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Title: Richmond National Battlefield Park, Virginia - National Park Service Historical Handbook Series No. 33
Author: Cullen, Joseph P.
Language: English
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[Illustration: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER THIRTY-THREE_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D.C. Price 25 cents.
RICHMOND
National Battlefield Park
Virginia
[Illustration: {Sniper}]
_by Joseph P. Cullen_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 33
Washington, D.C., 1961
[Illustration: _The National Park System, of which Richmond National
Battlefield Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic,
scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the
benefit and inspiration of its people._]
_Contents_
_Page_
Richmond 1
The Army of the Potomac 2
Part One
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER 1862
On to Richmond 3
Up the Peninsula 4
Drewry’s Bluff 5
Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) 6
Lee Takes Command 9
The Seven Days Begin 12
Beaver Dam Creek (Ellerson’s Mill) 13
Gaines’ Mill 16
Savage Station 18
Glendale (Frayser’s Farm) 21
Malvern Hill 22
End of Campaign 24
The Years Between 27
Part Two
THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65
Lincoln’s New Commander 28
Cold Harbor 29
Fort Harrison 37
Richmond Falls 40
The Park 46
Administration 46
[Illustration: _Richmond, 1858._ From a contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: ]
The American Civil War _was unique in many respects. One of the great
turning points in American history, it was a national tragedy of
international significance. Simultaneously, it was the last of the old
wars and the first of the new. Although it began in a blaze of glamor,
romance, and chivalry, it ended in the ashes of misery, destruction, and
death. It was, as Walt Whitman said, “a strange, sad war.”_
Richmond National Battlefield Park preserves the scenes of some of the
great battles that took place in the vicinity of the Confederate
Capital. When we visit these now quiet, peaceful woods and fields, we
feel an association with our past that is impossible to achieve with the
written or spoken word. Here we are not reminded of the Blue or the Gray
as such, only of the heroic struggle of men—men with two different
beliefs and philosophies, welded together by the blood of battle, to
give us our America of today.
_Richmond_
In session at Montgomery, Ala., in May 1861, the Confederate Congress
voted to remove the Capital of the Confederate States to Richmond, Va.
This decision, in effect, made Richmond a beleaguered city for 4 years.
Essentially, the move was dictated by political and military
considerations. The prestige of Virginia, richest and most populous
State in the South, was considered necessary for the success of the
Confederacy. For political reasons it was believed that the Capital
should be near the border States and the heavy fighting expected there.
Second only to New Orleans, Richmond was the largest city in the
Confederacy, having a population of about 38,000. It was also the center
of iron manufacturing in the South. The Tredegar Iron Works, main source
of cannon supply for the Southern armies, influenced the choice of
Richmond as the Confederate Capital and demanded its defense. During the
course of the war, Tredegar made over 1,100 cannon, in addition to
mines, torpedoes, propeller shafts, and other war machinery. It expanded
to include rolling mills, forges, sawmills, and machine shops. The
Richmond Laboratory made over 72 million cartridges, along with
grenades, gun carriages, field artillery, and canteens, while the
Richmond Armory had a capacity for manufacturing 5,000 small arms a
month.
[Illustration: _Tredegar Iron Works._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
Thus Richmond became the political, military, and manufacturing center
of the South, and the symbol of secession to the North.
Situated near the head of the navigable waters of the James River, and
within 110 miles of the National Capital at Washington, Richmond was the
key to the military planning of both sides. For 4 years the city
remained the primary military objective of the Union armies in the east.
As one southern newspaper stated: “To lose Richmond is to lose Virginia,
and to lose Virginia is to lose the key to the Southern Confederacy.”
_The Army of the Potomac_
In July 1861 the untrained Union Army of the Potomac suffered disaster
at Manassas (Bull Run) in the first attempt to drive into Virginia and
capture Richmond. President Abraham Lincoln then appointed Gen. George
B. McClellan the new commander of the demoralized army. McClellan
reported: “I found no army to command * * * just a mere collection of
regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac.”
To this chaotic situation he brought order and discipline. During the
long winter months, the raw recruits were marshalled and drilled into an
efficient fighting machine of over 100,000 men—the largest army ever
commanded by one man in the history of the western hemisphere. By the
spring of 1862 this army was ready for the supreme test—the goal was
Richmond.
Part One
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER, 1862
_On To Richmond_
Instead of marching overland, McClellan decided to take advantage of
Union control of the inland waters and transport his army, with its vast
supplies and materiel, down the Potomac River and across Chesapeake Bay
to the tip of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. Then with
his supply ships steaming up the York, he planned to march northwestward
up the peninsula, join another force under Gen. Irvin McDowell marching
overland from Washington, and together, converge on Richmond.
[Illustration: _McClellan’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney
King.]
To accomplish this, McClellan undertook the largest amphibious operation
ever attempted in the western world. Over 400 steam vessels, brigs,
schooners, sloops, ferry boats, and barges assembled on the Potomac
River. In March 1862 these vessels ferried the Army of the Potomac, with
its 3,600 wagons, 700 ambulances, 300 pieces of artillery, 2,500 head of
cattle, and over 25,000 horses and mules, to the southeast coast of
Virginia. As Q. M. Gen. Rufus Ingalls reported: “Operations so extensive
and important as the rapid and successful embarkation of such an army,
with all its vast equipment, its transfer to the peninsula, and its
supply while there, had scarcely any parallel in history.”
_Up The Peninsula_
After landing at Fortress Monroe the Federal troops pushed aside the
thinly held Confederate defenses at Yorktown and Williamsburg and
proceeded up the peninsula according to plan. But progress was slow.
Every day 500 tons of forage and subsistence were required to keep the
army in the field. Early in May it rained and kept raining, day after
dreary day. Federal soldiers had a saying: “Virginia used to be in the
Union—now it’s in the mud.” Dirt roads turned into bottomless
muck—creeks and gullies became swift flowing streams—fields were swamps.
Roads and bridges had to be built and rebuilt, and still the thousands
of wagons, horses, and mules continually stuck in the mud.
[Illustration: _Sumner’s troops crossing Grapevine Bridge to
reinforce Coach at Seven Pines._ From a contemporary sketch.]
Realizing that an effective overland pursuit of the retreating
Confederate forces under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was out of the question
because of the weather and the condition of the roads, McClellan on May
6 sent Gen. William B. Franklin’s division up the York River by
transport to West Point, terminus of the Richmond and York River
Railroad, in an attempt to cut off the Confederate wagon train. Johnston
anticipated the move, however, and on May 7 ordered Gen. W. H. C.
Whiting’s troops to attack Franklin in the battle of West Point, or
Eltham’s Landing.
The attack was repulsed, but, even so, the wagon train managed to
continue safely to Richmond. McClellan, however, had cleared the way to
his next objective—the landing at White House on the Pamunkey River, a
tributary of the York. Here the railroad crossed the Pamunkey on its way
to West Point. This would be the Union base of supply for the
contemplated attack on Richmond. This battle also cleared the way for
the right wing of the Union army, which would have to stay north and
east of Richmond in order to hook up with McDowell’s anticipated
overland march from Washington.
General Johnston, falling back steadily in front of McClellan’s slow
advance, was the target of severe criticism from Richmond newspapers for
not making a determined stand. But he wrote to Gen. Robert E. Lee: “We
are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. It is
plain that Gen. McClellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last
summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering. We can
compete with him in neither.”
_Drewry’s Bluff_
After the fall of Norfolk on May 10 to the Union forces under Gen. John
Wool, the crew of the _Virginia_ (_Merrimack_) scuttled their ship.
River pilots had advised that the iron-clad vessel could not navigate
the treacherous channel up the James River to Richmond. Loss of the
_Virginia_ opened the river to Federal gunboats, and McClellan
immediately telegraphed the War Department: “I would now most earnestly
urge that our gunboats and the iron-clad boats be sent as far as
possible up the James river without delay. Instructions have been given
so that the Navy will receive prompt support wherever and whenever
required.”
