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Title: History of the Peninsular War Volume II (of 6)
Author: Southey, Robert
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Note
Sidenotes are shown in UPPER-CASE and enclosed in ♦DIAMOND SYMBOLS♦;
italic text is enclosed in _underscores_. Other notes will be found at
the end of this eBook.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
“Unto thee
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”
DONNE.
BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.
POET LAUREATE,
HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.
A NEW EDITION.
_IN SIX VOLUMES._
VOL. II.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVIII.
Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη,
καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς
ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.
POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX.
PAGE
Preparations at Zaragoza 1
Description of that city 3
Legend of our Lady of the Pillar 5
Contempt of the French for the Zaragozans 7
The French attempt to storm the city 8
Palafox goes out to collect reinforcements 9
General Verdier joins Lefebvre with reinforcements 11
The Torrero taken 11
The French bombard the city 11
Exertions of the women 13
Countess Burita 13
Augustina Zaragoza 14
The French again repulsed in an attempt to take the city by
storm 15
They invest the city 16
They form a bridge over the Ebro 17
Distress of the inhabitants 17
Foundling Hospital burnt 18
Convent of St. Engracia 19
The Hospital set on fire 24
War in the streets 25
Santiago Sass 26
Number of the dead 28
Retreat of the enemy 29
CHAPTER X.
Moretti sent from Badajoz to the Spaniards at Lisbon 35
Difficulties of Junot’s situation 35
Kellermann takes the command in Alem-Tejo 37
He attempts to conciliate the Spaniards at Badajoz 38
Distribution of the French troops in Portugal 41
The Spaniards at Porto declare against the Intruder, and march
into Spain 41
The lawful government restored at Porto 42
The Governor adheres to the French, and suppresses the
insurrection 43
Junot disarms and seizes the Spaniards at Lisbon 45
Junot’s proclamation to the Portugueze 47
Festival of the Corpo de Deos at Lisbon 49
The procession interrupted by a panic fear 52
Junot fortifies the Castle 54
Edict for disarming the people 54
Movements at Braga 56
Insurrection at Melgaço 56
The Prince Regent proclaimed at Braganza 59
The Braganzans intimidated by the news from Porto 60
Second insurrection at Porto 62
Formation of a Junta in that city 63
Measures of the Junta 66
Arrest of Cardoso 67
Disturbed state of the people 70
The Junta conclude an alliance with the Junta of Galicia 72
Its authority acknowledged throughout the north of Portugal 73
The insurrection extends toward Coimbra 74
Scheme for surprising the enemy in Coimbra 75
The French in that city are made prisoners 76
The Juiz do Povo takes the command 78
Order restored there 79
Preparations for defence 80
Successful expedition against Figueira 81
Loison ordered to march from Almeida to Porto 83
He turns back from Mezam Frio 84
The peasantry harass his retreat 85
He goes to Viseu 86
Alarm at Coimbra in consequence of his movements 86
He returns to Almeida 87
Insurrection at Olham in Algarve 88
Success of the insurgents 90
The Chamber of Faro issue an edict against them 91
Insurrection at Faro 91
The French excluded from that city 93
A Junta formed at Faro 94
The insurrection spreads through Algarve 94
The French retreat to Mertola 95
The people of Algarve form a treaty with Seville 96
Insurrection at Villa-Viçosa 96
The French enter the town 98
Lobo gets possession of Jurumenha 99
A French detachment sent from Mertola to Beja 101
The people rise against them 102
Beja sacked by the French and set on fire 104
Kellermann’s proclamation to the people of Alem-Tejo 105
Junot’s proclamation to the Portugueze 106
National feeling of the Portugueze 108
The Juiz de Fora at Marvam 110
His flight 112
He returns, and seizes the town 114
Insurrection at Campo-Mayor and throughout the
north of the province 115
Measures of the French 116
They endeavour to avail themselves of the Clergy’s influence 118
Insurrection at Thomar 120
Insurrection at Leiria 121
Success of the insurgents at Nazareth 121
Margaron approaches Leiria 122
Preparations for defence 123
The French enter the city 124
Massacre of the prisoners 126
Loison’s march from Almeida to Abrantes 127
Language of the French Bulletins 129
Loison ordered towards Coimbra 132
Nazareth sacked and burnt by the French 133
A Junta established at Beja 135
Junta of Estremoz 136
A supreme Junta formed at Evora 138
Loison sent into Alem-Tejo 139
He advances against Evora 140
Action before that city 143
The city taken 145
Inhumanity of the conquerors 146
Alarm at Estremoz 147
Loison proceeds to Elvas 149
He enters Portalegre 150
He is recalled towards Lisbon 151
Insubordination of the people at Porto 151
Design of a military usurpation in that city 153
The conspirators are seized 154
Disturbances at Braganza 156
The New-Christians plundered at Villa Nova da Foz-Coa 157
Troubles at Viseu 159
Riotous proceedings at Arcos de Val de Vez 160
The rabble enact laws 161
Communication between Alem-Tejo and the northern provinces 163
CHAPTER XI.
State of public feeling in England 166
An expedition ordered to the court of Portugal 168
Former services of Sir Arthur Wellesley 169
Sir Arthur lands at Coruña 171
He proceeds to Porto 172
He goes to the Tagus to confer with Sir C. Cotton 173
Troops landed in the Mondego 174
They advance to Leiria 176
Joy of the Portugueze in Lisbon 177
Measures of the French 179
Movements of Laborde and Loison 180
General Freire separates from the English 181
Motives for this separation 183
Skirmish near Caldas 185
Laborde takes a position at Roliça 185
Battle of Roliça 188
Abrantes occupied by the Portugueze 190
Movements in Alem-Tejo and Algarve 193
Alcacere and Setubal abandoned by the French 194
Measures at Lisbon 195
Proclamation to the people of Lisbon 196
Preparations on board the Russian squadron 199
Junction of Loison, Laborde, and Junot 200
The British advance to Vimeiro 200
General Anstruther’s brigade lands 201
Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard in the roads 202
He alters the plan of the campaign 203
Battle of Vimeiro 205
The French resolve to propose terms 216
Arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple 218
He orders the army to advance 219
Kellermann comes to negotiate for the evacuation of Portugal 221
Terms of the armistice 222
Junot returns to Lisbon 224
General Freire dissatisfied with the armistice 226
Difficulty concerning the Russian squadron 227
Convention of Cintra 228
Remonstrances of the Portugueze Commander 233
Reply of Sir Hew Dalrymple 236
The British flag hoisted in the forts 238
Anarchy in Lisbon 239
The French continue to plunder 240
Question concerning baggage 241
The French endeavour to carry off articles from the Museum 243
They embark horses, carriages, and pictures, which are
recovered 243
They carry off large sums in money 244
Question concerning the silver in bars 245
Farther instances of dishonour in the French 246
Protests of the Monteiro Mor, and of the Juiz do Povo 247
Danger of tumults in Lisbon 249
Temper of the French 251
Their embarkation 252
Final report of the commissioners 253
Addresses of thanks to the British Commander 254
Galluzo besieges Elvas 255
Difficulties concerning the surrender of Elvas 257
Elvas and Almeida given up 259
Tumults at Porto 260
The Spanish troops at Lisbon embarked for Catalonia 262
Intrigues of the Junta of Porto 263
Council of Regency re-established 265
Outcry in England against the Convention 267
Board of Inquiry appointed 273
Its decision 274
CHAPTER XII.
Necessity of a provisional Government 277
Castaños prevents a contest between Granada and Seville 279
Plans for a Government 279
Arrival of a Sicilian Prince at Gibraltar 280
Ambition of the Junta of Seville 282
The Council of Castille advise a Central Junta 283
Project of the Junta of Seville 284
The Provincial Juntas assent to it 289
Unworthy choice of the Junta of Seville 290
The other members unexceptionable 292
Jovellanos refuses all offers from the Intrusive Government 295
Aranjuez chosen for the place of meeting 296
Installation of the Central Junta 298
Conduct of the Council of Castille 299
The Leonese Deputies arrested by Cuesta 300
Cuesta’s vindication of his conduct 301
The Council of Castille interfere 303
Cuesta is summoned before the Junta 303
Declaration of the New Government 306
Jovellanos proposes a Regency, and that a Cortes be summoned 311
Expectations from a Cortes 313
State of the war in Catalonia 315
Duhesme resolves to besiege Gerona 316
Difficulties on the march 317
Troops from Minorca land at Tarragona 318
Barcelona blockaded 319
The Junta of Catalonia remove to the head-quarters 320
Caldagues sent to interrupt the siege of Gerona 321
He attacks the enemy’s batteries with success 321
Duhesme raises the siege 323
Unpopularity of the Commander in Catalonia 324
Difficulties of the service 325
The Marques approaches Barcelona 327
British troops ordered from Sicily to Catalonia, but detained
by the Commander 328
Bilbao occupied by the French 329
Difficulties in bringing the Spanish armies into the field 330
The Marques de la Romana 333
Distribution of his troops in the Baltic 334
Their conduct when the oath of allegiance to Joseph was
proposed 336
An agent sent to communicate with him 337
He asks for a force to cover his retreat 338
Sir Richard Keats goes upon this service 339
Plan for collecting the Spanish troops 340
Romana takes possession of Nyborg 341
The entrance of the British squadron is resisted 342
Arrival of some of the regiments from Jutland 343
They leave the Isle of Funen 344
Fate of the horses 345
The Spaniards are landed in the Isle of Langeland 346
They sail for Gottenburg, and there embark for Spain 348
Romana lands in England 349
Error of the Spaniards in not appointing a commander-in-chief 350
Difficulty of feeding their armies 350
Bilbao taken by the French, and retaken 351
Position of the armies in October 352
Commissioners sent to the Spanish armies 353
CHAPTER XIII.
Buonaparte deeply affected by the reverses in Spain 355
He conceals them from the French people 356
Statement of the French Government 358
Report of M. Champagny 360
Second Report 363
Report of the War-minister 365
Suspicion of the views of Austria 367
Message from Buonaparte to the Senate 368
The Senate approves his measures 369
March of the troops toward Spain 371
Speech of Buonaparte to the troops 373
Conferences at Erfurth 374
Overtures of peace 374
Reply of the British Government 376
Reply of the Russian and French Ministers 378
Final answer of the British Government 380
British Declaration 381
Buonaparte departs for Spain 384
CHAPTER XIV.
Movements against Blake’s army 387
Blake falls back to Espinosa 388
Battle of Espinosa 390
Dispersion of Blake’s army at Reynosa 393
Buonaparte arrives in Spain 394
Defeat of the Extremaduran army at Burgos 395
Proclamation excluding certain Spaniards from pardon 396
Movements against Castaños 398
Battle of Tudela 398
Retreat of the defeated army 400
Their deplorable condition at Calatayud 401
They are ordered to approach Madrid 402
Measures of the Central Junta 403
Pass of the Somosierra forced 407
The Junta retire from Aranjuez 408
State of Madrid 409
Marques de Perales murdered by the populace 411
Duque del Infantado sent to the central army 411
Madrid summoned 412
Morla treats for a capitulation 414
Speech of Buonaparte to the Deputies 415
Surrender of Madrid 417
Decrees issued by Buonaparte 419
Proclamation to the Spaniards 420
Change in Buonaparte’s views concerning Spain 422
Retreat of the central army 423
Lapeña succeeds to the command 424
They reach Guadalaxara 425
The Duque del Infantado joins them 427
Condition of the troops 427
They retire toward the Tagus 429
Passage of the Tagus 430
Some of the troops mutiny 431
Infantado chosen Commander 432
They retire to Cuenca 432
Arrival of the Conde de Alache’s corps 434
Retreat of the Central Junta from Aranjuez 439
Their address to the people of Madrid 440
The French enter Toledo 442
Defence of Villacañas 444
Preparations for defending the Sierra Morena 446
Murder of S. Juan at Talavera 447
Edict against deserters 450
English stragglers butchered by the French cavalry 451
The French take possession of the Escurial 452
Excesses of the French 454
Galluzo collects the fugitives in Extremadura 456
He prepares for the defence of the Tagus 457
The French cross the river 459
Galluzo retreats to Jaraicejo 460
Dispersion of his army 461
Galluzo is superseded by Cuesta 463
CHAPTER XV.
Buonaparte reproaches and insults the English 465
The British army from Portugal enters Spain 466
Former services of Sir John Moore 468
His care to maintain discipline 468
Ill prospect of affairs when he arrives at Salamanca 469
Sir David Baird arrives at Astorga 470
Sir John Moore resolves to retreat upon Portugal, and embark
from Lisbon 471
He asks the opinion of the British Ambassador 473
Mr. Frere’s reply 475
He wishes the army to advance for the defence of Madrid 475
Two Spanish Generals sent to confer with Sir John Moore 477
Morla and the military Junta urge him to advance 477
Colonel Charmilly sent to Sir John Moore by the Duque del
Infantado and Mr. Frere 479
Sir John Moore resolves to advance 481
News of the surrender of Madrid 483
Correspondence with Romana 485
First skirmish at Rueda 486
The command of the Spanish armies offered to Sir John Moore,
and refused 488
Junction formed with Sir David Baird 490
They advance against Marshal Soult 491
The French endeavour to surround the British army 493
Sir John Moore begins his retreat 493
Ill conduct of the troops 496
Passage of the Ezla 496
General orders issued at Benevente 497
Affair of cavalry on the Ezla 499
Sir John Moore reaches Astorga 501
Honourable conduct of Romana and his army 502
Sir John Moore pursues his retreat 503
The Bierzo 505
Disorders committed by the troops 506
Buonaparte stops at Astorga 507
Skirmish at Cacabelos 509
Retreat continued from Villa Franca 510
Treasure abandoned 513
The army collects at Lugo 514
Sir John offers battle 516
Retreat to Coruña 517
Sir John is advised to propose terms 519
Preparations for battle 520
The artillery embarked 521
Battle of Coruña 522
Repulse of the French 527
Death of Sir John Moore 529
Embarkation of the army 530
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
CHAPTER IX.
SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.
♦1808. JUNE.♦
Important as the battle of Baylen was in its direct and immediate
consequences to the Spaniards, their cause derived greater celebrity
and more permanent strength from the defence of Zaragoza.
♦PREPARATIONS AT ZARAGOZA.♦
Order had been restored in that city from the hour when Palafox assumed
the command. Implicit confidence in the commander produced implicit
and alert obedience, and preparations were made with zeal and activity
proportioned to the danger. When the new Captain-General declared war
against the French, the troops which he mustered amounted only to 220
men, and the public treasury could furnish him with no more than an
hundred dollars; sixteen ill-mounted guns were all the artillery in
the place, and the arsenal contained but few muskets. Fowling-pieces
were put in requisition, pikes were forged, powder was supplied from
the mills at Villafeliche, which were some of the most considerable
in Spain, ... for every thing else Palafox trusted to his country and
his cause. And his trust was not in vain; the Zaragozans were ready to
endure any suffering and make any sacrifice in the discharge of their
duty; the same spirit possessed the whole country, and from all those
parts of Spain which were under the yoke of the enemy officers and
soldiers repaired to Zaragoza as soon as it was seen that an army was
collecting there; many came from Madrid and from Pampluna, and some
officers of engineers from the military academy at Alcala. And the
spirits of the people were encouraged by the discovery of a depôt of
fire-arms walled up in the Aljafaria; they had probably been secreted
there in the succession war, when one party resigned that city to its
enemies, and their discovery in this time of need was regarded by the
Zaragozans as a manifestation of divine Providence in their favour. The
defeats which their undisciplined levies sustained at Tudela, Mallen,
and Alagon abated not their resolution; and in the last of these
actions a handful of regular troops protected their retreat with great
steadiness. The French general, Lefebvre Desnouettes, pursuing his
hitherto uninterrupted success, advanced, and took up a position very
near the city, and covered by a rising ground planted with olive trees.
♦DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY.♦
Zaragoza was not a [1]fortified town; the brick wall which surrounded
it was from ten to twelve feet high, and three feet thick, and in
many places it was interrupted by houses, which formed part of the
inclosure. The city had no advantages of situation for its defence,
and would not have been considered capable of resistance by any men
but those whose courage was sustained by a virtuous and holy principle
of duty. It stands in an open plain, which was then covered with olive
grounds, and is bounded on either hand by high and distant mountains;
but it is commanded by some high ground called the Torrero, about a
mile to the south-west, upon which there was a convent, with some
smaller buildings. The canal of Aragon divides this elevation from
another rising ground, where the Spaniards had erected a battery. The
Ebro bathes the walls of the city, and separates it from the suburbs;
it has two bridges, within musket-shot of each other; one of wood,
said to be more beautiful than any other of the like materials in
Europe; the other of freestone, consisting of seven arches, the largest
of which is 122 feet in diameter; the river is fordable above the
city. Two smaller rivers, the Galego and the Guerva, flow at a little
distance from the city, the one on the east, the other on the west;
the latter being separated from the walls only by the breadth of the
common road: both are received into the Ebro. Unlike most other places
of the peninsula, Zaragoza has neither aqueduct nor fountains, but
derives its water wholly from the river. The people of Tortosa, (and
probably of the other towns upon its course,) drink also of the Ebro,
preferring it to the finest spring; the water is of a dirty red colour,
but, having stood a few hours, it becomes perfectly clear, and has a
softness and pleasantness of taste, which soon induces strangers to
agree with the natives in their preference of it. The population was
stated in the census of 1787 at 42,600; that of 1797, excellent as it
is in all other respects, has the fault of not specifying the places
in each district; later accounts computed its inhabitants at 60,000,
and it was certainly one of the largest cities in the peninsula. It had
twelve gates, four of them in the old wall of Augustus, by whom the
older town of Salduba upon the same site was enlarged, beautified, and
called Cæsarea-Augusta, or Cæsaraugusta; a word easily corrupted into
its [2]present name.
The whole city is built of brick; even the convents and churches were
of this coarse material, which was bad of its kind, so that there
were cracks in most of these edifices from top to bottom. The houses
are not so high as they usually are in old Spanish towns, their
general height being only three stories; the streets are, as usual,
very narrow and crooked; there are, however, open market-places; and
one very wide, long, and regularly built street, formerly called the
Calle Santa, having been the scene of many martyrdoms, but now more
commonly known by the name of the Cozo. The people, like the rest of
the Aragonese, and their neighbours, the Catalans, have been always
honourably distinguished in Spanish history for their love of liberty;
and the many unavailing struggles which they have made during the
last four centuries, had not abated their attachment to the good
principles of their forefathers. Within the peninsula, (and once
indeed throughout the whole of Catholic Europe,) Zaragoza was famous
as the city of our Lady of the Pillar, whose legend is still so firmly
believed by the people, and most of the clergy in Spain, that it was
frequently appealed to in the proclamations of the different generals
and Juntas, as one of the most popular articles of the national faith.
The legend is this: when ♦OUR LADY OF THE PILLAR.♦ the apostles, after
the resurrection, separated and went to preach the gospel in different
parts of the world, St. James the elder, (or Santiago, as he may more
properly be called in his mythological history,) departed for Spain,
which province Christ himself had previously commended to his care.
When he went to kiss the hand of the Virgin, and request her leave
to set off, and her blessing, she commanded him, in the name of her
Son, to build a church to her honour in that city of Spain wherein he
should make the greatest number of converts, adding, that she would
give him farther instructions concerning the edifice upon the spot.
Santiago set sail, landed in Galicia, and, having preached with little
success through the northern provinces, reached Cæsarea-Augusta, where
he made eight disciples. One night, after he had been conversing
and praying with them as usual on the banks of the river, they fell
asleep, and just at midnight the apostle heard heavenly voices sing,
_Ave Maria gratia plena!_ He fell on his knees, and instantly beheld
the Virgin upon a marble pillar in the midst of a choir of angels,
who went through the whole of her matin service. When this was ended,
she bade him build her church around that pillar, which his Lord,
her blessed Son, had sent him by the hands of his angels; there, she
told him, that pillar was to remain till the end of the world, and
great mercies would be vouchsafed there to those who supplicated for
them in her name. Having said this, the angels transported her back
to her house at Jerusalem, (for this was before the Assumption) and
Santiago, in obedience, erected upon that spot the first church which
was ever dedicated to the Virgin[3]. Cathedral service was performed
both in this church and in the see, and the meetings of the chapter
were held alternately in each. The interior of each was of the most
imposing[4] kind. When the elder of these joint cathedrals was erected,
Pope Gelasius granted indulgencies to all persons who would contribute
toward the work, and thus introduced a practice which contributed as
much to the grandeur and magnificence of ecclesiastical architecture,
as to laxity of morals and the prevalence of superstition.
♦CONTEMPT OF THE FRENCH FOR THE ZARAGOZANS.♦
Many mournful scenes of bigotry and superstition have been exhibited
in Zaragoza; but, in these fiery trials which Buonaparte’s tyranny was
preparing for the inhabitants, the dross and tinsel of their faith
disappeared, and its pure gold remained. The French, accustomed as
they were to undervalue the Spanish character, had spoken with peculiar
contempt of the Zaragozans. “Few persons,” they said, “are to be seen
among them who distinguish themselves by their dress; there is little
of that elegant attire so observable in large cities. All is serious
and regular, ... dull and monotonous. The place seems without any kind
of resource, because the inhabitants use no effort to obtain any; ...
accustomed to a state of apathy and languor, they have not an idea
of the possibility of shaking it off[5].” With this feeling, equally
despising the strength of the place, and the character of the people,
the French proceeded to besiege the capital of Aragon. A party of
their cavalry entered the town on the 14th, perhaps in pursuit of the
retreating patriots; they thought to scour the streets, but they were
soon made to feel, that the superiority of disciplined soldiers to
citizens exists only in the field.
♦JUNE 15.
THE FRENCH ATTEMPT TO STORM THE CITY.♦
On the following morning, the French, with part of their force,
attacked the outposts upon the canal, and, with their main body,
attempted to storm the city by the gate called Portillo. A desperate
conflict ensued. The Aragonese fought with a spirit worthy of their
cause. They had neither time, nor room, nor necessity for order.
Their cannon, which they had hastily planted before the gates, and
in the best situations without the town, were served by any persons
who happened to be near them; any one gave orders who felt himself
competent to take the command. A party of the enemy entered the city,
and were all slain. Lefebvre perceived that it was hopeless to persist
in the attack with his present force, and drew off his troops, having
suffered great loss. The patriots lost about 2000 men killed, and as
many wounded. In such a conflict the circumstances are so materially
in favour of the defendants, that the carnage made among the French
must have been much greater. Some part of their baggage and plunder
was abandoned in their retreat. The conquerors would have exposed
themselves by a rash pursuit, but Palafox exhorted them not to be
impatient, telling them, that the enemy would give them frequent
opportunities to display their courage. While he thus restrained their
impetuosity, he continued to excite their zeal. This victory, he said,
was but the commencement of the triumphs which they were to expect
under the powerful assistance of their divine patrons. The precious
blood of their brethren had been shed in the field of glory, ... on
their own soil. Those blessed martyrs required new victims; let us, he
added, prepare for the sacrifice!
♦PALAFOX GOES OUT TO COLLECT REINFORCEMENTS.♦
The Zaragozans had obtained only a respite; defeated as he was,
Lefebvre had only removed beyond the reach of their guns; his troops
were far superior to any which they could bring against him; and it was
not to be doubted that he would soon return in greater force, to take
vengeance for the repulse and the disgrace which he had suffered. A
regular siege was to be expected; how were the citizens to sustain it
with their brick walls, without heavy artillery, and without troops
who could sally to interrupt the besiegers in their works? In spite of
all these discouraging circumstances, confiding in God and their own
courage, they determined to defend the streets to the last extremity.
Palafox, immediately after the repulse of the enemy, set out to
muster reinforcements, to provide such resources for the siege as he
could, and to place the rest of Aragon in a state of defence, if the
capital should fall. He was accompanied by Colonel Butron, his friend
and aide-de-camp; Lieut.-Colonel Beillan, of the engineers; Padre
Basilio, and Tio Jorge. With these companions and a small escort he
left the city by the suburbs, crossed the Ebro at Pina, and collecting
on the way about 1400 soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, formed a
junction at Belchite with Baron Versage and some newly raised troops
from Calatayud. Their united numbers amounted to some 7000 men, with
100 horse and four pieces of artillery. Small as this force was,
and still more inefficient for want of discipline than of numerical
strength, Palafox resolved upon making an attempt with it to succour
the city. The prudence of this determination was justly questioned by
some; others proposed the strange measure of marching to Valencia:
this probably originated with some of the stray soldiers who were at
liberty to seek their fortune where they pleased, and the proposal
was so well received that a considerable party prepared to set off
in that direction, without orders. But Palafox called them together,
exhorted them to do their duty, and offered passports to as many as
chose to leave him in the moment of danger. The consequence of this
offer was that not a man departed. From Almunia, where he had rested a
day, he then marched towards Epila, thinking to advance to the village
of La Muela, and thus place the invaders between his little army and
the city, in the hope of cutting them off from their reinforcements.
Lefebvre prevented this, by suddenly attacking him at Epila, on the
night of the 23d: after a most obstinate resistance, the superior arms
and discipline of the French were successful. The wreck of this gallant
band retreated to Calatayud, and afterwards, with great difficulty,
threw themselves into Zaragoza.
♦G. VERDIER JOINS LEFEBVRE WITH REINFORCEMENT.♦
The besiegers’ army was soon reinforced by General Verdier, with 2500
men, besides some battalions of Portugueze, who, according to the
devilish system of Buonaparte’s tyranny, had been forced out of their
own country, to be pushed on in the foremost ranks, wherever the first
fire of a battery was to be received, a line of bayonets clogged,
or a ditch filled, with bodies. They occupied the best positions in
the surrounding plain, and, on the 27th, attacked the city and the
Torrero; but they were repulsed with the loss of 800 men, six pieces
of artillery, and five carts of ammunition. By this time, they had
invested nearly half the town. The next morning they renewed the attack
at both places; from the city they were again repulsed, losing almost
all the cavalry who were engaged. But the Torrero ♦THE TORRERO TAKEN.♦
was lost through the alleged misconduct of an artillery officer, who
was charged with having made his men abandon the batteries at the most
critical moment. For this he was condemned to run the gauntlet six
times, the soldiers beating him with their ramrods, and after this
cruelty he was shot.
♦THE FRENCH BOMBARD THE CITY.♦
The French, having now received a train of mortars, howitzers, and
twelve-pounders, which were of sufficient calibre against mud walls,
kept up a constant fire, and showered down shells and grenades from the
Torrero. About twelve hundred were thrown into the town, and there was
not one building that was bomb proof within the walls. After a time,
the inhabitants placed beams of timber together, endways, against the
houses, in a sloping direction, behind which those who were near when
a shell fell, might shelter themselves. The enemy continued also to
invest the city more closely, while the Aragonese made every effort
to strengthen their means of defence. They tore down the awnings from
their windows, and formed them into sacks, which they filled with
sand, and piled up before the gates, in the form of a battery, digging
round it a deep trench. They broke holes for musketry in the walls and
intermediate buildings, and stationed cannon where the position was
favourable for it. The houses in the environs were destroyed. “Gardens
and olive grounds,” says an eye-witness, “that in better times had been
the recreation and support of their owners, were cheerfully rooted up
by the proprietors themselves, wherever they impeded the defence of the
city, or covered the approach of the enemy.” ♦EXERTIONS OF THE WOMEN.♦
Women of all ranks assisted; they formed themselves into companies,
some to relieve the wounded, some to carry water, wine, and provisions,
to those who defended the gates. The ♦COUNTESS BURITA.♦ Countess Burita
instituted a corps for this service; she was young, delicate, and
beautiful. In the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells,
she was seen coolly attending to those occupations which were now
become her duty; nor throughout the whole of a two months’ siege did
the imminent danger, to which she incessantly exposed herself, produce
the slightest apparent effect upon her, or in the slightest degree
bend her from her heroic purpose. Some of the monks bore arms; others
exercised their spiritual offices to the dying: others, with the nuns,
were busied in making cartridges which the children distributed.
Among threescore thousand persons there will always be found some
wicked enough for any employment, and the art of corrupting has
constituted great part of the French system of war. During the night
of the 28th the powder magazine, in the area where the bull-fights
were performed, which was in the very heart of the city, was blown
up, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and about 200 persons
killed. This was the signal for the enemy to appear before three gates
which had been sold to them. And while the inhabitants were digging
out their fellow-citizens from the ruins, a fire was opened upon them
with mortars, howitzers, and cannons, which had now been received for
battering the town. Their attack seemed chiefly to be directed against
the gate called Portillo, and a large square building near it, without
the walls, and surrounded by a deep ditch; though called a castle,
it served only for a prison. The sand-bag battery before this gate
was frequently destroyed, and as often reconstructed under the fire
of the enemy. The carnage here throughout ♦AUGUSTINA ZARAGOZA.♦ the
day was dreadful. Augustina Zaragoza, a handsome woman of the lower
class, about twenty-two years of age, arrived at this battery with
refreshments, at the time when not a man who defended it was left
alive, so tremendous was the fire which the French kept up against
it. For a moment the citizens hesitated to re-man the guns. Augustina
sprung forward over the dead and dying, snatched a match from the hand
of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a six-and-twenty pounder; then,
jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during
the siege. Such a sight could not but animate with fresh courage all
who beheld it. The Zaragozans rushed into the battery, and renewed
their fire with greater vigour than ever, and the French were repulsed
here, and at all other points, with great slaughter. On the morning
of this day a fellow was detected going out of the city with letters
to Murat. It was not till after these repeated proofs of treasonable
practices, that the French residents in Zaragoza, with other suspected
persons, were taken into custody.
♦THE FRENCH AGAIN REPULSED IN AN ATTEMPT TO TAKE THE CITY BY STORM.♦
Lefebvre now supposing that his destructive bombardment must have
dismayed the people, and convinced them how impossible it was for so
defenceless a city to persist in withstanding him, again attempted to
force his way into the town, thinking that, as soon as his troops could
effect a lodgement within the gates, the Zaragozans would submit. On
the 2d of July, a column of his army marched out of their battery,
which was almost within musket-shot of the Portillo, and advanced
towards it with fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. But when
they reached the castle, such a discharge of grape and musketry was
opened upon their flank, that, notwithstanding the most spirited
exertions of their officers, the column immediately dispersed. The
remainder of their force had been drawn up to support their attack,
and follow them into the city; but it was impossible to bring them a
second time to the charge. The general, however, ordered another column
instantly to advance against the gate of the Carmen, on the left of
the Portillo. This entrance was defended by a sand-bag battery, and by
musketeers, who lined the walls on each side, and commanded two out of
three approaches to it; and here also the French suffered great loss,
and were repulsed.
♦THEY INVEST THE CITY.♦
The military men in Zaragoza considered these attacks as extremely
injudicious. Lefebvre probably was so indignant at meeting with any
opposition from a people whom he despised, and a place which, according
to the rules and pedantry of war, was not tenable, that he lost his
temper, and thought to subdue them the shortest way, by mere violence
and superior force. Having found his mistake, he proceeded to invest
the city still more closely. In the beginning of the siege, the
besieged received some scanty succours; yet, however scanty, they were
of importance. Four hundred soldiers from the regiment of Estremadura,
small parties from other corps, and a few artillerymen got in. Two
hundred of the militia of Logrono were added to these artillerymen, and
soon learnt their new service, being in the presence of an enemy whom
they had such righteous reason to abhor. Two four-and-twenty-pounders
and a few shells, which were much wanted, were procured from Lerida.
The enemy, meantime, were amply supplied with stores from the magazine
in the citadel of Pamplona, which they had so perfidiously seized on
their first entrance, as allies, into Spain. Hitherto they had remained
on the right[6] bank of the Ebro. On the 11th of July they forced the
passage of the ford, and posted troops enough on the opposite side to
protect their workmen while forming a floating bridge. In spite of
all the ♦1808. JULY. THEY FORM A BRIDGE OVER THE EBRO.♦ efforts of
the Aragonese, this bridge was completed on the 14th; a way was thus
made for their cavalry, to their superiority in which the French were
mostly indebted for all their victories in Spain. This gave them the
command of the surrounding country; they destroyed the mills, levied
contributions on the villages, and cut off every communication by which
the besieged had hitherto received supplies. These new difficulties
called out new resources in this admirable people and their general,
... a man worthy of commanding such a people in such times. Corn mills,
worked by horses, were erected in various parts of the city; the
monks were employed in manufacturing gunpowder, materials for which
were obtained by immediately collecting all the sulphur in the place,
by washing the soil of the streets to extract its nitre, and making
charcoal from the stalks of hemp, which in that part of Spain grows to
a magnitude that would elsewhere be thought very unusual[7].
♦DISTRESS OF THE INHABITANTS.♦
By the end of July the city was completely invested, the supply of food
was scanty, and the inhabitants had no reason to expect succour. Their
exertions had now been unremitted for forty-six days, and nothing but
the sense of duty could have supported their bodily strength and their
spirit under such trials. They were in hourly expectation of another
general attack, or another bombardment. They had not a single place of
security for the sick and the children, and the number of wounded was
daily increased by repeated skirmishes, in which they engaged for the
purpose of opening a communication with the country. At this juncture
they made one desperate effort to recover the Torrero. It was in vain;
and convinced by repeated losses, and especially by this last repulse,
that it was hopeless to make any effectual sally, they resolved to
abide the issue of the contest within the walls, and conquer or perish
there.
♦FOUNDLING HOSPITAL BURNT.♦
♦1808. AUGUST.♦
On the night of the second of August, and on the following day, the
French bombarded the city from their batteries opposite the gate of
the Carmen. A foundling hospital, which was now filled with the sick
and wounded, took fire, and was rapidly consumed. During this scene of
horror, the most intrepid exertions were made to rescue these helpless
sufferers from the flames. No person thought of his own property or
individual concerns, ... every one hastened thither. The women were
eminently conspicuous in their exertions, regardless of the shot and
shells which fell about them, and braving the flames of the building.
It has often been remarked, that the wickedness of women exceeds
that of the other sex; ... for the same reason, when circumstances,
forcing them out of the sphere of their ordinary nature, compel them to
exercise manly virtues, they display them in the highest degree, and,
when they are once awakened to a sense of patriotism, they carry the
principle to its most heroic pitch. The loss of women and boys, during
this siege, was very great, fully proportionate to that of men; they
were always the most forward, and the difficulty was to teach them a
prudent and proper sense of their danger.
♦CONVENT OF ST. ENGRACIA.
AUGUST 3.♦
On the following day, the French completed their batteries upon the
right bank of the Guerva, within pistol-shot of the gate of St.
Engracia, so called from a splendid church and convent of Jeronimites,
situated on one side of it. This convent was, on many accounts, a
remarkable place. Men of letters beheld it with reverence, because the
excellent historian Zurita spent the last years of his life there,
observing the rules of the community, though he had not entered into
the order; and because he was buried there, and his countryman and
fellow-labourer, Geronymo de Blancas, after him. Devotees revered it,
even in the neighbourhood of our Lady of the Pillar, for its relics
and the saint to whom it was dedicated. According to the legend, she
was the daughter of Ont Comerus, a barbarian chief, in the pay of the
Romans, by whom the city of Norba Cæsarea, (situated near the Tagus,
between the present towns of Portalegre and Alcantara) was given
him, together with its district, for his service in recovering it
from Cathelius, a chief of the Alemanni. His daughter, Encratis, or
Encratide, (for from one of these names Engracia has been formed) was
brought up a Christian, and espoused to a governor on the Gallic side
of the Pyrenees, to whom she was sent with a suitable escort. Their way
lay through Cæsarea-Augusta, where the Præses, or Governor of Spain,
Publius Dacianus, the bloodiest minister of the tenth persecution,
was at that time endeavouring to extirpate Christianity. Engracia,
either preferring martyrdom to her unknown spouse, or imagining that
her rank would be her safeguard, visited the governor for the purpose
of interceding in behalf of the Christians, and remonstrating against
his cruelty. Thus much of the legend is probably fabulous; but certain
it is, that a virgin of that name was tortured under that persecution;
and, though she survived, was venerated as a [8]martyr in that city,
before the close of the century in which she suffered. Just, however,
as her claim is to pious remembrance, her church, and the divine
honours which have been paid to her, were procured by fraud. Angels
are said to have descended at her death, and to have officiated at her
funeral, bearing tapers and thuribules, and singing hymns of triumph.
During the Moorish captivity, her relics disappeared; they were
discovered towards the close of the fourteenth century, which was the
great age for inventions of this kind. There stood at that time, upon
the site of this memorable convent, an old church, dedicated to the
Zaragozan martyrs, of the tenth persecution, and called the _Iglesia
de las Masas_, in memory of an early specimen of Catholic ingenuity.
Dacianus, holding relic-worship in as much contempt as the Christians
did his idolatry, in order to prevent them from indulging in it, burnt
the bodies of the martyrs, together with those of some malefactors,
thinking that their ashes would be undistinguishable; nevertheless, the
Christians found their own, which had collected together in white balls
or masses, separate from the rest. In 1389, the regular canons, to whom
the church belonged, resolved to rebuild a part of it: in digging the
foundation, two marble chests were discovered. The lid of the smaller
was fastened down very firmly with a sort of pitch; when this was taken
off, two sets of human bones were found in different compartments;
over the one were the words _Lupercii Martyris_, sculptured in the
marble; over the other, _Engratiæ Virginis_: these latter were of
rose-colour, which was admitted as proof of their authenticity. The
larger chest contained a great assortment of anonymous bones, ashes,
and the white masses, which had disappeared for so many centuries.
The mine was very rich; the workmen went on till they had invented
thirteen chests, and at last, a whole pit full of relics, not the
less efficacious because it could not be ascertained to whom they had
belonged. Seventy years afterwards, Juan II. of Aragon, one of the
wickedest and most perfidious of men, fancied or feigned, that by St.
Engracia’s intercession, he was cured of a complaint in his eyes; in
consequence of which, he resolved to enlarge this church, and build a
monastery adjoining it for the Jeronimites, ... an order which, during
that and the succeeding age, was in great favour at the three courts
of the Peninsula. He began his work, but died without completing it,
leaving that charge by will to his son, Ferdinand, the Catholic king.
He continued the building, but it was not finished till the reign of
Charles the Fifth.
Both the church and convent were splendidly adorned, but the most
remarkable part of the whole edifice was a subterranean church, formed
in the place where the relics were discovered, and having the pit, or
well, as it was called, in the middle. It was divided by a beautiful
iron grating, which excluded laymen from the interior of the sanctuary.
There were three descents; the widest flight of steps was that which
was for public use, the two others were for the religioners, and met
in one behind the three chief altars, within the grating. Over the
midst of these altars were two tombs, placed one upon the other in a
niche; the under one containing the relics of Engracia’s companions
and fellows in martyrdom; the upper, those of the saint herself, her
head excepted, which was kept in a silver shrine, having a collar of
precious stones, and enclosed in crystal. The altars on either side
had their respective relics; and several others, equally rich in such
treasures, were ranged along the walls, without the grating. The roof
was of an azure colour, studded with stars to represent the sky. The
breadth of the vault considerably exceeded its length; it was sixty
feet wide, and only forty long. Thirty little columns, of different
marbles, supported the roof. On the stone brink of the well, the
history of the Zaragozan martyrs was represented in bas-relief; and an
iron grating, reaching to the roof, secured it from being profaned by
idle curiosity, and from the pious larcenies which it might otherwise
have tempted. Within this cage-work, a silver lamp was suspended.
Thirty such lamps were burning there day and night; and, though
the roof was little more than twelve feet high, it was never in the
slightest degree sullied with smoke. The fact is certain[9]; but the
useful and important secret, by which oil was made to burn without
producing smoke, was carefully concealed; and the Jeronimites continued
till this time to exhibit a miracle, which puzzled all who did not
believe it to be miraculous.
♦THE HOSPITAL SET ON FIRE.♦
On the 4th of August, the French opened batteries within pistol-shot
of this church and convent. The mud walls were levelled at the first
discharge; and the besiegers rushing through the opening, took the
batteries before the adjacent gates in reverse. Here General Mori, who
had distinguished himself on many former occasions, was made prisoner.
The street of St. Engracia, which they had thus entered, leads into
the Cozo, and the corner buildings where it thus terminated, were
on the one hand the convent of St. Francisco, and on the other the
General Hospital. Both were stormed and set on fire; the sick and the
wounded threw themselves from the windows to escape the flames, and
the horror of the scene was aggravated by the maniacs, whose voices
raving or singing in paroxysms of wilder madness, or crying in vain
to be set free, were heard amid the confusion of dreadful sounds.
Many fell victims to the fire, and some to the indiscriminating fury
of the assailants. Those who escaped were conducted as prisoners to
the Torrero; but when their condition had been discovered, they were
sent back on the morrow, to take their chance in the siege. After a
severe contest and dreadful carnage, the French forced their way into
the Cozo, in the very centre of the city, and, before the day closed,
were in possession of one half of Zaragoza. Lefebvre now believed
that he had effected his purpose, and required Palafox to surrender,
in a note containing only these words: “Head-quarters, St. Engracia.
Capitulation[10]!” The heroic Spaniard immediately returned this reply:
“Head-quarters, Zaragoza. War at the knife’s point[11]!”
♦WAR IN THE STREETS.♦
The contest which was now carried on is unexampled in history. One side
of the Cozo, a street about as wide as Pall-mall, was possessed by the
French; and, in the centre of it, their general, Verdier, gave his
orders from the Franciscan convent. The opposite side was maintained
by the Aragonese, who threw up batteries at the openings of the cross
streets, within a few paces of those which the French erected against
them. The intervening space was presently heaped with dead, either
slain upon the spot, or ♦AUGUST 5.♦ thrown out from the windows. Next
day the ammunition of the citizens began to fail; ... the French
were expected every moment to renew their efforts for completing the
conquest, and even this circumstance occasioned no dismay, nor did any
one think of capitulation. One cry was heard from the people, wherever
Palafox rode among them, that, if powder failed, they were ready to
attack the enemy with their knives, ... formidable weapons in the hands
of desperate ♦THE CITY RECEIVES A REINFORCEMENT.♦ men. Just before the
day closed, Don Francisco Palafox, the general’s brother, entered the
city with a convoy of arms, and ammunition, and a reinforcement of
three thousand men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers
of Aragon, ... a succour as little expected by the Zaragozans, as it
had been provided against by the enemy.
♦P. SANTIAGO SASS.♦
The war was now continued from street to street, from house to house,
and from room to room; pride and indignation having wrought up the
French to a pitch of obstinate fury, little inferior to the devoted
courage of the patriots. During the whole siege, no man distinguished
himself more remarkably than the curate of one of the parishes,
within the walls, by name P. Santiago Sass. He was always to be seen
in the streets, sometimes fighting with the most determined bravery
against the enemies, not of his country alone, but of freedom, and
of all virtuous principles, wherever they were to be found; at other
times, administering the sacrament to the dying, and confirming, with
the authority of faith, that hope, which gives to death, under such
circumstances, the joy, the exultation, the triumph, and the spirit of
martyrdom. Palafox reposed the utmost confidence in this brave priest,
and selected him whenever any thing peculiarly difficult or hazardous
was to be done. At the head of forty chosen men, he succeeded in
introducing a supply of powder into the town, so essentially necessary
for its defence.
This most obstinate and murderous contest was continued for eleven
successive days and nights, more indeed by night than by day; for it
was almost certain death to appear by daylight within reach of those
houses which were occupied by the other party. But under cover of the
darkness, the combatants frequently dashed across the street to attack
each other’s batteries; and the battles which began there, were often
carried on into the houses beyond, where they fought from room to room,
and floor to floor. The hostile batteries were so near each other, that
a Spaniard in one place made way under cover of the dead bodies, which
completely filled the space between them, and fastened a rope to one of
the French cannons; in the struggle which ensued, the rope broke, and
the Zaragozans lost their prize at the very moment when they thought
themselves sure of it[12].
♦NUMBER OF THE DEAD.♦
A new horror was added to the dreadful circumstances of war in this
ever memorable siege. In general engagements the dead are left upon
the field of battle, and the survivors remove to clear ground and
an untainted atmosphere; but here ... in Spain, and in the month of
August, there where the dead lay the struggle was still carried on, and
pestilence was dreaded from the enormous accumulation of putrifying
bodies. Nothing in the whole course of the siege so much embarrassed
Palafox as this evil. The only remedy was to tie ropes to the French
prisoners, and push them forward amid the dead and dying, to remove
the bodies, and bring them away for interment. Even for this necessary
office there was no truce, and it would have been certain death to the
Aragonese who should have attempted to perform it; but the prisoners
were in general secured by the pity of their own soldiers, and in this
manner the evil was, in some degree, diminished.
♦RETREAT OF THE ENEMY.♦
A council of war was held by the Spaniards on the 8th, not for the
purpose which is too usual in such councils, but that their heroic
resolution might be communicated with authority to the people. It was,
that in those quarters of the city where the Aragonese still maintained
their ground, they should continue to defend themselves with the same
firmness: should the enemy at last prevail, they were then to retire
over the Ebro into the suburbs, break down the bridge, and defend the
suburbs till they perished. When this resolution was made public, it
was received with the loudest acclamations. But in every conflict
the citizens now gained ground upon the soldiers, winning it inch by
inch, till the space occupied by the enemy, which on the day of their
entrance was nearly half the city, was gradually reduced to about an
eighth part. Meantime, intelligence of the events in other parts of
Spain was received by the French, ... all tending to dishearten them;
the surrender of Dupont, the failure of Moncey before Valencia, and
the news that the Junta of that province had dispatched six thousand
men to join the levies in Aragon, which were destined to relieve
Zaragoza. During the night of the 13th, their fire was particularly
fierce and destructive; after their batteries had ceased, flames burst
out in many parts of the buildings which they had won; their last
act was to blow up the church of St. Engracia; the powder was placed
in the subterranean church, ... and this remarkable place, ... this
monument of fraud and of credulity, ... the splendid theatre wherein
so many feelings of deep devotion had been excited, ... which so many
thousands had visited in faith, and from which unquestionably many had
departed with their imaginations elevated, their principles ennobled,
and their hearts strengthened, was laid in ruins. In the morning the
French columns, to the great surprise of the Spaniards, were seen at a
distance, retreating over the plain, on the road to Pamplona.
The history of a battle, however skilfully narrated, is necessarily
uninteresting to all except military men; but in the detail of a siege,
when time has destroyed those considerations, which prejudice or
pervert our natural sense of right and wrong, every reader sympathizes
with the besieged, and nothing, even in fictitious narratives,
excites so deep and animating an interest. There is not, either in
the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded
more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the
siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained
for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing
more than a short respite from their fate? Woe be to the slavish heart
that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it
utterance! They purchased for themselves an everlasting remembrance
upon earth, ... a place in the memory and love of all good men in all
ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty; they redeemed
their souls from the yoke; they left an example to their country, never
to be forgotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to and
hasten its deliverance.
One of the first cares of Palafox, after the delivery of the city,
was, to establish a board of health to provide against the effects
of putrefaction, ... such was the number of French who were left
dead in the houses and in the streets. Pamplona, whither the wreck
of their army retreated, was for many days filled with carts full
and horse-loads of wounded, who arrived faster and in greater number
than they could be lodged in the hospitals and convents. It was
equally shocking to humanity to behold their sufferings, and the cruel
regardlessness of their comrades, who, while these wretches were
fainting for want of assistance and of food, and literally dying in the
streets, were exposing their booty to sale, and courting purchasers
for church plate, watches, jewels, linen, and apparel, the plunder
which they had collected in Navarre and Aragon; and which, in their
eagerness to convert into money, they were offering at a small part of
their value. There were, however, scarcely any purchasers except for
the church plate, which was bought for the purpose of restoring it, at
the same cost, to the churches and monasteries from whence it had been
stolen.
The temper of the Zaragozans after their victory was not less heroic
than their conduct during the struggle. It might have been expected
that some degree of exhaustion would have succeeded the state of
excitement to which they had been wrought; and that the widowed, the
childless, and they who were left destitute, would now have lamented
what they had lost, or, at least, that they themselves had not perished
also. This, however, was not so. Mr. Vaughan visited Zaragoza a little
while after the siege, and remained there during several weeks: he saw
(they are his own impressive words) “many a parent who had lost his
children, and many a man reduced from competence to poverty, but he
literally did not meet with one human being who uttered the slightest
complaint: every feeling seemed to be swallowed up in the memory of
what they had recently done, and in a just hatred of the French.” These
are the effects of patriotism, aided and strengthened by religion: its
influence, thus elevated and confirmed, made women and boys efficient
in the time of action, and the streets of a city not less formidable
to an invader than the best constructed works of defence. Let not the
faith which animated the Aragonese be called superstition, because our
Lady of the Pillar, Santiago, and St. Engracia, were its symbols. It
was virtually and essentially religion in its inward life and spirit;
it was the sense of what they owed equally to their forefathers and
their children; the knowledge that their cause was as righteous as
any for which an injured and insulted people ever rose in arms; the
hope that by the blessing of God upon that cause they might succeed;
the certain faith that if they fell, it was with the feeling, the
motive, and the merit of martyrdom. Life or death therefore became to
the Zaragozans only not indifferent, because life was useful to the
cause for which they held it in trust, and were ready to lay it down:
they who fell expired in triumph, and the survivors rather envied
than regretted them. The living had no fears for themselves, and for
the same reason they could have no sorrows for the dead. The whole
greatness of our nature was called forth, ... a power which had lain
dormant, and of which the possessors themselves had not suspected the
existence, till it manifested itself in the hour of trial.
When the dead were removed, and the ruins sufficiently cleared,
Ferdinand was proclaimed ♦AUGUST 20.♦ with all the usual solemnities;
a ceremony, at other times attended with no other feeling than such as
sports and festivity occasion, now made affecting by the situation of
Ferdinand himself, and the scene which surrounded the spectators; walls
blackened with fire, shattered with artillery, and stained with ♦AUGUST
25.♦ blood. The obsequies of the Spaniards who had fallen were next
performed with military honours, and their funeral oration pronounced
from the pulpit. The brave priest Santiago Sass was made chaplain to
the commander in chief, and Palafox gave him a captain’s commission.
These were times when the religion of Mattathias and the Maccabees was
required; and the priest of the altar was in the exercise of his duty,
when defending it, sword in hand, in the field. A pension was settled
upon Augustina, and the daily pay of an artilleryman. She was also to
wear a small shield of honour embroidered upon the sleeve of her gown,
with Zaragoza inscribed upon it. Tio Jorge was killed during the siege.
Other persons, who had distinguished themselves, were rewarded; and
the general reward which Palafox conferred upon the Zaragozan people,
is strongly characteristic of Spanish ♦SEPT. 20.♦ feeling. By his own
authority, and in the name of Ferdinand, he conferred upon all the
inhabitants of the city and its districts, of both sexes and of all
ranks, the perpetual and irrevocable privilege of never being adjudged
to any disgraceful punishment by any tribunal for any offence, except
for treason or blasphemy.
CHAPTER X.
INSURRECTION IN PORTUGAL.
♦1808. MAY.♦
While these events were passing in Spain, Portugal also was convulsed
by this political ♦AN AGENT SENT FROM BADAJOZ TO THE SPANIARDS AT
LISBON.♦ earthquake. The first insurrection in Madrid had been no
sooner known at Badajoz, than an anonymous proclamation from that
city was circulated on the Portugueze border; and a lieutenant of the
Walloon Guards, by name Moretti, was sent to consult at Lisbon with
General Carraffa upon the means of withdrawing the Spanish troops.
Carraffa thought it too hazardous to declare ♦NEVES, T. III. 7.♦
himself at that time; but though in other respect acting altogether
in subservience to Junot, he did not make him acquainted with the
transaction, and Moretti returned in safety.
♦DIFFICULTIES OF JUNOT’S SITUATION.♦
Junot was now disturbed from his dreams of royalty; yet his head lay as
uneasily as if it had worn a crown. Like the other French commanders,
when the insurrectionary movement became general throughout Spain,
he thought it impossible that any continued or formidable resistance
could be opposed to the power of France: but his own situation was
exposed to peculiar danger; he was farther removed from assistance than
any of the other commanders in the Peninsula; there was an English
squadron in sight, watching the course of events, and in defiance
of all his vigilance, well informed of whatever was going on; and
it was not to be doubted, that if a favourable opportunity offered,
Great Britain would make an effort for the deliverance of Portugal.
Pursuant to his instructions from Madrid, he had sent into Galicia the
remains of Taranco’s division, so that Carraffa’s was now the only one
which remained; some 4000 of these were at Porto, the rest were in
detachments at Lisbon, Mafra, Santarem, and on the other side the Tagus
at Setubal, Cezimbra, and ♦NEVES, III. 66.♦ other places. In the hope
of exciting a national feeling against them, and thereby counteracting
that sympathy which their common language, manners, and religion, and
now a sense of their common interest, were producing between them
and the Portugueze, rumours were spread, that by an arrangement made
with Buonaparte, Portugal was to be governed by Spain till its fate
should be determined at a general peace. But this artifice failed.
The Spaniards were not to be deceived; from the time when they knew
that Ferdinand had been inveigled to Bayonne, there was an end of all
good understanding between them and the French; and they were so ready
to engage in personal quarrels, from the national indignation which
possessed them, that it was found necessary to confine them to their
quarters at an early hour in the evening. Care was taken to divide them
into small detachments, and station every where with them a superior
number of French. Many deserted, especially of those who were quartered
beyond the Tagus. Some made their way to the Spanish frontiers in
strong parties. The regiment of Murcia marched for Spain in a body,
in defiance of its colonel; a detachment of 600 French was sent from
Lisbon to intercept them; they met at ♦NEVES, III. 67.♦ Os Pegoens;
this was a case in which individual ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 287.♦
strength and determination were of more avail than military discipline;
the Spaniards were victorious, and proceeded on their way, receiving
the utmost kindness from the people, and nearly two hundred wounded
French were landed at Lisbon.
♦KELLERMANN TAKES THE COMMAND IN ALEM-TEJO.♦
Badajoz was the point to which the Spaniards repaired from Alem-Tejo
and the south of Portugal, and the numbers who were collected there
made such an addition to the strength of the garrison, that General
Kellermann, who was then at Elvas, felt himself ill at ease in the
neighbourhood. That general had taken the command in Alem-Tejo
upon Solano’s departure, and so different was the spirit of his
administration, that one of his first measures was by his own authority
to impose an extraordinary contribution upon the exhausted province.
Evora was to pay 10,000 _cruzados novos_, Elvas and Portalegre 8000
each, Villa-Viçosa 6000, and other places in proportion. The sum was
exacted within six hours after the demand: but it was restored without
♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, P. 277.♦ delay, in consequence of peremptory
orders from Junot, when complaint was made to him of this unauthorized
exaction. He was displeased with Kellermann for presuming to levy
money at his own pleasure, and this was no time for exasperating the
people by farther acts of oppression. Already they were in so perturbed
a state, that it ♦MAY 22.♦ was deemed expedient to order all absent
bishops and beneficed priests to return to their dioceses and cures,
and there exert themselves in preserving order, and exhorting the
people to submission. Buonaparte had reckoned upon the good services
of the clergy; experience, he said, had shown him that countries where
there were many friars were easily conquered; ... he was undeceived of
both errors in the Peninsula.
♦HE ATTEMPTS TO CONCILIATE THE SPANIARDS AT BADAJOZ.♦
In the hope of reviving old animosities, and exciting the Portugueze
to act against the Spaniards, Kellermann called out the _Ordenanças_,
and required the people of Elvas to take arms for the defence of
their city, which, he said, the Spaniards, eternal enemies to the
name and independence of Portugal, were preparing to attack ♦JUNE
1.♦ from Badajoz. At the same time he sent a letter to the Spaniards
of that place, exhorting them to return to their duty, and promising
intercession, and pardon and protection. No answer was returned; he
then put forth an argumentative address to the Commandant and the
Representatives of Extremadura, asking them what end they could propose
to themselves from the revolt in which they had blindly engaged? The
House of Bourbon had renounced all its rights to Spain; Ferdinand was
in France, and the right of appointing a king for the Spaniards had
been transferred ♦1808. JUNE.♦ to the Emperor. Did they wish to draw
upon themselves the evils by which France had been ravaged during so
many years? If that country had come with glory out of a struggle
which would for ever be celebrated, it was owing to her internal
strength, her valour, and above all the talents of that extraordinary
man whom Heaven had sent to reign over her, for her happiness, and
for the happiness of the Spaniards also, if they chose it. Could they
expect a like issue? Would valour alone suffice to effect it? What was
their position? Half Spain had declared for the new order of things.
Their own countrymen would take the field against them. The French
armies were in the midst of the land, under the greatest generals,
without enemies, and abundantly supplied with all the means of war.
On their part they had only some soldiers who had murdered their
chiefs; a populace vain of their own strength, because they had met
with no resistance; and a few miserable English, the eternal artists
of discord, active in stirring up enemies to the French, and always
ready, like cowards, to abandon the victims of their infernal policy.
Nor was there any thing in the change which had taken place to provoke
their opposition. At the commencement of the preceding century Spain
had called Philip V. to the throne, for the purpose of establishing
an invariable union ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 288.♦ with France. The
establishment upon that throne of a prince of the new French dynasty
was nothing more than a consequence of the system which Spain had then
adopted, and which was now confirmed. There was yet time to choose. The
sword was not yet drawn, the door was still open for reconciliation,
... and he requested that they would not close the gate of their city
against his communications. To this also no answer was vouchsafed. He
made a third effort, telling them that he would suspend hostilities
till they should be better informed, and desiring the Junta to meet him
at the Caya, the little stream which there divides the kingdoms. No
persons were there to meet him; and he then began to store the forts of
Elvas, and to devise plans for attacking Badajoz, expecting, no doubt,
that some of the troops in Spain would be ordered upon that service.
Believing too that fêtes and rejoicings would have as much effect in
Portugal as in France, he appointed a day of public thanksgiving for
the benefits which Napoleon had promised to confer upon the Portugueze.
They were not a people to be thus deceived. Their hearts were with the
Spaniards, and so many repaired to Badajoz, where D. Joseph Galluzo,
with great activity, was forming a camp, that they were incorporated
in a legion of foreign volunteers, the command of which was given to
Moretti. Many artillerymen escaped thither from Elvas; some hundred
of the Portugueze troops whom the French had ordered away for foreign
consumption, had been collected there; ♦NEVES, III. 75.♦ promotion
was offered to all officers of that nation who should join them, and
Kellermann’s vigilance could not prevent the emigration which took
place in consequence.
♦DISTRIBUTION OF THE FRENCH TROOPS IN PORTUGAL.♦
A considerable garrison was required in Elvas, as being the strongest
fortress in the kingdom, and now of more importance because of the
hostile attitude which the Spaniards at Badajoz had assumed. Strong
garrisons were placed at Peniche and Setubal, for fear of the English.
Almeida also had been occupied by the French. ♦NEVES, III. 77.♦ Except
the troops in that place there were no other French in the whole north
of Portugal than the small parties stationed upon the military road,
a weak detachment at Figueira, and some fifty men at Coimbra. The
great body of the French was collected at Lisbon, and in the adjacent
country, where, in case of sudden danger, they might be brought to
act promptly and with ♦THE SPANIARDS AT PORTO DECLARE AGAINST THE
INTRUDER, AND MARCH INTO SPAIN.♦ effect. Porto was in possession of
the Spaniards, who had occupied it by virtue of the secret treaty
of Fontainebleau. General Bellesta, however, upon whom the command
had devolved, had been placed under the orders of the French General
Quesnel, when the abortive kingdom of Northern Lusitania was no longer
held out as a lure to the court of Spain. Quesnel had with him about
seventy dragoons, and a few other French, holding military or civil
situations. When news arrived of the movements in Gallicia, Bellesta,
obeying without hesitation the voice of his country, ♦JUNE 6.♦ arrested
the French and their general, and convoking the military, judicial,
and civil authorities, explained to them briefly the situation of
affairs, expressed a hope that Junot would by that time have been
seized in Lisbon, as Quesnel was in Porto, and asked of them what
course they would pursue, ... whether they would restore the national
government, choose a Spanish one, or remain in submission to the
French? The _Vereador_, Thomas da Silva Ferras, replied, that he, and
the chamber, and the city, desired nothing more than to be under the
government of their lawful sovereign, and required that the royal
arms might immediately be re-established. A _Desembargador_ ventured
to observe, that they had no authority to determine such things, not
being representatives of the people; that they were without arms, ...
that they had no means of resisting so terrible an enemy as the French;
and that it was better to wait till they knew what had happened at
Lisbon. Reasonable as the fear was which this speaker expressed, a more
generous feeling prevailed, and by Bellesta’s orders the _Sargento
Mor_, Raymundo José Pinheiro, went from the meeting to take the command
of ♦NEVES, III. C. 6.♦ the fortress of S. Joam da Foz, at the mouth of
the Douro.
♦THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT RESTORED AT PORTO.♦
It was late at night when the meeting broke up. Raymundo called
together his officers; they bound themselves by a formal deed and
solemn oath to act for the service of their lawful Prince against the
French, and invoking the aid of Our Lady of the Rosary, to whom that
castle was dedicated, vowed in the Prince’s name to solemnize the
anniversary of that day by a festival to her honour. At daybreak the
Quinas were once more seen flying upon the fortress, a royal salute
was fired, and returned from the castles of Queijo and Matozinhos,
the bells were rung, rockets were discharged, and the people gave
themselves up to joy. The Spaniards without delay marched for Coruña,
taking with them their prisoners. An English brig of war, which was
cruising off the river, hearing an unusual stir in the city, drew near
in hopes of ascertaining the cause; Raymundo went on board, he was
received with due honours, and an officer returned to shore ♦NEVES,
III. 85–91.♦ with him, and was sent to Luiz de Oliveira da Costa, who
commanded at Porto during the absence of General Bernardim Freire de
Andrada.
♦THE GOVERNOR ADHERES TO THE FRENCH, AND SUPPRESSES THE INSURRECTION.♦
Luiz de Oliveira had been present at the meeting which Bellesta
convened, and assented to the resolution which had there been taken.
Whether his heart was with his voice on that occasion, or whether he
had submitted to the prevailing opinion only while it was dangerous
to oppose it, the fear of the French returned upon him, now that the
Spaniards had left Porto to its own means of defence; and instead of
receiving the English officer with open arms, he wrote to Raymundo,
calling him to account for having opened a communication with the
English brig, and saying that he knew nothing of the business. Raymundo
replied with great spirit, that if the governor had forgotten what
passed when the government of the Prince Regent was re-established, he
had not; he and his officers had proclaimed their beloved Sovereign, he
had invited the English commander, in the Prince’s name, to assist him;
and if any person disputed the propriety of what he had done, he would
make that person know what the power of the royal name was, and that
that port was open for the English. Raymundo’s means, however, were not
commensurate with his will; the people of Porto were disheartened by
the departure of the Spaniards, and the city remained to all appearance
in perfect submission to the French government, while the Portugueze
flag was flying at S. Joam da Foz. A lieutenant-colonel, by name Manoel
Ribeiro de Araujo, now presented himself in that fortress with an order
from Oliveira to take the command. Raymundo told him, that if it were
taken for the service of the Prince, he was ready to resign it into
his hands; but if it were his intention to follow the French part, he
might return to the place from whence he came, for within those walls
no other name should be acknowledged than that of the lawful sovereign,
and not a shot should be fired from them against the English. Araujo
returned in the evening with fair words, and invited Raymundo to the
governor’s house, there to confer with him upon the best mode of
proceeding in the present critical circumstances. The treacherous
invitation was accepted, and he had no sooner set foot within
Oliveira’s apartment than he was arrested as a disturber of the people.
The next step would have been to deliver him up to the French, and to
certain death; but though he had with strange want of circumspection
walked into the snare, neither his courage nor his presence of mind
forsook him. Oliveira, with Araujo and another officer, went out into
the varanda to give directions ♦NEVES, III. 91–97.♦ concerning him;
Raymundo, who was left alone in the apartment, quietly locked the
varanda door, and lost no time in gaining a place of concealment.
♦JUNOT DISARMS AND SEIZES THE SPANIARDS AT LISBON.♦
Bellesta had left a letter for Junot, which the Chamber of Porto, as
soon as his departure left them to the sense of their own weakness,
dispatched to Lisbon, with assurance of their continued submission
to the French. The news reached him at the close of an entertainment
given by the French officers at the theatre, where, though the Russian
admiral and his officers were present, the portrait of Buonaparte was
displayed, with the Russian flag lying among other trophies ♦OBSERVADOR
PORTUGUEZ, 292.♦ at his feet. A sense of insecurity was manifested amid
their festivities; the avenues to the theatre were occupied by armed
troops, fire engines were made ready, and all the watermen were ordered
to be at hand with their barrels full. The entertainment continued
till four in the morning, and immediately afterward movements were
observed which indicated that some important intelligence had arrived;
couriers were sent off, troops crossed the Tagus, and detachments
marched to Mafra, Santarem, and other places. A body of Spaniards who
were stationed in the Campo de Ourique were ordered to the Convent
of S. Francisco da Cidade, an unfinished pile of enormous magnitude,
which the French occupied as barracks, and where a thousand men were
waiting to disarm them as soon as they should enter. The Spaniards,
when they drew nigh, suspected ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 295.♦ some ill
design, and fixing their bayonets, declared they would not be quartered
there. They were allowed to return without interruption; and in the
evening they and their countrymen at Val de Pereiro, being in all
1200, were ordered to assemble at two in the morning, in the Terreiro
do Paço, there to embark and cross the river on their way to Spain.
Thither they repaired joyfully, and found 3000 troops awaiting them,
with cannon placed under the arcades of that great square, and at the
mouths of the streets which open into it; and they were summoned to
lay down their arms and baggage, and surrender. In the course of that
and the succeeding day, the Spaniards from Mafra and other parts were
brought in as prisoners, in a condition which excited the compassion
of the people, their women exhausted with the fatigue of marching in
the burning heat of summer, some carrying children at the breast, and
some, who were unable to walk, tied upon the baggage carts, lest they
should be thrown off. The whole number of Spaniards thus arrested was
somewhat above 4500; they were confined in hulks upon the Tagus. The
officers were left at liberty upon their parole; but after a few days,
when several had broken an engagement, which, considering the manner
in which they had been seized, they did not think themselves bound in
honour to observe, they were placed under the same confinement as the
men. Junot then informed his army, in public orders, that the infamous
conduct of the Spanish General Bellesta, the revolt of two regiments,
the arrest of some of his officers at Badajoz and at Ciudad Rodrigo,
and the inability of the Spanish commanders to control their men, had
compelled him to this severe measure. Happily it had been executed
without shedding blood. These Spaniards were not enemies; they should
receive pay and provisions as heretofore, and their actual situation
in no degree altered his good disposition toward them. ♦NEVES, III.
99-109. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 300.♦ He expressed his satisfaction
at the conduct of his soldiers; and said, that if the English thought
proper to make an attack, they were now fully at leisure to receive
them.
♦JUNOT’S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦
He addressed a proclamation also to the Portugueze, wherein with
incautious effrontery he avowed the double treachery which had been
♦JUNE 11.♦ practised upon them and upon the Spaniards. After six months
of tranquillity, he said, the peace of the kingdom had been in danger
of being disturbed by the Spanish troops, who entered the country
apparently as allies, but in reality with the intention of dismembering
it. No sooner had he in the Emperor’s name taken possession of the
whole government, than they had begun to show their dissent: and at
length their conduct at Porto, and in other places, had compelled him
to disarm all who were within his reach. “Portugueze,” he continued,
“I have hitherto been satisfied with your good disposition. You have
known how to appreciate the advantages which must result to you from
the protection of Napoleon the Great. You have had confidence in me.
Continue it, and I will guarantee your country from all invasion, from
all dismemberment. If the English, who know not how to do any thing
except fomenting discord, choose to seek us, they will find us ready to
defend you. Some of your militia and your remaining troops shall make
part of my army to cover your frontiers; they will be instructed in the
art of war, and if I may be fortunate enough to put in practice the
lessons which I learnt from Napoleon, ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 297.♦ I
will teach you how to conquer.” Junot seems at this time to have aimed
at conciliating the Portugueze soldiers, and making them act with his
army. For this purpose he announced certain new regulations by which
they were placed upon the same footing with the French ♦JUNE 14.♦ as to
their pay and provisions. Hitherto four-fifths of their pay had been
in paper money, which was at a great discount; the proportion was now
reduced to two-thirds. A promise was made that the first item in the
monthly military expenses should be for the allowance of the Portugueze
prisoners in Algiers. The manner in which it was notified that the
troops were to be under French command, was not in the imperious tone
which the Duke of Abrantes, as he styled himself, heretofore had used;
they were to form part of the divisions, it was said, within whose
districts they were stationed; consequently the French commanders were
to include them in their reports, and inspect and review them, to see
that they received what was their due, and to perfect and accelerate
their instruction. The ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 303.♦ artillery, cavalry,
engineers, and marine, were to be immediately under the orders of the
respective French generals, who by this means would know their force,
watch over their instruction, and see to their welfare: the intention
of his majesty being, that the Portugueze troops should be treated in
the same manner as his own in all respects.
♦FESTIVAL OF THE CORPO DE DEOS AT LISBON.♦
But it was too late for conciliation and flattery, after so many
acts of insolent oppression: and an accident at this time occurred
to manifest ♦JUNE 16.♦ with what suspicious apprehensions the French
and the inhabitants of Lisbon mutually regarded each other. The day
arrived for the annual procession of the Corpo de Deos. In the days
of Joam V. this had been the most splendid display which the Catholic
religion exhibited in Europe; and though in latter years the management
had been less perfect, and there had been some diminution of its
splendour, it was still a spectacle of unrivalled magnificence and
riches. The streets of the capital on that occasion, and that only,
were cleaned and strewn with fine gravel; the houses were hung with
damask; the troops in their new uniforms, the various companies
and brotherhoods, civil and religious, each with their banners, the
knights of the military orders, and all the monks and friars of Lisbon,
moved in the procession; which was closed by the dignitaries of the
patriarchal church, the Prince in person, and the chief persons of
his court, following the great object of Catholic adoration, which on
that day, and that day only, was actually carried abroad. The most
remarkable object in this pompous display used to be an image of St.
George in complete armour, upon a beautiful horse, led by a squire and
supported by pages on each side, and accompanied by the finest horses
from the royal stables, with rich housings, and escutcheons thrown
across their saddles. These horses and the saint had formed part of the
procession from the year 1387, with one interruption only, early in the
seventeenth century, when, at the instigation of a certain Mordomo, the
Archbishop of Lisbon excluded the horses, as thinking it irreverent
that the Real Presence should be preceded by unreasonable creatures.
St. George’s charger alone was excepted from the prohibition; but in
the midst of the procession that charger suddenly stopped, and could
neither be induced nor compelled to proceed; it was not doubted that
the rider had chosen this means to manifest his displeasure at the
privation of his accustomed train; the Archbishop revoked his order
upon the spot, and when the horses were introduced as usual, St. George
consented to move forward, and the ceremony of the day was concluded
with more than wonted satisfaction. The profane Mordomo, however, was
not forgiven; on the following Sunday, when he was saying mass at the
saint’s altar, St. George let ♦MAPPA DE PORTUGAL, T. II. 257.♦ his
spear drop from his hand upon the offender’s head.
The image which performed this miracle, after appearing annually in the
procession during more than 350 years, was destroyed by fire at the
time of the great earthquake. A new one, however, had been substituted,
which succeeded to all the honours and miraculous properties of its
predecessor. One of the finest horses which could be found in Portugal
was selected to bear the saint in the great procession, and reserved
for that single purpose, as if any other would have desecrated it.
Junot, however, had taken St. George’s horse for himself, and rode it
every Sunday when he reviewed his troops. And this year, for the first
time, St. George was not to bear a part in the pageant: the reason
which the French assigned for excluding him was, that he could not
appear with his usual splendour, because the jewels of the Cadaval
family, which he always wore in his hat on that day, had been taken to
Brazil when the court emigrated. Other motives were imagined by the
Portugueze: when the saint returned, after the fatigues of the day, a
royal present had always been allotted him; it was thought that the
French wished to spare themselves this expense. They were carrying on
works within the circuit of the castle which were designed to command
the city, and render the place defensible against the English and the
Portugueze themselves; these works were carried on secretly, but it was
part of the ceremony that St. George should enter the castle, and in
that case his retinue would have observed what ♦NEVES, III. 257.♦ was
going on. Lastly, the people said that the French did not choose to let
St. George go into public because he was an English saint.
♦THE PROCESSION INTERRUPTED BY A PANIC FEAR.♦
In all other things Junot wished the Lisboners to see that the
spectacle had lost nothing of its wonted splendour. The procession had
performed half its course when a sudden alarm arose, occasioned, it is
said, by a thief, who being detected in some petty larceny, cried out,
in the hope of exciting confusion and effecting his escape, that the
English were crossing the bar. A general tumult ensued; some of the
French formed as if expecting immediately to be attacked, ... others
hurried to their posts with a celerity which was absurdly attributed
to fear instead of promptitude; a crowd rushed into the church of S.
Domingos for sanctuary, from whence the chapter of the patriarchal
church were just about to proceed with the pix, in which the Romish
mystery of impanation, the object of that day’s superstition, was
contained. Some of the insignia which were to form a part of the show
were thrown down and broken in the rush, and the clergy hastened to
secure themselves each where he could. Not the mob alone, but the
persons who were to form the procession, priests, monks, ministers,
and knights, in the habiliments of their orders, took to flight;
communities and brotherhoods forsook their banners and their crosses;
here and there only an aged friar or sacristan was seen in whom the
sense of devotion was stronger than fear, and who remained in his
place, thinking that if he were now to die, it were best to perish at
his station and in his duty. Wherever a door was open, the terrified
people ran in, as if flying from an actual massacre; the great streets
and the Rocio were presently deserted, and the pavement was strewn
with hats, cloaks, and shoes, lost in the confusion. Fewer accidents
occurred than might have been expected in such a scene; the alarm
abated when it was ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 306. NEVES, III. 256–262.
THIEBAULT, 122–124.♦ ascertained that the British fleet was not
entering; and when the cause of the [13]disturbance was discovered,
the broken parts of the procession were brought together as soon as
possible, and Junot with his generals closed it, in place of the Prince
Regent and his court.
♦JUNOT FORTIFIES THE CASTLE.♦
Though the tidings of the insurrection at Porto had soon been followed
by news that submission had been restored in that city, intelligence
of insurrectionary movements or designs was now arriving every day,
and Junot thought it necessary to take farther precautions for holding
Lisbon in subjection. The water-carriers were employed to fill the
cisterns in the Castle, which was now strongly fortified; stores and
fodder were laid in there, it was garrisoned with 800 men, and all the
swords and small arms from the arsenal ♦JUNE 24. EDICT FOR DISARMING
THE PEOPLE.♦ were removed thither. An edict was issued commanding all
persons to deliver up their fire-arms, swords, and hunting-spears,
those Portugueze alone whose legal privilege it was to wear a sword
being allowed still to retain one. If within forty-eight hours after
the publication of that edict arms should be found in the possession
of a Portugueze, he was to be imprisoned, and fined according to his
means from 100 franks to 1000 cruzados; if the offender were a native
of Great Britain, and delayed obedience half the time, his fine was to
be from 100 cruzados to 10,000, and greater punishment inflicted if
the case required it: for other foreigners the same time was appointed
as for the natives, and the extent of ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 314.♦
their fine was to be 2000 cruzados, but, like the English, they were
liable to any farther punishment which the French might think proper
to inflict. It was the custom in Portugal, as formerly in England, to
celebrate the eve of certain festivals, and especially those of St.
John the Baptist, and St. Peter, with bonfires: the custom of kindling
festal fires at that season of the year is as old as the worship of
the Kelts, even perhaps before their entrance into Europe; and it is
one of the many pagan rites which Romish Christianity adopted. The use
of gunpowder made it a dangerous custom even among a people so little
addicted to mischief as the Portugueze: and at the pretended desire of
certain pious persons, who deemed such rejoicings incompatible with
that calm and collected state of mind which the church required at
such times, all these demonstrations of festivity were prohibited. Any
person letting off fire-works or fire-arms, as had been usual, making
any use of gunpowder, or kindling a bonfire, was to be imprisoned
eight days, and pay a fine proportioned to his means: parents were
made answerable for their children, schoolmasters for their boys,
masters for their servants, tradesmen for those in their employ; the
public walk was not to be open in the evening, and any concourse of
people in the streets was forbidden. Orders were given to clear the
♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 311.♦ Campo de Ourique immediately, though the
crops were not ripe, that troops might be encamped there, from whence,
and from the Castle, the city would be completely under their command.
Detachments were sent north and south to keep down a people, who were
now everywhere beginning to manifest their long suppressed ♦OBSERVADOR
PORTUGUEZ, 317.♦ indignation. The men marched out of Lisbon with
provisions and kettles upon their backs, and each with a loaf fixed
upon his bayonet.
