Dutch frontier in circumstances on which only those who know
their difficulties are entitled to form a judgment.

If the Belgian Field Army had begun its withdrawal on October 3, as
originally intended, it could probably have got safely without aid to
Ghent and beyond. But the fortress troops, numbering many thousands, to
whom it had been throughout resolved to confide the last defence of
Antwerp, must in any case have been driven into surrender to the invader
or internment in Holland once the Field Army had gone. The prolongation
of the defence and the delay in the departure of the Field Army neither
bettered nor worsened their fortunes. They, therefore, do not enter into
any calculation of the loss and gain attendant on the attempted
operation of relief. So far as actual results are concerned, the damage
caused by the bombardment of the city, which was not extensive, and the
internment of two and a half British Naval battalions, on the one hand,
must be weighed against the gain of five days in the resistance and the
influence exercised on subsequent events by the 7th Division and 3rd
Cavalry Division on the other.

At the time the British Government decided to send help to Antwerp the
total German field force in Northern Belgium had been correctly
estimated at four or five divisions. But before the city capitulated and
while the British troops were still at Ghent, there began to manifest
itself that tremendous unexpected development of German force which from
the moment of Antwerp’s fall was launched against the Allied left and
aimed at Calais.

Besides the liberated Siege Army and the troops which had threatened the
Antwerp communications, no fewer than four fresh Army Corps (XXIInd,
XXIIIrd, XXVIth and XXVIIth), newly formed in Germany and concentrating
in Belgium, were already at hand. And in front of this formidable army
there stood from October 10 to October 21 only the wearied Belgians, the
Fusiliers Marins, and the British 3rd Cavalry and 7th Divisions. The
caution of the German advance may perhaps have been induced by their
uncertainty as to the whereabouts and intentions of the British Army,
and their fear that it might be launched against their right from the
sea flank. But, however explained, the fact remains, and to it we owe
the victory of the Yser and Ever-Glorious Ypres.

A simple examination of dates will reveal the magnitude of the peril
which the Allied cause escaped. Antwerp fell twenty-four hours after the
last division of the Belgian Field Army left the city. Had this taken
place on October 3rd or 4th, the city would have surrendered on the 4th
or 5th. No British 4th Corps[70] or Fusiliers Marins would have been at
Ghent to cover the Belgian retreat. But assuming that the Belgian Army
had made this good unaided, the same marches would have carried them
_and their German pursuers_ to the Yser by the 10th. There would have
been nothing at all in front of Ypres. Sir John French could not come
into action north of Armentières till the 15th. His detrainments at St.
Omer, etc., were not completed till the 19th. Sir Douglas Haig with the
1st Corps could not come into line north of Ypres till about the 21st.
Had the German Siege Army been released on the 5th, and followed by
their great reinforcements already available advanced at once nothing
could have saved Dunkirk, and perhaps Calais and Boulogne. The loss of
Dunkirk was certain and that of both Calais and Boulogne probable. Ten
days were wanted, and ten days were won.

* * * * *

We had now without respite to meet the great German drive against the
Channel ports. The six divisions released from the siege of Antwerp, and
the eight new divisions, whose apparition had been so unexpected to the
British and French Staffs, rolled southward in a double-banked wave. The
Belgian Army trooped back in a melancholy procession along the sea-shore
to the Yser. General Rawlinson, with the 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division, extricating himself skilfully from large German
forces—how great was not then known—and lingering at each point to the
last minute without becoming seriously engaged, found himself by October
15 in the neighbourhood of a place called Ypres.[71] Meanwhile Sir John
French, detraining at St. Omer, and hopefully believing that he was
turning the German right, struck through Armentières towards Lille, and
sent imperative orders to Rawlinson, over whose head the storm was about
to break, to advance in conformity and seize Menin. The French forces
intended for the relief of Antwerp and the beginnings of larger French
reinforcements endeavoured to close the gap between Rawlinson and the
Belgians. The dykes were opened and large inundations began to appear.
In this manner was formed a thin, new, loosely organised, yet continuous
allied front from the neighbourhood of La Bassée to the sea at the mouth
of the Yser; and upon this front, which grew up and fixed itself at
every point in and by the actual collision of hostile forces, was now to
be fought the third great battle in the West.

These events involved the Admiralty at many points. The position of
Rawlinson’s troops in the presence of vastly superior forces was
precarious, and for some days we stood ready to re-embark them. We
laboured to salve everything possible from the Belgian wreck. The Royal
Naval Division must be brought back to refit, reorganise and resume its
interrupted training. The Admiralty details—aeroplanes, armoured trains,
armoured cars, motor omnibus transport, etc.—with which I had been
endeavouring during the previous weeks to conceal our nakedness in the
vital coastal area, could now be merged in the arriving British armies.

It would not have been possible to deal with these
complications—themselves only one subsidiary part of our task—unless
Prince Louis and I, working in complete accord, had had the power to
give orders covering the whole business which were unquestioningly
obeyed. Yet some of the orders which I was forced to give to the
Admiralty Transport Department left me with misgivings that we were
asking more than they could do. Fortunately, a few weeks before, I had
taken the step of appointing in the place of the retired Admiral who
usually directed this cardinal machine the young civilian Assistant
Director of Transports, whose abilities in conference and on paper were
distinguished. Often in these weeks and in the succeeding months I had
to turn to Mr. Graeme Thomson’s department with hard and complex
demands. Never did they fail. October 10 was the climax of their strain.
I cannot do better than quote the minute I wrote at the time:—

10/10/14.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Transports and others concerned.

1. Between 5,000 and 6,000 men of the R.N. Division are assembling at
Ostend. They will not be ready to embark until to-morrow, the 11th.
The whole of these, including Marines, should sail after dark on the
11th for Dover and proceed to the camp at Deal, all previous orders to
the contrary being cancelled.

2. 1,500 Belgian recruits and volunteers are at Ostend, and are to be
embarked at once for Cherbourg, the French authorities being informed
by telegram.

3. The transportation of the 11,000 Belgian recruits and reservists at
Dunkirk to Cherbourg is to continue without intermission as rapidly as
possible. The Belgians will be rationed by the Admiralty while on
board ship, and the Belgians at Dunkirk will be rationed from the
supplies of the R.N. Division until embarked.

4. All transports are to leave Zeebrugge at once, and all transports,
other than those employed above, which are not accommodated in safe
shelter at Ostend, are to leave in both cases for convenient British
ports.

5. Enough transports to embark the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry
Division are to be kept in immediate readiness, with steam up, for the
next forty-eight hours, in Ostend, Dunkirk, Dover, and the Thames. It
is unlikely, having regard to the military situation, that any
re-embarkation will be required, but we must be continually prepared
for it, and should an emergency arise, both Zeebrugge and Ostend must
be used, notwithstanding any risks. Flotilla dispositions to be
arranged accordingly. General Rawlinson to be informed that we are
holding these ships in readiness, and that he should communicate
direct with the Admiralty by telephone if at any moment the situation
renders his re-embarkation likely. We are assuming that he could give
us twelve hours’ notice, within which time the transports could be
counted upon.

6. All Marines and R.N. Division details at Dunkirk are to be
re-embarked and brought back via Dover to Deal.

7. Colonel Osmaston’s Marine Artillery are to remain at Dunkirk for
the present.

8. The armoured trains and naval ratings working them, and all
available aeroplanes and armed motor-cars, except those now at Dunkirk
under the command of Commander Samson, are placed under the orders of
General Rawlinson.

9. The three monitors are to be held in readiness, with steam up, to
cover a re-embarkation at Ostend or Zeebrugge, should it become
necessary. General Rawlinson is to be told to telephone or telegraph
if at any time he thinks such naval protection will be required.

10. The Transport Department will provide whatever ships are necessary
to carry the stores, ammunition, and _matériel_ of the Belgian field
army. The transports standing by for the 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division are a prior claim on our resources. But as there is
no doubt that we can meet the two, the Transport Department is to get
into direct telephonic communication with the Belgian authorities and
arrange forthwith for the beginning of the embarkation of these
stores. For the embarkation of stores, as apart from troops, Zeebrugge
may be used equally with Ostend.

11. 8,000 to 10,000 Belgian wounded are to be evacuated from Ostend to
England as speedily as possible. The Transport Department is to make
proposals and preparations for their movement, while at the same time
the necessary arrangements for their reception in this country are
being concerted by the medical authorities.

12. All motor transports of the R.N. Division, excluding armed and
other motor-cars under Commander Samson actually employed, are to be
collected at Dunkirk under Colonel Dumble, who is to reorganise them
as quickly as possible, and will receive further instructions on that
subject.

W. S. C.

It was with a feeling of relief and of admiration that I saw all these
immense demands smoothly and punctually complied with.

While in Antwerp I had been in constant communication with Sir John
French both through Colonel Bridges and by aeroplane. On October 5 he
had written, ‘Thank you so much for writing so fully and clearly to me
from Antwerp. If the place is to be saved you have saved it by your
prompt action. As a matter of principle I hate putting mobile troops
_inside_ a fortress, but in this case it is very likely that the
_appearance_ of a large force inside the place may have a great moral
effect. But the situation ought to be most carefully watched....’ The
Field Marshal proceeded to complain of the exclusion by Lord Kitchener
of the forces under General Rawlinson from the main British army. What
would happen if and when he joined up with them? Other points of
difference arose between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of
State. ‘I shall do the best I can,’ the former continued, ‘to bring
relief to the place at the earliest possible moment and am arranging to
concentrate in the North as quickly as circumstances will allow. The
Germans are pushing out their flank defence towards the West and
South-West....’ He expressed a wish that we could meet.

I replied to this on October 11 when the fate of Antwerp was already
decided. Using my old and intimate friendship with the Field Marshal I
laboured as always to smooth the differences between him and Lord
Kitchener.

I consider that Kitchener has been thoroughly loyal to you, and has
done and is doing everything in human power to support you. It would
be disastrous to the cause and ruinous to all if there were any
breakdown in true comradeship between you and Kitchener. Military
staffs always tend to make mischief between principals, and try to set
their caps at each other.

The fall of Antwerp was a great and untimely injury to the Allied
cause. I do not agree with the policy which abandoned it[72]; and I
fear you will now have the army which was before Antwerp to meet
almost immediately. But I care for nothing but the future in war. I
clear my heart of all useless reflections and sterile controversies.
It is vain to look backwards, and I turn my gaze with hope to the
re-entry of the British army into the decisive centre of the struggle
and pray for the victory.

I am arranging the omnibuses and armoured cars for you as quickly as
possible. Rawlinson has got a very good naval armoured train which I
have attached to him, but which you had better take over when he joins
up.

The destruction of the Zeppelin and its shed was a gallant feat of
arms.

Naval affairs at the moment imperatively keep me here—Alas! I hope you
will not allow Joffre to deprive you of Dunkirk as your advanced base
and fortified camp. In view of embarkation facilities Calais or
Boulogne ought to be entrenched too—so that you have both. But we all
feel Dunkirk is the right place, and belongs to you.

The wave of [German] reinforcements from the East, and the slow
development of the Russian pressure, makes the situation rather grim
just now.

I hope greatly to see you soon. Only five hours from your lines!

I earnestly trust the day goes well. But anyhow we will compel the end
to do so.

You will want the big army I expect before your task is finished.

On October 16 General Joffre telegraphed to Lord Kitchener as follows:—

‘Now that the operations extend up to the coast of the North Sea
between Ostend and the advanced defences of Dunkirk, it would be
important for the two Allied Navies to participate in these operations
by supporting our left wing and acting with long-range guns on the
German right wing. The Commander of the Naval Forces would then act in
concert with General Foch through the Governor of Dunkirk.’

This duty we instantly accepted.

_First Lord to Sir John French._

_October 17, 1914._

* Monitors were delayed by weather, but will be in position from
daylight 18th; meanwhile eight destroyers should have arrived on the
flank between 4 and 5 p.m. 17th, and two scout cruisers an hour later.
They have been told to communicate with Colonel Bridges on the quays
of Nieuport.

We are sending two battleships mounting eight 12–inch guns to Dunkirk
roadstead to-morrow to cover the fortress and its coast approaches.

We set to work forthwith to support the Allied left flank. I entrusted
this operation, which required an officer of first quality, to Admiral
Hood, till then my Naval Secretary. He was now appointed to the Dover
Command, while I took in his stead Admiral Oliver. On the 18th the three
ex-Brazilian monitors, renamed _Humber_, _Mersey_ and _Severn_, escorted
by four destroyers, arrived at Dunkirk and the memorable series of naval
operations on the Belgian Coast began.

There was no difficulty in finding plenty of ships of different classes
to cover the flank of the army. Besides the three monitors, a large
proportion of the destroyers from Dover were readily available. There
were many old battleships, and these at certain states of the tide could
get into suitable positions for bombarding. In addition there was the
Scout class, seven of which were available, all happily newly re-armed
with the very best 4–inch guns. But Admiralty reserves of ammunition had
been based upon the needs of purely naval actions, which are few and far
between, and not many of which all ships survive. Bombarding the German
positions on the Belgian Coast week after week, and possibly for months,
made demands upon our stores of a totally different character. We had to
pick ships primarily for the class of ammunition they fired; ships that
could use up old ammunition and ships whose value was so small that we
could afford to spend all their ammunition. As October wore on we
scoured the dockyards for every little vessel that carried a gun of any
kind. Even the smallest gunnery tenders, 250 ton gunboats forty years
old, were pressed into service, and in one way or another the fire was
continuously maintained.

It was evident that these operations would have to be carried on under
unceasing submarine attack. Moreover, we had to be prepared for a sudden
dash by German cruisers and destroyers. We trusted to Commodore Tyrwhitt
with the Harwich Striking Force either to protect us from this or to
exact retribution on the return journey. On the 17th the Germans, torn
between the will to wound and the fear to strike, broke all the
commandments of the text books by sending a feeble force of four small
destroyers from the Ems down the Dutch Coast. They were almost
immediately destroyed by the Commodore, the British ships engaged being
the light cruiser _Undaunted_ and the destroyers _Lance_, _Lennox_,
_Legion_ and _Loyal_.

From the middle of October onwards the German hosts could look upon salt
water. First Zeebrugge was occupied, then Ostend, then mile by mile the
sand-dunes and golf courses and gay villas of that pleasure coast were
devoured by invading war. In his first contact with the new element the
land monster committed several imprudences. Apparently contemptuous of
the power of ships’ guns, he deployed batteries of artillery on the open
beach, and opened fire on our Scouts and destroyers. These experiments
were not repeated. A Swedish writer, Dr. Sven Hedin, at that time with
the German armies, belauding them and bowing obsequiously before what he
had convinced himself was world-conquering power, has described a scene
in the restaurant of the best Ostend hotel. The room was crowded with
hungry officers of the invading army, just marched in, all sitting down
to excellent fare.

‘A destroyer had just detached itself from the rest and was making at
full speed for Ostend, parallel with the coast, as close as possible
to the shore. Presently another destroyer appeared, following in the
wake of the first. What could they want, these ruffians? Strong
language was heard—it was a piece of consummate impudence to come
steaming right under our noses like this. Evidently they were
reconnoitring—but what insolence, they must have known that we had
occupied Ostend! Aha! they suspect that there are submarines and
destroyers in the inner harbour, and want to see whether they can
detect anything from outside!... Astounding insolence. Two small
German guns are hurried up. “Are they going to shoot?” I asked. “Oh,
yes, they are going to shoot all right.”... The first shot rang
out.... Directly the German shots had been fired, the two destroyers
swung round to port and at the same moment opened fire. Their guns
seemed to flash out straight at us....’

The results were instantaneous. The restaurant, which had been ‘one of
the most elegant in Europe,’ was blasted into a smoking shambles of ruin
and death.

In this manner the German Army and the British Navy first came into
contact with one another.

Here are a few of our messages at that time:—

_October 17, 1914_, 1.2 p.m.

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood, Dover._

Most important to send the scouts at once and some destroyers to
Dunkirk to work along the coast to Nieuport to support the Belgian
left, now being attacked by the Germans; also monitors as soon as
weather permits.

Acknowledge.

7.20 p.m.

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood, H.M.S. ‘Attentive.’_

Belgian Army is on line River Yser left bank, from Nieuport to
Dixmude, with advanced posts on E. bank at Lombartzyde Rattevalle and
Mannekensvere.

King is at La Panne, the last village on French coast.

The rôle of ships is as follows:—

Firstly, to prevent any disembarkation of German troops between
Nieuport and La Panne and to South-West.

Secondly to fire against enemy, which are advancing on Nieuport.

8.20 p.m.

_Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwhitt, H.M.S. ‘Maidstone,’ Harwich._

The first German attempt to send destroyers down the Broad Fourteens
being so successfully defeated may cause a larger number to be sent
next time: be ready to meet them. We are sending scouts and destroyers
to support the Belgian left at Nieuport.

Two battleships are leaving Portland to-night for Dover, four more
destroyers are being sent to escort them. Therefore, if you can spare
four destroyers, send them temporarily for Dover patrol to arrive at
daylight.

_October 19._

_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._

Engagement continues at Nieuport. I believe that naval bombardment has
done harm to enemy.

6–inch ammunition is urgently required for monitors, and must be sent
as soon as possible, otherwise they will be useless....

_October 21_, 10.55 p.m.

_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._

Fired to-day 11 hours continuously, could see no improvement in
situation. Patrolling coast every night. Monitors expended 600 6–inch
shells daily. In _Foresight_ alone 1,100 shells fired to-day, and even
then unable to comply with all demands.

_October 22._

_Rear-Admiral Hood, Dunkirk, to First Lord._

I have returned for a few hours to Dunkirk, at the request of Colonel
Bridges, to confer on future movements.

I have enough ships.

Firing has been less to-day.

In the event of a sudden northerly gale, the monitors and _Bustard_
would be lost. This is a justifiable risk if they are doing valuable
work, and is much less than submarine risk.

22/10/14.

_Communiqué._

On the 18th instant requests for naval assistance were made to the
Admiralty by the Allied Commanders. In consequence a naval flotilla,
mounting a large number of powerful long range guns, came into action
at daybreak on the 19th off the Belgian Coast, supporting the left of
the Belgian Army and firing against the right of the German attack,
which they were by their position able to enfilade. The Germans
replied by shells from their heavy guns, but owing to the superior
range of the British Marine Artillery practically no damage has been
done. The three monitors, which were building in British ports for
Brazil and were acquired on the outbreak of war, have proved
particularly well suited to this class of operation. A heavy
bombardment of the German flank has been maintained without
intermission since the morning of the 19th and is being continued
to-day. Observation is arranged from the shore by means of naval
balloons, and all reports indicate that substantial losses have been
inflicted upon the enemy and that the fire is well directed and
effective against his batteries and heavy guns. Yesterday a heavy
explosion, probably of an ammunition wagon, followed upon a naval
shot. The naval losses have so far been very small considering the
damage done and the important assistance rendered to the Belgian left
flank. All reports received by the Admiralty show the courage and
determination with which the Belgian Army, animated by the King in
person, is defending the last few miles of Belgian soil. The naval
operations are under the command of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A.
Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.

_October 23_, 1.5 a.m.

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood._

From First Lord.

* Vital to sustain Belgian Army with effective Naval Artillery support
to-morrow.

Arrange details with Bridges.

Am sending Gunnery School tenders to Dunkirk; draw upon them as you
need.

Recognise importance to Navy of dominating Belgian Coast; make the
most of your opportunity.

_October 23._

_Rear-Admiral Hood to First Lord._

Thanks for message. All going well.

Will bombard Ostend. Belgian Head-quarters granted permission.

Am quite satisfied that our firing has done good.

24/10/14.

_Communiqué._

All yesterday the monitors and other vessels of the British bombarding
flotilla fired on the German right, which they searched thoroughly and
effectively in concert with the operations of the Belgian Army. All
German attacks on Nieuport were repulsed. Much damage was done to the
enemy by naval fire which enfilades the German line, and enemy’s
prisoners taken yesterday and the day before testify to the heavy
losses they have suffered from this cause. Fire was also opened in the
afternoon on the German batteries near Ostend. Admiral Hood now has a
fine flotilla of vessels very suitable for this work and at the same
time not of great naval value. During the day our ships were
persistently attacked by an enemy’s submarine, and torpedoes were
fired without success at _Wildfire_ and _Myrmidon_. Other British
vessels again attacked the submarine. The naval aeroplanes and
balloons aided in the direction of the fire. The weather continued
fine and favourable. No loss was sustained by the flotillas yesterday.

_October 26_, 12.21 a.m.

_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._

Am off Nieuport. All well here. Have not succeeded so well to-day
owing to long range of German batteries, which are not yet located by
me. Aeroplanes reconnoitre the place when weather permits, and, if
located, shall attack batteries with guns I can muster. Portion of
shell on board here proves bigger guns.

Noon.

_Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Dover._

Urgent. Order _Venerable_[73] to raise steam at once ready to proceed
to support Allied left off Nieuport. Report how soon she can be ready
to proceed.

Four destroyers must accompany her.

_October 27_, 11.30 p.m.

_First Lord to Rear-Admiral Hood._

Certainly go on, husband ammunition till good targets show, but risks
must be run and Allies’ left must be supported without fail by the
Navy. You have all done very well, and on land the line has been
maintained. Keep it up.

_October 28_, 1.37 a.m.

_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._

The Belgian authorities begged me to fire more rapidly. Deliberate
firing will not produce more results as it is unmarked. I understand
that 48 hours of clinging to Nieuport may achieve decisive results. If
I am to order the firing to be deliberate, I shall not be able to do
what the Belgian army requires.

_October 28_, 4.34 p.m.

_Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty._

Have continued bombardment against increasing opposition. Captain of
Falcon and five men killed and several wounded. _Wildfire_ hit on the
water line and sent in for repairs. _Brilliant_ one killed and several
wounded. _Rinaldo_ eight wounded.... Submarine sighted—all destroyers
now chasing [her]. _Venerable_ has just grounded on sand-bank out of
gunfire. Tide rising, fine weather. She will be off in half an hour.

_October 29_, 1 a.m.

_First Lord to Rear-Admiral Hood._

Save ammunition where possible, but don’t lose any chance of hitting
the enemy. Give your ships the following message: ‘The inshore
flotilla and squadron have played an appreciable part in the great
battle now proceeding. You have shown the Germans that there is one
flank they cannot turn.’

You have full discretion to go ahead.

Meanwhile the British Army was heavily engaged. Sir John French wrote to
me October 21:—

I began this letter two days ago. I had to stop in the middle of a
sentence and hadn’t a single minute to go on with it. We have been
hard pressed the last two days. The enemy has received considerable
reinforcements and a big battle has been raging all along our front
from a point 10 miles North of Ypres to La Bassée, which is W.S.W. of
Lille. We have given way now and then in places and recovered the
ground again—and on the whole have lost nothing (except unfortunately,
men and officers!) although the enemy has attacked with the utmost
vigour.

I have been all along the line but the ground is so flat and the
buildings so numerous that it is impossible to see much of the
infantry work. I have this moment got a wire from the 1st Corps that
they have captured 350 prisoners this afternoon....

He ended by some very friendly expressions about Kitchener and my part
in clearing up misunderstandings; also with some kind words about
Antwerp.

26/10/14.

_Mr. Churchill to Sir John French._

(Private and Secret.)

I am touched and honoured by the kindness of your letter written from
the field of Armentières. It was a disappointment to have to give up
my visit but the press of events here was decisive.

Antwerp was a bitter blow to me, and some aspects of it have given a
handle to my enemies, and perhaps for a time reduced my power to be
useful. From minute to minute one does not know that some fine ship
will not be blown up by mine or submarine.[74] Great good fortune has
attended us so far. Out of twenty-five submarine attacks only five
have been effective, and only on ships of no value. But every
reconnaissance ordered, carries with it the risk of a disproportionate
loss. And if an atmosphere of distrust and malice is created—as is
deliberately and laboriously being done—an unlucky incident might
produce a most unpleasant state of feeling.... However, I am resolved
not to be drawn by any impatience from those carefully considered
plans of the naval war which I revealed to you in July, which are the
result of three years’ study, and with which Jellicoe is in the
fullest accord. These plans will not produce any feat of _éclat_, but
they will keep England safe and prosperous, and enable her in good
time to put in the field an army which will definitely and finally
turn the scale.

Kitchener is strangely alarmed about invasion, and on the C.I.D. we
have witnessed an absolute reversal of rôles—the W.O.[75] declaring
the country not safe and an invasion of 250,000 a possibility, and the
Admiralty reassuring them, or trying to. You know how carefully I have
examined that position, and how I have never minimised the risks. But
now that we are face to face with realities, I am not alarmed, and my
policy is that you should be reinforced by any effective division that
can be formed and maintained; and that the Navy will prevent any
invasion of a serious character. The Prime Minister is solid as a
rock; but waves of nervousness pass over others, and may result in
some retardation of your reinforcements.

We are making extraordinary efforts to grapple with the submarine
menace which tends to drive our great ships so far away, and during
November we shall, I believe, have got the better of it, and have
secured all our anchorages by network and other means. Then we shall
be able to give a greater assurance to those who need it.

But my dear friend, I do trust you realise how damnable it will be if
the enemy settles down for the winter along lines which comprise
Calais, Dunkirk or Ostend. There will be continual alarms and greatly
added difficulties. We must have him off the Belgian Coast, even if we
cannot recover Antwerp.

I am getting old ships with the heaviest guns ready, protected by
barges with nets against submarines, so as to dispute the whole
seaboard with him. On the 31st instant _Revenge_, four 13½-inch guns,
will come into action if required, and I have a regular fleet of
monitors and ‘bomb-ketches’ now organised which they all say has hit
the Germans hard, and is getting stronger every day.

If you could again passage off to the left, I could give you
overwhelming support from the sea, and there you will have a flank
which certainly they cannot turn.

You have on your front gained a fine success in hurling back the whole
weight of the German right. All your messages are so good—cool,
resolute and informing. They will make a good page of military
history. My heart is with you in the army.

_Sir John French to Mr. Churchill._

_October 28._

‘Your letters are always a great help and strength to me. Thank you
indeed for the last one. I wish you would try and take a less gloomy
view of what those people chatter about. What _does_ it matter....’ I
tried hard to retain a hold on the Belgians and with them to operate
alone on the northern flank; but the French sent Foch and a _Mission_.
As the Belgians were practically the guests of France, using their
territory and Calais as a base, I had no alternative but to gracefully
‘submit.’

I am, however, on the very best terms with Foch, who is doing splendid
work....

He added—

The fighting is still severe—I’ve been at two points of the line
to-day—but it is certainly slackening.

The Germans will never get further west.

This is only a hurried line written in the watches of the night.

No words written after the event can convey half so truthful or half so
vivid an impression as these unstudied letters and brief operative
telegrams flashing to and fro. Reading them again I feel once more the
battle going on, the exhausted Belgians clinging desperately to the last
few miles of soil left to their nation, their dauntless King and Queen
amid the shells at Furnes; the French troops hastening up, but only in
driblets; the heroic _Fusiliers Marins_ holding Dixmude till not a fifth
were left alive; our little ships barking away along the coast with the
submarines stabbing at them from underneath and heavier metal opening on
them every day from the shore; inundations slowly growing, a shield of
merciful water rising inch by inch, hour by hour, between the fainting
Belgian line and the cruel monster who had come upon them; and all the
time our own men fighting against appalling odds, ten days, twenty days,
thirty days, from Ypres to Armentières; nothing to send anyone, not a
man, not a musket. Each night Colonel Bridges spoke to me on the
telephone from the Belgian Head-quarters at Furnes. Each night we felt
it might be the last time he would speak from that address. It was only
very gradually towards the end of October that one began to feel that
the French and Belgian troops were getting a firm grip of the line of
the Yser, and that Sir John French could write, ‘The Germans will never
get further west.’ But three more weeks of agony ensued before the
decision at Ypres finally declared itself in favour of the British Army.

* * * * *

We are, I feel, entitled to treat the Antwerp episode as an integral and
vital part of this tremendous battle for the Channel Ports. If we had
not made our belated effort to prolong its defence, the whole after
course of events would have been different, and could hardly have been
better. But for the time gained at Antwerp and the arrival in such a
forward situation of the British and French forces assigned so hurriedly
for its relief, the impulsion of the Allied Armies towards the
sea—already less than was required—must have been sensibly weakened. The
great collision and battle with the German right would have taken place
all the same. Perhaps the same result would have been achieved. But
where? Where would the line have been drawn when the armies settled down
into trenches from which they were not appreciably displaced for more
than four years? At the very best the water defences, Gravelines—St.
Omer—Aire, would have been secured. Dunkirk and its fine harbour would
have become another nest of submarines to prey on our communications in
the Channel; and Calais would have been exposed to a constant
bombardment. The complications of these evils—the least that could be
expected—must have reacted formidably upon the whole subsequent fortunes
of the Allied Armies in France.

If this be true—and history must pronounce—the men who were responsible
for the succour of Antwerp will have no reason to be ashamed of their
effort. Hazard and uncertainty pervade all operations of war. It is idle
to pretend that Lord Kitchener or anyone else foresaw all the
consequences that flowed from the decisions of October 4. The event was
very different from both hopes and expectations. But rarely in the Great
War were more important results achieved by forces so limited and for
losses so small, as those which rewarded this almost forlorn enterprise;
nor is there in modern times, a more remarkable example of the
flexibility, the celerity, and the baffling nature of that amphibious
power which Britain alone wields, but which she has so often neglected.

CHAPTER XVII
THE GRAND FLEET AND THE SUBMARINE ALARM
October and November, 1914

‘Silence is the secret of war.’
PRIOR.

The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Alarm—The Harbour
Peril—Anti-Submarine Defences—Unwarranted
Reproaches—Correspondence with Sir John Jellicoe—Telegrams—Sir
David Beatty’s Letter of October 17—Exertions of the
Admiralty—Decisions of November 2—The Loss of the
_Audacious_—Suppression of the News—The Hard Days of October and
November, 1914—Public and Political Unrest—‘What _is_ the Navy
doing?’—Retirement of Prince Louis of Battenberg—The Return of
Lord Fisher—Fisher and Wilson—Rear-Admiral Oliver becomes Chief of
the Staff—The New Admiralty War Group—The Perpetual Clock—The Port
and Starboard Lights.

All the anxieties recorded in the last chapter faded before our
preoccupations about the Fleet. Indeed, the alarums and excursions on
the Belgian Coast were at times almost a relief compared to the stress
of our prime responsibilities. Everything depended upon the Fleet, and
during these same months of October and November the Fleet was
disquieted about the very foundations of its being. There lay the mighty
ships; every man, from stoker to Admiral, was ready to die at his duty
at any moment; no personal or individual fear found foothold. Still, at
the summit from which we watched, one could feel a new and heart-shaking
sensation. The Grand Fleet was uneasy. She could not find a
resting-place except at sea. Conceive it, the _ne plus ultra_, the one
ultimate sanction of our existence, the supreme engine which no one had
dared to brave, whose authority encircled the globe—no longer sure of
itself. The idea had got round—‘_the German submarines were coming after
them into the harbours_.’

On the South Coast no one would have minded. You could go inside the
Portland breakwater and literally shut the door. On the East Coast no
such absolutely sealed harbour existed. But Scapa was believed to be
protected by its currents from submarine attack. Destroyers no doubt
could attack it—if they cared to run the very serious risk of the long
daylight passage, to and fro, across the North Sea: but no one, we had
believed, could take a submarine _submerged_ through the intricate and
swirling channels. Now, all of a sudden, the Grand Fleet began to see
submarines in Scapa Flow. Two or three times the alarm was raised. The
climax came on October 17. Guns were fired, destroyers thrashed the
waters, and the whole gigantic Armada put to sea in haste and dudgeon.

Of course there never was a German submarine in Scapa. None during the
whole war achieved the terrors of the passage. One was destroyed in the
outer approaches towards the end of November in circumstances which
remained a mystery to the enemy. At the very end of the war in November,
1918, after the mutiny of the German fleet, a German submarine manned
entirely by officers seeking to save their honour, perished in a final
desperate effort. Thus none ever penetrated the lair of the Grand Fleet.
But nevertheless the mere apprehension of submarines attacking the
sleeping ships on which all else reposed, was sufficient in the winter
of 1914 to destroy that sense of security which every Fleet demands when
in its own war harbours.

Up till the end of September, 1914, no one seriously contemplated
hostile submarines in time of war entering the war harbours of either
side and attacking the ships at anchor. To achieve this the submarine
would have to face all the immense difficulties of making its way up an
estuary or inlet amid shoal water and intricate navigation, submerged
all the time and with only an occasional glimpse through the periscope;
secondly while doing this, to avoid all the patrolling craft which for
many miles kept watch and ward on the approaches; thirdly, to brave the
unknown and unknowable terrors of mines and obstructions of all sorts,
with which it must be assumed the channels would become increasingly
infested. It was thought that these deterrents would prove effectual.
Looking back on the events in the light of after-knowledge, we can see
now that this assumption was correct. There is no recorded instance of a
German submarine having penetrated into any British war harbour. The
British submarine service was certainly not inferior in enterprise to
the Germans, and from the very first hours of the War our boats were in
the Heligoland Bight; but no British submarine officer attempted
actually to penetrate a German war harbour or run actually into the
mouths of the Elbe, the Jade, the Weser or the Ems. The nearest
approaches to such an enterprise were the numerous passages of the
Dardanelles made by the British submarines, beginning at the end of
December with the heroic exploits of Commander Holbrook. For these feats
the submarines were able to start only a few miles from the mouth of the
Dardanelles and, diving along a very deep channel over two miles wide,
succeeded again and again in entering the Sea of Marmora. This was not
comparable to penetrating a British war harbour or river-mouth; and it
did not occur until experience of the war capabilities of submarines had
much increased.

During August and September the Admiralty made most strenuous efforts to
increase the protection of our bases in Scotland and upon the East Coast
by mounting guns, by posting guardships, by placing obstructions, by
preparing booms, by laying torpedo nets. But the danger against which
these defences were designed in those months, was primarily not the
submarine, but a regular attack by enemy destroyers on the fleet or
squadrons at anchor, or, secondly, a raid by cruisers upon bases in the
temporary absence of the fleet. It was not until the middle or end of
September that increasing knowledge and evidences of the power of the
largest submarines under war conditions, fostered the idea that the
German submarines might actually enter our northern war harbours at the
Forth, at Cromarty, and at Scapa Flow. Once this idea took root, it
became a grave preoccupation. Precautions taken against a rush of
torpedo boats, were clearly insufficient to stop a vessel which might
dive under booms and past protecting guns.

Reproach has been levelled at the Admiralty for not having accurately
measured this danger before the war and taken proper precautions against
it. It would have been very difficult, even had the danger been
foreseen, to find out under peace conditions what actually would or
would not stop a submarine. No one in peace time could have ordered a
submarine crew to run such awful risks. It would have been a matter of
enormous expense to create a vast system of booms with deep nets and
other obstructions for the defence of all our northern harbours. I
should have had the very greatest difficulty in coming to the Cabinet
and Parliament with such a demand during 1913 and 1914. Not only was
every penny of naval expenditure challenged, but this particular
expenditure would have been clearly of a most alarmist character, would
have been taken to indicate the imminence of war, and would have been
stigmatised as a provocation to the only Power to whom it could have
relation. Still, if the Sea Lords and the Naval Staff had recommended
solidly and as a matter of prime importance the provision of these great
obstructive works in the Humber, at the Forth, at Cromarty, and at
Scapa, it would have been my duty to go forward. But no such
recommendation was made to me or pressed upon me by the naval experts in
the years preceding the War, no doubt for the reasons which I have
described, namely that they did not think the danger had yet assumed a
sufficiently practical form to justify such extraordinary measures. It
certainly does not lie with anyone who was a member of the then Board of
Admiralty to level such reproaches.

Sir John Jellicoe’s book, although no doubt not intended for such a
purpose, has been made a foundation for several reflections upon our
pre-war arrangements in this respect. He recounts the dangers to which
his Fleet was subjected; but had he, either as Controller or Second Sea
Lord, foreseen these dangers, he would of course have warned his
colleagues and his chief. It is clear therefore that if the Admiralty is
to be criticised in this respect, it would be unfair to cite him as an
authority.

Moreover, this submarine danger was one which did not in fact
materialise at the outbreak of war. Six months later the position was
different. The enterprise and the skill of submarine commanders had
greatly grown, and all sorts of possibilities never previously envisaged
came successively into view. But by that time the submarines had to face
a very different set of obstructions. By the time they were convinced of
the possibility, the possibility had disappeared.

It seemed real enough, however, in the month of October, 1914. The booms
and obstructions which were everywhere being improvised were not
complete or only partially in position, while the danger had begun to
take full shape in the minds both of the Fleet and of the Admiralty.
There was nothing to be done but to await the completion of the booms
and obstructions, and meanwhile to keep the Fleet as far as possible out
of harm’s way. It really only felt safe when it was at sea. There,
steaming in the broad waters, the Grand Fleet was herself again: but
this involved a great strain on officers, men and machinery and a large
consumption of fuel.

On September 30 Sir John Jellicoe wrote to me on the general Fleet
position. He pointed out that Germany had got a lead over us in oversea
submarines, that we always expected that the preliminary stages of a
modern naval war would be a battle of the small craft, and that the
question of keeping heavy ships out of the North Sea altogether, until
the small craft menace had been reduced, had been frequently discussed.
He thought it suicidal to forego our advantageous position in big ships
by risking them in waters infested by submarines. He was of opinion that
the submarine had a very limited sphere of action, could not hurt our
oversea commerce (at that time this was true), nor could they help their
own ships to get in. He proposed therefore to use the Battle Fleet far
to the North, spread to intercept trade. We had not nearly sufficient
cruisers to form the double line that was really necessary to stop all
ships during the short days and long nights. It was perfectly easy, he
said, to run through the line at night, as its approximate positions
soon got known and could not be much varied. But with the Battle Fleet
helping in waters free from the submarine danger, one could make much
more certain. This, however, entailed giving up the idea of southerly
Battle Fleet movements. He suggested that the French submarines as well
as our own should be employed on the probable paths of the German
submarines. He emphasised the importance of fitting a number of our
trawlers with wireless installations. He desired me to show this letter
to the First Sea Lord and to know whether we were in agreement with his
views, whether steps would be taken to establish a trawler patrol, and
whether the idea of utilising the Grand Fleet effectively to shut up the
Northern entrance to the North Sea was approved. He concluded by urging
the hastening of the submarine defences for Scapa.

In reply I wrote, on the day of my return from Antwerp:—

_October 8, 1914._

I am in full agreement with your letter. No change in principle is
required in the naval policy to which we have steadily adhered since
1911. The main point is to secure the safety of the British Fleet
during the long and indefinite period of waiting for a general action.
The phase in which raids up to 10,000 or 20,000 men were dangerous or
would have had an object has passed. A very considerable, though no
doubt incomplete, watch over the Heligoland debouches is being
maintained by our oversea submarines. It is not necessary, as manœuvre
experience had suggested, to traverse the waters of the North Sea with
the Battle Fleet with any degree of frequency. Such movements should
only be undertaken for some definite, grave and primary purpose.
Occasional sweeps by cruisers in different directions, and avoiding
anything like routine patrolling, are all that is necessary in present
circumstances. In order to secure the greatest amount of rest and
security for the Fleet, and the maintenance of the highest efficiency
both of the steaming and fighting of its ships, you are justified in
using occasional anchorages even more remote than Scapa and Loch Ewe;
but on this you should make proposals officially. You need not fear
that by these withdrawals you will miss a chance of bringing the
German Battle Fleet to action. If that ever comes out it will be with
some definite tactical object—for instance, to cover the landing of an
invading force, to break the line of blockade to the northward in
order to let loose battle-cruisers on to the trade routes, or simply
for the purpose of obtaining a naval decision by fighting a battle. In
the first two of these cases you would have the time to come round and
meet or intercept them before their operation was completed; in the
third instance, their wishes would be the same as yours.

The Committee of Imperial Defence have again considered the question
of invasion in the light of the experience of the first two months of
the war. The War Office have pointed out that although no troops can
be spared by Germany in the present active state of the land war on
all frontiers, it is possible that in the winter a deadlock may arise
in both the Eastern and Western theatres, when the Germans might find
it possible or useful to create a diversion by attempting to throw a
regular invading army across the North Sea. In the Admiralty opinion
the difficulties of such a task have been in no wise diminished by
anything we have learnt since the war began. We think it is useless to
discuss such matters in general terms, and we are sure that a detailed
study of a concrete plan of landing, say, 150,000 men will prove fatal
to such ideas. In this connection it must be remembered that the war
has shown the absolute reliance of the Germans upon their artillery,
without which they would cease to be formidable. The landing of great
quantities of artillery and the maintenance of an ammunition supply,
are operations which, even if every other part of the enemy’s plan had
succeeded, could not be maintained without giving ample time for the
intervention of your Fleet in decisive force. Further, if the Germans
could spare 150,000 of their best troops for the invasion of England
during a deadlock, a similar number would be released from our side,
and it is obvious that even pushing this argument to its most extreme
conclusion, we could transport our men back across the Channel with
the command of the sea much more swiftly and surely than the Germans
could bring theirs across the much wider distances of the North Sea in
the face of a greatly superior naval force. All that would have
resulted from the success of this most perilous operation on the part
of Germany, would be to transfer the fighting of a certain number of
Army Corps from the Continent to the British islands, under
circumstances unfavourable in the extreme to the Germans, and
favourable in every way to our troops; with the certainty that the
Germans could not be reinforced, while we could be reinforced to
almost any extent, and that unless the Germans were immediately
successful before their ammunition was expended, the whole force to
the last man must be killed or made prisoners of war. I therefore see
no reason why this contingency, any more than that of raids, should
force the Battle Fleet to keep a station of danger during the winter
months. The power of the superior Fleet is exerted with equal effect
over the longer distances, and in fact pervades all the waters of the
world.

With regard to anchorages you have only to make your proposals and we
will do our best to equip with anti-submarine nets, lights, and guns
the places which you may wish to use. It is of importance that these
should be varied, absolute safety lying much more in the uncertainty
attending the movements of the Grand Fleet than in any passive or
fixed defence of any particular place. We must not be led into
frittering away resources by keeping half a dozen anchorages in a
state of semi-defence, and so far as possible we must organise a
movable defence of guardships, trawlers, patrolling yachts,
minesweepers, destroyers with towing charges, and seaplanes, which can
move while the Fleet is at sea and prepare the new resting-place for
its reception.

The employment of a portion or occasionally of the whole of the Battle
Fleet, to supplement the Northern Blockade from time to time is a
matter on which you must be the judge. A large part of your time must
necessarily be spent cruising at sea, and this being so the cruising
should be made as useful as possible. Here, again, anything in the
nature of routine or regular stations would be dangerous, and would,
after a while, draw upon you, even in remote northern waters, the
danger of submarine attack.

The enemy in my judgment pursues a wise policy in declining battle. By
remaining in harbour he secures for Germany the command of the Baltic,
with all that that implies, both in threatening the Russian flank and
protecting the German Coast, and in drawing supplies from Sweden and
Norway. This is an immense advantage to the Germans, and is the best
use to which in present circumstances they can turn their Fleet. It is
to secure the eventual command of the Baltic that British naval
operations must tend. I have already pointed out, in the papers which
I showed you, the three alternative conditions[76] [the defeat of the
German Fleet: the breaking of the Kiel Canal: or the effective
blocking in of the Heligoland Bight] under which this would be
possible, and I hope that proceeding on the assumption that one of
these conditions exist you will make a study of the actual method by
which the entrance to the Baltic could be effected when the time
arrives.

