Revolutionary Europe 1789-1815

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Title: Revolutionary Europe 1789-1815
Author: Stephens, H. Morse (Henry Morse)
Language: English
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PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY
REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE
1789–1815

REVOLUTIONARY
EUROPE
1789–1815

H. MORSE STEPHENS, M.A.
BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, U.S.A.
AUTHOR OF ‘A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,’ ETC.

_PERIOD VII_

London
RIVINGTON, PERCIVAL, & CO.
1896

_Third Edition_

_All Rights Reserved_

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

In this volume I have endeavoured to write a history of Europe during
an important period of transition. I have reduced military details to
the smallest possible limits, and have preferred to mention rather
than to describe battles and campaigns, in order to have more space
to devote to such questions as the Belgian revolution of 1789, the
reorganisation of Prussia in 1806–12, and the Congress of Vienna.
I have throughout tried to describe the French Revolution in its
influence on Europe, and Napoleon’s career as a great reformer rather
than as a great conqueror. The inner meaning of the period and its
general results I have sketched in a short introductory chapter, on
which the rest of the volume is really a detailed historical commentary.

The maps which accompany the volume are intended to show the changes
in the boundaries of States, and not to give the position of places
mentioned in the text. Every one who reads such a volume as the
present must use an atlas as his constant companion, for no book of
this size could possibly contain a sufficient number of maps adequate
to the illustration of the events narrated.

In conclusion, I must express my thanks to Mr. W. R. Morfill, Reader
in Slavonic to the University of Oxford, for giving me a canon for
the spelling of Russian proper names, and to the Editor, Mr. Arthur
Hassall, for willing assistance and friendly encouragement.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

CAMBRIDGE, 1893.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PAGE

The Period from 1789 to 1815 an Era of Transition—The Principles
propounded during the period which have modified the
political conceptions of the Eighteenth Century: I. The
Principle of the Sovereignty of the People; II. The Principle
of Nationality; III. The Principle of Personal Liberty—The
Eighteenth Century, the Era of the Benevolent Despots—The
condition of the Labouring Classes in the Eighteenth Century:
Serfdom—The Middle Classes—The Upper Classes—Why France
led the way to modern ideas in the French Revolution—The
influence of the thinkers and writers of the Eighteenth
Century in bringing about the change—Contrast between the
French and German thinkers—The low state of morality and
general indifference to religion—Conclusion, 1

CHAPTER I.

1789

The Treaty of 1756 between France and Austria—The Triple
Alliance between England, Prussia, and Holland, 1788—The
Minor Powers of Europe—Austria: Joseph II.—His Internal
Policy—His Foreign Policy—Russia: Catherine—Poland—France:
Louis XVI.—Spain: Charles IV.—Portugal: Maria I.—Italy—The
Two Sicilies: Ferdinand IV.—Naples—Sicily—Rome: Pope Pius
VI.—Tuscany: Grand Duke Leopold—Parma: Duke Ferdinand—Modena:
Duke Hercules III.—Lombardy—Sardinia: Victor Amadeus
III.—Lucca—Genoa—Venice—England: George III.—The Policy
of Pitt—Prussia: Frederick William II.—Policy of
Prussia—Holland—Denmark: Christian VII.—Sweden: Gustavus
III.—The Holy Roman Empire—The Diet—The Electors—College
of Princes—College of Free Cities—The Imperial
Tribunal—The Aulic Council—The Circles—The Princes of
Germany—Bavaria—Baden—Würtemburg—Saxony—Saxe-Weimar—The
Ecclesiastical Princes—Mayence—Trèves—Cologne—The
Petty Princes and Knights of the
Empire—Switzerland—Geneva—Conclusion, 11

CHAPTER II

1789–1790

The Empress Catherine and the Emperor Joseph II.—The Turkish
War—Campaign of 1789 against the Turks—Battles of Foksany and
the Rymnik—Capture of Belgrade—Revolution in Sweden—Affairs
in Belgium—Policy of Joseph II. in Belgium—Revolution in
Liége—Elections to the States-General in France—Meeting
of the States-General: struggle between the Orders—The
Tiers État declares itself the National Assembly—Oath of the
Tennis Court—The Séance Royale—Mirabeau’s Address to the
King—Dismissal of Necker—Riot of 12th July in Paris—Capture
of the Bastille—Recall of Necker—Louis XVI. visits
Paris—Murder of Foullon—Session of 4th August—Declaration
of the Rights of Man—Question of the Veto—March of the
women of Paris to Versailles—Louis XVI. goes to reside in
Paris—Effect of the Revolution in France on Europe—The
Revolution in Belgium—Formation of the Belgian Republic—Death
of the Emperor Joseph II.—Failure of his reign—The attitude
of Louis XVI. to the French Revolution—The new French
Constitution—Civil Constitution of the Clergy—Measures of the
Constituent Assembly—Mirabeau—Danger threatened to the new
state of affairs in France by a foreign war—Mirabeau and the
French Court—Probable causes of a foreign war—Avignon and the
Venaissin—Affair of Nootka Sound—The Pacte de Famille—Rights
of Princes of the Empire in Alsace—The Emperor Leopold master
of the situation, 42

CHAPTER III

1790–1792

The Emperor Leopold—His Internal Policy—The Policy of
Prussia—Leopold’s Foreign Policy—Conference of
Reichenbach—Leopold and the Turks—Treaty of Sistova—Leopold
crowned Emperor—Leopold and Hungary—State of Parties
in Belgium—Their Internal Dissensions—Congress at the
Hague—Leopold reconquers Belgium—War between Russia
and Sweden—Treaty of Verela—War between Russia and the
Turks—Capture of Ismail—Treaty of Jassy—Position of
Leopold—The State of France—Mirabeau’s advice—Death of
Mirabeau—The Flight to Varennes—Its Results: in France—The
Massacre of 17th July 1791—Revision of the Constitution—Its
Results: in Europe—Manifesto of Padua—Declaration of
Pilnitz—Completion of the French Constitution of 1791—The
Polish Constitution of 1791—The Legislative Assembly
in France—The Girondins—Approach of War between France
and Austria—Causes of the War—Attitude of Europe—Death
of the Emperor Leopold—Murder of Gustavus III. of
Sweden—Policy of Dumouriez—War declared by France against
Austria—Invasion of the Tuileries, 20th June 1792—Francis
II. crowned Emperor—Invasion of France by Prussia and
Austria—Insurrection of 10th August 1792—Suspension of Louis
XVI.—Desertion of Lafayette—The Massacres of September
in the prisons—Battle of Valmy—Meeting of the National
Convention—The Girondins and the Mountain—Conquest of
Savoy, Nice, and Mayence—Battle of Jemmappes—Conquest
of Belgium—Execution of Louis XVI.—War declared against
Spain, Holland, England and the Empire—Catherine invades
Poland—Overthrow of the Polish Constitution—Second Partition
of Poland—Contrast between the resistance of France and
Poland, 82

CHAPTER IV

1793–1795

France at War with Europe—Altered Character of the War—The
Revolutionary Propaganda—First Campaign of 1793—Battle of
Neerwinden—Desertion of Dumouriez—Creation of the Committee
of Public Safety—Insurrection in La Vendée—Creation of
the Revolutionary Tribunal—Struggle between the Girondins
and the Mountain—Overthrow of the Girondins—Second
Campaign of 1793—Loss of Valenciennes and Mayence—Civil
War in France—Royalist and Federalist Risings—Loss
of Toulon—Constitution of 1793—The work of the first
Committee of Public Safety—The Great Committee of Public
Safety—Growth of its Power—Position of Robespierre—The Reign
of Terror—The Committee of General Security, the Deputies
on Mission, the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Laws of the
Suspects and the Maximum—Results of the Terror—Battles
of Hondschoten, Wattignies, and the Geisberg—Relief of
Maubeuge—Recovery of Lyons and Toulon—Fall of the Hébertists
and the Dantonists—Campaign of 1794—Battles of Fleurus,
Kaiserslautern, and 1st June 1794—Fall of Robespierre—Rule
of the Thermidorians: First Phase: the Survivors of the
Mountain—Conquest of Holland—The Batavian Republic—Successes
on the Rhine, in Savoy, Italy, and Spain—Insurrection
in Poland—The Campaign of Kosciuszko—Third and Final
Partition of Poland—Contrast between the Polish and
French Revolutions—Its Causes—Change in the Attitude of
the Continental Powers to the French Republic—Rule of the
Thermidorians: Second Phase: the Survivors of the Girondins
and Deputies of the Centre—Insurrections of 12th Germinal
and 1st Prairial in Paris—The Constitution of the Year III.
(1795)—The Treaties of Basle—France again enters the Comity
of Nations, 124

CHAPTER V

1795–1797

Results of the Treaties of Basle on the Foreign Policy of
France—Constitution of the Year III.—The Directory—The
Legislature: Councils of Ancients and of Five Hundred—Local
Administration of France—The Insurrection of Vendémiaire—The
Rising of 13th Vendémiaire in Paris—The First French
Directors, Councils, and Ministers—Dissolution of
the Convention—England and the _Émigrés_—Treason of
Pichegru—Exchange of Madame Royale—Desire for Peace in
France—France and Prussia—Suggestion of Secularisations in
Germany—France and the Smaller States of Europe—Attitude of
Russia—Campaign of 1795 in Germany—Bonaparte’s Campaigns
of 1796 in Italy—Battle of Montenotte—Armistice of
Cherasco—Battle of Lodi—Armistice of Foligno—Conquest of
Upper Italy—Battles of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli—Peace
of Tolentino with the Pope—Campaign of 1796 in Germany—Battle
of Altenkirchen—Retreat of Moreau—Effects of the Campaign
in Germany—Treaty between Prussia and France—Internal
Policy of the Directory—Pacification of La Vendée—The
State of France—The Directory, Councils, and Ministers in
1796—Creation of the Ministry of Police—Alliance between
France and Spain—Treaty of San Ildefonso—Battle of Cape
Saint-Vincent—The Batavian Republic—Negotiations between
England and the Directory—Death of the Empress Catherine of
Russia—Bonaparte’s Campaign of 1797 in the Tyrol—The Campaign
of 1797 in Germany—Preliminaries of Leoben between France and
Austria, 158

CHAPTER VI

1797–1799

Elections of 1797 in France—Policy of the Clichians—Struggle
between the Directors and the Clichians—Negotiations for
Peace between England and the Directory—Changes in the
French Ministry—Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Bonaparte
in Italy—Occupation of Venice—The Ligurian and Cisalpine
Republics formed—Annexation of the Ionian Islands by
France—Treaty of Campo-Formio—Capture of Mayence—The
Batavian Republic—Battle of Camperdown—Bonaparte’s
Expedition to the East—Capture of Malta—Conquest of
Egypt—Battle of the Nile—Internal Policy of the
Directory after 18th Fructidor—Foreign Policy—Attitude
of England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia—The Helvetian
Republic—Italian Affairs—The Roman and Parthenopean Republics
formed—Occupation of Piedmont and Tuscany by France—The
Law of Conscription—Outbreak of War between Austria and
France—Murder of the French Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt—The
Campaign of 1799—In Italy—Battles of Cassano, the Trebbia
and Novi—Italy lost to France—In Switzerland—Battle
of Zurich—In Holland—Battles of Bergen—Results of the
Campaign of 1799—Policy and Character of the Emperor Paul
of Russia—Bonaparte’s Campaign of 1799 in Syria—Siege of
Acre—Battle of Mount Tabor—Struggle between the Directors and
the Legislature in France—Revolution of 22d Prairial—Changes
in the Directory and Ministry—Bonaparte’s return to
France—Revolution of 18th Brumaire—End of the Government of
the Directory in France, 187

CHAPTER VII

1799–1804

Constitution of the Year VIII.—The Consulate—The Council of
State—The Tribunate—The Legislative Body—The Senate—Internal
Policy of the Consulate—General Reconciliation—The
Code Civil—Ministers of the Consulate—Foreign Policy
of the Consulate—Russia—Prussia—The Pope—Campaign of
Marengo—Campaign of Hohenlinden—Winter Campaign of Moreau
and Macdonald—The Treaty of Lunéville—Arrangements in
Italy—Policy and Murder of the Emperor Paul of Russia—The
Neutral League of the North—Battle of Copenhagen—War
between Spain and Portugal—Treaty of Badajoz—Campaign
of 1801 in Egypt—Peace of Amiens between England and
France—Reconstitution of Germany—Secularisation of
the German ecclesiastical dominions—Reconstitution of
Switzerland—Concordat between the Pope and Bonaparte—Internal
Organisation of France under the Consulate—The new
Departments—Annexation of Piedmont—The Préfectures—System of
National Education—Constitutional Changes in France—Bonaparte
First Consul for life—Recommencement of War between
England and France—Causes—Position of Affairs on the
Continent—Plot of Pichegru and Cadoudal—Execution of the Duc
d’Enghien—Bonaparte becomes Emperor of the French—Francis II.
resigns the title of Holy Roman Emperor for that of Emperor
of Austria, 212

CHAPTER VIII

1804–1808

Napoleon, Emperor of the French—His Coronation as Emperor and
as King of Italy—The Imperial Court—The Grand Dignitaries,
Marshals, and Imperial Household—Institutions of the
Empire—Ministers and Government—The Camp at Boulogne—Pitt’s
last coalition—Campaign of 1805—Capitulation of Ulm—Battles
of Austerlitz and Caldiero—Battle of Trafalgar—Treaty of
Pressburg—Death of Pitt—Prussia declares War—Campaign of
Jena—Campaign of Eylau—Campaign of Friedland—Interview
and Peace of Tilsit—The Continental Blockade—Capture
of the Danish Fleet by England—French Invasion and
Conquest of Portugal—State of Sweden—The Rearrangement
of Europe—Louis Bonaparte King of Holland—Italy—Joseph
Bonaparte King of Naples—Battle of Maida—Rearrangement of
Germany—Bavaria—Würtemburg—Baden—Jerome Bonaparte King of
Westphalia—Murat Grand Duke of Berg—Saxony—Smaller States of
Germany—Mediatisation of Petty Princes—Confederation of the
Rhine—Poland—The Grand Duchy of Warsaw—Conference of Erfurt, 237

CHAPTER IX

1808–1812

Napoleon’s two reverses between the Treaty of Tilsit and the
Congress of Erfurt—England sends an army to Portugal—Campaign
of Vimeiro and Convention of Cintra—The Revolution in
Spain—Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain—Victory of Medina del
Rio Seco and Capitulation of Baylen—Napoleon in Spain—Sir
John Moore’s advance—Battle of Corunna—The Resurrection
of Austria—Ministry of Stadion—Campaign of Wagram—Treaty
of Vienna—Campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula—Battle
of Talavera—Expedition to Walcheren—Napoleon and the
Pope—Annexation of Rome—Revolution in Sweden—Revolution in
Turkey—Treaty of Bucharest—Greatest Extension of Napoleon’s
dominions—Internal Organisation of the Empire—The new
Nobility—Internal reforms—Law—Finance—Education—Extension
of these reforms through Europe—Disappearance of
Serfdom—Religious Toleration—Reorganisation of
Prussia—Reforms of Stein and Scharnhorst—Revival of
German National feeling—Marriage of Napoleon to the
Archduchess Marie Louise—Birth of the King of Rome—Steady
opposition of England to Napoleon—Policies of Canning and
Castlereagh—Campaigns of 1810 and 1811 in the Peninsula—Signs
of the decline of Napoleon’s power between 1808 and 1812, 263

CHAPTER X

1810–1812

Causes of Growing Disagreement between Alexander and
Napoleon—Intervention of Castlereagh and Bernadotte—The
Attitude and Internal Policy of Prussia—Invasion of Russia
by Napoleon—Battle of Borodino—Retreat of the French
from Russia—Campaign of 1812 in the Peninsula—Battle of
Salamanca—Policy of Bernadotte—Prussia declares War—First
Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Armistice of Pleswitz—Convention
of Reichenbach—Congress of Prague—Austria declares War—Second
Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Battle of Dresden—Treaty of
Töplitz—Battle of Leipzig—General Insurrection of Germany
against Napoleon—Campaign of 1813 in the Peninsula—Battle
of Vittoria—Wellington’s Invasion of France—Negotiations
for Peace—Proposals of Frankfort—The Allies invade
France—Napoleon’s first Defensive Campaign of 1814—Other
Movements against Napoleon—Bernadotte—Holland—Battle of
Orthez—Italy—Congress of Châtillon—Attitude of France towards
Napoleon—Treaty of Chaumont—Napoleon’s Second Defensive
Campaign of 1814—Occupation of Paris by the Allies—The
Policy of Talleyrand—The Provisional Government—Alexander’s
Speech to the French Senate—Napoleon declared to be no
longer Emperor—Abdication of Napoleon—Provisional Treaty of
Paris—Battle of Toulouse—Arrival of Louis XVIII., and his
Assumption of the Throne of France—First Treaty of Paris, 299

CHAPTER XI

1814–1815

The Congress of Vienna—Monarchs and Diplomatists
present—History of the Congress—Treaty between France,
Austria, and England—The Questions of Saxony and
Poland—The German Confederation—Disposition of the
provinces on the left bank of the Rhine—Mayence and
Luxembourg—Reconstitution of Switzerland—Rearrangements
in Italy—Questions of Murat, Genoa, and the Empress Marie
Louise—Sweden—Denmark—Spain—Portugal—England’s share
of the spoil—The Questions of the Slave Trade and the
Navigation of Rivers—Close of the Congress—Preparations
against Napoleon—The first reign of Louis XVIII. in
France—Napoleon’s return from Elba—The Hundred Days—The
Campaign of Waterloo—Occupation of Paris—Second Treaty of
Paris—Napoleon sent to St. Helena—The Holy Alliance—Return
of Louis XVIII.—Government of the Second Restoration—The
Chambre Introuvable—Reaction in Spain and Naples—Territorial
Results of the Congress of Vienna—The Principle of
Nationality—Permanent Results of the French Revolution
in Europe—The Problem of harmonising the Principles of
Individual and Political Liberty with that of Nationality, 336

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I. The Rulers and Ministers of the Great Powers of
Europe, 1789–1815, 364

APPENDIX II. The Rulers of the Second-rate Powers of Europe,
1789–1815, 366

APPENDIX III. The Family of Napoleon, 368

APPENDIX IV. Napoleon’s Marshals, 370

APPENDIX V. Napoleon’s Ministers during the Consulate and
Empire, 1799–1814, 372

APPENDIX VI. Concordance of the Republican and Gregorian
Calendars, 374

INDEX, 377

MAPS

Europe in 1789.}
Europe in 1802.} _At end of book._
Europe in 1810.}
Europe in 1815.}

INTRODUCTION

[Sidenote: A Period of Transition.]

The period from 1789 to 1815—that is, the era of the French Revolution
and of the domination of Napoleon—marks one of the most important
transitions in the history of Europe. Great as is the difference
between the material condition of the Europe of the nineteenth century,
with its railways and its electric telegraphs, and the Europe of the
eighteenth century, with its bad roads and uncertain posts, it is not
greater than the contrast between the political, social, and economical
ideas which prevailed then and which prevail now. Modern principles,
that mark a new departure in human progress and in its evidence,
Civilisation, took their rise during this epoch of transition, and
their development underlies the history of the period, and gives the
key to its meaning.

[Sidenote: The Sovereignty of the People.]

The conception that government exists for the promotion of the
security and prosperity of the governed was fully grasped in the
eighteenth century. But it was held alike by philosophers and rulers,
alike in civilised England and in Russia emerging from barbarism
that, whilst government existed for the good of the people, it
must not be administered by the people. This fundamental principle
is in the nineteenth century entirely denied. It is now believed
that the government should be directed by the people through their
representatives, and that it is better for a nation to make mistakes
in the course of its self-government than to be ruled, be it ever so
wisely, by an irresponsible monarch. This notion of the sovereignty of
the people was energetically propounded during the great Revolution in
France. It is not yet universally accepted in all the states of modern
Europe. But it has profoundly affected the political development of
the nineteenth century. It lies at the base of one group of modern
political ideas; and, though in 1815 it seemed to have been propounded
only to be condemned, one of the most striking features of the modern
history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna, has been its gradual
acceptance and steady growth in civilised countries.

[Sidenote: The Principle of Nationality.]

The second political belief introduced during the epoch of transition
from 1789 to 1815 was the recognition of the idea of nationality in
contradistinction to that of the State, which prevailed in the last
century. In the eighteenth century the State was typified by the
ruling authority. National boundaries and race limits were regarded as
of no importance. It was not felt to be an anomaly that the Catholic
Netherlands or Belgium should be governed by the House of Austria,
or that an Austrian prince should reign in Tuscany and a Spanish
prince in Naples. The first partition of Poland was not condemned as
an offence against nature, but as an artful scheme devised for the
purpose of enlarging the neighbouring states, which had appropriated
the districts lying nearest to their own territories. But during the
wars of the Revolution and of Napoleon the idea of nationality made
itself felt. France, as a nation in arms, proved to be more than a
match for the Europe of the old conceptions. And it was not until her
own sense of nationality was absorbed in Napoleon’s creation of a new
Empire of the West that France was vanquished by coming in contact with
the Spanish, the Russian, and the German peoples in the place of her
former foes, the sovereigns of Europe. The idea of nationality, like
the idea of the sovereignty of the people, seemed to be condemned in
1815 by the Congress of Vienna. The Catholic Netherlands were united
with the provinces of Holland; Norway was forcibly separated from
Denmark; Italy was once more parcelled out into independent states
under foreign princes. But the Congress of Vienna could not eradicate
the new idea. It had taken too deep a root. And another striking
feature of the European history of the nineteenth century has been the
formation of new nations, resting their _raison d’être_ on the feeling
of nationality and the identity of race.

[Sidenote: The Principle of Personal Liberty.]

The third modern notion which has transformed Europe is the recognition
of the principle of personal and individual liberty. Feudalism left the
impress of its graduation of rights and duties marked deeply on the
constitutions of the European States. The sovereignty of the people
implies political liberty of action; feudalism denied the propriety and
advantages of social and economical freedom. Theoretically, freedom
of individual thought and action was acknowledged to be a good thing
by all wise philosophers and rulers. Practically, the poorer classes
were kept in bondage either as agricultural serfs by their lords or as
journeymen workmen by the trade-guilds. Where personal and individual
liberty had been attained, political liberty became an object of
ambition, and political liberty led to the idea of the sovereignty of
the people. The last vestiges of feudalism were swept away during this
era of transition. The doctrines of the French Revolution did more
than the victories of Napoleon to destroy the political system of the
eighteenth century. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 might return to the
former notions of government and the State, but it did not attempt
to restore the old restrictions on individual liberty. With personal
freedom acknowledged, the reactionary tendency of the Congress of
Vienna was left of no effect. Liberty of thought and action led to the
resurrection of the conceptions of nationality and of the sovereignty
of the people, which were but for the moment extinguished by the defeat
of France in the person of Napoleon by the armies of united Europe.

[Sidenote: The Benevolent Despots.]

The period which preceded the French Revolution and the era of
war, from the troubles of which modern Europe was to be born, may
be characterised as that of the benevolent despots. The State was
everything; the nation nothing. The ruler was supreme, but his
supremacy rested on the assumption that he ruled his subjects for their
good. This conception of the _Aufgeklärte Despotismus_ was developed
to its highest degree by Frederick the Great of Prussia. ‘I am but the
first servant of the nation,’ he wrote, a phrase which irresistibly
recalls the definition of the position of Louis XVI. by the first
leaders of the French Revolution. This attitude was defended by great
thinkers like Diderot, and is the keynote to the internal policy of the
monarchs of the latter half of the eighteenth century towards their
people. The Empress Catherine of Russia, Gustavus III. of Sweden,
Charles III. of Spain, the Archduke Leopold of Tuscany, and, above
all, the Emperor Joseph II. defended their absolutism on the ground
that they exercised their power for the good of their subjects. Never
was more earnest zeal displayed in promoting the material well-being
of all classes, never did monarchs labour so hard to justify their
existence, or effect such important civil reforms, as on the eve of the
French Revolution, which was to herald the overthrow of the doctrine
of absolute monarchy. The intrinsic weakness of the position of the
benevolent despots was that they could not ensure the permanence of
their reforms, or vivify the rotten fabric of the administrative
edifices, which had grown up in the feudal monarchies. Great ministers,
such as Tanucci and Aranda, could do much to help their masters to
carry out their benevolent ideas, but they could not form or nominate
their successors, or create a perfect body of unselfish administrators.
When Frederick the Great’s master hand was withdrawn, Prussia speedily
exhibited a condition of administrative decay, and since this was
the case in Prussia, which had been for more than forty years under
the rule of the greatest and wisest of the benevolent despots, the
falling-off was likely to be even more marked in other countries. The
conception of benevolent despots ruling for their people’s good was
eventually superseded, as was certain to be the case, owing to the
impossibility of their ensuring its permanence, by the modern idea of
the people ruling themselves.

[Sidenote: The Condition of the Labouring Classes.]

[Sidenote: Serfdom.]

And, in truth, while doing full justice to the sentiments and the
endeavours of the benevolent despots, it cannot honestly be said that
their efforts had done much to improve the condition of the labouring
classes by the end of the eighteenth century. The great majority of
the peasants of Europe were throughout that century absolute serfs. To
take once more the example of Prussia, the only attempts to improve
the condition of the peasants had been made in the royal domain, and
they had only been very tentative. The dwellers on the estates of the
Prussian nobility in Silesia and Brandenburg were treated no better
than negro slaves in America and the West Indies. They were not allowed
to leave their villages, or to marry without their lords’ consent;
their children had to serve in the lords’ families for several years at
a nominal wage, and they themselves had to labour at least three days,
and often six days, a week on their lords’ estate. These _corvées_ or
forced labours occupied so much of the peasant’s time that he could
only cultivate his own farm by moonlight. This state of absolute
serfdom was general in Central and Eastern Europe, in the greater part
of Germany, in Poland and in Russia, and where it existed the artisan
class was equally depressed, for no man was allowed to learn a trade
without his lord’s permission, and an escaped serf had no chance of
admission into the trade-guilds of the cities. Towards the west a
more advanced civilisation improved the condition of the labourers;
the Italian peasant and the German peasant on the Rhine had obtained
freedom to marry without his lord’s interference; but, nevertheless, it
was a leading prince on the Rhine, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who
sold his subjects to England to serve as mercenaries in the American
War of Independence. In France the peasant was far better off. The only
serfs left, who existed on the domain of the Abbey of Saint-Claude
in the Jura, on whose behalf Voltaire wielded his powerful pen, were
in a far happier condition than the German serfs; they could marry
whom they pleased; they might emigrate without leave; their persons
were free; all they were deprived of was the power of selling their
property or devising it by will. The rest of the French peasants
and the agricultural classes generally were extremely independent.
Feudalism had left them some annoyances but few real grievances, and
the inconveniences they suffered were due solely to the inequalities
of the copyhold system of tenure and its infringements of their
personal liberty. The French peasants and farmers were indignant at an
occasional day’s _corvée_, or forced labour, which really represented
the modern rent, and at the succession-duties they had to pay the
descendants or representatives of their ancestors’ feudal lords. The
German, Polish, and Hungarian peasant, on the contrary, crushed beneath
the burden of his personal servitude, did not dream of pretending to
own the plot of land, which his lord kindly allowed him to cultivate in
his few spare moments.

[Sidenote: The Middle Classes.]

The mass of the population of Central and Eastern Europe was purely
agricultural, and in its poverty expected naught but the bare
necessaries of existence. Trade, commerce, and manufactures were
therefore practically non-existent. This meant that the cities,
and consequently the middle classes, formed but an insignificant
factor in the population. In the West of Europe, on the Rhine, and
more especially in France, where the agricultural classes were more
independent, more wealthy, and more civilised, existence demanded more
comforts, and a well-to-do and intelligent commercial and manufacturing
urban element quickly developed to supply the demand created. Commerce,
trade, and the concentrated employment of labour produced a prosperous
and enlightened middle class, accustomed for generations to education
and the possession of personal freedom. With wealth always goes
civilisation and education, and as there was a larger middle class in
France and Western Germany than in Central and Eastern Europe, the
peasants in those parts were better educated and more intelligent.

[Sidenote: The Upper Classes.]

The condition of the upper classes followed the same geographical
distribution. The highest aristocracy of all European countries was
indeed, as it has always been, on much the same intellectual and social
level. Paris was its centre, the capital of society, fashion, and
luxury, where Russian, Austrian, Swedish, and English nobles met on an
equality. But the bulk of the German and Eastern European aristocracy
was in education and refinement inferior to the bulk of the French
nobility. Yet they possessed an authority which the French nobility had
lost. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian nobleman and the Hungarian
magnate was the owner of thousands of serfs, who cultivated his lands
and rendered him implicit obedience. The French nobleman exacted only
certain rents, either copyhold quit-rents or feudal services, from the
tenants on his ancestral estates. His tenants were in no sense his
serfs; they owed him no personal service, and resented the payment
of the rent substituted for such service. The patriarchal feeling of
loyalty to the lord had long disappeared, and the French peasant did
not acknowledge any subjection to his landlord, while the Prussian and
Russian serf recognised his bondage to his master.

[Sidenote: Why France experienced the Revolution.]

These considerations help to show why the Revolution, which was after
twenty-six years to inaugurate modern Europe, broke out in France. It
was because the French peasant was more independent, more wealthy, and
better educated than the German serf, that he resented the political
and social privileges of his landlord and the payment of rent, more
than the serf objected to his bondage. It was because France possessed
an enlightened middle class that the peasants and workmen found
leaders. It was because Frenchmen had been in the possession of a great
measure of personal freedom that they were ready to strike a blow
for political liberty, and eventually promulgated the idea of social
equality. The ideas of the sovereignty of the people, of nationality
and of personal liberty, did not originate in France. They are as
old as civilisation. But they had been clouded in the Middle Ages by
feudalism, and, after the Reformation, had been succeeded by different
political conceptions, which had crystallised in the eighteenth century
into the doctrines of the supremacy of the State, of the arbitrary rule
of benevolent or enlightened despots. England and Holland had developed
separately from the rest of the Western World. For reasons lying deep
in their internal history and their geographical position, they had rid
themselves alike of feudalism and absolute monarchy; they had developed
a sense of their independent nationality, and had recognised the
importance of personal freedom. In England especially, the abolition
of the relics of feudalism in the seventeenth century had placed the
English farmers and peasants in a different economical position from
their fellows on the Continent. There existed in England none of the
invidious distinctions between nobleman and _roturier_ in the matter
of bearing national burdens, which had survived in France, and, though
owing to the curiosities of the franchise the larger proportion of
Englishmen had but a very small share in electing the representatives
of the people, the government carried on as it was by a small oligarchy
of great families possessed an appearance of political liberty, and of
a wisely-balanced machine for administrative purposes.

[Sidenote: Intellectual movement of the eighteenth century.]

Nor must the influence of intellectual ideas, as bearing on problems
which the French Revolution was to force on the attention of the more
backward and more oppressed nations of Europe, be underrated. The
great French writers of the eighteenth century—Voltaire, Montesquieu,
Diderot, and Rousseau—had been deeply impregnated with the ideas of
Locke and the English political thinkers of his school. In their
different lines they insisted that government existed for the good
of the governed, and investigated the origins of government and the
relations of man in the social state. It was their speculations which
altered the character of absolute monarchy and based its retention on
its benevolent purposes; they, too, insisted upon the rights of man to
preserve his personal freedom, as long as it did not clash with the
maintenance and security of civil society. The great French writers of
the eighteenth century exercised by their works a smaller influence on
the outbreak and actual course of the French Revolution than has been
generally supposed. The causes of the movement were chiefly economical
and political, not philosophical or social: its rapid development was
due to historical circumstances, and mainly to the attitude of the
rest of Europe. But the text-books of its leaders were the works of
the French thinkers of the eighteenth century, and if their doctrines
had little actual influence in bringing about the Revolution, they
influenced its development and the extension of its principles
throughout Europe. It is curious to contrast the opinions of the great
French writers of the middle of the eighteenth century, whose arguments
mainly affected the general conceptions of man living in society,
that is, of government, with the views advocated by the great German
writers of the end of the century, who concentrated their attention
upon man in his individual capacity for culture and self-improvement.
Schiller, Goethe, Kant, and Herder were, further, more cosmopolitan
than German. The problems of man and his intellectual and artistic
development proved more attractive to the great German thinkers than
the difficulties presented by the economical, social, and political
diversities of different classes of society. Goethe, for instance,
understood the signification of the French Revolution, and was much
interested in its effects on the human race, but he cared very little
about its impression on Germany.

[Sidenote: Morality and Religion in the eighteenth century.]

Finally, the low state of morality in the eighteenth century had sapped
the earnestness in the cause of humanity of men of all classes in all
countries. Disbelief in the Christian religion was general in both the
Protestant and Catholic countries of the Continent. The immorality
of most of the prelates in Catholic countries was notorious, and was
equalled by their avowed contempt for the doctrines of the religion
they professed to teach. The Protestant pastors of Germany were quite
as open in their infidelity. In the famous case of Schulz, the pastor
of Gielsdorf, who openly denied Christianity, and taught simply that
morality was necessary, the High Consistory of Berlin held that he was,
nevertheless, still fitted to hold his office as the Lutheran pastor of
his village. Christianity in both Catholic and Protestant countries was
replaced by the vague sentiments of morality, which are best presented
in Rousseau’s _Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard_. In reaction to
this vague and dogmaless morality, there existed many secret societies
and coteries of mystics, such as the Rosati and the Illuminati, who
replaced religion by ornate and symbolical ceremonies.

Such was the political, economical, intellectual and moral state
of Europe in 1789, on the eve of the French Revolution. The whole
continent was to pass through twenty-six years of almost unceasing
war, at the end of which it was to emerge with new conceptions and new
ideals of both political and social life. The new ideas seemed indeed
to be checked, if not destroyed, in 1815, but once inspired into men’s
minds they could not be forgotten, and their subsequent development
forms the history of modern Europe in the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER I

1789

The Treaty of 1756 between France and Austria—The Triple
Alliance between England, Prussia, and Holland, 1788—The
Minor Powers of Europe—Austria: Joseph II.—His Internal
Policy—His Foreign Policy—Russia: Catherine—Poland—France:
Louis XVI.—Spain: Charles IV.—Portugal: Maria I.—Italy—The
Two Sicilies: Ferdinand IV.—Naples—Sicily—Rome: Pope Pius
VI.—Tuscany: Grand Duke Leopold—Parma: Duke Ferdinand—Modena:
Duke Hercules III.—Lombardy—Sardinia: Victor Amadeus
III.—Lucca—Genoa—Venice—England: George III.—The Policy
of Pitt—Prussia: Frederick William II.—Policy of
Prussia—Holland—Denmark: Christian VII.—Sweden: Gustavus
III.—The Holy Roman Empire—The Diet—The Electors—College
of Princes—College of Free Cities—The Imperial
Tribunal—The Aulic Council—The Circles—The Princes of
Germany—Bavaria—Baden—Würtemburg—Saxony—Saxe-Weimar—The
Ecclesiastical Princes—Mayence—Trêves—Cologne—The
Petty Princes and Knights of the
Empire—Switzerland—Geneva—Conclusion.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of 1756.]

The states of Europe at the commencement of the year 1789 were ranked
diplomatically in two important groups, the one dominated by the
connection between France, Austria, Spain, and Russia; the other
by the alliance between England, Prussia, and Holland. The great
transformation which had been effected by the treaty between France
and Austria in 1756 in the relationship between the powers of Europe
was the crowning diplomatic event of the eighteenth century. The
arrangements then entered into and the alliances tested in the Seven
Years’ War still subsisted in 1789. But the spirit which lay at the
root of the Austro-French alliance was sensibly modified. The Treaty
of 1756 had never been really popular in either country. In France,
Marie Antoinette, whose marriage with Louis XVI. had set the seal
on the Austrian alliance, was detested as the living symbol of the
hated treaty, as _l’Autrichienne_, the Austrian woman, and the most
accredited political thinkers and writers were always dwelling on
the traditional policy of France, and on the system of Henri IV.,
Richelieu, and Louis XIV., which held the House of Hapsburg to be the
hereditary and the inevitable enemy of the House of Bourbon and of
the French nation. The dislike of the alliance was felt with equal
intensity in Austria by the wealthy and the educated classes. The
Austrian generals resented the inefficacy of the French intervention
during the Seven Years’ War, and the Austrian people attributed its
reverses in that war to it with as much acrimony as if France had
acted as an enemy instead of as an ally. The same sentiment actuated
even the Imperial House. ‘Our natural enemies, travestied as allies,
who do more harm than if they were open enemies;’[1] such is the
language in which Leopold of Tuscany, brother of Marie Antoinette,
characterised the French in a letter written in December 1784 to his
brother, the Emperor Joseph II. The Emperor Joseph was himself of the
same opinion. He preferred his Russian ally, the Empress Catherine,
to his brother-in-law, Louis XVI., King of France, and the tendency
of his foreign policy was to strengthen his friendship with Russia,
even at the expense of sacrificing his alliance with France. Russia,
whose expansion under the great Empress had been enormous since the
conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, cared but little for either of the
allies, and pursued independently its course of steady development.
Catherine had, indeed, during most of the later years of Frederick
the Great, remained in alliance with Prussia, and to some extent had
been on friendly terms with England. But her natural tendency was to
distrust England. In 1780 she had placed herself at the head of the
‘Armed Neutrality,’ which opposed the naval pretensions of England,
and in 1788 she had formally proposed a close quadruple alliance
between Russia, Austria, France, and Spain.

[Sidenote: Prussia, England, and Holland.]

If the relations between France, Russia, and Austria were unsettled,
the Triple Alliance between Prussia, Holland, and England was hardly on
a more stable footing in 1789. Prussia, since the death of Frederick
the Great, had become really decrepit, while apparently remaining a
first-rate military power. Though still preserving the prestige of
its famous King, who died in 1786, and recognising its alliance with
England, Prussia in 1789 exhibited a decaying internal administration,
and a vacillating foreign policy. England had received a heavy blow by
the success of the colonists in North America, and by the Treaty of
Versailles, and the powers of the Continent, while envying her wealth,
held her military power of but small account. This opinion prevailed
even at Berlin, and the new King of Prussia gave many evidences that
the alliance of England was rather distasteful to him than otherwise.
The third member of the alliance, Holland, was in the weakest condition
of all, and it was only by invoking the armed interference of Prussia
that England had maintained the authority of the Prince of Orange, as
Stadtholder, in 1787. Though this interference had led to the formation
of the famous Triple Alliance of 1788, in reality the English and
Prussian statesmen profoundly distrusted each other, while the forcing
of the yoke of the Stadtholder upon them caused the Dutch democratic
party in Holland to abhor the allies and to look for help to France.

[Sidenote: The Minor Powers of Europe.]

The rest of the European states were bound more or less firmly to
the one or the other of the two coalitions. The smaller states of
Germany, aggravated or intimidated by the measures of the Emperor
Joseph II., had rallied to the side of Prussia. In the north,
Denmark, whose reigning house was connected by family ties with the
royal families of England and Prussia, was completely under Russian
influence, while Sweden, under Gustavus III., was actually at war with
Catherine II. Poland, torn by internal dissensions, and threatened
with complete destruction by its neighbours, was awaiting its final
partition. The southern states of Europe were almost entirely bound
to the Franco-Austrian alliance. Spain had been united to France by
the offensive and defensive treaty, known as the ‘Pacte de Famille,’
concluded by the French minister, Choiseul, in 1761, and tested in the
war of American Independence. Portugal, though connected with England,
commercially by the Methuen treaty, and politically by a long course
of protection against Spanish pretensions, was striving by a series
of royal marriages to become the ally of Spain. In Italy, Naples was
ruled by a Spanish prince married to an Austrian princess; Sardinia
was closely allied with France, and the remainder of the peninsula was
mainly under Austrian influence. Turkey, now travelling towards decay,
was looked upon by Russia and Austria as their legitimate prey, and
met with encouragement in resistance, but not with active help, from
England and France.

After thus roughly sketching the general attitude of the powers of
Europe to each other in 1789, it will be well to examine each state
separately before entering on the history of the exciting period which
followed. Great and sweeping alterations were to be effected; many
diplomatic variations were to take place. The most important result of
the period of the French Revolution and of Napoleon was its influence
upon the minds of men, as shown in the growth of certain political
conceptions, which have moulded modern Europe. But great changes were
also brought about in dynasties and in the geographical boundaries of
states, which can only be understood by a knowledge of the condition of
Europe in 1789.

[Sidenote: Austria: Joseph II.]

[Sidenote: Joseph II.: Internal Policy.]

The figure of most importance in the beginning of the year 1789 was
that of the Emperor Joseph II., and his dominions were those in which
an observer would have prophesied a great revolution. Joseph was at
that date a man of forty-seven; he had been elected Emperor in the
place of his father, Francis of Lorraine, in 1765, and succeeded to
the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria on the death of his
mother, Maria Theresa, in 1780. He was, perhaps, the best type of the
class of benevolent despots. A singularly industrious, enlightened, and
able ruler, his ideas were far in advance of those of his age,—so much
in advance, indeed, that his efforts to impose them upon his subjects
brought upon himself hatred instead of gratitude, and among the people
turbulence and insurrection instead of peace and tranquillity. The
history of the Emperor Joseph’s reforms, and of the disturbances which
resulted from them, belongs to an earlier volume of this series. In
1789 the whole of the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg
were in a state of ferment. The Emperor’s scheme of welding them into
an Austrian nation, by insisting on the use of the German language,
by simplifying the state of the law and the administration, and
assimilating the various religious and educational institutions, had
roused the fire of local patriotism. In Hungary and in the Tyrol, in
Bohemia, and, above all, in the Austrian Netherlands, or Belgium,
there was declared rebellion, fanned by local prejudices, religious
fanaticism, and the spirit of caste. The first and second of these
causes were chiefly responsible in the Austrian Netherlands, the third
in Hungary. The Belgians, and more especially the Brabançons, were in
arms for their local rights and ancient constitutions, which had been
infringed by the Emperor’s decrees. The Belgian clergy, who looked upon
Joseph as worse than an infidel for his treatment of the Pope and his
suppression of religious houses, were inflamed at the establishment
of an Imperial Seminary in Brussels as a rival to the Roman Catholic
University of Louvain. But in Hungary it was the magnates of the
country who had fought so gallantly for Maria Theresa and saved her
throne, who were in an attitude of open disaffection. This was partly
due to Joseph’s infringement of their Constitution and his removal of
the Iron Crown to Vienna, but still more to his abolition of serfdom.
As has been already stated, serfdom in Europe was practically extinct
in the western part of the Continent, that is, in France, in Belgium,
and on the Rhine, while it increased in intensity steadily towards
the east, and was as bad in Prussia Proper, Poland, and Hungary, as
in Russia. ‘Most merciful Emperor,’ ran a petition from an Hungarian
peasant to Joseph, ‘four days’ forced labour for the seigneur; the
fifth day, fishing for him; the sixth day, hunting with him; and the
seventh belongs to God. Consider, most merciful Emperor, how can I
pay dues and taxes?’[2] The iniquity of serfdom, with its practice of
forced labour, was accentuated in Hungary by the constitutional custom
which exempted the nobility from all taxation. The Emperor Joseph
abolished serfdom in Hungary on 22nd August 1785, and inaugurated a
system of removing feudal burdens, and converting forced labour, by
means of a gradually diminishing tax. The condition of the hereditary
dominions of the House of Hapsburg was thus, in 1789, one of seething
discontent where it was not open rebellion; Belgian burghers and
Hungarian magnates were alike infuriated by the Emperor’s efforts at
reform; and the poor serfs of Hungary and Bohemia and the working men
of Belgium, whom he designed to benefit by direct legislation and
financial measures, were too weak to render him any help. His hope of
creating an Austrian state and an Austrian people out of his scattered
dominions was fated to be thwarted; obstacles of distance, race, and
language, cannot be overcome by legislation, however wise; and the
Emperor’s well-intentioned endeavours nearly lost his House its ancient
patrimony.

[Sidenote: Joseph II. Foreign Policy.]

The foreign policy of the Emperor Joseph II. was dictated by the same
leading principle as his internal reforms—the desire to form his
various territories into a compact state. His schemes to exchange the
Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria in order to unite his possessions in
Swabia with the nucleus of the Hapsburg territories were frustrated by
the policy of Frederick the Great. His attempt to make his authority as
Emperor more than nominal, and to create a real German empire based on
a German patriotic feeling, proved an utter failure. Foiled in these
two projects, the creation of an Austrian compact state, which he
deemed practicable, and the resurrection of a mighty Germany under his
headship, which he acknowledged to be but a dream, Joseph II. turned
his thoughts towards Russia. The ideal of his early manhood had been
his mother’s foe, Frederick the Great of Prussia; the ideal of his
later years was the Empress Catherine of Russia. Both were specimens of
the enlightened despots of the age; both had extended the realms they
ruled; both endeavoured to form their states into compact entities;
both had succeeded in administration and in war; and both were
cynical disciples of the eighteenth-century philosophers. They were
successively his models. It is characteristic of the Emperor Joseph II.
that the only picture in his private cabinet in the Hofburg at Vienna
was a portrait of Frederick; the only picture in his bedroom one of
Catherine. After the death of Frederick the Great, the Emperor Joseph
II., despising his successor, expressed more loudly his admiration for
Catherine. In 1787 he accompanied her in her famous progress to the
Crimea. Fascinated by her personality and dazzled by her projects, the
Emperor was persuaded to ally himself with Russia against the Turks,
and hoped to partition Turkey with her, as his mother, Frederick, and
Catherine had accomplished the first partition of Poland. In 1788 he
accordingly declared war against the Sublime Porte. But he found that
the Turks, in spite of the corruption of their government, were still
no contemptible foes. His own army was demoralised by the misconduct
of the aristocratic officers; disease decimated his troops; and the
Emperor Joseph returned from the campaign of 1788 with the seeds of
mortal illness in his system, but with his determination to pursue the
war unabated.

[Sidenote: Russia: Catherine.]

[Sidenote: Poland.]

Russia, the chosen ally of Joseph II., was in 1789 ruled by the Empress
Catherine II. This great monarch, though by birth a princess of the
petty German state of Anhalt-Zerbst, ranks with Peter the Great as a
founder of the Russian Empire; more Russian than the Russians, she
understood the importance of the development of her adopted country
geographically towards the Baltic and the Black Sea, and the capacity
of her people to support her in her enterprises. She was at this time
sixty years of age, in full possession of her remarkable powers, and
having ruled for twenty-seven years, she had fortified her authority
by experience. Peter the Great had seen the absolute necessity that
the Russian Empire should have access to the sea, and had built Saint
Petersburg; Catherine had moved southward and extended her dominions
to the Black Sea. She hoped to make the Baltic and the Black Sea
Russian lakes, and on that account was the consistent and watchful
enemy of Sweden and the Turks. Upon the western frontier of Russia
lay Poland. The natural policy of Russia was to maintain and even to
strengthen Poland as a buffer between Russia and the military powers
of Austria and Prussia. But the extraordinary Constitution of Poland,
which provided for the election of a powerless king, and recognised
the right of civil war and the power of any nobleman to forbid any
measure proposed at the Diet by the exercise of what was called the
_liberum veto_, kept the unfortunate country in a state of anarchy,
unable either to defend or to oppose. It might have been possible to
reform the Constitution, and make the Poles an organised nation, but
the neighbouring monarchs considered it easier to share the country
amongst them, and had, under the guidance of Frederick the Great,
carried out in 1772 the first partition, which excluded Poland from the
sea, brought the borders of the three powers, Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, nearer to each other, and caused Russia to become an European
instead of essentially an Eastern monarchy. Catherine grasped the
fact that in her present position Russia must intervene in European
politics, owing to the condition of Poland, and decided to derive what
benefit she could from this circumstance. In her internal government
Catherine was one of the benevolent despots. The patroness of Diderot,
she expressed her admiration for the new doctrines of the Rights of
Man, and even summoned a convention to draw up a Russian constitution.
But she knew that the new doctrines were not applicable to the Russian
people, and would be absurdly inappropriate to the nomad Tartar tribes
which wandered over the southern districts of the Russian Empire. She
was fully aware that their village organisation protected the peasants
from many of the evils which prevailed in seemingly more enlightened
countries, and gave them a right and interest in the soil to which
they were attached. Russia, in fact, had experienced no Reformation,
no Renaissance, no awakening of the ideas of individual and political
liberty, and therefore was eminently fitted for the rule of a
benevolent despot.

[Sidenote: France: Louis XVI.]

Next to the Austro-Russian alliance, the Austro-French alliance, sealed
by the Treaty of 1756, was of the greatest significance to the peace
and welfare of Europe in 1789. As has been said, in neither country
was the alliance popular; France and Austria were hereditary enemies;
classical policy in both courts favoured a resumption of this enmity;
the friendship was rather dynastic than national, the work of Kaunitz
and Maria Theresa, the Abbé de Bernis, Madame de Pompadour, and Louis
XV. France still appeared a very powerful nation. Its intervention in
the American War of Independence had largely contributed to England’s
loss of her American colonies, and the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 had
involved a confession that England was beaten by her cession of the
West India islands of St. Lucia and Tobago. But in spite of her seeming
power, France was from political and economic causes really very weak.
She had been unable in 1787 to effectually support the republican and
French party in Holland, and had been forced to allow England and
Prussia to reinstate the Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange. In spite
of her alliance with Austria, she had been obliged in pursuance of
a peace policy, made necessary by her financial condition, to draw
near to England, and had made a commercial treaty with her in 1786.
The weakness of France arose from internal circumstances. The State
and the Court were financially identical. The Court was extravagant,
and the result was a chronic national deficit. Efforts had been made
to meet this deficit, but all expedients, even partial bankruptcy,
had failed. It was evident that a systematic attempt must be made to
rearrange the finances by introducing a regular scheme of taxation
to take the place of the feudal arrangements for filling the royal
treasury, which with some modifications still survived. But a regular
scheme of taxation, which should abolish feudal privileges, and make
the government responsible to the nation for its expenditure, could
not be established without the consent of the people, and the educated
classes, who were both numerous and prosperous, claimed a voice in its
establishment. The feeling of political discontent went deeper. The
French people had outgrown their system of government; the peasants and
farmers resented the existence of the economic, social, and political
privileges dating from the Middle Ages, which had survived the duties
originally accompanying them; the bourgeois argued that they should
have a share in regulating the affairs of the State; the educated
classes sympathised with both. The day for benevolent despotism was
over in France; Louis XVI. was benevolent in disposition, but too weak
to reform the system under which he ruled; and it was the system, not
the person of the monarch, which the French people disliked; it was the
system as a whole which they had outgrown.

[Sidenote: Spain: Charles IV.]

Much of the strength of France rested on its intimate alliance with
Spain. The two great Bourbon houses had been closely united by the
‘Pacte de Famille’ concluded in 1761, which bound them in an offensive
and defensive alliance. Spain had loyally fulfilled her part of the
bargain, and had suffered much in the War of American Independence
against England. Spain had had the good fortune to be ruled by one of
the most enlightened of the benevolent despots, Charles III., whose
minister, Aranda, was one of the greatest statesmen of his century.
Aranda is best known from his persecution of the Jesuits, who had
spread their influence over the minds of the Spanish people so far
as to be the dictators of education and opinion. Their expulsion
contributed to the power of the Crown, which undertook the direction
of every form of national energy. Aranda was a great administrator;
he spent vast sums on the improvement of communications and on public
works, and he built up a powerful Spanish navy. The two evils which
had depressed the fame of Spain, the personal lethargy of the people,
due to the stamping out of liberty of thought by the Inquisition, and
the poverty, caused by the influx of gold from the Spanish colonies,
which prevented any encouragement of national industry, were however
too great for any administrator to subdue, without a national uprising
and the development of a national love for liberty. Aranda was ably
helped by Campomanes, who founded a national system of education to
take the place of the Jesuits’ schools and colleges, by Jovellanos, a
great jurist and political economist, by Cabarrus, a skilful financier,
who founded the bank of St. Charles, and developed a system of national
credit, and by Florida Blanca, who superintended the department of
foreign affairs, and succeeded Aranda in supreme power in 1774. Charles
III. died on 12th December 1788, and his successor, Charles IV., whose
weakness of character was manifested throughout the period from 1789 to
1815, commenced his reign by maintaining Florida Blanca at the head of
Spanish affairs, with Cabarrus and other experienced ministers.

[Sidenote: Portugal: Maria I.]

Portugal was the intimate ally of England as Spain was of France. The
hereditary connection of Portugal and England dated back for many
centuries, and had been strengthened by the Methuen Treaty in 1703,
which had made Portugal largely dependent on England. The great
Portuguese minister, Pombal, who had commenced the persecution of
the Jesuits and had effected internal and administrative reforms,
comparable to those of Aranda in Spain, had been disgraced in 1777,
but the offices of State were filled by his pupils and managed on the
principle, which he had initiated, of advancing the prosperity of the
people. Pombal, while holding the strongest views on the importance
of maintaining the royal absolutism, believed in the modern doctrines
of reform; he had abolished slavery, encouraged education, and in
the received ideas of political economy had encouraged by means of
protection manufactures and agriculture. The essential weakness of
Portugal rested, like that of Spain, on the exhaustion and consequent
lethargy of its people; the Jesuits and the Inquisition had stamped out
freedom of thought. Financially, also, its condition resembled that
of Spain, for the sovereign derived such wealth from Brazil as to be
independent of taxes, levied on the people. Politically the aim of the
House of Braganza, during the latter part of the eighteenth century,
had been to endeavour to free itself from dependence on England by
uniting closely through inter-marriages with the reigning family in
Spain. Queen Maria I., who had succeeded Joseph, the patron of Pombal,
in 1777, was a fanatical lady of weak intellect, and in 1789 the royal
power was in the hands of the heir-apparent, Prince John, who was
recognised as Regent some years later, and eventually succeeded to the
throne in 1816, as John VI.

[Sidenote: Italy.]

[Sidenote: Naples: Ferdinand IV.]

[Sidenote: Sicily.]

[Sidenote: Rome: Pope Pius VI.]

[Sidenote: Tuscany: Grand Duke Leopold.]

[Sidenote: Parma: Duke Ferdinand.]

[Sidenote: Modena: Duke Hercules III.]

[Sidenote: Lombardy.]

[Sidenote: Sardinia: Victor Amadeus III.]

[Sidenote: Lucca: Republic.]

[Sidenote: Genoa: Republic.]

[Sidenote: Venice.]