♦MOVEMENTS AT BRAGA.♦
The news of the first insurrection at Porto produced considerable
effect in the north of Portugal before it was known that that city,
through the treachery or timidity of the persons in power, had again
submitted to the intrusive government. At Braga the Archbishop gave
orders for taking the cover from the royal arms upon his palace, and
reciting in the service the collect for the Prince Regent and Royal
Family. The restoration of the legitimate government was proclaimed
by the better part of the people; but the public performance of that
duty was prevented by some of those persons who are to be found in
all countries, whose sole object is to advance themselves, they care
not by what means. They, putting their trust in Buonaparte and his
♦NEVES, III. 124–6.♦ fortune, drew up formal charges against the
primate, and dispatched them to Junot. Had the French remained masters
of Portugal, this process would have terminated in his deposition,
perhaps in his death; ... but the fire was now spreading on all sides,
and breaking out, as in ♦INSURRECTION AT MELGAÇO.♦ Spain, every where,
simultaneously. A Galician gentleman, by name Mosqueira de Lira,
having concerted measures at the house of his brother-in-law, who was
an inhabitant of Melgaço, with the Corregedor of that place, and with
a retired magistrate, entered the town with some other Galicians of
the border and their armed followers, on a day when the people from
the adjacent country were assembled there at a fair. Encouraged by
their appearance, the Portugueze broke out into execrations against
Napoleon and his instruments, and proclaimed their lawful Prince.
The Quinas, which, during the usurpation, had been covered upon all
public buildings and monuments where they had not been destroyed,
were presently exposed again to the eyes of a people whose belief
it was that Christ himself had in person commanded the founder of
their monarchy to bear upon his shield those ♦JUNE 9.♦ symbols of his
passion. The next day the acclamation was performed with the same
formalities as at the commencement of a new reign, the magistrates and
persons in office taking the lead; and the joyful inhabitants sallied
out to indulge their overflowing loyalty by repeating the scene in
the neighbouring villages. Their hilarity was interrupted by a sudden
report that a French army had landed on the coast of Galicia, and
that a corps of that army had already arrived at Caniza, meaning to
cross the Minho, and attack Melgaço. That town had been founded by
the first King of Portugal, and refortified by King Diniz: his works
had long since fallen to decay, and the place was open to an enemy.
The bells rang the alarm, and the people, resolving rather to meet
the danger than to wait for it, set off with two pieces of cannon,
tumultuously, and in that state of heated spirits and insubordination
which such calamitous times produce. The falsehood of the report was
soon ascertained; a fellow then boldly proposed that they should
nevertheless march forward and collect forces, and because the _Capitam
Mor_ ordered the countrymen to return peaceably to their homes, this
man attempted to pistol him; the mischief was prevented by a resolute
and right-minded peasant, who seized the ruffian and threw him to the
ground. Other indications of the disposition in the populace to abuse
their power as soon as they feel it, soon appeared. A rumour went about
that the _Juiz de fora_ had struck the red flag which had been planted
in the town; a tumultuous sentence of death was passed upon him, and
a party set out to execute it. But when they approached the town they
saw the flag still flying: it was however true that the Juiz had been
advised to strike it, because, if the French arrived, the sight of the
bloody flag might provoke them to put all to the sword. The advice was
given by an officer, and with no ill intention, for no man exerted
himself more actively: but his military prudence on this occasion had
well nigh cost him his life, and he only escaped by the swiftness of
his horse. Warned by these indications how dangerous any act would be
which the people could interpret into an intention of intimidating
them or checking their ardour, the Juiz, when he received Junot’s
proclamation, communicated it to none but those on whom he could rely;
he prepared for action as well as the means of the place would afford,
and applied to the Junta of Orense for assistance in men, arms, and
ammunition. Some troops accordingly were sent by them to Milmanda
and Cellanova, whence they might enter ♦NEVES, III. 126–135.♦
Portugal to assist Melgaço, whenever their assistance was required.
♦THE PRINCE REGENT PROCLAIMED AT BRAGANZA.♦
While the national feeling was thus displayed in one of the remotest
corners of the kingdom, similar scenes occurred in places of more
importance, and more exposed to the vengeance of the enemy. The
post-office in the city of Braganza was at the house of the Abbot of
Carrazedo. ♦JUNE 11.♦ A letter brought him news of the insurrection
at Porto; he read it aloud to the persons who happened to be present;
their letters confirmed the welcome tidings, and added the flattering
expectation that by that time Junot would have been made prisoner
at Lisbon. Readily believing what they wished, they set up a shout
of rejoicing; the news spread; the multitude joined in exulting
acclamations, and the parties from the post-office hastened to a
church, where the governor of the province, General Manoel Jorge Gomes
de Sepulveda, was attending a service in honour of St. Antonio. This
general, though oppressed with age and infirmities, hesitated not as
to the course which he should pursue. He left the church to issue such
orders as were expedient without delay. The bells of the cathedral were
ordered to strike up, and those of all the churches joined presently
in expressing and heightening the public joy. There were, however, men
in authority who had no generous hopes or feelings to mislead their
judgement on this occasion; and they, like others of the same stamp
at Braga, thinking to obtain favour with the intrusive government,
hastened to the general, and asked him what was the meaning of all this
stir. Sepulveda took them to the window, and showed them the streets
swarming with people, who were crying out, The Prince and the Royal
House of Braganza for ever! the General for ever! Down with the French!
“There,” said he, “you hear what is the meaning; ... and you may quiet
that multitude if you dare.” He illuminated his house, which was the
signal for a general illumination: he ordered such arms as were in the
city to be made ready for service, sent to Chaves for more, offered
pardon to deserters upon their repairing to Braganza, called upon
all reduced officers to come forward, and issued orders to all the
governors and _Capitaens mores_ within his jurisdiction to proclaim
their lawful Prince, and enrol the peasantry for the service of their
♦NEVES, III. 136–141.♦ country. A solemn mass was celebrated the next
day in the cathedral as a thanksgiving service, a sermon was preached
upon the occasion, and all who were present mounted the national
cockade, the clergy wearing it upon the breast.
♦THE BRAGANZANS INTIMIDATED BY THE NEWS FROM PORTO.♦
These festive days were of short duration. The next post, which was
expected to confirm the promises of the last, and bring news of Junot’s
overthrow and capture, arrived with intelligence that all was tranquil
at Lisbon, and that Porto had returned to subjection. It brought also
circular letters from the French government, requiring the Portugueze
to continue in obedience, and threatening severe vengeance to all who
should disturb the public tranquillity. The danger was now deemed as
imminent as the triumph had before seemed certain. Loison would hasten
from Almeida to punish Braganza for its revolt; and Marshal Bessieres
also, they thought, was about to descend upon them from Castille. The
time-servers now obtained an ascendancy, and were about to draw up a
formal accusation against Sepulveda, and the persons who had taken the
lead in this precipitate insurrection. They proposed to him, however,
that he should join with them in a representation soliciting pardon for
the city, saying that all which had been done, had been submitted to by
him because it was not possible at that moment to oppose the populace,
and that the illuminations and other demonstrations of joy were only in
honour of St. Antonio. Letters were accordingly written to this effect.
Sepulveda’s object was to gain time by dissimulation, while he took
measures for securing a retreat into Spain, unless affairs in Portugal
should take a fortunate turn; and while he let the promoters of this
submission ♦NEVES, III. 141–146.♦ send his letter with their own to the
post-office, he secretly instructed the post-master not to forward it.
♦SECOND INSURRECTION AT PORTO.♦
As the first declaration of the people at Porto had occasioned these
movements in the north of Portugal, so these secondary movements,
reported and exaggerated in like manner, re-acted upon the public
spirit in that city. Oliveira, who had acted under fear of the French,
was now in fear of his own countrymen, and soon found himself in such
a situation, that he was in danger of being regarded as an enemy by
both. On the day of the Corpo de Deos he wished the soldiers to carry
the French eagles in the procession instead of the national banner,
and this they resolutely refused to do; the end was, that only a few
companies, without any colours, appeared in the train. The temper of
the people was shown at this time by the groups which collected in the
streets, and the agitation which every countenance expressed. Raymundo,
consulting at once his own safety, and the furtherance of his country’s
cause, had conveyed letters to the city, dated from Vianna and from
Valença, saying that he was on his way to Spain, there to solicit
succours, with which he should presently return: and the ignorant
people, ready to believe any thing, were fully persuaded that he would
soon appear at the head of a Spanish ♦NEVES, III. 97.♦ army. A report,
with more appearance but as little reality of truth, accelerated the
success of his stratagem, though it was intended to intimidate the
people. The _Juiz de fora_ at Oliveira de Azemeis received orders
to provide rations for a French detachment on the way from Coimbra
to Porto. It was part of Junot’s policy to alarm the people by such
reports, for the purpose of keeping them in submission. The means of
that place were not equal to the sudden demand; the Juiz represented
this to the governor of Porto, and bread was ordered from that city,
in obedience to the requisition. A few Frenchmen, who had concealed
themselves during the first insurrection, and re-appeared when Oliveira
restored the usurped authority, imprudently assisted in loading the
carts with loaves for this purpose; a crowd collected at the sight,
burning with indignation; a native Portugueze artilleryman remarked,
that bread enough could be found for the French, though not for the
Portugueze; one of the Frenchmen returned an answer which ♦NEVES, III.
163–168.♦ provoked a blow; the mob immediately took part, seized the
French, and delivered them to a guard of soldiers, who took charge of
them, without knowing for what end, or inquiring by whose authority.
♦FORMATION OF A JUNTA IN THAT CITY.♦
This second insurrection had been prepared, though the occasion upon
which it broke out was accidental. The Portugueze flag was displayed,
Joam Manoel de Mariz brought out from the barracks at Santo Ovidio
four field-pieces ready for service, with thirty artillerymen to serve
them; the arsenal was opened, and arms and cartridges distributed to
all who applied for them. And Raymundo, who had concealed himself
in a country-house only two miles from Porto, made his appearance
by the convent of S. Domingos, with nineteen Spaniards, armed with
blunderbusses like himself, and covered with dust, and with their
cloaks upon their backs, like men arriving from a long march. They
declared that a Spanish army was on the way, and the people, in full
expectation of this support, prepared to defend the city against the
French. Some guns were placed upon the bridge, others on the heights
of Villa-nova. There was some difficulty in conveying them to the
latter position; a Dominican, who had sallied from his convent sword in
hand, and with his sleeves tucked up, laid hold of the ropes; friars,
priests, and women, followed his example, and the work was presently
accomplished. While they were thus exerting themselves to provide
for the defence of the city, the rabble exercised their authority in
the usual way, discharging fire-arms in the streets, beating drums,
blowing trumpets, ordering the bells to be rung in all the churches and
convents, breaking open houses to search for Frenchmen and suspected
persons. They threw Oliveira and many others into prison, but happily
no murders were committed. The mob were restrained in their ferocity by
the expectation that traitors would be brought to condign punishment
as soon as the lawful authority was re-established, which it soon
would be. Till that time it was resolved that a local and provisional
government should be formed after the manner of the Spaniards. The
authors of the movement had concerted this, and fixed upon persons to
constitute the Junta; but while they were engaged in the ceremony of
nominating and appointing them, a report arrived that the French were
actually at Grijo, within twelve miles of Porto. The question then was,
should they wait upon the defensive on the heights of Villa-nova, or
hasten to attack them, in the hope of surprising them by night, and
finding them exhausted by a long march? The bolder opinion prevailed;
and a volunteer party set off for Grijo, and hurried there so fast,
that they would have been in worse condition, as well as worse order,
than the enemy, if any enemy had been there. But instead of the French
they found a few travellers on the way from Coimbra, who assured them
that there was no rumour of the advance of any troops along the road.
Even a victory would hardly have elevated their spirits more. This
was about daybreak; they hastened back to the city. The ♦JUNE 19.♦
soldiers in the Campo de S. Ovidio swore upon their swords to defend
the independence of Portugal, their religion, and their King. A public
meeting was convoked, the bells of the chamber rung, the soldiers led
the way in military order, with two field-pieces; the people followed
to the episcopal palace; the Bishop came forth into the varanda, and
gave the assembled multitude his blessing; then he descended among
them, kissed their banner, and led the way to the cathedral, there to
implore the divine assistance in their meritorious undertaking. This
done, they returned to the palace, and proceeded to appoint what they
called the Provisional Junta of Supreme Government; the list which
had been prepared was shortened, as being inconveniently numerous;
eight members were appointed, in equal numbers, from the clergy, the
magistracy, the military, and the citizens, and ♦NEVES, III. 169–176.♦
the Bishop was placed at their head with the title of President
Governor.
♦MEASURES OF THE JUNTA.♦
The Bishop, D. Antonio de S. José e Castro, immediately published
a manifesto, in the name of the Prince Regent, declaring that the
French Government was abolished and exterminated in that country,
and the royal authority restored and to be exercised plenarily and
independently by the Provisional Junta of Porto, till the government
instituted by his Royal Highness should be re-established. The Junta
therefore gave orders, that in all places the Prince should be
proclaimed, and the royal arms uncovered and respected as heretofore
they always had been, and now again hereafter were to be; and they
called upon all constituted authorities to act accordingly. His next
business was to dispatch a messenger to General Sepulveda at Braganza,
requesting succours, especially in cavalry, and an officer capable of
taking the command, whether for attack or defence. The Visconde de
Balsamam was sent to the British brig, which was still hovering off
the bar, and a communication was thus opened with England. Voluntary
contributions were liberally made, the pay of the soldiers was raised,
and as a measure not less popular, a _Tribunal de Inconfidencia_
was instituted, to take cognizance of causes in which treason was
suspected. The prevalence of suspicion is indeed one of the many
dreadful evils in such calamitous times. An example of this occurred
before the close of ♦ARREST OF CARDOSO.♦ the day. Colonel José Cardoso
de Menezes Soutomaior had been that day appointed to the chief
command, as being the senior officer. Happening to send a messenger
that evening with letters upon public business to the _Juizes de fora_
at Oliveira de Azemeis and Recardaens, he forgot to provide him with
the passport which was now necessary for crossing the bridge. The
messenger was therefore stopped by the guards, and either from the
confusion occasioned by fear, or from a confidence of protection,
refused to declare whither he was going, or by whom he was sent. Upon
this the guards searched him, and found the two letters. These would
have explained the matter and cleared him; but perceiving that a third
letter which he carried more secretly about his person was in danger
of being found, he drew it out, tore it in pieces with his teeth, and
threw it over the bridge. A few fragments were saved, but not enough
to give any indication of its contents. The messenger was immediately
arrested as a traitor, and carried before José Cardoso, who thought at
first to end the business by desiring that the man might be left with
him, and saying that he would answer for him. The people (for a crowd
had collected on the way) transferred at this their suspicions upon
Cardoso himself; and to satisfy them, he found it necessary to open the
two letters, and thus acquaint the mob with arrangements which it had
not been intended that they should know. But he could give no account
of the paper which had been torn; and therefore the mob, having thrown
his messenger into prison, returned to arrest him and carry him before
the Bishop. Protestations of innocence were vain, and it was evident
that his life would be in danger on the way; some of his friends,
however, bethought themselves of a happy stratagem; they rung the
alarm bells, and raised a cry that the enemy was approaching. Evening
was now closing; the populace left their intended victim to go in
quest of the invaders, and passed the night in hurrying here and there
upon the false report. Cardoso meantime got in safety to the Bishop’s
palace, and related all that had passed. As far as he was concerned
his justification was clear, but of the third letter he could give no
account. The messenger, however, gave a plain and credible one; he had
not long since been at Lisbon, where a Frenchman had given him this
letter for one of his countrymen in Porto; on his arrival in that city
he found that the person to whom it was addressed had been carried away
prisoner by the Spaniards; and his intention was, when he returned to
Lisbon, to deliver it again to the writer. He had torn it in a moment
of fear, lest he should be considered a partizan and agent of ♦NEVES,
III, 186–192.♦ the French, if it were found upon him. The Bishop was
satisfied; but he advised Cardoso not to appear in public till this
unlucky accident should be forgotten.
About noon, on the ensuing day, the alarm bells were rung again,
drums beat, trumpets sounded, and preparations were again made for an
immediate engagement with the enemy. They were at Os Carvalhos, it
was said, eight miles off. There was some foundation for this report.
The Juiz at Oliveira de Azemeis was in expectation and fear of the
French, and not having received the bread from Porto which he had been
ordered to have in readiness for them, had sent to this town and to
the adjacent villages, to embargo all that could be found. Troops and
volunteers now hurried forward with the utmost alacrity, and in the
utmost disorder. This was a critical moment for Cardoso: if he went
abroad, to put himself at the head of the forces, as his duty required,
there was the risk of being again accused and endangered as a traitor:
if, on the other hand, he forbore to appear, the very forbearance would
be interpreted as a proof of disaffection to his country. After some
hours of indecision, he could not bear to remain inactive, and incur
the reproach to which it must needs subject him at such a time, and
forth he went. He had not gone far before a poor fellow, whom a party
of _Ordenanças_ upon some suspicion had seized, met him, and implored
his protection. Cardoso inquired into the case, and finding the man
innocent, gave orders to release him. His authority was disputed, and
presently he himself was reproached and seized as a traitor. Some were
for putting him to death upon the spot; and though others insisted
upon carrying him before the Bishop, it appeared very doubtful whether
he would reach the palace alive. When they met a priest upon the way,
the mob called upon him to confess this traitor, who was about to
die, and Cardoso himself cried out for absolution, seeing nothing but
death before his eyes. The Bishop was convinced of his innocence, but
could neither persuade the populace, nor command them; nor could he
save Cardoso’s life by any other expedient than that of allowing him
to be thrown into one of the worst dungeons of a Portugueze prison. In
that miserable confinement ♦NEVES, III. 192–196.♦ he remained till the
heat of these tumults had abated; he was then released, and honourably
distinguished himself afterwards.
♦DISTURBED STATE OF THE PEOPLE.♦
Meantime Porto was in a frightful state of insubordination. The people
readily enrolled themselves, but, as if intoxicated with joy, they
celebrated their deliverance instead of labouring to secure it: and
men who ought to have been practising the drill, or erecting batteries
and throwing up trenches, were beating drums, ringing the bells,
and wasting powder in empty demonstrations of bravery. The city was
illuminated during three successive nights, and they seemed so little
aware of the tremendous conflict in which they were engaged, that they
were about to march to war as to a festival. From this delusion the
Bishop roused them by an appeal well adapted to those for whom it was
intended. “Portugueze,” he said, “in the name of Heaven and of Jesus
Christ, listen to a government which loves you, which desires your
happiness, and is labouring for it! Their turbulence, he told them,
their insubordination, their waste of powder, only exposed them to the
enemy, who would come upon them by surprise, and surely destroy them,
if they would not listen to their rulers and obey orders. Strength
without order was like the bull, who, strong as he is, is brought to
the ground by a weak hand, with the aid of dexterity and a cloak. Their
endeavour should be to be unseen and unheard, that they might the more
fatally be felt; ... to conceal their movements, that they might strike
when the blow was not expected. The government conjured them, by every
thing which was most sacred in heaven and earth, to subject themselves
to discipline, and obey their officers. Where they were posted there
they were adjured to remain till the time for action arrived: they who
were first in the field would diminish the number of the enemy when
they engaged them; the second body, when they arrived, would weaken
the French still farther; the third would complete their destruction.
But if all hurried on tumultuously, all would be lost.” The populace
by this time had fired away so much powder, and spent so much of
their animal spirits in rioting, and hurrying here and there upon so
many false alarms, that they were disposed to listen to this advice.
Tranquillity was produced by exhaustion; and to preserve it, order
was given that the alarm bells should not be rung till the cathedral
♦NEVES, III. 196–198.♦ began, and that whenever that was necessary, a
flag should be hoisted on the tower by day, and a torch by night, to
distinguish it from the fire-bell.
♦THE JUNTA CONCLUDE AN ALLIANCE WITH THE JUNTA OF GALICIA.♦
Subordination being now in some degree restored, the Junta entered with
alacrity upon their arduous duties. They raised a loan, and imposed
new taxes, as the exigencies of the time required; among others a
duty of four _mil reis_ upon every pipe of wine which was exported.
Two deputies were sent to England; and an alliance was concluded with
the Supreme Junta of Galicia, the nearest of the newly constituted
authorities in Spain; Galicia engaging first to assist in liberating
Portugal, and Portugal promising, ♦NEVES, III. 199.♦ after her own
deliverance should be accomplished, to co-operate in expelling the
French from every part of the Peninsula. Wild as this promise appeared
to the French, and to those shallow statesmen by whom the French
were regarded as invincible, and the power of Buonaparte not to be
resisted, it was faithfully performed by the Portugueze, and fulfilled
to the letter of the bond. The Junta of Porto had another object to
accomplish, more difficult, and at that time not less important, than
an alliance with Spain. Other Juntas were now springing up in the
north of Portugal at the first hope of deliverance, and unless these
were induced to acknowledge that at Porto as supreme, all plans of
defence would be frustrated by the jealousy of contending authorities.
One had been formed ♦ITS AUTHORITY IS ACKNOWLEDGED THROUGHOUT THE
NORTH OF PORTUGAL.♦ at Viana on the same day; others at Torre de
Moncorvo, Miranda, and other places of less note; all these submitted
readily to the superiority which was claimed. Braganza was not so
willing to resign its pretensions. The intrusive government had not
been re-established in that city, notwithstanding the efforts of its
adherents, and the apparent assent of General Sepulveda. Their penitent
letters to the French ministry were stopped at Villa Real, where the
people proclaimed their lawful Prince; and when the Braganzans, upon
tidings of the second insurrection at Porto, formed a Junta, and
required obedience to its edicts, its authority was disowned there.
Sepulveda was so offended at this, that he sent Brigadier Manoel Pinto
Bacellar to arrest Francisco da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, then a
lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, who had taken the lead at Villa Real.
Bacellar acted with more prudence than the general who sent him, and
endeavoured by amicable means to bring about a good understanding; and
Silveira, disregarding the orders of one who had so far been found
wanting, that he had at least professed submission to the French
after having once thrown off their yoke, crossed the Douro, to spread
the revolution in the province of Beira. Sepulveda found as little
obedience in Torre de Moncorvo and some other Juntas in that district,
when he issued a circular order requiring that every town which was
entitled to a voice in the Cortes should send a deputy to assist
at the provincial Junta of Tras os Montes, the title which that of
Braganza had assumed. Opposed in their pretensions on that side, after
contesting the authority of the Porto Junta, concluding a treaty with
it, and then again disputing with it, and arraigning its measures, the
Junta of Braganza ended at length in ♦NEVES, III. 151–162. 180–185.♦
obeying the advice of the Bishop of Porto, which was repeated in strong
terms by Sepulveda, and dissolving itself.
♦THE INSURRECTION EXTENDS TOWARDS COIMBRA.♦
The whole of Tras os Montes and of the province between the rivers had
now declared against the intrusive government, and acknowledged the
Junta of Porto. The same spirit was spreading in Beira. Aveiro declared
itself, and a plan was formed for surprising the French in Coimbra, an
undertaking of more importance than danger. The details are curious,
as showing the disposition of the people, the insignificance of their
means, and the disorderly manner of their proceedings. A patrole of
armed peasants had been sent out from Porto upon the Coimbra road, to
obtain intelligence of the enemy, concerning whom nothing certain was
known. Dr. José Bernardo de Azevedo, of the order of Avis, hearing upon
what service these persons had been sent, represented to the Junta how
little likely it was that such a set of men should act with discretion;
upon the first news of the enemy they would hurry back without
ascertaining their numbers, position, and probable movements; or if
they ventured to approach them, would most probably fall into their
hands. He ♦JUNE 22.♦ offered to obtain the desired information himself,
knowing the country well, and accordingly laying aside his habit, set
off with one servant on horseback. When he arrived at Oliveira de
Azemeis, he met the greater part of the patrole on their return in
triumph; they had failed to arrest the Juiz as they intended, but they
had caught a lawyer, and were dragging him to Porto as a suspected
person. They had however sent four of their party forward on the
Coimbra road, in pursuance of their original object, and José Bernardo
proceeding on his journey, overtook them at Mealhada, a village about
twelve miles from Coimbra. Exulting that they had advanced so far
without meeting the French, and encouraged by what they heard from
the people of Mealhada, that the enemy had only a handful of men in
Coimbra, and most of them invalided, they resolved to fall upon them,
by surprise if possible, that very day. A reformed colonel of militia
at Ois undertook to bring thirty armed ♦NEVES, III. 200–205.♦ men; the
people of Mealhada volunteered their services, and the two parties were
to meet at Carquejo, half way on their march.
♦SCHEME FOR SURPRISING THE ENEMY IN COIMBRA.♦
When the men of Mealhada began to prepare for their expedition, there
were some whose hearts failed them, and the contagion spread. José
Bernardo, however, by reproaching and threatening some, encouraging
and praising others, with the seasonable administration of fruit and
wine, and the zealous help of a serjeant of the _Ordenança_, mustered
some thirty peasants, with about twenty muskets, the rest were armed
with pikes and sickles and other such instruments; and when they set
off many of the others followed, ashamed to be left behind. The party
from Ois not having arrived when they reached Carquejo, José Bernardo
ordered his people to halt for them there, and suffer no person to pass
toward Coimbra, while he and two others went on to reconnoitre and
form the plan of attack. He found no difficulty in entering the city
and obtaining all the information he desired. The French soldiers in
Coimbra did not amount to an hundred men, and of these not more than
forty were capable of service. There was a rumour that 1200 Spaniards
were on the way against them. This the inhabitants were more likely to
believe than the French, who, relying upon their Emperor’s fortune, the
terror of the French name, and the submission of the Portugueze, were
living to all appearance in full confidence of security. Satisfied with
this intelligence, and without venturing to concert any co-operation in
the city, José Bernardo returned as far as the Bridge of Agua de Maias,
and sent to hasten the march of his motley volunteers.
♦THE FRENCH IN THAT CITY ARE MADE PRISONERS.♦
When they were not far from this bridge, they were seen by a patrole
of four horsemen, two French and two Portugueze, who clapped spurs to
their horses, in order to cross the bridge before them and give the
alarm. The insurgents, however, equally on the alert, got between them
and the bridge, and addressed them with the _quem vive_? Napoleon,
was the answer, and two pistols were fired upon them without effect.
A general discharge was returned, which killed two of the patrole
and mortally wounded another. The fourth, who escaped unhurt, was
a Portugueze; he threw himself off his horse, cried out, _Viva o
Principe de Portugal!_ and joined his countrymen. The wounded man was
a Frenchman: the insurgents, with a humanity not to have been expected
at such a moment, left one of their number to assist him, and he was
afterwards removed into the city, and there humanely and carefully
attended; but to his latest breath he reviled the Portugueze, and the
last hope which he expressed was, that ample vengeance would be taken
for his blood. The French guard at the gate of S. Sophia hearing the
guns, and seeing a number of men approach, fired among them, and fled
to their quarters in the College of S. Thomas. The Portugueze followed
close: they were fired upon from the windows without effect, for the
French were too sensible of their own weakness to make any regular
defence; the doors were forced, and they quietly laid down their arms,
and suffered themselves to be bound, ♦NEVES, III. 207–212.♦ happy to
receive no worse treatment from such an assemblage, ... for by this
time the whole rabble of Coimbra had collected.
♦THE JUIZ DO POVO TAKES THE COMMAND.♦
Having thus easily succeeded, the first thought of José Bernardo and
his comrades was to obtain the sanction and assistance of some legal
authority for their future proceedings. The courage, and perhaps the
disposition, of the magistrates was doubted; but the _Juiz do Povo_
was an officer whom tumultuous times had heretofore forced into
importance, and the _Juiz do Povo_ was now called for. José Pedro de
Jesus, a cooper by trade, who held the office, happened to possess a
rare union of upright character, activity, and good sense. He came
forward, assumed a power which was willingly recognized, and exercised
it in a manner which at once gratified the populace and satisfied the
wishes of cooler minds. First he lodged the French safely in prison,
then distributed among the people the arms of those cavalry regiments
belonging to the northern provinces, which Junot had disbanded. In
the depôt with these weapons a flag was found with the royal arms. It
was carried in triumph through the streets, while the exulting people
hastened to uncover the shield of Portugal upon the public buildings.
The bells from all the colleges and convents and churches of that
populous city pealed in with the acclamations of the people, and
heightened the excitement and agitation of their spirits. Bonfires were
kindled, as in old times, in defiance of Junot’s prohibition: the night
of St. John’s had always been a festival in Coimbra, but never before
had it been celebrated with such uproar and overflowing joy. Some
barks on the river, laden with provisions for the French in Figueira,
were seized during the night; and in the morning it was deemed prudent
to march off the prisoners to Porto, under a strong escort, lest the
magistracy, in their fear, ♦NEVES, III. 214–217.♦ should release them,
and again reduce the city to submission.
♦ORDER RESTORED IN COIMBRA.♦
This apprehension, however, was ill founded. The _Juiz de fora_ came
forward to act in the national cause; the students and lecturers
formed themselves into an academical corps; and the Vice-Rector of
the university, Manoel Paes de Aragam Trigoso, took upon himself the
civil authority, in compliance with the wish of the inhabitants. They
would have vested the military command in General Bernardim Freire
de Andrade, whom the Prince, before his departure for Brazil, had
appointed to the command at Porto. Not choosing to exercise it under
the intrusive government, he was living privately at Coimbra; but being
now summoned by the Bishop and Junta of Porto to his proper station,
he declined for that reason the present nomination. The people next
thought of D. Miguel Pereira Forjas, but he chose rather to follow
Bernardim as his quarter-master general. They then chose Bernardim’s
brother, Nuno Freire de Andrade, making him, however, subordinate to
Trigoso. The men who thus accepted offices of authority discharged
a most perilous duty to their country. They were not, like their
countrymen in Tras os Montes and between the rivers, secured in some
degree by distance from the French, and within reach of assistance
from Spain, or, if need were, of an asylum in that kingdom. Nor would
Coimbra be like some of the smaller towns, overlooked as unworthy of
vengeance. Next to the capital itself there was no place in Portugal
where a terrible example would so deeply impress and intimidate the
nation: it was within easy reach of the enemy, from Almeida as well
as from Lisbon, and all military means of defence were ♦NEVES, III.
219–223.♦ wanting: a few pounds of powder were all that could be found
in the city, and not one piece of cannon.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE.♦
On the other hand, more talents and enterprise, such as the times
required, might reasonably be expected in Coimbra than in any other of
the Portugueze towns. It was a populous and flourishing university, the
only one in the kingdom: here therefore the flower of the Portugueze
youth would be found, just at that age when they would be most willing
and fit for service; and of that rank, and in that place, where
national and generous feelings would have their strongest influence.
If any where heads to plan and hands to execute might be found, it
would be here. Accordingly no exertions were wanting. Chemists made
gunpowder, geometricians directed works of defence, old soldiers were
employed, some in making cartridges, others in training volunteers;
mechanics were ♦NEVES, III. 223–225.♦ set to work in whatever manner
they might be most useful; bridges were broken down, roads broken up,
means made ready for defending the streets, if the enemy should enter
the city, and a strict police established.
♦SUCCESSFUL EXPEDITION AGAINST FIGUEIRA.♦
When one day had been passed in these arrangements and preparations
an expedition was planned against Figueira da Foz, a small town and
fort at the mouth of the Mondego, on the right bank, seven leagues
from Coimbra. The French had a garrison of an hundred men there. Forty
volunteers, who were almost all students, under the command of Bernardo
Antonio Zagalo, ♦JUNE 25.♦ a student also, set out at evening, in hope
of capturing this important point: they relied upon increasing their
numbers on the way, and they took with them authority from the governor
to raise the country as they went. Zagalo, with four horsemen, took
the right bank, the rest of the party the left: they met at Montemor o
Velho, and marching all night, appeared with the reinforcements which
they had gathered, now some 3000 in number, before Figueira, at seven
in the morning. The enemy were taken by surprise; they were dispersed
about the town, when they saw this multitude approach; but immediately
retiring into the fort, they prepared for defence. The place might
have been easily defended against a crowd of peasants, more of whom
were armed with pikes and reaping-hooks than with fowling-pieces, and
who were likely, upon the slightest loss or disgust, to abandon their
enterprise as precipitately as they had engaged in it. But the French,
relying too confidently upon the submission of the Portugueze, had
neglected to store the fort with provisions; and Zagalo summoned them,
saying he knew they had not food for more than four-and-twenty hours,
and that if they did not surrender they should all be put to the sword.
Contrary to his usual policy, Junot had given the command of this
fort to a Portugueze lieutenant of engineers; this person demurred
at surrendering, because his family were at Peniche, in the power
of the French. But, wanting either the will or the ability to exert
himself in the enemy’s service, he remained inactive and confounded,
till the following day, when Zagalo received positive orders from
Coimbra to return immediately with all his people. This enabled the
commander to obtain terms which might be pleaded to save his credit;
and he capitulated on condition that the garrison should be allowed to
cross the river with their arms and knapsacks, but without powder and
ball; and to march unmolested to Peniche, the nearest strong place in
possession of the French. Upon these terms the fort was given up; but
the peasantry searched the men when they were embarking, and finding
that some of them had concealed a few cartridges, declared that the
conditions were broken: they themselves were desirous of breaking them,
and therefore gladly found this pretext; and the ♦NEVES, III. 226–233.♦
French would have been massacred if the students had not exerted
themselves to protect them, and lodged them safely as prisoners at
Coimbra.
♦LOISON ORDERED TO MARCH FROM ALMEIDA TO PORTO.♦
A report of Loison’s sudden approach had occasioned the order for
recalling Zagalo. General Count Loison had been sent in the latter end
of May, with 4000 troops, to Almeida, in pursuance of positive and
repeated instructions from Murat when exercising the command in Madrid.
He was to concert his movements with Bessieres, and, if necessary, to
join him; he was to observe Salamanca, and secure Ciudad Rodrigo, if
that were practicable. But the Spaniards were too much awakened to be
again deceived or surprised by the French; and Loison having remained
at Almeida from the 5th of June till the 16th, received orders from
Junot to march upon Porto, take the command in that city, and keep the
northern provinces in subjection. He had previously got possession of
Fort Conceiçam. Each party seems at this time to have been strangely
ignorant of the movements and means of the other: Loison apprehended
that an enemy’s force might render it impossible for the French to
maintain this fort; he therefore directed General Charlot, whom he
left with the command at Almeida, to remove thither the guns from
Conceiçam, keep it as long as he could, and destroy the works if he
should be forced to evacuate ♦JUNE 17.♦ it. He then began his march
with two regiments of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of
♦THIEBAULT, 148–150.♦ artillery. A battalion of light infantry was to
set out from Torres Vedras, and reach Porto at the same time.
On the fourth day he reached Lamego without the slightest resistance,
and on the following morning crossed the Douro by the ferry at Regoa,
and reached Mezam-frio, meaning to sleep there. ♦HE TURNS BACK FROM
MEZAM-FRIO.♦ His advanced guard was on the way to Amarante, which
is only forty miles from Porto, when news was brought him while he
was at dinner that the mountaineers were defending the pass at Os
Padroens da Teixeira; and presently a second ill messenger arrived with
intelligence that his baggage was attacked at Regoa. These operations
had been ably planned by Silveira, and were well executed. In so strong
a country he deemed it better to turn back than to proceed at the
risk of being surrounded by an armed population. An ambuscade among
the vineyards at Santinho annoyed him greatly on his way toward the
Douro, and he himself was slightly hurt. The Portugueze, when they were
dislodged, retreated to the heights; the French took up a position
for the night, and in the morning sacked the villages of Pezo and
Regoa, where neither age, nor infirmity, nor sex, nor childhood, were
spared by them; for Loison was one of those men after Buonaparte’s own
heart, who, being equally devoid of honour and humanity, carried on
war in the worst spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring
without shame and without remorse. He now understood that Porto,
which he had expected to find discontented indeed, but passive and in
subjection, had thrown off the yoke; that a Portugueze officer, with
whom he maintained a secret correspondence, had been fain to abscond
from that city; that the disbanded soldiers had reassembled; and that
the insurgent peasantry, in such numbers as to be truly formidable,
were moving ♦THE PEASANTRY HARASS HIS RETREAT.♦ against him from all
parts of the two northern provinces. The news of his retreat was
presently known throughout the whole country between the Tua and the
Cavado; expresses and telegraphs could not have communicated it more
rapidly than it was spread by the voluntary bearers of good tidings.
One column came from Villa Real, one from Amarante, a third from
Guimaraens; a motlier assemblage had never taken the field; ... the
commonest weapons were pikes and long poles armed with reaping-hooks at
the end; and there were as many abbots, monks, friars, and parochial
clergy in command, as officers. The three columns united at Regoa,
too late to impede or molest the French in their passage of the
river. The enemy halted for part of the night at Lamego, and resumed
their retreat at two in the morning. The Portugueze came up with
them that day at Juvantes, and harassed them during three days. The
total want of discipline, order, and authority, rendered their great
superiority of numbers unavailing; and after they had reached Castro
d’Airo, dispersing as irregularly as they had collected, they gave
up the pursuit, less in consequence of the loss which they sustained
in a few brisk encounters, ♦NEVES, III. 235–248. THIEBAULT, 150–1.♦
than because they were too numerous to find sustenance, and every man
was eager to report the retreat of the enemy and the share he had
borne in the success. F. José Joaquim de Assumpçam, a friar of orders
gray, distinguished himself in this expedition, by his activity, his
strength, and his unerring aim.
♦HE GOES TO VISEU.♦
The loss on either side, in this pursuit, appears not to have been
great; the pursuers were too disorderly and too ill armed to make any
serious impression upon the enemy, and the French were not strong
enough to act upon the offensive with effect. They lost two pieces of
artillery, and some of their ammunition and baggage; and a few rich
uniforms which fell into the hands of the Portugueze were suspended as
trophies in the churches of N. Senhora da Oliveira at Guimaraens, and
of S. Gonçalo de Amarante, in the town which was under his peculiar
patronage. Being freed from his pursuers, Loison, sending part of his
force by the road of Moimenta da Beira, which was the shorter but
rougher line to Almeida, took himself the way of Viseu. This ♦ALARM
AT COIMBRA IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS MOVEMENTS.♦ was the movement which
alarmed the people at Coimbra, and induced them to recall Zagalo from
Figueira. It was not improbable that his intention was to march upon
that important city, and there place himself in communication with
Lisbon: his own judgement would dispose him ♦THIEBAULT, 152.♦ to this,
and indeed no fewer than five-and-twenty dispatches, instructing him
so to do, had been sent, not one of which had reached him. But he had
received an exaggerated report of the proceedings in Coimbra, brought
by some partizans of the French, who had fled to save their lives,
on the night of the insurrection, when their houses were broken open,
during the suspension of all order and authority. Their testimony
concerning the temper and unanimity of the inhabitants could not be
doubted; it was ♦NEVES, III. 217.♦ added, that they were busy in
constructing formidable works of defence, and that an auxiliary force
of 12,000 Spaniards was expected there. Such strange events were now
every day occurring, that nothing seemed too extraordinary to be
believed; and Loison, it is thought, in consequence of these rumours,
judged it best ♦HE RETURNS TO ALMEIDA.♦ to change his purpose, and
return to Almeida. The Portugueze general who commanded in Beira
resided at Viseu; upon the approach of the French he summoned the
magistrates and members of the _Camara_, and they determined not to
oppose a premature and unavailing resistance. Loison, though notorious
for rapacity, in the most rapacious army that ever disgraced its
profession and its country, was at this time sensible how desirable it
was, if possible, to obtain a character for moderation and equity. He
encamped his troops for the night without the city, in the open space
where the fairs were held, took up his own lodging in the general’s
house, and on his departure the next day, paid for every thing with
which the men had been supplied. He also released three or four
prisoners, who, in the late skirmishes, had fallen into his hands. At
Celorico, where an insurrectionary movement had commenced, it was
suspended by the prudence of the magistrates and the just fears of the
people, till the enemy had passed by. The peasantry of the adjacent
country were less cautious; they appeared in arms upon the heights, and
Loison therefore sent two companies to burn the village of Souropires.
Being now within easy reach of Almeida, and knowing that the country
about Trancoso and Guarda was in a state of insurrection, his intention
was to employ ♦THIEBAULT, 152.♦ himself in reducing it to submission;
but here the only one of the numerous dispatches from Lisbon which
reached its destination found him, and, in pursuance of its orders to
draw nearer the capital, he hastened to Almeida, to make the ♦NEVES,
III. 249–253.♦ necessary arrangements for his march. On the way he
began to sack the city of Pinhel, which the inhabitants had deserted
at his coming; but upon the tidings that a corps from Tras os Montes
had arrived at Trancoso, and that Viseu was now in arms, he hastened
forward, and on the 1st of July re-entered Almeida.
♦Insurrection at Olham.♦
When Loison, upon the first apprehension of danger, was sent to
occupy Porto, General Avril was instructed, at the same time, to take
possession of Estremoz and Evora, for the purpose of holding Alem-Tejo
in subjection, and to give orders for securing Algarve. General Maurin
commanded for the French in this kingdom, as it is designated, the
smallest but richest province in Portugal: owing to his illness the
command had devolved upon Col. Maransin, who received instructions to
occupy Mertola as well as Alcoutim, for guarding the Guadiana against
the Spaniards; and to protect the coast from Faro, the greatest port in
that province, to Villa Real, the frontier town, at the mouth of the
river. Maransin, however, was not left at leisure to do this. Junot’s
proclamation, announcing the seizure of the Spanish troops, expressing
his satisfaction with the Portugueze for their peaceable deportment,
and promising to instruct them in the art of war, had been fixed upon
the church door at Olham, a small fishing village about four miles
from the city of Faro. The governor of Villa Real, Col. José Lopes
de Sousa, happening to be in that village on the day of the Corpo de
Deos, as he was going into the church stopped to see what the people
were reading. The language of that proclamation proved how little Junot
understood the character of the nation to which it was addressed; it
wounded that high sense of national honour for which the Portugueze
are remarkable, and Lopes, giving way to an honourable feeling of
indignation, tore the paper down, and trampled upon it; then turning to
the bystanders, exclaimed, “Ah, Portugueze, we no longer deserve that
name ... we are nothing now!” But they answered, that they were still
Portugueze, and swore that they were ready to lay down their lives for
their religion, their Prince, and their country. Though the impulse
had thus been given, and the determination of the parties formed, they
did not neglect the religious duties of the day, but entered the
church peaceably, and attended mass. That done, they proclaimed the
Queen and Prince Regent in the porch, and called upon Lopes to be their
general. He without delay prepared an address to the people, and sent
for two pieces of artillery and some powder from an island at the bar
of Armona, and from Fort Lorenzo on the bar of Faro. These were secured
before the French in Faro could hear of the projected insurrection.
Two agents also went off to the English squadron; the means which were
at the commandant’s disposal had probably been all disposed of to the
Spaniards; they proceeded therefore to Ayamonte, and performed their
errand with such good speed, that on the following night they returned
to ♦NEVES, III. 270–275.♦ Olham with 130 muskets from the Junta of that
city.
♦SUCCESS OF THE INSURGENTS.♦
The greater part of Maransin’s force was stationed at Mertola, the
rest was at Tavira and Villa Real, except 200 men at Faro. But before
the news reached Faro a larger body of fishermen and peasantry had
collected than 200 men could with any prudence have attacked. The
French therefore sent for reinforcements from Villa Real and Tavira.
From the latter place fourscore men embarked for Faro in three caics.
The fishermen of Olham, confident in their skill upon the water, set
out to intercept them under Captain Sebastiam Martins Mestre, one of
those persons who had opened a communication with the English fleet
and with Ayamonte. So little were the French prepared for such an
encounter, that they surrendered without resistance, and thus the
insurgents obtained a seasonable supply of arms. They were not long
allowed to enjoy their victory; about 200 French arrived from Villa
Real to assist their countrymen at Faro, and they marched against
Olham. The Portugueze met them half way, and disposed an ambuscade
to receive them: their own eagerness prevented its success; but they
behaved so well in a skirmish which ensued, that the enemy thought it
not prudent to advance. This was the third day of the insurrection, and
the people of Faro had as yet made no manifestation in its ♦THE CHAMBER
OF FARO ISSUE AN EDICT AGAINST THEM.♦ favour. The chamber of that city
had, on the contrary, issued an edict against the insurgents, for what
it denominated a riotous and scandalous attempt against the security
of the nation, saying that their conduct would brand the Portugueze
with the infamous stain of ingratitude, and warning them against the
severe punishment which awaited them if they persisted in their frantic
and desperate attempt. This edict was posted up in Olham; and it so
evidently affected the people, in whom great excitement and fatigue
had now produced proportionate exhaustion, that ♦NEVES, III. 275–281.
OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 332, 333.♦ Lopes and Mestre, who had been hurt
in the skirmish, thought it prudent to carry their prisoners to Spain,
and go themselves to solicit aid from the Juntas at Ayamonte and at
Seville.
♦INSURRECTION AT FARO.♦
Maransin, not aware of their departure, and anxious to lose no time
in suppressing a spirit the consequences of which he had so much
reason to dread, sent out three pieces of cannon to his detachment, and
for want of French troops, a party of fifty Portugueze artillerymen,
under Lieutenant Belchior Drago, an officer much more inclined to
act against the enemies of his country than with them. Meantime the
commander of the French, having learnt that the people of Olham were
wavering, succeeded in obtaining a conference with some of them, and
proposed terms. He promised them a free pardon, if they would return to
their obedience; said that they should be protected in their fishery,
and that even Lopes himself should be no otherwise punished than by
forbidding him to appear in that place. The persons to whom these
conditions were propounded listened to them willingly, and expressed
an opinion that the people would probably assent, if the Portugueze
authorities in Faro gave their sanction to the proposals. Some of the
magistrates accordingly went to conclude this agreement with the Prior
of Olham, a zealous Portugueze, to whom, in the absence of Lopes and
Mestre, the insurgents looked as their proper counsellor and ruler. But
at this moment, when the French by mere authority had nearly quelled
the insurrection, the spell was broken, and they were made sensible
that they had relied too confidently upon the terror of their name.
A few Faro-men met in the shop of one Bento Alvares da Silva Canedo,
and determined, while the French troops were absent, to raise the
city against them. They hired a fellow for a few moidores to give the
signal, by chiming the bells of the Carmo church at a certain hour, in
the manner usual in that country when prayers are solicited for a woman
in labour. They who had concerted the scheme sallied into the streets,
and proclaimed their native Prince; the populace gathered together at
that welcome acclamation; a colonel of artillery joined them, and sent
advice to Belchior Drago, who immediately returned to the city with
his detachment; two of his brothers, both in the Portugueze service,
appeared in the same cause, and the rest of the native troops without
hesitation ♦THE FRENCH EXCLUDED FROM THAT CITY.♦ did the same. The
French, when they would have re-entered the city to restore order,
found cannon planted against them by men who knew how to use them;
and, being repulsed in two attempts, retreated towards Tavira. Their
magazines, their military chest, and all their papers, were taken[14],
General Maurin, sick in bed, was necessarily left to his fate; and the
populace would have killed him in their first use and abuse of power,
if some humaner spirits had not interfered to preserve him. The Bishop
also exerted ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 333–335.♦ himself to prevent this
inhumanity, and had him ♦NEVES, III. 282–289.♦ transferred to the
episcopal palace for security.
♦A JUNTA FORMED AT FARO.♦
On the following morning an assembly of the people was held in the Alto
da Esperança. The magistrates, the Bishop and his chapter, the clergy,
the monks and friars, (who had all taken arms), the troops and the
nobles, met and solemnly proclaimed their lawful Prince; the _Quinas_
were hoisted, and an oath was taken that they would each to the last
drop of his blood defend the rights of the house of Braganza. Circular
letters were dispatched to all the towns and villages in Algarve.
The next day some instances of insubordination, and the reasonable
apprehension of an attack, induced one of the canons to propose, and
the people to consent, to the appointment of a Junta. The Chamber
nominated seven electors for the nobles, and as many for the people,
the chapter seven for the clergy, and the army seven for themselves.
By these electors eight members were chosen, two for each of the four
orders, and the Conde de Castro-Marim was appointed president. This
nobleman had been governor and captain-general of Algarve at the
time of the invasion; under the intrusive government he resided as a
private individual at Tavira, and the popular desire of re-establishing
the order of things to which they had been accustomed, was shown
in nominating him to the presidency, as it was indeed in all the
circumstances of the insurrection throughout ♦THE INSURRECTION SPREADS
THROUGH ALGARVE.♦ Portugal. Emissaries were now sent to the east and
west: in the west there were no enemies, and within eight-and-forty
hours the acclamation was effected in Loule, Sylves, Lagos, at the
fort of Sagres, and in the little towns to the north of Cape St.
Vincent. From the east there was reason to apprehend an attack; the
enemy, who had been compelled to retire from Faro, had retreated to
Tavira, and had been joined there by a detachment from Mertola. But the
English squadron was in sight; and the French commander, knowing how
inadequate his whole force was to the dangers which menaced it, knew
also that Algarve might, with little inconvenience, be left to itself,
and that his business was to place himself in communication with the
♦THE FRENCH RETREAT TO MERTOLA.♦ troops in Alem-Tejo. He therefore
withdrew to Mertola, and the people of Tavira, rising as soon as the
enemy retired, harassed them on the way. Juntas, subordinate to that
of Faro, were now formed in Tavira, and in other smaller places; a
red riband upon the right arm was assumed as the badge of patriotism,
and they who ventured to appear without it were in no small danger
from the people; but though many persons were insulted and menaced,
and some imprisoned as partizans of the French, the better orders
exerted their influence with such effect, that no blood was shed.
Preparations were made for defending the passes of the mountains which
divide Algarve from Alem-Tejo; and accredited agents were sent to
Ayamonte, Seville, and Gibraltar. Arms were without delay supplied
from all these places, and from Gibraltar a considerable quantity of
ammunition. A circumstance, however, occurred, which seemed likely
at first to occasion a misunderstanding with the Spaniards; for the
Portugueze, upon the retreat of the French, having thrown up some works
at Castro-Marim, the Spaniards crossed the river and destroyed them.
This measure, so rash, and in appearance so hostile, was occasioned
by an apprehension that the French might return there, which they had
made a demonstration of doing before they ♦THE PEOPLE OF ALGARVE FORM
A TREATY WITH SEVILLE.♦ abandoned Tavira. It was soon explained, when
each people had so strong an interest in being upon the best terms with
each other, and a formal ♦NEVES, III. 290–303.♦ treaty was concluded
with the Junta of Seville.
Before the insurrection in Algarve had succeeded, and even before
it was known beyond the mountains, the same national feeling had
♦INSURRECTION AT VILLA-VIÇOSA.♦ manifested itself in Alem-Tejo at
Villa-Viçosa, the place of all others where the national and loyal
feelings of a Portugueze would be most elevated by local associations,
having been the residence of the Braganzan family during the Spanish
usurpation. Early in the month the inhabitants had been exasperated by
the passage of a French escort through the town, with the contributions
that had been levied in that _Comarca_ and the plate of the churches.
They were farther irritated by an order for the militia to repair
to Elvas at a time when Kellermann hoped to employ them against the
Spaniards at Badajoz. But Elvas, where the main body of the French in
Alem-Tejo were stationed, was only four leagues distant; there was a
strong detachment still nearer, at Estremoz, and a French company was
quartered among them, in the castle: they knew not that any movement
for the recovery of their country’s independence had been made; nor,
owing to their peculiar situation, were there any people in Portugal by
whom it could be made with so little hope or possibility of success.
Thus they had borne oppression, and might have continued to bear it,
if their oppressors, in the wantonness of power, had not added insult
to wrong. There was an image of N. Senhora dos Remedios, which, after
having by a supernatural declaration of its own pleasure, changed its
name, ♦SANTUARIO MARIANO, T. VII. 571, 579.♦ made sundry voyages to
and from India, and travelled from one place to another in Portugal
during more than fourscore years, had at length obtained a settlement
at Villa-Viçosa, in a chapel of its own, where, being in high odour
for its miraculous powers, it was visited with peculiar devotion on
its own holyday, the 19th of June, by the people of that town, and the
adjacent country. The history of this idol might excite a mournful
smile for human weakness, not without indignation at the systematic
frauds which have been practised upon a religious people. The French
were too irreligious to see any thing in it but matter of mockery; and
some of the soldiers, placing themselves in a gateway near the chapel,
amused themselves with deriding the Portugueze, who were going there
to worship, in ignorance indeed, and in delusion, but in simplicity
and sincerity of heart. Some of the peasants resented this insult
by manual force; more Frenchmen came to help their comrades, more
Portugueze to support their countrymen; the scuffle became serious, for
life or death, ... the bell of the _Camara_ was rung, the ♦NEVES, III.
305–309.♦ French retired into the Castle, and succeeded in closing the
gate, which had been so well secured with iron in old times, that the
people were neither able to break it open, nor to hew it in pieces.
This was towards evening, and the riot continued all night.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER THE TOWN.♦
The town was now in open insurrection. Messengers set off to solicit
succour from Badajoz, and General Francisco de Paula Leite, who had
lately governed the province, was called upon to take the command,
which he absolutely refused, knowing that this tumult must inevitably
end in the destruction of those who engaged in it. Antonio Lobo Infante
de Lacerda, an old officer, and then Sargento-Mor of the militia,
regarding consequences less, set his life fairly upon the die; he
took the lead, and stationed marksmen upon the top of the Conceiçam
church, and in other points which commanded the Castle. Owing to these
dispositions several of the French fell. Meantime the news reached
Estremoz, where Kellermann and Avril both happened to be: fifty
dragoons, with half a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon,
were immediately dispatched to rescue their fellows. A poor countryman,
by name Ignacio da Silva, was in Estremoz at the time; seeing their
movements, he easily divined their intention; good will gave him good
speed, and running the ten miles, he brought intelligence of their
march to Villa-Viçosa in time for Antonio Lobo to make preparations for
receiving them. He stationed some forty men, all for whom fire-arms
could be found, upon the walls, and towers, and houses, at the entrance
from the Borba road; the enemy, informed of, or divining this design,
took another entrance. The way was soon cleared by their field-pieces.
General Avril and Colonel Lacroix entered the town in pursuit of
the routed multitude, the bayonet was used, with little mercy or
discrimination, 200 persons were killed in the ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ,
335.♦ streets, many more in the country, twelve prisoners ♦NEVES, III.
309–315.♦ were put to death as ringleaders in what the French called
rebellion, and the place was given up to pillage for one hour.
♦LOBO GETS POSSESSION OF JURUMENHA.♦
The messengers from this unfortunate town had been joyfully received
at Badajoz; and Moretti, the officer who had performed the perilous
service of conferring with General Carraffa in Lisbon, was dispatched
with a corps of Portugueze refugees which had been formed under
protection of the Spanish fortress. They had arrived at Olivença on
their way, when Antonio Lobo arrived there also, escaping with about a
score companions from the carnage. Instead of returning with ill news,
as a man of ordinary spirit would have done, Moretti inquired whether
some useful enterprise might not be attempted; and they determined
upon getting possession of Jurumenha, knowing how important it was
that the Portugueze loyalists should possess a place within their own
border, which had the name of being fortified, when the French were in
no condition to attack it. It was occupied by a Portugueze garrison,
but the governor partook so little in the honourable feelings of his
nation, that he had that day seized some fugitives from Villa-Viçosa,
and sent them prisoners to Elvas, requesting at the same time a French
garrison for his security and that of the place. He understood the
temper of his own people; but Moretti and Lobo knew it also, and
calculated upon it. Sixteen Portugueze, concealing their arms, entered
as if upon ordinary business; eight proceeded to seize the governor,
the others took their station in the gates, and admitted their party
just in time to point the artillery of the place against the French,
who had been ordered from Elvas to occupy it without delay. Moretti now
obtained farther assistance from Badajoz, and discretionary powers: on
the other hand, Kellermann sent a second party to recover Jurumenha;
but supposing the force which defended it to be much stronger than in
reality it was, they returned without venturing to attack it. This
greatly encouraged the Portugueze, and more than counterbalanced the
effect of their slaughter at Villa-Viçosa. Emissaries and proclamations
were sent from hence throughout ♦NEVES, III. 316–320.♦ the province;
and the people, exaggerating the importance of the place, looked to it
with confidence as a strong point of support in their own country.
♦A FRENCH DETACHMENT SENT FROM MERTOLA TO BEJA.♦
The news from Algarve, spreading at the same time, elevated their
spirits; and the state of the country soon became such, that the
French couriers were every where intercepted. Colonel Maransin, with
his troops, had now effected his retreat to Mertola, from whence,
for the purpose of restoring a communication with Estremoz and with
Lisbon, he sent a detachment of 100 foot and thirty dragoons to Beja.
That city was originally a settlement of the Kelts, possessed next by
the Carthaginians, afterwards the Pax Julia of the Romans, a Moorish
corruption of which name has been euphonized to its present form.
It was taken from the Moors by the first king of Portugal, restored
from its ruins and fortified in the thirteenth century by Affonso
III. and beautified by his son, King Diniz, with his characteristic
magnificence, of which the walls with their forty towers, and the fine
castle, bore testimony in their ruins. Here, as in all the other cities
of Alem-Tejo, there was a melancholy air of decay, less owing to the
long and destructive struggle with Spain, in which that province had
been the great scene of action, than to the peculiar circumstances
which depressed its agriculture, and that inhuman persecution of the
New-Christians, by which the largest part of the commercial capital in
Portugal had either been annihilated by confiscations, or driven out of
the kingdom. Still, however, it contained some ten or twelve thousand
inhabitants, and was a place of considerable importance in that thinly
peopled province. It stood on the highest part of an elevated and
extensive plain, conspicuous from a distance, and commanding a wide
prospect on all sides, the heights of Palmella and even of Cintra being
distinctly visible. The immediate country, where it is cultivated, is
fertile, and the situation in high repute for its salubrity. Eventful
as the history of Beja had been, it was now to undergo as severe a
calamity as any with which it had been visited in the unhappiest ages
of Spain.
♦JUNE 23.
THE PEOPLE RISE AGAINST THEM.♦
The French detachment entered the city without opposition, passed the
night there, and on the next day ordered quarters and provisions to be
made ready for the whole body of troops in Mertola, who, they said,
were about to follow them. Their demand was received in such a manner
by the people of Beja, who were now acquainted not only with the state
of Spain, but with the nearer events in Algarve and at Jurumenha, that
the French deemed it prudent to march out, and take a position in the
open country, not far from the walls. This encouraged the populace;
and, like all mobs, becoming cruel as they felt themselves strong, they
murdered two soldiers whom the French indiscreetly sent into the city
for provisions. Ignorant of their fate, the commander supposed they
had been imprisoned, and threatened, if they were not immediately set
free, to release them by force. The people then riotously demanded
arms, that they might rush out and attack the enemy. The magistrates
remonstrated with them in vain, and on the following ♦JUNE 25.♦ morning
the Corregidor, finding that farther delay would only endanger his own
life, distributed among them such weapons as could be collected, and
taking the safest course for himself, set off to solicit aid from the
Junta of Ayamonte, the nearest authority by which it could be supplied.
The Provedor and the Juiz de Fora thought it their duty to avert, if
possible, the immediate danger: they went out to the French, entreated
them not to attack the town, and promised them supplies; the enemy
were easily entreated, because they were not strong enough in reality
for any such attempt: the magistrates then endeavoured to make the
people ratify what they had undertaken for them; all reasoning was in
vain, and to save their own lives they left the city. But here also
private malice availed itself of public troubles to effect its own
ends; a messenger recalled them, upon the plea that they were wanted
to give orders for collecting provisions, in fulfilment of their
agreement; for the Corregidor having departed, there was no person
to take upon himself that business. Deceived ♦NEVES, III. 323–327.♦
by this treacherous message, they returned, and were butchered by a
ferocious mob, who knew not that they were made the brutal instruments
of individual revenge.
♦BEJA SACKED BY THE FRENCH, AND SET ON FIRE.♦
By this time, however, the ardour of the people had so far cooled, that
they no longer talked of sallying against the French, they contented
themselves with keeping a tumultuous watch through the night; and
when the morning dawned, and there appeared no enemy, they fancied
themselves secure. The French commander had merely retired out of
sight: his dispatches reached Mertola at eleven on the preceding night;
at midnight Maransin, with 950 men, began his march, and at four the
next evening the united force ♦JUNE 26.♦ arrived before Beja. They were
opposed by a mere multitude without order, leader, or plan of defence,
every man acting for himself as he thought best. Yet the victory was
not gained without a brave resistance, and some loss to the assailants.
According to the French account they lost eighty in killed and wounded,
while 1200 of the Portugueze were slain in the action, and all who were
taken in arms were put to ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 341. NEVES,
III. 327–332.♦ death. The worst excesses followed by which humanity can
be disgraced and outraged, and the[15] city was sacked and set on fire.
In this whole merciless proceeding Maransin acted upon his own
judgement, well knowing that such was the system which Napoleon had
laid down, and which his generals felt no reluctance in executing. He
proceeded to Evora, and Kellermann, approving of his conduct, held
out the fate of Beja in a proclamation, as a warning ♦KELLERMANN’S
PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF ALEM-TEJO.♦ to the province. “Inhabitants
of Alem-Tejo,” he said, “Beja had revolted, and Beja exists no longer.
Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the edge of the sword, and its
houses delivered up to pillage and to the flames. Thus shall all those
be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and
with a senseless hatred take arms against us. Thus shall those bands
of smugglers and criminals be treated, who have collected in Badajoz,
and put arms into the hands of the unhappy Lusitanians, but dare not
themselves march against us. Who, indeed, can resist our invincible
troops? Ye who have precipitated yourselves into rebellion, prevent,
by prompt submission, the inevitable chastisement that awaits you! And
ye who have hitherto been happy or prudent enough to continue in your
duty, profit by this terrible example! Our general in chief has not
told you in vain that ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 347.♦ clouds of rebels
shall be dispersed before us like the sands of the desert before the
impetuous breath of the south wind.”
♦JUNOT’S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦
The bombastic sentence which Kellermann thus quoted, was from a
proclamation that Junot had just sent forth, in that spirit of
shameless falsehood and remorseless tyranny which characterised the
intrusive government. He asked the Portugueze what madness possessed
them? What reason they could have, after seven months of the most
perfect tranquillity, of the best understanding, to take arms; ... and
against whom? against an army which was to secure their independence
and maintain the integrity of their country! Was it their wish, then,
that ancient Lusitania should become a province of Spain? Could they
regret a dynasty which had abandoned them, and under which they were no
longer counted among the nations of Europe? What more could they desire
than to be Portugueze, and independent? and this Napoleon had promised
them. They had asked him for a king, who, under his all-powerful
protection, might restore their country to its rank. At this moment
their new monarch was expecting to approach them. “I hoped,” said
Junot, “to place him in a peaceable and flourishing kingdom; am I to
show him nothing but ruins and graves? Will he reign in a desert?
assuredly not; and you will not be any thing but a wretched province
of Spain. Your customs and laws have been maintained; your holy
religion, which is ours also, has not suffered the least insult; it is
you who violate it, suffering it to be influenced by heretics, who only
wish for its destruction. Ask the unhappy Roman-catholics of Ireland
under what oppression they are groaning! If these perfidious islanders
invade your territory, leave me to fight them; ... your part is to
remain peaceably in your fields.” He then attempted to soothe them,
saying, that if any abuses in the administration still existed, every
day’s experience would diminish them. The Emperor, satisfied with the
reports which he had received of the public spirit, had graciously
remitted half the contribution. He was fulfilling all their wishes. And
would they let themselves be dragged on by the influence of a banditti,
at the very moment when they should be happy? “Portugueze,” said he,
“you have but one moment to implore the clemency of the Emperor and
disarm his wrath. Already the armies of Spain touch your frontiers
at every point; ... you are lost if you hesitate. Merit your pardon
by quick submission, or behold the punishment that awaits you! Every
village or town in which the people have taken arms, and fired upon
my troops, shall be delivered up to pillage, and destroyed, and the
inhabitants shall be put to the sword. Every individual ♦OBSERVADOR
PORTUGUEZ, 317–320.♦ found in arms shall instantly be shot.”
The French had dealt largely in false promises; they were sincere in
their threats, and on the very day when this proclamation was issued
at Lisbon, that sincerity was proved at Beja. ♦NATIONAL FEELING OF
THE PORTUGUEZE.♦ But as the Portugueze had not been deceived, neither
were they now to be intimidated. Their character had been totally
mistaken by their insolent oppressors. They, like the Spaniards, had
a deep and ever-present remembrance of their former greatness. It
was sometimes expressed with a vanity which excited the contempt of
those who judge hastily upon that imperfect knowledge which is worse
than ignorance; more generally it produced a feeling of dignified and
melancholy pride. The kingdom had decayed, but the degeneracy of the
people was confined to the higher ranks, whom every possible cause,
physical and moral, combined to degrade. Generation after generation,
they had intermarried, not merely within the narrow circle of a few
privileged families, but oftentimes in their own; uncles with their
nieces, nephews with their aunts. The canonical law was dispensed
with for these alliances; but no dispensing power could set aside the
law of nature, which rendered degeneracy the sure consequence. Thus
was the breed deteriorated; and education completed the mischief.
The young fidalgo was never regarded as a boy: as soon as the robes,
or rather bandages of infancy were laid aside, he appeared in the
dress of manhood, was initiated in its forms and follies, and it was
rather his misfortune than his fault, if, at an early age, he became
familiar with its vices. When he arrived at manhood, no field for
exertion was open to him, even if he were qualified or disposed to
exert himself. The private concerns of embellishing and improving an
estate were as little known in Portugal as those public affairs in
which the nobility of Great Britain are so actively engaged: if not
in office, he was in idleness, and his idleness was passed in the
capital. A wasteful expenditure made him a bad landlord, and a bad
paymaster; a deficient education made him a bad statesman; and well
was it if the lax morality which the casuists had introduced into a
corrupt religion, did not make him a bad man. Exceptions there were,
because there are some dispositions so happily tempered, that their
original goodness can never be wholly depraved, however unpropitious
the circumstances in which they are placed; but men, for the most
part, are what circumstances make them, and these causes of degeneracy
were common to all of the higher class. On the other hand, the middle
classes were improved, and the peasantry uncorrupted. Their occupations
were the same as those of their forefathers; nor did they differ from
them in any respect, except what was a most important one at this time,
that a long interval of peace, and their frequent intercourse with the
Spaniards, had effaced the old enmity between the two nations, so that
along the border the languages were intermingled, and intermarriages
so common, as to have produced a natural and moral union. They were a
fine, hospitable, noble-minded race, respected most by those who knew
them best. The upper boughs were scathed, but the trunk and the root
were sound.
♦THEIR HATRED OF THE FRENCH.♦
Their ignorance as well as their superstition, contributed at this
time to excite and sustain a national resistance. They expected
miracles in their favour; the people of Coimbra actually believed
that a miracle had been wrought, because when the French fired upon
them from the windows of their quarters, no person was ♦NEVES, III.
210.♦ hurt. Of the relative strength of nations they knew nothing, nor
of the arrangements which are necessary for carrying on war, nor of
the resources by which it must be maintained. Spain filled a larger
space in their imagination than France, and Portugal than either; and
they were not erroneous in believing that Spain and Portugal together
possessed a strength which might defy the world. The threats of the
intrusive government therefore excited indignation instead of dismay;
such language addressed to minds in their state of exaltation, was like
water cast upon a fire intense enough to decompose it, and convert its
elements into fuel for the flames. The fate of Beja excited hatred and
the thirst of vengeance instead of fear, and the insurrection continued
to spread in the very province where the experiment had been made upon
so large a scale of putting an end to it by fire and sword.
♦THE JUIZ DE FORA AT MARVAM.♦
A Portugueze of the old stamp, by name Antonio Leite de Araujo
Ferreira Bravo, held the office of Juiz de Fora at Marvam, a small
town about eight miles from Portalegre, surrounded with old walls. Of
the many weak places upon that frontier it was the only one which, in
the short campaign of 1801, resisted the Spaniards in their unjust
and impolitic invasion, and was not taken by them; and this was in
great measure owing to his exertions. When the French usurped the
government, a verbal order came from the Marquez d’Alorna, at that time
general of the province, to admit either French or Spanish troops as
friends, and give them possession of the place. Antonio Leite protested
against this, maintaining that no governor ought to deliver up a
place intrusted to his keeping without a formal and authentic order:
proceedings were instituted against him for his opposition, and he was
severely reprehended, this being thought punishment enough at that
time, and in a town where no commotion was dreamt of. When the decree
arrived at Marvam, by which it was announced that the house of Braganza
had ceased to reign, Antonio Leite sent for the public notaries of the
town, and resigned his office, stating, in a formal instrument, that
he did this because he would not be compelled to render that obedience
to a foreign power which was due to his lawful and beloved Sovereign,
and to him alone. Then taking with him these witnesses to the church
of the Misericordia, he deposited his wand of office in the hands of
an image of N. Senhor dos Passos, and in the highest feeling of old
times called upon the sacred image to keep it till it should one day
be restored to its rightful possessor. He then returned to his house,
and put himself in deep mourning. The order arrived for taking down the
royal arms. He entreated the _Vereador_ not to execute it, upon the
plea that the escutcheon here was not that of the Braganza family, but
of the kingdom, put up in the reign of Emanuel, and distinguished by
his ♦NEVES, II. 109–122.♦ device; and when this plea was rejected, he
took the shield into his own keeping, and laid it carefully by, to be
preserved for better days.
♦HE FLIES THE TOWN.♦
The Juiz seems to have been a man who had read the chronicles of his
own country till he had thoroughly imbibed their spirit. These actions
were so little in accord with the feelings and manners of the present
age, that they were in all likelihood ascribed to insanity, and that
imputation saved him from the persecution which he would otherwise have
incurred. But when the national feeling began to manifest itself, such
madness was then considered dangerous, and the Corregidor of Portalegre
received orders from Lisbon to arrest him. Before these orders arrived
he had begun to stir for the deliverance of his country, and had sent a
confidential person with a letter to Galluzo, the Spanish commander at
Badajoz, requesting aid from thence to occupy Marvam; men could not be
spared; and the messenger returned with the unwelcome intelligence that
before he left Badajoz the business on which he went had transpired,
and was publicly talked of. Perceiving now that his life was in
danger, his first care was that no person might suffer but himself,
and therefore he laid upon his table a copy of the letter which he had
written, from which it might be seen that the invitation was his single
act and deed; having done this, he seemed rather to trust to Providence
than to take any means for securing himself. It was not long before,
looking out at the window, he saw the Corregedor with an adjutant of
Kellermann’s and a party of horse coming to his house. He had just
time to bid the servant say he was not within, and slip into the
street by a garden door. He had got some distance, when the Corregedor
saw him, and called after him, saying he wanted to settle with him
concerning the quartering of some troops. Antonio Leite knew what his
real business was too well to be thus deceived, and quickened his
pace. The town has two gates, one of which was fastened, because the
garrison was small: toward that however he ran, well knowing that if
he were not intercepted at the other, he should be pursued and surely
overtaken. Joaquim José de Matos, a Coimbra student, then at home for
the vacation, met him, and offered to conceal him in his house; but
the Juiz continued to run, seeing that the soldiers were in pursuit,
dropt from the wall, escaped with little hurt, and then scrambled down
the high and steep crag upon which it stands. Matos, thinking that he
had now involved himself, ran also, and being of diminutive stature,
squeezed himself through a hole in the gate; they then fled together
toward Valencia de Alcantara, and had ♦NEVES, III. 333–337.♦ the
satisfaction, at safe distance, of seeing a Swiss escort come round the
walls to the place where the Juiz had dropt.
♦HE RETURNS, AND SEIZES THE TOWN.♦
The Spanish frontier being so near, their escape was easy; but when
they had been a few days at Valencia de Alcantara, Matos determined
upon returning to his family, knowing that there was no previous charge
against him, and thinking that the act of having spoken to the Juiz
could not be punished as a crime. In this he was mistaken. The governor
of Marvam was a worthy instrument of the French. He not only arrested
Matos, but his father also, an old man who was dragged from his bed,
where he lay in a fit of the gout, to be thrown into a Portugueze
prison; and a physician, whom he suspected of being concerned in the
scheme of an insurrection. This news reached the Juiz; it was added,
that his own property had been sequestered, he himself outlawed, and
all persons forbidden to harbour him, and that a French escort had
arrived to carry the three prisoners to Elvas. He could not endure to
think that he should be, however innocently, the occasion of their
death, and therefore determined to attempt at least their deliverance
at any hazard. It was not difficult to find companions at a time when
all usual occupations were at a stand, and every man eager to be in
action against an odious enemy. With a few Spanish volunteers he
crossed the frontier, and there raised the peasantry, who knew and
respected him: with this force he proceeded to a point upon the road
between Marvam and Elvas; the escort had passed, ... but he had the
satisfaction to learn that it had not gone for the prisoners, only
to bring away the ammunition and spike the guns. This raised their
spirits; they directed their course to Marvam, climbed the walls during
the night, opened the prison, seized the governor, and without the
slightest opposition from two hundred Portugueze troops, whom he had
just obtained from Elvas to secure the place, and who, if they knew
what was passing, did not choose to notice it, the adventurers returned
to Valencia in triumph with their friends, and with the governor
prisoner. The Junta of Valencia did not now hesitate, in conformity to
an order from Badajoz, to give the Juiz regular ♦JUNE 26.♦ assistance;
he entered Marvam in triumph with this auxiliary force, and the Prince
Regent was proclaimed there by the rejoicing inhabitants, at the very
time when Beja was in flames. A few ♦INSURRECTION AT CAMPO-MAYOR.♦
days afterwards a Spanish detachment from Albuquerque entered
Campo-Mayor with the same ♦JULY 2.♦ facility. Some jealousies which
arose there, as well as at Marvam, from the inconsiderate conduct of
the Spanish officers in issuing orders as if they were in their own
territories, were put an end to by the formation of a Junta, of which
the Spanish commander at Campo-Mayor was made president. The example
of these places was immediately followed at Ouguela, Castello de
Vide, Arronches, and Portalegre; and the insurrection thus extended
throughout all that ♦NEVES, III. 337–360.♦ part of the province which
is to the north of Elvas.
♦MEASURES OF THE FRENCH.♦
Junot meantime was in a state of great anxiety at Lisbon. It was not
known what was become of Maransin and the troops in Algarve; there was
no news of Loison; the insurrection in the north had reached Coimbra,
and was spreading in Estremadura, and there was a report, probable
enough to obtain credit, that an expedition of 10,000 English was
off the bar. He called a ♦JUNE 28.♦ council, at which the generals
of division, Comte de Laborde and Travot, were present, the chief of
the staff, General Thiebault, Baron de Margaron, and other officers.
The result of their conference was, that the army should be collected
in and near Lisbon, leaving garrisons in only the three important
places of Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche; that Setubal and the left bank
of the Tagus should be maintained as long as possible; that when the
English appeared they should occupy in succession three positions; one
from Leiria to Ourem and Thomar; a second from ♦THIEBAULT, RELATION,
128.♦ Santarem to Rio-Mayor, Obidos, and Peniche; lastly, one from
Saccavem to Cintra: finally, that they should defend Lisbon till the
utmost extremity, and only leave it to retire upon Elvas, rest the
troops there, and then force their way either to Madrid, Segovia, or
Valladolid. In ♦1808. JULY.♦ pursuance of this resolution, Kellermann
was summoned from Alem-Tejo, and courier after courier dispatched to
recall Loison from Beira. Junot’s next measure was to put the church
plate ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 321.♦ which he had secured in a portable
form, and for this purpose what there was no time for coining was
melted into ingots. To counteract the rumours, true and false, by
which the Portugueze were encouraged, it was affirmed that Napoleon
had entered Spain, and that 20,000 men had reached the frontiers of
Portugal to reinforce the French. Alarmed and harassed by contradictory
rumours, and dreading from the temper of the people an insurrection,
which would be punished by a massacre, many families removed from
Lisbon; those who had country estates to their _Quintas_, the greater
number to the different ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 343. N.♦ places on the
opposite side of the river, particularly ♦JULY 1.♦ Almada and Casilhas.
They were however ordered to return; every head of a family who did not
within four days obey this order was to be arrested, and all persons
were prohibited from leaving Lisbon, unless they were provided with a
passport from the police, ... an institution to which the Portugueze at
this time applied the name of the Inquisition. It was of importance,
the decree said, that good citizens should be secured against the
ridiculous rumours which were promulgated, and that all notions of
danger to the city of Lisbon should be put an end to; the French army
would know how to maintain tranquillity there. This, however, was less
a measure of policy than of extortion; those families who had retired
were made to pay, in proportion to their means, for permission to
remain where they were. They who had nothing to ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ,
345.♦ give suffered the whole inconvenience of this oppressive law.
♦THEY ENDEAVOUR TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE CLERGY’S INFLUENCE.♦
The French commander tried to suppress the national feeling by the
influence of religion. In the village of Varatojo, near Torres Vedras,
there was a famous seminary for itinerant preachers of the Franciscan
order, instituted by Fr. Antonio das Chagas, a man remarkable alike for
his genius, for the profligacy of his youth, and the active, austere,
enthusiastic piety of his after life. Junot sent for the Guardian
of this seminary, requiring his immediate attendance; the old man,
in strict adherence to the rule of his order, which forbade him to
travel by any other means, obeyed the summons on foot, and arrived
four-and-twenty hours later than the time appointed. He was then
ordered to dispatch some of his preachers, as men who possessed great
authority over the people, to Leiria and into Alem-Tejo, to preach
the duty of submission and tranquil obedience. The Guardian excused
himself by representing that his brethren who were qualified for such
a mission were already on their circuits, and that there were then in
the seminary none but youths engaged in preparing for the ministry,
and old men, who, being past all service, rested there ♦NEVES, IV.