These general conclusions governed our policy during the next few
months. But as October wore on our anxieties were steadily aggravated.
The tension grew. Telegrams and letters tell their own tale.

_October 15._

_First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe._

Personal. You are invited to give your opinion secretly on every
aspect of the Naval situation at home and abroad and we welcome warmly
any scheme you may put forward.

Your proposals about mining are being attentively considered.

The general aspect of the war is grim.

The Russian pressure is not what we expected, and another avalanche of
[German] reinforcements is approaching the western theatre.

On October 17 Sir John Jellicoe telegraphed that a German submarine had
been reported entering Scapa at 5 p.m. the previous day. Although he
thought the report false, he took the whole Fleet to sea forthwith. He
appealed urgently for submarine obstructions as he had ‘no safe base at
present, and the only way to coal ships is to shift the coaling
anchorages constantly which seriously dislocates the organisation of
supply.’ On the 18th he stated that Scapa Flow could not be used till
the Submarine Defence was placed. On the 19th he asked the Admiralty
whether he should risk the submarine menace at Scapa Flow or move the
Fleet to remote bases on the west coast of Scotland or Ireland ‘more
than 300 miles from the Pentland Firth.’ He added, ‘It cannot be stated
with absolute certainty that submarines were inside Scapa Flow, although
Captain D, 4th Destroyer Flotilla, is positive H.M.S. _Swift_ was fired
at inside. I am of opinion that it is not difficult to get inside at
slack water.’

Another very serious warning reached me almost simultaneously:—

_Sir David Beatty to First Lord._

H.M.S. _Lion_,
_October 17, 1914_.

(Private.)

I take the opportunity of an officer going to London in charge of
signal books, to write you of what goes on. I have written you before,
or rather to Hood for you. I think it is right that you should know
how things generally affect the Fleet. I trust that you will take this
as it is written, in fact I know you will, as being written with only
one idea of service to the country. I write as I do because I know
that the plain truth at times such as these is the only thing worth
hearing, and because you are the one and only man who can save the
situation. Even at such times, official documents, requisitions and
demands, are of little value; they are met at once I admit, but
without understanding the time value of all that lies behind them.

At present we feel that we are working up for a catastrophe of a very
large character. The feeling is gradually possessing the Fleet that
all is not right somewhere. The menace of mines and submarines is
proving larger every day, and adequate means to meet or combat them
are not forthcoming, and we are gradually being pushed out of the
North Sea, and off our own particular perch. How does this arise? By
the very apparent fact that we have no Base where we can with _any_
degree of safety lie for coaling, replenishing, and refitting and
repairing, after two and a half months of war. This spells trouble. It
is a perfectly simple and easy matter to equip Scapa Flow, Cromarty,
and Rosyth, so that vessels can lie there undisturbed to do all they
want, and for as long as they want, provided material and men are
forthcoming. The one place that has put up any kind of defence against
the submarine is Cromarty, and that is because at Cromarty there
happens to be a _man_ who grapples with things as they are, i.e.,
Commander Munro,[77] and because they have trained artillerymen to man
their guns. That was one of the best day’s work you ever did when you
insisted on taking the defences there in hand. At Rosyth it appeared
to me in September when there, that to deny access to submarines and
destroyers was a fairly simple task; it was an awkward place to get
into, but when once in, it ought to be, and could be, very easily made
a safe asylum for vessels in need of rest, repair, fuel, etc. At
Scapa, something has been done towards blocking the many entrances,
but that is all. I am sure that all the brain and intellect at the
Admiralty could devise a scheme or method of defence which would make
the anchorage practically safe, and which could be done in a
fortnight. No _seaman_ can dispute that these three bases could have
been made _absolutely_ safe from submarine attack during the two and a
half months that the war has been in progress. As it is, we have been
lulled into a sense of false security, because we have not been
attacked before; but I can assure you that it has literally been
recognised by all that it was only a question of time when we should
have this sense rudely shattered....

The situation as it is, we have no place to lay our heads. We are at
Loch Na Keal, Isle of Mull. My picket boats are at the entrance, the
nets are out and the men are at the guns, waiting for coal which has
run low, but ready to move at a moment’s notice. Other squadrons are
in the same plight. We have been running now hard since 28th July;
small defects are creeping up which we haven’t time to take in hand.
Forty-eight hours is our spell in harbour with steam ready to move at
four hours’ notice, coaling on an average 1,400 tons a time; night
defence stations. The men can stand it, but the machine can’t, and we
must have a place where we can stop for from four or five days every
now and then to give the engineers a chance. Such a place does not
exist, so the question arises, how long can we go on, for I fear very
much, not for long, as the need for small repairs is becoming
insistent.

The remedy is to fix upon a base and make it impervious to submarine
attack; as I have pointed out I am firmly convinced this can be
done....

You might be told that this idea of making the entrances secure is
chimerical. This is not so; and I will guarantee that if the Fleet was
instructed to defend the entrances to the ports named, and was
provided with the material, they could and would devise not one but
several methods which would satisfy most requirements, and which would
keep out submarines. If the Fleet cannot spare the time and labour,
turn it over to Commander Munro and give him a free hand and what
labour he requires, and he will do it in a fortnight.

I think you know me well enough to know that I do not shout without
cause. The Fleet’s tail is still well over the back. We hate running
away from our base and the effect is appreciable. We are not enjoying
ourselves. But the morale is high and confidence higher. I would not
write thus if I did not know that you with your quick grasp of detail
and imagination would make something out of it.

Meanwhile, however, the Admiralty, particularly the First and Fourth Sea
Lords, had been labouring since the end of September to devise and make
the necessary protective structures. By dint of extraordinary exertions
the first instalment of these was already approaching completion, and on
October 20 Prince Louis was in a position to telegraph to the
Commander-in-Chief:—

The defences for Scapa will leave Dockyards on 24th October.

In the meantime Admiralty approve Battle Squadrons remaining on the
West Coast and if you prefer they can proceed as far as Berehaven.

In order to prevent being dogged by submarines a false course should
be steered until a sufficient offing is made.

Battle-Cruisers and Cruisers will have to remain north to cover exits
from North Sea. Cromarty appears to be a safe base for some of them.

_October 23_, 2 a.m.

_Admiralty to Sir John Jellicoe._

From First Lord.

Private and Personal. Every effort will be made to secure you rest and
safety in Scapa and adjacent anchorages. Net defence hastened utmost,
will be strengthened by successive lines earliest. If you desire,
Cabinet will I think agree declare area 30 miles east Kinnaird Head to
30 miles north Shetlands and down to 30 miles South of Hebrides
prohibited to all ships not specially licensed by Admiralty or you.

All vessels whatever Flag should be dealt with in this area as you
desire.

I wish to make absolute sanctuary for you there. I also propose
proclaiming all Scotland north of Caledonian Canal including all
Islands and Inverness prohibited area; you can do what you think
necessary for safety of Fleet.

Use your powers under Defence of Realm Act and ask for anything you
want in men, money or material. You must have a safe resting place:
tell me how I can help you.

Sir John Jellicoe replied with suggestions for closing certain areas,
and for the placing of obstructions and contact mines.

_October 24, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.

Every nerve must be strained to reconcile the Fleet to Scapa.
Successive lines of submarine defences should be prepared, reinforced
by Electric Contact mines as proposed by the Commander-in-Chief.
Nothing should stand in the way of the equipment of this anchorage
with every possible means of security. The First Lord and the First
Sea Lord will receive a report of progress every third day until the
work is completed and the Commander-in-Chief satisfied.

W. S. C.

On receipt of Sir John Jellicoe’s memorandum I convened all the
authorities and after prolonged discussion issued the following
directions, which since they show the variety of problems affecting the
Grand Fleet at this juncture may be printed _in extenso_ for those
interested in details:—

DECISIONS OF NOVEMBER 2, 1914.[78]

Secretary and all concerned.

1. The Fourth Sea Lord will give directions for 48 trawlers armed with
guns, and 3 yachts fitted with guns and wireless, to be collected from
the various trawler patrols and placed at the disposal of the
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. These trawlers, etc., are to be at
Scapa Flow, reporting to Admiral Colville there, by the 5th November.

2. Third Sea Lord will report what rafts and barges there are which
could be fitted with torpedo nets to afford protection to ships from
submarine attack, and when they can be ready.

3. Chief of the Staff will direct the Admiral of Patrols to provide 12
additional destroyers from the patrol flotillas to repair at once to
Scapa Flow and join the Flag of the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Twelve armed merchant cruisers of small size have been ordered to
strengthen the Northern patrol. It is necessary that these should join
the Grand Fleet within a week, and any circumstances likely to cause
delay must be immediately brought to notice of First Sea Lord.

5. The Naval Secretary and the Secretary have informed the
Commander-in-Chief of his powers under the Defence of the Realm Act,
when the area to the north of the Caledonian Canal, including all
islands and the town of Inverness, has been proclaimed a prohibited
area within the meaning of the Act. The Secretary will draft a letter
forthwith to the War Office, asking for the proclamation as from the
3rd November, of the whole of this area.

6. The warning as to the closing of the North Sea, issued to-night by
the Admiralty, is to be studied by departments concerned. The
Additional Civil Lord should deal with questions arising out of it
affecting trade and fishery interests in this country. Captain Webb
should consider its working from the point of view of commerce; he
will also consider what additional measures must be taken to increase
the Examination Service on account of the increased traffic in the
Channel which will result from the warning, consulting Chief of the
Staff as may be necessary for military security. The Additional Civil
Lord should also deal with the subject from the point of view of
existing arrangements as to contraband.

7. The War Office should be asked immediately to develop for the Navy
a system of lookouts on commanding points around the coast in the
prohibited area in the North of Scotland and on the islands, connected
as far as possible by telephone, in order that the movements of
suspicious vessels, and also intelligence collected from the land, may
be constantly reported. Admiral Coast Guards and Reserves will
co-operate.

8. The censorship of postal and telegraph offices in the prohibited
area, and the exclusion of all alien-born postal servants, and the
services of a sufficient detective force at points used by the Fleet,
must be undertaken forthwith. Secretary will propose the necessary
measures in consultation with the War and Home Offices.

10. Fourth Sea Lord and Naval Secretary will take the necessary steps
to provide, with the minimum delay, heavy booms for Scapa and Loch
Ewe, as asked for by the Commander-in-Chief.

11. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will arrange to send lines of
Electric Contact mines during the next 10 days to Scapa Flow, to be
disposed of under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.

12. A bi-weekly report is to be made to the First Lord and First Sea
Lord of the actual progress to date of all works now under
construction for the protection of harbours against submarine and
torpedo attack, and all unexpected circumstances which tend to delay
the work are to be reported as they occur.

13. The Chief of the Staff will report on the general question of
adding to the number of mines in our minefield.

14. A second light cruiser squadron for the patrol of the North Sea is
approved. It will be formed by dividing the existing light cruiser
squadron and adding _Sapphire_ and _Blanche_ from the 3rd Battle
Squadron. The Chief of the Staff to make detailed proposals. Naval
Secretary to propose a Commodore.

15. Eight light-draught, seaworthy vessels for fleet sweepers have
been taken up and should be completed with all speed.

16. The Director of the Air Division should, in consultation with the
Commander-in-Chief, establish an additional temporary seaplane station
at some convenient point on the Scottish coast facing the Hebrides,
for the better patrol and reconnaissance of that area.

17. A general order should be issued to the Fleet that no cruiser or
larger vessel is to stop for the purpose of boarding or challenging
any merchant ship. This work is to be invariably performed by
auxiliary merchant cruisers, torpedo craft, and trawlers. Cruisers and
larger vessels, wishing to turn back merchant ships, should fire a
shot across their bows and make signals.

18. The Chief of the Staff should draft the necessary order to the
patrolling lines of cruisers to turn back merchant ships, from the 5th
November onwards, from the danger area. The orders should be submitted
before being sent.

19. The reconstitution of the battle-cruisers into two squadrons:—

(1) _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _Lion_;

(2) _New Zealand_, _Inflexible_, _Invincible_; is authorised.

22. Sir John Jellicoe’s proposal in regard to the entry of defended
ports and the unsuitability of the proposed arrangements are to be
reported on by the War Staff, and submitted to the Board for adoption.

24. Third Sea Lord and Fourth Sea Lord should report whether it is
possible to postpone the lining of destroyers during the next two
months, as Commander-in-Chief states that they cannot be spared from
duty.

25. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will report upon the need of
establishing W.T. stations at St. Kilda and the other places in
question. Only small installations are required.

26. The docking of ships at Home ports and partial refit, one at a
time, may be permitted, beginning from the end of this month.

27. A report should be furnished on the state of the 3rd Battle
Squadron repair ship.

28. Steps are to be taken to increase the pumping power of the _Orion_
class and later types by adding a bilge suction to the main
circulating pumps. A report should be furnished by Third Sea Lord as
to what this involves in time and money.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

The Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the Admiralty authorisation,
withdrew at the end of October to the north coast of Ireland for a few
days’ rest and gunnery practice. By extraordinary ill-luck, the arrival
of the Fleet off Loch Swilly coincided with the visit of a German
minelayer to those waters. The minelayer had no idea of catching the
Fleet or that British warships would be in those waters. Her objective
was the Liverpool trade route, but the shot aimed at a crow brought down
an eagle.

On October 27th Prince Louis hurried into my room with the grave news
that the _Audacious_ had been struck by mine or torpedo North of Loch
Swilly, and that it was feared she was sinking. In the afternoon the
Commander-in-Chief telegraphed urging that every endeavour should be
made to keep the event from being published; and that night, in
reporting that the _Audacious_ had sunk, he repeated his hope that the
loss could be kept secret. I saw great difficulties in this but promised
to bring the matter before the Cabinet. Meanwhile I telegraphed to the
Commander-in-Chief, October 28th, 12.30 a.m.:—

‘I am sure you will not be at all discouraged by _Audacious_ episode.
We have been very fortunate to come through three months of war
without the loss of a capital ship. I expected three or four by this
time, and it is due to your unfailing vigilance and skill that all has
gone so well. The Army too has held its own along the whole line,
though with at least 14,000 killed and wounded. Quite soon the
harbours will be made comfortable for you. Mind you ask for all you
want.’

Measured by military standards, the _Audacious_ was the first serious
loss we had sustained. She was one of those vital units in which we
never were at that time more than six or seven to the good, and upon
which all strategic calculations were based both by friend and foe. When
I brought the question of keeping her loss secret before the Cabinet,
there was a considerable division of opinion. It was urged that public
confidence would be destroyed if it were thought that we were concealing
losses, that it was bound to leak out almost immediately, and that the
Germans probably knew already. To this I replied that there was no
reason why the Germans should not be left to collect their own
information for themselves, that the moment they knew the _Audacious_
was sunk they would proclaim it, and that then we could quite easily
explain to the public why it was we had preserved secrecy. I cited the
effective concealment by Japan of the loss of the battleship _Yashima_
off Port Arthur in 1904. If Sir John French had lost an Army Corps,
every effort would be made to conceal it from the enemy. Why then should
the Navy be denied a similar freedom? Lord Kitchener strongly supported
me; and our views were eventually accepted by the Cabinet.

The Press were asked by the Admiralty to abstain from making any
reference to the event. Some newspapers complied with an ill grace. It
was represented that hundreds of people knew already, including all the
passengers of the liner _Olympic_ which had passed the sinking vessel;
that German spies in England would certainly convey the news to Germany
in a few days, and that, anyhow, long accounts of the sinking with
actual photographs, would be despatched by the next mail to the United
States, whence the news would be immediately telegraphed to Germany. We,
however, remained obdurate, watching the German Press very carefully for
the slightest indication that they knew. Meanwhile it was thought clever
by certain newspapers to write articles and paragraphs in which the word
‘audacious’ was frequently introduced, while I was much blamed. I found
it necessary to issue a secret appeal, which, aided by the loyal efforts
of the Newspaper Press committee, certainly had some effect. In the
upshot it took more than five weeks before the German Admiralty learned
that the _Audacious_ had been sunk, and even then they were by no means
convinced that they were not the victims of rumour.

Says Admiral Scheer:—

The English succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable time the
loss of this great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success
for our efforts at equalisation.... The behaviour of the English was
inspired at all points by consideration for what would serve their
military purpose.... In the case of the _Audacious_ we can but approve
the English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy, because
accurate information about the other side’s strength has a decisive
effect on the decisions taken.’

* * * * *

I do not remember any period when the weight of the War seemed to press
more heavily on me than these months of October and November, 1914. In
August one was expecting the great sea battle and the first great
battles on land; but our course was obvious, and, when taken, we had
only to wait for decisions. All September was dominated by the victory
of the Marne. But in October and November the beast was at us again. The
sense of grappling with and being overpowered by a monster of appalling
and apparently inexhaustible strength on land, and a whole array of
constant, gnawing anxieties about the safety of the Fleet from submarine
attack at sea and in its harbours, oppressed my mind. Not an hour passed
without the possibility of some disaster or other in some part of the
world. Not a day without the necessity of running risks.

My own position was already to some extent impaired. The loss of the
three cruisers had been freely attributed to my personal interference. I
was accused of having overridden the advice of the Sea Lords and of
having wantonly sent the squadron to its doom. Antwerp became a cause of
fierce reproach. One might almost have thought I had brought about the
fall of the city by my meddling. The employment of such untrained men as
the Naval Brigades was generally censured. The internment in Holland of
three of their battalions was spoken of as a great disaster entirely due
to my inexcusable folly. One unhappy phrase—true enough in thought—about
‘Digging rats out of holes,’ which had slipped from my tongue in a weary
speech at Liverpool, was fastened upon and pilloried. These were the
only subjects with which my name was connected in the newspapers. My
work at the Admiralty—such as it was—was hidden from the public. No
Parliamentary attack gave me an opportunity of defending myself. In
spite of being accustomed to years of abuse, I could not but feel the
adverse and hostile currents that flowed about me. One began to perceive
that they might easily lead to a practical result. Luckily there was not
much time for such reflections.

The Admiralty had entered upon the War with commanding claims on public
confidence. The coincidence of the test mobilisation with the European
crisis, was generally attributed to profound design. The falsification
one after another of the gloomy predictions that we should be taken
unawares, that the German commerce destroyers would scour the seas, and
that our own shipping, trade and food would be endangered, was
recognised with widespread relief. The safe transportation of the Army
to France and the successful action in the Heligoland Bight were
acclaimed as fine achievements. But with the first few incidents of
misfortune a different note prevailed in circles which were vocal. The
loss of the three cruisers marked a turning-point in the attitude of
those who in the evil times of war are able to monopolise the expression
of public opinion. As the expectation of an imminent great sea battle
faded, the complaint began to be heard, ‘What is the Navy doing?’ It was
perhaps inevitable that there should be a sense of disappointment as
week succeeded week and the tremendous engine of British naval power
seemed to be neither seen nor heard. There was a general opinion that we
should have begun by attacking and destroying the German Fleet. Vain to
point to the ceaseless stream of troops and supplies to France, or to
the world-wide trade of Britain proceeding almost without hindrance.
Impossible, in the hearing of the enemy, to explain the intricate
movement of reinforcements or expeditions escorted across every ocean
from every part of the Empire, or to unfold the reasons which rendered
it impossible to bring the German Fleet to battle. There, was our little
Army fighting for its life, and playing to British eyes almost as large
a part as that of France; and meanwhile our great Navy—the strongest in
the world—lay apparently in an inertia diversified only by occasional
mishap.

Eaten bread is soon forgotten. Dangers which are warded off by effective
precautions and foresight are never even remembered. Thus it happened
that the Admiralty was inconsiderately judged in this opening phase. To
me, who saw the perils against which we had prepared and over which we
had triumphed, and who felt a sense of profound thankfulness for the
past and absolute confidence for the future, these manifestations of
discontent seemed due only to lack of understanding and to impatience
pardonable in the general stress of the times. But they were none the
less disquieting. Nor was it easy to deal with them. The questions could
not be argued out in public or in Parliament. No formal indictment was
ever preferred; nor could one have been fully answered without injury to
national interests. We had to endure all this carping in silence. A
certain proportion of losses at sea was inevitable month by month; and
in each case it was easy to assert that some one had blundered. In most
cases, indeed, this was true. With a thousand ships upon the sea and a
thousand hazards, real or potential, every day to menace them, accidents
and mistakes were bound to happen. How many were made, for which no
forfeit was claimed by Fortune! There was never an hour when risks
against which no provision could be made were not being run by scores of
vessels, or when problems of novelty and difficulty were not being set
to sea captains, scarcely any of whom had ever been tried in war. Was it
wonderful that we fell occasionally into error, or even into loss?
‘Another naval disaster. Five hundred men drowned. What are the
Admiralty doing?’ While all the time the armies reeled about in the
confusion of the mighty battles, and scores of thousands were sent,
often needlessly or mistakenly, to their deaths: while all the time
every British operation of war and trade on the seas proceeded without
appreciable hindrance.

This censorious mood produced a serious development in the case of
Prince Louis. In the first flush of our successful mobilisation and
entry upon the War, no comment had been made upon his parentage. But now
the gossip of the clubs and of the streets began to produce a stream of
letters, signed and anonymous, protesting in every variety of method and
often in violent terms against one of Teutonic birth filling the vital
position of First Sea Lord. This was cruel; but it was not unnatural,
and I saw with anxiety and distress the growth of very widespread
misgiving. I gathered also from occasional remarks which he made that
this atmosphere was becoming apparent to the First Sea Lord. He was thus
coming to be placed in the invidious position of having to take great
responsibilities and risks day by day without that support in public
confidence to which he was absolutely entitled, and with the certainty
that accidents would occur from time to time. I was therefore not
surprised when, towards the end of October, Prince Louis asked to be
relieved of his burden. The uncomplaining dignity with which he made
this sacrifice and accepted self-effacement as a requital for the great
and faithful service he had rendered to the British nation and to the
Royal Navy was worthy of a sailor and a Prince. The correspondence which
passed between us has already been made public, but is here inserted for
completeness.[79] I had now to look for a successor, and my mind had
already turned in one direction and in one direction alone.

Lord Fisher used to come occasionally to the Admiralty, and I watched
him narrowly to judge his physical strength and mental alertness. There
seemed no doubt about either. On one occasion, when inveighing against
some one whom he thought obstructive, he became so convulsed with fury
that it seemed that every nerve and bloodvessel in his body would be
ruptured. However, they stood the strain magnificently, and he left me
with the impression of a terrific engine of mental and physical power
burning and throbbing in that aged frame. I was never in the least
afraid of working with him, and I thought I knew him so well, and had
held an equal relationship and superior constitutional authority so
long, that we could come through any difficulty together. I therefore
sounded him in conversation without committing myself, and soon saw that
he was fiercely eager to lay his grasp on power, and was strongly
inspired with the sense of a message to deliver and a mission to
perform. I therefore determined to act without delay. I sought the Prime
Minister and submitted to him the arguments which led me to the
conclusion that Fisher should return, and that I could work with no one
else. I also spoke of Sir Arthur Wilson as his principal coadjutor. I
was well aware that there would be strong, natural and legitimate,
opposition in many quarters to Fisher’s appointment, but having formed
my own conviction I was determined not to remain at the Admiralty unless
I could do justice to it. So in the end, for good or for ill, I had my
way.

_October 30._

_First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe._

Prince Louis has resigned on grounds of parentage, to my deep regret.
The King has approved Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. He will assume
office to-morrow afternoon. I expect Sir Arthur Wilson will be
associated with Admiralty for special duties. Loss of _Audacious_ has
nothing to do with these events. There will be no change in Naval War
policy as set out in your war orders. Please telegraph whether you
think Grand Fleet could prudently take four or five days’ rest in
Portland Harbour.

_October 30._

_Sir John Jellicoe to First Lord._

Secret and personal.

I have made present base secure against submarine attack and think it
better to remain here than to go to Portland.

I propose to send out our squadrons one at a time next week to fire at
rocks off coast of Ireland, as target practice is very necessary and
towing targets is difficult in present weather and possibly unsafe.

The decision to recall Lord Fisher to the Admiralty was very important.
He was, as has been here contended, the most distinguished British Naval
officer since Nelson. The originality of his mind and the spontaneity of
his nature freed him from conventionalities of all kinds. His genius was
deep and true. Above all, he was in harmony with the vast size of
events. Like them, he was built upon a titanic scale.

But he was seventy-four years of age. As in a great castle which has
long contended with time, the mighty central mass of the Donjon towered
up intact and seemingly everlasting. But the outworks and the
battlements had fallen away, and its imperious ruler dwelt only in the
special apartments and corridors with which he had a lifelong
familiarity. Had he and his comrade, Sir Arthur Wilson, been born ten
years later, the British naval direction at the outbreak of the Great
War would have reached its highest state of perfection, both at the
Admiralty and afloat. The new figures which the struggle was
producing—Beatty, Keyes, Tyrwhitt—had not yet attained the authority
which would have made them acceptable to the Navy in the highest
situations. Fisher and Wilson had outlived their contemporaries and
towered above the naval generation which had followed them. It was to
these two great old men and weather-beaten sea-dogs, who for more than
half a century had braved the battle and the breeze, and were Captains
afloat when I was in my cradle, that the professional conduct of the
naval war was now to be confided.

It was clear, however, to me, who knew both these Admirals-of-the-Fleet
quite well and had had many opportunities in the previous three years of
hearing and reading their views, that the day-to-day organisation of our
Staff machinery would have to be altered. This necessitated a change in
the Chief of the War Staff. In Admiral Sturdee the Navy had a sea
officer of keen intelligence and great practical ability—a man who could
handle and fight his ship or his squadron with the utmost skill and
resolution. But he was not a man with whom Lord Fisher could have worked
satisfactorily at the supreme executive centre. Happily, there was no
difficulty in agreeing upon his successor.

Since Antwerp, Admiral Oliver had been my Naval Secretary. During the
year before the War he had been Director of Naval Intelligence. In this
capacity I had had to rely continually upon him, as upon Captain Thomas
Jackson before him, for all the facts and figures upon which the
controversy about British and German naval strength depended. His
accuracy in detail and power of continuous and tenacious mental toil
were extraordinary. He combined with capacious knowledge an unusual
precision of mind and clarity of statement. His credentials as a sea
officer were unimpeachable. He had been Navigating Commander to Sir
Arthur Wilson, and every one in the Navy knew the story of how in the
1901 Naval manœuvres these two had taken the Channel Fleet from off
Rathlin’s Island at the North of Ireland through the Irish Channel to
the Scillies in thick mist without sighting land or lights, and without
being inclined to make a single remark to each other. On the third day
the mist lifting suddenly revealed the Scilly Islands to the astonished
Fleet, which had already dropped anchor in the roads.

I was very glad when Lord Fisher proposed to me that he should be made
Chief of the Staff, and when he offered also to give me in exchange, for
my Private Office, his own personal assistant, Commodore de Bartolomé.
Everything thus started fair. We reformed the War Group, which met at
least once each day, as follows: First Lord, First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur
Wilson, Admiral Oliver and Commodore de Bartolomé (the last named
representing the younger school of sea officers), together with the
invaluable Secretary, Sir Graham Greene. Sir Henry Jackson was also
frequently summoned, but not so continuously as to impose an accountable
responsibility upon him.

Lord Fisher’s age and the great strain to which he was now to be
subjected made it necessary for him to lead a very careful life. He
usually retired to rest shortly after 8 o’clock, awaking refreshed
between four and five, or even earlier. In these morning hours he gave
his greatest effort, transacting an immense quantity of business,
writing innumerable letters and forming his resolutions for the day.
Indeed, his methods corresponded closely to the maxims of the poet
Blake: ‘Think in the morning; act in the noon; eat in the evening; sleep
in the night.’ But I never heard him use this quotation. As the
afternoon approached the formidable energy of the morning gradually
declined, and with the shades of night the old Admiral’s giant strength
was often visibly exhausted. Still, judged from the point of view of
physical and mental vigour alone, it was a wonderful effort, and one
which filled me, who watched him so closely, with admiration and, I will
add, reassurance.

I altered my routine somewhat to fit in with that of the First Sea Lord.
I slept usually an hour later in the morning, being called at eight
instead of seven, and I slept again, if possible, for an hour after
luncheon. This enabled me to work continuously till one or two in the
morning without feeling in any way fatigued. We thus constituted an
almost unsleeping watch throughout the day and night. In fact, as Fisher
put it, ‘very nearly a perpetual clock.’ Telegrams came in at the
Admiralty at all hours of the day and night, and there was scarcely an
hour when an immediate decision could not be given, if necessary, by one
or the other of us always awake.

This arrangement was also convenient from the point of view of business.
The First Lord completed everything with which he was concerned before
going to bed, and three hours later the First Sea Lord addressed himself
to the whole budget, and I, awaking at eight, received his dawn output.
I had not previously seen the pulse of the Admiralty beat so strong and
regular.

We made the agreement between ourselves that neither of us should take
any important action without consulting the other, unless previous
accord had been reached. To this agreement we both scrupulously adhered.
We had thus formed, for the first time, an overwhelmingly strong control
and central authority over the whole course of the naval war, and were
in a position to make our will prevail throughout the fleets and all
branches of the naval administration, as well as to hold our own against
all outside interference. I had for a long time been accustomed to write
my minutes in red ink. Fisher habitually used a green pencil. To quote
his words, ‘it was the port and starboard lights.’ As long as the port
and starboard lights shone together, all went well. We had established a
combination which, while it remained unbroken, could not have been
overthrown by intrigue at home or the foe on the sea.

CHAPTER XVIII
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS
October, November and December, 1914

‘Ill fared it then with Roderick Dhu,
That on the field his targe he threw,
Whose brazen studs and tough bull hide
Had Death so often dashed aside.
For train’d abroad his arms to wield
Fitz James’s blade was sword and shield.’
SCOTT, ‘The Lady of the Lake,’ Canto V, XV.

The Mystery of Admiral von Spee—First Threat to South American
Waters—His Apparition at Samoa—His Second Disappearance—Renewed
Threat to South America—Rear-Admiral Cradock Ordered to
Concentrate—The Relative Forces—Importance of the Battleship
_Canopus_—The First Combination against Admiral von
Spee—Rear-Admiral Cradock’s Disquieting Telegram—His Cruise up the
Chilean Coast without the _Canopus_—Certain News of the
Enemy’s Arrival—Admiralty Measures—News of the Action of
Coronel—The Meeting of the Squadrons—The British Attack the
Germans—Destruction of the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_—Escape of
the _Glasgow_—Reflections upon the Admiralty Examined—An
Explanation of Rear-Admiral Cradock’s Action—The Alternatives Open
to the German Squadron—Second Combination against Admiral von
Spee—Battle-cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ Ordered to
South America—Arrangements with the Japanese Admiralty—Development
of the Second Combination—British Naval Resources at their Utmost
Strain—_Königsberg_ Blockaded and the _Emden_ Sunk—Relief in the
Indian Ocean—Accelerated Despatch of the Battle-Cruisers—What
Admiral von Spee Found at the Falklands—News of the Battle and of
Victory—The Action—Total Destruction of the German Squadron—End of
the German Cruiser Warfare—End of the Great Strain.

As has already been described, Admiral von Spee, the German
Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, sailed from Tsingtau (Kiaochau),[80]
in the last week of June, with the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and on
August 5, immediately after the British declaration of war, these two
powerful ships were reported as being near the Solomon Islands. They
were subsequently reported at New Guinea on the 7th August, and coaling
at the Caroline Islands on the 9th. After this they vanished into the
immense Pacific with its innumerable islands, and no one could tell
where they would reappear. As the days succeeded one another and grew
into weeks, our concern on their account extended and multiplied. Taking
the Caroline Islands as the centre, we could draw daily widening
circles, touching ever more numerous points where they might suddenly
spring into action. These circles were varied according as the Germans
were credited with proceeding at most economical speed, at three-quarter
speed, or at full speed; and the speed at which they would be likely to
steam depended upon the nature of the potential objective which in each
case might attract them.

We have seen how the mystery of their whereabouts affected the movements
of the New Zealand and Australian convoys, and what very anxious
decisions were forced upon us. We have seen how the uncertainty brooded
over the little expedition from New Zealand to Samoa: how glad we were
when it arrived safely and seized the island: how prompt we
were—providentially prompt—to snatch every vessel away from the
roadstead of Samoa the moment the troops and stores were landed. When at
length more than five weeks had passed without any sign of their
presence, we took a complete review of the whole situation. All
probabilities now pointed to their going to the Magellan Straits or to
the West Coast of South America. The Australian convoy was now provided
with superior escort. Not a British vessel could be found in the
anchorage at Samoa. The old battleships were already on their way to
guard the convoys in the Indian Ocean. There was nowhere where they
could do so much harm as in the Straits of Magellan. Moreover, we
thought we had indications of German coaling arrangements on the Chilian
coast. There were rumours of a fuelling base in the Magellan Straits,
for which diligent search was being made. There was certainly German
trade still moving along the Western Coast of South America.

Accordingly, on the 14th September, the Admiralty sent the following
telegram to Rear-Admiral Cradock, who commanded on the South American
Station:—

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock, H.M.S. “Good Hope.”_

_September 14_, 5.50 p.m.

The Germans are resuming trade on West Coast of South America, and
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ may very probably arrive on that coast
or in Magellan Straits.

Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_, making Falkland Islands your coaling base, and leaving
sufficient force to deal with _Dresden_ and _Karlsruhe_.

_Defence_ is joining you from Mediterranean, and _Canopus_ is now _en
route_ to Abrolhos.[81] You should keep at least one County class and
_Canopus_ with your flagship until _Defence_ joins.

When you have superior force, you should at once search Magellan
Straits with squadron, keeping in readiness to return and cover the
River Plate, or, according to information, search as far as Valparaiso
northwards, destroy the German cruisers, and break up the German
trade.

You should search anchorage in neighbourhood of Egg Harbour and Golfo
Nuevo....[82]

Two days later all uncertainties, and with them our anxieties, vanished,
and news was received that both _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ had
appeared off Samoa on the 14th September. There was nothing for them to
hurt there. The empty roadstead mocked their power. The British flag
flew on shore, and a New Zealand garrison far too strong for any landing
party snarled at them from behind defences. Thus informed of the fate of
their colony, the German cruisers put to sea after firing a few shells
at the Government establishments.

A week later, the 22nd, they were at Papeete, which they bombarded,
destroying half the town and sinking the little French gunboat _Zélée_
which was in harbour. They left the same morning, steering on a
Northerly course. We did not hear of this till the 30th. Then once again
silence descended on the vast recesses of the Pacific.

We could now begin drawing our circles again from the beginning, and at
any rate for several weeks we need not worry about these ships.
Accordingly the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral _Cradock_, on the 16th
September, telling him the new situation and that he need not now
concentrate his cruisers, but could proceed at once to attack German
trade in the Straits of Magellan and on the Chilian coast.

Nothing more happened for a fortnight. On October 4, wireless signals
from the _Scharnhorst_ were heard by Suva wireless station, and also at
Wellington, New Zealand. From this it appeared that the two vessels were
on the way between the Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. Evidently
the South American plan was in their mind. We passed our information to
Admiral Cradock with the following telegram:—

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock. (October 5.)_

It appears from information received that _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ are working across to South America. A _Dresden_ may be
scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet them in company.
_Canopus_ should accompany _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_ and _Otranto_, and
should search and protect trade in combination.

On the 8th (received 12th) Admiral Cradock replied as follows:—

‘Without alarming, respectfully suggest that, in event of the enemy’s
heavy cruisers and others concentrating West Coast of South America,
it is necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to
bring them to action.

‘For, otherwise, should the concentrated British force sent from
South-East Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is not impossible, (?
and) thereby (? get) behind the enemy, the latter could destroy
Falkland, English Bank, and Abrolhos coaling bases in turn with little
to stop them, and with British ships unable to follow up owing to want
of coal, enemy might possibly reach West Indies.’

And on the same day (received 11th) he reported evidences of the
presence of the _Dresden_ in South American waters:—

Following intelligence _re_ _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ has been
received. Evidence found by _Good Hope_ revisiting Orange Bay on 7th
October that _Dresden_ had been there 11th September, and there are
indications that _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ may be joined by
_Nürnberg_, _Dresden_, and _Leipzig_. I intend to concentrate at
Falkland Islands and avoid division of forces. I have ordered
_Canopus_ to proceed there, and _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and _Otranto_
not to go farther north than Valparaiso until German cruisers are
located again....

With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74, does _Defence_ join my
command?

This was an important telegram. It showed a strong probability that the
enemy was concentrating with the intention to fight. In these
circumstances we must clearly concentrate too. I now looked at the Staff
telegram of 5th October, and thought it was not sufficiently explicit on
the vital point, viz., concentration for battle. In order that there
should be no mistake, I wrote across the back of Admiral Cradock’s
telegram received on the 12th October the following minute:—

First Sea Lord.

In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships to keep
within supporting distance of one another, whether in the Straits or
near the Falklands, and to postpone the cruise along the West Coast
until the present uncertainty about _Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_ is cleared
up.

They and not the trade are our quarry for the moment. Above all, we
must not miss them.

W. S. C.

The First Sea Lord the same evening added the word ‘Settled.’

On the 14th October, I discussed the whole situation which was
developing with the First Sea Lord, and in accordance with my usual
practice I sent him a minute after the conversation of what I understood
was decided between us.

First Sea Lord.

I understood from our conversation that the dispositions you proposed
for the South Pacific and South Atlantic were as follows:—

(1) Cradock to concentrate at the Falklands _Canopus_, _Monmouth_,
_Good Hope_ and _Otranto_.

(2) To send _Glasgow_ round to look for _Leipzig_ and attack, and
protect trade on the West Coast of South America as far north as
Valparaiso.

(3) _Defence_ to join _Carnarvon_ in forming a new combat squadron on
the great trade route from Rio.

(4) _Albion_ to join the flag of C.-in-C. Cape for the protection of
the Luderitz Bay expedition.

These arrangements have my full approval.

Will you direct the Chief of the Staff to have a statement prepared
showing the dates by which these dispositions will be completed, and
the earliest date at which _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ could arrive
in the respective spheres.

I presume Admiral Cradock is fully aware of the possibility of
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ arriving on or after the 17th instant in
his neighbourhood; and that if not strong enough to attack, he will do
his utmost to shadow them, pending the arrival of reinforcements.

The following telegram was sent to Admiral Cradock at the same time:—

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock, October 14._

Concur in your concentration of _Canopus_, _Good Hope_, _Glasgow_,
_Monmouth_, _Otranto_, for combined operation.

We have ordered Stoddart in _Carnarvon_ to Montevideo as Senior Naval
Officer north of that place.

Have ordered _Defence_ to join _Carnarvon_.

He will also have under his orders _Cornwall_, _Bristol_, _Orama_ and
_Macedonia_.

_Essex_ is to remain in West Indies.

On the 18th Admiral Cradock telegraphed:—

‘I consider it possible that _Karlsruhe_ has been driven West, and is
to join the other five. I trust circumstances will enable me to force
an action, but fear that strategically, owing to _Canopus_, the speed
of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots.’

Thus it is clear that up to this date the Admiral fully intended to keep
concentrated on the _Canopus_, even though his squadron speed should be
reduced to 12 knots. Officially the _Canopus_ could steam from 16 to 17
knots. Actually in the operations she steamed 15½.

Let us now examine the situation which was developing.[83] The
_Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ were drawing near the South Coast of
America. On the way they might be met by the light cruisers _Leipzig_,
_Dresden_ and _Nürnberg_. The squadron which might thus be formed would
be entirely composed of fast modern ships. The two large cruisers were
powerful vessels. They carried each eight 8–inch guns arranged in pairs
on the upper deck, six of which were capable of firing on either beam.
Both ships being on permanent foreign service were fully manned with the
highest class of German crews; and they had in fact only recently
distinguished themselves as among the best shooting ships of the whole
German Navy. Against these two vessels and their attendant light
cruisers, Admiral Cradock had the _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_. The
_Good Hope_ was a fine old ship from the Third Fleet with a 9·2–inch gun
at either end and a battery of sixteen 6–inch guns amidships. She had
exceptionally good speed (23 knots) for a vessel of her date. Her crew
consisted mainly of reservists, and though she had good gunlayers she
could not be expected to compare in gunnery efficiency with the best
manned ships either in the British or German Navies. The _Monmouth_ was
one of the numerous County class against which Fisher had so often
inveighed—a large ship with good speed but light armour, and carrying
nothing heavier than a battery of fourteen 6–inch guns, of which nine
could fire on the beam. These two British armoured cruisers had little
chance in an action against the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. No
gallantry or devotion could make amends for the disparity in strength,
to say nothing of gunnery. If brought to battle only the greatest good
fortune could save them from destruction. It was for this reason that
the moment the Admiralty began to apprehend the possibility of the
arrival of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ on the South American
station, we sent a capital ship to reinforce Admiral Cradock. Our first
intention had been to send the _Indomitable_ from the Dardanelles, and
at one time she had already reached Gibraltar on her way to South
America when increasing tension with Turkey forced her to return to the
Dardanelles. As we did not conceive ourselves able to spare a single
battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet at that time, there was nothing for
it but to send an old battleship; and by the end of September the
_Canopus_ was already steaming from Abrolhos rocks through the South
Atlantic.

With the _Canopus_, Admiral Cradock’s squadron was safe. The
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ would never have ventured to come within
decisive range of her four 12–inch guns. To do so would have been to
subject themselves to very serious damage without any prospect of
success. The old battleship, with her heavy armour and artillery, was in
fact a citadel around which all our cruisers in those waters could find
absolute security. It was for this reason that the Admiralty had
telegraphed on 14th September: ‘Keep at least _Canopus_ and one County
class with your flagship’; and again, on the 5th October: ‘_Canopus_
should accompany _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_ and _Otranto_.’ It was for this
reason that I was glad to read Admiral Cradock’s telegram: ‘Have ordered
_Canopus_ to Falkland Islands, where I intend to concentrate and avoid
division of forces,’ on which I minuted: ‘In these circumstances it
would be best for the British ships to keep within supporting distance
of one another, whether in the Straits or near the Falklands’; and it
was for this same reason that the Admiralty telegraphed on the 14th
October: ‘Concur in your concentration of _Good Hope_, _Canopus_,
_Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, _Otranto_ for combined operation....’

It was quite true that the speed of the _Canopus_ was in fact only
fifteen and a half knots, and that as long as our cruisers had to take
her about with them they could not hope to catch the Germans. All the
_Canopus_ could do was to prevent the Germans catching and killing them.
But that would not be the end of the story; it would only be its
beginning. When the Germans reached the South American coast after their
long voyage across the Pacific, they would have to coal and take in
supplies: they were bound to try to find some place where colliers could
meet them, and where they could refit and revictual. The moment they
were located, either by one of our light cruisers or reported from the
shore, the uncertainty of their whereabouts was at an end. We could
instantly concentrate upon them from many quarters. The Japanese
battleship _Hizen_ and cruiser _Idzumo_, with the British light cruiser
_Newcastle_, were moving southward across the Northern Pacific towards
the coast of South America—a force also not capable of catching the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, but too strong to be attacked by them. On
the East Coast of South America was Rear-Admiral Stoddart’s squadron
with the powerful modern armoured cruiser _Defence_, with two more
County class cruisers, _Carnarvon_ (7·5–inch guns) and _Cornwall_, the
light cruiser _Bristol_, and the armed merchant cruisers _Macedonia_ and
_Orama_. All these ships could be moved by a single order into a common
concentration against the German squadron the moment we knew where they
were; and meanwhile, so long as he kept within supporting distance of
the _Canopus_, Admiral Cradock could have cruised safely up the Chilean
coast, keeping the Germans on the move and always falling back on his
battleship if they attempted to attack him. The _Good Hope_ and
_Monmouth_ steaming together were scarcely inferior in designed speed to
the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and these last had been long at sea.
Admiral Cradock could, therefore, have kept on observing the Germans,
disturbing them, provoking them and drawing them on to the _Canopus_.
Moreover, in the _Glasgow_ he had a light cruiser which was much
superior in speed to the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and superior
both in strength and speed to any one of the German light cruisers
concerned.