Italy, in the eighteenth century, was composed of a number of small
states. The idea of Italian unity lived only in the minds of the great
Italian writers and thinkers; it met with no support from the powers
of Europe. Italy was still the home of music and the arts, which
were fostered by the numerous small Courts; but politically, owing
to its subdivision, it hardly counted as a power, and its diplomacy
had little weight in the European State system. It was entirely under
the influence of France and Austria, and showed the tendencies of the
century in the good government of most of the petty rulers. The most
important of the Italian states was the kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
which comprised the southern part of the peninsula and the island of
Sicily. The kingdom had been granted to Ferdinand IV., when his father,
the celebrated Don Carlos, succeeded as Charles III. to the throne
of Spain in 1759. It was in Naples that Charles III. had commenced
his career as a reforming monarch, and the great Neapolitan minister,
Tanucci, continued to administer the affairs of the kingdom in a most
enlightened fashion during the early years of the new monarch’s reign.
His policy was to check the feudal instincts of the Neapolitan barons,
whom he deprived of the lucrative right of administering justice, and
thus to strengthen the influence of the Crown; and he also opposed
the pretensions of the Pope, and concurred in the suppression of
the Jesuits. The power thus acquired for the Crown was wisely used;
the financial system was revised, education was encouraged, and an
attempt was made to procure a general reform of the laws. The young
publicist, Filangieri, whose _Science of Legislation_ contained the
most enlightened views on political economy and government, and who
ranks next to Montesquieu as a typical political thinker of the
eighteenth century, was a Neapolitan, and his speculations largely
influenced the current of Italian thought. Sicily, however, remained
to a great extent untouched by the influence of the great Neapolitan
minister owing to its insular jealousy and the maintenance of its
mediæval parliament. Ferdinand IV., in 1768, married Maria Carolina,
the ablest daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa, who at once assumed
the most entire sway over her ill-educated and indolent husband. She
secured the dismissal of Tanucci, whom she disliked on much the same
grounds that her sister, Marie Antoinette, disliked the reforming
French ministers, Turgot and Necker, in 1776, and after an interval
replaced him by Acton, a native of France of Irish descent, who, owing
to the temper of his patroness, was not able to continue efficiently
the work of Tanucci. The States of the Church, including the Legations
of Bologna and Ferrara and the principalities of Benevento and Ponte
Corvo, were also governed in accordance with the enlightened ideas of
the eighteenth century. The Papacy had much fallen in influence, and
had been forced to comply with the demands of Pombal, Choiseul, Aranda,
and Tanucci for the suppression of its spiritual mainstay, the order of
the Jesuits; but it nevertheless maintained its temporal sovereignty
in Italy. Giovanni Angelo Braschi, who had been elected Pope in 1775,
and taken the title of Pius VI., was a man of singular ability and
courtly manners. But he had to assent to vast reforms in Tuscany,
which seriously affected the wealth of the Church in that part of the
country, and had been unable, in spite of a personal visit to Vienna,
to persuade Joseph II. to alter his policy towards the Papacy. His most
notable internal measures in the Papal States were the draining of the
Pontine marshes, and his reconstitution of the Clementine Museum at
Rome, which he placed under the charge of the eminent antiquary, Ennius
Quirinus Visconti. Tuscany flourished under the rule of the Grand Duke
Leopold, brother and eventual successor of Joseph II., the ablest
administrator of all the benevolent despots. His reforms extended in
every direction; with the help of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia,
he reduced the number of bishoprics and monasteries; he drained many of
the marshes, and so benefited agriculture; he reorganised education and
encouraged the Universities of Pisa and Siena. But his greatest reforms
were legal and economic. Tuscany having originated from a number of
mediæval republics, had been hitherto administered as a collection of
semi-independent cities and districts, with their own laws and local
finances. Leopold was one of the first monarchs to project a uniform
code of laws for his state, which he intrusted to the great jurist,
Lampredi, to compile, and he abolished all personal privileges before
the law, torture, the right of asylum for malefactors, confiscation of
the property of condemned malefactors, and secret denunciations. In
economics he was the pupil of the French physiocrats, and the friend of
the Marquis de Mirabeau, the ‘Ami des hommes,’ and in consonance with
their doctrines he swept away all the internal customs duties and other
restrictions on industry and commerce. Lastly, Leopold, seeing that
his state was not strong enough to carry on a real war, abolished the
Tuscan army, to the great advantage of his finances. Next to Tuscany,
the best-governed state in Italy was Parma. Ferdinand, Duke of Parma
and Piacenza, was the only son of Don Philip, the second son of Philip
V. of Spain and Elizabeth Farnese, by Elizabeth of France, daughter
of Louis XV. He was educated by the celebrated French philosopher,
Condillac, and early in his reign showed the influence of the best
eighteenth century ideas. He had succeeded his father in 1765, and
continued his minister, a Frenchman, Du Tillot, Marquis of Felino, in
office. Du Tillot, though working in a smaller sphere, was as great a
reformer as Pombal and Tanucci. He brought about the suppression of
the Inquisition in Parma, improved the internal administration, and
encouraged education so greatly that the University of Parma, under the
management of the learned scholar, Paciaudi, became one of the most
famous in Europe. In 1769 Duke Ferdinand married Maria Amelia, daughter
of the Empress Maria Theresa, who two years later secured the dismissal
of Du Tillot from office. This dismissal was not, however, followed
by a reaction, though it put a close to the progress of reform, and
Parma, under the administration, first of a Spaniard, Llanos, and then
of a Frenchman, Mauprat, retained its reputation as a well governed
state. It was otherwise with Modena, where the last Duke of the House
of Este, Hercules III., reigned. This prince had succeeded to the
duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola in 1780, when already a man
of fifty-three, and had added to them by marriage the principalities
of Massa and Carrara. His only daughter and heiress, Maria Beatrice,
was married to the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, younger brother of
the Emperor Joseph, and Governor-General of Lombardy. Duke Hercules
was a superstitious and avaricious ruler, whose chief care was to
amass money, and, politically, he followed out the wishes of Austria.
While the House of Austria, by its scions or by marriages, ruled the
greater part of Italy indirectly, it possessed the direct sovereignty
of Lombardy, or, more accurately, of the Milanese and Mantua. This
province profited by the salutary policy of Joseph II., and was
administered, under the governor-generalship of the Archduke Ferdinand,
by a great statesman, Count Firmian, who understood and carried out the
most important reforms. His patronage of the arts and of education was
especially remarkable; he laboured ardently to restore the efficiency
of the Universities of Milan and Pavia, and appointed Beccaria, the
celebrated philanthropist, Professor of Political Economy at the
former, and Volta, the equally celebrated man of science, Professor
of Physics at the latter. The only other monarchy of Italy, that of
Sardinia, was more closely related to France than to Austria. Its
king, Victor Amadeus III., had married a Spanish princess, and two
of his daughters were married to the two brothers of Louis XVI. of
France—Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, and the Comte d’Artois. His
dominions comprised the island of Sardinia, Piedmont, Savoy, and Nice,
and it was a great subject of complaint to his Piedmontese subjects
that he unduly favoured his French-speaking province of Savoy. He, too,
was influenced by the spirit of his century; he encouraged agriculture
and commerce; he patronised literature and science; he built the
Observatory at Turin, and founded academies of science and fine arts;
and he undertook great public works, of which the most important was
the improvement of the harbour of Nice. But in one matter he pursued an
opposite policy to the Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany, for he increased
and reorganised his army, and constructed fortifications of the most
modern description at Tortona and Alessandria. Lastly must be noticed
three Italian republics, survivals of the Middle Ages. Of these the
smallest was the Republic of Lucca, which was entirely surrounded by
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Its trade suffered from the encouragement
given by the Grand Duke Leopold to Leghorn; but, on the whole, it was
well governed and prosperous. It was otherwise with the two great
aristocratic republics, in which the long continuance of oligarchical
government had stamped out all vestiges of political liberty. The
Republic of Genoa, of which Raphael di Ferrari was Doge in 1789, was in
utter decay. Its people were poverty-stricken; its trade had gone to
Leghorn and Nice; and its laws and customs were unreformed. It was so
weak that it had been unable to subdue the rebels in Corsica, who had
risen under Paoli for the right of self-government, and it had ended by
ceding the island to France in 1768. The Republic of Venice, of which
the Doge in 1789 was Paul Renier, had not fallen so low in the eyes of
Europe. Its possessions on the mainland, which extended from Verona to
the Tyrol and along the east coast of the Adriatic Sea, and included
the Ionian Islands, were administered for the benefit of the Venetian
oligarchy, and supplied it with wealth. From Dalmatia was raised a
considerable army, but the administration was wholly selfish, and did
not keep pace in enlightenment with that of Lombardy, Parma, Tuscany,
and Naples. On the whole, where monarchy existed in Italy, it tended in
the eighteenth century to benevolent despotism; and such rule was far
more beneficial to the people than that of the antiquated republics.
Politically, the whole country might be reckoned as a factor in the
Franco-Austrian alliance.

[Sidenote: England: George III.]

[Sidenote: The Policy of Pitt.]

The chief power of the Triple Alliance, which balanced the
loosely-defined league of Russia, France, and Austria, was England.
The severe blow which had been struck by the revolt of her American
colonies had made Great Britain appear weaker than she really was to
the powers of the Continent. The Treaty of Versailles, by which she
had been obliged to make cessions to France, seemed to have set the
seal on her humiliation. But in reality her finances were more affected
than her fighting strength, and the English navy, which, from her
insular position, must always constitute the principal element of her
force, was as excellent as ever. The policy of the younger Pitt, who
had come into office in 1783, was one of peace and retrenchment. The
country had lasted well through the financial strain of the American
War, and the chief aim of the minister was to allow its vast commercial
and industrial resources to expand. As a pupil of Adam Smith, Pitt
understood the great principles of political economy, and the most
significant part of his foreign policy was his conclusion of the
Commercial Treaty with France. A fiscal system, far in advance of that
in any continental country, enabled the English Government to draw on
the wealth of the nation more effectively than any other government,
if the money was needed for patriotic purposes. In spite of his love
of peace, Pitt was induced by his first Foreign Secretary, the Duke of
Leeds, to take an active part in European politics, and was eventually
led by the state of affairs in Holland to enter into the Triple
Alliance. At home, England was unaffected by the intellectual movement
which led to the French Revolution. She had in the previous century
got rid of the relics of feudalism, which pressed so heavily on the
continental farmer and peasant, and had won the boons of individual and
commercial liberty, and of equality before the law; while politically,
though her government was an oligarchy, supported by the class of
wealthy merchants and traders, an opportunity was afforded through
the existence of a free press and of the system of election, however
hampered by antiquated franchises, for public opinion to make itself
felt.

[Sidenote: Prussia: Frederick William II.]

Prussia, the other principal member of the Triple Alliance, contrasted
in every way with England. Seemingly, owing to the prestige of
Frederick the Great’s victories and that able monarch’s careful
organisation of his army, Prussia was the first military state in
Europe; in reality, her reputation was greater than her actual power.
Prussia was weak where England was strong. Prussia had no financial
system worthy of the name, no industrial wealth, and no national bank;
her only resources for war were a certain quantity of specie stored
up in Berlin. The Prussian Government was an absolutism, in which the
monarch’s will was supreme; its administration was based on feudalism,
of which England had entirely and France had practically got rid, with
all its mediæval incidents of serfdom, privilege of the nobility, and
social and commercial inequalities. The Prussian army was not national;
the soldiers were treated as slaves, and the officers, who were all of
noble birth, were tyrants in the maintenance of military discipline.

[Sidenote: Policy of Prussia.]

Frederick the Great was one of the finest types of the benevolent
despot of the eighteenth century, but in him the belief in the
importance of his despotic power outweighed his benevolence. While
wishing for the prosperity of the people, he deliberately maintained
the authority of the nobility, and discouraged any desire for change
on the part of the agriculturists or citizens. The former were left
at the disposal of their lords, the latter trammelled by antiquated
civic constitutions. The weakness of Prussia was not only inherent in
its government, but was also due to geographical causes. Its component
parts were scattered; its Rhenish duchies and East Friesland were
separated from its main territories by many German states; its central
districts, the Marks of Brandenburg, were sparsely populated, and cut
off from the sea; its largest provinces, Prussia Proper, Pomerania,
Silesia, and Prussian Poland were, in spite of German and French
Huguenot colonies, mainly Slavonic, and as backward in civilisation as
other Slavonic races in the eighteenth century. In Russia, however,
the Slavonic population in its barbarism yet retained sufficient local
organisation to make its lot fairly endurable; in eastern Prussia,
and especially in Prussian Poland, the people had been brought
into contact with the mediæval and Latin civilisation, and were
consequently treated as absolute serfs without the relief afforded by
local institutions. The policy of Prussia, as laid down by Frederick
the Great, had both Prussian and German aspirations, and in both was
utterly selfish. The example set by the cynical monarch in the Silesian
wars had left a deep impress on the minds of Prussian statesmen, and
the maxims of justice and international law were subordinated by them
to expediency. The Prussian policy of Frederick the Great culminated
in the first partition of Poland, which he had suggested, by means
of which Prussia united her eastern province of Prussia Proper to
Brandenburg, and cut off Poland from the sea, and the aim of his
successors was to pursue this path of aggrandisement, and, by further
annexations, to connect Silesia directly with Prussia Proper. The
German policy of Prussia was to assume the leadership of the Empire
by pretending the greatest zeal for the rights of the Princes of the
Empire, and posing as their protector, and it was on this ground that
Frederick the Great formed the League of the Princes. The hereditary
enemy of Prussia was Austria, which, though distinctly injured by
the conquest of Silesia, still retained the chief influence over the
Empire, and also showed a tendency to check the designs on Poland.
It was Frederick the Great of Prussia who had thwarted the Emperor’s
scheme of exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria, and he
intrigued against Austria at the Courts both of Russia and France. It
was as a counterblow to the Franco-Austro-Russian alliance that Prussia
intervened in Holland, at the request of England, and formed the Triple
Alliance with England and Holland in 1788. King Frederick William
II. of Prussia, who succeeded his famous uncle in 1786, was a man of
feeble intellect and undecided nature, but he had thoroughly imbibed
the classic ideas of Prussian policy, and regarded Austria as the
inevitable foe of Prussia, to be duped and taken advantage of on every
possible occasion. His chief minister, Hertzberg, was a consistent
enemy of Austria, but owing to the curious character of the king, the
real power of the State rested not with the minister but with the royal
favourites, of whom the chief at the end of 1788 were Bischofswerder
and Lucchesini.

[Sidenote: Holland.]

Holland was the link which bound England and Prussia together. Its
military power was of no account, but the wealth of its inhabitants,
derived from their vast commercial expansion in Asia and aptitude
for banking, made the Republic of the United Provinces of the
greatest importance. The Seven Provinces preserved the most complete
autonomy; only the veriest semblance of federation held them
together. Practically, the only bond of union was in the power of the
Stadtholder, which had been restored in 1747. In the more wealthy
provinces, such as Holland, the commercial aristocracy, which filled
the ranks of the local governments, resented the position of the
Stadtholder, who held the command-in-chief of the army and navy; but in
the poorer and agricultural provinces, such as Friesland and Groningen,
the landed aristocracy generally supported the Stadtholderate. In 1780
the United Provinces had joined in the Neutral League of the North,
invented by Catherine of Russia to break the commercial supremacy of
England, and in the war which followed they had suffered severe losses,
and had been compelled to cede Negapatam in India to England in 1783 on
the conclusion of peace. The Stadtholder, William V., Prince of Orange,
in whose family the office had been declared hereditary, was vehemently
accused of favouring England during this war, and when peace was
declared a movement was set on foot, headed by the authorities of the
Province of Holland, to oust him from his position, and to draw up a
new constitution for the Dutch Netherlands on the same lines as that of
the United States of America. This movement grew to its height in 1786;
a French Legion, commanded by the Comte de Maillebois, was raised; the
Stadtholder had to fly from the Hague, and the armed intervention of
France was requested. But, as has been said, France, in spite of her
seeming power, was too weak to intervene, and the Dutch patriots were
abandoned to their fate. On the other side, that of the Stadtholder,
England, through its able ambassador at the Hague, Sir James Harris,
afterwards Lord Malmesbury, induced Prussia to act. England and Prussia
had dynastic and political reasons for this conduct. The Stadtholder
was, through his mother, a first cousin of George III., and had married
a sister of Frederick William II., while politically, the acquisition
of Holland to the Franco-Austrian alliance, through the expulsion of
the Stadtholder, would bring nearly the whole of Europe into that
system, and would practically enclose the Austrian Netherlands or
Belgium. In September 1787, therefore, a Prussian army, under the Duke
of Brunswick, had occupied Amsterdam, and placed the Stadtholder firmly
in power; the Dutch patriots fled to France; the Legion of Maillebois
was disbanded; and in 1788 the work was consummated by the signature of
the Triple Alliance.

[Sidenote: Denmark: Christian VII.]

[Sidenote: Sweden: Gustavus III.]

The two northern kingdoms, Denmark and Sweden, had adhered to the
Neutral League against England in 1780, but for generations a bitter
animosity had existed between them. Denmark, which in 1789 included
Norway, was in an extremely prosperous condition. The philanthropic
ideas of the eighteenth century had made great way, and on 20th
June 1788 a royal ordinance had destroyed the last vestige of
serfdom. Efforts were made to improve the condition of the people by
reorganising the state of the finances, law and education, and progress
was made in every direction. These reforms were not the work of the
King, Christian VII., who had fallen into a state of dotage, but of
the Prince Royal, afterwards Frederick VI., and of his minister, Count
Andrew Bernstorff, the nephew of the greatest Danish statesman of the
eighteenth century. Sweden, which in 1789 included the greater part
of Finland as well as Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen, was
under the sway of one of the most enlightened rulers of the century,
Gustavus III. That monarch had in 1772, by a _coup d’état_, overthrown
the power of the Swedish Estates, with their division into the two
parties of the Caps and the Hats, subsidised respectively by Russia
and France. He had made use of his absolutism to carry out some of
the benevolent ideas of the time. He had abolished torture, regulated
taxation, encouraged commerce and industry, and diminished, where he
did not destroy, the privileges of the nobility. Had he contented
himself with these internal reforms he would have won the lasting
gratitude of the Swedish people, but he insisted on playing a part
in continental politics, which involved the maintenance of a large
army and the consequent exhaustion of the people. Though he too had
joined the League of the North in 1780, he afterwards assumed a
strong anti-Russian attitude, and resolved to take advantage of the
Russo-Turkish war in order to regain some of his lost provinces.
Accordingly he invaded Russia in the summer of 1788, while his fleet
threatened St. Petersburg.

[Sidenote: The Empire.]

[Sidenote: The Diet.]

[Sidenote: College of Electors.]

[Sidenote: College of Princes.]

[Sidenote: College of Free Cities.]

Hitherto a sketch has been given of states, which in 1789 possessed a
certain unity, and were able to play a part as independent countries
of more or less weight in European politics. It was otherwise with
the Holy Roman Empire, which still remained in the same condition,
and was ruled in the same manner, as had been arranged at the Treaty
of Westphalia in 1648. True Germany, that is Germany to the west of
the Oder, had been under this arrangement split up into a number of
independent sovereignties, loosely bound together as the Holy Roman
Empire. The number of these petty states caused the Empire to be, from
a military point of view, utterly inefficient; the bond was too loose
to allow of general internal reforms or of a consistent foreign policy;
and the federal arrangements were too cumbrous and unwieldy to allow
of Germany ranking as a great power. The Imperial Diet or Reichstag
consisted of three colleges, and a majority was required in each of
the upper colleges to agree to a resolution, which, when confirmed by
the Emperor, became a _conclusum_ of the Empire. The first of these
colleges was that of the eight Electors, three ecclesiastical, the
Elector-Archbishops of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne, and five lay, the
Electors of Bohemia, Brandenburg, and Hanover, who were also Kings of
Hungary, Prussia, and England, the Elector of Saxony, and the Elector
Palatine, who in 1789 was also Elector of Bavaria. The president of
this college was the Elector-Archbishop of Mayence, as Chancellor of
the Empire. The second college was that of the Princes, which consisted
of one hundred voices, thirty-six ecclesiastical and sixty-four
lay. In this college all the Electors had voices under different
designations; Hanover possessed six for different principalities,
Prussia six for the duchy of Guelders, the county of Mœurs, etc.,
Austria three, and so on, while the Kings of Denmark and Sweden also
were represented as Dukes of Holstein and of Pomerania. Less important
princes differing in power from the Landgraves of Hesse, the Margraves
of Baden, and the Duke of Würtemburg to the petty princes of Salm and
Anhalt, possessed single voices, and made up the number of temporal
voters in the college to sixty. The ecclesiastical princes included
thirty-four of the wealthiest bishops and abbots, many of whom ruled
over considerable territories, and of whom the most important were the
Archbishop of Salzburg, the Bishops of Bamberg, Augsburg, Würtzburg,
Spires, Worms, Strasbourg, Basle, Constance, Paderborn, Hildesheim,
and Münster, and the Abbots of Elwangen, Kempten, and Stablo. The
other six voices were called collegiate, and representatives to hold
them were elected by the petty lay and ecclesiastical sovereigns
who abounded in Franconia, Swabia, and Westphalia, to the number of
four lay and two ecclesiastical representatives. The presidency of
this college was held alternately by the Archduke of Austria and the
Archbishop of Salzburg. The third or inferior college was that of the
free cities, and any opposition on its part could prevent a decision
arrived at by the two upper or superior colleges being presented
to the Emperor for his assent as a _conclusum_ of the Empire. It
consisted of the representatives of fifty-two imperial free cities,
divided into two ‘benches,’ of which the Bench of Westphalia included
Frankfort-on-the-Main, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Hamburg, Bremen, and
Lübeck, and the Bench of Swabia included Nuremberg, Ratisbon, Ulm,
and Augsburg. The presidency of this college belonged to the city
of Ratisbon, in which the Diet held its sittings. By this elaborate
federative system, all sense of German unity was lost; the electors,
princes, and free cities were represented only by delegates; the
smaller states felt themselves swamped and were obliged to look to a
great power, Austria or France, Prussia or Hanover, to preserve their
political independence.

[Sidenote: The Imperial Tribunal.]

[Sidenote: The Emperor.]

[Sidenote: The Aulic Council.]

[Sidenote: The Circles.]

The other important institution of the Empire, the Imperial Tribunal
or Reichskammergericht, which sat at Wetzlar and was intended to
settle disputes between the German sovereigns, had also fallen into
desuetude. Its venality and procrastination became proverbial, and it
possessed no machinery to put its decrees into force. At the head of
the Empire was the Emperor, who was elected and crowned with all the
elaborate ceremonial of the Middle Ages. The office had been, with one
exception, conferred on the head of House of Austria, since the Treaty
of Westphalia, but it brought little actual authority on the holder.
It was as ruler of the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg
that the Emperor exerted some influence, not as an Emperor. Joseph II.,
indeed, endeavoured to be Emperor in more than name, with the result
that Frederick the Great was enabled to form the League of Princes
against him. As the chief Catholic state, Austria, however, possessed
a great influence in the Imperial Diet, for the ecclesiastical members
of the Colleges of Electors and Princes naturally inclined to support
her, and it was on their votes that she relied. She even went so far
as to establish the Aulic Council at Vienna, which intervened in cases
between sovereign princes, and usurped some of the prerogatives of
the Imperial Tribunal of Wetzlar. The executive power of the Empire,
when it had come to a decision, was entrusted to the circles. These
circles each had their own Diet, and it was their duty, for instance,
to raise money and troops when the Empire decided to go to war. Of the
ten circles of the Empire, originally created, one, that of Burgundy,
had been extinguished or nearly so by the conquests of Louis XIV.,
and those situated in the eastern portion were entirely controlled by
the important states of Prussia, Saxony, and Austria. It was only in
Western Germany, in the circles of Westphalia, Franconia, and Swabia
that the organisation was fairly tried, and the result was signal
failure, whenever those circles put their contingents in the field.
It could hardly be otherwise, when, owing to minute subdivision and
divided authority, a single company of soldiers might be raised from
half a dozen different petty sovereigns, each of whom would try to
throw the burden of their maintenance on his colleagues. The Holy Roman
Empire, in short, like other mediæval institutions, had fallen into
decay with the mediæval systems of warfare and religion; some of its
component states, such as Austria and Prussia, or in a lesser degree
Bavaria, might possess a real power; but, as a whole, it was utterly
inefficient to defend itself, and formed a feeble barrier between
France and the kingdoms of Eastern Europe.

[Sidenote: The Princes of Germany.]

[Sidenote: Bavaria.]

[Sidenote: Baden.]

[Sidenote: Würtemburg.]

[Sidenote: Saxony.]

[Sidenote: Saxe-Weimar.]

The impotence of the Empire for offensive and defensive purposes did
not, however, greatly affect the German people; the educated classes
prided themselves on being superior to patriotic impulses, and on being
cosmopolitan rather than German; the poorer classes thought more of
the internal administration which affected them than of the attitude
of the Empire to European politics. The tendency towards benevolent
despotism, which distinguished the greater powers, showed itself also
in the petty states of Germany in the diminution, if not the abolition,
of the ancient Estates and in the restraints placed on the authority
of the nobility. The increased power of the sovereign was generally,
if not universally, used to foster the prosperity of his subjects,
or at least to promote literature and art. A notice of a few of the
principal rulers of Germany will justify this view. Charles Theodore,
the Elector Palatine, who in 1778 had succeeded to the Electorate
of Bavaria, and united once more the territories of the House of
Wittelsbach, was a most enlightened sovereign. In the Palatinate he had
founded a brilliant University at Mannheim, and one of the most famous
picture galleries in Europe at Düsseldorf; in Bavaria he suppressed
some of the numerous convents, which stifled progress, in spite of his
sincere Catholicism. He took as one of his ministers the celebrated
American, Benjamin Thompson, whom he created Count Rumford, and that
man of science and learning endeavoured to suppress mendacity, and made
efforts to bring material comforts within reach of the very poorest.
Nevertheless, in some points, the Elector Charles Theodore showed
himself a bigot; he left education entirely in the hands of the Roman
Catholic priesthood and ex-Jesuits, and he allowed the Protestants in
his dominions to be persecuted. The Margrave Charles Frederick, who
in 1771 reunited in his person the two margraviates of Baden-Baden
and Baden-Durlach, was a more thoroughly enlightened prince. He was
truly a benevolent despot; he was a student of political economy, on
which he himself wrote a treatise, and applied its principles to his
little state; he established a scheme of primary education; and on 23d
July 1783 he abolished serfdom in his dominions, while maintaining
the royal _corvées_ and the prohibition for a subject to leave the
country without obtaining his permission. The Duke Charles Eugène of
Würtemburg formed a contrast to his neighbours. He established, like
them, his own absolutism, but he used his power to impose heavy taxes
and raise an army out of all proportion to the size of his duchy.
He treated his subjects like slaves, and his administration was so
cruel that the Aulic Council threatened to take measures against him.
Nevertheless, he was a patron of literature and the arts. He built a
theatre at Stuttgart and founded the Academy of Fine Arts there, and
he defrayed the expense of the education of the poet Schiller, who,
however, afterwards satirised him and fled to Weimar. Yet Charles
Eugène of Würtemburg appears an enlightened monarch to such princes as
Duke Charles of Deux-Ponts (Zweibrücken), whose successor, Maximilian
Joseph, was to succeed the Elector Palatine, Charles Theodore, and
to become the first King of Bavaria, for that prince sacrificed his
people to his passion for the chase, and to William IX., Landgrave
of Hesse-Cassel, who sold his subjects by the hundred to the English
Government to carry on the war in America. Going further east, Saxony,
which had ranked among the great states of Germany, was in a state of
decline. The Electors Augustus II. and Augustus III. had been Kings
of Poland, and had ruined their hereditary dominions to support their
royal dignity and position. Fortunately Frederick Augustus, who was
Elector in 1789, had not been elected to the Polish throne, and had
been able to do something for the prosperity of his subjects. He
formed a commission to draw up a code of laws, he abolished torture,
encouraged industry and agriculture, and founded an Academy of Mines.
But he did not go so far, for instance, as the Margrave of Baden, and
made no attempt to suppress serfdom. The glory of Saxony was not,
however, on the eve of the French Revolution its electoral house;
its intellectual capital was not the beautiful city of Dresden. That
place was taken by Weimar, where Duke Charles Augustus of Saxe-Weimar
collected around him the great philosophers and men of letters who made
the German name famous at the end of the eighteenth century and the
beginning of the nineteenth. To his Court resorted the most illustrious
Germans of the time, Goethe and Schiller, Herder, Wieland, and Musæus;
and the University of his state at Jena became the most famous in
Germany. It is not necessary to particularise the other states; it is
enough to say that those in the north were generally very backward,
especially the duchies of Mecklenburg, and that Hanover was left to the
rule of an aristocratic oligarchy, which allowed no reforms, although
its University at Göttingen, founded by George II., took rank with the
best.

[Sidenote: Mayence.]

[Sidenote: Trèves.]

[Sidenote: Cologne.]

The Ecclesiastical States followed also the movement of the century.
The ecclesiastical rulers were often enlightened men, but they were
to a great extent the slaves of their chapters. These chapters were
generally filled by younger sons of the smaller princes, who insisted
on the newly-elected prelates entering into the closest bonds with
them to make no changes in the feudal system in the bishoprics. The
prince-bishops and abbots at the close of the eighteenth century were,
therefore, generally scions of noble houses, such as, for instance,
Francis Joseph, Baron of Roggenbach, Bishop of Basle, Baron Francis
Louis of Erthal, Bishop of Bamberg and Würtzburg, the Baron of Rödt,
Bishop of Constance, the Count of Hoensbroeck, Bishop of Liége,
Count Augustus of Limburg, Bishop of Spires, Count Jerome Colloredo,
Archbishop of Salzburg, and the Baron of Plettenberg, Abbot of Münster.
One curious point deserves notice, that in some instances, Protestant
princes had the right to present to Catholic prince-bishoprics, and
in 1789 the Duke of York was Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, and Prince
Peter Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, Prince-Bishop of Lübeck. Of
higher rank and more independent of their chapters were the three
archbishop-electors, who were therefore more able to rule their states
in consonance with the ideas of the century. The chief of these was
Baron Frederick Charles of Erthal, Archbishop-Elector of Mayence, and
Prince-Bishop of Worms, the Chancellor of the Empire _ex officio_. This
great prelate busied himself mostly with his pleasures, but his rank
caused his countenance to be sought by all parties, and his adhesion
to Frederick the Great’s League of Princes was the greatest gain the
King of Prussia made in his anti-Austrian policy. In 1789 he had
completely abandoned the cares of internal and external politics to his
coadjutor Charles, Baron de Dalberg, who was to play a leading part
in the history of Germany during the period of the French Revolution
and Napoleon. The Archbishop-Elector of Trèves in 1789 was Clement
Wenceslas, a Saxon prince, and an excellent ruler, who, in 1783,
even issued an edict of tolerance, allowing men of any religion to
settle in his state, and exercise any trade or profession there. The
last Elector-Archbishop was the Archduke Maximilian, the youngest
brother of the Emperor Joseph, Archbishop of Cologne, who shared his
brother’s liberal opinions, and patronised his predecessor’s creation,
the University of Bonn, which had been founded in opposition to the
ultramontane University of Cologne, for the encouragement of the modern
developments of science. The tendency of all these governments, lay and
clerical, was to promote the prosperity of the people; Joseph II. was
but the type of the German princes of his time; all wished to do good
for the people, but not by them; their characters differed widely, from
the enlightened Margrave of Baden to the hunting Duke of Deux-Ponts;
but in their different ways and in different degrees they generally
meant well. But, while the more important princes showed the tendency
of the century, their poorer contemporaries were unable to do so.
They were mostly in debt, owing to their efforts to rival the wealthy
princes, and in order to raise money resorted to all the devices of
mediæval feudalism. The few villages over which they ruled suffered
from this tyranny, and it was always possible to know when a traveller
crossed the frontier into one of these ‘duodecimo duchies.’ Beneath the
petty princes were the Ritters or Knights of the Empire, who abounded
in Franconia and Swabia. These knights had no representation in the
Imperial Diet, and were consequently dependent directly on the Emperor.
Their poverty made them take service with the wealthy princes; and
to quote but two instances, Stein, the great Prussian minister, and
Würmser, the celebrated Austrian general, were both Knights of the
Empire. The result of this minute subdivision of Germany was to destroy
the sense of national patriotism; which was not to rise again until
after Germany had passed through the mould of Napoleon’s domination.

[Sidenote: Switzerland.]

[Sidenote: Geneva.]

The other European confederation, Switzerland, presented the same
symptoms of internal decay as the Holy Roman Empire, but it was
preserved from the same political degradation by the consciousness
of its nationality and the persistence of its local governments. The
eighteenth century was marked in Switzerland by struggles between
canton and canton, Catholics and Protestants, nobles and bourgeois.
In some cantons, such as Berne, an oligarchical system was maintained
in the hands of a few noble families; in others, such as Uri, a
purely democratic form of government was preserved, which allowed
every peasant a voice in the local administration. Where feudalism
had been established, the peasants were in no better condition than
in the rest of Europe, but in the mountain cantons such a _régime_
was impossible, and individual and political freedom still existed.
It must be remembered that the Switzerland of the eighteenth century
was not identical with that of the nineteenth. The Grisons formed no
part of the confederation, Neufchâtel belonged to Prussia, and Geneva
was an independent republic. The part the latter had played in the
intellectual movement of the century was most conspicuous. Rousseau
was born in Geneva, and Voltaire retired and spent his last years in
its neighbourhood. But Geneva had just before 1789 been the scene of a
revolution resembling that in Holland. A struggle broke out between the
bourgeois families, which monopolised the magistracy, and the mass of
the people, which had ended in the victory of the former. The Genevese
democrats were expelled, and many of them, notably Clavière, exercised
a considerable influence on the course of the Revolution in France.

The state of Europe in 1789 showed everywhere a sense of awakening
to new ideas. The bonds of feudalism were ready to break asunder;
the benevolent despots had recognised the rights of individual and
commercial freedom; the French Revolution was able to sow in ripe
ground the two new principles of the sovereignty of the people and the
sentiment of nationality.

CHAPTER II

1789–1790

The Empress Catherine and the Emperor Joseph II.—The Turkish
War—Campaign of 1789 against the Turks—Battles of Foksany and
the Rymnik—Capture of Belgrade—Revolution in Sweden—Affairs
in Belgium—Policy of Joseph II. in Belgium—Revolution in
Liége—Elections to the States-General in France—Meeting of
the States-General: struggle between the Orders—The Tiers
État declares itself the National Assembly—Oath of the
Tennis Court—The Séance Royale—Mirabeau’s Address to the
King—Dismissal of Necker—Riot of 12th July in Paris—Capture
of the Bastille—Recall of Necker—Louis XVI. visits
Paris—Murder of Foullon—Session of 4th August—Declaration
of the Rights of Man—Question of the Veto—March of the
women of Paris to Versailles—Louis XVI. goes to reside in
Paris—Effect of the Revolution in France on Europe—The
Revolution in Belgium—Formation of the Belgian Republic—Death
of the Emperor Joseph II.—Failure of his reign—The attitude
of Louis XVI. to the French Revolution—The new French
Constitution—Civil Constitution of the Clergy—Measures of the
Constituent Assembly—Mirabeau—Danger threatened to the new
state of affairs in France by a foreign war—Mirabeau and the
French Court—Probable causes of a foreign war—Avignon and the
Venaissin—Affair of Nootka Sound—The Pacte de Famille—Rights
of Princes of the Empire in Alsace—The Emperor Leopold master
of the situation.

[Sidenote: Catherine and Joseph II. 1789.]

At the commencement of the year 1789 the thoughts of European statesmen
were mainly turned to the events which were passing in the east of
Europe. The alliance between Catherine of Russia and the Emperor Joseph
II. was regarded with anxiety not only by Pitt in England and by King
Frederick William II. of Prussia, but by the French ministers and by
all the smaller states of Europe. The projects of Russia and Austria
for the extension of their boundaries at the expense of Turkey, Poland,
and Bavaria, were viewed with alarm, and the ambitious ideas of their
rulers with dismay. The attention of educated people, who were not
statesmen or politicians, but disciples of the philosophical teachers
of the eighteenth century, was entirely concentrated on the progress
of the Emperor Joseph’s policy in the Austrian Netherlands or Belgium.
Success seemed to have crowned the warlike measures of General d’Alton;
the Belgian patriots were in prison or in exile; and the philanthropic
and centralising reforms of the Emperor seemed to have ended in Belgium
in the establishment of a military despotism. France was known to be
in an almost desperate financial condition; and the convocation of the
States-General for 1st May 1789, was generally looked upon as a means
adopted by Louis XVI. to obtain financial relief. The great results,
which were to follow the meeting of the States-General, were little
expected by even the most acute political observers, and it was not
foreseen that for more than a quarter of a century the interest of
Europe was to be fixed upon France, and that a series of events in
that country, unparalleled in history, were to bring about an entire
modification in the political system of Europe, and to open a new era
in the history of mankind.

[Sidenote: The War with the Turks.]

[Sidenote: Joseph’s prediction.]

The campaign of 1788 had, upon the whole, terminated favourably for
the Austrians and Russians in their war with the Turks. Loudon, who
commanded the Austrian forces, had taken Dubitza, and penetrating into
Bosnia had reduced Novi on 3d October. Francis Josias, of the House of
Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, commonly known as the Prince of Coburg, at the
head of an Austrian army, had in conjunction with a Russian force under
Prince Soltikov taken Choczim on 20th September. But, on the other
hand, the Turks had overrun and laid waste the Banat of Temesvar and
routed the Austrian army in that quarter, which was under the personal
command of the Emperor. The Russians had also made some progress, and
on 6th December Potemkin, with terrible loss of life, and owing mainly
to the intrepidity of Suvórov and Repnin stormed Oczakoff (Ochakov).
These successes, despite his own failure, greatly inspirited Joseph,
who, in a letter to Prince Charles of Nassau, made the following
curious predictions in January 1789:[3]—‘If the Grand Vizier should
come to meet me or the Russians near the Danube, he must offer a
battle; and then, after having defeated him, I shall drive him back
to take refuge under the cannon of Silistria. In October 1789 I shall
call a congress, at which the Osmanlis will be obliged to beg for peace
from the Giaours. The treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz will serve
as the basis for my ambassadors on which to conclude peace; in it,
however, I shall claim Choczim and part of Moldavia. Russia will keep
the Crimea, Prince Charles of Sweden will be Duke of Courland, and the
Grand Duke of Florence King of the Romans. Then there will be universal
peace in Europe. Until then, France will have settled affairs with the
notables of the nation; and the other gentlemen think too much about
themselves and too little about Austria.’

[Sidenote: The Campaign of 1789.]

The campaign of 1789 was far from fulfilling the expectations of
the Emperor Joseph. His own health had suffered too much from the
privations of the previous year to enable him to take the field again
in person, but he was well served by his generals. The Grand Vizier
determined to adopt the offensive, and crossed the Danube at Rustchuk
in March at the head of an army of 90,000 men, with the intention of
invading Transylvania. But an unexpected event led to the recall of
the most experienced Turkish general. The Sultan Abdul Hamid died at
Constantinople on 7th April, and his nephew and successor, Selim III.,
at once disgraced the Grand Vizier, and replaced him in the command
of the western army and the office of Grand Vizier by the Pasha of
Widdin. This incompetent commander rashly advanced, and was defeated
by the Prince of Coburg and Suvoróv at Foksany on 31st July in an
attempt to prevent the junction of the Austrians and Russians. The
allies then took the offensive and inflicted a crushing defeat on the
main Turkish army on the Rymnik, in which 18,000 Austrians and 7000
Russians routed nearly 100,000 Turks, and took all their baggage and
artillery. This great victory was vigorously followed up. Loudon was
appointed Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, and he took Belgrade
on 9th October, and after occupying the whole of Servia, laid siege
to Orsova. For these services Joseph conferred upon him the title
of generalissimo, which had only been borne before by Wallenstein,
Montecuculi, and Prince Eugène. Among other results of the victory on
the Rymnik, the Prince of Coburg took Bucharest and occupied Moldavia,
while the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg forced his way into Wallachia.
In the eastern quarter of the Turkish frontier Prince Potemkin was
equally successful. He defeated the Turkish High Admiral, Hassan Pasha,
in a pitched battle at Tobac, and conquered Bessarabia, capturing
Bender, and laying siege to Ismail.

[Sidenote: Revolution in Sweden.]

Doubtless Catherine and Joseph would have met with even greater
successes, and perhaps they might have driven the Turks out of Europe,
had not their attention been diverted directly by the affairs of Sweden
and Belgium, and indirectly by the startling events which were taking
place in France. The Triple Alliance looked with great disfavour on the
alliance between Austria and Russia. Pitt, as has been said, prepared
a great fleet, which is known in English naval history as the Russian
Armament, and Frederick William II. began to negotiate an alliance with
Turkey. But they limited their direct interference to inducing Denmark
to make peace with Sweden. Gustavus III. of Sweden had, in 1788, forced
his way at the head of 30,000 men into Russian Finland, and the sound
of his guns had been heard in Saint Petersburg, which, owing to the
absence of the bulk of the Russian troops, was almost defenceless. But
the Swedish nobility had great influence over the army; they disliked
the war with Russia; and took this opportunity to declare themselves.
Under the secret leadership of Prince Charles, Duke of Sudermania,
they refused to obey the king’s orders, and hoped in the embarrassment
which ensued to regain their former power. At this moment Christian
VII., King of Denmark and Norway, at the instance of Catherine,
invaded Sweden and prepared to besiege Gothenburg. Gustavus saw the
opportunity which this invasion offered to rouse the patriotic feelings
of the Swedes. He appealed to the people, and leaving the command of
the army in Finland to the Duke of Sudermania, raised a fresh army of
volunteers to resist the invaders. In spite of his efforts, Sweden was
in great danger of falling before the combined attacks of Russia and
Denmark. The Triple Alliance now intervened promptly and decisively,
and by threatening to attack Denmark by land and sea, they induced
Bernstorff, the Danish minister, to evacuate Sweden and to agree to
an armistice. Gustavus III. returned to Stockholm with the reputation
of having repulsed the invaders, and summoned the Diet to meet on 2d
February 1789. Sure of the support of the Commons he proposed a new
Constitution, or rather a new fundamental law for the Swedish monarchy,
which is summed up in one of the articles: ‘The king can administer
the affairs of the State as seems good to him.’ The nobility opposed a
fruitless resistance; Gustavus imprisoned their leaders and completed
the work of his former revolution of 1772 by this _coup d’état_. He
then renewed the war with Russia, but the military operations of his
campaign in 1789 were not marked by any event of importance.

[Sidenote: Affairs in Belgium, 1789.]

While Catherine of Russia was being distracted from the vigorous
prosecution of the war against Turkey by the invasion of the Swedes,
her ally, the Emperor Joseph, was chiefly concerned with the state of
affairs in the Austrian Netherlands or Belgium. It seemed at first
as if he was to be as successful as Gustavus in changing the old
constitution of the country. But there was this difference. Whereas
Gustavus III. was enacting the part of a national deliverer, and
had the Swedish people on his side in his overthrow of the nobility,
Joseph II. was opposed not only by the Belgian nobles, but by the
clergy and the people also. The country seemed quiet enough under
the government of Count Trautmannsdorf and the military rule of the
Captain-General d’Alton. The suppression of the risings at Brussels and
Louvain, Malines and Antwerp seemed to have established the Austrian
sway most firmly, and the leading opponents of the Emperor’s policy
were in exile. The Estates of the different provinces were convoked
as usual, and all of them, except those of Hainault and Brabant,
voted the customary subsidies. The Estates of Hainault were at once
dissolved by a military force, and their constitution abolished on
31st January 1789. By this example the Emperor hoped to overawe the
wealthy and populous province of Brabant, and when it did not have
the expected effect, he directed Trautmannsdorf to summon a special
meeting of the Estates of Brabant, and to require them to increase
the number of deputies of the Third Estate or Commons, and to grant a
permanent subsidy. He also maintained his attitude towards the Church,
and tried to compel Cardinal Frankenberg, the Archbishop of Malines, to
withdraw his opposition to the new Imperial Seminary at Brussels, or
to resign his see. The Archbishop stoutly refused to comply, and the
Estates of Brabant proved equally stubborn. Joseph then decided on a
sudden blow, and by his orders Count Trautmannsdorf, on 18th June 1789,
declared the ‘Joyeuse Entrée,’ or Constitution of Brabant abolished.
The day was the anniversary of the battle of Kolin, in which, at the
crisis of the Seven Years’ War, the Austrians had defeated Frederick
the Great. D’Alton thought he made a happy comparison in saying: ‘The
18th of June is a happy epoch for the House of Austria; for on that
day the glorious victory of Kolin saved the monarchy, and the Emperor
became master of the Netherlands.’ But the victory was not to be won
so easily. The two parties of opposition, the Van der Nootists, or
partisans of Van der Noot, the supporter of the ancient constitutional
rights, and the Vonckists, or followers of Vonck, the advocate of
popular or democratic ideas, united. The Triple Alliance was as glad
to hamper Joseph’s activity in the East by encouraging these Belgian
patriots, as it had been to leave Gustavus free to harass Catherine, by
stopping the interference of Denmark in the north, and the ministers of
England, Holland, and Prussia all entered into relations with Van der
Noot. That partisan, encouraged by hopes of active assistance, formed
a patriotic committee at Breda, on the Dutch frontier, and raised an
army of exiles, which was placed under the command of Colonel Van der
Mersch. Joseph was not to be intimidated. D’Alton put down popular
riots, which broke out in various towns, notably at Tirlemont, Louvain,
Namur, and Brussels, with unrelenting severity. A sweeping decree was
issued on 19th October against the exiles or _émigrés_, declaring that
ordinary emigration would be punished by banishment and confiscation
of property, and that joining an armed force on the frontier for the
purpose of invasion would be punished by death, and that informers
against _émigrés_ would receive a reward of 10,000 livres and absolute
impunity.[4] But all the Emperor’s measures and decrees were of no
effect. The meeting of the States-General in France had been followed
by the capture of the Bastille and the bringing of the King of France
from Versailles to Paris by a Parisian mob; and the effects of the
French Revolution on affairs in Belgium was soon to be perceived.

[Sidenote: Revolution in Liège.]

In the bishopric of Liège, which, from its situation, always
reflected and repeated any political troubles that took place in
Belgium, the influence of the French Revolution was immediately
felt. The inhabitants of the bishopric had long resented the rule
of the prince-bishops, and felt the anomaly of being subject to an
ecclesiastical sovereign. Many exiles from the democratic party in
Belgium assembled in the bishopric, and on the news of the capture of
the Bastille, the people of Liége needed little persuasion to renew
their former insurrection. The revolution was carried out without the
shedding of blood. On 16th and 17th August 1789 the people of the city
of Liége rose in rebellion; on the 18th MM. Chestret and Fabry were
chosen burgomasters by popular acclamation, the garrison was disarmed,
and the citadel occupied by bourgeois national guards. On the same day
the Prince-Bishop, Count Cæsar Constantine Francis de Hoensbroeck, was
brought into the city, and he signed a proclamation acknowledging the
revolution and abrogating the despotic settlement of 1684. The other
towns in the bishopric followed the example of the capital, and in each
of them free municipalities were elected and national guards raised and
armed. The Prince-Bishop, after accepting the loss of his political
power, fled to Trèves, and considered himself fortunate to be allowed
to escape.

[Sidenote: The Elections to the States-General.]

It is now time to examine the course of the events in France, which
led to such important developments upon its north-east frontier, and
which distracted the attention of all the monarchs and ministers of
Europe, except Catherine of Russia, from the wars in the North and
East. It was owing to the increasing difficulty of raising money for
carrying on the administration of the State and paying the interest
on the national debt, and the consequent necessity for revising the
system of taxation and reorganising the financial resources of France
that Louis XVI., on the advice of his minister, Loménie de Brienne, had
vaguely promised in November 1787 to summon the States-General for July
1792, and had definitely convoked the ancient assembly of France on 8th
August 1788 to meet at Versailles on 1st May 1789. But the arrangements
for the elections were not made by Loménie de Brienne, who retired
from office in the same month as the States-General was convoked,
but by his successor Necker, who was recalled to office as an expert
financier, in view of the fact that the summons of the States-General
was looked on as a purely financial expedient. The procedure to be
adopted in electing deputies gave rise to much anxious deliberation
and heated controversy in the public press, and the Notables of 1787
were again assembled to give their advice. The burning question was
as to the representation of the Tiers État, Third Estate or Commons.
The ancient representative assembly of France was known to consist
of the three orders of the Nobility, the Clergy, and the Tiers État,
and the disputed question was as to the proportion of the number of
deputies of the Tiers État to that of the two other orders. This and
the other electoral questions were finally settled by the Résultat du
Conseil published on 27th December 1788. It was decreed that the royal
bailliages and royal sénéchaussées, feudal circumscriptions which had
long fallen into disuse, should be treated as electoral units, and that
they should elect, according to the extent of their population, one or
more deputations, each consisting of four members, one chosen by the
Nobility, one by the Clergy, and two by the Tiers État. The elections
were to be made in two and sometimes in three degrees, and at each
stage _cahiers_ or statements of grievances and projects for reform
were to be drawn up by the electoral assemblies.[5] In provinces, where
there were no royal bailliages or sénéchaussées, and consequently
no Grand Baillis or Grand Sénéchals to preside, corresponding
circumscriptions were adopted or invented. During the early months
of 1789 the French people were fully occupied in the election of the
deputies to the States-General. Whatever might be the opinion of the
French Court or the French Ministry, the people,—and more especially
the educated bourgeois of the towns and the country lawyers,—looked
upon the future assembly as something more than a financial expedient;
they trusted to it to draw up a new political system for the State,
which should admit the representative principle and allow the taxpayer
a voice not only in the granting, but in the spending of the national
revenue. The working classes, whether in the towns or the rural
districts, did not take much active interest in the elections, and
their representatives in the secondary electoral assemblies were
generally educated bourgeois, but they vaguely built high hopes on the
meeting of the States-General, and expected it to give them land or
higher wages. Considering the novelty of choosing representatives in
France, it is extraordinary that the electoral operations were carried
out as peacefully and as efficiently as they were. This was mainly
due to the success of a little revolutionary movement in Dauphiné,
where an unauthorised and irregular assembly had met in July 1788 to
protest against the abolition of the provincial Parlements by Loménie
de Brienne. That minister had left office when he was not permitted
to put down the assembly in Dauphiné by force, and Necker hoped to
save the prestige of the monarchy by summoning a new assembly of the
province in its place. But the ruse was quickly perceived; the men who
had sat in the illegal assembly were elected to its successor, and in
the eyes of France the representatives of the Dauphiné had won a signal
victory over the Court. The new assembly in Dauphiné became the court
of appeal in every electoral difficulty, and its secretary, Mounier,
the leader of the Tiers État of France. Owing to his energy and ability
local jealousies of town against town, province against province,
class jealousies and personal rivalry, were set at rest, and it was
more owing to Mounier than to any one else that the deputies to the
States-General were legally and quietly elected, and that the acts of
the future assembly could not be stigmatised as the work of a factious
or unrepresentative minority of the French nation.

[Sidenote: Meeting of the States-General.]

On 5th May 1789 the first States-General held in France since the
year 1614 met at Versailles. Barentin, the Keeper of the Seals, and
Necker harangued the collected deputies, and the latter explained
the desperate financial situation of the State and the necessity for
immediate action to relieve the national treasury. The representatives
of the nobility and clergy then retired to separate chambers,
leaving their colleagues of the Tiers État in the great hall. No word
was spoken about the relation of the three orders to each other.
It was assumed that each order was to deliberate separately. The
representatives of the Tiers État were placed in a most difficult
position. There was no advantage in their being as numerous as
the two other orders put together, if the three orders were to be
independent of each other, for in that case the majorities of the
privileged orders could outweigh the opinion of the majority among
themselves. The question of _vote par ordre_, which would give each
order equal authority, or _vote par tête_, which would allow the
numerical preponderance of the Tiers État to take effect, had been
long recognised as crucial. It had been assumed from the grant of
double representation to the Tiers État that the Government intended
to sanction the _vote par tête_, and the tacit acknowledgment of the
separation of the orders and consequent recognition of the _vote par
ordre_ on 5th May disconcerted for the moment the popular leaders.

[Sidenote: Struggle between the Orders.]

[Sidenote: The Tiers État declare themselves the National Assembly.]

But the deputies of the Tiers État, under the guidance of Le Chapelier,
a Breton lawyer from Rennes, and of Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, a
Protestant pastor from Nîmes, proceeded to take up a most skilful
attitude. They resolved on a policy of masterly inactivity. They
refused to form themselves into the assembly of the Order of the Tiers
État; they refused to open letters addressed to them under that title;
they refused to elect a president or secretaries; and stated that
they were a body of citizens, representatives of the French nation,
waiting in that hall to be joined by the other deputies. This attitude
received the unanimous approval of the people of Paris, and threw upon
the Government the onus of declaring that the double representation
of the Tiers État was merely a sterile gift. The representatives of
the two privileged orders treated the situation very differently. The
nobility accepted the separation of the orders to distinct chambers,
and resolved to constitute their chamber by 188 votes to 47, while the
clergy only decided in the same sense by 133 votes to 114. Even this
majority was not really significant. For, owing to a tendency which had
developed during the course of the elections, the greater part of the
deputies of the clergy were poor country curés, who sympathised with
the Tiers État, from which they sprung, and not with the prelates and
dignitaries of the Church, who belonged to the nobility. This tendency
of the true majority of the clergy was well known to the leaders of
the Tiers État and encouraged them in their passive attitude. In
vain the King and Necker attempted to terminate the deadlock; the
deputies of the Tiers État persisted that they did not form an order,
and they were reinforced by the representatives of Paris, where the
elections were not concluded until the end of May. At last, on 10th
June, on the proposition of the Abbé Sieyès, deputy for Paris, a final
invitation was sent to the deputies of the nobility and the clergy to
join the deputies of the Tiers État, and it was resolved that whether
the request was granted or refused the Tiers État would constitute
itself into a regular deliberative body. The invitation was rejected
by the nobility, and only a few curés, including the Abbé Grégoire,
belonging to the Order of the Clergy, complied with it. The deputies
then verified their powers, and elected Bailly, a famous astronomer
and deputy for Paris, to be their president. But what sort of assembly
were they? They denied that they were representatives of an Order, and
they were certainly not the States-General of France. The question was
hotly debated, and on 16th June they declared themselves the National
Assembly. They then declared all the taxes, hitherto levied, to be
illegal, and ordered that they should only be paid provisionally. This
defiant conduct disconcerted the King and his ministers, and it was
announced that a Séance Royale, or Royal Session, would be held by the
King in person to settle all disputed questions.

[Sidenote: The Oath of the Tennis Court. 20th June.]

[Sidenote: The Séance Royale. 23d June.]

On 20th June the deputies of the Tiers État, or of the National
Assembly, as they now termed themselves, were excluded from their usual
meeting-place. They therefore met in the Jeu de Paume or Tennis Court
at Versailles, and, amidst a scene of wild excitement, swore that they
would not separate until they had drawn up a new Constitution for
France. By this act they practically became rebels, and the French
Revolution really commenced. On 22d June they met in the Church of
Saint Louis at Versailles, where they were joined by 149 deputies of
the clergy, who thus recognised the act of rebellion. On 23d June the
Séance Royale was held. In the speech from the throne it was announced
that the King, ‘of his own goodness and generosity,’ would levy no
taxes in future without the assent of the representatives of the
people, but it was also declared that the financial privileges of the
nobility and clergy were unassailable, and that the States-General
was to vote _par ordre_. This was the most critical moment in the
first stage of the Revolution. If the deputies of the Tiers État had
given way, the oath of the Tennis Court would have seemed only an
idle threat. But they found a leader in the Comte de Mirabeau, deputy
for the Tiers État of Aix, a man of extraordinary ability, who in
the course of a tempestuous career had travelled much and learned
much. He courageously faced the situation, and after making a reply
to the Grand Master of the Ceremonies that the deputies of France
would only be expelled by force, he induced the National Assembly to
declare the persons of its members inviolable. Sieyès summed up the
situation by telling the deputies: ‘Gentlemen, you are to-day what
you were yesterday.’ Before this daring opposition the King gave way:
on 25th June the minority of the Order of the Nobility, consisting of
forty-seven deputies, headed by the Marquis de Lafayette, the friend
of Washington, joined the National Assembly, and two days later the
majority of that Order reluctantly followed their example at the
command of the King.

[Sidenote: Mirabeau’s Address to the King. 9th July.]

[Sidenote: Dismissal of Necker. 12th July.]

The rapid transformation of the deputies of the Tiers État into a
National Assembly, which defied the royal authority and spoke of
drawing up a new Constitution for France, exasperated the courtiers,
who looked with disgust at all attempts to modify the _ancien régime_.
The King did not share their feelings; he was honestly desirous of
doing his duty by his people, and preferred the diminution of his
royal prerogative to coming into open conflict with his subjects and
to initiating a civil war. He had hitherto trusted to Necker and
followed Necker’s advice. But the result had not been encouraging. His
minister had repeatedly put him in a false position. He had been made
to speak in a haughty tone to the deputies of the Tiers État at the
Séance Royale on 23d June, and then to eat his words by directing the
deputies of the Nobility to join the self-created National Assembly.
This great concession seemed to have been wrung from him; the deputies
of the Tiers État appeared to have won a great victory in the face of
the royal opposition, when in reality the King had yielded from the
goodness of his heart. Since he found that following the advice of
Necker had only resulted in a loss of authority, combined with profound
unpopularity, without improving the financial prospect, Louis XVI.
not unnaturally turned his attention to the enemies of the minister.
These enemies were headed by the Queen, Marie Antoinette, who resented
Necker’s endeavours to restrain the extravagance of the Court and his
admission of the need to make concessions to the will of the people,
and by the King’s younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, a staunch
supporter of the absolute prerogative of the Crown and of the system
of the _ancien régime_. Yielding unwillingly to the arguments of the
enemies of Necker and of the National Assembly, the King determined
to use force, and he began to concentrate troops in the neighbourhood
of Paris and Versailles. The National Assembly did not know what to
do; Mounier and other leaders had formed a committee to draw up the
bases of a new constitution; but they had no force on which they could
depend to resist the royal troops, and felt that they would probably be
arrested and the Assembly dissolved long before the foundation of the
Constitution was laid. At this crisis Mirabeau again came to the front.
With the most daring audacity he attacked and revealed the policy of
the Court on 8th July, and on 9th July carried an address to the King
on the part of the Assembly, requesting the immediate removal of the
troops collected in the neighbourhood, but protesting the loyalty of
the Assembly to the person of the King. But the King was now under the
influence of the opponents of the Assembly. His answer to Mirabeau’s
address was the dismissal of Necker and his colleagues on 12th July,
the banishment of Necker, and the appointment of the Maréchal de
Broglie, an experienced general, who detested the idea of change, to be
Minister for War and Marshal-General of the troops in the neighbourhood
of Paris.

[Sidenote: Formation of National Guards.]