Five Union gunboats, including the famous _Monitor_, started up the
James under Comdr. John Rogers in the _Galena_. By May 15 they reached
Drewry’s Bluff, just 7 miles below Richmond. Here, at a sharp bend, the
Confederates had effectively obstructed the river and erected powerful
batteries on a 90-foot bluff.
[Illustration: _Battle of Drewry’s Bluff._ Diorama, Richmond
National Battlefield Park Visitor Center.]
At 7 that morning the Federal gunboats opened fire on Fort Darling. The
battle raged for 4 hours while the fate of Richmond hung in the balance,
and near panic spread through the city. However, the accurate fire of
the heavy guns on the bluff, combined with effective sharpshooting along
the riverbanks, finally proved too much for the gunboats, and the
Federal fleet retreated down the river. One Confederate officer
observed: “* * * had Commander Rogers been supported by a few brigades,
landed at City Point or above on the south side, Richmond would have
been evacuated.”
Although the Secretary of the Navy requested “a cooperating land force”
to help the gunboats pass Fort Darling and take Richmond, McClellan,
despite his earlier promise of cooperation, wired the War Department:
“Am not yet ready to cooperate with them.” He neglected to say when he
would be ready. Richmond was never again seriously threatened by water.
_Seven Pines_ (_Fair Oaks_)
Slowed by the heavy rains and the bad condition of the roads, where
“teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are
stalled,” McClellan finally established his base of supply at White
House on May 15. Five days later his advance crossed the Chickahominy
River at Bottoms Bridge. By the 24th the five Federal corps were
established on a front partly encircling Richmond on the north and east,
and less than 6 miles away. Three corps lined the north bank of the
Chickahominy, while the two corps under Generals E. D. Keyes and Samuel
P. Heintzelman were south of the river, astride the York River Railroad
and the roads down the peninsula.
[Illustration: _Gen. George B. McClellan._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
With his army thus split by the Chickahominy, McClellan realized his
position was precarious, but his orders were explicit: “General McDowell
has been ordered to march upon Richmond by the shortest route. He is
ordered * * * so to operate as to place his left wing in communication
with your right wing, and you are instructed to cooperate, by extending
your right wing to the north of Richmond * * *.”
Then, because of Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson’s brilliant
operations in the Shenandoah Valley threatening Washington, Lincoln
telegraphed McClellan on May 24: “I have been compelled to suspend
McDowell’s movements to join you.” McDowell wrote disgustedly: “If the
enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming
us first at one point then at another, he will paralyze a large force
with a very small one.” That is exactly what Jackson succeeded in doing.
This fear for the safety of Washington—the skeleton that haunted
Lincoln’s closet—was the dominating factor in the military planning in
the east throughout the war.
Lincoln’s order only suspended McDowell’s instructions to join
McClellan; it did not revoke them. McClellan was still obliged to keep
his right wing across the swollen Chickahominy.
Learning of McDowell’s withdrawal, Johnston decided to attack the two
Federal corps south of the river, drive them back and destroy the
Richmond and York River Railroad to White House. Early in the morning on
May 31, after a violent rainstorm that threatened to wash all the
Federal bridges into the river, Johnston fell upon Keyes and Heintzelman
with 23 of his 27 brigades at Seven Pines.
The initial attack was sudden and vicious. Confederate Gen. James
Longstreet threw Gen. D. H. Hill’s troops against Gen. Silas Casey’s
division of Keyes’ corps, stationed about three-quarters of a mile west
of Seven Pines. Longstreet overwhelmed the Federal division, forcing
Casey to retreat a mile east of Seven Pines. Keyes then put Gen. D. N.
Couch’s division on a line from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks, with Gen.
Philip Kearney’s division on his left flank. Not until 4 that afternoon,
however, did Confederate Gen. G. W. Smith send Whiting’s division
against Couch’s right flank at Fair Oaks. The delay was fatal. Although
Couch was forced back slowly, he drew up a new line of battle facing
south towards Fair Oaks, with his back to the Chickahominy River. Here
he held until Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, by heroic effort, succeeded in
getting Gen. John Sedgwick’s division and part of Gen. I. B.
Richardson’s across the tottering Grapevine Bridge to support him. Led
by Sumner himself, Sedgwick’s troops repulsed Smith’s attack and drove
the Confederates back with heavy losses.
The battle plan had been sound, but the attack was badly bungled.
Directed by vague, verbal orders instead of explicit, written ones,
whole brigades got lost, took the wrong roads, and generally got in each
other’s way. Nine of the 23 attacking brigades never actually got into
the fight at all. Towards nightfall Johnston was severely wounded in the
chest and borne from the field. The command then fell to G. W. Smith.
Fighting ceased with darkness.
Early next morning, June 1, Smith renewed the attack. His plan called
for Whiting on the left flank to hold defensively, while Longstreet on
the right swung counterclockwise in a pivot movement to hit Richardson’s
division, which was facing south with its right near Fair Oaks. The
Federal troops repulsed the assault, however, and when Heintzelman sent
Gen. Joseph Hooker’s division on the Federal left on the offensive, the
Confederates withdrew and the battle was over before noon.
That afternoon President Jefferson Davis appointed his chief military
advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee, as commander of the Southern forces. Lee
promptly named his new command the Army of Northern Virginia—a name
destined for fame in the annals of the Civil War.
[Illustration: _McClellan’s troops repairing Grapevine Bridge._
Courtesy, Library of Congress.]
Although the battle itself was indecisive, the casualties were heavy on
both sides. The Confederates lost 6,184 in killed, wounded, and missing;
the Federals, 5,031. Undoubtedly the most important result of the fight
was the wounding of Johnston and the resultant appointment of Lee as
field commander.
_Lee Takes Command_
Lee immediately began to reorganize the demoralized Southern forces, and
put them to work digging the elaborate system of entrenchments that
would eventually encircle Richmond completely. For this the troops
derisively named him the “King of Spades.” But Lee was planning more
than a static defense. When the time came these fortifications could be
held by a relatively small number of troops, while he massed the bulk of
his forces for a counteroffensive. He was familiar with and believed in
Napoleon’s maxim: “* * * to manoeuver incessantly, without submitting to
be driven back on the capital which it is meant to defend * * *.”
On June 12 Lee sent his cavalry commander, Gen. J. E. B. (“Jeb”) Stuart,
with 1,200 men, to reconnoiter McClellan’s right flank north of the
Chickahominy, and to learn the strength of his line of communication and
supply to White House. Stuart obtained the information, but instead of
retiring from White House the way he had gone, he rode around the Union
army and returned to Richmond on June 15 by way of the James River,
losing only one man in the process.
[Illustration: _Gen. Robert E. Lee._ Courtesy, National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Lee’s fortifications east of Mechanicsville
Turnpike._ From a contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: _Chickahominy swamps._ Courtesy, National Archives.]
It was a bold feat, and Stuart assured his chief that there was nothing
to prevent his turning the Federal right flank. But the daring ride
probably helped McClellan more than Lee. Alerted to the exposed position
of his right flank and base of supply, McClellan withdrew his whole army
south of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s
corps, which stretched from Grapevine Bridge to the Meadow Bridge west
of Mechanicsville. On June 18 he started the transfer of his enormous
accumulation of supplies with the shipment of 800,000 rations from White
House to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. After Jackson’s success
in the Shenandoah Valley at Cross Keys and Port Republic, it was
becoming apparent even to McClellan that McDowell probably never would
join him, in which case he wanted his base of operations to be the James
rather than the York River.
Meanwhile, pressure from Washington for an offensive movement against
Richmond was mounting. But because of the wettest June in anyone’s
memory, McClellan was having trouble bringing up his heavy siege guns,
corduroying roads, and throwing bridges across the flooded Chickahominy
swamps. As one bedraggled soldier wrote: “It would have pleased us much
to have seen those ‘On-to-Richmond’ people put over a 5 mile course in
the Virginia mud, loaded with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of
cartridges, and haversacks filled with 4 days rations.”