I cannot therefore accept for the Admiralty any share in the
responsibility for what followed. The first rule of war is to
concentrate superior strength for decisive action and to avoid division
of forces or engaging in detail. The Admiral showed by his telegrams
that he clearly appreciated this. The Admiralty orders explicitly
approved his assertion of these elementary principles. We were not,
therefore, anxious about the safety of Admiral Cradock’s squadron. A
more important and critical situation would arise, if in cruising up the
West Coast of South America with his concentrated force Admiral Cradock
missed the Germans altogether, and if they passed to the southward of
him through the Straits of Magellan or round the Horn, refuelling there
in some secret bay, and so came on to the great trade route from Rio.
Here they would find Admiral Stoddart, whose squadron when concentrated,
though somewhat faster and stronger than the Germans, had not much to
spare in either respect. It was for this reason that I had deprecated in
my minute of the 12th October Admiral Cradock’s movement up the West
Coast and would have been glad to see him remaining near the Straits of
Magellan, where he could either bar the path of the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau, or manœuvre to join forces with Admiral Stoddart. However, I
rested content with the decisions conveyed in the Admiralty telegram of
the 14th October, and awaited events.

Suddenly, on the 27th October, there arrived a telegram from Admiral
Cradock which threw me into perplexity:—

_Rear-Admiral Cradock to Admiralty._

_Good Hope._ 26th October, 7 p.m. At sea.

Admiralty telegram received 7th October. With reference to orders to
search for enemy and our great desire for early success, I consider
that owing to slow speed of _Canopus_ it is impossible to find and
destroy enemy’s squadron.

Have therefore ordered _Defence_ to join me after calling for orders
at Montevideo.

Shall employ _Canopus_ on necessary work of convoying colliers.

We were then in the throes of the change in the office of First Sea
Lord, and I was gravely preoccupied with the circumstances and
oppositions attending the appointment of Lord Fisher. But for this fact
I am sure I should have reacted much more violently against the ominous
sentence: ‘Shall employ _Canopus_ on necessary work of convoying
colliers.’ As it was I minuted to the Naval Secretary (Admiral Oliver)
as follows:—

‘This telegram is very obscure, and I do not understand what Admiral
Cradock intends and wishes.’

I was reassured by his reply on the 29th October:—

‘The situation on the West Coast seems safe. If _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ have gone north they will meet eventually _Idzumo_,
_Newcastle_, and _Hizen_ moving south, and will be forced south on
_Glasgow_ and _Monmouth_ who have good speed and can keep touch and
draw them south on to _Good Hope_ and _Canopus_, who should keep
within supporting distance of each other.’

The half fear which had begun to grow in my mind that perhaps the
Admiral would go and fight without the _Canopus_ which I thought was so
improbable that I did not put it on paper, was allayed. It would, of
course, be possible for him to manœuvre forty or fifty miles ahead of
the _Canopus_ and still close her before fighting. To send the _Defence_
to join Admiral Cradock would have left Admiral Stoddart in a hopeless
inferiority. Indeed, in a few hours arrived Admiral Stoddart’s protest
of the 29th October:—

‘I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send _Defence_ to
Montevideo to coal, obtain charts, and to await further orders.

Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of _Defence_, as I do
not consider force at my disposal sufficient....’

The Admiralty Staff had, however, already replied in accordance with all
our decisions:—

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock._

(_Sent October 28, 1914_, 6.45 p.m.)

_Defence_ is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart.

This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile
cruisers appear there on the trade routes.

There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity.

Japanese battleship _Hizen_ shortly expected on North American coast;
she will join with Japanese _Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ and move south
towards Galapagos.

But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Cradock. He had
taken his own decision. Without waiting for the _Defence_, even if we
had been able to send her, and leaving the Canopus behind to guard the
colliers, he was already steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he
left the inexpugnable _Canopus_ behind because she was too slow, he took
with him the helpless armed merchant cruiser _Otranto_, which was
scarcely any faster. He was thus ill-fitted either to fight or run.

He telegraphed to us from off Vallenar at 4 p.m. on 27th October
(received 1st November, 4.33 a.m.):—

‘Have received your telegram 105. Have seized German mails.
_Monmouth_, _Good Hope_ and _Otranto_ coaling at Vallenar. _Glasgow_
patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept German shipping rejoining
flag later on. I intend to proceed northward secretly with squadron
after coaling and to keep out of sight of land. Until further notice
continue telegraphing to Montevideo.’

And at noon on 29th October (received 1st November, 7.40 a.m.):—

‘Until further notice mails for Rear-Admiral Cradock, _Good Hope_,
_Canopus_, _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, _Otranto_, should be forwarded to
Valparaiso.’

The inclusion of the _Canopus_ in the middle of the latter message
seemed to indicate the Admiral’s intention to work in combination with
the _Canopus_ even if not actually concentrated. These were the last
messages received from him.

On the 30th October Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord. As soon as he
entered the Admiralty I took him to the War Room and went over with him
on the great map the positions and tasks of every vessel in our immense
organisation. It took more than two hours. The critical point was
clearly in South American waters. Speaking of Admiral Cradock’s
position, I said, ‘You don’t suppose he would try to fight them without
the _Canopus_?’ He did not give any decided reply.

Early on the 3rd November we got our first certain news of the Germans.

_Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Admiralty._ (_Sent_ 5.20 p.m., _2nd
November_. _Received_ 3.10 a.m., _3rd November_.)

Master of Chilean merchant vessel reports that on 1st November 1 p.m.
he was stopped by _Nürnberg_ 5 miles off Cape Carranza about 62 miles
north of Talcahuano. Officers remained on board 45 minutes. Two other
German cruisers lay west about 5 and 10 miles respectively. Master
believes one of these was _Scharnhorst_. On 26th October, 1 p.m.
_Leipzig_ called at Mas-a-Fuera having crew 456 and 10 guns, 18 days
out from Galapagos. She was accompanied by another cruiser name
unknown. They bought oxen and left same day. On 29th October unknown
warship was seen in lat. 33 south, long. 74 west, steaming towards
Coquimbo.

Here at last was the vital message for which the Admiralty Staff had
waited so long. Admiral von Spee’s squadron was definitely located on
the West Coast of South America. He had not slipped past Admiral Cradock
round the Horn as had been possible. For the moment Admiral Stoddart was
perfectly safe. With the long peninsula of South America between him and
the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, there was no longer any need for him
to keep the _Defence_. She could join Cradock for what we must hope
would be an early battle. After surveying the new situation we
telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart as follows:—

(_Sent_ 6.20 p.m., _3rd November_.)

_Defence_ to proceed with all possible dispatch to join Admiral
Cradock on West Coast of America. Acknowledge.

This telegram was initialled by Admiral Sturdee, Lord Fisher and myself.
We telegraphed at the same time to the Japanese Admiralty:—

_Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Nürnberg_, _Leipzig_, _Dresden_ have been
located near Valparaiso coaling and provisioning. This squadron is
presumably concentrated for some serious operation. We are
concentrating _Glasgow_, _Good Hope_, _Canopus_, _Monmouth_, and
_Defence_ on the S.W. coast of South America, hoping to bring them to
battle.... We hope that the Japanese Admiralty may now find it
possible to move some of their squadrons eastward in order to
intercept the German squadron and prevent its return to Asiatic or
Australian waters.... We indicate our views in order to obtain yours
and to concert common action.

We also telegraphed to Admiral Cradock once more reiterating the
instructions about the _Canopus_:—

(_Sent_ 6.55 p.m., _3rd November_.)

_Defence_ has been ordered to join your flag with all dispatch.
_Glasgow_ should find or keep in touch with the enemy. You should keep
touch with _Glasgow_ concentrating the rest of your squadron including
_Canopus_. It is important you should effect your junction with
_Defence_ at earliest possible moment subject to keeping touch with
_Glasgow_ and enemy. Enemy supposes you at Corcovados Bay.
Acknowledge.

But we were already talking to the void.

When I opened my boxes at 7 o’clock on the morning of November 4, I read
the following telegram:—

_Maclean, Valparaiso, to Admiralty._ (_Sent November 3, 1914_, 6.10
p.m.)

Have just learnt from Chilean Admiral that German Admiral states that
on Sunday at sunset, in thick and wicked weather, his ships met _Good
Hope_, _Glasgow_, _Monmouth_, and _Otranto_. Action was joined, and
_Monmouth_ turned over and sank after about an hour’s fighting.

_Good Hope_, _Glasgow_ and _Otranto_ drew off into darkness.

_Good Hope_ was on fire, an explosion was heard, and she is believed
to have sunk.

_Gneisenau_, _Scharnhorst_ and _Nürnberg_ were among the German ships
engaged.

The story of what had happened, so far as it ever can be known, is now
familiar; it is fully set out in the official history, and need only be
summarised here. Arrived on the Chilean coast, having refuelled at a
lonely island, and hearing that the British light cruiser _Glasgow_ was
at Coronel, Admiral von Spee determined to make an attempt to cut her
off, and with this intention steamed southward on November 1 with his
whole squadron. By good fortune the _Glasgow_ left harbour before it was
too late. Almost at the same moment, Admiral Cradock began his sweep
northward, hoping to catch the _Leipzig_, whose wireless had been heard
repeatedly by the _Glasgow_. He was rejoined by the _Glasgow_ at
half-past two, and the whole squadron proceeded northward abreast about
fifteen miles apart. At about half-past four the smoke of several
vessels was seen to the northward, and in another quarter of an hour the
_Glasgow_ was able to identify the _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_ and a
German light cruiser. The _Canopus_ was nearly 300 miles away. Was there
still time to refuse action? Undoubtedly there was. The _Good Hope_ and
_Monmouth_ had normal speeds of 23 knots and 22·4 respectively and could
certainly steam 21 knots in company that day. The _Glasgow_ could steam
over 25. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ had nominal speeds of 23·2
and 23·5; but they had been long in southern seas and out of dock. On
the knowledge he possessed at that moment Admiral Cradock would have
been liberal in allowing them 22 knots. Rough weather would reduce
speeds equally on both sides. Had he turned at once and by standing out
to sea offered a stern chase to the enemy, he could only be overhauled
one knot each hour. When the enemy was sighted by the _Glasgow_ at 4.45,
the nearest armoured ships were about 20 miles apart. There were
scarcely two hours to sundown and less than three to darkness.

But the _Otranto_ was a possible complication. She could only steam 18
knots, and against the head sea during the action she did in fact only
steam 15 knots. As this weak, slow ship had been for some unexplained
reason sent on ahead with the _Glasgow_, she was at the moment of
sighting the enemy only 17 miles distant. Assuming that Admiral von Spee
could steam 22 knots, less 3 for the head sea, i.e. 19, he would
overhaul the _Otranto_ 4 knots an hour. On this he might have brought
her under long-range fire as darkness closed in. To that extent she
reduced the speed of the British squadron and diminished their chances
of safety. This may have weighed with Admiral Cradock.

We now know, of course, that in spite of being cumbered with the
_Otranto_ he could, as it happened, easily and certainly have declined
action had he attempted to do so. At the moment of being sighted,
Admiral von Spee had only steam for 14 knots, and had to light two more
boilers to realise his full speed. Further his ships were dispersed. To
concentrate and gain speed took an hour and a half off the brief
daylight during which the British ships would actually have been
increasing their distance. Moreover, in the chase and battle of the
Falklands the greatest speed ever developed by the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ did not exceed 20 knots in favourable weather. There is
therefore no doubt he could have got away untouched.

But nothing was farther from the mind of Admiral Cradock. He instantly
decided to attack. As soon as the _Glasgow_ had sighted the enemy, she
had turned back towards the flagship, preceded by the _Monmouth_ and the
_Otranto_ all returning at full speed. But Admiral Cradock at 5.10
ordered the squadron to concentrate, not on his flagship the _Good
Hope_, the farthest ship from the enemy, but on the _Glasgow_, which
though retreating rapidly was still the nearest. At 6.18 he signalled to
the distant _Canopus_: ‘I am now going to attack enemy.’ The decision to
fight sealed his fate, and more than that the fate of the squadron.

To quote the log of the _Glasgow_, ‘The British Squadron turned to port
four points together towards the enemy with a view to closing them and
forcing them to action before sunset, which if successful would have put
them at a great disadvantage owing to the British squadron being between
the enemy and the sun.’ The German Admiral easily evaded this manœuvre
by turning away towards the land and keeping at a range of at least
18,000 yards. Both squadrons were now steaming southward on slightly
converging courses—the British to seaward with the setting sun behind
them, and the Germans nearer the land. And now began the saddest naval
action in the war. Of the officers and men in both the squadrons that
faced each other in these stormy seas so far from home, nine out of ten
were doomed to perish. The British were to die that night: the Germans a
month later. At 7 o’clock the sun sank beneath the horizon, and the
German Admiral, no longer dazzled by its rays, opened fire. The British
ships were silhouetted against the afterglow, while the Germans were
hardly visible against the dark background of the Chilean coast. A
complete reversal of advantage had taken place. The sea was high, and
the main deck 6–inch guns both of the _Monmouth_ and of the _Good Hope_
must have been much affected by the dashing spray. The German batteries,
all mounted in modern fashion on the upper deck, suffered no
corresponding disadvantage from the rough weather. The unequal contest
lasted less than an hour. One of the earliest German salvos probably
disabled the _Good Hope’s_ forward 9·2–inch gun, which was not fired
throughout the action. Both she and the _Monmouth_ were soon on fire.
Darkness came on and the sea increased in violence till the _Good Hope_,
after a great explosion, became only a glowing speck which was presently
extinguished; and the _Monmouth_, absolutely helpless but refusing to
surrender, was destroyed by the _Nürnberg_, and foundered, like her
consort, with her flag still flying. The _Otranto_, an unarmoured
merchantman, quite incapable of taking part in the action, rightly held
her distance and disappeared into the gloom. Only the little _Glasgow_,
which miraculously escaped fatal damage among the heavy salvos,
continued the action until she was left alone in darkness on the stormy
seas. There were no survivors from the two British ships: all perished,
from Admiral to seaman. The Germans had no loss of life.

Quoth the _Glasgow_ in her subsequent report:—

‘... Throughout the engagement the conduct of officers and men was
entirely admirable. Perfect discipline and coolness prevailed under
trying circumstances of receiving considerable volume of fire without
being able to make adequate return. The men behaved exactly as though
at battle practice; there were no signs of wild fire, and when the
target was invisible the gunlayers ceased firing of their own accord.
Spirit of officers and ship’s company of _Glasgow_ is entirely
unimpaired by serious reverse in which they took part, and that the
ship may be quickly restored to a condition in which she can take part
in further operations against the same enemy is the unanimous wish of
us all.’

This as it happened they were not to be denied.

Surveying this tragic episode in the light of after knowledge, the
official historian has blamed the Admiralty on various grounds: first,
for dividing the available force into two inadequate squadrons under
Admiral Cradock and Admiral Stoddart; secondly, for a lack of
explicitness in the wording of the Staff telegrams. I cannot admit that
the first charge is in any way justified. It would, of course, have been
much simpler to have concentrated the squadrons of Admiral Cradock and
Admiral Stoddart in the Straits of Magellan and awaited events. But
until we knew for certain that the German cruisers were coming to South
America, there was a great disadvantage in denuding the main trade route
from Rio of all protection. Suppose we had done this and Admiral von
Spee had remained, as he could easily have done, for many weeks at
Easter Island, or anywhere else in the Pacific, the whole of the Plate
trade would then, for all we knew, have been at the mercy of the
_Karlsruhe_ or of any other German commerce destroyer. At least six
different courses were open to von Spee, and we had, while our resources
were at the fullest strain, to meet every one of them. Suppose for
instance he had gone northward to the Panama Canal and, passing swiftly
through, had entered the West Indies: of what use would be our
concentration in the Straits of Magellan? The reasoning and state of
mind which would have led to such a concentration would have involved a
virtual suspension of our enterprises all over the world. We could not
afford to do that. We decided deliberately in October to carry on our
protection of trade in every theatre in spite of the menace of the
unlocated _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and to do this by means of
squadrons which, though they would not be homogeneous in speed and
class, were in every case if held together capable of fighting the enemy
with good prospects of success. This was true of the Anglo-Japanese
squadron. It was true of the escort of the Australian convoy. It was
true of Admiral Stoddart. Most of all was it true of Admiral Cradock.
The last word in such an argument was surely spoken by Admiral von Spee.
‘The English,’ he wrote the day after the battle, ‘have here another
ship like the _Monmouth_; and also it seems a battleship of the _Queen_
type, with 12–inch guns. Against this last-named we can hardly do
anything. If they had kept their forces together we should, I suppose,
have got the worst of it.’

So far as the clarity of the Staff telegrams is concerned, no doubt here
and there the wording of naval messages had not been sufficiently
precise, and this fault ran through much of the Naval Staff work in
those early days; but on the main point nothing could have been more
emphatic, nor, indeed, should any emphasis have been needed. It ought
not to be necessary to tell an experienced Admiral to keep concentrated
and not to be brought to action in circumstances of great disadvantage
by superior forces. Still, even this was done, and in telegram after
telegram the importance of not being separated from the _Canopus_,
especially sent him for his protection, was emphasised.

Lastly, the official historian has represented the new decision to
reinforce Cradock by the _Defence_ as a reversal by Lord Fisher of the
mistaken policy hitherto pursued.

‘By the time it (Admiral Cradock’s telegram of 31st) reached the
Admiralty the new Board was installed with Lord Fisher as First Sea
Lord, and one of their first acts was an effort to improve the
precarious position in which Admiral Cradock found himself. The
_Defence_ was immediately ordered to join him.’[84]

This is unjust both to Prince Louis and to Admiral Sturdee. It was not
possible to order the superior concentration until the enemy had been
located, and such concentration would have been ordered by any Board the
moment the uncertainty was cleared up. The official historian would not
have fallen into this error in a work distinguished for its care and
industry, if he had mentioned the telegram from the Consul-General,
Valparaiso, which was received on the morning of the 3rd, or if he had
noticed that although the position in South American waters was known to
Lord Fisher on the 30th October, no fresh dispositions were made or
could be made until the whereabouts of the enemy was clearly
ascertained. Then and not till then could we strip Admiral Stoddart or
inform Admiral Cradock that the _Defence_ was hurrying to join him.

So far as Admiral Cradock is concerned, I cannot do better than repeat
the words which I wrote at the time and which commanded the recorded
assent both of Lord Fisher and of Sir Arthur Wilson.

_Draft of an answer to a Parliamentary question not subsequently put._

SIR,—As I have already said, I did not think it convenient to go into
this matter, but since it is pressed I will state that the _Canopus_
was sent from St. Vincent to join Admiral Cradock’s flag on September
4th, as soon as the possibility of the arrival of the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ on the West Coast of South America could be taken into
account. On October 12th Admiral Cradock telegraphed to the Admiralty
that the indications showed the possibility of _Dresden_, _Leipzig_,
and _Nürnberg_ joining _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_; and that he had
ordered _Canopus_ to Falkland Islands, where he intended to
concentrate and avoid division of forces; and on October 14th the
Admiralty approved specifically by telegram Admiral Cradock’s proposed
concentration of _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Canopus_, _Glasgow_, and
_Otranto_ for combined operations. The squadron thus formed was amply
strong enough to defeat the enemy if attacked by them. It was not fast
enough to force an engagement; but in view of the uncertainty as to
which part of the world the enemy’s squadron would appear in, it was
not possible at that time to provide another strong fast ship at that
particular point.

Admiral Cradock was an experienced and fearless officer, and we are of
opinion that feeling that he could not bring the enemy immediately to
action as long as he kept with the _Canopus_, he decided to attack
them with his fast ships alone, in the belief that even if he himself
were destroyed in the action, he would inflict damage upon them which
in the circumstances would be irreparable, and lead to their certain
subsequent destruction. This was not an unreasonable hope; and though
the Admiralty have no responsibility for Admiral Cradock’s decision
they consider that it was inspired by the highest devotion, and in
harmony with the spirit and traditions of the British Navy.

We had now to meet the new situation. Our combinations, such as they
were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral von Spee, now in temporary
command of South American waters, possessed a wide choice of
alternatives. He might turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the
mystery tactics which had been so baffling to us. He might steam
northward up the West Coast of South America and make for the Panama
Canal. In this case he would run a chance of being brought to battle by
the Anglo-Japanese Squadron which was moving southward. But of course he
might not fall in with them, or, if he did, he could avoid battle owing
to his superior speed. He might come round to the East Coast and
interrupt the main trade route. If he did this he must be prepared to
fight Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very even and hazardous
combat. Admiral Stoddart had against the two armoured German ships three
armoured ships, of which the _Defence_, a later and a better ship than
either of the Germans, mounted four 9·2–inch and ten 7·5–inch guns, and
was one of our most powerful armoured-cruiser class. Lastly, he might
cross the Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way,
and arrive unexpectedly on the South African coast. Here he would find
the Union Government’s expedition against the German colony in full
progress and his arrival would have been most unwelcome. General Botha
and General Smuts, having suppressed the rebellion, were about to resume
in a critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West Africa, and
a stream of transports would soon be flowing with the expedition and its
supplies from Cape Town to Luderitz Bay. Subsequently or alternatively
to this intrusion, Admiral von Spee might steam up the African coast and
strike at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cameroons,
which was quite without means of defending itself against him.

All these unpleasant possibilities had to be faced by us. We had to
prepare again at each of many points against a sudden blow; and, great
as were our resources, the strain upon them became enormous. The first
step was to restore the situation in South American waters. This would
certainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of the Staff,
written an hour after I had read the first news of the disaster, will
show the possibilities which existed. It will be seen that in this grave
need my mind immediately turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the
Grand Fleet which, joined with the _Defence_, _Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_
and _Kent_, would give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority.

4/11/14.

Director of Operations Division.

1. How far is it, and how long would it take _Dartmouth_ and
_Weymouth_ to reach Punta Arenas, Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if
they started this afternoon with all dispatch?

2. How long would it take—

(_a_) KENT to reach Rio and Abrolhos?

(_b_) _Australia_ (1) without, and (2) with _Montcalm_ to reach
Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also _Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ to
reach them?

(_c_) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace _Australia_ at
Fiji?

(_d_) _Defence_, CARNARVON and CORNWALL respectively to reach Punta
Arenas?

(_e_) INVINCIBLE to reach Abrolhos, Rio, Punta Arenas?

(_f_) _Hizen_ and _Asama_ to reach Galapagos or Esquimalt?[85]

W.S.C.

But I found Lord Fisher in a bolder mood. He would take two
battle-cruisers from the Grand Fleet for the South American station.
More than that, and much more questionable, he would take a third—the
_Princess Royal_—for Halifax and later for the West Indies in case von
Spee came through the Panama Canal. There never was any doubt what ought
to be sent. The question was what could be spared. We measured up our
strength in home waters anxiously, observing that the _Tiger_ was about
to join the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron, that the new battleships
_Benbow_, _Empress of India_ and _Queen Elizabeth_ were practically
ready. We sent forthwith the following order to the Commander-in-Chief:—

(_November 4, 1914_, 12.40 p.m.)

Order _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ to fill up with coal at once and
proceed to Berehaven with all dispatch. They are urgently needed for
foreign service. Admiral and Flag-Captain _Invincible_ to transfer to
_New Zealand_. Captain _New Zealand_ to _Invincible_. _Tiger_ has been
ordered to join you with all dispatch. Give her necessary orders.

I also telegraphed personally to Sir John Jellicoe as follows:—

(_November 5_, 12.5 a.m.)

From all reports received through German sources, we fear Cradock has
been caught or has engaged with only _Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_
armoured ships against _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. Probably both
British vessels sunk. Position of _Canopus_ critical and fate of
_Glasgow_ and _Otranto_ uncertain.

Proximity of concentrated German squadron of 5 good ships will
threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London. Essential recover
control.

First Sea Lord requires _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ for this
purpose.

Sturdee goes Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific.

Oliver, Chief of Staff. Bartolomé, Naval Secretary.

Apparently we had not at this stage decided finally to send the
_Princess Royal_. Sir John Jellicoe rose to the occasion and parted with
his two battle-cruisers without a word. They were ordered to steam by
the West Coast to Devonport to fit themselves for their southern voyage.
Our plans for the second clutch at von Spee were now conceived as
follows[86]:—

(1) Should he break across the Pacific; he would be dealt with by the
very superior Japanese 1st Southern Squadron, based on Suva to cover
Australia and New Zealand, and composed as follows:—_Kurama_
(battleship), _Tsukuba_ and _Ikoma_ (battle-cruisers), _Chikuma_ and
_Yahagi_ (light cruisers). At Suva also were the _Montcalm_ and
_Encounter_. Another strong Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on
the Caroline Islands.

(2) To meet him, should he proceed up the West Coast of South America,
an Anglo-Japanese Squadron, comprising _Australia_ (from Fiji), _Hizen_,
_Idzumo_, _Newcastle_, was to be formed off the North American Coast.

(3) Should he come round on to the East Coast, _Defence_, _Carnarvon_,
_Cornwall_, _Kent_ were ordered to concentrate off Montevideo, together
with _Canopus_, _Glasgow_ and _Bristol_, and not seek action till joined
by _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, thereafter sending the _Defence_ to
South Africa.

(4) Should he approach the Cape station, he would be awaited by
_Defence_ and also _Minotaur_ (released from the Australian convoy,
after we knew of von Spee’s arrival in South American waters), together
with the old battleship _Albion_, and _Weymouth_, _Dartmouth_, _Astræa_
and _Hyacinth_, light cruisers: the Union Expedition being postponed for
14 days.

(5) Should he come through the Panama Canal, he would meet the _Princess
Royal_, as well as the _Berwick_ and _Lancaster_, of the West Indian
Squadron, and the French _Conde_.

(6) Cameroons were warned to be ready to take their shipping up the
river beyond his reach.

(7) Should he endeavour to work homewards across the South Atlantic, he
would come into the area of a new squadron under Admiral de Robeck to be
formed near the Cape de Verde Islands, comprising the old battleship
_Vengeance_, the strong armoured cruisers _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_
and the _Donegal_, _Highflyer_, and later _Cumberland_.

Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two of which were
armoured, it was necessary to employ nearly thirty, including twenty-one
armoured ships, the most part of superior metal, and this took no
account of the powerful Japanese Squadrons, and of French ships or of
armed merchant cruisers, the last-named effective for scouting.

I telegraphed to the Japanese Admiralty as follows:—

_British Admiralty to Japanese Admiralty._

_November 5, 1914._

In consequence of unsuccessful action off Chili and definite location
of German squadron, we have ordered concentration off Montevideo of
_Defence_, _Kent_, _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_. These will be joined
with all dispatch by _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ battle-cruisers
from England, and _Dartmouth_ light cruiser from East Africa, and
remainder of defeated squadron from Chili. This assures the South
Atlantic situation. We now desire assistance of Japan in making
equally thorough arrangements on Pacific side. We propose for your
consideration and friendly advice the following:—_Newcastle_ and
_Idzumo_ to go south in company to San Clemente Island off San Diego,
California, there to meet _Hizen_ from Honolulu. Meanwhile _Asama_
will be able to effect internment or destruction of _Geier_. We also
propose to move _Australia_ battle-cruiser from Fiji to Fanning
Island. By the time these moves are complete, probably by November 17,
we may know more of _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ movements and a
further concentration of _Australia_ and _Asama_ with _Hizen_,
_Idzumo_ and _Newcastle_ will be possible either at San Clemente or
further to the south, further movements depending on the enemy.

We should also like a Japanese squadron to advance to Fiji to take the
place of the _Australia_ and so guard Australia and New Zealand in
case the Germans return.

With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it is now known
that _Emden_ is the only enemy ship at large. We therefore hope that
the Japanese squadrons and vessels not involved in the eastward
movement will draw westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch
East Indies in order to block every exit and deny every place of
shelter up to the 90th meridian of east longitude.

British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search of _Emden_
the following light cruisers:—_Weymouth_, _Gloucester_, _Yarmouth_,
_Melbourne_, _Sydney_, and the armoured cruiser _Hampshire_ and
Russian cruiser _Askold_. These ships will be ready by the middle of
November. Thus by concerted action between the Allied fleets the
_Emden_ should be speedily run down.

_Japanese Admiralty to British Admiralty. November 7, 1914._

Secret and Private.

‘Japanese Admiralty give their consent generally to strategical scheme
proposed and beg to withdraw the proposal of November 6, put forward
through Admiral Oguri to the British War Staff. Measures will be taken
in vicinity of Sumatra and Dutch East Indies as asked. First Southern
Squadron will be dispatched to Fiji, but Japanese Admiralty think that
it may be necessary for them to extend their sphere of operations to
the Marquesas Islands. With reference to the movements of the _Hizen_
and _Asama_, Japanese Admiralty will carry out your wishes as far as
possible, bearing in mind necessity of watching the _Geier_ until her
(? disposition) is settled, but the _Hizen_ will be dispatched at
once.

‘With reference to the _Hizen_, _Asama_ and _Idzumo_, Japanese
Admiralty request British Admiralty to make arrangements necessary for
their supply of coal, etc.’

Meanwhile it had been necessary to provide, as far as possible, for the
safety of the surviving ships of Admiral Cradock’s squadron and to move
the reinforcing ships.

_Admiralty to H.M.S. Kent._

(_November 4, 1914._)

Urgent. Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all dispatch and
communicate via Rio. It is intended you shall join Admiral Stoddart’s
squadron.

_Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Stoddart, Carnarvon._

(_November 4, 1914._)

In view of reported sinking of _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ by
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ off Coronel, November 1, armoured ships
on S.E. Coast America must concentrate at once. _Carnarvon_,
_Cornwall_ should join _Defence_ off Montevideo. _Canopus_, _Glasgow_,
_Otranto_ have been ordered if possible to join you there. _Kent_ from
Sierra Leone also has been ordered to join your flag via Abrolhos.
Endeavour to get into communication with them. Enemy will most likely
come on to the Rio trade route. Reinforcements will meet you shortly
from England.

Acknowledge.

_From Admiralty to Canopus._

(_November 4, 1914._)

In view of reported sinking of _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ by
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ on 1st November you should make the best
of your way to join _Defence_ near Montevideo. Keep wide of track to
avoid being brought to action by superior force.

If attacked, however, Admiralty is confident ship will in all
circumstances be fought to the last as imperative to damage enemy
whatever may be consequences.

_Admiralty to ‘Glasgow,’ ‘Otranto’_

(_November 4, 1914._)

You should make the best of your way to join _Defence_ near
Montevideo. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by
superior force.

_Admiralty to Governor, Falkland Islands._

(_November 5, 1914._)

German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers should be
concealed in unfrequented harbours. Be ready to destroy supplies
useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on enemy ships being
sighted. Acknowledge.

In a few days we learned that her continuous fast steaming had led to
boiler troubles in the _Canopus_, and we had to direct her to the
Falklands.

_Admiralty to Canopus._

(_November 9, 1914_, 3.10 a.m.)

You are to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor the ship so that the
entrance is commanded by your guns. Extemporise mines outside
entrance. Send down your topmasts and be prepared for bombardment from
outside the harbour. Stimulate the Governor to organise all local
forces and make determined defence. Arrange observation stations on
shore, by which your fire on ships outside can be directed. Land guns
or use boats’ torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before she reaches the
Narrows. No objection to your grounding ship to obtain a good berth.

Should _Glasgow_ be able to get sufficient start of enemy to avoid
capture, send her on to the River Plate; if not, moor her inside
_Canopus_.

Repair your defects and wait orders.[87]

The strain upon British naval resources in the outer seas, apart from
the main theatre of naval operations, was now at its maximum and may be
partially appreciated from the following approximate enumerations:—

Combination against von Spee, 30 ships.

In search of the _Emden_ and _Königsberg_, 8 ships.

General protection of trade by vessels other than the above, 40 ships.

Convoy duty in the Indian Ocean, 8 ships.

Blockade of the Turco-German fleet at the Dardanelles, 3 ships.

Defence of Egypt, 2 ships.

Miscellaneous minor tasks, 11 ships.

Total, 102 ships of all classes.

We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel of any sort or
kind which could be made to play any useful part. But we were soon to
have relief.

Already on October 30 news had reached us that the _Königsberg_ had been
discovered hiding in the Rufigi River in German East Africa, and it was
instantly possible to mark her down with two ships of equal value and
liberate the others. On November 9 far finer news arrived. The reader
will remember for what purposes the _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_ had been
attached to the great Australian convoy which was now crossing the
Indian Ocean. On the 8th, the _Sydney_, cruising ahead of the convoy,
took in a message from the wireless station at Cocos Island that a
strange ship was entering the Bay. Thereafter, silence from Cocos
Island. Thereupon the large cruiser _Ibuki_ increased her speed,
displayed the war flag of Japan and demanded permission from the British
Officer in command of the convoy to pursue and attack the enemy. But the
convoy could not divest itself of this powerful protection and the
coveted task was accorded to the _Sydney_. At 9 o’clock she sighted the
_Emden_ and the first sea fight in the history of the Australian Navy
began. It could have only one ending. In a hundred minutes the _Emden_
was stranded, a flaming mass of twisted metal, and the whole of the
Indian Ocean was absolutely safe and free.

In consideration of all the harm this ship had done us without offending
against humanity or the laws of sea war as we conceived them, we
telegraphed:—

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, China._

_November 11, 1914._

‘Captain, officers and crew of _Emden_ appear to be entitled to all
the honours of war. Unless you know of any reason to the contrary,
Captain and officers should be permitted to retain swords

These martial courtesies were, however, churlishly repaid.

The clearance of the Indian Ocean liberated all those vessels which had
been searching for the _Emden_ and the _Königsberg_. Nothing could now
harm the Australian convoy. Most of its escort vanished. The _Emden_ and
the _Königsberg_ were accounted for, and von Spee was on the other side
of the globe. The _Minotaur_ had already been ordered with all speed to
the Cape. All the other vessels went through the Red Sea into the
Mediterranean, where their presence was very welcome in view of the
impending Turkish invasion of Egypt.

Meanwhile the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had reached Devonport. We
had decided that Admiral Sturdee on vacating the position of chief of
the staff should hoist his flag in the _Invincible_, should take command
on the South American station, and should assume general control of all
the operations against von Spee. We were in the highest impatience to
get him and his ships away. Once vessels fall into dockyard hands, a
hundred needs manifest themselves.

On November 9, when Lord Fisher was in my room, the following message
was put on my table:—

The Admiral Superintendent, Devonport, reports that the earliest
possible date for completion of _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ is
midnight 13th November.

I immediately expressed great discontent with the dockyard delays and
asked, ‘Shall I give him a prog?’ or words to that effect. Fisher took
up the telegram. As soon as he saw it he exclaimed, ‘Friday the 13th.
What a day to choose!’ I then wrote and signed the following order,
which as it was the direct cause of the battle of the Falklands may be
reproduced in facsimile.[88]

The ships sailed accordingly and in the nick of time. They coaled on
November 26 at Abrolhos, where they joined and absorbed Admiral
Stoddart’s squadron (_Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, _Kent_, _Glasgow_,
_Bristol_ and _Orama_) and despatched _Defence_ to the Cape, and without
ever coming in sight of land or using their wireless they reached Port
Stanley, Falkland Islands, on the night of Dec. 7. Here they found the
_Canopus_ in the lagoon, prepared to defend herself and the colony in
accordance with the Admiralty instructions. They immediately began to
coal.

* * * * *

After his victory at Coronel, Admiral von Spee comported himself with
the dignity of a brave gentleman. He put aside the fervent acclamations
of the German colony of Valparaiso and spoke no word of triumph over the
dead. He was under no delusion as to his own danger. He said of the
flowers which were presented to him, ‘They will do for my funeral.’
Generally, his behaviour would lead us to suppose that the inability of
the Germans to pick up any British survivors was not due to want of
humanity; and this view has been accepted by the British navy.

After a few days at Valparaiso he and his ships vanished again into the
blue. We do not know what were the reasons which led him to raid the
Falkland Islands, nor what his further plans would have been in the
event of success. Presumably he hoped to destroy this unfortified
British coaling base and so make his own position in South American
waters less precarious. At any rate, at noon on December 6 he set off to
the eastward from the Straits of Magellan with his five ships; and about
8 o’clock on December 8 his leading ship (the _Gneisenau_) was in sight
of the main harbour of the Falklands. A few minutes later a terrible
apparition broke upon German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory,
sharply visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. One
glance was enough. They meant certain death.[89] The day was beautifully
fine and from the tops the horizon extended thirty or forty miles in
every direction. There was no hope for victory. There was no chance of
escape. A month before, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a
similar experience.

* * * * *

At 5 o’clock that afternoon I was working in my room at the Admiralty
when Admiral Oliver entered with the following telegram. It was from the
Governor of the Falkland Islands and ran as follows:—

‘Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his ships and
is now in action with Admiral Sturdee’s whole fleet, _which was
coaling_.’

[Illustration:

Facsimile of Admiralty’s Instructions to the Commander-in-Chief at
Devonport.
]

We had had so many unpleasant surprises that these last words sent a
shiver up my spine. Had we been taken by surprise and, in spite of all
our superiority, mauled, unready, at anchor? ‘Can it mean that?’ I said
to the Chief of the Staff. ‘I hope not,’ was all he said. I could see
that my suggestion, though I hardly meant it seriously, had disquieted
him. Two hours later, however, the door opened again, and this time the
countenance of the stern and sombre Oliver wore something which closely
resembled a grin. ‘It’s all right, sir; they are all at the bottom.’ And
with one exception so they were.

* * * * *

When the leading German ships were sighted far away on the distant
horizon, Admiral Sturdee and his squadron were indeed coaling. From the
intelligence he had received he had convinced himself that the Germans
were at Valparaiso, and he intended to sail the next day in the hopes of
doubling the Horn before the enemy could do so. More than two hours
passed after the enemy first came in sight before he could raise steam
and get under way. The first shots were fired by the 12–inch guns of the
_Canopus_ from her stationary position on the mudbanks of the inner
harbour. The _Gneisenau_ had continued to approach until she saw the
fatal tripods, whereupon she immediately turned round and, followed by
one of her light cruisers, made off at full speed to join her main body.
In a few moments the whole of the German squadron was steaming off in a
westerly direction with all possible speed. At 10 o’clock, the _Kent_,
_Carnarvon_ and _Glasgow_ having already sailed, Admiral Sturdee came
out of the harbour in the _Invincible_, followed by the _Inflexible_ and
_Cornwall_; while the light cruisers, one of whom (the _Bristol_) had
her engines actually opened up, hurried on after as fast as possible.

The whole five ships of the German squadron were now visible, hull down
on the horizon about fifteen miles away. The order was given for general
chase, but later on, having the day before him, the Admiral regulated
the speeds, the battle-cruisers maintaining only about 20 knots. This,
however, was quite sufficient to overhaul the Germans, who after their
long sojourn in the Pacific without docking were not able to steam more
than 18 knots in company. Even so, the _Leipzig_ began to lag behind,
and shortly before 1 o’clock, the _Inflexible_ opened fire upon her at
16,000 yards. Confronted with having his ships devoured one by one, von
Spee took a decision which was certainly in accordance with the best
traditions of the sea. Signalling to his light cruisers to make their
escape to the South American coast, he turned with the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ to face his pursuers. The action which followed was on the
British side uneventful. The German Admiral endeavoured more than once
to close to ranges at which his powerful secondary armament of 5·9’s
could play their part. The British held off just far enough to make this
fire ineffective and pounded their enemy with their 12–inch guns. At
this long range, however, it took a considerable time and much
ammunition to achieve the destruction of the German cruisers. The
_Scharnhorst_, with the Admiral and all hands, sank at 4.17 p.m., her
last signal to her consort being to save herself. _Gneisenau_ continued
to fight against hopeless odds with the utmost fortitude until 6 o’clock
when, being in a completely disabled condition, she opened her sea-cocks
and vanished, with her flag still flying, beneath the icy waters of the
ocean. The British ships rushing to the spot and lowering every
available boat were able only to save 200 Germans, many of whom died the
next day from the shock of the cold water. When both the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ had sunk, the _Inflexible_ had only thirty and the
_Invincible_ only twenty-two rounds left for each of their 12–inch guns.

[Illustration: CORONEL & THE FALKLANDS showing the second combination
against von Spee. _NOV: 10 to DEC: 10, 1914._]

Meanwhile, the other British cruisers had each selected one of the
flying German light vessels, and a series of chases ensued. The _Kent_
(Captain Allen) overtook and sunk the _Nürnberg_ by an effort of
steaming which surpassed all previous records and even, it is stated,
her designed speed. The _Nürnberg_ refused to surrender, and as she
foundered by the head, the victors could see a group of men on her
uplifted stern waving to the last the German flag. The _Leipzig_ was
finished off by the _Glasgow_ and the _Cornwall_. The _Dresden_ alone
for the time made good her escape. She was hunted down and destroyed
three months later in the roadstead of Mas-a-Fuera.

Thus came to an end the German cruiser warfare in the outer seas. With
the exception of the _Karlsruhe_, of which nothing had been heard for
some time and which we now know was sunk by an internal explosion on
November 4, and the _Dresden_ soon to be hunted down, no German ships of
war remained on any of the oceans of the world. It had taken four months
from the beginning of the war to achieve this result. Its consequences
were far-reaching, and affected simultaneously our position in every
part of the globe. The strain was everywhere relaxed. All our
enterprises, whether of war or commerce, proceeded in every theatre
without the slightest hindrance. Within twenty-four hours orders were
sent to a score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the first
time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses of ships of certain
classes, of trained men and of naval supplies of all kinds, and were in
a position to use them to the best advantage. The public, though
gratified by the annihilating character of the victory, was quite
unconscious of its immense importance to the whole naval situation.

CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS.

SHIPS DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

Approximate Name. Effective Speed: Guns.
Figure of Knots.
Comparative
Power.

BATTLE CRUISERS.

5 INVINCIBLE 24 8–12 inch
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------

5 INFLEXIBLE 24 8–12 inch
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------

BATTLESHIP.

4 CANOPUS 15½ 4–12 inch
------- 12–6 inch
-------
-------
-------

CRUISERS.

3 DEFENCE 22 4–9·2 inch
------- 10–7·5 inch
-------
-------

2½ SCHARNHORST 22 8–8·2 inch
----------- 6–5·9 inch
-----------
------

2½ GNEISENAU 22 8–8·2 inch
--------- 6–5·9 inch
---------
-----

2 GOOD HOPE 21½ 2–9·2 inch
---------- 16–6 inch
----------

1½ CARNARVON 21 4–7·5 inch
--------- 6–6 inch
-----

1 MONMOUTH 21 14–6 inch
--------

1 KENT 21½ 14–6 inch
----

1 CORNWALL 21 14–6 inch
--------

LIGHT CRUISERS.

GLASGOW 24 2–6 inch
10–4 inch

BRISTOL 24 2–6 inch
10–4 inch

LEIPZIG 21 10–4·1 inch

NÜRNBERG 22 10–4·1 inch

DRESDEN 22 10–4·1 inch

ARMED MERCHANT CRUISERS.