Hitherto the struggle had been between the Court and the deputies of
the Tiers État; the popular element was now to intervene; and the
people of Paris was for the first time to make its influence felt. The
news of Necker’s dismissal was received in Paris with wrath and dismay.
A young lawyer without practice, named Camille Desmoulins, announced
the event to the crowd collected in the Palais Royal and incited his
hearers to resistance. His words were eagerly applauded. The population
of Paris, both bourgeois and proletariat, had watched the course of
events at Versailles with unflagging interest, and the formation of a
camp of soldiers in the neighbourhood with terror. The working classes,
who lived near the margin of starvation, expected that the National
Assembly would cause in some way a rise in wages and a decrease in
the price of necessaries, and were exasperated at the prospect of the
non-fulfilment of their hopes. They had already sacked the house of a
manufacturer, named Réveillon, who was reported to have spoken scornful
words of their poverty, on 28th April, and were ready for any mischief.
From the Palais Royal, excited by the news and the words of Camille
Desmoulins, started a tumultuous procession bearing busts of Necker
and of the Duke of Orleans, a prince of the royal house, who had been
exiled by the King for previous opposition to him, and who was regarded
as a supporter of the popular claims. The procession was charged by a
German cavalry regiment in the French service, commanded by the Prince
de Lambesc, a near relative of the Queen, and the mob dispersed to riot
and to pillage. The more patriotic rioters broke into the gunsmiths’
shops to seize weapons, the rest pillaged the butchers’ and bakers’
shops, and burned the barriers where octroi duties were collected. This
scene of riot brought about its own remedy. The bourgeois, terrified
for the safety of their shops, took up arms, and on the following
day formed themselves into companies of national guards for the
preservation of the peace. The guidance of this movement was taken by
the electors of Paris, who, after completing their work of electing
deputies for Paris, continued to meet at the Hôtel-de-Ville.

[Sidenote: Capture of the Bastille. 14th July.]

The 14th of July found the capital of France organised for resistance.
The Gardes Françaises, the force maintained for the security of Paris,
were devoted to the cause of the National Assembly, and were resolved
to fight with the people, not against them. And it was ascertained
that the soldiers in the camp were very lukewarm in their attachment
to their officers, and were likely to refuse to attack the citizens.
Under these circumstances an idea arose that an armed demonstration of
the Parisians at Versailles would strengthen the King, whose sentiments
were well known, to resist the Court party and to recall Necker. With
this notion, large crowds approached the Hôtel des Invalides and the
Bastille, the two principal store-houses of arms in Paris. The crowd,
which went to the Hôtel des Invalides, had no difficulty in seizing
the arms there, in spite of the opposition of the Governor. But it was
otherwise at the Bastille. The mob, which collected in the Governor’s
Court in that fortress and shouted for arms, was isolated by the
raising of the outer drawbridge and fired upon by the weak garrison
in the Bastille itself. The sound of this firing brought a number of
armed men from other parts of the city; the outer drawbridge was cut
down, and preparations were being made to force a way into the fortress
itself, when the garrison surrendered. The result of the firing upon
the mob in the Governor’s Court had been to kill eighty-three persons
and wound many others. The sight of the corpses and the cries of the
wounded excited the anger of the successful conquerors of the fortress.
A panic arose, and three officers and four soldiers of the garrison
were murdered. Then the more disciplined of the conquerors started to
take the rest of the defenders of the Bastille to the Hôtel-de-Ville.
On the way the Governor and the Major of the fortress were murdered by
the mob, and M. de Flesselles, the Provost of the merchants of Paris,
who was accused of encouraging the Governor to resist, was also slain.
By these events the people of Paris felt that they had commenced a
war against the Crown; entrenchments were thrown up and barricades
were erected in the streets; all shops were shut up; the barriers were
closed; no one was allowed to leave the city, and preparations were
made to stand a siege.

[Sidenote: Recall of Necker. 15th July.]

[Sidenote: The King’s visit to Paris. 17th July.]

But if the people of Paris were ready to fight, the King was not. As
has been said, he loathed the idea of civil war, and when he heard of
the capture of the Bastille and of the martial attitude of Paris, he
at once gave up the idea of opposing the revolutionary movement by
force. He dismissed his reactionary ministers and recalled Necker, and
he declared himself ready to co-operate with the National Assembly
in restoring order. The first victories of the Assembly had been won
by its statesmanlike inaction in the month of May and its courage on
23d June; the victory over the party of force had been won by Paris
on 14th July. The Assembly prepared to take advantage of this fresh
success. On 16th July it legalised the establishment of National Guards
and elective municipalities all over France, and recognising that the
only way to convince the Parisians that the King had accepted the new
situation and had abandoned the idea of employing force, was to induce
the King to visit Paris in person, it proposed that he should do so at
once. Louis XVI. was not devoid of personal courage, and consented. On
17th July, accordingly, he entered Paris accompanied by 100 deputies,
and amidst wild acclamation put on the tricolour cockade, which the
Parisians had assumed as their badge, and consented to the nomination
of Bailly, the President of the National Assembly, to be Mayor of
Paris, and of Lafayette to be Commander-in-chief of the Paris National
Guard. These concessions, and the victory of the National Assembly
and of Paris threw consternation among the court party of reaction:
the Comte d’Artois and those of his adherents, who were most hated as
conspicuous reactionaries or who had advocated the employment of force,
fled from the country.

[Sidenote: Murder of Foullon. 21st July.]

The immediate results of the capture of the Bastille were no less
important in the provinces of France. In every city, even in small
country towns, mayors and municipalities were elected and National
Guards formed; in many the local citadels were seized by the people;
in all the troops fraternised with the people; and in some there was
bloodshed. This movement was essentially bourgeois; where blood was
shed and pillage took place at the hands of the working classes, the
new National Guards soon restored order. The general excitement was so
great that it is surprising that there was not more bloodshed and that
peace was so quickly and efficiently established. Among these outbreaks
the most noteworthy took place in Paris itself, where on 21st July
Foullon de Doué, who had been nominated to succeed Necker on 12th July,
and his son-in-law Berthier de Sauvigny were murdered almost before the
eyes of Bailly, the new Mayor of Paris. But these occasional town riots
were speedily quelled by the armed bourgeois. Far more widespread and
important was the upheaval in the rural districts of France.

The peasants believed that the time had come, when they were to
own their land free from copyhold rights or the relics of feudal
servitudes. Even the better-educated farmers for their own interests
favoured this idea. The result was a regular jacquerie in many
parts of France. The châteaux of the lords were burnt, or in some
instances only the charters stored in them, and the lords’ dovecotes
and rabbit-warrens were generally destroyed. In certain provinces
the National Guards of the neighbouring towns put down these rural
outbreaks, occasionally with great severity, but as a rule they ran
their course unchecked.

[Sidenote: The Session of 4th August.]

On 4th August a deputy named Salomon read a report on these occurrences
to the National Assembly, or as it is generally called from the
Constitution it framed, the Constituent Assembly. His report was
followed by a curious scene, which marked the transition from feudal
to modern France. The scene was opened by the sacrifice by some of the
young liberal noblemen of their feudal rights. Privileges of all sorts,
privileges of class, of town and of province were solemnly abandoned.
Feudal customs and all relics of feudalism were condemned and declared
to be abolished. Even tithes were swept away, in spite of a protest
from Sieyès, and the ‘orgie,’ as Mirabeau termed it, closed with a
decree that a monument should be erected to Louis XVI., ‘the restorer
of French liberty.’

[Sidenote: The Declaration of the Rights of Man.]

[Sidenote: The Suspensive Veto.]

But it was not possible to restore peace and prosperity to France
by the abolition of the relics of feudalism. Destruction of former
anomalies and of a crumbling system of government would inevitably lead
to anarchy, unless accompanied by the construction of a new scheme of
central and local administration. It was here that the Constituent
Assembly failed. The deputies were quick to destroy but slow to
construct. For two months they wasted time instead of hastening to draw
up a new constitution for France. They first wrangled over the wording
of a Declaration of the Rights of Man, which they resolved to compile
in imitation of the founders of the American Republic. They then
debated lengthily whether the future representative assembly of France
should consist of one or two chambers, and whether the King should have
power to veto its acts. The first question was decided in favour of a
single chamber, more because the English Constitution sanctioned two
chambers, and the deputies feared to be thought imitators, than for
any logical reason. And the debate on the second question terminated
in the grant to the King of a suspensive veto for six months, in spite
of the eloquence of Mirabeau, who saw that a monarchical constitution,
which gave the King no more power than the President of the United
States of America, would prove unworkable, because it would divorce
responsibility from real authority, leaving the former to the King and
the latter to the Legislature.

[Sidenote: The march of the Women to Versailles. 5th October.]

[Sidenote: The King brought to Paris. 6th October.]

During the two months occupied by these debates the situation had
again become critical. Necker’s only idea to relieve the financial
situation was to propose loans, which the Assembly granted, but which
he could not succeed in raising. The King was again being acted
upon by the Court party, which advocated the use of force and the
dissolution of the Assembly, and this party was encouraged by the
Queen and by the King’s sister, Madame Elizabeth. He was also urged
to leave the neighbourhood of Paris and to establish himself in some
provincial town, where the populace could be more easily restrained
by the regular troops. He would not heartily agree to either of these
courses, but weakly consented once more to concentrate troops round his
person. Everything advised at Versailles was soon known in Paris. The
journalists, who had since the capture of the Bastille sprung up in the
capital to advocate the views of the popular party, and of whom the
ablest were Loustalot, editor of the _Révolutions de Paris_, and Marat,
editor of the _Ami du Peuple_, kept warning the people of Paris against
treason on the part of the King, and prophesying dire consequences if
he were allowed to leave the neighbourhood or to concentrate troops.
Their words did not fall on unheeding ears. The working classes feared
a siege of Paris again as they had done in July, and looked on the
King’s presence in Paris as the only means to keep down the price
of necessaries. The thinking bourgeois, whether liberal deputies in
the Assembly or national guards in Paris, feared a sudden forced
dissolution of the Assembly, and not only the loss of the advantages
they had gained but punishment for the part they had played. Both
these elements were perceptible in the movement which followed. The
description given in the popular journals of a banquet at Versailles,
honoured by the presence of the royal family, at which the national
cockade had been trampled underfoot, on 1st October, roused the people
of Paris to a frenzy of wrath and fear. On 5th October a crowd of women
collected in Paris, declaring that they were starving, and were led to
Versailles by Maillard, one of the conquerors of the Bastille, followed
by a mob. The representatives of the women interviewed the King, and
the mob prepared to spend the night outside the palace walls. Late at
night they were followed by a powerful detachment of the National Guard
of Paris, under the command of Lafayette, who protested that he came to
save the King. Nevertheless, owing to bad management, some of the mob
broke into the palace before daybreak on the morning of 6th October and
murdered two of the royal bodyguards. Lafayette came to the rescue and
demanded that the King and royal family should come to Paris and take
up their residence at the Tuileries. The King, horrified by the events
of the morning, and obliged to obey Lafayette, consented, and the royal
family, accompanied by the mob, and escorted by the National Guard, at
once proceeded to the capital. This second victory of the Parisians was
not less important than the first: on 14th July the people of Paris had
terrified the King into abandoning the idea of dissolving the National
Assembly by force; on 6th October they brought him amongst them, so
that if he again conceived the idea, he would be unable to execute it.

[Sidenote: Effect in Europe.]

The capture of the Bastille caused the most profound astonishment in
Europe. Where the people possessed some amount of political liberty,
as in the United States of America and in England, it appealed to the
imagination, and the French were regarded as the conquerors of their
freedom. In the neighbourhood of France, in the Rhenish principalities,
in Belgium, and above all in Liège, it caused a general sense of
discontent and even riots. The despotic monarchs of Europe and their
principal ministers did not pay so much attention to the capture of
the Bastille as did the inhabitants of free countries; they did not
for one moment believe that the National Assembly would be allowed to
alter the old constitution of France, and looked upon the whole of the
popular movement with a favourable eye as likely to weaken France and
prevent her from interfering in the affairs of the Continent. They took
care, however, to suppress all similar risings in their own states. The
King of Sardinia and the Elector of Mayence were especially severe;
the Emperor’s General d’Alton was more than severe in Belgium; and the
King of Prussia sent General Schlieffen with a strong force to restore
the authority of the Bishop of Liège. This attitude of the continental
monarchs was encouraged by the first French _émigrés_, who loudly
declared that the success of the Assembly was due to the culpable
weakness of Louis XVI.

[Sidenote: The Belgian Revolution. Oct. 1789-Jan. 1790.]

The tidings of the events of 5th and 6th October showed both the French
_émigrés_ and the continental monarchs that they were wrong in their
estimate of the Revolution. That the French royal family should be
triumphantly brought to Paris and be practically imprisoned in the
Tuileries under the eyes of the Parisian populace was a startling
proof of the power of the people. It proportionately encouraged the
supporters of all the popular movements on the French borders. Of
these, the most important was that which had already made so much
progress two years before in Belgium. The first result of the removal
of the King of France to Paris was the Belgian Revolution of 1789,
which filled almost as large a place in the eyes of contemporaries
as the French Revolution itself. Encouraged by the Triple Alliance,
and more especially by Frederick William II. of Prussia, the Belgian
exiles of both wings, the supporters of Van der Noot, the advocate
of the ancient Constitution, and of Vonck, the radical, had formed a
patriotic army at Breda. The news of the events of 5th and 6th October
determined them to act. On 23d October the army under Van der Mersch
crossed the border, and on 24th October Van der Noot issued a manifesto
declaring the Emperor Joseph deprived of his sovereignty over the Duchy
of Brabant for having violated its fundamental charter.

[Sidenote: Formation of the Belgian Republic, 10th Jan. 1790.]

The march of the patriotic army was both rapid and successful. Bruges
and Ostend opened their gates to the exiles; the fort of St. Pierre
at Ghent was stormed; and the Estates of Flanders at once assembled,
published a declaration of independence, and called on the other
provinces to join in the movement. In Brabant the excitement was at
its height. Trautmannsdorf in vain promised to restore the ‘Joyeuse
Entrée,’ to abolish the Imperial Seminary at Brussels, and to declare a
general amnesty. The patriots would not trust him, and Van der Mersch
advanced into the Duchy and occupied Tirlemont. The people of Brussels
then rose in insurrection. From 7th to 12th December was a period of
long-continued riot and street fighting. Many of the Austrian soldiers
deserted to the popular side, and those who remained true to their
colours were shot at from windows and refused to charge. The advance
of Van der Mersch set the seal upon d’Alton’s discomfiture. He made a
capitulation on 12th December, and marched out of Brussels, leaving
his guns, military stores, and military chest containing 3,000,000
florins behind. He retreated to Luxembourg, the only province which
remained faithful to the House of Austria, and his example was followed
by the imperial garrisons of Malines, Antwerp, and Louvain, which
were abandoned to the patriots. D’Alton himself died at Trèves, it is
said by taking poison, on being summoned to Vienna to be tried by a
court-martial, and was succeeded in command of the Austrian troops in
Luxembourg by General Bender. On 18th December the patriot committee
entered Brussels, headed by Van der Noot, who was hailed by the people
as the Belgian Franklin. On 7th January 1790 representatives from all
the provinces of the former Austrian Netherlands met at Brussels under
the presidency of Cardinal Frankenberg, Archbishop of Malines, and
on 10th January they passed a federal constitution for the ‘United
Belgian States,’ resembling that of Holland, under which each province
was to preserve its internal independence, and only foreign affairs
and national defence were left to the central government. Van der Noot
was chosen Minister of State, and he at once asked for the official
recognition of the new Belgian Constitution by the Triple Alliance,
whose ministers at the Hague, Lord Auckland, Count Keller, and Van
der Spiegel had, he asserted, promised to guarantee the independence
of the new United States of Belgium. Frederick William II. of Prussia
endeavoured to carry out this promise. He authorised one of his
officers, General Schönfeld, to organise the Belgian army, and ordered
General Schlieffen at Liége to enter into communication with the new
government. But England and Holland, though approving the insurrection
of Belgium as affording a powerful counterpoise to the Emperor’s policy
in the East, were in no hurry to guarantee the new Republic, and Van
der Noot then determined, under the influence of the radicals or
Vonckists, to solicit the help of France, and announced the new Belgian
Constitution in a significant manner both to Louis XVI. and to the
President of the National Assembly.

[Sidenote: Death of the Emperor Joseph. 20th Feb. 1790.]

The news of the declaration of the independence of the Belgian
provinces, and of the revolution which had led to it, proved to be the
death-blow of the Emperor Joseph. To the Prince de Ligne, a native
of Belgium, he said, just before his death, ‘Your country has killed
me; the taking of Ghent is my agony; the evacuation of Brussels is
my death. What a disgrace this is for me! I die; I must be made of
wood, if I did not. Go to the Netherlands; make them return to their
allegiance. If you do not succeed in the attempt, remain there. Do
not sacrifice your fortune for me; you have children.’ The dying
Emperor in his despair made concessions in every direction. He humbled
his pride to entreat the Pope to use his influence with the Belgian
clergy. He gave in to the Hungarian magnates, who demanded the repeal
of his great reforms with threats of insurrection; and on 28th January
1790 he issued his ‘Revocatio Ordinationum quæ sensu communi legibus
adversari videbantur,’ by which he revoked all his reforms in Hungary,
except the edict of toleration and the decrees against serfdom; and
on 18th February he ordered the Crown of St. Stephen to be sent back
to Pesth. He assented to the suspension of his reforming edicts in
Bohemia, and even in the Tyrol, where an insurrection was on the point
of breaking out. Then, feeling his life a failure, he prepared for
death. He confessed and received the ordinances of the Church; the
last words he was heard to say were: ‘I believe I have done my duty
as a man and a prince,’ and on the morning of 20th February he died.
The words he wished to be written on his grave were: ‘Here rests a
prince, whose intentions were pure; but who had the misfortune to
see all his plans miscarry;’ but the people of Vienna, with a deeper
sense of the merits of the great ruler who had lived in their midst,
placed on his statue the inscription, ‘Josepho secundo, arduis nato,
magnis perfuncto, majoribus præcepto, qui saluti publicæ vixit non
diu, sed totus.’ The failure of the career of Joseph, the noblest
sovereign of the eighteenth century,—one of the noblest sovereigns
of any century,—was a proof of the fallacy of the eighteenth century
conception of benevolent despotism. He had tried to accomplish in his
dominions the very measures of reform which the Constituent Assembly
had undertaken in France. The abolition of the relics of feudalism,
the creation of a spirit of nationality, based upon the existence of
uniform laws, the nationalisation of the Church and of education, the
removal of all caste privileges, whether in the payment of taxes or in
eligibility for public employment, and the maintenance of good internal
administration, the primary aims and the great achievements of the
Revolution in France, were also the objects of Joseph’s reforms. But
everything was to be done for the people, nothing by the people, and
it is doubtful whether, if Joseph had been in the place of Louis XVI.,
the French people would have relished the advantages he might have
conferred. The spirit of locality was perhaps not so strong in France
as in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria. Dauphiné and
Burgundy did not differ from Brittany and Normandy as much as Bohemia
and Hungary, Belgium and the Milanese differed from each other. Yet the
abolition of local distinctions might have been resented in France,
as it was in the dominions of Joseph, if it had been accomplished by
the monarch, instead of being the work of elected representatives.
It is indeed remarkable that, allowing for the want of exactness in
the parallel, owing to the difference of local conditions, the very
reforms, which rallied all France to the side of the Revolution,
should have led to the disastrous termination of the Emperor Joseph’s
reign, and it is difficult to avoid coming to the conclusion that the
whole subject illustrates the grand distinction between the eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries, the distinction between alterations in
the political, social, or economical conditions of a state made by a
monarch for his people, and by a people for itself.

Louis XVI., indeed, showed himself a very different type of monarch
from Joseph. He wished for the good of his people as ardently as his
brother-in-law, but he had during the early years of his reign been
satisfied with wishing for reforms, instead of energetically initiating
them. When the success of the Revolution was assured by the policy of
the deputies of the Tiers État, by the capture of the Bastille and by
his own establishment at Paris, he never thought of setting himself at
the head of the party of reform. He did not openly ally himself with
the Tiers État, to vanquish the opposition of the nobles, as Gustavus
III. of Sweden had done; he did not dream of outbidding the National
Assembly for popularity by lavish promises, as other monarchs before
and since have done; and he did not even try to share the credit of the
representatives of the people by exhibiting an ardent zeal for reform.
The horror he felt for civil war was not recognised; his partial
yielding to the Court party of reaction in July and October, though at
so late a date and so half-heartedly as to nullify any chance of its
success, was imputed to him as a crime; and the difficulty presented
by the fact that his dearest relatives, his Queen, Marie Antoinette,
and his sister, Madame Elizabeth, were against all reform, was never
fully appreciated. In consequence, the King’s real wishes to please
his people and avoid bloodshed were looked on as simulated by the
members of the National Assembly, and not only Louis himself, but the
very principle of the French monarchy, were regarded as hostile to
representative institutions. Louis XVI. was as weak as Joseph II. was
energetic, but he was equally well-intentioned; and it was a distinct
misfortune, both for himself and for France, that the value of the
passive inertness, which he generally opposed to the reactionary
schemes of his family and of the partisans of the _ancien régime_, was
not adequately recognised.

[Sidenote: The New French Constitution. 1789–1791.]

This attitude towards the King had an important effect upon the
constitution which the Constituent Assembly was engaged in framing
during the year 1790. Only the main points in the growth of this
Constitution, which occupied the greater part of the time of the
Assembly from 1789 to 1791, can here be touched upon. But one striking
feature must first be observed, that it was drawn up and applied
piecemeal, not as an organic whole, like the later French constitutions
of the revolutionary period. The first important principle was decreed
upon 12th November 1789, when it was resolved that all the old local
divisions of France, which perpetuated the memory of the gradual
growth of the French provinces into France, should be abolished, and
that the country should be divided into eighty departments of nearly
equal size. It was naturally some months before the new division
was effected, and still longer before the further division of each
department into districts, and each district into cantons was finished.
No wiser step for converting France from a congeries of provinces into
a nation could have been devised. On the basis of the new divisions
a new local government was established. Each department and district
was to be administered by elected authorities, elaborately chosen by a
system of double election. Next to the local government, the judicial
system was reorganised. The Parlements were all abolished, and local
courts, consisting of elected judges of departmental and district
tribunals, and elected justices of the peace, were substituted. A
uniform system of law was projected, and juries were sanctioned in
criminal but not in civil cases. In these sweeping reforms one natural
blemish is perceptible: from having no elected officials the other
extreme was adopted of having all officials elected.

[Sidenote: The Civil Constitution of the Clergy.]

The mania for election affected the reform of the ecclesiastical
arrangements of France, and directly brought about the schism, which
so largely contributed to the misfortunes of France during the
revolutionary period. On 2d November 1789 it had been resolved, in
the face of the financial distress, that the property of the Church
in France should be confiscated or resumed, as it was represented by
opposite parties, while acknowledging the duty of providing and paying
curés and bishops. This implied the formation of a State Church, a
measure which needed the most delicate handling. On 13th February 1790
all monasteries and religious houses were suppressed; but as there had
already been a partial suppression a few years previously, this would
not by itself have caused a schism. It was otherwise with regard to the
Civil Constitution of the Clergy. It was resolved to reduce the number
of bishoprics to one for each department, and that all the beneficed
clergy, from curés to bishops, should be elected. This violation of
a fundamental principle of the Catholic Church could not be allowed
to pass unchallenged, and when the Constituent Assembly found that
opposition was raised, it drove matters to a crisis by ordering that
every beneficed ecclesiastic should take an oath to observe the new
Civil Constitution of the Clergy. This oath was generally refused by
the bishops and dignitaries, and largely by the parochial clergy, and
it was resolved by the Assembly, on 27th November 1790, that all who
refused the oath within one week should be held to be dismissed from
their offices. The King sanctioned this decree on 26th December 1790,
and the great schism in France began. It was doubtful at first whether
apostolical succession could be preserved in the new Church of France.
Only four beneficed bishops, including Loménie de Brienne, Cardinal
Archbishop of Sens, and Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, out of one hundred
and thirty-five, and three coadjutor bishops, or bishops _in partibus_,
including Gobel, Bishop of Lydda, consented to take the oath, but
by them the first of the elected bishops of departmental sees were
consecrated.

The measures of the Constituent Assembly in abolishing the old
provincial divisions and law courts, and substituting new and more
modern arrangements for administration, were in the nature of great
reforms, though marred by the mania for election; the attempt to
establish a Gallican Church, though obviously opposed to the discipline
of the Catholic Church, and seriously discounted by the same mania,
was patriotic, if not very wise; but the arrangements for the central
administration were utterly absurd. In their dislike of the system
of the _ancien régime_, and their fear of a strong executive, the
Constituent Assembly thought it could not do enough to hamper the
authority of the throne and of the central administration. The King,
under the new Constitution, was left powerless. He was to be the first
functionary of the State, nothing more. His veto on the measures of the
Legislature was to have effect for only six months; his guards were
suppressed, and his position made untenable for a strong monarch, and
unbearable for a weak one. The ministers were invested with supreme
executive authority, but more regulations were made to ensure their
responsibility and limit their actual power, than to define their
functions. They were to be answerable to the Legislature, in which they
were not allowed to sit; and their measures were to be criticised by
an irresponsible representative assembly. Under such regulations the
King and his ministers, that is, the executive, were put in a position
of inferiority, which no vigorous man could be expected to accept, to
the inevitable derangement of the whole administrative machine. In
addition to the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly carried several
measures of the greatest importance to a free state. All citizens,
of whatever religion or class, were declared eligible for employment
by the State; and on 13th April 1790 a noble decree, declaring the
most absolute and entire toleration of every form of religion, was
carried. The Constitution of 1791 was, on the whole, a praiseworthy
effort of untried legislators to give their country a representative
constitution. It was marred only by the fatal jealousy of giving due
authority to the executive, and the mania for election. But it was
in no way democratic. For the election to all offices was to be by
at least two degrees, and no man was to have a vote unless he was an
‘active citizen.’ To be an active citizen, a man had to contribute to
the direct taxation of the country an amount equivalent in value to
three days’ wages in his locality. Further, to be eligible for office,
a candidate had to pay taxes of the value of a ‘silver mark,’ which
inevitably restricted all offices to the bourgeois, or very prosperous
working men.

[Sidenote: Other acts of the Constituent Assembly.]

Though the main occupation of the Constituent Assembly was the
building up of the Constitution of 1791, it interfered only too much
in matters of current administration. It was soon obvious that its
power exceeded that of the King, and it has been observed that Van der
Noot announced the new Belgian Constitution alike to the King and the
President of the Assembly, as to authorities of equal importance. The
mischief produced by this constant interference was perceptible in
every department of government. Mirabeau, who was a profound master of
statecraft, saw through the fallacies of endeavouring to separate the
legislative and executive powers in the State, and, what was implied
in the preponderance of a legislature in which the ministers had no
seat, to divorce authority from responsibility. He understood and
approved of the English system, and as soon as the Constituent Assembly
had removed to Paris in October 1789, after the establishment of the
King at the Tuileries, and he had got the ear of the Court through his
friend, La Marck, Mirabeau proposed the formation of a constitutional
ministry, after the English fashion, from among the leading members of
the Assembly. His scheme got noised abroad: the Assembly in its fear
of the executive, which was afterwards consecrated in the Constitution
of 1791, and stimulated by Lafayette, who dreaded the influence of a
strong ministry, passed a motion on 7th November, that no member of the
Assembly could take office as a minister while he remained a deputy, or
for three years after his resignation.

The spirit, which lay at the root of this decree, showed itself in
other ways. The fear of the influence of the Crown extended itself
to the army and navy, as the natural instruments of the Crown for
re-establishing its former authority. The army, already disorganised by
the emigration of many of its officers, was practically destroyed in
its efficiency as a fighting machine by the relaxation of discipline
among the soldiers, caused not only by the actual decrees of the
Assembly, but by the impunity allowed to desertion and mutiny. The
Marquis de Bouillé, the general commanding at Metz, did indeed put
down a military mutiny at Nancy on 31st August 1790, but his action,
though applauded by the Assembly, which could not openly encourage
mutiny, was isolated and not imitated. In the navy matters were even
more desperate, for a larger proportion of officers deserted, resigned,
or emigrated than in the army, and loss of discipline is even more
disastrous in a naval than in a military force. The weakness of the
army was intended to be compensated by the enrolment of national
guards. But these citizen soldiers could not be treated with the
strictness of regular troops. They were chiefly of the bourgeois class,
and had the prejudices of that class, caring more for the protection of
their property than for military efficiency. In Paris they were of the
most importance, owing to their numbers, and their commander-in-chief,
Lafayette, probably the most powerful man in France in 1790. The
framing of the Constitution, and the disorganisation of the central
authority and its instruments were the chief results of the labours of
the Constituent Assembly in 1790; but among its minor acts should be
noted the abolition of titles of nobility, liveries and other relics of
social pre-eminence on 13th July 1790, as an evidence of its desire to
extirpate even the outward signs of the _ancien régime_.

[Sidenote: Mirabeau.]

Only one man seems to have understood the dangers to which France
was drifting owing to the policy of the Constituent Assembly, and
that man was Mirabeau. He had done more than any man to assure the
victory of the Tiers État in June 1789; he was the greatest orator and
greatest statesman the revolutionary crisis had produced. Mirabeau,
however, hated anarchy as much as he did despotism. He saw the absolute
necessity of establishing a strong executive, if the crisis of 1789,
the dissolution of the old authorities, the unpunished riots in towns,
and the jacquerie in the rural districts were not to lead to anarchy.
Foiled in his prudent scheme of selecting a strong ministry from the
Constituent Assembly[6] by the vote of 7th November 1789, Mirabeau
saw that it was impossible to overcome the distrust of the Assembly
for the executive. He therefore turned to the Court, and in May 1790
he became the secret adviser of the King through the mediation of
his friend La Marck. In a series of memoirs or notes for the Court
of surpassing political wisdom, Mirabeau analysed the situation of
affairs and proposed remedies. The two main dangers were the state of
the finances and the fear of foreign intervention. Mirabeau’s horror
of national bankruptcy was as great as his personal extravagance in
expenditure. In September 1789 he advocated Necker’s scheme of a
general contribution, though it was accompanied by stipulations which
were certain to make it almost entirely unproductive, and he personally
disapproved of it; in December 1789 he grudgingly acquiesced in the
first issue of ‘assignats’ or promises to pay, based on the value of
the property of the Church, resumed or confiscated by the Assembly,
and to be extinguished as this property was sold. In August 1790
he went yet further. Comprehending that men are mainly influenced
by their pecuniary interests, he advocated a wide extension of the
system of assignats, down to small sums, on the grounds that they
would then be able to reach the hands of the poorer classes and give
them an interest in their maintaining their value, and would also
frustrate the machinations of speculators, who began to make money by
depreciating the exchange of specie against the new paper currency. But
he also wisely proposed and successfully carried severe regulations
for the extinction of assignats as the national property was realised,
regulations which, unfortunately, were not strictly observed. His
decree was followed in September 1790 by the retirement of Necker from
office, and it is a significant proof of the change in popular opinion
that the final retirement of the minister, whose dismissal in July 1789
had brought about the capture of the Bastille, was received without
excitement.

The other great danger which France incurred, by the disorganising
policy of the Constituent Assembly, was the possibility of the armed
intervention of foreign powers. Mirabeau thought that if national
bankruptcy and the interference of foreigners could be avoided, the
anarchy, which was making itself felt, might soon be quelled. He did
not fear civil war; indeed, he argued that it might be a positive
advantage, and that as long as the King did not retract his concession
of a representative constitution, a large portion of his subjects would
support him in winning back the legitimate authority of the executive.
But foreign war was to him an evil to be feared as much as national
bankruptcy. He knew the spirit of his countrymen well, and that they
would in case of national disaster submit to any despotism rather than
submit to the dictation or the interference of a foreign power in their
internal affairs. Success in a foreign war owing to the state of the
army was not to be expected, but if it did come, it would with almost
equal certainty lead to the despotism of the conquering government,
whether it were the reigning monarch, his successor, or a victorious
general. To avoid a foreign war it was necessary as far as possible to
leave the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of the King. This
was Mirabeau’s intention in the great debate on the right of declaring
peace and war in May 1790, and he succeeded in getting the Assembly
to sanction the initiation of peace or war as part of the duties of
the King. But at this period Louis XVI. was too weak or too unwilling
to understand the paramount necessity of maintaining peace. Mirabeau,
therefore, got himself elected to a special Diplomatic Committee of the
Constituent Assembly, and as its reporter endeavoured throughout the
year 1790 to keep France clear of international complications.

[Sidenote: Mirabeau and the Court.]

Unfortunately neither Louis XVI. nor his ministers, and still less
Marie Antoinette, grasped the truth of Mirabeau’s memoirs for the
Court. On the contrary, the one idea of the Queen was to get her
brother, the Emperor Leopold, to interfere, and, if necessary, by force
of arms to restore the power of the French monarch. The King, too, was
startled at Mirabeau’s ideas; he felt no horror at the notion of a
foreign war, but would suffer anything rather than engage in a civil
war. The wise advice of the great statesman went unheeded; both King
and Queen regarded their connection with him as the clever muzzling of
a dangerous revolutionary leader. They could not comprehend his desire
to establish a strong executive for the sake of France, and looked
on it as a bit of personal ambition. The King was not sufficiently
far-seeing, nor the Queen sufficiently patriotic to understand his
views. If the Constituent Assembly distrusted the Court, the King and
Queen no less strongly distrusted Mirabeau.

As reporter of the Diplomatic Committee, Mirabeau had three different
problems to solve, in which the policy of the Assembly came in contact
with foreign powers, the affairs of Avignon, the maintenance of the
Pacte de Famille with Spain, and the interference caused by the
legislation of the Assembly with the Princes of the Empire who owned
fiefs of the Empire in Alsace.

[Sidenote: Avignon and the Venaissin.]

The city of Avignon and the county of the Venaissin, though inhabited
by Frenchmen and surrounded by French territory, were under the
sovereignty of the Pope. As early as the ‘orgie’ of 4th August 1789
the Constituent Assembly had pronounced on the expediency of uniting
both the city and the county with France. A French party was formed in
Avignon; and a free municipal constitution after the model of those
just established in France was framed and assented to by the Cardinal
Vice-Legate in April 1790. The Pope, however, annulled his deputy’s
assent, with the result that fierce street fighting took place in the
city, which was only stopped by the intervention of the National Guard
of the neighbouring French city of Orange. The result of these events
was that the city of Avignon, or at least the French party there,
declared Avignon united to France on 12th June 1790. The inhabitants
of the Venaissin, on the other hand, declared their attachment for the
Pope, and their wish to remain subject to him. When these circumstances
became known in Paris a strong party showed itself in the Assembly in
favour of accepting the union of Avignon with or without the Pope’s
assent. Mirabeau skilfully averted the danger of a flagrant breach of
international law by securing the appointment of an Avignon Committee,
and when it became necessary to send regular troops to maintain order
in the city, he secured their despatch thither without the assumption
of any rights of sovereignty.

[Sidenote: The Affair of Nootka Sound. May 1790.]

Far more serious was the question which arose in May 1790, and which
gave rise to the debate in the Constituent Assembly on the right
of declaring peace and war, for it brought into prominence a doubt
whether the Assembly should recognise the treaties made by the French
monarchy. Of these treaties, the most popular in France, and the first
to be brought into evidence, was the Pacte de Famille, which had been
concluded in 1761 by Choiseul between France and Spain. Charles IV.
had succeeded his able and accomplished father, Charles III., on 12th
December 1788. The new monarch was completely under the influence
of his wife, Marie Louise, a princess of Parma, who in her turn was
governed by a young guardsman, her lover, Godoy. Charles IV. made a
friend of Godoy, a fact which of itself shows the essential weakness
of his character. He, as well as his Queen, was, outwardly at least,
deeply religious, and it was pretty certain that before long a reaction
would take place at the Spanish Court against the liberal _régime_,
which, in the previous reign, under the administration of Aranda and
Florida Blanca, Campomanes and Jovellanos, had done so much for Spain.
But for the first three years of his reign, Charles IV. maintained
his father’s experienced ministers, with the assent of the Queen, who
did not dare at once to introduce her lover into the ministry, or
invest him openly with power. Florida Blanca, the Spanish minister,
with Spanish pride, refused to recognise the actual weakness of Spain,
and was particularly active in maintaining her supremacy in America.
When, therefore, Vancouver Island was demonstrated to be an island
and not a peninsula, he claimed its possession for Spain, and also
alleged pre-colonisation. But he went further. Spanish officers had
seized an English ship in Nootka Sound, now St. George’s Sound, in
Vancouver Island, had destroyed an English settlement there, and had
even insulted an English naval captain. When Pitt demanded reparation,
Florida Blanca replied haughtily, and claimed the possession of the
island on the grounds stated. Pitt at once sent one of the ablest
English diplomatists, Alleyne Fitzherbert, afterwards Lord St. Helens,
to threaten to declare war, and prepared a great fleet, known in
English naval history as the Spanish Armament.

Both Pitt and Florida Blanca knew that a war between England and Spain
would only be seriously undertaken if France decided to intervene.
Florida Blanca claimed the assistance of France under the terms of the
Pacte de Famille, and Pitt, who understood that power had passed from
Louis XVI. to the Constituent Assembly, sent two secret emissaries to
Paris to see if the Assembly was inclined to maintain the policy of
the _ancien régime_. One of these emissaries was Hugh Elliot, brother
of Sir Gilbert Elliot, afterwards Lord Minto, an old schoolfellow of
Mirabeau, who was expected to influence the orator, and the other,
William Augustus Miles, who was to ally himself with the leading
democratic deputies. The question came before the Constituent Assembly
on a letter from the Comte de Montmorin, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The enthusiasm in the Assembly for the maintenance of the Spanish
Alliance was extreme, defiance was hurled at England, Spain’s faithful
adherence to the Pacte de Famille in the Seven Years’ War and the War
of American Independence was remembered, and a fleet for active service
was ordered to be got ready at Brest, and sixteen new ships of war
built. But the first burst of enthusiasm soon cooled. Some deputies
feared war would strengthen the monarchy, others did not like to be
bound by the treaties, especially the dynastic treaties of the _ancien
régime_, and others again, headed by Robespierre and Pétion, inveighed
against the idea of any offensive war. The whole question was referred
to the Diplomatic Committee. Mirabeau, who knew perfectly well that
Spain would not fight without the aid of France, read an able report,
recommending that the Pacte de Famille should be changed to a simple
defensive treaty, which was adopted. The Court of Spain, seeing that no
help was to be got from France under these circumstances, resigned its
pretensions to Vancouver Island, and consented to pay the compensation
demanded by England. This diplomatic victory of England exasperated the
Spaniards; Charles IV. was surprised and disgusted at the concessions
made by Louis XVI., and declared them a breach of the Pacte de Famille;
and by her conduct France lost the friendship of her closest ally of
the eighteenth century.

[Sidenote: The Rights of the Princes of the Empire in Alsace.]

The third question in which the new state of things in France
touched the diplomatic system of old Europe and threatened to cause
international complications, which might lead to a foreign war, was
concerned with the fiefs of the Empire in Alsace. By the Treaty of
Westphalia that province had been ceded to France in full and entire
sovereignty, but reserving the rights of the Empire. The complications
caused by this ambiguous arrangement had raised perpetual difficulties
throughout the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., and many separate
treaties had been concluded with individual princes, by which they
recognised the sovereignty of France in Alsace, in return for the
acknowledgment of all their ancient rights. A further problem was
added by the fact that the more important princely landowners in
Alsace were also ruling and independent sovereigns across the French
border. They were thus supreme, save for the loose over-lordship of
the Emperor in Germany, and subject to the French monarchy for their
domains in Alsace. Among the principal of these rulers were the
three ecclesiastical electors, the Archbishops of Mayence, Trèves,
and Cologne, the Bishops of Strasbourg, Spires, Worms, and Basle,
the Abbot of Murbach, the Dukes of Würtemburg and of Deux-Ponts or
Zweibrücken, the Elector Palatine, the Margrave of Baden, the Landgrave
of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Princes of Nassau, Leiningen, Salm-Salm,
and Hohenlohe-Bartenstein. These princes were naturally profoundly
affected by the abolition of feudalism decreed by the Constituent
Assembly, which further complicated their position. They felt as German
princes, and appealed against the measures of the Assembly as contrary
to international law, and violating the Treaty of Westphalia and the
many separate treaties. The protests of certain of these princes were
laid before the Assembly on 11th February 1790, and referred by it to
the Feudal Committee on 28th April. The reporter of the Committee on
this matter was Merlin of Douai, one of the greatest French jurists
and statesmen of the whole revolutionary period. On 28th October he
read his report, in which he insisted on the new principle of the
sovereignty of the people. He asserted that the unity of Alsace with
France rested not on ancient treaties, but on the unanimous resolution
of the Alsatian people to be Frenchmen. But at the same time he argued
that in practice old rights ought to be maintained. Mirabeau, with his
usual sagacity, saw that international complications might, on this
ground, be adjourned, if not altogether avoided; and it was on his
motion that the Constituent Assembly resolved to uphold the sovereignty
of France in Alsace, and the application of all its decrees to that
province, but at the same time requested the King to arrange the amount
of indemnity to be paid to the Princes of the Empire as compensation
for the rights of which they were thus deprived. These princes,
however, with but very few exceptions, refused absolutely to accept any
monetary compensation, and appealed to the Diet of the Empire. It was
on this question, therefore, that foreign intervention most seriously
threatened France at the end of 1790, in spite of the diplomatic
knowledge and skill of two of her leading statesmen, Mirabeau and
Merlin of Douai.

While Mirabeau was doing his best to keep France from the disturbance,
and even disasters, which a foreign war would cause in the midst of
her new development, the Queen cast all her hopes for the restoration
of the power of the French monarchy on the armed help of foreign
states. Louis XVI. in a half-hearted fashion was opposed to foreign
interference, but his younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, and the
French _émigrés_, who had established themselves on the borders of
France, declared that the King was not in his right senses, and that
he was forced to yield to the measures of the Constituent Assembly
against his will. They felt no patriotic misgivings, and loudly invoked
the assistance of all monarchs in the cause of monarchy and the feudal
system. The ruler on whom the Queen chiefly relied, and to whom she
appealed most fervently, the monarch to whom the _émigrés_ looked with
most confidence, was Leopold, the brother and successor of Joseph
II. He held the key of the position; he was the sovereign especially
feared by the leaders of the Constituent Assembly, and as Emperor and
as brother of Marie Antoinette he was expected by the royalists to
intervene in the affairs of France.

CHAPTER III

1790–1792

[Sidenote: The Emperor Leopold.]

The successor of Joseph II., the Emperor Leopold, was, except perhaps
Catherine of Russia, the ablest monarch of his time. He had had a
long experience in the art of government, for he had succeeded to the
sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1765, on the death of his
father, the Emperor Francis of Lorraine. While his brother Joseph
was kept until 1780 by Maria Theresa in leading-strings as far as the
actual administration of the Hapsburg dominions was concerned, and
was only able to exert his authority as Emperor, Leopold had from his
boyhood been an absolute and irresponsible sovereign, and had imbibed
from his education an Italian knowledge of statecraft. During his
long reign in Tuscany he showed the finest qualities of a benevolent
despot in his measures for increasing the material comforts of his
people, combined with tact and diplomatic subtlety. His reforms were
as sweeping as those of Joseph, but were so managed as not to set
his dominions in a flame. With the help of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop
of Pistoia, he freed the people of Tuscany from the heavy burden of
an excessive number of ecclesiastics; he reorganised the internal
administration, and especially the judicial system; and he showed such
intelligence in grasping and partially applying the new principles of
political economy as to be called ‘the physiocratic prince.’ He had
been Grand Duke of Tuscany for twenty-five years, and when he succeeded
his elder brother Joseph as King of Hungary and Bohemia in February
1790, he had earned the reputation of a singularly wise and prudent
statesman, and of one who, if it could be done, might be expected to
restore the power of the House of Austria. He abandoned the Grand Duchy
of Tuscany to his second son Ferdinand, and at once applied himself to
the difficult task bequeathed to him by Joseph II.

[Sidenote: Policy of Leopold.]

Leopold found the power of Austria seriously affected by dangers from
within and dangers from without. He at once undid much of Joseph’s
work. He recognised the difference between consolidating and unifying a
nation, which was essentially one, and a congeries of nations speaking
different languages, belonging to different races, and geographically
widely separated. In Tuscany he had accomplished a great work in
abolishing the local franchises of the cities and building up a Tuscan
state, but he understood that such a work was impossible in the divided
hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg, and that the Emperor
Joseph had been attempting a hopeless task. Leopold’s first step was,
therefore, to restore the former state of things in such parts of his
dominions as were not in open insurrection. In Austria proper, in
Bohemia, in the Milanese, and in the Tyrol, the concessions of Leopold
were received with demonstrations of popular gratitude. He abolished
the new system of taxation and the unpopular seminaries; he recognised
the separate administrations of provinces which were essentially
diverse; he gave up futile attempts at unification. But, at the same
time, he maintained the edict of religious toleration, the most noble
of Joseph’s reforms, and introduced many slight but appreciable
improvements in the local institutions which he restored. Having thus
assured the fidelity of an important body of his subjects, he prepared
to deal with the declared rebels in Belgium and the unconcealed
opposition in Hungary. It was here that Leopold suffered most from the
foreign policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph, for it was indisputable
that the prevalent discontent and insurrection in Belgium and Hungary
was fostered by the Triple Alliance, and especially by Prussia. He
had a serious war with the Turks on his hands; his ally, Catherine of
Russia, was too much occupied with her wars with the Swedes and Turks
and with the affairs of Poland, to come to his help; France, excited
by her internal dissensions, and with the Assembly indisposed to the
maintenance of the Treaty of 1756, might almost be reckoned an enemy;
the Empire had been roused to distrust by the policy of Joseph, and the
Triple Alliance was openly hostile. Under these circumstances Prussia
appeared at once the chief power on the Continent and the principal
enemy of Austria, and it was with Prussia that Leopold first resolved
to deal.

[Sidenote: The Policy of Prussia.]

The events of the year 1789 had greatly improved the position of
Prussia on the Continent. The pretensions of Joseph to Bavaria had made
Frederick William II., as it had made Frederick the Great, the real
leader of the Princes of the Empire, and the Triple Alliance had done
more to improve and strengthen his position in Europe. The classic
policy of Prussia was consistent opposition to Austria, and Hertzberg,
the Prussian minister, in pursuance of this policy, had made use of all
Joseph’s mistakes to lower the power of the House of Hapsburg. He felt
it necessary, indeed, to disavow a treaty with the Turks, which the too
zealous Prussian envoy had signed in January 1790, but he was eager
to make use of the difficulties of Russia and Austria caused by the
Turkish war to forward Prussia’s designs on Poland. His main aim was to
obtain the cession of the important Polish cities of Thorn and Dantzic,
which would give Prussia complete control of the great river Vistula.
The ablest Prussian diplomatist, Lucchesini, was sent to Warsaw, and
on 29th March 1790 he signed a treaty of friendship and union with
the Poles, by which Poland was to cede Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia
in return for the retrocession of part of Austrian Galicia, which had
fallen to Austria at the first partition, while Prussia promised to
guarantee the territory and constitution of Poland, and to send an army
of 18,000 men to the help of the Poles if they were attacked.

This treaty, shameless even in its epoch for its desertion of allies,
breach of former engagements and absence of good faith, was highly
approved by Frederick William II. and Hertzberg. They would not have
dared to conclude it but for the seeming weakness of Russia and
Austria, the partners in the former partition. Russia was hampered by
the Swedish and Turkish wars, and the discontent of the ceded provinces
of Poland. Austria was in a still more desperate condition. With the
Turkish war still unconcluded, with open insurrection in Belgium, and
disaffection in Hungary, unpopular in the Empire, and deprived of the
alliance of France by the unconcealed dislike of the Assembly to the
Treaty of 1756, it seemed as if the House of Hapsburg must now give
way entirely to the House of Hohenzollern. Of the active encouragement
given to the Turks, the Belgians, the Hungarians, and the Princes of
the Empire against Austria by Prussia, mention has been made. Not less
skilful was the conduct of the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Goltz, who
intrigued with the more extreme leaders in the Assembly, and especially
Pétion,[7] against Austria, and in particular did all in his power to
increase the growing unpopularity of Marie Antoinette and to insist
that she was a traitor to France.

[Sidenote: The Policy of Leopold.]

Had a less able statesman than Leopold been the successor of Joseph,
the schemes of Prussia might have been crowned with success. But he
had not ruled in the native city of Machiavelli for a quarter of a
century for nothing; and he set to work to checkmate the designs of
Hertzberg and Frederick William II. His wise measures of conciliation
speedily rallied the heart of the hereditary dominions to him; and he
determined to use diplomacy to establish his position in Europe before
he dealt with Belgium and Hungary. He quickly perceived that Prussia’s
real strength lay in the support of the Triple Alliance; her financial
situation was such that she dared not undertake a serious war without
the active countenance of England and Holland. He knew that it was
worse than hopeless to rely upon France, and therefore at once applied
to England. He protested that he did not share his brother’s attachment
for Russia, or his schemes for the division of the Ottoman provinces;
and he further hinted that he would abandon all attempt to reconquer
Belgium and surrender it to France unless he received some assistance.
Pitt felt the weight of these considerations; he did not care much
about what happened to Poland, but he cared a great deal that the
French should not occupy Belgium. When, therefore, the King of Prussia
mobilised a powerful army in Silesia, and demanded through Hertzberg
that Austria should on the one hand make an armistice with the Turks,
and on the other restore Galicia to Poland, Leopold, trusting that
he had broken the harmony of the Triple Alliance, made no elaborate
warlike preparations, but demanded a conference.

[Sidenote: The Conference of Reichenbach. June 1790.]

The King of Hungary and Bohemia thoroughly understood the character of
the Prussian king and the intrigues of his courtiers and ministers; he
knew that Hertzberg was the real enemy of Austria, and that Frederick
William was unstable and easily persuaded. He felt that his own
strength lay in diplomacy, not war. On 26th June the two Austrian
envoys, Reuss and Spielmann, arrived at the headquarters of the
Prussian army in Silesia at Reichenbach, and demanded a conference.
Rather to the disgust of the Prussians, their allies of the Triple
Alliance insisted on being present, and a regular congress was held,
at which Hertzberg and Lucchesini represented Prussia, Reuss and
Spielmann, Austria, Ewart, England, Reden, Holland, and Jablonowski,
the Poles. Even the Hungarian malcontents and the Belgian rebels,
relying on the promises of Frederick William, ventured to send envoys.
The conclusions of the congress justified Leopold’s diplomatic skill.
When Hertzberg laid the Prussian demands in full before the assembled
envoys, to his surprise Jablonowski declared that the Poles would
never cede Thorn and Dantzic, while the representatives of England and
Holland not only advocated the maintenance of the _status quo_, but
refused the co-operation of their governments in Prussia’s schemes for
aggrandisement. The policy of Hertzberg and Kaunitz, of perpetuating
the rivalry of Prussia and Austria, had failed. Leopold was far too
acute to leave these matters to ministers. He placed himself in direct
communication with the King of Prussia and his personal favourites,
Lucchesini and Bischofswerder; he argued that the interests of the
two great German states both with regard to Poland and France were
identical, and on 27th July 1790 the Convention of Reichenbach was
signed, by which Austria promised at once to make an armistice with the
Turks, and eventually to conclude peace with them under the mediation
of the Triple Alliance, while, on the other hand, the powers of the
Triple Alliance guaranteed the restoration of the Austrian authority
in Belgium. It was more privately arranged that Prussia should withdraw
from encouraging discontent in Hungary and Belgium, and support
Leopold’s candidature for the Imperial throne. This great diplomatic
victory did more than merely check the active enmity of Prussia; it
established the ascendency of Leopold over the weak mind of Frederick
William; and it eventually, in May 1791, brought about, not indeed his
actual dismissal from office, but the removal of Hertzberg, the sworn
foe of Austria, from the charge of the foreign policy of Prussia.

[Sidenote: Leopold and the Turks.]

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Sistova. 4th Aug. 1791.]

The first actual consequence of the Convention of Reichenbach was the
conclusion of an armistice between Austria and the Turks. The war had
never been looked on with favour by Leopold, who regarded Joseph’s
infatuation for the grandiose schemes of Catherine of Russia as absurd,
and the dismemberment of Turkey as impracticable, and at the present
time undesirable. He had not attempted to press matters against the
Turks, and had withdrawn many of his best troops under Loudon from the
seat of war to Bohemia to strengthen his position at Reichenbach. The
Prince of Coburg, who succeeded Loudon, aided by an earthquake, took
Orsova, and laid siege to Giurgevo, but he was defeated in his camp
after a severe battle on 8th July 1790. This defeat was only partially
compensated by a victory won by Clerfayt, and by the capture of Zettin
by General de Vins on 20th July. Under these circumstances Leopold was
not sorry to conclude an armistice for nine months at Giurgevo on 19th
September. Shortly afterwards a congress of plenipotentiaries from
Austria, Turkey, and the mediating powers met, as had been arranged
at Reichenbach, at Sistova. The negotiations lasted for many months;
Leopold insisted on the cession by Turkey of Old Orsova and a district
in Croatia, which would make the Danube and the Unna the boundary
between Austria and Turkey; Prussia at first strongly protested against
any cession to Austria; the congress even for a time broke up; and it
was not until Leopold adroitly got Lucchesini, the Prussian envoy, on
his side, that the important Treaty of Sistova upon the terms desired
by Leopold was concluded on 4th August 1791.

[Sidenote: Leopold crowned Emperor. 9th Oct. 1790.]

By this treaty the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg were
relieved from the danger of foreign war; the next result which Leopold
drew from the Convention of Reichenbach was the re-establishment
of the Austrian ascendency in Germany. Assured of the support of
Prussia, Leopold travelled to the Rhine. On 30th September 1790 he was
unanimously elected King of the Romans; on 4th October he solemnly
entered Frankfort, and on 9th October he was crowned Emperor. But it
was not enough for him to be crowned Emperor; he had to destroy the bad
effect of his brother Joseph’s attitude towards the Empire; he had to
become the real as well as the nominal head and leader of the German
princes, and to win back the advantages which Prussia had secured by
forming the League of Princes. The opportunity was afforded to him by
the disinclination of the German princes, who owned territories in
Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, to accept the compensation offered
to them by the French Constituent Assembly. Their protests took the
shape of a clause in the ‘capitulation’ laid before him and accepted
by him on his election as Emperor by which he promised to intervene on
behalf of the Empire for the preservation of the rights, sanctioned
by the Treaty of Westphalia, of the princes, whose interests were
affected. Leopold thus seized this opportunity to pose as the head of
the German Empire, and on 14th December 1790 he wrote a very strong
letter to Louis XVI., in which he said: ‘The territories in question
have not been transferred to the kingdom of France; they are subject to
the supremacy of the Emperor and the Empire: no member of the Empire
has the right to transfer that supremacy to a foreign nation. It
follows, therefore, that the decrees of the Assembly are null and void
so far as concerns the Empire and its members, and that everything
ought to be replaced on the ancient footing.’[8]

[Sidenote: Leopold and Hungary.]

[Sidenote: Leopold crowned King of Hungary. 15th Nov. 1790.]

After being crowned Emperor at Frankfort, Leopold returned to Vienna
and proceeded to establish his power firmly in Hungary. The discontent
aroused in the most backward part of his dominions by the Emperor
Joseph’s measures had not been appeased by that monarch’s wholesale
retractation, nor even by the return of the Crown of St. Stephen. The
Hungarian nobles regarded Joseph’s retractation as a sign of weakness,
and, encouraged by the intrigues of Prussia and the difficulties
in which Leopold was involved by the war with the Turks, resolved
to obtain more sweeping concessions. The example of France exerted
an influence even in Hungary, and the following sentences from a
memorial,[9] presented to Leopold by the people of Pesth, might have
been written by a Parisian popular society: ‘From the rights of nations
and of man, and from that social compact whence States arose, it is
incontestable that sovereignty originates from the people. This axiom
our parent Nature has impressed on the hearts of all; it is one of
those which a just prince (and such we trust Your Majesty will ever be)
cannot dispute; it is one of those inalienable, imprescriptible rights
which the people cannot forfeit by neglect or disuse. Our constitution
places the sovereignty jointly in the king and people, in such a manner
that the remedies necessary to be applied according to the ends of
social life for the security of persons and property, are in the power
of the people. We are sure, therefore, that at the meeting of the
ensuing Diet, Your Majesty will not confine yourself to the objects
mentioned in your rescript; but will also restore our freedom to us,
in like manner as to the Belgians, who have conquered theirs with the
sword. It would be an example big with danger to teach the world that a
people can only protect or regain their liberties by the sword, and not
by obedience.’ The Hungarian Diet, which Leopold had summoned for the
ceremony of his coronation, and to which the people of Pesth alluded in
this remarkable address, was largely attended. The Hungarian nobility
regarded its convocation as a further sign of weakness, for none
had been held since the accession of Maria Theresa, and prepared an
inaugural act or compact, which would have reduced the kings of Hungary
to a similar position to that occupied by the kings of Poland. Full of
confidence in themselves they even went so far as to send envoys, as
has been mentioned, to the Congress of Reichenbach. Leopold, however,
had no intention of yielding to these demands; his only desire was to
gain time until he had secured his position by diplomacy. Meanwhile
he tried to stir up opposition in Hungary itself, by encouraging
the other nationalities in the kingdom, such as the inhabitants of
Croatia and the Banat. But when the Congress of Reichenbach was over,
the armistice of Giurgevo concluded, and his coronation as Emperor
performed, Leopold proceeded to deal with the Hungarians. He first
ordered the army of 60,000 men, which he had concentrated in Bohemia
to support his attitude against the Prussians, to Pesth, and then
directed the Diet to remove to Presburg for his coronation as King of
Hungary. He then declared that nothing would induce him to accept the
proposed new constitution, or to consent to an infringement of the
Edict of Toleration, and that he would only consent to the terms of
the inaugural acts of his grandfather, Charles VI., and his mother,
Maria Theresa. The Hungarian nobles, overcome by his firmness and the
presence of his troops, yielded; the Emperor appointed his fourth son,
the Archduke Leopold, to be Palatine of Hungary in the place of the
late Prince Esterhazy; and it was from him that he received the Crown
of St. Stephen on 15th November, on the terms he had stipulated.