Also, McClellan believed erroneously that the Confederates had twice as
many available troops as he had. Consequently, his plan of action, as he
wrote his wife, was to “make the first battle mainly an artillery
combat. As soon as I gain possession of the ‘Old Tavern’ I will push
them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my
heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.”
_The Seven Days Begins_
[Illustration: _Lee’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney King.]
McClellan’s plan probably would have succeeded had Lee been willing to
stand still for it. But the Confederate commander did not intend to let
McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote to Jackson: “Unless
McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments he will move by
positions under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of
Richmond.” It was almost as if Lee had read McClellan’s letter to his
wife.
Lee’s plan to drive McClellan away from Richmond was bold and daring,
and strategically brilliant. He would bring Jackson’s forces down from
the valley quickly and secretly to turn McClellan’s right flank at
Mechanicsville. At the same time Gen. A. P. Hill’s division would cross
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, turn east and clear the Federal
forces from Mechanicsville, thereby opening the Mechanicsville Turnpike
bridge for D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Then, in
echelon, the four divisions would sweep down the north side of the
Chickahominy, annihilate Porter’s corps, capture the supply base at
White House, then turn and destroy the rest of the Union army. With
Jackson’s forces and other reinforcements from farther south, Lee would
have about 90,000 men, the largest army he would ever command in the
field.
To protect Richmond, he planned to leave about one-third of his army,
under Generals John B. Magruder and Benjamin Huger, in the entrenchments
around the city to hold back the main part of McClellan’s force, about
70,000 men, from marching into the Confederate Capital. If this force
started to withdraw, then Magruder and Huger would attack.
Lee apparently believed that McClellan would try to retreat to his base
at White House, or failing that, would retire back down the peninsula.
He assured Jefferson Davis that “any advance of the enemy toward
Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and
crippling and arresting his progress.” The strategy was just about
perfect, but, unfortunately for Lee, the tactics were not.
On the morning of June 25 the Seven Days began with the advance of
Hooker’s division along the Williamsburg road at Oak Grove, preparatory
to a general advance McClellan planned for the next day. But Hooker ran
into strong opposition from Huger’s troops, and when McClellan received
intelligence of Jackson’s approach, Hooker was ordered back. McClellan
wired Washington: “I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right
and rear.” He had delayed too long—the next day Lee wrested the
initiative from him.
_Beaver Dam Creek_ (_Ellerson’s Mill_)
According to Lee’s plan, Jackson was to march from Ashland on June 25
and encamp that night just west of the Central Railroad. At 3 a.m. on
the 26th he was to advance and envelop Porter’s right flank at Beaver
Dam Creek. Then, wrote Lee, “A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge when Jackson’s advance beyond that point should be known
and move directly upon Mechanicsville.”
[Illustration: _Confederate attack at Beaver Dam Creek._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
But from the beginning, unforeseen circumstances upset the operation and
timing of this plan. McClellan suspected Jackson’s approach, so the
element of surprise was lacking. And when the action of the Union
pickets in destroying bridges and felling trees in Jackson’s path, as
well as the fatigue of his weary troops, combined to delay him, the
all-important time element was lost.
As the day wore on with no word from Jackson, A. P. Hill became
impatient and fearful for the success of Lee’s plan. He decided to
attack regardless. At 3 that afternoon he crossed the Chickahominy and
swept the Union outposts from Mechanicsville, thus clearing the way for
D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Porter withdrew to a
prepared position behind Beaver Dam Creek, a mile east of
Mechanicsville. This naturally strong position was further fortified by
felled trees and the banks of a millrace. Here, atop the high banks of
the stream, he placed Gen. George McCall’s division, extending from near
the Chickahominy on the south, across Old Church road (now U.S. 360) on
the north. Gen. Truman Seymour’s brigade held the left and Gen. John
Reynold’s the right, with Gen. George G. Meade’s brigade in reserve. The
only approaches to the position were across open fields, commanded by
the Federal artillery, and down the steep banks of the stream, covered
by the soldiers’ muskets.
Hill recklessly hurled his brigades forward in a hopeless frontal
assault. The gray-clad infantry charged bravely down the steep banks and
up to the stream before the murderous fire of artillery and musketry
from the surrounding slopes forced a bloody withdrawal. Casualties in
killed and wounded were: Confederate 1,485; Union, 258.
Despite the successful defense, when Jackson’s forces finally appeared
on his right flank later that night, Porter’s position became untenable
and McClellan ordered him to withdraw to a previously prepared position
behind Boatswain Swamp, near Gaines’ Mill. At the same time he ordered
his quartermaster general at White House to reship all the supplies he
possibly could to Harrison’s Landing on the James, and send all the beef
cattle to the vicinity of Savage Station. Early next morning, June 27,
the herd of 2,500 head of cattle started on its drive from White House.
[Illustration: _Battle of Gaines’ Mill._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
OLD COLD HARBOR
Gaines’s MILL
NEW COLD HARBOR
_CONFEDERATE_
Lee’s Headq’rs
D. H. HILL
JACKSON
EWELL
A. P. HILL
WHITING
LONGSTREET
_UNION_
SYKES
McGehee
BUCHANAN
WARREN
LOVELL
MORELL
Porter’s Headq’rs
GRIFFIN
MARTINDALE
BUTTERFIELD
McCALL
REYNOLDS
SEYMOUR
MEADE
J. Martin
W. F. SMITH
SLOCUM _ARRIVING 4 O’CLOCK_
NEWTON
TAYLOR
BARTLETT
FRENCH & MEACHER _ARRIVING TO COVER RETREAT about 6.30 p.m._
[Illustration: _McClellan’s change of base._ Painting by Sidney
King.]
WHITE HOUSE
MECHANICSVILLE
GAINES MILL
Pomunkey
SAVAGE STATION
Chickahominy
GLENDALE
MALVERN HILL
HARRISON’S LANDING
_Gaines’ Mill_
The tactical situation was now extremely critical for both Lee and
McClellan. Because of the repulse at Beaver Dam, Lee had not yet
achieved his first objective, which, according to his battle order, was
to “drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge,” about 4 miles
east of Mechanicsville. Lee’s whole plan for the defense of Richmond, in
the event McClellan should elect to march on the city with his main
force south of the Chickahominy, hinged on his ability to cross the
river quickly and attack the Federal rear. Lacking control of New Bridge
this would be impossible. Although the Union position behind Boatswain
Swamp was actually east of New Bridge, the approaches to the bridge
could be covered by Porter’s artillery.
The situation was equally serious for McClellan. With Jackson enveloping
his right flank and rear, and believing he “had to deal with at least
double” his numbers, White House would have to be abandoned. Having made
the decision to change his base to the James, he desperately needed time
to perfect the arrangements and to get the thousands of wagons and the
herd of cattle safely started. His order to Porter was explicit, “hold
our position at any cost until night * * *.”
Porter’s corps now occupied a semicircular line of battle along the
crest of the partially wooded plateau behind Boatswain Swamp, with both
extremes resting on the Chickahominy River. It was another naturally
strong position further strengthened by felling trees and digging rifle
pits. The approaches to the position were over an open plain and across
a sharp ravine. Gen. George Morell’s division held the left and Gen.
George Sykes’ right, with McCall’s weary troops in reserve. Gen. Philip
St. George Cooke’s cavalry was on Porter’s extreme left, in the lowlands
bordering the Chickahominy. During the course of the impending battle of
Gaines’ Mill, Porter would be reinforced by Gen. Willard Slocum’s
division, giving him a total strength of about 35,000, as opposed to
about 60,000 for Lee.
On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on Lee’s right opposite Morell,
A. P. Hill in the center, and Jackson and D. H. Hill on the left. Lee
was convinced that the greater part of the Federal army was in his
front, and he still thought McClellan would try to protect his base and
retreat toward White House. On these erroneous assumptions he made his
plans.
A. P. Hill would attack the center while Longstreet made a feint on the
Union left. Then when Jackson appeared on the Union right, Lee believed
Porter would shift part of his troops to meet Jackson’s threat in order
to keep him from getting between the Union army and its base at White
House. As soon as Porter did this, Longstreet would turn the feint into
a full assault, and together with Hill drive the Union forces into
Jackson and D. H. Hill, waiting on Lee’s left.