MACEDONIA 17

OTRANTO 16 4–4·7 inch

NOTE:—The figures of comparative value are only intended to enable the
reader to follow the account. As broad classifications they are true,
but they can only be taken as approximate.

CHAPTER XIX
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY
November and December, 1914

‘... that pale, that white-faced shore,
whose foot spurns back the ocean’s roaring tides
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
That water-walled bulwark, still secure
And confident from foreign purposes.’
KING JOHN. Act II, Sc. 1.

German Dreadnoughts off Yarmouth—What does it mean—Anticlimax—Inroads
upon the Grand Fleet—The Drain of Refits—Sir John Jellicoe’s
Protests—Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief—The Dreadnought
Margin—The Third Battle Squadron to Rosyth—The Admiralty Insist on
their view—The Destroyer Distribution—A Real Difficulty—A Wearing
Discussion—The actual Facts of Relative Strength—British Readiness
to Accept Battle—The Attempted Seaplane Raid on Cuxhaven—The Grand
Fleet sweeps South—The Invasion Alarm—Moon and Tides—Further
Intervention on the Belgian Coast—Immense Relief of the Falklands
Victory—Lord Fisher’s View—Correspondence between us—Lord Fisher
and Admiral Sturdee—Admiral Oliver’s foresight—Growing Power of
the Fleet—New Construction—Submarines—Fisher’s Great Impulse—The
Battle Cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_—Monitors—The Great
Programme—Full Speed Ahead.

Lord Fisher had barely taken up his duties in the Admiralty, when an
incident occurred which seemed to indicate the ending of the period of
German inactivity in the North Sea which had succeeded the action of
August 28 in the Heligoland Bight. Early in the morning of November 3,
the unusual signal was made to the Admiralty that several German
battle-cruisers or battleships had been sighted off Gorleston on the
Norfolk coast by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Halcyon_ and that she was
engaged with them. Almost immediately afterwards heavy shells were
reported to be bursting in the water and on the beach near Yarmouth. The
First Sea Lord and I reached the War Room from our bedrooms in a few
minutes. The question was, What did it mean? It seemed quite certain
that German battle cruisers would not be sent to throw shells at an open
town like Yarmouth. Obviously this was a demonstration to divert the
British Fleet from something else which was going to happen—was already
perhaps happening. Was it a German raid into the Channel, or a serious
attempt by the German Navy to intervene upon the Belgian coast while the
land battle was still raging? Was it a descent on the British coast at
Sunderland or Blyth? We had no means of judging. The last thing it
seemed possible to believe was that first-class units of the German
Fleet would have been sent across the North Sea simply in order to
disturb the fisher-folk of Yarmouth. By other signals our destroyers,
_Leopard_ and _Lively_, who were patrolling in the neighbourhood of
Yarmouth, also reported that they were engaged, and added that they were
proceeding to attack the enemy. Where were our main forces? The
Commander-in-Chief was for the first time in the war at the Admiralty,
whither he had been summoned to confer with the new First Sea Lord. The
Grand Fleet was at Lough Swilly in the North of Ireland. The 3rd Battle
Squadron was steaming through the Irish Channel. No part of the Grand
Fleet was nearer than Beatty and his battle cruisers: and these were as
far off as Cromarty. Whatever happened, we could not fight a general
action with our main Fleet till late on the following day. Meanwhile the
Harwich striking force, the Dover flotillas, Admiral Hood’s forces off
the Belgian coast and Admiral Burney’s Channel Fleet must do the best
they could. If the German demonstration off Yarmouth was the prelude or
concomitant to a serious attempt to break into the Channel, the very
greatest naval events would follow. The contingency, as the reader is
aware, had always been faced, and we were well aware that we should have
to wait for our revenge till the next day. Meanwhile there was nothing
to be done but to put all the fleets and flotillas on guard and in
motion with the double object of resisting to the utmost a German attack
to the southward and intercepting as speedily as possible from the North
the return of the enemy. Several hours of tension passed; and then
gradually it became clear that the German battle cruisers were returning
home at full speed, and that nothing else was apparently happening; and
the incredible conclusion forced itself upon us that the German
Admiralty had had no other purpose in hand than this silly demonstration
off Yarmouth beach.

This anticlimax was fatiguing. The experience of bracing ourselves to
the most tremendous events, and then finding nothing happen, was one
which we were compelled more than once to undergo at the Admiralty.

* * * * *

The new First Sea Lord was even more sure of the superiority of the
British line of battle over the enemy than I was, and in this his views
contrasted very sharply with those of the Commander-in-Chief. In full
agreement with Sir Arthur Wilson, he proposed on his assumption of
office to bring the Third Battle Squadron (the _King Edwards_) down to
Portland to increase our security against a German incursion into the
Channel; and he moved the Fifth Battle Squadron (the _Formidables_) with
the two _Lord Nelsons_ to Sheerness to provide battleship support for
the Harwich Striking Force, and to give an additional security against
raid or invasion. These movements were no sooner determined than news of
the Battle of Coronel was received (November 4), and we were forced to
make far more serious inroads upon Sir John Jellicoe’s command. The
battle cruisers _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were sent as described to
the Falklands: and Lord Fisher, as we have seen, demanded the _Princess
Royal_ for the Atlantic.

This last order produced continuous protests from Sir John Jellicoe, and
led to an interchange of telegrams and letters in which the
Commander-in-Chief dwelt upon every aspect of his dangers and weakness
and the Admiralty, while insisting on their decision, endeavoured to
reassure and placate him.

Our Dreadnought margin in home waters at the outbreak of war had been
just sufficient. Every ship was ready and in good order. We did not feel
that we could spare one. But after the first two months we were
compelled to send ships one at a time from each Battle Squadron down to
their home ports on the South Coast for refit. A regular system of
refits, as was foreseen, had to be instituted. This involved the
permanent absence of two or three of the most important vessels from the
Grand Fleet. The enemy, on the other hand, lying in his main base, could
always in theory be credited with having all his ships available at his
selected moment for battle. Before, however, the drain of refits came
upon us we had succeeded in reinforcing the Fleet by five fine ships, so
that we began the war at our maximum possible strength and always,
except for the briefest intervals, held or improved on that number.

The requirements of the Commander-in-Chief were, however, hard to meet.
The strategy on which we were all agreed, involved keeping the Grand
Fleet in distant northern waters and required very large forces of
destroyers and other light craft for its local security, and for its
service in battle. On the other hand, while no properly defended war
harbour had yet been created capable of holding the entire fleet,
various other bases had to be effectively guarded and patrolled, for
which separate flotillas must be supplied. If at any time from any
cause, two or three ships were absent from the Grand Fleet for a week or
two, the Commander-in-Chief drew severe comparisons between the German
Fleet and his own. He was a master of this kind of argument. From his
own side he deducted any ship which had any defect, however temporary,
however small—even defects which would not have prevented her from
taking her place in the line in an emergency. He sometimes also deducted
two or three of the most powerful battleships in the world which had
newly joined his command because they were not trained up to the full
level of efficiency of the others; and these were absolutely blotted out
as if they were of no value whatever.[90] He next proceeded to deal with
the enemy. He always credited them with several ships more than we now
know they had, or were then thought likely to have. In October, 1914, he
gave credence to a suggestion that the four German Dreadnoughts of the
_König_ class had been completely re-armed with 14–inch guns. In 1915
the size of these guns had advanced to 15–inch. I was on both occasions
compelled to set up expert committees to demolish these baseless
suppositions. Unable to deny that the British line of battle could fire
a broadside double in weight to that of the Germans, he developed a
skilful argument to prove that this advantage was more than counteracted
by other disadvantages arising from the superior displacement of
contemporary German ships. He dwelt on this even at a period when his
fleet had been reinforced by seven or eight additional units of enormous
power without any corresponding accession to the enemy’s strength.

One must admit, nevertheless, that the withdrawal of the _Princess
Royal_ inflicted a very serious injury upon the Battle Cruiser Squadron,
and that Sir David Beatty might have had to fight an action without any
margin of superiority during her absence. In this matter, however, Lord
Fisher entered the lists in person.

_First Sea Lord to Commander-in-Chief._

Personal.

_November 12, 1914._

I want to make it clear to you what the _Scharnhorst_ Squadron means
as regards our dispositions.

1. We have not heard of them since November 4.

2. They may adopt the following courses:—

(_a_) Go through Panama Canal, smash our West Indian Fleet and
release all the armed German liners from New York—hence the
_Princess Royal_.

(_b_) Go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital food
supplies—hence the two _Invincibles_.

(_c_) Go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walfish Bay—hence the
_Minotaur_ to reinforce _Albion_.

(_d_) Go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our ships and
military expedition—hence the _Warrior_, _Black Prince_ and
three _Edgar Quinets_.

I hope to send Bartolomé to you to-morrow with information which is
too secret to be written or telegraphed.

The secret information pointed to the possibility of the Germans
endeavouring to slip one or two of their battle cruisers into the
Atlantic to help the return to Germany of the _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ and incidentally to release all their fast liners in New
York. Lord Fisher became vehemently impressed with this idea, and
certainly the period was one of extreme strategic tension when some
enterprise by the enemy seemed especially to be expected.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 13, 1914._

Since war began you have gained two Dreadnoughts on balance, and will
have by 20th twenty-seven superior units to twenty. We intend
_Princess Royal_ to rejoin you as soon as _Scharnhorst_ is dealt with.

During the next month you should suspend sending ships away for refit,
doing the best you can at Scapa. If notwithstanding the above you feel
the need of reinforcements we should propose to meet you by stationing
the eight _King Edwards_ at Rosyth, where they would be well placed to
join you for general action or to attack an invading force.

This would avoid necessity of stationing cruisers there for the
present.

If you agree the eight _King Edwards_ will be ordered to sail
to-night.

The Commander-in-Chief in reply asserted that the twenty-seven units
quoted included three ships, two of which had never fired a gun and the
third was only partially trained. He deprecated the Third Battle
Squadron being stationed at Rosyth, as without being covered by cruisers
or sea-going destroyers, it would run a great risk from mines and
submarines outside the limits of the port defence. He suggested that it
was preferable to keep them at Cromarty closely adjacent to the main
base where they would be covered by the cruisers of the Grand Fleet and
by the Destroyer Flotilla stationed at Cromarty.

The Admiralty, however, insisted on the Third Battle Squadron being
stationed at Rosyth.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 16, 1914._

... The importance of preventing the enemy from making a serious
attack on our coast and getting away without being engaged makes it
imperative to have a force nearer the probable points of attack than
either Scapa Flow or Cromarty, which are practically the same distance
off. The coast has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of
strengthening the force with you (amounting now to seventy-one
destroyers) that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels
available on the East Coast, amounting to three Scouts, twenty-three
Destroyers, twelve Torpedo Boats, between the Naze and St. Abbs Head,
a distance of 300 miles. In these circumstances we are reluctantly
compelled to decide on the _King Edwards_ and the Third Cruiser
Squadron going to Rosyth, and you should detach half a flotilla of the
seventy-one destroyers at Scapa Flow to act with them. We are sending
you a carefully compiled table of comparative strength of your Fleet
and the German High Sea Fleet, which makes it clear that without the
Third Battle Squadron you have such a preponderance of gun power that
with equal gunnery efficiency a successful result is ensured....

The Admiralty have in mind the importance of getting back the
_Princess Royal_ as soon as the situation admits. Your proposals as to
mining have been carefully considered, but the work done by our
submarines in the Bight has been of such importance that it is
undesirable to add to their dangers by laying mines whose positions
must be very uncertain. The Germans have no difficulty in sweeping any
channel they wish when they want to bring any of their ships out, and
do so daily. It would be very difficult for us to lay fresh lines in
any channels they sweep on account of the dangers to the mine-layers
from our own mines.

This and preceding telegrams expressed the deliberate views of the First
Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, and I was in the fullest agreement with
them.[91]

The Commander-in-Chief, however, urged that the 71 destroyers mentioned
by the Admiralty included 10 which were absent refitting, and pointed
out with justice that the 40 destroyers of the Harwich flotillas had
been omitted from those at the disposition of the Admiralty. He asked
particularly for reconsideration of the order to detach half a flotilla
with the Third Battle Squadron. Without these additional 12 destroyers
he stated that the safety of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was seriously
endangered; a submarine attack on Scapa Flow was quite feasible and ‘as
I am directed to use this base, I trust I shall not be held responsible
for any disaster that may occur.’ He concluded by pointing out that the
relative strength of the High Sea Fleet and the Grand Fleet could not be
decided without reference to the cruiser and destroyer strength of the
two fleets: his comparative weakness in these essentials
counterbalanced, he declared, any battleship superiority he possessed
and made him anxious to be concentrated.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 17, 1914._

We have carefully reviewed the position and given fullest
consideration to your wishes. We are confident that your fleet with
its cruisers and flotillas is strong enough for the definite task
entrusted to it. In view of the grave needs we have to meet elsewhere
we cannot reinforce you at present, nor alter our dispositions.

The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers
should proceed to Rosyth as ordered. You have, of course, full
discretion to move your Fleet in any way necessary to provide for its
safety and enable you to meet the enemy, and are not tied to Scapa.
Every effort is being made to accelerate the completion of the
submarine defences.

The destroyer question was one of real difficulty. Although we had more
than double the sea-going strength of the German flotillas, we had so
much to guard, that we could not provide a superior force kept always
intact in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief for a great Fleet action.
‘I know perfectly well,’ wrote Sir John Jellicoe on December 4 to Lord
Fisher, ‘that the First and Third Flotillas [from Harwich] will not join
me in time.’... The Germans, he declared, would have eight flotillas
comprising 88 torpedo boat destroyers, all of which would certainly be
ready at the selected moment. ‘They have five torpedoes each: total 440
torpedoes—_unless I can strike at them first_.’ He himself might, he
claimed, fall as low as 32 or even 28. ‘You know,’ he added, ‘the
difficulty and objections to turning away from the enemy in a Fleet
action: but with such a menace I am bound to do it, unless my own
torpedo boat destroyers can stop or neutralise the movement.’ There was
no doubt that all the Commander-in-Chief’s thought fitted together into
one consistent whole and was the result of profound study and
reflection. Lord Fisher, however, remained obdurate. ‘I think we have to
stand fast,’ he wrote to me, enclosing Sir John Jellicoe’s letter. ‘The
Tyrwhitt mob and our oversea submarines are our sole aggressive force in
the South.’ He proposed however to put one of the Harwich flotillas in
the Humber. ‘We wait your return before action[92]—Humber and Harwich
each 290 miles from Heligoland—but the complete flotilla at the Humber
is very much nearer Jellicoe, and so a salve to him in reply to
enclosed. As A. K. Wilson observed a moment ago, both he and I would
probably have written exactly the same letter as Jellicoe _trying to get
all we could_! Yours till death, F.’

This was a wearing discussion, and no one can blame the
Commander-in-Chief for expressing his anxieties and endeavouring to keep
his command up to the highest strength. I always tried to sustain him in
every possible way. His powerful orderly brain, his exact and
comprehensive knowledge, enabled him to develop and perfect in this
first year of the war the mighty organisation of the Grand Fleet. He
bore with constancy the many troubles and perplexities of the early
months. His fine sailorlike qualities made him always ready night or day
to take his whole gigantic Fleet to sea, and he was never so happy as
when he was at sea. Even when I did not share his outlook, I sympathised
with his trials. The opinions of Lord Fisher at this period upon the
margin of strength required for the Grand Fleet were, as will be seen,
in sharp contrast with those he expressed at a later period during the
operations at the Dardanelles. Personally I always considered our line
of battle amply superior; nor did I believe the Germans would be able to
bring out at a given moment all the 88 torpedo boats with which Sir John
Jellicoe always credited them. We now know the actual forces which the
enemy assembled on December 16 of this same year, on the occasion when
the whole High Sea Fleet made almost the most ambitious sortie into the
North Sea which its history records. There were 13 Dreadnought
battleships and 4 battle cruisers, total 17 Dreadnoughts instead of the
20 which were completed and which the Admiralty counted as available;
and 53 torpedo boats in place of the Commander-in-Chief’s 88. Against
this Sir John Jellicoe had (until refits were reopened at the end of
November) 27 superior units (subject to what he says about them); and as
many of the 71 destroyers as were fit for sea on any given day. The
Germans also took to sea on December 16 a squadron of 8
pre-Dreadnoughts, and against this our Third Battle Squadron, which had
been rightly restored to the Grand Fleet, was a proper and superior
provision. This balance of strength represents the period of our
greatest strain in Home waters and all over the world.

At this, as at all other times, the Admiralty would have welcomed a
general battle. An attack by seaplanes launched from carrying ships upon
the Zeppelin sheds near Cuxhaven, was planned by us for November 22. On
the 20th we telegraphed to Sir John Jellicoe:—

‘Our reliable German information and also our telegram No. 338 to you
shows, firstly, concentration of German cruisers, battle cruisers and
battleships in Weser and Elbe; and secondly, disposal of their
submarines to hunt in the Shetlands and English Channel. In these
favourable circumstances the aerial attack on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds,
which we had previously planned and considered desirable in itself,
might easily bring on a considerable action in which your battle
cruisers and the Grand Fleet might take part without undue risk from
German submarines.

‘We suggest for your consideration Tyrwhitt and aeroplanes attacking
on Monday at daybreak, with you supporting him from the northward with
whatever force is necessary, if the enemy respond to the challenge.
Further, if it should prove, as some reliable information indicates,
that the enemy is preparing an offensive raid or sortie himself, our
movement would bring on a collision at the outset unexpected and
disconcerting to him.’

The Commander-in-Chief, after some discussion, preferred Tuesday
daybreak for the attack, as the longer notice would enable him to finish
certain repairing work. The Admiralty plans were altered accordingly. We
telegraphed on the 21st:—

‘We consider the present a good occasion for a sweep southward by the
Grand Fleet. The seaplane attack is incidental and subsidiary, though
very desirable in itself. It may bring on an action now that the
German Fleet is concentrated near Wilhelmshaven, and their cruisers
and battle cruisers are active. It will frustrate any offensive
movement they may intend, as reported.... Tuesday, 24th, at 5.30 a.m.,
will be the time.’

No result was, however, achieved. Sir John Jellicoe brought the Battle
Fleet down into the centre of the North Sea about 180 miles from
Heligoland, with the battle-cruisers about 40 miles nearer. But in the
weather prevailing the seaplanes could hardly get off the water; and the
Germans remained unaware of our movements and without any plans of their
own. The episode shows however the underlying confidence of the
Admiralty and of the Commander-in-Chief in the strength of the Grand
Fleet even during this time of strain.

To add to the distractions of this hard month of November, 1914, an
invasion scare took a firm hold of the military and naval authorities.
It was argued by the War Office that the lull on the fighting fronts
would enable the Germans to spare large numbers of good troops—250,000
if necessary—for the invasion of Great Britain. Lord Kitchener directed
all defensive preparations to be made, and Lord Fisher threw himself
into the task with gusto. Although, as the reader is aware, I was
sceptical on this subject, I felt that the precautions were justifiable,
and would at any rate add interest to the life of our coast and Home
defence forces. I therefore allowed myself to succumb to the suppressed
excitement which grew throughout the highest circles, and did my utmost
to aid and speed our preparations. We stationed as described the 3rd
Battle Squadron at the Forth, brought the 2nd Fleet to the Thames,
disposed the old _Majestic_ battleships in the various harbours along
the East Coast, arranged block ships to be sunk, and laid mines to be
exploded, at the proper time in the mouths of our undefended harbours;
while the whole coastal watch, military, aerial and marine, throbbed
with activity. The Army arrangements were complicated by the fact that
some of the divisions which were sufficiently trained to be used to
repel the invaders, had lent their rifles to those that were undergoing
training, and these rifles had to be collected and redistributed as a
part of the procedure prescribed for the supreme emergency. To such
expedients were we reduced! However, the Germans remained absolutely
quiescent; the tides and moon, which for some days before November 20
were exceptionally favourable to nocturnal landings, ceased to present
these conditions, and the sense of some great impending event gradually
faded from our minds.

_Lord Fisher to Mr. Churchill._

_7 a.m., November 21, 1914._

An angel’s sleep! In Heaven from 9 till now!

It WAS kind of you not to wake me with Grey’s credible witness!

Let us entreat and urge Kitchener to send a hundred thousand men AT
ONCE to Flanders, and warn Joffre not to be ‘two divisions too few and
two days too late!’ Kitchener’s balance of 160,000 men will amply
suffice and the ‘Ides of March’ have passed! The waning moon and
dawning tide [dawn high-tide] will not recur till days following
December 10. _Do write to him accordingly, or shall I?_

It has been a splendid ‘dress rehearsal,’ tell him, and very
reassuring—his mass of men and his mobile guns! We MUST press him to
send 100,000 men to Flanders....

On November 20 General Joffre asked for further naval co-operation on
the Belgian coast.

‘General Foch,’ he stated, ‘reports that for some little time the
French or English ships have no longer been participating in the
action of our forces in the neighbourhood of Nieuport. On account of
very violent bombardment by the enemy in this region, it would be
advantageous if the ships could attack the numerous German batteries
established to the east of the mouth of the Yser. I should be glad if
you would notify the Ministry of Marine, and the Admiralty, of this
situation, in order to obtain a more active co-operation on the part
of the squadron between Nieuport and Ostend.’

We were able to send the old battleship _Revenge_, whose guns had been
specially re-mounted for long range fire, and several smaller vessels
under Admiral Hood, and the naval bombardment of the German right was
effectively resumed. ‘The conditions on the coast,’ Hood, however,
reported on the 22nd, ‘are quite different from what they were during
the first few days. To-day there was a heavy fire from guns I could not
locate or damage. No troops are ever visible. The inundation has stopped
their movement.’

To the situation of strain and effort which gripped us during November
came the welcome relief of the victory at the Falklands. Lord Fisher
received it with a moderated satisfaction.

‘We cannot,’ he wrote to me on December 10, ‘but be overjoyed at the
_Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_ being avenged! But let us be
self-restrained—_not too exultant!—till we know details! Perhaps their
guns never reached us!_ (We had so few casualties!) We know THEIR
gunnery was excellent! Their THIRD salvo murdered Cradock! So it may
have been like shooting pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back!
Not too much glory for us, only great satisfaction. Not a battle for a
Poet Laureate! _Let us wait and hear before we crow!_ Then again, it
may be a wonder why the cruisers escaped—if they have escaped—I hope
not, for we had such a preponderating force—such numbers! (_How the
Glasgow must have enjoyed it!_) Anyhow, don’t let us encourage
ourselves in too many joy messages till we know more.’

But I made haste to ascribe to him all the credit that was his due.

_December 10._

This was your show and your luck.

I should only have sent one Greyhound[93] and _Defence_. This would
have done the trick.

But it was a niggling coup. Your _flair_ was quite true. Let us have
some more victories together, and confound all our foes abroad—and
(don’t forget) at home.

This delighted the Admiral, and in his reply (December 11) he threw a
friendly light upon other fields of activity than those with which this
chapter has been concerned.

Your letter _pleasant_! There is another _quite lovely scheme_! _I_ am
to be praised so as to get ‘swelled head’ and think myself ignored by
you, and to be in your shoes! It is all too sweet for words! It is
palpably transparent! I was told of this yesterday! It really _is
curious_ why they so hate you! I think I told you what G—— said, that
though he abhorred me, yet ... I have splendid friends in the Tory
camp!

A cause of difference, however, soon arose between us. The First Sea
Lord was displeased with Sir Doveton Sturdee for not having succeeded in
destroying the German light cruiser _Dresden_ with the rest, and he
searchingly criticised that Admiral’s dispositions after the action. He
wished to leave Admiral Sturdee in South American waters till the
_Dresden_ was hunted down. As it was imperative that the _Invincible_
and _Inflexible_ should come home at once, such a decision would have
entailed transferring Admiral Sturdee’s flag to the _Carnarvon_, and
leaving him with a command scarcely suited to his rank and standing, and
woefully out of harmony with his recent achievement. I was obliged to
veto this proposal, and Lord Fisher was for some time much vexed at my
decision.

The First Sea Lord also made the disquieting suggestion that the Germans
might slip a battle cruiser like the _Derfflinger_ through our blockade
in the long winter nights and fall upon the returning _Invincible_ and
_Inflexible_, who had fired away three-quarters of their ammunition. I
was greatly disturbed at this, and hastened to the Chief of the Staff.
But Admiral Oliver was not often found improvident. He had already
several weeks before sent the battleship _Vengeance_ with a quarter
outfit for both vessels to St. Vincent, where it awaited them.

* * * * *

In spite of their anxieties, November and December were months of
rapidly growing power to the Navy. The variety and scope of Admiralty
business extended continually, and the number of important directions to
be given increased every week. The reader who is further interested
should study in the Appendix the selection of First Lord’s Minutes which
I have thought it worth while to print.[94] From these original
documents, conceived under the pressure of events, a truer idea can be
formed of what was passing than from much description.

In no part of our work did Lord Fisher and I act together in greater
harmony than in the realm of new construction.

The first task of the Admiralty in naval construction on the outbreak of
war was to accelerate the completion of all the warships which were
building in Great Britain, and according to the schemes we had had
prepared before the war, extreme priority was to be assigned to vessels
which could be finished within six months. On this basis we proceeded
during the first three months. When it became clear that the war would
not be ended one way or the other by the first main decisions on land,
and that the sea battle was indefinitely deferred, I extended this
original period, and we adopted the principle ‘Everything that can be
finished in 1915, and nothing that can’t.’

This brought very large numbers of vessels into the accelerated class
and, of course, opened the way for a considerable new construction of
submarines, destroyers and even light cruisers. There had already been
ordered when Lord Fisher arrived at the Admiralty a score of new
destroyers and submarines, in addition to all the pre-war vessels under
accelerated construction.

The yards were therefore full of work, and care was needed not to impede
current construction by new orders. Lord Fisher, however, brought a very
great surge of impulse to this sphere of our activities. It was a moment
when megalomania was a virtue. Some progress had already been made on
two of the British battleships of the programme of 1914–15. The First
Sea Lord at once demanded to make them into battle-cruisers, sacrificing
two more guns in each in order to get the immense speed for which he
thirsted. I agreed to this, although it involved some delay; and the
_Repulse_ and the _Renown_ were redesigned accordingly.

The construction of submarines was more urgent. I was not alarmed about
the immediate position, although all sorts of rumours were afoot.

Naval Intelligence Division.

_November 7, 1914._

With reference to your report of yesterday, apparently attaching
credence to a statement that from 100 to 200 small submarines have
been manufactured secretly in Germany, have you considered how many
trained officers and personnel this important flotilla would require?
What evidence is there at your disposal to show that the Germans have
trained this number of submarine captains and officers? I have always
understood that their flotilla of submarines before the war did not
exceed 27. There is no personnel that requires more careful training
than the submarine personnel. All the experience of our officers shows
that a submarine depends for its effectiveness mainly upon its
captain. The function of the Intelligence Division is not merely to
collect and pass on the Munchausen tales of spies and untrustworthy
agents, but carefully to sift and scrutinise the intelligence they
receive, and in putting it forward to indicate the degree of
probability which attaches to it. It appears to me impossible that any
large addition to the German submarine force can be made for many
months to come. Even if the difficulties of material were overcome
those of personnel would impose an absolute limit. It is very likely
that a few small portable submarines have been prepared for coast
work.

W. S. C.

But the future already contained its menaces. I greeted Fisher on his
arrival with the following minutes, the first two of which were
addressed to his predecessor:—

Secretary.
Third Sea Lord.

_October 13, 1914._

Please state exactly what is the total submarine programme now
sanctioned by the Cabinet or under construction in the various yards.
What measures can be adopted for increasing the number of submarines?
Is it possible to let further contracts for submarines on a fifteen
months’ basis? It is indispensable that the whole possible plant for
submarine construction should be kept at the fullest pressure night
and day.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.

_October 28, 1914._

Please propose without delay the largest possible programme of
submarine boats to be delivered in from 12 to 24 months from the
present time. You should assume for this purpose that you have control
of all sources of manufacture required for submarines, that there is
no objection to using Vickers’ drawings, and that steam engines may be
used to supplement oil engines. You should exert every effort of
ingenuity and organisation to secure the utmost possible delivery. As
soon as your proposals are ready, which should be in the next few
days, they can be considered at a conference of the Sea Lords. The
Cabinet must be satisfied that the absolute maximum output is being
worked to in submarines. We may be sure that Germany is doing this.
Third Sea Lord’s department must therefore act with the utmost vigour,
and not be deterred by the kind of difficulties which hamper action in
time of peace.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.

_October 30, 1914._

More important than the deliveries of battleships is the acceleration
of light cruisers and submarines. With regard to light cruisers, it
ought not to take more than one year to construct _Castor_,
_Inconstant_, _Cambria_ and _Canterbury_. What is the present position
of these ships? Have they been begun yet? Proposals should be made
which secure their delivery before the end of 1915.

2. Proposals should also be made to accelerate _Royalist_,
_Cleopatra_, _Champion_, and _Carysfort_, _Conquest_, and _Calliope_,
so as to obtain deliveries in February. This will only be possible by
working night and day in three 8–hour shifts on all these vessels,
arranging with other firms not concerned in their construction to lend
the necessary men.

3. All the “M” Class destroyers to be delivered in August, 1915,
should be pushed forward into April and May. There is surely no reason
why this cannot be done. Firms who will undertake to complete their
vessels by this date could be immediately given another order for a
repeat ship, so that there would be no fear of dislocation of their
business. Let me have proposals on this.

4. Submarines F2, F3, G6, G8, G15, G9, G7, G10, to G13, and G1, to G5,
all ought to be delivered before the end of 1915. There is an
extraordinary gap after G4, when for 6 months we do not receive a
single new submarine, and in 12 months we only receive 2. This is
shocking, and must be bridged at all costs.

Pray let me have further proposals after such conferences as may be
necessary with the firms concerned.

W. S. C.

Lord Fisher hurled himself into this business with explosive energy. He
summoned around him all the naval constructors and shipbuilding firms in
Britain, and in four or five glorious days, every minute of which was
pure delight to him, he presented me with schemes for a far greater
construction of submarines, destroyers and small craft than I or any of
my advisers had ever deemed possible. Mr. Schwab was at that time
passing through England on his return to the United States. We invited
him to the Admiralty; and he undertook to build twenty-four
submarines—twelve in Canada and twelve in the United States—the bulk of
which were to be completed in the hitherto incredibly short period of
six months. I arranged a system of heavy bonuses for early delivery.
These large negotiations were completed and the subsequent work was
carried out with wonderful thoroughness and punctuality by the immense
organisation of the Bethlehem Steel Company. One evening, as Lord
Fisher, Mr. Schwab and I sat round the octagonal table in the Admiralty,
after a long discussion on the submarine contracts, we asked Mr. Schwab,
‘Have you got anything else that will be of use to us?’ He thereupon
told us that he had four turrets carrying two 14–inch guns each which
had almost been completed for the Greek battleship _Salamis_ then
building in Germany for Greece. We set our hearts on these; and I had an
idea. The reader will remember the three small monitors building for
Brazil, which although no one could see any use for them at the time, I
had decided to take over at the outbreak of war. The operations on the
Belgian Coast had shown their value. I suggested to Lord Fisher that we
should buy these 14–inch turrets and build monitors to carry them. The
Admiral was delighted with the plan, and in a few hours he was closeted
with his constructors designing the vessels. In all our correspondence
we referred to them as the _Styx_ class.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

_December 11, 1914._

We ought without delay to order more ‘Styx’ class for heavy inshore
work. There are, for instance, the four reserve 13.5–inch guns of the
_Audacious_, which should certainly be mounted in new monitors. It
should also be possible to draw from the reserve of 15–inch guns, and
to make in a short time 15–inch or 18–inch howitzers. We require now
to make ships which can be built in 6 or 7 months at the outside, and
which can certainly go close in shore and attack the German Fleet in
its harbours. These are special vessels built for a definite war
operation, and we must look to them in default of a general action for
giving us the power of forcing a naval decision at the latest in the
autumn of 1915.

Our thought is proceeding independently on the same lines. I propose,
as a basis of discussion, that in addition to the 4 Schwab monitors,
we prepare 8 more at a cost of not more than £700,000 apiece. These
vessels should be armed either with 13·5–inch or 15–inch guns, two or
four in each as convenient. Or, alternatively, they should be armed
with four 18–inch howitzers in separate cupolas sunk low on their
heavily-armoured turtle backs. They should draw 8 feet at most, and be
propelled entirely by internal combustion at a speed not exceeding 10
knots; no funnels; three or four alternative telescopic masts for fire
observation; strong crinolines 20 feet away all round to make them
immune from mine or torpedo, etc....

W. S. C.

We soon embarked on an extensive scheme of monitor building.

Besides making four monitors to carry the American 14–inch gun turrets,
we took two spare 15–inch gun turrets which had been prepared for two of
the furthest-off new battleships (now converted into battle-cruisers),
and eight 12–inch gun turrets out of four ‘Majestics,’ which we laid up;
and with these and the American guns we armed no less than fourteen
monitors, namely, two with two 15–inch guns, four with two 14–inch guns,
and eight with two 12–inch guns apiece. Lord Fisher then went on and
pulled the 9·2–inch guns out of the old ‘Edgars’ and mounted them in
fourteen small monitors, drawing 6 feet 6 inches of water; and ten
6–inch guns[95] were mounted in still smaller monitors drawing 5 feet 11
inches. We also built later on twelve large river gunboats capable of
being transported by rail for service on the Danube, if we ever got
there, and twelve small river gunboats, or baby monitors, for service on
the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bulk of the large monitors were
constructed in Belfast with extraordinary celerity by Harland & Wolff
and their sturdy ardent men. We also prepared 240 lighters with steel
shields and internal combustion engines for landing troops under fire.

Thus in the autumn of 1914, under various programmes culminating in the
great Fisher impetus, we set on foot the following enormous Fleet, all
due to complete by the end of 1915:—

Battleships and Battle cruisers of the greatest power 7
Light cruisers 12
Destroyers of the largest class and leaders 65
Oversea submarines 40
Coastal submarines 22
Monitors—
Heavy 18
Medium 14
Light 5
Sloops and smaller anti-submarine vessels 107
Motor launches 60
Ex-lighters with internal combustion engines 240

This tremendous new Navy, for it was nothing less, was a providential
aid to the Admiralty when more than two years later the real German
submarine attack began. Its creation on such a scale is one of the
greatest services which the nation has owed to the genius and energy of
Lord Fisher. Probably Fisher in all his long life never had a more
joyous experience than this great effort of new construction. No man
knew better than he how to put war thought into a ship. Shipbuilding had
been the greatest passion of his life. Here were all the yards of
Britain at his disposal and every Treasury barrier broken down.

Of the battle-cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_, and still more of the
light battle-cruisers _Courageous_, _Furious_ and _Glorious_, to which I
consented four months later in circumstances which will be narrated in
their place, it must be said that they were an old man’s children.
Although possessing many marvellous qualities never hitherto combined in
a ship of war, they were light in the bone; and the Navy always
considered them wanting in the structural strength and armour which the
new conditions of war more than ever required. None the less, their
parent loved them dearly and always rallied with the utmost vehemence
when any slur was cast upon their qualities.

I presided over all this process in November and December with the
greatest admiration for the First Sea Lord, but with some misgivings on
the score of expense. I was not yet satisfied that the war would be
prolonged beyond 1915, and I did not wish to draw away from the armies
men or material which might be needed in their service. Not until April,
1915, when the failure of Russia as a decisive factor became final, did
I authorise a further extension of view to December 31, 1916, and agree
to plans for additional new construction being made within that limit.
Meanwhile I endeavoured to satisfy Lord Fisher as best I could. I
pointed out to him repeatedly that from some points of view a ship
finished twelve months before the end of the war was worth twelve times
as much as a ship finished one month before its end, and urged
continuously that vessels nearest completion must in no way suffer. He
was, however, very difficult to feed. In a day he would sketch the
design of a capital ship. In a week he would devour a programme and come
back asking for more. A tit-bit like an 18–inch experimental gun which I
suggested he should make, was snapped up the moment it was mentioned. ‘I
will put it in a light cruiser and drive her 40 knots,’ he cried. ‘Hit
how you like, when you like, where you like.’ This was his theme; but
what about his doctrine ‘Armour is vision’? However, I backed him up all
I could. He was far more often right than wrong, and his drive and
life-force made the Admiralty quiver like one of his great ships at its
highest speed.

CHAPTER XX
THE BOMBARDMENT OF SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL
December 16, 1914

‘All comes out even at the end of the day, and all comes out still
more even when all the days are over.’

VOLTAIRE.

Naval Intelligence—The Captured German Signal Book—Directional
Wireless—Sir Arthur Wilson’s Task—His Conclusions of December
14—Orders to the Fleets—December 16: Bombardment of Scarborough
and Hartlepool—Favourable Position of the British Forces—The
Visibility Fails—Groping in the Mist—The German High Sea Fleet at
Sea—Disappointment—A forlorn Hope—What had Happened—The Dawn
Situation—A Fateful Hour—Flight of the German Fleet—The British
Sweep to the West—The Brush with the Enemy’s Light
Cruisers—Mischance—von Hipper dodges to the North—Escape of the
German Battle Cruisers—The Admiralty Communiqué—Public Discontent.

Our Intelligence service has won and deserved world-wide fame. More than
perhaps any other Power, we were successful in the war in penetrating
the intentions of the enemy. Again and again the forecasts both of the
military and of the naval Intelligence Staffs were vindicated to the
wonder of friends and the chagrin of foes. The three successive chiefs
of the Naval Intelligence Division, Captain Thomas Jackson, Rear-Admiral
Oliver, and lastly Captain Reginald Hall, were all men of mark in the
service, and continuously built and extended an efficient and profound
organisation. There were others—a brilliant confederacy—whose names even
now are better wrapt in mystery. Our information about German naval
movements was principally obtained (1) from the reports of secret agents
in neutral and enemy countries and particularly in Germany, (2) from the
reports of our submarines, which lay far up in the Heligoland Bight in
perilous vigilance, and (3) from a special study we had made of the
German wireless. In this we were for a time aided by great good luck.

At the beginning of September, 1914, the German light cruiser
_Magdeburg_ was wrecked in the Baltic. The body of a drowned German
under-officer was picked up by the Russians a few hours later, and
clasped in his bosom by arms rigid in death, were the cypher and signal
books of the German Navy and the minutely squared maps of the North Sea
and Heligoland Bight. On September 6 the Russian Naval Attaché came to
see me. He had received a message from Petrograd telling him what had
happened, and that the Russian Admiralty with the aid of the cypher and
signal books had been able to decode portions at least of the German
naval messages. The Russians felt that as the leading naval Power, the
British Admiralty ought to have these books and charts. If we would send
a vessel to Alexandrov, the Russian officers in charge of the books
would bring them to England. We lost no time in sending a ship, and late
on an October afternoon Prince Louis and I received from the hands of
our loyal allies these sea-stained priceless documents. We set on foot
at once an organisation for the study of the German wireless and for the
translating of the messages when taken in. At the head of the
organisation was placed Sir Alfred Ewing the Director of Naval
Education, whose services to the Admiralty in this and other matters
were of the first order. The work was of great complexity, as of course
the cypher is only one element in the means of preserving the secrecy of
a message. But gradually during the beginning of November our officers
succeeded in translating intelligible portions of various German naval
messages. They were mostly of a routine character. ‘One of our torpedo
boats will be running out into square 7 at 8 p.m.,’ etc. But a careful
collection of these scraps provided a body of information from which the
enemy’s arrangements in the Heligoland Bight could be understood with a
fair degree of accuracy. The Germans, however, repeatedly changed their
codes and keys and it was only occasionally and for fitful periods that
we were able to penetrate them. As the war went on they became
increasingly suspicious and devised measures which were completely
baffling. While, however, this source of information lasted, it was
obviously of the very greatest value.

The German official history shows itself at last well-informed upon this
subject (p. 194): ‘Even if doubt were to exist that the British
Admiralty were in possession of the whole secret cyphering system of the
German Fleet, it has been cleared away by the reliable news from
Petrograd, that after the stranding of the _Magdeburg_ off Odensholm the
secret papers of that ship, which had been thrown overboard, were picked
up by the Russians and communicated to their Allies.’

Lastly, largely through the foresight of Admiral Oliver, we had begun
setting up directional stations in August, 1914. We thus carried to an
unrivalled and indeed unapproached degree of perfection our means of
fixing the position and, by successive positions, the course of any
enemy ship that used its wireless installation.

‘The English,’ says Scheer (p. 73) ‘received news through their
“directional stations” which they already had in use, but which were
only introduced by us at a much later period.... In possessing them the
English had a very great advantage in the conduct of the war as they
were thus able to obtain quite accurate information of the locality of
the enemy as soon as any wireless signals were sent by him. In the case
of a large fleet; whose separate units are stationed far apart and
communication between them is essential, an absolute cessation of all
wireless intercourse would be fatal to any enterprise.’

But between collecting and weighing information, and drawing the true
moral therefrom, there is very often an unbridged gap. Signals have been
made, the wireless note of a particular ship is heard, lights are to be
shown on certain channels at certain hours, ships are in movement,
sweeping vessels are active, channels are buoyed, lock-gates are
opened—what does it all mean? At first sight it all appears to be only
ordinary routine. Yet taking the items together may lead to a tremendous
revelation. Suffice it to say that all these indications, from whatever
sources they emanated, were the subject of a special study by Sir Arthur
Wilson, and he had the solemn duty of advising our War Group upon them.

The silence of the North Sea remained unbroken until the afternoon of
Monday, December 14. At about 7 o’clock Sir Arthur Wilson came to my
room and asked for an immediate meeting with the First Sea Lord and the
Chief of the Staff. It took only a few minutes to gather them. He then
explained that his examination of the available intelligence about the
enemy indicated the probability of an impending movement which would
involve their battle-cruisers and perhaps—though of this there was no
positive evidence—have an offensive character against our coasts. The
German High Sea Fleet, he stated definitely, appeared not to be
involved. The indications were obscure and uncertain. There were gaps in
the argument. But the conclusion reached after hearing Sir Arthur Wilson
was that we should act as if we knew that our assumptions and
suppositions were true. It was decided not to move the whole Grand
Fleet. A great deal of cruising had been imposed on the Fleet owing to
the unprotected state of Scapa, and it was desirable to save wear and
tear of machinery and condensers as much as possible. Moreover the risks
of accident, submarine and mine, which were incurred every time that
immense organisation was sent to sea, imposed a certain deterrent upon
its use except when clearly necessary.

This decision, from which the Commander-in-Chief did not dissent, was,
in the light of subsequent events, much to be regretted. But it must be
remembered that the information on which the Admiralty was acting, had
never yet been tested; that it seemed highly speculative in character,
and that for whatever it was worth, it excluded the presence at sea of
the German High Sea Fleet. Orders were therefore given immediately for
the battle-cruisers and the 2nd Battle Squadron, with a light cruiser
squadron and a flotilla of destroyers, to raise steam and to proceed to
sea at such hours and at such speeds as to enable them to be in an
intercepting position at daylight the next morning. Orders were sent to
Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force to be at sea off Yarmouth, and to
Commodore Keyes, to place our eight available oversea submarines in a
position off Terschelling to guard against a southward raid. The coastal
forces were also put upon the alert.[96]

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_December 14, 1914. Sent 9.30 p.m._

Good information just received shows German 1st Cruiser Squadron with
Destroyers leave Jade River on Tuesday morning early and return on
Wednesday night. It is apparent from the information that the
Battleships are very unlikely to come out.