61–63.♦ from their labours, in expectation of their release. ♦JULY 2.♦
The dignitaries of the patriarchal church could not so well evade
his commands; a pastoral letter was obtained from them denouncing
excommunication against all persons who should, directly or indirectly,
either by writing, speaking, or acting, encourage the spirit of
insurrection which had gone abroad. This was sent into the provinces,
with a letter from the French intendant of police, Lagarde, in which
the clergy ♦JULY 4.♦ and the heads of convents were informed, that
wherever public tranquillity might be disturbed, they would be held
responsible, because no disturbance would break out if they exerted
themselves to prevent it, as the true spirit of religion required.
The fate of Beja, he said, should be that of every city in Portugal
which should have the guilty imprudence to revolt against the Emperor,
now the sole sovereign of that country. And he asked the Portugueze,
wherefore they would bring upon themselves the heavy weight of power
at a moment when the Almighty authority (such was the blasphemous
expression) thought only of putting in oblivion the rights of conquest,
and of governing with mildness? Is it, said he, before a few handfuls
of factious men ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 348–353.♦ in Portugal that the
star of the great Napoleon is to be obscured, or the arm of one of his
most valiant and skilful captains to be deadened? Deeply as the baneful
superstition of the Romish church has rooted itself in that country,
the threat of excommunication excited nothing but contempt. The French
could not derive any assistance from ecclesiastical interference while
it was remembered that they had robbed the churches.
♦INSURRECTION AT THOMAR.♦
It is not extraordinary that the intrusive government should have
failed to deceive the people by its addresses; but that it should have
attempted so to do; that it should have talked of benefits intended
and conferred upon a nation on whom it had brought such wide and
general misery, and inflicted injuries as unprovoked as they were
enormous, indicated indeed an effrontery of which none but the agents
of Buonaparte were capable. Their insolent language exasperated the
Portugueze. One of these papers was lying upon a tradesman’s counter
in Thomar, and one of their very few partizans vindicated the manner
in which the Prince was there spoken of, saying, that the country was
now rid of him and of the Inquisition. A Franciscan who was present
immediately took a knife from his sleeve, and struck it through the
paper into the board, saying, that in that manner he would serve any
one who dared speak against his Prince and his religion: and producing
a pistol, he was only withheld by force from giving murderous proof
of his sincerity. An information was laid against him, and a party of
Portugueze soldiers sent from Abrantes to arrest him: he absconded in
time, and the Guardian of the convent, who was suspected of favouring
his escape, was taken in his stead. Before they could carry him out of
the ♦NEVES, IV. 3–8.♦ town, the people rose and rescued him, and the
restoration of the legitimate government was proclaimed with the same
ceremonies as in other places.
♦INSURRECTION AT LEIRIA.♦
About the same time a handful of students from Coimbra, collecting
volunteers as they went, spread the insurrection at Condeixa, Ega, and
Pombal, and approached Leiria, from which city a small party of the
French retired before them. This place was within easy reach of the
enemy, and troops, arms, and ammunition were wanting to defend it. The
people sent to Coimbra for all, as if Coimbra could supply either: the
Bishop exerted himself to forward the preparations; and the people
mustered tumultuously with that confidence which an ignorant multitude
always feels of its own untried strength. The French had some small
garrisons upon the coast, about twenty miles off, in the little forts
of Nazareth, S. Giam, and S. Martinho, which communicated with each
other by telegraphs, and drew rations every day from the adjoining
country. The Juiz of Pederneira was compelled to furnish these; in
this time of alarm he was called upon to store them with a convenient
stock beforehand, and because this was not, and could not be done in a
few hours, they began to pillage the neighbourhood. Provoked at this,
the fishermen fell upon a ♦SUCCESS OF THE INSURGENTS AT NAZARETH.♦
Frenchman, who was going with dispatches from S. Martinho to Nazareth,
and murdered him, crying, Down with the French! The sentinel at the
signal-post had the same fate ... the signal-post was broken, and
the country round about was presently in insurrection. The enemy
withdrew from S. Giam and S. Martinho, having hastily spiked two guns
at the former place, and buried two barrels of powder. They fell back
upon a detachment under General Thomieres, which watched the country
between the Caldas, Obidos, and Peniche. Nazareth was blockaded by
the insurgents; the report was, that a considerable Spanish army had
arrived at Leiria, and incredible as this was, it was believed, and
gave full confidence to these ignorant and zealous people. They sent
thither for assistance, and the Coimbra students came with a party of
peasants, those who could muster the best arms. The cannon were brought
from S. Giam, and rendered serviceable; the two barrels of powder were
discovered; a Portugueze artilleryman escaped from the fort to join
his countrymen, and direct their operations; and the French, finding
themselves now in serious danger, capitulated ♦JULY 5.♦ to save their
lives. The victorious students and their party were far advanced on
their ♦NEVES, IV. 14–30.♦ return to Leiria, when they heard news of
that miserable city, which rendered it necessary for them to strike
into the pine forest, and conduct their prisoners by unfrequented ways
to Figueira.
♦MARGARON APPROACHES LEIRIA.♦
General Margaron had been sent from Lisbon with between 4000 and 5000
men, to check the progress of the insurrection in Estremadura, and
learn some intelligence of Loison, from whom nothing had been heard
for a considerable time. Though the disposition of the people was
every where the same, they were kept down by the presence or by the
neighbourhood of the enemy, every where within reach of the capital;
and he met with no opposition till he approached Leiria. That city,
which is the most considerable place on the road to Coimbra, is built
upon the little rivers Liz and Lena, in a beautiful country, an hundred
miles from Lisbon. It is believed to have been built from the ruins of
Colippo, a Lusitanian city which the Romans destroyed; and it has been
asserted, that Sertorius planted a colony there whom he brought from
Liria in Spain. Affonso Henriquez fortified it as a strong hold against
the Moors, who then possessed Santarem, and recovered it after they had
captured it. Some of his successors occasionally resided there, and
its fine castle was enlarged and beautified by Queen St. Isabel, wife
of the magnificent King Diniz. At the beginning of the last century
it contained 900 houses and 2150 communicants. Its population had
increased, and might at this time have been estimated at about 5000.
The adjacent country has been made the scene of pastoral romance by
Francisco Rodriguez Lobo, for which it is precisely adapted by its wild
yet beautiful and peaceful character.
♦PREPARATION FOR DEFENCE.♦
The people of Leiria and the peasantry who had collected there had
had little time for preparation when they heard that the French were
approaching. They had paraded through their streets the banner of the
city, bearing for its device a crow upon a pine tree; in memory of one
which, when Affonso Henriquez attacked the city, perched there in the
midst of his camp, and clapped its wings and croaked in a manner that
was accepted as a good omen. They had proclaimed the Prince, restored
and repainted the royal arms, and assisted at the performance of _Te
Deum_ in the cathedral; but school-boys in a rebellion could not have
been more unprepared with any plan of defence, or unprovided with
means for it. They were in an open city. They had not a single piece
of cannon. Of some 800 men who were stationed at outposts and other
points of danger, scarcely a fourth part were armed with muskets, and
for these three or four round of cartridges were all that could be
found. To persons unacquainted with the character and condition of the
Portugueze it might appear almost incredible that resistance should
have been attempted under circumstances thus absolutely hopeless.
But the people were goaded by insult, and stung by the feeling of
insupportable wrong. They had been wantonly invaded, ... grievously,
inhumanly, and remorselessly oppressed. They knew that the nation
was rising against its oppressors: they felt instinctively what
the strength of a nation is; and were too ♦NEVES, IV. 31–36.♦ much
exasperated to consider, or too little informed to understand, that
without order and discipline numbers are of little avail, and even
courage not to be relied on.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER THE CITY.♦
The higher orders were perfectly sensible of their imminent danger,
but they would have exposed themselves to certain destruction if
they had attempted to reason with the infuriated multitude. The
magistrates therefore, and the person who had been appointed to the
command, withdrew secretly from the city during the night, and fled.
In the morning five Frenchmen, who had been surprised upon a marauding
party, were ♦JULY 5.♦ brought in prisoners. A short-lived and senseless
exultation was excited at their appearance. At noon it was known that
the enemy were close at hand; they sent forward a peasant who had
fallen into their hands, and whom, contrary to their custom, they had
spared, to offer pardon to the people if they would return to their
obedience; that offer being refused, they attacked the insurgents. By
their own account the resistance was so momentary, that there was no
time for the artillery, nor for half the troops to take part in the
action. The insurgents threw away their arms, like terrified villagers,
imploring the clemency of an irritated conqueror. From 800 to 900 were
left upon the field. The city was ♦3d BULLETIN. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ,
357. THIEBAULT, 143.♦ entered on all sides. But, by their own
account, the moment the action was over, General Margaron restrained
the indignation of his troops; their moderation was equal to their
valour, and victory was immediately followed by order. Margaron, in a
proclamation to the inhabitants, dwelt upon his clemency. “A decree had
been issued,” he said, “commanding that every town where the French
were fired upon should be burnt, and its inhabitants put to the sword.”
They had incurred that penalty, and his duty required him to inflict
it. Nevertheless he had prevented the massacre and the conflagration;
not a house, not a cottage had been burnt; he had protected their
persons and their property, as far as was possible under such
circumstances; and instead of seeking for the guilty, he repeated
to them his offers of peace and union. He called upon them to learn
who were their real friends, and ♦THIEBAULT, PIÈCES JUSTIFICATIVES,
NO. 10.♦ lay aside their arms. “Leave,” said he, “the noble task of
protecting and defending you to the soldiers of the great nation.
Submit yourselves to the power which Heaven supports, and obey our holy
church as I do, ... you in renouncing your projects of exterminating
the French, I in forgiving all that you have done against them.”
♦MASSACRE OF THE PRISONERS.♦
♦NEVES, IV. 48.♦
This is what the French relate of their conduct at Leiria. “Sepulchres
of Leiria,” exclaims the Portugueze historian of these events, “prove
ye the falsehood with which these robbers, as cruel as they are
perfidious, have deceived the world!” What they have not related is now
to be recorded. It is not dissembled by the Portugueze that the defence
was as feeble and as momentary as the enemy describe it. They entered
the city on all sides, and began an indiscriminate butchery; old and
young, women and babes, were butchered, in the streets, in the houses,
in the churches, in the fields. The most atrocious acts of cruelty were
committed, and not by the common soldiers only. One of the superior
officers related of himself, that a feeling of pity came over him when
upon entering the town he met a woman with an infant at her breast,
but calling to mind that he was a soldier, he pierced mother and child
with one thrust! Free scope was given to every ♦MEMOIR OF THE EARLY
CAMPAIGNS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, P. 8.♦ abominable passion; and in
the general pillage the very graves were opened, upon the supposition
that treasure might have been hidden there, as in a place where no
plunderer would look to find it. When the slaughter in the streets had
ceased, they began to hunt for prisoners, and all who were found were
taken to an open space before the Chapel of S. Bartholomew, there to
be put to death like the prisoners at Jaffa. The greater number of
these poor wretches fell on their knees, some stretching their hands
in unavailing agony toward their murderers for mercy; others, lifting
them to heaven, directed their last prayers where mercy would be found.
The murderers, ♦NEVES, IV. 37–42.♦ as if they delighted in the act of
butchery, began their work with the sword and bayonet and the but-end
of the musket, and finished it by firing upon their [16]victims.
♦LOISON’S MARCH FROM ALMEIDA TO ABRANTES.♦
On the same day actions of the same devilish character were committed
by Loison’s division on their way from Almeida. Leaving a garrison
of 1250 men in that place, and having blown up the works of Fort
Conception, he set out towards Lisbon, in pursuance to the orders
which he had received, with between 3000 and 4000 troops. The next
day he approached the city of Guarda; it happened to be Sunday, and
also the annual festival of Queen St. Isabel, whose name, stripped
of all fable and idolatrous observances, deserves always to be held
in dear and respectful remembrance by the Portugueze. The assemblage
of people was therefore much greater than at other times; but they
were assembled to keep holyday, not to provide for their defence.
A Junta had been constituted there two days before; and with that
miscalculation of strength, or ignorance of the state of things, which
prevailed so generally among their countrymen, they seem not to have
considered themselves as in danger of an attack till Loison was within
two miles of the city. An old iron gun, rusty and dismantled, and lying
useless in the ruins of the castle, was their whole artillery; ... a
few peasants mounted it upon a cart, and so carried it to a rising
ground near the road, as if the sight of it would deter the French from
advancing. According to the ♦BULLETIN 4. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ,
366.♦ French official account, the rebels, as they insolently styled
the Portugueze, drew up in two ♦THIEBAULT, 153.♦ lines, having their
flanks well supported, and two pieces of cannon to protect their
centre; their lines were forced at all points, their guns taken,
themselves surrounded as well as routed; the disorder was general, the
slaughter dreadful; more than a thousand dead were left upon the field,
and Loison in pursuit of the fugitives entered the city. The truth is,
that a disorderly multitude fled as soon as they were attacked; and
that, as all who could not escape were cut down, the number of the
slain has not perhaps been much exaggerated. A night of licentiousness
and pillage followed, and Loison then proceeded. The ancient and
flourishing town of Covilham escaped a similar visitation, because
it lay somewhat out of the line of his march, and he had no time to
spare. Alpedrinha, a place containing between two and three thousand
inhabitants, was not so fortunate. On the same day that Margaron
entered Leiria, and with as little resistance, General Charlot entered
this ♦JULY 5.♦ unhappy town; that General was one of the few commanders
who had hitherto obtained a character for honour and humanity, ...
here, however, all horrible crimes and cruelties were committed; one
inoffensive old man was taken out of the town, and burnt alive within
sight and hearing of the fugitives upon the mountains; and the French,
having carried off every thing ♦NEVES, IV. 77.♦ that was portable,
set the place on fire. They proceeded, plundering as they went, by
Sarzedas, Cortiçada, and Sardoal to Abrantes.
♦LANGUAGE OF THE FRENCH BULLETINS.♦
The French stated in their bulletin that they had lost upon their
march twenty killed, and from thirty to forty wounded, whereas the
rebels had left at least three thousand upon the different fields
of battle[17]. The character of the intrusive government would be
imperfectly understood hereafter, if its language as well as its
acts were not faithfully recorded. The bulletin which announced this
statement to the Portugueze, and to that great portion of the civilized
world in which the events of the war were anxiously observed, proceeded
to say, “this is the mournful result of a frenzy which nothing can
justify, which nothing can excuse, and which obliges us to multiply
the number of victims who excite sorrow and compassion, but upon
whom a terrible necessity compels us to inflict the strokes of just
vengeance. Thus it is that the Portugueze people, blind instruments
of the unfeeling calculations of the British cabinet, destroy with
their own hands the happiness which we with all our power were
endeavouring to make them enjoy! Thus it is that from the bosom of
tranquillity, of good order, and of repose, they draw upon themselves
the destructive scourge of war, and bring devastation even upon the
very fields where God had given abundance! Thus it is that deluded
men, ungrateful children as well as guilty citizens, change all the
claims which they had to the benevolence and protection of government,
for deserved misfortune and wretchedness, ruin their families, carry
desolation, flames, and death, into their dwellings, transform
flourishing cities into heaps of ashes and vast tombs, and by their
fatal union draw upon the whole country the calamities which they
provoke, which they deserve, and from which (weak victims as they are)
they cannot escape, covering themselves with shame, and completing her
destruction. Thus it is that no other resource remains to them than
the clemency of those whom they sought to assassinate, ... a clemency
which they do not implore in vain, when, acknowledging their crime,
they ask pardon from the French, who, incapable of belying their
noble character, are ♦BULLETIN 4. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 368.♦
always as full of generosity as of valour.” This was the [18]language
of Buonaparte’s governor in Portugal! “To be the victim,” says Mr.
Wordsworth, commenting upon these things and words at the time, in
that strain of profoundest feeling and philosophy by which his higher
compositions are so eminently distinguished, “to be the victim of such
bloody-mindedness, is a doleful lot for a nation; and the anguish must
have been rendered still more poignant by the scoffs and insults,
and by that heinous contempt of the most awful truths, with which
the perpetrator of those cruelties has proclaimed them. Merciless
ferocity is an evil familiar to our thoughts; but these combinations
of malevolence historians have not yet been called upon to record;
and writers of fiction, if they have ever ventured to create passions
resembling them, have confined, out of reverence for the acknowledged
constitution of human nature, those passions to reprobate spirits. Such
tyranny is, in the strictest sense, intolerable; not because it aims at
the extinction of life, but of every thing which gives life its value,
... of virtue, of reason, of repose in God, or in truth.”
♦LOISON ORDERED TOWARDS COIMBRA.♦
Loison, for the sake of intimidating the country, and thereby
preventing the danger of such resistance as he had experienced in Tras
os Montes, had sent before him a report that he had been reinforced
by 16,000 men from the army of Marshal Bessieres; and this news was
officially transmitted to Junot by the Corregedor of Abrantes. At
first the French received the tidings with entire belief, and with a
joy proportionate to the danger from which they now thought themselves
delivered. A comparison of dates and distances occasioned some
uncomfortable doubts, and the next day advices came that Loison had
arrived at Abrantes with no other force than his own. But even this was
of no inconsiderable importance: it relieved them from their anxiety
concerning him, it brought the whole of their disposable force within
reach and within command, for Kellermann had now arrived with the
troops from Alem-Tejo; and Junot determined upon striking a great blow
before the English should appear. Kellermann had been sent to Alcobaça,
where the troops under General Thomières, who covered Peniche, and
those of Margaron (who had received the submission of the people of
Thomar, and exacted from them ♦NEVES, IV. 64.♦ 20,000 cruzados) were
to be under his orders. Loison was now instructed to form a junction
with them and take the command; crush the insurgents in that part of
the country, march against Coimbra, subdue and chastise that city, thus
quenching one great furnace of the insurrection, ♦THIEBAULT, 146.♦ and
return to Lisbon. Before he reached Alcobaça part of these instructions
had been fulfilled by Thomières.
♦NAZARETH SACKED AND BURNT BY THE FRENCH.♦
That General had advanced with a few hundred men to Obidos, with the
intention of relieving the fort at Nazareth; but a reconnoitring
party which he sent forward to Barquinha was driven back, four of his
scouts were made prisoners and sent on board an English vessel, and a
report that a considerable body of English had landed there to assist
the insurgents deterred him from proceeding in time. The Portugueze
themselves raised this report; in reality they had applied for aid
to the English, who, some time before, had taken possession of the
Berlengs; a few pieces of cannon were given them, but the garrison was
so scanty that no men could be spared; and the short respite which
they obtained by deceiving the enemy would have been better employed
in providing for escape, than for a feeble and disorderly resistance.
Nine days after their triumph Thomières proceeded against them ♦JULY
14.♦ with 3000 men, in the belief that some English had joined them.
One column, under cover of the darkness, got under the ill-served guns
of the insurgents before they were perceived; the Portugueze fired
in haste without aim and without effect, and then took to flight. A
few drunken fellows, who had undertaken to serve the guns, remained
by them, with a woman and a few old men, and these were put to death.
The town of Nazareth was sacked, and set on fire. The jewels which
they took from the church of N. Senhora de Nazareth were estimated at
more than £20,000; for of the innumerable and many-named idols of Our
Lady in Portugal, this was the most celebrated. It is the very image
which, according to the legend, St. Jerome sent from Bethlehem to St.
Augustine, and St. Augustine to his monks at the Caulian monastery,
from whence, at the destruction of the Goths, it was brought by King
Roderick and Romano to this spot. It is said, that during the last
century the idol has sometimes been visited by not less than 20,000
devotees on the day of its festival. The enemy then descending to the
beach, burnt the lower town, consisting of some 300 houses, of which
only four escaped the flames; they burnt also the nets and vessels,
upon which the inhabitants, ♦NEVES, IV. 84–87.♦ being fishermen,
depended for their subsistence: they then plundered Pederneira, and set
it on fire, and returned with their booty to Alcobaça[19].
♦A JUNTA ESTABLISHED AT BEJA.♦
Loison having taken the command, proceeded, in pursuance of his
instructions, towards Coimbra; but he had hardly got beyond Leiria when
he was recalled, in consequence of an alteration in Junot’s plans,
which the events in Alem-Tejo had rendered necessary. In the north of
that province the insurrection was spreading far and wide, while Beja
was in flames; and when Kellermann marched for Lisbon, leaving only a
garrison in Elvas, it spread with equal rapidity in the south. Beja
had not been destroyed by the fire; houses with little furniture and
little wood-work are not easily burnt. The Corregedor returned there
from Ayamonte with a supply of arms; a Junta was formed, which assumed
great authority, and acted with unusual promptitude and vigour. Men
were raised, the regular taxes claimed in the name of the rightful
government, and a detachment under Sebastiam Martins Mestre, who had
taken an active part in Algarve, was sent to guard against the French
at Setubal, by forming a cordon to guard the river Sadam. Having raised
a few men for this purpose in the districts of Grandolo and Santiago
de Cacem, he proceeded to Alcacer do Sal, established a Junta there,
and brought four iron guns from Melides for the defence of this town,
a point of great importance to the province while there was an enemy’s
force ♦NEVES, IV. 92–95.♦ at Setubal: Setubal and Palmella were the
only places which they now occupied on that side the Tagus.
♦JUNTA OF ESTREMOZ.♦
Lobo meantime, leaving Moretti in Jurumenha, formed Juntas at Borba
and at Villa-Viçosa, where he placed the palace and park upon their
former establishment. These Juntas readily acknowledged the supremacy
of Estremoz, where one was at this time formed, which endeavoured
to make its authority recognized as supreme in Alem-Tejo, and was
supported in its pretensions by the Spanish government at Badajoz.
The claim was admitted by all the smaller places in the surrounding
country, but not at Beja nor at Campo-Mayor, in which latter place
considerable activity had been displayed. Instead of doubling the
soldiers’ pay, which had been rashly done at Porto, the officers who
assembled at Campo-Mayor resolved that those whose means rendered
it possible should serve for half-pay, or without pay; they raised
loans and donatives, levied a third of the rent upon the entailed
estates, and took from the property of the church contributions in
kind; and having thus acquired considerable funds, they undertook, and
for a time sustained, the improvident expense of paying their Spanish
allies. The ready obedience shown to its authority, when these imposts
were demanded, and the power which it derived from the distribution
of the money thus raised, gave the Junta of Campo-Mayor exaggerated
notions of its own importance, and when tidings arrived that a Junta
of higher or equal pretensions had been formed at Estremoz, that of
Campo-Mayor sent to propose a reciprocal alliance, as if one sovereign
power were treating with another. But in reply a paper in the form of a
decree was sent, declaring, that the primacy of the Junta of Estremoz
should be acknowledged by all others in the province, because of the
position of that place, and because it was a fortified town; that the
members of that Junta should have the title of Highness, because they
represented the august person of the Sovereign; and that there should
be a subordinate Junta in every town, and one deputy from each sent as
a representative to assist in the Supreme Junta of Estremoz. Obedience
♦NEVES, IV. 92–116.♦ to this decree was required from Campo-Mayor, till
a Supreme Junta should be established, as it was about to be, at Evora,
whither head-quarters were to be removed.
The transfer of the supreme provincial authority to Evora was
concerted by Moretti and by the Portugueze General Francisco de
Paula Leite, who had refused to concur in the first hasty tumult at
Villa-Viçosa, but who now, when the insurrection had become general
throughout the province, felt himself bound to resume the charge
with which the Prince Regent had intrusted ♦A SUPREME JUNTA FORMED
AT EVORA.♦ him. The object of this transfer seems to have been a
persuasion, that as Evora was the most populous city in the province,
and the seat of the Archbishop, its authority would at once be
acknowledged, and all disputes for precedency, which might otherwise
prove so prejudicial to the common cause, would thus be terminated.
This object was effected: in other respects the measure was incautious,
and contrary to the judgement of the most judicious inhabitants; for
when Moretti had by letter proposed it to them, they replied, that the
richest city of Alem-Tejo, lying as it did so near Elvas, ought not to
declare itself, unless it could reckon upon a force of 8000 men for its
defence. It was not that the will was wanting; this General Leite knew;
and without farther demur, he and Moretti and Lobo, with ♦JULY 20.♦
200 foot soldiers and 100 cavalry, entered Evora. They were received
with enthusiasm; a Junta was formed under two presidents, Leite being
one, and the Archbishop, D. Fr. Manoel do Cenaculo Villas Boas, the
other, a man then in extreme old age, distinguished for his erudition
and his exemplary virtues. Circular letters were dispatched to all the
other Juntas in Alem-Tejo, requiring a recognition, and the troops
which had been embodied were ordered to Evora. Before the new machine
of government could be ♦NEVES, IV. 118–126.♦ put in motion, Loison had
crossed the Tagus on his way to destroy it.
♦LOISON SENT INTO ALEM-TEJO.♦
Notwithstanding the contempt with which the French government, and its
agents in Portugal, regarded the Portugueze, Junot knew how easily
brave men might be made good soldiers, under due instruction; and he
seems to have apprehended, that better officers would be found to train
and command them than either Portugal or Spain at that time could
supply. He apprehended that the force in Alem-Tejo would soon become
strong enough not only to seize Setubal, but to occupy the heights
of Almada, and render useless all the batteries on the left bank of
the Tagus; while at the same time another division of their troops,
acting higher up the river, would co-operate with the insurgents from
Coimbra. To prevent this combination, he resolved to attack the weaker
and nearer body first. For this purpose Loison had been recalled from
Leiria, Solignac and Margaron were placed under his command, with
5000 men, and it was thought, that after quelling the insurgents
in Alem-Tejo, he might send a supply of food to Lisbon, especially
of meat, ... victual Elvas, strike a blow against the Spaniards at
Badajoz, and then, recrossing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes,
proceed against Coimbra; operations from which, at any time, in case
of need, he could speedily turn back to join the main body of the
French at Lisbon. There was, in fact, so little combination ♦THIEBAULT,
156.♦ among the Portugueze at this time, that the insurgents in the
northern provinces, and those in Alem-Tejo, knew nothing whatever of
each other’s proceedings, and the first news which reached the latter
of the insurrection at Porto was communicated to the people of Sines by
an English frigate.
♦HE ADVANCES AGAINST EVORA.♦
The first tidings of Loison’s movement which reached Evora were, that
he had crossed the Tagus, and was in full march towards that city. No
time was lost in transmitting this from Aldea Gallega; any previous
intelligence had been rendered impossible by the secrecy with which
the French prepared their measures. Moretti applied for reinforcements
to Badajoz; orders were sent for the forces from Campo-Mayor and the
other places in the north of the province, to hasten to Evora, and
General Galluzo was requested to occupy the posts which would be left
unprotected by their absence; but no assistance came from Badajoz, and
Galluzo, instead of acting as was expected, forbade the Portugueze to
leave Campo-Mayor. An advanced guard of 700 men had been stationed at
Montemor o Novo, twenty miles from the city. General Leite ordered 400
men to reinforce this post. They met the corps which they had been sent
to support in full retreat, the commander, not knowing that succours
were on the way to him, having thought himself too weak to await[20]
an attack. Instead of deriving confidence or hope from the meeting,
they hastened to Evora, and entered the city in alarm, exclaiming that
they were betrayed. That cry, in such miserable times, is sure to be
eagerly taken up. The people had been assured that the French who were
coming against them did not exceed 800 men; this had been said either
in a most erroneous policy, to keep up the spirits of the inhabitants,
by deceiving them as to the extent of their danger; or more probably in
good faith, all ranks being credulous in believing what they wished;
the natural effect, when the truth now became known, was to give the
populace apparent ground for believing the vague charge of treason;
their tumultuous movements were with difficulty suppressed, and the
Corregedor found himself so marked an object of suspicion, that,
in the hope of securing himself, he secretly left the city. Order
being in some degree restored, piquets of cavalry and patroles were
stationed for the night. In the morning a company of Miquelets arrived
from Villa-Viçosa (that term having been borrowed from the Catalans),
and the legion of Foreign Volunteers in the Spanish service, under
Sargento-Mor D. Antonio Maria Gallego: both came by forced marches;
the latter had left Jurumenha the preceding evening, a distance of
four-and-forty miles. With these succours the whole force collected
then amounted to 1770 ♦NEVES, IV. 126–131.♦ men, of whom about half
were regular troops, the others being volunteers newly-raised and
undisciplined.
♦EVORA.♦
The city of Evora is so ancient, that fabulous history has laid its
foundation more than two thousand years before the Christian era.
Certain it is, that it was a flourishing city in the days of Viriatus.
Sertorius chose it for his residence; some of the buildings with which
he adorned it are still remaining, and the inhabitants are still
supplied with water by his aqueduct, which Joam III. repaired. Cæsar
made it a municipal town, and from him it was called Liberalitas Julia.
Under the Visigoths it continued to flourish, and Sisebut coined
money there. It was recovered from the Moors in the reign of Affonso
Henriquez, the first king, by the romantic enterprise of Giraldo
the Fearless, then an outlaw. King Fernando rebuilt or repaired its
walls; and Cardinal Henrique founded an university and established an
Inquisition there; but the university had been suppressed. In the war
of the Restoration it was besieged and taken by D. Juan de Austria,
but it was soon recovered, and the Spaniards in retreating toward
their own frontier suffered one of the most signal defeats which they
sustained during that long contest. Its population, once amounting
to 40,000, had declined to about half that number at the beginning
of the eighteenth century; since which time it had varied so little,
that there had neither been any apparent diminution nor increase. The
city was populous enough to have defeated the force which was now
marching against it, if it had been prepared for a Zaragozan defence.
There is courage enough for any thing in the Portugueze character; but
that individual and commanding genius was wanting by which alone the
inhabitants of a large city can be made to act steadily with one will,
and thereby capable of heroic valour. They prepared for a military
defence in the field, which was exposing peasantry and half-disciplined
troops to certain defeat.
♦ACTION BEFORE THE CITY.
JULY 29.♦
About seven in the morning the vedettes announced that the enemy were
in sight, and the Portugueze took their ground in better order than
might have been expected, considering the alarm and insubordination
which had lately prevailed, and the real inequality of the contest.
Their right rested upon the Mill of S. Bento, about a mile from the
city, the centre was posted upon the hill of S. Caetano, the left
rested upon the Quinta dos Cucos. Having reconnoitred this position,
Loison directed General Solignac to attack the enemy’s right, and
Margaron to break the centre with one part of his brigade, while the
other attacked the left; they were to unite behind the city, occupy
the roads to Arrayolos and Estremoz, and thus cut off the fugitives
from all retreat, the cavalry being ready for pursuit upon the right
and left, ... so sure and easy a victory was anticipated. The action
began about eleven. The Portugueze had four four-pounders in their
right wing, one three-pounder in the centre, and two howitzers in
the left; there was no want of artillerymen, and if the other troops
had understood their business and performed their duty like these,
the event might have been doubtful; but the cavalry could not by any
exertion of their commanders be brought into action; they hung back
and retired, while the infantry stood their ground. When the latter
were defeated, instead of flying, as the French had expected, in all
directions, they retreated into the town. The defeat, however, was
thought so irreparable, that General Leite and his staff made the best
of their way to Olivença, and Moretti hastened to the Archbishop, to
bid him provide for saving his own life without delay, in the imminent
danger which threatened it. The venerable prelate calmly told him
in reply, to think of preserving his own, which might yet be useful
and honourable to his country; for himself, he said, the remainder
of his days, few and useless as they needs must be, did not deserve
a thought. The city had five gates, three of which had been walled
up; the breaches which time had made in the walls had also been
closed, but the walls were old and ruinous, and the French forced
their entrance at many points, and then most of the defendants took
flight: ... Moretti and the ♦NEVES, IV. 132–138. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ
382–387. THIEBAULT, 158–165.♦ Spaniards to Jurumenha, the company
from Villa-Viçosa to their own town; others dispersed; time was gained
for them by the resistance which Lieutenant-Colonel Franco made at one
of the gates, and the brave conduct of the foreign volunteers under
[21]Gallego, who fought desperately in the streets, and suffered great
loss.
♦THE CITY TAKEN.♦
The horrors which ensued will be remembered in Portugal while any
record of past times shall be preserved there. Though even a military
pretext was wanting for delivering up the city and the inhabitants
to the will of the soldiers, the whole proceedings of the Portugueze
and their Spanish allies having been those of regular war, to them it
was abandoned. A resolution had been taken in the Junta that those
persons who feared the event should provide for their safety by
retiring in time; ... from some unexplained cause, most probably from
a well-grounded fear that any persons who attempted to remove would
be regarded as traitors by the furious populace, few or none availed
themselves of this ominous warning; when it was too late great numbers
got over the walls, but the French horse surrounded the city, and
showed as little mercy to the fugitives without, as the infantry did
to the ♦INHUMANITY OF THE CONQUERORS.♦ inhabitants within. The convents
and churches afforded no asylum; not those who had borne arms alone,
but children and old men, were massacred, and women were violated and
slaughtered. The lowest computation makes the number of these victims
amount to 900. The clergy and religioners were especial objects of
vengeance: they were literally hunted from their hiding-places like
wild beasts: eight-and-thirty were butchered; among them was the Bishop
of Maranham. The Archbishop’s intercession with Loison obtained only a
promise that a stop should be put to these enormities; no attempt was
made to restrain them that day, nor during the whole night, nor till
eleven on the following morning, and then by an order of the General,
what he called the lawful pillage was declared to be at an end; but
he contented himself with ♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 387. NEVES, IV.
138–142.♦ issuing the order; no means for enforcing it were taken, and
the soldiers continued their abominations till every place had been
ransacked, and their worst passions had been[22] glutted.
♦ALARM AT ESTREMOZ.♦
According to the statement of the French, 8000 of the allies were
killed or wounded in the battle and in the capture of the city, and
4000 made prisoners, the latter being chiefly peasants. Their own loss
they stated at 90 killed, and more than 200 wounded. The intimidation
of that part of the country which was within the immediate reach of
the victors was such as might be expected after such a blow. At the
first rumour that reached Estremoz, the populace became ungovernable;
their first impulse was that of rage, which would willingly have
found any victim on which to sate itself. An officer had just arrived
from Portalegre; they fancied that he had prevented the coming of
some regular troops, which they had looked for; an attempt was made
to murder him in the hall of the Junta, whither he fled for refuge,
and in the presence of the members; and there was no other means of
saving him but by concealing him from the ferocious rabble. Presently
a dispatch came, announcing the total defeat at Evora, the capture
of the city, and the loss of every thing. Such was the temper of the
people, that it was a service of the utmost danger to communicate
this news; and the member who attempted to read the dispatch to them
from a varanda found his life in danger, and drew back. But it was
not possible either to conceal the fatal intelligence or to delay it.
Estremoz would assuredly be the next object of the enemy, and Evora
was only six leagues distant; if they had hitherto dreamt of defending
the town, the fate of Evora was now before their eyes: they knew that
even the unreasonable multitude would feel this near and imminent
danger, though they would not endure to be told of it; and the members
of the Junta determined to take measures for immediate submission. The
melancholy manner with which they passed through the crowd confirmed
the worst apprehensions of the people; and as they went along they
spake each to those persons on whose prudence he could rely, telling
them what had occurred, and what must now of necessity be done; thus
they thought the news might pass from one to another with the least
danger, and every one take such measures for himself as he deemed best.
There was a cry of treason at first, when it was seen that of the three
guns which had been mounted to defend the walls, one was cast into the
ditch, and the other two sent off to Olivença. The Juiz de Fora became
the object of suspicion, and could he have been found at that moment,
would have been murdered; ... so fickle is popular feeling, that this
very man was presently sought for as the ♦NEVES, IV. 145–149.♦ fittest
person to give counsel. A meeting was held, and a messenger deputed to
solicit Loison’s clemency.
♦LOISON PROCEEDS TO ELVAS.♦
Loison received the messenger well, thinking that severity enough had
been shown to secure the submission of Alem-Tejo. He constituted a
provisional government in Evora, at the head of which the Archbishop
was compelled to act, and he set off for Estremoz on the fourth day
♦AUGUST 2.♦ after the action. He raised no contributions there,
permitted no pillage, and paid for every thing which the troops
consumed; he also set at liberty some of his prisoners. But when
he proceeded to Elvas he ordered two Swiss prisoners to be shot,
condemned four others to work in chains for five years, threw the
Spanish commander Gallego into a dungeon, and condemned the Portugueze
Lieut.-Colonel Franco to death, for bearing arms against the French.
The Bishop of Elvas interceded earnestly for this officer, and finding
all intercession vain, concluded by saying, if this favour were refused
him, he had still one to ask, which was, that the General would
sentence him to the same fate, seeing life would be hateful to him if
he could not save his countryman under such circumstances. Loison was
♦1808. AUGUST. NEVES, IV. 149, 156–158. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 397.♦
touched at this, and revoked the order for execution. That General
has left a name in Portugal which will be execrated to the latest
generations; here, however, is an instance which evinces some sense of
generosity, as if his heart had not been naturally bad; but it was the
tendency of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte’s system, to make men
wicked whom it did not find so.
♦LOISON ENTERS PORTALEGRE.♦
The less portable part of the plunder of Evora was sold at Elvas, a
sort of fair being held for the purpose; and many persons purchased
church vessels for the sake of restoring them to the altars from whence
they had been taken. Loison made a movement upon Badajoz, and believing
that the troops in that city had been called off to the Spanish armies,
and that his recent success had occasioned great consternation there,
endeavoured to introduce officers under a flag of truce, for the
purpose of observing the state of the place; but they were refused
admittance. The commandant of Elvas, Colonel Miquel, had made himself
odious in that city, especially for executing a German as an emissary
of the Spaniards, the main proof against him being some thirty pieces
of gold which were found in his possession. Some fugitives from
Elvas, with a few comrades from Campo-Mayor, waylaid this commandant
as he went from the city, intending to sleep in Fort La Lippe, for
greater security; they fired upon him and an officer in his company;
the officer escaped, but Miquel lay all night upon the ground, the
soldiers not venturing to seek him in the darkness, and being removed
to Lisbon, he died there of his wounds. ♦HE IS RECALLED TO THE
NEIGHBOURHOOD OF LISBON.♦ This was some days before Loison’s arrival.
That General appointed M. Girod de Novilard of the engineers to succeed
him, and marched upon Portalegre. The Spaniards had already retired
from thence, and the Bishop, with most of the principal persons,
withdrew also in time. The city was plundered, and a contribution of
100,000 cruzados demanded from the district; about 40,000 were raised,
and six persons were carried away as pledges for the remainder. He
then ♦NEVES, IV. 156–164. THIEBAULT, 168–172.♦ marched for Abrantes,
having received dispatches which ordered him to hasten his return
toward Lisbon by that route, it being now certain that an expedition
from England was off the coast.
♦INSUBORDINATION OF THE PEOPLE AT PORTO.♦
Those provinces, meantime, which had not felt the vengeance of the
French were in a state of anarchy. The temporary dissolution of order,
even though no revolutionary opinions were at work, produced evils
little less alarming than the actual presence of the enemy. The cry
of an inflamed multitude is always for blood. The Intendant of Police
at Porto addressed a manly proclamation to the people, reproving them
for eagerly demanding the death of a few suspected persons, who were
already in the hands of justice, and from whom they had nothing to
fear. In the processes against them, he said, there ought to be nothing
precipitate, nothing that could be accused of inhumanity; he must
see that all the proofs of their guilt were brought forward, that
his own honour might suffer no stain. If they were dissatisfied with
him, he would gladly lay down an office which he had never solicited;
more willingly would he accompany his son to the army, than occupy a
station for which, even in quiet times, he should have thought himself
unqualified; and though life was dear to him, he would rather lose
it in the service of his country than in a tumult. But mobs are as
seldom capable of reason as of compunction. It was necessary, for
the sake of preventing wider evils, to accelerate the processes, and
to promise blood. No person, however innocent of any connexion with
the French, however distinguished for his exertions against them,
was safe from suspicion; no place, however sacred, was secure from
search. Upon a report that a suspected person had concealed himself in
a burial-vault, it was proposed to open all the vaults in the church
till he was found. Upon another rumour that he was concealed in a nun’s
habit in a Carmelite nunnery, the mob proposed to break in and examine
the sisterhood. Raymundo exerted himself to prevent this scandalous
outrage. Some one charged him also with treason, and his life was for a
moment in danger. But Raymundo, who knew how little in such times any
popularity, however deserved, was to be trusted, had provided himself
with a crucifix in case of need. He displayed ♦NEVES, IV. 209–224.♦ it
in this emergency, and by an exclamation according with the display,
induced the rabble to join with him in a shout of loyalty, and
succeeded in dissuading them from entering the convent.
♦DESIGN OF A MILITARY USURPATION IN THAT CITY.♦
Even in this early stage of popular commotions a military usurpation is
said to have been projected by Luiz Candido Cordeiro Pinheiro Furtado,
in conjunction with Joam Manoel de Mariz. Both were esteemed good
officers; the latter was a member of the Junta, the former offended
that he had not been nominated, and still more so that another person
had been made commander-in-chief. They designed to erect a military
Junta under their own direction, and they proposed to raise a corps
under the name of the Loyal Porto Legion, of which Candido was to have
the command; the officers were named, the uniform designed, and worn by
Candido with some of his associates; he took to himself also a guard of
honour, which, from a small beginning, was gradually increased, till at
length the armed attendance with which he always appeared in public was
such as to excite reasonable apprehension. The city was in this state
when Bernardim Freire arrived from Coimbra to take upon himself the
command. He was received with great joy by the people; but Luiz Candido
was evidently displeased at his coming, and Bernardim was soon apprised
that a conspiracy was formed against him and against the Junta. He was
careful therefore to keep Candido and Mariz as much about his person as
possible. Among other precautions for preserving tranquillity in the
city, he ordered the guns to be unloaded; persons were not wanting to
represent this as being done with a treacherous design; and a priest,
notorious for irregularities, at the head of a mob seized his bridle,
and exclaimed that the people would have no such General. A dangerous
stir had already begun, when some men of better mind came resolutely
forward; one of them felled the priest to the ground; Bernardim spake
to the crowd in a manner which conciliated their good ♦NEVES, IV.
225–229.♦ will, the priest was thrown into prison, and the day was
closed with an illumination in honour of the General.
♦THE CONSPIRATORS ARE SEIZED.♦
Upon the arrival of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to assist his
brother-in-law Bernardim, an attempt was made to establish a military
Junta, in aid of the provisional government, and as a check upon
the designs of Candido and his associates. This, however, proved
ineffectual; and they proceeded so rapidly in organizing an armed
party, that it was deemed necessary to secure Candido and Mariz without
delay, lest the city should become a scene of bloodshed. They were
accordingly summoned to a consultation at the Bishop’s palace, and
there arrested. Their escort, which, as usual, had accompanied them,
began to express displeasure at this; and three of the men entering the
palace, demanded insolently that their commander should be delivered to
them; if he were innocent, they said, they would set him at liberty; if
he were a traitor, they would blow him to pieces from the mouth of a
cannon. These men were secured, and Raymundo, with some other officers
to whom this service had been assigned, disarmed their fellows. The
agitation, however, continued the whole day, though this was at an
early hour; and it was not till after midnight that the prisoners
could be conducted without danger of a rescue to the jail. They were
immediately proceeded against according to the forms of Portugueze law,
and the evidence against them appeared so conclusive, that Candido was
condemned to death, and Mariz to be degraded to Angola. The gallows
accordingly was erected, Candido was led into the oratory to perform
the last religious duties, the brethren of the Misericordia went out
to attend the execution, and the crowd collected to witness it; when,
after a while, it was announced that the two prisoners were removed
to the fortress of S. Joam da Foz, to be embarked for Brazil, and
there placed at the Prince’s disposal. So fickle is a multitude, that
the crowd, which a few days before had almost mutinied because of the
arrest of this man, became riotous now because he was not put to death.
They were pacified by the personal exertions of the Bishop and two of
his dignitaries, and by an official notification that the Junta having
pronounced sentence of death against Luiz Candido upon full proof of a
most ♦NEVES, IV. 229–237.♦ atrocious crime, had thought it proper to
lay the proceedings before the Prince, and remit the criminal to his
mercy.
♦1808. JULY.♦
The populace at Porto were kept in some degree of submission by
the vigorous measures of the provisional government, the respect
which was paid to the episcopal character, and by the influence
which men of property possess in a ♦DISTURBANCES AT BRAGANZA.♦
flourishing commercial town. In remoter parts the local authorities
were weaker, and tumults of the most disgraceful nature occurred.
After the provinces beyond the mountains and between the rivers had
been delivered from their first danger, by the failure of Loison’s
expedition from Almeida, they were more seriously alarmed from the
side of Castille and Leon; and indeed had it not been for the success
of the Spaniards in Andalusia, Junot would probably have received
powerful reinforcements from Marshal Bessieres after the battle of Rio
Seco. The first disturbances arose at Braganza upon a rumour that this
army was approaching. The people gathered together tumultuously, and
when they learnt that no enemies were near, directed their vengeance
against all whom they suspected; and in such times it is in the power
of any wretch, however vile and worthless, to throw suspicion upon
the object of his envy or resentment. The Junta, in hope of appeasing
them, convoked a popular meeting, ... the readiest means of showing
them their power, and teaching them how to abuse it; and the result
was, that most of the members of the Junta were turned out, and such
as the mob thought fit elected in their places. A shoemaker, and the
keeper of a wine-house, who, because he was maimed in one arm, called
himself _o Loison Portuguez_, were the kings of the rabble. The latter
took upon himself the office of general, and was actually obeyed by the
troops. Their chief vengeance was directed against the New-Christians,
for Pombal’s law (the redeeming act of that tyrannical statesman) had
not even in half a century produced a feeling of toleration in the
populace. Any accusation, however preposterous, was believed; they
gutted the house of one man, and threw him into prison, upon a charge
of witchcraft, for having, it was said, made an image of General
Sepulveda, and placed it over the fire in a frying-pan. When the city
had thus continued three days under mob-rule, the magistrates took
courage from despair, arrested the ruling demagogues during the night,
and sent them prisoners to Chaves. Troops came from Villa Real, where
Sepulveda at that time was, and tranquillity was restored; but it was
necessary to gratify the people by making useless preparations for
defence; and the popular opinion was, that nothing but what was right
had been done, that the persons whose property had been destroyed, and
their lives endangered, ♦NEVES, IV. 238–245.♦ deserved the usage they
had suffered, and that the magistrates were bribed by the Jews.
♦THE NEW-CHRISTIANS PLUNDERED AT VILLA NOVA DE FOZ-COA.♦
More serious disturbances occurred at Villa Nova de Foz-Coa, arising
from the same popular intolerance and love of rapine. That town, one of
the most flourishing in Beira Alta, owed in great part its prosperity
to its position at the confluence of the Coa with the Douro. A
considerable trade in silk, and in rice, salt-fish, and other articles
of foreign importation, brought thither by the river from Porto, was
carried on with the adjacent country, and with the Spaniards of the
border. This trade was mostly in the hands of persons who, because they
were of Jewish extraction, were believed by the vulgar to be still
attached in heart to the Mosaic law. The cry of Down with the French,
was coupled here with Kill the Jews; ... their houses were attacked,
their goods plundered, their persons abused, their lives threatened and
seriously endangered, and more than twenty of the wealthiest families
in that country reduced to utter ruin by the complete destruction of
their property. Some of these unhappy persons effected their escape
to Moncorvo; and, because they were protected there, and the Junta
of that town endeavoured to restore order at Villa Nova, hostilities
ensued between the two townships. The evil spread; and if the Junta of
Moncorvo had not arrested during the night some movers of sedition in
their town, and seized also some of the ringleaders from Villa Nova,
who had crossed the Douro, the province of Tras os Montes would soon
have suffered all the evils of civil war, exasperated by a spirit of
fanaticism, such as existed in the worst ages of superstition and
ignorance. The New-Christians were accused of assisting the French
with money, blaspheming God, cursing the Prince, ♦NEVES, IV. 245–263.♦
defiling the crucifix, and finally, of Manicheism! When a judicial
inquiry was afterwards instituted concerning the riots, depositions to
this effect were made against them upon oath!
♦TROUBLES AT VISEU.♦
The troubles at Viseu, though less destructive in their consequences,
assumed a more revolutionary character. The mob insisted upon having
a Juiz do Povo, and elected a demagogue to that office, which had
not before been known among them, which in quiet times is useless,
and in turbulent ones dangerous. Florencio José Correa de Mello, the
general of the province, and the Bishop, a good but timid man, instead
of refusing to acknowledge this tumultuous and illegal appointment,
ratified it by administering an oath to the chosen favourite of the
mob, who from that moment became a person of more authority than either
Bishop or General. The latter offended the military by refusing to
double their pay, as had been so imprudently done at Porto; on this
account they became mutinous, and a riot broke out in the city upon an
absurd report that Loison was come to visit him. The demagogue, who was
lord of the day, obtained from the intimidated Bishop an order for his
arrest, his house was sacked, and he and the Juiz de Fora were thrown
into prison amid the insults of a multitude who knew not what they
did. A meeting of the people was then held, at which the magistrates
were deposed, new ones ♦NEVES, IV. 263–273.♦ appointed, and the Bishop
was declared Generalissimo, with Silveira, who happened to be passing
through Viseu, for his adjutant-general.
Proceedings equally outrageous, and of more perilous tendency,
occurred in the town of Arcos de Val de Vez. The bells in that town
and in the surrounding villages rung the alarm upon a report that
20,000 French had landed at Espozende, and were entering Ponte de Lima.
♦RIOTOUS PROCEEDINGS AT ARCOS DE VAL DE VEZ.♦ A disorderly multitude
collected, and set out in search of the enemy; their courage was easily
roused, and soon spent; for when they had ascertained that the report
was without foundation, and were returning home, they learnt that
a body of men from the north were in possession of their town, and
instead of hastening thither to protect their property, and restore
order, they took to flight, each seeking a place of refuge where he
thought best. The people in fear of whom they fled were peasantry, who,
like themselves, had set out to fight the French, in utter disorder;
hurrying along in scattered parties, some with a soldier for their
leader, some with an abbot, provided neither with ammunition nor bread,
increasing their numbers as they went along, and expecting that the
magistrates were to issue orders for supplying them wherever they
came. The _Vereadores_ exerted themselves to feed this rabble, and be
rid of them; the Juiz de Fora, dismayed at such a visitation, and in
despair of satisfying such visitors, absconded, and his disappearance
was imputed to a consciousness of treason. While they were seeking him
every where, an unlucky messenger entered the town with dispatches
from the Corregedor of Barcellos, and as he happened to have lost an
arm, the senseless multitude took him for Loison; and even when they
had examined his papers were still so possessed with this preposterous
notion, that they placed him in confinement. Another messenger with
letters fell into their hands, and was seized in like manner; and they
were demanding a warrant for the apprehension of the Juiz de Fora,
when he was brought in from the country, by an inhuman rabble, in a
condition which would have excited pity in the poor unthinking wretches
themselves who were his tormentors, if they had beheld him separately,
and if men did not seem to be divested of all compassion when they
act in mobs. With great difficulty they were prevailed upon not to
finish killing him, but to lodge him in prison. Presently the thirst
for blood returned, and they ordered a young priest to go and prepare
him for death. The priest objected that he had not yet received that
order in the church which empowered him to officiate in the sacrament
of confession; upon which they replied, that they ♦NEVES, IV. 279–287.♦
conferred the order. The young man then entered the prison, and with
great presence of mind advised the Juiz to feign himself dead; then
going out, he asked the mob, with a tone of anger, why they had sent
him to confess a man whom they had already killed? They made no farther
inquiry; ... the bells tolled for his death, and by this artifice his
life was saved.
♦THE RABBLE ENACT LAWS.♦
The rabble now took upon themselves to reform the state; they began
by turning out the members of the Camara, throwing the chairs out
of window, demolishing the seat of the Judge, and burning the public
papers. They displaced officers, deposed two or three abbots, and
nominated a Capuchin friar to be their General. They appointed a Junta,
and made laws whereby they abolished the recruiting system, fixed the
prices of milk, meat, and wine, prohibited the exportation of bread,
forbade all processes for debt, suspended all law-suits during the war,
abolished the fees of the parochial priests, and were hardly persuaded
to spare the tithes, and, finally, exempted all tenants from payment
of manorial rights; and these laws were enacted not for their own
district alone, but for the whole kingdom. This was the only indication
of a revolutionary disposition which manifested itself during these
unhappy times. By good hap the persons whom they had chosen to form
their Junta were prudent and well-intentioned men, who temporized
with them, and accepted an illegal authority in the hope of restoring
order. The anniversary of a religious procession occurred at this
time, and they took advantage of it. The Host was borne through the
streets, a sermon adapted to the circumstances was preached with good
effect, and the reformers, tired of their work, and willing to secure
what they had gained by pillage, broke up, and returned to their own
part of the country. The people of the land then enrolled themselves,
established patroles, and subjected themselves to ♦NEVES, IV. 287–293.♦
good discipline; so that when a second visit of the same kind was
attempted, they seized the ringleaders. Troops at length came from
Viana, and many of the criminals were apprehended and sent prisoners to
Porto.
♦COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ALEM-TEJO AND THE NORTHERN PROVINCES.♦
The authority of the provisional government at Porto would not
have been generally acknowledged, and with so little reluctance,
throughout these provinces, if that city had not been looked to as a
capital, because of its great commercial importance. But so little
intercourse was there between the north and south of Portugal, that
both had been in insurrection against the French more than a month,
before it was known in one part that any resistance had commenced in
the other. Vague reports indeed were in circulation, which could be
traced to no authentic source; but no intelligence upon which any
reliance was placed arrived in Alem-Tejo, till a student from Coimbra,
who had enlisted in the academic corps, came to Campo-Mayor on his
own concerns, and gave a clear account of the transactions in which
♦JULY 18.♦ he had borne a part. The news was immediately dispatched
to Badajoz; tidings of the battle of Baylen reached that city at the
same time; and messengers, accredited by the governors of Badajoz
and Campo-Mayor, were sent to Coimbra, to communicate the joyful
accounts from Spain. They were received not merely with transports of
exultation, but with as much surprise, says the Portugueze historian
of these events, as if they had come from another world, ... in such
utter ignorance were the people of Beira of what had been going on
in Alem-Tejo, though the two provinces, along an extent of some forty
miles, are only separated by the Tagus. The messengers on their part
with equal surprise learnt that the legitimate government was restored
in Tras os Montes, and Entre Douro e Minho. Being thus referred to
Porto, thither they proceeded; and returned from thence with letters
from the Bishop and the General to the Archbishop of Evora and the
Junta of Badajoz, recommending the establishment of a provisional
government under the Archbishop, similar to that at Porto, that the
same system might be pursued in the south as in the north. When they
reached Coimbra on their way, they learnt the fate of Evora, that
news having been circulated by the French without delay. Proceeding
on their journey, when they drew near Castello-Branco they found the
roads full of fugitives, removing with their children and families, and
such goods as they could carry away, in fear of Loison, so far had the
terror of his name extended. It was not then known that he had marched
toward Abrantes; and the messengers, to avoid the ♦NEVES, IV. 197–205.♦
danger of falling in with his troops, entered Spain by Zebreira, and so
proceeded to Badajoz and Campo-Mayor.
Things were in this state when a British expedition arrived upon the
north coast. General Leite was collecting at Olivença the troops which
had escaped from Evora. The Conde de Castro-Marim was raising and
embodying forces in Algarve; and the Junta of Porto were hardly less
perplexed by the perilous spirit of insubordination which prevailed
both in the city and in the remoter parts of the provinces, than by the
deficiency of money and means for the men who willingly came forward to
serve against the invaders. There were numbers, and courage, and good
will, but every thing else was wanting.
CHAPTER XI.
FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. CONVENTION OF CINTRA.
♦1808.♦
♦STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND.♦
These transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest
in the English people; not so much for the hope, which had thus
unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general
welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation
of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their
sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on.
Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be co-operating
with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings
of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious
struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for
foreign service, and the country with one voice called for an effort
equal to the occasion. But the Government was not prepared for such
exertions. Our military operations had never yet been carried on upon
a scale such as was now required, and since the peace of Amiens they
had been almost wholly suspended. Though great and most essential
improvements in the army had been steadily and unostentatiously carried
into effect by the Duke of York, much remained to be done; and it
wanted that efficiency which nothing but experience could give it.
That our troops were able to beat the enemy wherever they should meet
on equal terms, or even with considerable advantage of numbers on
the enemy’s side, no Englishman doubted, unless he wished the enemy
success; but the public confidence went no farther. The war had on
our part so long been almost exclusively maritime, that the army had
suffered something in reality and more in reputation. The French,
always fond of war, had become a military people; their military
establishment was supposed to be perfect in all its branches, their
troops experienced, their officers excellent, their commanders of the
highest celebrity: to oppose them we had generals very few of whom
had ever been tried in command, and officers of whom the far greater
number, like their men, had never seen an enemy in the field. A great
effort, however, was now called for by our new allies. The Spanish
Juntas with which the British Government had hitherto communicated,
preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force; they
had a brave but undue confidence in their own strength, and perhaps
they foresaw that mutual ill will might probably arise between combined
armies whose habits and prejudices were widely dissimilar. What they
desired was, that a British expedition should be employed against the
French in Portugal; this would act as a powerful diversion in favour
of Spain; thither we were called by the wishes and groans of the
Portugueze people; and it was believed, that when the deliverance of
that kingdom should have been effected, a plan of co-operation with the
Spaniards might be arranged.
♦AN EXPEDITION ORDERED TO THE COAST OF PORTUGAL.♦
When the insurrection of the Spaniards began, an armament was preparing
at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been
supposed to be intended at one time against Ceuta, at another for
South America. Its destination was now fixed for the Peninsula, and
the command was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His
instructions were, while the fleet proceeded off Cape Finisterre,
to make for Coruña himself, and consult there with the Provisional
Government of Galicia. He was authorized to give the most distinct
assurances to the Spanish and Portugueze people, that his Majesty, in
sending a force to their assistance, had no other object in view than
to afford them his most unqualified and disinterested support. In all
questions respecting their provisional government, should any such
arise, he was as far as possible to avoid taking any part; maintaining
only these principles, that no act done by Charles or Ferdinand could
be considered valid, unless they returned to their own country, and
were absolutely free agents there; and that the entire evacuation of
the Peninsula by the French was the only basis upon which the Spaniards
should be induced to treat. In any arrangements he was directed to
act with the utmost liberality and confidence, the object of Great
Britain being to assist the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring
and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their
respective monarchies.
♦FORMER SERVICES OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.♦
Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of Viscount Wellesley, Earl of Mornington,
was born in the year 1769, at Dengan Castle, in Ireland, the seat of
his ancestors. After having been a short time at Eton, he was removed,
while very young, to the military academy at Angers; for there was not
at that time any institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were
taught, and the youth who meant to follow the military profession was
obliged to go to France if he wished to learn the elements of war.
He obtained his first commission about the age of eighteen, in the
41st regiment; and after a series of exchanges and promotions, his
elder brother, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, purchased for him the
lieutenant-colonelcy of the 33rd, in 1793. He conducted himself in
the disastrous retreat from Holland so as to obtain much praise from
military men. In 1795 he embarked for service in the West Indies,
but being providentially driven back by storms, his destination was
altered. In 1797 he went out to India with his brother Lord Mornington,
then Governor General; there he distinguished himself in the war
against Tippoo, and being appointed Governor of Seringapatam after the
capture of that city, and one of the commissioners for disposing of
the conquered territories, he discharged his arduous duties in such
manner as to deserve and obtain the gratitude of the conquered people.
In the subsequent war against the Mahrattas he commanded at the battle
of Assye, against an army exceeding his own number in the proportion
of ten to one; and whose disciplined troops, under French officers,
more than doubled the British force. The action was severe beyond all
former example in India: having won the enemy’s artillery, consisting
of an hundred pieces, which were served with perfect skill, he had to
take them a second time with the bayonet, when men who had feigned
death rose from the ground and turned them upon the conquerors as they
pressed forward in pursuit. The victory was decisive; the success was
followed up, and at the close of that triumphant war a monument in
honour of the battle was erected at Calcutta; the inhabitants of that
city presented him with a sword, and his own officers with a golden
vase; the thanks of parliament were voted him, and he was made a Knight
Companion of the Bath. He returned to England in 1805; took his seat
in the House of Commons the ensuing year, as member for Newport in the
Isle of Wight, and in 1807 was appointed Chief Secretary in Ireland.
But his military services were soon required; he accompanied Lord
Cathcart in the expedition against Copenhagen, and commanded in the
only affair of importance which took place. He was now to be tried
in more arduous undertakings; and such was the repute in which his
talents were held, that when the armament for the Peninsula was placed
under his command, the opinion both of the army and of the public
entirely accorded with the choice which Government had made.
♦SIR ARTHUR LANDS AT CORUÑA.♦
Sir Arthur Wellesley, having about ten thousand men under his command,
sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as
he had seen it clear of the coast, made sail in a frigate for Coruña,
and arrived there on the 20th. There the Junta of Galicia informed him
of the battle of Rio Seco; and that the French, being, in consequence,
masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the
communication between that province and the country to the south and
east. The French in Portugal they estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000
were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portugueze
troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000
had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to
arrive there about the 25th. Sir Arthur consulted with them concerning
the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that
they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money:
... this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from
England that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his
forces against the enemy in Portugal, because while that army remained
unbroken the Spaniards could never make any simultaneous effort to
drive the French out of the Peninsula; and they advised him to land
in the north, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the
Portugueze troops in that quarter.
♦HE PROCEEDS TO PORTO.♦
Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to
follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that
night with the Bishop and the general officers. From them, and from
Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had previously joined them, he learnt
that the regular Portugueze troops who had been collected amounted
to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were about 1200
peasants in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portugueze and 300 Spanish
infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly
equipped and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted
that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the
Spanish corps, then, so the Spaniards had informed him, on its way
from Galicia; and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the
blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which
province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence
of his victory at Rio Seco. Sir Arthur stated, that he should want
cattle for draught, and for the supply of his army; the Bishop took pen
and ink, wrote down the number which would be required, and replied
immediately that they were ready.
Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, advising
him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego,
and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. ♦HE GOES TO THE TAGUS
TO CONFER WITH SIR C. COTTON.♦ The fleet accordingly was ordered to
Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles.
There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had
landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville;
but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castaños,
thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, for the purpose
of acting with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a
position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for
Castaños, in case of defeat, and from whence he could re-embark in
eight-and-forty hours: and he supposed that Sir Arthur would begin
his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not
be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being
convinced by the Junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with
more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General
Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be
actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without
injury to the Spaniards.
♦THE MONDEGO THE ONLY PLACE WHERE A LANDING COULD BE EFFECTED.♦
General Spencer represented Junot’s force as exceeding 20,000 men:
the admiral, according to the reports of the Portugueze, estimated
them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to
18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and
2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered
impracticable: it would be equally so at Cascaes: it was at all times
difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would
be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy:
Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but
to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined
the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the
defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be
reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland,
and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden,
the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple; but he was directed
to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had
received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received
accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the
communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined
by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being
now formidable.
♦TROOPS LANDED IN THE MONDEGO.♦
♦1808. AUGUST.♦
This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of
being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached
him; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and
because he knew that the Portugueze, who were much discouraged at
seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego
Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend
with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred.
It was now found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of
real importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the
Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and ability of the
navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial
assistance of the Portugueze. They began to disembark on the first of
August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high,
that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that
day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had
embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting
for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on
which night the whole army were in readiness to advance: the march of
the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the
Portugueze general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor
o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected
their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and
offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray
the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their
officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry
arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This
hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho.
A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered,
was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to
intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the
French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command,
followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their
dangerous march in safety.
♦THEY ADVANCE TO LEIRIA.♦
Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the
sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as this communication
must needs be very precarious, both as depending upon the state of
the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike
more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them
sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The
advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under
Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their
corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood
of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the
Portugueze army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as
possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed
on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña,
informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to
act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should
enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the
Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would
be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier,
than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there
was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres
could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or
Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices,
therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity
the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined
the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portugueze force,
consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force
being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that
city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several
monks who had been murdered by the French; ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE DUKE
OF WELLINGTON, P. 8.♦ the murderers had amused themselves with dipping
their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark
upon the wall.
♦JOY OF THE PORTUGUEZE IN LISBON.♦
The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the immediate
effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already produced
so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports
were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people looking every where for
deliverance, believed that an army from Morocco was coming to their
aid. The trick of the egg was repeated, not as before, with mysterious
initials, referring to King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation
that the French were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed
was found ♦NEVES, V. 67.♦ upon the high altars of the Patriarchal
Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the
easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and
on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same
fashion, were to be seen upon the ♦THIEBAULT, 170.♦ high altar in every
church in Lisbon: at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining
the trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and
his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now
without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very
soon intelligence came that the only foe of which ♦NEVES, V. 62, 65.♦
he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portugueze commanders
at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information
of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were
assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment
was not possible; ... the news came to Lisbon at the same time from
General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters,
and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of
his dispatches, all doubt ♦THIEBAULT, 172.♦ would have been removed by
the altered appearance of the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth
their deliverance was at hand.
Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-Tejo, and Laborde, who was
supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two
brigades of Generals Brenier and Thomieres to manœuvre and delay the
enemy till Loison ♦MEASURES OF THE FRENCH.♦ could arrive, Travot being
appointed to the command at Lisbon in Laborde’s stead; ... this general
♦THIEBAULT, 175.♦ was chosen because having demeaned himself as a man
of honour and humanity, he had deserved and obtained the respect and
good opinion of the Portugueze. The castle at Lisbon, which had now
been strongly fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores.
The fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up in
obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless, ... the
bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast, and the other
portable plunder, packed for removal, and deposited on board one of the
Portugueze ships of war. Whole piles of rich hangings and vestments,
the spoils of palaces and churches, were burnt in a building erected
for the purpose near head-quarters, and in the sight of the people,
for the sake of the gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered.
In order to counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was
confidently asserted, that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on the
side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of provoking
their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought a stain upon
their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans to fight against the
French, who, like themselves, professed the true religion. It was
indeed actually believed by the Portugueze that the British had brought
with them a Moorish force: the Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact
obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 _cruzados_
for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a
belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the Highlanders: ...
♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 402. NEVES, V. 65, 118.♦ their dress was
immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was
entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries.
♦MOVEMENTS OF LABORDE AND LOISON.♦
The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon the Zezere and
the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison’s detachment
and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and
Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from Rio-Maior he might
either take the direction of Alcobaça, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it
was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to
prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept
the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without
opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he
proceeded to Alcobaça, ♦THIEBAULT, 175.♦ where he found Thomieres.
Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; ...
the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would
have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also
with English aid,) had achieved her own deliverance in the battle of
Aljubarrota, one of the most signal and important victories in the age
of chivalry. The country was too open for his force, and he therefore
remained at Alcobaça, watching the movements of the enemy, and hoping
to be joined by Loison. That general, meantime, had suffered much on
his march through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and the want of
water. Though there were none to oppose them in the field or harass
them, the French felt what it was to be in a country where every
inhabitant regarded them with a deadly hatred. Wherever they went the
towns and villages were deserted; ... meat, wine, and even bread, were
wanting; and the persons who fell into their hands, or perhaps remained
in their line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them out of
their way in search of springs or rivulets, which when they reached
them were dry; ... or ♦THIEBAULT, 172.♦ of stagnant waters, wherein
hemp was steeped, and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was, the
men could not be prevented from drinking greedily. Many died of heat
and exhaustion on the way; and they who from fatigue or sickness fell
behind, were killed by the peasantry.
♦G. FREIRE SEPARATES FROM THE ENGLISH.♦
Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing the Tagus by the bridge
of boats at that city. He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men
in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where
he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached
Leiria, the two cities being about thirty miles from each other.
Laborde was at Alcobaça, six leagues from the latter city, on the road
to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the
British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road
for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaça, Loison could only effect
a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and
thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de
Freire, the Portugueze commander, in his former conferences with Sir
Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply
his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility
of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir
Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing
from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also
that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however,
that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for
bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage
would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should
be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed
the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his
march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message
to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portugueze were to
be fed by the English commissariat, he would separate them from the
English army, and march for Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his
reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here
there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut
off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily
placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur’s command only the day
preceding.
♦MOTIVES FOR HIS SEPARATION.♦
There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate
to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portugueze officers
during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew,
would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was
before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions
were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the
Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information
of the utmost importance, that Laborde’s orders were to amuse the
Portugueze army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and
destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in
a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person
upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice
came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him.
General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even
that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from
the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that
he was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as
little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing
from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of ♦NEVES, V. 79–81.♦
his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies.
The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur
urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the
deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to
the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to
send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400
light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised
him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in
the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily
exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the
English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to
their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur,
considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portugueze
troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them,
if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained,
was so ill [23]composed, as to be incapable of distributing, even to
the British troops, the ample supplies which had been procured for
them. Freire’s conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were
too weak for the service upon which they were advancing; it was not
suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed him, and
which he had withheld from the British commander. He was, however, wise
enough to follow the advice which he had at first refused, and remained
at Leiria.
♦SKIRMISH NEAR CALDAS.♦
On the 14th, Sir Arthur reached Alcobaça, from which the French fell
back the preceding night: the next day he arrived at Caldas. Laborde
and Thomieres were now at Roliça, about ten miles off, and their
advanced posts were within a league of the Caldas. Four companies
of riflemen were ordered to drive them back; they were tempted to
an incautious pursuit; a superior body of the enemy endeavoured to
cut them off, and would have succeeded, had not General Spencer come
to their support. A trifling loss was sustained in this affair,
but the village was won, and the French retired entirely from the
neighbourhood; their picquets having been driven from Obidos.
♦LABORDE TAKES A POSITION AT ROLIÇA.♦
The country between the Caldas and Obidos is a sandy level, with an
open pine wood. Obidos itself stands finely upon an insulated hill,
and a little beyond a mountainous or hilly region begins, the ascent
from the low country being abrupt and difficult. Laborde had retired
thither, knowing the strength of the ground, and expecting to be joined
there by Loison, who, he knew, would make every exertion to effect his
junction in time. That junction had once already been prevented by the
timely arrival of the British at Leiria, and Sir Arthur now advanced
for the ♦AUGUST 17.♦ purpose of a second time preventing it. The enemy
were drawn up at the foot of the hill, in front of their position;
they retired to the heights, and Sir Arthur, having reconnoitred the
ground, and seen how difficult the attack in front would be, determined
to attack both flanks. He therefore directed Major-General Ferguson,
with 3000 men, to turn the enemy’s right, and Major-General Hill to
attack the left, while the Portugueze troops, under Colonel Trant, by a
wider movement on that side, were to penetrate to his rear. Meanwhile
columns under Major-Generals Crawford, Nightingale, and Fane, were
to assemble in the plain, ready to force their way up the passes as
soon as it should be seen that the enemy were shaken. This plan, which
would have ensured success with the least possible loss, was frustrated
by some mistake in the delivery of an order. Ferguson’s brigade was,
in consequence of this error, brought into the plain to support the
central movement; and the attack was made in front, upon the strength
of the position, before the enemy apprehended any danger on the flanks
or in the rear, and consequently while they were able to apply their
whole force and undivided attention where they were strongest.
Roliça was at that time a large and beautiful village, with more
appearance of comfort and welfare about it than was usual in Portugueze
villages. The place, with its five dependent hamlets, contained about
three hundred families, the larger half of the population being in
Roliça itself. Most of the houses had an inclosed garden or orchard,
and the country is full of olive grounds, vineyards, and gardens, with
stone inclosures. A little beyond Roliça is the hamlet of N. Senhora
de Misericordia, a place of fewer houses, but of the same description:
just without this village the British artillery was well placed, on a
rising ground, where there stood some of those strong and well-built
windmills which are common in Portugal; below were olive grounds, and
an open grove of ilex or cork, under cover of which our troops were
enabled to approach and deploy with little loss, though the French kept
up a constant fire from the heights. Laborde had planted his eagle on
the highest point of Monte S. Anna, near a wooden cross, which marked
the spot of some murder or accidental death. The view from those
heights is singularly beautiful, presenting just such objects as Gaspar
Poussin delighted in painting, and in such combination as he would
have placed them; rocks and hills rising in the valley, open groves,
churches with their old galilees, and houses with all the picturesque
varandas and porticos which bespeak a genial climate; Obidos with its
walls and towers upon an eminence in middle distance, and its aqueduct
stretching across the country as far as the eye could follow it; Monte
Junto far to the east, and on the west the Atlantic. And till the
iniquitous invasion of the country by France, there had been something
in the condition of the people here which accorded with the loveliness
of the scene wherein they were placed. Such as their lot was, they were
contented with it; three and even four generations were found under
the same roof: like plants, they grew, and seeded, and decayed, and
returned to earth upon the spot where they had sprung up. If this state
of things be not favourable to commercial prosperity and the wealth of
nations, it is far more conducive to individual virtue and happiness
than the stage by which it is succeeded.
♦BATTLE OF ROLIÇA.♦
Upon this beautiful ground it was that the British troops were first
to be tried against the soldiers of Buonaparte in the Peninsula.
The strength of the enemy’s position fully compensated for their
inferiority in numbers. The way by which the assailants had to ascend
was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men,
so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal,
in some parts overgrown with briars, and in others impeded by fragments
of rock. Three of these dry water-courses, which appeared the least
difficult, were attempted; that in the centre was the most promising,
and this the 9th and 29th regiments attacked. They were protected in
their advance by the fire of our artillery. The way would not admit
more than three or four men abreast, in no place more than six. Near
the top there was a small opening, in the form of a wedge, overgrown
at the point with a thick coppice of myrtle, arbutus, arborescent
heath, and those other shrubs which in this part of Portugal render
the wild country so beautiful. An ambush of riflemen had been posted
here, and here Colonel Lake, of the 29th, fell, with many of his men.
When they had reached the summit, they were exposed to a fire from
the vineyards, while they could not form a front to return it. The
grenadier company, by a brave charge upon that part of the enemy who
were in the open ground, won for them time to form; and though Laborde,
with great promptitude, rallied the French as soon as they gave way,
and brought them thrice to the charge, they kept their ground. This
severe contention had continued two hours, when Brigadier-General Fane,
with the light troops, appeared on the right, and Major-General Hill
on the left. Laborde then deemed it necessary to abandon his first
line and retire into the hamlet of Azambugeira, which was in the rear.
Throughout the action this General had shown that the high military
reputation which he enjoyed was well founded; all his movements were
judiciously planned, and rapidly and well executed, men and officers
giving good proof of skill and courage. The superiority of the British
troops was therefore finely shown; for, from the nature of the ground,
and from unavoidable circumstances, the force which on our side was
actually engaged was by no means equal to that of the enemy. A gallant
charge, under Major-General Spencer, drove them from this last position
in the hamlet; the advantage could not be followed up for want of
cavalry, and also because of the difficulty of bringing up cannon and
more troops in time. Laborde therefore, making his last stand upon a
height beyond Azambugeira, collected his troops on the plain ground
behind, formed them into lines, and then retired toward Torres Vedras,
leaving his guns upon the field.
♦ABRANTES OCCUPIED BY THE PORTUGUEZE.♦
The loss of the British, in killed, wounded, and missing, was nearly
500. The French[24] acknowledge to have lost nearly 600. Laborde was
slightly wounded at the beginning of the action. Even during the action
he was in hopes that Loison might arrive; but Loison, finding that the
English were before him at Leiria, found it necessary to take the line
of Torres Novas and Santarem, and so for Torres Vedras. The Portugueze
had anxiously watched his movements, and no sooner was it ascertained
that he had left Thomar, than they prepared to cut off the small
garrison which he had left in Abrantes. Freire had ordered Bacellar
to get possession of that city, with the aid of some Spanish troops
under the Marques de Valadares, who had arrived at Castello Branco.
Captain Manoel de Castro Correa de Lacerda had been sent forward to
obtain certain intelligence of the enemy; and he finding circumstances
favourable, and adventurers enough to join him, determined, with three
priests militant, by name Captain-Father P. Manoel Domingos Crespo,
Lieutenant-Father Lourenço Pires, and Ensign-Father José Nicolao Beja,
to make the attempt without waiting for the Spaniards. They collected
at Villa de Rei some three hundred men, armed with hunting-spears, and
a few with firelocks; a considerable number of the _Ordenanças_ joined
them during the night on the heights of Abrançalha, which was the place
appointed for their meeting; and early on the morning of that day on
which the battle of Roliça was fought, they entered Abrantes, leaving
Ensign-Father Beja with a party of spearmen in ambush to cut off the
enemy if they should attempt to fly. The French, upon the first
appearance of danger, retired into the old castle, and fired from the
windows, ... for there was no artillery there. Upon this Father Crespo
stationed some sharp-shooters upon the roof of S. Vicente’s church,
which was opposite. The enemy, then knowing how impossible it was to
hold out in their unprovided state, resolved to sally, and make for the
river side, where they had four vessels laden with stores, about to
fall down the stream for Lisbon; but before they could reach the shore,
they were surrounded by such numbers, and lost so many men, that they
laid down their arms. They who were on board the vessels, seeing their
danger, leaped into the river; some perished in attempting to cross it,
they who reached the opposite shore were pursued and hunted down like
wild beasts; fifty-two were killed that day, and 117 taken prisoners;
the few who escaped for the time had no place of safety near, and fell
into the hands of the peasantry. The Corregedor-Mor at this time met
with a miserable fate. Because of the office which he unfortunately
held, the French had made him the instrument of their exactions: the
same constitutional timidity which prevented him from resigning his
post rather than obey their tyrannical orders, induced him now to fly,
in the unworthy hope of securing himself under their protection. He
therefore forded the river, and hid himself in a vineyard; there a
peasant discovered him, to whom he immediately offered 200 milreis if
he would conduct him to the French army; the villain took the money,
led him to a solitary place, stabbed him in five places, then robbed
him, and left him to expire. On the third day he was found by some
women, still alive, and was carried to Abrantes; no care availed to
save his life, and he died rather of inanition and loss of blood, than
from the nature ♦NEVES, V. 95–105.♦ of his wounds; but he was able
to relate what had passed, so that the murderer was apprehended and
brought to justice.