About 2:30 p.m. Hill attacked the center of the Federal line, but under
a devastating fire of artillery and musketry, “where men fell like
leaves in an autumn wind,” his troops were hurled back with heavy
losses. Longstreet, realizing a feint now would not help Hill, ordered a
full-scale attack, but he too suffered a bloody repulse. Jackson,
sensing that “Porter didn’t drive worth two cents,” as he quaintly put
it, threw D. H. Hill against Sykes on Porter’s right.
By now A. P. Hill’s division was badly cut up, and on Lee’s request
Jackson sent Whiting’s division, consisting of Gen. E. M. Law’s and John
B. Hood’s brigades, over to support him. Porter then threw in Slocum’s
division of Franklin’s corps, to protect threatened points along the
line. The vicious battle waged furiously for 4 hours. “The noise of the
musketry,” said one veteran, “was not rattling, as ordinarily, but one
intense metallic din.”
Finally, just as darkness covered the bloody field, Hood’s Texas
brigade, along with Gen. George Pickett’s brigade on Longstreet’s left,
penetrated the right of Morell’s line in a courageous bayonet charge
that broke the morale of the Federal troops. They went streaming back
across the plateau to the safety of the Chickahominy River. In a last
desperate attempt to stem the tide, General Cooke (“Jeb” Stuart’s
father-in-law) sent his cavalry in a wild charge against the pressing
Confederates. But the retreating Union infantry and artillery obstructed
the cavalry and broke its attack. The only result was the loss of
several more artillery pieces in the confusion.
With darkness closing in and the Confederate troops disorganized after
the breakthrough, Lee did not attempt to pursue the Federals farther.
Porter withdrew the remnants of his corps across the river and rejoined
the main Union army. Total casualties in this crucial battle, the most
costly and vicious of the Seven Days, were: Union, 6,837; Confederate,
8,751.
In a sense, both sides had achieved their immediate objectives. Porter
had held until night, so McClellan could get his army safely started for
Harrison’s Landing. Lee had cleared the north side of the Chickahominy
of all Federal forces, broken their supply line to White House,
controlled strategic New Bridge, and had turned back McClellan’s advance
on Richmond.
_Savage Station_
[Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
MAGRUDER’S HEADQUARTERS ON BRIDGE OVER RAILROAD
TOOMB’S BRIGADE
BARKSDALE’S BRIGADE
COBB’S BRIGADE
HART’S BATTERY
RAILROAD BATTERY
KERSHAW’S BRIGADE
SEMMES’S BRIG.
KEMPER’S BATTERY
17^TH. & 21^ST. MISS. OF BARKESDALE’S BRIG.
RICHARDSON’S DIVISION
SUMNER’S CORPS
MEAGHER
CALDWELL
FRENCH
FIELD HOSPITAL
SEDGWICK’S DIVISION
BURN’S BRIG.
GORMAN
1ST-MINN. GORMAN’S BRIG.
DANA
PETTIT, HAZZARD AND OSBORN
SUMNER & FRANKLIN _HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD_
HANCOCK’S BRIGADE, SMITH’S DIVISION, FRANKLIN’S CORPS
CENTER’S BATTERY
BROOKS’S BRIG., SMITH’S DIV., FRANKLIN’S CORPS
DAVIDSON’S BRIGADE
McClellan was now engaged in the most difficult move an army can be
called upon to make in the face of an aggressive enemy—a flanking
movement to effect a change of base. There was no thought given to any
offensive movement. President Lincoln telegraphed: “Save your army at
all events.” This was now McClellan’s only objective.
That McClellan had not tried to fall back on White House surprised Lee,
as he had believed he was facing the main part of the Federal army at
Gaines’ Mill. The next day, June 28, he spent burying the dead,
reorganizing for another offensive movement, and attempting to divine
McClellan’s plans. Lee reported to Jefferson Davis that “the bridges
over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their
reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and
powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to wait until his
purpose should be developed.” By nightfall, however, he realized that
McClellan was headed for the James River, and made his plans
accordingly.
Early next morning, June 29, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross the
Chickahominy at New Bridge and take the Darbytown road to where it met
the Long Bridge road. Huger and Magruder, already on the south side of
the river in front of Richmond, were ordered in pursuit of the Federal
forces—Huger by Charles City road and Magruder by the Williamsburg road.
In the meantime, Jackson would cross Grapevine Bridge and sweep down the
south side of the river to get in McClellan’s rear.
Again, Lee’s strategy was brilliant. The Charles City road met the Long
Bridge road at a place called Glendale or Frayser’s Farm. Lee planned to
have all his divisions converge there at about the time the middle of
McClellan’s long column should be passing. The impact of the expected
blow would undoubtedly split the Union army, and with Jackson’s corps in
the rear of one half, the other half could be cut off and annihilated.
Once again, however, the staff work and tactics were pitiful.
McClellan’s rearguard was posted about Savage Station on the Richmond
and York River Railroad, facing west. Richardson’s division, of Sumner’s
corps, was in an open field north of the railroad tracks in back of the
station. Sedgwick’s division held the center in another open field south
of the tracks, with its left resting on the Williamsburg road. Gen.
William F. (“Baldy”) Smith’s division, of Franklin’s corps, took
position in the woods south of the Williamsburg road.
Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage Station about noon, June 29, but
did not attack as he realized his four brigades were badly outnumbered.
He halted and waited for Jackson, who was supposed to turn the Federal
right flank along the Chickahominy and get in their rear. But Jackson
“was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine Bridge.”
Magruder then mistakenly reported McClellan advancing and sent for two
brigades from Huger to support him. Lee cancelled the order when he
realized that what Magruder had hit was only the rearguard covering the
Federal army’s passage across White Oak swamp. What Lee did not realize,
however, was that Jackson was not in position and would not reach Savage
Station until 3 the following morning. Finally, about 5 that afternoon,
Magruder attacked with his four brigades and two regiments, but it was
too late with too little. The Federals withdrew hastily but safely. In
their haste they were forced to leave 2,500 sick and wounded men in the
field hospital at Savage Station and to abandon or destroy a vast amount
of supplies and equipment.
[Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
[Illustration: _Battle of Glendale._ From _Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War_.]
_CONFEDERATE_
JACKSON’S CORPS & D. H. HILL
HUGER
LONGSTREET
A. P. HILL
_UNION_
SMITH
RICHARDSON
1 REG^T., 1 GUN
SLOCUM
KEARNY
McCALL
SEDGWICK
HOOKER
_Glendale (Frayser’s Farm)_
Lee now ordered Magruder to follow Longstreet and A. P. Hill down the
Darbytown road. The next day, June 30, Longstreet and Hill came upon the
Union troops of McCall and Kearney across the Long Bridge road about a
mile west of the Charles City road intersection at Glendale. Hooker held
the left or south flank, with Slocum on the right guarding the Charles
City road approach. Sedgwick was in the rear in reserve. Longstreet and
Hill halted and waited for Huger, coming down the Charles City road, and
Jackson, supposedly coming on the Federal rear from White Oak Swamp.
Meanwhile, Gen. T. H. Holmes, who had come from the south side of the
James River with part of his division and Gen. Henry A. Wise’s brigade,
had been sent by Lee down the River, or New Market road in an attempt to
get between McClellan and the James River. McClellan anticipated the
move, however, and Warren of Sykes’ division stopped Holmes south of
Malvern Hill. Lee then ordered Magruder on the Darbytown road to
reinforce him, but Magruder’s forces did not get there in time to help.
Huger was delayed by obstructions, mostly felled trees, with which the
Federals had blocked his path. Instead of going around the obstructions,
Huger continually halted to clear the road. Thus it resolved itself into
a question of whether Huger could clear the trees as fast as the Union
soldiers cut them down. In this so-called “battle of the axes” Huger
lost, and did not get to Glendale in time to participate in the
engagement.