[Sidenote: Parties in Belgium.]

Having gained this victory by his firmness, Leopold proceeded to win
popularity by a timely concession, and proposed a law, obliging every
future king to be crowned within six months of his accession. This
concession was received with the wildest enthusiasm, as it obviated
the possibility of conduct resembling that of Joseph II.; the Diet
granted the Emperor a gift of 225,000 florins instead of the usual
100,000 florins; and the disaffected attitude of the nobility was
changed for one of hearty admiration and gratitude. The bourgeois of
Pesth and their declarations were disavowed; the echo of the French
Revolution, which had been heard there, was quickly stifled; and
the Hungarian nobility, well contented with Leopold, declined to
encourage the popular aspirations. The difficulties which the Emperor
Leopold encountered in Hungary were trifling to those which faced
him in Belgium. But in this quarter time had worked for the House of
Hapsburg, and when the Congress of Plenipotentiaries, arranged at
the Congress of Reichenbach, met at the Hague in October 1790, the
situation had entirely changed. The victory of the Belgian rebels
in 1789 had been followed by internal dissensions, which appeared
directly the new Constitution was proclaimed. The first difference was
between the Van der Nootists, or Statists, as they termed themselves,
and the Vonckists. The latter, inspired by the success of the French
Revolution, advocated a thoroughly democratic constitution, and the
organisation of a new elective system of local administration, to the
great disgust of the Statists, who desired simply the restoration of
the old order of things, but with the central government controlled
by elected assembly instead of being in the hands of the House of
Hapsburg. Curiously enough popular feeling ran in a direction very
different from that followed in France. Influenced by the priests,
the Belgian people, and more especially the mob of Brussels, were
convinced that the Vonckists were atheists; the democrats were attacked
in the streets, maltreated and imprisoned; the bourgeois National
Guards refused to protect them; they were proscribed by Van der Noot
and the party in power; and after many riots and disturbances Vonck
fled to France in April 1790. These events greatly weakened the
Belgian Republic, for the democratic party, which had been energetic
in the revolution, numbered in its ranks many of the ablest and
most enlightened men in the country. But even more serious was the
result abroad, for the National Assembly of France and Lafayette were
surprised and disgusted at the persecution of the democrats, and the
sympathy of the French people was entirely alienated from the Belgian
leaders. Still more striking in its effect was the conduct of the Van
der Nootists towards the gallant officer, Van der Mersch, who had
commanded the patriot troops in the invasion of October 1789. Not
satisfied with superseding him by the Prussian general, Schönfeld,
the Van der Nootists had him arrested on a charge of disorganising
the Belgian army and imprisoned at Antwerp, to the great wrath of the
people of Flanders, of which province Van der Mersch was a native. The
conquering party was further divided. The nobility and clergy, headed
by the Duc d’Aremberg, were jealous of the ascendency assumed by Van
der Noot, and of the continued omnipotence of the Assembly at Brussels.
Under these circumstances it was a significant fact that the Austrian
troops in Luxembourg under the command of Marshal Bender were able with
the help of the people themselves to occupy the province of Limburg.

[Sidenote: Congress at the Hague. Oct. 1790.]

[Sidenote: Leopold reconquers Belgium.]

[Sidenote: The Austrians at Liége.]

In October 1790 the Congress, which had been resolved on at
Reichenbach, met at the Hague. The Austrian plenipotentiary was the
Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, the most accomplished Austrian diplomatist
and ambassador at Paris, and the representatives of England, Prussia,
and Holland were Lord Auckland, Count Keller, and the Grand Pensionary
Van der Spiegel. Leopold now reaped the advantages of his skilful
diplomacy at Reichenbach. England and Holland understood that the new
Emperor was a very different man from his predecessor, and Prussia
dared not act without them. As he had promised, Leopold solemnly
announced his intention to restore all the charters, laws, and
arrangements, which had existed in Belgium in the time of his mother,
Maria Theresa, under the guarantee of the three powers, and further
promised a general amnesty if his authority was recognised by 21st
November. The Belgian States-General made no reply to Leopold, and the
Emperor proceeded to concentrate 45,000 men under Bender in Luxembourg.
Then the Belgian leaders applied to the Congress at the Hague for a
prolongation of the armistice and the restoration of the state of
government existing in the time of Charles VI. and not in that of
Maria Theresa. These demands were supported by the representatives
of the Triple Alliance, but rejected by the Austrian ambassador. On
21st November the Belgian States-General elected the Archduke Charles,
the third son of the Emperor, to be hereditary Grand Duke, but the
time had gone by for compromises, and on the following day Bender
entered Belgium. The experiences of a year of revolution made the
Belgian people not unwilling to return under the sway of Austria; the
cities surrendered without a blow, and on 2d December 1790 Brussels
capitulated. Van der Noot fled with his chief friends, and Belgium
was won back by Leopold as easily as it had been lost by Joseph. On
8th December the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau assented to the restoration
of the liberties recognised in the inaugural act of Charles VI.,
but Leopold disavowed his ambassador and insisted on the authority
possessed by Maria Theresa at the close of her reign. Under these
circumstances the mediating powers refused their guarantee, a refusal
which rather gratified the Emperor than otherwise, as it freed him
from the fear of foreign interference. Not only in Belgium itself,
but in the neighbouring bishopric of Liége also, Leopold established
Austrian ascendency. The princes of the Circle of the Empire, which
adjoined, were dissatisfied with the conduct of Prussia and General
Schlieffen, and appealed to the Emperor. He was only too glad to assert
his authority; Schlieffen evacuated the territory; and on 13th January
1791 it was occupied by an Austrian force, which re-established the
Prince-bishop in all his former authority.

[Sidenote: Russia and Sweden.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Verela. Aug. 14th 1790.]

The entire reversal of Joseph’s policy by Leopold, the arrangements
made at Reichenbach, and the friendly attitude of the new Emperor
towards the powers forming the Triple Alliance, deprived Russia of her
only ally at a time when the Empress had on her hands two exhausting
wars with Sweden and Turkey. The former was the most serious. Gustavus
III., freed from the dangers of a Danish invasion, and by his _coup
d’état_ from the formidable plots of his nobility, rejoined his army in
Finland and prepared to carry on the war vigorously by land and sea.
His army was too small to effect much in spite of his near approach to
St. Petersburg, and his chief confidence was in his fleet. This fleet
was soon blockaded in the Gulf of Vyborg by the Russian admiral, the
Prince of Nassau-Siegen, one of the most famous soldiers of fortune
of the century; an attempt it made to break out on 24th June 1790 was
repulsed, and the Russians even hoped to force it to capitulate. But,
to their surprise, the Swedes broke the blockade on the 3d July, though
with a loss of 5000 men, and on 9th July won a great naval victory
in Svenska Sound, in which the Russians lost 30 ships, 600 guns and
6000 men. But this victory led to no corresponding diplomatic result.
Catherine, defeated though she was, made overtures in no humiliated
spirit to the King of Sweden, and proposed to him that, instead of
quarrelling with his neighbours, he should turn his attention to the
state of affairs in France. The chivalrous and romantic king was not
unwilling to listen to her suggestions; he had, during a visit to
Paris, been much impressed by Marie Antoinette, and was full of pity
at the situation of the royal family of France and of disgust at the
progress of the Revolution. He felt, too, that the war with Russia
was not popular among his people, and on 14th August 1790 he signed
a treaty of peace at Verela, by which the _status quo ante bellum_
between Russia and Sweden was restored without any compensation in
money or territory being obtained by the victorious Swedes.

[Sidenote: Capture of Ismail. 20th Dec. 1790.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Jassy. 9th Jan. 1792.]

While resisting the Swedes, Catherine made her chief effort against
the Turks. In this quarter the defection of Leopold and the Armistice
of Giurgevo seriously compromised her position. The war had resolved
itself into the siege of the strong city of Ismail, where the Turks
defended themselves with the utmost tenacity. The Russian attacks
were foiled again and again, and Potemkin resigned the conduct of the
siege in despair. His place was taken by Suvórov, whose brilliant
victory on the Rymnik in 1789 had marked him as the greatest Russian
general of his time. His valour and constancy equalled those qualities
in the Turks; and Ismail was stormed on 20th December 1790, after a
scene of carnage which cost the lives of 10,000 Russians and 30,000
Turks. In the following year the Russians pressed onwards towards
Constantinople, and on 9th July 1791 the Russian General Repnin, under
whom served Suvórov and Kutuzov, defeated the Grand Vizier at Matchin.
But the Empress Catherine was not inclined to follow up these military
advantages. The policy of Leopold had isolated her; the Treaty of
Sistova had deprived her of an auxiliary army against the Turks; the
state of affairs in Poland demanded her most serious attention; and she
had to observe the action of Europe on the French Revolution and of the
French Revolution on Europe, in the hope of deriving some advantage for
Russia from the complications. She, therefore, signed a treaty of peace
with the Turks at Jassy on 9th January 1792, by which Russia retained
only Oczakoff and the coast-line between the mouths of the Bug and the
Dniester. By making this peace, Catherine only deferred the prosecution
of the schemes of Russia against the Ottoman Empire, and certain
clauses with regard to the Danubian Principalities, affording a pretext
for future wars, were skilfully included in the Treaty of Jassy.

[Sidenote: Position of Leopold.]

The success of the policy of the Emperor Leopold entirely altered
the situation of the European states and their attitude towards each
other. He was in 1791 not only master in his own dominions, but the
recognised representative of the Empire, in fact as well as in name. He
had broken down the combination against Austria and the solidarity of
the Triple Alliance. England was far more favourably inclined to him
than she had ever been to Joseph II.; Frederick William II. of Prussia
was his ally not his enemy. He was, therefore, able in 1791 to turn
his thoughts to the situation of France, and to see what advantages
could be drawn from the position of affairs there for the benefit of
Austria. The political effacement of France in foreign affairs was due
to the assumption of all real authority by the Constituent Assembly,
while leaving the responsibility to the King’s ministers, and Leopold
did not doubt that the result of an entire victory of the popular
party would be a recurrence to the classical policy of opposition to
Austria and the rupture of the Treaty of 1756. It was to his interest
to prevent this, and he had therefore political, as well as personal,
ends to secure in endeavouring to restore the authority of the King
of France. The capture of the Bastille and the transference of the
royal family to Paris were great events in the history of France, but
they only affected Leopold as weakening the authority of Louis XVI.
and Marie Antoinette, the faithful allies of Austria. The behaviour of
the Constituent Assembly gave him pretexts for interfering in France,
in spite of the diplomatic ability of Mirabeau, and he was earnestly
besought by the French _émigrés_, or opponents of the new state of
things in France, who had gone into voluntary exile with the King’s
younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, at their head, to intervene on
behalf of the French monarchy.

[Sidenote: The state of France, 1791.]

The conduct of the Constituent Assembly in disorganising every branch
of the executive in France had its natural effect by the commencement
of 1791. The army, in spite of the effort of General Bouillé to restore
discipline by making an example of some Swiss mutineers at Nancy in
1790, was rendered inefficient by the disaffection of the soldiers and
the exaggerated royalism of most of the officers; the navy was in a
still worse condition; the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had caused
a schism, which disturbed the minds of men in all parts of France,
and created an army of opponents to the work of the Assembly, who had
peculiar influence over the rural communities; the issue of assignats
on the security of the confiscated domains of the Church had inflated
the currency, and, while giving an appearance of fictitious prosperity,
had really given a feeling of insecurity to all trade and commerce;
the old internal administrations of the provinces had been replaced
by the new administrations of the departments, which were filled by
inexperienced men, utterly unable to cope with the difficulties of
a time of unrest and revolution. The practical disorganisation of
the executive was meanwhile being consecrated by the measures of the
Constituent Assembly, which, in the Constitution it was drawing up, in
its fear of the power of the monarchy, so hampered the authority of the
executive as to destroy the necessary foundations of good government.

[Sidenote: Death of Mirabeau.]

In its ardour for the Rights of Man and the principle of election,
the Constituent Assembly forgot the need for enforcing the authority
of the law, and the necessity for providing a strong arm to carry it
into effect. Mirabeau had clearly perceived that France was drifting
into a state of anarchy. In his secret notes for the Court he insisted
on the importance of restoring its proper power to the executive, and
he advised the King to leave Paris and call the partisans of order to
his side. Civil war, he contended, was preferable to anarchy, cloaked
by fine words; it would openly divide France into the adherents of
order and of disorder, and result in the maintenance of the popular
rights sanctioned by the royal power. The King was to acknowledge the
right of the people to legislate, and tax themselves through their
representatives, but was to point out the importance of maintaining a
strong government to secure the happiness of the governed. Against
foreign war, however, Mirabeau strongly protested; foreign interference
would rouse the spirit of national patriotism, and if the King was
suspected of favouring the foreigners, it would result in the overthrow
of the monarchy, and in a long struggle before the country could agree
on a new form of government. However, on 2d April 1791, Mirabeau
died, and France was deprived of its most sagacious, if not its only,
statesman. In truth, Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette had no wish to
take Mirabeau’s advice; the King regarded civil war as a horrible
calamity, and to be shunned in every way and at any sacrifice; the
Queen longed for the interference of her brother, the Emperor, and
begged him to intervene to restore the royal authority. The King’s
religious convictions were wounded by the Civil Constitution of the
Clergy; the Queen was roused to wrath by the feeling that she was a
prisoner, by daily insults in the press, and by the degradation of the
power of the monarchy. On 18th April 1791 the royal prisoners were
prevented by the Parisians from going to Saint-Cloud for Easter, and
on 18th May the Emperor Leopold issued a circular to all crowned heads
calling attention to the position of the King of France in his capital.
On 20th May he had an interview with the Comte de Durfort, a secret
emissary from the Tuileries, at Mantua, and charged him to tell the
King and Queen of France that ‘he was going to concern himself with
their affairs, not in words, but in acts.’

[Sidenote: The Flight to Varennes. 21st June 1791.]

The action of the Parisian mob on 18th April caused Louis XVI. and
Marie Antoinette to resolve to escape secretly from Paris, since they
were obviously prisoners and could not leave openly. They determined,
contrary to the advice so often given by Mirabeau, and contrary also to
the wishes of the Emperor and of his able representative at the Hague,
the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, who knew France better than any living
diplomatist, to fly towards the frontier. Leopold, under the pretext
of supporting his authority in Belgium and Luxembourg, and that of
his allies, the Elector-Archbishop of Trèves and the Bishop of Liége,
massed his troops upon the frontier in readiness to succour or assist,
and Bouillé, who commanded at Metz, made preparations to have the part
of his forces on which he could rely ready to receive the fugitive
monarch. On 20th June 1791 the royal family left Paris by night, after
the King had drawn up a declaration protesting against the whole of the
measures of the Constituent Assembly, and disavowing them. The flight,
from a combination of circumstances, ended in the royal family being
stopped at Varennes, and being brought back to Paris in custody. It had
the most momentous results upon the history of the French Revolution,
which are sometimes disregarded in the recollection of the romantic
circumstances attending it.

[Sidenote: Results of the Flight to Varennes.]

[Sidenote: The Massacre of 17th July in Paris.]

The primary result of the flight to Varennes was the sudden
comprehension by France that Louis XVI. was an unwilling collaborator
in the work of reconstituting the French government on a new basis.
Hitherto the people, and even the leaders of the Constituent Assembly,
had believed in his acquiescence, if not in his hearty assistance. But
the declaration, left behind on the occasion of his flight, proved the
contrary. The statesmen of the Constituent Assembly, including the
makers of the new Constitution, such as Le Chapelier and Thouret, and
the triumvirate of Duport, Barnave, and Lameth, who, after Mirabeau’s
death, were the undisputed leaders of the majority, saw they had gone
too far, and that in their desire to weaken the royal authority, they
had seriously weakened the executive, and had made the King’s position
intolerable. They therefore threw the blame of the flight to Varennes
on the subordinates in the scheme, ignored the King’s declaration,
and acted on the supposition that he was misled by bad advisers. This
attitude not being wholly approved by the Jacobin Club, which, through
its affiliated clubs in the provinces, exercised the most powerful
sway in the formation of public opinion, the believers in the royal
authority seceded and formed the Constitutional Club, or Club of
1789, which temporarily weakened the power of the Jacobins in Paris.
But this secession was entirely sanctioned by the bourgeois classes
both in Paris and throughout France, who had the strongest interest
in the maintenance of order, and who sent in numerous declarations
of their adhesion to the cause of monarchy. Moreover, their chief
representatives in arms, the National Guard of Paris, under the command
of Lafayette, had soon an opportunity of giving practical proof
of this loyal disposition. The Cordeliers Club, which was chiefly
influenced by Danton, a lawyer of Paris, who had Mirabeau’s gift of
seeing things as they really were, felt it impossible to hush things
up. They understood the King’s declaration to mean a declaration of
war against the new Constitution; his flight to Varennes they rightly
interpreted to show that he was trusting to the intervention of foreign
powers to re-establish him in his former position; and they resolved
to draw up a petition for his dethronement. This petition was largely
the work of Danton and of Brissot, a pamphleteer and journalist, who
had been imprisoned in the Bastille, and had imbibed republican notions
in America, and a large crowd assembled to sign it on the Champ de
Mars. Lafayette determined to disperse this crowd, and the National
Guard, under his command, fired on the people, killing several persons.
This vigorous measure, which was intended to show the power of the
party of order, was followed by vigorous steps against the party for
dethronement.

[Sidenote: Revision of the Constitution.]

The leaders of the Cordeliers were proscribed. Danton and Marat fled
to England, and the party of order seemed triumphant. A revision of
the Constitution was undertaken, and various reactionary clauses,
specially directed against the press, the popular clubs or societies,
and the rights of assembly and of petition, were inserted. But this
new attitude of the Constituent Assembly had but a slight effect
upon France, for the king’s flight had caused the people in general
to believe that he was the enemy of their new-born liberties, and a
traitor in league with foreign powers to overthrow them.

[Sidenote: Effects of the Flight to Varennes.]

[Sidenote: Manifesto of Padua. 6th July 1791.]

The flight to Varennes proved to the people of France, as well as to
the monarchs and statesmen of Europe, that Louis XVI. was a prisoner in
Paris, and an enemy to the new settlement of the government, as laid
down by the Constitution in course of preparation. The Emperor Leopold,
as brother of Marie Antoinette, as Holy Roman Emperor and supporter
of dynastic legitimacy, as the leading monarch of Europe, decided to
intervene. On 6th July 1791 he issued the Manifesto of Padua, in which
he invited the sovereigns of Europe to join him in declaring the cause
of the King of France to be their own, in exacting that he should be
freed from all popular restraint, and in refusing to recognise any
constitutional laws as legitimately established in France, except such
as might be sanctioned by the King acting in perfect freedom. The
English Government paid little or no attention to these requests of
Leopold, but the Empress Catherine, and the Kings of Prussia, Spain,
and Sweden, for different reasons and in different degrees, heartily
accepted Leopold’s views, and armed intervention to carry them into
effect was suggested. But Leopold had no desire for war. His policy
since his accession had been distinctly in favour of peace. He was
a diplomatist, not a soldier, and he desired to frighten France by
threats, rather than to fight France for the liberty of Louis XVI. and
his family.

[Sidenote: Declaration of Pilnitz, 27th Aug. 1791.]

[Sidenote: Completion of the Constitution.]

The sequel to the Manifesto of Padua was a conference at Pilnitz
between the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William II. of Prussia,
accompanied by their ministers, in August 1791. At this conference
the King’s brothers, Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, afterwards
Louis XVIII., who had escaped from France at the time of the flight
to Varennes, and the Comte d’Artois, afterwards Charles X., who had
fled in July 1789, at the epoch of the capture of the Bastille, were
present. They had their own aims to serve. They were disgusted at the
weak conduct, as they termed it, of Louis XVI. in yielding so far as he
had done to the popular wishes; they desired to undo the whole effect
of the Revolution and to restore the Bourbon monarchy in its ancient
authority by the arms of the monarchs of Europe. But Leopold did not
care about the French princes or the Bourbon monarchy. He cared rather
for the safety of his sister, Marie Antoinette, and the maintenance
through her of the Franco-Austrian alliance. In the Declaration of
Pilnitz, which was signed by the Emperor and the King of Prussia on
27th August 1791, the two sovereigns declared that the situation of
the King of France was an object of interest common to all European
monarchs, and that they hoped other monarchs would use with them the
most efficacious means to put the King of France in a position to lay
in perfect liberty the bases of a monarchical government, suited alike
to the rights of sovereigns and the happiness of the French nation.
Provided that other powers would co-operate with them they were willing
to act promptly, and had therefore placed their armies on foot. These
threats exasperated but did not terrify the French people. Leopold had
no intention of entering upon hostilities, and found a loophole by
which to escape from declaring war in the acceptance by Louis XVI. of
the completed Constitution on 21st September 1791. He then solemnly
withdrew his pretensions to interfere in the internal affairs of France.

[Sidenote: The Polish Constitution. 3d May 1791.]

While the first Constitution of France, sanctioning the representative
principle and the rights of the people, was being slowly built up in
the midst of troubles and intrigues in Paris, a not less remarkable
constitution was promulgated in Poland, manifesting the same ideas.
The partition of Poland in 1773 had proved to all patriotic Poles that
their independence as a nation was in the utmost peril. A serious
effort was therefore made to organise the country, and to place the
government on a settled and logical basis. The army was made national
instead of feudal; an attempt was made to establish a national system
of finance, and a scheme of national education was propounded and
partly carried into effect. But these measures were but steps in the
work of making Poland a nation, instead of a loose confederation of
nobles; the final decision was taken in 1788, when the Polish Diet
elected a Committee to draw up a new Constitution, raised the national
army to 60,000 men, and decreed regular taxes in order to replenish
the national treasury. This consciousness of nationality enabled
Stanislas Poniatowski, King of Poland, to negotiate as an independent
and powerful sovereign with Prussia in 1789, and to send his envoys to
Reichenbach in 1790 to act with the envoys of the other powers. The
leading member of the Polish Constitutional Committee was Kollontai, a
most remarkable man, and a Catholic priest, who had done good service
as Rector of the University of Cracow, which he reorganised, and
who had been made Vice-Grand-Chancellor of the kingdom. He was the
principal author of the Polish Constitution, which was accepted by the
Diet of Warsaw on 3d May 1791. This Constitution was noteworthy in what
it abolished and what it created. It abolished the elective monarchy,
the source of so many evils and intrigues, and declared the throne of
Poland hereditary in the House of Saxony in succession to Stanislas
Poniatowski, and it also abolished the _liberum veto_, which had
enabled one member of the Diet to thwart the wishes of the majority. It
created a regular government, conferring the legislative power on the
King, the Senate, and an elected Chamber, and the executive power on
the King, aided by six ministers responsible to the Legislature. The
cities were permitted to elect their judges and deputies to the Diet;
but the plague-spot of serfdom was too delicate to touch, and the Diet
only declared its willingness to sanction all arrangements made between
a lord and his serfs for the benefit of the latter. In some respects
this Constitution compares favourably with that of France drawn up at
the same time; if it does not proclaim so firmly the liberty of man,
it at any rate is free from the lamentable fear of the power of the
executive, which vitiated the work of the French reformers. France
feared its executive after a long course of despotic monarchy; Poland
felt the need of a strong executive after a long history of anarchy.
Both countries, trying to be free, were affected in different ways, and
with very different results, by the intervention of foreign powers.

[Sidenote: The Legislative Assembly.]

The acceptance of the completed French Constitution was the signal
for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. It was at once
succeeded by the Legislative Assembly, elected under the provisions
of the new Constitution. The new Assembly consisted, owing to a
self-denying ordinance passed in May 1791, on the proposition of
Robespierre, forbidding the election of deputies sitting in the
Constituent Assembly to its successor, of none but untried men, who
had no experience of politics. They were mostly young men who had
learned to talk in their local popular societies, and who at once
joined the mother of such societies, the Jacobin Club at Paris. They
were forbidden by a clause in the Constitution of 1791 to interfere
with constitutional questions, which could only be touched by a
Convention summoned for the purpose, and so could only interfere in
current politics and matters of administration. In such interference
they were justified by the position of powerlessness into which the
executive authority, the King and his ministers, were reduced by
the Constitution. The two burning questions which first came before
them were, the treatment of the clergy who had not taken the oath to
observe the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and of the _émigrés_.
Both questions gave plenty of opportunity for the display of fervid
revolutionary and patriotic eloquence, for the priests, who had not
taken the oath, were undisguisedly stirring up opposition to the
Revolution in the provinces, and the _émigrés_ were forming an army
on the French frontier. And the Legislative Assembly was in a greater
degree than either its predecessor, the Constituent, or its successor,
the Convention, liable to be swayed by oratory. The deputies liked
to listen to glowing words and patriotic sentiments, and were largely
influenced by the speeches of three great orators, Vergniaud, Gensonné,
and Guadet, who all came from Bordeaux, the capital of the department
of the Gironde, and to whose supporters posterity has given the name of
Girondins. But these orators were in their turn influenced by a Norman
deputy, Brissot. This veteran pamphleteer was a sincere republican;
he also, having long been a journalist, believed himself a master
of foreign politics. He desired to bring about a war between France
and Austria. He believed that such a war would either cause the King
to throw in his lot heartily with the Revolution, or, what was more
likely, would make him declare himself openly against it, and would
thus enable the advanced democratic party to call him a traitor, and
by rousing all France against him, pave the way for his overthrow and
the establishment of a republic. The first step was taken to make Louis
XVI. appear the opponent of the Revolution by passing a decree against
the priests, who had not taken the oath, which his conscience would
not permit him to sign; the second by passing a decree against the
_émigrés_, who were led by his own brothers, and an instruction that he
should ask the Emperor and the German princes on the Rhine to prevent
the _émigrés_ from forming an army, and to expel them if they did so.

[Sidenote: Approach of War between France and the Emperor.]

The question of the expediency of war with Austria was soon taken
up in France, and not only the Legislative Assembly but the popular
clubs busied themselves in discussing it. The Declaration of Pilnitz
exasperated the whole nation, which resented dictation or interference
in the internal affairs of France, and the warlike and menacing
attitude of the army of _émigrés_, which had been formed by the Prince
de Condé on the French frontier at Worms, increased the universal
wrath. Louis XVI., whose ministers had been but feeble figure-heads
during the Constituent Assembly, at this juncture appointed the Comte
de Narbonne, a young man of distinguished ability, to be Minister
for War. Narbonne grasped the situation. He saw the people wished
for war, and he therefore declared that the King was as patriotic as
his subjects, and was also ready for war if satisfaction were not
given to France. Three large armies were formed and placed upon the
frontiers under the command of Generals Rochambeau, Lückner, and
Lafayette, of whom the two former were created Marshals of France. By
this policy Narbonne took the wind out of the sails of Brissot and
the Girondins; he hoped that if the Austrian war was successful the
King would be sufficiently strengthened in popularity to regain his
authority as head of the executive; while, if it failed, the nation
in its extremity would turn to its legitimate sovereign and invest
him with dictatorial power. The leaders of the democratic party in
Paris, which had been scattered by Lafayette in July 1791, saw this
equally clearly with Narbonne, and therefore opposed the war with all
their might. The Jacobin Club had become their headquarters; most of
the deputies who came up from the provinces joined the mother society
in Paris, and it soon became more powerful than ever in creating
public opinion. The effect of the secession and consequent formation
of the Club of 1789 only made the Jacobins more frankly democratic,
while the presence of many of its members in the Legislative Assembly
strengthened the influence of the Jacobin Club. It was in the Jacobin
Club during the debates on the war that the difference between what
were to be the Girondin and the Mountain parties in the Convention
first appeared. Brissot and the Girondin orators argued in favour of
war; while Marat, Danton, and still more Robespierre, whose career in
the Constituent Assembly had made him exceedingly popular, opposed it.
The last-mentioned orator was indeed the chief opponent of the war; he
saw through Narbonne’s schemes, and hinted that the projected war was
merely a court intrigue to promote the power of the King. The political
strife became personal, and Robespierre, Marat, and Danton became the
sworn foes of Brissot and the Girondins.

[Sidenote: Causes of war between France and the Emperor.]

The main causes of the war were the questions of the rights of the
Princes of the Empire in Alsace and of the _émigrés_. The defence of
the former rights as rights of the Empire had been pressed upon Leopold
at the time of his election as Emperor, and on 26th April 1791 the
Prince of Thurn and Taxis, as Imperial Commissary, summoned the Diet
to meet. It assembled, and after a long discussion a _conclusum_ was
arrived at, that the Empire maintained the Treaties of Westphalia and
of the eighteenth century now violated by France, and requested the
Emperor to take severe measures against the revolutionary propaganda.
The Emperor Leopold, as sovereign of Austria, had withdrawn from the
position he had taken up at Pilnitz, but as Emperor he was obliged
to submit this _conclusum_ of the Diet to the King of France, which
he did in a strongly-worded despatch drawn up by the Chancellor
Kaunitz, which was laid before the Legislative Assembly on 3d December
1791. It was as Emperor also that Leopold defended the conduct of
the border princes of the Empire, notably the Elector-Archbishops of
Trèves, Cologne, and Mayence, and the Bishops of Spires and Worms, in
sheltering French _émigrés_. On 29th November 1791 the Assembly had
desired the King to write to the Emperor and to these border princes
protesting against the enlistment of troops by the _émigrés_, and the
Emperor’s answer defending the conduct of the princes concerned was
read to the Assembly on 14th December. The replies of Leopold were
referred to the Diplomatic Committee, and on its report, the Assembly
resolved on 25th January 1792 that the Emperor should be requested to
explain his attitude towards France and to promise to undertake nothing
against her independence in forming her own constitution and settling
her own mode of government before 1st March 1792, and that an evasive
or unsatisfactory reply should be considered as annulling the Treaty of
1756 and as an act of hostility. The answer to this demand, which was
drafted by Kaunitz, was read to the Assembly on 1st March; it censured
the course which was being taken by France, stigmatised the Revolution
and accused the Jacobins of fomenting anarchy, and its first results
were the dismissal of Narbonne, the impeachment of De Lessart, the
Foreign Minister, and the formation of a Girondin ministry.

[Sidenote: Death of Leopold, 1st March 1792.]

In the position he had taken up the Emperor Leopold was generally
supported. The Princes of the Empire, as was represented in their
_conclusum_ passed at the Diet, not only resented the interference
of France with historic rights in Alsace and her dictation as to
whom they should shelter, but were beginning to fear the contagion
of the revolutionary conceptions of the rights of man and political
liberty. Throughout the Rhine provinces the peasants had risen in
partial rebellion against their lords; in all the great cities of
western Germany the more enlightened bourgeois protested against their
exclusion from political influence. This contagion, however, did not
spread far in these early days. The Empress Catherine, the King of
Prussia, and the King of Sweden, who chiefly urged Leopold to make
a brave stand against the Legislative Assembly, were urged by other
motives. Catherine wished to see Austria and Prussia embroiled with
France so as to have her hands free to deal with the Poles, who seemed
likely with their new Constitution to ward off destruction. Frederick
William II. was disgusted by the disrespect shown to the principle
of monarchy by the Parisians’ treatment of Louis XVI. Gustavus III.
had imbibed a knightly admiration for Marie Antoinette, and felt a
personal desire to relieve her from her position of humiliation. Each
monarch showed his inclination characteristically. Catherine received
some French _émigrés_, who found their way to her distant court, with
kindness, and dismissed the French ambassador; Gustavus hurried to
Spa to consult with the French _émigrés_, and proposed an immediate
expedition to carry off the French court; Frederick William signed
an offensive and defensive alliance with the Emperor on 2d February
1792, which saved him the trouble of personal decision, and left to
the Emperor the harassing business of arranging the details of the
war and of so carrying out the necessary diplomatic negotiations
which preceded an open rupture, that the interference of the powers
should seem justified. In the midst of his preparations the Emperor
Leopold died suddenly on 1st March 1792, the very day on which his
last manifesto was read to the Legislative Assembly. His death was
an irreparable blow for Austria, for Germany, for France, and for
Europe. In his short reign he had shown himself to be a monarch of
extraordinary ability, possessing alike singular tact and great force
of character. He was succeeded in the hereditary dominions of the House
of Hapsburg by his eldest son Francis II., an inexperienced youth,
quite unfitted to continue Leopold’s policy in the troublous times
approaching.

[Sidenote: Murder of Gustavus III. 29th March 1792.]

Europe had hardly recovered from the shock of the Emperor’s sudden
death, when it was startled by the news of the murder of Gustavus III.
of Sweden, who was shot on his way from a masked ball at Stockholm
by an officer named Ankarström, on 16th March 1792. He lingered till
29th March, when he died, and was succeeded on the throne of Sweden by
his infant son, Gustavus IV. Duke Charles of Sudermania was appointed
Regent. He at once reversed the policy of the late king; he felt
none of the sympathy so warmly expressed by Gustavus III. for Marie
Antoinette, and he distrusted the close alliance which had been entered
into with Russia after the Treaty of Verela. His first measure was to
place Sweden in a position of absolute neutrality, from which she never
swerved during his tenure of power.

[Sidenote: Policy of Dumouriez.]

[Sidenote: War declared by France against Austria. 20th April 1792.]

Of the ministers who came into office in France in March 1792 through
the influence of the Girondins in the Legislative Assembly, the most
notable were Roland and Dumouriez. The former was a sincere republican,
who was induced by his wife to take up an offensive attitude to the
King, the latter an experienced soldier and diplomatist, who was well
fitted for the ministry of foreign affairs. Dumouriez at once accepted
war with Austria as inevitable, and directed all his efforts to
isolate her. He was a sworn enemy of the Austrian alliance, entered
into by the Treaty of 1756, and cemented by the marriage of Marie
Antoinette, and his first step was to endeavour to detach Prussia. He
was sanguine enough to believe in the possibility of doing this, but
he did not understand the character of Frederick William II. It was
difficult to induce that monarch to make up his mind, but when he did
make it up he was obstinate. The French party at his Court, headed by
his uncle Prince Henry, and in his ministry, represented by Haugwitz,
was very strong; but, on the other hand, he had been convinced by
Leopold that the cause of Louis XVI. was the cause of monarchy, and
the German party at Berlin hinted that if he allowed Austria to pose
as the defender of the rights of the Empire by herself, the policy
of Frederick the Great to make Prussia the leader of Germany would
be undone. Frederick William II., therefore, listened coldly to the
overtures of Dumouriez, and made preparations to support his ally in
the field. On 20th April 1792 the Legislative Assembly assented almost
unanimously to the King’s proposition, as read by Dumouriez, to declare
war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, as Francis II. was at
this time styled, and the great war, which was to rage with but slight
intermissions for twenty-three years, began.

[Sidenote: Invasion of the Tuileries. 20th June 1792.]

The commencement of the first campaign of 1792 proved how thoroughly
the French army had been disorganised and demoralised by the policy of
the Constituent Assembly and the general course of the Revolution. An
attempt was made to invade the Austrian Netherlands or Belgium on four
lines; but one column was seized with panic and rushed back to Lille,
murdering its general, Theobald Dillon. The other commanders found
their soldiers filled with a spirit of distrust for their officers and
hardly amenable to discipline, and it soon became obvious that France
would have to stand on the defensive. This news profoundly moved the
people of France and especially of Paris. The word treachery was freely
used in connection with the Court, and it was asserted that the plan
of campaign had been revealed to the Austrians by the Queen. This was
true; Marie Antoinette had always looked to Austrian help to rescue
her from her position, and Louis XVI. had now entirely come round to
her view. At this juncture he dismissed his Girondin ministers on
their insisting upon his signing a decree, which had been passed by
the Assembly ordering the deportation of priests who had not taken
the oath, and even accepted the resignation of the ablest of them,
Dumouriez, who had offered to form a new ministry. The populace of
Paris was intensely excited by the failure of the attack on Belgium,
the concentration of the Prussian army on the frontier, and the
dismissal of the popular ministers, and a body of petitioners, after
filing through the hall of the Assembly, burst into the Tuileries and
for some hours filled the palace, insulting the King and Queen and
forcing the former to put on a red cap of liberty. The invasion of the
Tuileries marked the final breach between the King and the people.
Louis XVI. longed more ardently than ever for the arrival of the allied
monarchs; and the Jacobin leaders, who perceived the impossibility that
France should be successful in war with an unwilling king at her head,
began to plot for his overthrow. His last chance was lost, when he
rejected the proffered assistance of Lafayette, who returned from his
army without leave and offered to bring the National Guard of Paris to
his help.

[Sidenote: Francis II. Emperor. 14th July 1792.]

The news of the invasion of the Tuileries by the mob on the 20th June
further decided the allied monarchs to take immediate action. Francis
II., who was crowned Emperor at Frankfort on 14th July 1792, was
eager to come to his aunt’s help. The position of the allies was now
reversed. Instead of Austria in the person of the experienced Emperor
Leopold guiding Prussia, it was now Frederick William II. of Prussia
who directed the policy of the young Emperor Francis. It was arranged
that the Prussians should invade Champagne, supported by a _corps_ of
Austrians and _émigrés_ on their left, and joined midway by a _corps_
of Austrians from their right, while an Austrian army under Duke Albert
of Saxe-Teschen was to march from the Netherlands and invest Lille.
The central Prussian army was placed under the command of the Duke of
Brunswick, who issued a proclamation, drafted by an _émigré_, M. de
Limon, and filled with violent language by Count Fersen, threatening to
hold Paris liable for the safety of the King, and vowing vengeance on
the French people as rebels.

[Sidenote: Insurrection of 10th Aug. 1792.]

[Sidenote: Suspension of Louis XVI. 10th Aug. 1792.]

Brunswick’s proclamation was the very thing to complete the
exasperation of the French people. National patriotism rose to its
height; the country had been declared in danger, and thousands of
volunteers were arming and preparing to go to the front; the threats
of the Prussians only increased the national spirit of resistance; and
the universal feeling was one of defiance. But there was obviously no
chance of success while the executive remained in its present hands.
The King’s power of interfering with the preparations for resistance
had to be stopped. This was clearly understood by the democratic
leaders, who, ever since 20th June 1792, had been organising an armed
rising. They waited till some volunteers from Marseilles entered the
capital, singing the song that bears their name, and then they struck.
The royal plans for the defence of the Tuileries were thwarted; a
number of the most energetic democrats ousted the Council-General of
the Commune of Paris, and formed an Insurrectionary Commune; and the
men of the poorer districts of Paris, the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and
Saint-Marceau, headed by the Marseillais, advanced to attack the royal
palace. Before the assault commenced, Louis XVI., accompanied by his
family and his ministers, took refuge in the hall of the Legislative
Assembly. The attack was gallantly resisted by the Swiss Guards, who
garrisoned the palace, but the people were eventually successful and
the Tuileries was taken. The Legislative Assembly at once declared the
King suspended from his office, and ordered him to be confined with
his family in the Temple. It then elected a new ministry, consisting of
three of the former Girondin ministers, Roland, Clavière, and Servan
for the Interior, Finance, and War, and three new men, Danton, Monge,
and Lebrun for Justice, the Marine, and Foreign Affairs. This ministry,
with the help of an extraordinary Commission of Twenty-one, elected by
the Legislative, and of the Commune of Paris, displayed the greatest
energy. By means of domiciliary visits, those suspected of opposition
to the insurrection of 10th August were seized and imprisoned; a
camp was formed for the defence of Paris; men were everywhere raised
and equipped and sent to the front; and commissioners were sent
throughout France, and especially to the armies, to tell the tale of
the insurrection and to secure the adhesion of the people. Danton
was the heart and soul of the defence movement and of the ministry,
and inspired confidence and patriotism into those who hesitated;
the Commission of Twenty-one, whose mouthpiece was the great orator
Vergniaud, aided him to the best of their power; the Legislative
directed the convocation of the primary assemblies, without distinction
of active and passive citizens, for the election of a National
Convention; and the Commune of Paris took measures to prevent any
attempt at a counter-revolution.

[Sidenote: Desertion of Lafayette.]

[Sidenote: The Massacres of September 1792.]

But no amount of energy and patriotism could in a moment make trained
armies and enable France to repulse the most famous troops in Europe.
Fortunately for France, in this crisis, her untrained soldiers behaved
admirably. Lafayette, on the news of the insurrection of 10th August,
arrested the commissioners sent to him by the Legislative Assembly,
and endeavoured to induce his army to march to the aid of the King.
But his men refused; the former commander of the National Guard of
Paris deserted, and Dumouriez took command of his army. Lille made a
gallant resistance to the Austrians, who had formed the siege, but the
Prussians met with no such obstinate opposition. Longwy surrendered
to them on 27th August, and Verdun on 2nd September, and they
continued their march directly on Paris. Dumouriez fell back with
his main army to defend the uplands,—they can hardly be called the
mountains,—of the Argonne. He summoned to him the _corps d’armée_ on
the Belgian frontier under Arther Dillon, and a detachment from the
Army of the Rhine under Kellermann, while he was also reinforced by
some thousands of undisciplined, and therefore useless, volunteers,
and by a fine division of old soldiers collected from the garrisons
in the interior. In Paris the news of the Prussian advance caused a
panic; it seemed impossible that Dumouriez’ hastily concentrated army
could oppose an effective resistance; and even Danton and Vergniaud
could hardly keep up the enthusiasm they had at first aroused. At this
juncture the Parisian volunteers were half afraid to go to the front
for fear that the numerous prisoners, arrested during the domiciliary
visits, would break out and revenge themselves on the families of the
volunteers. This feeling induced the horrible series of murders, known
as the Massacres of September, in the prisons. The massacres began
fortuitously, and there were not more than 200 murderers at work; but
the crowd, including national guards, stood by and saw them committed
without raising a hand to help the victims. All Paris was responsible
for the murders; they could have been easily stopped; but no one
wanted to check them: the feeling which allowed them was the popular
feeling; neither Danton, nor Roland, nor the Commune of Paris, nor the
Legislative Assembly cared to interfere; the massacres were the answer
to the Prussian advance and the capture of Longwy, as the insurrection
of 10th August was the reply to Brunswick’s manifesto.

[Sidenote: Battle of Valmy. 20th Sept. 1792.]

On 20th September 1792 the main Prussian army, which had reached the
Argonne, attacked the position occupied by Kellermann at Valmy, and
was repulsed. The victory was not a great one; the battle was not very
hotly contested; the losses on both sides were insignificant; but its
results both military and political were immense. The King of Prussia,
who complained that the Austrians had not fulfilled their engagements,
and that the whole burden was thrown on him, was easily persuaded by
the Duke of Brunswick to order a retreat. The Duke of Brunswick was
induced to give that advice from military considerations, in that his
army was wasted by disease and harassed by the inclement weather,
and from policy, because, like many Prussian officers, he considered
it unnatural for Prussians and Austrians to fight side by side. The
retiring army was not hotly pressed; Dumouriez still hoped to induce
Prussia to quit the coalition against France, and pursued with more
courtesy than vigour until the army of Brunswick was beyond the limits
of French territory.

[Sidenote: Meeting of the Convention. 20th Sep. 1792.]

[Sidenote: Parties in the Convention.]

On the day of the battle, or as it is with more correctness termed the
cannonade, of Valmy, the National Convention met in Paris and assumed
the direction of affairs. It contained all the most distinguished men
who had sat in the two former assemblies on the Left, or democratic
side, and its first act was to declare France a Republic. After
this had been unanimously carried, dissensions at once arose, and a
fundamental difference between two groups of deputies appeared, which
threatened to end in the proscription of the one or the other. On
the one side were the distinguished orators of the Gironde, who have
given their name to the whole party, reinforced by the presence of
several old members of the Constituent Assembly and of a few young and
inexperienced men. This group was roughly divided into Buzotins and
Brissotins, or followers of Buzot, a leading ex-Constituant, and of
Brissot, the author of the war; but some of the greatest of them, like
Vergniaud, refused to ally themselves with either leader. The chief
meeting-place of the Buzotins, who included most of the younger men,
was Madame Roland’s salon. On the other side, taking their name from
the high benches on which they sat, were the deputies of the Mountain,
including almost the whole of the representatives of Paris, and all
the energetic republicans, who had brought about the insurrection
of 10th August. This group comprised Robespierre, Danton and Marat,
Collot-d’Herbois and Billaud-Varenne, all deputies for Paris, and none
of whom, except Robespierre, had ever sat in either of the former
assemblies, with some leaders of the extreme party in the Legislative,
Merlin of Thionville, Chabot and Basire. It was not long before open
quarrels arose between the two groups. The Girondins accused the
leaders of the Mountain of having in the Insurrectionary Commune
fomented the massacres of September in the prisons, and abused them
as sanguinary and ambitious anarchists. This accusation was formally
indeed brought against Robespierre by Louvet, a Rolandist Girondin,
in an elaborate attack delivered on 29th October; while at the same
time the Mountain accused the Girondins of being federalists and
desiring to destroy the essential unity of the Republic, an accusation
which was used with deadly effect at a later date. Both groups,—they
cannot be called parties, for they had no party ties and recognised no
party obligations,—appealed to the great majority of the Convention,
the deputies of the Centre, who sat in the Plain or Marsh. The
representative of this vast majority was Barère, an ex-Constituant, who
trimmed judiciously between the two opposing groups.

[Sidenote: Conquest of Savoy and Nice.]

[Sidenote: Capture of Mayence. 21st October 1792.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Jemmappes. 6th Nov. 1792.]

The Convention, which had been elected in days of deepest dejection, if
not despair, when the Prussians were moving on Paris and the Austrians
were besieging Lille, was soon raised by a succession of conquests to a
state of patriotic exaltation, bordering on delirium. In the month of
September, just after the battle of Valmy, General Montesquiou occupied
Savoy, and General Anselme the county and city of Nice, territories
belonging to the King of Sardinia, without striking a blow. This was
followed by a more important series of successes. Though not as a
body engaged in war with France, many princes of the Empire had sent
contingents to the aid of the Prussians and Austrians. In reply, still
without declaring war on the Empire, the French attacked the Rhenish
princes. On 1st October General Custine, commanding a corps of the
Army of the Rhine, took Spires, on October 4 Worms, and on October
21 Mayence, one of the bulwarks of the Empire and the capital of the
Elector-Archbishop. From Mayence Custine detached divisions in other
directions, and held the wealthy city of Frankfort-on-the-Main to
ransom. Not less startlingly rapid were the conquests of Dumouriez on
the north-east frontier. After the retreat of the Prussians he turned
north against the Austrians; he raised the siege of Lille, which had
been heroically defended, and on 6th November he defeated the Austrians
in a pitched battle at Jemmappes, near Mons. This victory laid Belgium
open to him. He occupied the whole country, entered Brussels as a
conqueror, and established his headquarters at Liége. The conquest of
Belgium intoxicated the Convention; they believed their armies to be
invincible; they regarded themselves as having a mission to carry the
doctrines of the French Revolution as embodied in the Rights of Man
and the Sovereignty of the People into all countries; they declared
themselves on 19th November ready to wage war for all peoples upon all
kings; and in disregard of all international obligations, they declared
the Scheldt, which by treaty had been closed to commerce for years, a
free river, because it had its source in a free country.

The intoxication which followed this series of unparalleled successes
blinded the Convention to the need of improving and disciplining their
troops. The French republicans did not comprehend that the chief cause
of the facile conquests of their armies was that they met with the
sympathy of the conquered. Belgium, the Rhine provinces, Savoy, and
Nice were all filled with revolutionary enthusiasm, and welcomed the
French as liberators; they requested to be united to France, when
primary assemblies were summoned by the French commissioners, and
on 9th November Savoy and Nice, and on 13th December the Austrian
Netherlands or Belgium, were declared a part of France. In spite of
these military successes, the republican army could not be organised
in a day; the seeds of anarchy sown by the Constituent had gone too
deep to enable discipline to be restored except by sharp measures; the
administration of the army, that is, the commissariat, the war office,
etc., was in a state of chaos; the soldiers, both officers and men,
of all the armies, kept their eyes too closely fixed on the course of
politics in Paris to do their duty efficiently at the front.

[Sidenote: Execution of Louis XVI. 21st Jan. 1793.]

The burning question which divided the Convention at the end of 1792
was the treatment to be meted out to Louis XVI. Robespierre urged
that, as a political measure, he should be put to death; but the
Girondins, filled with an idea of imitating the English republicans
of the seventeenth century, decided on a royal trial. When the trial,
which was but a defence of Louis XVI. by his counsel, was over, the
Girondins, in their desire to avoid responsibility, or perhaps from a
genuine belief that it might save the King’s life, proposed that the
sentence on him should be submitted to the primary assemblies of the
people. The deputies of the Mountain feared no responsibility, and
taunted the Girondins with being concealed royalists. The motion for an
appeal to the people was rejected; the King was sentenced to death by a
small majority; and on 21st January 1793 Louis XVI. was guillotined at
Paris.

[Sidenote: War with Spain, Holland, England, and the Empire.]

The result of the execution of Louis XVI. was to give a pretext to
the countries of Europe which had not yet declared war against the
French Republic to do so. Charles IV. of Spain, in the hope of saving
the chief of the Bourbon family, maintained his minister at Paris
until the last possible moment, and it was with reluctance that he
placed his army in the field on the news of the King’s execution. The
French Republic accepted the challenge, and early in March declared
war against Spain. The war with Holland stood on a different basis.
Dumouriez, after his conquest of Belgium, looked on Holland as an
easy and particularly wealthy prey. He believed that by conquering
Holland, France would have in her hands a means of forcing England to
keep the peace. His views were supported by Danton, who was sent on
mission to Dumouriez’ headquarters. The contrary was the result. Pitt
sincerely wished for peace, and was essentially a peace minister, but
he had no idea of allowing the faithful ally of England, Holland, to be
overrun and held to ransom by the French. The opening of the Scheldt
had crowned the long series of French breaches of international law,
and Pitt resented the assumption of the Convention that the law of
nature, as interpreted by themselves, was to take the place of the
law of nations. Pitt’s hand was also forced in two directions; the
philippics of Burke had roused the fears of English property-holders
against the spread of French principles; and George III. was as anxious
as any Continental monarch to preserve the dignity of kings. Pitt
and his foreign minister, Grenville, gradually became convinced that
the French meant to fight England, and that war was inevitable, and
Chauvelin, the French ambassador, was ordered to leave London. The
French leaders were under a misconception with regard to the spread
of their ideas in England; they knew that a large body of educated
men sympathised with them, and expected a national democratic rising
which should overthrow not only Pitt, but the English monarchy. They
did not understand that an English parliamentary opposition, in spite
of its words, is as staunchly loyal as the ministry, and that it would
never foment or encourage insurrection. Under these circumstances and
deluded by these misconceptions France declared war against England and
Holland on 1st February 1793. Many smaller nations entered on the fray.
Sweden under the prudent government of the Regent Duke of Sudermania,
Denmark under Christian VII. and Bernstorff, and Switzerland declared
their neutrality. But Portugal, where the heir-apparent, afterwards
King John VI., had become regent for his mother, Maria Francisca, who
was insane; Tuscany, whose Grand Duke, Ferdinand, was a brother of the
Emperor; Naples, or rather the Two Sicilies, whose king was a Bourbon,
and whose queen was a sister of Marie Antoinette, all declared war
on the French Republic. Catherine of Russia wore mourning for Louis
XVI. inveighed against the wickedness of the French republicans, and
proceeded to take advantage of the occupation of the rest of Europe
in the affairs of France to prosecute her schemes on Poland. Last of
all, the Holy Roman Empire, which had decreed the armament of the
contingents of the circles, on 23d November 1792, after the news of
the capture of Mayence, solemnly, and with all the circumlocution
inseparable from the movement of the unwieldy machine, declared war
against France on 22d March 1793.

[Sidenote: Catherine invades Poland.]

[Sidenote: Second partition of Poland. 24th Sept. 1793.]

While regenerated France was at bay with nearly the whole of Europe,
regenerated Poland was being conquered by a single power. While Europe
pretended to fight France on behalf of the principle of monarchy,
Catherine invaded Poland, because by the Constitution of 3d May 1791
it had strengthened its monarchy. France was attacked because it was
asserted to be in a state of anarchy, Poland because it had by wise
reforms tried to put an end to an historic system of constitutional
anarchy. As soon as Catherine had made peace with the Turks at Jassy,
and Austria and Prussia were engaged in war with France, she intervened
to overthrow the new Polish Constitution. It was not difficult to find
Polish nobles who resented the abrogation of the old system, and,
under Catherine’s encouragement, Branicki, Felix Potocki, and some
others formed the Confederation of Targovitsa, and protested against
the abolition of the _liberum veto_ and the reforms of 3d May 1791.
They then asked Catherine to send a Russian army to their assistance.
She willingly complied, and on 18th May 1792 published a manifesto,
stating that she was the guarantor of the ancient Polish Constitution,
and stigmatising the reformers of 1791 as Jacobins. Suvórov at once
entered Poland at the head of 80,000 Russians and 20,000 Cossacks, and
by force of numbers defeated the Polish army under Joseph Poniatowski
at Zielencé on 18th June 1792, and under Kosciuszko at Dubienka on 17th
July. These defeats caused the reformers of 1791, including Kollontai
and Kosciuszko, to go into exile; their place at the Diet was taken by
the leaders of the Confederation of Targovitsa, and the Constitution
of 3d May 1791 was abrogated. The conquest of the Polish patriots by
Russia greatly excited the King of Prussia and the Emperor, and was one
of the causes which induced Frederick William to order Brunswick to
retreat after his trifling check at Valmy. The Polish patriots appealed
to Prussia for help under the terms of the alliance of 1790, but the
King only answered that he had not recognised the Constitution of 3d
May 1791, and that the Polish leaders were Jacobins and imitators and
allies of the French revolutionary leaders. A Prussian army, therefore,
entered Poland to co-operate with the Russians and to share the spoil.
A treaty of partition was signed by Catherine and Frederick William
on 4th January 1793, by which Russia was to annex eastern Poland,
including the whole of Minsk, Podolia, Volhynia, and Little Russia, and
Prussia was to have Posen, Gnezen, Kalisch, and the cities of Dantzic
and Thorn. Austria was too hotly engaged in the war with France to
be able to claim a share, but the conduct of Prussia at this time in
excluding her from the partition of Poland was never forgotten nor
forgiven, and increased the hereditary feeling of distrust between
the two powers. The Emperor Francis regarded himself as duped, and
Prussia by acting alone broke the solemn engagements entered into with
Leopold, and commenced the policy which was to end in the conclusion
of the Treaty of Basle with the French Republic. Though the second
partition of Poland was agreed upon in 1792, it was not consummated
until the following year. A Diet was called at Grodno, and there, in
the presence of the Russian soldiers, Stanislas Poniatowski and the
Diet consented in silence, on 24th September 1793, to the arrangements
made between Russia and Prussia. On 16th October Catherine signed a
treaty, guaranteeing the liberty of Poland, that is, the abuses of the
old Constitution, which were certain to give Russia the opportunity
of finishing the work of blotting out the Poles as an independent
nationality from the map of Europe.

The close of the year 1792 thus witnessed at the same time the
overthrow of Poland and France in arms against foreign aggression.
Each country was to make a violent effort for independence. The French
were to be successful, because under the influence of personal and
political freedom every Frenchman felt it his duty to resist foreign
interference; Poland was to fail, because it was not the Polish people,
but only the enlightened Polish nobles and bourgeois, who appreciated
the situation.

CHAPTER IV

1793–1795

[Sidenote: France at War with Europe.]