♦MOVEMENTS IN ALEM-TEJO AND ALGARVE.♦
Among the French effects which were taken at Abrantes were about 200
hides and 1000 bags of cotton, which the state of the intermediate
country had prevented them from sending into France: they had carried
on a gainful trade while the communication was open. But now they
began to feel that the amount of their gains and of their plunder
was in danger. In spite of all prohibitions and precautions, some
intelligence still found its way to Lisbon. The British squadron and
the transports had been seen from the heights, and though the French
abated nothing of their high tone, the inhabitants were now well
assured that their deliverance was at hand. As the only course which
offered any hope of extricating himself, Junot resolved to collect
the whole of his disposable force, and give the English battle before
their reinforcements arrived, and before they should be ready to act on
the offensive. The only places in which he left garrisons were Elvas,
Almeida, and Peniche. Setubal had hitherto been occupied by a force
under General Graindorge, who had succeeded Kellermann in the command
there. His situation had not been tranquil, while Mestre had taken
possession of Alcacere do Sal, and an English frigate was off the port.
But Mestre was recalled in all haste to Beja, when that city, after the
fate of Evora, apprehended a second visitation with fire and sword.
The men whom he commanded gave on this occasion proof of that patient
and uncomplaining spirit with which the Spaniards and Portugueze
endure privations. They started fasting and without provisions, and
after a long day’s march reached the little town of Odivella, where
no rations had been provided for them. Mestre and his adjutant then
went from door to door, to beg bread, and with the bread which was
thus obtained they were contented and cheerful. Aware of the alarm
which Loison’s operations had excited, Graindorge resolved to clear
the neighbourhood, and the Juntas of Alcacere, Santiago de Cacem, and
Grandola, fled at his approach. But when Beja was relieved from danger
by Loison’s movements to the north, Mestre, who had been dispatched
toward Evora, ♦ALCACERE DO SAL AND SETUBAL ABANDONED BY THE FRENCH.♦
was ordered to return upon Alcacere, and the same direction was taken
by one body of men from Algarve, and by another under Lopes from Beja.
Graindorge had now received orders to retire with his troops to Almada;
Alcacere therefore was abandoned when the Portugueze arrived there,
and Setubal also. Setubal had been singularly fortunate during a time
of general rapacity. Perfect order had been maintained there while
Solano and the Spaniards possessed it; and when Graindorge succeeded
Kellermann, a Portugueze woman, who lived with him as his mistress, had
influence enough to prevent him from delivering up that beautiful town
to pillage, which his men required, and which, it is said, they had
been ♦NEVES, IV. 173–179. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 291.♦ promised. The
Portugueze writers ought not to have passed over in silence the name
of one who averted so much evil, and who, it may well be believed, was
more to be pitied than condemned for her frailty.
♦MEASURES AT LISBON.♦
About 300 men were left at Palmella. Graindorge had two regiments
under his command at Almada and other places on the left bank of the
Tagus. The forts at the Bugio, Trafaria, and St. Julien, were occupied
by the French, and they had troops also at Cascaes and Ericeyra.
Sufficient force was to be left in and near Lisbon, to keep down
the inhabitants, by the presumed aid of the Russian squadron, whose
presence in the river was of great importance to Junot at this time.
The enemy had recourse also to their usual policy of circulating
fabricated intelligence. They affirmed, that 20,000 French had arrived
at Braganza, and they produced Badajoz Gazettes which must have been
forged for the purpose, relating the defeat and consternation of the
Spaniards, and the rejoicings with which Joseph had been received on
his triumphant entrance into Madrid. Few persons were deceived by these
artifices. On the 15th the Emperor Napoleon’s birthday was celebrated;
the guns from the ships and fortresses were fired, Junot gave a grand
entertainment to his officers, and appeared afterwards at the Opera
in state; but meantime every thing was made ready for his departure.
The night was passed in giving orders, and at daybreak the reserve was
in motion, with the staff, the military chest, containing a million
francs, and the most precious and portable part of their plunder. The
Comte de Bourmont, and some other French emigrant officers who had
found an asylum in Lisbon during the horrors of the Revolution, on this
occasion joined the French army, the Count at his own solicitation
being placed upon the staff, to fight against a government by whose
bounty they had been supported, and a people who had hospitably
received them in their distress: and for this moral treason ♦OBSERVADOR
PORTUGUEZ, 406. THIEBAULT, 187–8.♦ they have been extolled
in their own country, with that perversion of principle and utter
insensibility to honour, which equally characterise the schools of the
Revolution, and of Buonaparte.
♦PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF LISBON.♦
It had been proposed to form a national guard at Lisbon at this time,
composed of all who had any property to protect; but this was rejected,
less as being impracticable than as dangerous. The Lisbonians had too
much reason to execrate their oppressors. Their sufferings, though not
of that kind which give a splendour to history, and consecrate the
memory of the sufferers, had been more pitiable, for they had been long
continued and obscure. The French themselves confessed, that they
knew not how the people of Lisbon subsisted during the three months
preceding the harvest; ♦THIEBAULT, 95.♦ for it was known that the
consumption of food in that great city was only one-third of what it
used to be, and the numbers who had been expelled, who had emigrated
with the court, or had found means of following it, were not greater
than that of the foreign troops who had been introduced. Impossible as
it was to conciliate a people upon whom they had inflicted such deep
and irreparable injuries, the French deemed it politic at this time
to take the most conciliatory measures in their power; if the popular
feeling could be repressed or allayed only for a few days, by that time
they should either have obtained a victory over the English, or have
placed themselves by treaty under the safeguard of British honour.
With these views Junot left a decree, that the heads of the tribunals,
and the chief persons among the nobility and clergy, should be invited
to assist at the council of government during his absence. He left
also a proclamation to the inhabitants of Lisbon, saying, that he was
departing from them for three or four days, to give battle to the
English, and whatever might be the event, he should return. “I leave,”
said he, “to govern Lisbon, a general who, by the mildness and firmness
of his character, has obtained the friendship of the Portugueze at
Cascaes and Oeyras; General Travot will, by these same virtues, obtain
that of the inhabitants of Lisbon. Hitherto you have been tranquil;
it is your interest to continue so! do not stain yourselves with a
horrible crime at the moment when, without any danger of your own, the
lot of arms is about to determine by what power you are to be governed.
Reflect for an instant upon the interests of the three nations who are
contending for the possession of Lisbon. What the French desire is the
glory and the prosperity of the city and of the kingdom, for this is
the interest and the policy of France. Spain wishes to invade Portugal
and reduce it to a province, that she may again make herself mistress
of the Peninsula. And England would domineer over you for the purpose
of destroying your port and your navy, and impeding the progress of
industry among you. The English regard the magnificence of your port
with envy; they will not suffer it to exist so near them, and they have
no hope of preserving it. They know that a new French army has already
passed your frontiers, and that if this should not be sufficient,
another will come after it; but they will have destroyed your naval
establishments, they will have caused the destruction of Lisbon, and
this is what they aim at, and what they desire: they know that they
cannot maintain themselves upon the Continent; but if they can destroy
the ports and the navy of any other power, they are content. I depart
full of confidence in you. I reckon upon all the citizens who are
interested in the preservation of public order; and I am persuaded that
it will be preserved. Call to mind the miseries which must necessarily
follow, if this beautiful city should compel my troops to enter it by
force! The exasperated soldiers would not be then to be controlled; ...
fire, sword, all the horrors of war which are practised in a city taken
by assault, ... pillage, ... death, ... behold what you would draw
♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 408.♦ upon yourselves! The thought alone makes
me shudder. Inhabitants of Lisbon, avert from yourselves these terrible
calamities!”
♦PREPARATIONS ON BOARD THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON.♦
The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had
been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to
the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated.
Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute
their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor
in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the
men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no
doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but ♦OBSERVADOR
PORTUGUEZ, 410.♦ La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city
in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however,
for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his
office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to
pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and General Travot, though
he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable
conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought
it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle. ♦JUNCTION OF LOISON,
LABORDE, AND JUNOT.♦
Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to
command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had
reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather
was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air
stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst,
and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as
they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the
inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out,
and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot.
Each of Loison’s long marches at this time is said to have cost him
not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted,
that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he
proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then
moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British
army distinctly ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS, 18.♦ saw their columns in the line
of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had
retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the
19th, and ♦THIEBAULT, 190–193.♦ when General Thiebault arrived with the
reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the
field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or
1500 horse.
♦THE BRITISH ADVANCE TO VIMEIRO.♦
Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the
line by which the enemy ♦AUGUST 18.♦ retired would have led him from
the sea. He was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow,
when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the
coast. His original intention had been to employ this General’s
brigade, and that of General Acland, in besieging Peniche, if that
should be necessary; otherwise to land them in some of the bays near
the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their
front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and
his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now
to land General Anstruther’s troops, and join them to the army. He
proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position
best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march
in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the
Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade
was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a
cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep
and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and
♦GENERAL ANSTRUTHER’S BRIGADE LANDS.♦ hazard. The boats were almost
always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few
men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and
skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been
expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by
their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the
hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this danger due
precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about
three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at
Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.
♦ARRIVAL OF SIR HARRY BURRARD IN THE ROADS.♦
The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they
scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the
enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by
their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General
Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry
Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur
immediately went on board, informed him of what had been done, and of
the present state of things, and laid before him the plan of operations
upon which he had intended to proceed. His purpose was to march on the
following morning, push his advanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main
body about four or five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy’s
position at Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground
as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir Charles
Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never been allowed a
field whereon to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part
of the country when he commanded the British troops in Portugal; it had
not escaped him, that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion,
the kingdom must be saved or lost; and his maps and papers were in
Sir Arthur’s hands. The battle would thus be fought in a country of
which he had adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the
retreating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had formed, and
orders for marching on the morrow had actually been issued, before Sir
Harry’s arrival.
♦HE ALTERS THE PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.♦
To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in himself and in
his troops, no prospect could have been more encouraging; but the new
commander did not behold it hopefully. The objections to a forward
movement preponderated in his mind; he learnt that the artillery[25]
horses were inefficient, that our men, for want of cavalry, were kept
close to their encampments by the enemy’s horse; and that it would
not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended
upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced
that Sir Arthur’s intentions were expedient; the decision which he
was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he
thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check
might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait
for Sir John Moore’s division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that
division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem,
a position from whence it might intercept the enemy’s retreat, whether
they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new
commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving
this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir
John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as
speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent
the precious time that would be lost before this division could be
landed and become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which
might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of at once
changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and
of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated
as the two armies now were, it was impossible to avoid an action. If
the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on
the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before
the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case
they should turn the French position. But these representations were
unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan
of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three
leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should
arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who
commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the
excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.
♦THE BATTLE OF VIMEIRO.♦
It was soon seen how well Sir Arthur had judged of the enemy’s
intentions. Junot was ill supplied with provisions; he could not
venture long to be absent from Lisbon: situated as he was, it appeared
to him that there would be less evil in an immediate defeat, than must
arise from prolonged operations, though they should lead ♦THIEBAULT,
194.♦ to a victory. His business, therefore, was to bring on an action
as soon as possible, and to make the attack; and at the moment when Sir
Harry Burrard, resolving upon delay, had countermanded the orders for
advancing on the morrow, the French were in motion.
Vimeiro, a name which was now to become memorable in British and
Portugueze history, is a village situated nearly at the bottom of a
lovely valley, about three miles from the sea, and screened from the
sea breeze by mountainous heights, through which the little river
Maceira winds its way. The village stands at the eastern extremity of
these heights; and on the opposite side, separated from them by a deep
ravine, are other heights, over which the road to Lourinham passes,
a little town in the _Termo_ or district of which the parishes of
Vimeiro and Maceira are included. The western termination reaches the
sea-shore. As the army had halted here only for the night, meaning to
proceed early on the morrow, they were disposed of, not as expecting an
attack, but as most convenient for the troops. Six brigades bivouacked
on the height to the westward. The advanced guard was posted on a hill
south-east of Vimeiro, to cover the commissariat and stores which were
in the village: this height was entirely commanded by higher ground
to the westward. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the
valley, between the hills on which the infantry were placed; and there
were picquets of observation on the hills to the eastward.
♦AUG. 21.♦
The enemy, who had marched all night, and whom some accidents had
impeded on their way, first appeared at eight in the morning, forming
in strong bodies upon the heights toward Lourinham, thus threatening
the advanced guard and the left, which was the weak part of the
British position. Sir Arthur had visited the advanced posts early in
the day, and had returned to his quarters before the first shots were
exchanged with the enemy’s advance. He now moved the brigades of
Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, successively across
the ravine to the heights on the Lourinham road. General Anstruther’s
brigade took post on the right of the advanced guard, and Major-General
Hill was moved nearer, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve,
in addition to which our small cavalry force was in the rear of their
right. The French army was in two divisions, ... the right, of about
6000 men, under General Loison; the left, about 5000, under Laborde.
Kellermann had the reserve, which was intended to connect the two
wings, but they were too distant from each other. General Margaron
commanded the cavalry.
Laborde came along the valley to attack the advanced guard on the
eminence or table hill; he had a column of infantry and cavalry to
cover his left flank, and on his right one regiment marched in column
to turn the defenders, and penetrate the village by the church; but
this purpose had been foreseen, and part of the 43rd had been ordered
into the churchyard to prevent it. The French advanced with perfect
steadiness, though exposed to a severe fire of riflemen posted behind
the trees and banks, and of seven pieces of artillery well directed.
They advanced like men accustomed to action and to victory; but
suffering more severely as they drew nearer, and especially from the
Shrapnell shells, (then first brought into use,) they faltered, and
opened a confused fire. Still they advanced, and arrived within a few
paces of the brow of the hill, where the 50th regiment, under Colonel
Walker, with a single company of the rifle corps on its left, stood
opposed to them. That regiment poured upon them a destructive volley,
and instantly charged with the bayonet, and penetrated the angle
of the column, which then broke and turned. The regiment which was
entering the village by the church, was attacked in flank by General
Acland’s brigade, then advancing to its position on the heights;
and our cavalry, poor in number as it was, charged with effect. The
discomfiture of this column was then complete; they fled, leaving about
1000 men on the ground, 350 prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery;
and they were pursued for nearly two miles to the plain beyond the
woody ground, where they were supported by a reserve of horse, and
where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons, who
particularly distinguished himself that day, fell, with many of his
men, overpowered by a much superior force of cavalry. The secondary
column, under General Brenier, which was to have supported Laborde in
his attack, made a side movement to the left, in order to cross the
ravine, and thus it was separately engaged by General Anstruther’s
brigade; and being charged with the bayonet, was repulsed with great
loss. An aide-de-camp of Sir Arthur’s coming up to tell this General
that a corps should be sent to his assistance, he replied, “Sir, I am
not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am
able to beat them wherever I find them.”
Loison’s attack was made nearly at the same time as Laborde’s: it was
supported by a large body of cavalry, and made with the characteristic
and imposing impetuosity of French troops. They drove in our light
troops, but they were checked by General Ferguson’s brigade, consisting
of the 36th, 40th, and 71st, which formed the first line; after some
close and heavy firing of musketry, the 82d and 29th came up, and the
brigades of Generals Bowes and Acland. The enemy were then charged
with the bayonet; this weapon is of French invention, but it was made
for British hands. They came to the charge bravely, and stood it for
a moment; ... in that moment their foremost rank fell “like a line of
grass before the mowers.” This is not the flourish of an historian,
seeking artfully to embellish details which no art can render
interesting to any but military readers; it is the language of an actor
in the scene, who could not call it to mind in after-hours without
shuddering; for the very men whose superiority was thus decidedly
proved, could not speak without involuntary awe, of so complete and
instantaneous a destruction, produced as it was, not by artillery or
explosions, but by their own act and deed, and the strength of their
own hearts and hands. The bodies of about 300 French grenadiers were
counted upon the field, who had fallen in this charge. The enemy were
pursued to a considerable distance, and six pieces of cannon were taken
in the pursuit. General Kellermann made a vigorous attempt, late in
the action, to recover these from the 71st and 82d, which were halted
in a valley where the guns had been captured. These regiments retired
a little way to some advantageous ground, then faced about, fired, and
advancing with the bayonet, drove the French back with great loss.
Thus were they every where repulsed, though their whole force had been
engaged, while not more than half the British army had been brought
into action.
♦SIR HARRY BURRARD TAKES THE COMMAND.♦
Before the action began Sir Harry Burrard and his staff left the
ship; they soon heard the firing after they were on shore, and by
the time they reached Vimeiro, which is about three miles from the
landing-place, the armies were hotly engaged. They found Sir Arthur on
the heights, and he explained in few words to the new Commander the
position of the army, and the measures which he had taken for beating
the enemy. Sir Harry was perfectly satisfied, and directed him to go
on with an operation which he had so happily and so well begun. This
he did not as giving up his command for the time, but as fulfilling
one of the functions of a commander, by directing Sir Arthur to pursue
measures which he approved, and holding himself as responsible for
the event as if the plan had been originally his own. So far all was
well. Toward the close of the action, when the French were beaten on
the left, and it was evident that they must be every where defeated,
Sir Arthur went to him, and represented that this was the moment for
advancing; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and
pursue the beaten enemy with the left. By this movement upon Torres
Vedras, the French would be cut off from the nearest road to Lisbon, or
if they attempted it, they would find themselves between two bodies of
our troops; there remained for them, as the alternative, the circuitous
route by Alenquer and Villa Franca; ... they were dispirited, beaten,
and in confusion, absolutely, in his opinion, incapable of forming
or of appearing again in the shape of an army, if they were followed
even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy; and this he said, giving
them full credit for discipline and great facility in forming after
having been broken. There was plenty of ammunition in the camp for
another battle, and provisions for twelve days. But neither these
representations, urged as they were with natural and fitting warmth,
nor the victory which was before his eyes, could induce the new
Commander to deviate from his former opinion. He replied, that he
saw no reason to change his purpose, and that the same motives which
induced him yesterday to wait for reinforcements, had still the same
weight. At this moment the enemy were retiring in great disorder, and
most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur, grieved at
seeing the irrecoverable opportunity go by, made a second attempt
to convince the Commander that victory was in his hands. General
Ferguson had sent his aide-de-camp to represent the great advantage of
advancing, ... he himself could, in fact, have cut off a considerable
body of the enemy. Sir Arthur took the aide-de-camp to the Commander.
But this second representation was as ineffectual as the first. His
Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Clinton, and Colonel Murray, his
Quarter-Master-General, who had coincided in opinion with him the
preceding evening, agreed with him now also. He had just heard from an
officer who had passed through General Freire’s troops, such an account
of them and their proceedings, as precluded any hope of rendering
them useful; the artillery horses seemed to him inefficient; but more
especially the want of cavalry, he thought, incapacitated the army
from following up its success. The 260 Portugueze horse which were
with us had shown themselves nearly useless; the British were only 210
in number, and they had suffered severely in the action, ... this was
known, though the extent of their loss had not yet been ascertained.
These difficulties preponderated with him; he adhered still to his
determination; and Sir Arthur, whose sense of military duty would not
allow him to act in disregard of orders, as Nelson was accustomed to
do, turned to one of his officers, and concealing the bitterness of
disappointment under a semblance of levity, said, “Well, then, we have
nothing to do, but to go and shoot red-legged partridges,” ... the
game with which that country abounds. From that moment he gave up all
hope of cutting the French off from Lisbon, inclosing them there, or
preventing them, if they thought proper to attempt it, from protracting
the campaign by retreating upon Elvas and Almeida.
The loss of the enemy in this action was about 3000[26] killed and
wounded, thirteen pieces of artillery, and twenty-three ammunition
waggons; that of the English little more than 700 killed, wounded, and
missing. The British numbers in the field were 16,000, of which only
half had been engaged; the French were about 14,000, including 1300
cavalry, and the whole of this force was brought into action. General
Solignac was severely wounded; General Brenier wounded, and left on the
field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands
he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in
the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French General, in gratitude for
his preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused
to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to Colonel
Pack, the French General could not help saying, “What sort of man is
this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take
the only reward which I can at present offer him!” Brenier no doubt
contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacities
and cruelties, it appears by the testimony of the Portugueze, that he
had no share; when, therefore, Colonel Pack replied, “We are British
soldiers, sir, and not plunderers,” he must have deeply felt the
disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay
was immediately made a serjeant by Sir Arthur Wellesley’s express
desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him
a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to
the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name,
received early in the action a dangerous wound in the thigh: he would
not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down[27] where
his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till
the end of the engagement. A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with
an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the
donation, was voted him by the Highland Society.
Most of the wounded French who fell into the conqueror’s hands were
young, and of delicate appearance, ... apparently men whose lot would
not have fallen in the army, under any other system than that of the
conscription, though, having been forced into it, they had acquired
the worst vices which have ever disgraced and degraded the profession
of arms. They were dressed in long white linen coats and trowsers,
their firelocks were about six inches longer in the barrel than ours,
their bayonets about three shorter, the locks of their pieces much
better finished, and the pans so constructed, that the powder was not
liable to fall out, ... an accident which at that time often happened
to ours. A chaplain of the British army, as he was endeavouring to
render assistance to some of them, while under the surgeon’s hands,
addressed himself to one in the language of commiseration, and uttered,
at the same time, a natural expression of regret at the horrors of
war: but the Frenchman fiercely answered him, with a mixture of pride
and indignation, that he gloried in his wounds, and that war was the
greatest happiness of life. During the whole day the armed peasantry
prowled about the field, taking vengeance upon every wounded or
straggling Frenchman whom they could find, for the manifold wrongs of
their country, and the aggravated injuries which they had endured. So
conscious indeed were the prisoners of the little mercy which they
deserved at their hands, that they dreaded lest these men should break
in upon them, and massacre them all; and a guard was stationed to
protect them. The peasantry, however, passed the night in the field,
carousing round a large fire, recounting to each other what they had
done, and rejoicing over the day’s work.
♦THE FRENCH RESOLVE TO PROPOSE TERMS.♦
In withholding the army from following up the great advantage which it
had gained, Sir Harry Burrard knew how unpopular such a determination
must be, and sacrificed his own feelings to his judgement. He thought
it not allowable to risk much when the reinforcements which were at
hand would make the British force so superior, that any further efforts
of the enemy must be vain, and success would be obtained without
hazard and with less loss. He erred in judgement; but this honourable
testimony was borne to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley, the person of
all others by whom that error must have been felt most keenly, that
he decided upon fair military grounds in the manner which he thought
most conducive to the interests of the country. The French failed not
to profit by the respite which was thus allowed them; they formed a
rear-guard of four regiments of cavalry, and retired[28] at leisure,
no attempt being made to harass their retreat. Junot, who is said
to have exposed himself at the close of the action so as hardly to
have been saved from the British cavalry, summoned Generals Laborde,
Loison, Kellermann, and Thiebault, upon the field, and demanded their
opinions, whether the army ought again to try the lot of arms, and if
not, what course it should pursue. They agreed that they were neither
in a condition to give battle, nor to stand one. Their troops were
harassed, discontented, and discouraged; their ammunition would not
last three hours longer; their provisions were failing, their horses
already sinking for want of forage. Their losses were irreparable,
whereas the enemy were looking for strong reinforcements; and, in fine,
the slightest reverse would now leave them at the mercy of the English
and Portugueze. Nothing remained but to preserve the best attitude they
could, and retire to Lisbon, the possession of which was now their
only safeguard. They retreated accordingly to Torres Vedras. A second
council was held there on the morrow; and upon a full view of the
difficulties and dangers[29] of their situation, and the impossibility
of effecting a retreat through so large a part of Spain as must be
traversed before they could effect a junction with their countrymen,
they resolved to try what could be done by negotiation. General
Kellermann, therefore, was dispatched with a flag of truce to propose a
convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Meantime Sir Hew Dalrymple
had arrived and taken the command of the British army, which thus had
three commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours.
♦ARRIVAL OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.♦
Sir Hew Dalrymple had been expressly chosen for this command because of
the zeal and judgement which he had displayed during the whole of those
important transactions in the south of Spain on which so much depended,
and in which he had acted upon his own responsibility. In a private
letter from Lord Castlereagh, then minister for the war department,
Sir Arthur Wellesley was recommended to his particular confidence, and
a full persuasion expressed that that officer’s high reputation would
alone dispose Sir Hew to select him for any service which required
great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience; but,
above all, that the habits of communication in which Sir Arthur had
for a length of time been with his majesty’s ministers, concerning the
affairs of Spain, would point him out as an officer of whom it would
be desirable for the commander-in-chief, on all accounts, to make the
most prominent use which the rules of the service would permit. Sir
Hew embarked at Gibraltar on the 13th; and learnt that night from Lord
Collingwood, who was off Cadiz, that Sir Arthur’s corps had either
landed, or was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus
on the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur
was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew’s wish to supersede
that General in a detached command for which he had been particularly
chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise
from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all
his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the
Commander-in-chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join
the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur
meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the
way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account
of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-de-camp
on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he
chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry
Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed
of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command.
This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned,
bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in
command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as
honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His
determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate
stood in for the shore.
♦HE ORDERS THE ARMY TO ADVANCE. AUG. 22.♦
None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed to him
had been received; he landed therefore with no other information than
what had been thus gathered upon the way, and entirely unacquainted
with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach
they were embarking the wounded for Porto; during the whole night the
sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the
sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro,
he found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day before,
the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in removing the
wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a military position, but
merely as a halting-place, and it was now necessary to remove from it,
because of the late action. Sir Hew therefore gave orders for marching
the next morning at daybreak toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his
predecessor, he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous
operation, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in
complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor any thing
upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on their part
the battle would be fought for existence, while the enemy, in case of
defeat, would lose only what were killed or taken. But he differed from
Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir
John Moore’s division, the arrival of which was extremely uncertain,
and that he saw the necessity of pursuing active measures. The French,
he knew, must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon,
(a chance which he was willing to take, though they were superior in
cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they would have
the great advantage of choosing their ground;) or they would cross the
Tagus.
♦KELLERMANN ARRIVES TO PROPOSE AN ARMISTICE.♦
Soon after mid-day an alarm was given that the enemy were advancing to
renew the attack; the position was taken as on the preceding morning.
It proved to be a body of cavalry with a flag of truce; and General
Kellermann alighting at head-quarters, proposed an armistice, for
the purpose of concluding a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by
the French. Sir Hew immediately called for his two predecessors. He
himself had no means of knowing, but from them, what the consequences
of yesterday’s battle really had been; the responsibility was his,
but for the information upon which the agreement was to be founded,
he trusted to them, and more especially to Sir Arthur. That General’s
plans had been completely defeated by the refusal to follow up the
victory, and by the change which Sir Harry Burrard, before he landed,
had made in the intended destination of Sir John Moore’s corps.
Considering, therefore, that in consequence of these errors the enemy
had been allowed leisure to resume a formidable position between the
British army and Lisbon, and could not now by any increase of the
British numbers be prevented from crossing the Tagus, and occupying in
strength the strong place of Elvas, with its stronger fort La Lippe,
and Almeida; that the Tagus would not for some time longer be open to
the fleet, the army meantime depending upon the ships for supplies,
and that its communication with them by the coast must at that season
be most precarious: considering also how important it was that the
troops should not be delayed by regular sieges in Portugal, but march
as soon as possible into Spain, he thought it expedient that the French
should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage,
and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them.
They occupied at that time, in a military point of view, he thought,
the whole of Portugal, having every strong hold in their hands; their
present situation enabled them still to avail themselves of those
possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and he
was of opinion that an army which had its retreat open, and possessed
such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed such terms. He wished,
however, to limit the suspension of arms to eight-and-forty hours. Sir
Hew preferred that it should be unlimited, as it had been proposed; in
this he had a view to the disembarkation of Sir John Moore’s corps,
which was not forbidden by the agreement.
♦TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE.♦
An armistice accordingly for the purpose of negotiating a definitive
convention was concluded upon[30] these terms: That the river
Sisandre should be the line of demarcation between the two armies,
and that neither of them should occupy Torres Vedras; that the English
general should bind himself to comprehend the armed Portugueze in the
truce, and that their line of demarcation should be from Leiria to
Thomar: that it was agreed that the French army should in no case be
considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should
be transported to France with their arms and baggage and private
property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever:
that no individual, whether Portugueze, Frenchman, or of a nation
allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct, but
be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire
from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the
neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian
fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be
in possession of the city and port, the Russian fleet should neither be
disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart,
nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such
cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their
cavalry horses, should be transported to France.
A demur was, with good reason, made concerning the baggage and private
property which the French were to carry off with them; and Kellermann
explained, that the words were only to bear their strict grammatical
meaning. The article regarding the Russians underwent more discussion.
Sir Hew insisted, that this was a point referable to the Admiral,
and that if he did not agree to it, it must be struck out; with this
understanding on the part of the French negotiator that article was
framed.
♦JUNOT RETURNS TO LISBON.♦
While Kellermann was thus employed in the British camp, Junot occupied
the positions of the Cabeça de Montechique and Mafra, and hastened
himself to Lisbon. On the 20th official intelligence had been
published in that city that Laborde had sustained an action with the
English army, and though he had only 2000 men, had kept his ground
against it; in the night he had taken a position conformably to his
orders, for the purpose of joining the Commander-in-chief; their
junction had been formed, the enemy were in a strait, and would be
attacked on the morrow, when they would be made to see what the French
could do: two English regiments had been destroyed in the action.
The people, however, understood by reports more worthy of belief
than any official statements of the enemy, that the English had been
successful at Roliça. The news of the battle of Vimeiro also reached
them at nightfall of the 22d; it was asserted, not only that Junot
had been defeated, but that he was taken prisoner; the people openly
congratulated each other in the streets, and the exultation and stir
at the Ave Maria hour were such as to indicate an insurrection. None
of the French deemed it prudent to appear, except General Travot, who
relied, and not in vain, upon that personal good-will which he had
obtained by a conduct always humane and honourable. At daybreak of
the 23d, a letter from Junot was published, dated from the field of
battle, at four in the afternoon. It stated that the English had been
attacked at nine o’clock that morning, in the fortified position which
they occupied, and that in an instant they had been dislodged from all
their advanced points. The left of the French army had obtained from
the first complete success; their right having to take a circuitous
course, could not arrive in time to decide the action entirely; it
had continued till two o’clock, and they should probably finish it on
the morrow. At two they had taken a position, and were three leagues
nearer the enemy than on the preceding day. The loss of the English had
been great. “On our part,” said Junot, “there have been 150 killed,
and from 300 to 400 wounded. We are stronger now, fresh troops having
reached me ... to-morrow, therefore ...” there the sentence was broken
off, and General Travot concluded the bulletin by saying, that many
of the enemy’s superior officers had been killed or wounded, that the
Commander-in-chief was well, and in a few days would be in Lisbon. He
arrived, in fact, that afternoon, with the reserve, and such of the
wounded as could be removed. A royal salute was fired from the Castle,
as if he had returned victorious; but the countenances of the French,
even the generals themselves, belied this manifestation of success.
♦NEVES, V. 151–154. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 413, 417.♦ It was soon
rumoured that a capitulation had been proposed, and no doubt could be
entertained concerning this when it was known that an English officer
arrived that night in company with Kellermann, and that a boat had been
sent off to the English fleet.
♦GENERAL FREIRE DISSATISFIED WITH THE ARMISTICE.♦
The British army marched on the morning after the armistice was signed,
and took a position near the village of Ramalhal, this movement
being made merely for convenience. The Portugueze General, Bernardim
Freire, visited the Commander-in-chief there; and received a copy of
the armistice: he was dissatisfied with it, and promised to send a
confidential officer to communicate with him thereupon. Accordingly
Major Ayres Pintode Sousa soon arrived at Sir Hew’s head-quarters.
His strongest objections related to that article which stipulated
that no persons should be molested for their political conduct; that
being a question, he said, which it was for the Portugueze government
to decide. It appeared evident to Sir Hew, that General Freire was
offended because there was no mention of the Junta of Porto in the
armistice. His answer was, that the government of Portugal, to
which the decision of this point would belong, nowhere existed; and
moreover the measure was wholly military, and admitted of no delay; he
desired, however, that General Freire would state in writing whatever
observations he had to make, and promised that they should be most
favourably considered in the progress of the negotiation.
♦DIFFICULTY CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON.♦
There arose a difficulty now respecting the Russian fleet.
Notwithstanding the preparations of defence which had been made on
board their ships, the feelings of the Russians and of their Admiral
were not with the French, and all Junot’s endeavours to make their
presence available for the increase of his own means were in vain. Sir
Arthur Wellesley had learnt, when he visited the British squadron off
the Tagus, that it was Admiral Siniavin’s intention to take no part in
the contest between the two contending powers, but claim the protection
of a neutral port. It was his opinion, that if they conducted
themselves upon this principle, they ought not to be molested, and that
it mattered not what became of their ships, so they were not allowed
to return to the Baltic. In Sir Hew’s judgement the Admiral was the
best, if not the only judge of the question, and to him accordingly the
stipulation in the armistice concerning them had been referred. Sir C.
Cotton refused to ratify it; and upon this Sir Arthur recommended the
Commander to put an end to the armistice, and lose no farther time in
advancing, leaving it for Junot to renew the negotiation if he thought
proper. The Commander was of a different opinion; good faith, he
thought, required that the Admiral’s sentiments should be communicated
to General Junot; but he notified to him, at the same time, that the
armistice must be at an end in forty-eight hours, and Colonel Murray,
who was the bearer of this notice, was authorized to negotiate a
convention.
♦CONVENTION OF CINTRA.♦
The question concerning the Russians was adjusted between the two
Admirals. It was agreed that the ships should be held as a deposit by
Great Britain, to be restored within six months after the conclusion
of peace between Russia and that power; and that the men should
be conveyed to their own country at the expense of the British
Government, without any condition or stipulation respecting their
future services. The definitive convention also was soon concluded. The
terms were, that the French army should evacuate Portugal with their
arms and baggage, not be considered prisoners of war, be furnished
with means of conveyance by the English government, and disembarked
in any of the ports between Rochefort and l’Orient, and be at liberty
to serve on their arrival. They were to take with them all their
artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the
tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun, all their equipments,
and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army;
and all individuals of the army were to be at liberty to dispose of
their private property of every description, with full security for
the purchasers. The horses of the cavalry and of the officers were
to be embarked, those of the former not exceeding 600, those of the
latter not exceeding 200; and as the means of conveyance for horses
were very limited, facility should be given them for disposing of
those which could not be embarked. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche,
and Palmella, were to be embarked at Lisbon, that of Almeida at Porto,
or the nearest harbour, and British commissaries were to provide for
their subsistence and accommodation on the march. The sick and wounded
who were not in a state to be removed were entrusted to the British
army, their expenses while they remained to be discharged by the
British Government, and reimbursed by France. Should doubts arise as
to the meaning of any article, it was to be interpreted favourably
to the French. From the date of the ratification of this convention,
all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever of
the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or any other
individuals residing in that country, founded on the occupation of
Portugal by the French troops, should be cancelled, all sequestrations
upon their property removed, and the free disposal of the same restored
to the proper owners. All subjects of France, or of powers in alliance
with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally there, should
be protected, their property respected, and themselves at liberty
either to remain in the country, or to accompany the French army. No
Portugueze was to be held accountable for his political conduct; and
all who had continued in office, or accepted it, under the French
Government, were placed under the protection of the British commanders,
and were to sustain no injury either in their persons or property, for
it had not been at their choice to obey the French or not: if they
chose to sell their property and remove, the term of one year should be
allowed them for that purpose. The Spanish troops detained at Lisbon
were to be given up to the British Commander, and he engaged to obtain
from the Spaniards the release of such French subjects, as, not having
been taken in battle, nor in consequence of military operations, were
now detained in Spain.
♦1808. SEPTEMBER.♦
That this convention, considered in a military point of view, was
advantageous to Great Britain, was the opinion of all the British
Generals. By effecting the immediate deliverance of Portugal, it
left the British army at liberty to advance into Spain, and reach
the main scene of action in time for the great struggle which was
expected there. The details of the treaty were thought of inferior
consideration. Kellermann had declared that the French would not submit
to severer terms, but that if such were insisted on, they would retire
to the strong fortresses in their possession, defend themselves there
till the last extremity, and destroy Lisbon before they abandoned it.
There was no reason to think that any compunction would withhold them
from doing this; and though it might possibly have been prevented
by bringing on an action, that action must have been fought in the
immediate vicinity of Lisbon, perhaps in the city itself. Motives of
humanity therefore had their weight with the Commander-in-chief in
making such large concessions to an enemy, who, if they had met with
sterner treatment, better suited to their deserts, would presently have
lowered their tone, and been glad to accept of any terms which should
secure them a safe embarkation.
The military advantages of the convention were not over-rated; it
will indeed appear hereafter that they proved greater than had been
foreseen. But some political errors were committed in framing it;
and the British Generals did not assume that moral tone which the
occasion justified, and which the soundest policy required. Buonaparte
was designated in the armistice as his imperial and royal majesty,
although Great Britain had never acknowledged him either as Emperor of
the French or King of Italy. Junot was allowed to sign the convention
as Duke of Abrantes, a title to which he had no better right than to
the property which he had amassed in Portugal by rapine. Sir Arthur
Wellesley had recommended, pending the negotiation, that some mode
should be devised “for making the French Generals disgorge the church
plate which they had stolen.” An article had been framed accordingly,
specifying in direct terms that the property of churches, monasteries,
and palaces should not be carried away. But this article was withdrawn,
on the repeated representations of Kellermann that its introduction
into a public monument would be reproachful to the French army. The
Commander-in-chief, he said, was particularly desirous it should be
omitted; and he was willing, on that condition, to pledge his word
of honour that no property of this kind should be removed. Except in
the case of some carriages which the court had left behind, and some
beasts taken for the service of the army, he disclaimed all knowledge
of any such appropriation of Portugueze property by the French as was
imputed to them; and if there were any officers who had thus acted, he
expressed a hope that they might reap no benefit from their misconduct.
With regard to the churches, a contribution had been regularly levied
on them for the public service, and its produce expended; this of
course the English could not mean to redemand. The confidence with
which these representations were urged, imposed for a time upon
honourable men, and the obnoxious article was withdrawn upon the very
ground for which it ought to have been retained.
♦REMONSTRANCES OF THE PORTUGUEZE COMMANDER.♦
The convention was concluded on the 30th of August, and ratified by
the British Commander, not at Cintra, from which place it has been
denominated, but at Torres Vedras. It was communicated immediately to
General Bernardim Freire. The reply from that General was, that he was
in some measure responsible to the Provisional Government for obtaining
for the Portugueze whatever could be useful and honourable to the
state; but there was not in the whole treaty a single article relating
to the Portugueze army. It became therefore his duty to inquire how
far the engagement contracted with the French for the restoration of
their civil officers who were in the hands of the Portugueze extended?
if the Provisional Government, taking advantage of his conduct in
having taken no part in these arrangements, should order him to act in
co-operation with the Spanish army in Alem-Tejo against the French,
would the British army oppose any such intention? and if the honour
and dignity of the Portugueze nation, and the authority of the Prince,
should seem to have been compromised by these arrangements, would the
British Generals take upon themselves to answer for it? Ayres Pinto,
when he delivered this reply, declared that he did justice to the
friendship and loyalty of the British nation, and individually felt
himself highly honoured by the manner in which Sir Hew had received
him; “nevertheless,” said he, “your Excellency must well know that the
public will judge of us not by our private conduct, but by that which
bears an authentic character; and there is no other means of avoiding
the ill will of the public than by obtaining from your Excellency a
reply which may convince the Portugueze people that the General to whom
the direction of their forces is confided, has yielded only to urgent
circumstances, and to the absolute necessity of not compromising the
army under his command.”
If the Portugueze General had not separated from the British army,
contrary to the advice and request of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he would of
course have been a party to the negotiation. Sir Hew, upon occasion of
the armistice, had desired him to state his sentiments fully while the
negotiations were in progress; not having received one word of comment
during that time, he expressed his surprise at this late expostulation
on terms to which the honour of the British Commanders was pledged, as
far as their influence or power could be supposed to extend by the
common and known laws of war. But to this it was replied, that Ayres
Pinto had personally communicated the General’s objections to the
conditions of the armistice, representing that the Portugueze army and
the Government were treated too cavalierly in this transaction; that
some notice should be taken of them, were it only to prevent factious
persons from raising injurious reports; that the French were not strong
enough to deserve so much consideration; and that the Portugueze were
now in a condition to demand account from them of the robberies,
rapines, depredations, murders, and sacrileges of every kind which
they had committed in that kingdom, and which called for exemplary
vengeance. The Portugueze Commander now poured in his representations
and complaints. It was his duty to declare, he said, that not having
been consulted on, or privy to this negotiation, in which he supposed
his country was concerned, he considered himself exempt from all
responsibility for it. He complained that no notice had been taken in
the armistice of the troops under the Monteiro Mor in Alem-Tejo, nor of
the Spanish army of Extremadura which had entered that province. The
British army, he affirmed, could not, and ought not to be considered
in any other light than an auxiliary army; as such it had been applied
for by the Provisional Government, and as such it was still to be
regarded, let its strength be what it might. Under these circumstances
any treaty with the French ought to have been made in conjunction with
the Portugueze Government, and with its full approbation. He protested
finally against the treaty in the whole and in its separate parts,
... in the whole, because it contained no consideration of the Prince
Regent or the Government which represented him; in its parts, because
no declaration was made that what places, stores, and ships were to be
taken possession of should be restored to the Portugueze Government;
because it stipulated for the impunity of individuals who had betrayed
their country; and because it made no provision for the security of the
people of Lisbon and its neighbourhood while the French continued there.
♦REPLY OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.♦
These representations were in some respects well founded; they were
mingled with futile matter, and there was also a covert purport in
them, which Sir Hew Dalrymple perfectly understood, of exciting a
popular feeling in favour of the Junta of Porto, that body being
desirous of prolonging and extending its authority, after the
circumstances which alone rendered it legitimate had ceased. Leaving
this question untouched, Sir Hew replied, with a courtesy and frankness
that disarm resentment. It was not possible, he said, to engage the
existing Government of Portugal in a negotiation purely military in its
nature, and in which no reference was had either to the Governments
of England or of France. With regard to the indemnity for political
offences, it was natural that the French should demand it; and to him
it appeared that the treaty afforded a fair occasion for remitting
punishments which, by keeping political animosity alive, would not have
tended to the tranquillity and happiness of the country. There was
little reason to suppose that persons who had thus rendered themselves
obnoxious would venture to remain long after the French; if they did,
they would of course be vigilantly observed, and their future treatment
would depend upon their future conduct. It was not from any want of
personal respect to General Freire that he did not enter into the
discussion of points which it was only incumbent on him to explain to
the Government of the country. But being aware of the calumnies which
had been disseminated by the enemy in other countries, as now in this,
he assured his Excellency, and would use the necessary means for giving
publicity to the pledge, that he served in Portugal as the Commander
of a force acting in alliance with the Sovereign of that country;
and therefore considered himself bound by duty and honour to pay as
strict a regard to the interests of the Prince Regent, the dignity and
security of his Government, and the welfare of the nation of which he
was the lawful ruler, as even his Excellency himself. But as touching
the cessions, he did not see in what terms they could have been
better framed. “The nominal Duke of Abrantes,” said Sir Hew, “is not
the guardian of the Prince Regent’s interests; and if any pledge is
necessary of the pure and disinterested views of the Sovereign I have
the honour to serve, I do not think it was through the stipulations of
a treaty with that General that it could most properly be conveyed.”
The manifest good faith and the temper of this reply produced their
proper effect, and General Freire expressed his satisfaction in it as
promising the most happy, prompt, and secure accomplishment of the
object at which they aimed.
♦THE BRITISH FLAG HOISTED IN THE FORTS.♦
Before the British troops entered Lisbon the Russian Admiral wrote
to Sir Hew to inquire what flag was to be displayed when the forts
on the Tagus were delivered up, and whether, if the Portugueze flag
were hoisted, the port would be considered neuter, and his squadron
entitled to the benefit of that neutrality. Sir Hew replied, that if he
felt authorized to interfere in a business which had been exclusively
referred to Sir C. Cotton, he could easily anticipate the answer which
that Commander would make. Contrary, however, to his expectation,
when two regiments were landed from the fleet, and took possession of
the ports on the river, the British flag was hoisted. The Portugueze
were naturally hurt at this; but before their General could offer any
representation on the subject, Sir Hew had ordered the Portugueze
colours to be displayed in its stead. The negotiation concerning the
Russian squadron had not been concluded when the question was proposed
to the British General, and it was to settle in a summary way Admiral
Siniavin’s claim to the protection of a neutral port that the English
flag had been planted by Sir C. Cotton.
♦ANARCHY IN LISBON.♦
During the negotiation Lisbon was in a dreadful state. Those wretches
who, to the reproach of Christian states and civilized society, are
bred in the corruption of all great cities, took advantage of the
temporary dissolution of government as they would have done of a
conflagration or an earthquake. The soldiers of the police, being
Portugueze, had almost all gone to join their countrymen in arms;
and the French while they went the rounds, suffered robberies to be
committed in their hearing and in their sight, either not understanding
the cries for help, or not choosing to interfere, now that their
reign was at an end. They indeed themselves were in such danger, that
they soon gave over patrolling the streets, and fired upon those
who approached their quarters in the night. In this manner several
♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 420, 501–3. NEVES, V. 202.♦ Portugueze were
shot; the French venturing upon this, not so much in the confidence of
their own strength, as in full reliance upon the interference of the
English to protect them.
There had been a great error of judgement in not following up
the victory at Vimeiro; and in the subsequent negotiations the
British Generals had taken a lower tone than the enemy expected, or
circumstances required. But they were more censurable for having
failed to manifest that moral sense of the enemy’s conduct which
individually they felt, and yet collectively seemed for a time to have
suppressed for the sake of professional considerations and courtesy,
never more unworthily bestowed. The soldiers of Buonaparte in Portugal
had forfeited all claim to those courtesies which honourable men will
always delight in rendering to honourable enemies. They had disgraced
their profession and their country, and it behoved the British, for
the sake of theirs, to have testified their sense of this in the most
decided manner. But instead of shunning any farther intercourse than
was necessary for the execution of the treaty, they entered into social
intercourse with the French, entertainments were mutually given, and
British Generals sate at Junot’s table in company with the men who
were responsible for the horrors committed at Evora and Leiria. They
were not fully informed of those crimes, and certainly did not believe
Junot and his people to be so thoroughly destitute of honour as they
soon found them. But proof enough of their wickedness had been given in
public and official acts; and in thus appearing for a time to forget
the real character of the cause in which Great Britain was engaged, a
moral fault, as well as a political error, was committed.
♦THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PLUNDER.♦
Elated no doubt by this, as well as by their success in negotiation,
the French continued that system of public and private robbery for
which they seemed to think the convention had granted them entire
impunity. General Freire complained to Sir Hew Dalrymple that they
were plundering the treasury, the museum, public libraries, arsenals,
churches, and the houses and stores of individuals. The British
commissioners for carrying the convention into effect, Major-General
Beresford and Lord Proby, informed him, that except the military and
naval stores there was no kind of public property which the French
intended to relinquish; that they meant to carry off the valuables
of the Prince, the plunder of the churches, and much of the property
of individuals; that they had packed up the royal library, and most
of the articles of the museum; that during the negotiation they had
taken a sum of about £22,000 from the _Deposito Publico_, which was in
fact a robbery of individuals, that money being deposited there till
litigations concerning it should be decided; and that even after the
terms were signed they had actually demanded the money arising from the
revenues of the country. The merchants of Lisbon addressed a memorial
to the British Commander, stating that Junot had exacted from them a
forced loan of two million _cruzados_, promising that payment should
be made out of the enormous war-contribution which he had imposed;
they had not been paid, and it was now his intention to depart without
paying them; they therefore prayed for redress, and likewise that some
steps should be taken for recovering their ships and property which had
been unlawfully sequestered in France.
♦QUESTION CONCERNING BAGGAGE.♦
There was something absolutely comic in the impudent persuasion of
the French that they might continue to pillage, and carry off what
they pleased, under protection of the British army. They proposed to
take away the Vasco da Gama and some Portugueze frigates; the Gama, it
may be remembered, was the ship wherein they had embarked great part
of the treasure which they had collected. The reply was, that these
vessels did not belong to them, and they were only to carry away their
individual baggage. Junot actually demanded five ships to remove his
own personal effects. Such a demand was of course pronounced to be
inadmissible. Sir Hew declared he would not listen to any proposal
which compromised his own honour and that of the British nation.
He perceived, that owing to the shameless and open manner in which
the French were preparing to carry off public and private property,
popular indignation was strongly excited, and that because of the
interpretation which they by their conduct affected to give the
convention, this feeling was little less directed against the English
than the French. He instructed the commissioners therefore to require
the restoration of these plundered goods; “by this means,” said he,
“affording a proof to the Portugueze nation that we at least act with
good faith, and are therefore entitled to use the necessary measures,
however vigorous, for the protection of those obnoxious persons for
whose safety that faith is pledged.”
The commissioners exercised their charge with becoming firmness.
The money taken from the public deposit they compelled the French
to promise to replace, ... a concession which was not obtained till
after a very long discussion. The spoils of the museum and royal
library were also ♦THE FRENCH ENDEAVOUR TO CARRY OFF ARTICLES FROM THE
MUSEUM.♦ reclaimed. They had been selected, General Kellermann said,
by M. Guiffroi, a member of the National Institute: the objection,
indeed, on the part of the English, he admitted to be well founded;
nevertheless, he observed that these articles, consisting chiefly of
specimens in natural history, and interesting manuscripts, were, in
general, duplicates, ... that they were precious acquisitions for the
sciences; ... the sciences were of all countries, and far from making
war upon them, we ought to promote their communication. They wished,
therefore, to select articles of natural history at their pleasure, and
to leave for them such compensations as the English might think proper.
Of course, the British commander returned a most decided negative,
saying he could not sell articles which were not his, and would not
allow them to be removed: and the French general was compelled to issue
a general order, commanding all individuals of the French army, or
administration, to make restitution of whatever they had taken from any
public or private establishment, within four-and-twenty hours.
♦THEY EMBARK HORSES, CARRIAGES, AND PICTURES, WHICH ARE RECOVERED.♦
It was something to have wrung from them such a confession of robbery;
yet within a few hours after this very order had been issued, Junot’s
first aide-de-camp, Colonel de Cambis, carried off the Prince Regent’s
horses from the royal stables, to embark them as General Junot’s
property. Having been compelled to restore them, this same officer
the next day endeavoured in like manner to carry off two carriages
belonging to the Duke of Sussex, and it was necessary to threaten him
with being carried prisoner to England, if he persisted in this sort
of conduct. It was ascertained that Junot had embarked a collection
of pictures from the house of the Marques de Angeja; restitution was
demanded, and he said they had been given to him. This was found to be
false; and Junot then laid the affair upon a relation of his who was
embarked with him, but who immediately endeavoured to conceal himself
in one of the transports. A threat of detaining the General brought
this person back; he was ordered on shore, to give an account of the
transaction, and as he refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the
commissioners, or to land, was compelled to do both, and to produce the
pictures.
♦THEY CARRY OFF LARGE SUMS IN MONEY.♦
But in other cases the commissioners were bound by the letter of a
treaty, in which it now appeared that one party could not have presumed
too little upon the honour of the other, nor one too much. All the
money which these plunderers had collected they were allowed to carry
off. Sir Hew observed, that this description of property could never
come under the provisions of the treaty, and that it was impossible
to identify it, or prove exactly from whom it was obtained. But Ayres
Pinto had pointed out a simple and satisfactory mode of proof: the
French had brought no Portugueze money with them, consequently,
whatever they possessed in it must have been the fruits of rapine. Yet
the French carried off three months’ pay for the whole army, in the
general military chest, and, besides this, distributed large sums to
the different regiments, to be carried off in their regimental chests.
One regiment alone was said to have taken 100,000 crowns with it.
♦QUESTION CONCERNING THE SILVER IN BARS.♦
The French had also a great quantity of silver in bars, into which they
had reduced the pillage of the churches and palaces, for the sake of
easier conveyance. Kellermann strenuously insisted that the convention
guaranteed to them whatever was in their possession previous to the
first day of the truce, and declared, most positively, that they
never would concede this point. The commissioners, on the contrary,
insisted upon the article which restricted them from carrying off
other than military and personal baggage; and they declared that the
Commander-in-chief would never consent to any other construction. At
length they compromised the dispute: the French, though they would
not acknowledge that, by the treaty, they were under any obligation,
proposed to pay the debts of the army with this silver, for which
purpose, they said, it had ever been expressly intended, and agreed,
that if any remained after these debts were discharged, it should be
delivered up. The commissioners acknowledged, that, by the convention,
they could scarcely require more; and Sir Hew pronounced that the
offer was fair, and might be acceded to.
♦FURTHER INSTANCES OF DISHONOUR IN THE FRENCH.♦
The commissioners, however, were soon convinced that concession was not
the likeliest expedient for avoiding new pretensions. The ingenuity of
man, they said, could not provide against French cavil, and ingenuity
in misconstruction; and in consequence of the perpetual subterfuges and
false promises of Kellermann, they insisted upon the establishment of a
committee, to inquire into all the claims presented by the Portugueze,
and to be invested with full authority to summon persons, and to order
restitution. Property to a very great amount, both private and public,
was recovered by these means. Information was obtained that fifty-three
boxes of indigo were embarked as part of Junot’s baggage: the indigo
was found and seized: the French general, of course, disclaimed
any knowledge of the transaction; and the commissioners, without
hesitation, assured him that every officer in the British army would
acquit him personally on this head, because it was impossible for him
to inspect or know what was done in his name! A bold and well-supported
attempt was made to avoid the repayment of the money taken from the
Deposito Publico, and a compensation for articles taken from the public
magazines since the convention, amounting in the whole to £40,000. The
justice of this demand had been acknowledged, and immediate payment
promised. Nevertheless, it had not been made when Junot embarked, and
when he was called upon to fulfil his agreement, Kellermann pleaded
that the money remaining in the _Caisse Militaire_ did not amount to
the £60,000, which, by the explanation of the convention, was admitted
to be a fair military chest, and therefore he considered the agreement
to repay these sums as cancelled. The first division of the French had
already sailed, but the commissioners applied to Sir Charles Cotton
to detain the second, and the Commander-in-chief, till that point
should be satisfactorily settled. Even after this instance of vigour,
much litigation and discussion was permitted; and when, at length,
Kellermann yielded to necessity, attempts were still made to put off
the payment, till no means of enforcing it should be left. During
the three last days that Junot remained in the river, orders were
repeatedly given to the _payeur-general_ to pay this money, and they
were always evaded, under some frivolous pretext; till at last the
commissioners ordered him and his baggage on shore to the arsenal, and
then the Frenchman reluctantly refunded this part of the plunder.
♦PROTESTS OF THE MONTEIRO MOR AND OF THE JUIZ DO POVO.♦
While the commissioners were thus recovering from the French a part
of that wealth which they had collected by every means of oppression
and violence, the strong interference of the British alone preserved
these plunderers from the vengeance of the people. The popular feeling
was partaken by all ranks. The Monteiro Mor, who had now advanced
to Azeitam, addressed a protest to the British Admiral against the
treaty, because the Prince and his Government had not been consulted;
and because no attention had been paid to himself, who, without any
foreign aid, had found means to expel the enemy from the kingdom of
Algarve, and pursuing them, passing on to Alem-Tejo, and compelling
them to evacuate all their posts, had taken a position with his army
on the south bank of the Tagus. Such fanfaronade could only detract
from his own deserts, and discredit the exertions and the sufferings
of a brave and loyal nation. He accompanied this protest by a request,
that, on account of the robberies and atrocities which the French had
committed, the vessels employed to carry them home might be embargoed
till the King of England and the Prince of Brazil should have resolved
on what was best for the honour and interest of the two nations; and he
required that their baggage should be rigorously searched by Portugueze
and English commissioners, lest they should carry away with them the
booty which they had so infamously obtained. The Juiz do Povo also
presented a protest; though the convention had not been published, the
people, he said, knew there was no mention made in it of the three
states of the kingdom, and that it left them without satisfaction for
the crimes both against divine and human laws, and without vengeance
for the murders, robberies, and atrocities of every kind, which the
usurpers had committed. “Our churches stript,” said he, “the royal
palaces damaged, the royal treasury plundered, the people reduced to
poverty and misery, so that the streets and squares of the capital
are rendered impassable by crowds of beggars, ... nothing of this is
taken into consideration: ... yet the safety of kingdoms depends on
not letting their rights be invaded without punishing the offenders,
and the consequence of permitting such crimes with impunity will
occasion incalculable misfortunes. The people and the officers of
this tribunal declare their gratitude to the generous allies who have
liberated Portugal, but they pray for the suspension of a convention
so favourable to the French as this is said to be. It must be invalid
after the abuses and hostilities which they have continued to commit in
Almeida, and the contribution which they have since extorted; and this
tribunal cannot consent to the return of the enemy to France, as they
already threaten that they will come back to destroy what they have
left.”
♦DANGER OF TUMULTS IN LISBON.♦
Such language from a magistrate whose name was never heard but in
turbulent times, increased the popular ferment; and General Hope, who
now commanded in Lisbon, found it necessary to issue a proclamation,
prohibiting the Portugueze from entering the city with arms, or wearing
them in the streets; and enacting that all places where wine was sold
should be shut at six in the evening, and not opened before sunrise. To
enforce these regulations, and maintain order, strong guards, picquets,
and patroles, were appointed to arrest every person who should break
the peace. Nothing but this prompt vigilance prevented the people from
gratifying their thirst for vengeance. It is said that all the houses
in Belem in which the enemy were lodged were marked in the course of
one night, and that lists of those Frenchmen and their adherents who
were deemed most worthy of death were posted up. The English were
loudly reproached for having protected men who deserved the most
exemplary punishment; and there were not wanting persons unreflecting
enough to assert, that sure as they were of the Spaniards, they could
have exacted that punishment without any necessity for English aid.
This feeling, however, was far from general. The English character was
too well known in Lisbon, for the English name ever to be unpopular
among a people not less retentive of kind and friendly feelings than
of injuries. When the English soldiers went to occupy the arsenals
and forts, refreshments were brought out for them along the way, and
British officers were followed in the streets by applauding crowds;
while the hatred which was manifested towards the French was so deep
and general, that no people could possibly have incurred it unless
they had deserved it to the utmost. Not only did the Portugueze refuse
to purchase from them those things which they wished to convert into
money, they refused to sell them any thing, even provisions for their
hospital. If a Frenchman ventured to appear alone, trusting to escape
discovery, he betook himself, upon the first suspicious eye which
was directed toward him, to an Englishman for protection. Kellermann
came on shore one day after his embarkation to dine with a British
officer, and being recognized on his return to the water-side, was
attacked by the mob. Our sailors defended and saved him, but not before
he had received some severe contusions. Loison, who was a more marked
object of execration, was considered in so much personal danger, that
four battalions were bivouacked near his quarters, and four pieces of
cannon planted there for his protection. But toward those officers who
had demeaned themselves humanely and honourably, the people testified
nothing but respect and good-will.
♦TEMPER OF THE FRENCH.♦
The French were not sufficiently humbled to bear this meekly. The
success which they had obtained in negotiation, in their minds more
than counterbalanced the humiliation of their defeat, and of their
present state. They denied that they had been defeated; they affirmed
that they had dictated the terms; and Junot continued to occupy the
royal box at the opera till his departure. The English generals
respected, in this instance, the custom of the country, and after the
Frenchman had resigned it, left it unoccupied, with the curtain down.
But however much the enemy might console themselves with the confident
hope of again becoming masters of the kingdom, their pride was bitterly
wounded by the display of national feeling which met them every where,
and which they considered presumptuous in a people who were soon to be
brought again under their iron yoke. They called it audacity in the
Portugueze to wear the national cockade, which they still chose to
denominate a badge of insurrection; and they complained that even in
their sight lamps were prepared for illuminating the city upon their
departure, ♦THIEBAULT, 219–222.♦ and demanded in greater numbers than
could be supplied.
♦EMBARKATION OF THE FRENCH.♦
The first division of the French embarked under protection of the
second, the second and third were protected by the British troops from
the fury of the Portugueze. Wholly to restrain it was impossible,
but no serious injury was done. They embarked amid the curses of the
people. Nine days and nights the rejoicings continued, not by any order
from the magistracy, but by the voluntary act of the inhabitants,
whose joy was in proportion to the misery from which they had been
delivered. It was a joy which thousands whose fortunes had been ruined
in the general calamity, partook; and which brought the last earthly
consolation to many a broken heart. The enemy, while they lay in the
river, were within sight of the illuminations and fire-works, and could
hear the bells with which that great city rang from side to side.
However brave in arms, however skilful in negotiation, they departed
under circumstances more reproachful than had ever before attached to
any army, or body of military men. As a last act of baseness, one of
their general officers called at the commissioners’ office, while they
were absent, just before he embarked, and carried off all the papers he
could collect, in the hope of making it impossible for them to produce
an account of their proceedings. But he was driven back to Lisbon by
contrary winds, and compelled ♦FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS.♦ to
restore them. The commissioners concluded the final report of their
transactions by stating, that the conduct of the French had been
marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and probity, publicly
evincing their intention of carrying off their plundered booty, and
leaving acknowledged debts unpaid. “Finally, said they, they have
only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted
to carry off. The British commissioners had represented to General
Kellermann, that whatsoever the words, it could never be the spirit of
any convention, that an army should, as a military chest, or otherwise,
carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid: they had called
upon him, for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly;
and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army
had taken away a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its
debts unpaid, to a very large amount.”
Thus the courtesy which had been shown toward the French Generals in
the course of the negotiation, had the effect of fixing upon them a
deeper stigma; by bringing into full view a low chicanery, a total want
of honour, and utter disregard of truth, which could not have been
suspected, if it had not been thus officially proved, and placed upon
public record. Had such charges been advanced by the enemy against the
general officers of a British army, the strictest inquiry would have
been instituted, and no rank, no influence, no professional merits,
could have screened the offenders. They would have been dismissed
with ignominy from the service which they had disgraced, and for
ever excluded from all honourable society. There was a time when the
highest eulogium which the French bestowed upon a soldier was to say,
that he was without fear and without reproach; but under the system of
Buonaparte nothing was considered reproachful in his soldiers, provided
they feared nothing in this world or in the next.
♦ADDRESSES OF THANKS TO THE BRITISH COMMANDER.♦
The good faith of the British, and their real regard for the
interest and feelings of the Portugueze nation, were now apparent.
The national flag was every where displayed, and the people were
informed by a proclamation that no time would be lost in establishing
their government upon the basis on which the Prince had left it, and
substituting the civil for that military power which was continued
only from necessity and for a few days. The magistrates and the clergy
meantime, and all persons who possessed authority or influence, were
called upon to co-operate in preserving order. Addresses of thanks came
from the provinces; and the Juiz do Povo, who had protested in the name
of the people of Lisbon so strongly against the convention, now for
those same people expressed their gratitude to the British Commander,
the British Sovereign, and the British nation, requesting that their
sincere thanks for this great deliverance might be made known to the
smallest village as well as to the throne. Such was the proud situation
of the British army at Lisbon. Some formalities had been forgotten
in the negotiation, some minor interests had been overlooked, and
the courtesies of war had been too liberally accorded to an enemy
who should have been made to feel their moral degradation. But the
unstained honour, the unsuspecting integrity, the open manliness, the
plain dignity of the British character, had been manifested throughout
the whole of these transactions; and this was felt and acknowledged by
the Portugueze.
♦GALLUZO BESIEGES ELVAS.♦
Difficulties which could not have been foreseen arose concerning the
delivery of Elvas. Galluzo, who commanded the army of Extremadura, and
who had hitherto afforded no very efficient aid to the Portugueze,
thought proper at this time, when he had been required by every civil
and military authority to begin his march towards Castille, in contempt
of those orders to enter Alem-Tejo, and besiege Elvas, as if no treaty
for its surrender had been made. The French Commandant, Girod de
Novillars, upon this required from the inhabitants an immediate loan of
money, to the amount of 30,000 francs, and wine and provisions to the
value of 20,000 more. Drained as they had been by repeated exactions,
the people of Elvas were in no condition to obey this demand; the
Bishop and the magistrates therefore easily obtained permission to go
to the Spanish camp, and entreat Galluzo to suspend hostilities. That
General, however, declared, that if the French did not surrender within
six hours, he would open his fire against Fort La Lippe, and put the
whole garrison to the sword. He had no time to lose, he said, but must
hasten to assist his fellow-soldiers in expelling the enemy from the
Peninsula; and the inhabitants must either abandon the city, or take
arms against the French. From this dilemma they were delivered by the
French themselves, who, during the night, withdrew into the forts,
leaving about an hundred men in the hospital. An agreement was then
made, with Galluzo’s consent, that the city should remain neutral;
and the Spaniards began an absurd fire against Fort La Lippe, which
is the strongest fortress in Portugal. Things were in this state when
Lieutenant-Colonel Ross arrived with letters from the French Commander,
instructing M. Girod to give up the place to him in pursuance of the
convention. A demur was made by the Commandant, till he could send
an officer to Lisbon, and satisfy himself that the dispatches were
authentic; and difficulties less reasonable in their kind were started
both by the Spaniards and Portugueze. Galluzo argued that no agreement
between the British and French Generals could be binding upon him. The
Spaniards, he affirmed, had a right as besiegers to take possession of
Elvas, and the Spanish arms were not to be defrauded of the splendour
which this would give them. He threatened Girod that if any injury
were offered to the city the prisoners should be put to death, and
the garrison receive no mercy; and he insisted that they should march
out and lay down their arms, and that the place should be entered
and occupied by the Spaniards only. In his communications with Sir
Hew Dalrymple he held rather a lower tone, saying that certainly he
should not have besieged and cannonaded Elvas if he had known of the
convention; but it had not been thought proper to announce it to him.
He required only a joint surrender to the British and Spanish arms,
leaving the place and the prisoners to his Excellency; but he had
heard the garrison were not to be considered prisoners; that article,
though the opinion was that it would not be executed, occasioned some
uneasiness, and therefore he would make them lay down their arms, and
swear not to bear them again against Spain or her allies.
♦DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE SURRENDER OF ELVAS.♦
Galluzo was at this time upon ill terms with the Portugueze. They
complained that throughout the struggle in Alem-Tejo he had promised
much and performed little; that the Spaniards had acted as masters
in those fortresses which they had entered as friends, countermanded
the orders of the Portugueze General, encouraged insubordination,
appropriated to their own use money which had been raised for the
national cause, and pillaged the country as they passed through it. On
the other hand, Galluzo reproached the Portugueze with want of activity
and energy, and with giving his people nothing but water when they went
to assist them. His pretensions to Elvas, therefore, which under any
circumstances might have given offence, were now peculiarly offensive;
and it happened that the Junta of Porto, who were at this time not
without hope of getting the government of the kingdom into their own
hands, had ordered General Leite to march into Elvas and occupy it as
soon as it should be evacuated. The General communicated their orders
to Sir Hew, declaring that he felt it his duty to obey, and laying
before him his complaints against the Spaniards. These difficulties
were surmounted by a proper mixture of conciliation and firmness on
the part of the British Commander. The first great object was, that
British faith should be kept, and complete protection afforded to the
French garrison. For this purpose those troops whom it was intended to
canton in Alem-Tejo were immediately ordered thither, and stationed as
near Elvas as possible. Colonel Graham was sent to Galluzo to bring him
to reason; and if this were found impracticable, then to proceed to
Madrid, and call for the interference of higher authorities. Colonel
Ross was instructed to bear in mind, that as the French surrendered
to no nation except the English, neither Spanish nor Portugueze
troops were to appear when they marched out: that with respect to
the Portugueze, the feelings of the nation were to be gratified, and
their flag every where displayed under a salute; but he was to hold
the substantial power, even if he saw cause for allowing a Portugueze
General to march in with a detachment of his men. Colonel Graham
performed his difficult mission with great ability. Galluzo ceased
from all farther interference, and was so gratified by the temper in
which this affair had been carried on by the British Commander, and the
services which had been rendered to the soldiers of Extremadura who had
been released at Lisbon, that he ordered the black English cockade to
be blended with the red Spanish one in his army, to mark his gratitude,
as he informed Sir Hew, and denote the intimate alliance between the
two countries.
♦ELVAS AND ALMEIDA GIVEN UP.♦
All difficulties being at length removed, the forts were delivered up,
General Leite entered the city, and the French garrison, between 1400
and 1500 in number, were marched to Aldea Gallega. No insults were
offered them on the way; and they were joined by their comrades, who,
having been wounded at Evora, had been left in that city, and treated
with careful humanity by the inhabitants. The garrison of Almeida were
not removed so easily. The Portugueze had kept up an irregular blockade
of that fortress after Loison’s departure; they borrowed fire-arms from
the Spaniards of Ciudad Rodrigo, and were so little scrupulous in their
mode of warfare, that a friar poisoned the water of a tank at which
the cattle belonging to the garrison used to drink. Almeida might long
have defied any efforts which the Portugueze or the Spaniards in that
quarter could have made against it; it was, however, gladly delivered
up, in conformity to the convention, and the garrison were marched
to Porto, under a British escort, there to be embarked. ♦TUMULTS AT
PORTO.♦ On the day of their arrival, they employed themselves in
converting as much of their plunder as possible into money: purchasers
were not wanting, and their market continued the whole day and
night, horses being the ostensible articles. Such a traffic excited
the indignation of all but those who were profiting by it; and that
indignation was excited to the highest pitch, when, on the following
morning, as the baggage of the French was examined at the Castle
of St. Joam da Foz, in presence of the governor and of Sir Robert
Wilson, several rich church vestments were found in one of the boxes.
The horror which the Portugueze feel at sacrilege is perhaps hardly
conceivable by those who are not acquainted with them. The governor
himself, on this occasion, joined the populace in their outcry, and
immediately gave orders that no vessel should be permitted to pass the
castle. The news soon reached Porto, exaggerated as it passed from
mouth to mouth; a mob collected, bent upon putting the French to death;
and some insults were offered the English for protecting them. The
Bishop, Sir Robert Wilson, and many officers, Portugueze and English,
used their utmost exertions to quiet the tumult. They succeeded in
restoring peace at St. Joam da Foz: but the crowd still continued on
both sides the river; and at an early hour of the morning some thousand
persons had assembled, with a determination to attack the French on
board the transports: they placed artillery on both shores, and mounted
guns on board the ships. Fortunately for the French, they were provided
with sixty rounds each man, and one of the transports in which they
were embarked was armed with six-pounders. The Bishop and Sir Robert
Wilson again came down to mediate, and the latter was employed, without
intermission, from nine in the morning till five in the afternoon in
negotiating between the French General and the populace. It was in
vain for the Frenchman to tell Sir Robert that he was bound to see the
articles of capitulation executed to the very letter, ... that was
impossible: he had secured their lives, and this was the utmost he
could do. The mob insisted that the French should be disembarked, their
baggage examined on shore, and that they should leave their arms: there
was no alternative, and they were compelled to submit. No sooner had
they left the transports, than the rabble boarded them, and began to
plunder in their turn: every thing was ransacked; the very provisions
and wearing apparel of the ship-owners disappeared. Here, however,
the tumult ended: the more riotous of the populace retired with their
booty; the better classes were ashamed of the disgrace which had thus
been brought upon them; and every possible reparation was made, to the
entire satisfaction of the British officers.
♦THE SPANISH TROOPS AT LISBON EMBARKED FOR CATALONIA.♦
During the negotiation the French, who were not ashamed to propose
any thing, proposed that an equal number of French prisoners should
be set at liberty, in exchange for the Spaniards whom they had seized
at Lisbon. This Sir Hew declared to be inadmissible; the Spaniards,
he said, must be immediately set free, and not the interests alone,
but the feelings of the Spanish nation were to be considered. He
consented, however, to obtain for them, if possible, the release of
such Frenchmen as had been arrested in Spain during the troubles, not
having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations.
Humanity induced him to this; and in communicating it to the Spanish
authorities, he relied upon Spanish generosity for complying with
his request for their deliverance. The scene at Lisbon, when arms,
horses, and artillery were restored to the Spaniards who had been so
long detained prisoners, was one of those spectacles at which the
heart rejoices. They were about 3800 in number, some 2000 having
effected their escape. The ceremony was made as public and impressive
as possible, and the Spanish Commander distributed alms upon the
occasion among the poor of Lisbon, which caused a general festivity.
Applications for these troops were made from various parts of Spain.
The Junta of Galicia required them; and some of the Spanish Generals
at Madrid wished them to be embarked for Santander, there to join
Blake’s army. Castaños, to whose judgement at this time that deference
was paid which his great services had well deserved, was of opinion
that they would be more serviceable in Catalonia than in any other
part. For Catalonia therefore they were embarked in British transports,
and Sir Hew advanced a loan of 90,000 dollars to purchase horses for
them.
♦INTRIGUES OF THE JUNTA OF PORTO.♦
It was sufficient for the British Commander in these transactions to
follow the plain dictates of a humane and honourable mind. In settling
a civil government, and thereby putting an end to the fearful anarchy
which every where prevailed, he had a more delicate task. The Junta
of Porto were intriguing to obtain a continuance of their power;
and under a pretext that Lisbon would for some time be in a state
of great confusion, they made their wishes known to Sir Hew, that
the seat of the temporary government might remain at Porto, and that
deputies from the other provinces, as they then did from the northern
ones, should repair thither to transact business for those parts
which they represented. The Bishop also observed, that an authority
had been forced upon him, which he had accepted only in the hope of
re-establishing the government of his lawful Prince; and that if it
were thought expedient for him to retain it till the pleasure of the
Prince was known, it must be under the condition of remaining at Porto,
from whence the inhabitants would not permit him to depart, unless by
a direct order of their Sovereign. Such an arrangement would be most
beneficial to the kingdom in its present state; and that opposition
to it which might otherwise be expected, would be obviated if Sir
Hew Dalrymple would take upon himself to recommend it. This sort of
finesse was little likely to attain its end with a British Commander.
Sir Hew, who was better acquainted with the state of affairs in Spain
than any other person at that time, had no such advantage in Portugal.
But in politics, as in morals, there is a principle of rectitude which
always leads us right, and that principle he followed. He neither
lent himself to this intrigue, nor allowed the displeasure which it
naturally excited to preponderate against the real services which the
Bishop of Porto had rendered to his country, and the popularity which
in consequence he then possessed. He replied therefore to the Bishop,
that had there been no objection, the Council of Regency which the
Prince had appointed at his departure, would now have resumed their
authority of course; but seeing that some of its members were strongly
suspected of being in the French interest, he felt himself authorized
to state, that however desirous the King his Sovereign might be to
interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of Portugal,
it was impossible for his Majesty, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, to acquiesce in the return of those persons to power. On
the other hand, those members who had kept aloof from the interests
of the enemy, and retaining their loyalty had retained the confidence
of the nation, had an unquestionable claim to be reinstated in their
situations. Declaring therefore that his instructions were to take
measures for forming a Regency as soon as possible, composed of such
persons of rank, character, and talents, as might be found ready to
undertake, and qualified to discharge, the important trust, but with as
few changes (particularly in the subordinate departments) as might be
compatible with the public interests, in the fulfilment of this duty he
naturally addressed himself to his Excellency and the Provisional Board
of Government at Porto. “You,” Sir Hew continued, “have already turned
your thoughts to the great question now at issue, and are doubtless
prepared to propose measures for completing the Council of Regency so
as to merit the confidence of the nation, and to prevent any just cause
of discontent in any other provisional government, or other respectable
description of the people. For my own part, I have only been able, from
the information I have received since my arrival in Portugal, to form
one decided opinion on this subject; which is, the infinite importance
to the public welfare that your Excellency should yourself hold a
distinguished place in the proposed Regency.”
♦THE COUNCIL OF REGENCY RE-ESTABLISHED.♦
The Bishop’s reply was, that he should readily acquiesce in whatever
might be determined upon, except his own nomination to the Council;
for he, better than any other person, knew what was necessary for the
good of the public cause, and of the northern provinces, and therefore
would not remove from the place where he had been stationed by God
and by his Prince. It was soon, however, ascertained, that if this
Prelate could not remain at the head of the government at Porto, he
would not persist in refusing to accept a share in it at Lisbon. Sir
Hew therefore, upon mature deliberation, and with the best advice which
could be obtained, issued a proclamation, saying, that through the
success with which Providence had blessed the British arms, the time
was come when the re-establishment of the Portugueze government ♦SEPT.