About 4 that afternoon, however, Longstreet heard artillery firing from
Huger’s direction which “was supposed to indicate his approach,” and
expecting Jackson’s appearance momentarily, he opened with one of his
batteries and thus brought on the battle. Jackson never did show up,
being held north of White Oak Swamp by the artillery of Richardson and
Smith, and did not get to Glendale until the next day. The fight was
particularly vicious with many pockets of hand-to-hand combat, but,
without the expected support of Huger and Jackson, Longstreet could not
break the Union lines in time to inflict any serious damage or to
interrupt the withdrawal. Lee stated in his report: “Could the other
commands have cooperated in the action the result would have proved most
disastrous to the enemy.” Gone was Lee’s last chance to cut McClellan’s
army in two.
_Malvern Hill_
McClellan had already selected another naturally strong position, this
time on Malvern Hill, for the last stand before reaching the James
River. On the morning of July 1, Morell and Sykes’ divisions of Porter’s
corps were drawn up on the crest of the hill west of the Quaker road.
East of the road Couch’s division of Keyes’ corps held the front, with
Kearney and Hooker of Heintzelman’s corps flanked to the right and rear.
Sumner’s troops were in the rear in reserve. The position was flanked on
either side by creeks in deep ravines less than a mile apart, and across
this narrow front, Porter placed his batteries with the guns almost hub
to hub. In front, the ground was open, sloping down to woods, marshes,
and swamps, through which the Confederate forces had to form for attack
within range of the Federal artillery.
Lee had Jackson on his left facing Kearney, Hooker, and Couch’s right.
D. H. Hill was in the center opposite Couch’s left and Morell’s right.
Lee then ordered Magruder to the right of Hill, but Magruder was delayed
by taking the wrong road; so instead two brigades of Huger’s were placed
on Hill’s right. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, their ranks decimated from
the actions at Gaines’ Mill and Glendale, were held in reserve. The
terrain rendered it almost impossible for effective use of Confederate
artillery, and the few batteries that did get into position were quickly
cut to pieces by the massed Union guns.
[Illustration: _Battle of Malvern Hill._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
_Confederate Forces_
LONGSTREET’S DIVISIONS
FIELD OF A. P. HILL
THOMAS OF A. P. HILL
BRANCH OF A. P. HILL
COBB OF MAGRUDER
G. T. ANDERSON OF MAGRUDER
RANSOM OF HUGER
JONES OF JACKSON
WINDER OF JACKSON
LAWTON
EARLY OF EWELL
MAHONE OF HUGER
SEMMES OF MAGRUDER
KERSHAW OF MAGRUDER
BARKDALE OF MAGRUDER
TOOMBS OF MAGRUDER
TAYLOR OF EWELL
HAMPTON OF JACKSON
LAW OF WHITING
TRIMBLE OF EWELL
WRIGHT OF HUGER
ARMISTEAD OF HUGER
GORDON OF HUGER
OF D. H. HILL:
E. B. ANDERSON
RIPLEY
GARLAND
COLQUITT
HOOD OF WHITING
HOLMES’ DIVISION
_Union Forces_
BERDAN’S SHARPSHOOTERS
MEAGHER _after dark_
QUAKER
PALMER
ABERCROMBIE
HOWE
J. W. Binford
GRIFFIN
McQUADE
MORELL
Crew
West
CALDWELL
NICKLES OF HOOKER
KEARNY
HOOKER
HEINTZELMAN’S CORPS
FRANKLIN
SUMNER’S CORPS
Binford
BUCHANAN
MARTINDALE
BUTTERFIELD
LOVELL
SYKES
HOLMES’ DIVISION
RESERVE BATTERIES
WARREN OF SYKES
Malvern House _HEADQUARTERS OF GEN. PORTER_
SEYMOUR OF McCALL
Greenwood _(HOSPITAL)_
GUN-BOAT FIRE FROM JAMES RIVER
“Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary
communications, and the extreme difficulty of the ground,” Lee reported,
“the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the afternoon.” The
first real assault did not take place until after 5, and then it was
uncoordinated and confused. The signal for the attack was to be a yell
from one of Huger’s brigades, after the Confederate artillery had
blasted a hole in the Union lines. This put the responsibility of where
and when to begin the attack on a mere brigade commander.
The artillery was unable to put concentrated fire in any one spot, but
Huger attacked regardless and was beaten back with heavy losses. Then D.
H. Hill attacked, only to suffer the same fate. Magruder finally sent
his troops in a gallant charge across the open fields right up to the
cannons’ muzzles, only to be mowed down like wheat at harvest time. Late
in the battle Jackson sent his own division to Magruder’s and Hill’s
support, but in the heavily wooded and swampy ground they got lost and
did not arrive in time to help. Darkness finally put an end to these
hopeless attacks. As D. H. Hill declared bitterly, “It was not war—it
was murder.”
_End of Campaign_
[Illustration: _McClellan’s withdrawal._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
During the night McClellan continued his withdrawal, and the next day
found the Army of the Potomac safe at Harrison’s Landing under the
protection of the Federal gunboats on the James. The Seven Days were
over. Total casualties: Army of Northern Virginia, 20,614; Army of the
Potomac, 15,849.
[Illustration: _Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
In his official report of the campaign Lee stated: “Under ordinary
circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its escape
was due to * * * the want of correct and timely information. This fact,
attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled Gen.
McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add much to the
obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns
* * *.” But his other objective had been achieved—Richmond was safe, at
least for the time being.
While McClellan had successfully changed his base of operations from the
York to the James River and saved his army in the process, he had failed
in his first objective of capturing Richmond and possibly ending the
war. The decision to remove the army from the peninsula, rather than
reinforce it for another attempt on Richmond, was made in Washington
over McClellan’s strong objections. He wrote to Gen. Henry W. Halleck:
“It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should
be decided.”
[Illustration: _McClellan’s cartographers._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
Although McClellan wisely realized the advantages of another assault on
Richmond on the line of the James, it was his own mistaken view of Lee’s
strength that was the major reason for the withdrawal. As Halleck
explained to him:
You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy’s forces in
and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report
that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from
the South. General Pope’s army covering Washington is only about
40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30 miles
from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly
between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the
other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of
such an attack. If General Pope’s army be diminished to re-enforce
you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered
and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be
too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy
turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army
of the Potomac is split into two parts * * * and I wish to unite them.
In August the Army of the Potomac was transported by water back to
Washington to support Pope’s campaign in Northern Virginia. McClellan’s
failure to capture the Confederate Capital, combined with Lee’s failure
to destroy the Union Army, assured the nation a long, bitter war that
became one of the great turning points in American history.
_The Years Between_
[Illustration: _Richmond, summer of 1862._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
In August 1862 Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If we are able to change
the theater of the war from the James River to the north of the
Rappahannock we shall be able to consume provisions and forage now being
used in supporting the enemy.” So Lee moved into Northern Virginia to
meet Pope’s threatened overland campaign against Richmond. At Second
Manassas (Bull Run) the Union army was defeated again and withdrew into
the fortifications around Washington.
Lee took advantage of this opportunity and made his first invasion north
into Maryland, only to be defeated by McClellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg)
in September. Lee then withdrew into Virginia, and at Fredericksburg in
December he severely repulsed Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s move on Richmond.
In the spring of 1863 the Union army, now under Hooker, attempted to
flank Lee’s left and rear to cut him off from Richmond, but it was
decisively defeated at Chancellorsville and driven back across the
Rapidan. Lee then made his second thrust north, penetrating into
Pennsylvania, but was beaten back by Meade at Gettysburg in the summer
of 1863 and, once again, retired into Virginia.
These gallant armies fought each other across the fields of
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia before they clashed again in the
outskirts of Richmond 2 years later.
Part Two
THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65
_Lincoln’s New Commander_
In March 1864 President Lincoln appointed Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as
commanding general of all the Union armies. Said Grant: “In the east the
opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each
other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both
between the Federal and Confederate Capitals. Battles had been fought of
as great severity as had ever been known in war * * * from the James
River to Gettysburg, with indecisive results.” He hoped to change this
situation by putting pressure on all Confederate armies at the same
time, something that had never been done before.