The first months of 1793 found France at war with Europe. Though
such minor states as Denmark and Sweden and Venice declared their
neutrality, they manifested no desire to assist the French Republic,
and their neutrality was but of slight service. It was otherwise with
the neutrality of Switzerland. The Swiss cantons had nearly been drawn
into the general war by the support given to the revolutionary party
in the Republic of Geneva by the French ministry, which included among
its members Clavière, a Genevese exile. The canton of Berne went so
far as to occupy the city of Geneva, and it was only by the exercise
of much diplomatic skill that open war was avoided. The neutrality of
Switzerland made the land blockade of the French Republic of no avail.
Through secret agents in Switzerland, arms, provisions, and necessaries
were obtained from Southern Germany, and diplomatic relations were
maintained with the democrats residing in the states of the belligerent
powers. The declaration of war by the Holy Roman Empire completed the
armed opposition of the greater countries of Europe against France.
Of these countries Russia alone sent no army or fleet against the
Republic, and Catherine satisfied herself with stating that she was
engaged in conquering Jacobins in Poland.

[Sidenote: Altered character of the War.]

The character of the war in 1793 differed from that waged in 1792.
In 1792 France was invaded on behalf of Louis XVI., and the fighting
was carried on according to the principles which had existed in the
eighteenth century. But in 1793 the powers were at war with France for
a different and more far-reaching reason. The revolutionary propaganda,
that is, the idea consecrated in the decree of the Convention on the
19th of November 1792, that France was to spread among all countries
the new doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity, vitally
affected every government in Europe. England in particular, which
had studiously kept aloof while the Revolution was pursuing its
course at home, only felt obliged to interfere when the new rulers of
France announced their intention of disregarding all principles of
international law, and of converting other nations to their doctrines.
It was this common opposition to the revolutionary propaganda which
united the powers of Europe against France in 1793. England made
herself the paymaster of the coalition. She lavished money freely,
not only in subsidies to Prussia and Austria, but to less important
countries, such as Spain and Sardinia. With this community of aim
necessarily came a community of action. The war against France became a
matter of principle and not of intrigue. This new attitude was marked
by changes of ministry both in Prussia and in Austria. The failure of
the invasion of 1792 disgusted Frederick William II. with his advisers.
The Duke of Brunswick fell into open disgrace, and Schulemburg, the
foreign minister, made way for Haugwitz. At Vienna, Count Philip
Cobenzl, the Vice-Chancellor of State, who had managed foreign affairs
owing to the old age of Kaunitz, was dismissed, and his place was taken
by Thugut, a man of low origin, whose sole political object was the
humiliation of France, and his guiding principle a horror of French
principles. Even in the secondary states similar ministerial changes
took place, of which the most remarkable was the dismissal of Aranda in
Spain, who was succeeded in power by Godoy, the Queen’s lover.

[Sidenote: First Campaign of 1793.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Neerwinden. 21st March 1793.]

The first result of the formation of the coalition was a determined
attack upon Dumouriez’ position in Belgium. That general had hitherto
not despaired of detaching Prussia from Austria, but the execution of
Louis XVI. destroyed his last hope. Both Prussia and England declined
to listen to his lavish promises; his army had wasted away while in
winter quarters; the first volunteers returned to their homes in
thousands when France was freed from the invaders; the troops he
retained were deprived of all necessaries by the disorganisation
of the French War Office; and the people of Belgium, finding that
their country was annexed to the French Republic, in spite of their
patriotic desire for independence, showed their hostility in every
way, and harassed instead of aiding the French troops. Under these
circumstances, Dumouriez’ invasion of Holland failed, as it was certain
to fail. His right wing, which was besieging Maestricht under the
command of General Miranda, was defeated by the Austrians under the
command of the Prince of Coburg, and he had to withdraw his advanced
divisions, for fear of being cut off from France. He was rapidly
pursued. An English army, under the Duke of York, joined the Austrians,
under the Prince of Coburg, and Dumouriez was utterly defeated by
the allies at Neerwinden on the 21st March 1793. The defeat became a
rout, and the French were driven from Belgium as speedily as they had
conquered it. Dumouriez then made a fruitless effort to lead his army
against the Convention. He arrested four deputies and the Minister for
War who had been sent to suspend him from his command, but, finding
that his army would not follow him, he deserted to the Austrians on the
5th April.

[Sidenote: Effect on the Convention.]

[Sidenote: The Committee of Public Safety.]

[Sidenote: Insurrection in La Vendée. 1793.]

The effect of Dumouriez’ reverses, and, finally, of his desertion,
on the temper of the Convention was most striking. The enthusiasts
who believed in the inauguration of a new era, who boasted that free
Frenchmen, even without arms and discipline, would be able to defeat
all foreign armies, and who considered that the career of the Republic
was certain to be one of victory, were rudely awakened. The need of
the creation of a strong government was forced upon the attention of
the Convention. Danton, recurring to the views of Mirabeau, proposed
that a new ministry should be chosen from among the members of the
Legislature. But the republicans had the same horror of the power
of the executive as the constitutionalists, and Danton’s motion was
rejected. Nevertheless, it was quite impossible that an unwieldy
assembly and a discredited ministry could defend France with any
degree of success. As early as January 1793, a Committee of General
Defence had been elected by the principal committees of the Convention;
this was replaced, on the news of the defeat at Neerwinden, by a
Committee of General Defence of twenty-five members chosen directly
by the Convention; this was still too unwieldy, and on the news of
the desertion of Dumouriez, the first Committee of Public Safety of
nine members, exercising supreme executive authority, was appointed.
But the question was, how was the Committee to be enabled to rule.
Its first duty was to raise soldiers to meet the enemies upon every
frontier. For this purpose eighty-two deputies of the Convention were
sent through France, two and two, to raise by volunteering where
possible, but by conscription if other measures failed, 300,000 men.
This call for recruits caused disturbances in many parts of France;
in La Vendée it started civil war. It was to protest against the
conscription, and not to defend the Church or the nobility, that
the people of La Vendée rose in insurrection. But the leadership
of the movement, which had at first been taken by gamekeepers and
postillions, was speedily assumed by members of the ancient French
clergy and nobility. Cohesion was thus given to the insurgents, and a
large and important district in the west of France maintained for a
time a successful opposition to the decrees of the Convention. But the
reverses and desertion of Dumouriez not only caused, for the first time
in the history of the Revolution, the creation of a real executive,
it caused also the forging of the weapons by which that executive
was in the future to establish the Reign of Terror. On 9th March the
Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris was established. Its special object was
the summary punishment of all enemies of the Revolution. On the 4th of
April the Convention decreed that a maximum price of food should be
fixed. Extended powers were granted to deputies sent on mission to the
armies or to the departments; and an army, consisting of the very poor,
or _sans culottes_, was proposed.

[Sidenote: Overthrow of the Girondins. 2d June 1793.]

While these measures, which did not take full effect for some months,
were being debated, the Convention was torn by the opposition between
the Girondins and the deputies of the Mountain. The details of the
struggle are not important. The arguments used by the Girondins were
that their enemies were responsible for the massacres of September
in the prisons, that they were under the influence of the Commune
of Paris, and that they encouraged anarchy. The Mountain, on their
side, alleged that the Girondins were concealed royalists, because
they had voted against the execution of Louis XVI., that they were
federalists, who desired to destroy the unity of the Republic, and that
they preferred a weak to a strong government. The struggle was mainly
carried on in the tribune of the Convention; Robespierre attacked
Brissot, Vergniaud, and Guadet, and these orators replied by attacking
Robespierre and Danton. The latter for a time endeavoured to avoid
breaking with the Girondins, but he was so violently impeached for his
conduct while on mission in Belgium, and accused of being an accomplice
of Dumouriez, that in self-defence he was forced to take up the
gauntlet. He had been elected to the first Committee of Public Safety,
and though his constitutional indolence prevented him from becoming its
most important member, he shared with Cambon, the financier, the chief
responsibility of the new method of government. Meanwhile, worse news
kept coming from every frontier. It was felt to be both injudicious and
unpatriotic for the Convention to be occupied in personal squabbles
when the fate of France was in the balance. The Commune of Paris
decided to intervene. The deputies who sat in the Plain, or Centre of
the Convention, were more influenced by the eloquence of the Girondins
than by the energy of the Mountain, and it was with regret that they
felt obliged to yield to the Commune of Paris. On the 31st May 1793,
regular troops and national guards, under the direction of Hanriot, the
commander of the National Guard of Paris, surrounded the Tuileries,
to which the Convention had removed on the 10th May, and the Commune
demanded that the leading Girondins should be expelled from the
Convention, and sent for trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The
_coup d’état_ was completed on the 2d June, when these demands were
complied with, and from that date the Girondins as a political party in
the Convention ceased to exist.

[Sidenote: Second Campaign of 1793.]

The desertion of Dumouriez left the way clear for the Austrians and
English to invade France. They advanced slowly and did not attempt,
like the Duke of Brunswick in the previous year, to mask the frontier
fortresses and move straight upon Paris. On 24th May the French camp at
Famars was stormed; on 12th July Condé, on 28th July Valenciennes, were
taken after making an obstinate resistance, and the allies were thus
firmly established in France. Then, fortunately for the Convention,
the allied commanders-in-chief quarrelled. The Duke of York, acting
under the orders of the English ministry, besieged Dunkirk, which port
he desired to hold for the disembarkation of supplies. The Prince of
Coburg, with the Austrians, refused to assist in the siege of Dunkirk,
and invested Le Quesnoy. Further south the Prussians captured Mayence
on the 22d of July, and a mixed army of Austrians and troops of the
Empire under Würmser forced their way into Alsace. At both ends of
the Pyrenees Spanish armies invaded the French Republic. In the
eastern Pyrenees nearly the whole of Roussillon was conquered, and in
the western Pyrenees the passage of the Bidassoa was forced. These
repeated reverses in so many quarters did not destroy the courage of
the Convention or of the French people, but they proved that hastily
raised undisciplined masses can never be a match for trained soldiers.
The successes of Dumouriez and Custine had been as much the result of
accident and of the hearty reception given to them by the natives of
the districts they invaded as of talent and bravery, but the first
defeats showed how thoroughly the policy of the Constituent Assembly
had sapped the discipline of the French army.

[Sidenote: Civil war in France.]

To add to the dangers which threatened France during the summer of
1793, civil war in many quarters redoubled the perils caused by the
foreign invasion. The war in La Vendée increased in magnitude almost
daily, and the soldiers of the Republic were frequently defeated by
the hardy peasants who fought in guerilla fashion among their woods
and marshes. Throughout Brittany and in the mountains of Auvergne
similar movements took place, generally guided by priests and country
gentlemen; but except in La Vendée there was no serious royalist
manifestation. But the expulsion of the Girondins from the Convention
had given rise to another movement of even greater importance. The
insurrections in La Vendée and similar risings in country or mountain
districts were the work of ignorant peasants; the movement in favour of
the Girondins was headed by wealthy and intelligent cities. The news of
the _coup d’état_ of the 2d of June was received with consternation in
most of the chief cities of France. Girondin journals had long preached
the wickedness of the Commune of Paris, and that the leaders of the
Mountain were either anarchists or ambitious men aiming at power.
These words now had their effect. Several of the deputies proscribed
on the 2d of June escaped into the provinces, and a group of them,
collected at Caen in Normandy, endeavoured to organise an army against
the Convention. Other cities followed the example. Marseilles arrested
the representatives on mission; Bordeaux refused to receive the
deputies sent to it; Lyons started a counter-revolution and executed
Chalier, the leader of the local democratic party; and several cities
agreed to send detachments of local troops to form a central army
against the Convention at Bourges. For a few days matters looked most
threatening for the victorious members of the Mountain, but they were
well served by the deputies on mission. The Norman army was easily
defeated at Pacy on the 13th of July; Bordeaux and Marseilles quickly
submitted, and Lyons was invested. But the success of the Mountain was
due to something more than the vigour of its representatives in the
provinces. The general sentiment in France was that the conduct of
the Girondins in causing civil war showed the very excess of want of
patriotism; even if the Commune of Paris had done wrong in interfering
with the Convention, the Girondins had behaved worse in attempting
to rouse the provinces, and owing to this sentiment many departments
and many cities speedily repented of the encouragement they had given
to the Girondin designs, and withdrew their support to the proposed
concentration of local troops at Bourges.

[Sidenote: The Constitution of 1793.]

[Sidenote: The work of the first Committee of Public Safety.]

The deputies of the Mountain met the unparalleled dangers of foreign
and civil war with undaunted courage. Their first measure was to
draw up with extreme rapidity a republican constitution, which is
known as the Constitution of 1793. As it never came into effect, the
details of this proposed system of government need not be described.
But the fact that it was drawn up, promulgated, and sent before the
primary assemblies of the people, deprived the Girondin insurgents
of one of their chief weapons. They had asserted that the Mountain
admired anarchy and wished to retain power for the Convention and
themselves. To these allegations the issue of the Constitution of
1793 was an adequate reply. But it was quite impossible, according to
the leaders of the Mountain, for the Convention to abandon the reins
of power. A general election at such a time would but increase the
difficulty of the situation. So, while declaring the existence of the
new Constitution, it deferred putting it into effect, and strengthened
the authority of its new executive, the Committee of Public Safety.
The advantages to be derived from the concentration of authority in
a few hands became quite clear to the Convention after the expulsion
of the Girondins. It may be doubted whether the distinguished orators
who directed Girondin opinion, from their constant apprehension of
the dangers of a strong executive to individual liberty, would ever
have perceived them. The existence of the Committee made it possible
for representatives on mission and other agents of government to
have a central authority on which to rely. It was the Committee
which directed the short campaign in Normandy which overthrew the
most promising movement of the escaped Girondin deputies; it was the
prudence of a member of the Committee, Robert Lindet, which pacified
Normandy, after the victory had been won, by ruthlessly tracking down
the ringleaders and generously sparing those who had been led away;
it was the Committee which first attempted to re-establish discipline
in the armies and to supply them with provisions and munitions of war;
and it was on the motion of the most important member of the first
Committee, Danton, that the fatal decree of the 19th of November, which
consecrated the revolutionary propaganda, and gave good reason for the
continued opposition of foreign powers, was repealed. This good work
in all directions showed the members of the Convention that they were
acting in the right direction.

[Sidenote: The Great Committee of Public Safety.]

On 10th July 1793 the first Committee was dissolved on the motion of
Camille Desmoulins, but a new Committee with similar powers was at
once elected. This Committee, which may be called the Great Committee
of Public Safety, remained in power for more than a year. Danton was
not a member of it, partly because he believed he could do better work
outside, partly because of his dislike of continued labour; Cambon also
was not re-elected, preferring to confine himself to the charge of
the finances of the Republic as the principal member of the Financial
Committee. The nine members originally elected in July were Barère, who
acted as reporter throughout its tenure of office, and was therefore in
some respects the most important of them all; Jean Bon Saint-André, who
took charge of naval matters; Prieur of the Marne and Robert Lindet,
whose main duties were to provide for the feeding of the armies;
Hérault de Séchelles, the chief author of the Constitution of 1793, who
busied himself with foreign affairs; Couthon, Saint-Just, Gasparin, and
Thuriot. Robespierre entered the Committee in the place of Gasparin on
the 27th of July; Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d’Or were added on the
14th of August to superintend the military operations on the frontiers;
Billaud-Varenne and Collot-d’Herbois were added on September the 6th
to establish the Reign of Terror; and on the 20th of September Thuriot
retired. The steps in the growth of the supremacy of this second
Committee of Public Safety are significant. On the 1st of August 1793
Barère read his first report to the Convention. In it he proposed the
most energetic, not to say sanguinary, measures. The war was to be
carried on with the utmost energy; La Vendée was to be destroyed; and
Marie Antoinette was to be sent for trial before the Revolutionary
Tribunal. On the same day Danton proposed that the Committee should be
formally recognised as a provisional government, and that the ministers
should be directed to act as its subordinates. This motion was not
carried, but the entire control over the resources of France, and the
lives of Frenchmen, which Danton contemplated, was secured without the
passing of a formal decree. The Convention seems to have been very
glad to rid itself of the work of government. It accepted without a
murmur every measure proposed by the Committee of Public Safety; it
re-elected the members month after month; it threw all responsibility
upon them and registered all the decrees they proposed. As has been
said, it definitely gave them the charge of the military operations by
the election of Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d’Or, and it established
the unity of their internal administration by the election of
Billaud-Varenne and Collot-d’Herbois.

[Sidenote: The Position of Robespierre.]

The rule of the second or Great Committee of Public Safety is generally
known as the Reign of Terror. The Committee itself divided the chief
functions of government among its members. The special functions of
all, except those of Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just, have been
already noticed. Robespierre was the only one amongst them who had any
reputation outside, or indeed within, the walls of the Convention.
His conduct during the session of the Constituent Assembly, his
clear-sighted opposition to the war with Austria, his sagacious
views on the subject of the treatment of the King, his war against
the Girondin federalists, his oratorical talent, and above all his
reputation for being absolutely incorruptible and sincerely patriotic,
made him the man of mark among the Committee. He was well aware of the
importance of his position. His colleagues on the Committee used him
as their figure-head to represent them on great occasions, and he made
it his business to lay down the general principles which underlay the
system of revolutionary government—that is, of the Reign of Terror. But
though to the Convention and to France at large Robespierre was the
most conspicuous member of the Committee of Public Safety, he really
exercised but very slight influence on the actual work of government.
He had no department of the State given into his charge; he had not
the necessary fluency or facility to take Barère’s place as ordinary
reporter; he was not on terms of friendship with the majority of his
fellow-workers; he was made use of, but was neither trusted nor liked
by the real governors of France. It was to their benefit that the
system of the solidarity of the Committee was established, which gave
to all their measures the sanction of Robespierre’s great reputation
for incorruptibility and patriotism. The majority of the Committee
had no positive views on government; they tried to do the work which
lay to their hands in the best way they could; Robespierre alone
hoped to evolve out of the Reign of Terror a new system of republican
government. His only real friends in the Committee were the two men
least suited to give him effectual help, for Couthon was a cripple,
and unable to attend with the necessary assiduity, and Saint-Just was
but five-and-twenty, the youngest of the Committee, and was generally
absent from Paris on special missions.

[Sidenote: The Reign of Terror.]

[Sidenote: Committee of General Security.]

The system by which the Great Committee of Public Safety regulated the
Reign of Terror was based upon two important institutions. The first of
these was the Committee of General Security which sat in Paris, and was
elected from the members of the Convention, and which exercised general
police control over all France. On great occasions its members sat with
the Committee of Public Safety as a Committee of Government, but its
special functions were to deal with men, while the Committee of Public
Safety dealt with measures. Danton, who was the principal creator of
the supremacy of the Great Committee of Public Safety—though he himself
refused to join it—saw the importance of subordinating in fact, if not
in name, the Committee of General Security to the Committee of Public
Safety. On 11th September 1793 a Committee of General Security had been
elected, containing certain deputies of independent character, and
Danton, fearing a rivalry would arise between the two Committees, at
once obtained its dissolution, and secured, on September the 14th, the
election of a Committee of General Security which would act in harmony
with the great Committee. The members elected at this time were with
but few exceptions re-elected every month.

[Sidenote: Deputies on Mission.]

The second instrument by which the Great Committee ruled were the
deputies on mission. The practice of sending deputies on special
missions originated in August 1792. It had grown in importance, and
the deputies proved their value in their vigorous suppression of the
Girondin movement in the provinces in the summer of 1793. The power
of deputies on mission was more than once specifically declared to be
unlimited. On grounds of public safety they were not only permitted,
but were ordered, to alter the composition of local authorities,
whether municipal or departmental. They had full powers to arrest
and to make requisitions. They were consistently supported by the
Committee of Public Safety sitting in Paris, and the greatest latitude
was given to them in administering the local government. As long as
they preserved the peace and sent up plenty of supplies of money, and,
when demanded, of recruits to Paris, their methods of government were
not minutely inquired into. Besides the deputies on mission employed
in the internal administration, another important body of similar
representatives were kept at the headquarters of the different armies.
These deputies likewise had unlimited authority. They could arrest even
generals-in-chief at their absolute will; they could degrade officers
of any rank; they could interfere with military operations; and could
overrule the orders of a general in the field. The Committee of General
Security and the deputies on mission ruled by means of inspiring
terror. This terror was based on the existence of the Revolutionary
Tribunal in Paris, and of its imitations termed revolutionary or
military commissions in the provinces, and the armies.

[Sidenote: Law of the Suspects.]

[Sidenote: Law of the Maximum.]

The Revolutionary Tribunal took cognisance of all political offences,
and its sentence was almost invariably death. Nearly every Frenchman
or Frenchwoman could be brought within the net of the Revolutionary
Tribunal by the Law of the Suspects. By this law, which was most
carefully drafted by Merlin of Douai, any one who for any reason could
be suspected of disliking the new state of affairs could be arrested.
All relatives of _émigrés_ or of noblemen came into this category as
well as all former functionaries and officials of whatever sort. But
since the Law of the Suspects was not sufficiently wide to impress the
ordinary bourgeois, more especially the petty bourgeois, with terror, a
new weapon was forged in the Law of the Maximum. This law was put into
operation in September 1793. The laws of political economy could not be
seriously affected by such a measure as the Law of the Maximum, which
fixed maximum prices at which all articles of prime necessity were
to be sold. Such a law was certain to be evaded; but its existence,
and the fact that evasions of the Law of the Maximum brought the
offender under the Revolutionary Tribunal, was enough to establish the
Reign of Terror over the petty bourgeois. There were other means for
extending the system which need not here be particularised, such as
the necessity of every person carrying a card with him giving a full
history of his conduct during the Revolution, the encouragement of
denunciations by the bestowal of rewards, and similar precautions. The
Revolutionary Tribunal was provided with victims under these measures
by the Committee of General Security, and by the numerous little
Revolutionary Committees sitting in every section of Paris, and in
every city, district, and village throughout France. The Revolutionary
Committees consisted of tried Jacobins, and were in the provinces
appointed by the deputies on mission. They were frequently purified by
the expulsion of any member who gave evidence of moderate opinions. The
Revolutionary Committees filled the prisons—it was the business of the
Revolutionary Tribunal to empty them. This it did with much expedition.
The death sentences of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, which only
averaged three a week from April to September 1793, averaged thirty-two
a week from September 1793 to June 1794, and 196 a week in June and
July 1794. This increase was very gradual; it became an established
system to send batches of victims to the guillotine every day; and the
numbers in these batches increased steadily. The Committee of Public
Safety, through its agent, the Committee of General Security, did not
much care who were executed as long as a considerable number went to
the scaffold every day. Exceptions to this rule are, however, to be
noted in the executions of Marie Antoinette on 16th October 1793, of
twenty-one Girondins on 31st October, of certain generals, such as
Custine, Houchard, and Biron, and of the Duke of Orleans and Bailly,
which intimidated courtiers, deputies, generals, and ex-Constituants.

This system of terror was not suddenly evolved—it was the result of
gradual growth. The two men mainly responsible for systematising it and
carrying it into effect were Billaud-Varenne and Collot-d’Herbois, who
were specially added to the Committee of Public Safety to superintend
the internal administration of France. On 10th October 1793, on the
motion of Saint-Just, the Constitution of 1793 was declared suspended,
and revolutionary government, that is, the Reign of Terror, was ordered
to continue until a general peace. On 10th December Billaud-Varenne
read a report which defined the system, of which the most important
clause was the substitution of national agents nominated by the
government,—that is, by the deputies on mission,—to take the place of
the elected procureurs-syndics of the districts. The Reign of Terror
in the provinces varied greatly. Some proconsuls, such as Carrier at
Nantes and Le Bon at Arras, carried out their government in the most
bloodthirsty fashion, but the ‘Noyades,’ or drowning of prisoners
wholesale at Nantes, must not be regarded as typical of the terror
in the provinces. Many proconsuls, such as André Dumont, contented
themselves with threats, and while filling their prisons with suspects
declined to empty them by means of the guillotine. Other proconsuls,
such as Bernard of Saintes, preferred to send an occasional batch of
prisoners to Paris to having a revolutionary tribunal of their own;
but in every case except those of Carrier and Javogues, which were
too atrocious to be passed over, the Committee of Public Safety gave
its agents in the provinces a free hand to rule as they would so long
as they maintained internal tranquillity and passive obedience to the
decrees of the revolutionary government.

[Sidenote: Results of the Terror.]

[Sidenote: Battles of Hondschoten and Wattignies. 1793.]

While the government of the Committee of Public Safety was being
organised in Paris and in the provinces, disasters succeeded each other
with rapidity both on the frontiers and in the interior of France. The
Prussians, after the capture of Mayence, only advanced a short distance
into France; but the Austrians made steady progress in the north-east
in conjunction with the English, and, under Würmser, penetrated Alsace
and stormed the lines of Wissembourg. The Comte d’Artois declared his
intention to place himself at the head of the insurgents in La Vendée,
at Lyons, and in the mountains of Auvergne. The English also promised
to send armed assistance in every direction. But the younger brother of
Louis XVI. thought it enough to make promises—he did absolutely nothing
to fulfil them. The English on their part confined themselves to one
important operation. They had on the outbreak of war despatched a fleet
to the Mediterranean under the command of Lord Hood, and on the 4th of
August 1793 the insurgents at Toulon, in the course of their opposition
to the Convention, surrendered their city to the allied English and
Spanish fleets. In Lyons the same progress of opposition was to be
observed. The original insurgents had professed federalist opinions,
but when the Convention sent an army against them open royalists took
the place of the federalists. The vigorous action of the new government
soon freed the French Republic from its foreign and internal foes.
Carnot, on taking charge of military measures, saw that the only means
of defeating the invaders was to take advantage of the numbers of his
soldiers and to act in masses. Acting on this policy General Houchard
raised the siege of Dunkirk and defeated the English and Hanoverians
in the battle of Hondschoten (8th September). In spite of his victory
Houchard was disgraced for not following it up with vigour. Jourdan,
his successor, carrying out the same policy, concentrated his army
against the Austrians, raised the siege of Maubeuge, and defeated the
Austrians at Wattignies (16th October). These victories did not drive
the Anglo-Austrian army out of France, but they stopped the progress
of the allies and caused them to stand upon the defensive. Farther
south the same vigour was displayed. Saint-Just restored discipline
in the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle. Hoche, at the head of the
latter, won the victory of the Geisberg (25th September) over the
Austrians and Prussians, while Pichegru, at the head of the Army of
the Rhine, relieved Landau and drove Würmser across the Rhine. Almost
at the same time a powerful army, of which the best regiments were
the former garrison of Valenciennes, captured Lyons on the 9th of
October, and on the 18th of December Toulon was retaken by an army
under the command of General Dugommier. It was at the siege of Toulon
that Napoleon Bonaparte first made himself conspicuous and won the rank
of general of brigade. The republican armies were equally successful
against the Spaniards. The Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, under D’Aoust,
recovered Roussillon, while that of the Western Pyrenees, under Müller,
drove the Spaniards across the Bidassoa. In La Vendée equal success
was achieved. The former garrison of Mayence, which was composed of
excellent soldiers who had gained experience and discipline from their
long resistance to the Prussians, destroyed the Vendéan armies, and
the insurrection of the province was severely punished by Carrier at
Nantes and by the infernal columns which, under General Turreau, were
directed to devastate the country. These repeated successes in every
quarter reconciled the French people to the hideous _régime_ of the
Reign of Terror. Its despotism was excused because of its success, and
its absolute authority reluctantly submitted to as a necessary evil.

[Sidenote: Fall of the Hébertists and Dantonists.]

In Paris the supremacy of the Committee of Public Safety and the Reign
of Terror met with opposition in two distinct quarters. On the one
hand the Commune of Paris, which was principally influenced by the
Procureur-Syndic, Chaumette, and his substitute, Hébert, soon began
to resent the loss of its former authority. The Commune had actually
carried out the _coup d’état_ which overthrew the Girondins, and had
expected to reap the chief advantage for itself. In order to form a
party it demanded that the revolutionary government should cease and
that the Constitution of 1793 should be put into force. But this cry
did not raise a sufficiently powerful support. The leaders of the
Commune, therefore, allied themselves with the most extreme democratic
party, which met generally at the Cordeliers Club. This extreme party
professed absolutely atheistic principles. It proclaimed the Worship
of Reason; it celebrated that worship with orgies in the cathedral of
Notre Dame; it induced Gobel, Bishop of Paris, to resign his see; it
carried its opposition to Christianity to an extreme; and started a
system of persecution against the Christian religion. In home politics
it did not defend the socialistic notions which had found some currency
in Paris, but it nevertheless declared itself the party of the _sans
culottes_, and denounced all rich men and bourgeois as selfish egotists
and enemies of the people. In foreign policy it adopted the doctrines
of the revolutionary propaganda and declared it the destiny of France
to destroy all tyrants. The Committee of Public Safety, as soon as
its power was firmly organised, resolved to overthrow this party of
opposition by striking at its leaders. Robespierre attacked them in the
Jacobin Club, and caused them to be excluded as atheists and enemies of
all government; Danton denounced the Worship of Reason as a disgraceful
masquerade; Camille Desmoulins exhausted his resources of eloquence
and sarcasm to hold them and their doctrines up to reprobation in the
_Vieux Cordelier_. As soon as the extreme party, which is commonly
called the Hébertist party, after its most conspicuous leader Hébert,
the editor of the _Père Duchesne_, was thoroughly discredited, the
Committee of Public Safety struck. On 24th Ventôse (14th March 1794)
Hébert and his principal supporters were arrested on the report of
Saint-Just. They were at once sent for trial before the Revolutionary
Tribunal, and on 4th Germinal (24th March) they were guillotined.

The Hébertists fell because they opposed the despotism of the new
government. The Dantonists, who followed them to the guillotine, fell
because they believed the Reign of Terror to be carried too far. Danton
had done more than any man to bring about the supremacy of the Great
Committee of Public Safety. Convinced as he was that only a strong
executive could possibly disentangle France from the dangers which
beset her on every side, he had consistently advocated the creation
of a strong government. Though not himself a member of the Great
Committee, he had believed it to be his duty to support its power on
every possible occasion. He had not only been the chief author of its
supremacy, but the principal creator of the system by which it ruled.
But he began to believe, in the beginning of the year 1794, that the
Reign of Terror was being too stringently exercised. He was quite in
accord with Billaud-Varenne and Collot-d’Herbois in considering it
necessary to frighten the people of France into acquiescence with the
new order of things, but he did not consider that it was necessary
to shed so much blood to accomplish the work of fright. His friend
Camille Desmoulins had in the _Vieux Cordelier_ not only exposed the
Hébertists, but had hinted at the need for mercy and the advantages of
appointing a Committee of Mercy. The Great Committee of Public Safety
was not only determined to maintain its autocratic power, but to defend
its system of government. Danton’s influence in the Convention was
still sufficiently great to give the members of the Committee a cause
for uneasiness. It therefore resolved, in order to stop all murmuring
against the Reign of Terror, and to establish a reign of terror
over the Convention itself, to make an example of the most vigorous
patriot in France. On 10th Germinal (30th March 1794) Danton, Camille
Desmoulins, and their chief adherents were arrested, and on 16th
Germinal (5th April 1794) the Dantonists followed the Hébertists to the
guillotine. These two blows ensured the supremacy of the Committee of
Public Safety and the continuance of the Reign of Terror.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1794.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Fleurus. June 26, 1794.]

The Great Committee of Public Safety knew that its tenure of power
rested on its successful conduct of the foreign war. Throughout
the interior tranquillity prevailed except in La Vendée, where the
sanguinary measures adopted perpetuated a guerilla warfare. The French
troops were, in 1794, in a very different condition from that in which
they had been left at the commencement of 1793. The measures of terror
which pacified France had been in the army the cause of the restoration
of discipline. Constant fighting had converted the men into efficient
soldiers. Excellent officers had come to the front during the campaign,
and, owing to the rapidity of promotion, most of the generals were
young and energetic men. All that was best in France had gone to the
front. There, and there alone, men who might have fallen under the
terrible Law of the Suspects at home, were not only safe themselves,
but by their presence in the ranks of the Republic protected their
relatives. All the resources of France were laid at the disposal of her
armies. The country became one vast arsenal. The soldiers were well
fed, clothed, and armed, and the ablest administrators were employed in
rendering them efficient. The result of this concentration of France
upon the foreign war was success in every quarter. In the spring of
1794 the various armies took the offensive, the Army of the North,
under Pichegru, marched by the northern line into Belgium, while a new
army, afterwards called the Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, which was
formed out of the Army of the Ardennes, and a wing of the Army of the
Moselle penetrated Belgium from the south. Before these two armies the
English and Austrians fell back. They were rapidly pursued, and on the
26th of June 1794 Jourdan won the battle of Fleurus. This victory, like
the victory of Jemmappes the year before, laid Belgium open to the
French armies. Brussels was reoccupied; the English and Dutch retired
into Holland; the Austrians fell back behind the Meuse. Meanwhile, the
Army of the Moselle, under René Moreaux, stormed the Prussian position
at Kaiserslautern, and with the Army of the Rhine drove the Austrians
across that river. The Army of Italy, which had taken Toulon, also took
the offensive, and defeated the Piedmontese at Saorgio. Dugommier, with
the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, turned the tables on the Spaniards,
and crossing the mountains penetrated into Catalonia, while the Army of
the Western Pyrenees invaded Spain in that quarter, and threatened San
Sebastian.

[Sidenote: Battle of the 1st of June.]

The only checks which the Great Committee received were at sea. Whether
it was because it is more difficult to improvise a navy than an army,
or because sufficient attention was not paid to the republican navy, it
is impossible to decide, but it is quite certain that the sailors of
the Republic did not rival the soldiers in success, though they did in
valour. One reason for this was that all the best sailors preferred the
lucrative work of preying upon the commerce of the world in frigates
and privateers to serving in the regular fleets, where no prizes were
to be made. The two principal French fleets were those stationed at
Toulon and at Brest. An ineffectual effort had been made by Sir Sidney
Smith to burn the Toulon fleet when the English and Spaniards evacuated
that port. Nevertheless, a new fleet was soon prepared, but its action
against the English and the Spaniards who blockaded the coast were
ineffectual. The English on leaving Toulon had proceeded to Corsica.
That island had been raised against the Convention by the native
patriot, Paoli, who invited the English to come and take possession in
the name of George III. In Corsica, owing to the weakness of the French
Mediterranean fleet, the English remained unmolested for nearly a
year. The Brest fleet, however, came to blows with the English Channel
fleet, under the command of Lord Howe. The United States of America
had agreed to pay part of the debt which they owed France for money
lent during the War of American Independence in grain, and a convoy was
sent to protect the grain-ships. Lord Howe was directed to cut off this
convoy, and the French fleet left Brest to ensure its safe arrival.
From one point of view, the action of the French fleet was crowned
with success, for the convoy arrived safely, but the fleet itself was
utterly defeated by Lord Howe on the 1st of June 1794. Since the object
had been attained, the Committee of Public Safety claimed credit for
the action in which the fleet had been engaged, and the reports which
Barère read daily from the tribune of the Convention were invariably of
battles won and of feats of valour.

[Sidenote: Fall of Robespierre, 9th Thermidor (27th July) 1794.]

The brilliant successes which followed the establishment of the power
of the Great Committee of Public Safety justified its despotism in the
eyes of France, but as soon as those successes had freed France from
the invaders, it was generally felt that the weight of the Reign of
Terror was intolerable, and that it had become unnecessary. It was at
this period of most brilliant military triumphs that the Terror grew
to its greatest height in Paris. On 22d Prairial (10th of June 1794)
a law was passed to accelerate the procedure of the Revolutionary
Tribunal, and the number of deaths upon the guillotine increased to
an average of 196 a week. Robespierre, who, as has been said, was
more of a statesman than his colleagues upon the Committee of Public
Safety, who were simply administrators, understood the tenor of feeling
in France. He believed that the time was coming when the Reign of
Terror should cease, and a new Reign of Virtue, carrying into effect
the maxims of Rousseau, could be established. The working members of
the Committee allowed Robespierre to theorise to his heart’s content;
as long as he did not interfere with them, he might advocate what
principles he pleased. The first evidence of Robespierre’s new tendency
appeared in his establishment of the Worship of the Supreme Being. He
was a profoundly religious and virtuous man, and the chief cause of
his hatred of Hébert and Danton was his belief that they were immoral
atheists. On 18th Floréal (7th May 1794) Robespierre made his most
famous speech in the Convention, by which he induced the Convention
to officially acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being and the
immortality of the soul. The speech was followed on 20th Prairial by
a great festival in honour of the Supreme Being, at which Robespierre
presided. This was the day when his power seemed greatest, but many of
his colleagues laughed at his assumption of virtue and at his posing
as a high priest. He perceived clearly that he could not establish his
chimerical Reign of Virtue without destroying the scoffers who refused
to believe in him and his doctrines. He absented himself for six weeks
from the meetings of the Committee, and prepared a speech by which he
hoped to induce the Convention to proscribe his opponents.

On 8th Thermidor (26th July 1794) he read this speech to the
Convention, and attacked covertly, and without mentioning many names,
not only certain of his colleagues in the Committee of Public Safety,
but also the majority of the Committee of General Security and of the
Financial Committee. These men, who had been governing France while
Robespierre was theorising, would not tamely submit to be ejected from
power and guillotined. On the evening of the same day Robespierre
read his speech to the Jacobin Club, which was the headquarters of
the puritans who believed in the possibility of a Reign of Virtue.
But on 9th Thermidor the accused deputies determined to act. It was
not only the working members of the Committees, but also the friends
of Danton, the independent deputies of the Mountain, and the members
of the Centre, who felt threatened, and their attitude was speedily
declared. Saint-Just began to read a report accusing Billaud-Varenne
and Collot-d’Herbois by name, but he was interrupted, and Robespierre
himself, with Couthon, Saint-Just, and two other deputies were, after
a stormy scene, ordered under arrest. But the puritan party were not
only strong in the Jacobin Club; they dominated the Commune of Paris
ever since the overthrow of the Hébertists. Hanriot, the commandant
of the National Guard of Paris, rescued Robespierre and the other
imprisoned deputies, and took them to the Hôtel-de-Ville, where a
scheme of government was discussed. The Convention did not wait to be
attacked. It declared Robespierre and all his adherents to be outlaws,
and Barras, Fréron, and Léonard Bourdon collected columns of regular
troops and national guards to attack the Hôtel-de-Ville. The Convention
was completely successful. The people of Paris, like the people of all
France, persisted in considering Robespierre as the author of the Reign
of Terror, while not only his enemies but his colleagues threw upon
him the responsibility for all the atrocities included under the name
of the Terror. Though personally he had very little influence in the
Committee, he was represented and regarded as its master. Consequently
no hand was raised to protect Robespierre and the puritans; the
Hôtel-de-Ville was easily occupied by Barras; Robespierre was wounded
in the mouth by a gendarme, and on 10th Thermidor (28th July) he was
guillotined, and was accompanied or followed to the scaffold by the
small group of colleagues who had been impeached with him, and by the
majority of the Commune of Paris.

[Sidenote: The Rule of the Thermidorians. First Phase.]

The death of Robespierre did not lead to a change of government, but
it led to an alteration in the system by which the government was
administered. The deputies who had been most instrumental in the
revolution of Thermidor belonged to the Mountain, and expected to
retain power in their hands; but they saw the necessity of preventing
such a permanence of power as had existed during the previous year. It
was, therefore, resolved that the Committees of Government—that is, the
Committees of Public Safety and of General Security—should be renewed
by a quarter every month, and that the retiring members should not
be eligible for re-election until a month had passed. The survivors
of the Great Committee still believed in the system of government by
terror, but their new colleagues understood that now that France was
victorious the country would no longer submit to such rigorous measures
of repression. The victory of Fleurus had done away with the necessity
of continually employing the guillotine. The system of terror was
therefore tacitly abandoned; the supremacy of the Committees continued;
the Law of the Suspects was unrepealed; the Revolutionary Tribunal
continued to exist; representatives were still sent on mission with
unlimited powers; but the succession of executions ceased, and the
method of government, though arbitrary, was no longer sanguinary. The
men who ruled France from Thermidor (July) 1794 to Ventôse (March) 1795
were deputies of the Mountain, men of the type of Carnot and Robert
Lindet, the most sagacious of the members of the Great Committee of
Public Safety. The most conspicuous of the new men of this period were
Merlin of Douai and Treilhard, who took charge of the foreign policy.
These statesmen, while Carnot superintended the carrying on of the
war with his accustomed vigour and success, finally broke with the
propagandist doctrines which had made the war of unparalleled magnitude
and bitterness, and Merlin of Douai, on 14th Frimaire (4th December)
1794 read a report in the name of the Committee of Public Safety,
declaring that the Republic did not wish to be at war with Europe for
ever, and laying down the bases on which treaties of peace honourable
to France could be made. While the Thermidorians were administering
the government strongly and honourably, they were beset with cries
of vengeance against the Terrorists of the previous year. They felt
it necessary to yield to the general outcry, and on 21st Brumaire,
Year III. (11th November 1794), Carrier, the most ferocious of the
proconsuls of the Terror, was sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal.
He was tried and eventually executed for his crimes. The agitation
was stronger against the organisers of the Terror, Billaud-Varenne,
and Collot-d’Herbois, with whom were associated in the popular hatred
Barère, the reporter, and Vadier, who had been the most conspicuous
member of the Committee of General Security. Both the doctrines and
the men of the Terror had still plenty of supporters in Paris, who
now dominated the Jacobin Club, which was therefore closed by the
Thermidorians in December 1794. Almost at the same date the Law of
the Maximum was repealed. In the same month the survivors of the
seventy-three deputies who had protested against the proscription of
the Girondins, and consequently been imprisoned, were recalled to their
seats in the Convention.

[Sidenote: Conquest of Holland. 1794–5.]

[Sidenote: The Batavian Republic.]

[Sidenote: Successes in other quarters.]

Meanwhile the series of victories which had commenced during the rule
of the Great Committee of Public Safety continued. Pichegru at the
head of the Army of the North pursued the English and their Dutch and
Hanoverian allies. On the 9th of October he took Nimeguen, and forcing
his way across the frozen rivers drove the English through Holland. He
occupied Amsterdam, and then with his hussars took the Dutch fleet,
which was unable to leave its moorings in the Texel owing to the ice.
By the end of January 1795 the whole of Holland was in the possession
of the French. The Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange, fled to England,
and the English troops were soon after withdrawn. The conquest of
Holland was of the greatest service to the Thermidorians, for it
enabled them, by drawing upon the wealth of that country, to relieve
the financial distress of the French Republic. With regard to Belgium
there was no difficulty in coming to a decision as to its future, for
the Decree of Reunion passed in the days of Dumouriez’ success remained
unrepealed, and the Austrian Netherlands were therefore organised as
part of the French Republic. It was otherwise with regard to Holland.
The Thermidorians did not desire to further aggravate the fears of
Europe by annexing that country, but at the same time they were quite
resolved that it should not again fall under the power of the English.
Reubell and Sieyès, two ex-Constituants who had remained in obscurity
during the Reign of Terror, were despatched to Holland to see what
could be done. They found many Dutch admirers of the doctrines of
the French Revolution, and speedily conciliated the burghers of the
Dutch cities, who had always resented the power of the Stadtholder.
With the help of these parties and of the Dutch patriots who had been
exiled in 1787, and who now returned from France full of enthusiasm
for democracy, they organised a Batavian Republic on the model of the
French Republic, and in March 1795 a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was
signed between the French and Batavian Republics. In other quarters
the French Republic was likewise triumphant. Maestricht was taken
by Kléber on the 4th of November 1794. Jourdan with the Army of the
Sambre-and-Meuse, defeated the Austrians under Clerfayt at Aldenhoven
on the 2d of October, and marching south occupied Aix-la-Chapelle,
Bonn, Cologne, and Coblentz. Meanwhile the Army of the Moselle,
under René Moreaux, finally drove the Prussians out of France and
occupied the Palatinate and the whole of the Electorate of Trèves. On
the southern frontier there were similar successes. The Army of the
Eastern Pyrenees, which had invaded Catalonia, stormed the Spanish
camp at Figueras on the 20th of November 1794, and took Rosas on
the 3rd of February 1795. In the first of these actions the French
General Dugommier was killed in action. Moncey, with the Army of the
Western Pyrenees, took Bilbao, Vittoria, and San Sebastian. The Army
of Italy won the victory of Loano on the 24th of November, which
opened communication with Genoa. The Army of the Alps finally reached
the summits of Mont Cenis and the Little St. Bernard, and drove the
Piedmontese before it.

[Sidenote: Poland. 1794–5.]

While the French nation had thus after much suffering and long
submission to the Reign of Terror secured its independence and made
itself feared by Europe, a Polish insurrection had taken place which
was not crowned with the same success. The second partition of
Poland, which was consummated in 1793, has been described. But the
Polish nation was not inclined to acknowledge its extinction without
another blow. Many Polish exiles came to France, and the leader of
the Polish patriots, Kosciuszko, received a flattering reception,
though no promise of active help. On the 23d of March 1794 Kosciuszko
entered Cracow and raised the standard of national independence.
This news caused a general rising in Prussian Poland, where the new
administrators of Prussia had behaved with extreme cruelty. Stanislas
Poniatowski, King of Poland, acting under the influence of the Russian
general commanding at Warsaw, Igelstrom, disavowed Kosciuszko and
declared him a rebel. But the Polish people welcomed Kosciuszko
as a liberator. He defeated the Russians at Raclawice on the 4th
of April 1794, and after a further victory occupied Warsaw on the
19th. Both Russians and Prussians prepared to defend the provinces
they had annexed in 1793, and laid siege to Warsaw in July 1794. By
the beginning of September all Prussian Poland was in a flame of
insurrection; Frederick William II., who was conducting the siege
in person, rapidly retreated and summoned to his assistance a large
proportion of the troops hitherto employed against France. But though
the Prussians had temporarily retired, Catherine of Russia determined,
at all hazards, to conquer the Poles. She gathered a great army from
all parts of her empire, and placed it under the command of the most
famous of the Russian generals, Suvórov. Caught between the army of
Suvórov and the army of Fersen, who had succeeded Igelstrom in command
of the Russians already in Poland, the Polish patriots were utterly
defeated at Maciejowice on the 12th of October 1794, when Kosciuszko
was wounded and taken prisoner. On the 4th of November, Praga, the
suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula, was stormed by
Suvórov, and on the 9th of November the capital surrendered. Catherine
determined to complete the work of the destruction of Poland. Stanislas
Poniatowski was removed from Poland on the 7th of January 1795, and on
the 25th of November 1795 he abdicated the throne.

[Sidenote: Extinction of Poland. 1795.]

The division of the spoils caused much trouble to the allies. The
Austrians, who had been left in the lurch at the second partition,
claimed a share, and, like the Prussians, weakened their armies on
the frontier of France in order to defend their claims on Poland. By
the final partition, which was arranged between the powers in 1795,
Prussia received Warsaw and the surrounding palatinates; Austria
received Cracow and the rest of Galicia, and the Russians were content
with rectifying their frontier from Grodno to Minsk. It is interesting
to contrast the simultaneous failure of the Poles and success of the
French. The cause lay in the fact that the great bulk of the Polish
people were serfs, to whom it mattered little what master they served,
whereas the French people had long thrown off the bonds of personal
serfdom, and had just succeeded in getting rid of the last shackles of
the privileged classes. The Polish Constitution of 1791 was the work of
a few enlightened noblemen and priests, and was gladly accepted by the
educated bourgeois of the cities, but the peasants were in too degraded
a condition to understand what personal liberty meant. In France every
peasant, every farmer had profited by the Revolution, and was wedded to
its cause not only for political reasons, but because of the purchases
of ecclesiastical property which he had made. The national feeling in
France embraced the whole people, and made France successful against
her foreign foes; the national feeling in Poland only existed among
a minority of the population, and the result was that Kosciuszko was
unable to attain the triumph which he so well merited.

[Sidenote: Change in the attitude of Continental Powers.]

The successes of the French Republic and the failure of the Polish
national movement affected the attitude of the coalition both towards
France and towards its own members. The Prussians, ever since the
defeat of Brunswick in 1792, had openly expressed their belief
that the Austrians were betraying them and using them as catspaws.
Frederick William II. for a long time battled against these views,
which were held by the chief Prussian statesmen, such as Haugwitz and
Alvensleben, by the most respected Prussian generals such as Kalkreuth
and Möllendorf, and by his own personal clique of favourites, headed
by Lucchesini. In the year 1793 he had confined his operations against
France to the siege of Mayence, while his best troops were directed
on Poland, and in 1794 he had still further reduced the number of his
soldiers upon the Rhine. England, which had paid large subsidies to the
Prussian government, resented this conduct, and declared its intention
of withdrawing all subsidies unless Prussia would do as she was
directed. Frederick William II. declared that he would not receive the
English subsidies on these terms; but the truth was, that his attention
was far more occupied by the gains he hoped to get in Poland than with
the prosecution of the war against France. Austria, also, where Thugut
had in 1794 become the nominal as well as the real director of the
foreign policy of the Emperor Francis, was getting tired of the war
with France. Prussia’s conduct in making the second partition of Poland
in 1793, and leaving the Emperor out, had sown the seeds of discontent.
Thugut was determined that the same thing should not occur again, and,
therefore, when the Polish insurrection broke out in 1794, Austria
also denuded her armies upon the French frontier. This attitude of
Prussia and Austria does not entirely account for the victories of the
French republican armies, but it explains to some extent the ease with
which those victories were obtained. Spain also was weary of the war.
Godoy felt that his tenure of office was imperilled by the existence of
two French armies in Spain which might easily march upon Madrid, and
the Queen, and therefore the King, was entirely under the influence of
Godoy. Many of the princes of the Holy Roman Empire likewise wished to
see the war at an end, for it was their states upon the left bank of
the Rhine which were occupied by the French armies; it was their states
upon the right bank of the Rhine which would be invaded by the passage
of that river, whereas the home dominions of Austria and Prussia were
far to the east, and not likely to be reached by an invading army.
England was the only power which seriously desired to prosecute the
war, for in England a national feeling of repulsion against the French
had arisen. The English government, however, was unable to strike any
effective blow; Hoche destroyed a body of _émigrés_ landed from English
ships at Quiberon Bay in July 1794; the continental powers who received
subsidies were not very earnest in doing the work for which they were
paid; the French occupation of Holland had deprived England of the only
base from which an army could act in Europe; and the English government
had therefore to be contented with blockading the French ports and
occupying the French West Indian Colonies.

[Sidenote: The Rule of the Thermidorians. Second Phase.]

[Sidenote: Insurrection of 12th Germinal. 1st April 1795.]

[Sidenote: Insurrection of 1st Prairial. 20th May 1795.]

The recall of those sympathisers with the Girondin party, who had been
imprisoned, in December 1794 was followed in March 1795 by the recall
to their seats in the Convention of the outlawed Girondin leaders, of
whom the most conspicuous were Lanjuinais and Louvet. The return of
these victims increased the clamour against the surviving Terrorist
leaders and proconsuls who had ruled France in 1793–94 in Paris, or
on mission in the provinces. Hot debates took place on the necessity
of punishing what was now termed ‘Robespierre’s tail.’ In Paris a
powerful section of the populace—namely, the young bourgeois, who
were commonly called the Jeunesse Dorée, or after their leader Fréron
the Jeunesse Fréronienne—never ceased to demand the punishment of the
Terrorists. Popular sympathy was generally with the Jeunesse Dorée;
conspicuous Jacobins of the Terror were beaten in the streets; the
heart of Marat was taken from the Pantheon and thrown down a sewer; and
the busts of Marat, who was regarded as the apostle of Terrorism, were
everywhere broken. The former rulers of Paris, the old members of the
Jacobin Club and the Revolutionary Committees, were not inclined to
submit to popular vengeance without striking a blow. On 12th Germinal,
Year III. (1st April 1795) they raised an insurrection in the turbulent
Faubourg Saint-Antoine, and the insurgents broke into the Convention
shouting ‘Bread and the Constitution of 1793.’ The only result of
this riot was that Billaud-Varenne, Collot-d’Herbois, Barère, and
Vadier were ordered to be deported to French Guiana without trial. The
persecution of the Terrorists continued. A commission was appointed
to inquire into the acts of the former proconsuls; power passed into
the hands of the returned Girondins and the members of the Plain or
Centre. Certain of the remaining deputies of the Mountain, supported by
the Jacobins of Paris, then resolved on a second insurrection. On 1st
Prairial, Year III. (20th May 1795) the Convention was again invaded
by a Saint-Antoine mob, headed by women who had gained the unenviable
name of the ‘Furies of the Guillotine.’ A deputy named Féraud was taken
for Fréron and murdered on the spot, and throughout the day the hall of
the Convention was occupied by a howling mob, which vainly endeavoured
to compel the President, Boissy-d’Anglas, to pass the decrees they
desired. Meanwhile the Committees of Government prepared to act with
vigour. With the help of some regular troops quartered in Paris, of the
national guards of the bourgeois sections, and of the Jeunesse Dorée,
they expelled the mob, and on the following days a force composed of
these elements under the command of General Menou, an ex-Constituant,
disarmed the revolutionary sections. The victory of the Committees was
the victory of the enemies of the Reign of Terror. Some of the former
Terrorist deputies were condemned to death and committed suicide,
others were impeached and placed under arrest, and the Mountain as a
party ceased to exist. The expulsion of the deputies of the Mountain
caused the Committees of Government to be filled by the members of the
Centre, the men who during the Reign of Terror had been peacefully
occupied in the legislative and educational reforms, which were the
most lasting works of the Convention. Of these new members the most
typical is Cambacérès, the great jurist and principal law reformer of
the period, on whose labours Napoleon compiled the Code Civil. While
the Committees were engaged in the work of government, a commission
of eleven deputies was appointed to draw up a new Constitution which
should avoid the errors of its predecessors. The chief authors of this
Constitution, which is known as the Constitution of the Year III., were
Boissy-d’Anglas and Daunou.

[Sidenote: Treaties of Basle. 1795.]

The direction of foreign policy was still mainly conducted by Merlin
of Douai, who was now aided in this department by Cambacérès,
Sieyès, and Reubell. Their great work—indeed the great work of the
Thermidorians—was the conclusion of the Treaties of Basle. The causes
of these treaties have been shown in the examination just made of the
changed attitude of the powers of Europe towards the French Republic.
The agent of the French Republic in Switzerland, Barthélemy, was the
diplomatist who negotiated the series of treaties. Switzerland had
throughout the Reign of Terror been the centre of diplomatic action,
for in Switzerland alone France could meet the representatives of
foreign powers. The first and the most important of the Treaties of
Basle was that between France and Prussia, which was signed upon the
5th of April 1795. By it not only was peace concluded between the
contracting powers, but a line of demarcation was agreed to be drawn
by which Prussia might secure safety from French invasion for the
states of Northern Germany. One point only was left in abeyance by
Barthélemy and Hardenberg, the negotiators of this treaty. The French
Government insisted that France, in reward for her exertions, and in
compensation for the long war, should receive her natural limits of the
Rhine. Prussia’s territory upon the left bank of the Rhine was very
small in amount, and it was agreed that the amount of compensation
she should receive for ceding it to France should be left unsettled
for the present. Frederick William II., who posed as a guardian of
the Holy Roman Empire, refused openly to assent to the doctrine that
France should reach the Rhine and thus consecrate the infringement of
the limits of the Empire. He had no desire to appear ready to consent
to any such arrangement, for he felt that such a policy would leave to
Austria the position of protector of the Empire. The Treaty of Basle
with Prussia was succeeded at the same place by a treaty with Spain
on the 22d of July, and finally by a treaty with the most energetic
of the petty princes of the Empire, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel,
on the 29th of August. Peace had already on February 9th been made
with Tuscany, which had most unwillingly declared war on France under
pressure from England. Of these treaties, the most important was that
with Spain, which was excessively popular at Madrid, and won for Godoy
the high-sounding title of ‘Prince of the Peace.’ Thus, after three
years of war, France re-entered the comity of nations and broke up the
coalition formed against her independence.

CHAPTER V

1795–1797

Results of the Treaties of Basle on the Foreign Policy of
France—Constitution of the Year III—The Directory—The
Legislature: Councils of Ancients and of Five Hundred—Local
Administration of France—The Insurrection of Vendémiaire—The
Rising of 13th Vendémiaire in Paris—The First French
Directors, Councils, and Ministers—Dissolution of
the Convention—England and the _Emigrés_—Treason of
Pichegru—Exchange of Madame Royale—Desire for Peace in
France—France and Prussia—Suggestion of Secularisations in
Germany—France and the Smaller States of Europe—Attitude of
Russia—Campaign of 1795 in Germany—Bonaparte’s Campaigns
of 1796 in Italy—Battle of Montenotte—Armistice of
Cherasco—Battle of Lodi—Armistice of Foligno—Conquest of
Upper Italy—Battles of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli—Peace
of Tolentino with the Pope—Campaign of 1796 in Germany—Battle
of Altenkirchen—Retreat of Moreau—Effects of the Campaign
in Germany—Treaty between Prussia and France—Internal
Policy of the Directory—Pacification of La Vendée—The
State of France—The Directory, Councils, and Ministers in
1796—Creation of the Ministry of Police—Alliance between
France and Spain—Treaty of San Ildefonso—Battle of Cape
Saint-Vincent—The Batavian Republic—Negotiations between
England and the Directory—Death of the Empress Catherine of
Russia—Bonaparte’s Campaign of 1797 in the Tyrol—The Campaign
of 1797 in Germany—Preliminaries of Leoben between France and
Austria.