The enemy force will have time to reach our coast.

Send at once leaving to-night the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light
Cruiser Squadron supported by a Battle Squadron preferably the Second.

At daylight on Wednesday morning they should be at some point where
they can make sure of intercepting the enemy on his return.

Tyrwhitt with his Light Cruisers and Destroyers will try to get in
touch with enemy off British coast and shadow him keeping Admiral
informed.

From our information the German 1st Cruiser Squadron consists of 4
Battle-Cruisers and 5 Light Cruisers and there will possibly be three
flotillas of Destroyers.

Acknowledge.

_Admiralty to Commodore ‘T’ Harwich._

_December 15, 1914. Sent 2.5 p.m._

There is good probability of German Battle-Cruisers, Cruisers and
Destroyers being off our coast to-morrow about daybreak.

One M Class Destroyer is to patrol vicinity of North Hinder Lightship
from midnight until 9 a.m. A second M Class Destroyer is to patrol a
line extending 15 miles south magnetic from a position lat. 53° 0′ N.,
long. 3° 5′ E. from midnight until 9 a. m.

The duty of these Destroyers is to look out for and report the enemy
and trust to their speed to escape.

If the weather is too bad, they are to return to Harwich. Report their
names.

The 1st and 3rd Flotillas with all available Light Cruisers are to be
under way off Yarmouth before daylight to-morrow ready to move to any
place where the enemy may be reported from, whether it is to the
northward or southward.

Their duty is to get touch with the enemy follow him and report his
position to the Vice-Admiral 2nd Battle Squadron and Vice-Admiral 1st
Battle Cruiser Squadron.

The 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser
Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron will be in a position in N. lat.
54° 10′ E. long. 3° 0′ at 7.30 a.m. ready to cut off retreat of enemy.

Should an engagement result your Flotillas and Light Cruisers must
endeavour to join our Fleet and deal with enemy Destroyers.

If the weather is too bad for Destroyers use Light Cruisers only and
send Destroyers back. Acknowledge.

All measures having been taken on the chance of their being necessary,
we awaited during thirty-six hours the events of Wednesday morning with
a doubting but expectant curiosity. On the morning of December 16 at
about half-past eight I was in my bath, when the door opened and an
officer came hurrying in from the War Room with a naval signal which I
grasped with dripping hand. ‘German battle-cruisers bombarding
Hartlepool.’ I jumped out of the bath with exclamations. Sympathy for
Hartlepool was mingled with what Mr. George Wyndham once called ‘the
anodyne of contemplated retaliation.’ Pulling on clothes over a damp
body, I ran downstairs to the War Room. The First Sea Lord had just
arrived from his house next door. Oliver, who invariably slept in the
War Room and hardly ever left it by day, was marking the positions on
the map. Telegrams from all the naval stations along the coast affected
by the attack, and intercepts from our ships in the vicinity speaking to
each other, came pouring in two and three to the minute. The Admiralty
also spread the tidings and kept the Fleets and flotillas continuously
informed of all we knew.

Everything was now sent to sea or set in motion. The 3rd Battle Squadron
(_King Edwards_) from the Forth was ordered to prevent the enemy
escaping to the Northward. As a further precaution, (though, unless the
Germans were driven far to the North, this could hardly be effective in
time,) the Grand Fleet itself was after all brought out. Commodore
Tyrwhitt and his cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Striking Force
were directed to join Sir George Warrender, who commanded the Second
Battle Squadron, and was the senior Admiral with the intercepting force.
The weather was, however, too rough for the destroyers, and only the
light cruisers could proceed. Lastly, later in the day Commodore Keyes
who was in the _Lurcher_—one of our latest destroyers and had also with
him the destroyer _Firedrake_, was told to take his submarines from his
preliminary station off Terschelling into the Heligoland Bight and try
to catch the enemy returning.

The bombardment of open towns was still new to us at that time. But,
after all, what did that matter now? The war map showed the German
battle-cruisers identified one by one within gunshot of the Yorkshire
coast, while 150 miles to eastward _between them and Germany_, cutting
mathematically their line of retreat, steamed in the exact positions
intended, four British battle-cruisers and six of the most powerful
battleships in the world forming the 2nd Battle Squadron. Attended and
preceded by their cruiser squadrons and flotilla, this fleet of our
newest and fastest ships all armed with the heaviest gun then afloat,
could in fair weather cover and watch effectively a front of nearly 100
miles. In the positions in which dawn revealed the antagonists, only one
thing could enable the Germans to escape annihilation at the hands of an
overwhelmingly superior force. And while the great shells crashed into
the little houses of Hartlepool and Scarborough, carrying their cruel
message of pain and destruction to unsuspecting English homes, only one
anxiety dominated the thoughts of the Admiralty War Room.

The word ‘Visibility’ assumed a sinister significance. At present it was
quite good enough. Both Warrender and Beatty had horizons of nearly ten
miles: near the coast fighting was actually in progress at 7,000 yards.
There was nothing untoward in the weather indications. At 9 a.m. the
German bombardment ceased, and their ships were soon out of sight of
land, no doubt on their homeward voyage. We went on tenter-hooks to
breakfast. To have this tremendous prize—the German battle-cruiser
squadron whose loss would fatally mutilate the whole German Navy and
could never be repaired—actually within our claws, and to have the event
all turn upon a veil of mist, was a wracking ordeal. Meanwhile telegraph
and telephone were pouring the distress of Hartlepool and Scarborough to
all parts of the Kingdom, and by half-past ten, when the War Committee
of the Cabinet met, news magnified by rumour had produced excitement. I
was immediately asked how such a thing was possible. ‘What was the Navy
doing, and what were they going to do?’ In reply I produced the chart
which showed the respective positions at the moment of the British and
German naval forces, and I explained that subject to moderate visibility
we hoped that collision would take place about noon. These disclosures
fell upon all with a sense of awe, and the Committee adjourned till the
afternoon.

At 10.30 the Admiralty learned that the enemy was leaving our coasts and
apprised Admiral Warrender accordingly.

Enemy is probably returning towards Heligoland. You should keep outside
minefield and steer so as to cut him off.

But now already ominous telegrams began to arrive. Warrender soon had
horizons of only 7,000 yards; Beatty of only 6,000; some of the light
cruisers nearer to the coast already mentioned 5,000; and later on 4,000
was signalled. Meanwhile no contact. Noon passed, and then 1 o’clock.
The weather got steadily worse. It was evident that the mist curtains
were falling over the North Sea. 3,000 yards visibility, 2,000 yards
visibility were reported by ships speaking to each other. The solemn
faces of Fisher and Wilson betrayed no emotion, but one felt the fire
burning within. I tried to do other work, but it was not much good.
Obscure messages were heard from our fleet. Evidently they were very
close to the enemy, groping for him in a mist which allowed vessels to
be distinguished only within 2,000 yards. We heard Warrender order his
priceless ships to steam through the located German minefield off the
Yorkshire coast apparently in an endeavour to close with something just
out of sight, just beyond his finger-tips. Then all of a sudden we heard
Rear-Admiral Goodenough with the light cruisers report that he had
opened fire upon a German light cruiser at 3,000 yards. Hope flared up.
Once contact was established, would it not drag all other events in its
train? The prospect of a confused battle at close range had no terrors
for the Admiralty. They had only one fear—lest the enemy should escape.
Even the proposed movement of the 2nd Battle Squadron through the
minefield was received in utter silence.

About half-past one Sir Arthur Wilson said ‘They seem to be getting away
from us.’ But now occurred a new development of a formidable kind. At
1.50 we learned that the High Sea Fleet was at sea. Up till noon this
great Fleet had not spoken. Once she had spoken and the necessary
calculations had been made, which took some time, we could both
recognise and locate her. She had already in fact advanced far into the
North Sea. The apparition of the German Fleet, which as we then supposed
was advancing to the support of the German battle-cruisers, entirely
altered the balance of strength. Our ten great ships steaming together
with their light squadrons and flotillas, were not only the strongest
but the fastest naval force in the world. No equal German force existed
which could at once overtake and overcome them. On the other hand, they
were not capable of meeting the High Sea Fleet. The German battle
cruisers were still separated from their fleet by 150 miles, but it
seemed to us that a running action begun with the German battle
cruisers, might in the thick weather then prevailing conceivably lead to
a surprise encounter with the main naval power of the enemy. This was
certainly not the wish of the Admiralty. We instantly warned our
squadrons.

_Admiralty to 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron._

_Sent_ 1.50 p.m.

(Urgent.)

High Sea Fleet is out and was in latitude 54° 38′ N. longitude 5° 55′
E.[97] at 0.30 p.m. to-day, so do not go too far to Eastward.

These sinister possibilities soon faded like our earlier hopes. The High
Sea Fleet was not, as we imagined, coming out, but had long been out and
was now retiring.

At 3 o’clock I went over and told the War Committee what was passing;
but with what a heavy heart did I cross again that Horse Guards’ Parade.
I returned to the Admiralty. The War Group had reassembled around the
octagonal table in my room. The shades of a winter’s evening had already
fallen. Sir Arthur Wilson then said, in his most ordinary manner, ‘Well,
there you are, they have got away. They must be about here by now,’ and
he pointed to the chart on which the Chief of the Staff was marking the
positions every fifteen minutes. It was evident that the Germans had
eluded our intercepting force, and that even their light cruisers with
whom we had been in contact had also escaped in the mist. Said Admiral
Warrender in his subsequent report, ‘They came out of one rainstorm and
disappeared in another.’

It was now nearly 8 o’clock.

Was it then all over? I inquired about our submarines. They had already
been collected by Commodore Keyes from their first position and were now
moving on to the German line of retreat. But whether the enemy’s course
would come within their limited range was a matter of luck. Sir Arthur
Wilson then said, ‘There is only one chance now. Keyes with the
_Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_, is with the submarines. He could probably
make certain of attacking the German battle-cruiser squadron as it
enters the Bight to-night. He may torpedo one or even two.’ It seemed
indeed a forlorn hope to send these two frail destroyers, with their
brave Commodore and faithful crews, far from home, close to the enemy’s
coast, utterly unsupported, into the jaws of this powerful German force
with its protecting vessels and flotillas. There was a long silence. We
all knew Keyes well. Then some one said, ‘It is sending him to his
death.’ Some one else said, ‘He would be the last man to wish us to
consider that.’ There was another long pause. However, Sir Arthur Wilson
had already written the following message:—

8.12 p.m.

‘We think Heligoland and Amrun lights will be lit when ships are going
in. Your destroyers might get a chance to attack about 2 a.m. or later
on the line given you.’

The First Sea Lord nodded assent. The Chief-of-the-Staff took it, got up
heavily and quitted the room. Then we turned to the ordinary business of
the day and also to the decision of what could be told to the public
about the event.

Two days later when I received Admiral Keyes in my room at the
Admiralty, I said, ‘We sent you a terrible message the other night. I
hardly expected to see you again.’ ‘It _was_ terrible,’ he said, ‘not
getting it till I was nearly home. I waited three hours in the hopes of
such an order, and I very nearly did it on my own responsibility,’ and
he proceeded to reproach himself without need.[98]

* * * * *

So far I have described this episode of December 16 exactly as it
appeared from the War Room of the Admiralty, and as we understood it
at the time. But let us now see in essentials what had happened.[99]
No one could tell at what point on our shores the German attack would
fall; and with 500 miles of coast studded with possible objectives to
guard, there could be no certain solution. The orders issued by the
Commander-in-Chief, however, and the dawn position selected, ably
comprehended the design of the enemy. In pursuance of these orders the
2nd Battle Squadron (6 ships) and the Battle Cruiser Squadron (4
ships), together with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, a Squadron of Light
Cruisers and a flotilla, steaming down from Scapa, Cromarty and the
Forth, arrived at about 5.30 in the morning of the 16th, two hours and
a half before daybreak, at the Southern edge of the Dogger Bank. Here
in the very centre of the North Sea, almost on a line drawn from
Hartlepool to Heligoland, the advanced screen of British destroyers
became engaged with German destroyers and light cruisers, and when
daylight came they sighted a large German cruiser identified as the
_Roon_.[100] Fighting ensued, some of our destroyers were hit, and the
Germans retreated to the Eastward. Thereupon Admiral Beatty with his
battle cruisers began to chase the _Roon_. From this pursuit he was
recalled by the news which reached him and Admiral Warrender from the
Admiralty about 9 a.m., that the German battle cruisers were
bombarding Hartlepool and later Scarborough. All the British ships at
once turned to the Westward and steamed abreast in a long line towards
the British coast and the German battle cruisers, whose interception
appeared highly probable.

During the war we were puzzled to understand what the _Roon_ and the
German light forces were doing on the edge of the Dogger Bank at this
hour in the morning. It was an ill-assorted force to be in so exposed a
position, and it was not a force or in a position, which could be of any
help to the German cruisers raiding the British coasts. Now we know the
answer. The _Roon_ and her cruisers and destroyers were part of the
advanced screen of the German High Sea Fleet who were out in full force,
three squadrons strong, with all their attendant vessels and numerous
flotillas. Admiral von Ingenohl in command of the High Sea Fleet had
sailed from Cuxhaven after darkness had fallen on the evening of the
15th (between 4 and 5 p.m.) and before dawn on the 16th was pushing
boldly out towards the Dogger Bank in support of his battle cruisers
who, under Admiral von Hipper were already approaching the British
shores. Had von Ingenohl continued on his course, as was his intention,
his scouts would between 8 and 9 o’clock, in the clear weather of that
morning in this part of the North Sea, have come in sight of the British
battle cruisers and the 2nd Battle Squadron coming down from the North.
A meeting was almost certain. What would have happened? Admiral von
Tirpitz proclaims that this was the one heaven-sent never-recurring
opportunity for a battle with the odds enormously in German favour. ‘On
December 16,’ he wrote a few weeks later, ‘Ingenohl had the fate of
Germany in the palm of his hand. I boil with inward emotion whenever I
think of it.’ We will examine this claim later. Let us first follow the
event.

Admiral von Ingenohl had already strained his instructions by going so
far to sea. An appeal by him against the ‘Muzzling Order,’ which the
Emperor had issued after the action of the Heligoland Bight (August 28),
had recently encountered a rebuff. ‘The Fleet must be held back and
avoid actions which might lead to heavy losses.’ Such had been the
latest _ukase_. And here was the Fleet right out in the middle of the
North Sea in the darkness of a December dawn. Suddenly the flashes of
guns, English destroyers reported in action with the cruisers of his
screen, the screen retiring, the destroyers pursuing—and still two hours
before daylight. Von Ingenohl conceived himself in danger of a torpedo
attack in darkness. At about 5.30 therefore he turned his whole Fleet
about and steamed off South-Eastward, and shortly after 6 o’clock,
increasingly disquieted by his hampering instructions, but knowing no
more of the presence of our squadrons than they of him, he, in the
justly chosen words of the British official historian, ‘fairly turned
tail and made for home, leaving his raiding force in the air.’ Even so,
at 6 o’clock the two Fleets were only about 50 miles apart and their
light forces in contact! Says Scheer, who was in command of the German
2nd Squadron (p. 71), ‘Our premature turning on to an East-South-East
course had robbed us of the opportunity of meeting certain divisions of
the enemy according to the pre-arranged plan, which is now seen to have
been correct.’

There was, however, no compulsion upon Admirals Warrender and Beatty to
fight such an action. Their squadrons were moving properly protected by
their screen of cruisers and destroyers. In this part of the sea and at
this hour the weather was quite clear. They would have known what forces
they were in presence of, before they could become seriously engaged.
There would not have been any justification for trying to fight the High
Sea Fleet of twenty battleships, with six battleships and four battle
cruisers, even though these comprised our most powerful vessels. Nor was
there any need. The British 2nd Battle Squadron could steam in company
at 20 knots, or could escape with Forced Draught at 21, and only six of
von Ingenohl’s ships could equal that speed. As for the battle cruisers,
nothing could catch them. The safety of this force acting detached from
the main British Fleet was inherent in its speed. Admirals Warrender and
Beatty could therefore have refused battle with the German Fleet, and it
would certainly have been their duty to do so. Still having regard to
the large numbers of destroyers at sea with the German Fleet and the
chances of darkness and weather, the situation at this juncture, as we
now know it to have been, gives cause for profound reflection. That it
never materialised unfavourably was the reward of previous audacity. The
sixteenth of December lay under the safeguard of the twenty-eighth of
August.

We now enter upon the second phase of this extraordinary day. All four
British squadrons with their flotilla between 9 and 10 o’clock were
steaming towards the British coasts. The German raiding cruisers, having
finished their bombardments, were now seeking to return home with the
utmost speed. There were two large minefields which had been laid
earlier in the war by the Germans off the Yorkshire coast, and we,
having located them and considering them as a protection against
raiding, had improved them by laying additional mines. Between these
minefields there was opposite Whitby and Scarborough a gap about fifteen
miles wide. Sir John Jellicoe, reflecting upon the whole position from
the _Iron Duke_ from afar, formed the opinion that the enemy would
either try to escape to the Northward by steaming up our coast inside
the minefield or, much more probably, would come straight out Eastward
through the gap opposite Whitby and Scarborough. He had ordered the 3rd
Battle Squadron from the Forth to close the gap to the Northward and
this was rapidly being effected. At 10.10 he signalled to Sir George
Warrender telling him the position of the gap in the minefields opposite
Whitby and adding ‘Enemy will in all probability come out there.’
Admirals Warrender and Beatty were already proceeding on this
assumption, which in fact correctly divined what the Germans were doing.

At 11 o’clock, therefore, the four German battle cruisers, with their
light cruisers returning independently 60 miles ahead of them, were
steaming due East for Heligoland at their highest speed. At the same
time all our four squadrons were steaming due West in a broad sweep
directly towards them. The distance between the fleets was about 100
miles, and they were approaching each other at an aggregate speed of
over 40 miles an hour. Across the course of our fleet lay the South-West
patch of the Dogger Bank on which there was not enough water for battle
cruisers, either British or German. The British sweeping line therefore
divided—Beatty and the light cruisers going North of the patch.
Warrender with the battleships and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron going South
of it. This involved a certain detour and delay in our advance. The
weather, moreover, became very bad. The mist descended and the sea ran
high. The German light cruisers were now sighted by our Light Cruiser
Squadron scouting ahead of Beatty through the driving mist and
rainstorms. The _Southampton_, the most Southerly light cruiser, opened
fire and was answered by the enemy. Hopes on board the _Lion_ rose. Just
at the place and just at the moment when they might expect it, was the
enemy’s cruiser screen. Clearly the main body was behind them: probably
it was not far behind. But now Mischance intervened.

The other three British light cruisers, seeing the _Southampton_ engaged
to the Southward, turned in that direction to join in the fight and the
_Birmingham_ opened fire. This was not in accordance with the wishes of
Admiral Beatty, who wished to keep his scouts in front of him at the
time when he must expect to be closely approaching the enemy’s battle
cruisers, and when the danger of missing them was so great. He therefore
ordered his light cruisers to return to their stations. The signal,
instead of being directed by name to the 2 vessels who were not engaged,
was made general to the Light Cruiser Squadron, and acting on this order
the _Southampton_ and _Birmingham_ both broke off their action with the
German cruiser and resumed their places in the line. The German light
cruisers turned off to the Southward and vanished in the mist. Contact
with them was thus lost.

Meanwhile, however, the battle cruisers on both sides continued rapidly
to approach each other. At 12.15 Admiral von Hipper warned by his light
cruisers that an enemy force was immediately in front of him, also
turned slightly and to the South-East. Admiral Beatty continued on his
course till 12.30. At this moment the two battle cruiser forces were
only 25 miles apart and still rapidly closing.[101] But now again
Mischance! The German light cruisers, deflected away to the Southward
from Beatty, came into contact with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron in front of
Warrender. Fire again was opened and returned, and again the enemy
cruisers were lost in the thick mist. They reported to von Hipper that
on this path also was a blocking force. Thereupon at 12.45 he made ‘a
three-quarters left about turn’ (if I may employ a cavalry term), and
dodged off due North. This by itself would not have saved him. Had
Admiral Beatty held on his original course for another quarter of an
hour, an action at decisive ranges must have begun before 1 o’clock. But
observe what had happened.

[Illustration:

OPERATIONS OF

December 16, 1914.
]

At 12.30 Admiral Beatty had received a signal from Sir George Warrender
at the moment of the second contact with the German light cruisers,
‘Enemy cruisers and destroyers in sight.’ He therefore concluded that
the German battle cruisers had slipped past him to the Southward, and
acting in addition on the sound principle of keeping between the enemy
and the enemy’s home at all costs, he too whipped round and steamed back
on his course, i.e., Eastward, for three-quarters of an hour. At 1.15,
hearing that the enemy battle cruisers had turned North, he too turned
North; but contact was never re-established. Von Hipper succeeded in
escaping round the Northern flank of our squadrons. His light cruisers,
so thick was the weather, made their way through the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, passing for a few moments actually in sight of Warrender’s
battleships.

Thus ended this heart-shaking game of Blind Man’s Buff.

It remains only to mention the action of our British submarines. By 3.30
Commodore Keyes had collected four of his boats from their station
submerged off Terschelling, and in accordance with Admiralty orders was
making for the Heligoland Bight. Eventually he succeeded in placing
three boats on the Southern side of Heligoland and one on the Northern.
This solitary boat, under Commander Nasmith, on the morning of the 17th
found itself in the middle of Von Hipper’s squadron and flotillas
returning from their raid and fired two torpedoes at battle cruisers
under very difficult conditions and without effect.

Such was the episode of the Scarborough and Hartlepool raids. All that
we could tell the public was contained in the following communiqué which
was issued in the morning papers of December 17.

_Admiralty, December 16_, 9.20 p.m.

This morning a German cruiser force made a demonstration upon the
Yorkshire coast, in the course of which they shelled Hartlepool,
Whitby, and Scarborough.

A number of their fastest ships were employed for this purpose, and
they remained about an hour on the coast. They were engaged by the
patrol vessels on the spot.

As soon as the presence of the enemy was reported, a British
patrolling squadron endeavoured to cut them off. On being sighted by
British vessels the Germans retired at full speed, and, favoured by
the mist, succeeded in making good their escape.

The losses on both sides are small, but full reports have not yet been
received.

The Admiralty take the opportunity of pointing out that demonstrations
of this character against unfortified towns or commercial ports,
though not difficult to accomplish provided that a certain amount of
risk is accepted, are devoid of military significance.

They may cause some loss of life among the civil population and some
damage to private property, which is much to be regretted; but they
must not in any circumstances be allowed to modify the general naval
policy which is being pursued.

Naturally there was much indignation at the failure of the Navy to
prevent, or at least to avenge, such an attack upon our shores. What was
the Admiralty doing? Were they all asleep? Although the bombarded towns,
in which nearly five hundred civilians had been killed and wounded,
supported their ordeal with fortitude, dissatisfaction was widespread.
However, we could not say a word in explanation. We had to bear in
silence the censures of our countrymen. We could never admit for fear of
compromising our secret information where our squadrons were, or how
near the German raiding cruisers had been to their destruction. One
comfort we had. The indications upon which we had acted had been
confirmed by events. The sources of information upon which we relied
were evidently trustworthy. Next time we might at least have average
visibility. But would there be a next time? The German Admiral must have
known that he was very near to powerful British ships, but which they
were, or where they were, or how near he was, might be a mystery. Would
it not also be a mystery how they came to be there? On the other hand,
the exultation of Germany at the hated English towns being actually made
to feel for the first time the real lash of war might encourage a second
attempt. Even the indignation of our own newspapers had a value for this
purpose. One could only hope for the best. Meanwhile British naval plans
and secrets remained wrapped in impenetrable silence.

CHAPTER XXI
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

‘Now mark me well—it is provided in the essence of things, that from
any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to
make a greater struggle necessary.’

WALT WHITMAN, _The Open Road_.

Britain and Turkey—My correspondence with Djavid, 1911—Effect of
requisitioning the Turkish battleships—Nominal transfer of the
_Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ to Turkey—General Situation in the
Balkans—Bulgaria the dominant factor—Venizelos offers a Greek
alliance—Reasons against acceptance—My letter to Mr. Noel
Buxton—Menacing attitude of Turkey—Possibilities of a Greek
military attack upon Gallipoli—Difficulties of Greek
intervention—Search for an army—Withdrawal of the British Naval
Mission in Constantinople—Letter to Sir Edward Grey of September
23—Alternative considerations—Secret Turco-German treaty of August
2—The Turco-German attack on Russia—Ultimatum to Turkey and
declaration of war—The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts of
November 3—Impending Turkish attack upon Egypt—Naval concentration
in the Canal—Repulse of the Turkish attack—Arrival of the
Australians in Egypt—The prelude to the Dardanelles—General Survey
of the War—The Great Strain—The Sudden Relief—The End of the
Beginning.

It is now necessary to describe the circumstances attending the entry of
Turkey into the war. In Turkey, as in Greece and all the Balkan States
except Serbia, there were two violently conflicting parties—pro-German
and pro-Entente. The assiduous courting of Turkey by Germany and the
condonation of her most atrocious actions had given the Germans great
advantages at Constantinople. In addition the profound instinct of the
Turk was to be on the opposite side to his historic and tremendous enemy
Russia. Britain, on the other hand, took no trouble to counteract these
formidable tendencies. Large sections of the British Press and public
denounced the Turk, often with justice, in unmeasured terms, and no
foreign policy based on special relations with Turkey could have stood
for a day in a Liberal House of Commons. Notwithstanding all this,
British influence in Turkey rested on foundations so deep and ancient,
and the impression produced upon the Turkish mind by her obviously
disinterested course of action was so strong, that at any rate up till
the beginning of 1914 she would have welcomed a British alliance. This
was the wish not only of the old Turks but of the young Turks. When in
the summer of 1909 I had visited Constantinople, I made the acquaintance
of the Young Turk leaders and passed several days in the company of
Djavid, Talaat and Halil. I also met at the German Manœuvres of 1910
Enver Pasha, with whom I established amicable relations. All these men
seemed animated by a sincere desire to help their country to reform and
revive, and I could not help feeling much sympathy for them in their
difficulties.

In 1911, when Turkey was attacked by Italy and her Tripoli Province
seized, I received the following letter from Djavid Bey written on
behalf of his friends on the then all-powerful Committee of Union and
Progress:—

_Djavid Bey to Mr. Churchill_

_October 29, 1911._

My belief in your sincere friendship for Turkey and the Young Turks
leads me to speak of a very important matter to-day.

After the Constitution in Turkey those that believed in the beginning
of a close friendship between England and Turkey saw with regret the
misunderstanding that prevented it. I need not speak of its different
causes here. Only the true friends of England in Turkey never ceased
from trying to remove it. The actual circumstances appear to be a good
occasion for success. The attack of one of the Triple Alliance Powers
on our territory has turned the public opinion greatly against the
Triplice. The pro-English statesmen in Turkey and pro-Turkish
statesmen in England could profit of this occasion.

Knowing and believing you to occupy an important and influential
position among our friends in England, I will beg you to join our
efforts using your influence in bringing out this friendship. Has the
time arrived for a permanent alliance between the two countries? On
what basis could it be attempted? Will you please write me your
personal views on the matter? They will be considered entirely
personal and unofficial. But I will consider myself happy if we can
prepare a possible ground for official purposes.

I commended this matter promptly to Sir Edward Grey, but the danger of
estranging Italy—apart from political considerations—made it impossible
for him to authorize me to say more than the following:—

_Mr. Churchill to Djavid Bey._

_Admiralty, November 19, 1911._

It is a great pleasure to me to receive your letter, the importance of
which I fully recognize. So far as the present lamentable struggle is
concerned, we have definitely declared our neutrality; and it is not
to be expected that we shall alter a policy so gravely decided. My
answer therefore to your question must be that at the present time we
cannot enter upon new political relations. In the future the enormous
interests which unite the two great Mussulman Powers should keep us in
touch. That is our wish; the feeling of British public opinion, as you
will have seen from recent manifestations of it, opposes no barrier to
that wish, if only the Turkish Government will not alienate it by
reverting to the oppressive methods of the old regime or seeking to
disturb the British status quo as it now exists; and you and your
friends, whom I remember to have met with so much pleasure, should
bear in mind that England, almost alone among European States, seeks
no territorial expansion, and that alone among them she retains the
supremacy of the sea. We earnestly desire to revive and maintain our
old friendship with Turkey, which while we retain that supremacy
should be a friendship of value.

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter, which was due
to the importance of its nature.

In the years which followed the Young Turks looked towards Germany, and
here they were very powerfully swayed by their military instincts and
training. They rightly regarded Germany as the leading military Power:
many of them had received their military education in Berlin, and they
were spellbound by the splendour and authority of Prussian organisation.
They saw the Russian giant ever growing to the east and to the north.
And if England stood aloof, where else could Turkey find protection
except through the German sword? I do not see what else we could have
expected. Therefore, from the very beginning of the war I hoped for
nothing from Turkey and apprehended much.

The first events of the war obviously added to the tension between the
two countries. We had found it necessary, as has been described, to
requisition the two Turkish battleships which were building in British
yards. The money for these ships had been largely raised by public
subscription in Turkey, and their sequestration angered not only the
Turkish Government but large numbers of patriotic Turks throughout the
country. Moreover, in the struggles which ensued in Constantinople and
in the Turkish Cabinet between the Turkish war party and those who
favoured neutrality, this episode seemed to have weight.

I did my best, with the approval of the Cabinet, to allay the legitimate
heartburnings of the Turkish Ministry of Marine. These efforts were
seconded by Admiral Limpus, the Head of the British Naval Mission to
Turkey, whose relations with the Turks were extremely good and whose
mission had won much esteem. But with the arrival at the Dardanelles of
the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, a new and formidable complication arose.
These two ships, which had presented themselves at the entrance to the
Straits about 5 o’clock on the afternoon of August 10, were received by
the Turkish authorities. They were piloted through a passage in the
minefield and proceeded to Constantinople. The British Government had a
right to assume that they would be interned and disarmed. In view of the
delicacy of the situation, however, it was thought prudent to accept a
less drastic solution. The following minutes tell their own tale.—

_August 12, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

“_Goeben_” and “_Breslau_”

In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale or
transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be allowed,
provided that the transference is _bona fide_ and permanent. The
essential condition to insist on is that all the German officers and
men of the crews of both ships must, without exception, be at once
repatriated to Germany under parole not to serve again during the war.
We cannot agree to any exceptions being made, whether of officers or
skilled ratings, or of the ordinary crew. The British Embassy,
assisted if necessary by the English Naval Mission, should assure
themselves that all the Germans leave at once, and that the ships are
definitely handed over to the Turkish Navy. In these circumstances,
the Admiralty would allow the [British] Naval Mission to remain, as
requested by the Grand Vizier. The Turks could also be informed that
after the war is over, we should be quite ready in principle, and as
far as we can now foresee, to transfer one or both of the two ships we
have requisitioned to their flag, and that we are quite ready to
negotiate with them at the present time in regard to payment of the
sums due to Turkey.

W. S. C.

_August 17, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

The situation about _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ is extremely
unsatisfactory. Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of
neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the German
complements down to the last man has not taken place; probably the
whole of the German crews are still on board, and it is admitted that
‘experts are to be retained.’ Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has
been banished from the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and
forbidden to go on board the two ex-Germans. As long as the _Goeben_
and _Breslau_ remain in this condition, and until we know that the
whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have to keep
two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed elsewhere,
waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles. This is a
situation which cannot continue indefinitely.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

The Turkish position could only be judged in relation to the general
situation in the Balkans; and this could not be understood unless the
dominant facts of pre-war Balkan history were continually borne in mind.
The first Balkan war saw Bulgaria triumphantly bearing the brunt of the
attack on Turkey. While her armies were advancing on Constantinople
against the best troops of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks and Serbians
were overrunning the comparatively weakly-held regions of Thrace and
Macedonia. The Bulgarians, having fought the greatest battles and
sustained by far the heaviest losses, found themselves finally checked
before Constantinople, and, turning round, beheld almost the whole of
the conquered territory in the hands of their Allies. The destination of
this territory had been regulated before the war by treaty between the
four belligerent minor States. Adrianople had not however surrendered,
and in obedience to the treaty the Serbians came to the aid of the
Bulgarian forces, and played a prominent part in the capture of that
fortress. Both the Serbians and the Greeks utilised the argument that
the war had been prolonged through the need of reducing Adrianople as a
ground for claiming to repudiate in important particulars the pre-war
treaty, and meanwhile they retained occupation of all the conquered
districts in their possession. The Bulgarians were quick to repay this
claim with violence. They attacked the Greeks and Serbians, were
defeated by the more numerous armies of these two Powers, and in the
moment of extreme weakness and defeat were invaded from the other side
by Roumania, who, having taken no part in the conflict, had intact
armies to strike with. At the same time the Turks advanced in Thrace,
and led by Enver Pasha recaptured Adrianople. Thus the end of the second
Balkan war saw Bulgaria stripped not only of almost all her share of the
territory conquered from the Turks (and this entirely divided between
Greece and Serbia), but even her native province of the Dobroudja had
been wrested from her by Roumania. The terrible cruelties and atrocities
which had been perpetrated on both sides in the internecine struggle
that followed the expulsion of the Turks had left a river of blood
between the Greeks and Serbians on the one hand and the Bulgarians on
the other.

It is possible that no nation ever contemplated its fortunes with more
profound and desperate resolve than the Bulgarians at this juncture. All
their sacrifices had been useless and worse than useless. All the fruits
of their conquests had gone to aggrandise their rivals. They had been,
as they considered, stabbed in the back and blackmailed by Roumania, to
whom they had given no provocation of any kind. They saw the great
Powers, England in the van, forbid the return of the Turk to Adrianople
without offering the slightest attempt to make their words good. They
saw not only Salonika, but even Kavala, seized by the Greeks. They saw
large districts inhabited largely by the Bulgarian race newly liberated
from the Turks pass under the yoke—to them scarcely less odious—of
Serbians and Greeks. It was in these circumstances that the Bulgarian
army, in the words of King Ferdinand, ‘furled its standards’ and retired
to wait for better days.

This warlike and powerful Bulgaria, with its scheming King and its
valiant peasant armies brooding over what seemed to them intolerable
wrongs, was the dominant factor in the Balkans in 1914 and 1915.

* * * * *

On August 19, 1914, Monsieur Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Greece,
with the approval which he had, astonishing to relate, obtained, of King
Constantine, formally placed at the disposal of the Entente powers all
the naval and military resources of Greece from the moment when they
might be required. He added that this offer was made in a special sense
to Great Britain with whose interests those of Greece were indissolubly
bound. The resources of Greece, he said, were small, but she could
dispose of 250,000 troops, and her navy and her ports might be of some
use. This magnanimous offer, made as it was while all was so uncertain,
and even before the main battle in France had been joined, greatly
attracted me. No doubt on the one hand it was a serious thing to run the
risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On the other hand, the Greek Army
and Navy were solid factors; and a combination of the Greek armies and
fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of
settling the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and
effective manner. The Gallipoli Peninsula was then only weakly occupied
by Turkish troops, and the Greek General Staff were known to be ready
with well-thought-out plans for its seizure. Moreover, it seemed to me
that anyhow Turkey was drifting into war with us. Her conduct in regard
to the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ continued openly fraudulent. The presence
of these two vessels themselves in German hands in the Sea of Marmora
offered a means of putting decisive pressure on the neutrality party in
Constantinople. If we were not going to secure honest Turkish
neutrality, then let us, in the alternative, get the Christian States of
the Balkans on our side. Could we not get them on our side? Could we not
make a Balkan confederation of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania?
Whatever happened, we ought not to fall between two stools.

Sir Edward Grey, however, after very anxious consideration, moved the
Cabinet to decline Monsieur Venizelos’ proposal, as he feared, no doubt
with weighty reasons, that an alliance with Greece meant immediate war
with Turkey and possibly Bulgaria. He feared that it might jeopardise
Greece without our being able to protect her. He was anxious above all
things not to foster a Greek enterprise against Constantinople in such a
way as to give offence to Russia. And, lastly, he hoped that Sir Louis
Mallet, who was in close and intimate relations with the Grand Vizier
and the leaders of the Turkish neutrality party in Constantinople, would
after all be able to keep the peace. Certainly nothing could exceed the
skill and perseverance with which the British Ambassador laboured. It
followed from this that we should maintain the very handsome offer we
had made in common with France and Russia at the outbreak of the war to
guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire in return for her faithful
neutrality. I naturally conformed to the Cabinet decision, but with
increasing misgivings. I still continued to work and hope for a Balkan
confederation. I gave the following letter, of which the Foreign
Secretary approved, to Mr. Noel Buxton, who was starting for a
propaganda tour in the Balkans. Of course in view of our decision about
Turkey, it could refer only to the common interests of these States
against Austria.

_August 31, 1914._

It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of the Balkan
States that they should act together. This is the hour when the metal
can be cast into the mould. It is only by reclaiming from Austria
territories which belong naturally to the Balkan races that the means
can be provided to satisfy the legitimate needs and aspirations of all
the Balkan States. Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way
by which any Balkan State can expand except by internecine war. But
the application of the principle of nationality to the Southern
Provinces of Austria will produce results so advantageous to the
Balkan States that the memory and the consequences of former quarrels
could be assuaged for ever.

The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia,
Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong enough to play an effective
part in the destinies of Europe, must be the common dream of all their
peoples. The result of this war is not doubtful. Sooner or later,
Germany will be starved and beaten. Austria will be resolved into its
component parts. England has always won in the end; and Russia is
unconquerable. England has been the friend of every Christian State in
the Balkans during all their years of struggle and suffering. She has
no interests of her own to seek in the Balkan Peninsula. But with her
wealth and power she will promote and aid every step which is taken to
build up a strong union of the Christian peoples, like that which
triumphed in the first Balkan War. By acting together in unity and
good faith the Balkan States can now play a decisive part, and gain
advantages which may never again be offered. By disunion they will
simply condemn themselves to tear each other’s throats without profit
or reward, and left to themselves will play an utterly futile part in
the destinies of the world.

I want you to make your friends in Greece and in Bulgaria realise the
brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now presents itself, and to
assure them that England’s might and perseverance will not be withheld
from any righteous effort to secure the strength and union of the
Balkan peoples.

In the early days of September it seemed highly probable that Turkey,
under the influence of the German advance on Paris, would make war upon
us and upon Greece whatever we did. I began immediately to prepare for
the event.

_Mr. Churchill to General Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff._

_September 1, 1914._

_Secret._

I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers from
Admiralty should meet two officers from the Director of Military
Operations Department of the War Office to-day to examine and work out
a plan for the seizure by means of a Greek army of adequate strength
of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet
to the Sea of Marmora.

In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary directions, as
the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war on us at any moment.

The meeting can take place either here or at the War Office as soon as
you can arrange with our Chief of Staff. I will myself explain
verbally to the Committee the subject on which his Majesty’s
Government desire information.

The Director of Military Operations, General Callwell, replied on the
3rd, on behalf of the General Staff, that the operation of seizing the
Gallipoli Peninsula would be an extremely difficult one. Sixty thousand
men would be required, thirty thousand of whom should be landed in the
first instance, should gain as much ground as possible, should prepare
landing stages, and hold their own for a week while the transports
returned to Greece for the second thirty thousand. On this basis the
operation was considered feasible. These estimates were not excessive,
and the Greeks could certainly provide a considerably larger force if
necessary.

Thereupon I telegraphed, with the approval of the Foreign Office, to
Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of our naval mission to Greece, as
follows:—

_September 4._

In event of war with Turkey, with England and Greece as Allies,
Admiralty consider it essential, as a Staff precaution, that the
question of the right war policy to be followed should be examined, in
consultation with Greek General and Naval Staff, leaving political
probabilities to be decided by respective Governments.

Admiralty give you permission to do this, should you be approached by
the Greek Government. In principle, the Admiralty views are as
follows:

In order to provide unquestionable and decisive superiority over the
German and Turkish vessels, the Greek Fleet would be offered, as
reinforcements, a squadron and flotilla, and the whole of the combined
Fleets would be placed under your command, with the _Indomitable_ as
your Flagship. Should circumstances demand it, you would be reinforced
with any class of vessel necessary and to any extent.

In order that the right and obvious method of attack upon Turkey (viz.
by striking immediately at the heart) may be carried out, the Greek
Army would, under superiority of sea predominance, have to seize the
Gallipoli Peninsula, thus opening the Dardanelles and enabling the
Anglo-Greek Fleet, in the Sea of Marmora, to fight and sink the
Turco-German ships, and from there the whole situation can be
dominated, in combination with the Black Sea Fleet of the Russians and
their military forces.

The Admiralty desire that, in consultation with you, the Greek Naval
and Military Experts should immediately examine this enterprise, and
that you should report fully by telegraph to the Admiralty what are
the general views of the Greek Government upon it, and what, in their
opinion, would be the force required to carry it out, assuming that
safe transportation is assured. Should we provide the necessary
transports, or in what time and to what extent could Greece do so?
Have they any alternative suggestions?

The Rear-Admiral’s reply reached me through the Foreign Office on the
9th.

The Greek General Staff have been consulted on the subject of your
telegram, and I agree with them in their opinion that, if Bulgaria
does not attack Greece, the latter can take Gallipoli with force at
their disposal. Greece will not trust Bulgaria unless she at the same
time attacks Turkey with all her force. They will not accept
Bulgaria’s guarantee to remain neutral.

Subject to above conditions, plan for taking Dardanelles Straits is
ready.

Greece can provide necessary transports for troops. A British squadron
of two battle cruisers, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers and
flotilla of destroyers will be needed to assist. General Staff and
myself originally formulated this plan, but operation has become
greater since Turkey has mobilised and obtained German ships.

He mentioned as an alternative the region of Alexandretta.

On September 6 Monsieur Venizelos told our Minister in Athens that he
was not afraid of a single-handed attack from Turkey by land as the
Greek General Staff were confident of being able to deal with it. The
Greek Government had received from Sofia positive assurances of definite
neutrality, but did not trust them. They would, however, be satisfied
with a formal protest by the Bulgarian Government against a violation of
Bulgarian territory by Turkish troops proceeding to attack Greece. If,
however, Bulgaria joined Turkey while Serbia was occupied with Austria,
the situation would be critical. On this I pointed out to the Foreign
Secretary on the same date that a Russian Army Corps could easily be
brought from Archangel, from Vladivostok, or with Japanese consent from
Port Arthur to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula. ‘The price to be paid in
taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy, but there would be no more war
with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 men and sea power—that is the end of
the Turkish menace.’

But it was easier to look for armies than to find them. Sir Edward Grey
replied by sending me a telegram that had been received that very
morning from Petrograd stating that in view of the very large number of
German troops which were being transferred from the Western to the
Eastern theatre, Russia was calling up every available man from Asia and
the Caucasus, and was only leaving one Army Corps in the latter. Greece
would therefore, according to the Petrograd telegram, have to bear the
brunt of the war single-handed unless she could placate Bulgaria by
territorial concessions. He added on the back of my note, ‘You will see
from the telegram from St. Petersburg that Russia can give no help
against Turkey. I do not like the prospect in the Mediterranean at all,
unless there is some turn of the tide in France.’

It is only by faithful study of this problem that its immense
difficulties are portrayed. Lest it should be thought that I underrated
the gravity of a war with Turkey, it must be remembered that I had
convinced myself that Turkey would attack us sooner or later, and that I
was also proceeding on the belief that the German invasion of France
would be brought to a standstill. Both these assumptions proved true. I
do not claim that my view was the wisest, but only to expose it to
historical judgment. The policy emerging from such a view would of
course at this juncture have offered Cyprus to Greece in compensation
for her offering Kavala to Bulgaria. It would have put the most extreme
pressure on Serbia to make concessions to Bulgaria in Monastir. Whether
these measures would have succeeded at this time I do not pronounce.