Grant’s plan called for Gen. Benjamin F. Butler to march up the south
side of the James and attack Petersburg or Richmond or both; Gen. Franz
Sigel to push down the Shenandoah Valley driving Gen. Jubal Early before
him, thereby protecting Washington; Gen. Nathaniel Banks in New Orleans
to march on Mobile; Gen. William T. Sherman to cut across Georgia
driving Johnston before him, take Atlanta, and if necessary swing north
to Richmond; Meade’s Army of the Potomac, with Grant in command, to push
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond. As Grant stated:
“Lee, with the Capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all
were working.”
Lee’s objective now was to stop Grant and protect Richmond. Said Lee:
“We must destroy this army of Grant’s before he gets to the James River.
If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere
question of time.”
The campaign started in the spring of 1864 when the Army of the Potomac
crossed the Rapidan River and the Army of Northern Virginia blocked its
path at the Wilderness. After a particularly vicious and costly battle,
Grant instead of retreating to lick his wounds as other Federal
commanders had done, executed a left flank movement, still heading south
and trying to get between Lee and Richmond. A few days later the two
armies clashed again at Spotsylvania in a series of grim battles, but
still indecisive as far as major objectives were concerned. Although
Grant’s losses were staggering, he was slowly but methodically
destroying Lee’s ability to wage offensive war.
[Illustration: _Gen. Ulysses S. Grant._ From a contemporary sketch.]
Again Grant executed a left flank movement to get around Lee, and then
by a series of flanking marches, which the Confederate soldiers called
the “sidling movement,” and the Union soldiers the “jug-handle”
movement, Grant gradually worked his way down to Cold Harbor.
_Cold Harbor_
Where and what was Cold Harbor? Cold Harbor was a seedy-looking tavern,
squatting by a dusty crossroads 8 miles from Richmond, on the flat,
featureless plain, intersected by hundreds of small creeks, gullies, and
swamps, that is characteristic of the land between the Pamunkey and the
Chickahominy Rivers. There wasn’t a harbor for miles and it was anything
but cold. It was the only Cold Harbor in the United States, although
there were many Cold Harbors on the stagecoach routes along the Thames
River in England. The name indicated a place to get a bed for the night
and something cold to drink, but not hot meals.
[Illustration: _Cold Harbor Tavern._ From a photograph taken in 1885
as it appears in _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
But these dusty crossroads were strategically important if Grant was to
attack Richmond, and both Lee and Grant realized it. Also, it was
Grant’s last chance to continue his strategy of trying to get between
Lee and Richmond—any more flanking movements and Lee would be in the
entrenchments around the Confederate Capital where Grant did not want to
fight him. As Grant stated: “Richmond was fortified and entrenched so
perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five
outside besieging or assaulting.”
It is significant that Lee also did not want to fight in the
entrenchments around Richmond. There he would be on the defensive, and
in such a position could not possibly destroy Grant’s army. So both
commanders were willing for the test.
And what of the lowly foot-soldier, the unsung hero in the ranks, the
poor bloody infantryman? Was he ready for the awful test?
[Illustration: _Confederate camp._ From a contemporary sketch.]
To the average soldier, this whole campaign was fast becoming just a
series of hazy, indistinct recollections, like the fragments of a
half-forgotten dream: Long columns of sweat-soaked soldiers marching
over hills and rivers and swamps, across ploughed fields and corn
fields, down endless dusty roads through dark, lonely woods; 30 days of
marching by night and fighting by day, until it must have seemed to them
that the only things left in life were stupefying fatigue, merciless
heat, choking dust, smoke and noise, mud and blood.
In the Union ranks many of the men began to find out for the first time
what hunger really was. They had moved so fast and so often the ration
wagons were left far behind. Hardtack was selling for a dollar apiece—if
you could find a seller. And here at Cold Harbor the soldiers wrote
their names and regiments on pieces of paper and pinned or sewed them to
the inside of their dirty blouses, with the forlorn hope that if and
when they were killed someone might take the time to find out who they
were.
To Lee’s barefoot, ragged veterans, hunger had been a constant companion
for a long time, but at Cold Harbor they approached starvation. A
Confederate sergeant recorded in his diary: “When we reached Cold Harbor
the command to which I belonged had been marching almost continuously
day and night for more than fifty hours without food, and for the first
time we knew what actual starvation was.” When scurvy appeared among the
men, owing primarily to a lack of fresh vegetables, Lee advised them to
eat the roots of the sassafras and wild grape, if they could find any.
In the race for initial possession of the crossroads at Cold Harbor,
Lee’s cavalry won by a few hours. But in the afternoon of May 31 Gen.
Philip Sheridan’s cavalry drove them out and held the crossroads until
relieved by the Federal VI Corps under Gen. Horatio Wright. Most of
Sheridan’s troopers were armed with the new Spencer repeating carbine,
which made dismounted cavalrymen effective infantry.
The next morning, June 1, Lee threw Gen. Richard Anderson’s corps
(Longstreet’s old corps—Longstreet having been wounded in the
Wilderness) against the Federal VI Corps in a bold attempt to seize the
crossroads and roll up Grant’s left flank before he could reinforce it,
but Anderson was repulsed. Grant then moved the XVIII Corps under
“Baldy” Smith, which he had borrowed from Butler’s army bottled up on
the south side of the James, over to the right of the VI Corps. That
afternoon they attacked Anderson, now supported by Gen. Robert Hoke’s
division.
The assault failed to break the Confederate line, but it did bend it
back in several places. Grant believed that with a greater concentration
a breakthrough could be achieved. Consequently, he ordered the II Corps
under Gen. Winfield Hancock over to the left of the VI Corps, between it
and the Chickahominy River, and planned an all out attack by the three
corps for the morning of June 2.
Anticipating the move, Lee put A. P. Hill, supported by Gen. John
Breckinridge’s division, over to his right between Anderson and the
Chickahominy and waited.
The expected attack failed to materialize, however. Hancock got lost in
the woods and swamps moving to his assigned position, and after an
all-night forced march the men were too exhausted to mount an attack.
Any chance the assault might have had for success was now gone. The
delay was fortunate for Lee because Breckinridge also got lost and was
not in position to support Hill on the morning of June 2. The attack was
then ordered for that afternoon but again postponed until 4:30 the
morning of June 5. And each corps commander received a telegram from
Grant’s headquarters that read: “Corps Commanders will employ the
interim in making examinations of the ground in their front and
perfecting arrangements for the assault.”
Lee’s veterans took advantage of this fatal 24-hour delay to entrench
themselves quickly and effectively, using every creek, gully, ravine,
and swamp in such fashion that all approaches to their positions could
be covered with a murderous fire. A newspaper reporter present at Cold
Harbor wrote a vivid description of those entrenchments. “They are
intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting flanks of
lines, lines built to enfilade opposing lines * * * works within works
and works outside works, each laid out with some definite design.”
Lee needed this strong position; he would fight at Cold Harbor without a
reserve. He wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If I shorten my lines to provide
a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve,
he will break them.”
Grant’s battle plan was relatively uncomplicated. It was, essentially, a
simple, frontal assault. Hancock’s II Corps and Wright’s VI Corps,
between the Chickahominy and the Cold Harbor road (now State Route 156),
together with Smith’s XVIII Corps north of the road, were to attack all
out and break the Confederate lines. Gen. Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps,
north of the XVIII, was to be held in reserve, while Burnside’s IX
Corps, on Grant’s extreme right, was not to enter the fight unless Lee
weakened his line in that sector, then it would attack, supported by the
V Corps. Lee did not weaken any part of his line, so these two corps
were not engaged to any appreciable extent. Thus the battle actually
took place on approximately a 2½-mile front, although the armies
stretched for 6 miles from south to north, with the Union army facing
west. Grant’s total strength was over 100,000 men, but less than 50,000
were actually engaged in the struggle.