[Sidenote: Result of the Treaties of Basle.]

The conclusion of the Treaties of Basle in the spring and summer of
1795 brought France once more into a recognised position among the
nations of Europe. The idea of a revolutionary propaganda had been
entirely abandoned by the leading Thermidorians, who looked upon it as
the first duty of the French Government to secure peace for France.
All the great statesmen of the revolutionary period, from Mirabeau to
Danton and Robespierre, had protested against the absurd notion that
it was the mission of France to secure the pre-eminence of democratic
ideas throughout the whole of Europe. Events had shown that it was a
task of quite sufficient difficulty to secure the prevalence of such
ideas in France. The abandonment of the revolutionary propaganda broke
up the league of old Europe against new France. When the Prussian
state, and still more the ancient monarchy of Spain, had consented to
make peace with France, the rest of the powers of the Continent felt
that they could no longer affect to treat the French republicans as
beyond the pale of humanity, or the French Republic as having destroyed
the title of France to be reckoned as a nation.

[Sidenote: Constitution of the Year III.]

The Thermidorians, not satisfied with their diplomatic success,
constructed a new government for France. The authors of the policy,
which resulted in the Treaties of Basle, were also the sponsors of
the ‘Constitution of the Year III.’ The task of drawing up the bases
of a new Constitution was referred upon 14th Germinal, Year III. (3d
April 1795) to a committee of seven deputies, but the details were
worked out by a subsequent commission of eleven. Among the seven the
most important were Sieyès, Cambacérès, and Merlin of Douai, who were
also at this period the three principal members of the Committee of
Public Safety. Just as in making the Treaties of Basle, they and
their colleagues had recurred to the fundamental ideas and policy of
the old French Monarchy, so in the new Constitution they exhibited
the influence of bygone ideas. The experience of the Constituent and
Legislative Assemblies, and of the Convention until the formation
of the Committee of Public Safety, had shown the utter inadequacy
of intrusting supreme executive and administrative authority to an
unwieldy deliberative assembly. The power of the monarchy in all
modern states has rested upon the conviction of the importance of
consolidating, as far as possible, the executive authority; the
founders of the United States of America understood this truth, and
invested their President with power resembling that exercised by
kings; and the Convention, when it yielded to the voice of Danton, and
conferred supreme authority upon the Committee of Public Safety, had
reaped the advantage in its victories upon all the frontiers. Even the
most obtuse of the deputies who sat in the Convention had learnt this
lesson. And the founders of the Constitution of the Year III. had no
difficulty in carrying the most important point in their programme.
This was the entire separation of the executive and legislative
powers. The Constitution of 1791, in its jealousy of the monarchy, had
practically deprived the king and his ministers of all real authority,
while leaving him the entire responsibility. The Constitution of 1793
had placed all executive authority in the hands of the Legislature. The
Constitution of the Year III. endeavoured to separate the executive and
legislative authorities.

[Sidenote: The Directory.]

Under the new arrangement the executive was placed in the hands of
five Directors. One was to retire every year and was not eligible
for re-election; his successor was to be chosen by the Legislature.
In order to secure an entire separation between the members of the
Directory and of the Legislature, no member of the latter could
be elected a Director until twelve months had elapsed after the
resignation of his seat. The Directors were to appoint the Ministers,
who were to have no connection whatever with the Legislature, and who
were to act as the agents of the Directors. The individual Directors
were to exercise no authority in their own names. They were to live
under the same roof in the Palace of the Luxembourg at Paris. They were
to meet daily, and the will of the majority was to be taken as the will
of the whole. They were to elect a President every month, who was to
act as their mouthpiece at the reception of foreign ambassadors and on
all occasions of ceremony. The control of the internal administration,
the management of the armies and fleets, and all questions of foreign
policy were entirely left to the Directors. But treaties, declarations
of war and similar acts had to be ratified by the Legislature. The
Directors had nothing whatever to do with the work of legislation, and
their assent was not needed to new laws. With regard to the revenue,
the administration of the finances and of the treasury rested with the
Directors, but they could not impose fresh taxes without the assent of
the Legislature.

[Sidenote: The Legislature.]

The Legislature, under the Constitution of the Year III. consisted of
two chambers—the Council of Ancients and the Council of Five Hundred.
It is a curious commentary upon the debates which took place in the
Constituent Assembly in August 1789, when the establishment of two
chambers was rejected with scorn as being an obvious imitation of
the English Parliament, that in 1795 this very principle was almost
unanimously adopted. The experience of the three great revolutionary
assemblies had convinced Sieyès and his colleagues of the inexpediency
of leaving important measures to be decided in a single chamber. The
delay necessitated by a law being obliged to pass before two distinct
deliberative bodies now appeared most advantageous, when compared with
the headlong precipitation which had marked all the earlier stages
of the Revolution. The Council of Ancients was to consist of men
forty-five years old and upwards, and, therefore, presumably not liable
to be carried away by sudden bursts of enthusiasm. For the Council
of Five Hundred there was no limitation of age, and elderly men were
not precluded from being returned to it. The Council of Five Hundred
consisted, as its name implies, of five hundred deputies; the Council
of Ancients of two hundred and fifty. Dictated by experience, also,
were the measures taken for the election of deputies. In order to avoid
the inconvenience which had resulted from the election of an entirely
new body of representatives at one and the same moment, as had happened
in 1791, it was resolved that one-third of the two Councils should
retire yearly. Deputies were to be chosen by an elaborate system of
primary and secondary assemblies held in each department of France,
and a property qualification was demanded both for the electors and the
deputies. With these safeguards Sieyès and his colleagues believed they
had secured a practical means of obviating all the errors of the past.
The Council of Five Hundred had allotted to it as its special function
the initiation of all fresh taxation and the revision of all money
bills. The Council of Ancients was the court of appeal in diplomatic
questions, such as the declaration of war. In actual legislation the
consent of the majority of both chambers was needed for a new law. For
their most important function—the yearly election of a new Director—the
two chambers were to form one united assembly.

[Sidenote: Local Administration of France.]

By this Constitution, the conspicuous drawbacks of the two former
Constitutions, namely, the enforced weakness of the executive and
the undefined powers of the Legislature were avoided. But the local
administration established by the Constitution of 1791 had proved so
excellent that it was only slightly modified and not radically altered.
The great achievement of the Constituent Assembly—the abolition of old
provincial jealousies by the division of France into departments—was
maintained. The wise step which had been taken by the Great Committee
of Public Safety in abolishing the directories of the departments
and of the districts was sanctioned, and the council-generals were
left to act alone. The main distinction between the administrative
systems of 1791 and 1795 was that the elected _procureurs-syndics_
and _procureurs-généraux-syndics_, established by the former, were
replaced by officials nominated by the supreme executive at Paris.
These officials went under the name of agents during the Directory,
but possessed the same authority and carried out the same functions as
the _sous-préfets_ and _préfets_ afterwards appointed by Napoleon. The
courts of justice, whether local, appellant, or supreme, established by
the Constitution of 1791, were left untouched by the Constitution of
the Year III.

[Sidenote: The Insurrection of Vendémiaire.]

In spite of the glories of the conquest of Holland, the passage of
the Rhine, the victory of Quiberon, and the invasion of Spain,—in
spite of the even greater credit justly earned by the Treaties of
Basle,—in spite of the new Constitution, which, if faulty in places,
was superior to those which had preceded it—the Thermidorians were
intensely unpopular in France. The recollection of the Reign of
Terror weighed upon the imaginations of the people even after the
death of Robespierre, the deportation of Billaud-Varenne, and the
closing of the Jacobin Club. The Convention was still in the minds of
men shrouded by the remembrance of the innocent blood that had been
shed. The inauguration of the new constitutional system was looked
upon as an opportunity for driving the members of the Convention from
power, and threats of vengeance were everywhere heard against them.
Intriguers, some of them possibly royalists, who desired the return
of the Bourbons, but most of them bourgeois or aristocrats who had
personal reasons for desiring revenge, hoped to take advantage of this
general feeling to overthrow the Republic. But the mass of Frenchmen
were sincerely republican, and were clear-sighted enough to perceive
that the return of the Bourbons would be followed by the loss of the
material advantages that had been gained by the sale of the lands of
the Church and the nobility. The members of the Convention understood
the intentions of the intriguers, and understood also that the French
people sincerely loved the Republic. They proceeded to frustrate the
designs of their enemies by decreeing that two-thirds of the new
Legislature must be elected from among the deputies of the Convention.
The intriguers in Paris, thus foiled in their expectations of a certain
majority in the new Legislature, tried to rouse the people of Paris
into active insurrection. There can be no doubt that not only in Paris,
but throughout France, the action of the Convention in ordering the
election of so large a proportion of the old deputies was profoundly
unpopular, but it was one thing to dislike a measure and another thing
to involve France in a fresh revolution. In the provincial towns there
was universal grumbling but no active opposition. In Paris, however,
where the intriguers abounded, it was hoped that the _jeunesse dorée_,
who had played so great a part in the previous winter, assisted by the
bourgeois Sections, would be able by making an imposing display of
force to compel the Convention to revoke the obnoxious decree.

[Sidenote: Fighting in Paris, 13th Vendémiaire (5th October 1795).]

This project of the agitators in Paris was soon known in the
Convention, and had the result of causing the divided forces of the
Thermidorians to close up their ranks. The three chief groups in this
party were the returned Girondins, the leaders of the Plain, and
the former adherents of the Terror. The leaders of all these groups
united in the presence of a common danger, for they felt that the
dissolution of the Convention without some such measure of security
as the re-election of the two-thirds to the forthcoming Legislature
would lead to their own proscription. They therefore appointed Barras,
who had commanded in the attack upon the Hôtel-de-Ville upon the
9th Thermidor of the previous year, and overthrown the supporters
of Robespierre assembled there, to watch over their safety. Barras
summoned to his assistance Napoleon Bonaparte, who was then in Paris
engaged in protesting against his recall from the Army of Italy. The
antecedents of this young general, his well-known Jacobin principles
and his former friendship for Augustin Robespierre, had led to his
recall and to his being placed upon the unemployed list. Barras had
under his command the garrison of regular troops quartered in Paris and
the armed guards of the Convention. The Royalist agitators counted on
the _jeunesse dorée_ and the bourgeois Sections. Bonaparte perceived
that in numbers each party was evenly matched, and he at once sent for
the artillery quartered at Meudon. The Convention declared itself _en
permanence_, the troops were stationed round the Tuileries, Bonaparte’s
guns were mounted in the gardens and the Place du Carrousel. The attack
on the Convention was made on the 13th Vendémiaire (5th October) in a
very slovenly manner. No effort had been made to concentrate the force
of the assailants at a given moment, and as the first column marched
carelessly down without recognised leaders, it was fired upon and
almost entirely cut to pieces by Bonaparte’s artillery. Nevertheless
column after column of devoted national guards approached the Tuileries
with the utmost gallantry to meet the same fate. The insurrection of
13th Vendémiaire cannot be compared with the other famous insurrections
of the 14th July 1789 and 10th August 1792, for not one of the
defenders of the Convention was wounded. It was a butchery, not a
battle.

[Sidenote: The First Directors.]

The Convention, conscious of its unpopularity, and not desiring to
increase it, made but slight efforts to discover and punish the
leaders of the insurrection of 13th Vendémiaire. Only a few military
executions, after trial by court-martial, of a few prisoners taken with
arms in their hands were permitted, and no vigour was shown in hunting
down even the most conspicuous agitators. It was resolved at once to
proceed to the election of the first Directors under the new system.
Sieyès refused to be one of them. It was generally agreed, though not
formally declared, that the first Directors should all be deputies of
the Convention who had voted for the death of Louis XVI., and who might
therefore be presumed to be faithful to republican institutions, if not
from inclination at least from fear. The five deputies actually elected
were—Barras, whose conduct on the 9th Thermidor, and on the 13th
Vendémiaire, had obtained for him the gratitude of the majority of the
deputies; Reubell, an ex-Constituant and an Alsatian, who was believed
to have a special knowledge of foreign affairs; Revellière-Lépeaux,
another ex-Constituant, a member of the Committee of Public Safety, a
good lawyer, and the future inventor of a new religion; Carnot, the
famous military member of the Great Committee of Public Safety, who
was selected for his strategic ability; and Letourneur, an ex-officer
of Engineers, like Carnot, who was expected to act as Carnot’s
assistant. To the Council of Ancients and the Council of Five Hundred
were elected among the two-thirds chosen from the Convention the more
conspicuous Thermidorians, including Sieyès, Cambacérès, Tallien, and
Treilhard. The six first ministers were appointed by the Directors on
14th Brumaire (5th November). They were Merlin of Douai and Charles
Delacroix, two ex-deputies of the Convention who had not been elected
to the new Legislature, appointed to the Ministries of Justice and
of Foreign Affairs, Aubert-Dubayet, a distinguished general, to the
Ministry of War, and Faypoult, Benezech and Admiral Truguet to the
Ministries of Finance, the Interior, and the Marine.

[Sidenote: Dissolution of the Convention.]

The first Directors elected and the new Legislature constituted, the
Convention had to decree its own dissolution. The three years during
which it had sat are perhaps the most important and most critical in
the whole history of France. The Convention had not merely witnessed
the rise and fall of many cliques and many parties; it had allowed the
Reign of Terror to be established, and had punished its inventors with
death or deportation. It had passed through nearly every variety of
government, and had seen France in her greatest degradation and at the
height of her success. Its last act, passed on the very day on which it
dissolved itself, 4th Brumaire (26th October), was worthy of its best
and greatest days, for it was an act declaring a complete amnesty for
all political offences, or supposed offences, since the declaration of
the Republic.

[Sidenote: England and the Emigrés.]

[Sidenote: Treason of Pichegru.]

The successful establishment of the Directory and the victory won
over the royalist agitators on 13th Vendémiaire had a profound effect
upon the policy of England. Hitherto Pitt and Grenville, inspired
by their agent in Switzerland, William Wickham, had believed in the
vain promises of the royalist _émigrés_, and had hoped by their means
to restore the Bourbon monarchy in France. The headquarters of the
royalist agitators were, as they had always been, in Switzerland.
Neither the Comte de Provence, who, since his nephew’s death, called
himself Louis _XVIII._, nor the Comte d’Artois were really deceived
by the hopes held out by their royalist friends. But the English
ministers, deluded by the extravagant promises of the _émigrés_ and by
the reports of Wickham, considered the prospects of an overthrow of
the Republic to be excellent. They had shown their confidence in the
_émigrés_ by the active assistance they had given to the expedition to
Quiberon Bay, and still more by the large sums of secret-service money
which had been expended in Switzerland. The efforts of the royalist
_émigrés_ took two directions; on the one hand, they had fomented the
feeling of discontent in Paris which had culminated in the insurrection
of 13th Vendémiaire, and, on the other, they had attempted to affect
the loyalty of the generals of the Republic. The general on whom they
counted most was Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland. This general, like
Dumouriez in 1793, was more ambitious to attain wealth and power for
himself than success for the Republic. During his sojourn in Paris in
the spring of 1795 he had formed a close alliance with the royalist
agitators in the capital, and on proceeding to take up the command of
the Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle he entered into direct communications
with the Prince de Condé, the general commanding the _émigré_ army
in Germany. Condé promised Pichegru the government of Alsace, the
Château of Chambord, a million livres in cash, an income of two hundred
thousand livres a year, and the rank of Marshal of France, if he would
undertake to restore the Bourbons. Great hopes were built upon these
negotiations, and the Comte de Provence left Verona to take part in
them. But the success of these intrigues was nullified by the victory
of 13th Vendémiaire; the Margrave of Baden-Baden refused to allow the
Pretender to enter his territory; Wickham was unwillingly convinced
that the purchase of the general did not include the purchase of his
army; and the Directory, as soon as it had firmly seized the reins of
power, recalled Pichegru, whose transactions with Condé had been more
than suspected, and replaced him by a thorough republican, Moreau.
These failures convinced Pitt and Grenville that there was no advantage
to be gained in trusting to the promises of the _émigrés_.

[Sidenote: Exchange of Madame Royale.]

The Directory, on assuming power, resolved to continue the policy
of the Thermidorians, and not to recur to the notions of the
revolutionary propaganda. It desired to show Europe that France was
ready to enter into the comity of nations, and did not presume for
the future to interfere with the internal arrangements of other
countries. It, therefore, on grounds of humanity, took up again the
negotiations which had been commenced in July 1793 for the release
of the children of Louis XVI., and, using Spain as an intermediary,
entered into communications on this subject with the bitterest enemy of
France—Austria. The death of the Dauphin, commonly called Louis XVII.,
had left only one of the children of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette in
the hands of the Republic. The Thermidorians had, at the instigation
of one of their leaders, Boissy-d’Anglas, seen the expediency of
proving to Europe that the French republicans were not barbarians,
by offering to surrender the person of Madame Royale to her Austrian
relatives. This project was carried out by the Directory. On 20th
December 1795 Madame Royale was exchanged in Switzerland for the four
deputies and the Minister of War whom Dumouriez had handed over to the
Austrians, and for another deputy, Drouet, the former postmaster at
Sainte-Menehould, who had been taken prisoner by the Austrians in 1793.

[Sidenote: Desire for Peace in France.]

The exchange of Madame Royale was a manifest evidence of the desire
of the Directors to conclude peace. The Prussian ambassador at Paris
reported to his government on 28th December 1795, ‘The general cry in
Paris is, “Make peace and you will have money and bread.”’[10] Peace,
indeed, was the desire not only of the people of Paris, but of the
people of all France, of the majority in the new Legislature, and
of the Directory. It was hoped that the Treaties of Basle were but
the preliminaries of a general peace throughout Europe. But the two
remaining enemies of the French Republic, England and Austria, did not
see their way to meeting the Directory halfway. Pitt and Grenville
argued that a peace made with the Directory would be only of the nature
of a truce. They were ready enough to make peace, but considered it
inadvisable to negotiate with a government which seemed to them in
its essence unstable. Owing either to the intrigues of the _émigrés_,
or to their own knowledge of politics, they grasped the fact that the
new government of France was constructed on a faulty basis, and that a
peace concluded with it would not be lasting. The attitude of Austria
was somewhat different. Thugut, the Austrian minister, believed that
France was exhausted, and that by a continuance of war substantial
concessions could be wrung from her. Reubell, the Director who took
charge of the conduct of Foreign Affairs, expressed himself as follows
to the Prussian ambassador at Paris: ‘The war with Austria troubles us
less than the war with England. Our means for supporting the former
are ready, but not without having exhausted all the resources of the
Republic. It will be probably the last effort of the two belligerent
powers.... Our plan of campaign is almost settled; the war will be
defensive in Germany and offensive in Italy. It is important to us to
detach Austria from England and Sardinia from Austria.’[11] Contrary
to their wish, therefore, the Directors found themselves obliged to
continue the war with England and Austria.

[Sidenote: France and Prussia.]

While continuing the war with these two powers, the French Directory,
like the Thermidorians, hoped to obtain not only the neutrality of
Prussia and Spain, which had been secured by the Treaties of Basle,
but their active co-operation. One of its first diplomatic endeavours
was to enter into close relations with Prussia. Some of the ministers
of Frederick William II., notably Alvensleben, were in favour of an
alliance with France; but the King himself, though he had been forced
by the emptiness of his treasury, and his projects on Poland to make
peace with the French republicans, looked on the idea of making an
alliance with them with horror. In this attitude he was supported by
his two ablest ministers, Haugwitz and Hardenberg. By the terms of the
Treaty of Basle Hardenberg had secured the preponderance of Prussia in
northern Germany. A line of demarcation or neutrality was drawn across
Germany, and the northern states, which were thus freed from the fear
of a French invasion, looked to Prussia as their leader and saviour.
An excuse for not forming an offensive and defensive alliance with
France was found in the occupation by the French troops of the Prussian
territories on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia would only negotiate
on the basis of the restoration of the _status quo ante bellum_, and
the French Directory, like its predecessors, the Thermidorian Committee
of Public Safety and the Great Committee of Public Safety, insisted on
the cession to France of all territory up to the Rhine. The Directors,
had they wished, could not have opposed the universal feeling in France
in favour of making the Rhine the frontier, and proposed that Prussia
should take compensation for its cessions on the left bank of the
Rhine, by secularising the bishoprics and abbeys of northern Germany
and annexing their territories. This proposal, which would bring in
its train the overthrow of the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire,
could not be sponsored by Prussia. The policy of Frederick the Great
had been to assume that Prussia, not Austria, was the true defender of
the rights of the Empire, and his nephew, in spite of Alvensleben’s
representations, feared to break with the hereditary policy. The
arrangement with regard to the line of demarcation had placed Prussia
in the position of the guardian of the Empire; the acceptance of
the French propositions would have made her seem its destroyer. The
attempts of the Directory, and afterwards of the Consulate, to secure
an alliance with Prussia, were therefore foredoomed to failure.

[Sidenote: France and the Smaller States.]

The victories of the French Republic were received with more than
toleration in the smaller states of Europe, which feared the
aggressions of Austria, Prussia, and Russia far more than any invasion
by the French. Switzerland had profited greatly by the strict
neutrality it had maintained. The wealth of France had poured freely
into the cantons for the purchase of provisions and other necessaries;
the residence of the diplomatists of Europe at Berne, the headquarters
of Wickham, and at Basle, the headquarters of the French minister
Barthélemy, had also been profitable to the country, while the Swiss,
ready as ever to accept money from all sides, were enabled to make very
considerable gains. Of the Princes of Italy, Ferdinand, Grand Duke of
Tuscany, and brother of the Emperor, had, to the disgust of the Court
of Vienna, made a separate peace with the French Republic in February
1795; Ferdinand of Naples had followed his example, and the King of
Sardinia alone remained in armed opposition to France. With Portugal
the Directory and the Committee of Public Safety, refused to treat,
for, like the French statesmen throughout the eighteenth century,
the Directors regarded Portugal as merely a province of England.
With the smaller northern powers the Directory established the most
friendly relations. Christian VII. of Denmark had always maintained his
neutrality, and through the French minister, resident at his Court,
many important secret negotiations had passed with Prussia. In Sweden,
Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the guardian of the young King Gustavus
IV., abandoned the policy of Gustavus III., and now made a treaty of
friendship and a commercial treaty with the French Republic. The only
other state to be mentioned is Turkey. The Turks looked upon the events
which were passing in the West of Europe with unconcern; still they
were inclined to be friendly with the French Republic, because it was
engaged in fighting with Austria, and thus distracted the attention of
one of the hereditary enemies of the Sublime Porte.

[Sidenote: Russia.]

Catherine of Russia, now at the close of her long reign, still regarded
the French Revolution as affording a happy opportunity for her to
pursue her schemes on Poland without active interference from Prussia
or Austria. Her one desire was that France should continue the war,
and for this reason she cordially received at her court the Comte
d’Artois, and encouraged the presence of French _émigrés_. The Treaties
of Basle had greatly offended her, for Prussia was thus left free to
interfere in Poland, but Catherine was too wise to attempt to do more
than intrigue with the affairs of Western Europe. She had no idea of
intervening actively.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1795.]

The campaign of 1795 on the Rhine frontier is chiefly important in
regard to the treason of Pichegru. The Elector of Bavaria, who was at
the same time the Elector Palatine, had, as has already been said,
been uniformly friendly to the French. It was by his connivance that
two of the most important fortresses upon the Rhine, Mannheim and
Düsseldorf, were surrendered to Pichegru and Jourdan respectively.
Meanwhile Marceau besieged the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and Kléber
the city of Mayence. There can be little doubt, though it is not
absolutely proved by documents, that it was because of the negotiations
he had commenced with the Prince de Condé that Pichegru did not
advance into Germany. Jourdan, who did advance with the Army of the
Sambre-and-Meuse, therefore found himself unprotected on his right,
and was forced to retire with considerable loss. Marceau succeeded in
taking Ehrenbreitstein, but the same treacherous inaction of Pichegru
allowed the Austrian General Clerfayt to force Kléber to raise the
siege of Mayence. It was on 20th October 1795 that Jourdan recrossed
the Rhine; on the 29th Kléber was driven from before Mayence; and on
the 30th Pichegru was defeated and driven behind the Queich. The first
operations of the French armies under the Directory were, thus, owing
to Pichegru’s treachery, unsuccessful, and on the 21st December an
armistice was made between the French and the Austrians on the Rhine.
In the north, owing to the Treaties of Basle, there were no military
operations of importance during the autumn of 1795, and the French
army maintained its position on the frontier of Holland. In the south
considerable alterations were made. The treaty of peace with Spain
enabled the experienced and warlike soldiers of the two armies of
the Pyrenees to be despatched to reinforce the Army of Italy, which
was also joined by the bulk of the troops of the Army of the Alps.
General Schérer, who commanded the Army of Italy, pushed forward, and
by a victory at Loano on the 24th November 1795, opened up a direct
communication with Genoa and cut off the Sardinians from the sea. In
the four armies of the Directory which had thus taken the place of the
thirteen armies of the Republic, there were under arms at the close of
1795 about 300,000 men under experienced generals, excluding what was
known as the Army of the Interior, which guarded Paris and garrisoned
the chief cities of France.

[Sidenote: Campaign in Italy, 1796. First Stage.]

[Sidenote: Armistice of Cherasco. April 28, 1796.]

Reubell, in his conversation with the Prussian ambassador at Paris,
openly declared that the chief military effort of France in 1796 was
to be made in Italy. Hitherto the Army of Italy had been overshadowed
by the operations of the armies engaged upon the Rhine; but the
Directory now desired to attack Austria in a vital place. Upon the
Rhine they were in reality waging war with the Empire and not with
Austria. Mayence, for instance, was the capital of an Elector, not an
Austrian city, and blows struck in that quarter affected the Empire
and the petty princes of the Empire far more than they did Austria.
But in Italy the House of Austria owned an important possession in
the Milanese. Between the Milanese and the French Army of Italy was
Piedmont, the principal state of the King of Sardinia. Victor Amadeus
III. of Sardinia was the only petty monarch in Europe who had not
attempted to make peace with the French Republic. In his resentment
at the loss of Savoy and Nice he had thrown himself into the arms of
Austria, and had borrowed an Austrian general, Colli, to command his
small but well equipped army. This was the situation when Napoleon
Bonaparte, who had been nominated to the command of the Army of
Italy by the Directory, on the proposition of Barras, to whom he had
rendered such signal service on 13th Vendémiaire, arrived to take up
his new command on the 27th of March 1796. He understood the policy
of the Directory, and determined to crush the King of Sardinia first,
in order to be free to attack the Austrians in the Milanese. He
therefore turned the Maritime Alps and separated the Austrian from the
Sardinian army. The rapidity of his success was such as to surprise the
Directors. After turning the Alps Bonaparte struck north and defeated
the Sardinians at Montenotte, Millesimo, and Dego on the 12th, 13th,
and 15th April, stormed their camp at Ceva on 16th April, and finally
defeated them at Mondovi on 22d April. He then threatened Turin, and
the King of Sardinia signed an armistice with him at Cherasco on 28th
April, abandoning to the French army his most important frontier
fortresses. As the first result of these military operations the King
of Sardinia sued for peace, which he was only granted on recognising
the cession to France of Savoy and Nice, and as a second result General
Bonaparte was enabled to attack the Austrians in Lombardy without
leaving a hostile power behind him.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Italy. Second Stage.]

The operations of the second stage of the famous campaign of 1796
were as rapid and as completely successful. On the 8th May Bonaparte
crossed the river Po by skilfully misleading the Austrians as to his
intentions, and on 10th May he forced the passage of the Adda at Lodi,
where he won one of his most famous victories. The Austrian General
Beaulieu felt himself incapable of holding the lines of the other
rivers, and fled into the Tyrol. Bonaparte first occupied Milan, and
then forced the Dukes of Parma and of Modena to submit to his demands,
and to send ambassadors to treat for peace at Paris. To these petty
princelets Bonaparte behaved with the utmost arrogance; not satisfied
with making large requisitions of money and provisions, he selected
their finest pictures and works of art, and directed them to be sent
to Paris. Far more important, from his spiritual position, though not
of greater military strength, was the Pope. The French armies occupied
the Legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and Bonaparte then threatened
to march on Rome. In terror Pope Pius VI. concluded, on the 24th June
1796, an armistice at Foligno, by which he abandoned Ancona, and
promised to send to Paris the large sum of 20,000,000 livres, with
many manuscripts and works of art. The conquest of Italy revealed to
Europe the French Republic in a new light. It showed the monarchs,
and especially the rulers of little states, that the revolutionary
propaganda which they had hated and dreaded so much had given way to
an even more dangerous military policy, directed by a victorious and
ambitious general.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Italy. Third Stage.]

But Austria was not going to be driven out of Italy by a single
campaign. The beaten army of Beaulieu was reorganised by General
Melas, and reinforced by 30,000 picked men from the Rhine. This army,
amounting in all to 70,000 men, was placed under the command of Marshal
Würmser, who, at the end of July, debouched from the Tyrol and invaded
Italy by the two sides of Lake Garda. Bonaparte, whose army did not
exceed 40,000 men, broke up the siege of Mantua which he had formed,
and utterly defeated the Austrians in the great battle of Castiglione
on 5th August 1796. Würmser fell back, but in September, the following
month, he invaded Italy by the valley of the Brenta, and threw himself
into Mantua. Bonaparte, now considering himself for a time freed from
the danger of another Austrian attack, made an effort to reconstitute
Northern Italy. Several of the cities, notably Modena, Bologna, and
Ferrara, had declared themselves republics, but Bonaparte could see
no advantage in little republics, and summoned a general assembly of
deputies from the whole of Lombardy to meet at Milan. This assembly was
disposed to form a Lombard Republic, but before it could complete its
deliberations Bonaparte had to fight another Austrian army.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Italy. Fourth Stage.]

The Austrians, disgusted and surprised by these successive defeats,
prepared to make a great effort. For the first time, the Emperor
appealed directly to the patriotism of the people, and more especially
of the nobility. A new army was equipped, which, if not so numerous,
was more enthusiastic than the former armies, and was placed under
the command of General Alvinzi. Bonaparte had received few or no
reinforcements, and felt himself unable to face an army of 60,000 men.
He waited, therefore, patiently in his headquarters at Verona while
Alvinzi advanced slowly down the Brenta. Having learnt experience
from their former defeats, the Austrians were in no hurry to come
to blows, even with the small French army in front of them. Alvinzi
entrenched himself in a formidable position on the heights of Caldiero,
and repulsed a French attack upon the 12th of November. Another such
check meant the ruin of the French army. Bonaparte decided to turn
the position. Advancing along the causeway through the marshes upon
Alvinzi’s left, he fought the celebrated battle of Arcola on the 16th
of November, and Alvinzi, finding his position untenable, retreated
into the Tyrol.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Italy. Fifth Stage.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Tolentino. Feb. 19, 1797.]

Even yet the Austrians were not finally discouraged. Würmser held out
in Mantua; the Pope, incited by the Court of Vienna, did not observe
the Armistice of Foligno, and determined to raise the Italian populace
against the French; and it was resolved to make a final effort. In
the depth of winter Alvinzi advanced down the eastern shore of Lake
Garda, but was stopped and utterly defeated at Rivoli on the 14th
January 1797. Provera, who had endeavoured to relieve Würmser by the
Brenta, while Alvinzi occupied the main French army at Rivoli, was also
defeated, and on 2d February 1797 Mantua surrendered. These successive
blows destroyed the military power of Austria in Italy, and Bonaparte
began to make plans for invading Austria itself. But before he started
it was necessary to establish peace behind him. The behaviour of the
Pope showed the general that His Holiness could not be trusted, and it
was only under the pressure of a French advance upon Rome that Pius VI.
signed a treaty of peace with the French at Tolentino on 19th February
1797. By this treaty Bonaparte’s lines of communication were secured;
the people of Lombardy were his enthusiastic admirers, and everything
promised a speedy and successful advance upon Vienna.

[Sidenote: Campaign in Germany, 1796.]

As Reubell had stated to the Prussian ambassador, the chief effort of
the French armies was directed in the year 1796 against the Austrians
in Italy. But the operations in Germany were nevertheless of extreme
importance; not on account of what was achieved, but because of
their effect on the policy of the Princes of the Empire. Carnot,
who was left in entire charge of military affairs by the Directory,
combined a skilful plan of campaign. He directed the Army of the
Rhine-and-Moselle, now under the command of Moreau, and the Army of
the Sambre-and-Meuse, still under the command of Jourdan, to make a
simultaneous advance into the heart of Germany, and to unite their
forces upon the Danube. The generals were sufficiently able, and the
troops sufficiently experienced in war, to carry out this movement; but
at the head of the Austrians, for the first time since the outbreak of
the war, there appeared a general of real military genius. The Archduke
Charles, the third son of the Emperor Leopold, and the brother of the
reigning Emperor, Francis II., was only a young man, but he proved
himself to be a profound strategist. On the 1st June 1796 he announced
to the French generals that the armistice, which had lasted six months,
was at an end. Jourdan at once advanced from Düsseldorf, and after
taking Frankfort and Würtzburg invaded Franconia. The Archduke Charles
immediately opposed him with his whole army, and Jourdan had to fall
back after a three weeks’ campaign. Moreau was not able to cross
the Rhine until 24–25 June 1796. The operation was one of extreme
difficulty, which was chiefly overcome by the skill and gallantry of
Desaix. Moreau then proceeded to carry out Carnot’s orders; he advanced
with great rapidity; he defeated the Prince de Condé and his army of
_émigrés_ at Ettlingen; he occupied Stuttgart, and forced his way into
Bavaria, reaching the Danube in the month of August. To oppose him
the Archduke Charles marched rapidly to the south, and Jourdan once
more left Düsseldorf and invaded Franconia. The Archduke Charles soon
understood the intentions of Carnot, and took up a central position
between the two French armies at Ingolstadt. He waited until the French
generals had penetrated far from their base of operations, and then,
leaving but a weak division in front of Moreau, he attacked Jourdan
in force. The French Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse was overcome by the
weight of numbers; on the 3d of September it was driven from Würtzburg,
and on the 20th of September defeated at Altenkirchen, where Marceau,
one of the most renowned of the young generals of the republican
period, was killed. Having driven back Jourdan, the Archduke Charles
turned upon Moreau. That general had imprudently continued to advance
into Bavaria, and did not perceive until late in September the critical
position in which he had been left by the retreat of Jourdan. When
he did perceive it, he extricated himself by one of the most famous
retreats known in military history. For forty days he fell back through
a hostile country, with bad roads, and offering almost innumerable
difficulties from its lofty mountains and dense forests, and harassed
by the presence of a victorious Austrian army attempting to cut off his
retreat, and eventually he recrossed the Rhine on the 24th of October.

[Sidenote: Effects of the Campaign in Germany.]

From a military point of view, apart from the intrinsic interest
presented by the operations of the armies, the chief importance of
the campaign of 1796 in Germany lay in the fact that it occupied a
considerable force of Austrian troops, which were thus prevented from
being sent as reinforcements to the Austrian army in Italy. From the
diplomatic point of view, the campaign had results almost rivalling
those achieved by Bonaparte in Italy. The advance of the French threw
the states of Southern Germany into the hands of Prussia. They felt
a natural sentiment of jealousy at perceiving the states of Northern
Germany escaping the horrors of war, owing to the line of demarcation
established by the Treaty of Basle. Many of the smaller states, and
at least one of the larger states, Saxony, implored the intervention
of Prussia. Frederick William II., only too glad to pose as the
guardian of the Empire, made use of all his influence to induce the
French Directory to consent to the further extension of the line of
demarcation. Reubell, the Director who took charge of foreign policy,
was possessed by the idea that Prussia and France were natural allies,
and induced the Directory to meet the views of Frederick William
II.; but in return he demanded that Prussia should enter into an
offensive and defensive alliance with the French Republic. The King of
Prussia, in his hatred of Jacobin principles, was inclined to reject
this proposal, but his ministers, notably Haugwitz and Alvensleben,
persuaded him that it was impossible to refuse entirely. A compromise
was arranged, and on 5th August 1796 a secret supplement to the
Treaty of Basle was signed between France and Prussia. By this secret
convention Prussia definitely promised to recognise the limits of
the Rhine for the French Republic, and in return France guaranteed
that at a general peace not only the King of Prussia should receive
compensation for the territories he surrendered, by the cession of some
ecclesiastical states, but also that his brother-in-law, the Prince of
Orange, should receive a sovereignty in Germany, to make up for the
loss of the Stadtholderate in Holland. It proved impossible to extend
the line of demarcation to the southern states of Germany as long as
the Austrian army of the Archduke Charles remained there. And therefore
the petty rulers endeavoured to make peace with France on their own
account. The Duke of Würtemburg and the Margrave of Baden both opened
negotiations, and since the Elector of Bavaria had fled into Saxony on
the advance of Moreau, the Estates of Bavaria signed a treaty of peace
with the French general at Pfaffenhofen on the 7th September 1796. But
the successes of the Archduke Charles and the retreat of Moreau put
an end to these peaceful dispositions. The Elector of Bavaria refused
to ratify the treaty his Estates had made; the Duke of Würtemburg
dismissed the minister who had conducted his negotiations; and in spite
of all the efforts of Prussia, the predominance of Austria continued in
Southern Germany.

[Sidenote: Internal Policy of the Directory, 1796.]

The successes of Bonaparte in Italy, and the operations of the French
armies in Germany which, though they had ended in retreat, had not been
discreditable to the generals or soldiers, reacted very favourably upon
the position of the Directory. The French, as a nation, have always
been dazzled by military glory, and since the armies of the Directory
were victorious, they were inclined to look upon the government of
the Directory as excellent. But military successes did not merely add
to the reputation of the Directors; by means of them their financial
difficulties were relieved. The doctrine that invading armies should
live upon the resources of the invaded countries was a most convenient
one. Not only did the armies in Italy and Germany maintain themselves
free of cost to the Directory, but the generals sent large sums of
money to Paris. It was therefore unnecessary to impose fresh taxes
or issue more paper money. But the relief of financial distress was
not the only result of the government of the Directory in 1796; it
restored internal peace. Hoche, after his defeat of the _émigrés_ at
Quiberon Bay in 1795, devoted himself to the pacification of Brittany
and La Vendée. The chief credit due to the Directors is that they gave
the young general a free hand. While putting down armed insurrection,
and defeating the Vendéan chiefs whenever they appeared, Hoche used
the most conciliatory measures towards individuals. His policy, as he
himself declared in one of his proclamations, was to make the Republic
loved. While punishing brigandage severely, he conveniently forgot all
past offences as long as the offenders occupied themselves peacefully;
and on the 15th of July 1796 the Directory was able to announce to
the Legislature that the whole of France was at peace. In truth, all
political disturbances were at an end. The majority of the French
people frankly accepted the Republic, and seemed to care very little
what was the actual form of the republican government. But though
political disturbances were over, the troubled times through which
France had passed had left only too much scope for private animosity.
In the south armed bands, resembling the Companies of Jehu of 1795,
pretended to be acting for the defence of religion, when they were
really moved by desire of plunder and booty. In the centre the pretext
of religion was not alleged, but armed bands of brigands collected
in the forests and the mountains, and, like the banditti in Italy,
pillaged travellers on the high roads, and held whole villages to
ransom. These evils steadily diminished with the consistent enforcement
of the law, but it was some years before France became absolutely safe
for travellers. Of less importance were the insurrections fomented
by the extreme democratic party. Democracy was discredited by the
recollection of the Reign of Terror, and the plot of Babeuf in May,
and an attack on the camp at Grenelle in November 1796, were easily
suppressed.

[Sidenote: First changes in the Directory and the Legislature, 1797.]

[Sidenote: Changes in the Ministry.]

By the terms of the Constitution of the Year III. no change in the
Directory or the Legislature was to be made until February 1797. By
this arrangement a period of consistent government was secured. The
Directors, on the whole, acted harmoniously together. The pre-eminence
of Reubell and Carnot was generally recognised; Barras occupied
himself chiefly with his pleasures; Revellière-Lépeaux was engaged in
establishing his new religion of Theo-philanthropy, which made some
converts in the towns, but found no followers in the villages; and
Letourneur simply acted as Carnot’s lieutenant. In the Legislature
the chief leaders, such as Sieyès, Cambacérès, and Boissy-d’Anglas,
showed occasionally their jealousy of their former colleagues in the
Convention; but, on the whole, they did not try to interfere with their
measures. The only heated debates which took place in the Council of
Five Hundred were on the nature of the disturbances in the south of
France. These were roundly asserted by the opposing parties to be
caused by intrigues of priests, or by intrigues of Jacobins. Fréron,
who had been sent by the Directory to settle these troubles, was very
violently attacked, and with difficulty exculpated himself from the
charge of political partisanship. But, on the whole, the debates in
both branches of the Legislature were very tame. Nevertheless there
appeared, during 1796, the germ of what in 1797 was known as the
Clichian party, so called from its meeting at the Club de Clichy. This
party was not openly royalist, but the chiefs of the French _émigrés_,
supported by the funds supplied by Wickham, believed they could use
it to serve their own purposes, as they had made use of the agitators
in the Paris Sections in 1795. In the ministry no changes of great
importance were made in 1796; Ramel, the former colleague of Cambon
in the Financial Committee of the Convention, replaced Faypoult as
Minister of the Finances; and Pétiet, a former commissary-general, was
appointed Minister of War in succession to Aubert-Dubayet. Of more
importance was the creation of a seventh ministry, of General Police,
in January 1796, for it was an evidence of a new spirit, and the first
symptom of the elaborate scheme for muzzling public opinion, which was
developed to its height by Fouché at a later date. Merlin of Douai
left the Ministry of the Interior for three months to organise the new
department, and was succeeded in April 1796 by Cochon de Lapparent, a
former member of the Convention.

[Sidenote: France and Spain.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of San Ildefonso. 19th Aug. 1796.]

[Sidenote: Battle of St. Vincent.]

It has been said that the Directors endeavoured in vain to form
an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. They were more
successful with regard to Spain. The power of Godoy, who for the
negotiations at Basle had been created Prince of the Peace, rose to its
height. General Pérignon, who had been sent as ambassador to Madrid by
the Directory, skilfully flattered the vanity of the new prince, and,
to the astonishment of all Europe, an offensive and defensive alliance
was signed between the French Republic and the ancient Bourbon monarchy
of Spain at San Ildefonso, on the 19th of August 1796, by which Spain
agreed to declare war against England, and the French promised to
assist in the conquest of Portugal, which was to be divided between
the two allies. From a military point of view the alliance with Spain
did not yield any advantage to France, but from a naval standpoint
it proved of incalculable value. The English were obliged to abandon
Corsica, their only foothold in the Mediterranean, and to concentrate
their fleet at Gibraltar. The Spanish navy, to which much attention had
been paid throughout the eighteenth century, had certainly improved,
and, united with a few French men-of-war, far outnumbered the English
Mediterranean Fleet. This was the year of the great English naval
mutiny at the Nore, and the profound discontent which possessed the
English sailors was equally perceptible at Gibraltar. But fortunately
the English admiral, Sir John Jervis, was a man of singular ability,
who understood the English sailor perfectly. He showed no mercy to
ringleaders, but maintained discipline, and even made it popular
by looking after the men’s food, and appealing to their patriotic
feelings. He understood that, on the eve of a battle, the sailors would
cease their disaffection. Accordingly he kept at sea for several months
after the junction of the French and Spanish fleets, announcing his
intention to offer battle; and when discipline was restored he utterly
defeated the French and Spaniards off Cape St. Vincent, on the 14th of
February 1797. By this victory, in which Nelson greatly distinguished
himself, the Spanish fleet was practically destroyed for offensive
purposes, and the high hopes that the Directory had built on the naval
assistance of Spain were frustrated. England had promptly, as in former
days, come to the help of Portugal, and sent an army under the Hon.
Sir Charles Stuart to defend the country, and a general, the Prince of
Waldeck, to reorganise the Portuguese army.

[Sidenote: The Directory and England.]

While the Directory made an alliance with Spain, and hoped to make one
with Prussia, its sentiments of hostility towards England remained
undiminished. It had been expected in France that the conquest of
Holland and the formation of the Batavian Republic, in close alliance
with the French Republic, would have struck a more serious blow at
the prosperity of England than it had really done. As a matter of
fact, the loss of Holland proved but a slight commercial disaster; the
commerce of the North of Europe, which passed through English hands,
merely moved from Amsterdam to Hamburg, and the English merchants
suffered little. From a naval point of view, the French possession
of Holland made it necessary for England to set on foot a powerful
fleet to watch the Dutch navy in the Texel, while she also had to
maintain a fleet blockading the French port of Brest in addition to
her Mediterranean fleet. The English government was more profoundly
affected by Bonaparte’s victories in Italy than by the loss of Holland.
In November 1796 Lord Malmesbury was sent to Paris to discuss the bases
of a peace. He began to negotiate for the restoration of the _status
quo ante bellum_, and demanded the surrender of Belgium to the Emperor.
Such terms were ridiculous; the French Directors, even had they wished,
would not have dared to withdraw from their policy of making the Rhine
the frontier of France. The diplomatic habitudes of Lord Malmesbury
were regarded by the Directors as proofs of his double-dealing, and
he was abruptly ordered to leave Paris on the 20th December 1796.
There was little real expectation of peace on either side. At the
very time Lord Malmesbury was in Paris the Directory was preparing
a naval expedition in Brest harbour. It was announced that the
expedition was intended for the West Indies, and it was placed under
the command of Hoche. On the 16th of December it set sail for Bantry
Bay, for the Directory had really recurred to the old French idea of
attacking England through Ireland. But a terrible storm scattered the
French Fleet, and only two or three ships reached Bantry Bay, and they
returned to France without effecting a landing.

[Sidenote: Death of Catherine of Russia. Nov. 17, 1796.]

Though the history of Europe during the year 1796 is chiefly bound up
in the policy and military achievements of France, the close of the
year witnessed the disappearance of the greatest monarch of Eastern
Europe. On the 17th November 1796, Catherine of Russia died. The
importance of her reign belongs to the period prior to the French
Revolution, and her attitude towards the series of events grouped under
that title, was chiefly dictated by the course of events in Poland. She
was succeeded on the throne of Russia by her son, the Emperor Paul. The
new monarch soon gave evidence of the aberration of intellect which led
him into the strange excesses that brought about his assassination.
His first step in foreign politics was to decline to assist Austria
with his armies, and he even withdrew a Russian fleet which his mother
had recently sent to the assistance of England. In conversation he
expressed his detestation of the French as Jacobins, but none the less
he opened negotiations with the Directory by means of his ambassador at
Berlin, Kolichev, who communicated freely with the French ambassador
Caillard.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte’s Campaign of 1797.]

In the commencement of the year 1797 the interest of Europe was
concentrated upon Bonaparte and his army. Being master of Italy he
now determined to invade the home domains of the House of Austria.
He begged the Directory to act with energy in Germany in order to
prevent reinforcements being sent against him. The Emperor recalled
his brother, the Archduke Charles, from the Rhine, and placed in him
command of the Austrian army in the Tyrol. On the 16th of March 1797
Bonaparte forced the passage of Tagliamento. Joubert, who was acting
independently in the district of Friuli, made his way by that route
into the Tyrol, and joined his general-in-chief at Klagenfurt on the
13th of March. With the combined army Bonaparte pursued the Austrians.
He defeated the Archduke Charles at Neumarkt and Unzmarkt, and on 7th
April he entered Leoben. The Archduke Charles felt it impossible to
oppose the French longer, and on the 17th of April 1797 preliminaries
of peace were signed at Leoben.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1797 in Germany.]

Simultaneously with Bonaparte’s advance the Armies of the
Rhine-and-Moselle under Moreau, and of the Sambre-and-Meuse under
Hoche, were set in motion. The latter advanced from Düsseldorf,
defeated the Austrians in five engagements, took Wetzlar, and was
already marching on Giessen in Hanover when his progress was stopped by
the news of the signature of the Preliminaries of Leoben. Moreau, on
his side, had not been able to cross the Rhine until 20th April, and
had made no further offensive movement, when he was ordered to cease
operations.

[Sidenote: Preliminaries of Leoben. April 17, 1797.]

By the Preliminaries of Leoben the war between France and Austria,
which had lasted without intermission for five years, came to a
termination. By the Convention signed at that place, Austria agreed
that the Rhine should be recognised as the frontier of France, which
involved the cession of Belgium. In Italy the Emperor promised to give
up the Milanese, and to receive Venice in compensation. These were the
territorial bases agreed to, and General Bonaparte was intrusted by the
Directory with the task of concluding a definitive peace with Austria.
But this Convention only bound Francis II. as head of the House of
Hapsburg, not as Emperor. It was therefore agreed that a congress
should be held at Rastadt, at which terms of peace should be arranged
between the French Republic and the Empire. The Preliminaries of Leoben
crowned Bonaparte’s great victories, and the monarchs of Europe quickly
recognised that they had no longer to deal with the French Republic,
but with the young Corsican general.

CHAPTER VI

1797–1799

Elections of 1797 in France—Policy of the Clichians—Struggle
between the Directors and the Clichians—Negotiations for
Peace between England and the Directory—Changes in the
French Ministry—Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Bonaparte
in Italy—Occupation of Venice—The Ligurian and Cisalpine
Republics formed—Annexation of the Ionian Islands by
France—Treaty of Campo-Formio—Capture of Mayence—The
Batavian Republic—Battle of Camperdown—Bonaparte’s
Expedition to the East—Capture of Malta—Conquest
of Egypt—Battle of the Nile—Internal Policy of the
Directory after 18th Fructidor—Foreign Policy—Attitude
of England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia—The Helvetian
Republic—Italian Affairs—The Roman and Parthenopean Republics
formed—Occupation of Piedmont and Tuscany by France—The
Law of Conscription—Outbreak of War between Austria and
France—Murder of the French Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt—The
Campaign of 1799—In Italy—Battles of Cassano, the Trebbia
and Novi—Italy lost to France—In Switzerland—Battle
of Zurich—In Holland—Battles of Bergen—Results of the
Campaign of 1799—Policy and Character of the Emperor Paul
of Russia—Bonaparte’s Campaign of 1799 in Syria—Siege of
Acre—Battle of Mount Tabor—Struggle between the Directors and
the Legislature in France—Revolution of 22d Prairial—Changes
in the Directory and Ministry—Bonaparte’s return to
France—Revolution of 18th Brumaire—End of the Government of
the Directory in France.

[Sidenote: The Elections of 1797 in France.]

In the month of May 1797 a new Director and a new third of the
Legislature were, in accordance with the Constitution of the Year
III., elected in France. These elections were entirely favourable to
the Clichian party. This party, which had gradually grown up since
the dissolution of the Convention, and took its name from the Club de
Clichy, was led by men of very considerable ability. The sentiment
which united them was a loathing of the memory of the Reign of Terror
and a desire to expel from power those who had taken part in it.
This sentiment was very general in France, and the new legislators
returned to the Council of Ancients and the Council of Five Hundred
were, with but few exceptions, men who had not sat in the Convention.
Many of them were former members of the Constituent and Legislative
Assemblies, and had a considerable knowledge of parliamentary tactics.
Foremost among this group was Barbé-Marbois, who had, under the Bourbon
monarchy, been intendant of San Domingo, but the deputy belonging to it
who attracted most attention was General Pichegru. The first success
of the Clichian party was won in the election of the new Director.
The retiring Director on whom the lot had fallen was Letourneur, and
to fill his place was chosen Barthélemy, a former marquis, and the
diplomatist who had negotiated the Treaties of Basle. This election was
very significant. It seemed to presage a consistent peace policy. It
afforded a guarantee that the proscription of the nobles of the _ancien
régime_ was to be ended.

[Sidenote: Policy of the Clichians.]

In foreign policy it was indeed the aim of the Clichians to bring about
a universal peace. Their home policy was neither so definite nor so
logical. In their hatred of the Terrorists there can be no doubt that
the wiser heads among the Clichians desired a return to a monarchical
government. Pichegru and the more self-seeking among them thought that
they could obtain money and power by a new revolution. Never were
the prospects of a counter-revolution more promising. The Clichians,
recognising the impossibility of restoring the Bourbon Monarchy in its
former authority, were in favour of a constitutional, limited monarchy
after the English pattern. But Louis XVIII., and the Comte d’Artois,
buoyed up by the hopes of the _émigrés_ refused to make the slightest
concession; they would not acknowledge the Constitution of 1791; they
would not even promise to consent to the slightest limitation of
the old monarchical power. Under these circumstances the Clichians
had to look for a king elsewhere. A few, among whom may possibly be
counted Pichegru, were ready to accept Louis XVIII. on his own terms.
A larger party were in favour of the Duke of Orleans, son of Philippe
Égalité, and, in the future, King of the French as Louis Philippe.
Others favoured the accession of a Prussian prince, and negotiations
were opened at Berlin to see whether Prince Francis, the nephew of
Frederick William II., would accept the throne. With such divisions of
opinion, there was no doubt that the internal policy of the Clichians,
even though backed by large subsidies from England, which passed to
them through Switzerland, was certain to bring about no result. Nor
was their peace policy more likely to succeed. The wars of the French
Republic had organised a body of valiant and experienced soldiers
whose trade was war, and to whom the idea of peace was repugnant.
Both Bonaparte and Hoche, the two greatest generals of the Directory,
naturally looked with suspicion and dislike upon the policy of the
Clichians.

[Sidenote: Struggle between the Directory and the Clichians.]

[Sidenote: Negotiations for Peace between England and the Directory.]

It need hardly be said that the attitude of the Clichians was one of
open hostility to the four original Directors. Their one adherent
in the Directory, Barthélemy, proved to be a very weak support, and
his brother Directors soon saw that it was unnecessary to trouble
themselves about him. The four remaining original Directors were
united in their dislike of the new theories, and also as regicides
had reason to fear their success. A severe struggle was therefore
imminent between the majority of the Legislature and of the Executive.
A crisis had arisen which tested the political theories which had found
their expression in the Constitution of the Year III. The Legislature
endeavoured to encroach upon the authority of the Directory; the
Directors refused to yield one jot of their power. The first active
measure of hostility in the Councils was an attack upon the Foreign
Minister, Charles Delacroix. Pitt had decided to make a second attempt
to bring about peace between England and France, though without much
expectation of its success, and a conference was opened at Lille
on the 4th July 1797, at which Lord Malmesbury was present as the
English plenipotentiary. He presented, on behalf of England, almost
the same demands as had been rejected in the previous December, and
the negotiations were speedily broken off. Using this as a pretext,
the hostile majority in the Council of Ancients and Council of Five
Hundred accused the Directors of not sincerely wishing for peace,
and threw the chief blame for the rupture of the conference on their
minister, Delacroix. The Directory yielded. Charles Delacroix was
sent as ambassador to Holland, and was succeeded as Foreign Minister
by Talleyrand. This skilful and subtle diplomatist saw that the
rivalry between the two powers in the State must lead to an open
rupture. He sided strongly with the Directors; he communicated with
Hoche and Bonaparte, and there can be little doubt that he was one of
the principal, if not the principal, author of the _coup- ’état_ or
revolution which followed. The dismissal of Delacroix was perhaps the
most important episode; but the other ministers were likewise violently
attacked by the Councils, and in addition to the Foreign Office every
department of State, except the ministries of Finance and Justice,
changed hands in July 1797. François de Neufchâteau became Minister
of the Interior, General Schérer Minister for War, Pleville de Peley
Minister of the Marine, and Lenoir-Laroche, who was succeeded in a few
days by Sotin de la Coindière, Minister of Police.

[Sidenote: The Revolution of 18th Fructidor. (4th September 1797.)]

The revolution of the 18th Fructidor was one which created but little
interest among the people of France. It was the result of an intrinsic
weakness in the Constitution, not of a popular movement. Two co-equal
powers can never exist in the government of a State: when a collision
takes place one must be overthrown. In their measures for overthrowing
or muzzling the leaders of the opposition in the Legislature, the four
senior Directors could not agree. Carnot, the greatest of them all,
disliked any interference with the Constitution, and looked upon
the employment of force as likely to lead to great disasters. The
other original Directors, Barras, Reubell, and Revellière-Lépeaux,
were, however, perfectly agreed. They were determined to use the
regular troops that formed the garrison of Paris; Hoche, from Holland,
sent them a sum of money; and Bonaparte instructed one of his best
generals, Augereau, to act according to their orders. Accordingly, on
the morning of the 18th Fructidor (4th September 1797) fifty-five of
the leaders of the Clichian party in the Legislature, including both
Barbé-Marbois and Pichegru, were arrested, and were at once deported,
with the ex-minister of Police, Cochon de Lapparent, and several other
individuals, without trial, to Cayenne and Sinnamari. The same harsh
measures were not taken with regard to the two dissentient Directors,
Carnot and Barthélemy, who were given every facility for escaping from
France. This revolution was carried out without the shedding of a
single drop of blood, and the success of the Directors was acquiesced
in by the people of France.