By September 9 the behaviour of the Turks about the _Goeben_ and the
_Breslau_ had become so openly defiant that it became necessary to
withdraw the British Naval Mission, who were exposed to daily insolences
at the hands of the Germans and of the Turkish war party. It was my
intention to appoint the head of the mission, Rear-Admiral Limpus, to
command the squadron watching the Dardanelles, and orders were sent
definitely to that effect. This project was not, however, pursued, it
being thought that it would be unduly provocative to employ on this
station the very officer who had just ceased to be the teacher of the
Turkish Fleet. No doubt this was a weighty argument, but in bowing to it
we lost the advantages of having at this fateful spot the Admiral who of
all others knew the Turks, and knew the Dardanelles with all its
possibilities. It was a small link in a long chain. Delay was caused and
I had to make fresh arrangements.

On September 21, I telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Carden, who was in charge
of the Malta Dockyard:—

Assume command of the squadron off Dardanelles. Your sole duty is to
sink _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, no matter what flag they fly, if they
come out of Dardanelles. We are not at war with Turkey but the German
Admiral Souchon is now Commander-in-Chief Turkish Navy and Germans are
controlling and largely manning it. Turks have been told that any
Turkish ships which come out with _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ will be
equally attacked by us. You are authorised to act accordingly without
further declaration or parley. You must deal at your discretion with
any minor Turkish war vessel which may come out alone from
Dardanelles, either ordering her back or allowing her to proceed as
you may think fit, remembering that we do not want to pick a quarrel
with Turkey unless her hostile intention is clear.

_Indomitable_ will be diverted from convoy off Crete and ordered to
join your squadron. French Commander-in-Chief has been requested to
send 2 battle ships of _Patrie_ class to reinforce your flag.

The victory of the Marne, although afterwards discounted by adverse
events, checked the developments in the Near East. Turkey was steadied
for the moment, and her attitude towards Greece became less menacing.
This however produced a corresponding cooling at Athens about joining in
the European war. From the middle of September the conditions throughout
the Balkans had declined again from crisis into suspense. They remained
however fundamentally vicious.

I continued increasingly to press as opportunity served for a policy of
uniting the Balkan States without reference to what might happen in
Turkey.

On September 23 I wrote to Sir Edward Grey as follows:—

_September 23, 1914._

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey._

I must write you a line about Turkey.... We are suffering very
seriously from Turkish hostility. Our whole Mediterranean Fleet is
tied to the Dardanelles. We are daily trying to buy Turkish neutrality
by promises and concessions. Meanwhile the German grip on Turkey
tightens, and all preparations for war go steadily forward. But all
this would in itself be of minor consequence but for the fact that in
our attempt to placate Turkey we are crippling our policy in the
Balkans. I am not suggesting that we should take aggressive action
against Turkey or declare war on her ourselves, but we ought from now
to make our arrangements with the Balkan States, particularly
Bulgaria, without regard to the interests or integrity of Turkey. The
Bulgarians ought to regain the Turkish territory they lost in the
second Balkan War, and we ought to tell them that if they join with
Roumania, Greece, and Serbia in the attack upon Austria and Germany,
the Allied Powers will see that they get this territory at the peace.
We always said that Adrianople should never fall back into Turkish
hands, and the strongest possible remonstrances were addressed to the
Porte by you at the time. There is therefore nothing wrong or
inconsistent in our adopting this position. If we win the war, we
shall be quite strong enough to secure this territory for Bulgaria,
and Turkey’s conduct to us with repeated breaches of neutrality would
release us from any need of considering her European interests. Like
you, I sympathise deeply with Mallet in the futile and thankless task
on which he is engaged. I do not know what the result will be, but I
am sure it is not worth while sacrificing the bold and decisive
alternative of throwing in our lot frankly with the Christian States
of the Balkans to get the kind of neutrality which the Turks have been
giving us, and for which we are even asked to pay and be grateful. The
whole tone of the telegrams from Roumania and Bulgaria is hopeful. I
do most earnestly beg you not to be diverted from the highway of sound
policy in this part of the world, both during the war and at the
settlement, by wanderings into the labyrinth of Turkish duplicity and
intrigue. All I am asking is that the interests and integrity of
Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are
made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.

Judged in afterlight these views can hardly be contested. I have never
swerved from them; but the reader should understand the other arguments
by which the Cabinet was ruled. The loyal desire not to spread the war
to regions still uncursed; the dangers in India of a British quarrel
with Turkey; our awful military weakness in 1914; Lord Kitchener’s
expressed wish to keep the East as quiet as possible till the two Indian
Divisions were safely through the Suez Canal; the difficulties of
winning the support of Greece, and particularly of King Constantine,
without exciting the suspicion and jealousies of Russia about
Constantinople; and, lastly, the doubts—admittedly substantial—whether
Bulgaria and King Ferdinand could ever, in the absence of substantial
military successes in the main theatres or strong local intervention by
Allied forces in the Balkans, be detached from the Teutonic system.

When I talked these questions over at the time with Sir Edward Grey it
was upon this last argument that he was most inclined to dwell. ‘Until
Bulgaria believes that Germany is not going to win the war, she will not
be moved by any promises of other people’s territory which we may make
her.’ The swift overrunning of Northern France by the German armies, the
withdrawal of the French Government to Bordeaux, the fall of Antwerp,
the tremendous victories of Hindenburg over the Russians, were events
all of which dominated the Bulgarian equally with the Turkish mind.
England, without an army, with not a soldier to spare, without even a
rifle to send, with only her Navy and her money, counted for little in
the Near East. Russian claims to Constantinople directly crossed the
ambitions both of King Ferdinand and of King Constantine. In all the
Balkans only one clairvoyant eye, only the genius of Venizelos,
discerned the fundamental moral issues of the struggle, measured justly
the relative powers of the mighty combatants, and appraised at their
true value both the victories of the German Army, and the Sea Power
under which were slowly gathering the latent but inexhaustible resources
of the British Empire.

So the Allies continued to wait and hope at Constantinople, and the days
slipped swiftly by.

Not till long after did we learn the blasting secret which would have
destroyed all British and Russian doubts. Already in the crisis of July
the leaders of the Young Turk party had been in vital negotiation with
the Germans, and on August 2 an alliance had been signed between Germany
and Turkey. Thus all this time we were deceived. Whether anything that
it was in our power to do could have averted the evils must always
remain a disputed question; but that the evils were not averted is
certain. In the end we had all the evils of both courses and the
advantages of no course. We were forced into a war with Turkey which
ultimately became of enormous magnitude. Greece was thrown into
inextricable confusion. Serbia was overrun. Bulgaria, joining hands with
her recent enemies the Turks, became our foe. And Roumania, when she
finally came in isolated upon the allied side, suffered the direst
vengeance at German hands. A more fearful series of tragedies has
scarcely ever darkened the melancholy page of history.

It must not be thought that the action of Turkey was inspired solely by
treachery and duplicity. Two parties were struggling for mastery in the
capital, but in view of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on
August 2, there could have been no doubt about the final outcome.
Moreover, in the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, to say nothing of the Turkish
Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force the Turkish
Government to adhere to the covenants which they had entered into on her
behalf. By the middle of October we learnt that Turkish preparations to
invade Egypt were actually being made. We learned also from a secret
source, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had received
solemn assurances from Enver that Turkey would enter the war against the
Entente at an early date. At the end of October, our outposts beyond the
Suez Canal had to be withdrawn in face of gathering Turkish forces; and
finally, about October 27, the _Breslau_, with the Turkish cruiser
_Hamidieh_ and a division of destroyers, followed by the _Goeben_,
steamed into the Black Sea, and on the 29th and 30th bombarded the
Russian fortress of Sevastopol, sank a Russian transport, raided the
harbour of Odessa, torpedoed a gunboat, and, lastly, practically
destroyed Novorossisk, its oil tanks and all the shipping in the port.

On this the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople immediately demanded
his passports; and the British Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m. on October
30, after reciting its many griefs against the Turks, especially their
invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and their misconduct about the Goeben,
sent an ultimatum requiring repudiation of these acts and the dismissal
of the German Military and Naval Missions within 12 hours. The Admiralty
conformed to this decision by telegraphing to all Admirals concerned as
follows:—

(_October 31, 1914._ 12.35 a.m.)

Orders sent Ambassador Constantinople 8.15 p.m. 30th October to
present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of 12 hours. Do not
yourself commence hostilities without further orders.

_Add to Vice-Admiral Carden (Indefatigable)._

You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very shortly.

Russia declared war on Turkey at the expiry of the ultimatum; and the
British and French Ambassadors, in company with their Russian colleague,
left Constantinople on November 1—the same day on which at the other end
of the world the battle of Coronel was being fought. Naval orders to
commence hostilities were sent, in concert with the Foreign Office, in
conformity with the expiry of the ultimatum.

_Admiralty to all ships._

_October 31, 1914_ (sent 5.5 p.m.)

‘Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowledge.’

On November 1 two of our destroyers, entering the Gulf of Smyrna,
destroyed a large armed Turkish yacht which was lying by the jetty
carrying mines; and late that same day Admiral Carden was instructed to
bombard the outer Dardanelles forts at long range on the earliest
suitable occasion. This bombardment was carried out on the morning of
November 3. The two British battle-cruisers, firing from a range beyond
that of the Turkish guns, shelled the batteries on the European side at
Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles. The French battleships fired at the
Asiatic batteries at Kum Kali and Orkanieh. About eighty rounds were
fired altogether, resulting in considerable damage to the Turkish forts,
and in several hundred casualties to the Turks and Germans who manned
them.

The reasons for this demonstration have been greatly canvassed. They
were simple though not important. A British squadron had for months been
waiting outside the Dardanelles. War had been declared with Turkey. It
was natural that fire should be opened upon the enemy as it would be on
the fronts of hostile armies. It was necessary to know accurately the
effective ranges of the Turkish guns and the conditions under which the
entrance to the blockaded port could be approached. It has been stated
that this bombardment was an imprudent act, as it was bound to put the
Turks on their guard and lead them to strengthen their defences at the
Dardanelles. At the Admiralty we did not think it would have this
effect: nor were we wrong. When, three and a half months later (February
19, 1915), Admiral Carden again bombarded these same forts, the
Gallipoli Peninsula was totally unprepared for defence, and was still
weakly occupied; and small parties of Marines were able to make their
way unopposed into the shattered forts and a considerable distance
beyond them. That no harm was done can therefore be plainly proved. On
the other hand, valuable data were obtained.

We had now to provide against the impending Turkish attack upon Egypt.
The First Cruiser Squadron, comprising the _Black Prince_, _Duke of
Edinburgh_ and _Warrior_, had been either employed on escort duties at
sea or on guard at Alexandria or Port Said. Even before the news of
Coronel had reached us, the increasing strain upon our resources had
made it necessary to replace these fine ships by older smaller vessels.
They were now urgently required to form a combat squadron near the Cap
de Verde Islands as part of the second general combination against von
Spee. They were also promised to the Commander-in-Chief for the Grand
Fleet at the earliest possible moment thereafter. We should have been
hard pressed in these circumstances to find a new and satisfactory naval
force for the defence of the Canal against the now imminent Turkish
attack. The discovery and blocking in of the _Königsberg_ on 31st
October liberated two out of the three vessels searching for her. But
this was not enough. The destruction of the _Emden_ on the 9th November
was an event of a very different order. It afforded us immediate relief,
and relief exactly where we required it. The Indian Ocean was now clear.
The battleship _Swiftsure_ from the East Indian station was at once
ordered to the Canal. Of the fast cruisers that had been searching for
the _Emden_, the _Gloucester_, _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, _Hampshire_ and
_Yarmouth_ were immediately brought homewards through the Red Sea into
the Mediterranean. I felt that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies
must come himself to the new scene of danger.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies._

_November 14, 1914._

Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from
India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should rejoin your
flagship _Swiftsure_ at Port Said by the quickest route at once.
_Gloucester_ can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph
what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult
with General Officer Commanding, Egypt, and work hand in hand with him
and with the British authorities.... The following ships will be at
your disposal in the Red Sea: _Swiftsure_, _Minerva_, _Doris_,
_Proserpine_ ... and eight torpedo-boats from Malta. Measures are also
being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use
in the Canal. Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other
duties of your command, namely convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at
the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your
absence in Egyptian waters.

A few days earlier I had minuted:—

_November 18, 1914._

First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

I cannot agree to this. It would be a great waste of a valuable ship.
Considerably more than a week has passed since I minuted that _Askold_
should be ordered to the Mediterranean. There or in Egyptian waters
this Russian ship will have a chance of fighting against Turkey. To
send her off to Hong-Kong is an altogether purposeless errand. Her
stores should go on with the mines or in another vessel which keeps
company with the mines from Vladivostok. No convoy is necessary; but
if it were, the _Clio_ or _Cadmus_, or some little vessel like them,
could be used. The whole Japanese Navy is in the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. They would quite willingly find a convoy for the mines and the
_Askold_ stores. The whole area of the sea, from the coast of Chili to
the coast of Mozambique, has been cleared of the enemy. But for vague
rumours of a possible armed merchantman at large, there is not the
slightest menace. We must profit from this situation to the full while
it lasts, and this can only be done by moving every ship that is of
any use promptly into waters where they are required. No one knows how
many ships we shall want in Egypt when the Turkish invasion begins.
There may also be massacres of Christians in the coast towns of Levant
which will require vessels for immediate action there. All the ships
out of the Indian Ocean that can play an effective part ought to be
hurried home. The cruisers ought to steam at least 18 knots. Nearly
all these ships have lost three or four precious days since the
destruction of the _Emden_ was known.

W. S. C.

These directions were complied with. I searched the oceans for every
available ship. During the second and third weeks of November the
_Swiftsure_ and the squadron and flotilla mentioned above, together with
the French _Requin_ and the Russian _Askold_, entered the Canal for the
defence of Egypt. The Turkish attack proved however to be only of a
tentative character. Finding themselves confronted with troops and
ships, they withdrew after feeble efforts into the Eastern deserts to
gather further strength.

All this time the great Australasian convoy, carrying the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps, ‘A.N.Z.A.C.,’ has been steaming steadily towards
France across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Preparations had been made
if necessary to divert them to Cape Town. But before the convoy reached
Colombo General Botha and General Smuts had suppressed the rebellion in
South Africa. The Australians and New Zealanders therefore continued
their voyage to Europe under the escort of the _Ibuki_ and the
_Hampshire_. By the end of November their transports were entering the
Canal. As the Turkish invasion of Egypt was still threatening, the need
of resolute and trustworthy troops in Egypt was great, and on the first
day of December Lord Kitchener, in the fateful unfolding of events,
began to disembark the whole Australian and New Zealand Force at Suez
for the double purpose of completing their training and defending the
line of the Canal.

* * * * *

At this point we may leave the Turkish situation for a time. The German
grip was strengthening every day on Turkey. The distresses of her
peoples and the improvement of her military organisation were advancing
together. Under the guns of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, doubt, division
and scarcity dwelt in Constantinople. Outside the Straits the British
squadron maintained its silent watch. Greece, perplexed at the attitude
of Britain, distracted by the quarrels of Venizelos and King
Constantine, had fallen far from the high resolve of August. Serbia
stoutly contended with the Austrian armies. Roumania and Bulgaria
brooded on the past and watched each other with intent regard. In Egypt
the training of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps perfected
itself week by week.

Thus, as this act in the stupendous world drama comes to its close, we
see already the scene being set and the actors assembling for the next.
From the uttermost ends of the earth ships and soldiers are approaching
or gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean in fulfilment of a destiny as
yet not understood by mortal man. The clearance of the Germans from the
oceans liberated the Fleets, the arrival of the Anzacs in Egypt created
the nucleus of the Army, needed to attack the heart of the Turkish
Empire. The deadlock on the Western Front, where all was now frozen into
winter trenches, afforded at once a breathing space and large
possibility of further troops. While Australian battalions trampled the
crisp sand of the Egyptian desert in tireless evolutions, and Commander
Holbrook in his valiant submarine dived under the minefields of Chanak
and sank a Turkish transport in the throat of the Dardanelles, far away
in the basins of Portsmouth the dockyard men were toiling night and day
to mount the fifteen-inch guns and turrets of the _Queen Elizabeth_. As
yet all was unconscious, inchoate, purposeless, uncombined. Any one of a
score of chances might have given, might still give, an entirely
different direction to the event. No plan has been made, no resolve
taken. But new ideas are astir, new possibilities are coming into view,
new forces are at hand, and with them there marches towards us a new
peril of the first magnitude. Russia, mighty steam-roller, hope of
suffering France and prostrate Belgium—Russia is failing. Her armies are
grappling with Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and behind their brave battle
fronts already the awful signs of weakness, of deficiency, of
disorganisation, are apparent to anxious Cabinets and Councils. Winter
has come and locked all Russia in its grip. No contact with her Allies,
no help from them, is possible. The ice blocks the White Sea. The
Germans hold the Baltic. The Turks have barred the Dardanelles. It needs
but a cry from Russia for help, to make vital what is now void, and to
make purposeful what is now meaningless. But as yet no cry has come.

* * * * *

I cannot close without taking a more general survey of the naval war.

The reader has now followed through six chapters the steady increase of
strain upon Admiralty resources which marked in every theatre the months
of September, October and November, 1914. He must understand that,
although for the purposes of the narrative it is necessary to deal in
separate chapters with each separate set of strains and crises, many of
the events were proceeding simultaneously in all theatres at once, and
the consequent strains were cumulative and reciprocally reacting on one
another, with the result that during November an extraordinary pitch of
intensity was reached which could not well be prolonged and could not
possibly have been exceeded.

It is worth while to review the whole situation. First, the transport of
troops and supplies to France was unceasing and vital to our Army. On
the top of all this came the operations on the Belgian Coast, the
approach of the enemy to the Channel ports, and the long-drawn crisis of
the great battle of Ypres-Yser. Secondly, all the enemy’s cruisers were
still alive, and a number of hostile armed merchantmen were free in the
outer seas, each threatening an indefinite number of points and areas
and requiring from five to ten times their numbers to search for them
and protect traffic while they were at large. At the same time the great
convoys of troops from India, from Canada, from Australia, and the
collection of the British regular garrisons from all parts of the world
were proceeding; and no less than six separate expeditions, viz., Samoa,
New Guinea, German East Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons and German
South-West Africa, were in progress or at a critical stage. Upon this
was thrust the outbreak of war with Turkey, the attack upon the Suez
Canal, and the operations in the Persian Gulf.

To meet these fierce obligations we had to draw no less than three
decisive units from the Grand Fleet. This Fleet, which at the outset of
the war was in perfect order, was already requiring refits by rotation,
with consequent reduction of available strength. Meanwhile, the
submarine menace had declared itself in a serious form, and was moreover
exaggerated in our minds. Although the most vehement efforts were being
made to give security to our fleets in their Northern harbours, these
measures took many weeks, during which anxiety was continual. Behind all
stood the German Fleet, aware, as we must suppose, of the strain to
which we were being subjected, and potentially ready at any moment to
challenge the supreme decision. With the long nights of winter, the
absence of all regular troops from the country, the then inadequate
training of the Territorial Force and the embryonic condition of the new
Kitchener armies, the fear of invasion revived; and, although we
rejected it in theory, nevertheless we were bound to take in practice a
whole series of precautionary measures. It was a formidable time. More
than once the thought occurred that the Admiralty would be forced to
contract their responsibilities and abandon to their fate for a time
some important interests, in order that those which were vital might be
secured. In the event we just got through. It may be claimed that during
these months we met every single call that was made upon us, guarded
every sea, carried every expedition, brought every convoy safely in,
discharged all our obligations both to the Army in France and to the
Belgians, and all the time maintained such a disposition of our main
forces that we should never have declined battle had the enemy ventured
to offer it.

Then suddenly all over the world the tension was relaxed. One after
another the German cruisers and commerce destroyers were blocked in or
hunted down. The great convoys arrived. The Expeditions were safely
landed. Ocean after ocean became clear. The boom defences of our
harbours were completed. A score of measures for coping with the
submarine were set on foot. Large reinforcements of new ships of the
highest quality and of every class began to join the Fleet. The attack
on the Suez Canal was stemmed. The rebellion in South Africa was
quelled. The dangers of invasion, if such there were, diminished every
day with the increasing efficiency of the Territorials and the New
Armies. The great battle for the Channel ports ended in decisive and
ever glorious victory. And finally with the Battle of the Falkland
Islands the clearance of the oceans was complete, and soon, except in
the land-locked Baltic and Black Seas and in the defended area of the
Heligoland Bight, the German flag had ceased to fly on any vessel in any
quarter of the world.[102]

As December passed, a sense of indescribable relief stole over the
Admiralty. We had made the great transition from peace to war without
disaster, almost without mishap. All the perils which had haunted us
before the war, and against which we had prepared, had been warded off
or surmounted or had never come to pass. There had been no surprise. The
Fleet was ready. The Army had reached the decisive battlefield in time
and was satisfactorily maintained. The Mine danger had been overcome. We
thought we had the measure of the submarine, and so indeed we had for
nearly two years to come. All the enemy’s plans for commerce destruction
and all our alarms about them had come to nought. British and allied
commerce proceeded without hesitation throughout the world; the trade
and food of Britain were secured; the war insurance dropped to one per
cent. A feeling of profound thankfulness filled our hearts as this first
Christmas of the war approached; and of absolute confidence in final
victory.

The mighty enemy, with all the advantages of preparation and design, had
delivered his onslaught and had everywhere been brought to a standstill.
It was our turn now. The initiative had passed to the Great Amphibian.
The time and the means were at our command. It was for us to say where
we would strike and when. The strength of the Grand Fleet was, as we
believed, ample; and in addition the whole of those numerous squadrons
which hitherto had been spread over the outer seas now formed a surplus
fleet capable of intervening in the supreme struggle without in any way
compromising the foundation of our naval power.

But these realisations were only permissible as the prelude to fresh and
still more intense exertions. It would indeed be shameful, so it seemed
at least to me, for the Admiralty to rest contented with the
accomplishment of the first and most hazardous stage of its task and to
relax into a supine contemplation of regained securities and dangers
overcome. Now was the time to make our weight tell, perhaps decisively,
but certainly most heavily, in the struggle of the armies. Now was the
time to fasten an offensive upon the Germans, unexpected and
unforeseeable, to present them with a succession of surprising
situations leading on from crisis to crisis and from blow to blow till
their downfall was achieved.

Moreover, these same Germans were, of all the enemies in the world, the
most to be dreaded when pursuing their own plans; the most easily
disconcerted when forced to conform to the plans of their antagonist. To
leave a German leisure to evolve his vast, patient, accurate designs, to
make his slow, thorough, infinitely far-seeing preparations, was to
court a terrible danger. To throw him out of his stride, to baffle his
studious mind, to break his self-confidence, to cow his spirit, to
rupture his schemes by unexpected action, was surely the path not only
of glory but of prudence.

* * * * *

Here then ends the first phase of the naval war, and with it this
volume. The first part of the British task is done both by land and sea.
Paris and the Channel Ports are saved, and the oceans are cleared. It is
certain that the whole strength of the British Empire can be turned into
war power and brought to bear upon the enemy. There is no chance of
France being struck down, before the British Empire is ready; there is
no chance of the British Empire itself being paralysed, before its full
force can be applied to the struggle. The supreme initiative passes from
the Teutonic Powers to the Allies. Resources, almost measureless and of
indescribable variety in ships, in men, in munitions and devices of war,
will now flow month by month steadily into our hands. What shall we do
with them? Strategic alternatives on the greatest scale and of the
highest order present themselves to our choice. Which shall we choose?
Shall we use our reinforced fleets and great new armies of 1915, either
to turn the Teutonic right in the Baltic or their left in the Black Sea
and the Balkans? Or shall we hurl our manhood against sandbags, wire and
concrete in frontal attack upon the German fortified lines in France?
Shall we by a supreme effort make direct contact with our Russian ally
or leave her in a dangerous isolation? Shall we by decisive action, in
hopes of shortening the conflict, marshal and draw in the small nations
in the North and in the South who now stand outside it? Or shall we plod
steadily forward at what lies immediately in our front? Shall our armies
toil only in the mud of Flanders, or shall we break new ground? Shall
our fleets remain contented with the grand and solid results they have
won, or shall they ward off future perils by a new inexhaustible
audacity?

The answers to these momentous questions will appear as this tale is
carried forward to a further stage.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

APPENDIX A
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON NAVAL STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

(A.)—_Military Education and War Staff Training._

1. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required
to secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers
and the definite processes by which Staff Officers are to be trained.
The first may be called ‘Military Education,’ and the second ‘War Staff
Training.’ They require to be treated separately, and not mixed together
as in the report of the Committee. Both must again be distinguished from
all questions of administration, of material, and of non-military
education and training. The _application_ of fighting power can thus be
separated from its _development_. We are not now concerned with the
forging of the weapon, but only with its use.

_Military Education._

2. As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer
must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His
interest must be awakened. He must be put in touch with the right books,
and must be made to feel the importance of the military aspect of his
profession. The existing curriculum at Dartmouth and on the cruiser is
already too full. And until the officer has reached the rank of
Lieutenant I see no immediate opportunity of adding to his instruction.
But thereafter his ‘Military Education’ should be provided for in two
ways. First: Every Lieutenant should go through a military course of
(say) two months during the first four years of his service. The course
to be prepared by the Training Division of the War Staff; aim,
thoroughness in a simple and strictly limited sphere. The course to
conclude by a standard examination to test only what the pupil remembers
of his instruction. It would be preferable to hold the courses at
Greenwich continuously. Thus a good scheme of instruction adapted to the
class of officers and the limits of time will develop and uniformity
will be established; and young officers will be accustomed to associate
Greenwich with the study of war.

All specialist officers, submarine and air service officers included,
must go through this course.

In exceptional circumstances, where exigencies of service do not allow,
extension to within the first six years may be granted.

The course will be obligatory on officers now under two years’ service
as Lieutenant. There should be four courses a year; the first to begin
October, 1914. It should be voluntary for officers now over two years’
service as Lieutenant.

(Let me have calculations about numbers which can be handled during the
first five courses; and make proposals for giving effect to the above
scheme in detail.)

No grading as Assistant War Staff Officers will result from this course,
and no certificate will be given or letters printed after an officer’s
name. It is a pure matter of routine, and a necessary qualification of
all future naval officers. The college authorities will, however, keep a
register of officers, and report upon their general aptitudes for staff
work and tactical subjects. This will be of use later in considering
claims to compete for entry into the War College.

Secondly, as soon as practicable (if possible, next time) an examination
should be held for entry into the War College for the War Staff Course.
This examination should be competitive. It will be open to all
Commanders and Lieutenant-Commanders, or Lieutenants who will be
Lieutenant-Commanders before the course is completed, whose names are
submitted by the Flag officers under whom they are serving and who are
approved as candidates by the Admiralty. A proportion of vacancies will
be assigned to each rank. The results will be published. The object of
this examination will be to test ability for staff work. In the first
instance the tests will have to be of a simple character, but gradually,
as the military education of the naval officer develops, they can be
stiffened and extended. The examination will be conducted by the War
College according to principles prescribed by the War Training Division.
Intending candidates will be notified three months in advance of the
subjects in which they should prepare themselves.

When an officer is successful in the competition, but owing to foreign
service or other exigency cannot at once attend the War Course, he may
be allowed to take a vacancy next time.

Captains of ships and War Staff Officers afloat will aid officers to
prepare themselves for this examination.

_War Staff Training._

3. The successful candidates will enter the War College at Greenwich as
residents for War Staff training. This course must for the present be
limited to one year, but later it should be extended to eighteen months.
As an examination will be held every six months, there will at the
beginning be two batches under instruction, rising later to three. This
will give the necessary numbers at the College. The period of this
course, provided the officer gives satisfaction, should, in my opinion,
count as sea service.

On completing the course, the officers who have qualified may be placed
upon the War Staff List, with the approval of the Admiralty, as at
present, and will then be available for staff employment.

(B.)—_Development of the Admiralty War Staff._

1. Two years have passed since this body was instituted, and both the
progress made in the Admiralty and the acceptance of the idea by the
Fleet justify a further advance.

Three main questions have arisen:—

(1.) The creation of a Trade Division.

(2.) The preparation of Manuals and direction of training generally.

(3.) The detachment of the Mobilisation Department from the War Staff.

I have come to the conclusion that the first essential is the creation
of a War Training Division, under a Director, and equal in importance to
the Operation and Intelligence Divisions. This division will be charged
with the theoretical direction and co-ordination of all tactical and
strategical exercises and instruction whether in the Fleets or at the
Colleges. It will, of course, have nothing to do with the education
which fits a cadet to become a naval officer, or with the training of
Specialists of any kind, or with the training which fits a boy to become
an able seaman. All this is in the Administrative sphere and belongs to
the Second Sea Lord. The War Training Division is concerned only with
what the naval officer learns about war, what tactical use the gunnery
and torpedo experts make of their weapons, and what exercises are
prescribed for the Fleets and Squadrons.

2. Nothing in the work of this division will relieve Flag Officers from
their present duties and responsibilities in the training of their
commands. But henceforward they will work on regularly explored and
considered lines, and within limits which are the result of collective
thought and experience; and henceforward continuity and uniformity will
be preserved by a central direction and co-ordination, which gathers up
and authorises the established conclusions, without restricting
reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the advocates of such a
Division, to say that war training is given by the Commanders-in-Chief
at sea, and that war training is in the department of the First Sea
Lord. The Commanders-in-Chief change repeatedly, and with them their
personal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace behind.
The First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical and
strategic instruction. This work can only be done by a regular
department permanently at work.

3. I propose, therefore, in principle to constitute without delay a War
Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff. This division will be
organised under a Director (D.T.D., short for D.N.T.D.) in three
sections, denominated respectively X, Y, and Z.

The following will be the main distribution of duties:—

(X). _Manuals and Exercises._

Preparation and revision of all Training Books and Manuals (other than
technical or administrative) including Signal Books in their tactical
aspect.

Preparation of manœuvre schemes.

Report and criticism of manœuvres.

Record and criticism of tactical and strategic exercises.

Advice upon the initiation of experiments (other than technical or
administrative), upon the organisation of units, upon War
Establishments, and upon the tactical aspects of New Construction.

Distribution of War Staff publications.

(Y). _War Colleges: Examinations and Courses._

Supervision of War Colleges and all war educational arrangements.

Examinations and courses in tactical and strategic subjects.

Libraries.

(Z). _Historical._

The staff of this new division will be formed in part by reductions from
the Mobilisation and Operations Divisions (some of which latter’s work
is taken over); and in part by an addition to the Estimates for which
Treasury sanction will be required. As a set-off against this there is
the economy of reducing an Admiral by bringing the War College to
Greenwich.

Nine or ten officers (some of whom can be retired officers) should
suffice with the necessary clerks and writers.

Let me have proposals on these lines with estimates.

4. _The Operations Division_ will have been to some extent relieved by
the formation of the War Training Division. It must, however, be
augmented by the addition of a new section (the Manning Department)
dealing with War Mobilisation, which will be explained later; and,
secondly, by the new Trade Defence Section. This latter is clearly only
a part of the Operations sphere. It is grouped with Operations because
the defence of trade is essentially an offensive operation against the
enemy’s armed ships.

The Operations Division will, therefore, be organised in four
sections—(_a_), (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_)—as follows:—

(_a_) _War Plans._
Distribution of the Fleet.
Schemes of attack of all kinds.
Joint naval and military action.
C.I.D. work.
War Room.

(_b_) _Coast Defence._
Plans for the employment of
Patrol Flotillas.
Air Craft at the Naval Stations.
Coastal submarines.
Organisation of Signal and Wireless Stations.
Examination Service.
Distribution of Intelligence along the coast.
Joint naval and military action in coast defence.
Home Ports Defence Committee.
Overseas Defence Committee.

(_c_) _Trade Defence._
All arrangements for the direction of trade in time of war.
All naval questions connected with food supply.
Armed merchantmen.
Distribution of warships for the control of the trade routes.
International law.
All relations with the Mercantile Marine.

(_d_) _War Mobilisation._
Supervision of the arrangements of the Manning Department for the
mobilisation of the Fleet.
Advice upon the complements of ships.

Attention is drawn to the minute of the Secretary on the proposed issue
of charts and returns to the Trade Division. This necessity is not
proved. The staff of the new section must be reconsidered accordingly.

5. _The Intelligence Division_ requires little change, but should, in
principle, be divided into three sections, as follows:—

(_l_) Potentially hostile countries.
(_m_) Friendly countries.
(_n_) Neutral countries.

Section (_l_) is to be charged with the new duty of preparing war plans
for the hostile countries separately or in combination against us alone
or allied, showing both—

(1.) What they will probably do against us.

(2.) What would be the worst they could do against us. From time to time
war games will be played between the Intelligence and Operations
Divisions.

Section (_m_) will likewise report on the needs and dangers of the
friendly countries and study the measures best adapted to strengthen
them in peace and war.

These new duties open to the Intelligence Division a large creative and
imaginative sphere, and offer opportunities for the highest tactical and
strategic ability.

6. _The Mobilisation Division_ is not well named. Mobilisation is a
small and infrequent part of the duties of this division. Mobilisation
is, indeed, a comparatively unimportant feature in our naval system, all
the more powerful vessels being constantly in full commission, and the
Second Fleet requiring only to be ‘completed.’ The day-to-day provision
of complements for ships commissioning, and the intricate arrangements
connected therewith, constitute the staple of the work of this
Department.

Further, its duties are almost entirely administrative, and
administration is foreign to the sphere of the War Staff.

I therefore propose that the Mobilisation Division shall be separated
from the War Staff, and shall be called the ‘_Manning Department_.’

A section of the Manning Department will, however, be formed to deal
with War Mobilisation, and this section will work under the D.M.D., but
in close association with the new Training Division of the War Staff.

Thus the whole administrative work connected with the manning of the
Fleet will be left intact under the Second Sea Lord, while, at the same
time, the War Staff will have included in its circle everything
necessary to its reflective and organising duties. I await definite
proposals to give effect to this.

7. It is important that every officer serving in the War Staff should
look for recommendation for advancement from the C.O.S. I propose,
therefore, that C.O.S. should be allotted a proportion of
recommendations as if he were a Flag Officer in independent command, and
should make them to my Naval Secretary in the usual way for the
half-yearly promotions. C.O.S. will also initiate all recommendations
for War Staff appointments and appointments to the Naval War College,
and all lists of officers for war courses of all kinds will be proposed
by him and submitted through the First Sea Lord to me.

The record books in the Private Office will be sufficient for general
purposes, but a _Staff Register_ should be formed for recording the War
Staff capacities and services of officers whether at the Admiralty, the
Colleges, or afloat, and a copy of this register will be kept written up
to date in the Private Office.

It may be found necessary to add an officer to the personal staff of
C.O.S.

8. I attach a skeleton chart of the new organisation.

9. I add the following general observations. The divisions of the War
Staff though separate are parts of one united organisation. Each
discharges its own functions in association with the others. They are
not to do each other’s work. The Operations Division is not, for
instance, to collect its own data. It is to accept them from the
Intelligence Division. The Training Division is to accept the
conclusions of the Operations Division and propose the Fleet for their
execution. But there must also be unity and free intercourse between the
three Directors. In order to promote and ensure this, C.O.S. will be
enjoined to hold every month a formal Staff meeting with his three
Directors and any of their subordinates who may be required for the
discussion of Staff questions, and the agenda and minutes of these
meetings will be submitted through the First Sea Lord to the First Lord.

(C.)—_The Operations Staff Afloat._

I agree with the proposals of the Second Sea Lord as concurred in and
amended by the First Sea Lord. This organisation observes the principle
of a clear division between the thinking and administrative branches.

The Captain for administration should bear the title of Flag Captain.
The Captain of the ship should simply be styled ‘The Captain.’

The extra officers for the Intelligence and Operations ‘Groups’
(Divisions is too large a word and already taken) can be found from the
War Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff which will cease to
exist on mobilisation. They should go afloat whenever large manœuvres
are in progress, and should be appropriated by name to their posts in
war. The Commander-in-Chief should have no one on his staff in war that
he does not know and has not worked with.

It is desirable that the Commander-in-Chief’s staff when formed should
work out strategic and tactical exercises together at the War College,
Portsmouth, or if possible at Greenwich, at least once a year, apart
from actual manœuvres afloat, in order that each may know his exact
function.

The approved form of the Fleet Flagship Staff is as follows:—

Secretary and clerks.-------C.-in-C.--------Captain of the Flagship.
|
Captain of the Fleet.
(C.O.F.)
|
+--+-----------------+
| |
| Flag Captain for Administration.
| |
| +-----------+------------+
| | | |
| Engineer Fuelling Victualling
| Assistant. Assistant. Assistant
| (Paymaster
| of Flagship).
+------------------+---+-------------------------+
| | |
Operations Intelligence Communications
Group. Group. Group.
[103]2 Staff Officers. [103]1 Staff Officer. [103]2 Staff Officers.
[104]3 Staff Officers. [104]2 Staff Officers. [104]4 Staff Officers.

I approve also the Second Sea Lord’s proposals for the staffs of
Squadron Flagships.

SKELETON CHART OF ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF ORGANISATION.

New additions in heavy type.

W. S. C.

_May 1, 1914._

APPENDIX B

BRITISH DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
BATTLESHIPS
───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────
Consec-│ Ship. │Launch-│Displace-│ Speed │Armour│ Armament │Weight
utive │ │ ed. │ ment. │(design-│ belt │(excluding│ of
No. │ │ │ │ ed). │(max.)│guns below│broad-
│ │ │ │ │ │ 12 prs.) │side,
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ pri-
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ mary
│ │ │ │ │ │ │guns.
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
│ │ │ tons. │ knots. │ in. │ │ lb.
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
1│Lord Nelson │ 1906 │ 16,500 │ 18·5 │ 12│4–12 in., │ 5,300
│ │ │ │ │ │ 10–9·2 │
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 24–12│
│ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │
2│Agamemnon │ 1906 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
3│Dreadnought │ 1906 │ 17,900 │ 20·9 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │24–12 prs.│
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
4│Superb │ 1907 │ 18,600 │ 20·75 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
5│Temeraire │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │
6│Bellerophon │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
7│St. Vincent │ 1908 │ 19,250 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │ 20–4 in. │
8│Vanguard │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │
9│Collingwood │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
10│Neptune │ 1909 │ 19,900 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 8,500
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
11│Colossus │ 1910 │ 20,000 │ 21·0 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 8,500
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
12│Hercules │ 1910 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
13│Orion │ 1910 │ 22,500 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 2,500
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
14│Thunderer │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │
15│Monarch │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │
16│Conqueror │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
17│King George V│ 1911 │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
18│Centurion │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │
19│Ajax │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │
20│Audacious │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
21│Iron Duke │ 1912 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
22│Marlborough │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │
───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────
BUILDING
───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────
23│Benbow │ 1913 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
24│Emperor of │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │
│ India │ │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
25│Queen │ 1913 │ 27,500 │ 25 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360
│ Elizabeth │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │
26│Warspite │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │
27│Valiant │ │ │ │ │ │
28│Barham │ │ │ │ │ │
29│Malaya │ │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
30│Resolution │ │ 25,750 │ 21 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360
│ │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 4–3 in. │
31│Ramillies │ │ │ │ │ │
32│Revenge │ │ │ │ │ │
33│Royal │ │ │ │ │ │
│ Sovereign │ │ │ │ │ │
34│Royal Oak │ │ │ │ │ │
───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────
SHIPS BUILDING IN GREAT BRITAIN FOR FOREIGN POWERS AND REQUISITIONED FOR
THE ROYAL NAVY
───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────
35│Agincourt │ │ 27,500 │ 22 │ 9│14–12 in.,│12,900
│ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │
│ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │
36│Erin │ │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │14,800
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–6 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 8–3 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │
│ │ │ │ │ │in. A.A.C.│
37│Canada │ │ 28,000 │ 23 │ 9│10–14 in.,│16,560
│ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │
│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │
│ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │
───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────
BATTLE CRUISERS
───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────
1│Invincible │ 1907 │ 17,250 │ 26 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
2│Inflexible │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │
3│Indomitable │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
4│Indefatigable│ 1909 │ 18,750 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
5│Lion │ 1910 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │10,000
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
6│Australia │ 1911 │ 18,800 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800
│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │
7│New Zealand │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────
8│Princess │ 1911 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200
│ Royal │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
9│Queen Mary │ 1912 │ 27,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────
BUILDING
───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────
10│Tiger │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200
│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │
───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

GERMAN DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

BRITISH. │ GERMAN.
_Grand Fleet._ │ _High Seas Fleet._
Iron Duke (10–3·5 inch), Fleet │Friedrich der Grosse (10–12 inch),
Flagship. │ Fleet Flagship.
│
_1st Battle Squadron._ │ _1st Battle Squadron._
1 Iron Duke (10–13·5 inch). │
2 Colossus │10–12 inch. │4 Heligolands (12–12 inch).
1 Neptune │ │4 Nassaus (12–11 inch).
3 St. Vincents │ │
1 Bellerophon │ │
│
_2nd Battle Squadron._ │ _2nd Battle Squadron._
4 King George V │10–13·5 inch.│10 Preussens (4–11 inch).
4 Orions │ │
│
_3rd Battle Squadron._ │ _3rd Battle Squadron._
8 King Edward VII (4–12 inch; 4–9·2│4 Kaisers (10–12 inch).
inch). │
│
_4th Battle Squadron._ │
1 Dreadnought │10–12 inch. │
2 Bellerophons │ │
1 Agincourt (14–12 inch). │
(One Light Cruiser attached to each│
Battle Squadron). │
│
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruiser Squadron._
3 Lions (8–13·5 inch). │ _Battle Cruisers._
1 New Zealand (8–12 inch). │2 Moltke (10–11 inch).
│1 von der Tann (8–11 inch).
_2nd Cruiser Squadron._ │1 Derfflinger (8–12 inch).
1 Shannon (4–9·2 inch; 10–7·5 │1 Blücher (12–8·2 inch).
inch). │
3 Achilles (6–9·2 inch; 4–7·5 │
inch). │
│
_3rd Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Light Cruisers._
4 Antrims (4–7·5 inch; 6–6 inch). │1 Rostock │12–4·1 inch.
│2 Strassburgs │
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron._ │3 Mainz. │
3 Birminghams (9–6 inch). │
1 Southampton │8–6 inch. │
1 Falmouth │ │
1 Bristol (2–6 inch; 10–4 inch). │
│
_Destroyer Flotillas._ │ _Destroyer Flotillas._
2 Flotillas, each of 20 vessels, │
with Light Cruiser Active and │7 Flotillas, each of 11 vessels.
Flotilla Leader Swift. │
│
_Harwich Force._ │
1 Amethyst (12–4 inch). │
2 Amphions (10–4 inch). │
35 Destroyers. │
│
_Channel Fleet._ │ _Other Vessels in Home Waters._
│
_5th Battle Squadron._ │ _Battleships._
8 Formidables (4–12 inch). │5 Wittelsbachs.
│5 Kaiser Class (old) (5–9·4 inch).
_6th Battle Squadron._ │2 Brandenburgs (6–11 inch).
2 Lord Nelsons (4–12 inch; 10–9·2 │
inch). │
5 Duncans │4–12 inch. │
1 Glory │ │
│
_7th Battle Squadron._ │
4 Majestics (4–12 inch). │
│
_8th Battle Squadron._ │
1 Majestic (4–12 inch). │
5 Glory. │
4 Light Cruisers were attached to │
the Battle Squadrons. │
│
_7th Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruisers._
5 Cressys (2–9·2 inch; 12–6 inch). │2 Roons (4–8·2 inch; 10–5·9 inch).
│2 Prinz Adalbert (4–8·2 inch;
│ 10–5·9 inch).
_12th Cruiser Squadron._ │
3 Talbots (11–6 inch). │1 Prinz Heinrich (2–9·4 inch;
│ 10–5·9 inch).
1 Charybdis (2–6 inch; 8–4·7 inch) │
(patrolling west end of Channel).│
│
_Dover Patrol._ │ _Light Cruisers._
2 Light Cruisers. │12 Vessels, with armaments of 10 or
│ 12–4·1 inch guns.
22 Destroyers. │
│
_11th Cruiser Squadron._ │
5 Talbots (11–6 inch) (on the coast│
of Ireland). │
│
_10th Cruiser Squadron._ │
8 Crescents (Northern Patrol). │
│
_Patrol Flotillas on East Coast._ │ _Destroyers._
3 Light Cruisers. │67 available for coast patrol,
│ service in Baltic, etc.
48 Destroyers. │
24 Torpedo Boats. │
│
_Submarines._ │ _Submarines._
65, organised in 8 Flotillas, 7 │
Flotillas for Coast Defence, 1 │27 serviceable.
for Overseas operations. │

APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE
OUTBREAK OF WAR

_Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914_

1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority
of the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt
down and bring to battle in war, every enemy’s warship which attempts to
keep the seas. A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy’s warships
wherever stationed, will give immediately far greater protection to
British traders than large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about
in an attitude of weak and defensive expectancy. This should be enjoined
as the first duty of all British warships. Enemy’s cruisers cannot live
in the oceans for any length of time. They cannot coal at sea with any
certainty. They cannot make many prizes without much steaming; and in
these days of W. T. their whereabouts will be constantly reported. If
British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot do much
harm before they are brought to action. Very few German Town Class
cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are
detached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to
detach a larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have
been hitherto opposing them there. They cannot afford to send away many
without crippling their battle fleet.