18.♦ could be effected. He gave the people due praise for the exertions
which they had made against the French; and saying that no views of
interest or of national aggrandizement could be imputed to the liberal
policy of Great Britain, declared, that the best manner in which he
could fulfil the intentions of his Sovereign, and promote the welfare
of Portugal, was by restoring that Council to which their Prince had
delegated his authority when he preserved his royal dignity from the
insults of an implacable enemy, and secured his American dominions. One
of that Council had been unhappily sent away from his country; others
had incurred imputations which rendered their restoration impossible at
this time. The three, however, who had contracted no such disability,
the Monteiro Mor, D. Francisco Xavier de Noronha, and Francisco da
Cunha e Menezes, he called upon to resume the administration, and with
them the Desembargador Joam Antonio ♦SEPT. 20.♦ Salter de Mendonça, and
Brigadier D. Miguel Pereira Forjas Coutinho, whom the Prince had named
to succeed in case of vacancies. These persons assembled accordingly,
and to fill up the number which the act of regency appointed, elected
the Marquez daz Minas and the Bishop of Porto. The Junta of Porto then
dissolved itself, declaring, however, that if the Regency should again
be overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, (which they prayed
God to avert,) or any other calamity, they should by that event enter
again upon the full exercise of the authority which they now laid
aside. The other Juntas were in like manner dissolved: the Regency
was acknowledged throughout Portugal, and things resumed, as far as
possible, their former course.
♦OUTCRY IN ENGLAND AGAINST THE CONVENTION.♦
While Sir Hew Dalrymple was employed in carrying the terms of the
convention into effect, putting an end to the anarchy which prevailed,
and preparing with all possible speed to advance into Spain, an
outcry which he little expected had arisen against him at home. The
official account of the battle reached England a fortnight before the
news of the armistice and convention: tidings came with it that the
French had proposed to evacuate Portugal, and the news of Junot’s
unconditional surrender was looked for as what must necessarily ensue.
When the terms of the convention were received the Park and Tower
guns were fired; but the public feeling was not in accord with this
demonstration of joy, and never was any public feeling so unanimously
and instantaneously manifested. The hopes of the nation had been raised
to the highest pitch; their disappointment was in proportion, and it
was expressed with a violence only to be explained by the deep and
general abhorrence which the conduct of the French in Portugal had
provoked. The capitulations of the Helder and of Buenos Ayres were
remembered as less mortifying than the convention of Cintra. Nothing
else could be talked of, nothing else could be thought of: men greeted
each other in the streets with execrations upon those who had signed
this detested convention; it kept them waking at night, or disturbed
their sleep, like a misdeed or a misfortune of their own. The London
newspapers joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence; on no former
occasion had they been so unanimous. The provincial papers proved
that, from one end of the island to the other, the resentment of this
grievous disappointment was the same; some refused to disgrace their
pages by inserting the treaty; others surrounded it with broad black
lines, putting their journal in mourning for the dismal intelligence it
contained; some headed the page with a representation of three gibbets,
and a general suspended from each, cut in wood for the occasion.
What could be done? There were not wanting writers who called upon
government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have
done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and
haltered, to the enemy’s discretion. Would it be argued, that to break
the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was
so framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith
towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies of Portugal;
and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army
of thieves, ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which they
had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible
means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of
faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off
from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British
flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might
join the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against
the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of
faith towards Sweden to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet
for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we
then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends?
for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us!
No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no
law of nations therefore could justify us in performing them. But
the French, it was urged, had already fulfilled their part of the
convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us
into Lisbon. Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in
honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which
was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour
was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the terms than
to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach us, than that
they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure
our allies. The blow, it was affirmed, might have gone far towards
deciding the fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia,
and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss was shown by the anxiety with
which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been
the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following
so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the
Portugueze, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope
and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the
tyrant’s yoke!
The conditions which had been granted to the Russian Admiral were
condemned with the same vehement feeling of disappointment. The
intimate connexion which had so lately subsisted between the Courts
of London and Petersburgh, and the personal regard which the British
Admiral entertained for Admiral Siniavin, had been adduced as reasons
why an agreement acceptable to both nations should be concluded.
Certainly it became us to manifest every mark of personal respect
toward the Russian officers, because, though the false policy of their
government had engaged the two countries in war, there existed no
angry feelings nor jarring interests between them; and the wishes of
both were for a renewal of that long established intercourse which was
beneficial to both. It also behoved us especially to show ourselves
grateful for the protection which the Russians had afforded to the
English and Portugueze refugees, and the facilities which they had
given them of effecting their escape. These were personal favours, for
which the obvious personal return should have been to have immediately
sent home men and officers under an engagement not to serve against
us or our allies, and to have shown towards them every courtesy and
kindness by which the evils of hostility can be mitigated. But that
personal regard should influence the terms of capitulation, was a thing
as unheard of as the terms themselves. “Hold in deposit!” The phrase
had never before been known in the British navy. They knew what it was
to fight their enemies; they knew what it was to beat, capture, sink,
burn, and destroy them, according to the spirit and letter of their
instructions. This was said by the navy, and by the nation; and the
bitter reflection arose, how would Nelson have received such a proposal!
Such language as this arose from a right feeling; but the
disappointment of well-founded and high-raised hopes had heated the
public mind, and disqualified it for regarding the whole transaction
dispassionately. The manner in which the Portugueze had been overlooked
in the negotiation was aggravated in England by persons who supported
the pretensions of the Junta of Porto; and undue stress was laid upon
the neglect of formalities which could not have been overlooked if
the Portugueze General had been acting with the British army as he
ought. There had been one serious omission affecting the Portugueze,
which was, in not insisting upon a stipulation that the troops of that
nation who had been sent to serve in Buonaparte’s armies should be
restored to their own country; such a stipulation ought to have been
required, though it would undoubtedly have been broken. The other
oversights which were objected were merely frivolous, and the manner
in which, through all the subsequent details, the feelings as well as
interests of the Portugueze had been consulted, had already contented
them, and made them grateful for the conduct of their allies. There was
another cause which exasperated the English people: they compared the
treatment of Junot’s army with that of Dupont’s, and were mortified
by a comparison which ought rather to have elated them; for looking
to what seemed advantageous, and not to what was just, they did not
perceive that in deferring to a popular cry the Junta of Seville had
broken a solemn engagement. The strong disapprobation with which Sir
Hew Dalrymple regarded that breach of faith, acted upon him, perhaps
unconsciously, when he allowed the French the utmost which could be
claimed upon the most liberal construction of the letter of the treaty
in their favour.
♦BOARD OF INQUIRY APPOINTED.♦
Meetings were convened in most parts of England to express the
indignation of the people at the convention, and call for the
punishment of those by whom it had been negotiated. The Common Council
presented an address to the same purport, and were told in reply that
it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce
judgement without previous investigation, and that their interposition
was not necessary for inducing the King to institute a due inquiry
into a transaction which had disappointed the hopes and expectations
of the nation. Accordingly the three Generals were recalled, and a
Board of Inquiry was appointed, composed of the Earl of Moira, General
Craig, Lord Heathfield, the Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and
Lieutenant-General Nicolls, with Sir David Dundas for president.
Their decision, after a long and full investigation, was, that they
could not pronounce, with confidence, whether the victory of Vimeiro
ought to have been pursued or not; but, considering the extraordinary
circumstances under which two new commanders arrived from the ocean,
and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after
the battle, and these successively superseding each other, and both
the original commander, within the space of twenty-four hours,) it
was not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the
second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals’ being
acquainted with the actual state of things, and proceeding accordingly.
On a consideration of all circumstances, they were of opinion, that
no farther proceeding was necessary; and, however some of them might
differ respecting the fitness of the convention, it was their unanimous
declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited
by all the three generals.
As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the board was
called upon, by the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, to resume its
consideration of the armistice and convention, and pronounce decidedly
whether they thought them adviseable. The armistice was disapproved
by Earl Moira; the convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of
Pembroke, and General Nicolls: thus, six of the seven members approved
the armistice, and four approved the convention. The dissentient
members delivered in their reasons for the opinion which they gave.
General Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a military
point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope, and argued ably against
the moral and political effects of the treaty. The proceedings ♦JAN.
18, 1809.♦ were concluded by a declaration from the King, adopting
the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was
necessary; but expressing his disapprobation of those articles of
the convention in which stipulations were made, directly affecting
the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portugueze nations. That
disapprobation his Majesty had signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when
the treaty was first laid before him, and he repeated it, deeming it
necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the
impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into military
conventions, of articles of such a description. Nor could he forbear
observing, that Sir Hew’s delaying to transmit the armistice concluded
on the 22d of August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified
convention was transmitted at the same time, was calculated to produce
great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience had, in fact,
resulted therefrom. The King abstained from any observations upon other
parts of the convention.
Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. But it was seen
by the people that the great error of judgement had been committed
at home, in not providing that the General by whom the campaign was
planned should carry it to the end. And how often may it be observed
in history, as in private life, that the course of events is better
directed to the end desired, than if the persons most interested in the
success could themselves have ordered it! So it was in this campaign,
which at the time so severely disappointed the nation. A more splendid
triumph might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone might
have been taken in the negotiation; but in either of these cases
Almeida and Elvas would have been left in possession of the enemy; and
whatever efforts might have been made for reducing them, they could
easily have held out till the dispersion of the Spanish armies. It
would then have been a great object with the French to relieve the
garrisons, and this would have brought them to Lisbon at a time when
there were neither preparations nor means for resistance there.
CHAPTER XII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF THE
SPANISH TROOPS FROM DENMARK.
♦1808.♦
♦NECESSITY OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.♦
When Castaños was informed of Sir Hew Dalrymple’s appointment to
the command of the British army, he declared that he regarded this
nomination as the most fortunate event of his own life; so much
advantage to the common cause did he anticipate from their confidence
in each other, and the cordial co-operation which would ensue. In
reality that influence which the confidence of a British commander
would have given him, might have been of the most essential benefit to
Spain at this momentous crisis.
Such was the national character, that when the struggle commenced every
man was ready to follow in the cause of his country; but so pitiable
had been the state of education, and so successfully had the double
despotism of the government and the inquisition shut out knowledge
from their empire, that no man was fit to lead. There were now as many
governments as there were Juntas, each acting with little regard to the
others; and as these were every where filled by persons chosen because
of their station, the government throughout Spain was delivered, or
rather fell into the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, with
a few clergy; a set of men whom their general want of information,
their prejudices, and their previous way of life, in great measure
disqualified for the task to which they were called. Among them were
some persons who had formerly been in office at Madrid; but whatever
advantage they might have derived from habits of business, was more
than counterbalanced by the dilatory formalities acquired at the same
time, and their attachment to the old routine with all its defects and
evils. Wherever therefore such statesmen of the old school were found,
the Juntas were less efficient than they might have been without them.
The powers with which these bodies found themselves invested were
neither limited in extent or duration: the people in their confidence
(which at such times is as blind as their suspicion) never thought
of proposing restrictions: and the Juntas, when once in possession
of authority, thought only of making it as extensive, and retaining
it as long as they could. Some of them passed decrees bestowing upon
themselves the titles of Excellencies and Highnesses, and adopted
uniforms of the gaudiest fashion. This was mere vanity; but serious
injury was done, when, with as little decency as had been observed
under the old system, they conferred commissions and commands, not upon
those persons who had the fairest claim, but upon their own friends
and relations and dependents; and thus, as the enrolment was general,
the armies were filled with officers who had no other pretensions to
rank and promotion than what they derived from favour.
♦CASTAÑOS PREVENTS A CONTEST BETWEEN GRANADA AND SEVILLE.♦
After the great success in Andalusia, the provincial Juntas, instead
of exerting themselves to the utmost for completing the deliverance of
the country, became jealous of each other. Where the rival authorities
were far distant, this feeling impeded the public service; greater
evils were threatened when they bordered upon each other. Granada at
this time refused to acknowledge the supreme authority which the Junta
of Seville assumed, and had hitherto exercised with ability and good
fortune. A warm contention ensued; and Tilly, either from irritation,
or worse motives, proposed that a division of the Andalusian army
should be sent to enforce submission. Fortunately Castaños was present
at the meeting in which this proposition was made; he rose from his
seat, and, striking the table, said, he should like to see the man who
dared order a division of the troops under his command to march without
his authority! He knew no distinction of provinces; he had the honour
to command part of the army of Spain, and never would he suffer it to
be made the instrument of civil war.
♦PLANS FOR A GOVERNMENT.♦
The occasion required, and therefore justified, this prompt assumption
of a power, dangerous in its kind, and in nowise congenial to the
unambitious temper of Castaños, a man whose only desire was to do his
duty like a true Spaniard under any circumstances. It proved, however,
the necessity of establishing a more legitimate authority than as yet
existed. Lord Collingwood, in his first communications with Seville,
had advised that a general Council, Cortes, or Congress, should be
appointed, and invested with power from the several provincial Juntas
to preside over and act in the name of the whole. The necessity of some
such arrangement became every day more apparent. Some persons proposed
to establish a military form of government, in which that vigour which
the emergency required might be found; some were for assembling a
Cortes; others recommended that a viceroy or lieutenant of the kingdom
should be appointed, and to this Castaños was at one time inclined.
His first thought before the struggle began had been to invite the
Archduke Charles; but upon considering that the invitation could not
be accepted while Austria continued at peace with France, and that if
a war between those powers took place, the Archduke’s services would
be required at home, he then thought the Prince Royal of the house of
Naples would be the fittest person to hold the regency till the fate
of Ferdinand should be known; and this he proposed to the ♦ARRIVAL
OF A SICILIAN PRINCE AT GIBRALTAR.♦ Junta. The Sicilian court from
the commencement of the insurrection had directed their views to the
same object: their minister in London had sounded the disposition of
the British Government, and found it decidedly unfavourable to their
schemes; and they sent a plenipotentiary to reside at Gibraltar, for
the purpose of furthering the interests of the family. But Sir Hew
Dalrymple happened to be informed of what had passed in London, and
finding that the object of this mission was altogether disapproved by
the British Government, and that the agent had papers which he intended
to circulate without previously communicating their contents to him,
felt it necessary to let him know that his residence in the garrison,
under these circumstances, might be attended with inconvenience, and
therefore he must return to Palermo for new instructions. This was
about the middle of July; in the ensuing month, a few days before Sir
Hew left Gibraltar to take the command of the army, Prince Leopold,
second son of the King of the Two Sicilies, with the Duke of Orleans
and a large retinue, arrived there in a British man of war. A more
ill-judged step could hardly have been taken. Great Britain had
scrupulously avoided any thing which could have the appearance of
dictating to the Spaniards, or interfering with them in any other way
than that of giving the most prompt and liberal support; but what
a pretext would it afford those who were ever ready to malign the
measures of England, if at a time when the Spaniards were deliberating
concerning the settlement of their government, a Prince who claimed
the regency should be received with royal honours at Gibraltar, and at
the very juncture when a British army arrived upon the coast! Under
these embarrassing circumstances Sir Hew acted with great firmness and
discretion. Persisting in that upright and steady course of conduct
which had in so great a degree contributed to win the confidence of
the Spanish nation, he refused in any manner to support pretensions
which he had reason to believe were not approved by his government;
to that government he referred the Duke of Orleans, who accordingly
resolved to go to England, and make his representations in person; the
Prince was received into Gibraltar, and left there, when Sir Hew went
to the army; if he were chosen Regent, any deputation duly appointed to
announce that nomination was of course to be admitted, and considered
as attached to his retinue; but no such deputation from any local or
provisional government was to be received on such terms.
♦AMBITION OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
There was at this time a report that the Junta of Seville had declared
for a regency, and were hesitating between the Archbishop of Toledo, as
the only remaining member of the Bourbon family in Spain, a Prince of
the Neapolitan house, and the Conde de Montijo, the most intriguing,
and then one of the most popular persons in Spain. As this individual
had no pretensions to such a charge, except what his undeserved
popularity might give him, the report was probably raised by himself as
one means to bring about his elevation. Some members of that Junta were
intoxicated with success; a few others cared for nothing but their
own interest: the latter wished for a Regent of their own appointment,
under whose name they might possess the real power; the former were
for retaining the authority which hitherto they had administered well,
but which ceased to be legitimate when it became apparent that it was
retained for ambitious motives. A paper from the Junta of Murcia, which
expressed the opinion of Florida-Blanca, had forcibly pointed out the
necessity of a central government, and the inevitable ruin which a
polyarchy of independent Juntas would bring on. It advised that the
cities which had a seat in the Cortes should elect a council to govern
in the name of Ferdinand, and that the military affairs should be
entrusted to a council of generals. The Junta of Seville suppressed
this paper wherever their influence extended; but a like measure was
now recommended by an authority with which the Junta could not cope.
♦THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE ADVISE A CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Council of Castille had recovered some of its lost reputation
by the tardy resistance which it opposed to the Intruder, and by
exerting itself with authority to maintain order in the capital, after
the retreat of the French. It published a justification of its own
conduct, more elaborate than convincing, and dispatched a circular
address to the provincial Juntas, declaring ♦AUG. 4.♦ its readiness to
co-operate with them in any plans of defence. With respect to measures
of another kind, it said, which were necessary to save the country,
all that belonged to that Council was to excite the authority of the
nation, and assist it with its influence, advice, and knowledge. Under
circumstances so extraordinary it was not possible to adopt at once
the measures indicated by the laws and customs of Spain; the Council
therefore would confine itself to recommending that deputies should be
appointed by all the different Juntas, who should meet together, and,
in union with it, confer and determine upon this important object; so
that all provisions proceeding from this common centre might be as
expeditious as the end required.
♦PROJECT OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
The better spirits in the Junta of Seville prevailed on this occasion,
and that body, yielding with a good grace to the general opinion,
seemed at the same time to direct it. They published an address,
written with the ability which distinguished all their public papers.
Hitherto, they said, the cause of the Spaniards had been prosperous,
and nothing could frustrate their hopes of success, except a want of
union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious to foment divisions.
Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance,
the weakness, the blindness of men, might assist these evil designs,
destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin of Spain.
This they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God
and man, that they wrote nothing but what was dictated by the love of
their country, being ready to hear the opinions of other provinces,
and to amend their own errors, whenever it should be shown that they
had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever might
serve to sow disunion: of this nature were all discussions concerning
the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families
which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well
known; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this? Long live
King Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers, heirs of the crown after
his attested decease! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be
necessary in default of them?
The second question which agitated the people was of a different
nature: ... Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government,
which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till
the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? From the beginning they
had been persuaded such a government was by all means necessary. Many
Juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction
of this truth, ... a conviction arising from the necessity in every
nation of a civil government, to which the military may be subordinate.
Spain, deriving wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing
a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the
Spanish name) had been the first to acknowledge a system of things as
ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people
in the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which pecuniary resources
had been placed at their disposal, the heroic loyalty wherewith
the army had obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their
civil administration, and of the military enterprises which they had
directed, placed in the most conspicuous light, and established,
beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political
principle. But who was to create this supreme civil government? Who
were to compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What the
extent of its authority? How might it be established, without producing
disunion among the different provinces? These were the important
questions to be examined.
It had been said that the Cortes ought to assemble, that the Council
of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed
under the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of Castille never
possessed the right of convoking the Cortes, ... why then should they
give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of
its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition
to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and
defend? Because it had afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the
sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the
crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized
and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of
a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a
government convoked by an authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty
of acts which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes
against their country? But the Council of Castille being thus excluded
from all consideration, who was to convoke the Cortes? It was the
peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the King to summon them; the
provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not
unite: thus, therefore, there would be no Cortes, or, if a few deputies
were to assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions, the
very evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom found itself
suddenly without a king and without a government, ... a situation
unknown in its history, and to its laws. The people legally resumed
the power of appointing a government. They created Juntas without any
regard to the cities which had votes in the Cortes. The legitimate
power was therefore deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power
they had governed, and still were governing, and had been, and still
were, universally acknowledged and obeyed. Their situation had not
changed; the danger still existed; no new authority had supervened: the
lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which the people had
confided it. It was therefore incontestable that the sole and exclusive
right of electing those who were to compose the supreme government
was vested in the supreme Juntas. And whom should they elect? Most
certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derived their
power from the people, and in them the nation had reposed entire
confidence. Hence, if there were any province in which the military
power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta
should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being
indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the
people; for, under present circumstances, the government could not be
legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent.
The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that the supreme
Juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own
members, two deputies; and the persons so elected, from that moment,
be acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom. The supreme
Juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the
present state of things, being invested with the internal management
of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the
general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies
constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those
deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims
of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal.
If there were one of the Royal Family capable of presiding in the
supreme government, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that
office; but if there were no person of the royal blood, then it must
elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all danger, the
presidency should be only for such limited time as might seem best.
The Juntas would appoint a place for the seat of government, which the
government might afterwards change, if it should see cause. It ought to
be at a distance from the dangers of war, and to possess other local
advantages. Seville possessed those advantages, but had no anxiety to
be selected, and willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that
city would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion, La Mancha
was most convenient for the seat of government, and, especially, either
the city of Ciudad-Real, or Almagro. But this point was to be decided
by the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The paper concluded with a
brief and dignified recapitulation of what the Junta of Seville had
done for their country, disclaiming, on their part, any affectation or
desire of superiority, and declaring, that whatever they had done was
no more than their indispensable duty.
♦THE PROVINCIAL JUNTAS ASSENT TO IT.♦
The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the plan of government
thus recommended; and it is no light proof of its fitness, that
schemes the same in principle and effect should have been suggested
by persons who had no communication with each other, and whose views
were in other respects so different. There were many in England who
thought it would have been better to have at once convoked the Cortes,
in the supposition that there was more resemblance between the Cortes
and the English parliament than had ever really existed, and in the
generous but mistaken hope that vigorous measures might be expected
from a free legislative assembly. The best and wisest of the Spaniards
wished also for a Cortes, and looked to it for such judicious reforms
as were conformable to the constitutional principles of the monarchy,
and suited to the habits and feelings of the nation. But they saw that
many points must be determined before the manner of assembling the
Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of forming a central
government was immediate and urgent. The plan therefore which the
Junta of Seville proposed was assented to without opposition. Still
it was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas to retain
their power. That of Valencia drew up secret rules for its deputies,
declaring that they were to follow the direction of their constituents,
remain subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly with them,
and in no instance depart from their instructions; and they reserved
to themselves the power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This
paper was made public; and it was known that other Juntas, that of
Seville in particular, had pursued the same mischievous course.
♦UNWORTHY CHOICE OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this. In electing its
deputies it chose two persons so notoriously unworthy of such a trust,
that the only motives which could be assigned for the choice were a
desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they would submit to
any terms for the sake of the appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the
one; he had been a creature of Godoy’s, and was so sensible of the
estimation in which he was held, that he declined the charge, knowing
his life would be in danger if he appeared in Madrid, where it was of
course expected that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de Vera
y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, the coadjutor of Seville,
was then chosen in his place; and this was an unexceptionable choice.
It was hoped and expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow
Hore’s example, in declining an appointment for which he was equally
disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder stamp. A blasted character had
not prevented him from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being
utterly regardless of the means by which he brought about his ends, he
was ready to venture for the highest stake in the game of revolution.
Foul facts had been proved against him, and fouler were, upon no light
grounds, imputed. He had found it necessary to fly from Madrid before
the troubles, because he was implicated in the robbery of a jeweller.
The murder of the Conde de Aguila was attributed to him, because
it was certain that he might have saved the Count by the slightest
interference in his behalf. A wretch who was notoriously his creature
had been one of the most active instruments in Solano’s death; and
Reding would have been made away with by his means before the battle of
Baylen, if the intention had not been disclosed to Castaños, and by him
prevented.
This appointment was not perhaps what Tilly would have chosen; for it
was believed that he had no inclination to show himself at Madrid; but
he trusted to his talents for intrigue, obtained a monthly allowance
of 500 dollars, and looked ♦THE OTHER MEMBERS UNEXCEPTIONABLE.♦ for
those opportunities which revolutionary times offer to insane and
desperate ambition. It is to the honour of the Spaniards, that this
was the only exceptionable person elected for the central Junta:
perhaps in no country could an equal number of men, under similar
circumstances, have been chosen more worthy of the trust reposed in
them. To be elected to a situation of so great responsibility, in
a time of unexampled difficulties, was no object of desire; in no
instance was the appointment solicited, and in most it was reluctantly
accepted. The persons deputed were thirty-five[32] in number; of
whom Florida-Blanca and Jovellanos were the most remarkable, for the
offices which they had formerly filled, and the rank which they held
in public opinion. Both were scholars as well as statesmen, both men
of business, both high-minded and honourable Spaniards. Florida-Blanca
had more of the spirit of his country, Jovellanos was more influenced
by that of the age. The former had been an ambitious politician; the
latter was always a philosopher, in the true and virtuous meaning
of that polluted word. As the despotic minister of an absolute king,
Florida-Blanca had used his power vigorously to uphold the dignity of
the kingdom, and improve its internal condition; most of his measures
were wise, and all were well-intended; but if he had ever conceived
a wish to correct the abuses of the state, it had never appeared in
his actions: Jovellanos had unwillingly accepted office, because it
placed him in a sphere uncongenial to his modest habits and better
mind, and withdrew him from the task to which he had devoted himself,
of improving his native province. Jovellanos’s desire was to meliorate
the government and the nation by recurring to the free principles of
the old constitution; Florida-Blanca thought that if governments were
administered as they ought to be, the strongest must be the best.
Both, without hesitation[33], obeyed the call of their country, though
Florida-Blanca, who was in extreme old age, would more willingly have
passed the short remainder of his days in preparing and waiting for
death; and Jovellanos, broken down, more by the infirmities which
an unjust and cruel imprisonment had aggravated or induced, than
by the weight of sixty-five years, desired for himself nothing in
this world but tranquillity. The former brought with him little more
than a venerable name; but Jovellanos was in full possession of his
intellectual powers.
♦JOVELLANOS REFUSES ALL OFFERS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Every effort had been made by Azanza, O’Farril, Urquijo, Mazarredo,
and Cabarrus, to engage this excellent man in the Intruder’s service.
He had lived in habits of friendship with all these persons, more
especially with the two last. Knowing how inaccessible he would be to
all unworthy inducements, they endeavoured to deceive him, as they
would fain have deceived themselves, by representing that theirs was
the only course which could secure the welfare of Spain; and that by
no other means could the calamities with which it was threatened be
averted; for they thought it absurd to imagine any effectual resistance
could be opposed to the determined ambition of Buonaparte. His reply
was, that if the cause of their country were as desperate as they
supposed it to be, still it was the cause of honour and loyalty, and
that which a good Spaniard ought to follow at all hazards. Jovellanos
held with his favourite author Cicero that friendship was to be
preferred to every thing except honour and virtue; he had given proof
of this by his former conduct toward some of these friends, and they
found now, as they had then, that no considerations could ever prevail
in him over the sense of duty. It gave him no little pain that his name
should be published in the Madrid gazette as one of Joseph’s ministers;
thus to appear a traitor even for a few days to those who knew him
not, or knew not how decidedly he had refused the appointment, was an
injury which he felt severely. This was one of Buonaparte’s insolent
acts; fallen as Urquijo and his colleagues were, they would not have
thus outraged the feelings of a man whom it was not possible that
they could ever cease to respect and admire. At length, the Intrusive
Government having ascertained that he was really suffering under severe
bodily infirmities, forbore to molest him with further solicitations.
He was gradually recovering when news of the battle of Baylen refreshed
his heart, and seemed to give him new life as well as hope. And when
his appointment to the Central Junta was announced, though his first
thought was of the ravages which age and affliction had made upon his
debilitated frame, the sense of duty ♦JOVELLANOS A SUS COMPATRIOTAS,
P. II. ART. I. 18–25.♦ overcame all personal considerations, and he
notified his acceptation without delay, at the same time declining a
salary of 4000 ducats which had been assigned him.
♦ARANJUEZ CHOSEN FOR THE PLACE OF MEETING.♦
In little more than a week he joined the deputies for Aragon,
Catalonia, and Valencia, at Madrid; and then two difficulties,
which had not been anticipated, occurred. The first related to the
instructions with which the Junta of Seville had fettered their
members; instructions wholly repugnant to the principle upon which
the provisional government was formed. The inconsistency and the
evils of this measure were represented to Castaños, who was then in
Madrid with his army; that General’s influence was never exercised
unworthily, nor withheld when it might be useful; and in consequence
of his remonstrance the obnoxious instructions were withdrawn, though
it appeared afterwards that secret ones to the same tenour had been
substituted. The other difficulty was concerning the place of meeting.
Jovellanos thought that no place could be so proper as the metropolis:
there, in the palace of their kings, the Central Junta would derive
consequence and respect from the place; they would appear at the head
of the first tribunals and chief magistracy; the public documents were
upon the spot, and any advice or assistance which they might require at
hand. The members who were at Madrid agreed in this opinion, which was
supported also by Castaños: but the Junta of Seville were averse to any
measure which might lessen their authority, and in this instance they
were well served by Tilly for reasons which nearly concerned himself.
He had stopped at Aranjuez, and succeeded in persuading Florida-Blanca,
who was decidedly for fixing the government at Madrid, that it would be
convenient to hold their first sittings where they were, and determine
there upon the forms which they should observe in the capital. He
gained time by this ... always a great object for one who trusts to
intrigue and fortune. So fully persuaded however were Jovellanos and
his colleagues when they went to Aranjuez that they should speedily
adjourn to Madrid, that they left orders for forming an establishment
there.
♦INSTALLATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. SEPT. 26.♦
The greater part of the deputies having arrived, their installation was
performed with as much ceremony as the place and circumstances would
permit. The Archbishop of Laodicea performed mass, and administered
an oath to his colleagues, first taking it himself, that they would
preserve and extend the holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion,
defend their Sovereign Ferdinand, their rights, privileges, laws, and
usages, and especially those relating to the succession in the reigning
family, promote every thing conducive to the welfare and improvement of
the kingdom, keep secret every thing which ought not to be divulged,
maintain the laws, and resist the enemies of the country at all
hazards. The oath having been taken, Te Deum was sung by the barefooted
friars of St. Pasqual, and the assembly then adjourned to the hall
chosen for their sittings. Florida-Blanca was appointed president, and
his first act was to proclaim King Ferdinand from the great gallery of
the principal front of the palace. The gates of the palace had not been
opened till now since the departure of Charles for Bayonne; and the
ceremony of thus proclaiming Ferdinand in the favourite residence of
his ancestors, ... the scene of his own childhood, ... the spot where,
six months ago, he had been acclaimed King, ... he who was now prisoner
in a foreign land, and in the power of the perfidious tyrant who had
ensnared him, ... moved the venerable statesman to tears when he
pronounced his name, and excited feelings of grief and indignation in
the multitude, which heightened and hallowed the enthusiasm wherewith
they repeated it.
♦CONDUCT OF THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE.♦
The Junta dispatched copies of the act and oath of installation to the
different councils and tribunals, requiring their members to take the
same oath, and issue orders to all the subordinate Juntas, provinces,
magistrates, governors, and viceroys, for obeying the new government,
as holding in deposit the sovereign authority for Ferdinand, the
councils continuing in the exercise of their ordinary functions, but
referring to the Central Junta all matters exceeding their powers,
and upon which the Sovereign ought to be consulted. Other tribunals
immediately signified their prompt and unreserved obedience; the
Council of Castille alone delayed their answer. The mortification which
they felt at not being incorporated with the provisional government,
as they had proposed, was embittered by a consciousness that they had
forfeited all claim to the confidence of the nation. Having, however,
almost by accident, recovered so much authority, they strove to extend
it, and after five days returned an answer, saying that, having given
the subject their most serious consideration, they had resolved to take
the oath, and circulate the necessary orders that the Central Junta
should be obeyed in whatever was for the service of the King and of the
public cause. But they added, that in discharge of their indispensable
duty, they would hereafter communicate to the Junta the result of
their consultations for the observance and maintenance of the laws.
The reservation implied in this reply offended the Junta, and more
especially the President Florida-Blanca, who had not been accustomed
to tolerate delay or demur under his administration; and an answer was
returned conveying reproof in the form of admonition, which reduced the
Council of Castille to a quiet but malevolent submission.
♦THE LEONESE DEPUTIES ARRESTED BY CUESTA.♦
The Leonese deputies had been seized by General Cuesta on their way.
One of them, the Bayley Valdes, notified his arrest to Florida-Blanca,
who instantly perceiving what fatal consequences must arise from any
serious dispute between the civil and military authorities, wrote
mildly to Cuesta, requesting that he would release the deputies,
prefer his charges against them to the Junta, and leave the decision
to that body. At the same time Castaños, to whom the judicious part
of the people in Madrid looked for some interference in their fear
at this unexpected act of military violence, addressed a letter to
the Castillian general, representing to him calmly, but forcibly, the
surprise and alarm which this arrest had occasioned, at a time when
the great object of forming a provisional government was on the point
of being happily effected; and asking what offence the deputies had
committed, men as they were of high character, and the Bayley Valdes
distinguished for the services which he had performed? what authority
was competent to arrest and detain them? why, if they were delinquents,
they had not been denounced to the Juntas of their respective
provinces? why their crimes were not published in the face of the
nation, and themselves accused before the Central Junta, then about to
assemble?
♦CUESTA’S VINDICATION OF HIS CONDUCT.♦
In his answer to Castaños, Cuesta declared, that as principal and
sole chief of the provinces of Castille and Leon, he was not bound
to give an account of his conduct to any other provincial authority,
being independent of all till a general government or regency should
be established; nevertheless, as his Excellency apprehended some
uneasiness in the people of Madrid, and in the whole nation, concerning
this transaction, he deemed it proper to satisfy his doubts. The
Junta of Castille having been dissolved by the entrance of the enemy
into Valladolid, he had increased the Junta of Leon by adding to it a
deputy for every intendency or province of Castille, and had confirmed
Valdes as their president, Valdes having promised to obey his orders
in all things, without consideration of his own rank. But after the
battle of Rio Seco, a few members of this Junta, seeing him pursued by
the French, and forsaken by the Galician army, retired to Ponferrada,
instead of Astorga, whither he had directed them to repair: and there,
under the influence of Valdes, treated clandestinely with the Junta
of Coruña, to unite with them at Lugo, and from thence govern both
Castille and Leon, independently of the captain-general, who, indeed,
was to become subordinate to them. The Bayley had notified this to him,
and at the same time ordered him to deliver up his cavalry to General
Blake. Instead of obeying such orders, he had immediately annulled this
fugitive Junta, and commanded the inferior Juntas to break off all
communication with it, which they had accordingly done, except in those
parts of Leon which were under the immediate power of the Galician
general. The fugitive Junta persisted in its pretensions, and had
elected Valdes and the Vizconde de Quintanilla as its representatives
in the Central Junta. Let any impartial person then say whether he
had not good reason to arrest them for insubordination! Not having
been elected by any competent authority, they were not members of the
Central Junta, and therefore no offence had been offered to that body
in arresting them. Whenever that body should be assembled, he would be
the first person to obey it, and submit to its high consideration the
cause of Valdes and his accomplices: till then neither the rank of the
Bayley, nor his assumed quality of member of the Central Junta, for the
provinces of Castille and Leon, shall suffice, said the old General,
to exempt him from my jurisdiction. The same answer he returned
to Florida-Blanca, and sent back the letter which that nobleman
had addressed to Valdes, saying that the prisoner was in strict
confinement, deprived of all communication.
♦THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE INTERFERE.♦
Castaños, not receiving a reply as soon as he had expected, called upon
the Council of Castille to interfere; and that tribunal, well pleased
that its authority should be appealed to on so important an occasion
in such times, wrote in consequence to Cuesta, remonstrating on the
dangerous tendency of his conduct. But he returned for answer, that the
imprisonment of these persons was the best means of preventing danger,
as it would effectually preclude the contentions which might arise if
a double set of representatives for Castille and Leon should present
themselves; that neither prudence nor justice permitted him to overlook
the infidelity, insurrection, and insubordination of a Junta which he
had created; and that for these offences, as Valdes was a general, he
would deliver him over to be tried by a council of war, composed of
generals, unless a sovereign regency should first be established; in
which case he would submit the whole proceeding to their judgement,
and his own powers also, ... powers which till then he considered
independent of any other authority.
♦CUESTA IS SUMMONED BEFORE THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
Upon this principle, and an assumption that the Juntas in Castille
and Leon derived their authority from him and not from the people,
Cuesta made the Junta of Valladolid, who had assembled in Leon, send
a representative to the Central Junta. The assembly refused to admit
him, and ordering Cuesta to set his prisoners at liberty, summoned
him also to Aranjuez, that all parties might be heard. This was in
effect removing him from the command of his army. Such an assertion
of their power was well-timed, for Cuesta, making no secret of his
hostile intentions against them, had declared to the British agent,
Mr. Stuart, that two measures were necessary for the public good;
first, the restoration of the authority of the Captains General and of
the Royal Audiences, (which would have ensured to him the continuance
of his command); and, secondly, the exercise of military influence
over the Junta, to make them elect an Executive Council, of three or
five members, each of whom should be placed at the head of one branch
of the government, and responsible to the nation only. But Cuesta,
intemperate as he was, sincerely desired to serve his country; and he
obeyed the summons without hesitation. Mutual accusations were made.
The Junta of Leon reproached the General with his attempts to maintain
order at the commencement of the insurrection, and thereby serving
the Intrusive Government. They injured themselves more than Cuesta by
this disingenuous attack; for his defence upon that point was full and
satisfactory: what persons in authority were there throughout Spain, he
asked, who had not endeavoured to suppress the first popular movement,
knowing how great a force the enemy had in the heart of the country,
ready to act any where, and not knowing that the spirit of resistance
was universal? As soon as that spirit was fairly manifested, he had
taken the national side, had brought armies into the field, and had
done his duty faithfully, if not fortunately. It was base indeed in
the Junta to bring against him this accusation, which, if it had been
taken up by the populace, or his own soldiers, might so easily have
occasioned his murder. On the other hand, it was found, that in the
affair of the deputies Cuesta’s conduct had not been distinguished by
that honest obstinacy which appeared in his own account, and which
characterised his general conduct. He had not disapproved of the
Junta’s measures till they ordered him to send his cavalry to Blake, a
measure which all the military men in Madrid considered of the utmost
importance at the time. His opinion of the Bayley Valdes had been so
favourable, that he had made known his intention to have him elected as
his own colleague; and the immediate cause of this rash and intemperate
proceeding was anger that he himself had not been chosen. So completely
had this feeling mastered him, that instead of advancing with his
army to Burgo del Osma, (as had been resolved in a council of war at
Madrid at which he was present,) he had actually fallen back to Segovia
to gratify his resentment by seizing Valdes. Valdes would now have
terminated the dispute by giving in his resignation: this it was not
thought proper to accept; the validity of his election was admitted,
and the other points were referred to a competent tribunal, but the
course of events soon put an end to all further proceedings.
♦DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta, thus peaceably established, and unanimously
recognized by the nation, began their administration with the fairest
promises. They acknowledged the national debt, and took upon themselves
the obligations contracted by the crown, which formed the patrimony
of many families; and which they pledged themselves punctually to
pay. That portion of the revenue which had formerly been swallowed up
in the enormous expenses of the royal household, or engrossed by the
favourite, would, they trusted, enable them to diminish the imposts
laid upon the towns and villages; and great resources would be found
in the property forfeited by those who had betrayed their country. The
sum total of the funds arising from these sources, from the regular
revenues, and from the donatives and contributions of Spain and the
Indies, they promised annually to publish, with an account of its
expenditure. They would simplify, as far as possible, the revenue
system, gradually suppress useless offices, establish economy in
all the branches of financial administration, and remove the abuses
introduced into it by the old government.
The duties which they proposed to themselves, and the benefits which
they promised the people, were farther explained in an address to
the nation; for they affirmed, it became them to inform the people
of their situation, with a dignity becoming the Spanish character;
and to establish, in a frank and generous manner, those relations of
reciprocal confidence which ought to be the basis of every just and
wise administration. A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the most
incapable hands, had brought them to the very brink of perdition:
the nation was alienated from its government by hatred or contempt:
every thing favoured the perfidious plot which Buonaparte had formed
against them, when they rose to vindicate their rights, and became at
once the admiration of Europe. Their situation was unexampled in their
history, unforeseen by their laws, and, as it were, opposed to their
habits. Great and wonderful things they had accomplished; but all their
enthusiasm and all their virtue were required for what remained to be
done. Their armies were naked and unprovided with every thing. The
French, collected behind the Ebro, were expecting reinforcements, and
ravaging Upper Castille, Rioja, and the provinces of Biscay; Navarre
and Catalonia were almost wholly in their power: they possessed the
passes, and had made themselves, by what treachery was well known,
masters of the strong frontier fortresses, and of Barcelona. The despot
of France, deceiving, by the grossest impostures, the slaves who
obeyed him, was striving to keep all other states in inactivity, that
he might bring the whole enormous weight of his military force upon
Spain. The continental powers were watching the issue of this first
struggle, desiring to declare themselves against the common enemy, but
proceeding with the timid circumspection which they had learnt from
past misfortunes. A confederacy against the tyrant was evidently their
only means of preservation: for what state could now hold relations of
amity with him? who could now give credit to the words and promises of
Buonaparte, or trust to his good faith? The fate of Spain was at once
a lesson and a warning to Europe, ... her resolution would serve as
an example, her victories as an incentive; and the reprobate, who had
trampled under foot the principles of justice, had placed himself in
that fearful situation, that he must either become master of all, or
perish in the struggle which he had so wantonly provoked.
But this co-operation would not be obtained till the Spaniards had
given such earnest of success as rendered victory certain: they must
therefore call forth all their means, as if they were singly to contend
against the whole power of France. The Junta believed it would be
necessary to maintain 500,000 men in arms, besides 50,000 cavalry, ...
a force which, however disproportionate to their present situation, and
to all former exigencies, was not more than the present times required.
The power of their adversary was colossal, his ambition even greater
than his power, and his existence incompatible with their liberty. His
exertions were to be estimated by the barbarity of his character and
the extremity of his danger; but they were the exertions of a tyrant,
and would be confounded, when opposed to the constancy of a great and
free people.
The last government ... if that might be called government which
was one continued and monstrous dilapidation, had exhausted all the
sources of prosperity. The resources which arose from the revenues
of the royal household, from the enormous sums formerly devoured by
the insatiable avarice of Godoy, from his collected rapine, and the
confiscated estates, from a free trade, a well-arranged administration
of the revenue, and regularly distributed contributions, had already
been indicated. The succours already given so generously by England,
and still to be expected from that nation, were to be added to these
means. “But,” said the Central Junta, “it is incumbent on us that these
succours, which have been so opportunely given, and so gratefully
received, and the effects of which have been so beneficial, should
be hereafter recognized and recompensed with the reciprocity and
decorum which become a great and powerful nation. The Spanish monarchy
must not, in this respect, be placed in a state of inequality and
dependence on its allies. The produce of these various means would be
great but slow, and therefore insufficient for the urgent necessities
of the state. Would they be sufficient to furnish for a time the
ordinary supplies, discharge the great debt which must be incurred,
and maintain the formidable army which must be kept up? If not, the
government would at once have recourse to the nation, certain, from
the fidelity with which its accounts would regularly be published, from
the necessity and notoriety of the public wants, and the patriotism
of the nation, that although to evils so extraordinary as the present
remedies as extraordinary must be applied, its demands would neither be
disregarded through distrust, nor detested as arbitrary.
“The defence of the kingdom, and the means of providing for it, must
necessarily be the first duty of the government; but it would fulfil
only half its duties if it attended to this alone: other duties
remained, to be the great reward of the virtue of the Spaniards and of
their sacrifices. A little time only had passed since, oppressed and
degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection
against these evils, neither in the institutions nor in the laws, they
had even regarded foreign dominion as less hateful than the wasting
tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious,
and most often unjust, had lasted too long: their patience, their love
of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused: it was time
that law, founded on general utility, should commence its reign. This
was the desire of their good and unfortunate King Ferdinand; this was
what he pointed out, even from the captivity to which a perfidious
traitor had reduced him. The name of their country ought no longer
to be a vague and idle word to the Spaniards; henceforward it was
to import to their ears and to their hearts the sanctuary of laws,
the theatre for talents, the reward of virtue. Such a country the
Junta solemnly promised they should possess; and till the military
operations, which must at first be slow, in order better to insure
success, should furnish the leisure necessary for this great and solemn
reform, the government would privately prepare for it. Instead of
rejecting the advice of enlightened men, they desired and requested
it. The knowledge and illustration of their ancient and constitutional
laws; the changes which change of circumstances rendered necessary in
their re-establishment; the reform which might be necessary in the
civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects for improving public
education, which was in Spain so greatly on the decline; a system of
regulated economy for the distribution and collection of the public
revenue, ... these were subjects for the investigation of wise and
thoughtful men, and on which the opinions of such men were solicited.
The Junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a
particular department, to whom all writings on matters of government
and administration might be addressed: so that each contributing by his
exertions to give a just direction to the public mind, the government
might be enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain.”
♦JOVELLANOS PROPOSES A REGENCY, AND THAT A CORTES BE SUMMONED.♦
These were fair professions; nor were the intentions of the Central
Junta less laudable than their language. Tilly alone excepted, the
members were upright and honourable men, worthy to represent a nation
distinguished for its high sense of honour. But they were unacquainted
with each other, and except the President, Jovellanos, and Garay,
wholly unused to business: for a national assembly too few, and for
an executive government too many. Jovellanos was of opinion that they
ought immediately to appoint a regency of five persons, one of them
being a dignitary of the church, to be installed on the first day of
the ensuing year: that the Central Junta should then be reduced to half
its original number, retaining one member only of each deputation,
for the purpose of watching over the observance of the constitution
entrusted to the regency, and corresponding with the provincial Juntas,
which should thenceforward consist of four members each: these were
to exist as long as the Council of Regency; and the Central Junta of
Correspondence, as it was then to be called, only till the meeting
of the Cortes, which Jovellanos maintained ought immediately to be
announced as to assemble as soon as the enemy should have been driven
out of Spain, or, at all events, in two years from the present time,
if the delivery of the country should not be accomplished before. He
proposed also that the Junta, before it resigned its powers, should
appoint persons qualified for such a task to prepare plans of reform in
the constitution, laws, finance, system of public instruction, army,
and marine; ... these plans were to be formed under the inspection and
approbation of the Council of Regency and the Junta of Correspondence,
and finally submitted to the Cortes. ♦1808. OCTOBER.♦ In delivering
this advice, Jovellanos, to remove all suspicion of any interested
views, repeated in writing the solemn declaration which he had before
made by word of mouth, that he never would accept of any office or
employment himself; the natural and invincible repugnance which he had
ever felt for such preferment, the bitter price which he had paid for
having once accepted it, in deference to a brother whom he respected
like a parent, and the sad sense of decay both in his physical and
moral powers, determined him to this resolution. The only duty which
he would undertake to perform was ♦JOVELLANOS MEMORIA, P. II. § 33,
34. APPENDICES, NO. 5.♦ the noble one of simply delivering those
opinions which he thought most conducive to the good of his country, in
discharge of the high trust wherewith his own province had honoured him.
♦EXPECTATIONS FROM A CORTES.♦
Jovellanos expected the greatest benefit from a Cortes; but he
apprehended great evil if it were hastily convoked, and without due
preparation. That party who have since assumed the appellation of
_Liberales_ censured him for proposing to postpone it so long. They
were then a very small, but active, minority, consisting chiefly of
physicians, lawyers, and unbelieving priests, whose little knowledge,
exclusively derived from prohibited French books, was worse than
ignorance. These persons were for hurrying on to a jacobinical
revolution, and were impatient for a Cortes as the first great means
of embodying that democracy which they expected to govern. But there
were also many of the best of the Spaniards who looked to the Cortes
as the surest means of delivering their country, and restoring it to
its former dignity and power; and the same views were very generally
entertained in England, and by the British Government itself. In fact,
the assembling of a Cortes had been proposed by our first authorized
agent, Mr. Stuart, to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias. Some of the
difficulties which would attend it were then perceived; the Asturians
proposed that it should assemble at Oviedo, the Galicians at Villa
Franca in the Bierzo, each Junta wishing that it should be convoked
near their own place of abode; and for the purpose of retaining their
power, they wished to enlarge the deputation, so that all their own
members might be included. Though it was thus seen that the measure
was not so easily accomplished as had been supposed, still the opinion
prevailed in England, that if a free legislative assembly were
established in Spain, the same blessings would ensue as the British
people enjoy under the well-tempered constitution which has grown
with their growth, and adapted itself to their circumstances. There
are errors from which it is painful to be undeceived. Those persons
were wiser in their generation, who, having the recent example of
France before their eyes, believed that legislative assemblies, in
countries unaccustomed to such modes of legislation, are more to be
dreaded than desired; that the reformation which is thus begun tends
to certain anarchy; and that where great and extensive improvements in
the existing system are necessary, the only means whereby they can be
effected, without inducing worse evils than those which are removed,
is by an upright and far-sighted minister, under a strong government.
Upon ♦FLORIDA-BLANCO AVERSE TO IT.♦ this point Florida-Blanca judged
more truly than Jovellanos. Such, however, was the respect with which
the opinions of that admirable man were at this time heard, that his
proposal would have been carried, if the Junta had come ♦JOVELLANOS
MEMORIA, P. II. § 35.♦ to an immediate decision upon it; and it
was only by deferring the final discussion till Nov. 7, being that
day month, that the minority averted a measure which shocked their
prejudices as much as it alarmed their fears.
♦State of Catalonia.♦
The Junta were at this time full of hope; they had just confidence
in the national character; and they were elated by the enthusiastic
spirit which had manifested itself, the splendid successes which had
been obtained, the apparent inactivity of the enemy, and the promised
co-operation of Great Britain, which had already effected the delivery
of Portugal. They had also encouraging advices from Catalonia. After
relieving Figueras, the French dispatched a force from that fortress
to get possession of Rosas, but failed in the attempt. ♦JULY 16.♦ Ill
armed, and worse disciplined as they were, the Catalans displayed that
unconquerable spirit which in all ages has distinguished them. ♦1808.
JULY.♦ In no other province were such great and continued exertions
made against the invaders: and in no other province were the people
left so entirely to their own resources. They made the most urgent
solicitations to the Junta of Seville for a supply of artillery, which
could have been spared in abundance from the arsenals of Seville and
Cadiz, and which Lord Collingwood offered them the means of conveying;
but they could obtain none, and were fain, therefore, to use the
trunks of trees, bored, and hooped with iron. The want of cavalry was
even more severely felt in all the level part of the country; ... no
substitute could be found for this, nor was it possible that their
volunteers and newly-raised levies could resist the well-disciplined
horse-soldiers upon plain ground. They had, however, been eminently
successful where the ground favoured them; and confiding in their
numbers, they occupied the right bank of the Llobregat from San Boy to
Martorell, in order to distress the enemy in Barcelona. From thence
they were dislodged by General Lechi, who, marching out by night with
2500 men, forded the river in several places at daybreak, drove them
from their batteries, sacked the towns and villages along the line, set
fire to them, and returned in triumph, bearing as trophies the banners
of the churches which had been plundered. ♦DUHESME RESOLVES TO BESIEGE
GERONA.♦ Duhesme then resolved to undertake the siege of Gerona, having
concerted it with Reille, who was to co-operate with him from Figueras.
It was an object of great importance; for while Gerona and Hostalrich
were in possession of the Spaniards, they would be able greatly to
molest, if not wholly to interrupt, the communication by land between
Barcelona and France. Materials of every kind were found in the
well-stored arsenals and magazines of Barcelona, and the horses, mules,
and carriages of the inhabitants of that city were put in requisition
for conveying them. So sure of success was Duhesme, and so exasperated
by his former failure, that he is ♦CABAÑES, P. I. 80–85.♦ said to have
declared he would arrive before the city on one day, attack it the
next, take it on the third day, and on the fourth destroy it.
♦DIFFICULTIES ON THE MARCH.♦
He began his march on the 10th of July, with about 6000 men. From
Barcelona to Gerona is a journey of twenty hours; but Duhesme had not
calculated upon the obstacles which he was to encounter on the way.
The road for two-thirds of the distance lies always within sight of
the sea, and in great part along the coast; the Catalans, under D.
Francisco Milans, had broken it up, and annoyed him with great activity
on his left, while an English frigate, and some smaller vessels,
brought their guns to bear upon him from the sea; these impediments
delayed him five days between Caldetas and San Pol. On the 19th he
divided his troops; one part crossed the wild mountains of Vallgorguina
to S. Celoni, and endeavoured by a sudden attack to get possession of
Hostalrich. Twice they attempted to escalade it, and were repulsed with
loss by the acting governor D. Manuel O’Sulivan. The other division
continued the coast road, losing many guns and much of its ammunition
there. They rejoined on the way to Gerona, and arrived before that
city on the 22nd, where they were met on the following day by Reille
♦CABAÑES, I. 85–87.♦ with 2000 men from Figueras; but Duhesme had
suffered so much on the march, that he was in no condition for active
operations, and the remainder of the month was employed in preparing
for the siege.
♦TROOPS FROM MINORCA LAND AT TARRAGONA.♦
On the very day that the French General appeared for the second time
before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, with 4600 regular troops from
Minorca, landed at Tarragona. Many officers, who had hitherto remained
in Barcelona, and several magistrates, escaped now from that city to
join it. The first measure of the Marques was to strengthen the line of
the Llobregat, which the Somatenes and Miquelets, undismayed by their
late defeat, had again occupied. The Conde de Caldagues was sent with
a detachment upon this service, and the garrison, who made a vigorous
attempt to dislodge him immediately on his arrival, were repulsed. The
Catalans were now in high spirits, and with the assistance of Lord
Cochrane, in the Imperieuse frigate, made a successful attack upon the
Castle of Mongat, a small fort on the coast, about nine miles from
Barcelona, which the French had strengthened, as a point of support for
their plundering incursions to the eastward. About an hundred prisoners
were taken there, seven pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity
or ammunition ♦1808. AUGUST.♦ and stores. The enemy could no longer
maraud in that direction, and feeling great present inconvenience,
began to apprehend serious consequences ♦BARCELONA BLOCKADED.♦ from the
blockade of Barcelona: the British cruisers watched it effectually by
sea, and in the only part of the land now open to them, which was the
mountainous country in their immediate vicinity, between the Llobregat
and the Besos, they had to contend with an ♦CABAÑES, P. II. 3–25.♦
armed and exasperated peasantry; for even those persons who would have
remained quiet were driven to despair by the system of fire and sword
which Duhesme pursued.
♦BARCELONA.♦
Barcelona, with its fort Monjuich, is one of the strongest places in
Europe. It is remarked by Swinburne, that the citadel was calculated
to overawe the inhabitants at least as much as to protect them from a
foreign enemy. For this in fact it was built, when six hundred houses
were demolished for its site; and to the same purpose it was now
applied against the family which built it, when Buonaparte’s perfidy
had made the Bourbons as popular in Catalonia as they had been hated
there during the war of the succession. Every house in Barcelona lies
exposed to Monjuich, which stands singly on the south-west. A new
fortress had been erected there early in Charles the Third’s reign, and
it had that completeness and magnificence which characterised public
works in Spain. On the sea side it was considered impregnable, so
admirably had the natural strength of the situation been improved by
art; and toward the land the glacis had been sloped at an incredible
expense in such a manner that no approaches could be made under
shelter. The population of Barcelona in 1797 was 130,000, and if
the increase since had been in proportion to that of the ten years
preceding, it must have amounted to 150,000 at this time. Yet this
population, than which a braver and nobler-minded people were no where
to be found, was kept under control by 4000 French, Lechi having been
left with no greater force. The city was so completely at the mercy of
the citadel and Monjuich, that the invaders had nothing to fear from
open attacks. Their only danger was from stratagems or famine. Against
the former they were always on their guard; and it was to open the
communication for supplies and reinforcements from France that Duhesme
had undertaken the expedition against Gerona.
♦THE JUNTA OF CATALONIA REMOVE TO THE HEAD-QUARTERS.♦
The Marques del Palacio arrived in Catalonia without treasure or
provisions, and there was no government to which he could look for
either. The contributions which had been raised had already been
expended, and nothing was to be obtained by way of loan. A temporary
resource was found in the confiscation of French property; for in these
calamitous times the numerous French families who were settled in Spain
bore their full share in the general misery and ruin. These funds,
however, could not long suffice; and for the better establishment
of some permanent system, it was agreed that the Supreme Junta of
Catalonia, which had hitherto resided at Lerida, should remove from
that inconvenient situation, and accompany in future the head-quarters.
The Junta was newly constituted accordingly, and the Commander-in-chief
was chosen president. The Marques would now have marched to raise the
siege of Gerona; but such means as he would have deemed adequate were
wanting; he had no cavalry, the little which there was in Lerida and
Tarragona was unfit for action, and perhaps he reasonably distrusted
his troops if they were led against a well-disciplined ♦CALDAGUES
SENT TO INTERRUPT THE SIEGE OF GERONA.♦ army. Caldagues, however, was
sent to harass the enemy and interrupt the siege, with four companies
of regular troops, 2000 Miquelets and Somatens, and three pieces of
artillery. He was joined at Hostalrich by more of these new levies,
making his whole number 4300 men, and he received two cannon from that
fortress. They advanced to Castella, passing within sight of the French
encampment; some officers came out of ♦CABAÑES, II. 30–32, 52–55.♦ the
city to confer with the Count, and a joint attack upon the enemy’s
batteries was concerted for the following morning.
♦HE ATTACKS THE ENEMY’S BATTERIES WITH SUCCESS.♦
This was on the night of the 15th; Duhesme had been so harassed in his
operations, and so slow in them, that though he arrived before Gerona
on the 19th of July, it was not till the morning of August 13 that
his batteries began their fire. It was directed chiefly against the
Castle, which, like that at Barcelona, bears the name of Monjuich,
and which, with all the other forts around Gerona, had been neglected,
and was in a state of great dilapidation. On the 15th a considerable
breach had been made. The garrison was then strengthened with 900 men,
who were ordered to be ready at daybreak, and to sally as soon as the
relieving troops should be ascending the hill of Monjuich; but instead
of waiting for this, they sallied as soon as they saw them marching
down the distant heights of St. Miguel and Los Angeles. The execution
therefore was as rash as the plan, and certainly few attempts in war
have ever been made in which there was so little reasonable prospect of
success. The besieging army consisted of 11,000 men, of which 1000 were
cavalry, all disciplined soldiers, upon whom their officers could rely.
There were 4700 regular troops in Gerona, who, for want of discipline,
were not to be relied on in the field; and of the force which Caldagues
had now collected, amounting to 6000, there were but 300 regulars. But
Duhesme was at this time too much dispirited by the general prospect of
affairs in Spain, and the reverses which he himself had suffered, to
be sensible of his own superiority, or to profit by the errors of his
opponents. One battery was taken at the point of the bayonet in this
premature sally, and presently set on fire. A second also was stormed;
the French, who had been driven from it, recovered it, being reinforced
by a Swiss battalion; but a column of the Spaniards arrived in time to
assist their countrymen, and it was again taken, and the carriages
burnt. D. Henrique O’Donell, who held the rank of _Sargento Mayor_ in
the regiment of Ultonia, distinguished himself greatly in this part of
the action. The destruction of these batteries was the object for which
Caldagues had hazarded an attack upon an enemy so greatly superior in
strength. His own troops, meantime, drove the French from the heights
of S. Miguel to the village of Camp-Dura; from thence they, in their
turn, were driven back to the heights, and being ♦CABAÑES, II. 55–62.♦
there reinforced, made the enemy again give way before them, dislodged
them from Camp-Dura, and pursued them till they crossed the river Ter
to Sarria.
♦DUHESME RAISES THE SIEGE.♦
Caldagues dispatched news of his victory from the field of battle to
Tarragona, saying that the enemy’s batteries were demolished, and
all the artillery taken with which they had battered Monjuich in
breach. All that he had hoped, and more than he could reasonably have
expected, had been obtained; and when his troops, flushed with success,
would have exposed themselves in the plain to the French cavalry, he
restrained them, ordered them to fortify themselves upon the heights,
and exerted himself to repair the breach in Monjuich, lest it should
be attacked in the morning. Duhesme indeed might have recovered in
the night the positions which he had lost, so little discipline was
there among the Spaniards, and so little watch or order was observed,
notwithstanding the strict injunctions of the Commander. But Duhesme
appears to have been one of those men who lose their powers of mind
when good fortune forsakes them; and Caldagues, when day broke, and he
was expecting a formidable attack, discovered, to his astonishment,
that the enemy had disappeared. They had fled, rather than retreated,
in the night, and in such haste, that they left several hundred barrels
of powder which they might with ease have rolled into the river. Reille
returned to Figueras with little loss, there being no impediment in
that direction; but Duhesme, who did not venture a second time upon
the coast road, when he reached Calella took a line between the high
♦MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYR, PIECES JUSTIF. NO. 3. CABAÑES, II. 62–81.♦
mountains and the sea, throwing his artillery down the precipices, and
abandoning great part of the baggage and stores, and even leaving the
sick and wounded who were not able to sit on horseback. The retreat was
made with such precipitation, that Milans, who pursued, did not come
up with them till they were within seven miles of Barcelona, on the
heights of Mongat. But Lechi being, fortunately for them, apprised by a
spy of their approach, met them there with part of the garrison, at a
time when a small Spanish force might have completed their destruction.
♦UNPOPULARITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CATALONIA.♦
An outcry was raised against Palacio because he had not intercepted the
enemy in their retreat, nor was he ever forgiven by the unreasonable
people for not having done what it was impossible to do. When the
account from the field of battle reached him at Tarragona, the French
were half way to Barcelona; and before he was apprised that they had
broken up the siege, they were already in that city. The command which
he had ♦CABAÑES, II. 101.♦ undertaken was no enviable one. The repulse
of the enemy at Valencia, their losses in Andalusia, and the heroic
defence of Zaragoza, had ♦DIFFICULTIES OF THE SERVICE.♦ raised hopes
which nothing but the most brilliant success could satisfy; the service
in which he was engaged required great steadiness and military skill;
the best of his troops were wanting in both, and the great body of them
fit only for irregular war. The Junta of Catalonia had decreed that an
army of 40,000 men should be raised; and because there were no officers
to command, and no time for disciplining them, they determined that the
whole force should consist ♦D. FR. MANOEL HIST. DE CATALAÑA, L. IV. P.
90.♦ of Miquelets. This class of irregular troops was originally called
[34]Almogavares; but when they began to alter their savage appearance
and barbarous mode of warfare, they took their present name from one
of their favourite commanders, Miquelot de Prats, a notable partizan
who attached himself to Cæsar Borgia. The name was popular among the
Catalans, the Miquelets having distinguished themselves whenever the
country was invaded, and especially in the succession war. It was
intended to raise forty _tercios_ of a thousand men each, and this
might have been done in a few days, such was the national spirit, if
equipments of every kind had not been wanting. A great bounty was given
to these Miquelets, but this prevented recruiting for the line, and
the regular troops were disgusted at seeing that men received larger
pay for engaging in a service where they had more ♦CABAÑES, I. 90–93.♦
liberty, and were subject to less discipline. On the other hand, the
Miquelet officers received less pay than those of the army, and were
less esteemed, their rank being only during the war. The force which
was thus defective in its constitution, was also ill armed. Sir Hew
Dalrymple, upon whom pressing demands for arms were made from all
that side of the peninsula, could allot but few to Catalonia; and the
abundant supplies which had been sent out by England were dispatched
to other parts, where they were neither so much wanted nor so well
bestowed; for Barcelona was the great arsenal of the province: 50,000
firelocks had there fallen into the enemy’s hands, whereas the
manufactory at Ripoll could furnish the Catalans with not more than
150 per week. Palacio therefore ordered pikes or partisans to be made,
with which he armed the two foremost ranks of the Miquelets, who,
as upon the old system, were drawn up three deep. In hands that can
be trusted with the bayonet the pike would be a weapon hardly less
efficient; but for these raw troops the want of fire-arms lessened
the little confidence which they felt in themselves when they were
brought to encounter soldiers as well disciplined as armed. ♦CABAÑES,
II. 130–132.♦ Even the regular troops knew their own inferiority in the
art of war. They were incapable of manœuvring in the face of an enemy;
for so greatly had their discipline been neglected while no danger was
apprehended, that they had gone through none of the rehearsals by which
soldiers ♦CABAÑES, I. 78.♦ are prepared for real action; mere drilling
seems to have been all the instruction they had received.
♦THE MARQUIS APPROACHES BARCELONA. SEPT. 1.♦
With this force, as ill officered as it was ill provided in all other
respects, the Marques removed his head-quarters to Villa-franca,
to maintain the line of the Llobregat, and take advantage of any
opportunity for recovering Barcelona while the blockade was kept up.
An expectation that something would be attempted by the inhabitants
seems to have influenced the Spaniards to this measure, otherwise ill
judged. The recovery of Barcelona was indeed an object of the greatest
importance; but weakened as Duhesme then was, a few thousand Miquelets,
with the armed population, would have sufficed to prevent the
incursions of the garrison, and the Spaniards should have taken their
post on the Pluvia instead of the Llobregat, with the Ter for their
second position, and Gerona and Hostalrich to ♦MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYR,
280.♦ support them, ... there they could best have impeded the efforts
which the French would make for relieving and securing to themselves
the strongest place in Spain. A British force might here have rendered
the most essential service. Deputies from the Junta of Catalonia were
sent to Madrid, to consult with the Council of Generals there upon
the affairs of the province; and in the hope of obtaining British aid
one of them proceeded to Lisbon to confer with Sir Hew Dalrymple. All
that could be done in that quarter was effected; the Spanish troops
in Lisbon were embarked for Catalonia; and the British Government,
sensible of what might be effected there by timely measures, ordered
thither 10,000 men from the army at that time stationed ♦BRITISH TROOPS
ORDERED FROM SICILY, BUT DETAINED THERE BY THE COMMANDER.♦ in Sicily.
But a feint of invading Sicily was made by Murat, who had succeeded
Joseph Buonaparte as Intrusive King of Naples; and the troops were
detained in an inactive and unworthy service, when they ought to have
been co-operating for the most important ends with one of the finest
and bravest people in the world. At no other time or place during the
whole war could such a body of English troops have been employed to so
much effect as at this time in Catalonia. Some petty jealousies or idle
forms had hitherto deprived the Catalans also of cavalry when it might
have been most useful. There was a regiment of hussars in Majorca,
for which the Junta repeatedly applied, and its applications were
earnestly enforced by the British officers who were in communication
with that island; but it was ♦CABAÑES, II. 129.♦ not till after a
series of frivolous and vexatious delays that they were embarked at
length in the beginning of October; and a detachment of them had not
reached the Llobregat more than twenty-four hours before they were led
to intercept the enemy at S. Culgat, on their return to Barcelona from
a marauding expedition. Not expecting to be attacked by cavalry, the
French were taken by surprise; they suffered a considerable loss, and
from that time confined their incursions within narrower bounds. The
troops from Portugal soon afterwards arrived; reinforcements also came
from Valencia and Majorca; Palacio ♦CABAÑES, II. 161.♦ was removed from
the command, because of the unpopularity which he had incurred, and was
succeeded by D. Juan Miguel de Vives.
♦BILBAO OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The want of military knowledge and military talent was never more
severely felt in any country than in Spain at this momentous crisis.
It could not be doubted that Buonaparte was preparing to bring against
the Spaniards that tremendous force which none of the continental
powers had hitherto been able to withstand. If he seemed to delay, it
was only that the preparations might be more complete; sure, meantime,
that neither Spain nor England knew at that time how to profit by
the interval, and that very probably disunion might arise among the
Spaniards themselves, of which he might take advantage. The French
had paid dearly for the error of dividing their forces, and advancing
where they had no point of support; they were now in strong positions,
receiving reinforcements from time to time, and waiting in security
till Buonaparte should come in person to complete the subjugation of
Spain, which they, as well as the tyrant himself, believed could not be
averted by any human interference. About the middle of August they sent
a detachment to take possession of Bilbao, a beautiful but defenceless
city, commanded on every side by its hanging gardens. The inhabitants,
inferior in number, ill armed, and without any works to protect them,
made a brave resistance, in revenge for which the French committed
great enormities when they entered the town: had they arrived a few
hours later, they would have got possession of arms, ammunition, and
money from England, which were just entering the harbour.
♦DIFFICULTIES IN BRINGING THE SPANISH ARMIES INTO THE FIELD.♦
A full sense of their danger, when the whole wrong which was intended
them was avowed, had roused the Spaniards to their first great and
successful exertions. After their victorious troops had entered
Madrid, they were less alive to the danger, and more sensible of the
embarrassments of their situation. Sudden efforts, directed by the
emergency which called them forth, would no longer avail. Foresight
and combination were required for extensive operations; and these were
thwarted by selfish views, and still more by capricious or obstinate
tempers, which in this state of general insubordination there was
nothing to restrain. The Galician army under Blake, having the plains
of Castille before them, could not advance without cavalry in the face
of an enemy who had from three to five thousand dragoons; and Cuesta
would not send his cavalry to act under Blake, because of his quarrel
with that General and with the Junta of Galicia. The Extremaduran
army, from a similar feeling of pride, was kept vapouring before
Elvas, while it was called for by all the authorities at Madrid. A
more vexatious impediment was interposed by the Junta of Seville. That
Board had thought proper, when the army in Andalusia was first raised,
for one of its members to accompany the Commander-in-chief, that no
injury might arise from delay in consulting the civil authority, and
perhaps also to rid themselves of Tilly, who was the person appointed.
When, to their disgrace, they elected this man to the Central Junta,
D. Andres Miñano was deputed to the army in his stead, with a salary
of a thousand dollars per month; but public opinion at Seville was so
strongly expressed against this misapplication of the public money,
and supported by so many members, especially by the Archbishop, that
the allowance was reduced one half. The whole was a needless expense,
for the Junta was still so tenacious of their authority, that this
representative was a mere agent to execute their pleasure, and not
to determine upon his own judgement. They sent positive orders that
the army of Andalusia should not advance beyond Madrid; and knowing
that Castaños had delivered his opinion strongly upon the impropriety
of regarding any army as belonging to its own province instead of
the kingdom at large, they let him know, that if these instructions
were disobeyed he should not be supplied with money. At this time the
French had driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and pushed forward to
Borja; the troops which were opposed to them in that quarter falling
back upon Zaragoza. Pressing demands for support came from Palafox:
the Generals who were at Madrid saw that the Andalusian army ought
to advance without delay, and this it could not do without money.
This matter was taken up warmly by the British agents at Madrid and
Seville; and as the Junta of that city had received two millions
of dollars from the British Government, a strong remonstrance was
presented to them upon their present conduct, and they were called
upon to apply it to the public service without delay. Their reply,
which, like all their papers, was written with great ability, would
have been satisfactory, if they had not passed over in silence their
orders that Castaños should not advance. They argued, that after all
that Andalusia had done, it was to be expected that La Mancha and the
other provinces which the Andalusian army was gone to protect, would
provide for it while it was employed in their service. The sums which
they had received from Great Britain had been sent expressly to them,
as other sums had to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias, who had
neither incurred such expenses, nor contributed such aid to other parts
of Spain. But upon this matter they waived all discussion; ... they
answered the bills which an English agent at Madrid had negotiated for
the use of their army, authorized Castaños to draw on them according
to his wants, and immediately sent forward 200,000 dollars. This was
just before the meeting of the Central Junta: the Andalusian army was
then advanced to Soria, the Valencian under General Llamas moved to
Zaragoza, and Blake toward Miranda upon the Ebro.
♦THE MARQUES DE LA ROMANA.♦
One of the first things which Castaños had requested after he had
opened a communication with Gibraltar was, that dispatches might be
forwarded to Romana, who commanded the Spanish troops in the Baltic.
He expressed the greatest anxiety concerning him and his army, who had
been thus treacherously removed to so great a distance from their own
country, but at the same time the fullest confidence in them and their
Commander. He judged of the men as Spaniards, of the General by his
individual character. D. Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marques de la Romana, was
a man whose happy nature had resisted all the evil and debilitating
influences of the age and country and rank in which he was born. His
public career was begun in the navy; but having attained the rank of
_Capitan de Fragata_, he quitted that profession for the land service,
a change not unfrequent in Spain. During the French revolutionary
war he served under his uncle, D. Ventura Caro, who commanded on the
Biscayan frontier; and having distinguished himself there, was made
General of division in the army of Catalonia, under Urrutia, where he
continued to be conspicuous for his good conduct. When that miserably
misconducted war was concluded by a scandalous peace, Romana devoted
part of his leisure to the theory of his profession, which he was
the better able to study as having received an excellent education,
and made the best use of it. And so evenly did he steer his course,
that without in the slightest degree courting the favour of Godoy, or
sullying himself by any condescension, he never became an object of his
persecution; a singular instance of good fortune in those disgraceful
times, or rather of what may be effected by undeviating rectitude and
good sense. For he possessed a rare union of frankness and perfect
prudence; and while his own breast wore no disguise, and needed none,
could read with unerring intuition the characters of others. There
was in his manners that simplicity which is the sure indication of
generosity and goodness, and which wins confidence while it commands
respect. Spain, where honour is the characteristic virtue of the
nation, where so many heroic and illustrious men have arisen, has never
produced a man more excellently brave, more dutifully devoted to his
country, more free from all taint of selfishness, more truly noble than
Romana.
♦DISTRIBUTION OF HIS TROOPS IN THE BALTIC.♦
The force under his command consisted of about 14,000 men. They were
marched to Hamburgh in Aug. 1807, and quartered there, along the Elbe
and at Lubeck, as part of the army under Marshal Bernadotte, then
Prince of Ponte Corvo. It was reported that this army was to invade
Sweden, in conjunction with the Danes, and the Spanish division was
put in motion accordingly about the middle of March. But when the
van-guard, having safely crossed the Little Belt to the Isle of Funen,
was preparing for the passage of the Great Belt, they were prevented
by the appearance of an English frigate and brig between Nyeborg and
Corsoer, at a season when it was thought no enemy’s vessels would
venture into those seas. The remainder of the troops therefore were of
necessity ordered to halt, and were quartered in Sleswic, till they
should be able to effect the passage. The Prince Christian Frederick,
of seventy-four guns, was sent to clear the Great Belt of these
enemies, but falling in with the Stately and the Nassau, was captured,
after a severe action, close to the shore of Zeeland. Bernadotte,
who had crossed to that island a few hours only before the English
cruisers appeared, was now, in order to return to his head-quarters
at Odensee, obliged to go round the Isles of Falster and Laland, land
in Sleswic, travel to Kolding, and from thence cross the Little Belt.
Watching their opportunity, as they could during the months of April,
May, and June, some of these troops got to the Isle of Langeland; and
some succeeded in effecting by night the passage of the Great Belt from
Funen to Zeeland, the greater number still remaining in Funen, or upon
the coast of Jutland.
♦THEIR CONDUCT WHEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO JOSEPH WAS PROPOSED.♦
The French journals affirmed that these troops had taken the oath of
allegiance to the Intruder with unanimous enthusiasm. No man who knew
the Spanish character believed this falsehood. They were in a situation
where they were cut off from all communication with their own country,
and where no intelligence could reach them but what came through the
French press, or other channels equally under the control of the French
government. Nevertheless in these garbled and falsified accounts they
saw enough to convince them that their countrymen were not submitting
to a foreign dominion so easily as the tyrant endeavoured to represent.
This opinion was confirmed when a dispatch arrived from Urquijo to
Romana, requiring the army to take the oath to the Intrusive King,
that dispatch being the only paper which the courier brought; ... it
was plain, therefore, that private letters were intercepted, and that
something must have occurred of which it was important that they should
be kept in ignorance. When the oath was proposed, it was taken without
much demur by the troops in Jutland under D. Juan Kindelan, the second
in command. Those in Funen, with the Commander, refused it vehemently
at first, but took it at length conditionally, that is to say, with a
protestation that it was to be null if the changes which had occurred
in Spain were not confirmed by the general consent of the nation. The
regiments of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which were in Zeeland, were less
placable; being under the immediate command of a Frenchman, General
Frerion, they attacked his house, killed one of his aids-de-camp, and
wounded another, and he himself only escaped with life by disguising
himself, and flying to Copenhagen. The men then planted their colours,
knelt round them, and swore to be faithful to their country.
♦AN AGENT SENT TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM.♦
The British Government meantime had not been inactive. The first
difficulty was how to communicate with the Spanish Commander. A
Roman-catholic priest, by name Robertson, was found willing to
undertake this dangerous service, and qualified for it by his skill as
a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other
credentials might probably have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote
connected with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission.
During Mr. Frere’s residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was
an accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gests of
the Cid, as the most animated and highly poetical, as well as the
most ancient and curious poem in the language. One day he happened to
call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a conjectural
emendation in one of the [35]lines; Romana instantly perceived the
propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he
was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated
with his friend the British Ambassador. Mr. Mackenzie was sent with
Robertson to Heligoland, there to provide means for landing him on the
continent, and to make farther arrangements as circumstances might
direct.