Lee now had A. P. Hill, supported by Breckinridge, on his south flank
next to the Chickahominy opposite Hancock and Wright. Hoke’s division
straddled the Cold Harbor road with Gen. Joseph Kershaw’s division just
north of Hoke, then Anderson and Gen. Richard Ewell’s corps. Lee’s total
strength consisted of less than 60,000 men, but only about half were
involved in the action of June 3.
It rained all night the night of June 2. Toward morning the heavy rain
died to a soft, sticky mist that held the area in clammy fingers. The
first gray streaks of dawn warned of the approach of a scorching sun
that would turn the rain-soaked plain, with its myriad streams and
swamps, into a steaming cauldron. Promptly at 4:30 the three corps
jumped off to the attack, knowing nothing of the strength of the
Confederate positions they would have to face. The corps commanders had
ignored Grant’s telegraphed order of the previous afternoon and no
proper reconnaissance was made.
The average soldier saw little in any battle in the Civil War, and even
less at Cold Harbor because of the terrain. But as the first yellow rays
of the sun shifted the gray mists, most of the Union soldiers could see
the main line of Confederate entrenchments across the open spaces in
front of them—a tracing of raw earth that had been turned up like a huge
furrow, along a line of uneven ridges, looking empty but strangely
ominous. Here and there bright regimental colors perched insolently on
the dirt hills.
Suddenly, it seemed, the line was dotted with black slouch hats and
glistening bayonets. Yellow sheets of flame flashed from end to end,
then disappeared in a heavy cloud of smoke. Regiment after regiment
exploded into action with a metallic roar. Gigantic crashes of artillery
split the air. Shells screamed overhead like a pack of banshees,
exploding in clouds of earth, horses, and men. The noise roared to a
crescendo with a volume of sound that left the men dazed and confused.
One veteran said it was more like a volcanic blast than a battle.
It was over in less than 30 minutes, but 7,000 killed and wounded Union
soldiers were left lying in the sun between the trenches. Said one
general sadly: “In that little period more men fell bleeding as they
advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war.”
Those not already killed or wounded threw themselves on the ground and
desperately heaved up little mounds of earth in front of them with
bayonets, spoons, cups, and broken canteens. They could neither advance
nor retreat—nothing standing could live long in that hail of lead and
iron. They just dug in and stayed there.
A peculiar thing about the battle came to light afterwards. The three
corps commanders sent identical telegrams to Grant’s headquarters, each
accusing the other of not supporting him in the attack. Later it was
discovered what had actually happened. Hancock, on the left, had veered
to his left because of the heavy fire from there and the peculiarities
of the terrain. Wright, in the center, had gone straight ahead. And
Smith, on the right, bore off to his right because of swamps and
ravines. So the farther they advanced the more separated they became and
the more their flanks were left open to a deadly crossfire.
No other major assault was attempted by either army, although the troops
stayed in the hot, filthy trenches until June 12, with constant,
nerve-wracking sharpshooting and skirmishing. From June 1 to 12 the
Union losses totaled 12,700; Confederate losses are estimated at between
1,500 and 2,000.
Cold Harbor proved to be Lee’s last major victory in the field, and
although it was a military zero so far as Grant was concerned, it turned
out to be one of the most important and significant battles fought
during the Civil War. The results of this battle changed the course of
the war in the east from a war of maneuver to a war of siege. It also
influenced the strategy and tactics of future wars by showing that
well-selected, well-manned entrenchments, adequately supported by
artillery, were practically impregnable to frontal assaults.
[Illustration: _Federal trenches at Cold Harbor._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: _Federal coehorn mortars at Cold Harbor._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: _Looking for a friend at Cold Harbor._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
On June 5, Grant decided to bypass Richmond, cross the James and attack
Petersburg, an important railway center 25 miles south of the
Confederate Capital. This would still keep Lee’s army pinned down, and
if successful would cut communications between Richmond and the rest of
the Confederacy.
On June 6 he withdrew Warren’s V Corps from the lines and used it to
secure the passages across the Chickahominy and down to the James. On
June 7 he sent Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, back into the
Shenandoah Valley against Early. To counter this, Lee was forced to send
Gen. Wade Hampton’s cavalry after Sheridan, which in effect left Lee
without adequate cavalry. During the night of June 12 Grant secretly
moved all the troops out of the trenches at Cold Harbor, without Lee’s
being aware of the move until the following morning, and by June 16 the
Army of the Potomac of over 100,000 men, 5,000 wagons, 2,800 head of
cattle, and 25,000 horses and mules, were all safely across the James
River. Richmond was saved for another 10 months.
[Illustration: _Pontoon bridge across the James._ Courtesy, National
Archives.]
_Fort Harrison_
In the pre-dawn darkness of September 29, Grant quietly slipped Gen.
David Birney’s X Corps and Gen. Edward Ord’s XVIII Corps back across the
James in a surprise move against the outer defenses of Richmond. The
primary purpose was to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early in the
Shenandoah Valley. If, however, any weakness was discovered it could be
exploited fully, and it might force Lee to weaken some part of the
Petersburg line.
Shortly after daybreak Gen. George Stannard’s division of the XVIII
Corps successfully stormed heavily armed but badly undermanned Fort
Harrison on the Varina road. Gen. Hiram Burnham, commanding the leading
brigade, was killed in the assault and the Union forces renamed the
captured fort for him. A mile and a half farther north, Gen. Adelbert
Ames’ division of the X Corps was repulsed in a similar attack on
another fortification, Fort Gilmer, on the New Market road.
[Illustration: _Area of the Richmond battlefields._ From _Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
General Lee regarded the loss of Fort Harrison as serious enough to
demand his personal attention. The next day, with re-enforcements rushed
from Petersburg, he directed several vigorous assaults against the fort.
However, the Union forces had closed in the rear and strengthened it,
and, armed with new repeating rifles, successfully beat back the attacks
and inflected heavy losses on the Confederates.
[Illustration: _Members of the 1st Connecticut Artillery at Fort
Brady, 1864._ Courtesy, Library of Congress.]
The fall of Fort Harrison forced Lee to draw back that part of his outer
line and to build new entrenchments to compensate for the loss. It also
forced him to extend his line north of the James, thus weakening his
already dangerously undermanned defenses in front of Petersburg. The
Union forces, to protect their position further and to neutralize
Confederate gunboats, constructed Fort Brady a few miles south of Fort
Burnham (Harrison) on a high bluff overlooking the James River.
No further serious efforts were made to enter Richmond from the north
side of the James, and the two armies faced each other in these
respective positions until Grant finally broke Lee’s lines at Petersburg
on April 1, 1865, forcing the Confederates to abandon Richmond.
_Richmond Falls_
Spring came gently to Richmond that year of 1865. The winter had been
long and hard. After a cold, wet March, Sunday, April 2, dawned mild and
pleasant. The green buds on the trees and the bright new grass put the
breath of seedtime in the air; sap flowed warm in the lilac and the
magnolia. Under a rich blue sky the people strolled leisurely to church
amid the cheerful music of the bells and the soft murmur of the James
River falls.
In St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, at the corner of Ninth and Grace
streets, Jefferson Davis sat in the family pew listening to the sermon.
The sexton walked up the aisle and handed him a message from General
Lee.
“I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond tonight.”
Davis arose quietly and left the church, walked a block down Ninth
street to his office in the War Department and gave the necessary orders
for evacuation.
Late in the afternoon the official order was posted—then pandemonium
reigned. Trunks, boxes, bundles of every description were piled on the
sidewalks and in the streets. Wagons, carts, buggies, anything that had
wheels and could move, were loaded and raced through the city to fight
their way across Mayo’s Bridge in the mad rush to cross the James and
flee south.
A frantic mob trampled each other without mercy and jammed the streets
leading to the railroad stations, only to be turned back by soldiers’
bayonets. The few trains that would manage to leave were reserved for
government officials, archives, the treasury, and military personnel.
Early in the evening the character of the crowds began to change. From a
city of less than 38,000 before the war, Richmond now had over 100,000
people jammed into every available nook and cranny. They had come by the
thousands to work for the various government departments and in the
munitions factories. Refugees from the many battles fought in Virginia
had poured in, as well as the sick and wounded, followed inevitably by
deserters, spies, criminals, gamblers, speculators, and derelicts of
every kind.