2. As for enemy’s armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into
cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an
equal number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes
armed and commissioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this
threat is very shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on
board is extremely doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been
forthcoming during the last year and a half in spite of every effort to
procure it. How are they to be converted on the high seas? Where are
they to get rid of their passengers? Are they to take hundreds of
non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval Power may well treat
as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To say that we have
to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger appears
extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a
similar number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make
arrangements to commission these for their own defence and that of other
British ships in their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of
these vessels plying always in considerable numbers along the regular
trade routes will from the very outset of the war, and however suddenly
it may begin, provide a constant and immediate counter to enemy armed
merchantmen, and probably deter them from any injurious action.

3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is
the large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense
number of harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean
routes. This makes any serious interruption by enemy’s commerce
destroyers impossible. We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided
that we can induce all these ships to put to sea and carry on their
business boldly, and provided that they are warned in time and
encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel wide of them,
very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.

4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean
spaces. To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds
of cruisers. The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognise
that we cannot specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect
confluences. The only safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy
has not discovered and those upon which he has been exterminated. There
are areas where the trade necessarily converges and narrow channels
through which it must pass; and these defiles or terminals of the trade
routes should be made too dangerous for enemy’s commerce destroyers to
approach, by employing our older cruisers in adequate force so as to
create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for our trading
ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband our
resources, and not with a view to finding employment for as many old
cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy’s armed
merchantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach
the area where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old
cruisers steam 19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam
more is not large. As for the enemy’s warships and his few exceptionally
fast vessels, they must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels
which are concerned with nothing else but to bring them to action.

5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant
feature in our operations, and British cruisers should not engage in
them to the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on
Germany by the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her
trade, both export and import, as a whole. If this is effectively done
it is of very little consequence to us whether individual German vessels
are captured as prizes, or whether they take refuge in neutral harbours
till the end of the war. It is reasonable to suppose that German
merchant ships, other than those armed and commissioned for warlike
purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks out, and
that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home running
the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.

6. Protection will be afforded to British seaborne trade in time of war
by the following measures:—

A. Hunting down of enemy’s warships and armed vessels.

Every German cruiser stationed abroad should be covered in peace and
brought to action in war by a superior vessel of superior speed, or
alternatively by two equal vessels having speed advantage.

B. Organised warning of British merchant vessels.

All British armed merchantmen plying on the routes will, on receiving
the warning telegram by wireless, open their secret instructions which
direct them to steam along their regular route warning all unarmed
British vessels met with to leave the trade route, and steam without
lights at night, keeping well away from their usual course, avoiding
company, and making their own way to their port of destination.

7. Similar warnings and directions adapted to each case and each route
will be issued by British Consuls at all ports. These should be prepared
beforehand in the fullest detail and according to a general scheme. For
instance, the British Consul at Buenos Ayres should have separate
instructions all ready prepared for every British ship leaving the port
for the United Kingdom. These instructions will be regularly kept up to
date by the Trade Division of the Admiralty War Staff. They will
prescribe for each ship the general course she is to follow, the
portions of the voyage she should endeavour to cover in darkness, and
the areas within which she will find safety. A good wireless
organisation can, of course, deal at once with all vessels so fitted.
Thus the unarmed trade will, in the first week of the war, be
effectively scattered over immense areas of ocean.

The control and guidance of merchant traffic must, of course, vary with
circumstances. There are two quite different situations to consider. The
first is that which occurs at the moment of a sudden outbreak of war. We
must assume that hostilities begin by surprise, and that the enemy’s
commerce destroyers, whether warships or armed merchantmen, will begin
their attacks within a very few hours of the first warning being given.
None of our Third Fleet cruisers will be on their stations. The only
vessels available will be the ordinary foreign squadrons and the fast
cruisers shadowing individual German warships, and these will probably
not be in positions which have any special relation to the trade routes.
None of the British converted auxiliary merchant cruisers will be on the
routes: the only thing that will be there and that can be there are the
defensive armed merchantmen. In these circumstances it seems probable
that the best course would be to scatter the trade; and it is in any
case essential that we should have the power to do so, and that all
arrangements should be made to that end.

8. When, however, the war has been in progress for some time, and in
proportion as our available force increases and we pass from a peace to
a war organisation, it may well be that the scattering of the trade will
no longer be necessary or even desirable, except perhaps locally between
special points. Trading vessels would then be told to return to their
regular trade routes; and this might easily lead to drawing such
commerce destroyers as then remain into areas where they could be
reported, located, and destroyed, by the British cruisers.

9. The organisation for the control and guidance of the trade should
therefore be of so complete a character that the trade may be either
dispersed about the ocean or concentrated along particular routes; or in
some places dispersed and in other concentrated; and that changes from
one policy to the other can be made when necessary at any time.

10. The British armed merchantman will only be employed on a strictly
limited service, namely, that of carrying food supplies to the United
Kingdom. They will be forbidden to engage enemy’s warships and are to
surrender if overtaken by them. They will not molest or pursue unarmed
ships of the enemy. They will only fire on enemy’s armed merchantmen if
they are themselves attacked or pursued by them.

The result of these arrangements will be that the enemy’s armed
merchantmen will either have to scatter in haphazard search for prizes,
or run into a succession of armed British vessels plying the usual
route, finding prizes few and far between on the first course, and
nothing but kicks on the other.

11. C. As soon as possible after the outbreak of war a sufficient number
of British merchant ships or liners of high speed, selected and prepared
beforehand, will be converted into auxiliary cruisers and commissioned
for the further policing of the trade routes, and incidentally or if
desired to prey on enemy’s commerce. These vessels will be taken over on
the same or similar basis as the Cunarders. They will differ from the
armed merchantmen in ‘B,’ in that their duties will not be limited to
self-defence and warning; they will be directly employed in hunting down
enemy’s armed merchantmen; they may be used offensively against enemy’s
trade; they will not carry on their ordinary business; they will be
wholly taken over by and maintained by the Admiralty; they will be
officered and manned by the Royal Navy, will fly the White Ensign, and
execute the orders of the Admiralty.

12. D. While we have a large supply of older cruisers, they may be
employed in protecting the approaches to the principal trade terminals,
and at certain special points. These cruisers will be additional to any
fast modern British vessels employed on the general service of hunting
down individual German cruisers. They will neglect no opportunity of
engaging enemy’s warships or armed merchantmen. They may be at any time
withdrawn from their areas by the Admiralty for such a purpose. Only the
older ships will be employed on this service; and as they wear out,
control will be maintained by a smaller number of new, fast vessels
employed on the general and primary service of hunting down the enemy’s
warships.

13. E. The last but indispensable condition of maintaining British food
supplies and British trade in time of war, is that British traders
should send their ships to sea, and from the very beginning of the war
press forward boldly on their regular business. The question of
encouraging them to do this by means of a system of State Insurance
under certain restrictions to guard against fraud, is now being
considered by a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. We have expressed on behalf
of the Board of Admiralty the strongest opinion in favour of the
adoption of such a system, it being essential to all our arrangements
that very large numbers of British vessels, undeterred by a small
proportion of captures, should continue to traverse the seas under the
British flag.

In exceptional cases convoys will, if necessary, be organised under
escort of Third Fleet vessels. It is hoped, however, that this cumbrous
and inconvenient measure will not be required.

W. S. C.

_April, 1914._

APPENDIX D
MINING

In order to combat the many unwise proposals which were pressed upon me
at this time to squander our small stock of mines, I drew up the
following paper with which I endeavoured to repel the demands from the
Cabinet, the Admiralty and the Fleet. I am aware that these views will
be disputed, and I shall no doubt be told that the experience of the
later stages of the war has disproved them. I still believe, however,
that they were sound and truly applicable to the circumstances of 1914.
But I go further and declare that the reasoning held good all through
1915, and 1916. If I am reminded that as part of the life and death
struggle against the German submarines in 1917, we were led into a
mining policy on a scale so gigantic as dwarfed every previous scheme,
and if as the result of this huge diversion of our resources a certain
number of German submarines were destroyed, still I assert that these
conditions would never have arisen if a proper offensive had been
developed by the Royal Navy, as would have been possible at far less
cost. All being said, I take my stand as I wrote to Fisher on the
_dictum_ ‘Mine in Haste and Sweep at Leisure.’

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD

Mining is mainly of two kinds, ambush mining and blockade mining.

_Ambush Mining._

Ambush mining depends on the whereabouts of the field remaining unknown.
These mines may be scattered about in patches, or short lines in the
neighbourhood of the enemy’s ports or of the approaches to your own
ports or landing places on the chance of enemy ships running into them.
This chance is not great. The seas are very large; the area mined, even
if on a great scale, very small. The chances of preserving secrecy long
are not great, and most ambush minefields are soon discovered by
merchant ships, or other craft of no military value, being blown up by
them. On the other hand, every patch of mines soon hampers the movement
of the stronger fleet. The position of the minefields cannot be
accurately known. There is very often a tendency for them to drag with
their anchors in tide and sea. Also ships cannot always be sure of their
positions, and very often when out of sight of land, in weather unsuited
to taking observations of the sun, 15, 20, or 30 miles’ error in
position may easily arise. The fact that you know generally where your
own mines are and when you are getting near their area, but do not
exactly know where they are, or exactly where you are, tends to paralyse
your own movements, and might easily prevent effective action against or
the interception of the enemy’s fleet should it put to sea. The
conclusion to be drawn is that ambush mines should be very sparingly
used, chiefly in sight of land, and that not very much is to be expected
from them. The general failure, so far as our present experience goes,
of the German policy of ambush mining with which they opened the war
illustrates the truth of these conclusions. The only British warship,
apart from the gunboat _Speedy_ (which was actually engaged in fishing
up mines), lost by this agency has been the _Amphion_, and she was
drifted out of her course on to the very minefield whose position she
knew and which she was endeavouring to avoid.

This is not by any means to decry the use of ambush mines as an
immediate part of a concerted tactical combination. It is for this
purpose mainly that the British Fleet mine-layers are organised. To lay
mines in the course of an enemy before or during a battle, or across his
homeward path if he has put to sea, may be operations of the greatest
consequence and value, and it would be most unwise to deplete them of
their not too extensive store of mines, which should be reserved for
this purpose, and not squandered on promiscuous and haphazard uses.

One more class of ambush mines deserves to be noted. A few scattered
about on trade routes and off enemy or neutral ports, if well advertised
and enforced by a few ships actually blown up, may exercise a very
effective deterrent on neutral commerce which may be of use to the
enemy.

_Blockade Mining._

It is not possible to blockade a modern fleet by mining, even on a very
large scale, unless superior force is maintained in the neighbourhood of
the minefield to prevent or oppose the mines being removed. In the days
when Admiral Togo mined the debouches from Port Arthur the submarine did
not exist, and it was possible to maintain a close and constant watch on
the minefields, so that even if he was unable to stop the enemy removing
the mines he knew when they were doing so, and this perhaps gave some
clue to their future intentions. Even so, the Russian Fleet put to sea
whenever they wanted to. It would not be possible to keep such a watch
now without exposing the vessels so engaged to almost certain
destruction from the enemy’s submarines. Further, blockade mining is
more effective the closer in it is to the enemy’s ports, and therefore
the watching vessels would be continually exposed not only to the
attacks of the submarines, but to a greatly superior force of enemy
destroyers and light cruisers. In order to maintain them against this,
appropriate supports would have to be kept close at hand in proper
tactical relation and brought up as the need arose, with the result that
more and more ships of greater value would be drawn into the most
dangerous area of the enemy’s submarine activities, and considerable
operations would develop in waters less suited to us and most favourable
to the enemy.

But if the minefield is not watched, the enemy has no difficulty in
proceeding to sea at any time he chooses. He will soon learn the
existence of the minefield, because one or two small craft will be blown
up on it. In the British Fleet the regular mine-sweepers can sweep a
clear channel ahead of the Fleet at a rate of 12 knots an hour through
any minefield. The Germans have not used, as we have, old gunboats
converted as mine-sweepers, but have built a special class of good, fast
vessels. It must therefore be assumed that they could sweep a channel at
least as quickly as, and probably quicker than, we could. They could
therefore proceed to sea at any time if they wished to do so, and with
scarcely any delay. Also, if they did not wish immediately to proceed to
sea, they could sweep a channel through the minefield of which they
would know the existence, and which, being in close contact with land
where actual bearings could be obtained, they could follow exactly, and
so have continued means of ingress and egress. We, on the other hand,
would not know where this channel was, and would be prevented from
approaching by the known existence of our own field. The conclusion is
that it is not possible by blockade mines to stop a fleet from putting
to sea, even if that were what we wanted to do.

Still less is it possible to stop the enemy’s submarines from putting to
sea, either by ambush mines or blockade mines. The rise and fall of the
tide between high and low water makes a minefield ineffective against
shallow-draft craft for half the twenty-four hours. The distance of 50
yards, which is the usual interval between mines, is five times the
breadth of a submarine. By diving to 50 feet, the chance of contact with
the mine is removed, and only the lesser danger of fouling the moorings
remains. It is perfectly easy to sweep a channel for submarines, as for
other vessels, at any time. Where there is any uncertainty about the
whereabouts of a minefield, trawlers, or small merchant ships with a
very few people on board, can go ahead of the submarines and pilot them
out. If necessary, vessels could be specially prepared as mine-bumpers,
with a kind of cow-catcher apparatus in front of them. We are
experimenting with five different methods of fitting ships for
mine-bumping, and shall very soon have a number of vessels which can go
almost with impunity into a minefield. British submarines have
frequently traversed, wittingly and unwittingly, the German minefields
around Heligoland, and German submarines are probably traversing our
southern mined area with indifference, and impunity, at the present
time.

On the other hand, it is a curious truth that your own minefield is a
greater deterrent to your own operations than to those of the enemy. You
have put it down yourself, so you do not want to sweep it up. You know
where it is, though not very accurately. You instinctively try to avoid
the waters you have yourself fouled. Nothing has been more valuable than
the searching and relentless watching maintained in the Heligoland Bight
by our submarines since the beginning of the war. Its vigilance and
efficiency have defeated themselves by forcing the Germans to retire
actually inside their basins and canal, and thus depriving our
submarines of any targets. It would be a great pity to hamper them in
their work and expose them to additional dangers for the sake of such
vain and illusory precautions. The weak passive defence of mines cannot
for a moment be compared as a military measure with the enterprising
offensive of submarines.

The above considerations also apply to suggested schemes for shutting
submarines in by a network of mines fastened together by wire.
Mine-sweepers or mine-bumpers would force a channel through this as
easily as through ordinary lines of mines, the only difference being
that several being dragged along by the string would be exploded at the
same time. Also it is evident that the limitations of this form of
defence cannot be carried very far on account of the enormous quantities
of material and explosives required. It would be very difficult and
dangerous to lay in close proximity to the enemy’s ports and fleets. The
process would be slow; the losses certain, and it could in any case
block only a very small portion of the 100–mile broad mouth of the
Heligoland Bight. Devices of this character may, however, be useful in
defending one’s own harbours, and making anchorages submarine-proof,
where we can, by our superior strength, prevent our arrangements from
being interfered with. A variety of these methods are at present in use,
and are being rapidly extended and developed. The following seven
principal expedients are being applied:—

(1) Sinking ships with cement or stone in such a way as to form an
absolute breakwater and barrier like the mole of a harbour.

(2) Electrical contact mines strung very closely together, and capable
of being made dangerous or safe by the current being switched on or off.

(3) Barges or piles, with torpedo nets attached to them.

(4) Loose wire nets of very large mesh, not fastened at either end,
which clog round a submarine and entangle it.

(5) Network arrangement, with explosives attached.

(6) Network arrangements, with upright floating spars, which also
entangle the submarine.

(7) Long lengths of fishing nets, particularly Portuguese tunny nets,
which operate in the same way.

As the war progresses, we shall gradually improvise the torpedo-proof
harbours, of which, except on our southern coast, we are now entirely
destitute.

I explained to the Cabinet the quantities of mines which we had in
store, and which were available in the future. The experience of the
last three months seems to justify the partial and limited reliance put
by the Admiralty upon mining as a method of warfare.

W. S. C.

_October, 1914._

APPENDIX E
FIRST LORD’S MINUTES

_Formation of the Royal Naval Division_

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.

In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists
of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of
one marine and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been
partially formed in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service
men. To this will be added an approximately equal number of
reservists, making the total strength of the brigade 3,900, organised
in four battalions of four double companies of approximately 250 men.
The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions, each, if
possible, of 880 men, organised in sixteen double companies of 220.
The composition of each battalion should be as follows:—

R.N.V.R. 375
R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age) 313
R.N.R. 190

The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore
be:—

R.N.V.R. 3,000
R.F.R. 2,500
R.N.R. 1,500

The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion
by a Lieutenant-Colonel; each company by a Major and a Captain. The
means of remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with
separately. About fifty new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either
permanently or on a three years’ or till the war stops engagement.

Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N.; five of the
battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and
three by R.N.V.R. Commanders; each company will be commanded by a
Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not
forthcoming, by a Major, R.M. The question of making good deficiencies
in these and in the marine brigade will be dealt with separately.
There are, however, available 50 R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66
Sub-Lieutenants, and 12 Midshipmen; total, 128. About 50 more officers
would be required.

The use of these brigades need not be considered until the
organisation has advanced sufficiently to allow of their military
value to be judged.

The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as
resources allow in the present week. The officers commanding the
companies and battalions must be appointed forthwith. The first
essential is to get the men drilling together in brigades; and the
deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions can be filled up
later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the war to
build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army
strength of 1,070, and the organisation will readily adapt itself to
this. All the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the
three brigades will be available if required for service afloat, and
it must be distinctly understood that this is the paramount claim upon
them; but in the meanwhile they will be left to be organised for land
service.

W. S. C.

_August 16, 1914._

ACTION OF AUGUST 28

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Ordnance.

1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for
service in every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action.
Careful attention should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the
officers who fought them, in order that everything possible can be
done to increase their fighting efficiency.

2. The failure of the 4–inch guns in the _Arethusa_ is most serious,
and must be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both
from the breaking of the ejector catches, of which there were no
spares, and secondly from the coating of the cartridge cases, which
gradually fouled the gun. At one critical moment only one 4–inch gun
could fire, and but for her 6–inch guns the Arethusa would have been
destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an effective
remedy has been provided.

3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give
the officers and men a few days’ leave. The nervous strain of a modern
action is considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore
poise and resiliency.

W. S. C.

_August 30, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

(1) Selections might be made from all the reports of this action,
beginning with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports which the
Prime Minister has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting
matter which can be made public without detriment to the future should
be collected, circulated to the Fleet, and published in the
newspapers.

(2) The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief’s report and various
references to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in
Commodore S’s and other statements must all be kept absolutely secret.
Mistakes are always made in war, but there is no need to weaken
confidence by dwelling on them after success has been obtained. The
Senior Officers concerned in the manœuvre should, however, all have
the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every
effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this
profoundly secret circle no whisper must go.

(3) I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and
rewards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished
themselves in this fortunate and skilful enterprise.

W. S. C.

_September 6, 1914._

SEPARATION ALLOWANCES FOR THE NAVY

Financial Secretary.

I have to-day obtained the assent of the Cabinet in principle to the
granting of a separation allowance to the whole Navy at once. The
scale should be the full Army scale less any deductions which should
be made on account of higher pay and allowances the sailor may receive
as compared with the soldier. These details are to be settled between
the Admiralty and the Treasury. I regard the matter as one of prime
importance and urgency.

It is, of course, understood that the present decision only authorises
the payment of a separation allowance during the period of active
service, and that the question of what is to happen in time of peace
is not prejudiced.

I wish you to take up this question in conjunction with the
Accountant-General and the Naval Branch and make me your proposals in
the course of to-morrow. It will be a great fillip to our sailors when
this great boon to them is announced to the Fleet, as I hope it may
be, in the next few days. Pray press it forward by every means in your
power, acting with the Treasury and calling me in where there is a
hitch or difficulty.

W. S. C.

_September 4, 1914._

Financial Secretary.

The Cabinet decided that evidence of allotment regularly made should
decide whether the Separation Allowance should be paid or not, and
that legal marriage is not indispensable. Where it is clear that the
woman has been dependent on the man, and the man has recognised this
tie by a regular allotment, the legality of the marriage will be
assumed.

W. S. C.

_September 19, 1914._

ENEMY RESERVISTS

Secretary.

Please inquire who was responsible for allowing a merchant ship from
Buenos Ayres with 400 German reservists on board, to pass Gibraltar
and to convey them to Italian ports, whence they left to join their
units. How was it that these men were not arrested and made prisoners
of war when passing the Straits?

W. S. C.

_September 5, 1914._

LIFE-BELTS

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

The sinking of the _Pathfinder_ shows how important it is that there
should be more life-belts or life-buoys available on our ships. Many
lives would have been saved in this case if such steps had been taken.
I don’t like the German system of going into action with life-belts
on, but there certainly ought to be in the boats and on the deck of
British ships something like 100 life-belts or life-buoys which could
be seized and would float overboard if the vessel foundered.

Pray let me have a proposal.

W. S. C.

_September 10, 1914._

SUBMARINE HONOURS

Secretary.
Naval Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

Since it is difficult to choose which man in a submarine has done
specially well, it is necessary that the decoration should be given to
the boat, and that the men should ballot among themselves to decide
who is to have it.

W. S. C.

_September 17, 1914._

BLOCKADE

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
A.C.L.
C.O.S. and others.

A standing Admiralty Committee will be formed under the presidency of
the Additional Civil Lord, to be called ‘The Restriction of Enemies’
Supplies Committee,’ composed as follows:—

One representative of the Trade Division of the War Staff.

One representative of the Foreign Office.

One representative of the Board of Trade.

Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P.

Mr. C. Money, M.P.

The duties of this Committee will be to examine and watch continually
all means or routes by which supplies of food or raw material may
reach Germany and Austria; to report weekly all importations or
exportations to and from these countries coming to their knowledge;
and to recommend by what methods, financial, commercial, diplomatic,
and military, they may be hampered, restricted, and, if possible,
stopped. Measures should, in the first instance, be recommended to
secure full and accurate information from day to day of all vessels
unloading cargoes which may ultimately reach Germany or Austria at
neutral ports, and the port of Rotterdam especially, as well as the
possibility of supplies coming through a northern part of Sweden or
from Sweden itself across the Baltic, or through Norway and Denmark.
Holland must be the subject of the closest study, it being clearly
impossible for the British Government to allow the neutral port of
Rotterdam to serve as a base of supplies to the enemy. Trustworthy
agents in Holland must be obtained or dispatched thither for this
purpose. Any possible importation overland through Italy or up the
Adriatic must be included in the survey.

Funds will be forthcoming for any special action required.

The Committee should hold its first meeting on Friday, the 14th, using
a committee room at the Admiralty.

A.C.L. to nominate his own Secretary, and make all further
arrangements to carry this minute into effect.

W. S. C.

_August 13, 1914._

MUNITIONS

Lord Kitchener.

Captain Hankey, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has been to me
with what seems rather a good idea. He suggests that Girouard should
be put at the head of an emergency armament multiplication committee
or department, to set on foot and develop the maximum possible output
of guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. I am sure, myself, that more could
be done by the firms than is being done at present. For instance,
after you told me of the pressure you had put upon them and that their
complete limits had been reached, our people went round and obtained
undertakings from the trade to produce 700 rifles a week more,
additional to all that had been ordered by you.

This is only a half-formed idea, and I pass it on to you not as a
recommendation, but simply for what it is worth.

W. S. C.

_September 3, 1914._

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY

Sir Edward Grey.

Please see attached.

I should be so glad if you could see your way to making a strong stand
against this. Even if we ultimately have to give way, the fact that
they will have overruled our protest will, in the existing balance of
public opinion in the United States, make them desirous of being
helpful, or at any rate not unfriendly, on other points at issue.

Our case is clear. The Germans have announced their intention, have
endeavoured on a large scale, and have partially begun, to arm
merchant ships as commerce destroyers, and they even claim to carry
out this process of arming and equipping in neutral harbours or on the
high seas. We have been forced in consequence of this to arm a number
of our ships in self-defence. In doing this we follow the undoubted
law of the seas as it was practised in all the great wars of the past.
We claim that by international law a merchant ship armed in her own
defence, so long as she takes no aggressive action, is entitled to the
full status of a peaceful trading ship. We ask that our ships so armed
for this purpose shall be accorded that status in the neutral ports of
the world. We are quite willing to agree that German merchant ships
similarly armed in self-defence shall be similarly treated. It is only
when merchant ships are armed and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers,
not for purposes of self-defence, but for those of commerce
destruction, that we claim they should be treated as ships of war. And
here again we ask no better treatment for ourselves than for the
enemy.

We recognise the natural difficulty to a neutral State, anxious to
preserve a strict impartiality, of discerning whether ships carrying
the same armament are intended for offensive or defensive action. We
offer that this question should be decided by a simple and practical
test. If the armed merchant ship is engaged in ordinary commerce,
discharging and taking a regular cargo, and embarking passengers in
the usual way, she should be counted as a trader in spite of her
armament. If, on the other hand, she is not engaged in commerce, is
not doing the ordinary things she would do and has done in times of
peace, but is either carrying special cargoes of coal and stores to
belligerent cruisers on the high seas, or is travelling in ballast, or
is not trafficking in her cargo in the natural way, then we say she
should be treated as a ship of war, even if the Government of the
State whose flag she flies declares that she is only armed and will
only fight in self-defence. We must therefore hold a neutral
Government impeccable if she allows a German armed merchantman, which
takes a regular cargo in the ordinary way, to arm in her ports or
leave them for the high seas, even if subsequently that vessel engages
not merely in self-defence, but in actual aggressive attack. Neutrals
who deal with ships according to the ‘Cargo Test’ must be held
blameless by us whatever the subsequent careers of the vessels may be.
The issues which remain open after these ships have put to sea can
only be decided between the belligerents.

The second point that I hope you will be able to fight is: no
transference after the declaration of war of enemy’s ships to a
neutral flag, as agreed upon in the Declaration of London. We cannot
recognise such transferences, which are plainly, in the nature of
things, designed to enable the transferred ship to obtain under the
neutral flag an immunity from the conditions created by the war.

I would earnestly ask that both these points should be pressed now in
the most direct and formal manner on Powers concerned, and
particularly upon the United States, and that very great pressure
should be exerted.

In this connection it may be pointed out that the United States have
already allowed one or more ships, including the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_,
to leave their ports armed, denuded of cargo, and cleared for action,
and that to stop British ships of a self-defensive character is
showing a partiality to one of the belligerents incompatible with fair
and loyal neutrality. If to this is to be added the attempt which Mr.
Bryan has made, by his personal intervention, to take over the
Hamburg-American liners from Germany and run them under the American
flag, it seems to me clear that a situation has arisen which, in the
ultimate issues, ought, in some form or other, to be brought publicly
before the people of the United States. I am under no illusions as to
their attitude, but the forces at work there in the present
circumstances are such as to make it impossible for any Government to
load the dice against England, or go openly one inch beyond an even
neutrality.

I venture to suggest to you that this position ought to be fought up
to the point of full publicity, and by every means and influence at
our disposal, before we are forced to consider the various inferior
alternatives which no doubt exist.

W. S. C.

_August 19, 1914._

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Admiral Slade.
Chief of Staff.
Captain Webb.

The Cabinet decided this morning that we must abandon, under protest
and as an exception, the running of defensively-armed merchantmen to
American ports. We do this on the assumption that we in no way waive
the principle, but in consideration of the fact that the United States
are preventing a large number of German ships suitable for armament
from fitting out. We must also stipulate that the guns, having been
landed from these ships, shall be returned without their mountings in
some other non-military vessel on which and from which they clearly
cannot be used during the voyage.

Pray draft a note to the Foreign Office accordingly.

W. S. C.

_September 3, 1914._

THE BRITISH PATROL OFF NEW YORK

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Admiral Slade.

I have felt uncomfortable about this for some time. Although it is
strictly legal, it must be very galling to the Americans to see their
capital port picketed in this way. Instructions should be given that
the patrolling cruisers should usually keep 8 or 10 miles away, or
even farther if possible, and should only close in occasionally when
there is some special need. They should, above all, be careful never
to infringe the 3–mile limit, and should discharge their duties with
tact, remembering how greatly British interests are concerned in the
maintenance of good relations with the United States. On the other
hand, the closest watch should be kept on shore upon the
Hamburg-American liners, and our cruisers should be given the earliest
warning if these are seen to be getting up steam. It ought to be quite
easy to give our cruisers full warning of any movement. The prevention
of these Hamburg-American liners leaving armed and fuelled is
practically the whole duty of our vessels off New York; and as long as
they are in a position to discharge this they need not be too
obtrusive in their other duties.

W. S. C.

_October 26, 1914._

ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES

_Dover._

First Sea Lord and others.

It is intolerable that we should be told that Dover is not safe
against submarine attack. It is the only military harbour we have
except Portland. We must be able to keep ships there safely. Measures
are being taken to close one of the entrances by sinking two ships.
This is urgent and vital, and should be pressed forward from hour to
hour without a moment’s pause. The other entrance should have an
anti-submarine net and gate arranged. If the boom defence has carried
away it must be repaired and replaced by night-and-day exertions.
Meanwhile the long barges fitted with nets which have been prepared at
Dunkirk should be brought over as soon as the weather allows, and used
either to block the entrance or to give net-protection to ships lying
inside.

W. S. C.

_November 1, 1914._

HIGH-EXPLOSIVE PRODUCTION

A.C.L.

You must act in this matter and refer to me only when special need
arises. The points to be held in view are clear and simple:—

1. We must have effective Government control of all the explosive
works, so as to attain the maximum output, and ensure our not being
hampered by German influences, which are powerful and subtle in the
Explosive Trust.

2. Naval interests must be properly safeguarded, and this can only be
either by the Navy taking Nobels and the other two companies, or by an
absolutely equal representation and control as between the two
Departments over the whole of the explosive factories combined. We
cannot be placed in the position of being overborne by the military
authorities, and having our necessary demands set aside.

3. It is, however, our duty to do everything in our power to aid in
the expansion of the Army and the production of war material for the
conduct of the campaign, and at a certain point only State policy can
decide whether naval or military interests are to claim priority.

4. We must make a good bargain for the country; and if these people
are financed by Government money to set up great new works and broaden
the scale of their business, good arrangements should be made to
transfer these works to the Government at the end of the war.

W. S. C.

_November 9, 1914._

THE DUMMY FLEET

(_Most Secret._)
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Construction.
Naval Secretary.

It is necessary to construct without delay a dummy fleet: 10 merchant
vessels, either German prizes or British ships, should be selected at
once. They should be distributed among various private yards not
specially burdened with warship building at the present time. They are
then to be mocked up to represent particular battleships of the 1st
and 2nd Battle Squadrons. The actual size need not correspond exactly,
as it is notoriously difficult to judge the size of vessels at sea,
and frequently even destroyers are mistaken for cruisers. We are
bearing in mind particularly aerial and periscope observations, where
deception is much more easy. It is not necessary that the structures
should be strong enough to stand rough weather. Very little metal
would be required, and practically the whole work should be executed
in wood or canvas. The ships would move under their own power under
favourable conditions of weather from one base to another, and even
when the enemy knows that we have such a fleet its presence will tend
to mystify and confuse his plans and baffle and distract the
enterprise of his submarines. He will always be in doubt as to which
is the real and which is the dummy fleet. An attack upon the dummy
fleet can be made not less dangerous than an attack upon the real
fleet by the proper use of our own submarines and destroyers with
towing charges, and possibly by traps of nets and mines.

The matter is urgent. Three years ago I formed this idea, and deeply
regret that I have been so long deterred from putting it into
execution. The Third Sea Lord, Fourth Sea Lord, and Naval Secretary
will meet to-day under the Third Sea Lord, and formulate detailed
proposals for immediate action. The utmost secrecy must be observed,
and special measures taken to banish all foreigners from the districts
where the mocking-up is being done. I should hope to receive the list
of ships which are selected for conversion to-morrow morning, and the
list of firms among whom the work will be parcelled out during the
course of that day. Estimates of cost and time should also be made,
but paint, canvas, and woodwork can be quickly done, and I should
expect in a fortnight, or at the outside in three weeks, that 10
vessels will be actually at our tactical disposal.

W. S. C.

_October 21, 1914._

THE COASTAL PATROL

Secret.
First Sea Lord.

If the system of working the patrol flotillas explained in the
enclosed memorandum, has actually been enforced, it is in complete
violation not only of the obvious principles of war, but of all the
orders and directions issued on this subject during the last three
years. The word ‘distribution’ applied to armed force implies the most
vicious ideas. To proceed by dividing the front to be watched by the
number of destroyers available for watching and working out the number
of miles to the destroyers is the negation of good sense and military
principle.

Ever since the Manœuvres of 1912 I have repeatedly explained the
principles which should govern the working of the patrol flotillas
(_see_ attached papers), and these have been expounded to the C.I.D.
and issued to the War Staff with the full concurrence of the First Sea
Lord and the C.O.S. If there has been a departure from these
principles and an adoption of the barbarous method of ‘distributing’
the destroyers along the whole coast in a single row like toy soldiers
on the kitchen table, this shows a total lack of comprehension.

It must again be repeated:—

1. That the coast, with its cyclists, signal stations, and watchers,
is the line of observation, and the only line of observation, which
can certainly report the arrival of an enemy;

2. That the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers,
instead of being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling
duties, should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected
sally-ports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point
where shore information shows that an enemy is attempting to land;

3. That there is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling,
except at the mouths of harbours, and that from time to time
occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70, and 80 miles out to
seaward should be pushed from each sallyport by the whole of the boats
available, varied occasionally by the prying scouting of a single
destroyer;

4. That the prevention of mine-laying can only be done by trawlers,
who must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.

It must be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevents an
enemy from approaching the British coasts with transports, and
beginning a landing there, but that if the flotillas are properly
handled he should be attacked within a few hours by submarines and
destroyers, and that the numbers and strength of the forces against
him should continually increase until long before any considerable
force can be landed the enemy’s transports and escort would be
overwhelmed, and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only
alternative to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then
attacking him while his landing is in progress is the close blockade
of the Heligoland Bight. There is much to be said for and against both
courses, but the intermediate course of ‘distributing’ a weak and thin
cordon of patrols at a short distance from the coast in the hopes of
putting up some defensive shield or screen is utterly futile.

The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at
fixed points and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while
relying upon the coast watch to give early and accurate information of
any attack by the enemy. If this policy be adhered to strictly and
simply it will not be found impossible to spare the 12 destroyers
which the Commander-in-Chief needs. It is, however, to be considered
whether they could not better be taken from the two 1st Fleet
Flotillas at Harwich.

W. S. C.

_November 7, 1914._

THE RIFLE SHORTAGE

The following course is to be adopted:—

1. As soon as the War Office are ready to hand over the 50,000
Japanese rifles, the whole of the rifles, long and short, whether used
by sailors or marines, on board H.M. ships at home and abroad, will be
collected and brought on shore to the Royal Naval Ordnance Depots. The
Japanese rifles will be issued to all ships in their place; there will
be no rifles of any sort on board H.M. ships other than Japanese.

2. From the British rifles surrendered by the Fleet, 15,000 short .303
charger loading rifles will be set aside for the Royal Naval Division,
i.e. one rifle for each of 12,000 men, plus 25 per cent for reserve
and training. All the rifles now possessed by the Royal Naval Division
will then be surrendered to the Ordnance Depots in exchange for the
15,000 short .303 British rifles aforesaid. Therefore the Royal Naval
Division will have 15,000 short British .303, and no more.

3. There will then be handed over to the Army 57,800 rifles, of which
9,000 will be short charger loading.

4. The 50,000 Japanese rifles will be issued to the Fleet in the
following proportion:—

One rifle for each marine, and one rifle for every 5 sailors, ships on
foreign service receiving one rifle for every 3 sailors. The rest of
the rifles will be issued as required to trawlers and auxiliaries, and
kept in the Royal Marine and Royal Naval Ordnance Depots.

The Fleet will thus be completely re-armed with the 50,000 Japanese
rifles, and the Royal Naval Division with .303 short rifles ready for
field service.

Let me now have calculations worked out on this basis; and draft a
letter accordingly to the War Office.

W. S. C.

_November 25, 1914._

INDEX

_Aboukir_, 351, 354
Cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots.
Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Abrolhos, coaling base, 444

_Acasta_ class, 142

_Acheron_ class, 142

_Active_, 144
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Admiralty, Board of, 256–61

Admiralty Transport Department, 397–98

Aerenthal, Count, 30

Aerial attack and defence, 220–21, 340–44

Aeroplanes, 336–44

Agadir Crisis, 38–67

_Agamemnon_, 225
Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement 16,500 tons. Speed 18½ knots.
Four 12″, ten 9·2″ guns.

Airships, 338

Albert, King, 380, 403

_Albion_, 310, 447, 467, 484
Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

Algeciras Conference, 25–28

_Algerine_, 315
Canadian sloop. Launched 1895. Displacement 1,050 tons. Speed 13
knots. Six 4″ guns.

Allen, Captain, 476

Alsace-Lorraine, 7, 50–1

Americans and the War, 293

_Amphion_, 264
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, 15, 25, 41

Anglo-French military conversations authorized by Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, 27, 29

Anglo-Persian Oil Convention, 137, 139, 181

Antwerp, 348, 355–90, 398–9, 408, 411–12

_Arethusa_, 148, 332
Light cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

_Ariadne_, 332
German light cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 2,618 tons. Speed
22 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Armoured cars, 344–5

Army mobilized, 234, 247–80

_Asama_, 465, 468–69
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 9,885 tons. Speed 22
knots. Four 8″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Askold_, 315–16, 323, 468, 544
Russian light cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 5,905 tons. Speed
23 knots. Twelve 6″ guns.

Asquith, H. H., 24, 28–9, 66, 99

—— invites Mr. Churchill to Admiralty, 66

Aston, General, 335, 347, 377

_Astræa_, 467
Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displacement 4,360 tons. Speed 19¾
knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

_Attentive_, 388, 403
Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,670 tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine
4″ guns.

_Audacious_, 408, 429–31, 437, 498
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1912. Displacement 23,000 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Australia_, 262, 314–6, 321–24, 465, 467–8
Australian battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 18,800 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Australian Navy: First fight, 471–2

Austria, 29–31, 275

—— ultimatum to Serbia, 204

Bacon, Admiral, 74–5, 345

Balfour, Earl, 15, 21–4, 158, 197, 232

Balkan States, 18, 522–51

Ballin, 96, 99, 189, 207–8

—— letter to Sir E. Cassel, 112

_Barham_, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Bartolomé, _see_ De Bartolomé, Commodore

Bayly, Admiral Lewis, 160

Beaconsfield, 4

Beatty, Earl, 87–8, 160, 331–2, 422, 438, 483, 509–10, 514–9

—— and submarine alarm, 422–4

Belgium: Neutrality, 234

_Bellerophon_, 223
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1907. Displacement 18,600 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Benbow_, 465
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 25,000 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Beresford, Lord Charles, 71–2, 73–5

Bertie, Sir Francis, 369

_Berwick_, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

Bethlehem Steel Company, 498

Bethmann-Hollweg, 37, 96–7, 103

Birkenhead, Lord, 229

_Birmingham_, 518
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,440 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Nine 6″ guns.

Bismarck, Prince, 7, 207

Black, Sir Frederick, 138

_Black Prince_, 269, 312, 467, 484, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23½ knots.
Six 9·2″, ten 6″ guns.

Blake, Wm., 440

_Blanche_, 428
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed 25
knots. Ten 4″ guns.

‘Blimps,’ 338

_Blonde_, 143–5, 147
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed 25
knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Board of Admiralty, 256–61

Boer War, 12

Borden, Sir Robert, 183, 187

Bosnia, 30–1

Botha, General, 306, 464, 544

Boué de Lapeyrère, Admiral, 237

Bowles, Thomas Gibson, 353

_Breslau_, 526–7, 529, 536, 539, 544
German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Bridgeman, Sir Francis, 82–3, 89, 120, 133

Bridges, Colonel, 386, 400, 404–5, 411

Briggs, Admiral, 83, 144

_Brilliant_, 407
Light cruiser. Launched 1891. Displacement 3,600 tons. Speed 19½
knots. Two 6″, six 4·7″ guns.

_Bristol_, 448, 451, 467, 475, 478
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

British Expeditionary Force, 250, 276–80

British Navy: Assembly at Portland, 1912, 121–4;
German submarine alarm, 413–41;
in 1914–15, 501;
leaves for Scapa Flow, 224–27;
mobilised, July, 1914, 201;
mobilised, July 31–August 4, 228–46;
visits Kronstadt and Kiel, 198–202;
_see_ under names of ships, and _passim_.

British ultimatum to Germany, 235–46

Broqueville, M. de, 372–3, 377–8

Budget of 1909, 20

Bulkeley-Johnson, Colonel, 303

Buller, Captain, 308

Bülow, General von, 358

Bülow, Prince, 25

Burmah Oil Companies, 139, 323

Burney, Admiral, 480

Burns, John, 24

_Bustard_, 404
Gunboat. Launched 1871. Displacement 254 tons. One 6″, one 4·7″ gun.