♦HE ASKS FOR A FORCE TO COVER HIS RETREAT.♦
The war with the Northern powers, and the interdict against British
goods, had given the miserable island of Heligoland an importance at
this time which it had never before possessed. Upon Mr. Mackenzie’s
arrival, an embargo was placed on the shipping there, and Robertson
was dispatched in a boat to land on the nearest shore; but so vigilant
a watch was kept wherever this might have been possible, that after
three days he returned to the island, convinced there was no hope of
accomplishing his errand unless he were provided with a passport.
Fortunately a vessel belonging to the port of Bremen had recently been
captured, and carried into Heligoland. Mr. Mackenzie sent for the
master, and proposed to liberate him and his ship if he would engage to
procure a passport for Robertson at Bremen. It happened to be in the
man’s power to redeem himself and his property upon these easy terms,
for he had a near relation in office in that city. The engagement was
faithfully performed; and Robertson, whose appearance was quite German,
and who assumed the character of a schoolmaster, found his way to
Romana. That noble Spaniard was greatly agitated at learning the real
situation of his country; the success in Andalusia, the deliverance
of Zaragoza, and the retreat of the Intruder from Madrid, were not
known in England at the time of Robertson’s departure; but he did not
hesitate a moment. Their conversation was in Latin; and Robertson was
sent back with a request that Mackenzie would proceed to the Baltic,
and procure the assistance of as many troops as might be necessary
to cover the retreat and embarkation of the Spaniards. Ten thousand
British troops, under Sir J. Moore, had been sent to Gottenburg in
the month of May, to co-operate with the Swedes. It was this aid that
Romana required.
♦SIR RICHARD KEATS GOES UPON THIS SERVICE.♦
This information was immediately communicated to the British
Government, and within a week Mr. Mackenzie received letters for Sir
John Moore, directing him to employ the troops in this service. Instead
of sending these dispatches, he thought it better to carry them, and
confer with that Commander in person, but when he reached Gottenburg
the expedition had sailed for England. Having left Heligoland without
permission, he now attempted to return thither, and for that purpose
embarked in the packet. A gale of wind drove it on the Danish coast. A
privateer, carrying sixteen guns, and well manned, came out, expecting
an easy capture; inferior as the English were, both in men and guns, a
fight of four hours was supported, till the Dane put his ship about,
and the packet returned to Gottenburgh in a shattered state. Baffled
in this intent, he thought his better course would be to make for the
fleet in the Baltic, and acquaint the Admiral with the disposition of
the Spaniards. Travelling therefore with all speed to Ystad, he there
found a Swedish vessel, which conveyed him to Sir James Saumarez’s ship
the Victory; and upon his representations Sir James, without waiting
for instructions, ordered Admiral Sir Richard Keats, with part of his
squadron, to the Great Belt, there to act in concert with Romana.
While they were preparing, orders for the performance of this service
arrived. A Spaniard attached to the embassy in London came out with
the dispatches, bringing letters from the Junta of Galicia, and from
individuals to Romana and the second in command.
♦PLAN FOR COLLECTING THE SPANISH TROOPS.♦
It was of great importance that Romana’s determination should be kept
secret as long as possible, lest the French and the Danes, who were
but too ready to have acted with them, should overpower his dispersed
forces. A young Spanish officer crossing from Zeeland to Langeland
was taken by this squadron; the letters were intrusted to him, he was
secretly put on shore in Langeland, and from thence crossed to Funen.
Such a messenger, it was thought, would not excite suspicion. Admiral
Keats proposed that the troops in Funen should secure themselves in a
peninsula on the north side of that island, from whence, if necessary,
they might be removed to the small island of Romsoe. The Danish
gun-boats would be rendered inactive if Romana was able, and should
think proper, to seize on the town and port of Nyborg; but this the
Admiral thought would endanger the troops in Zeeland ♦1808. AUGUST.♦
and Jutland, by provoking the Danes to act as enemies, when otherwise
it might be hoped they would be disposed secretly to favour the quiet
removal of the Spaniards, or at least to make no serious efforts for
impeding it. There was little probability that any negotiation for
their peaceable departure would be successful, subservient as the
court of Denmark was to the policy of France; but after the movement
should have commenced, a declaration of the honourable and unoffending
object in view might be advantageous. The two regiments in Zeeland,
it was proposed, should attempt to force their way to the peninsula
near Corsoer; if they succeeded in this, they might probably defend
the isthmus there, till they could be removed to the little island of
Sproe, half way between Corsoer and Nyborg. There were four regiments
in Jutland, distributed at Aarhuus, Ebeltoft, Greenaae, Randers,
Hobroe, Mariager, and some as high as Aalborg on the Gulf of Limefiord.
Orders were sent to these that they should take possession of such
vessels as they could find at Randers, Aarhuus, Fredericia, and Snogoe,
and make their way to Funen.
♦ROMANA TAKES POSSESSION OF NYBORG.♦
It was scarcely possible that these movements could be concerted
without exciting suspicion, prepared as the French officers and the
Danish Government were to expect some such attempt, and especially
after the manner in which the regiments in Zeeland had expressed their
national feeling. The French Commandant in Langeland discovered that
the officer who had passed from thence to Funen had communicated with
the English ships. When Romana understood this, he doubted not but
that the French in Holstein and Sleswic would be brought up by forced
marches; and as there were more than 3000 Danish troops in Funen,
he thought it necessary to take possession of Nyborg without delay.
The garrison were too weak to resist, and no violence ♦AUG. 9.♦ or
incivility was offered: the concerted signal was then made to Admiral
Keats, who had hoisted his flag the preceding day in the Superb off
that town; and he dispatched a letter to the Governor, assuring him,
that notwithstanding the state of war between England and Denmark, it
was his wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, provided
no opposition were made to the embarkation of the Spaniards. While this
was going on, he must co-operate with those troops, and consequently
often communicate with the town of Nyborg; but the strictest orders
had been given that all under his command should observe the utmost
civility toward the inhabitants. If, however, the Spaniards were
opposed, he must, however reluctantly, take measures which might
occasion the destruction of the town.
♦THE ENTRANCE OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON IS RESISTED.♦
The Danish garrison had yielded to circumstances; but an armed brig and
cutter, which were moored across the harbour, rejected all the pacific
offers both of the Spaniards and English, and even the remonstrances
of their own countrymen; such small vessels and boats as could be
collected were sent against them, and they were captured after half
an hour’s resistance and some waste of lives. Romana had been careful
that no act of hostility should be committed by his people, except
what was absolutely necessary for securing their embarkation; but some
of them, now irritated at the obstinacy with which their friends and
deliverers were opposed, fired a few shots at the Danish ships from the
batteries before they struck. Admiral Keats then wrote a second time to
the Governor, saying, that as his entrance into the harbour had been
resisted, he was bound by no law or usage to respect the property of
the inhabitants. The Spaniards had occasion for some of the vessels in
that port, and unless the masters and crews would assist in equipping
and navigating them, he could not secure them from injury; if they
would, he pledged himself to do so, and to grant them passports to
return in safety, after the short service for which they were required
should be ended.
♦ARRIVAL OF SOME OF THE REGIMENTS FROM JUTLAND.♦
On the same day that Nyborg was thus taken possession of, the
Spaniards, who were at Svendborg, which is at the southern extremity
of Funen, got possession of some gun-boats, that might otherwise have
prevented their passage, and crossed to Langeland. The regiment of
Zamora on the same day also arrived from Ebeltoft and Greenaae at
Middlefahrt; and starting from that place at ten on the same night,
performed the march to Nyborg in twenty-one hours, a distance of more
than fifty English miles. The regiment which made this prodigious
exertion for the sake of returning to assist in the deliverance of
Spain, was one of those which the French papers described as having
displayed the greatest satisfaction at the accession of the Intruder!
The troops which were at Hobroe and Mariager, and those at Aarhuus,
succeeded also in embarking, and arrived safely in the port of Nyborg.
The two regiments in Zeeland were unable to escape; three of the
battalions had previously been disarmed for their conduct when the oath
was proposed to them, and the others were now surrounded by Danish
troops: and there still remained three cavalry regiments and one of
infantry, in Jutland, of which, and of the officers sent to them, no
account had been received. While the troops were embarking on board
such vessels as were in the port of Nyborg, one of these regiments
arrived.
♦THEY LEAVE THE ISLE OF FUNEN.♦
The British Admiral had been at first of opinion, that if the troops
in Langeland felt themselves safe, it would be better to land all
the others there, from whence they might be removed at leisure. The
possession of Langeland had now been secured, but Nyborg was an
insecure position; it was reported that some thousand French had
collected upon the shores of the Little Belt; and these, with the
Danes in Funen, and the garrison of Nyborg, might seriously impede
the embarkation from that town, or perhaps succeed in cutting off
the rear-guard. It was judged expedient, therefore, to spike the guns
there, and remove the troops to a neck of land called Slipshavn, about
a league distant; and from thence they were shipped with as much
expedition as the unfavourable weather permitted.
♦FATE OF THE HORSES.♦
Two of the regiments which had been quartered in Funen were cavalry,
mounted on the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses. It was
impracticable to bring off these horses, about 1100 in number; and
Romana was not a man who could order them to be destroyed lest they
should fall into the hands of the French: he was fond of horses
himself, and knew that every man was attached to the beast which had
carried him so far, and so faithfully. Their bridles, therefore, were
taken off, and they were turned loose upon the beach. As they moved
off, they passed some of the country horses and mares, which were
feeding at a little distance. A scene ensued such as probably never
before was witnessed. The Spanish horses are not mutilated, and these
were sensible that they were no longer under any restraint of human
power. A general conflict ensued, in which, retaining the discipline
that they had learnt, they charged each other in squadrons of ten or
twenty together; then closely engaged, striking with their fore-feet,
and biting and tearing each other with the most ferocious rage, and
trampling over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the
course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and disabled.
Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance; and
they no sooner heard the roar of the battle than they came thundering
down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness,
plunged into the fight with equal fury. Sublime as the scene was, it
was too horrible to be long contemplated, and Romana, in mercy, gave
orders for destroying them; but it was found too dangerous to attempt
this; and after the last boats quitted the beach, the few horses that
remained were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual[36]
destruction.
♦AUG. 11. THE SPANIARDS ARE LANDED IN THE ISLE OF
LANGELAND.♦
On the second morning all were safely on board, but the wind detained
them in the harbour; and there, on the evening of that day, the
regiment from Aarhuus joined them, in four vessels, which they had
seized. The one at Randers did not succeed in making its escape. The
south part of Langeland was in possession of the Spaniards. As soon as
the wind permitted, their fellow-soldiers were landed there. The whole
number was about 9000 men, with some 230 ♦AUG. 13.♦ women and children.
Stores and water were to be laid in for their voyage to Gottenburg.
The Danish Governor, General Ahlefeldt, agreed not to molest them, and
withdrew his troops to the northern part of the island, promising, that
if any French were known to arrive in Funen, he would then deliver
up their arms. It was thought necessary to demand them the ensuing
day, upon a rumour that this had occurred; and also because a body of
Danish cavalry had appeared as if observing the Spaniards for some
military view; and because the escape of the French Commandant had
been facilitated by the General. Some of the troops refused to obey,
a detachment was therefore marched against them to enforce obedience,
and this demonstration of force was sufficient. They took the horses
also, having only about 200 of their own, which had been brought from
Svendborg; but they voluntarily promised that these arms and horses,
and whatever else belonged to the Danes, should be left upon the beach
at their departure. Some robberies, which a few of the men committed,
were instantly punished, and restitution made; and a just price was
fixed for the provisions which were demanded: they were supplied,
therefore, without reluctance. Meat was in abundance, but there was a
difficulty in obtaining bread; and the water lay at a distance from
the shore, ... a thousand men, and all the carriages that could be
procured, were employed in conveying it. Their situation was still an
anxious one: an attack was to be apprehended from the opposite port
of Svendborg; it was known that the Danes could collect as many as
four-and-twenty gun-boats there, and the channel would not admit of
frigates to defend it: a flotilla, indeed, came out from thence one
night, and kept up an idle cannonade upon the Spanish encampment.
It was reported that French troops had arrived there, and of this no
certain information could be obtained, for not a peasant in Langeland
could be induced by the offer of any reward to go and ascertain the
fact; an instance of national honour which may more than counterbalance
the unworthy conduct of the Danish Government at this time. That the
French were not inactive was certain. Proclamations from Bernadotte
were introduced into the camp, endeavouring to deceive the Spaniards
with regard to the state of affairs in their own country, to excite
suspicion of the English, and to make them arrest their leaders; but
these papers provoked only the contempt which they deserved.
♦THEY SAIL FOR GOTTENBURG, AND THERE EMBARK FOR SPAIN. AUG. 18.♦
On the sixth day after their landing Admiral Saumarez arrived,
and in three days more, every thing being ready, the troops were
re-embarked. The arms and horses which they had taken from the Danes
were left in the batteries. Before they departed a flag of truce was
sent to Copenhagen, requiring, on the part of their Commander, that
the regiments which were detained should be allowed to depart. The
vessels from Aarhuus, being manned by Danes, were supplied by the
British Admiral with stores for eight days, and released. Those from
Nyborg were manned from the fleet, and an offer was made to send them
back from Gottenburg with the crews of two Danish vessels which had
been captured, provided the Danes would release an equal number of
British prisoners in exchange. But these measures were not met with
a corresponding temper by the Danish Government, and the convoy was
fired at as it passed the battery of Slipshavn. They reached Gottenburg
in safety; and the Spaniards there received the first intelligence of
the successes which their countrymen had obtained. They were landed,
for the sake of health and comfort, upon the islands in the harbour;
transports from England arrived in a few days, and this little army
then sailed for their own country, full of ardour, ... to lay down
their lives in its defence.
♦1808. SEPTEMBER.♦
♦ROMANA LANDS IN ENGLAND.♦
While the convoy proceeded on its voyage to Coruña, Romana landed in
England, for the purpose of consulting with the British Government. It
was there determined that his force should be disembarked at Santander,
to be incorporated with the Galician army; and to avoid all immediate
difficulty concerning its support, the existing armies in the present
disorganized state of Spain being raised and subsisted by their
respective provinces. Great Britain undertook to pay and feed it for
two months, by which time it was supposed the Central Junta would be
ready to perform this part of its duties. These were troops on whose
discipline and courage entire reliance might be placed; and Romana’s
intention was to triple the infantry, by forming upon each battalion a
regiment of three. And as it was designed that a British army should
advance to bear its part in the first brunt of the great contest, the
intention was, that, if possible, it should act with Romana on the
left flank, and Castaños on its right. With both these officers it
was justly thought the service might proceed in the true spirit of
confidence and good will; the reputation of both stood deservedly high,
and their disposition was even of more importance, when operations were
to be carried on by concert between the generals, not by a paramount
and controlling command. For, ♦ERROR OF THE SPANIARDS IN NOT APPOINTING
A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.♦ by a strange error, the Spanish Government
had resolved to make the commands independent of each other. This
error seems to have been committed less from want of judgement than
in deference to the provincial Juntas, and in fear of offending them;
yet at that time public opinion would have supported them had they
appointed Castaños commander-in-chief.
♦DIFFICULTY OF FEEDING THEIR ARMIES.♦
It was not, however, the abilities of any single general, however
pre-eminent, which could have saved the Spanish armies, constituted
as they then were, from inevitable defeat, unless a strong British
force had been ready to have acted with them. Preparations upon
an adequate scale had been promised and intended by the Central
Government; but when they had raised men and embodied them, the
difficulty of maintaining them occurred, a difficulty which has at all
times been greater in Spain than in any other civilized country. Our
own commissariat was then far from effective; for great experience,
as well as great activity and talents, are required in the business
of providing an army: it is not then to be wondered at that the
Spaniards, under their complicated embarrassments, should have been
grievously defective in this main branch of the military art; but
this was one cause why the number of their armies fell far short of
their computed force, many young recruits returning to their homes,
when they saw how miserably they fared in the camp. It would have been
most desirable to have followed up the first successes with vigour,
and have attacked the enemy while the impression made upon them by so
many humiliating failures was fresh, and before farther reinforcements
should enable them to resume the offensive. But this had not been
possible. The French were strongly posted, and well provided with all
the means of war; and their cavalry gave them complete command of the
plains of Castille. They had ravaged the land from Burgos to Astorga,
and driven in contributions from the very gates of the latter city.
Blake could oppose no resistance to them in that open country without
cavalry, and for want of that essential arm was obliged to alter his
intended plan of operations, and pursue, at considerable risk, a
different course. He resolved to take a position between Bilbao and
Vitoria, and menace the right flank and rear of the French, while the
army of Aragon should act on their left.
♦BILBAO TAKEN AND RETAKEN. SEPT. 20.♦
Bilbao had remained a month in possession of the enemy; it was then
retaken by the Marques de Portazgo, and if his advanced posts had not
♦1808. OCTOBER.♦ begun to fire too soon, the garrison might have been
surprised and made prisoners. After an action of three or four hours
they effected their retreat, losing some 400 men. But considerable
bodies of French had now passed the Pyrenees; and Marshal Ney, who came
at this time to take the chief command till Buonaparte himself should
arrive, feigning to retreat upon Vitoria for the purpose of deceiving
Portazgo, suddenly marched with the centre of his army upon Bilbao.
The Marquis drew off in time, without losing a man or a gun, and took
up a position at Valmaseda. There he was joined by a detachment of the
Galician army, and Blake immediately made preparations to recover the
city; but General Merlin, whom Ney had left to command there, knew that
the place was not tenable against a superior force, and evacuated it on
the night of Oct. 11.
♦POSITION OF THE ARMIES IN OCTOBER.♦
The French force at that time amounted to about 60,000; and the
Spanish Generals knew, by an intercepted dispatch, that 72,000 more
would enter Spain before the middle of November. The Spaniards were
nominally 130,000, but the effective number was very far short of this.
With the left or western army Blake occupied a line from Burgos to
Bilbao. The eastern army, that of Aragon and Valencia, under Palafox,
was stationed, part near Zaragoza, and part was as far advanced as
Sanguessa, on the left of the enemy, outflanking them on that side, as
Blake did on the west. The head-quarters of the central army, under
Castaños, were at Soria; ... so that the whole formed a crescent. The
Spaniards now began to experience the ruinous effects of that false
policy which had exaggerated their successes and their strength, and
had represented the final deliverance of the country as an event soon
and certainly to be looked for. This delusion made the people clamorous
for the accomplishment of their expectations, and the government itself
either partook or yielded to this impatience. The wise precautions
with which the Junta of Seville began the war were disregarded, and
the Central Junta called upon the Generals to hasten their operations.
However strong, they said, might have been the reasons for delay,
loss of time had already proved injurious, and must be more so if the
enemy should receive their expected reinforcements. An end therefore
must be put ♦COMMISSIONERS SENT TO THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦ to this
inactivity. And, as if dissatisfied with their generals, they appointed
D. Francisco Palafox to go as their representative to the armies, with
the Marques de Coupigni and the Conde de Montijo under him. He was to
be received with the same honours as a Captain-General of the army, to
confer with the Commanders, concert operations with them, and himself
decide upon the plan of attack. Another reason for this mission was,
that Castaños and Palafox differed totally in opinion concerning the
measures which ought to be pursued. The latter was eager for action,
because he believed that every thing might be accomplished by zeal
and courage; the former understood the art of war better, and knew
how little these qualities alone were to be trusted in the open field
against an enemy strong in cavalry, equal in numbers, and superior in
discipline. The commissioners were sent to determine between them.
Of all the measures of the Central Junta this was the worst. It was
taken a few days before Romana arrived in Spain. Had he been present,
his authority, coming in aid of the opinion of Castaños, which was
decidedly but warily expressed, might have prevented so preposterous a
mission, and averted the evils which were thus precipitated.
CHAPTER XIII.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. CONFERENCE AT ERFURTH.
PROPOSAL FOR PEACE. BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN.
♦1808.♦
♦BUONAPARTE IS DEEPLY AFFECTED BY THE REVERSES IN SPAIN.♦
It had always been Buonaparte’s system, and therein it was that the
strength and wisdom of his policy consisted, to ensure success, as
far as the end can be rendered certain by the employment of adequate
means. Having stripped Spain of its best troops, introduced his armies
into the heart of the country, seized the most important fortresses,
inveigled into captivity the whole Royal Family, and extorted from
them a formal renunciation of the crown in his favour; the people,
he thought, if they dared attempt any partial opposition, would be
effectually intimidated by the first slaughter, and the military
executions which should follow it. His calculation was erroneous,
because the Spanish character, and the strength of good principles,
had not been taken into the account. He had never dreamt of a national
resistance; and the defeat of armies, till that time irresistible,
affected him the more deeply, because he felt that the measures
♦MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYR, 18.♦ which had drawn on these disasters were
as infamous as he now perceived that they were impolitic. The reverses
which befell him in the latter part of his bloody career he bore with
the coldest insensibility; but he was distressed by these, and all but
cast down.
♦HE CONCEALS THEM FROM THE FRENCH PEOPLE.♦
But it was too late to recede; the infamy was indelible, it remained
only to secure the prize, and this he believed there would be no
difficulty in effecting. His first care was to conceal from the French
all knowledge of the mortifying failure his arms had experienced,
till he should have secured the subserviency of the other continental
powers, and collected fresh armies to pour into the peninsula. His
system of government was founded upon falsehood as well as force. While
all Spain was in arms, the French papers represented it as joyfully
welcoming its new sovereign. “The disturbances,” they said, “which
broke out in a few provinces were completely quelled: they had been
occasioned only by the common people, who wished to pillage the rich:
the disaffected had got together some bands of smugglers, opened the
prisons, and put arms into the hands of the felons: these wretches
had committed great excesses upon their peaceful countrymen, but
every thing was now quiet. The captains-general, the magistrates, and
the polished part of the nation, displayed the best sentiments, and
the greatest repose and best state of mind prevailed. At Cadiz the
public tranquillity did not experience a moment’s interruption; the
inhabitants of that interesting city had resisted all the insidious
offers of the English. Throughout the peninsula, indeed, only a few
insignificant individuals had been led astray by the spies of England.
But the Council of Castille, and the most respectable persons, had
exerted their influence with all ranks, to crush the seeds of sedition
before they should shoot forth; and their efforts had been completely
successful.” Over great part of France and of the continent these
accounts would be believed; wherever, indeed, a vigilant tyranny could
keep out all information except its own. But at Bayonne it was not
possible that the truth could be concealed; and by the falsehood which
was officially circulated in that part of the country, it seems that
the general opinion there was strongly against a war, provoked solely
for the aggrandizement ♦JUNE 8.♦ of the Buonaparte family. M. Champagny
addressed a note to the prefect of the Gironde, informing him, that
the Emperor had just received advices from his brother the King of
Holland, saying the King of England was dead, and that the first act
of George IV. had been to make a total change of ministers. This
was not given as a report, but as an authenticated fact, officially
communicated: “and may this event,” it was added, “be the presage of a
general peace, ... the object of the Emperor’s wishes, to the want of
which Europe is so sensible, and which would be so advantageous to the
commerce of Bourdeaux in particular!” The same falsehood was repeated
in that number of the Madrid[37] Gazette which contained Buonaparte’s
proclamation of Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies. Buonaparte
endeavoured also to keep his allies as well as his subjects ignorant of
the real state of things. The Russian Ambassador at Madrid could find
no means of communicating to his court an account of what was passing
in Spain, all his letters being intercepted in France, till at the end
of August, when some British officers were in Madrid, an opportunity
was afforded him of sending his dispatches through England; he then
confided to the honour of a hostile power what could no longer be
trusted to an unprincipled ally.
♦STATEMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.♦
It was not till two months after the capture of the ships at Cadiz,
and five weeks after the flight of the Intruder from Madrid, that any
account of the affairs of Spain appeared in the French ♦SEPT. 6.♦
papers, except assurances that all was well. A long narrative was then
published, written with the usual falsehood of the French government,
but not with its usual skill. The insurrection was ascribed entirely
to the artifices and bribes of England, assisted by the monks and the
Inquisition, ... the Inquisition, which had lent its whole authority
to the usurpation! Great stress was laid upon the excesses which the
patriots had committed; whereas the list of persons who were here
claimed as martyrs in the Intruder’s cause did not equal in number
the victims of one _noyade_ in the Loire, scarcely exceeded that of
one day’s allowance for the guillotine in Paris. The military detail,
which was called a correct abstract of the events of the campaign,
was composed with studied and inextricable confusion; all order of
time and place was inverted and involved, and facts, exhibited thus
piecemeal, were still farther disguised by suppression, exaggeration,
and falsehood. At Valencia, it was said, French intrepidity overcame
every obstacle: twenty pieces of artillery were taken; the suburbs
were carried, and the streets strewed with dead bodies: ... this
indeed was true; but they were the bodies of the French. At Zaragoza,
fourteen cloisters, which had been fortified, three-fourths of the
city, the arsenal, and all the magazines were in their possession. That
unfortunate city was almost ruined by fire, the bombardment, and the
explosion of mines. Not a hint was given of the event of that memorable
siege. The loss of the fleet was not mentioned. Dupont was so spoken
of, as to make it evident, that, if he returned to France, his life
would atone for his failure. After a series of events which could not
be described, because they ought to be a subject of judicial inquiry,
he had committed the triple fault of suffering his communication with
Madrid to be cut off, of letting himself be separated from two-thirds
of his army, and then giving battle in a disadvantageous position,
after a forced night-march; and, manifesting an equal deficiency of
political as of military talent, he had allowed himself to be deceived
in negotiations. This unexpected event, the numerous descents of the
English upon the coast of Galicia, (where no English had landed, except
a few officers,) and the excessive heat of the season, had induced
the King to assemble his troops, and place them in a cooler climate
than that of New Castille, and in a situation possessing a milder
atmosphere, and better water: therefore, he left Madrid, and the
army went into cooler cantonments. The bodies of insurgents scarcely
deserved to be mentioned: they defended themselves behind a wall or a
house; but a single squadron of cavalry, or a battalion of infantry,
was sufficient to put many thousands of them to the rout. “All that
the English papers have published,” said Buonaparte’s gazetteer, “is
unfounded and false. England knows well the part that she is acting;
she also knows well what she is to expect from all her efforts. Her
only object is to involve Spain in confusion, that she may thereby make
herself mistress of such of its possessions as best suit her purposes.”
♦REPORT OF M. CHAMPAGNY.♦
At the same time, two reports from the minister of foreign affairs
were laid before the French senate. The first of these bore date
from Bayonne, so far back as the 24th of April. Hitherto the modern
powers of Europe had always thought it necessary to hold forth some
decent pretext for engaging in hostilities, however iniquitous might
be the latent motives ... but the semblance of moral decorum was now
contemptuously laid aside; and in this state-paper Buonaparte was
advised to seize upon Spain, for the purpose of carrying on the war
against England more effectually, every thing being legitimate which
led to that end. No state in Europe was more necessarily connected with
France than Spain: she must be either a useful friend, or a dangerous
enemy; ... an intimate alliance must unite the two nations, or an
implacable enmity separate them. Such an enmity had in old times become
habitual: ... the wars of the 16th century proceeded as much from the
rivalry of the nations as of the sovereigns: the troubles of the League
and the Fronde had been excited and fomented by Spain; and the power
of Louis XIV. did not begin to rise, till, having conquered Spain, he
had formed that alliance with the royal family which ultimately placed
his grandson on the throne. That act of provident policy gave to the
two countries an age of peace, after three ages of war: but the French
revolution broke this bond of union; and the Spanish Bourbons must
always, through their affection, their recollections, and their fear,
be the secret and perfidious enemies of France. It was for the interest
of Spain, as well as of France, that a firm hand should re-establish
order in her affairs, now when a feeble administration had led her to
the brink of ruin. A king, the friend of France, having nothing to fear
from her, and not being an object of distrust to her, would appropriate
all the resources of Spain to her interest, and to the success of that
common cause which united Spain to France and to the continent. Thus
would the work of Louis XIV. be re-established. What policy suggests,
said the report, justice authorises. The increase of the Spanish army
before the battle of Jena was really a declaration of war: the laws of
the customs were directed against French commerce: French merchants
were aggrieved, while the ports were open to the contraband trade of
England, and English merchandize was spread through Spain into the rest
of Europe: Spain, therefore, was actually in a state of war with the
Emperor.
Even M. Champagny, however, had not the effrontery to press this
conclusion. Exclusive of this, he said, existing circumstances did
not permit the Emperor to refrain from interfering in the affairs of
Spain. He was called upon to judge between the father and the son.
Which part would he take? Would he sacrifice the cause of sovereigns,
and sanction an outrage against the majesty of the throne? Would he
leave on the throne a prince who could not withdraw himself from the
yoke of England? In that case, France must constantly keep a powerful
army on foot in Spain. Would he reinstate Charles IV.? This could
not be effected without overcoming a great resistance, and shedding
French blood. And should that blood, of which France was prodigal for
her own interests, be shed for a foreign king, whose fate was of no
consequence to her? Lastly, would he abandon the Spanish nation to
themselves, and while England was sowing the seeds of trouble and of
anarchy, leave this new prey for England to devour? This was not to
be thought of. The Emperor, therefore, occupied, of necessity, with
the regeneration of Spain, in a manner useful to that kingdom and to
France, ought neither to re-establish the dethroned king, nor to leave
his son upon the throne; for in either case it would be delivering her
to the English. Policy advised, and justice authorized him to provide
for the security of the empire, and to save Spain from the influence of
England.
♦SECOND REPORT.♦
Thus was the principle, that whatever is profitable is right, openly
proclaimed by the French government, ... a principle which the very
thief, on his career to the gallows, dares not avow to himself. The
other report from the same minister ♦SEPT. 1.♦ was of four months
later date, though the former had plainly not been written till it
was thought expedient to publish it: for the Tyrant needed no adviser
in his conduct at Bayonne; and if his usurpation had been passively
submitted to by the Spaniards, Spain would have been represented as
the brave and faithful ally of France, and the new dynasty exhibited
as the reward of her loyalty, which was now to be the means of curbing
her hostile disposition. This second report began by proposing to the
Emperor that he should communicate to the Senate the treaties which
had placed the crown of Spain in his hands, and the constitution,
which, under his auspices, and enlightened by his advice, the Junta
at Bayonne, after free and mature deliberation, had adopted, for
the glory of the Spanish name, and the prosperity of Spain and its
colonies. He had interfered with Spain, it said, as a mediator; but
his persuasive means, and his measures of wise and humane policy, had
not been successful. Individual interests, foreign intrigues, and
the influence of foreign corruption had prevailed. The disturbances
in Spain were occasioned by English gold. Would, then, his Majesty
permit England to say, “Spain is one of my provinces! My flag, driven
from the Baltic, the North sea, the Levant, and even from the shores
of Persia, rules in the ports of France?” No, never! To prevent so
much disgrace and misfortune, two millions of brave men were ready to
scale the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the peninsula. If the
French fought for the liberty of the seas, they must begin by wresting
Spain from the influence of the tyrant of the ocean. If they fought
for peace, they could not obtain it till they had driven the enemies
of peace from Spain. If they fought for honour, they must promptly
inflict vengeance for the outrages committed against the French name
in Spain. The probability of meeting the English at last, of fighting
them man to man, of making them feel the evils of war themselves, ...
evils of which they were ignorant, having only caused them by their
gold, was represented as no small advantage. They will be beaten, said
M. Champagny, destroyed, dispersed, or, at least, they will make haste
to fly, as they did at Toulon, at the Helder, at Dunkirk, in Sweden,
... wherever the French armies have been able to find them! But their
expulsion from Spain would be the ruin of their cause; it would exhaust
their means, and annihilate their last hope. In this contest the wishes
of all Europe would be with France!
♦REPORT OF THE WAR-MINISTER.♦
These reports, with the two mock treaties of Bayonne, were laid before
the Senate, and, at the same time, a report of the war-minister was
presented. France, it was said, had never possessed more numerous or
better appointed armies, neither were they ever better kept up, or
better provisioned. Nevertheless, the events which had taken place in
Spain had occasioned a pretty considerable loss, in consequence of an
operation, not less inconceivable than painful, of the division under
General Dupont. His Majesty had notified his resolution of assembling
more than 200,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, without weakening either the
armies in Germany or that in Dalmatia. A levy of 80,000 was therefore
indispensable, and these could only be taken from the four classes of
the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, and 9, which, exclusive of
the men who had married within those years, might furnish 600,000. In
levying 80,000, only one conscript out of seven would be called out,
and the vacancies in the armies would thus be filled up with soldiers
of 21, 22, and 23 years of age, that is, with men fit to undergo the
fatigues of war. “It is true, Sire,” said the war-minister, “that the
custom observed of late years might, to a certain degree, induce a part
of your subjects to consider themselves released from the duty of the
conscription, as soon as they had furnished the contingent required
for the year; and, under this point of view, what I propose might
appear to require from your people a sacrifice. But, Sire, there is
no one but knows, that, by the words of the law, your Majesty would
be authorised to call to your standard the whole of the conscription,
not only of the last four years, but even of the antecedent years: and
even were there question of a real sacrifice, what sacrifice is it that
your Majesty has not a right to expect from the love of your subjects?
Who among us is ignorant that your Majesty wholly sacrifices yourself
for the happiness of France, and that upon the speedy accomplishment
of your high designs depend the repose of the world, the future
safety, and the re-establishment of a maritime peace, without which
France can never enjoy tranquillity? In proposing to your Majesty to
declare, that henceforth no retrospective call shall take an antecedent
conscription, I only participate, Sire, in your paternal wishes. I
think it expedient, at the same time, to propose to your Majesty to
order out the conscription of the year 1810, determining the amount of
it, from the present instant, at 80,000 men ... to furnish the means,
as occasion may require, of forming camps of reserve, and of protecting
the coast in the spring time. This conscription would be raised only
under the apprehension of a war with other powers, nor would it be
called out before the month of January next.”
Thus, then, it appeared that those persons who had escaped from the
conscriptions of four years were again to stand the hazard of this
dreadful lottery, and that of the unmarried men, between the ages of
21 and 23, one in seven was to be sent to the armies! ... and this
draught upon the morality, the happiness, the vital strength, the
flesh and blood of the French people ... was required, because their
Corsican master had thought proper to appoint his brother to be king
of Spain! The promise that no retrospective conscription should again
be called for, shows plainly what the feelings of the nation were at
such a measure, when Buonaparte thought it necessary to soothe them,
by declaring, that it was not to be repeated. This was not all: one
year’s conscription had already been anticipated, another year was
to be levied in advance, and 80,000 men, whose services, by these
baleful laws, were not due till 1810, were now to be ♦SUSPICION OF THE
VIEWS OF AUSTRIA.♦ called forth. This was necessary, the report said,
because England and Austria were increasing their armies; and it was
an evil inseparable from the present state of Europe, that France must
increase hers in the same proportion. A suspicion of the intentions of
Austria was now intimated. Its armaments, the war-minister declared,
had often excited his solicitude. He had been told by the minister for
foreign affairs, that the best understanding prevailed with the court
of Vienna; but though it did not belong to his department to dive into
the views and interests of states, and explore the tortuous labyrinths
of politics, it was his duty to neglect nothing for preserving to the
French armies, at all points, that just superiority which they ought to
possess. The plan which he had proposed would give the army of Spain
200,000 men, without weakening the other armies; and the conscription
of 1810 would increase the armies of Germany, of the North, and of
Italy, by more than 80,000. From such a force what could be expected
but the speedy re-establishment of tranquillity in Spain, of a maritime
peace, and of that general tranquillity which was the object of the
Emperor’s wishes? Much blood would be spared, because so great a number
of men would be ready to shed it.... Here the tyrant’s principle is
right: and grievously was that parsimony of strength on the part of
his mightiest enemy to be lamented, which, by never sending a force
sufficient to insure its object, so often wasted what it sent.
♦MESSAGE FROM BUONAPARTE TO THE SENATE.
SEPT. 4.♦
A message from Buonaparte accompanied these reports, when they were
laid before the Senate. He mentioned his firm alliance with Russia,
and said, that he had no doubts of the peace of the continent, but
that he ought not to rely upon the false calculations and errors of
other courts; and since his neighbours increased their armies, it was
a duty incumbent upon him to increase his: he therefore imposed fresh
sacrifices upon his people, which were necessary to secure them from
heavier, and to lead them to the grand result of a general peace. “I am
determined,” said he, “to carry on the war with Spain with the utmost
activity, and to destroy the armies which England has disembarked in
that country. The future security of my subjects, a maritime peace,
and the security of commerce, equally depend upon these important
operations. Frenchmen, my projects have but one object in view ... your
happiness, and the permanent well-being of your children; and if I
know you right, you will hasten to comply with this new call, which is
rendered necessary by the interests of the country.”
♦THE SENATE APPROVE HIS MEASURES.♦
In the first of Buonaparte’s three constitutions for France, the
affectation of Roman titles, and the false taste with which they were
applied to offices essentially different, were equally to be remarked.
The name of Senate, however, was well retained under his imperial
government, just such a Senate having existed during those disgraceful
ages of the Roman empire, when a despotism, similar to that which he
had established in France, was degrading their country, and preparing
the way for the universal barbarism and misery which ensued. The
baseness of those wretches who sanctioned the iniquities and cruelties
of Tiberius and Caligula was equalled by the obsequious senators of
Buonaparte. On the day after his message had been presented, they
voted an address, echoing the gross and palpable falsehoods of his
assertions, applauding his measures, and appropriating to themselves,
and, as far as the crimes of a government can be imputed to the people,
to the French nation also, the guilt of his conduct towards Spain.
“Your Majesty,” said they, “desires to defend solemn and voluntarily
concluded treaties; to maintain a constitution freely discussed,
adopted, and sworn to by a national junta; to suppress a barbarous
anarchy, which now covers Spain with blood and mourning, and threatens
our frontier; to rescue the true Spaniards from a shameful yoke, by
which they are oppressed; to assure to them the happiness of being
governed by a brother of your Majesty; to annihilate the English
troops, who unite their arms with the daggers of the banditti; to
avenge the French blood, so basely shed; to put out of all doubt the
security of France, and the peace of our posterity; to restore and
complete the work of Louis XIV.; to accomplish the wish of the most
illustrious of your predecessors, and particularly of him who was by
France most beloved; to extend your great power, in order to diminish
the miseries of war, and to compel the enemy of the continent to a
general peace, which is the sole object of all your measures, and the
only means for the repose and prosperity of our country. The will
of the French people is, therefore, Sire, the same as that of your
Majesty. The war with Spain is politic, just, and necessary.”... If the
transactions which are the subject of this history had passed in remote
ages, and such a narrative as is here presented had been preserved to
us, it would scarcely be possible, when we found the Senate of a great
nation, like France, thus solemnly approving and ratifying the conduct
of its Emperor, not to suspect that the history had been handed down
in an imperfect state; that some facts had been suppressed, and others
distorted; for, however credible the usurpation itself might appear,
as the act of an individual tyrant, that it should, with its attendant
circumstances of perfidy and cruelty, be thus represented as a just
and necessary act, by a legislative assembly, and made the ground of
a national war, is something so monstrous, that it would startle our
belief; and, for the honour of human nature, we should hesitate before
we trusted human testimony.
♦MARCH OF THE TROOPS TOWARD SPAIN.♦
The conscription for which the tyrant called was decreed without one
dissentient voice, by an assembly constituted for no other purpose than
that of executing his will and pleasure. His other measures had already
been taken. About the middle of August he had ordered General Gouvion
Saint Cyr from Boulogne, to repair to Perpignan, and there collect an
army, with which to enter Catalonia, as soon as Buonaparte himself
should enter Spain on the other side. He gave him no other instructions
than that he should use all efforts to preserve Barcelona: “if that
place be lost,” said he, “to recover it will cost me eighty thousand
men.” The troops from Prussia and Poland were recalled; they consisted
not of Frenchmen alone, but of Germans and Italians, Poles, Swiss,
and Dutch, Irish, and Mamalukes, men of all countries and languages,
of all religions and of none, united into one efficient body by the
bond of discipline. They cared not whither they were ordered, so it
were only to a land which produced the grape, ... upon what service,
or in what cause, was to them a matter of indifference; war was their
element, and where-ever they went they expected to find free quarters,
and no enemy who could resist them. Not a few of them when they heard,
as they had so often heard before, that they were now to give the last
blow to the tottering power of England, believed they were about to
march to England by land through Spain; the desert, they said, had
separated them from that country when they were in Egypt, and when they
were at Boulogne there was the sea; but they should get there now. As
soon as these troops had crossed the Rhine, they were received with
public honours in every town along the line of their march. Deputations
came out to welcome them, they were feasted at the expense of the
municipality, and thanked at their departure for the honour they had
conferred upon the place. This was Buonaparte’s policy. But the conduct
of the soldiers showed what an enemy might expect from them, when
their own countrymen, upon whom they were quartered, did not escape ill
usage. They treated them as they had done the Germans; and the allied
troops took the same licence which they had seen the French exercise
among an ♦ROCCA, 9, 12.♦ allied and friendly people. Under the imperial
government every thing was subject to the sword.
♦SPEECH OF BUONAPARTE TO THE TROOPS.♦
Buonaparte reviewed them at Paris. “Soldiers,” said he, “after having
triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have passed
through Germany by forced marches. I shall now order you to march
through France, without allowing you a moment’s rest. Soldiers, I have
occasion for you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the
continent of Spain and Portugal. Let your aspect terrify and drive him
from thence! Let us carry our conquering eagles even to the pillars of
Hercules: there also we have an injury to avenge!” The capture of the
French squadron at Cadiz had never been published in France, and this
hint is the only notice that ever was publicly taken of it. “Soldiers,”
he pursued, “you have exceeded the fame of all modern warriors. You
have placed yourselves upon a level with the Roman legions, who, in one
campaign, were conquerors on the Rhine, on the Euphrates, in Illyria,
and on the Tagus. A durable peace and permanent prosperity shall be the
fruits of your exertions. A true Frenchman can never enjoy any rest
till the sea is open and free. Soldiers, all that you have already
achieved, and that which remains to be done, will be for the happiness
of the French people, and for my glory, and shall be for ever imprinted
on my heart.”
♦1808. OCTOBER.
CONFERENCES AT ERFURTH.♦
The preparations for war were answerable to the arrogance of this
harangue. All the roads to Spain were thronged with troops, marching
from all parts of France and its dependencies toward the Pyrenees.
While they were on their march, Buonaparte set out for Germany, to
meet his dependent German princes, and the Emperor Alexander, at
Erfurth. Some of the performers of the _Theatre Française_ had orders
to precede him, that these potentates might be provided with amusement.
An opportunity was taken of giving Alexander a momentous hint of the
superiority of his new friend: ... Buonaparte took him to the field of
Jena: a temple, dedicated to Victory, was erected on the spot where
the French Emperor had past the night previous to the battle: tents
were pitched round it; and, after a sumptuous breakfast, he was led
over every part of the ground which the two armies had occupied, and
left to make his own reflections upon the spot where Prussia received
the reward of its long subserviency to France, and of its neutrality
when the fate of the continent was upon the hazard. The immediate
consequence of the meeting was a proposal for peace to Great Britain.
♦OVERTURES OF PEACE FROM ERFURTH.♦
These overtures were made in the customary diplomatic forms; but they
were accompanied by a joint letter from the Emperors of France and
Russia to the King of England. Having been brought together at Erfurth
by the circumstances of the continent, their first thought, they said,
had been to yield to the wishes and wants ♦OCT. 12.♦ of every people,
and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the remedy for the common
miseries of Europe. The long and bloody continental war was at an end,
and could not possibly be renewed. Many changes had taken place, many
states had been overthrown. The cause was to be found in the evils
arising from the stagnation of maritime commerce. Still greater changes
might yet occur, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English
nation. Peace was their interest, as well as the interest of the
continent. We unite, therefore, said they, in intreating your Majesty
to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to
seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, how to conciliate
all interests, and by that means to preserve the powers which still
exist; and to insure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation,
at the head of which Providence has placed us. The official notes
stated, that Russian plenipotentiaries would be sent to Paris, there
to receive the answer of England; and that French plenipotentiaries
would repair to any city on the continent, to which the King of Great
Britain and his allies should send theirs. It was added, that the King
of England must, without doubt, feel the grandeur and sincerity of this
conduct on the part of the two Emperors; that their union was beyond
the reach of change; and that it was formed for peace as well as for
war.
♦REPLY TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTER.
OCT. 28.♦
In answer to the Russian minister, it was stated, that however desirous
his Majesty might be to reply directly to the Emperor Alexander, the
unusual manner in which his letter was drawn up deprived it entirely
of the character of a private and personal communication, and it was
impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards him, without, at the
same time, recognizing titles which the King of England never had
acknowledged. This was a needless demurral. We had sent ministers to
treat with Buonaparte since he had been Emperor of France, ... surely
this was, to all intents, an effectual recognition of his title. It was
weakening the moral strength of our cause, to rest, even for a moment,
upon a point of punctilio. In every other respect, the correspondence
on the part of England was worthy of the cause. An immediate assurance
that France acknowledged the government of Spain as party to any
negotiation, was declared to be absolutely necessary: that such was the
intention of the Emperor of Russia, it was added, his Majesty could
not doubt. He recollected the lively interest which that Emperor had
always manifested for the dignity and welfare of the Spanish monarchy,
and wanted no other assurance that he could not have been induced to
sanction, by his concurrence, or by his approbation, usurpations,
the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was
dangerous to all lawful sovereigns.
♦REPLY TO THE OVERTURES.♦
The letter of the two Emperors was fully and most ably answered in an
official note. The King’s readiness and desire to negotiate a peace on
terms consistent with his own honour, and with the permanent security
of Europe, were again declared. If the condition of the continent
were one of agitation and of wretchedness, if many states had been
overthrown, and many more were still menaced with subversion, it was a
consolation to the King to reflect, that no part of those convulsions
could be in any degree imputable to him. Most willing was he to
acknowledge that all such dreadful changes were indeed contrary to the
policy of Great Britain. And if the cause of so much misery was to be
found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although he could
not be expected to hear with unqualified regret that the system devised
for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon
its authors or its instruments, yet it was neither in his disposition,
nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in
the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined
against him. He anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of
the continent. The war in which he was engaged was entered into for
the immediate object of national safety; but, in its progress, new
obligations had been imposed upon him, in behalf of powers whom the
aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to make common cause with
him, or who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication
of their national independence. The interests of Portugal and of Sicily
were confided to his friendship and protection; and he was connected
for peace, as well as for war, with the King of Sweden. To Spain he
was not yet bound by any formal instrument, but he had, in the face of
the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred,
and not less binding upon his mind than the most solemn treaties. He
therefore assumed, that, in an overture made to him for entering into
negotiations for a general peace, his relations subsisting with the
Spanish monarchy had been distinctly taken into consideration, and that
the government acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand
VII., was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which he was
invited to engage.
♦REPLY OF THE RUSSIAN AND FRENCH MINISTERS. NOV. 8.♦
The answer of the Russian minister was, that the admission of the
sovereigns in alliance with England could not be a point of any
difficulty; but this principle by no means extended to the necessity
of admitting the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish insurgents, and the
Emperor Alexander could not admit them. He had already acknowledged
King Joseph Napoleon; he was united with the Emperor of the French;
and he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of that
monarch. But Count Romanzoff added, he saw, with pleasure, that,
in this difference of opinion respecting the Spaniards, there was
nothing which could either prevent or delay the opening of a congress;
because his Britannic Majesty had himself admitted, that he was bound
to no positive engagement with those who had taken up arms in Spain.
Count Romanzoff did not intend to insult a British King, by telling
him he might violate his word and honour, because he was not bound
to keep them by any formal instrument; ... but M. Champagny’s reply
was intentionally insulting. “How,” said he, “is it possible for the
French government to entertain the proposal which has been made to it,
of admitting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation? What would
the English government have said, had it been proposed to them to
admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any
treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them
promises, and has frequently sent them succours.” The writer did not
perceive what warning this utterly irrelevant argument held out to the
disaffected in Ireland, by thus plainly informing them, that however
Buonaparte might promise them support, he was at all times ready to
abandon them, whenever it might suit his views. Menacing language was
then introduced. England, we were told, would find herself under a
strange mistake, if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still
entertained the idea of contending successfully, upon the continent,
against the armies of France. What hope could she have, especially
when France was irrevocably united with Russia? France and Russia
could carry on the war till the court of London recurred to just and
equitable dispositions; they were resolved to do so; and the English
were admonished not to lose sight of the inevitable results of the
force of states.
♦DEC. 9.
FINAL ANSWER OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.♦
Mr. Canning’s replies were equally decided and dignified. To Count
Romanzoff he expressed the King’s astonishment and regret, that it
should be supposed he would consent to commence a negotiation by
the previous abandonment of the cause of the Spanish nation, and
of the legitimate monarchy of Spain, in deference to an usurpation
which had no parallel in the history of the world. He had hoped that
the participation of the Emperor Alexander in these overtures would
have afforded a security to him against the proposal of a condition
so unjust in its effect, and so fatal in its example. Nor could
he conceive by what obligation of duty or of interest, or by what
principle of Russian policy, his Imperial Majesty could have found
himself compelled to acknowledge the right assumed by France, of
deposing and imprisoning friendly Sovereigns, and forcibly transferring
to herself the allegiance of loyal and independent nations. If these
were indeed the principles to which the Emperor had inviolably attached
himself, to which he had pledged the character and resources of his
empire, and which he had united himself with France to establish by
war, and to maintain in peace ... deeply did the King of England lament
a determination by which the sufferings of Europe must be aggravated
and prolonged: but not to him was to be attributed the continuance
of the calamities of war, by the disappointment of all hope of such
a peace as would be compatible with justice and with honour. To the
French minister Mr. Canning said, he was especially commanded to
abstain from noticing any of those topics and expressions insulting
to his Majesty, to his allies, and to the Spanish nation, with which
the official note of M. Champagny abounded. The King of England was
desirous to have treated for a peace which might have arranged the
respective interests of all the belligerent powers on principles of
equal justice, but he was determined not to abandon the cause of the
Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain; and the
pretension of France, to exclude from the negotiation the central
and supreme government, acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty,
Ferdinand VII., was one which he could not admit, without acquiescing
in an usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world.
♦BRITISH DECLARATION.
DEC. 15.♦
As soon as this correspondence was concluded, the rupture of the
negotiation was made known in England, by a declaration which, while
any sense of honour remains in the English nation, may always be
recollected with pride and satisfaction. The continued appearance of a
negotiation, it said, when peace was found to be utterly unattainable,
could be advantageous only to the enemy. It might enable France to
sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who were combined
to resist her oppression; and if, among the nations which were
groaning under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which
maintained against France a doubtful and precarious independence,
there should be any who were balancing between the certain ruin of a
prolonged inactivity and the contingent dangers of an effort to save
themselves from that ruin ... to nations so situated, the delusive
prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail
to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed, by
the vain hope of returning tranquillity, or their purpose shaken, by
the apprehension of being left to contend alone. That such was, in
fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted from
Erfurth, his Majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment
when results, so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from
their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or
war, he felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility
of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies. It was difficult
for him to believe that the Emperor of Russia had devoted himself so
blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with
which his Imperial Majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be
prepared openly to abet the usurpation of Spain. He therefore met the
seeming fairness and moderation of the proposal with fairness and
moderation on his part real and sincere, expressing his just confidence
that the Spanish government, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., was
understood to be a party to this negotiation. The reply returned by
France to this proposition cast off at once the thin disguise, which
had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and displayed, with less than
ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The
universal Spanish nation was described by the degrading appellation
of the Spanish insurgents, and the demand for the admission of its
government as a party to any negotiation was rejected, as inadmissible
and insulting. With astonishment, as well as grief, he had received
from the Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, although less
indecorous in tone and manner. The King would readily have embraced
an opportunity of negotiation which might have afforded any hope
or prospect of a peace compatible with justice and with honour. He
lamented an issue by which the sufferings of Europe were prolonged; but
neither his honour nor the generosity of the British nation would admit
of his consenting to commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a
brave and loyal people, who were contending for the preservation of all
that is dear to man, and whose exertions, in a cause so unquestionably
just, he had solemnly pledged himself to sustain.
Such an answer was consistent with the honour, the principles, and
the feelings of the British people. Buonaparte anticipated it: his
♦BUONAPARTE DEPARTS FOR SPAIN.♦ proposals might have that effect which
the English cabinet had foreseen, upon the powers which he oppressed,
and they might deceive the French people; at least they gave a popular
topic for his sycophants in the Senate, and those whose office it was
to mislead the public mind. He himself knew what the result must be,
and had not for a moment suspended or slackened his preparations. ♦OCT.
25.♦ Before a reply could be made to the first overture, he returned
to Paris, and, in his address to the legislative body, informed them
that he should depart in a few days, to put himself in person at the
head of his army, and, with God’s help (such was the expression of the
blasphemer), to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles
on the forts of Spain. It was a distinguished favour of the providence,
he said, which had constantly protected his army, that passion had so
far blinded the English councils, as to have made them abandon the
defence of the seas, and at last produce their army on the continent.
His vaunts and his impieties were, of course, echoed by those whom he
addressed: but their flattery was far exceeded by the language of some
deputies from the new Italian departments, who had audience on the same
day. The destinies of the whole world, they told him, were confided by
the Almighty to his impenetrable views, to the supreme power of his
genius, to the miraculous exploits of his arms. Hence a new order
of things, already written in the books of the Eternal, was prepared
for their country. In the necessity in which he was to overthrow, to
destroy, to disperse all enemies, as the wind dissipates the dust,
he was not an exterminating Angel; but he was the Being that extends
his thoughts, and measures the face of the earth, to re-establish its
happiness upon a better and surer basis. He was destined before all
ages to be the Man of God’s right hand; the Sovereign Master of all
things. Language of more idolatrous adoration was never listened to
by the frantic Caligula, nor uttered by the infatuated followers of
Sabatai Sevi. It was not, however, too gross for the tyrant to whom it
was addressed; and he applauded it in his reply. Immediately after this
scene he left Paris, reached Bayonne on the 3d of November, and, five
days afterwards, put himself at the head of his army at Vitoria.
CHAPTER XIV.
BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN. DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. SURRENDER OF
MADRID. THE SPANIARDS ENDEAVOUR TO RALLY AT CUENCA, AND ON THE
TAGUS.
♦1808. OCTOBER.♦
An old prophecy was at this time circulated in Paris, importing that
the disasters which would lead to the overthrow of the French empire
were to originate in Spain. It had probably been sent abroad in the
days of Louis XIV. when his designs upon that kingdom were first
manifested, and the resistance which they would provoke from the powers
of Europe was foreseen. The persons by whom it was now reproduced
apprehended ♦PASLEY ON THE MILITARY POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN, P.
34.♦ that the English would land a strong force in the north of the
peninsula, so as to cut off the French armies from their communication
with Bayonne. Like all desponding or discontented politicians, they
overrated the wisdom and the power of the enemy. If indeed, when an
expedition was sent to Portugal, this had been done at the same time,
the issue can hardly be deemed doubtful. We had disciplined soldiers,
ships to transport them, and means of every kind in abundance; but
vigour was wanting in our councils, and in offensive war we had every
thing to learn. It was, however, intended that an army little short
of 40,000 men should take the field with the Spaniards; and had such
an army been in the field, under an able and enterprising commander,
subsequent events have given an Englishman right to affirm, that no
force which could have been brought against it in one point, would have
been able to defeat it. But this intention was frustrated as much by
the precipitance of the Spaniards as by the dilatoriness of the British
movements.
♦MOVEMENTS AGAINST BLAKE’S ARMY.♦
By the latter end of October not less than 100,000 troops had crossed
the Pyrenees from the side of Bayonne, to reinforce their countrymen.
The head-quarters were at Vitoria, where they had continued since
Joseph arrived there on his flight from Madrid. The left wing, under
Marshal Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano, was posted along the banks of
the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla; Marshal
Ney, Duke of Elchingen, had his head-quarters at Guardia; Marshal
Bessieres, Duke of Istria, at Miranda, with a garrison at Pancorbo;
Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, occupied the heights of Durango,
and defended the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of
the Spaniards. Blake had posted the main body of his army in front
of Lefebvre’s force, and occupied with the rest the debouches of
Villarcayo, Orduña, and Munguia. He hoped that the Asturian General,
Azevedo, would cut off the communication between Durango and Vitoria
by Ochandiano, and that, by possessing himself of the heights of
Mondragon, and thus getting in the rear of the enemy’s advanced guard,
he might be enabled to strike a great blow. The plan was good, if it
could have been executed in time; but Blake persisted in it after he
knew that the French had received strong reinforcements. Some trifling
advantages, and the confidence of the Spanish character, encouraged
him to this imprudence, by which he exposed himself to be entirely cut
off. It was Buonaparte’s intention to take the advantage which was thus
offered him; and Lefebvre therefore had been ordered to content himself
with keeping the Spaniards in check till the Emperor should arrive;
but his flanks were so much annoyed by Blake, that this delay became
inconvenient, and on the last day of October the French attacked him.
After a long and well-contested action of nine hours the Spaniards
retreated in good order by Bilbao and Valmaseda to Nava, without losing
colours or prisoners. No artillery had been used, the country being
too mountainous for it. The enemy entered Bilbao the next day; and the
corps of Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, arriving at this time, was
directed by Munguia and Amurrio to Valmaseda, to fall upon the flank of
the Galician army.
♦BLAKE FALLS BACK TO ESPINOSA.
1808. NOVEMBER.♦
Blake’s intention had been to fall back till he could concentrate his
whole force; but the second division, and a part of the Asturians under
Azevedo, had their communication cut off; and as the French were
strengthening themselves at Arancadiaga and Orrantia to prevent the
junction, he prepared to attack them. They retreated during the night
of the 4th; but on the following day a division of his army came up
with 7000 of the enemy near Valmaseda, and drove them from thence with
considerable loss. Having thus effected the junction, he attacked the
enemy again on the 7th at Gueñes, and turned their left wing, but his
own centre was unable to advance; and perceiving that the French had
received very considerable reinforcements that day from Bilbao, his own
men too being exhausted by hunger and fatigue, he deemed it prudent to
retire to Espinosa de los Monteros, where he hoped to refresh and feed
his men, and draw artillery and supplies from Reynosa. Seldom indeed
have any troops endured greater hardships. From the 23rd of October
they had been continually in the open air, among the mountains of
Biscay, during rainy nights and the most inclement weather: they were
all without hats, great part of them half clothed, and barefooted, and
they had been six days without bread, wine, or spirits; indeed, without
any other supply of food than the sheep and cattle which were to be
found among the mountains. There had been a considerable desertion
among the young recruits; but from those who remained not a murmur was
heard under all these privations: they manifested no other wish than
that the sacrifice of their lives might contribute to the destruction
of the enemy, and the deliverance of Spain.
♦BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.♦
The system of the French was to beat this army down, as their
increasing numbers enabled them to do, by repeated attacks. Blake
intended to remain some days at Espinosa, for the purpose of giving
his men some rest. But having arrived on the 9th, his rear-guard,
under the Conde de San Roman, one of the officers who had escaped
from the Baltic, was attacked on the following day, by a far superior
force. He immediately posted his army in front of the town; Azevedo,
with the Asturians and the first division, on a height to the left,
covering the road to S. Andero; the second division on a hill to the
right; the third and the reserve in the centre. The van-guard was
posted on a little hill close in the rear of the centre, with six
four-pounders. The enemy were successful in their first attack, and
drove the Spaniards from a wood which they had occupied; they returned,
however, to the charge, being reinforced with the third division, and
the action became general, except on the left of the Spanish position.
It continued for three hours, till evening closed in; and Blake thought
the advantage was on his side, though the enemy had gained possession
of a wood and ridge of hill in front of his centre and right. The
contest had been very severe, and a very great proportion of the
Spanish officers had fallen, San Roman among them, and the Galician
General Riquelme, both mortally wounded. The men lay on their arms
that night, and Victor, who commanded in this battle, brought up fresh
troops from his rear to the ridge. At daybreak, when the main attention
of the Spaniards was drawn towards this point, he made his great attack
upon their left, commencing it with a strong body of sharp-shooters;
they were twice repulsed; meantime one of their large columns, under
General Maison, came up and formed in line; the sharp-shooters, being
reinforced, returned to the charge, and General Ruffin, with his
division, attacked the centre. There the enemy were well resisted; but
on the left they succeeded, owing, in great part, it appears, to the
system which on this and the preceding day was practised, of marking
out the officers. Azevedo, and the two Asturian Generals who were next
in command, fell; this threw the men into confusion, and when they saw
themselves cut off from the road to S. Andero, and that the French
were advancing to occupy a height in rear of the town which commands
the road to Reynosa, they gave way, and nothing remained but to order
a general retreat. They had to retire by a bridge over the Trueba and
a defile; and instead of attempting to save the guns, which would
necessarily have impeded the retreat of the army, Blake thought it
better to employ them till the last moment; this was done with great
effect, and they were spiked when the enemy was close to them.
Blake was one of those men who would have been thought worthy of the
chief command if they had never been trusted with it. His talents
were considerable; he understood the theory of his profession well,
and could plan an action or a campaign with great ability; but he
was deficient in that promptitude and presence of mind which are
the first qualifications of a commander. His own game he could play
skilfully, but when the adversary disconcerted it by some unexpected
movement, he was incapable of forming new dispositions to meet
the altered circumstances. By persisting against a superior and
continually increasing force in operations which had been calculated
against an inferior one, he exposed himself to the imminent hazard
of being entirely cut off; and by advancing so far into a country
which had been stripped of its provisions, and with no commissariat
to follow him, he exhausted his men. Under every privation he indeed
set them an example of cheerfulness, and let them see that he fared
as hardly as themselves; but this could not counteract the effects
of inanition. They were in a state of famine when they arrived at
Espinosa, and would have found nothing there to relieve them if 250
mules, laden with biscuits, had not most opportunely arrived, sent by
Major-General Leith, who was forwarding partial supplies toward them
by every possible way. But men thus hungered, and enfeebled also by
long continued exposure to cold and rain, were ill fitted for close
action, in which much depended upon personal strength. Another and
more lamentable error was, that the troops from the Baltic, the only
thoroughly disciplined part of his force, were brought into action
after the first defeat, and exposed by single battalions to bear the
brunt of every conflict; and thus they were sacrificed in detail,
giving melancholy proof, by the devoted courage with which they stood
their ground, of what they could have effected, if, as a body, they had
been brought into some fair field of battle.
♦DISPERSION OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT REYNOSA.♦
Blake attempted with the remains of his army to make a stand at
Reynosa; his principal magazine and his park of artillery were there;
it is one of the strongest positions in that strong country, and
had it been occupied in time, the event of the campaign might have
been different. But the forlorn hope of collecting his scattered
forces there was soon defeated. Victor was pursuing him closely from
Espinosa; Lefebvre from the side of Villarcayo. And from the side of
Burgos, where a fatal blow had now been struck, Marshal Soult, Duke
of Dalmatia, marched upon Reynosa. No alternative was left him but to
retreat toward S. Andero, and the dispersion was so complete, that
there no longer remained any force on this side to oppose the enemy.
Yet in justice to this ill-fated army it should be said, that no men
ever behaved more gallantly, nor with more devoted patriotism. Without
cavalry, half clothed, almost without food, they fought battle after
battle against troops always superior in number, and whose losses were
always filled up with reinforcements. Nor did any circumstance of
disgrace attend their defeat; there was no capitulation, no surrender
of large bodies, or of strong places; the ground on which they fought
was won by the French, and that was all, as long as any body of the
Spaniards remained together. The magazines at Reynosa now fell into
their hands, and they entered S. Andero. ♦NOV. 16.♦ The Bishop saved
himself in an English ship, and General Riquelme expired as his men
were lifting him on board. They had borne him thither from Espinosa;
for, routed as they were, they would not leave him to die in the hands
of the enemy. Here, and in some of the smaller ports, the French found
a considerable booty of English goods.
♦BUONAPARTE ARRIVES IN SPAIN.♦
When Buonaparte arrived in Spain he was not pleased at finding that
Lefebvre had opened the campaign; his hope had been to march a strong
force in the rear of Blake’s army, and thus place it in a situation
where it must either have been destroyed or have laid down its arms.
In crossing the mountains near Mondragon he had nearly lost one of his
favourite Generals, Marshal Lasnes, Duke of Montebello; the ground was
covered with frozen snow, his horse fell with him, and in attempting to
rise fell on him. He was carried to Vitoria in a state of great danger,
his body covered with those discolorations which show that the small
vessels of the skin are ruptured, the abdomen swoln, the extremities
cold, suffering acute pain, and with all the symptoms of inflammation
in the intestines, from the shock and the pressure. M. Larrey, who
attended Buonaparte in all his campaigns, had learnt a remedy from the
savages of Newfoundland, applied by them to some sailors whose boat had
been broken to pieces and themselves dashed by the waves upon their
coast. A large sheep having been first stunned by a blow on the neck,
was immediately flayed, the reeking skin was sown round the Marshal’s
body, while his limbs were wrapped in warm flannels, and some cups of
weak tea were given him. He felt immediate relief, complaining only of
a painful sense of formication, and of the manner in which the skin
seemed to attract every part wherewith it was in contact. In the course
of ten minutes he was ♦LARREY, CAMPAGNES ET MEMOIRES, T. III. 243–246.♦
asleep. When he awoke, after two hours, the body was streaming with
perspiration, the dangerous symptoms were relieved, and on the fifth
day he was able to mount on horseback and follow the army.
♦DEFEAT OF THE EXTREMADURAN ARMY AT BURGOS.♦
Buonaparte reached the head-quarters at Vitoria on the 8th, and
immediately pushed forward a corps under Soult against the Extremaduran
army in his front. Bessieres commanded the cavalry, which had before
proved so fatal to the Spaniards at Rio Seco, and which had now been
greatly reinforced. This army, under the Conde de Belveder, had been
intended to support Blake, and keep up a communication between his
army and that of Castaños. It consisted of about 13,000 men; and their
Commander, a young man, although aware that a superior force was
advancing against him, waited for the attack in an open ♦NOV. 10.♦
position at Gamonal. He had with him some of the Walloon and Spanish
guards, and a few regiments of the line; the rest were new levies, and
among them a corps of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon.
These youths, the pride and the hope of many a generous family, were in
the advanced guard. They displayed that courage which might be looked
for in men of their condition, and at that time of life: twice they
repulsed the French infantry, and when Bessieres with the horse came
upon their flank, fell almost to a man where they had been stationed.
The loss in killed was estimated at 3000, nearly a fourth of this brave
army; the victorious cavalry entered Burgos with the fugitives, and
the city, which was entirely forsaken by its inhabitants, was given up
to be plundered. Bessieres pursued Count Belveder, while Soult turned
aside toward Reynosa, to complete the destruction of Blake’s army. One
corps of the French marched upon Palencia, another upon Lerma; from
the latter place the Count retreated to Aranda; there also Bessieres
pursued, and the wreck of the army collected at Segovia; the piquets
of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry covered the
plains of Castille.
♦PROCLAMATION EXCLUDING CERTAIN SPANIARDS FROM PARDON.♦
On the second day after the defeat of the Extremaduran army Buonaparte
established his head-quarters at Burgos, and issued a proclamation,
granting, in the Intruder’s name, a pardon to all Spaniards who,
within one month after his arrival at Madrid, should lay down their
arms, and renounce all connexion with England. Neither the members
of the Juntas nor the general officers were excepted: but wishing,
he said, to mark those, who, after having sworn fidelity to Joseph
Buonaparte, had violated that oath; and who, instead of employing
their influence to enlighten the people, had only used it to mislead
them: wishing also that the punishment of great offenders might serve
as an example in future times to all those, who, being placed at the
head of nations, instead of directing them with wisdom and prudence,
should mislead them into disorders and popular tumults, and precipitate
them into misfortunes and war: for these reasons he excepted from
this amnesty the Dukes of Infantado, Hijar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna,
the Marques de Santa Cruz, Counts Fernan Nunez and Altamira, the
ex-Minister of State Cevallos, and the Bishop of S. Andero; declaring
them traitors to the two crowns of France and Spain, and decreeing
that they should be seized, brought before a military commission, and
shot. Those persons who had sworn homage to the Intruder, compulsory as
that homage was, had unquestionably exposed themselves to its possible
consequences: they had been forced into a situation in which the
only alternative was to become traitors to him, or traitors to their
country: but by what law or what logic were they traitors to France,
a country to which they owed no allegiance, and with which they had
contracted no obligation?
♦MOVEMENTS AGAINST CASTAÑOS.♦
From Burgos Marshals Ney and Victor were dispatched with their
divisions to act on the rear of Castaños, and cut off his retreat,
while Lasnes, with 30,000 men, should attack him in front. This last
remaining army of the Spaniards is represented by the French as
consisting of 80,000 men, of whom three-fourths were armed. But the
nominal force of the conjoined armies under Castaños and Palafox was
only 65,000, and the effective soldiers hardly more than half that
amount. Many of the Andalusian troops had returned to their homes
after the first success, and many more had remained at Madrid, so that
though some thousands (mostly from Valencia) had joined Castaños, his
force was little more numerous than it had been at Baylen. His own
opinion was decidedly against risking an action in which there could
be no reasonable hope of advantage; but the commissioner, D. Francisco
Palafox, to whom the power of overruling the General had been madly
entrusted by the Central Junta, determined that a battle should be
fought, and Castaños therefore was compelled to fight, lest he should
be stigmatized as a traitor, and murdered by his own men, or torn to
pieces by a mob. Already the Conde de Montijo, who left the army at
this time, was every where accusing him of treachery, because he had
warmly opposed a determination, the fatal consequences of which he
certainly foresaw.
♦BATTLE OF TUDELA.♦
The plan of the French against this army was the same as that which
they had practised against Blake’s; they meant to rout it by a
powerful attack in front, and to destroy the fugitives by intercepting
them with a second force in their flight. Their destruction was
considered to be as certain as their defeat, but Ney was less
expeditious in his movements than had been calculated; and Castaños
hearing on the 21st that this corps was advancing upon Soria, while
Lasnes and Moncey approached from the side of Logroño and Lodosa,
abandoned Calahorra and fell back upon Tudela. On the 22d Lasnes
entered Calahorra and Alfaro, and at daybreak on the following morning
he found the Spaniards drawn up in seven divisions, with their right
before Tudela, and their left extending along a line of from four
to five miles upon a range of easy heights. The Aragonese, who had
joined only a few hours before by forced marches, were on the right,
the Valencians and the troops of New Castille in the centre, the
Andalusians on the left. Their line was covered by forty pieces of
artillery. Situations were chosen by the enemy for planting sixty
pieces against them; but upon seeing their own relative strength, and
the confusion which was observable among the Spaniards, they preferred
a more summary mode of attack. General Maurice Mathieu, with a division
of infantry, forced the Spanish centre; and General Lefebvre, with the
cavalry, passing through, wheeled to the left, and coming in the rear
of the Aragonese, at a time when that wing, having withstood an attack,
supposed itself victorious, the fate of the battle was decided. At the
same time Lagrange, with his division, attacked the left; a brave,
and in some part a successful resistance was opposed; and the action,
which began in the morning, was prolonged on this side till darkness
enabled Lapeña’s division to fall back from Cascante to Tarazona,
where the first and third divisions were stationed, and had not been
engaged. There too the second division arrived, which had been ordered
to support Lapeña; but though it received these orders at noon, and
the distance which it had to march was only two leagues, either from
incapacity in the leaders, or want of order, it did not arrive till
night, after the action was decided.
♦RETREAT OF THE DEFEATED ARMY.♦
According to the French 4000 Spaniards fell in this battle, 3000 men,
300 officers, and thirty pieces of cannon were taken, their own loss
not amounting to 500. The right wing, dispersing and escaping how it
could, assembled again at Zaragoza, with some of the central division
also, there to prove that their failure in the field had not been for
want of courage. As soon as the wreck of the left had collected at
Tarazona, Castaños ordered them to begin their march by way of Borja to
Calatayud. It was midnight, and at the moment when they were setting
forward a chapel, which served as a magazine, blew up. Many shells went
off after the explosion; this occasioned an opinion that an enemy’s
battery might be playing upon them, and the Royal Carabineers, in the
midst of the confusion, fancying that the chapel was occupied by the
French, presented themselves sword in hand to charge it. Presently
a cry of treason was set up; it spread rapidly; misfortune in such
times is always deemed a proof of treachery; those troops who had
not been engaged could not understand wherefore they were ordered to
retreat, and at such an hour; a general distrust prevailed; some corps
dispersed, and they who remained together were in a fearful state
of insubordination. They retreated however through Borja and Ricla,
without stopping in either place, and on the night of the 25th reached
Calatayud.
♦THEIR DEPLORABLE CONDITION AT CALATAYUD.♦
On that same day Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit, ... too
late to make any prisoners. Ney arrived on the day following. He had
been ordered to reach Agreda on the 23d, which, if he had done, the
wreck of this army must have been destroyed; but he found a pretext
for delay in the fatigue of his men, and a cause in the pillage of
Soria. The people of that city, unmindful of the example which the
Numantines had set them upon that very ground, opened their gates to
the enemy. This did not save them from being plundered. Their church,
and their rich wool-factors, afforded good spoil to the French; and
for the sake of this booty, and that he might extort all he could
from the inhabitants, Ney remained there three days, not because his
men had been over-marched. But this delay enabled Castaños to reach
Calatayud. He had thus escaped the danger of immediate pursuit, and men
and officers had leisure now to feel the whole wretchedness of their
situation. There were neither magazines nor stores here; the system of
supplying the troops, which before had been miserably incomplete, was
at an end, and the military chest, containing two million _reales_,
had been conveyed to Zaragoza. Desperate with hunger, the men broke
through all restraint, and the inhabitants fled from their houses,
hardly less dismayed at the temper of their own soldiers than at the
vicinity of the French. The muleteers attached to the baggage and
artillery could obtain no payment, nor food either for their animals
or themselves; such as could find opportunity threw away the baggage,
mounted their beasts, and rode away; others abandoned them altogether,
cursing their ill fortune, and yet glad to escape with their lives. The
soldiers, having nothing else to stay the cravings of hunger, devoured
cabbage leaves, or whatever crude vegetables they could find, and many
literally dropped for want.
♦THEY ARE ORDERED TO APPROACH MADRID.♦
Here Palafox and the Aragonese army expected that Castaños would
have rallied, have made a stand, and, acting on the offensive as
circumstances permitted, have saved Zaragoza from a second siege, or
at least have delayed its evil day. They who formed this expectation
did not reckon upon the activity of the enemy, and imputed to their own
government a promptitude and power which it was far from possessing.
Had the defeat of the central army been apprehended in time, and
measures taken for supporting it, one of the first objects would have
been to have strengthened this point. There had been no such foresight.
The French were in pursuit, and orders arrived from Morla, who was one
of the council of war, requiring Castaños to hasten with his army to
the defence of the capital. He consulted accordingly with the chiefs
of division, and they resolved to march by way of Siguenza; from
whence they might either repair to Somosierra, if that strong position
should still be retained, or to Madrid, if such a movement should be
more advisable. In that direction, therefore, they recommenced their
retreat, after one day’s rest.
♦MEASURES OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta, mean while, was occupying itself with measures ill
adapted to such times. While Blake’s army was fighting, day after day,
without clothing, without food, and without reinforcements to recruit
its ranks, they passed a decree for the establishment of a special
tribunal, to try all persons accused of treason; its object being not
more to bring such as were guilty to deserved punishment, than to
rescue from suspicion and danger those who were unjustly suspected;
for, under the existing circumstances of Spain, they said, the people
having suffered so much from treachery, would naturally suspect all
those whose conduct it did not fully comprehend. The tribunal, which
was composed of members from each of the great councils of state, was
to have a jurisdiction over persons of all ranks: but not to carry
into execution any sentence of death, confiscation, or dismissal from
office, till they laid the whole case before the Supreme Junta. A
certain number of its members might carry on the ordinary business, but
a writ for the arrest of any person, or the sequestration of his goods,
must be issued by the whole. Especial provisions were made to prevent
secret arrest, or long confinement; and the papers of the accused were
not to be detained, as soon as it was ascertained that they contained
no relation to the matter with which he was charged. No proceedings
were to take place upon anonymous information, nor was any informer
to be admitted, who would not consent to let his name be known. The
humanity of these provisions is in such direct opposition to the
practice of the holy office, that it seems to have been the intention
of the framers of this tribunal to render their state inquisition as
unlike as possible to that curse and disgrace of their country. The
tribunal was particularly charged to inquire into the conduct of those
persons who had gone as deputies to Bayonne, or who had submitted to
the Intruder at Madrid; endeavouring carefully to distinguish between
what was compulsory and what was their own act and deed; and proceeding
with the caution and prudence required, where, on the one hand, the
public safety was at stake, and, on the other, the reputation of
many good and honourable citizens. And when their investigations had
established the innocence of any one, they were to consult with the
Supreme Junta upon the means of restoring to him all the credit and
respectability which he had formerly enjoyed.
By another decree, dated on the day when Castaños was defeated at
Tudela, they resolved that honorary militias should be formed in
all towns which were not in the scene of war, in order to prevent
disorders, and to arrest robbers, deserters, and ill-disposed persons.