And now the cheap hotels, saloons, and gambling dens began to empty
their customers into the streets, many of them half drunk.
All semblance of law and order disappeared. When the guards at the State
penitentiary fled, the prisoners broke loose to roam the city at will.
The provost guard took the prisoners of war from Libby Prison down the
river to be exchanged. This left only the Local Defense Brigade,
consisting of government and munitions workers. But most of them were
required in government buildings to pack and burn records; some guarded
the railroad depots, while others were engaged in destruction
assignments. The order had been given to burn all tobacco and cotton
that could not be removed by tossing flaming balls of tar into the
warehouses along the riverfront.
In the meantime, Mayor Mayo and the city council had appointed a
committee in each ward to see that all liquor was destroyed, and shortly
after midnight they set to work. Casks and barrels of the finest
southern bourbons were rolled to the curbs, the tops smashed open and
left to drain.
Like flies around honey, the mobs swarmed and fought their way into the
streets where the whiskey flowed like water. Men, women, and children,
clawing and screaming, scooped it up with bare hands, or used pails,
cups, basins, bottles, anything that would hold the amber liquid. They
used rags on sticks dipped in whiskey for torches, and went howling
through the city in search of food and plunder like a pack of mad
wolves, looting, killing, burning.
The soft night sky became pink, then turned a dull red. The blaze from
the Shockhoe Warehouse at Thirteenth and Cary streets, where 10,000
hogsheads of tobacco was put to the torch, flew skyward as if shot from
a huge blowtorch. The flames quickly spread to the Franklin Paper Mills
and the Gallego Flour Mills, 10 stories high. Higher and higher they
soared, and then widened until it seemed a red hot sea of fire would
engulf the whole city.
[Illustration: _Evacuation of Richmond._ From a contemporary
engraving]
A faint hot breeze began to stir from the southeast, scattering burning
embers through the streets and alleys and houses. Powder magazines and
arsenals let go with a whooshing boom. Thousands of bullets and shells
tore through buildings and ploughed up the streets. Shells exploded high
in the smoke cascading a metal spray over the area, followed by the
rattle of bursting cartridges in one great metallic roar. Just before
daybreak a deafening explosion from the James River signalled the
destruction of the Confederate warships and the Navy Yard.
Richmond was now one vast inferno of flame, noise, smoke, and trembling
earth. The roaring fire swept northwestward from the riverfront,
hungrily devouring the two railroad depots, all the banks, flour and
paper mills, and hotels, warehouses, stores, and houses by the hundreds.
About dawn a large crowd gathered in front of the huge government
commissary at Fourteenth and Cary streets, on the eastern edge of the
fire. The doors were thrown open and the government clerks began an
orderly distribution of the supplies. Then the drunken mob joined the
crowd.
Barrels of hams, bacon, flour, molasses, sugar, coffee, and tea were
rolled into the streets or thrown from windows. Women ran screaming
through the flames waving sides of bacon and whole hams. Wheelbarrows
were filled and trundled away. When the building finally caught fire
from the whiskey torches, the mob swarmed into other sections of the
doomed city where the few remaining clothing, jewelry, and furniture
stores were ruthlessly looted and burned. A casket factory was broken
into, the caskets loaded with plunder and carried through the streets,
and the fiendish rabble roared on unchecked.
As the drunken night reeled into morning the few remaining regiments of
General Kershaw’s brigade, which had been guarding the lines east of
Richmond, galloped into the city on their way south to join Lee in his
retreat to Appomattox. They had to fight their way through the howling
mob to reach Mayo’s Bridge. As the rearguard clattered over, Gen. M. W.
Gary shouted, “All over, good-bye; blow her to hell.”
The barrels of tar placed along the bridge were promptly put to the
torch. Soon tall flames shot high into the air, and with the two
railroad bridges already burning, the three high-arched structures were
like blazing arrows pointing to the very gates of hell.
Then down Osborne Turnpike and into Main Street trotted the Fourth
Massachusetts cavalry. When the smoke and heat blocked their path, they
turned into Fourteenth Street past fire engines blazing in the street
and proceeded up the hill to Capitol Square, where a tragic scene
awaited them.
[Illustration: _Richmond burns._ From a contemporary sketch.]
Like a green oasis in a veritable desert of fire and destruction, the
sloping lawn around the Capitol was jammed with frightened people
seeking safety from the flames. Family groups, trying desperately to
stay together, huddled under the linden trees for protection from the
burning sparks. Piles of furniture were scattered in every
direction—beds, chairs, settees, paintings, silverware, gilt-framed
mirrors—the few possessions left, the family heirlooms, the treasures
faithfully passed down from generation to generation. In the background
the massive white columns of the Capitol, designed by Thomas Jefferson
as a replica of the famous Maison Carée at Nimes, stood guard over the
huddled masses below.
The soldiers in blue quickly dispersed the mobs at bayonet point. Guards
were immediately placed to prevent further looting. The fire was
contained by blowing up buildings in its path to create a fire-lane,
leaving the main part to burn itself out. By nightfall everything was
under control, but most of the business and industrial section of the
city was gone.
The stars shone down that night on the smouldering ruins of more than
700 buildings. Gaunt chimneys stood naked against the black velvet sky.
A Federal officer, picking his way through thousands of pieces of white
granite columns and marble facades that littered the streets to inspect
the guard, noted that the silence of death brooded over the city.
Occasionally a shell exploded somewhere in the ruins. Then it was quiet
again.
A week later Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House, Va. The
war was over.
[Illustration: _Richmond after the war._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
[Illustration: _Richmond National Battlefield Park._]
_The Park_
Richmond National Battlefield Park was established on July 14, 1944, as
authorized by act of Congress. The property was originally acquired by a
group of public-spirited Virginians who donated it to the Commonwealth
of Virginia in 1932. The park occupies nearly 800 acres of land in 10
widely separated parcels. Included are some 6 acres in Chimborazo Park
on East Broad Street, site of Chimborazo Hospital during the Civil War.
A complete tour of the battlefields requires a 57-mile drive which is
outlined on the map in this booklet. We suggest that you begin at the
main Visitor Center in Chimborazo Park, 3215 East Broad Street,
Richmond, where museum exhibits and an audio-visual program are
available to enhance your appreciation of this battlefield area.
Markers, maps, and interpretive devices along the tour will help you to
understand the military operations. You will see parts of the fields of
combat, massive forts, and intricate field fortifications. Two houses on
the battlefields have wartime associations—the Watt House (Gen.
Fitz-John Porter’s headquarters) and the Garthright House (Union field
hospital).
_Administration_
Richmond National Battlefield Park is administered by the National Park
Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superindendent, whose
address is 3215 East Broad Street, Richmond, Va., is in immediate
charge.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 OF-588588
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES
(PRICE LISTS OF NATIONAL PARK SERVICE PUBLICATIONS MAY BE OBTAINED
FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.)
Antietam
Bandelier
Chalmette
Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
Custer Battlefield
Custis-Lee Mansion, The Robert E. Lee Memorial
Fort Laramie
Fort McHenry
Fort Necessity
Fort Pulaski
Fort Raleigh
Fort Sumter
George Washington Birthplace
Gettysburg
Guilford Courthouse
Hopewell Village
Independence
Jamestown, Virginia
Kings Mountain
The Lincoln Museum and the House Where Lincoln Died
Manassas (Bull Run)
Montezuma Castle
Morristown, A Military Capital of the Revolution
Ocmulgee
Petersburg Battlefields
Richmond Battlefields
Saratoga
Scotts Bluff
Shiloh
Statue of Liberty
Vanderbilt Mansion
Vicksburg
Yorktown
[Illustration: _Roll book of 27th N. Y. Regiment punctured by
Confederate bullet_]
Transcriber’s Notes
—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
is public-domain in the country of publication.
—Corrected a few palpable typos.
—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
_underscores_.
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