Buxton, Noel, 530

Byng, General, 377

_Cadmus_, 316, 543
Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″
guns.

Caillaux, M., 65

Calais, 346

Callaghan, Sir George, 83, 225, 231–2

_Calliope_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Callwell, General, 532

Cambon, M., 231–2

_Cambria_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Five 6″ guns.

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 24–9

—— authorises Anglo-French military conversations, 27–9

—— supports France at Algeciras, 27

Canadian Army, 327–9

_Canopus_, 310, 444–56, 458, 462–3, 466, 470–1, 473, 475
Battleship. Launched 1897. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Canterbury_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Five 6″ guns.

_Cap Trafalgar_, 308
German armed merchant cruiser.

Capper, General, 377

Caprivi, Count, 9

Carden, Admiral, 535, 540–1

_Carmania_, 308
Armed merchant cruiser.

_Carnarvon_, 447–8, 451, 465, 467–9, 473, 475, 478, 493.
Cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 10,850 tons. Speed 22¼ knots.
Four 7·5″, six 6″ guns.

Carson, Lord, 197–8, 229

_Carysfort_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Cassel, Sir Ernest, 96, 99–100, 112–3, 189

Castelnau, General de, 356, 358

_Castor_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Five 6″ guns.

Cawdor, Lord, 74

Chamberlain, Joseph, 12, 22

_Champion_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Channel Ports, 395–412

Charles, Archduke, 198

_Chatham_, 312
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Chikuma_, 316–7, 321, 323, 466
Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed
26 knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Chinese Labour cry, 20, 25

Churchill, Lord Randolph, 187

Churchill, Winston Spencer, Agadir crisis, 1911;
letter to Sir E. Grey, 63–4;
air defence of Great Britain, 348;
at Antwerp, 372–90;
attacks on, 431–2;
attends Committee of Imperial Defence, 53–8;
authorises examination of letters of spies, 49;
_Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_, 352–4;
goes to Admiralty, 64;
Herr Ballin and Mr. Churchill, 207–8;
letters to Sir E. Grey, _passim_;
letter to Sir E. Cassel on German Navy Law, 113;
letter to Lord Fisher on liquid fuel problem, 137–8;
letter to Sir E. Carson on Irish affairs, 196–7;
letter to Prince Louis on his resigning office, 435–6;
letters to Sir John French, 408, and _passim_;
‘Military Aspects of the Continental Problem,’ 1911, 58–62;
naval cordite, 48;
President of Board of Trade, 29;
proposes Naval War Staff, 81–4;
sends ‘warning telegrams’ to Commanders-in-Chief, 218–20;
signs order ... Battle of Falklands, 473;
sends for Lord Fisher, 75;
speech at Belfast, 101;
speech at Glasgow, 101–3;
studies military position in Europe, 49–50;
talk with Count Metternich, 50–1;
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29;
and _passim_.

_Cleopatra_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

_Clio_, 316, 543
Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″
guns.

Colville, Admiral, 426

‘Commence hostilities against Germany,’ 245

_Condé_, 467
French cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,856 tons. Speed 21
knots. Two 7·6″, eight 6·4″, six 3·9″ guns.

_Conquest_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Constantine, King, 529, 538

Convoy system, 310–13, 317, 322–9

Corbett, Sir Julian, 93 (note)

Cordite, 48

_Cormoran_, German armed merchant cruiser, 316

_Cornwall_, 448, 451, 465, 467–9, 473, 475, 477–8
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

Coronel and the Falklands, 442–77

_Courageous_, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots.
Four 15″, eighteen 4″ guns.

Cradock, Admiral, 444–66, 492

_Cressy_, 351–3
Cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots.
Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Crewe, Lord, 185, 231

Cromarty, 162

_Cumberland_, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

Cunliffe, Lord, 139

Custance, Sir Reginald, 160

Cuxhaven: attack by seaplanes, 489

_Daily Chronicle_, 187

Dallas, Colonel, 363–4, 368, 371–2, 374

‘Danger Year,’ 32

_Dartmouth_, 312–3, 465, 467–8
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Dawnay, Hugh, 303

De Bartolomé, Captain, 82, 439, 466, 484

De Robeck, Admiral, 467

_Defence_, 269, 313, 444, 446–7, 451–6, 462–70, 473, 439, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,600 tons. Speed 22½ knots.
Four 9·2″, ten 7·5″ guns.

Deguise, General, 372, 384–5

Delcassé, 16, 26, 44

_Derfflinger_, 141
German battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed
27 knots. Eight 12″, twelve 5·9″ guns.

Devlin, Mr., 191

Devonshire, Duke of, 22

Dillon, John, 191

Disraeli, 12

Djavid Bey, 523–4

_Donegal_, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

Donnesmarck, Count, 26

_Doris_, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 19½
knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

Douglas, Sir Charles, 531

Dreadnought Battle Fleet, 482, 486

_Dresden_, 307, 444–6, 448, 456, 463, 477–8, 493, 548
German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 3,544 tons. Speed
24 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Dryden, John, 236 (_note_)

Dual Alliance, 9, 12

Dubail, General, 356, 358

_Dublin_, 268–72, 275
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Duke of Edinburgh_, 269, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six
9·2″, ten 6″ guns.

Dumble, Colonel, 398

Dunkirk, 345–8

_Dupleix_, 314
French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 7,578 tons. Speed 21
knots. Eight 6·4″, four 3·9″ guns.

Dupont, General, 336

Dutch neutrality, 361–2

_Eber_, 307
German gunboat. Launched 1903. Displacement 977 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Eight 3·4″ guns.

_Edgar Quinets_, 484
French cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 13,780 tons. Speed 23
knots. Fourteen 7·6″ guns.

Elgin, Lord, 24

_Emden_, 307–9, 312, 316–7, 319, 322–4, 468, 471–2, 542–3
German light cruiser. Launched 1908. Displacement 3,544 tons. Speed
24 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Empress of Asia_, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.

_Empress of India_, 465
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 25,000 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Empress of Japan_, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.

_Empress of Russia_, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.

_Enchantress_, 122
Admiralty yacht.

_Encounter_, 316–7, 320, 466
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 5,880 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

Enver Pasha, 523, 528, 539

Esher, Lord, 388

_Essex_, 448
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 22½ knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

_Euryalus_, 351
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots.
Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Ewing, Sir Alfred, 503

_Falcon_, 407
Destroyer. Launched 1899. Displacement 375 tons. Speed 30 knots. One
12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Falklands and Coronel, 442–78

Falklands Victory, Fisher’s opinion, 491–3

_Fearless_, 332, 351
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Ferdinand, 538

_Firedrake_, 219, 508, 512–3
Destroyer. Launched 1912. Displacement 860 tons. Speed 33 knots. Two
4″ guns.

Fisher, Lord, 85, 113, 125–7, 137, 144–5, 179–80, 259, 354, 436–41,
452, 454, 462, 465, 473, 510

—— appointed First Sea Lord, 437;
at the Admiralty, 479–501;
and Falklands Victory, 493–4;
character sketch, 71–8;
letter on a naval programme, 106–9

Foch, Marshal, 358–9, 410, 491

_Foresight_, 404
Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,850 tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine
4″ guns.

Fowler, Sir Henry, 24

_Fox_, 311, 313, 317
Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displacement 4,360 tons. Speed 19½
knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

Franco-German War, 6–8

Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, 7–10

_Frauenlob_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 2,657 tons. Speed
21 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

French, Earl, 249–50, 279, 286, 289, 299–300, 302, 342, 371, 382, 395,
400, 408–11

—— differences between French and Kitchener, 398–9, 408

—— letter to Mr. Churchill on Lord Kitchener’s visit to Paris, 300–1

French General Staff, 57

French Navy, 242.
_See also_ under names of Ships

_Furious_, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 19,100 tons. Speed 31½ knots.
Two 18″, eight 5·5″ guns.

_Geier_, 307, 316, 468–9
German light cruiser. Launched 1894. Displacement 1,597 tons. Speed
16 knots. Eight 4·1″ guns.

General Election of 1906, 24

_General_, German mail steamer, 266

George, David Lloyd, 20, 24, 28–9, 43–7, 282, 292

—— speech at Bankers’ Association on Agadir crisis, 43–5

—— effect on Germany, 45–6

German alliance with Turkey, 539

German colonial expansion, 6–7, 95

German finance, 1909, 35–6

German merchant ships captured, 326

German Navy, 12–15, 32–4, 36, 51, 333–4, 503.
_See also_ names of ships.

German Navy Law, 53–124

German oversea trade, 326

German plan for attacking France, Sir H. Wilson’s view, 53–67

German spies, 49

German torpedo boats, 487–8

Germany and balance of power, 6–11

—— and Boer War, 11–2

—— declares war on Russia, 231

—— invited to join Japanese Alliance, 14

—— Moroccan problem, 14

Gerrard, Major, 340

_Glasgow_, 445–8, 450–1, 453–4, 460, 463, 466, 469–71, 473, 475, 477–8,
492
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

_Glorious_, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots.
Four 15″, eighteen 4″ guns.

_Glory_, 310, 328
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Gloucester_, 267, 269, 271–2, 468, 542
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

_Gneisenau_, 307–8, 313–6, 320–3, 424, 443–64, 466, 468–70, 474–8, 484
German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 11,420 tons. Speed 22½
knots. Eight 8·2″, six 5·9″ guns.

_Goeben_, 219, 222, 236–43, 266–75, 525–7, 529, 535, 539–40, 544
German battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 22,640 tons. Speed
26 knots. Ten 11″, twelve 5·9″ guns.

_Good Hope_, 308, 444, 446–54, 456–59, 463, 469–70, 316, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two
9·2″, sixteen 6″ guns.

Goodenough, Admiral, 510

Goulding, Sir Edward, 229

Grant, Captain Noel, 308

Grant-Duff, Col., 49 (_note_)

Greene, Sir Graham, 439

Grey, Earl, 24–31, 40–5, 96–9, 105, 115, 155, 186, 189, 191, 197, 204,
207–8, 210–6, 231, 360, 365–6, 370, 384, 524–7, 530, 534, 536

Gun: weight of shell fired, 125–6

Gunnery, 125–31

Haig, Earl, 90, 395

_Halcyon_, 479
Torpedo gunboat. Launched 1894. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 19
knots. Two 4·7″ guns.

Haldane, Lord, 24, 48, 66, 103–4, 111, 231

—— asks for a Naval War Staff, 56

—— goes to Berlin, 98–9

—— Haldane Plan, 248

Halil Bey, 523

Hall, Captain Reginald, 502

_Hamidieh_, 540
Turkish fight cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 3,800 tons. Speed
22 knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

_Hampshire_, 314, 316–7, 323–4, 468, 542, 544
Cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 10,850 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Four 7·5″, six 6″ guns.

Hankey, Captain, 49, 172, 220

Harcourt, Sir William, 20

Harland and Wolff, 499

Hartlepool bombardment, 507–9, 520

‘Harwich Striking Force,’ 330, 402, 480–1, 506–7

Hase, Commander von, 141 (_note_)

Hedin, Dr. Sven, 402

Heligoland Bight Action, 331–4

Heligoland exchanged for Zanzibar, 11

Henry, Sir Edward, 47–8

Herzegovina, 30–1

Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 22

_Highflyer_, 308, 467
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Himalaya_, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.

Hindenburg, 538

Hipper, Admiral von, 514, 518–21

_Hizen_, 453, 465, 467–9
Japanese battleship. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,700 tons. Speed
18 knots. Four 12″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_Hogue_, 351–3
Cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots.
Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Holbrook, Commander, 415, 545

Holland and neutrality, 361–2

Hood, Admiral, 255–6, 401, 403–7, 422, 480, 492

Hopwood, Sir Francis. _See_ Southborough, Lord

Hornby, Admiral, 328

_Humber_, 401
Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two
6″, two 4·7″ guns.

_Hyacinth_, 468
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Ibuki_, 316, 321–2, 327, 472, 544
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,620 tons. Speed 22
knots. Four 12″, eight 8″, fourteen 4·7″ guns.

_Idzumo_, 415, 453, 465, 467–9
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 9,750 tons. Speed 22
knots. Four 8″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Ikoma_, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 13,750 tons. Speed 21
knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″, twelve 4·7″ guns.

Imperial Defence, Committee of, 173, 221

_Inconstant_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

_Indefatigable_, 140, 239–40, 313, 540
Battle cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 18,750 tons. Speed 25
knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Indomitable_, 239–40, 266, 274, 312, 467–8, 533, 536
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25
knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Inflexible_, 266, 428, 466–8, 472,475–8, 481, 493
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25
knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Ingenohl, Admiral von, 515–6

Intelligence Department, 495–6, 502–5

Invasion, 177–8, 288–9, 409, 419, 490

_Invincible_, 261, 331, 427, 428, 465–8, 475–8, 481, 493
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25
knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Ireland and the European balance, 179–202

_Iron Duke_, 517
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1912. Displacement 25,000 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Isvolsky, M., 30

Italian neutrality, 237, 242

Jackson, Sir Henry, 310–1, 320, 439

Jackson, Admiral Thomas, 439, 502

Jameson Raid, 11, 20

Japanese Alliance, 14

Japanese Navy, 468;
convoy, 321.
_See also_ names of ships

Japanese ultimatum to Germany, 315

Jellicoe, Lord, 83–4, 146, 179, 232, 276, 278, 331, 408, 417–8, 425–6,
428, 437, 466, 480–9, 517

—— opinion of Mr. Churchill, 109

—— raids the British coast in 1913, 153–4

—— takes command of the Fleets, 233

—— and submarine alarm, 417–9, 421

Jerram, Admiral, 314

Joffre, General, 285–6, 298, 301–2, 347, 365–7, 400, 491

Jutland, Battle of, 338

_Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, 308
German armed merchant cruiser.

_Karlsruhe_, 307–8, 444, 448, 461, 477
German light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 4,820 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Keble’s _Christian Year_, 146

Kelly, Captain John, 270–1

Kelly, Captain W. A. Howard, 271

_Kent_, 465, 467, 473, 475–6, 478
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

Kerr, Admiral Mark, 532–3

_Kersaint_, 316
French gunvessel. Launched 1897. Displacement 1,223 tons. Speed 15
knots. One 5·5″, five 3·9″ guns.

Keyes, Commodore, 278, 330, 332, 349, 438, 506, 508, 512–3, 519

Khaki Election, 20, 24

Kiderlen-Wächter, 39, 46

Kiel Canal, 98

_King Alfred_, 350
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two
9·2″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_King Edwards_, class of ship, 481, 484–5

Kitchener, Lord, 160, 214, 248, 250–5, 287–9, 294, 299–304, 306–7, 326,
329, 334, 337, 343, 347, 360, 362, 365–73, 377, 381–4, 388–9,
399–400, 408–9, 412, 430, 490, 531, 538

—— and British Territorial system, 254;
effects of Mons, 288–9;
goes to Paris and Lord French’s comment, 299–304;
differences between Kitchener and French, 399–400, 408;
orders batteries from India, 307;
Secretary of State for War, 250–1

Kluck, General von, 279, 357–8

_Köln_, 332
German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,280 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

_Komet_, 307
German torpedo gunboat. Launched 1892. Displacement 971 tons. Speed
21 knots. Four 3·4″ guns.

_Königsberg_, 307–9, 311, 324, 471–2, 542
German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed
23 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Kruger, President, 11

_Kurama_, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,620 tons. Speed 22
knots. Four 12″, eight 8″, fourteen 4·7″ guns.

Lambert, Mr., 183

_Lancaster_, 328, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Fourteen 6″ guns.

_Lance_, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots.
Three 4″ guns.

Lanrezac, General, 279, 286, 299

Lansdowne, Marquis of, 14

Law, Mr. Bonar, 229

_Legion_, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots.
Three 4″ guns.

_Leipzig_, 307–9, 311, 315, 447–8, 455–7, 463, 476–8
German light cruiser, Launched 1905. Displacement 3,200 tons. Speed
22½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Lennox_, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots.
Three 4″ guns.

_Leopard_, 480
Destroyer. Launched 1897. Displacement 350 tons. Speed 30 knots. One
12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Licensing Bill, 1908, 28

Lichnowsky, Prince, 255

Lighters, 500

Limpus, Admiral, 525, 535

Lindequist, von, 65

_Lion_, 89, 109, 134, 145–6, 333, 428, 517
Battle cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 26,350 tons. Speed 27
knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Liquid fuel, 133–41

_Lively_, 480
Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement 385 tons. Speed 30 knots. One
12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

London Conference, 1871, 30

_Lord Nelson_, 261
Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement 16,500 tons. Speed 18½ knots.
Four 12″, ten 9·2″ guns.

Loreburn, Earl (Sir Robert Reid), 24, 42

Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 82–3, 89–90, 120, 162 (_note_), 183, 201,
242, 259, 287, 313, 350, 377, 380–2, 396, 429, 462, 503

—— orders the Fleet not to disperse, 209;
letter of resignation, 435–6

_Loyal_, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1913. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots.
Three 4″ guns.

Lucas, Lord, 250

Ludendorff, General, 282

_Lurcher_, 219, 333, 508, 512
Destroyer. Launched 1912. Displacement 860 tons. Speed 35 knots. Two
4″ guns.

‘_Luxus Flotte_,’ 103, 112

_Macedonia_, 448, 451, 478
Armed merchant cruiser.

McKenna, Mr., 32–3, 44, 68, 74–5, 102, 125

Macnamara, Dr., 181, 183

Madden, Admiral, 83

‘Maestricht Appendix,’ 55, 64

_Magdeburg_, 503–4
German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Mahan, Admiral, 93 (_note_)

_Maidstone_, 404
Depot ship for submarines.

_Mainz_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,232 tons. Speed
25½ knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

_Majestic_, 312, 328
Battleship. Launched 1895. Displacement 14,900 tons. Speed 17½ knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Malaya_, 111, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Mallet, Sir Louis, 530, 537

Mannesmann Brothers, 38

Marine Brigade, 255, 334–5, 343, 347

Marix, Commander, 389 (_note_)

Marne, Battle of, 299, 357–8

Marsh, Mr., 205 (_note_)

Marwitz, 359

Maunoury, General, 356–7

Maurice of Battenberg, Prince, 436

_Melbourne_, Lord, 52

Melbourne, 314, 316–7, 320–3, 327, 468, 471, 542
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons.
Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Mensdorf, Count, 256

Mercantile marine, 264

_Mersey_, 401
Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two
6″, two 4·7″ guns.

Metternich, Count, 40, 44–6, 50–2

‘Military Aspects of the Continental Problem, 1911,’ by Mr. Churchill,
58–62

Milne, Sir Berkeley, 238–9, 266–75

_Minerva_, 312, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1895. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 19½
knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Minotaur_, 142, 313–4, 316–7, 321–2, 327, 467, 472, 484
Cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 14,600 tons. Speed 22½ knots.
Four 9·2″, ten 7·5″ guns.

Moltke, H., Count, 7, 12, 51

_Monarch_, 109
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1911. Displacement 22,500 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Monitors, 498–500

_Monmouth_, 308, 445–64, 416, 469, 478, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 22·4 knots.
Fourteen 6″guns.

Mons, 289

_Montcalm_, 315–6, 320–2, 324, 465–6
French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 9,367 tons. Speed 21
knots. Two 7·6″, eight 6·4″, four 3·9″ guns.

Moore, Admiral, 127, 138

Morley, Lord, 24, 42, 250

Morocco crisis, 25–7, 38–67

Motor omnibuses from London streets, 347

_Mousquet_, 308
French destroyer. Launched 1902. Displacement 300 tons. Speed 30
knots. One 9–pr., six 3–pr. guns.

Munro, Commander, 423–4

_Myrmidon_, 406
Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement 370 tons. Speed 30 knots. One
12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Napoleon, 153, 245

Nasmith, Commander, 519

Naval Brigades, 377–90, 392

Naval Intelligence Division, 495–6, 502–5

Naval Reserves called out, 231

Naval Volunteers, 255

Naval War Staff, 56, 69, 90–3

_Neptune_, 122
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1909. Displacement 19,900 tons.
Speed 21 knots. Ten 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

New Guinea Expedition, 322

New Zealand, 319–20

New Zealand Contingent sails, 321–2

_New Zealand_, 219, 237, 274, 331, 428, 466
Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 18,800 tons. Speed 25
knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Newcastle_, 315, 450, 453, 465, 467–8
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

Newspaper Press Committee, 431

Nicholson, Sir William, 50, 249

Nieuport, 406

_Nürnberg_, 307, 316–7, 319, 446, 448, 455–6, 463, 477–8
German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 3,396 tons. Speed
23½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Nusa_, 307
German Government yacht.

_Ocean_, 312
Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

Oguri, Admiral, 469

Oil Problem, 133–41, 179–81

Oliver, Admiral, 374–5, 401, 438, 452, 466, 474, 493, 502, 504, 508

Ollivant, Colonel, 306, 345, 347

_Olympic_, liner, 431

Omnibuses from London streets, 321

Oram, Sir Henry, 129, 133, 144, 147

_Orama_, 448, 451, 473
Armed merchant cruiser.

Osmaston, Colonel, 397

Ostend, 404;
British destroyers fire on, 402–3

_Otranto_, 445–447, 450, 454, 456–9, 463, 466, 469–70, 478
Armed merchant cruiser.

Ottley, Sir Charles, 81, 220

Pakenham, Captain, 83, 86–7, 89

_Panther_, 39, 46
German gunboat. Launched 1901. Displacement 962 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Eight 3·4″ guns.

Paris, General, 347, 381–3, 385, 387

_Pegasus_, 308
Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Philomel_, 323–24
Light cruiser. Launched 1890. Displacement 2,575 tons. Speed 19
knots. Eight 4·7″ guns.

_Pioneer_, 316, 324
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 2,200 tons.
Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

‘Plan XVII,’ 285–7

_Planet_, 307
German surveying vessel.

Pohl, Admiral von, 260, 334

_Princess Royal_, 328, 333, 428, 466–7, 481–5
Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 26,350 tons. Speed 27
knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Prince Eitel Friedrich_, 316
German armed merchant cruiser.

_Proserpine_, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

Protectionist Movement, 20, 22

_Psyche_, 323–4
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 2,200 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Pyramus_, 323–4
Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Queen Elizabeth_, 137, 140–1, 465, 545
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Queen Mary_, 141
Battle cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 27,000 tons. Speed 27
knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 303, 381–3, 386–8, 394

Reading, Lord, 291

Redmond, Mr., 191, 197

Reid, Sir Robert. See Loreburn, Earl

_Renown_, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32
knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Repulse_, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32
knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Requin_, 544
French battleship. Launched 1885. Displacement 7,200 tons. Speed 14
knots. Two 10·8″, six 3·9″ guns.

_Reshadieh_, 222
Turkish battleship building in Great Britain. Requisitioned for Royal
Navy. Renamed Erin. Launched 1913. Displacement 22,940 tons. Speed
21½ knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_Revenge_, 409, 492
(old.) (Renamed _Redoubtable_ later.) Battleship. Launched 1892.
Displacement 14,000 tons. Speed 17½ knots. Four 13·5″, ten 6″
guns.
(new.) Dreadnought Battleship. Launched 1915. Displacement 25,750
tons. Speed 23 knots. Eight 15″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Rinaldo_, 407
Sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″
guns.

Ripon, Lord, 24

Roberts, Earl, 248–9, 360

Ronarc’h, Admiral, 371, 377, 379

_Roon_, 514
German cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 9,350 tons. Speed 21
knots. Four 8·2″, ten 5·9″ guns.

Rosebery, Lord, and Anglo-French Agreement, 15

Rouvier, M., 26

Roy, General, 371, 377

Royal Fleet Reserve, 255

Royal Flying Corps, 336–7

Royal Naval Air Service, 336–7

Royal Naval Division, 306–7

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 255

_Royalist_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6 six 4″ guns.

Russian Army, 55, 298

Russo-Japanese War, 14, 23

— Influence of Russian defeat on German policy, 14

Saint-Seine, Comte de, 233

_Salamis_, 498
Greek battle cruiser building in Germany, 1914.

Salisbury, Marquess of, 10, 11, 21

Samoa, 321, 444–5

Samson, Commander, 340, 343–4, 398

Samuel, Sir Marcus, 108

_Sapphire_, 428
Light cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 3,000 tons. Speed 22
knots. Twelve 4″ guns.

Scapa Flow, 414, 425–6, 485–6, 505

Scarborough bombardment, 507–9, 520

_Scharnhorst_, 307–8, 313–4, 316–7, 320–4, 443, 445–69, 476–7, 483–4
German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 11,420 tons. Speed 22½
knots. Eight 8·2″, six 5·9″ guns.

Scheer, Admiral, 261 (_note_), 332–4, 431, 504, 515

Scheldt, 361, 373

Schwab, Mr., 497–8

Seaplanes, 336–44

Serbia, 31, 204

_Severn_, 401
Monitor. Launched 1914. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two
6″, two 4·7″ guns.

_Shearwater_, 315
Canadian sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Six 4″ guns.

Shells, weight of, 121–2

Slade, Admiral, 139

Smith, F. E. _See_ Birkenhead, Lord

Smith, Sir James M., 205 (_note_)

Smuts, General, 464, 544

Souchon, Admiral, 265, 269, 275, 536

South African War, 12, 20

_Southampton_, 517
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Southborough, Lord, 108, 138

Spee, Admiral von, 317–9, 442, 455–8, 460–6, 473–7, 542

Spenser-Grey, Commander, 389 (_note_)

Spies, 49, 224

_Stettin_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 3,396 tons. Speed
23½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Stoddart, Admiral, 448, 452–5, 460–4, 462, 473

_Strassburg_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Sturdee, Admiral, 438, 455, 462, 466, 472–5, 493–4

Submarine menace, 409, 413–41, 495–7

Sueter, Commodore, 340, 344

_Swift_, 143–5, 422
Destroyer leader. Launched 1907. Displacement 1,800 tons. Speed 35
knots. Four 4″ guns.

_Swiftsure_, 312–3, 542–3
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots.
Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Swinton, Major, 300

_Sydney_, 314, 316–7, 320–4, 327, 468, 471–2, 542
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons.
Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Talaat Bey, 523

Tanks, 344–5

Tariff Reform, 22

Tennyson-D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 129

Tholens, Lieutenant, 333

Thomson, Graeme, 396

_Tiger_, 428, 465–6
Battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed 28
knots. Eight 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 33, 46, 66, 103, 111, 114, 117–8, 140, 188–91,
260, 263, 333, 515

Togo, Admiral, 86, 131

Toul demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Transport Department, 397–8

_Tribal_ class, 142

Triple Alliance, 7, 12, 16

_Triumph_, 219, 313–7
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots.
Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Troubridge, Admiral, 120, 267, 269, 272–3

_Tsukuba_, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,750 tons. Speed 21
knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″, twelve 4·7″ guns.

Turkey enters the War, 522–51

Turkish alliance with Germany, 266, 539–40

Tweedmouth, Lord, 74

Tyrrell, Sir William, 210, 367

Tyrwhitt, Admiral, 148, 330–2, 349, 352, 404, 506

_Undaunted_, 402
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

Unionist Party supports Government, August, 1914, 215–6, 232

_Valiant_, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Venerable_, 406–7
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 15,000 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Vengeance_, 467, 493
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12″ twelve 6″ guns.

Venizelos, M., 529–30, 534, 538, 544

Verdun demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Villiers, Sir F., 364, 367, 370

Von der Marwitz, 359

Warrender, Sir George, 508–10, 512, 514–8

_Warrior_, 269, 467, 484, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six
9·2″, four 7·5″ guns.

_Warspite_, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Watts, Sir Philip, 106, 129, 133, 144, 147

Webb, Captain, 427

Weddigen, Lieutenant, 352

Wemyss, Admiral, 527

Westminster, Duke of, 302

_Weymouth_, 313, 465, 407–8
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Whitby bombardment, 520

White, Sir W., 108

_Wildfire_, 406–7
Sloop. Launched 1888. Displacement 1,140 tons. Speed 14 knots.

William, Crown Prince, 65

William, German Emperor, 11, 26, 33, 96, 98, 101, 104, 110–2, 216, 334

Wilmot, Sir E., 107

Wilson, Sir Arthur K., 78, 84–6, 146, 159, 437–9, 462, 481, 486, 488,
505, 510–2

—— character sketch, 78–81;
letter to Mr. Asquith refusing to undertake office of First Sea Lord
unless under Mr. Churchill, 85;
opposes creation of Naval War Staff, 81;
view of the British plan in event of war, 55

Wilson, Sir Henry, 50, 53, 55, 286

—— states his view of the German plan for attacking France, 53–5

Wyndham, George, 508

_Yahagi_, 466
Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed
26 knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Yarmouth, bombardment of, 479–81

_Yarmouth_, 314, 316–7, 323–4, 468, 542
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Yashima_, Japanese battleship, loss of, 430

Yeomanry Cavalry, 347

Ypres, 411

Zanzibar, 11

_Zélée_, 316, 445
French gunboat. Launched 1899. Displacement 554 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Two 3·9″, four 2·5″ guns.

_Zemchug_, 308, 314, 323
Russian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 3,130 tons. Speed
23 knots. Eight 4·7″ guns.

Zeppelins, 337–40, 400

-----

Footnote 1:

Prince Henckel von Donnesmarck.

Footnote 2:

Von Tirpitz’s account is quite direct. “At his [von
Kiderlen-Wächter’s] suggestion the Chancellor dispatched the gunboat
_Panther_ to the Moroccan port Agadir on July 1, 1911, and left the
British Government, when it asked the reason, completely in the dark
and without a reply for many weeks. The result was that on July 21
Lloyd George delivered a speech which had been drawn up in the British
Cabinet, in which he warned Germany that she would find British power
on the side of France in the event of a challenge.”

Footnote 3:

The work had been begun by Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Grant-Duff,
afterwards killed on the Aisne.

Footnote 4:

The italics are mine.

Footnote 5:

The close blockade of the German ports was prescribed in the war
orders of 1909, during Lord Fisher’s term of office. Sir Arthur Wilson
did not reveal any modification, which he had made in consequence of
new conditions to anyone.

Footnote 6:

Sir Charles Ottley: at that time Secretary to the Committee of
Imperial Defence.

Footnote 7:

The memorandum abridged can be read in Appendix A.

Footnote 8:

Admiral Mahan.

Footnote 9:

Sir Julian Corbett.

Footnote 10:

_Reflections on the World War_, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, p. 48.

Footnote 11:

It was not in fact completed till August, 1914.

Footnote 12:

By later decision a Squadron of British Battle-cruisers was stationed
in the Mediterranean.

Footnote 13:

i.e. The Entente.

Footnote 14:

The final published text of the law provided for 72.

Footnote 15:

Sir Francis Hopwood, now Lord Southborough, the Additional Civil Lord.

Footnote 16:

A doubtful gem! They could have coaled only in a few ports with
special appliances.

Footnote 17:

This is the biggest gun which can be completely worked by hand, the
shot being lifted by a single man.

Footnote 18:

_Lion, Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal._

Footnote 19:

Contrary to common opinion and, as many will think, to the proved
lessons of the war, I do not believe in the wisdom of the
Battle-Cruiser type. If it is worth while to spend far more than the
price of your best battleship upon a fast heavily-gunned vessel, it is
better at the same time to give it the heaviest armour as well. You
then have a ship which may indeed cost half as much again as a
battleship but which at any rate can do everything. To put the value
of a first-class battleship into a vessel which cannot stand the
pounding of a heavy action is false policy. It is far better to spend
the extra money and have what you really want. The battle-cruiser in
other words should be superseded by the fast battleship, i.e. fast
strongest ship, in spite of her cost.—W.S.C.

Footnote 20:

The Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 21:

Director of Admiralty Contracts.

Footnote 22:

An approximate estimate of the return obtained by His Majesty’s
Government on their original investment of £2,200,000, in the
Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd.:

(1) The original Government investment of £2,200,000 in £1
Ordinary Shares has become one of 5 million shares, and
the appreciation in value of these at current prices
represent approximately some £16,000,000

(2) The Government has received in dividends, interest,
Income Tax, Excess Profits, Duty and Corporation Tax,
over 6,500,000

(3) The supply contract has enabled the Government
Departments to save on the purchase price of oil as
compared with current prices, about 7,500,000

(4) It may also be claimed that the prices of oil supplied
by other companies have been brought down by the
competition of the Anglo-Persian Company, though to what
extent must be a matter of opinion: and further, that the
saving on oil prices under the supply contract may be
expected to continue throughout the currency of the
contract. It would not be unfair to estimate the effect
of the last two factors at an additional 10,000,000
———————————
Total £40,000,000

Footnote 23:

Actually four.

Footnote 24:

_Kiel and Jutland_, by Commander George von Hase.

Footnote 25:

Rear-Admiral Briggs was at this time Controller or Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 26:

No one can form any idea of the difficulties the Admiralty encountered
in securing adequate defences for Eastern harbours. Coast Defence was
in the province of the War Office and paid for on their estimates.
They needed every penny for their Field Army and Expeditionary Force,
and naturally marshalled all their experts against expenditure on
fortifications in Great Britain. In consequence expert opinion was
always divided. The discussions evaporated in technicalities, and the
lay members of the Committee were rarely convinced of the unwelcome
need of spending money. To such a point was the dispute carried, that
Prince Louis and I undertook in desperation to fortify Cromarty
ourselves, arm it with naval guns and man it with marines. And this
was the only new work completed when the war broke out.

Footnote 27:

Mr. Marsh and Mr. (now Sir James) Masterton Smith.

Footnote 28:

I have inconsistently adopted the familiar spelling of this ship’s
name instead of _Göben_.

Footnote 29:

Later in the morning I learnt that Lord Fisher was in the office and I
invited him into my room. I told him what we had done and his delight
was wonderful to see.

Foolish statements have been made from time to time that this sending
of the Fleet to the North was done at Lord Fisher’s suggestion. The
interview with me which Lord Fisher records in his book is correctly
given by him as having taken place on the 30th. The Fleet had actually
passed the Straits of Dover the night before. I think it necessary to
place on record the fact that my sole naval adviser on every measure
taken prior to the declaration of war was the First Sea Lord.

Footnote 30:

Now Lord Birkenhead.

Footnote 31:

Dryden, _Threnodia Augustalis_.

Footnote 32:

The minute constituting the Division is printed in Appendix A.

Footnote 33:

Appendix B.

Footnote 34:

Admiral Scheer, p. 13.

Footnote 35:

Appendix C. I hope it may be read.—W. S. C.

Footnote 36:

See map to face p. 274.

Footnote 37:

_The Flight of the Goeben_, Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne.

Footnote 38:

See Official Naval History, pp. 60, 61.

Footnote 39:

At the Falklands the two British battle cruisers used up nearly
three-quarters of their ammunition to sink only two weaker
antagonists, using 12–inch guns against 8·8–inch. The _Goeben_
single-handed would have had to have sunk four, using 11–inch guns
against 9·2–inch.

Footnote 40:

The italics are mine.—W. S. C.

Footnote 41:

General Lanrezac—‘_Le plan de Campagne Français_,’ p. 110.

Footnote 42:

General von Kluck—‘_The March on Paris_,’ p. 38.

Footnote 43:

Committee of Imperial Defence.

Footnote 44:

The Fourth Division (the Fifth to go).

Footnote 45:

The Fourth Division (fifth in order of embarkation) arrived on the
field at the beginning of the battle of Le Cateau.

Footnote 46:

Actually called the 6th Army.

Footnote 47:

In fact, however, it was the 1st Middlesex (19th Infantry Brigade
attached to 4th Division), who captured the guns at Néry, the Guards
being miles away at Villers Cotterets.

Footnote 48:

The italics are new.

Footnote 49:

The Third German Army took Rheims and were bombarded in the town by
the Second Army.

Footnote 50:

Official History Appendix 22, p. 473.

Footnote 51:

The correspondence on this subject is printed in the Official History
of the War, Appendix 22, p. 471.

Footnote 52:

See map to face p. 328.

Footnote 53:

See Appendix.

Footnote 54:

The old battleships in question were actually “Canopuses”—the class
above “Majestics.”

Footnote 55:

The underlining denotes approximately the comparative values of the
units.

Footnote 56:

Only those ships of the Japanese Navy who took part in the operations
are included.

Footnote 57:

_Encounter_ went instead of _Melbourne_.

Footnote 58:

They went without escort and without mishap.

Footnote 59:

Admiral Scheer, p. 52.

Footnote 60:

_See also_ Appendix.

Footnote 61:

Dupont, ‘Haut Commandment Allemand en 1914,’ p. 92.

Footnote 62:

The Naval torpedo school centre.

Footnote 63:

The first design of the Tank made at my request by Admiral Bacon in
September, 1914, carried a bridge in front which it dropped on
arriving at a trench, passed over, and automatically raised behind it.

Footnote 64:

An officer of the General Staff who had been attached, at my request
in 1913, to the Admiralty War Staff in order to promote an effective
_liaison_ between the two staffs. This very gifted officer rendered us
invaluable service. He died prematurely after the hardships of the
war, throughout the whole of which he served with distinction in
situations of responsibility and danger.

Footnote 65:

Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles.

Footnote 66:

‘The loss on September 22,’ wrote Mr. Gibson Bowles, ‘of the
_Aboukir_, the _Cressy_ and the _Hogue_, with 1,459 officers and men
killed, occurred because, despite the warnings of admirals, commodores
and captains, Mr. Churchill refused, until it was too late, to recall
them from a patrol so carried on as to make them certain to fall
victims to the torpedoes of an active enemy.’

Footnote 67:

But see Lord Esher: ‘One night he (Kitchener) was in bed asleep, when
Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, bursting into the
room, pleaded for the War Minister’s permission to leave at once for
Antwerp. In spite of the late hour, Sir Edward Grey arrived in the
middle of the discussion, and while he was engaging Lord Kitchener’s
attention, Mr. Churchill slipped away. He was next heard of when a
telegram from Antwerp was put into Lord K.’s hands, in which his
impetuous colleague asked bravely to be allowed to resign his great
office, to be given command of a Naval Brigade, and pleading that
reinforcements should be hurried out to those “forlorn and lonely
men,” as he called them, who were vainly trying to hold on to the
Antwerp lines. Lord K. was not upset, but he was not unmoved,
etc....’—_The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener_, p. 67.

It is remarkable that Lord Esher should be so much astray; for during
the war I showed him the text of the telegrams printed in this chapter
and now made public for the first time. We must conclude that an
uncontrollable fondness forbade him to forsake fiction for fact. Such
constancy is a defect in an historian.

W. S. C.

Footnote 68:

Commanders Marix and Spenser-Grey.

Footnote 69:

It was perhaps an unconscious recognition of the naval significance of
Antwerp that all three great Powers—Germany, France and Britain—used
in its attack and defence Naval Brigades formed since the outbreak of
war.

Footnote 70:

Rawlinson’s Force was so styled.

Footnote 71:

The heavy losses of the 7th Division have often been attributed to
their attempt to relieve Antwerp. In fact, however, these losses did
not begin until after they had joined the main army.

Footnote 72:

i.e. The absence of a greater French effort.

Footnote 73:

A battleship.

Footnote 74:

A curious coincidence or foreboding. Almost at that moment the
_Audacious_ was moving to her doom.

Footnote 75:

War Office.

Footnote 76:

This will be discussed in the second volume. The alternatives are here
only mentioned to explain the context.

Footnote 77:

This energetic and practical officer, whom I had employed during the
previous eighteen months to supervise the fortification of Cromarty,
had already designed a type of anti-submarine boom which he was
actually installing at Cromarty.

Footnote 78:

I have slightly abridged this minute.

Footnote 79:

_October 28, 1914._

DEAR MR. CHURCHILL,—

I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this
juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some
respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these
circumstances I feel it to be my duty, as a loyal subject of His
Majesty, to resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to
facilitate the task of the administration of the great Service, to
which I have devoted my life, and to ease the burden laid on H.M.
Ministers.

I am,
Yours very truly,
LOUIS BATTENBERG,
_Admiral_.

_October 29, 1914._

MY DEAR PRINCE LOUIS,—

This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or
death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind.
It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilisation. I
cannot further oppose the wish, you have during the last few weeks
expressed to me, to be released from the burden of responsibility
which you have borne thus far with so much honour and success.

The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration of
our country are in themselves enough to try a man’s spirit; and when
to them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you speak,
I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them.

The Navy of to-day, and still more the Navy of to-morrow, bears the
imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital
ships, the score of thirty-knot cruisers, the destroyers and
submarines unequalled in modern construction which are coming now to
hand, are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in
which the Board of Admiralty owes so much to your aid.

The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet
was taken by you.

I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to you, and the pain I
feel at the severance of our three years’ official association. In
all the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in
which you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of
Battenberg has given his life to our cause and in which your gallant
son is now serving in the Fleet.

I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues
on the Board.

I remain,
Yours very sincerely,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

Footnote 80:

Throughout this chapter the map facing page 476 and the table of ships
on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 81:

The rocks of Abrolhos off the Brazilian Coast were our secret coaling
base in these waters.

Footnote 82:

Details relating to colliers, supply ships and mails have been
omitted, unless of significance to the account.

Footnote 83:

The table of ships on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 84:

_Official History of the War: Naval Operations_, Vol. I, p. 344.

Footnote 85:

All the ships in small capitals fought eventually in the battle of the
Falkland Islands.

Footnote 86:

Here the reader should certainly look at the map facing page 476,
which deals directly with this situation.

Footnote 87:

All the above telegrams had to be sent by various routes and most were
repeated by several routes, as of course we could not communicate
direct across these great distances. But I omit the procedure to
simplify the account.

Footnote 88:

See opposite page 474.

Footnote 89:

Only _Dreadnoughts_ had tripods.

Footnote 90:

_The Grand Fleet_, by Sir John Jellicoe, p. 31.

Footnote 91:

_See_ Appendix D., p. 566.

Footnote 92:

I was in France for thirty-six hours.—W. S. C.

Footnote 93:

Battle cruiser.

Footnote 94:

Appendix E.

Footnote 95:

Two had had to be removed from each of the five ‘Queen Elizabeths,’
owing to spray interference.

Footnote 96:

See map to face page 518.

Footnote 97:

i.e. about 80 miles West of Heligoland.

Footnote 98:

It must be explained that in these days the wireless communication
with destroyers and still more submarines was not as perfect as it
became later on. The _Firedrake_ had therefore been stationed in the
morning midway between the submarines and Harwich to pass on messages.
She had late in the afternoon, after the orders to take the submarines
into the Bight had reached her, rejoined Commodore Keyes and the link
was, for the time being, broken.

Footnote 99:

The whole of this operation is described in minute detail in the
official British Naval History, and should be studied with the
excellent charts by those who are interested in its technical aspect.
So complicated is the full story that the lay reader cannot see the
wood for the trees. I have endeavoured to render intelligible the
broad effects.—W.S.C.

Footnote 100:

See map to face page 518, ‘The Dawn Situation.’

Footnote 101:

See map facing this page, ‘The Noon Situation.’

Footnote 102:

The _Dresden_ and two armed merchant cruisers were alive for a few
weeks more, but in complete inactivity.

Footnote 103:

In peace.

Footnote 104:

In war.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 50, changed “Tirah Expedition in 1988” to “Tirah Expedition in
1898”.
2. P. 517, changed “out Light Cruiser Squadron” to “our Light Cruiser
Squadron”.
3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as
printed.
5. Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together
at the end of the last chapter.
6. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
7. Enclosed bold font in =equals=.
8. Superscripts are denoted by a caret before a single superscript
character, e.g. M^r.

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