A more remarkable measure related to the Ex-Jesuits: their banishment
was repealed, and they were permitted to return to any part of Spain,
and there enjoy their pensions. The reason assigned was, that it was
a miserable thing for them to be expatriated, to live far from their
friends and kin, and be abandoned to the mercy of strangers; that it
was now become difficult to furnish them with the pensions assigned
to them by the crown; and that the sums thus allotted were so much
withdrawn from the circulating specie of the kingdom, to increase that
of foreign and even of hostile countries. This late act of humanity to
the poor survivors of an injured community, is not at any time to be
censured; but it is extraordinary that at such a time it should have
occupied the attention of the Junta.
Of these measures, all would have been unexceptionable, and even
praise-worthy, had they been well-timed; but the Central Junta still
pursued the fatal system of deceiving the people as to the extent
and imminence of their danger. They addressed a proclamation to the
inhabitants of Madrid, saying, that they had taken all the measures in
their power for defeating the enemy, ♦NOV. 21.♦ who, continuing his
attacks, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra; and that the
number of the French there hardly amounted to 8000 men. The enthusiasm
with which the soldiers were preparing to beat the enemies of their
country, they said, and their confidence in their valour, was not to be
expressed; and the English were ready to march from the Escurial, to
reinforce the position chosen by the able general whom the Junta had
appointed, and to support the operations of the van, who, by that time,
were already engaged with the slaves of the tyrant.
With such representations did the government endeavour to deceive the
people of Madrid, and lull them into a feeling of security, when its
duty was, to have told them the whole extent of their danger, and
manfully roused them to those exertions which the emergency required.
But they themselves still in some degree partook the delusion which
they inspired. Their confidence in the Spanish character was too well
founded ever to be shaken; and they relied, with little reflection,
upon the natural strength of the country. Their present hope was upon
the pass of the Somosierra. D. Benito San Juan, a judicious and able
officer, of high reputation, was stationed there with the remains
of the Extremaduran army, which had with great promptitude been
reinforced. The Junta did not call to mind with how little difficulty
Vedel had forced the stronger passes of the Sierra Morena.
♦PASS OF THE SOMOSIERRA FORCED.♦
Buonaparte continued at Aranda till the 29th, when his head-quarters
were removed to Bocaguillas, a village upon the skirts of the
Somosierra. There he learnt that about 6000 men were entrenched upon
the heights of Sepulveda, and that a stronger body occupied the pass.
The advanced guard was attacked without the success which the French
expected; but the Spaniards, instead of being encouraged by this
advantage, forsook their entrenchments and dispersed. On the following
morning the enemy, under M. ♦NOV. 30.♦ Victor, attempted the pass.
Sixteen pieces of cannon had been well placed to flank the ascent, and
some attempts had been made to break up the road; but this easy means
of defence had been so imperfectly performed, that the pass was won
by a charge of Polish lancers. They were favoured in their approach
by a thick fog; but the Spaniards must have strangely neglected the
advantage of the ground, when they suffered a strong mountain defile
to be taken by a charge of light horse. The men, fancying themselves
betrayed, betrayed themselves by their own fears; they threw away their
arms, and dispersed among the hills, leaving all the artillery and
baggage to the enemy. And now the way to Madrid was open.
During the series of disasters which thus rapidly succeeded each
other, there had been no time for the Junta to think of removing
their residence to the capital, still less for them to take into
consideration, on the appointed day, the plan for forming a Regency,
and convoking the ♦THE CENTRAL JUNTA RETIRE FROM ARANJUEZ.♦ Cortes.
They began now to feel themselves insecure at Aranjuez; ... already
advanced parties of the French had approached the Tagus; wherever they
went there was no armed force to oppose them; they had appeared at
Villarejo on the 28th, on the 30th at Mostoles; and if at this time two
or three hundred horse, with a few infantry, had pushed on to Aranjuez,
they might with perfect ease have surprised the Junta, and by depriving
Spain of its government, have inflicted ♦JOVELLANOS’S MEMORIAL, P. II.
§ 44.♦ upon it a more dangerous injury than all which it had hitherto
suffered in the field. This opportunity was overlooked by Buonaparte;
and the Junta, sensible of their danger when the consequences of the
defeat at Tudela and the rout at Somosierra were known, deliberated
whither to retire. Florida-Blanca, who was sinking under the burthen
of years and the anxieties of his situation, was for removing at once
to Cadiz, and a few others agreed with him. Jovellanos, who added to
his other virtues that of perfect calmness and intrepidity under any
danger, represented that this would be sacrificing too much for safety;
and that the honour of the government, as well as the public service,
required that it should establish itself as near as possible to the
theatre of war. Toledo was named, and rejected, ♦1808. DECEMBER.♦ as
having nothing but its situation to defend it. Cordoba and Seville were
proposed, but liable to the same objection; and Badajoz, which was the
place that Jovellanos advised, was chosen: the provinces every where
were open to the enemy, but Badajoz was a strong place, from whence
the Junta might correspond with the British army, and with that which
Romana was now re-forming in the northern provinces from the dispersed
troops of Blake and the Conde de Belveder. There they could take
measures for raising new armies in Extremadura and Andalusia; and if
the French should overrun those provinces, which there was now nothing
to prevent them from doing, they might thence pass through Portugal to
those northern parts where the founders of the Spanish monarchy had
found an asylum from the Moors; and where its restorers, animated with
the same spirit, might, in like manner, Jovellanos thought, maintain
the independence of their country. They were to halt at Toledo on the
way, and there take such measures as circumstances might require.
♦STATE OF MADRID.♦
Two days before the passage of the Somosierra orders had been given
to arm and embody the people of Madrid. The people were ready and
willing, but this measure had been too long delayed; nevertheless a
permanent Junta was formed, to maintain order, and provide for the
defence of the capital; and the latter object was especially entrusted
to Morla and to the Marques de Castelar. Now indeed was the time for
that city to have emulated Zaragoza, and the spirit was not wanting in
the inhabitants, had there been one commanding mind to have directed
them. Priests and regulars came forward to bear arms, and old men, and
women, and boys offered themselves for the service of their country;
... for this purpose leaving their houses open, and their property
to take its chance, they employed themselves in opening trenches,
erecting batteries, and barricading the streets. The pavements were
torn up, and women and children carried the stones to the tops of the
houses, to be used from thence against the enemy. Parapets were made
on the houses, and the doors stopped with mattresses. Whatever arms
were in the possession of individuals were brought forth, and about
8000 muskets were distributed. The troops who were in the city, and
the armed inhabitants, were now assembled in the Prado, that they
might be distributed to their appointed stations; the first step for
establishing that order without which all efforts in defence of the
city would be ineffectual. Great confusion prevailed, and when the
people called out for cartridges, Morla coolly replied, that there
were none. Happy had it been for Morla, if the indignation which
this proof of negligence excited had been directed against himself;
had he then perished under the hands of the mob, the treachery which
he was preparing would never have been known on earth, and he would
have escaped perpetual infamy. But his character stood so high, that
no ♦MARQUES DE PERALES MURDERED BY THE POPULACE.♦ suspicion pointed
towards him. It happened that among those cartridges which had been
delivered in the morning some were found containing sand instead of
gunpowder; they had probably been made by some dishonest workman, or
mischievous lad; but in such a time of feverish irritation and imminent
danger, the fact was of course imputed to a deep-laid scheme of
treason, and the Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime
was laid. The Duque del Infantado was informed that a mob was hastening
toward the house of this unfortunate nobleman, and that he and his
family were in the greatest peril. Infantado himself seems to have
thought there was guilt somewhere; he repaired instantly to the spot,
meaning to deliver over the suspected persons to a proper tribunal, by
which they might be tried; but before he arrived Perales[38] had been
pierced with wounds, and his dead body dragged upon a mat through the
streets, the rabble accompanying it, and exulting in what they believed
his deserved punishment.
♦THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO SENT TO THE CENTRAL ARMY.♦
The permanent Junta, who held their sittings at the post-office, as
the most central point, taking into consideration the proximity of
their danger, thought that more reliance was to be placed upon succour
from without, than on any exertions of the inhabitants. These persons
were in truth unequal to the arduous situation in which they were
placed; even the example of Zaragoza had not taught them what wonders
might be effected in a civic defence; and they did not consider, that
as the first insurrection, and the consequent massacre at Madrid, had
roused all Spain to arms, a greater impulse would now be given if
the capital opposed a determined resistance. They agreed therefore
to content themselves with such efforts as might prevent the enemy
from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant terms of
capitulation. If by this means time could be gained for a diversion to
be effected, or a successful attempt made in their favour, it would be
well; but if not, their minds were subdued to this. They counted upon
succour from San Juan’s troops, many of whom were now arriving, and
they dispatched Infantado to meet the remains of the central army, and
bring it ♦MANIFESTO DEL DUQUE DEL INFANTADO, I. 10.♦ with all speed to
the relief of Madrid. On the 2d of December, therefore, early in the
morning, the Duke set out on this forlorn commission, accompanied by
the Duque de Albuquerque and a small escort.
♦MADRID SUMMONED TO SURRENDER.♦
Only an hour or two after their departure, Bessieres, with the
French cavalry, came within sight of Madrid, and took possession of
the heights. Buonaparte arrived at noon on the same day, being the
anniversary of his coronation. There were not more than 6000 troops in
the city, but there were ten times as many men ready to lay down their
lives in its defence; and the sight of the enemy excited indignation,
not dismay. It was apparent that there was a total want of order among
the people, but that they were in a state of feeling which might render
them truly formidable: the bells of all the churches and convents were
sounding, and from time to time the shouts of the multitude were heard,
and the beat of drums. Preparations had been made which evinced at once
the zeal and the ignorance of those by whom they were directed; the
batteries were so low, that it was easy for the French to plant their
guns where they could completely command them; and they were so near
the wall, that there was scarcely room to work them, and the men would
suffer more by the broken stones than the direct effect ♦INFANTADO,
P. 4.♦ of the enemy’s shot. Buonaparte thought it easier to force the
city than he would have found it; but though insensible to any humane
considerations, policy made him desirous of avoiding that extremity.
Such a catastrophe might inflame the continent as well as Spain, by
proclaiming to all Europe how utterly the Spaniards abhorred the yoke
under which he had undertaken to subject them. An aide-de-camp of
Marshal Bessieres was therefore sent to summon the town in form; he
was seized by the people, and would have been torn to pieces if the
soldiers had not protected him. No communication could be opened that
day with those who wished to deliver up the capital. In the evening the
French infantry came up; arrangements for an attack in the morning
were made by moonlight; and at midnight a Spanish Colonel, who had been
taken at Somosierra, was sent with a letter from M. Berthier, Prince
of Neufchatel, to the Marques de Castelar, exhorting him not to expose
Madrid to the horrors of an assault. Castelar replied, that he must
consult the constituted authorities, and ascertain also how the people
were affected by their present circumstances before he could give an
answer; and he requested a suspension of arms for the ensuing day.
♦MORLA TREATS FOR A CAPITULATION.♦
This reply was sent on the morning of the 3rd. Before it arrived an
attack had been commenced upon the Buen Retiro, the favourite palace
of Philip IV. which had been fortified with some care, as a point
from whence the city might be commanded. Thirty pieces of cannon
soon made a breach in the walls, and the place was carried, after
a thousand Spaniards had fallen in defending it. The other outlets
which had been fortified were won also, but the French were repulsed
from the gates of Fuencarral and Segovia. Some shells were thrown,
in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants. In the forenoon of the
ensuing day Berthier sent in a second summons. “Immense batteries,”
said he, “are mounted, mines are prepared to blow up your principal
buildings, columns of troops are at the entrances of the town, of
which some companies of sharp-shooters have made themselves masters.
But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories,
suspends the attack till two o’clock. To defend Madrid is contrary to
the principles of war, and inhuman towards the inhabitants. The town
ought to seek protection for its peaceable inhabitants, and oblivion
for the past.” The firing ceased, and at five in the afternoon Morla
and D. Bernardo Yriarte came out to Berthier’s tent. They assured
him that Madrid was without resources, and that it would be the
height of madness to continue its defence, but that the populace
and the volunteers from the country were determined to persevere in
defending it. They themselves were convinced that this was hopeless,
and requested a pause of a few hours, that they might make the people
understand their real situation.... Hopeless, and without resources,
when threescore thousand men were ready to defend their streets, and
doors, and chambers! This would not have been said if Palafox had been
in Madrid.
♦SPEECH OF BUONAPARTE TO THE DEPUTIES.♦
These unworthy deputies were introduced to Buonaparte, and one of
those theatrical displays ensued in which he delighted to exhibit
himself. “You use the name of the people to no purpose,” said he; “if
you cannot appease them, and restore tranquillity, it is because you
have inflamed them, and led them astray by propagating falsehoods. Call
together the clergy, the heads of convents, the Alcaldes, the men of
property and influence, and let the city capitulate before six in the
morning, or it shall cease to exist. I will not withdraw my troops,
nor ought I to withdraw them. You have murdered the unfortunate
French prisoners who fell into your hands; and only a few days ago
you suffered two persons in the suite of the Russian Ambassador to be
dragged through the streets, and killed, because they were Frenchmen.
The incapacity and the cowardice of a General put into your power
troops who capitulated on the field of battle, and that capitulation
has been violated. You, M. Morla, what sort of an epistle did you write
to that General? Perhaps it becomes you, Sir, to talk of pillage;
you, who, when you entered Roussillon, carried off all the women, and
distributed them as booty among your soldiers. Besides, what right had
you to use such language? the capitulation precluded you from it. See
what has been the conduct of the English, who are yet far from piquing
themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They cried
out against the convention of Portugal, but they have fulfilled it.
To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilization; it is
placing generals on a footing with the Bedouins of the desert. How dare
you then presume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of
Baylen? See how injustice and ill faith always recoil upon the guilty!
I had a fleet at Cadiz, it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you
directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had
a Spanish army in my ranks; and rather than disarm it, I would have
seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced to precipitate
it afterwards down the rocks at Espinosa. I would rather have seven
thousand more enemies to fight than be wanting in honour and good
faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o’clock in the morning;
come back at that hour, if you have to announce the submission of the
people; otherwise you and your troops shall be all put to the sword.”
Had there been a Spaniard present to have replied as became him in
behalf of his country, Buonaparte would have trembled at the reply,
like Felix before the Apostle.
♦SURRENDER OF MADRID.♦
The enemy had now been three days before Madrid, and the ardour of
the people was deadened by delay and distrust. Deserted and betrayed
as they were, they knew not in whom to confide, and therefore began
to feel that it behoved every one to provide for his own safety.
During the night the strangers who had come to assist in the defence
of the capital, and such of the inhabitants as had been most zealous
in the national cause, left a scene where they were not allowed to
exert themselves; and at ten o’clock on the morning of the 5th the
French General Belliard took the command of the city. Morla’s first
stipulation was, that the catholic apostolic Roman religion should be
preserved, and no other legally tolerated. No person was to be molested
for his political opinions, or writings, nor for what he had done in
obedience to the former government, nor the people, for the efforts
which they had made in their defence. It was as easy for the tyrant to
grant this, as to break it whenever he might think proper. The fifth
article required that no contributions should be exacted beyond the
ordinary ones. This was granted till the realm should definitely be
organized; and, with the same qualifying reserve, it was agreed, that
the laws, customs, and courts of justice should be preserved. Another
article required, that the French officers and troops should not be
quartered in private houses nor in convents. This was granted with
a proviso, that the troops should have quarters and tents furnished
conformably to military regulations, ... regulations which placed
houses and convents at their mercy. The Spanish troops were to march
out with the honours of war, but without their arms and cannon: the
armed peasantry to leave their weapons, and return to their abodes.
They who had enlisted among the troops of the line within the last four
months were discharged from their engagements, and might return home;
the rest should be prisoners of war till an exchange took place, which,
it was added, should immediately commence between equal numbers, rank
for rank. It was asked that the public debts and engagements should
be faithfully discharged; but this, it was replied, being a political
object, belonged to the cognizance of the assembly of the realm, and
depended on the general administration. The last article stipulated,
that those generals who might wish to continue in Madrid should
preserve their rank, and such as were desirous of quitting it, should
be at liberty so to do. This was granted; but their pay was only to
continue till the kingdom received its ultimate organization.
♦DECREES ISSUED BY BUONAPARTE.♦
Notwithstanding the formality with which the soldiers were included
in this capitulation, very few of them remained to be subject to its
conditions. Castelar and all the military officers of rank refused to
enter into any terms, and, with the main body of the troops and sixteen
guns, marched out of the city on the night of the 4th, and effected
their retreat. The Council of Castille, which had already suffered the
just reproaches of their country, had now to endure the censure of
the tyrant whom they had supported while his power was predominant,
and disowned when the tide turned against him. He issued a decree,
whereby, considering that that Council had shown, in the exercise of
its functions, as much falsehood as weakness, and that, after having
published the renunciation of the Bourbons, and acknowledged the
right of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne, it had had the baseness to
declare that it had signed those documents with secret reservations, he
displaced them, as cowards, unworthy to be the magistrates of a brave
and generous nation. Care, however, was taken to except those who had
been cautious enough not to sign the recantation. At the same time
another decree was passed, abolishing the Inquisition, as incompatible
with the sovereign power, and with the civil authority. Its property
was to be united to the domains of Spain, as a guarantee for the public
debt. A third decree reduced the number of existing convents to
one-third. This was to be effected by uniting the members of several
convents in one; and no novice was to be admitted or professed till the
number of religioners of either sex should be reduced to one-third of
their present amount. All novices were ordered to quit their respective
convents within a fortnight; and those who, having professed, wished
to change their mode of life, and to live as secular ecclesiastics,
were permitted so to do, and a pension secured to them, to be regulated
by their age, but neither exceeding 4000 reales, nor falling short of
3000. From the possessions of the suppressed convents, a sum was to
be set apart sufficient for increasing the proportion of the parish
priests, so that the lowest salary should amount to 2400 reales; the
surplus of this property should be united to the national domains;
half of it appropriated to guarantee the public debt, the other to
reimburse the provinces and cities the expenses occasioned by supplying
the armies, and to indemnify the losses caused by the war. Provincial
custom-houses were abolished, and all seignorial courts of justice;
no other jurisdiction being permitted to exist than the royal courts;
and another decree, premising that one of the greatest abuses in the
finances of Spain arose from the alienation of different branches of
the imposts, which were, in their nature, unalienable, enacted, that
every individual in possession, either by grant, sale, or any other
means, of any portion of the civil or ecclesiastical imposts, should
cease to receive them.
♦PROCLAMATION TO THE SPANIARDS.♦
Buonaparte now addressed a proclamation to the Spaniards. What possible
result, he asked them, could attend even the success of some campaigns?
Nothing but an endless war upon their own soil. It had cost him only a
few marches to defeat their armies, and he would soon drive the English
from the peninsula. Thus, to the rights which had been ceded him by
the princes of the last dynasty, he had added the right of conquest:
that, however, should not make any alteration in his intentions. His
wish was to be their regenerator. All that obstructed their prosperity
and their greatness, he had destroyed; he had broken the chains which
bore the people down; and, instead of an absolute monarchy, had given
them a limited one, with a free constitution. The conclusion of this
proclamation was in a spirit of blasphemy, hitherto confined to the
barbarous countries of Africa or the East. “Should all my efforts,”
said he, “prove fruitless, and should you not merit my confidence,
nothing will remain for me but to treat you as conquered provinces, and
to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then set the crown of
Spain upon my own head, and cause it to be respected by the guilty;
_for God has given me power and inclination to surmount all obstacles_.”
But though Buonaparte had thus easily dispersed the Spanish armies, and
made himself master of Madrid, his triumph was not without alloy. He
now perceived with what utter ignorance ♦CHANGE IN BUONAPARTE’S VIEWS
CONCERNING SPAIN.♦ of the national character he had formed the scheme
of this usurpation, and he complained of having been deceived, when,
in reality, he had turned a deaf ear to all who would have dissuaded
him from his purpose. Till he arrived at Madrid, ♦DE PRADT, 180.♦ the
people, as well as the armies, had disappeared before him; the towns
and cities were abandoned ♦ROCCA, 24, 55.♦ as his troops approached.
Twelve months before there was no other country wherein his exploits
were regarded with such unmingled admiration; they had a character of
exaggerated greatness which suited the Spanish mind, and as he had
always been the ally of Spain, no feeling of hostility or humiliation
existed to abate this sentiment: now, it was not to be disguised from
himself that he was universally detested there as a perfidious tyrant.
But policy, as well as pride, withheld him from receding; unless he
went through with what he had begun, he must confess himself fallible,
and let the world see that his power was not equal to his will, and
then the talisman of his fortune would have been broken. He had
committed the crime and incurred the odium; wherefore then should he
not reap the benefit, and secure the prize, not for a brother, whom he
began to regard with contempt as the mere puppet of his pleasure, but
for himself? This was a feeling which he did not conceal from those who
possessed his confidence; and Joseph, and the unworthy ministers who
had abased themselves to serve him, were made to perceive it, by the
manner in which Napoleon, regardless even of appearances, issued edicts
in his own name, as in a kingdom of his ♦DE PRADT, 222, 225.♦ own. The
obstinacy of the Spaniards in refusing to acknowledge his brother, he
thought, would give him ere long a pretext for treating the country as
his own by right of conquest. Meantime no interval was to be allowed
them for collecting the wreck of their forces to make another stand.
♦RETREAT OF THE CENTRAL ARMY.♦
Three days before the battle of Somosierra, Castaños, with his broken
army, recommenced their retreat from Calatayud. Some ten miles west of
that city, near the village of Buvierca, the high road to Madrid passes
through a narrow gorge, where the river Xalon has forced or found
its way between two great mountain ridges. When D. Francisco Xavier
Venegas, with the rear-guard, consisting of 5000 men, reached this
place, he found instructions from the Commander-in-chief, requesting
him to suspend his march, and take measures for defending the pass,
on which, he said, the safety of the other divisions depended; and
he desired him to place the troops whom he selected for this purpose
under such officers as would volunteer their services, promising to
reward them in proportion to the importance and danger of the duty.
Venegas was too well aware of its importance to trust the command to
any but himself, and he replied, that he would halt there till the
rest of the army was beyond the reach of pursuit. Early on the 29th
the French came up, 8000 in number, under Mathieu. They commenced an
attack at eight o’clock, which continued for eight hours: the Spaniards
suffered severely; but they maintained the pass, and they effectually
disabled this part of the French army from pursuing. On the evening
of the following day the army reached Siguenza with all the artillery
which they took with them from Tarazona, notwithstanding the bad state
of the roads and the fatigue of the men, who had been allowed no rest
upon this last march. Here Castaños received a summons from the Central
Junta, and resigned the command to Don Manuel de Lapeña.
♦LAPEÑA SUCCEEDS TO THE COMMAND.♦
The situation to which this general succeeded was deplorable. The
artillery had indeed been saved, and the pass of Buvierca most
gallantly maintained; nevertheless the army had suffered during its
retreat from all the accumulated evils of disorder, insubordination,
nakedness, and cold, and hunger, and fatigue. Sometimes when the
rear-guard had been on the point of taking food, the enemy came in
sight, and the ready meal was abandoned to the pursuers; this, though
it was the effect as much of panic in the soldiers as of any want of
conduct in their commanders, gave new cause for dissatisfaction and
distrust. The men themselves were ready to fly at sight of the French,
because they suspected their leaders, yet they accused their leaders of
treachery for not always turning and making head against the enemy,
... not reflecting, that the officers in like manner, though from a
different motive, could place no confidence in their men. Many dropped
on the way, overmarched, or foundered for want of shoes; others turned
aside because they considered the army as entirely broken up: they were
ready to die for their country, but it was folly, they thought, to
squander their lives, and, under the present circumstances, their duty
was to preserve themselves, and recover strength for future service.
The loss at Buvierca, too, had been considerable. Before they reached
Siguenza the four divisions had thus been wasted down to 8000 men.
♦THEY ARRIVE AT GUADALAXARA.♦
It was on the evening of the last day of November that they reached
this point. Here message after message arrived, requiring them to
hasten with all possible speed to Somosierra. They set forward again
the following day, the infantry by Atienza and Jadraque, the horse and
artillery by Guadalaxara, in order to avoid the bad roads, leaving
the river Henares on their right. This plan was soon changed; advices
reached them in the middle of the night at Jadraque, that the pass of
Somosierra had been lost. It was now determined that the whole army
should march for Guadalaxara, for the defence of Madrid; information
of this movement was dispatched to the Marques de Castelar, in that
city; and persons were sent, some to ascertain the position of the
enemy, others to learn whither San Juan had retreated, in order that
some operations might be concerted with him. ♦DEC. 2.♦ The next day,
when the foremost troops entered Guadalaxara, they found some detached
parties of the enemy in the town, whom they drove out: the first and
fourth divisions, the horse and the artillery, arrived there that
night; here the news was, that Madrid was attacked, and the continual
firing which was heard confirmed it. Poor as the numbers were which
they could carry to the capital, they were eager to be there; and if
Madrid had been protected, as it might have been, by a British army,
or defended as the inhabitants, had it not been for treachery, would
have defended it, 8000 men, who stood by their colours under so many
hopeless circumstances, would have brought an important succour. The
inhabitants relied with great confidence upon this reinforcement; ...
they expected hourly that these brave men would appear, and take post
beside them at their gates, and in their streets; and one of the most
successful artifices by which the traitors who made the capitulation
depressed their zeal, was by reporting that a second battle had been
fought, in which the army of the centre had been entirely defeated by
Marshal Ney, so that no possible succour could be expected from it. At
the very time when this falsehood was reported, a part of this brave
army was only nine leagues from Madrid, impatient to proceed to its
assistance. They were, however, compelled to remain inactive the whole
of the next day, waiting for the second and third divisions and the
van, which did not come up till the day following.
♦THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO JOINS THEM.♦
On that day the Duque del Infantado joined them, having passed safely
through the advanced posts of the French by favour of a thick fog.
A council of war was held; the urgent danger of the capital was
represented by the Duke, and low as his hopes had fallen, when he saw
the deplorable state to which the remains of the army were reduced
by fatigue and hunger, it was nevertheless determined that an effort
should be made, not to attack the besiegers, for this would have
been madness, but to collect as large a convoy of provisions as they
could, and endeavour to enter with it under cover of the night by the
Atocha gate. The Duke, however, knew but too well the situation of
the metropolis; and at his suggestion a letter was sent to the French
General who commanded before the walls, reminding him that a great
number of French were in the hands of the Spaniards, and would be held
responsible with their lives for any ill treatment which might be
offered to the inhabitants of Madrid. Both the officer and the trumpet
were detained prisoners by Buonaparte’s orders.
♦CONDITION OF THE TROOPS.
DEC. 4.♦
The troops were now mustered, and it was then perceived what they had
lost in number, and how severely they had suffered during this fearful
retreat. From 6000 to 7000 infantry, and about 1500 cavalry, were all
that could be brought together; men and horses alike exhausted by
fatigue and hunger; many indeed had fallen and perished by the way.
Here for the first time they found something like relief, great numbers
not having tasted bread for eight days: they had now sufficient food,
and there was cloth enough in the manufactory there to supply every man
with a _poncho_, the rude garment of the Indians about Buenos Ayres,
which the Spaniards have adopted for its simplicity and convenience.
Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood; they
occupied Alcala and the adjoining villages, and some skirmishes took
place at Meca. Buonaparte had been informed of their movements, and as
soon as Madrid capitulated, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara
with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with infantry.
The first business of Lapeña was to disencumber himself of his
superfluous artillery, for they had brought off no fewer than sixty
pieces of cannon. Forty of these, to preserve them from the enemy,
were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and these were safely forwarded
to Carthagena. The van, under Venegas, which had saved the army at
Buvierca, arrived on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced
by drafts; the post of honour and of danger had been assigned it during
the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements
of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving Guadalaxara when it
arrived, the second and third followed the next noon, in two columns,
proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz: this division began to follow
them, but before it was out of one gate, the advanced guard of the
enemy entered at another.
♦THEY RETIRE TOWARDS THE TAGUS.♦
Venegas perceived the importance of a position to the south of the
city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he
immediately, occupied it. The battalions (_tercios_) of Ledesma and
Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his
intention, and turned back and joined him; their commanding officers,
D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing
part in the action which they expected. The French were in great force
opposite on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments
forded both on the right and left of the Spaniards’ position; but
light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished
with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too
formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French
halted during the whole evening, not choosing to cross the river.
Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was
all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness
had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss
of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a
little village about two leagues east of Alcala, between the rivers
Henares and Tajuna. There he learnt the fate of Madrid. The French now
evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back
of Meca, and along the banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced
parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood.
The plan of Lapeña and his officers under these circumstances was, to
cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the
mountains of Toledo. With this intent they marched to Villarejo de
Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropped behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were
sabred by the French with that cruelty which at this time so frequently
characterised and disgraced their armies.
♦PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS.♦
On the 6th, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings
came that the French were in possession of that place, and this was
confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted
to resist the enemy there with a few armed peasantry, and a few
soldiers who had escaped from Madrid. New difficulties now presented
themselves to the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo
was become hopeless: it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia,
for the French General, Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession
of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and, pushing on as far as Ocaña, cut
off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross
the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and
other places where there were ferries, and make for the Sierras of
Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the
stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance
for all their sufferings. Hazardous as it was to cross the river in
this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare
good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man
nor a gun was lost. Having gained the left bank of the river, they
hastened on their retreat, and head-quarters were established on the
7th at Belinchon. The second division, under General Grimanest, which
crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered. This
having effected the passage, took up a position at Santa Cruz, between
Aranjuez and Ucles, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th
by a corps of Bessieres’ division, under General Montbrun. Finding
themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was
superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss.
♦SOME OF THE TROOPS MUTINY.♦
The first and fourth divisions mutinied on their march to Yedra,
where they were to be stationed. This was ascribed to the intrigues
of some traitorous agents, as well as to the unprincipled ambition of
a few officers, desirous, in these times of insubordination, to exalt
themselves by flattering the soldiers and slandering their commanders.
It was easy to inflame the men, who imputed all their misfortunes to
treason, and were already in a state of great insubordination. They
insisted upon marching to Madrid, that they might attack the enemy
there; an artillery officer was at their head; and the guns were
planted to prevent the troops from proceeding in the direction where
they had been ordered. A difference of opinion among themselves
prevented the execution of this mad purpose; some were for hastening to
Despeñaperros, to take their post in the passes of the Sierra Morena
for the defence of Andalusia. This afforded opportunity for the General
to reason with them, and pacify them for a while. In consequence of
this circumstance, the difficulty which daily increased of subsisting
the troops, their increasing wants, and the rapid desertions which were
naturally occasioned by privations, want of hope, and total relaxation
of discipline, Lapeña assembled his general officers at Alcazar de
Huete. The Duque del Infantado, and Llamas, who had joined them at
Villarejo, were present at this council, and it was determined, on
Lapeña’s proposal, that the ♦INFANTADO CHOSEN COMMANDER. DEC. 9.♦
Duque should take the command. One reason for appointing him was, that
he was president of the Council of Castille, and in that character
was entitled to require provisions and all things necessary from the
people, ... such being the respect paid to the old authorities and
established forms, even at a time when necessity might have superseded
all laws, as paramount to all.
♦THEY RETIRE TO CUENCA.♦
No command was ever accepted under more painful and disheartening
circumstances. The troops were in a state of mutiny: the enemy within
three leagues, preparing to complete their destruction; they had
neither stores, supplies, nor treasure, nor other means of obtaining
any than by the obedience which the people might pay to his authority;
and upon any panic which might seize the soldiers, or any suspicion
that should arise among them, the General would be the first victim; it
had too fatally been proved, that no character, however unimpeached, no
services, however eminent, afforded any protection against the ferocity
of a deluded multitude. With a full sense of these dangers, the Duke
accepted a command which it might have been even more dangerous to
refuse. His rank, his affable manners, the part which he had taken
against the Prince of the Peace, and the share which he was supposed
to have had in bringing about the downfall of that worthless minion,
had made him one of the most popular persons in Spain; and though he
had lost something by accompanying Ferdinand on his miserable journey
to Bayonne, still he stood high in the opinion of the nation. The new
appointment was announced to the army in a short proclamation; and the
Central Junta ratified it afterwards, approving Lapeña’s resignation,
and dispensing with an informality, which the dangerous and peculiar
state of things rendered prudent. The immediate good which had been
expected from this measure was produced; for the soldiers confided in
their untried General, and order was re-established among them. On
the 10th they entered Cuenca, there concluding a retreat of nearly
four hundred and fifty miles. The position of that city enabled them
to receive supplies from La Mancha, Valencia, and Murcia; there they
rested for a while, discipline was restored, and three persons,
who had been most active in the mutiny, were brought to trial and
executed. The troops were clothed, funds were raised for paying and
supporting them, and hospitals established. The stragglers having
recovered that strength, for want of which they had fallen behind,
rejoined their corps; new levies were raised; and it was manifest that,
notwithstanding all their disasters, notwithstanding the mighty power
of the enemy, the treachery of some leaders, and the misconduct of
others, which had been hardly less injurious, the spirit of patriotism
was still unimpaired, and the people, by whom alone a country is to be
saved, had not abated one jot of heart or hope.
♦ARRIVAL OF THE CONDE DE ALACHE’S CORPS.♦
Five days after their arrival they were joined by a corps which it was
supposed had been cut off among the mountains of Rioja. The history
of its escape is equally honourable to the men and to the Conde de
Alache D. Miguel Lili, who conducted them. They formed originally a
part of the army of Old Castille, under the Conde de Cartaojal, which
had been broken up after the position of Logroño was lost. At the
end of October, Castaños stationed it along the skirts of the Sierra
de Cameros, extending from in front of Logroño to Lodosa; the last
division of this force, which formed the left flank of the army, was
posted at Nalda under Lili. During the first three weeks of November,
this division sustained repeated and almost daily attacks; varying its
position as circumstances required, and having, like Blake’s army, to
endure the severest privations; nevertheless it carried off fourteen
pieces of artillery, from Nalda to Ausejo and Calahorra, in sight of
the French, and by roads which had been thought impracticable. On the
night of the 21st, Lili received intelligence that a considerable force
of the enemy had moved from Logroño towards Ausejo; the next day he
learnt that the Spaniards, who were stationed there and at Tudelilla,
had fallen back upon their right, and that 5000 French infantry and
1000 horse had moved from Najara, giving out that they were going
for Calahorra. He was thus in imminent danger of being surrounded.
Immediately he left the banks of the Iregua, and fell back to Venta de
Codes, four leagues in the rear of Nalda, where, in the course of the
night, a messenger from Cartaojal reached him with instructions written
at Tudelilla, on the 21st, saying, that the French were in great force
at Ausejo, and that Castaños ordered him to retreat by the Sierra to
Agreda, whither Cartaojal himself was going with all his troops to
oppose the French on the side of Almazan.
♦NOV. 23.♦
For Agreda, therefore, Lili began his march at daybreak. By two in the
afternoon he had reached Villar del Rio, five leagues from the place
which he had left, eight from that to which he was bound; but here
he met intelligence of fresh disasters and new dangers. Agreda, it
was said, had already been abandoned by the Spaniards; 1200 French
cavalry, with a small body of foot, were on their way to that town from
Soria, which had opened its gates to the enemy; other columns from
Soria and from Almazan were to follow in the same direction. Fugitives
now arrived every hour, with tidings that the enemy were sacking one
place, or approaching another, all their parties tending to the one
point of Agreda. Lili perceived, that if Cartaojal had not already
retired from that town, he inevitably must, and that for himself,
if he continued his march, it would be to run into the midst of his
enemies. He did not hesitate, therefore, to disobey orders which would
have involved him in certain destruction; and, acting upon his own
judgement, he marched the next morning in a contrary direction, to
Lumbreras, and the day afterwards to Montenegro, thinking that a more
defensible point, and for the sake of receiving certain intelligence
from the side of Agreda. The report that that town had been evacuated
on the 23d was premature; and Lili received a letter from Cartaojal,
written from thence on the 24th, and regretting that he had fallen
back to Lumbreras upon erroneous information; to have joined him at
Agreda, he said, was the proper movement, and almost the only means of
safety; but it was no time to consider what might have been done, and,
as things were, he must now follow his own discretion, with that zeal
which it was not doubted he possessed. Whatever regret Lili might have
felt at receiving this reproof, was effectually counteracted by the
report of the messenger who brought it; for at the very moment when
Cartaojal dispatched him, news arrived that the enemy were beginning to
attack the town. In fact, he was compelled speedily to abandon it, and,
marching by way of Borja to Calatayud, joined the wreck of the army of
the centre, and accompanied them in their retreat.
Perilous as Lili’s situation now was, he had yet to receive
intelligence of events which rendered it more desperate. On the 27th he
learned at Salas de los Infantes, by some stragglers who had escaped
from the action at Burgos, that that capital was now in the hands of
the French. His spies brought him information, that the Intruder was
with a great force at Aranda; that the enemy occupied all the bridges
and fords of the Duero; and that the Somosierra was threatened:
finally, to crown the distressing news of the day, a full account
reached him of the battle of Tudela. On every side he was surrounded;
to move in any direction seemed equally perilous, and he was utterly
ignorant what course had been taken by the relics of the army which
he wished to join. In these difficulties his first measure was to
march to Canales, four leagues from Salas, where, in the very centre
of the mountains, he might hope to remain concealed from the enemy,
or resist them to the best advantage if he were attacked. There, amid
those difficult and inclement heights, from whence the Arlanza flows
toward Lerma, the Duero toward the plains of Castille, the Tiron, the
Najerilla, and the Iregua toward Rioja, he remained six days. During
this time he obtained sufficient intelligence of the movements of the
French to direct his own, and then proceeded towards New Castille, in
search of Castaños’s broken army. On the 5th he reached Quintanar de
la Sierra, on the 6th San Leonardo. His men travelled the whole of the
following day and night, and crossed the Duero at Berlanja. On the 9th
they entered Atienza, and here the information which they found served
only to occasion new perplexity; for here Lili learned that the central
army had passed through, and been pursued by the French; that they
had afterwards abandoned Guadalaxara and the heights of Santorcaz: of
their farther movements nothing was known. Lili, however, considering
all circumstances, was convinced that they must have retreated upon
Cuenca, and he directed his march towards the same point. On the 11th,
at daybreak, he crossed the great road from Zaragoza to Madrid, at
an opportune and happy hour, passing between the last division of
the French and their rear-guard, then on the way from Calatayud; and
on the day that the Duke del Infantado reached Cuenca, he arrived at
Villar de Domingo Garcia, from whence, on the 16th, he passed to the
head-quarters of the Commander. During this whole retreat, which was
over a tract of nearly four hundred miles, through the most difficult
and untravelled ways, this corps had constantly been surrounded by the
enemy, who were seldom more than ten or twelve miles distant from
them. Food they had none, but what they could procure upon the way;
most of the men were barefoot, many of them nearly naked, but their
spirits never failed.
♦RETREAT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA FROM ARANJUEZ.♦
If ever during the contest there was a time when Spain might have
been irretrievably subjected, it was now, if a dissolution of the
government had taken place. The Central Junta had been slow in
perceiving the danger, but when it came upon them they acted with
promptitude and wisdom. Before they left Aranjuez a commission of
six members was appointed to transact business during their journey,
and official intelligence of their removal was communicated to the
foreign ministers. Their escort was so insufficient, that a small
body of cavalry might have surprised them; they travelled in parties,
but assembled at Talavera; three members were left there to collect
and re-organize the soldiers who were coming in great numbers to that
point. From thence proceeding to Truxillo, there they again met,
dispatched orders to the provinces, and sent some of their own members
to those places where they might be most useful. That city afforded an
opportunity of reconsidering where they should fix their abode, whether
at Badajoz, as had been determined, or at Cordoba, the road to either
place being open: Seville was preferred to either, and they assembled
there on the 17th of December. Before this removal it had been
concerted by Jovellanos, with some members of the Royal Council and of
the Council of the Indies, that eleven members of the former, and nine
of the latter, including their presidents, should follow the Central
Junta, and with two members from each of the other tribunals, form a
_Consejo reunido_, or united Council. The other members were commanded
to leave Madrid, and retire either to their own places of abode in the
provinces, or whither they would, there to receive their salaries,
assist the government with their advice and services when called upon,
and promote by all means in their power the national cause. Too many of
these persons were found wanting in the hour of trial, some in weakness
submitting to the Intruder rather than endure the ills of honourable
poverty, others taking an active and infamous part in his service.
The proposed Council was formed of those who repaired to Seville; and
those who, from whatever cause, arrived at a later time, found from
the Junta an indulgence which would not have been granted them by the
people, less charitable, and perhaps less just; they were received with
respect, and their salaries continued to them.
♦THEIR ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MADRID.♦
The agents of the Intruder knowing how desirable for their views it
would be to bring the national government into disrepute, reported
that the Junta had sanctioned and approved the capitulation of the
capital. This the Junta contradicted in a manly proclamation, and they
exhorted the inhabitants of Madrid to bear in mind that the temporary
occupation of their buildings by the enemy was of little moment, while
he was not master of their hearts. “Continue to resist him,” said
they, “in the very bosom of your families; place no confidence in the
promises of the French; remember that they have promised happiness to
every people, and have made every people miserable. Keep alive your
hope, retain your fortitude, and your deliverance will be glorious in
proportion to the greatness of the danger which you have encountered.”
They made no attempt to conceal the extent of their disasters; but
they attributed them to the inexperience of their troops, and denied
that the monarchy was comprehended within the narrow precincts of
the metropolis. “Were you to believe the enemy,” said they, “our
armies have vanished like the smoke of the battle, and Spain has
neither forces wherewith to oppose her invaders, nor authority to
regulate her councils, nor resources to save her from destruction.
All this is false. The government which has been chosen by the people
never attracted more respect, never felt more strongly the strong
principle of union, and never found more ardour in the public cause.
The provinces have redoubled their exertions at its voice, and new
enlistments, new contributions, and new sacrifices have already filled
the void occasioned by our losses.” A splendid instance of patriotism
in one of the nobles was at this time made public; the Duke of Medina
Sidonia, whose property had just been confiscated in Madrid by the
intrusive government, had from the commencement of the struggle made a
free gift every month of 2500 dollars, in addition to his share of the
public burthens, and to various donations of necessaries for the army.
While the Junta was making exertions which were well seconded by the
zeal of the people, the whole of those extensive plains, which form
the centre or table-land of Spain, lay at the mercy of the invaders.
On the 11th of December Victor had his detachments in Aranjuez and
in Ocaña; ♦THE FRENCH ENTER TOLEDO.♦ on the 19th he occupied Toledo.
The surrender of this ancient and famous city, after its professions
of determined patriotism, was one of those circumstances for which
the Spaniards were reproached, by those who had depreciated their
exertions, and despaired of their cause. Yet if the Toledans did not
signalize themselves by heroic sacrifices, like the Zaragozans, there
was no want of a right spirit, nor had they been deficient in their
duty. In the spring of the preceding year Dupont and Vedel entered that
city with their divisions, and raised a most oppressive contribution.
But no sooner had they proceeded on their way to Andalusia, than a
Junta was formed, consisting of the most respectable citizens: they
could not raise forces themselves, being surrounded by the enemy, and
having no military means; but they ordered as many of the districts in
that kingdom as could exert themselves to act under the instructions
of the Junta of Badajoz; they contributed large sums of money; and
they refused obedience to four successive orders which enjoined them
to proclaim the Intruder, though it was announced, that, if they
continued in their disobedience, 5000 French would come, and perform
the ceremony sword in hand. The evacuation of Madrid relieved them
from this danger. And when the victorious army of Castaños was on its
way to the capital, Toledo supported 10,000 men of that army for three
weeks, made a donation of 300,000 reales to them on their departure,
equipped many of their officers, and clothed a great proportion of
the men. This was not all. In two months it raised and equipped two
regiments of infantry, and a corps of 700 horse; for which funds
were raised by a subscription, all persons, from the archbishop to
the poorest peasant, contributing according to their means. The
university also raised a corps of students; and after the siege of
Zaragoza the pectoral of the archbishop, valued at 150,000 reales,
was converted into money to relieve the inhabitants of that heroic
city. After the defeat at Burgos, the Toledans applied to government
for arms to defend their walls. This was the mode of warfare to which
the Junta, if they had rightly understood the nature of their own
strength, should have resorted; and this system of defence was advised
by the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, than whom no man judged more
generously, nor more wisely, of the Spanish character and the Spanish
cause. But this essential precaution had been neglected; and when the
Toledans applied for artillery and ammunition, disaster followed so
close upon disaster, that there was no leisure for attending to their
request, urgent as it was. What then could be done? They sent off
their moveable property to Seville; 12,000 swords also were dispatched
to the same place, from that fabric which for so many centuries has
been famous, and which probably owes its original celebrity to workmen
from Damascus. The Junta, the legitimate authorities, and all the most
distinguished inhabitants, left the city; neither the threats nor
promises of the Intruder could induce them to return: they retired
to the free part of the peninsula, submitting to poverty with that
dignified composure which resulted from the consciousness of having
discharged their duty. This was the fate of the parents, while their
sons, in the corps of students, fought and bled for the independence
of Spain. It is plain, therefore, that though the gates of Toledo were
opened to the enemy, that same spirit still existed within its walls
which, during the war of the Commons of Castille, rendered it the last
hold of Spanish liberty.
♦DEFENCE OF VILLACAÑAS.♦
From Toledo, from Aranjuez, and from Ocaña, parties of French
cavalry overran the open and defenceless plains of lower La Mancha,
foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far
as Manzanares. The La Manchans, relying, like the government, too
confidently upon the resistance which regular armies and the modes
of regular warfare could oppose to such a military power as that of
France, had made no preparations for defending themselves; some places
were deserted by the inhabitants; all left open to the enemy, who
scoured the country at their pleasure. The little townlet of Villacañas
afforded a single and honourable exception. A party of 60 horse entered
it on the night of the 20th of December, being a detachment from a
much larger force which had quartered itself in Tembleque. The people
caught up such arms as they could find, and drove the invaders out;
they began immediately to dig trenches and throw up barricadoes, ...
the adjoining peasantry came to their assistance, ... a few persons of
high quality fled; but, with these few exceptions, the utmost zeal and
alacrity were displayed by all ranks, and ready obedience was paid to
some old soldiers, who took upon themselves the command. During five
successive days the French renewed their attacks, and were constantly
repulsed; their plundering parties had no artillery with them, and the
means of defence, therefore, as long as the Spaniards took care not
to expose themselves to a charge of horse in the open country, were
equal to those of attack. Weary at length of repeated failures, and
unwilling to incur farther loss in an object of no other value than
what the plunder of the place might be worth, the French desisted from
any farther attempts, and Villacañas remained safe and uninjured,
while all the country round was ransacked. The example was deservedly
thought of such importance, that the whole details of this little
siege were published by the government in an extraordinary gazette.
Whatever contributions were due to the state by the inhabitants of this
townlet were remitted to them, and those persons who had taken the lead
were rewarded by other privileges. “This,” said the government, “is
the kind of war which our perfidious enemy feareth most, and which is
the most advantageous for ourselves. Let the people of every village
arm themselves, entrench themselves in their very houses, break up
the roads, lay ambushes upon every height and pass, intercept his
provisions, cut off his communications, and make him perceive that
at every step he will find the most obstinate resistance. Thus we
shall waste his forces; thus we shall show to the world that a great
and generous nation is not to be insulted with impunity, not to be
conquered when it fights for its king, for its liberty, and for its
religion.”
♦PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENDING THE SIERRA MORENA.♦
Meantime the Juntas of Ciudad Real, (the capital of Upper La Mancha,)
and of the four kingdoms of Jaen, Granada, Cordoba, and Seville, which
compose the province of Andalusia, formed a Central Assembly in La
Carolina, where two deputies from each province met to consult upon
speedy measures for fortifying the gorge of Despeñaperros, this pass
of the Sierra Morena being considered as the Thermopylæ, where the
progress of this new barbarian might be withstood. Here an army was
necessary, and there was none: the Marques de Palacio was sent by the
Supreme Junta to form one under his command. The Juntas of Andalusia
and La Mancha raised new levies; and officers and men who had deserted
from the central army, many of them scattering alarm and sedition
where they fled, re-entered into this new establishment. The marine
battalions and brigades of artillery were ordered hither from Cadiz,
leaving only 300 men in that city, besides the volunteers. Fourteen
pieces of cannon had been fortunately stopped at Manzanares, on their
way to Madrid. These were now mounted upon the works which were thrown
up to defend this important position. Another road also, by which the
enemy might have passed the Sierra, was occupied by a detachment of
500 men. Before the middle of December, 6000 foot and 300 horse had
assembled at La Carolina, and their number increased daily. But it
was not towards the Sierra Morena that Buonaparte was looking; his
attention was chiefly fixed upon the English army, and the road by
which he thought to reach Andalusia was through Extremadura, hoping
to overtake the Supreme Junta in their flight; having reached them at
Truxillo, his armies might divide, one marching to take possession of
Lisbon, the other to take vengeance for Dupont at Seville and Cadiz.
♦MURDER OF SAN JUAN AT TALAVERA.♦
There was no force in Extremadura which could oppose any obstacle
to this plan. When the pass of Somosierra was lost, San Juan, who
commanded there, cut his way sword in hand through a squadron of Poles,
and by by-roads reached Segovia, where he found the troops who had
retired from Sepulveda. From thence he marched to Guadarrama, united
with the Extremaduran troops under General Heredia, and descended to
the Escurial, because he was without provisions in the pass. There
they received orders to hasten to Madrid, and enter that city by the
gate of Segovia. On the way exaggerated reports were spread of the
strength of the enemy; suspicion increased the insubordination of the
soldiers; the artillery and baggage-men forsook their charge and fled,
and several corps broke up. The whole of Heredia’s van-guard dispersed
in this manner, in spite of all San Juan’s efforts to detain them;
they would rally, they said, at Talavera: this word went through the
army, and served as a pretext for every one who chose to fly. The two
generals had only a handful of men with them when they approached
Madrid, and then they discovered that the city had been betrayed. No
other course remained for them than to repair to Talavera, in the hope
of rallying what would still form a considerable force. The rabble of
the army, sufficiently faithful to their appointment, bent their way
to that city, plundering as they went along; and there San Juan met
them, unhappily for himself. The wretches who had been foremost in
subverting discipline, and instigating the troops to break up, began to
apprehend punishment if the army should again assume a regular form;
and this was likely to be the case immediately, for many thousands
(many having escaped from Madrid) were now collected there, and the
government had already begun to take measures for re-equipping them. It
was easy for these villains to raise a cry against San Juan: all men
knew the importance of the position at Somosierra; but there were few
who knew with what insufficient means the general had been supplied.
Mobs never reason, least of all when they are under the influence of
fear; and the Spanish troops had suffered so much from incapacity,
that when any person was denounced as a traitor, it seemed like a
relief to themselves, and an act of justice to their country, to vent
their vengeance upon him. The cry against San Juan became general: a
friar went at the head of a party to the convent of the Augustines,
where he had taken up his quarters, and they cried out that they were
come to put ♦DEC. 7.♦ Benito San Juan to death. San Juan attempted to
expostulate, but in vain. He drew his sword to defend himself, and
immediately he was pierced with their bullets. The rabble dragged the
body to a gibbet, and hung it there; next they sought for Heredia,
that they might kill him also; but he eluded their search. As soon
as their fury was allayed, the instigators of these excesses secured
themselves by flight; and the troops, who had been misled, perceived
the consequences of their lawless conduct. If San Juan had indeed been
a traitor, they felt that they ought to have delivered him up to the
proper tribunal; ... by taking vengeance into their own hands they had
made themselves obnoxious to the laws. Whom too could they trust, whom
were they to obey? Instead, therefore, of forming a new army, as they
had designed, at Talavera, they dispersed again, not having now any
rallying place appointed, but each man going whither he thought best.
Some took the road to Andalusia, some to Avila: the Extremadurans, who
were the most numerous, went to their homes.
♦EDICT AGAINST DESERTERS.♦
The dispersion of the soldiers called forth a severe edict. It began
by stating, that the martial laws of Spain had affixed no punishment
for officers who deserted their colours or stations, it never having
been supposed that men of such rank could possibly be guilty of such
a crime. But now it had unhappily been seen that many officers,
forgetful of all honour and duty, had fled, scattering disorder and
terror wherever they went, and pretending treason in their generals
as an excuse for their own conduct; whereas they themselves had been
the worst enemies of their country, by abandoning their generals in
the most critical moments. The Junta, therefore, pronounced sentence
of death against every officer who absented himself from his colours
without permission, and confiscation of his property for the relief of
the widows and orphans of soldiers in his parish. Soldiers were made
liable to the like penalty; any person who harboured a deserter was to
be punished by confiscation of his property, and the same penalty was
denounced against all magistrates who suffered deserters to remain
within their jurisdiction. But all who, within fifteen days, should
present themselves to the nearest authority in order to rejoin the
army, were exempted from the pains in this decree.
♦A FEW ENGLISH STRAGGLERS BUTCHERED BY THE FRENCH CAVALRY.♦
Four days after the murder of San Juan, and the dispersion of his army,
two divisions of French cavalry, under Milhaud and Lasalle, entered
Talavera. They found the body of the Spanish General still on the
gibbet, and this murder furnished Buonaparte with a new subject of
invective against the Spaniards; though this, and the thousand deaths,
and all the untold crimes, and all the unutterable miseries with which
the peninsula was filled, were the consequences of his own single
conduct, the fruits of his individual wickedness. Lasalle fell in
with sixteen Englishmen upon the road, stragglers from General Hope’s
detachment, and it was related in the bulletins[39] of Buonaparte, as
an exploit worthy of remembrance and commendation, that a division of
French cavalry, falling in with sixteen Englishmen who had lost their
way, put them to the sword. This was but a small part of the force
which was destined to proceed in this direction. As soon as Madrid had
been delivered up, Lefebvre was ordered to advance from Valladolid
towards Lisbon. First he advanced to Segovia, which he entered
unresisted. The people were dispirited by the panic and flight of their
armies; but it should not be forgotten for their exculpation, that the
more generous and heroic spirits, having flocked to their country’s
standard among the foremost levies, had already received their crown
of martyrdom, or were clinging to the wreck of the two great armies of
the north and the centre, or were consummating the sacrifice of duty
in Zaragoza. In one place only between Valladolid and the capital did
this part of the French army experience any opposition. The pass of
Guadarrama was open to them: General Hope had been stationed there,
but was recalled by Sir John Moore, and there were no native troops
to supply his place. But when the enemy descended ♦THE FRENCH TAKE
POSSESSION OF THE ESCURIAL.♦ upon the Escurial, and proceeded to take
possession of that palace, the magnificent monument of a victory which
Spain had achieved over France in open, honourable war, and in a fair
field, they found the peasantry assembled to defend the seat and
sepulchres of their kings. Undisciplined as they were, ill-armed, and
with none to direct their efforts, they stood their ground till they
were overpowered by practised troops, superior in numbers as well as
in arms; and the French, after the slaughter of these brave peasants
before the gates, took up their quarters in the palace of the Philips.
He who founded that stately pile, could he then have beheld from his
grave what was passing around him, would have seen the consequences of
that despotic system which he and his father established upon the ruins
of the old free constitution of Spain.
It was a noble feeling which led these peasants to sacrifice themselves
in defence of the Escurial, and the action did not pass unnoticed by
those able and enlightened Spaniards whose patriotic writings at this
time did honour to themselves and to their country. “Nothing,” said Don
Isidro de Antillon, “is more worthy of public interest, and nothing
will more excite the admiration of posterity, than a deed like this.
If indeed we had only armies to oppose to Buonaparte, infallibly we
should become his slaves; the victory would be the usurper’s beyond all
resource. But it is the collective strength of our inhabited places,
the defence of our walls, the obstinate and repeated resistance of
the people in the streets and gateways, along the roads and upon the
heights, wherever they can cut off or annoy the detachments of the
enemy, ... the universal spirit of insurrection, now become as it
were the very element of our existence; this it is which disconcerts
his plans, which renders his victories useless, and after a thousand
vicissitudes and disasters, will finally establish the independence and
the glory of Spain.”
♦EXCESSES OF THE FRENCH.♦
Lefebvre entered Madrid on the 8th of December. Buonaparte reviewed his
division in the Prado, and dispatched it to Toledo, while Sebastiani
with another division marched for Talavera. In that city, by the 19th,
about 25,000 French were assembled, including 5000 cavalry. The wiser
inhabitants fled before their arrival, preferring the miseries of
emigration to the insults and atrocities which they must otherwise
have endured: for the exaction of heavy contributions, which reduced
half the people to beggary, was the least evil those towns endured
that fell under the yoke of the French. Every where the soldiers were
permitted to plunder; no asylum could secure the women from their
unrestrained brutality; churches and convents were profaned with as
little compunction as dwelling-houses were broken open; and in many
instances, the victims were exposed naked in the streets. The Spanish
government exclaimed loudly against these enormities. “In other times,”
they said, “war was carried on between army and army, soldier and
soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle; and when
courage, combined with fortune, had decided the victory, the conquerors
behaved to the conquered like men of honour, and the defenceless people
were respected. The progress of civilization had tempered the evils of
hostility, till a nation which so lately boasted that it was the most
polished in the world, renewed, in the 19th century, the cruelty of the
worst savages, and all the horrors which make us tremble in perusing
the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like tygers,
these enemies make no distinction in their carnage, ... the aged, the
infants, the women, ... all are alike to them, wherever they can find
blood to shed.”
This appeal could be of no avail against a tyrant who, in the very
origin of the war, had shown himself dead to all sense of justice,
humanity, and even of honour, which sometimes supplies their place;
nor against generals and officers who could serve him in such a cause.
Such men could be taught humanity only by the severest retaliation. The
language which the government addressed to their own subjects might be
more effectual. “What resource have you,” said they, “in submission
and in cowardice? If by this abasement you could purchase a miserable
existence, that perhaps with base minds might exculpate you. But you
fly to your houses to perish in them, or to be idle spectators of
the horrors which these ruffian soldiers are preparing for you! Yes!
wait for them there, and they will not tarry long ere they come and
shed before your eyes the blood of the innocent victims whom you will
not defend. Old fathers, wretched mothers, prepare to receive your
daughters released from the arms of an hundred barbarians only when
they are in the act of death! or if they recover life, to curse it in
the bitterness of unextinguishable shame; tell them to reproach those
cowardly husbands, those base lovers, who are content to live, and see
them plunged in this abominable infamy. But they will not be suffered
to live; hand-cuffed and haltered, they will be dragged out of their
country; they will be made soldiers by force, though they would not
become so from honour and a sense of duty; there they will be exposed
in the foremost ranks to the fire of the enemy; there they will not be
able to fly; ... the toil, the danger, and death will be theirs; the
glory and the spoil will be their conquerors’, and the crowns which
they win will be for the tyrant, the cause of all this misery.”
♦GALLUZO COLLECTS THE FUGITIVES IN EXTREMADURA.♦
It had been happy for Spain if the government had always acted as
energetically as it wrote; but it should be remembered in justice to
the Spaniards, that the dispersion of the troops was in many instances
an act of self-preservation, so utterly were they left without supplies
of food or clothing, by the inexperience and incompetence of every
military department. Even against the testimony and the reproaches of
its own government, the Spanish nation stands acquitted. Never did
men suffer more patiently, or fight more bravely, than Blake’s army.
There was no want of courage at Tudela; and of the remains of the army
which fought there, a large proportion was at this very time defending
Zaragoza with a heroism unexampled in modern times, upon any other
soil. Wherever, indeed, a new army was to be collected, soldiers were
not wanting. After San Juan’s death, Galluzo was appointed to the
command; he took his post at the bridge of Almaraz to defend the left
bank of the Tagus; and in a few days had collected about 8000 soldiers,
... many of them were without arms, ... most of them barefooted,
and now unhappily accustomed to flight and desertion. Nevertheless
they assembled; for every man felt individually brave, and it was
only the want of discipline, which, by preventing them from feeling
confidence collectively, made panic contagious in the moment of danger.
The province of Extremadura immediately provided money for these
troops; this province, though the least populous in the peninsula,
had particularly distinguished itself by its exertions; it had raised
and equipped, wholly at its own expense, 24,000 men, and had supplied
ammunition and arms of every kind from Badajoz to the other provinces.
♦HE PREPARES FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE TAGUS.♦
There are four bridges between Talavera and the confluence of the
Tietar with the Tagus; the Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop’s,
the Puente del Conde, or the Count’s, the bridge of Almaraz, and the
Puente del Cardinal, or the Cardinal’s. With his present feeble and
inefficient force Galluzo had no other means of protecting Extremadura
than by breaking down, or defending these bridges; if he could effect
this, the province would be secure from an attack on the side of
Talavera. Almaraz was the most important of these points; here he
planted ten pieces of cannon and two mortars, and stationed 5000
men. The more surely to prevent the enemy from winning the passage
he mined the bridge; but so firmly had this noble pile been built,
that when the mine was fired, the explosion only served to injure it
without rendering it impassable. Don Francisco Trias was sent with
850 men to the Puente del Arzobispo; on his way he met the engineer,
who had previously been dispatched to break it down, but who had been
prevented from attempting it by the enemy, so that this bridge was
already in their power. Trias, therefore, took his position with the
view of checking the incursions of the French on this side, and ordered
Don Antonio Puig, with such assistants as he could procure from the
magistrates of Talavera la Vieja, to destroy the Puente del Conde, and
provide for the defence of that point, and of three fords upon the same
part of the river. When this officer arrived he had neither a single
soldier under his command, nor arms for the peasantry; the latter
want was soon supplied; the peasantry were zealous, and some of the
stragglers joined him.
The bridge of the Cardinal was assigned to the keeping of a battalion
of Walloon Guards and a squadron of the volunteers of Extremadura,
under Brigadier Don Francisco Durasmiel. Galluzo also stationed his
reserve at Jaraicejo, under Brigadier Don Josef Vlazquez Somosa, and
sent another field officer to Truxillo to collect and organize the
stragglers who might either voluntarily join him, or be detained by
the patroles. While the General was making these dispositions for
the defence of the province, the Junta of Badajoz made the greatest
exertions to supply the wants of this new army, and its efforts were
well seconded by the Extremaduran people. Half a million of reales
was raised in loans and free gifts within a week; all the cloth of
Torremocha and of other clothing towns was applied to the use of the
army, ... no other work was carried on in the monastery of Guadalupe
than that of making earthen vessels for their cookery; and commissaries
were sent to the sixteen villages nearest the bridge of Almaraz to see
that rations of bread for 5000 men were daily delivered there. These
measures were so effectual, that the troops were soon comfortably
clothed, and after the first day they had no want of any thing.
♦THE FRENCH CROSS THE RIVER.♦
It was, however, scarcely to be hoped that so small and ill-compacted
a force could maintain its ground, in a country which offered them no
advantages for defence against such an army as the French had assembled
in Talavera. After some skirmishes with the advanced guard at Almaraz,
and some slight attacks upon the Puente del Conde, which were designed
chiefly to keep the Spaniards on the alarm, and divert their attention
from the side where the real attack was intended, Sebastiani crossed
the Puente del Arzobispo on the 24th of December, and attacked Trias
in front and on his right flank with superior numbers. The Spaniards
did not yield till after a vigorous resistance; and then retreated by
the Sierra to Castanar de Ibor. On the same day, about two hours after
noon, the Puente del Conde was attacked, and the fords. The bridge was
bravely defended by Don Pablo Murillo, whose distinguished talents
were now first displayed. Puig guarded the fords, and they repelled
the enemy every where till night; when, being informed of the defeat
of Trias, and that Sebastiani had proceeded by Peralera de Garbin and
Bohonal towards Almaraz, Puig perceiving that he must be taken in the
rear if he continued in his present position, retreated to Peralera de
Garbin behind the French, and from thence to Castanar de Ibor.
♦GALLUZO RETREATS TO JARAICEJO.♦
The news of these disasters reached Galluzo at night. Immediately
he apprehended that the object of the enemy, who were marching by
Valdecasa, Valdecañas, and other points, to Romangordo and Miravete,
was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he
ordered all the artillery, except four pieces, which formed a battery
on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo,
for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aide-de-camps
and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining
battery under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked
on the following morning by the French; the battery was ill-placed,
and Hore perceived that the ammunition-carts were within reach of the
enemy’s fire. He ordered them to be removed behind a bank which would
shelter them; ... the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight, than
they cut the traces, and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct
of some infantry who took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves
masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, ...
though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken
bridge, and pass in sufficient number, most of the Spaniards effected
their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas.
♦DISPERSION OF HIS ARMY.♦
Galluzo’s first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this
intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from
Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested
the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as
possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almaraz had
been forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back
upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat.
His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was
brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village something
less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed
by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish
and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious easily
believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order, but the army,
before it reached Truxillo, was in a state of total disorganization.
Galluzo, confounded at the first approach of danger, (for if he had
deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Miravete would
have been the place which he would have chosen, after the bridge was
forced,) called a council of war; it was agreed that the defence of
Extremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into
Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine,
was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy.
The explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight,
excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their
lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now
became a rout; ... most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns
and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the
General were no longer under any restraint; they went through Miajadas,
Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above an
hundred miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and
here Galluzo found himself with not more than a thousand men. Nothing
could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; ...
some sold their muskets, ... some threw them away, ... houses were
broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found,
... a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The
officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some
of them active themselves in pillage; it is probable, indeed, that had
they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those
officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery
had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their
object: though without an escort, they lost only two pieces of cannon,
and carried seventeen to Miajadas, ... from whence part were sent to
Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. Trias also effected a
far more dangerous retreat than his commander in good order. He set
forward from Castanar for Fresnedoso, and when within a mile of the
place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of
Almaraz. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach
Jaraicejo. After a day’s march he found that the French were there
also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession
of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved
discipline in his little troop, and that preserved confidence; instead
of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and
arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought
there.
♦GALLUZO IS SUPERSEDED BY CUESTA.♦
Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly manifested, it had
been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta
in his place. This General, as an arrested person, followed the Junta
on their retreat from Aranjuez. It so happened, that while he was at
Merida, some soldiers belonging to the scattered army of Extremadura
gathered together in that city, and the owner of the house in which
Cuesta lodged persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were
by acclamation. The Junta of Merida upon this sent up a representation
to the Central Junta, requesting that Cuesta might be appointed to
the command. It was replied, that this ought not to be done without
the approbation of the Junta of Badajoz, which had made such signal
exertions in the patriotic cause, and was not willing to supersede
Galluzo, whom it had appointed. But now, after this disorderly flight,
he was immediately deprived of the command, and put under arrest, and
Cuesta was nominated to succeed him. Cuesta’s errors were overlooked,
because no doubt of his motives was entertained; and at a time when
the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was sufficient to
break up an army, it was an object of considerable importance to find
a leader in whom the men would confide. At this moment the whole of
Extremadura to the very walls of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the
Junta trembled for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was
sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El
Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and co-operate
with Cuesta in covering Andalusia on that side. These means of defence
would have been as ineffectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had
not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out
of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south.
CHAPTER XV.
CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE.
♦1808.♦
♦BUONAPARTE REPROACHES AND INSULTS THE ENGLISH.♦
In all the bulletins and proclamations of Buonaparte the English were
held up to the Spaniards for indignation and contempt: they were a
people, he said, who fomented war every where, and distributed arms
like poison, ♦14TH BULLETIN.♦ but who shed their own blood only
for their own direct interest. At this time it is probable that he
sincerely despised the English as a military nation. ♦GAZETA DE MADRID,
DEC. 18.♦ Can any thing be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that
England should pretend to struggle with her land forces against France?
♦DO. DEC. 24.♦ she will realize the fable of the frog swelling itself
to rival the ox, till it burst. “The day,” said Buonaparte, “wherein
we succeed in seeing these English will be a day of jubilee for the
French army. Oh, that they may dye with their blood this continent,
which they have desolated with their intrigues, their monopolies, and
their frightful selfishness! Oh, that they might be met with to the
number of 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that English mothers
might feel the evils of war, and the English government cease to sport
with the ♦14TH BULLETIN. 12TH BULLETIN.♦ lives and blood of the
continental nations. All the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict
the human race, come from London.” He represented the Spaniards as
complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing,
but had sent troops only to excite ♦14TH BULLETIN.♦ them, lead them
astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger, when 40,000 British at
Espinosa or Tudela might have balanced the fortune of the war.... That
number of British troops would at either place have turned it.
Great Britain possessed at that time men, means, and generals equal to
any service; but the nation did not yet understand its own strength,
nor had the government yet learnt either to direct it wisely, or to
make exertions commensurate to the end whereat they aimed. The lessons
which books and history might teach had been neglected, and experience
therefore was to be purchased at a heavy price.
♦THE BRITISH ARMY FROM PORTUGAL ENTERS SPAIN.♦
As soon as the campaign in Portugal was ended, Sir Hew Dalrymple began
to prepare for entering Spain: on the 6th of October Sir John Moore
received his appointment to the command; the preparations meantime had
not been relaxed, and in eight days afterward part of the troops were
in motion. Difficulties and doubts had occurred at the very outset.
The infantry were to go either by sea or land at the Commander’s
discretion; the voyage at that season was thought too precarious; and
the Junta represented, that if they went by sea, half the army would
be unable to leave the coast for want of necessaries, there being
scarcely means at Coruña for forwarding 10,000 men who were to land
there under Sir David Baird, and join the Commander wherever he should
appoint. The land-journey therefore having been chosen, the Spanish
Commissary-General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting
the army on the great road by Elvas; but the quantity of meat which
was required astonished him; and he computed that in three months all
the oxen in the country would be consumed, and very few hogs left.
There was no want of food in the north of Portugal, but it was said
that artillery could not be transported across the mountains. British
officers were sent to examine the roads, and they confirmed this
assertion of the natives. It was ascertained when too late, that bad
as the ways were, they were practicable for cannon; but in consequence
of this error, it was deemed necessary to divide the army, and this
led to serious evils. General Hope, with the artillery, cavalry, and
four regiments of foot, was to go by the Madrid road; General Paget,
with two brigades, by Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved
through Almeida; two brigades, under General Beresford, by way of
Coimbra; three, under General Fraser, by Abrantes, crossing the Tagus
there, and recrossing at Villa Velha, ... a point which, in former
wars, has been considered the key to Lisbon. These were to unite at
Salamanca, and General Hope and Sir David Baird to join them either
there or at Valladolid.
If the people of England had been required to name the general who
should be employed on this important occasion, Sir John Moore would
certainly have been their choice, so generally was he respected as
an officer and as a man. ♦FORMER SERVICES OF SIR JOHN MOORE.♦ He was
born at Glasgow in 1760. From the eighteenth to the twenty-third year
of his age he was on the continent with his father (a physician and a
distinguished man of letters, then travelling with the young Duke of
Hamilton), and soon afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel
in the army. He served with distinction in Corsica, the West Indies,
the Helder expedition, and in Egypt; had often been wounded, and
given proofs of professional skill as well as of personal gallantry,
for he was fond of his profession, and had studied it well. But the
constitution of his mind led him to look at the dark rather than
the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his farther misfortune to
have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military
people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of
their Emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always
labouring to produce, for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their
country.
♦HIS CARE TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE.♦
Before the troops began their march Sir John Moore warned them in
his general orders that the Spaniards were a grave, orderly people,
extremely sober, but generous, and easily offended by any insult
or disrespect; he exhorted them to accommodate themselves to these
manners, to meet with equal kindness the cordiality wherewith they
would be received, and not shock by their intemperance a people worthy
of their attachment, whose efforts they were come to support in the
most glorious cause. His resolution to maintain order and proper
discipline was farther evinced by punishing a marauder upon the march
with death: the offender was one whose character gave no hope of
amendment, and the General took that opportunity of declaring his
determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders, in other
words, to thieves and villains. Farther to gratify the Spaniards, the
army, upon entering Spain, were ordered to wear the red cockade in
addition to their own.
♦ILL PROSPECT OF AFFAIRS WHEN HE ARRIVES AT SALAMANCA.♦
On Nov. 13, Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca.
Before he entered the city, he learnt the defeat of the Extremaduran
army at Burgos, and on the second night after his arrival, was awakened
by an express, with news that the French had possession of Valladolid,
... twenty leagues distant. He had only three brigades of infantry
with him, and not a single gun. His first thought was to fall back
upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the French had retired to
Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos:
he therefore sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope, to concentrate
their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought
with it intelligence of new disasters. Blake’s army was dispersed,
and Buonaparte might either turn his force against Castaños, or march
against the English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed
nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were
approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive.
Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government,
and indignant at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to
despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity,
which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not, he said,
shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their wisdom was not a
wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they were a fine people; that
they had a character of their own, quite distinct from that of any
other nation; and much, he thought, might have been done with them. He
erred in thinking that they would not do much for themselves.
♦SIR DAVID BAIRD ARRIVES AT ASTORGA.♦
Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition under his
command reached Coruña on the 13th of October; and such were the
idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish authorities, that the
troops were kept on ship-board till an order for their landing could
be received from the Central Junta. This General had been accustomed
to an Indian army, with its train of slaves and sutlers, elephants
and palanquins; he had now to march through a country where it is not
without difficulty that a party of travellers can obtain food, and
which had already been drained by its own troops; and his commissaries
were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but
ignorant of the language of the people. Dividing his army into small
detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance,
he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat of
Blake’s army, and anticipating that of Castaños’s, he consulted with
his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous
opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole force was
assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. Sir
John Moore’s opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed
by Sir David Baird. “I see my situation,” he said in his journal, “as
clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; yet I am determined
to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no
business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to
abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.”
♦SIR JOHN MOORE RESOLVES TO RETREAT UPON PORTUGAL, AND EMBARK FROM
LISBON.♦
It was not long before intelligence arrived that Castaños was defeated,
and his army dispersed. ♦NOV. 28.♦ This event the British Commander had
expected; it had always been his opinion that the south of Spain ought
to have been the scene of action; that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have
been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or
Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon
Portugal.... “Thus,” he said, in a letter to the English ambassador,
Mr. Frere, “he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country
where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of
Spain, if the French detached a force against him, and be ready to
return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again
render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no
expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to
subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest,
they might have troublesome subjects.” And, in his letter to Sir David
Baird, ordering him to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence for
the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order
that transports might be sent to Lisbon; “they will be wanted,” said
he; “for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.” He
had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that
he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to
be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas;
in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the
stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off
the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should
not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the
British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency.
“If the French,” said he, “succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt
to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be defended against a
superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south, and
the English might still be of use, if they were landed at Cadiz. But
it was impossible to be very sanguine on this subject, after what had
been seen.”
♦HE ASKS THE OPINION OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.♦
When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at
Salamanca, murmurs against it were heard in every quarter, and from
men of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the resolution of
their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat
of Castaños was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what
the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should
retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into
the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of
the Spanish nation? “This movement,” he said, “would be one of great
hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain,
and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it
was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought
to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their
defeats.” “The question,” said Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, “is not
purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me
to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government,
and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of
the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance
that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with
the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would
that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is
of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is
comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share
of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I
am very anxious to know your opinion.” Mr. Frere knew that what the
Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon
Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make
them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed
into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore,
a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought
the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about
Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the
two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid)
were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or
provincial spirit in all Spain: the people had been passive during
the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by
the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them: living in open
villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had
neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily
belong to the party which was superior in cavalry; ... yet even there
there was no want of a right feeling; the towns were abandoned at the
approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to
take the oath of allegiance to the Intruder, nor had the French been
able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed
by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the
people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to
be very active; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon
be remedied. “They are resolute,” said Mr. Frere, “and I believe every
man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at
least set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of
other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity.”
♦MR. FRERE WISHES HIM TO ADVANCE FOR THE DEFENCE OF MADRID.♦
Great advantages, the ambassador thought, would result from advancing
speedily to cover Madrid. It was a point of great moment for effect
in Spain, and still more in France, and in the west of Europe. The
people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend
it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable
to the claim of the Intruder than a siege of the capital. The first
object of the English, therefore, he thought, should be to march
there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before
farther reinforcements arrived from France. There were reports that the
resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual,
and a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that
these reports were not wholly without foundation. An advantage obtained
over the French now would be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it would
render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely
difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their present forces,
they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the
completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces, which would
give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces,
and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between
the two countries, which could stand out longest against the waste of
population.
If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear
sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce
him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced
would meet with the approbation of his Majesty’s government, he would
venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat
from thence to Coruña (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be
allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be
less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that
position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the
army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens
immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and
Old Castille.... Before this letter arrived, the General’s resolution
had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castaños’s defeat. It
was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he
had asked, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to
commence his retreat on Portugal.
♦1808. DECEMBER.
TWO SPANISH GENERALS SENT TO CONFER WITH SIR JOHN MOORE.♦
The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have
conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military
council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing
that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat
of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable.
But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with
another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience,
were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in
representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under
San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham
had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and
Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially
as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted.
Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its
strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form
a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid,
nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that
intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.