Merlin of Douai, the great jurist and statesman, and François de
Neufchâteau, a dramatist and former member of the Legislative
Assembly, were elected as the new Directors in the place of Carnot and
Barthélemy, and were succeeded in the ministries of Justice and the
Interior by Lambrechts and Letourneur.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte in Italy.]

[Sidenote: Occupation of Venice.]

[Sidenote: The Ligurian Republic.]

[Sidenote: The Cisalpine Republic.]

After the conclusion of the Preliminaries of Leoben Bonaparte returned
to Italy and established himself at Montebello, near Milan. He was
appointed plenipotentiary of the French Republic to conclude a final
treaty with Austria, but the negotiations lasted for many months.
During this time the young general was chiefly engaged in settling
Italy. He first made a terrible example of the city of Verona, where
the people had risen in revolt during his campaign in the Tyrol, and
had murdered the wounded French soldiers left in their city. He next
occupied Venice, and exacted from it a heavy contribution in money.
Having thus established his power throughout northern Italy, Bonaparte
began to set up new governments. On the 15th of June 1797 be insisted
on the dissolution of the ancient government of Genoa, and formed
that city and the surrounding districts into a new Ligurian Republic.
Piedmont, by the terms of the Treaty of Cherasco, was left to the King
of Sardinia, but Bonaparte at once formed Lombardy, Modena, Reggio,
Bologna, Ferrara, the Romagna, Brescia, and Mantua into one State,
which he named the Cisalpine Republic. The Constitution of this new
Republic, which was modelled on the Constitution of the Year III., was
promulgated on the 9th of July 1797. In these measures Bonaparte had
carefully avoided any annexations by France. It was otherwise with
regard to the Ionian Islands, which were ceded to the French Republic
by Venice. Corfu was occupied on the 28th of June 1797, and Bonaparte
believed that by this cession the French fleet in the Mediterranean
would be able to close the Adriatic Sea.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Campo-Formio. 17th October 1797.]

[Sidenote: Capture of Mayence. 29th December 1797.]

During the months in which Italy was being thus reconstructed, the
Austrian plenipotentiary, Cobenzl, was skilfully delaying the signature
of a definitive treaty between France and Austria. In truth, the
Austrians, like the English, Thugut, like Pitt, hoped that the Clichian
party would win the day. The successful _coup d’état_ of 18th of
Fructidor destroyed his hopes, and on 17th of October 1797 the Treaty
of Campo-Formio was signed. The bases laid down by the Preliminaries of
Leoben were generally followed. The frontier of the Rhine for France
was solemnly recognised. The new arrangements in Italy were also agreed
to, and to Austria was ceded Venice and all the territories of Venice
in Istria and Dalmatia and up to the Adige, in compensation for the
loss of the Milanese. The Emperor also engaged to use his influence
at the Congress of Rastadt to secure peace between France and the
Holy Roman Empire. The Treaty of Campo-Formio really struck a more
severe blow at the Empire than at the House of Austria. The cession
of the Rhine frontier to France implied the loss to the Empire of the
electorates of Trèves, Mayence, and the Palatinate, while it only
deprived Austria of her mutinous and rebellious subjects in Belgium.
A secret clause was also added to the Treaty, by which the French
Republic promised to guarantee the whole of Bavaria to the House of
Austria, in return for the immediate evacuation of all the fortresses
which the Austrians occupied upon the Rhine. Immediately upon receiving
the news of the Treaty of Campo-Formio the Directory equipped a special
army under the command of General Hatry for the capture of Mayence,
the only place on the left bank of the Rhine not in the possession of
France. Deprived of the assistance of Austria, the troops of the Empire
and of the Elector of Mayence could make but little resistance, and on
29th of December 1797 Mayence was once more surrendered to the French
Republic.

[Sidenote: Holland. The Batavian Republic.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Camperdown. 11th October 1797.]

The Batavian Republic, which had been established in 1795 in Holland,
was also considerably affected by the revolution of 18th Fructidor.
The Dutch Legislature had been influenced by every current of feeling
in France, and during the predominance of the Clichians had made no
real effort to support their French allies. After the conclusion of
the Convention of Leoben, and the consequent cessation of hostilities
in Germany, the Directory despatched Hoche to Holland. He there busied
himself with another effort for his favourite scheme for the invasion
of England. For this purpose he relied upon the powerful Dutch fleet,
which was being blockaded by an English squadron under Admiral Duncan
in the Texel. During the mutiny at the Nore in the summer of 1797
the position of the blockading English fleet had been very critical,
and on one occasion it is stated that two English ships were left to
watch fifteen Dutch. Directly after the revolution of Fructidor, the
Directors, who did not feel certain of the support of Moreau, removed
Hoche from Holland and placed him in command of the united Armies
of the Rhine-and-Moselle and the Sambre-and-Meuse under the title of
the Army of Germany. Hardly had he taken up his command when the most
distinguished rival of Bonaparte died on the 18th of September 1797.
Though deprived of the active superintendence of Hoche, the government
of the Batavian Republic, under the influence of the vigorous war
policy of the new Directory, ordered the Dutch fleet to leave the
Texel. It was met at sea by Admiral Duncan off the dunes or downs
of Kampe (Camperdown), and entirely defeated after the most hotly
contested naval battle of the war. The naval policy of the Directory
had thus resulted in the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the battle
of Cape St. Vincent and of the Dutch fleet in the battle of Camperdown.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte in Paris.]

On the 5th of December 1797 General Bonaparte arrived in Paris. The
death of Hoche had left him without a rival, and the revolution of the
18th of Fructidor had been so entirely the result of the assistance
of the army that its greatest general was practically the master of
the political situation. The Directors received him with transports
of enthusiasm and gave him a public reception, but, nevertheless,
they were overawed by the extent of his reputation and afraid that he
might attempt to take an active part in politics. He was appointed to
the command of the Army of the Interior, which was intended for the
invasion of England. Bonaparte, like Hoche, sincerely wished that such
an invasion should be effected, but he understood the extraordinary
difficulty inherent in any attempt to transport an army across the
Channel in the presence of a powerful fleet. He therefore advised the
Directory that it would be wiser not to attack England directly, but to
make an effort to overthrow her power in Asia. It seemed to him more
practicable to invade India than to invade England. His imagination
was stirred by the conception of an expedition to the East, and the
Directory was only too glad to remove from France for a time its most
able and ambitious general.

[Sidenote: Expedition to Egypt. 1798.]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Nile. 1st August.]

On the 9th of May 1798 Bonaparte left Toulon at the head of a picked
force of his veterans of Italy, and accompanied not only by his
favourite generals, but also by some of the leading savants and men
of letters of France. On the 9th of June the fleet reached Malta, and
on the 12th the Knights of St. John of the Hospital, who had held
the island ever since the Middle Ages, surrendered it to the French
general. Leaving a garrison in Malta, Bonaparte then proceeded to
Egypt. He disembarked in front of Alexandria on the 1st of July, and
upon the 4th he occupied that city. He then advanced on Cairo, and
on the 21st of July he defeated the Mamelukes at the Battle of the
Pyramids, and on the 24th he occupied Cairo. The English fleet in the
Mediterranean, under the command of Nelson, had been intended to stop
the expedition to Egypt, but it had been misdirected, and was unable
to prevent the disembarkation of the French forces. On the 1st of
August, however, Nelson appeared before Alexandria, and in the battle
of Aboukir Bay, generally known as the Battle of the Nile, he destroyed
the French fleet. This victory entirely cut off Bonaparte and his army
from France. The English held the Mediterranean, and for many months
prevented the despatch of either news or reinforcements. In November
they strengthened their position in the great south European sea by the
occupation of Minorca by an army under the Hon. Sir Charles Stuart, and
in 1800 the French garrison in Malta surrendered to General Pigot and
Captain Sir Alexander Ball.

[Sidenote: Internal Policy of the Directory.]

Before Bonaparte left Paris the time had come round for the election
of a new Director. The lot fell upon François de Neufchâteau to
retire, and his place was filled by Treilhard, a former member of the
Constituent Assembly and of the Convention. Treilhard had been himself
one of the leading Thermidorians, and since the close of the Convention
he had been employed first as Minister in Holland and then as one of
the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Rastadt. There is
little doubt that Sieyès might have entered the Directory had he so
wished, but he preferred to act in a different capacity. François
de Neufchâteau at once returned to his former office of Minister of
the Interior, and the only other alteration in the ministry was the
appointment of Admiral Bruix to be Minister of Marine. The Directory,
inspired by its victory on the 18th of Fructidor, did not hesitate to
infringe the terms of the Constitution of the Year III. The Royalists
or Clichians had not dared to appear at the elections to the Councils
in 1798, and the democrats had been able to elect whom they wished. But
the Directors did not intend to be subject to the democrats any more
than to the Clichians, and without the slightest show of legality they
quashed many of the elections to the Councils and gave the vacant seats
to their own nominees. This disregard of the law was also shown in
other branches of the internal policy of the Directory. The Directors,
in spite of the Constitution, interfered with the finances, and, by
the advice of Ramel, followed Cambon’s example of declaring a partial
bankruptcy. This, however, had but little effect in France, for, owing
to the depreciation in the value of the government paper money, very
little interest was expected by the creditors of the State. In purely
internal administration the weariness of the French people of political
disturbances enabled the agents of the Directory to maintain the public
peace without difficulty. The lack of capital in the country was
compensated by the fact that the government was the only great employer
of labour, and the spoils of the conquered countries enabled it to
pay the workmen sufficiently. It seems surprising that this bankrupt
government should have been acknowledged without opposition throughout
France, but the cause is to be found in the universal attention paid to
the course of foreign affairs.

[Sidenote: The Foreign Policy of the Directory.]

The Peace of Campo-Formio had, as has been shown, left France face to
face with England, and it was to strike a blow at the power of England
that Bonaparte proceeded to Egypt. For the same reason the Directory
carried out the favourite scheme of Hoche, and despatched a force
to Ireland under General Humbert in August 1798, which was forced to
surrender to Lord Cornwallis in September. But though the powers of the
Continent had been compelled to acknowledge the military superiority of
France, they were only seeking a loophole by which to enter once more
upon a general war. The departure of Bonaparte seemed to offer them a
good opportunity, and pretexts were not wanting for the formation of
a new coalition against France. The English ministry understood this
attitude of the Continental powers, and their emissaries were busy
in all the Courts of Europe. The Directors knew of these efforts of
Pitt and did their best to counteract them. The keynote of the French
policy was, as it had always been, to make an ally of Prussia. For
this purpose Sieyès, who, though not in office, was probably the most
influential man in France, obtained his nomination to a special embassy
to Berlin. He hoped by mixed measures of conciliation and of menace to
induce Frederick William III. of Prussia, who had succeeded his father
in November 1797, to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance.
But that monarch, in spite of the weakness of his personal character,
had absolutely determined to maintain his father’s policy of strict
neutrality, and neither the arguments of Sieyès nor those of Mr. Thomas
Grenville, the brother of the English Foreign Minister, could induce
him to swerve from it in either direction. The efforts of England
were crowned with more success at Vienna and St. Petersburg. The
Emperor Francis, and still more the Austrian people, were profoundly
disgusted by the triumphs of the French, and flattered themselves
that their defeats had been due to the genius of Bonaparte more than
to the valour of the French soldiers. On the conclusion of the Treaty
of Campo-Formio, Bonaparte had, without consulting the Directory,
nominated General Bernadotte to be the French Ambassador at Vienna.
The Austrian people took this appointment as an insult; Bernadotte,
though well received by the Emperor and his ministers, soon found
that he was most unpopular in Vienna, and on the 13th of April 1798
the Viennese mob collected in front of the French Embassy, insulted
the ambassador, and tore down the insignia of the French Republic. In
spite of this insult the Directors did not at once declare war against
Austria, but it afforded a pretext for dwelling on the inborn hatred
of the Austrians for the French in their proclamations to the French
people. Since such was the disposition of the Austrian people, it need
hardly be said that the English envoy was heartily welcomed at Vienna.
At St. Petersburg the application of Pitt for armed help was favourably
received. The Emperor Paul, though already showing signs of the brutal
insanity which was to lead to his assassination, still preserved the
prestige of being the heir of the great Catherine. His ministers were
those of Catherine; his policy was based on hers. But whereas Catherine
had steadfastly refused to go to war with France, Paul showed a decided
inclination, which was fostered by his generals, to see whether the
Russian army would not be more successful than the Prussian or the
Austrian against the seemingly invincible French republicans.

[Sidenote: The Helvetian Republic. April 1798.]

The French Directory, though recognising that it might have soon to
contend again with the power of Austria, and for the first time with
that of Russia, nevertheless roused without any reason fresh enemies
upon the French frontiers. Its greatest mistake at this period was its
interference with the affairs of Switzerland. For this interference
there was no real cause, but the Directors could not resist the
temptation of inflicting their special form of republic upon the Swiss.
The organisation of most of the cantons of Switzerland was essentially
feudal and oligarchical. The government of each canton and of each
city was in the hands of a very few families, and the people were in
much the same condition politically, socially, and economically as
the people of France before the Revolution. The Swiss peasants had
caught the contagion of revolution from France, and in the beginning
of 1798 the people of the Pays de Vaud rose in insurrection against
the authority of the Canton of Berne. This rising was followed by
popular tumults in other cantons, and the peasants everywhere destroyed
the signs of the feudal system and declared themselves in favour
of ‘Liberty—Equality—Fraternity.’ The popular leaders appealed to
France for help, and a powerful army under the command of General
Brune invaded Switzerland. The militia of the cantons was speedily
routed; Brune occupied Berne and sent the national treasury to
Paris, and a freely-elected Constituent Assembly was summoned. This
assembly proclaimed an Helvetian Republic, one and indivisible, with
a Directory, two Councils, and Ministers, in imitation of the French,
the Cisalpine, and the Batavian Republics, to take the place of the old
Swiss federal constitution. Great reforms were speedily accomplished;
on the 8th of May 1798 internal customs-houses were abolished, and on
the 13th of May torture was forbidden in judicial processes; on the
3d of August marriages between persons of different religions were
declared legal; and eventually all feudal rights were suppressed.
Great as were these reforms, they were not entirely acceptable to the
Swiss people. The mountaineers of Uri, Schweitz and Unterwalden, the
descendants of the founders of the ancient Swiss liberties, objected
to be freed under the influence of French bayonets, and the cry of
national patriotism soon raised an army against the French liberators
of the peasants. The French troops had to remain perpetually under
arms, and the Helvetian Republic, in spite of the popular freedom which
it secured, was hated even by the peasants whom it had relieved. The
hatred for the French name was increased by the arbitrary conduct,
and it was asserted by the corrupt behaviour, of Rapinat, the French
commissioner, who was a near relative of Reubell, the Director. The
intervention of the Directory had, therefore, in Switzerland, roused
a people in arms, even though it had been dictated by the best of
motives.

[Sidenote: Italian affairs.]

[Sidenote: The Roman Republic. February 1798.]

[Sidenote: The Parthenopean Republic. January 1799.]

When Bonaparte left Italy he had been succeeded in the command of the
French troops which occupied the frontiers of the Cisalpine Republic
by General Berthier. This general, desirous of emulating the successes
of Bonaparte, took the opportunity of the murder of the French
ambassador at Rome, General Duphot, to occupy the Eternal City. The
Pope, Pius VI., fled from Rome to the Carthusian monastery at Pisa,
and the Roman people declared themselves to be once more the Roman
Republic. Consuls and Tribunes, as in ancient days, were elected;
the Directory, full of classical recollections, recognised the Roman
Republic with transports of enthusiasm; and General Berthier took the
opportunity to send large sums of money to Paris. The King of Naples,
or to speak more accurately, the King of the Two Sicilies, regarded
the new republic with anything but favour. Encouraged by English and
Austrian envoys, and still more by the news of Nelson’s victory at
the Battle of the Nile, he determined to attack Rome. He placed one
of the most distinguished of the Austrian generals, Mack, at the head
of his army, and, without declaring war, occupied Rome on the 29th of
November 1798. The French troops for the moment had to retire. But
Championnet, who had succeeded Berthier, quickly concentrated his army,
and on the 15th of December he reoccupied Rome in force. Championnet
then took the offensive; he invaded the Neapolitan territory, and he
quickly conquered all Ferdinand’s dominions in Italy. The King fled
to Sicily, and in January 1799 the Parthenopean Republic was solemnly
installed at Naples. The two remaining independent states of Italy
were also occupied by the French armies. The one of these, Piedmont,
was conquered without any declaration of war or any pretext by General
Joubert in November 1798, and King Charles Emmanuel IV. fled to
Sardinia. The other, Tuscany, in spite of the desire of the Grand Duke
to remain at peace with France, was the next victim, and on the 25th of
March 1799 the French troops occupied Florence.

[Sidenote: The Law of Conscription. 5th Sept. 1798.]

The occupation of the whole of Italy and of Switzerland did not
increase the military strength of France; on the contrary, the
proceedings of the Directory only aroused the most profound disgust
and fear in Austria, Russia, and England. The Directors felt that a
far more terrible war than they had yet been engaged in was about to
break forth, and it may be assumed that, on the eve of hostilities,
they even regretted the absence of Bonaparte. Enormous numbers of
soldiers would be necessary in a new war. Trained and experienced
officers and non-commissioned officers existed, but the difficulty was
how to fill the ranks. It was no longer possible to have recourse to
the measures of the Convention, to the _levée en masse_, and to the
appeal for volunteers with the cry that the country was in danger. The
Republic had now become a military power, and the question was how
to recruit its armies, not how to rouse the whole population. On the
19th of Fructidor, Year VI. (5th September 1798), the Councils of the
Ancients and of Five Hundred, on the application of the Directory,
passed the first Law of Conscription. By this law all Frenchmen between
the ages of twenty and twenty-five with certain exceptions were
declared to be subject to military service. They were divided into five
classes, and one or more classes could be called out by the executive
authority after receiving the consent of the Legislature. This law is
the starting-point of the military levies which formed the army of
Napoleon, and the principle of conscription was thus laid down many
months before Bonaparte became First Consul.

[Sidenote: The Outbreak of War. 1799.]

[Sidenote: Battles of Stockach and Magnano. 25th March and 5th April.]

Mention has been made of the riot at Vienna which caused the departure
of the French ambassador, Bernadotte. He was not replaced by the
Directory, and long negotiations took place on the subject of the
compensation due to the Republic for this insult. But neither party
was in earnest. Both the French Directory and the Emperor Francis were
preparing for the contest. The first overt act of war took place at
the commencement of 1799, when the Austrian troops, under the command
of the Archduke Charles, occupied the passes of the Grisons, and it
was in this quarter that before war was actually declared the first
engagements were fought. In Italy General Schérer was attacked at
Verona by the Austrian General Kray, and in Germany General Jourdan
fell back into the Black Forest. In both of these quarters many
skirmishes took place, and eventually on the 25th of March 1799 the
Archduke Charles defeated Jourdan in a pitched battle at Stockach. A
few days later, on the 5th of April, Schérer was defeated at Magnano.
Meanwhile the Congress of Rastadt was still sitting, and Austria was
nominally at peace with France. The conclusion of a treaty between
France and the Empire, which was the subject of the deliberations
at Rastadt, was necessarily a difficult matter to negotiate, for it
involved nothing less than the entire reconstitution of the Holy
Roman Empire, a reconstitution which could only be carried out by
the secularisation of the bishoprics. Eventually, in the month of
April 1799, after the engagements of Stockach and Magnano, the French
plenipotentiaries at Rastadt understood that it was hopeless to expect
to conclude a treaty with the Empire. They therefore asked for their
passports to France. These passports were refused. As they left Rastadt
the French plenipotentiaries were attacked by some Austrian hussars;
two of them, Roberjot and Bonnier-d’Alco, were killed, and the other,
Jean Debry, left for dead. This odious violation of international law
and the rights of ambassadors took the place of a formal declaration
of war, and roused not only the Directory but the French people to the
most strenuous exertions. Meanwhile the Emperor Paul of Russia declared
war against France, and ordered three armies to be despatched to the
scenes of action.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Italy. 1799.]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Trebbia. 17th-19th June.]

The campaign of 1799 was fought out in three localities, in all of
which the Russians played a most prominent part. In Italy a Russian
army, under the command of one of the most famous generals in Europe,
Suvórov, reinforced the Austrians after the battle of Magnano.
Suvórov forced the passage of the Adda at Cassano on the 27th of
April, and rapidly drove Moreau, who had succeeded Schérer in command,
across northern Italy. On the 28th of April Suvórov entered Milan,
and the Cisalpine Republic at once expired. On the 27th of May he
entered Turin, and after leaving besieging armies before Mantua and
Alessandria, shut up the remnants of Moreau’s army in Genoa. But the
army of Moreau was not the only French army in the Italian Peninsula.
Several powerful divisions, under the name of the Army of Naples, were
concentrated in Rome and Naples to support the newly-formed Roman and
Parthenopean Republics. Macdonald, who had succeeded Championnet in the
command of this army, rapidly concentrated and threatened to take the
Austro-Russian army in flank. Suvórov withdrew from Turin and turned
to his left to meet his new assailant. On the banks of the Trebbia a
three days’ battle was fought from the 17th to the 19th of June. The
issue of the battle itself was doubtful, but Macdonald, finding himself
unsupported by Moreau from Genoa, was obliged to retreat into Tuscany.
Fearing to be cut off, he then forced his way along the difficult
passage between the mountains and the sea, and joined Moreau, after
collecting every French soldier from the garrisons in the south of
Italy. The retreat of the French was followed by an outburst against
the Italian republicans.

[Sidenote: Death of Pope Pius VI. 29th Aug. 1799.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Novi. 15th August.]

The Parthenopean Republic was at once overthrown, and King Ferdinand
of the Two Sicilies wreaked cruel vengeance on his subjects. Pope Pius
VI. had been removed from his retreat near Florence to Valence, and the
French Directors had some idea of keeping him prisoner as a hostage in
the same way as Napoleon afterwards imprisoned his successor. But the
old Pope could not bear the sufferings of his imprisonment, and died
at Valence on the 29th of August 1799. Rome, deprived of the presence
of the Pope and the Cardinals, fell under the dominion of the Roman
nobles, who followed the example of the King of the Two Sicilies in
persecuting the republicans. Meanwhile the French Directory appointed
General Joubert, who was believed to be the best of the former
subordinates of Bonaparte, to take command at Genoa of the relics of
the armies of Moreau and Macdonald. With these soldiers he burst out
of Genoa to raise the siege of Alessandria, but on the 15th of August
he was utterly defeated by Suvórov at Novi in a great battle, in which
Joubert himself was killed. In spite of these defeats the Directory
refused to believe that Italy was lost. A new army was formed, and
placed under the command of Championnet, who, however, was defeated at
Genola on the 4th of November by the Austrians, under Melas, and driven
back into France.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Switzerland. 1799.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Zurich. 26th Sept.]

While Suvórov was conquering Italy and destroying the recollection
of the victories of Bonaparte in that country, Masséna, who was in
command of the French army in Switzerland, was engaged in a most
difficult task. The Archduke Charles, who also had under his command a
Russian army under Korsakov, forced his way slowly into Switzerland,
driving the French before him, and in August 1799 left Korsakov in
command at Zurich. The Archduke was then ordered to take the bulk of
his army to the Rhine in order to invade France. Korsakov, abandoned
to his own resources, showed himself far inferior in military ability
to Suvórov. Masséna, with singular boldness, refused to remain on the
defensive, and on the 26th of September drove the Russians out of
Zurich. His victory was won just in time, for Suvórov, after defeating
Joubert at Novi, had determined, in spite of the terrible weather,
to cross the Alps. It was on the 24th of September, two days before
Masséna’s victory at Zurich, that the main Russian army arrived at the
summit of the St. Gothard Pass. General Lecourbe, one of the finest
mountain generals of his day, occupied the St. Gothard, and with a few
battalions kept the whole Russian army at bay. Suvórov nevertheless
persevered and hoped to turn Masséna’s flank. But it was several weeks
before he could reach the village of Altdorf. Being unable to find
boats to cross the lake, he had now to retreat, and when he reached
the Grisons his army was practically destroyed by starvation and the
stress of the weather. Masséna, thus relieved of his most formidable
enemies, took possession of Constance, and by threatening the flank of
the Archduke Charles forced the main Austrian army to fall back to the
Danube.

[Sidenote: The Campaign in Holland. 1799.]

[Sidenote: Battles of Bergen.]

The third campaign of 1799 was fought in Holland. In this quarter it
had been arranged that the English and Russians were to act in concert.
On the 27th of August the English fleet had successfully reached the
Dutch coast, and had captured the relics of the Dutch fleet, defeated
at Camperdown, in the Texel. After this operation an English army,
under the Duke of York, and a Russian army, under General Hermann,
disembarked at the Helder. General Brune was hurriedly despatched to
take command of the few French troops in Holland, and co-operated
with the army of the Batavian Republic under General Janssens. The
campaign consisted of a succession of fierce but indecisive battles
in the neighbourhood of Bergen. The English and Russians did not act
harmoniously together; the country was unsuited for field operations;
and supplies were not adequately provided. As a result of the
operations, though he had not been really defeated, the Duke of York
signed the Convention of Alkmaar on the 18th October, by which he
agreed to surrender all prisoners on being allowed to evacuate Holland.

[Sidenote: Results of the Campaigns.]

The results of the campaigns of 1799 were decidedly favourable to
France. Though Italy was lost, and more than one French army had been
defeated, the victories of Masséna and of Brune more than compensated
for these disasters. Not only had France not been invaded, but she had
been able to retain her position in Switzerland and in Holland, and
to hold the whole of the right bank of the Rhine. England, in spite
of the Convention of Alkmaar, could point to the victory of the Nile
and the capture of the Dutch fleet in the Texel as real successes,
and Pitt and Grenville did not despair of ultimate victory. The King
of Prussia, who, when the affairs of France seemed to be desperate,
had begun to assume an attitude of opposition, and demanded the
evacuation of the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, speedily repented
of his indiscretion, and made excuses for his behaviour. The Austrian
ministers evinced no desire to continue the war; they resented the
high-handed conduct of Suvórov, and showed themselves more afraid of
their powerful ally, Russia, than of their declared enemy, France. They
implored the English government to bring about the withdrawal of the
Russian troops, and the Emperor Paul was only too glad to comply. The
retreat of the Russians left Italy practically in the hands of Austria.
The Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany was restored to his dominions, but
the King of Sardinia was not recalled, and Piedmont remained in the
occupation of the Austrian troops. Genoa alone was held by a French
garrison, which was closely besieged by the Austrians on the land side,
and blockaded by the English Mediterranean fleet. It was under the
influence of Austria and under the protection of Austrian troops that
the Conclave met at Venice in November 1799 to elect a new Pope.

[Sidenote: Russia.]

The significant feature of the campaigns of 1799 was the intervention
of Russia. Mention has been made of the abandonment of the policy of
the great Catherine by her successor. This change in the attitude
of Russia was due mainly to the influence of England, but partly
to the encouragement given by the French Directory to the Poles.
The restoration of Poland to its place among the nations had long
been a favourite idea among French republicans. Kosciuszko had been
enthusiastically welcomed at Paris, and the first of the Polish legions
which were to do good service under Napoleon was raised by Dombrowski
in 1797. The Emperor Paul had met this attitude by welcoming the
pretender Louis XVIII. to Russia, where he lent him the palace of
Mittau and gave him a considerable pension. He also took into Russian
pay the armed corps of _émigrés_ under the command of the Prince de
Condé. But fear of French assistance to Poland would not alone have
induced the Emperor Paul to declare war. He was particularly offended
by the French occupation of the Ionian Islands and of Malta. By the
Treaty of Campo-Formio the Ionian Islands had been ceded to France, and
the Russians regarded this cession as an indication that the Directory
was going to interfere actively in the affairs of the East. The bad
impression created by the occupation of the Ionian Islands had been
increased by the conquest of Malta and the expedition to Egypt. Though
Russia quite intended to destroy the power of Turkey, she had no idea
of allowing any western nation to share the spoils. It was for this
reason that the Emperor Paul accepted the title of Grand Master of the
Knights of St. John, which the expelled Knights of Malta offered to
him, and that he occupied the Ionian Islands with a Russian force in
1798. The foreign policy of the Emperor was so far popular in Russia in
that it maintained the sole right of Russia to interfere in the East,
but it was unpopular in that it seemed by the despatch of the armies
under Suvórov and Korsakov to bolster up the power of Austria. Suvórov
and his officers returned to Russia with a feeling of respect for their
enemies, but with a feeling of intense disgust at the behaviour of
their allies. Suvórov, indeed, went so far as to accuse the Austrians
of playing the part of traitors, and the anger of Paul was raised to
its height by the capture of Ancona, which was delivered by a secret
compact to the Austrian general in spite of the assistance of Russian
troops. He was equally angry with England on account of the failure of
the expedition to Holland. Every thing at the close of 1799 conduced
to make the Emperor Paul seek for a pretext to make peace, if not an
actual alliance, with the French Republic.

[Sidenote: Campaign in Syria. 1799.]

While these important campaigns were being fought out in Europe,
Bonaparte had not been idle in the East. The Battle of the Pyramids
had made him master of Egypt, and though cut off by the English fleet
from communication with France, he remained master of the country.
His internal administration made him excessively popular among the
Egyptians. He removed the Turks and Mamelukes from office, and called
on the Egyptians to govern themselves. But the Turks did not intend
to lose Egypt without striking another blow, and a powerful army was
sent for its reconquest. Bonaparte determined to meet this army half
way, and in February 1799 he advanced into Syria. He speedily reduced
Palestine and took Jaffa, and then laid siege to the strong fortress of
Acre. Assisted by the English sailors of Sir Sidney Smith, the garrison
of Acre made a gallant defence. The Turkish army advancing to its
relief was defeated by Bonaparte at Mount Tabor on the 16th of April.
In spite of his victory, he had, nevertheless, to abandon the siege
of Acre, and on the 20th of May he commenced his retreat to Egypt. He
there found the position to be extremely critical. The Mamelukes had
reorganised their army and reoccupied Cairo, and a Turkish army had
been disembarked by the English fleet at Aboukir. Meanwhile Desaix,
whom he had left in command in Egypt, had gone up the Nile for the
conquest of the interior. Bonaparte soon re-established his power; he
defeated the Mamelukes at Cairo, and drove the Turkish army into the
sea. At this juncture he heard the news of the events of the campaigns
in Europe, and, what affected him more, of the course of politics at
Paris. He determined, therefore, to return to France, and leaving
Kléber in command in Egypt, he set sail with a few personal friends.
The ship on which he embarked escaped the English cruisers, and he
landed at Fréjus on the 9th of October 1799 after a perilous voyage of
forty-seven days.

[Sidenote: Quarrel between the Councils and the Directory.]

The varying issues of the campaigns of 1799 had profoundly affected
the situation of the Directors, and the disasters in Italy had turned
the hopes both of the army and of the French people towards Bonaparte.
At the annual change in the composition of the Directory and the
Councils which took place in 1799 a considerable alteration had been
made. The new third of the Councils consisted almost entirely of men
who, without being either Jacobins or Clichians, longed to see the
establishment of a strong government in order to secure peace. The
Directory, which had seemed so strong after the revolution of the
18th of Fructidor, had been considerably weakened by the behaviour
of the Directors themselves. The election of none but civilians to
the highest offices in the State was disliked by the army, and the
characters of the Directors themselves had suffered. Reubell was the
Director designed by lot to retire in May 1799; he was perhaps the
ablest and most experienced of them all, but had been discredited by
the bad conduct of his relative, Rapinat, in Switzerland. Sieyès was
elected to succeed Reubell. This choice, and the acceptance of Sieyès,
testified to a new condition of affairs. The former abbé might have
been a Director on at least two former occasions, in 1795 and 1798, and
his acceptance at this juncture was very significant. He had failed
in his embassy to Berlin to induce the new King of Prussia to become
the active ally of France, and had been convinced by his diplomatic
experiences that the government of France must become frankly
military, since the monarchical powers of Europe would not accept the
possibility of a peaceable French Republic. From an internal point of
view the acceptance of Sieyès indicated an increase of power for the
Legislature, of which he was the idol.

[Sidenote: Coup d’état of 30th Prairial (18th June 1799).]

The election of Sieyès was followed by a bloodless revolution. He
maintained that the failure of the Constitution of the Year III. was
due to the usurpation of the functions of the Legislature by the
Directory, and, therefore, when the Councils declared Treilhard and
Merlin of Douai to have been illegally chosen Directors, and called
for the resignation of Revellière-Lépeaux, they found a powerful ally
in Sieyès. The attacked Directors yielded without a struggle, and on
30th Prairial, Year VII. (18th June 1799), they were replaced by three
personal friends of Sieyès, Gohier, Roger Ducos, and General Moulin.
Barras was thus the only member left of the original Directory. The
Councils, not satisfied with this victory, began to usurp the executive
functions of the Directory, and a general change of ministry took
place. The new ministers were Reinhard, Robert Lindet, Cambacérès,
Quinette, Bernadotte, replaced on 14th September by Dubois-Crancé,
Fouché, and Bourdon de Vatry, who succeeded Talleyrand and his
colleagues as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Finances, Justice,
the Interior, War, Police, and the Marine respectively. It is worthy
of note that four of the new ministers were formerly leading members
of the Convention. But the administration of the Councils was not
more effective than that of the Directory, and the news of the
disembarkation of Bonaparte at Fréjus was received with a feeling of
general satisfaction throughout France.

[Sidenote: Revolution of 18th Brumaire. (9th November 1799.)]

Bonaparte reached Paris on the 16th of October, and his assistance was
sought by men of all parties. He allied himself with none, but there
can be little doubt that he took the advice mainly of Talleyrand,
Fouché, and Sieyès. Nevertheless he did not repulse the leaders of
the Councils, and to show their attachment for him the Council of
Five Hundred, on the 22d of October 1799, elected his brother Lucien
Bonaparte to be their president, and the whole Legislature gave him
a grand banquet on 6th November. The first stage of the revolution
of Brumaire was a decree by which the Council of Ancients, or rather
certain of its members, who had been initiated into the project of
a _coup d’état_, taking advantage of a clause in the Constitution
applicable to circumstances of popular agitation, resolved in the
early morning of the 18th Brumaire, Year VIII. (9th November 1799),
that the two Councils should leave Paris and meet at Saint-Cloud; and
the execution of this decree was intrusted to General Bonaparte. In
the palace of Saint-Cloud it was easy to surround the legislators by a
body of troops faithful to Bonaparte, since the command of the troops
in Paris was in the hands of one of his friends, General Lefebvre, who
was discontented at not having been elected a Director instead of
Moulin. Sieyès and Roger Ducos, who were in the plot, at once declared
their resignations; Barras was induced to acquiesce; and the other two
Directors were guarded as prisoners in the palace of the Luxembourg
by General Moreau. On the following morning, the 19th of Brumaire,
Bonaparte entered the Councils, escorted by soldiers; the Ancients
listened to him quietly; but the Five Hundred were in a tumult; a
proposal was made to declare the general and his supporters _hors la
loi_ or outlaws; and after a stormy scene the deputies were driven from
the hall by the grenadiers. In the evening a few deputies, who were in
the secret of the general’s plans, met and decreed the suppression of
the Directory and the creation of a provisional government, consisting
of three Consuls. The three men chosen for this office were Bonaparte,
Sieyès, and Roger Ducos. Commissions were appointed to revise the
Constitution and to draw up with the Consuls new fundamental laws for
the Republic. By this revolution Bonaparte practically became ruler of
France, for Sieyès had no influence with the army, and Roger Ducos no
influence with anybody. It was a military revolution like that of the
18th Fructidor; it was a bloodless revolution like that of the 18th
Fructidor; but it differed in that, instead of establishing the power
of five men, it established the power of one. And that one man was the
idol of the army, and generally acknowledged to be the greatest general
of France. The preponderance of Bonaparte was quickly recognised by
his colleagues. ‘Who shall preside?’ said Sieyès at the first meeting
of the provisional Consuls on 20th Brumaire. ‘Do you not see that the
general is in the chair?’ replied Roger Ducos. And Sieyès, who was
the chief epigram maker as well as the constitution-monger of the
Revolution, is said to have summed up the situation with the remark to
his friends on the same evening: ‘Messieurs, nous avons un maître; il
sait tout, il peut tout, il veut tout.’

CHAPTER VII

1799–1804

[Sidenote: The Constitution of the Year VIII.]

The revolution of the 18th of Brumaire had placed supreme power in the
hands of Bonaparte; that power was speedily legalised and defined in
the Constitution of the Year VIII. The chief political problem was once
more how to regulate the relation between the legislative and executive
authorities. The Constitution of 1791, and still more that of 1793, had
entirely subordinated the executive to the legislative authority; the
Constitution of the Year III. (1795) had endeavoured to co-ordinate
them; the Constitution of the Year VIII. (1799) entirely subordinated
the legislative to the executive. It fell once more to Sieyès, one
of the principal authors of the Constitutions of 1791 and 1795, as
Second Provisional Consul, to define the new arrangements. His attempt
at co-ordinating the two powers in the State in 1795 had failed in its
operation: as was inevitable, the two authorities declined to preserve
their legal relations to each other. On the 18th of Fructidor, Year V.
(4th September 1797), the executive in the form of the Directory had
usurped and partially destroyed the power of the Legislature, and on
the 30th of Prairial, Year VII. (18th of June 1799) the Legislature had
acted in the same way towards the executive. By the Constitution of the
Year VIII., therefore, the executive power was frankly acknowledged to
be supreme. In its details it was entirely the work of Sieyès, though
his main idea—the appointment of a Grand Elector who should nominate
to fill all offices, but should exercise no power—was rejected by
Bonaparte. The new Constitution was soon ready; it was submitted to the
primary assemblies of the people on the 14th December 1799, and was
accepted by them by 3,011,107 votes against 1567, and was officially
proclaimed on the 24th of December.

[Sidenote: The Consulate.]

The key-stone of the new Constitution was the Consulate. There were
to be three Consuls nominated for ten years, but these officials
were not to be equal in authority, as had been the case with the
Directors. On the contrary, the First Consul was to be perpetual
president and perpetual representative of the governing triumvirate.
All administrative power was placed in his hands, and the Second and
Third Consuls were little more than his chief assistants. The Consuls
acting together nominated the Ministers, and also the Council of State,
which was intended to be at the same time an administrative tribunal of
appeal, and the originating source in matters of legislation.

[Sidenote: The Legislature.]

In the work of legislation the Council of State was supplemented by the
Tribunate and the Legislative Body. All laws prepared by the Council
of State were first submitted to the Tribunate, which was composed
of one hundred members. The Tribunate could neither reject nor amend
a law, but decided whether to support or oppose the project before
the Legislative Body. The Legislative Body consisted of three hundred
deputies chosen by certain electoral assemblies formed by a complicated
scheme out of the taxpayers of the departments. By this scheme, after
three series of elections, what was termed a ‘National List’ was drawn
up. From this national list the Senate chose the members both of the
Legislative Body and the Tribunate. The Legislative Body alone voted
the taxes. In legislative matters it played the part of a national
jury, listening to the arguments for or against brought forward by
the Tribunate on every project prepared by the Council of State, and
deciding in every case without discussion. The Legislative Body alone
could give a project of the Council of State the character of a law.
The Senate was composed of eighty members nominated for life by the
Consuls. Its duties were to choose the members of the Tribunate and
Legislative Body from the National List, and to decide whether any
law or measure of the government was contrary to the Constitution. If
it decided that such law or measure was unconstitutional it had the
authority to annul it.

[Sidenote: Internal Policy of the Consulate.]

[Sidenote: The Code Napoléon.]

The Consulate was composed of Bonaparte as First Consul, with
Cambacérès and Le Brun, both famous jurists, as his associates. Their
policy was one of general reconciliation. The individuals deported
after the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor were allowed to return
to France if they had not, like Pichegru, become declared royalists.
They were even taken into favour; while Carnot was appointed Minister
of War, Portalis and Barbé-Marbois were nominated to the Council of
State. The lists of emigration were closed; no longer could persons be
declared to have emigrated on mere suspicion, and the First Consul, as
an administrative measure, annulled the decrees excluding relations of
_émigrés_ and former nobles from filling executive offices. More than
150,000 _émigrés_ were also allowed to return, mostly priests, who were
no longer regarded as rebels, and who, whether they had taken the oath
to observe the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or not, were allowed
to resume their sacred functions on simply promising to obey the new
Constitution of the State. The Consulate did even more than this for
the cause of religion; many churches which had been appropriated
for civil purposes were restored to their original uses. Brigandage
was sternly put down, and Bonaparte, at last, pacified La Vendée by
negotiating a treaty of amnesty with the remaining Vendéan leaders at
Montluçon, on the 17th of January 1800. A special effort was made to
put the finances in order, and Gaudin, who held office as Minister of
the Finances throughout the Consulate and the Empire, first proved
his extraordinary powers. His financial reforms may be roughly summed
up by the mention of his two most important measures. The decrees of
the Directory in favour of forced loans from the rich, which had been
arbitrarily and unfairly carried out, were abrogated and replaced by
a general income tax of twenty-five per cent. This established some
justice in the collection, which partly compensated for the heaviness
of the tax. The second measure was the appointment of receivers-general
of taxes in every department. These men had to give heavy security, and
were allowed a fair measure of profit in the form of a percentage on
what they collected. They were strictly supervised, and the scandalous
dilapidations which had signalised the period of the Directory were
made impossible for the future. Further, in order to secure the support
of the capitalists, the Bank of France was founded under the guarantee
of the State. Finally, the First Consul decided to carry into effect
the projects of the legal reformers of the Constituent Assembly and the
Convention. Their labours had made possible the formation of a uniform
code of law for France. Bonaparte appointed a Commission, consisting of
Tronchet, Portalis, and Bigot de Préameneu, to examine the labours of
their predecessors, and with their help to draw up the admirable civil
code, which was afterwards known as the Code Napoléon.

[Sidenote: The Ministry.]

In no respect was the administrative ability of the Consuls better
manifested than in the selection they made of their ministers. It has
already been noticed that Gaudin, the greatest financier of France, was
appointed Minister of the Finances. Talleyrand and Fouché once more
took possession of the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and of Police,
which they held for many years. Their first Minister of the Marine,
Forfait, did not remain long in office, but his successor, Decrès,
held that post from 1801 till 1814. The same may be said with regard
to the Ministry of Justice. Abrial, the first occupant of this post,
gave way to Regnier in 1802, but he likewise remained in office till
1814. The Ministries of War and of the Interior were more difficult to
fill; Carnot soon resented the tone of Bonaparte, and was succeeded
by Berthier, afterwards Prince of Neufchâtel, who had been Chief of
the Staff to Bonaparte in Italy. La Place, the great astronomer, had
been appointed Minister of the Interior by the Provisional Government
in November 1799. He did not show himself very efficient, and was
succeeded by Lucien Bonaparte, the First Consul’s ablest brother, in
the following month. He too failed to carry out the wishes of the
Consuls, and was succeeded in 1800 by one of the most distinguished
administrators of the period, Chaptal.

[Sidenote: The External Policy of the Consulate.]

Of foreign affairs Bonaparte, as First Consul, assumed the entire
management; in internal matters he laid down the main principles
indeed, but he allowed his colleagues some share in the government.
He found France once more at war, as she had been before the Treaty
of Campo-Formio, with Austria and England. But another redoubtable
enemy had been added in Russia. Fortunately for France, for reasons
which have already been indicated, the Emperor Paul was profoundly
dissatisfied with his allies. From an unreasoning hatred for France,
the Russian Emperor had now altered his sentiments to one of profound
admiration for the person of the First Consul. Bonaparte was soon
notified of this disposition at the Court of St. Petersburg. He sent
his most intimate friend, Duroc, on a special mission to Russia, and
the idea was already suggested that Russia and France ought to be the
arbiters of Europe. He offered to recognise Paul not only as Grand
Master of the Knights of Malta, but as the sovereign of that island,
and promised in every way to forward Russian interests. In return,
Paul, with his usual exaggeration, declared Bonaparte to be his
dearest friend, surrounded himself with his portraits, drank publicly
to his health, and ordered Louis XVIII. to leave Mittau. The Russian
ambassador in Paris, Kolichev, on behalf of his master, proposed that
Bonaparte should take the title of King of France, and make the crown
hereditary in his family. Next in importance to the commencement of
good relations with Russia, was the First Consul’s effort to make the
King of Prussia his declared ally. For this purpose he sent Duroc also
to Berlin. But Frederick William III. was a different type of monarch
from the Emperor Paul; he could not so readily alter his policy.
Personally, he too admired the First Consul, and regarded him as the
restorer of order and as a monarch in embryo; but, in spite of his
admiration, he refused to comply with the wishes of Bonaparte, as he
had rejected the propositions of the Directory, and insisted on the
maintenance of his consistent attitude of strict neutrality. The last
point to be noticed in the foreign policy of Bonaparte was his attitude
towards the Pope. He not only allowed the body of Pope Pius VI. to be
removed from Valence to be buried at Rome, but he recognised the new
Pope, Pius VII., although he had been elected at Venice under Austrian
influence: he even offered to restore him to his temporal dominion at
Rome, and promised to enter into negotiations with him with regard to
the re-establishment of the Catholic Church in France.

[Sidenote: The Campaign of Marengo. 1800.]

With the two great enemies of France, Austria and England, the First
Consul had no desire to treat. Though unable to strike at England,
owing to the weakness of the French navy, he could yet attack the
Austrians in two quarters. Two powerful armies were prepared, the
one the Army of the Danube, which was placed under the command of
Moreau, and the other the Army of the Interior, soon to become famous
as the Second Army of Italy. Of all the conquests in Italy made by
the French in 1796 and 1797, only Genoa remained in their possession.
Masséna, fresh from his victories in Switzerland, had taken command of
the besieged army. His defence is one of the most famous in history,
and does no less honour to the general than his victory at Zurich.
Bonaparte desired to relieve Genoa; and he resolved not to advance
along the coast, as he had done in 1796, but by crossing the Alps, and
descending upon Piedmont, to cut off the Austrian army occupying that
province.

In the month of May Bonaparte crossed the Great Saint Bernard Pass at
the head of 40,000 men, and fell at once on the Austrian flank. He was
too late to relieve Genoa, which surrendered on the 4th of June, when
but few of the soldiers were still able to stand, but he was in time to
close the retreat of the Austrians upon Lombardy. On the 9th June 1800
General Lannes defeated the Austrian advanced guard at Montebello, and
Bonaparte then barred the road from Alessandria to Piacenza. General
Melas, though not yet joined by the troops which had taken Genoa,
had a larger army than Bonaparte; on June 14 he forced his way out
of Alessandria, and drove back the French columns which occupied the
village of Marengo. The battle was practically lost by the French, when
Desaix, who had been detached to the left with 6000 men, fell upon
the Austrian flank. Desaix was killed, but the vigour of his attack
practically cut the Austrian army in two. The dragoons of Kellermann
completed the victory, and General Melas signed the Convention of
Alessandria, by which he surrendered Genoa, Piedmont, and the Milanese
to the French, and promised to withdraw the Austrian garrisons from all
cities to the west of the Mincio. Bonaparte then attended a _Te Deum_
sung in honour of his victory in the cathedral of Milan, and returned
to Paris, leaving the Army of Grisons, under the command of General
Macdonald, to follow up the Austrians.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Hohenlinden.]

While Bonaparte was winning the battle of Marengo, and reconquering
Italy by a single blow, Moreau was again face to face with his old
opponent, the Archduke Charles. The French advance was very slow.
Fierce battles were fought at Engen, Mœskirchen, and Biberach in May
1800, and by the close of the summer Moreau had his headquarters at
Augsburg, and his advanced guard at Munich. The slowness of Moreau’s
progress dissatisfied the First Consul, as did the want of success
of the Archduke Charles dissatisfy the court of Vienna. Augereau was
sent with 20,000 men to the assistance of Moreau, who was ordered, in
spite of the severity of the winter, to continue his advance; and the
Archduke John was appointed to succeed his brother, and ordered to take
the offensive. The crowning event of this winter campaign was the great
victory of Hohenlinden, which was won by Moreau on the 3d of December
1800. The Austrians lost the whole of their baggage and artillery and
12,000 prisoners.

[Sidenote: The Winter Campaign of 1800.]

The First Consul from Paris ordered Moreau and Macdonald to advance
into the home districts of the House of Austria. Moreau accordingly
pushed along the Inn, the Salz, the Traun, and the Ens, driving the
disorganised and discouraged Austrians before him until he was within
twenty leagues of Vienna. Macdonald, at the same time, crossed the
Splügen Pass in spite of the avalanches, and penetrated into the
Tyrol, thus turning the Austrian forces on the Mincio and the Adige.
On arriving at Trent, Macdonald turned to the right and was joined by
Brune, who had occupied the territory of Venice, and the united French
army marched upon Vienna. Under these circumstances, with Italy lost,
and Vienna threatened from two quarters, the Emperor Francis sued for
peace, which was concluded at Lunéville on the 9th of February 1801.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Lunéville. Feb. 9, 1801.]

The Treaty of Lunéville was more important from its destruction of the
old Holy Roman Empire than as the treaty of peace between France and
Austria. From the latter point of view the Emperor Francis once more,
as in the Treaty of Campo-Formio, recognised the Rhine as the limit
of France. In Italy the Cisalpine Republic was once more constituted
with the Adige as its frontier, Modena was to be compensated with the
Breisgau, and Venice was again left to the House of Austria. Tuscany
was taken from its Austrian Grand Duke, and erected into a kingdom of
Etruria in favour of the Prince of Parma, a relative of the King of
Spain, and Piedmont was annexed to France; but the King of the Two
Sicilies was allowed to retain his dominions, and the Pope was restored
to all his possessions except the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara.
The Cisalpine Republic was reorganised, and granted a Constitution on
the model of that of the Year VIII., in which Bonaparte was appointed
First Consul. The Ligurian Republic was maintained, with the alteration
that its Doge was nominated by France instead of being elected. The
result of the new arrangements in Northern Italy was that both France
and Austria had a foothold by their occupation of Piedmont and Venice,
with the Cisalpine Republic as a buffer between them. The principle
of secularising the German bishoprics was also again recognised in
the Treaty of Lunéville, and the actual manner in which it should be
carried out was referred to a special commission, whose conclusions
were not adopted till 1803. The principal result of the treaty in
Austria was the retirement of the minister Thugut, who was succeeded
as State Chancellor by Count Louis Cobenzl, the diplomatist, who had
negotiated the treaties both of Campo-Formio and of Lunéville.

[Sidenote: Murder of the Emperor Paul. 23d March 1801.]

The admiration of the Emperor Paul for Bonaparte increased daily, and
it was the Russian Czar, not the French First Consul, who proposed an
invasion of India across Asia, in order to strike a blow at the English
power in the East. Indeed, the English had taken the place of the
French in the mind of Paul, who, not satisfied with forming once again
the Neutral League of the North, determined to send his best troops
against them. The Emperor’s proposition was that one expedition should
consist of 35,000 Frenchmen and 35,000 Russians, under the command of
Masséna. This column was to go down the Danube, and then up the Don to
a point whence it would be but a short march to the Volga. It was then
to proceed down the Volga to Astrakhan, thence across the Caspian Sea
to Astrabad, and then to march by Herat and Kandahar to the Punjab.
Another column was to move by Khiva and Bokhara, and to invade India
by the north of Afghanistan. These grandiose plans were not entirely
accepted by Bonaparte, and the death of the Emperor prevented an
attempt being made to see if they were practicable. The madness of Paul
had steadily increased during his short reign. His nobility disapproved
heartily of his war policy, both against France and later against
England; his adoption of the Neutral League and its policy had done
much to ruin the wealthy nobles of Northern Russia by forbidding the
exportation of Russian commodities on English ships. To the discontent
of the nobility, of the politicians, and of the capitalists must be
added the fears of the courtiers. Even the heir to the throne, his
eldest son Alexander, perceived that the rule of the maniac could not
be borne much longer. It is hardly necessary to particularise all the
causes of his unpopularity; it is enough to say that his behaviour
was that of a madman. Certain courtiers, of whom the leaders were
Count Pahlen, a Livonian nobleman; Benningsen, a Hanoverian general;
Plato Zubov, the last favourite of the Empress Catherine, and his
brother Nicholas, and the Prince Jachvill, determined to put an end
to the tyranny of the Czar. In the night of the 23d of March 1801
he was attacked by these conspirators and ordered to sign an act of
abdication; he refused; the lamp went out, and the Emperor was struck
down and strangled by an unknown hand among his assailants.

[Sidenote: The Neutral League of the North. 1800–1.]

When Bonaparte first entered office he recognised that England was
a more formidable, because a less approachable, enemy than Austria.
Knowing that the French navy was unable to meet the English, he hoped
to counterbalance the maritime preponderance of England by a league
against her commerce. Owing to the long period of war, nothing was to
be gained by solemn decrees forbidding the importation of goods into
France, it was necessary to strike through the neutral nations. The
three great commercial seats of English trade were the Levant, the
Baltic, and Portugal. The failure of the expedition to Egypt proved
that it was impossible to destroy the English trade in the Levant, and
Bonaparte therefore resolved to strike in the other two directions.
Acting mainly through the Emperor Paul, the Armed Neutrality of the
North, or the Neutral League of 1780, was re-established between
the Baltic powers of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark. The real
intention of Paul and of Bonaparte was to exclude English commerce
entirely from the Baltic; but for the second time the Baltic powers
nominally made themselves the guarantors of the rights of neutrals.
They protested against the right assumed by England to search neutral
ships, and to confiscate as contraband of war all the goods of
belligerent powers found in them, and also against the prohibition
against neutral ships trading between different enemies’ ports. The
Emperor Paul, like the Empress Catherine twenty years before, made
himself the patron of the Neutral League.

[Sidenote: Battle of Copenhagen. 2d April 1801.]

The English government naturally refused to accede to the demands of
the Neutral League, and when the Baltic was closed to them an English
fleet was ordered to force the blockade. This fleet was placed under
the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second in command. On
the 30th of March 1801 the fleet sailed down the Sound, in spite of the
Danish batteries at Elsinore, and on the 2d of April Copenhagen was
bombarded and a large part of the Danish fleet destroyed. This victory,
and still more the death of the Emperor Paul, caused the dissolution
of the Neutral League of the North, and Bonaparte had to adjourn for
some years his schemes for the annihilation of English commerce.

[Sidenote: Spain and Portugal. 1800–1.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Badajoz.]

In the Iberian peninsula the designs of Bonaparte against English trade
were more successful. Spain still remained the ally of France in spite
of the sufferings that alliance had brought upon her, but Portugal had
hitherto continued the faithful friend of England. Through Portugal
English goods entered Spain and the south of France, and Bonaparte
resolved to put an end to the neutrality of Portugal. For this purpose,
in the year 1800, he despatched his ablest brother, Lucien Bonaparte,
as ambassador to Madrid, with orders to negotiate with the Prince
Regent of Portugal. The terms offered were that the Portuguese ports
were to be closed to English trade, that special commercial advantages
were to be given to French merchants, that French Guiana was to
be extended to the river Amazon, and that a portion of Portuguese
territory was to be ceded to Spain until Trinidad and Minorca were
recovered by the latter power. The Prince Regent of Portugal rejected
these hard terms; Spain declared war in the beginning of 1801, and
22,000 veteran French soldiers, under the command of General Leclerc,
Bonaparte’s brother-in-law, were sent to the assistance of Spain.
The campaign was a very short one. The French troops never came into
action; but the Portuguese were twice defeated in pitched battles, and
lost some of their fortresses. The Prince Regent sued for peace, and a
treaty was signed between Spain and Portugal at Badajoz on the 6th of
June 1801. By this treaty the city and district of Olivenza were ceded
to Spain, and, by a subsequent arrangement, the limits of French Guiana
were extended to the river Amazon. Bonaparte was much disgusted with
these treaties, and especially with the continued refusal of Portugal
to close her ports to English commerce, and it was many months before
he consented to ratify them. England refused to recognise Portugal as
an enemy; but an English force occupied the island of Madeira, and the
East India Company’s troops garrisoned Goa.

[Sidenote: Campaign in Egypt. 1800–1.]