♦MORLA AND THE MILITARY JUNTA URGE HIM TO ADVANCE.♦
On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla,
informing him that about 25,000 men, of the central army, were falling
back on Madrid; that 10,000 from Somosierra were coming thither; and
that nearly 40,000 would join them. With that number of troops, the
French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But
the Junta, apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he
would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the
enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would
be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter was
written on the second, and the men who signed it had then determined
to betray their country, ... but though they might have wished and
designed to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal
that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil
and military Junta also, and was such as true Spaniards would have
given. While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly,
a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England,
arrived, with dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in
Madrid on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by
torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading
the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who told him there
were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had
that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material
importance to the common cause that the British commander should make
a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and
thus afford some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to
communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of
the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making
for resistance. By another Grandee he was requested to say to Sir John
Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making
conditions with the Junta for a better government; but especially that
he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the
British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under
Lord Peterborough.
♦COL. CHARMILLY SENT TO SIR JOHN MOORE BY THE DUQUE DEL INFANTADO AND
MR. FRERE.♦
When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere
had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring
from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed
with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a
colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John
Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would
have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest
injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the
retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr.
Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered
in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of
this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a
council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision
of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the
responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered.
Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the
dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador’s
first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded
every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution
of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General,
in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity,
of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been
entrusted to him for that purpose. “I have no hesitation,” he added,
“in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach
itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending
absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt.
I say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the
country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means
despair of their ultimate success.” Having read this letter, and
heard Charmilly’s communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to
suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired,
however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed
him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and
the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention: ...
both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of
the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming
his report came from various quarters. He was persuaded that a great
improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not
becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir
David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard
again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be
necessary.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE RESOLVES TO ADVANCE.♦
Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very
letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen
too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in
that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and
unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people
would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British
force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir
David to return to Astorga. “We must be at hand,” said he, “to aid and
take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our
duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.” But he
added, “I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and
Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.” These were ominous words.
It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the
Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong
the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions
weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of
the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was
sacrificing his own.
While Sir John was dispatching these instructions, it was not known at
Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating: officers
and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking
of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally
ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his
second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General,
not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a
high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in
pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of
his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered
him to quit Salamanca. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had
not deserved such treatment. The General replied that he did not mean
to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was
obeyed. Sir John Moore, in his resentment for what he conceived the
improper interference of the Ambassador, soon, however, recollected
what was due to him as the King’s minister. He told Mr. Frere,
therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters
delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied
them. “I certainly,” said he, “did feel and express much indignation
at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that
sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say
they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your
friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have
prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put
any trust in him.” He informed the Minister that every thing should be
done, for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could
be expected from such an army as he commanded, ... but he could not
make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and
Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was much
too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.
♦NEWS OF THE SURRENDER OF MADRID.
DEC. 7.♦
On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of
Toledo, telling him they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies
there, and defend the city to the last. He replied, that if the
Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their
ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain;
and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures
for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should
move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push
on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel
Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from
Talavera, with tidings that these men had surrendered Madrid. The
number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000
men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having
taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the
inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging
Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no
sooner approached than it was surrendered to him. These circumstances
did not induce the British General to alter his plan: his object was to
threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid
and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected
by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was
taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn
against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would
be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which
his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than
the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked,
therefore, to a retreat, as an event which would soon be unavoidable;
in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out
reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon,
and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the
efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary
to evacuate the peninsula.
♦CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROMANA.♦
Having determined, in this inauspicious state of mind, upon advancing,
he wrote to Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting
the remains of Blake’s army. Sir John complained to him that he had
been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, had been
kept perfectly in the dark with respect to their movements, the plans
of their generals and their government, and that while his army was
on the march to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed,
without the least support. Therefore, though his wish had always been
to co-operate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding
that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that
feeling he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back on Coruña,
and meant himself to retire upon Portugal, there to be ready for the
assistance of Spain whenever their affairs were better managed, and an
opportunity offered for doing them any good. Perhaps this opportunity
had now occurred; and as his retreat had been reluctant, so he had
stopped it the moment a chance of acting to advantage presented itself.
His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he
had the highest respect, and who would always find him ready to
undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish
nation. The account which Romana gave of his army in reply was far from
encouraging. He had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost all
without haversacks, cartridge boxes, and shoes, and at least two-thirds
were without clothing, from head to foot. Their spirits however
were good, and if they were well fed they would do their duty. Their
dispersion in Biscay had been wholly owing to the want of subsistence.
He should not doubt of uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive
attack upon the troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a
division of 8000 or 10,000 men, extending from Sahagun to Almanza,
whose apparent object was to check his army. As long as they remained
in that position, he could not abandon his, because it would leave them
a free way into Asturias; they would take possession of the country
from whence he drew large supplies, and they would threaten the passage
into Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird might oblige
them to fall back upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult to
form a junction.
♦FIRST SKIRMISH AT RUEDA.♦
From the beginning Sir John Moore had thought so poorly of the
Spaniards, that this account of the force with which he was to
co-operate could make no alteration in his views. It was perfectly
understood by him that he must stand, or fall, by his own means. He
left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day, Lord Paget, with the
principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and
General Stuart surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted
at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French
in Spain; and the prisoners declared it was universally believed
that the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was
at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French
army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who
had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal
Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into
Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. He would have
no English in front, it was said; for every thing evinced that they
were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the
road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they
were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought
Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared from this letter, that
Soult had two divisions with him at Saldaña; that Junot was collecting
another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso),
had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.
♦HEAD-QUARTERS REMOVED TO TORO.♦
Sir John had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult
was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move
to Toro, and unite his army there, Sir David Baird doing the same at
Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a
forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before
that General should be reinforced. While the head-quarters were at
Toro, a member of the Junta arrived there with Mr. Stuart. After the
manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr. Frere had
little reason to hope that any thing would induce Sir John Moore to
alter his determination of retiring from the country in despair. The
Spanish Government ♦THE COMMAND OF THE SPANISH ARMIES OFFERED TO SIR
J. MOORE.♦ had, however, pressed him to make one effort more: if that
determination were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most
dreadful consequences. The measures which alone could save Portugal
and Spain would be completely disconcerted, and England would have
afforded them succour only to make them rely on an effective aid, and
then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most needed. In
reality, the enemy at this moment exposed himself to ruin by dividing
his army to cover such an extended line. Romana would join Sir John
Moore with 14,000 men, and the Junta had taken such measures that
within a month 30,000 would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and Asturias.
Mr. Frere inclosed this note to the British Commander, and reminding
him of the immense responsibility with which he charged himself in
adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate if not final
ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose
resources he was entrusted, expressed a hope that Mr. Stuart, who was
personally esteemed by the General, would by that advantage be enabled
to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. “I am unwilling,”
he pursued, “to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be
stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an
interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But this much I
must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express
purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause,
with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops,
they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be
pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.... That the defence
of Galicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible.”... This letter
arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John’s movements; he
had advanced, but it was with a heavy heart: and when the Deputy from
the Junta, D. Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the
command in chief of the Spanish armies, he refused it. He would not
have done this if he had had any hope of acting with success against
the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them: for at this
time he learnt that Romana was beginning to retire on Galicia, and felt
how inconvenient it was that the army which was to co-operate with
him should be independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques,
saying, he had looked for the assistance of such part of his corps as
was fit to move; and had expected also that the road to Coruña would
have been left open for the British army, as that by which it must
receive its supplies, and the only one by which it must retreat, if
compelled so to do. Romana replied, that he should have had no thought
of retreating had it not been for the intelligence which he received
from Sir D. Baird; that he was ready to act with Sir John; and that
this was the moment, not for retreating, but for trying what could be
done against the enemy, and drawing him from the capital.
♦JUNCTION WITH SIR D. BAIRD FORMED.♦
The junction with Sir D. Baird was formed at Mayorga on the 20th; the
united force amounting to something more than 28,000 men, of whom
2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under
Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the
enemy’s cavalry were posted at Sahagun, Lord Paget endeavoured to
cut them off. The alarm was given, and they had time to form in a
favourable position; but they were out-manœuvred, charged, overthrown
in a moment, and dispersed in every direction, with the loss of many
killed, and 157 prisoners, including two Lieutenant-Colonels. In this
affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French;
and the British felt and proved their own exceeding great superiority.
Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was
severe; the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the troops had
suffered from forced marches, they halted there for a day, and there a
co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to
move with from 9000[40] to 10,000 men, being that part of his force
which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Pitiable
as their condition appeared when they were compared to troops so
admirably equipped as the English, it was, nevertheless, evident, even
to a desponding observer, that they might be brought into action as
auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy’s force, and to complete his
destruction in case of victory.
♦THEY ADVANCE AGAINST M. SOULT.♦
According to the information which Romana could obtain, Soult’s corps
consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse; but that General,
apprehending that some attempt would be made against him, had applied
for reinforcements, and without waiting for them, called to his
assistance the nearest troops; he had thus brought together about
18,000 men, who were posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement
was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, ...
never more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun were
prepared for the reception of the wounded; and the soldiers confidently
anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was less sanguine. “The
movement I am making,” he said to Mr. Frere, “is of the most dangerous
kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior
forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish
it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of
the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of
the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after
the Spaniards had abandoned us.” The truth is, that nothing had
been done; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and he
had no faith in the people: his own judgement would have led him to
fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what
would be the feelings of the English nation, if its army had retired
without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr. Frere, for having
given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the
suggestion of that Minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy
of consideration. It was at once rejected, as futile; and he advanced
against this detachment of the French, “bridle in hand,” as he himself
said, and expecting to “have a run for it,” ... not thinking that any
possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking a reason
which might appear valid to the people of England for abandoning the
peninsula, and for leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate.... “It
was necessary to risk this army,” he said, “to convince the people of
England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither
the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves.
With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I
beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other effect than the
character it will attach to the British arms.”
At the hour appointed, the whole force was under arms; the right column
had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting
the word of command: ... just at this time came a letter from Romana,
with intelligence ♦THE FRENCH ENDEAVOUR TO SURROUND THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or
Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other
messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements ♦DEC. 23.♦ had
arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that
the troops should go back to their quarters, and by daybreak next
morning be again under arms. “In my life,” says one who was present,
“I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any
body of living creatures! A few murmurs only were heard, but every
countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of
that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all
heart and ♦SIR J. MOORE BEGINS HIS RETREAT.♦ hope.” The next morning
General Hope fell back to Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his
own division and with General Fraser’s. Sir David Baird was ordered
to pass the river Ezla at Valencia de San Juan: on Christmas-day the
Commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the
light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve
on the 26th. When Sir John Moore apprized Romana that he should fall
back, he told him that if he were pursued he should stop and offer
battle: and in a second communication from Sahagun he said, that if he
were pressed after crossing the Ezla, he should have no objection to
try an action. But he had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage,
and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying
point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from
thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to
receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from
England. At the worst, he could defend himself, and, with Romana’s
aid, defend Galicia. “You may rest assured,” he added, “that I shall
not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from
being intercepted.... You will find no inclination in me to abandon
the Spanish cause.” But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th,
show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously entertained,
was soon abandoned; and as for the reinforcements, he had already
countermanded them in his feeling of despair. His force, he said, when
he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000; Romana could not have above
8000. The troops moving against him he estimated at not less than
50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming, with 10,000
of his guards. His real purpose was not to stop longer at Astorga
than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where he
had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated to him, some
time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia by this route, but
Sir John begged it might be left open to the English, being the only
communication they had for their retreat or supplies.
From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made
his army superior to the British. Junot, with the army which had been
transported from Portugal to France, had advanced to Palencia, and
threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening from Madrid,
with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that
quarter. The force under Lefebvre was counter-ordered from the road
to Badajoz, and directed toward Salamanca. The retreat of the British
upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers advancing against him
Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying
when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the
prisoners; and they were accordingly stowed in covered waggons. A thaw
came on the day when they first fell back; on the following it rained
without intermission: the soil in that part of the country is a heavy
loam, and the roads were above a foot deep in clay. The proclamations
of the French travelled faster than the British army: these were, as
usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which
would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the
people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility and a fanatic priesthood.
All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken
them, speedily returned, should receive no injury; but otherwise,
whatsoever belonged to them should be confiscated. Unhappily, the
conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills.
The soldiers were indignant ♦ILL CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS.♦ with the
Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the
conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry
the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken
their mules, and run away in the night, because the movements of a
retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts
to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want of rest and
food, disappointed in their confident hopes of victory, and indignant
at turning their backs upon an enemy whom they would so eagerly have
met in the field, it was a relief for them to vent these feelings,
in the shape of anger, upon the only objects within their reach. In
this temper they began to plunder and commit havoc wherever they went;
and the officers, many of whom already murmured at the rapidity of
the retreat, and were discontented with the total silence which the
Commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future measures, did not
exert themselves as they ought to have done, to prevent these excesses.
♦PASSAGE OF THE EZLA.
DEC. 26.♦
Sir David Baird, who took the shorter line to Astorga, by way of
Valencia de S. Juan, effected his march without molestation. The sick
and wounded, following the same track, halted at the latter place, to
pass the night. Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food,
and laid to rest, before the alarm was sounded, and they were again
hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and exceeding
dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the
town. They were not provided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous,
because of the rapidity of the stream, occasioned by two narrow banks
of shingles, which form an angle in the middle; and at this time the
river was fast rising, from the melting of the snow upon the mountains.
A serjeant’s guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to
assist the waggons in passing, and skuttle two ferry-boats, when they
had effected their passage. They kindled a fire with grass and rushes,
for the sake of its light, but the materials were wet, and the wind
soon extinguished it. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide them over
the ford: his mule tripped in the mid stream, he was thrown, and saved
by a soldier, when just in the act of sinking. Perilous, however, as
the ford was, the passage was accomplished, without other loss than
that of some baggage-waggons, which broke down.
♦GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED AT BENEVENTE.♦
Sir John Moore, meantime, with the other division of the army, reached
Benevente, and there found it necessary to issue general orders,
♦DEC. 27.♦ which reflected severely upon the conduct both of his men
and officers. “The misbehaviour of the column which had marched by
Valderas exceeded,” he said, “what he could have believed of British
soldiers. He could feel no mercy towards officers who neglected, in
times like these, essential duties, nor towards soldiers who disgraced
their country, by acts of villany towards the people whom they were
sent to protect.” Alluding then to the discontent which was manifested
at the hurry of the retreat, and the mystery which was thrown over
their proceedings, he said, “it was impossible for the General to
explain to his army the motives of the movements which he directed;
he could, however, assure them, that he had made none since he left
Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, as
far as he was a judge, they had answered the purposes for which they
were intended. When it was proper to fight a battle he would do it,
and he would choose the time and place which he thought most fit. In
the meantime, he begged the officers and men to attend diligently to
discharge _their_ parts, and leave to _him_, with the general officers,
the decision of measures which belonged to them alone.” Strong as this
language was, it had no effect, and the havoc which had been committed
at Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle there is one of the
finest monuments of the age of chivalry; we have nothing in England
which approaches to its grandeur: Berkley, Raby, even Warwick and
Windsor are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has
the richness of Moorish decoration; open galleries, where Saracenic
arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters,
with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns and tesselated
floors, niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various
forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver,
and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke
of Ossuna; and the splendour of old times was still continued there.
The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this
circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered
within its walls. They proved the most destructive enemies that had
ever entered them: their indignant feelings broke out again in acts of
wanton mischief; and the officers, who felt and admired the beauties
of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation.
Every thing combustible was seized, fires were lighted against the
fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps, of the
greatest Spanish masters, and of those other great painters who left
so many of their finest productions in Spain, were heaped together as
fuel. The archives of the family fortunately escaped.
♦AFFAIR OF CAVALRY ON THE EZLA.♦
The soldiers had, however, here an opportunity of displaying a spirit
more becoming them as ♦DEC. 28.♦ Englishmen. Soon after the rear of
the army had marched into the town, an alarm was given that the enemy
were on the opposite heights. In an instant all was on the alert;
every man hastened to his place of rendezvous; the cavalry poured
out of the gates: ... the plain in the opposite direction was covered
with fugitives, and the streets were filled with women bewailing their
fate, and calling upon the Saints and the Virgin for protection. The
French, seeing with what alacrity they would be encountered, looked
at our men from the heights, and retired. It was ♦DEC. 29.♦ towards
evening, and as the enemy were so near, orders were given to destroy
the bridge. This was effected about daybreak the following morning;
and it was supposed that their progress was for a while impeded. The
troops again continued their retreat, and the whole of the infantry
and heavy artillery had departed, when intelligence arrived that the
French were again appearing, and that their cavalry were in the act
of passing the Ezla: ... they had found a ford about three hundred
yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in
the town. The picquets of the night, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway
and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair
to their alarm posts; and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget
hastened to the spot: he found four squadrons of imperial guards
already formed and skirmishing with the picquets; other cavalry were
in the act of passing. The 10th Hussars were sent for: as soon as they
arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets,
and charged the enemy. The French gave way, and repassed the ford
more expeditiously than they had crossed it. They formed again on the
other side, and threatened a second attempt; but three pieces of
horse artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the bridge,
and opened a fire upon them, that did considerable execution. About
seventy prisoners were taken; among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes,
Commander of the imperial guard of cavalry. The loss of the enemy could
not be ascertained: it was variously guessed, from 60 to 200. Ours was
about 50 in killed and wounded. It was reported that Buonaparte was on
the heights during this action.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE REACHES ASTORGA.♦
The ardour of the French was manifestly damped by this fresh proof of
British valour; and they continued their pursuit at such respectful
distance, that the rear of the army, which had been engaged with
them, reached Bañeza ♦DEC. 30.♦ that night unmolested. The next day
the Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was the rallying point,
and here they found about 5000 men of Romana’s army. That army was
literally half naked and half starved; a malignant typhus fever
was raging among them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the
hospitals. About this number, however, were fit for service. Romana
arrived there the same day. The first intimation that the French were
advancing to interpose between Portugal and the British army had
been received from him; but it was his opinion that that information
ought to have produced no change in Sir John Moore’s intentions. The
intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made; Soult
might have been beaten in time to fall upon the corps which was
coming to reinforce him, and by the success which prompt and vigorous
measures would have ensured, they should have become masters of Leon
and Castille. To his utter astonishment he now found that there was
no intention of making a stand at Astorga, part of the British army
being already on the way to Villa Franca, and a regiment of cavalry all
that was left on the side of Bañeza. He went therefore to the British
Commander, and represented to him the propriety of facing the enemy
where they were, a point from whence they had always a secure retreat
by the passes of Manzanal and Foncebadon, ... passes so strong that a
small force might maintain them against any numbers. He represented
to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferrada, where also
the hospitals were established, and there were magazines of corn; that
in Villa Franca there were more than 2000 sick, with hospital stores
and depôts of arms, and therefore it was of the utmost consequence to
defend the Bierzo. But Sir John Moore replied, that he had determined
upon retiring into Galicia, because his troops required rest. He
desired that the high road of Manzanal might be left to him, saying,
he would defend that and the principal entrance to Galicia by Villa
Franca; and that Romana might take the Foncebadon pass, and enter by
way of the Val de Orras and Puebla ♦HONOURABLE CONDUCT OF ROMANA AND
HIS ARMY.♦ de Sanabria. And here a proof of Spanish magnanimity was
given by these half armed, half naked, and half famished men, for such
they literally were. A malignant fever was raging among them, and
long fatigue, privations, and disease, made them appear more like an
ambulatory hospital than an army. Under such circumstances it might
have been supposed they would have sought to secure their retreat under
protection of the British to Coruña and Ferrol. But Romana and his
forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden upon
those allies with whom they had so lately expected to co-operate in
honourable and hopeful enterprise; and they assented without hesitation
to the British General’s desire. Romana only requested that the British
troops might no longer be permitted to commit disorders which even in
an enemy’s country ought never to be allowed; it must have been painful
indeed for Sir John Moore to have heard of such excesses, and still
more painful to feel, that in a retreat so hasty as this was intended
to be, it was impossible to prevent them.
♦SIR JOHN MOORE PURSUES HIS RETREAT.♦
The troops had been assured, at Benevente, that they were not falling
back upon Coruña, but that their march was only to secure a more
favourable position: ... no affirmations could make the soldiery
believe this: and when Sir John Moore reached Astorga, and issued
his orders, it was too manifest that they were not retreating, but
flying, before the enemy. Ammunition waggons were burnt here, and
an entire depôt of entrenching tools abandoned, so that the army
was thus deprived of a most important means of impeding the enemy’s
progress. The position at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief
had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of.
Two brigades under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense,
to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be
sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This
detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have
been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting
only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country
stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned.
General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with
orders to proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir
David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the
coast. “With respect to me and the British troops,” said the Commander,
in his official letter, “it has come to that point which I have long
foreseen.... From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement
against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely; but as there
is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army
for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast
as fast as I am able.... We must all make forced marches, from the
scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon
our flanks, may otherwise intercept us.”
It appears evident, from these expressions, that Sir John Moore was
not well informed of the nature of the country through which he was
about to retreat. Westward of Astorga, two great ♦THE BIERZO.♦ ranges
of mountains trend from north to south: Puerto del Rabanal, Cruz de
Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern branch; those of the
western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto del Courel, and Puerto
del Aguiar; they meet, on the south, with the Sierra de Sanabria,
the Sierra de Cabrera, and the Montes Aquilianos. The tract which
these mountains enclose is called the Bierzo: from summit to summit
it is about sixteen leagues from north to south, and about fourteen
from east to west. The whole waters of this amphitheatre have but one
opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass, through a
narrow gorge, into the Val de Orras, in Galicia.... The centre is a
plain of about four square leagues. There is scarcely in Europe a more
lovely tract of country, certainly no where a more defensible one. The
main road, one of the finest in Europe, is that of Manzanal; that of
Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo; there is no third ingress, and
from Villa Franca toward Coruña the only way is that of the Puerto
Cebrero; both the former passes lead along defiles, where, as Romana
observed three months before this miserable retreat, a thousand men
might stop the march of twenty times their number: and beyond Villa
Franca there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird’s army had travelled
this road; they supposed that it could not possibly be intended to
fall back beyond that point. But the Commander saw no security till
he should reach the coast; there he hoped to find transports ready,
or to take up some defensible position till they arrived. The same
difficulties which affected him must affect his pursuers. It was not
probable that all the numbers which were now marching against him
would follow him the whole way; and once on the coast, it was his
determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force: ...
“it is only while retreating,” said he, “that we are vulnerable.” His
sole object now was to bring off the army, ... to effect this he had
already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and
now left behind many of the sick.
♦DISORDERS COMMITTED BY THE TROOPS.♦
The mountain-tops were covered with heavy clouds, and the roads
knee-deep in snow. Provisions, in a country where the natives are not
rich enough at any time to lay by a store, can never be abundant, and
what there were, had already been exhausted by the repeated march
of troops, English and Spaniards. The little order with which such
food as could be found was issued out, occasioned waste, and thereby
increased the evil. The men, half famished, half frozen, and altogether
desperate, were no longer in any subordination. They forced their way
into the houses where their rations should have been served, seized
it by force, frequently spilling the wine, and destroying more than
they could carry away. This was not all: ... pillage could not be
prevented. Houses and villages were burning in all directions; but when
they thus acted as enemies, they were treated as such; and many of them
were put to death by the peasantry, in revenge, or in self-defence.
♦BUONAPARTE STOPS AT ASTORGA.♦
Buonaparte pursued in person no farther than Astorga: he left Marshal
Ney with 18,000 men to keep that part of the country in subjection; and
assigned to Marshal Soult, with 23,000, what he called the “glorious
mission of destroying the English army, ... pursuing them to their
point of embarkation, and driving them into the sea.” Marshal Soult’s
was an easy task: he had only to follow the English just close enough
to keep them at the pace at which they set out, and not come near
enough to make them turn and stand at bay; fatigue would do his work
more surely than the sword. From Astorga to Villa Franca del Bierzo
is fifteen leagues, about sixty English miles; the road for the first
four leagues is up the mountain, but through an open country. Having
reached the summit of Foncebadon, you enter into some of the strongest
passes in Europe. It would scarcely be possible for an invading army to
force their way here, against a body of determined men. These passes
continue between two and three leagues, nearly to the village of Torre;
from thence, through Benvibre and Ponferrada, nothing can be finer than
the country, and the circle of mountains which binds it in. But never,
in the most melancholy ages of Spanish history, had a more miserable
scene ♦1809. JANUARY.♦ been represented, than was now to be witnessed
here. The horses of the retreating army began to fail, and this, in
great measure, for want of shoes and shoe-nails. There was no want of
iron to hammer new ones: there are iron-works near Villa Franca, and
enough might have been procured, had there been time allowed. As soon
as these noble animals foundered, they were shot, lest the enemy should
profit by them. The rain continued pouring, ... the baggage was to be
dragged, and the soldiers were to wade through half-melted snows, ...
the feet of the men as well as of the beasts began to fail, ... more
waggons were left behind, ... more ammunition destroyed along the way;
and when the troops reached Villa Franca, they were in such a state,
that several experienced officers predicted, if this march against time
were persevered in, a fourth of the army would be left in the ditches,
before it was ♦JAN. 2.♦ accomplished. More magazines and carriages
were here destroyed. Some of the men abandoning themselves now, as
knowing that if they proceeded they must die of cold, hunger, and
weariness; they got into the wine cellars, and, giving way to desperate
excess, were found dead when the French entered the town. When the
General marched with the reserve from Benvibre, he left a detachment
to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers of
their danger, and drive them out of the houses, ... for the place
was filled with them, near a thousand men of the preceding divisions
having remained there, all abandoned to despair, and most of them to
drunkenness. A few were prevailed upon to move on; the greater number
were deaf to threats, and insensible to danger, till the rear-guard was
compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still covered them,
and did not quit the town till the enemy approached, and then the road
was filled with stragglers, armed and unarmed, mules, carts, women, and
children.... Four or five squadrons of French cavalry compelled the
detachment in the rear to retire, and pursued them closely for several
miles, till General Paget, with the reserve, repulsed the pursuers. As
the French dragoons galloped through the long line of these wretched
stragglers, they slashed them with their swords to the right and left,
... the men being so insensible with liquor that they neither attempted
to resist nor get out of the road. Some of these men having found their
way to the army, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks,
to show their comrades the miserable consequence of drunkenness at such
a time.
♦SKIRMISH AT CACABELOS.♦
The Spaniards at Villa Franca would not believe that the French were
advancing; through so strong a country, and in so severe a season, they
thought it was impossible. Sir John Moore, however, well knew that he
was pursued, and he was afraid of halting, lest the enemy should get in
his rear, and intercept him at Lugo; an apprehension which could not
have been entertained, had he been acquainted with the country. The
troops, therefore, were hurried on: the artillery and head-quarters
went foremost; General Baird’s column, and the cavalry, under Lord
Paget, covered the rear. The advanced guard of the enemy, under General
Colbert, were close at their heels: Merle’s division joined them on
♦JAN. 3.♦ the 3d, and on the afternoon of that day they ventured to
attack the rear-guard at Cacabelos. They were repulsed by the dragoons
and riflemen. General Colbert received a ball in his forehead, and
fell; he was an officer of great promise, and of so fine a person, that
Canova is said to have called him the modern Antinous. Having thus once
more shown the enemy what they could do in battle, the rear of the
army, reluctantly and almost broken-hearted, continued their retreat.
♦RETREAT CONTINUED FROM VILLA FRANCA.♦
From Villa Franca to Castro is one continued ascent up Monte del
Cebrero for about fifteen miles, through one of the wildest, most
delightful, and most defensible countries in the world. The road is
a royal one, cut with great labour and expense in the side of the
mountain, and following all its windings; ... for some part of the
way it overhangs the river Valcarce, a rapid mountain stream, which
falls into the Burbia near the town, and afterwards joins the Sil,
to pass through the single outlet in the gorge of the Bierzo. Oaks,
alders, poplars, hazels, and chestnuts grow in the bottom, and far up
the side of the hills: the apple, pear, cherry, and mulberry are wild
in this country; the wild olive, also, is found here; and here are
the first vineyards which the traveller sees on his way from Coruña
into the heart of Spain. The mountains are cultivated in some parts
even to their summits, and trenches are cut along their sides, for
the purpose of irrigating them. Even those writers whose journals
were written during the horrors of such a flight noticed this scenery
with admiration. It was now covered with snow: ... there was neither
provision to sustain nature, nor shelter from the rain and snow, nor
fuel for fire, to keep the vital heat from total extinction, nor
place where the weary and foot-sore could rest for a single hour in
safety. All that had hitherto been suffered was but the prelude to
this consummate scene of horrors. It was still attempted to carry on
some of the sick and wounded: the beasts which drew them failed at
every step; and they were left in their waggons, to perish amid the
snow. “I looked round,” says an officer, “when we had hardly gained
the highest point of those slippery precipices, and saw the rear of
the army winding along the narrow road.... I saw their way marked by
the wretched people who lay on all sides expiring, from fatigue and
the severity of the cold: ... their bodies reddened in spots the white
surface of the ground.” The men were now desperate: excessive fatigue,
and the feeling of the disgrace there was in thus flying before the
enemy, excited in them a spirit which was almost mutinous: ... a few
hours’ pause was what they desired, an opportunity of facing the
French, the chance of an honourable and speedy death, the certainty of
sweetening their sufferings by taking vengeance upon their pursuers. A
Portugueze bullock-driver, who had faithfully served the English from
the first day of their march, was seen on his knees amid the snow, with
his hands clasped, dying in the attitude and act of prayer. He had at
least the comfort of religion in his passing hour. The soldiers who
threw themselves down to perish by the way-side gave utterance to far
different feelings with their dying breath: shame and strong anger were
their last sentiments; and their groans were mingled with imprecations
upon the Spaniards, by whom they fancied themselves betrayed, and upon
the generals, who chose rather to let them die like beasts than take
their chance in the field of battle. That no horror might be wanting,
women and children accompanied this wretched army: ... some were frozen
to death in the baggage-waggons, which were broken down, or left upon
the road for want of cattle; some died of fatigue and cold, while their
infants were pulling at the exhausted breast: ... one woman was taken
in labour upon the mountain; she lay down at the turning of an angle
rather more sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which
drifted along; ... there she was found dead, and two babes, which she
had brought forth, struggling in the snow: ... a blanket was thrown
over her, to cover her from sight, ... the only burial which could be
afforded, ... and the infants were given in charge to a woman who came
up in one of the bullock-carts, ... to take their chance for surviving
through such a journey.
♦TREASURE ABANDONED.♦
While the reserve were on this part of the road, they met between
thirty and forty waggons filled with arms, ammunition, shoes, and
clothing, from England, for Romana’s army. There was no means of
carrying them back; ... such things as could be made use of were
distributed to the soldiers as they passed, and the rest were
destroyed. Indeed, the baggage which was with the army could not be
carried on: nearly an hundred waggons, laden with shoes and clothes,
were abandoned upon this ascent. The dollars, too, could no longer be
dragged along: had the resolution of sacrificing them been determined
upon in time, they might have been distributed among the men: in this
manner, great part might have been saved from the enemy, and they who
escaped would have had some little compensation for the hardships
which they had undergone: ... they were now cast over the side of
the precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal them from the
French: ... many men are supposed to have been lost, in consequence of
having dropped behind, for the hope of recovering some of this money.
Dreadful as this march appeared to those who beheld the wreck of the
army strewing its line of road, it was perhaps still more so for them
who performed it in a night stormy and dark, wading through sludge
and snow, stumbling over the bodies of beasts and men, and hearing,
whenever the wind abated, the groans of those whose sufferings were not
yet terminated by death.
From the summit of this mountain to Lugo is nearly twelve leagues.
There are several bridges upon the way, over glens and gills, which
might have impeded the pursuit, had they been destroyed. One, in
particular, between Nogales and Marillas, is the most remarkable work
of art between Coruña and Madrid. This bridge, which is called Puente
del Corzul, crosses a deep ravine: from its exceeding height, the
narrowness of its lofty arches, and its form, which, as usual with
the Spanish bridges, is straight, it might at a little distance be
mistaken for an aqueduct. Several of those officers who knew the road
relied much upon the strength of the ravine, and the impossibility
that the French could bring their guns over, if the bridge were
destroyed. Grievous as it was to think of destroying so grand a work,
its destruction was attempted; but, as in most other instances, to no
purpose; whether the pioneers performed their office too hastily, or
because their implements had been abandoned upon the way.
♦THE ARMY COLLECTS AT LUGO.♦
The different divisions had been ordered to halt and collect at Lugo.
Sir John Moore was now sensible of the impossibility of reaching
Vigo, ... the distance was double that to Coruña, the road was said
to be impracticable for artillery, and the place itself offered no
advantages for embarking in the face of an enemy. The brigades,
however, of Generals Craufurd and Alton had marched for that port; and
General Fraser, with his division, had been ordered to follow and join
them. A dispatch was sent to stop him: the dragoon who was entrusted
with it got drunk on the way, and lost the letter; and these troops, in
consequence, had proceeded a full day’s journey on their way towards
Vigo before the counter-order reached them, and they were marched back.
Thus, instead of having two days’ rest at Lugo, as had been designed,
they returned to that place excessively harassed, and with some
diminution of number, occasioned by fatigue. When the horses entered
Lugo, many of them fell dead in the streets, others were mercifully
shot; ... above four hundred carcasses were lying in the streets and
market places; ... there were none of the army who had strength to bury
them; the towns-people were under too painful a suspense to think of
performing work which it seemed hopeless to begin while the frequent
musket-shot indicated so many fresh slaughters; there therefore the
bodies lay, swelling with the rain, bursting, putrifying, and poisoning
the atmosphere, faster than the glutted dogs and carrion birds could
do their office. Here the retreating army might have rested, had the
destruction of the bridges been effected; but this attempt had been so
imperfectly executed, that the French came in sight on the 5th, and,
collecting in considerable strength, took up a good position opposite
our rear-guard, a valley dividing them.
♦SIR JOHN OFFERS BATTLE AT LUGO.
JAN. 6.♦
On the following day they attacked the outposts, opening upon them with
two Spanish pieces of ordnance, which they had taken on their march.
The attack was made with great spirit; but it was received, says an
officer, “with a steadiness which excited even our own wonder;” ...
for at the sight of the enemy, and the sound of battle, the English
recovered heart, and derived from their characteristic and invincible
courage a strength ♦JAN. 7.♦ which soon made them victorious. On the
7th another attack was made, and in like manner repelled. The prisoners
reported that Marshal Soult was come up with three divisions. Sir
John Moore, therefore, expecting a more formidable attempt, drew up
his whole force on the morning ♦JAN. 8.♦ of the 8th. It was his wish
now to bring the enemy to action; he had perfect confidence in the
valour of the troops, and perceived, also, that, unless he crippled
his pursuers, there was no hope of embarking unmolested. Order and
discipline were instantaneously restored by this resolution to fight,
and the men seemed at once to have recovered from their sufferings.
The French were not equally eager for battle; the trial which they had
made of their enemies on the two preceding days was not such as to
encourage them; and Soult was waiting for more troops to come up. The
country was intersected with inclosures, and his position was thought
too strong to be attacked by an inferior force. But, in reality,
the French at this time were less numerous than the English. Another
reason assigned for not attacking the enemy was, that the commissariat
had only provisions for two days: delay, therefore, was judged as
disadvantageous as retreat. It was afterwards known, that the French
expected to be attacked, that they had no confidence in the strength
of their position, and that their ablest officers apprehended their
advanced guard would have been cut off. They frequently spoke of this
to those English who were left in their power at Lugo, and exulted that
Sir John Moore had contented himself with offering battle, instead of
forcing them to an engagement. After waiting till the afternoon, during
a day of snow and storms, Sir John ordered large fires to be lighted
along the line, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and continued
his retreat during the night.
♦RETREAT TO CORUÑA.♦
Before the reserve left Lugo, the General once more endeavoured to
repress the irregularity of the march. He warned the soldiers that
their safety depended entirely upon their keeping their divisions, and
marching with their regiments; and that those who stopped in villages,
or straggled in the way, would inevitably be cut off by the French
cavalry, ... “who have hitherto,” said he, “shown little mercy even to
the feeble and infirm who have fallen into their hands. The army has
still eleven leagues to march; the soldiers must make an exertion to
accomplish this: the rear-guard cannot stop; and they who fall behind
must take their fate.” These representations were ineffectual: ... it
was, indeed, impossible to obey them: many of the men were exhausted
and foot-sore, and could not keep their ranks: ... others, who had
totally broke through all discipline, left them for the love of wine,
or for worse motives. So irresistible was the temptation of liquor to
men in their state, that it was deemed better to expose them to the
cold and rain of a severe night, than to the wine-houses of Betanzos,
the next town upon their march. When the Royals reached that place,
they only mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants,
and three privates: the rest had dropped on the road; and many of
those who joined did not come up for three days. There was a memorable
instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might have been
accomplished by discipline and presence of mind. A party of invalids,
between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two squadrons of the
enemy’s cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among
them: he made an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor
men, then halted, rallied round him such as were capable of making any
resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could. This
party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and
retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat
of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.
♦SIR JOHN IS ADVISED TO PROPOSE TERMS.♦
The partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which he had been exposed
of a general one, checked Soult in his pursuit; and he was too sensible
of the danger which he had escaped, to trust himself again so near the
British, without a superior force. The British army, therefore, gained
twelve hours’ march upon him, and reached Coruña with little farther
molestation; they obtained implements from Coruña for destroying the
bridge over the Mero, and thus impeded ♦JAN. 11.♦ the enemy’s progress.
At Coruña, if the General had not represented the cause of Spain as
hopeless, they might have found reinforcements from England, which
would have enabled them to turn upon their pursuers, and take ample
vengeance for the sufferings and the shame which they had endured. But,
instead of reinforcements, he had directed that empty transports should
be sent; and, for want of due knowledge of the country, had ordered
them to Vigo, instead of Coruña. That order had been countermanded
as soon as the error was discovered; but contrary winds detained the
ships, ... happily for the honour of their country, for otherwise the
troops would have quitted Spain as fugitives. It was apparent now
that they could not escape unless they gained a battle. Coruña was a
bad position. Had they been numerous enough to have occupied a range
of hills about four miles from the town, they could have defended
themselves against very superior numbers, ... but these heights
required a larger force than the English army, of which not less than
a fourth part had been foundered by the way. Both flanks would have
been liable to be turned: it was therefore necessary to relinquish
them to the enemy, and be content with occupying a second and lower
range. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this situation, that
some of our general officers advised the Commander to propose terms to
Soult, for permitting the army to embark unmolested. In communicating
this to the Government, Sir John said he was averse to make any such
proposal, and exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any
good effect, ... but whatever he might resolve upon this head, the
Ministers might rest assured that he would accept no terms which were
in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. Happily for
his own memory, upon farther consideration, he rejected the advice. It
is sufficiently disgraceful that such advice should have been given;
and deeply is England indebted to Sir John Moore for saving the army
from this last and utter ignominy, and giving it an opportunity of
displaying to the world that courage which had never forsaken it, and
retrieving the honour which, had this counsel been followed, would
irretrievably have been lost.
♦PREPARATION FOR BATTLE.♦
Arrangements, therefore, were made to give the enemy battle. One
division, under General Hope, occupied a hill on the left, commanding
the road to Betanzos: the height decreased gradually to the village of
Elvina, taking a curved direction. At this village General Baird’s
division commenced, and bent to the right: the whole formed nearly a
semicircle. On the right of Sir David Baird, the rifle corps formed a
chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser’s division,
which was drawn up about half a mile from Coruña, near the road to
Vigo. The reserve, under General Paget, occupied a village on the
Betanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. On the
outside of the British posts was a magazine, containing 4000 barrels of
gunpowder, which had been brought from England, and left there, while
the Spanish armies were without ammunition! It was now necessary to
blow it up: ... the explosion shook the town like an earthquake; and a
village near the magazine was totally destroyed.
♦THE ARTILLERY EMBARKED.♦
The French made their appearance on the morning of the 12th, moving in
force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position
near the village of Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the
houses along the river. Their force was continually increasing. On the
14th they commenced a cannonade, which was returned with such effect,
that they at last drew off their guns. In the evening of this day
the transports from Vigo hove in sight. Some slight skirmishes took
place the following morning. Preparations meantime were making for the
embarkation. Sir John finding that, from the nature of the ground, much
artillery could not be employed, placed seven six-pounders and one
howitzer along the line, and kept four Spanish guns as a reserve, to
be advanced to any point where they might be wanted: the rest of the
artillery was embarked. The sick and the dismounted cavalry were sent
on board with all possible expedition. A few horses also were embarked,
... but there was little time for this: most of them were completely
disabled; another slaughter, therefore, was made of them: and the beach
was covered with their bodies. Some of these animals, seeing their
fellows fall, were sensible of the fate intended for them: they became
wild with terror, and a few broke loose.
♦BATTLE OF CORUÑA.♦
The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the
16th, and the General gave notice, that he intended, if the French did
not move, to begin embarking the reserve at four in the afternoon.
This was about mid-day. He mounted his horse, and set off to visit the
outposts: before he had proceeded far, a messenger came to tell him
that the enemy’s line were getting under arms; and a deserter arriving
at the same moment, confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward.
Their light troops were pouring rapidly down the hill on the right
wing of the British, and the advanced picquets were already beginning
to fire. Lord William Bentinck’s brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d,
and 50th regiments, maintained this post. It was a bad position, and
yet, if the troops gave way on that point, the ruin of the army was
inevitable. The guards were in their rear. General Paget was ordered
to advance with the reserve, and support Lord William. The enemy
opened a cannonade from eleven heavy guns, advantageously planted on
the hills. Two strong columns, one advancing from a wood, the other
skirting its edge, directed their march towards the right wing. A third
column approached the centre: a fourth advanced slowly upon the left:
a fifth remained half way down the hill, in the same direction. Both
in number and weight of guns they had a decided superiority; and they
fired with such effect from the commanding situation which they had
chosen, that the balls in their bounding reached the British reserve,
and occasioned some loss there.
Sir David Baird had his arm shattered with a grape-shot as he was
leading on his division. The two lines of infantry advanced against
each other: they were separated by stone walls and hedges which
intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the
French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body
of the enemy was observed moving up the valley to turn it. Marshal
Soult’s intention was to force the right of the British, and thus to
interpose between Coruña and the army, and cut it off from the place
of embarkation. Failing in this attempt, he was now endeavouring to
out-flank it. Half of the 4th regiment was therefore ordered to fall
back, forming an obtuse angle with the other half. This manœuvre was
excellently performed, and they commenced a heavy flanking fire: Sir
John Moore called out to them, that this was exactly what he wanted
to be done, and rode on to the 50th, commanded by Majors Napier and
Stanhope. They got over an inclosure in their front, charged the enemy
most gallantly, and drove them out of the village of Elvina; but Major
Napier, advancing too far in the pursuit, received several wounds, and
was made prisoner, and Major Stanhope was[41] killed.
The General now proceeded to the 42d. “Highlanders,” said he, “remember
Egypt!” ... they rushed on, and drove the French before them, till they
were stopped by a wall: Sir John accompanied them in this charge. He
now sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left
flank of the 42d. The officer commanding the light infantry conceived,
at this, that they were to be relieved by the guards, because their
ammunition was nearly expended, and he began to fall back. The General,
discovering the mistake, said to them, “My brave 42d, join your
comrades: ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets!” Upon this,
they instantly moved forward. Captain Hardinge returned, and pointed
out to the General where the guards were advancing. The enemy kept up
a hot fire, and their artillery played incessantly on the spot where
they were standing. A cannon-shot struck Sir John, and carried away his
left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging
by the flesh. He fell from his horse on his back, his countenance did
not change, neither did he betray the least sensation of pain. Captain
Hardinge, who dismounted, and took him by the hand, observed him
anxiously watching the 42d, which was warmly engaged, and told him they
were advancing; and upon that intelligence his countenance brightened.
Colonel Graham, who now came up to assist him, seeing the composure of
his features, began to hope that he was not wounded, till he perceived
the dreadful laceration. From the size of the wound, it was in vain to
make any attempt at stopping the blood; and Sir John consented to be
removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him up, his sword, hanging
on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his
legs: Captain Hardinge began to unbuckle it; but the General said,
in his usual tone and manner, and in a distinct voice, “It is as
well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the field with me.”
Six soldiers of the 42d and the guards bore him. Hardinge, observing
his composure, began to hope that the wound might not be mortal, and
said to him, he trusted he might be spared to the army, and recover.
Moore turned his head, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few
seconds, replied, “No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.”
As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them frequently
turn round, that he might see the field of battle, and listen to
the firing; and he was well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A
spring-waggon came up, bearing Colonel Wynch, who was wounded; the
Colonel asked who was in the blanket, and being told it was Sir John
Moore, wished him to be placed in the waggon. Sir John asked one of
the Highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket was best?
and the man said the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and
the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. So they
proceeded with him to his quarters at Coruña, weeping as they went.
General Paget, meantime, hastened with the reserve to support the right
wing. Colonel Beckwith dashed on with the rifle corps, repelled the
enemy, and advanced so far as nearly to carry off one of their cannon;
but a corps greatly superior moved up the valley, and forced him to
retire. Paget, however, attacked this body of the enemy, repulsed it,
and pressed on, dispersing every thing before him, till the enemy,
perceiving their left wing was now quite exposed, drew it entirely
back. The French then advanced upon Generals Manningham and Leith, in
the centre, and there they were more easily repelled, the ground being
more elevated, and favourable for artillery. The position on the left
was strong, and their effort there was unavailing: but a body of them
took possession of a village on the road to Betanzos, and continued to
fire from it, till Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls attacked it, and beat
them out. Night was now closing in, and the French had fallen back in
all parts of the field. The firing, however, was not discontinued till
it was dark.
Never was any battle gained under heavier disadvantages. The French
force exceeded 20,000 men; the British were not 15,000. The superiority
in artillery was equally great: ... the enemy had met English guns on
the way, sent off, thus late, to the patriotic armies, and these they
had turned back, and employed against the English. Our artillery was
embarked; and the Shrapnell shells, which contributed so materially to
the success at Vimeiro, were not used in this more perilous engagement.
If the moral and physical state of the two armies be considered, the
disadvantages under which our soldiers laboured were still greater:
... the French, equipped in the stores which they had overtaken upon
the road, elated with a pursuit wherein no man had been forced beyond
his strength, and hourly receiving reinforcements to their already
superior numbers; ... the English, in a state of misery, to which no
army, perhaps, had ever before been reduced till after a total defeat;
having lost their military chest, their stores, their baggage, their
horses, their women and children, their sick, their wounded, their
stragglers, every thing but their innate, excellent, unconquerable
courage. From 6000 to 7000 men had sunk under the fatigues of their
precipitate retreat. The loss in the battle did not amount to 800; that
of the [42]French is believed to have exceeded 2000. If such a victory
was gained by the British army under such circumstances, what might not
have been achieved by that army when unbroken, with all its means at
hand, in health and strength, in its pride, and in its height of hope!
The General lived to hear that the battle was won. “Are the French
beaten?” was the question which he repeated to every one who came into
his apartment; and he expressed how great a satisfaction it was to him
to know that they were defeated. “I hope,” he said, “the people of
England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice.” Then,
addressing Colonel Anderson, who had been his friend and companion in
arms for one-and-twenty years, he said to him, “Anderson, you know that
I have always wished to die this way.... You will see my friends as
soon as you can: ... tell them every thing.... Say to my mother”--But
here his voice failed, he became excessively agitated, and did not
again venture to name her. Sometimes he asked to be placed in an
easier posture. “I feel myself so strong,” he said, “I fear I shall be
long dying. It is great uneasiness ... it is great pain.” But, after
a while, he pressed Anderson’s hand close to his body, and, in a few
minutes, died without a struggle. He fell, as it had ever been his wish
to do, in battle and in victory. No man was more beloved in private
life, nor was there any general in the British army so universally
respected. All men had thought him worthy of the chief command. Had he
been less circumspect, had he looked more ardently forward, and less
anxiously around him, and on all sides, and behind, ... had he been
more confident in himself and in his army, and impressed with less
respect for the French Generals, he would have been more equal to the
difficulties of his situation. Despondency was the radical weakness of
his mind. Personally he was as brave a man as ever met death in the
field; but he wanted faith in British courage, and it is faith by which
miracles are wrought in war as well as in religion. But let it ever
be remembered with gratitude, that, when some of his general officers
advised him to conclude the retreat by a capitulation, Sir John Moore
preserved the honour of England.
He had often said that, if he were killed in battle, he wished to be
buried where he fell. The body was removed at midnight to the citadel
of Coruña. A grave was dug for him on the rampart there, by a party of
the 9th regiment, the aides-du-camp attending by turns. No coffin could
be procured; and the officers of his staff wrapped the body, dressed as
it was, in a military cloak and blankets. The interment was hastened;
for, about eight in the morning, some firing was heard, and they feared
that, if a serious attack were made, they should be ordered away, and
not suffered to pay him their last duty. The officers of his family
bore him to the grave; the funeral service was read by the chaplain;
and the corpse was covered with earth.
Meantime, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, passed the night
in embarking the troops. At ten o’clock he ordered them to march from
the field by brigades, leaving strong picquets to guard the ground, and
give notice if the enemy approached. Major-General Beresford, with a
rear-guard of about 2000 men, to cover the embarkation, occupied the
lines in front of Coruña. Major-General Hill, with a corps of reserve,
was stationed on a promontory behind the town. Nearly the whole
army was embarked during the night: the picquets were withdrawn and
embarked also before day, little remaining ashore at daylight except
the rear-guard and the ♦JAN. 17.♦ reserve. The French, seeing this,
pushed on their light troops to the heights of St. Lucia, which command
the harbour, got up some cannon to a rising ground, and fired at the
transports. Several of the masters of these vessels were frightened,
and cut their cables: four of them ran a-ground. The men were put on
board other ships, and these were burnt. During the night of the 17th,
and the following morning, Beresford sent off all the sick and wounded
who were in a condition to bear removal: and lastly, the rear-guard
got into the boats, no attempt being made to interrupt them. Thus
terminated our first campaign in Spain.
END OF VOL. II.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
FOOTNOTES
[1] “Elle est sans defense et sans fortification,” said Colmenar,
writing a century ago, “fermée d’une simple muraille; _mais ce défaut
est reparé par la bravoure des habitans_.” After the proofs which the
inhabitants have given of their patriotism, this praise appears like
prophecy.
[2] The Spaniards, by a more curious corruption, call Syracuse,
Zaragoza de Sicilia.
[3] _Hist. Apparitionis Deiparæ supra Columnam, Beato Jacobo apud
Cæsaragustam prædicante. Ex cod. membraneo, qui in Archivo Sanctæ Maria
de Pilari asservatur._ Espana Sagrada, t. xxx. p. 426. Risco adds
to this account, the Collect, which, from time immemorial, has been
used in the Church of the Pillar. It may be added here as a curiosity
for those who are not accustomed to such things. _Omnipotens æterne
Deus, qui Sacratissimam Virginem matrem tuam inter choros Angelorum
super columna marmorea a te ab alto emissa venire, dum adhuc viveret,
dignatus est,_ _ut Basilica de Pilari in ejus honorem a Protomartyre
apostolorum Jacobo suisque sanctissimis discipulis ædificaretur; præsta
quæsumus ut ejus meritis et intercessione fiat impetrabile quod fida
mente poscimus. Qui vivas et regnas, &c._
The French, as may be supposed, ridicule this fable; but, it is worthy
of remark, that, in the early part of the last century, the Spanish
annalist, Ferreras, represented the story as of doubtful authority;
his book passed through the hands of the usual censors, and was
printed; and then Philip V. the first of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain,
a Frenchman by birth and education, personally interfered, commanded
Ferreras to cancel the heretical leaf, and sent the edict in which this
was decreed to Zaragoza, there to be deposited among the archives of
the Virgin’s church, in proof of his especial devotion to our Lady of
the Pillar.
[4] “Here,” says Mr. Townsend, “I forgot all the hardships and fatigues
which we had suffered in this long journey: nay, had I travelled all
the way on foot, I would have freely done it to enjoy the sight of
these cathedrals. That which is called _El Aseu_ is vast, gloomy,
and magnificent; it excites devotion, inspires awe, and inclines the
worshipper to fall prostrate, and to adore in silence the God who seems
to veil his glory. The other, called _El Pilar_, spacious, lofty,
light, elegant, and cheerful, inspires hope, confidence, complacency,
and makes the soul impatient to express its gratitude for benefits
received.”
[5] Laborde.
[6] In military language, you always describe the country by the
current of water, and speak as if you were looking down the stream. It
was requisite to explain this to the court upon Whitelocke’s trial, and
therefore the explanation cannot be thought unnecessary here.
[7] “On this simple foundation,” says Mr. Vaughan, “a regular
manufactory of gunpowder was formed after the siege, which produced 13
arrobas of Castille per day; that is, 325 lb. of 12 ounces.”
[8]
Martyrum nulli, remanente vitâ,
Contigit terris habitare nostris;
Sola tu morti propriæ superstes,
Vivis in orbe,
Vivis ac pœnæ seriem retexis,
Carnis et cæsæ spolium retentans,
Tetra quam sulcos habeant amaros,
Vulnera narras.
Prudentius Περι Στεφανων. Hym. 4.
The poet goes on describing her torments with his usual love of
live-anatomy ... I know not whether it be possible that any person
should have survived them; but that some may be found wicked enough
to inflict equal tortures under the pretext, and others conscientious
enough to endure them for the sake of religion, has been too often
proved, and in few places more frequently than in Zaragoza itself, from
which city many an inquisitor has gone to keep company with Dacianus.
St. Engracia is invoked in diseases of the heart and the liver, in
consequence of the circumstances of her martyrdom.
Vidimus partem jecoris revulsam,
Ungulis longe jacuisse pressis;
Mors habet pallens aliquid tuorum,
Te quoque vivâ.
[9] The Bollandists relate this miracle with a candid admission of
doubt, because the writer, in whom they found it related, spoke upon
the testimony of others, instead of boldly asserting it on his own
authority. There are, however, testimonies in abundance, and that of
M. Bourgoing will be admitted to be decisive. “The roof,” he says,
“though very low, is certainly not smoked. They invite those who are
doubtful of it, to put a piece of white paper over one of these lamps.
I tried this experiment, and I must confess, I saw, or thought I saw,
that my paper was not blackened. I had still my doubts, but I took care
to conceal them from my bigoted conductors. I was, however, tempted to
say to them, God has not thought proper to work any striking miracle to
accelerate the end of the French revolution, or to calm the passions
which it has roused; and do you think that he would condescend to
perform here a miracle as obscure as your cavern, and as useless as
your own existence?”
[10] _Quartel-general, Santa Engracia. La capitulation._
[11] _Quartel-general, Zaragoza. Guerra al cuchillo._
[12] It is asserted by the French, in their official account, that,
after many days fighting, they won possession of many cloisters which
had been fortified, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all
the magazines; and that the peaceable inhabitants, encouraged by these
advantages, hoisted a white flag, and came forward to offer terms of
capitulation; but that they were murdered by the insurgents; for this
is the name which the French, and the tyrant whom they served, applied
to a people fighting in defence of their country, and of whatever could
be dear to them. Unquestionably, if any traitors had thus ventured to
show themselves in the heat of the contest, they would have been put to
death as certainly as they would have deserved it; and, if the thing
had occurred, it would be one fact more to be recorded in honour of
the Zaragozans; but there is no other authority for it than the French
official account, in which account the result of the siege is totally
suppressed. The circumstance, had it really taken place, would not have
been omitted in Mr. Vaughan’s Narrative, and in the accounts published
by the Spaniards.
[13] General Thiebault says, “_On attribua d’abord ce mouvement, si
brusque et si general, à des causes peu signifiantes, à des terreurs
paniques, &c.; mais on apprit depuis qu’il tenoit à des grands projets,
et on en eut la preuve, quand on sut que dans presque toutes les
provinces il avoit été tenté ce même jour avec plus ou moins d’audace
ou de succès; et que, s’il avoit manqué à Lisbonne, il avoit (et
toujours par le moyen des prêtres) eu tout son succès à Oporto, Braga,
Chaves, ou ce jour même, une insurrection générale avoit éclaté,
fait prendre les armes contre nous à tous les habitans des provinces
d’Oporto, du Tras-los-Montes, d’une partie du Beira, et fait arrêter ou
assassiner tous les Français isolés qui s’y trouvoient._”--Relation de
l’Expédition du Portugal, p. 124.
General Thiebault is certainly wrong. Had there been any combination
against the common enemy, the persons by whom it was concerted would
eagerly have pleaded it afterwards as a claim to honour if not to
reward. The Portugueze have preserved the most minute details of a
national insurrection so honourable to the nation, and the merit of
priority has been contested by different places: but from all that
has been published it appears, in direct contradiction to the French
general’s statement, that no combination existed, (indeed it was
impossible that it should exist,) and that no tumult broke out on
the day which he has specified as the commencement of a general and
concerted movement, except at a village of fishermen in Algarve.
[14] Baron Thiebault ascribes the success of the insurgents, and the
loss of Faro, to the news of Dupont’s surrender, and to the landing
of troops, arms, ammunition, and money, at Faro, from the English
squadron. Not a man nor a musket had been landed from that squadron,
and the surrender of Dupont did not take place till a month afterwards!
With so little accuracy do the French relate the circumstances of their
ill success, even where no military misconduct is imputable.
[15] Baron Thiebault represents this as a great exploit on the part of
his fellow-soldiers. He says, _Le Colonel Maransin auroit pu éviter
Beja, mais il crut devoir ramener, par un grand exemple, ce pays à
l’obeissance. Il forme ses colonnes en marchant, et sans artillerie
attaque cette ville, enceinte de hautes murailles, dont toutes les
portes étoient barricadées, dont les murs, les tours, étoient défendus
par des forces quintuples des siennes, et par des hommes qui, dans
leur fureur, defioient nos bataillons._ Who would suppose, from this
description, that these high walls and towers were in ruins, and that
they were defended by a mob of three or four thousand men, not a third
part of whom were armed with firelocks! After killing 1200 men in
action, and all who were found in arms after it, sacking the city, and
setting it on fire, it seems difficult to understand what the mercy
was which the surviving inhabitants are said to have sent to Lisbon
to solicit. According to Baron Thiebault, _un brave religieux_, after
the assault, moved all his auditors to tears, by representing to them
how much they had provoked their own misfortunes: he was consequently
deputed unanimously to implore Junot’s clemency. Junot received him
graciously, and rewarded him with a canonry; LA RECONNOISSANCE FUT
EXTREME, ... _et Beja n’en reprit pas moins les armes peu de jours
après_. In the bulletin published at Lisbon upon this occasion, and
signed by this same General Thiebault, it is said, the inhabitants
expressed their contrition by their deputy, acknowledged that they had
been justly punished, and confessed that they had been seduced by the
English!
[16] Two persons were left alive when the French thought their accursed
work was done. One of them lingered three days before he was relieved
by death. Feliz Lourenco, the surveyor of the high road, was the other.
“He,” says Neves, (writing in 1811,) “still lives ... but in what a
condition! With his body and face disfigured by the marks of powder,
and the scars of eight and twenty bayonet wounds; ... with his left
eye struck out by a ball, the bones of his right shoulder broken, the
tendons rendered useless, and the hand paralyzed. It is from himself
that I have received the details of this frightful transaction,
of which there exists no other witness, except the murderers
themselves.”--_Historia Geral da Invasam dos Francezes em Portugal_,
_t._ iv. _p._ 42.
[17] General Thiebault, by whom the bulletin was signed, gives a
different statement in his book (p. 155). The French loss is there
given at sixty men killed, and from 130 to 140 wounded; that of the
Portugueze as at least 4000 left upon the field.
[18] As another example of the arts used to impose upon the Portugueze
people by the intrusive government, the following extract from the
fifth bulletin of the army of Portugal may be read with feelings
very different from what the detail in the text must excite. “On the
10th of July forty English disembarked at the foot of the village of
the Costa, to take in water and provisions. That point was defended
by only five carabineers of the thirty-first regiment of light
infantry. Notwithstanding this disproportion of numbers, these five
men, in sight of all the inhabitants, attacked the forty English,
repulsed them, forced them to abandon upon the beach all that they had
purchased, and pursued them to the sea.” Yet even this is outdone in
the same bulletin. “Three conscript lads (it is farther said), of the
sixty-sixth regiment, occupied a small post on the sea-shore, in front
of Cascaes, when they saw a boat put off from the English squadron, and
make towards them. Immediately these three lads placed themselves in
ambush, to wait till the boat should draw near: as soon as it reached
the shore they rose from their ambush, fired upon the boat, killed
the pilot (who was the master of Admiral Cotton’s ship), obliged two
English officers, and six seamen or soldiers, who were in the said
boat, to come on shore, and lay down their arms upon the beach, and
then conducted them as prisoners of war to the quarters-general of
General Solignac at Cascaes. This fact discovers a presence of mind,
a degree of intelligence, and a vigour, which do honour to the three
lads.” To complete the story, it should have been added, that the three
lads ate the eight Englishmen.
[19] Neves relates that Kellermann demanded for his own use 50,000
cruzados from the prior of Alcobaça at this time, letting him know,
without circumlocution, that what the French generals wanted was money.
He accepted a hundred moidores after hard bargaining. Loison heard of
this on his arrival, and, being on bad terms with Kellermann, made
him refund the money, charging the prior, if any such extortion were
practised upon him in future, to complain to him, wherever he might be.
Kellermann, however, coming there again when Loison had marched to the
south, redemanded the money, and laid on ten per cent. for interest. T.
iv. p. 82, 88.
[20] General Thiebault says, there was an action at Montemor, in which
the Portugueze lost fifty men, and that Loison also took prisoners
there some hundred peasants, _que les lois de la guerre condamnoient à
la mort, mais qu’il se borna à desarmer et renvoya chez eux_.
[21] General Thiebault says, that after their defeat in the field the
Portugueze wished to capitulate, but that the Spaniards shot those
persons who by timely submission would have saved the town: whereas the
fact is, that immediately after the defeat the Spaniards made the best
of their way towards their own country. During the action, he says that
several men dropt down dead, owing to the excessive heat, the blood
gushing from their ears, nose, and mouth. He is mistaken in saying that
General Leite (whom he calls Loti) fell in this action.
[22] These facts are notorious in Portugal, and circumstantial
accounts, too horrible to be repeated, are published of them. General
Thiebault only says in his text, that there was a desperate conflict in
the streets, and that “all who were found in arms were exterminated.”
He annexes the following note: “_Si l’on ne put de suite arrêter ces
terribles représailles, si l’on ne put éviter le pillage de beaucoup
de maisons, les officiers-généraux, superieurs, et d’état-major,
parvinrent du moins à faire respecter les églises, où les femmes,
les vieillards, et les habitans paisibles s’étoient retirés, avec ce
qu’ils avoient de plus précieux; ils firent plus, ils allèrent rassurer
eux-mêmes tous ceux qui s’y trouvoient, et dès que l’ordre commença à
se rétablir, ils firent escorter les femmes jusques chez elles, afin de
les préserver de toute insulte._” P. 164.
That there were some men of honour and humanity, who protected the
inhabitants as far as they could, must be believed for the sake of
human nature. But the Revolution and the school of Buonaparte had done
all that was possible for eradicating both humanity and honour; and
I affirm, on the testimony of the Portugueze, and of those British
officers who have had full opportunities of ascertaining the truth,
that the conduct of the French in Evora was marked with deliberate and
sportive cruelty of the most flagitious kind. Concerning the conduct of
the general officers, as respects their sense of honour, I happen to
possess some rather curious information. Loison promised the Archbishop
that his property should not be touched. After this promise, Loison
himself, with some of his officers, entered the Archbishop’s library,
which was one of the finest in Portugal; they took down all the books,
in the hope of discovering valuables behind them, they broke off the
gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings of the rarest part
of the collection, and in their disappointment at finding so little
plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every
gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and every jewel and
bit of the precious metals with which the relics were adorned, or which
decorated any thing in his oratory. Loison was even seen in noon-day
to take the Archbishop’s episcopal ring from the table and pocket it.
These circumstances are stated on the authority of the Archbishop
himself.
[23] Sir Arthur, upon the court of inquiry, begged leave, in justice
to the individuals composing this commissariat, to state, that he
did not intend to complain of want of zeal, nor of any deficiency of
exertion on their part. “The fact is,” said he, “that I wished to
draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the
service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of
which I complained are probably to be attributed to the nature of our
political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military
operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of
serious consideration and difficulty, and these evils consisted in the
inexperience of almost every individual belonging to the commissariat,
of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies.” He
requested that this explanation might stand upon the minutes.
[24] General Thiebault affirms, that they had only 1900 in the field.
An officer who was dying of his wounds informed Sir Arthur Wellesley
that their numbers were 6000. General Thiebault asserts also, that
in a charge made by General Brenier with two companies in front of
Azambugeira, the 29th regiment having lost its colonel, and many of its
officers and men, surrendered _tout-entier_: but that _par-malheur_
the firing did not cease, and the wreck of the regiment saved itself
by a spontaneous movement, leaving a major, eight officers, and fifty
men, in the hands of the French. There is an official test by which
the accuracy of this statement may be tried; and thereby it appears,
that only four officers were missing in this action, and that there was
no major among them. The loss of the English he states at more than
2000. The accuracy of our official lists of the killed and wounded is
among those things relating to Great Britain which a Frenchman cannot
understand.
[25] They were cast off cavalry, purchased in Ireland; and they were
described as old, blind, and lame: some of them, it was said, had
already at this time died of age, others of work, though they had been
carefully fed: nearly a sixth part had thus perished on the way, and
of the remainder a great number were not worth the forage which they
consumed. Nine years after these poor horses had been delivered over to
the dogs and wolves, a representation was made to me in their favour,
and I feel myself bound to notice it, were it only for the singularity
of the case. I am assured that the 300 horses (which Lord Castlereagh
good-naturedly called his countrymen) were selected with the greatest
care, as well as knowledge, in horseflesh, from 1050 of which the
corps was then composed; that they were in the very best condition and
working order; they were drafts from a collection made by purchase
in 1803, (that is, five years before, and therefore not young); or
from the best and most useful horses cast from dragoon regiments, as
unfit for dragoon service generally, (the inferior description of such
cast horses having been from time to time sold); that they had been
always carefully groomed and well fed, and were in excellent condition
for common draft, the service for which they were required. From the
manner in which this representation was made to me, I have no doubt of
its truth. The horses, when they began the campaign, had probably not
recovered from the voyage; they were not accustomed to the food of the
country, and were employed in much harder work than had ever fallen to
their lot before, and upon much worse roads. And so, peace to their
memory. I must not however omit to observe, that Captain Eliot, in his
Treatise on the Defence of Portugal, says, these artillery horses, in
the brigade to which he was attached, did their duty perfectly well at
the battle of Vimeiro.
[26] According to General Thiebault, ten guns and 1800 men; but to make
up the number of killed and wounded, he adds to the British loss, what
he takes off from the French, and says, we had more than 500 killed and
1200 wounded.
[27] _Weel, my bra’ lads, I can gang nae farther wi’ ye a-fighting; but
Deel ha’e my saul if ye sal want music_, were his words.
[28] They remained, according to General Thiebault, long enough to
dress 800 of their wounded upon the field, and send them all off for
Torres Vedras. The attitude of the grenadiers with which General
Kellermann had charged, the rapidity with which the infantry re-formed,
and the movements of four cavalry regiments under General Margaron, he
says, _concoururent efficacement à contenir l’ennemi. Nous restames
de cette manière, maîtres du champ de bataille, plus de trois heures
après la cessation de l’action._ It is melancholy to observe, that the
historical relations of this war which the French have published since
its termination, are, generally speaking, as little to be relied on as
their official accounts during its continuance.
[29] General Thiebault, who was present at this council, represents
the force against them, independent of Lisbon, of 30,000 British, and
17,000 Spaniards, at more than 80,000 men, _auxquels rien ne manquoit_!
In reality, every man in Portugal was their enemy; but except animosity
and individual courage, the Portugueze at that time wanted every thing.
[30] It is asserted by General Thiebault, that General Kellermann was
sent to feel his ground, under pretext of a conference relating to
the prisoners and wounded. Upon that General’s return he says, “_On
conçoit de quel interêt étoient les nouvelles qu’il rapportoit, et
combien elles parurent heureuses quand on sut à quel point il avoit
réalisé tout ce qu’on avoit pu esperer. Il avoit_ _été reçu avec la
plus grande distinction; il avoit eu le talent de faire prendre aux
Anglais l’initiative des propositions qu’il avoit à leur faire; sachant
parfaitement l’Anglais, il avoit suivi la partie la plus mysterieuse
de leurs conversations[31]; il s’étoit fortifié de la certitude que,
malgré l’énormité de leurs avantages, les Anglais, incertains de
l’époque de l’arrivée des renforts, qu’ils attendoient, n’étoient
pas tranquilles sur leur position: il étoit parvenu à traiter pour
la flotte Russe en même temps que pour l’armée Française, et cela
en faisant pressenter que les Russes alloient se joindre à nous: il
étoit arrivé de cette manière à demander même que nous émmenassions
la flotte Portuguese, non pour l’obtenir, mais afin d’avoir quelque
chose à céder, dans le cas où des articles d’une haute importance
seroient trop contestés; et c’est ainsi, que par autant d’habilité que
de fermeté et d’adresse, il parvint à conclure et à signer un traité
provisoire._” This statement is sent into the world with General
Kellermann’s sanction, Baron Thiebault’s _Relation_ having, as the
preface states, been read to him. General Kellermann was so successful
in this negotiation, that he can derive no additional credit from
these additions to the plain facts. With regard to the initiative, he
came declaredly to treat for an armistice preparatory to a convention
for evacuating Portugal, and he produced a paper containing the
wishes of the French Commander-in-chief; the deliberations upon his
proposal, which he is said to have overheard, were not carried on in
his presence, but in an inner room. (_Proceedings upon the Inquiry_, p.
57.) As to the demand that the French might carry away the Portugueze
fleet, the French are certainly bold askers; and in this negotiation,
as in many others, they proved that Fortune favours the bold; ... but
he must have been more than bold, who could have made such a proposal.
What was afterwards asked upon that score will appear hereafter.
[31] Voici quelques-unes des phrases qu’il recueillit: _Notre position
est delicate--Le corps de Sir John Moore n’est pas encore arrivé à
Figuières--La bonne intelligence des Russes et des Français doit nous
donner des inquietudes_, &c.
[32] LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.
For Aragon D. Francisco Rebolledo de Palafox y Melzi, Gentleman
of the Bed-chamber, and Brigadier in the army;
D. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, Intendant of the army and
kingdom of Aragon.
Asturias D. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Knight of the Order of
Alcantara, of the Royal Council of State, and formerly
Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques de Campo-Sagrado,
Lieutenant-General of the army, and Inspector-general
of the troops of Asturias.
The Canaries Marques de Villanueva del Prado.
Old Castille D. Lorenzo Bonifaz y Quintano, Prior of the holy
Church of Zamora; D. Francisco Xavier Caro, Professor
of Laws at Salamanca.
Catalonia Marques de Villel, Conde de Darnius, a Grandee, and
Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Baron de Sabasona.
Cordoba Marques de la Puebla de los Infantes, a Grandee; D.
Juan de Dios Gutierrez Rabé.
Extremadura D. Martin de Garay, Intendant of Extremadura,
and Honorary Minister of the Council of War; D.
Felix Ovalle, Treasurer of the army of Extremadura.
Gallicia Conde de Gimonde; D. Antonio Aballe.
Granada D. Rodrigo Riquelme, Regent of the Chancery of
Granada; D. Luiz Funes y Salido, Canon of the
holy Church of Santiago.
Jaen D. Francisco Castanedo, Canon of the holy Church of
Jaen, Provisor and Vicar-general of that diocese; D.
Sebastian de Jocano, of his Majesty’s council, in the
_Tribunal de Contaduria Mayor_, and _Contador_ of the
province of Jaen.
Leon Frey D. Antonio Valdes, Bailey and Grand Cross of the
Order of S. Juan, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Gentleman
of the Bed-chamber, Captain-General of the
Fleet, Counsellor of State, formerly Minister of the
Marine, and acting Minister of the Indies; the Vizconde
de Quintanilla.
Madrid Conde de Altamira, Marques de Astorga, a Grandee,
Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order
of Charles III., First Equerry, and Gentleman of the
Bed-chamber; D. Pedro de Silva, Patriarch of the Indies,
Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., and
formerly Camp-Marshal of the Royal Armies.
Majorca D. Tomas de Veri, Knight of the Order of S. Juan,
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Volunteers; Conde de
Ayamans, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Militia.
Murcia Conde de Florida-Blanca, Knight of the Golden Fleece,
Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., Gentleman
of the Bed-chamber, and formerly First Secretary of
State, and acting Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques
del Villar.
Navarre D. Miguel de Balanza; D. Carlos de Amatria, Members
of the Deputation of the kingdom of Navarre.
Seville D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, Archbishop of Laodicea and
Coadjutor of Seville; Conde de Tilly.
Toledo D. Pedro de Ribero, Canon of the holy Church of Toledo;
D. José Garcia de la Torre, Advocate of the Royal
Councils.
Valencia Conde de Contamina, a Grandee, Gentleman of the
Bed-chamber; Principe Pio, a Grandee, Colonel of
Militia.
[33] Llorente, under his name of Nellerto, (vol. i. 155,) asserts,
that when Florida-Blanca was summoned to the central Junta he left
a writing, addressed to the municipality of the city of Murcia,
protesting that he acted under fear and compulsion, and in the full
knowledge that his country was going to destruction; and adding, that
he made this solemn declaration lest King Joseph should one day treat
him as a criminal. This infamous calumny, which by its own absurdity
confutes itself, is advanced by the ex-secretary of the Inquisition
upon no better authority than that of a Madrid journal, published
under the Intruder’s government. It is so palpably calumnious, that I
should not have thought it worthy of contradiction, if it had not been
doubtfully repeated by Col. Jones in his very able Account of the War.
[34] An account of them may be found in the notes to the Chronicle of
the Cid, pp. 141 and 418. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr says of the present
Miquelets, that they are the best light troops in Europe (p. 54.) But
Cabañes argues that they cannot possibly be so efficient as they were
when war was carried on less scientifically, and he regrets that it was
not possible to raise regular regiments in their stead. P. i. 90.
[35] Aun vea el hora que vos _merezca dos_ tanto. V. 2348, p. 318. Mr.
Frere proposed to read _merezcades_.
[36] I give this remarkable story from that very meritorious journal,
‘The Plain Englishman,’ (vol. i. 294,) where it is related by the
editor on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself.
[37] June 14. _Se sabe de oficio que ha muerto el 26 de Mayo el Rey de
Inglaterra; y que su sucessor ha mudado todo el ministerio eligiendo
sugetos decididos por la paz._
[38] M. Nellerto (Llorente) kills him twice. Once on the flight of the
Intruder from Madrid, preliminarily, (t. i. p. 143); and secondly and
definitively on this occasion. T. i. p. 159.
[39] This part of the bulletin was officially transmitted by Lord
Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, with the following instructions:--“His
Majesty cannot overlook this account, descriptive, according to the
obvious sense of it, of the murder of some unresisting stragglers of
his army, although his Majesty is disposed to disbelieve a transaction,
however sufficiently recorded, which is so utterly repugnant to the
usual laws of war, and to every principle of humanity. His Majesty
therefore desires that you will take the earliest means of ascertaining
the truth of the fact so recorded, and the circumstances under which it
was perpetrated, if perpetrated at all. If it shall upon investigation
appear to be founded, I am to desire you will cause a protest to be
made by you to the nearest head-quarters of the French army, and that
you will take such measures as shall appear to you most expedient
for the protection of the troops under your orders against conduct
so barbarous and so disgraceful.”--No such measures were taken, in
consequence of Sir John Moore’s retreat. This instruction, however,
exculpates the British government from any charge of indifference upon
the subject.
[40] The French historian of Marshal Soult’s Campaigns in 1808–9,
affirms that Sir John Moore had 37,000 effective men, and Romana had
from 25,000 to 30,000; their united force amounting thus to more than
60,000!
[41] He was shot through the heart, and died so instantaneously, that
the smile with which he was regarding the conduct of his men was fixed
upon his cheek. They buried him at the entrance of the bivouac which
he had occupied the preceding night; and as his brother leant forward
to look upon the body for the last time, a rifle-shot passed through
his cloak, and struck his side; its force was broken by the folds of
the cloak, otherwise the blow must have been fatal, and he would have
fallen into the grave upon his brother’s corpse.
[42] The historian of Marshal Soult’s campaigns in 1809 states the
loss of the French at 150 killed and 500 wounded. They were successful
on all points, he says; the victory was decided, and if the action
had begun earlier, and if the ground had permitted the cavalry to
charge, _c’en était fait de cette armée Anglaise_. These are modest
mis-statements in an author who asserts that, in the hope of impeding
the French in their pursuit, the English conceived the horrible
intention of blowing up the town of Betanzos, where the inhabitants had
received them as allies; and that for this purpose they deposited six
thousand weight of powder on the ground floor of the town-house and set
fire to the four quarters of the town!!
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
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Simple typographical errors were corrected; two unbalanced quotation
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All six volumes of this work are available at no cost at Project
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Volume I: LibraryBlog eBook number 60386
Volume II: LibraryBlog eBook number 60387
Volume III: LibraryBlog eBook number 60388
Volume IV: LibraryBlog eBook number 60389
Volume V: LibraryBlog eBook number 60390
Volume VI: LibraryBlog eBook number 60391
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