When Bonaparte left Egypt he was unable, owing to the stringency of
the blockade maintained by the English fleet, to take more than a few
companions with him. Kléber, who, as has been said, succeeded him
in the command of the French army, soon found himself confronted by
a powerful Turkish and Mameluke army. This army he defeated at the
battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March 1800, after which success
Egypt again submitted to French rule. On the 14th of June 1800, the
very day on which his former comrade Desaix met a soldier’s death at
the battle of Marengo, Kléber was assassinated by a Muhammadan fanatic
in Cairo. Menou, the new French general in Egypt, was in every way
Kléber’s inferior, and concentrated the French troops in the two cities
of Cairo and Alexandria. Isolated entirely from the mother country, and
unable to receive reinforcements or ammunition, the English government
regarded the French in Egypt as an easy prey. On the 19th of March 1801
a powerful English army disembarked at Aboukir, under the command of
Sir Ralph Abercromby, and defeated the French before Alexandria two
days later in a pitched battle, in which Abercromby was killed. Siege
was then laid to Alexandria and Cairo, and both cities surrendered to
the English general, Lord Hutchinson, before the arrival of a division
from India, which, under the command of Sir David Baird, had sailed up
the Red Sea, marched across the Soudan desert, and descended the Nile
to Cairo in boats. As a result of these operations, a convention was
signed between the French and English generals in Egypt on the 2d of
September 1801, by which the French garrisons evacuated all remaining
posts, and were conveyed to France in English ships.

[Sidenote: The Peace of Amiens. 25th March 1802.]

Though neither Bonaparte nor the leaders of English political opinion
believed it possible for a permanent peace to be agreed to in the
interests of their respective countries, the outcry of both the
English and the French people against the prolonged war made it
necessary for their rulers to conclude some kind of a truce. Pitt had
in 1801 gone out of office, and his successor Addington, afterwards
Lord Sidmouth, declared in favour of a peace policy. The treaty, which
is known as the Peace of Amiens, was really nothing more than a truce.
Only a very general agreement was come to, and many essential points
were left undecided. Both nations needed a rest, and neither government
looked upon the Peace of Amiens as affording a permanent solution of
their differences. Many loopholes were left, which were certain to
afford pretexts for renewing the war to both contracting powers, and of
these the most notable was the question of the possession of Malta.

[Sidenote: The Reconstitution of Germany.]

Far more important than the temporary Peace of Amiens was the
reconstitution of Germany, which was finally accepted by the Diet at
Ratisbon on the 25th of February 1803. The Holy Roman Empire which
had lasted so many centuries ceased to exist. The ancient division
of the Empire into circles was abolished, and the three colleges
which formed the Diet were profoundly affected. Instead of the eight
electors, three ecclesiastical and five lay, that formerly existed,
ten electors, one ecclesiastical and nine lay, were created. The
Archbishops of Cologne and Trèves, whose states being on the left bank
of the Rhine were absorbed into France, lost their electoral dignity.
The Archbishop-Elector of Mayence was retained as Arch-Chancellor of
the Empire, and he received as his dominions the Bishopric of Ratisbon,
the Principality of Aschaffenburg, and the County of Wetzlar. The
nine lay electors were the five princes who had formerly enjoyed the
dignity, namely, the Electors of Bohemia, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria,
and Hanover, and four new Electors, the Margrave of Baden, the Duke
of Würtemburg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the Grand Duke
Ferdinand, brother of the Emperor, and former Grand Duke of Tuscany,
who was appointed Elector of Salzburg. By this new arrangement, and
by the abolition of two-thirds of the ecclesiastical electorate, the
majority in the College of Electors passed from the Catholics to the
Protestants. In the College of Princes there was the same result, for
by the secularisation of the Catholic bishoprics the majority passed to
the Protestant rulers. More sweeping still was the alteration in the
third College—that of the Free Cities. Instead of fifty-two constituent
members of this College only six were retained, and their maintenance
was due to the intervention of France. These six cities were Augsburg,
Bremen, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Nuremberg. By these
changes the constitution of the Empire was entirely altered; but still
more notable was the change in the position of the various princes in
Germany, for the tendency of the secularisation of the ecclesiastical
states was to diminish the number of ruling princes and to increase the
extent of their dominions.

[Sidenote: The Secularisations in Germany.]

The great war with France had shown the weakness of the Empire as an
organisation, and had also proved the advantages to the inhabitants
of the existence of large and powerful states. It was, therefore,
the already existing kingdoms which received the greatest addition
of territory under the new arrangements. Nominally, the secularised
bishoprics were intended to compensate those German princes whose
territories on the left bank of the Rhine had been ceded to France;
practically, the powerful states only were increased. Austria, whose
new possession of Venice in place of the Milanese had been reaffirmed
by the Treaty of Lunéville, only acquired in Germany the Bishoprics of
Brixen and Trent, but two Austrian princes received independent states,
namely, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand, who, as has been said,
was given the Archbishopric of Salzburg, with the title of Elector,
and the Duke of Modena, who received the Breisgau. Nevertheless, the
power of Austria was greatly weakened, for under the old arrangement
the ecclesiastical electors and the Catholic bishops had always been
partisans of Austria. Prussia was the country which profited the
most, though she had suffered the least in the war against France. In
exchange for part of the Duchy of Cleves, the Duchy of Guelders, and
the County of Moers, Prussia received the large and wealthy Bishoprics
of Hildesheim, Paderborn, Erfurt, and part of Münster, together with
a number of abbeys, of which the largest were Herford, Quedlinburg,
Elten, Essen, and Werden, and several free cities. Hanover received
the Bishopric of Osnabrück, to which the King of England, as Elector
of Hanover, had previously possessed the alternate nomination. Bavaria
was made into a powerful and concentrated state. In exchange for the
Palatinate, the Duchy of Deux-Ponts (Zweibrücken), the Principalities
of Juliers, Simmern and Lautern, she received the Bishoprics of
Würtzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, Freisingen, and part of Passau, together
with a large number of abbeys and free cities. Baden received the
portion of the Bishoprics of Spires, Strasbourg, and Basle, situated
on the right bank of the Rhine, the Bishopric of Constance, the
cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim, and many abbeys and free cities.
Finally, the Duchy of Würtemburg, in exchange for the Principality
of Montbéliard, received abbeys and free towns, which increased its
population by a hundred thousand inhabitants. It is not necessary to
describe the various accessions granted to the Princes of Hesse-Cassel,
Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and the rest; but, it may be noted that the
Prince of Orange, the former Stadtholder of Holland, received the
Bishopric of Fulda. These changes remodelled Germany, and in the result
were most prejudicial to France; for instead of there existing a series
of buffers in the shape of small and weak states, France was brought
almost directly into contact with Prussia and Austria.

[Sidenote: The Reconstitution of Switzerland.]

At the same time that the ancient federal Holy Roman Empire was
reconstituted, the ancient federal Republic of Switzerland was likewise
reorganised. The reasons which had induced the Directory to intervene
in Swiss affairs still existed; the revolutionary party which opposed
the federal idea, and desired to form a united Switzerland, remained
in direct opposition to the supporters of the former government of the
cantons. It was essentially the question of government which divided
the two parties, and there was no suggestion of restoring the feudal
system, or the privileges of certain towns and certain cantons over
others. The breath of the French Revolution had swept away political
inequalities as completely in Switzerland as in France. Soon after the
Treaty of Amiens, Bonaparte withdrew the French troops from the new
Helvetic Republic. Civil war, as he expected, recommenced, and the
Helvetic Government was driven from Berne by the federalists. Bonaparte
therefore despatched an army to restore order, and summoned the
leading Swiss statesmen to Paris. To them he propounded a new scheme
of federal government, which was accepted, and the Act of Mediation,
which was promulgated on the 19th of February 1803, established the
new Constitution, and recognised the First Consul as Mediator. By
the Act of Mediation Switzerland was divided into nineteen cantons,
each of which had its own local government and special laws and
taxes. The thirteen old cantons were maintained; six of them were
democratic—Appenzell, Glarus, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Uri, and Zug;
seven were oligarchical—Basle, Berne, Friburg, Lucerne, Schaffhausen,
Soleure, and Zürich. The six new cantons added by Bonaparte comprised
five territories which had formerly been subject; the Pays de Vaud
and Aargau were made independent of Berne; Thurgau was separated from
Schaffhausen, and Ticino from Uri and Unterwalden, and the canton of
Saint-Gall was formed out of certain districts formerly belonging to
Appenzell, Glarus, and Schwyz; finally, the Grisons, which had hitherto
been an independent mountain republic, was declared a canton of
Switzerland. Geneva had some years before been added to France as the
Department of the Leman, and the Valais was now declared independent—a
preliminary step to its ultimate annexation by France. The Federal
Diet was to consist of twenty-five deputies, two from the six largest
cantons, Aargau, Berne, the Grisons, Saint-Gall, the Pays de Vaud,
and Zurich, and one from each of the others. The Diet was to meet
every year in the capital of a different canton, and the Landamman
of that canton was for that year the President of the Confederation.
The Federal Act once more declared the entire abolition of feudalism,
and of all privileges of birth, etc., and forbade for the future all
internal customs duties. Bonaparte proclaimed that he would not allow
the interference of any other power in Switzerland, and took the title
of Mediator of the Confederation of Switzerland.

[Sidenote: The Concordat. 1801–2.]

It has already been stated that Bonaparte desired to stand well with
the Catholic Church, and had recognised the advantages of a state
religion. One of his most important measures during the Consulate was
to put an end to the schism which had lasted since the promulgation
of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790, with the assistance
of the Pope, Pius VII. All the bishops elected under the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy, and most of those who had emigrated, sooner
than take the oath of allegiance to it, resigned, and the leaders of
both sections were nominated and instituted to different dioceses.
A new circumscription of sees was agreed to, and France was divided
into fifty bishoprics and ten archbishoprics. It was agreed by the
Concordat, which was signed between the Pope and the First Consul on
the 15th of July 1801, and solemnly proclaimed on the 18th of April
1802, after being sanctioned by the Legislative Body, that the First
Consul should nominate all bishops, and the Pope should institute.
The government of the Consulate recognised the Catholic, Apostolic
and Roman religion as that of the majority of the French people, and
ordained that its public worship should be carried on freely so long as
the police regulations were observed. All ecclesiastics were to swear
fidelity to the government, which promised to pay a suitable salary to
all bishops and curés. In return, the Pope promised that neither he
nor his successors would lay any claim to the ecclesiastical estates
which had been alienated, and that all such property should be held the
indisputable possession of its purchaser.

[Sidenote: Internal Organisation.]

[Sidenote: The Prefectures.]

The recognition of the frontier of the Rhine by the Treaty of Lunéville
and the Diet of Ratisbon largely increased the territory of France.
The First Consul proceeded to organise the additions on the bases
laid down by the Constituent Assembly, Convention, and Directory.
Belgium was divided into nine departments. The Rhenish territories,
including the Palatinate, the Diocese of Trèves, etc., were divided
into four departments, of which the headquarters were Aix-la-Chapelle,
Coblentz, Mayence, and Trèves. Further south, the Department of the
Mont-Terrible, which had been formed by the Convention out of the
Republic of Mulhouse and the District of Porentruy, was merged into the
Department of the Haut-Rhin, and the Principality of Montbéliard was
united to the Department of the Doubs. The Republic of Geneva, as has
been said, formed the Department of the Leman. Savoy was constituted
as the Department of Mont-Blanc, and the County of Nice that of the
Alpes-Maritimes. These were the recognised limits of France in 1801,
and were defensible on geographical grounds; but, on the 11th of
September 1802, Bonaparte went further, and declared the union of
Piedmont with France. Instead of being amalgamated with the Cisalpine
Republic, Piedmont was divided into six departments, and the island
of Elba was detached from Tuscany and declared, like Corsica, to be a
French island. At the head of each department a Préfet was appointed,
to take the place of the national agents maintained by the Directory.
At the head of each subdivision, now called an arrondissement instead
of a district, was placed a Sous-Préfet, also nominated by the supreme
executive, and at the head of each commune was the Maire, who was also
nominated and not elected. Préfets, Sous-Préfets, and Maires were
assisted by nominated councils in administrative matters, and appeals
from their decisions lay to the Council of State.

[Sidenote: Education.]

Just as Bonaparte had built up the new Code of Law on the bases laid
by the Legislative Committee of the Convention, so, too, he made use
of the labours of its Committee of Public Instruction to establish
a scheme of national education. In every commune which could afford
the expense, he maintained the primary school established by the
Convention; but he feared to burden the National Treasury with the
expense of schools in the poorer communes, and preferred to leave their
establishment to local endeavour. In secondary education, he suppressed
the central schools of the Convention, and replaced them by twenty-nine
lycées, specially intended for the education of the middle classes. For
higher education, he founded ten schools of law and six of medicine;
he improved the Polytechnic School, and started a school of mechanics,
which became later the famous École des Arts et Métiers. The key-stone
of the whole educational system, the foundation of the University, was,
however, not laid till some years later.

[Sidenote: Constitutional Changes.]

The great administrative reforms of Bonaparte made him as popular among
all classes of the population as his victories had made him in the
army. Not only in France, but throughout Europe, he was looked upon as
the restorer of order and good government. This sentiment appeared most
vividly at the time when a plot against his life was discovered on the
24th of September 1800. This plot, which is known as the Conspiracy
of the Infernal Machine, is said to have been the work of the Jacobin
party; the explosion took place in the Rue Sainte-Nicaise, too late
to do him any harm, but it was used as a pretext to exile the most
vigorous republicans. So great was his popularity, that rumours were
already heard of making him monarch. The first step in this direction
was taken in 1802, when the Council of State proposed that the primary
assemblies should be summoned to decide whether Bonaparte should not be
made First Consul for life. In May 1802 this proposal was laid before
the people, and was carried by more than 3,500,000 votes to 8000. Some
slight changes were made at the same time, of which the most important
were that the First Consul was enabled to nominate his successor, that
the lists of candidates for public functions were replaced by electoral
colleges appointed for life, and that the Senate was given the right to
dissolve the Tribunate and the Legislative Body.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte’s Colonial Policy.]

The First Consul clearly understood that the Peace of Amiens was not
likely to last, and that war would soon break out again with England.
He knew that England derived much of her influence from her navy and
her colonies; he therefore spared no efforts to restore the French
navy, and to make France once more a colonial power. His first essays
in this direction were to obtain Louisiana from Spain in exchange for
the kingdom of Etruria, formed in Italy for Prince Louis of Parma, and
the extension of the limits of French Guiana to the Amazon extorted
from Portugal. But his main project was to restore the French power
in the West Indies. Guadeloupe and Martinique and the French Antilles
had been restored to France by the Treaty of Amiens, and the First
Consul resolved to make them the starting-point for the reconquest of
San Domingo. This island had, as a result of the policy of Sonthonax
and Polverel, the proconsuls of the Convention, been entirely lost
to France; the planters and other whites had fled; and the revolted
slaves and mulattoes were masters of the island. Toussaint Louverture,
the leader of the negroes, refused to hold any communications with
Bonaparte, and the First Consul therefore, as soon as the Peace of
Amiens had opened the sea, sent an expedition of 20,000 men against
him, commanded by his brother-in-law, General Leclerc. The island
was reconquered by May 1802; but the victorious army was practically
destroyed by yellow fever. Toussaint Louverture was taken prisoner and
sent to France: but nevertheless, as soon as war with England again
broke out, and the arrival of reinforcements was prevented by English
cruisers, the negroes rose afresh under new leaders and destroyed the
remnant of the garrison. It may be added that the French Antilles were
recaptured by the English in 1809 and 1810.

[Sidenote: Recommencement of the War between England and France. 18th
May 1803.]

It has been said that the Treaty of Amiens was practically only a
truce, and that many points of interest to the two nations were left
undecided. Of these the most important regarded Malta. The English
ministry positively refused to surrender this island to the Knights
of Saint John, under the protectorate of the Emperor Alexander,
which would leave it at the mercy of France. Bonaparte demanded the
evacuation of Malta with much insistance as one of the conditions of
the Treaty of Amiens; but the English government in reply pointed to
the annexation of Elba, Parma and Piacenza, and Piedmont, and the
interference in Switzerland, as also being breaches of the treaty. The
First Consul was also very exasperated at the personal attacks made on
him in the irresponsible English press. He failed to understand that
by the English law the government could not prevent the publication
of libels against him, and regarded their refusal to punish the
libellers as personal insults to himself. The French ambassador in
London prosecuted Peltier, the chief libeller, before the Court of
King’s Bench. He was brilliantly defended by Sir J. Mackintosh, and
only ordered to pay a small fine. A public subscription was raised to
pay his fine and costs, and the First Consul regarded this as adding
a further insult to the injuries he had received. In truth, both
governments felt that war was inevitable, and in May 1803 the rupture
was complete. The English navy began to seize the French trading
vessels, and the First Consul, as a reprisal, arrested all the English
travellers he could find in France, and ordered Mortier to occupy
Hanover.

[Sidenote: Position of Foreign Affairs.]

The First Consul entered upon a fresh war with England with a light
heart, for he believed that she would be unable to obtain any allies.
Austria was exhausted by the terrible wars she had undergone, and the
State Chancellor, Cobenzl, held that she needed time to recuperate.
Prussia persisted in her attitude of strict neutrality; Haugwitz was
dismissed from the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs as
being too French in his sympathies, after the occupation of Hanover,
and was succeeded by Hardenberg, the maker of the Treaty of Basle.
Spain was Bonaparte’s faithful and hopeful ally; and Russia, the
most formidable of the continental powers, inclined to his side. The
attitude of the Emperor Alexander at this period was of the greatest
importance. Educated by a Swiss publicist who sincerely loved France,
La Harpe, the Emperor of Russia was inclined to admire the results of
the French Revolution and the French people. His sentiments for the
person of Bonaparte were nearly as full of enthusiastic admiration as
those of his father, the Emperor Paul. He made the French ambassadors
at St. Petersburg, Duroc and Caulaincourt, his personal friends, and
wrote letters to Bonaparte expressing his feelings. But the Emperor’s
relatives, especially his mother, with his ministers and his courtiers,
were opposed to France and in favour of a close alliance with England,
or at the very least of the maintenance of strict neutrality. England
practically commanded the Russian trade, and war with England meant
the loss of the only market for Russian raw material, the consequent
impoverishment of the Russian people, and the ruin of the Russian
capitalists. Nevertheless the Emperor Alexander was an autocrat, and
Bonaparte counted upon his friendship even though he could not secure
his alliance.

[Sidenote: The Plot of Pichegru and Cadoudal.]

On the outbreak of war the numerous French exiles in England offered
their services to the English Government. It is significant of the
change which had come over the state of affairs that, instead of
endeavouring to raise a counter-revolution, they proposed to attack the
person of the First Consul. The leaders of the new plot were Pichegru,
now a declared royalist and partisan of the Bourbons, and Georges
Cadoudal, the celebrated Chouan leader. Both had the audacity to go to
Paris and to enter into relations with General Moreau. Moreau, though
he resented the lofty position of Bonaparte and refused to serve him,
would be no party to an assassination, more especially an assassination
which would restore the Bourbons, and Cadoudal and Pichegru had to
act with the assistance of certain French noblemen and some former
Chouans. A plot was formed to murder the First Consul on the road
from Malmaison to Paris, but it was discovered by the French police,
and Bonaparte in terror ordered the gates of Paris to be closed as in
the most terrible days of the Revolution, and proclaimed the pain of
death against all who sheltered the conspirators. After some daring
adventures the leaders were seized; Georges Cadoudal was executed;
Pichegru was strangled in prison; and Moreau, who was condemned to two
years’ imprisonment, was allowed to go into exile in the United States.
The French noblemen implicated were treated with more leniency, and the
lives of their two chiefs, Armand de Polignac and Charles de Rivière,
were spared.

[Sidenote: Execution of the Duc d’Enghien. 21st March 1804.]

The discovery of this plot against his life, which was undoubtedly
fostered by the Bourbon princes, made the First Consul determined to
wreak his vengeance against that unfortunate family. Being unable to
seize the persons of the pretender, Louis XVIII., and his brother, the
Comte d’Artois, who resided in England, he carried off a young Bourbon
prince, the eldest son of the Prince de Condé, who was quite innocent
of the conspiracy of Pichegru. The Duc d’Enghien was at this time
living at Ettenheim in the Grand Duchy of Baden. He was arrested there
by French soldiers, contrary to all international law, and taken to
Vincennes. He was at once tried by a military commission as an _émigré_
who had borne arms against France, and was condemned to death. The
sentence was immediately carried out in spite of the demands of the
young prince for an interview with the First Consul. This execution was
a great political mistake. Bonaparte expected that it would terrify
the Bourbon princes, but it reacted to his own prejudice. The Court
of Saint-Petersburg went into mourning; the King of Prussia, who had
at last almost resolved to make an alliance with France, began to
negotiate with Russia; the royal family of Austria looked upon the
execution as a pendant to that of Marie Antoinette; and the English
Government made use of the horror caused by it to endeavour to form a
fresh coalition against France.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte becomes Emperor of the French. 18th May 1804.]

[Sidenote: Francis II. becomes Emperor of Austria.]

Directly after this tragedy, which proved that Bonaparte was
practically an absolute monarch, he decided to take upon himself the
rank of Emperor of the French. The Senate offered this title to the
First Consul at Saint-Cloud on the 18th of May 1804, and the people
ratified it by a majority of more than 3,500,000 votes. By the _senatus
consultum_ which made him Emperor the office was made hereditary to
his direct descendants. As he had no children he was given the power
to adopt, a power which it was undoubtedly expected would be used in
favour of his step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais. A few months after the
Corsican soldier of fortune was declared Emperor of the French, the
last Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II., resolved to rid himself of what
was now but an empty title. The new Constitution of the Holy Roman
Empire had destroyed the imperial authority by depriving it of the
votes of the ecclesiastical members in the Diet, and increasing or
consolidating the dominions of the principal German states. Francis
II. acknowledged the new order of things. On the 11th of August 1804,
he erected the Austrian dominions into an hereditary empire, and on
the 7th of December following, five days after the coronation of
Bonaparte as the Emperor Napoleon by the Pope at Paris, the last Holy
Roman Emperor proclaimed himself Emperor of Austria under the title of
Francis I. This then was the result of fifteen years of revolution, the
disappearance of the ancient figure-head of Europe, and the creation of
a new Empire founded on the power of the sword.

CHAPTER VIII

1804–1808

[Sidenote: The Empire.]

Napoleon’s elevation to the rank of Emperor of the French only
legalised in a more striking fashion the possession of power which he
had long held. It did not make his authority any greater, for he had
been practically the absolute monarch of France ever since 1799, but
it gave promise of permanency, and that was what the French people
most needed after the series of successive governments which had run
their course since 1789. It is a mistake to regard Napoleon as having
been made supreme ruler of France by the army alone; the legalisation
of his power was even more enthusiastically received by the peaceful
part of the population. The few ardent republicans who were left
had been terrified out of resistance by the wholesale deportation
of the principal Jacobins after the affair of the Infernal Machine.
The adherents of the Bourbons were equally discouraged by the severe
punishment dealt out to Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal. Every section
of both the military and civil communities was ready to hail Napoleon
as Emperor. But in the institution of the Empire he appealed to more
than men’s interests, he appealed to their imaginations. This he did
in two ways. He created a Court, with all the magnificent apparatus of
the great officers of the household, stately ceremonies and ancient
customs, which gave to the people of Paris the spectacle of royal pomp
which they had long regretted. On the other hand, he called to his
assistance the most powerful engine for influencing the imagination of
men, namely, religion. He determined to be consecrated with a ceremony
which should exceed in splendour all the coronation ceremonies of the
Bourbons. He summoned the Pope to France, and instead of being crowned
at Rheims by the Archbishop and Primate, he received his crown at
Paris from the hands of the Holy Father himself. At the very moment
of his coronation he showed a pride of bearing at least equal to that
of any of his predecessors upon the throne of France. After the Pope
had anointed him, girded the sword of empire about him, and given him
the sceptre, he prepared to place the crown upon the head of the new
Caesar. But Napoleon gently took the crown from the hands of Pius VII.,
and after replacing it on the altar, raised it and crowned himself. The
presence of the Pope in Paris for this great ceremony following upon
the Concordat, caused Napoleon to be looked upon as the restorer of the
Catholic religion, and greatly strengthened his position. Not satisfied
with the crown of France, he accepted that of Italy also on the 20th
of May 1805, and proceeded to Milan, where he placed upon his head the
Iron Crown of the old Lombard Kings. He at once declared his intention
of not personally administering his Italian kingdom, and appointed his
step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais, to be Viceroy of Italy.

[Sidenote: The Imperial Court.]

It has been said that Napoleon created a new Court, which was intended
to efface the recollection of the magnificence of the old Court of
Versailles. At the head of this Court he created a hierarchy of
Grand Dignitaries of the Empire, who were designed to form a Council
of Regency in case of necessity. The chief of them was the Grand
Elector, whose duty was to convoke the Senate, the Legislative Body,
and the Electoral Colleges,—this post was conferred on the Emperor’s
elder brother, Joseph Bonaparte. Next ranked the Arch-Chancellor of
the Empire, who was the chief of the judicial body,—this post was
conferred on Cambacérès, the former Second Consul. Third came the
Arch-Chancellor of State, whose business it was to receive foreign
ambassadors and ratify treaties—this post was conferred upon Eugène de
Beauharnais. Next came the Arch-Treasurer of the Empire, which post was
first filled by Le Brun, the former Third Consul, and the remaining
Grand Dignitaries were the Constable of the Empire, Louis Bonaparte,
the Grand Admiral, Marshal Murat, and the Grand Judge, Regnier. In
the same way as the Grand Dignitaries were at the head of the civil
administration of the Empire, Napoleon created Marshals of France to be
the representatives of the army. The first marshals were eighteen in
number, and included all the most famous generals of the revolutionary
period except Pichegru and Moreau, whose fate has been related. It was
indispensable for the rank of Marshal of France to have commanded an
army in the field, or at least a detached corps, and the office was
surrounded with so many privileges as to make it the object of ambition
to every colonel of a French regiment. The third hierarchy consisted of
the great officers of the Emperor’s household, who comprised a Grand
Marshal, Duroc; a Grand Almoner, his uncle, Joseph Fesch, whom he had
induced the Pope to make a cardinal; a Grand Chamberlain, Talleyrand;
a Grand Huntsman, Marshal Berthier; and a Grand Equerry, Caulaincourt;
and most of the first occupants of these offices were personal friends
and former comrades in arms of the Emperor.

[Sidenote: Institutions of the Empire.]

[Sidenote: Administrative System of the Empire.]

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Ministers.]

The Senate remained under the Constitution of the Empire, as under
that of the Consulate, the most important and dignified political
body. It was extended by the addition of the Grand Dignitaries, of
the members of the Emperor’s family, and of those whom he specially
wished to reward; its seats were conferred for life; but it did little
but congratulate the Emperor on all his proceedings. The Tribunate
was reduced to fifty members, and the Legislative Body was allowed
to discuss laws, but only in closed committees. These institutions,
carefully devised though they were to maintain a semblance of free
discussion, were really reduced to impotence by the autocratic power
of the Emperor. The Council of State became more and more the real
key-stone of the administration of France. It was the one institution
of the Consulate which developed under the Empire. But it did not
develop collectively, but rather as a convenient administrative centre
and a court of appeal for administrators in every branch of the
government. Though the ministries were maintained, they were, as the
government became more bureaucratic in its form, and more concentrated
into the hand of Napoleon, infinitely subdivided, and the head of each
subdivision had a seat in the Council of State. By this arrangement
the Emperor was able to keep a check on his ministers, and to prevent
the administration from being thrown out of gear by the death or
retirement of a single man. Nevertheless, the ministries, as in all
highly organised states, were of vast importance, and Napoleon was
fortunate in the men he placed at their head. It is worthy of note that
three of the ministers who had served him during the Consulate remained
in office throughout the Empire, namely, Gaudin, afterwards created
Duke of Gaeta, Minister of Finance, who had several assistants in the
Council of State, of whom the most notable were Defermon, a former
deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the Convention, and Louis;
Decrès, also created a duke, Minister of the Marine; and Regnier, Duke
of Massa and Grand Judge, Minister of Justice. At the War Office,
the Emperor retained his chief of the staff, Marshal Berthier, until
1807, when he was succeeded by General Clarke, Duke of Feltre; and the
various sections were presided over by able administrators, of whom the
best were perhaps Lacuée de Cessac and Daru. At the Foreign Office,
Talleyrand remained supreme until after the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807,
when he was replaced by Champagny, Duke of Cadore, who in his turn
gave way to Maret, Duke of Bassano. At the Ministry of the Interior a
change was made at the beginning of the Empire by the retirement of
Chaptal, who had held that post with singular distinction throughout
the Consulate, and the appointment of Champagny. But this department
was overshadowed by the existence of the Ministry of General Police.
Napoleon abolished this office in 1803, in the hope, doubtless, of
dispensing with the services of Fouché; but that astute minister was a
necessity, and in 1804 he was again appointed to his old office, which
he held until 1810.

[Sidenote: The Camp at Boulogne.]

In the midst of the _fêtes_ which accompanied his acceptance of the
Empire, Napoleon did not forget that he was engaged in war with
England. He declared that as he had crossed the Alps, so, too, he
could cross the Channel. For this purpose he collected a flotilla of
flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, and encamped picked soldiers from
the Armies of the Rhine and of Italy upon the coast. But he felt that
it would be impossible for his flotilla to cross the Channel while
the English fleets were masters of the sea. He therefore determined
to unite the two French fleets, which were concentrated at Toulon and
Brest, and summoned his allies, the Dutch and the Spaniards, to prepare
fleets also. He kept 120,000 veterans continually at work practising
embarkation and disembarkation, and it was commonly believed, not
only in Europe, but in England itself, that the invasion would be
carried into effect. The army was equipped in a very thorough fashion,
and carefully organised as the Grand Army under the most experienced
generals in France, and it became one of the most efficient fighting
machines ever known in the history of the world, its discipline being
perfect and its enthusiasm unbounded.

[Sidenote: Villeneuve’s Failure.]

While making these preparations for the invasion of England, Napoleon
struck at other more accessible branches of the British power. In
1803 he occupied Hanover, the hereditary dominion of George III., in
spite of its being covered by the Prussian line of demarcation. In
1804 he sent a division into the kingdom of Naples, in order to close
the Neapolitan ports to English trade; and once more he threatened
Portugal. He also endeavoured to stir up a maritime foe to the English,
and sold to the United States the province of Louisiana, which he had
annexed from Spain, in the hope of obtaining their alliance. It was
only necessary for Napoleon to be master of the Channel for a few
hours, and to have a fine day, for his project of invading England to
succeed. According to his instructions, Admiral Villeneuve left Toulon
in March 1805, eluded Nelson, joined the Spanish fleet, and made his
way to the West Indies, where he expected to meet the fleet from Brest.
But the Brest fleet could not break through the blockade; Villeneuve
had to return, and, after an action with an English squadron under Sir
Robert Calder on 22nd July, he put into Ferrol. At Napoleon’s command,
the admiral set out for Brest on 11th August, but meeting with bad
weather, he lost heart and sailed away to Cadiz. Thus foiled in his
great scheme for bringing up an overpowering French fleet to cover his
invading army, Napoleon dared not leave the harbour of Boulogne.

[Sidenote: Pitt’s New Coalition. 1805.]

While threatened by the Boulogne flotilla, the English Government did
all in its power to raise enemies on the Continent against Napoleon.
Prussia, as usual, insisted on her neutrality; but Russia and Austria
were not unwilling to try their strength once more with France. The
Emperor Alexander of Russia was personally inclined to admire Napoleon,
but he was induced by his Court, his family, and his ministry, who
pointed out to him the importance of remaining on good terms with
England, to sign an alliance with Pitt; he was further profoundly
irritated by the violent scene which Napoleon, as First Consul, had had
with his ambassador, Count Morkov, and was horrified at the execution
of the Duc d’Enghien. The Emperor Francis of Austria was even more
willing to fight Napoleon. He had spent the period of peace since the
Treaty of Lunéville in reorganising his army, and believed that he
would be more successful now that he was freed from the incubus of his
position as Holy Roman Emperor. The State Chancellor, Cobenzl, was also
keenly in favour of war, for he was a sincere believer in the might of
Russia, and had imbibed a desire to please the Court of St. Petersburg,
at which he had long held the post of Austrian ambassador. To induce
these powerful allies to attack in force, Pitt, who was once more
Prime Minister, did not grudge the wealth of England. Large subsidies
were offered both to Russia and Austria, which supplied the means for
commencing the campaign; and strenuous efforts were made to win the
assistance of Prussia.

[Sidenote: Outbreak of War.]

In the second line, Pitt counted on the assistance of Sweden and
Naples. Napoleon’s promptitude in invading the latter country destroyed
any chance of its effecting a diversion in Italy, and Gustavus IV.
of Sweden, though, like his father, a violent enemy of France, was
unable to bring any active assistance, while Prussia remained neutral.
A pretext for war was found in the annexation of Lucca and Genoa
to the French Empire, and the Austrians and Russians resolved to
strike at once. General Mack, with a powerful Austrian force, invaded
Bavaria before the declaration of war, and, by the occupation of Ulm,
he believed he had secured the valley of the Danube. Meanwhile the
principal Austrian army of 120,000 men, under the Archduke Charles,
invaded Italy, and a powerful force of Russians kept close to the
Prussian frontier, in the hope of inducing Prussia to declare war
against France.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1805.]

[Sidenote: Surrender of Ulm. 20th Oct. 1805.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Austerlitz. 2d Dec. 1805.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Trafalgar. 21st Oct. 1805.]

Napoleon, despairing of success in his projected invasion of England,
resolved to turn promptly upon England’s principal ally, and directed
the Grand Army to break up from Boulogne and enter Germany. Mack
regarded it as certain that the French, as in the campaigns of Moreau,
would advance through the Black Forest. Napoleon encouraged his
illusion by showing him a few French troops in that quarter. Meanwhile,
the Grand Army advanced in two portions through Würtemburg and
Franconia, and, on reaching the Danube, after violating the Prussian
neutrality by marching through Anspach, cut off Mack’s retreat on
Vienna. The Austrian general made an effort to break through the French
army, but he was defeated by Ney at Elchingen, and surrendered on the
20th of October 1805 with 33,000 men. The capitulation of Ulm did more
than deprive Austria of a serviceable army,—it left open the road to
Vienna. Napoleon rapidly followed up his success. He marched past a
united Russian and Austrian army, which was quartered in Moravia, to
influence Prussia, occupied Vienna, crossed the Danube, and eventually
faced the army of the two emperors at Austerlitz. On the 2d of December
1805, the anniversary of his coronation, the Grand Army utterly
defeated the Austrians and Russians. The allies lost 15,000 men killed
and wounded, 20,000 prisoners, and 189 guns; and the Emperor Francis
found himself defenceless, for his only other army, that in Italy,
had been defeated at Caldiero by Eugène de Beauharnais and Masséna on
the 30th of October. While the rapid campaign of Austerlitz,—perhaps
the most glorious of Napoleon’s military career,—was taking place, he
lost the navy which he had prepared with so much care, and which had
been intended to cover his invasion of England. The French admiral,
Villeneuve, left Cadiz at the head of the united French and Spanish
fleet, consisting of thirty-three ships of the line and five frigates.
He had not gone far when he was met by Nelson at the head of the
English squadron of twenty-seven ships off Cape Trafalgar. The victory
of Trafalgar, which was won on the 21st of October, was as complete
as that of Austerlitz. The French and Spanish fleet was as entirely
destroyed as the Austrian and Russian army. The allies at Trafalgar
lost 7000 men in killed and wounded, and the English only 3000, among
whom, however, was Nelson himself.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Pressburg. 26th Dec. 1805.]

The result of the battle of Austerlitz was the Treaty of Pressburg,
which was signed by Austria and France on the 26th of December 1805.
The Russians had only lost one army, and their territory had not been
invaded, so that they were still enabled to remain in arms. But Austria
was completely crushed. By the Treaty of Pressburg, Venice, Istria, and
Dalmatia were ceded to the Kingdom of Italy; but Napoleon kept the two
latter provinces under his direct rule, and gave the command of them to
General Marmont. The Tyrol and part of Swabia were ceded to Bavaria,
and the Elector of that State took the title of King. The same title
was conferred on the Duke of Würtemburg; the Duke of Baden became a
Grand Duke; many small German principalities were suppressed, and, on
12th of July 1806, the Confederation of the Rhine was formed under the
protectorate of the French Emperor. England could not blame Austria
for making a separate treaty with France, for she herself had been
saved from invasion by the departure of the Grand Army from Boulogne,
not less than by the victory of Trafalgar. The news of Austerlitz was
followed on the 23d of January 1806 by the death of Pitt, and the new
English ministry of Fox and Grenville, now that the fear of invasion
was over, desired to enter into negotiations with Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Overthrow of Prussia.]

The overthrow of Austria was followed by the overthrow of Prussia.
Frederick William III. had prided himself on the manner in which, in
spite of many temptations, he had maintained his attitude of strict
neutrality. Neither the offers of the Directory or of Napoleon, nor the
subsidies lavishly promised by England, had been able to disturb his
determination. The Prussian ministry proudly pointed to the fact that,
while the rest of Europe had been torn by disastrous wars, Prussia
had remained at peace ever since the Treaty of Basle in 1795. She had
profited by her peace policy as much as France and Austria by their war
policy. The rearrangement of Germany in 1803 had converted Prussia from
a collection of scattered states into a united kingdom. She had even,
up to the year 1803, maintained the freedom of the whole of the north
of Germany from the terrible French invaders by the observation of the
line of demarcation settled in 1795. The northern states of Germany
looked to Prussia as their leader, and since the destruction of the
Holy Roman Empire the Prussian policy had been completely victorious
over the Austrian. The maintenance of the line of demarcation was the
favourite scheme of the Prussian King, and as long as it was observed,
nothing short of invasion would have disturbed his neutrality. But the
occupation of Hanover in 1803, as one of the measures taken by Napoleon
against England, had infringed the line of demarcation, and from that
moment Frederick William III. inclined towards war.

In this warlike attitude he was encouraged by Russia and England,
and still more by his own army. The Prussian army, the creation of
Frederick the Great, represented in more than an ordinary fashion the
Prussian nation. Relying on the recollections of the Seven Years’
War, and confident in the proverbial discipline of their soldiers,
the Prussian generals believed that they would be able to defeat the
conquerors of the rest of Europe. With the utmost ardour the young
Prussian noblemen shouted for war; they resented the long peace, and
applauded the new attitude of the king. He was stimulated likewise by
the hatred for France, which was openly encouraged by his beautiful
Queen Louisa, and he met with opposition only from a few of his more
experienced ministers, and from the old Duke of Brunswick, who well
knew the excellence of the French troops. Undecided and hesitating,
Frederick William refused to join the coalition of Austria and
Russia in 1805, when his assistance would have been of the greatest
service. He signed, indeed, the Treaty of Potsdam on 3d November 1805,
undertaking to mediate, and to join the coalition with 180,000 men if
Napoleon refused the terms he offered. But the proposed intervention
came to nothing. Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, awaited at Napoleon’s
headquarters the result of the battle of Austerlitz, and on December
15 he signed the Treaty of Schönbrunn, by which Prussia ceded Cleves
to France and Anspach to Bavaria, and received provisional possession
of Hanover. Two months later, on February 15, Prussia was compelled by
a supplementary treaty to definitely accept Hanover from Napoleon, an
arrangement which was tantamount to declaring war with England.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Jena. Oct. 1806.]

The long neutrality of Frederick William III. was thus broken, and, as
it soon appeared, in vain. For Napoleon almost immediately offered to
restore Hanover to England, with which country he was induced to enter
into negotiations for peace by the accession of Fox to office. At this
news Frederick William mobilised his troops and prepared for war with
France. In October 1806 he ordered the victor of Austerlitz to at once
retire behind the Rhine, and slowly concentrated his army in Thuringia
without waiting for the succour promised by the Russians. The Prussian
officers applauded their king’s conduct, for they desired to have the
glory of defeating the French entirely to themselves. On the 14th of
October 1806 the two corps of the Prussian army, which were advancing
along the river Saale, were defeated by Napoleon himself at Jena, and
by Marshal Davout at Auerstädt. The triumph was as complete as that of
Austerlitz; and on the 25th the French army entered Berlin.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Eylau.]

It was now necessary for the Grand Army to attack the Russians.
Napoleon, after occupying nearly the whole of Prussia and laying siege
to Dantzic, entered Poland. He was received with an enthusiastic
welcome by the Poles, whose independence he hinted at restoring. Polish
troops had long served in his armies, and the sympathy of the French
people for the oppressed Poles was known throughout Poland. On the 15th
of December 1806 Napoleon occupied Warsaw and sent his army into winter
quarters upon the Russian frontier. The Russian general, Benningsen,
one of the murderers of the Emperor Paul, conceived the idea of
surprising part of the French army in its winter quarters. He drove
back the division of Bernadotte; but when he reached the neighbourhood
of Königsberg he found that Napoleon had received information of his
movement and had collected the bulk of his army. It was now Napoleon’s
turn to pursue the Russians. At the head of 60,000 men he found 80,000
Russians entrenched in the village of Eylau, and attacked them during
a snowstorm on the 8th of February 1807. The battle was long disputed.
The Russians had to retire, but it was estimated that the loss of both
armies was about the same, namely, 35,000 men. This loss was far more
severe to the French than to the Russians, for the French soldiers
slain at Eylau were veterans of the Grand Army, and their place could
only be taken by raw conscripts.

[Sidenote: Battle of Friedland. 14th June 1807.]

The result of the battle of Eylau was to allow the French army to
remain undisturbed in its winter quarters. In the Russian camp,
meanwhile, important diplomatic negotiations had been going on.
Frederick William cemented his friendship with the Emperor Alexander,
and appointed the most able of his servants, Hardenberg, to be State
Chancellor in the place of Haugwitz. Prussia could indeed give but
little real help, for her army was destroyed, and her country almost
entirely in the hands of the French; but Alexander, nevertheless,
consented in April 1807 to sign the Treaty of Bartenstein with
Frederick William, by which they formed an offensive and defensive
alliance. But the hopes of the diplomatists, founded on the drawn
battle of Eylau, were soon to be frustrated by the military successes
of Napoleon. On the 24th of May 1807 Dantzic, which had withstood a
desperate siege, surrendered to General Lefebvre, and the besieging
troops were able to join the main army. The summer campaign of 1807
was very short. Benningsen, accompanied by the Emperor Alexander in
person, advanced to attack the French army on the 14th of June. The
Russians foolishly crossed the Alle at Friedland, and with the river
at their back were completely defeated with a loss of 25,000 men. The
victory of Friedland was decisive; it did not destroy the Russian
Empire, as the victories of Austerlitz and Jena had destroyed the
Austrian Empire and the Prussian Kingdom; it did not extinguish the
fighting power of Russia; it did not diminish the _morale_ of the
Russian army, which proudly boasted that it had made a better stand
against the French than either the Austrians or the Prussians. It was
not positively necessary for the very existence of his monarchy that
the Emperor Alexander should treat with Napoleon, but his successive
defeats justified him before his Court and his ministers in demanding
peace. He could reply to their arguments in favour of an English
alliance for Russia that he had loyally tried to carry out the terms of
that alliance, but that under the circumstances he could maintain it no
longer. He had always wished for peace with France and the friendship
of Napoleon; he now considered himself free to follow his personal
inclinations.

[Sidenote: Interview at Tilsit, 25th June 1807.]

[Sidenote: Peace of Tilsit, 7th July 1807.]

On the 25th of June 1807 the Emperor of the French and the Czar of
Russia had their famous interview at Tilsit on a raft moored in the
middle of the river Niemen. The personal magnetism of Napoleon and his
glory as a great conqueror powerfully impressed the vivid imagination
of Alexander, who had always felt the warmest admiration for him.
During this interview Napoleon spread before the eyes of the Emperor
of Russia his favourite conception of the re-establishment of the
old Empires of the East and of the West. They were to be faithful
allies. France was to be the supreme power over the Latin races and
in the centre of Europe; Russia was to represent the Greek Empire
and to expand into Asia. These grandiose views charmed the Emperor
Alexander, who believed that in adopting them he was following out
the policy of Peter the Great and of the Empress Catherine. The
one enemy to be feared and to be crushed according to Napoleon was
England. And Alexander, in spite of the loss which his subjects would
suffer, promised to enter into Napoleon’s policy for the exclusion of
England’s commerce from the Continent, and to accept the doctrine of
the Continental Blockade. But, at the same time, Alexander did not
dare to go so far as to promise to declare war against England, in
spite of the pressure put upon him by Napoleon. The first interview at
Tilsit was followed by others, and eventually by the Peace of Tilsit.
By this treaty Russia ceded the Ionian Islands and the mouths of the
river Cattaro in the south of Dalmatia, which had been occupied by the
Russians since 1799, to France. Napoleon, on his part, promised that he
would not restore the independence of Poland, and advised Alexander to
obtain compensation for the growth of the power of France from Sweden
and from Turkey. In pursuance of this policy a division of the French
army invaded Swedish Pomerania and took Stralsund, while the Russians
occupied Finland. Alexander was pressed by Napoleon to invade Turkey,
and was promised the assistance of France in obtaining the cession of
the Danubian principalities. The Emperor of Russia made loyal efforts
to obtain a favourable peace for his ally, the King of Prussia. But
Napoleon, though willing to humour Alexander, and desirous of making
Russia his firm ally, did not hesitate to show his contempt for
Frederick William III. He thought for a time of entirely extinguishing
Prussia, but on the representations of Alexander he contented himself
by taking possession of the Rhenish and Westphalian provinces of
Prussia, and forming them with the principality of Hesse-Cassel into
the kingdom of Westphalia. He also included Prussian Poland in his new
Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

[Sidenote: The Continental Blockade.]

The Peace of Tilsit left Napoleon face to face with only one enemy, and
that was England. The destruction of the French fleet at Trafalgar
and the diminution of the strength of the Grand Army from the losses
suffered at Austerlitz, Jena, and Eylau, proved to the Emperor of the
French that he had better abandon his project of invading England.
But if he could not cross the Channel in force or meet the English
fleets at sea, he believed he could ruin England by excluding her
from the markets of the Continent. The English ministry, in pursuance
of its reading of international law, had closed all neutral seaborne
commerce from the mouth of the Elbe to the extremity of the French
coast. Napoleon answered this measure by his Berlin Decree, which was
issued in that city on the 21st of November 1806, and declared the
British Islands to be in a state of blockade. All English merchandise
was to be confiscated, as well as all ships which had touched either
at a British port or at a port in the British Colonies. He followed
up this measure by the Milan Decree of the 17th of December 1807, by
which he declared that any ship of any country which had touched at a
British port was liable to be seized and treated as prize. The entry
of Russia into the scheme of the Continental Blockade would, Napoleon
hoped, entirely ruin the English trade. But, in reality, it did nothing
of the sort. English commerce was as active and enterprising as ever,
and the risks it encountered in running the Continental Blockade only
increased the profits of the English merchants. The real sufferers were
the inhabitants of the Continent, who had to pay enhanced prices for
such articles of prime necessity as sugar. Napoleon’s expectation that
the carrying trade of the world would desert England and fall into the
hands of France and her allies was not fulfilled, because the English
war fleets remained complete masters of the sea, and effectually
prevented the rise of any other commercial power. The result of the
Continental Blockade was therefore the impoverishment of the allies
of France and their consequent hatred of Napoleon, while it increased
rather than diminished the commercial prosperity of England.

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Copenhagen. Sept. 1807.]

The English ministers were not afraid of Napoleon’s Continental
Blockade. But his occupation of Northern Germany made them fear that
his next step would be to seize the Danish fleet as the Directory had
in former days appropriated the Dutch fleet. Secret stipulations were
indeed made at Tilsit, by virtue of which the Danish fleet was to be
seized by France. Information of this scheme was given to the English
ministers, and a secret expedition was planned to prevent its being
carried into effect. Denmark was a neutral nation, and had given no
pretext for war to either France or England. But Denmark was a weak
nation and unable to defend itself. Under these circumstances the
English struck first. A powerful expedition anchored before Copenhagen
in September 1807; the city was bombarded; the small Danish army
was defeated at Kioge by a division under the command of Sir Arthur
Wellesley; and the whole Danish fleet was appropriated or destroyed by
England. By this rapid blow one of Napoleon’s most cherished schemes
came to nought, and his hope of getting another serviceable navy
effectually extinguished.

[Sidenote: French Invasion of Portugal. 1807.]

The two most faithful allies of England were the small kingdoms of
Portugal and Sweden. The Russians were left to deal with the latter;
Napoleon resolved to attack the former himself. The French Emperor,
like the Directory before him, insisted on regarding Portugal as an
outlying province of England, and, indeed, there was some ground for
this view, as owing to the Methuen Treaty the relations between the two
countries were very close. Yet the Prince Regent of Portugal in 1806
had declined to declare himself the open ally of England, and insisted
on the maintenance of his position of neutrality. Nevertheless,
Napoleon resolved to ruin Portugal because the Prince Regent declined
to become a party to the Continental Blockade. He at first resolved to
act with Spain as he had done in 1801, and on the 29th of October 1807
the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, by which it was agreed that
the combined armies of France and Spain should conquer Portugal. The
little kingdom was then to be divided into three parts; the northern
provinces were to be given to the King of Etruria in exchange for
his dominions in Italy which Napoleon desired to annex; the southern
districts were to be formed into an independent kingdom for Godoy,
the Prince of the Peace, the lover of the Queen of Spain, and the
most powerful man in that kingdom; and the central portion was to be
temporarily held by France. In pursuance of this secret treaty a French
army under General Junot marched rapidly across the Peninsula, and
on the news that it was close to Lisbon, the Prince Regent, with his
mother, the mad queen, Maria I., and his two sons sailed for Brazil
with an English squadron. Hardly had the Regent left the Tagus when
Junot entered Lisbon on the 20th of November 1807. The French were
favourably received in Portugal. The Portuguese resented the departure
of the Prince Regent; democratic principles had made considerable
progress; and no idea was entertained that there was a secret design to
dismember the kingdom. Junot had little difficulty in occupying almost
the whole of Portugal; he sent the picked troops of the Portuguese
army under the name of the Portuguese Legion to join the Grand Army
in Germany; and he promised a Constitution to the country. On the 1st
of February 1808 he issued a proclamation that the House of Braganza
had ceased to reign, and after the fortresses had been surrendered he
proceeded to administer Portugal as a conquered country.

[Sidenote: Sweden.]

Gustavus IV. of Sweden, who had taken the power into his own hands
from his uncle the Regent Duke of Sudermania and had married the
sister-in-law of the Emperor Alexander of Russia, in 1797, had
inherited the hatred for France, which had been, after 1789, one of
the guiding principles of his father, Gustavus III. He had been the
ready ally of England in all the coalitions against both the French
Directory and Napoleon, and after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens
in 1803, he became the key-stone of the Anglo-Russian alliance. In
1805 he promised to place himself at the head of an English, Russian,
and Swedish army which was to invade Hanover, and occupy Holland; but
he failed to set sail on the appointed day, and caused the expedition
to lead to no result. Nevertheless, he remained faithful to England,
and at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit refused to abandon the English
alliance. As has been already said, Swedish Pomerania was occupied by
a division of the Grand Army, under Marshal Brune, and Sweden never
recovered the ancient conquest of Gustavus Adolphus. In 1808, on the
obstinate refusal of the Swedish King to accede to the Continental
Blockade, the Emperor Alexander, as had been agreed at Tilsit, invaded
Finland. England was ready to assist Sweden, and a powerful army, under
Sir John Moore, was sent to Stockholm. At this crisis the King showed
signs of insanity. The English expedition retired, and at the beginning
of 1809 Gustavus IV. was dethroned.

[Sidenote: The Rearrangement of Europe.]

[Sidenote: Holland.]

After he had made himself Emperor, and still more after his victories
over Austria and Prussia and his alliance with Russia, Napoleon
began to assure his power on the Continent by establishing vassal
kings in the neighbourhood of France. Just as the French Directory
had surrounded the French Republic with smaller republics governed
after its own model, so Napoleon surrounded his frontiers with
subject kingdoms. The Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Parthenopean
Republics were succeeded by the kingdoms of Holland and of Naples
and the vice-royalty of Italy. The form of the Batavian Republic
had altered with every change in the Constitution of France. From a
democratic Republic in the time of the Convention it had become a
Directory and a Consulate, and in 1805, after the French Empire had
been established, it received a new Constitution. By this arrangement
Count Schimmelpenninck, a distinguished Dutch statesman, was appointed
Grand Pensionary for life, but in June 1806 he was induced to resign,
and Louis Bonaparte, the favourite brother of the French Emperor,
was made King of Holland. The Dutch people had no objection to these
changes. The introduction of the French system of administration
consolidated the country from a group of federal states into a united
nation. Its trade prospered, though it lost its fleet at Camperdown
in 1797, and in the Texel in 1799, and it became more wealthy than
ever, in spite of the conquest of all its colonies by England, by the
close communication established with Paris and the abolition of the
vexatious transit-duties in Belgium. Louis Bonaparte, the first King of
Holland, showed himself a sagacious monarch. He caused the Civil Code
to be introduced into his dominions in the place of the old cumbrous
system of Dutch law. He encouraged literature and art, and he moved
the capital from the Hague to Amsterdam. But the introduction of the
Continental Blockade caused profound discontent. The Dutch merchants
were ruined by its rigorous application; riots took place in many
districts; and since Napoleon found the Continental Blockade was being
evaded he caused French troops to enter Holland and occupy the mouths
of the rivers. Louis Bonaparte protested against this conduct, and in
1810 he resigned the crown which his brother had given him.

[Sidenote: Italy.]

[Sidenote: Rome.]

[Sidenote: Naples.]

[Sidenote: Illyria.]

It has been said that when Napoleon made himself Emperor he likewise
assumed the title of King of Italy, and that he did not undertake the
government, but conferred it upon his step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais,
as Viceroy. The original Kingdom of Italy only comprehended the
dominions of the Cisalpine Republic,—that is to say, Lombardy, the
Duchies of Modena and Parma, and the former Papal Legations of Bologna
and Ferrara. By the Treaty of Pressburg in 1806 the Kingdom of Italy
was increased by the addition of Venice and of the former Venetian
territories on the mainland. Genoa, Lucca, Piedmont, and Tuscany,
were, however, directly administered by France, and the city of Rome
and the Campagna was added to the French Empire in the year 1810.
In the south of the Italian peninsula Naples was erected into an
independent kingdom, which was intended to include the island of
Sicily. This kingdom was conferred upon the elder brother of Napoleon,
Joseph Bonaparte, on the 30th of March 1806. Joseph, like King Louis
of Holland, tried to act as a good king. He formed an able ministry,
consisting almost entirely of Neapolitans, and containing but two
Frenchmen,—Miot de Melito, Minister of War, and Saliceti, Minister
of Police. He introduced good laws, and made efforts to put down the
brigandage which ravaged the southern districts of his kingdom. The
island of Sicily meanwhile resisted all the attempts of the French.
It acknowledged the rule of Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, who
had retired to Palermo, and it was garrisoned by an English army. This
army kept Joseph in perpetual embarrassment. The English encouraged the
brigands of Calabria, and in the summer of 1806 they made a descent
upon the mainland, and on the 3d of July the English general, Sir John
Stuart, defeated the French general Reynier at Maida. This victory,
however, was followed by the capitulation of Gaeta on the 18th of
July, after which event the French army in Calabria was strengthened
to such an extent that the English were unable to do more than defend
Sicily. The internal administration of Joseph Bonaparte deserves every
praise; he abolished feudalism; he endeavoured to introduce honesty and
uprightness in the collection of the taxes; he declared the equality of
all citizens before the law; and by the suppression of many monasteries
he improved the finances of the country and largely increased the
number of peasant proprietors. Lastly, must be noticed the Illyrian
provinces of Dalmatia and Istria, which had been ceded by the Treaty
of Pressburg. They were directly administered by General Marmont, who
reported to Napoleon himself and not to the Viceroy of Italy. After
the Treaty of Tilsit they were augmented by the Ionian Islands, and
Napoleon kept a powerful army in this quarter to threaten the Turks.
It is probable, indeed, that he dreamt of restoring the independence of
Greece, and his Illyrian army was well placed for carrying out such a
project.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Reorganisation of Germany.]

In his rearrangement of the states of Germany and of the balance
of power in Central Europe, Napoleon, like the Directory, followed
out the traditional policy of Richelieu and Mazarin. He held it to
be an advantage for France that there should be a number of small
German states between the Rhine and the hereditary dominions of
the House of Austria, but he considered that the very small size
of the states maintained by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 made
them inadequate buffers. He, therefore, enlarged the Western German
states and endeavoured to unite their interests with those of France.
The reconstitution of Germany after the Peace of Lunéville in 1803
destroyed the old Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon worked on the same
lines, and his measures have had almost the same permanence as the
arrangements of 1803. The changes took place gradually in accordance
with the Treaties of Pressburg and of Tilsit, but their final results
may be considered as a whole.

[Sidenote: Bavaria.]

[Sidenote: Würtemberg.]

[Sidenote: Baden.]

[Sidenote: Westphalia.]

[Sidenote: Grand Duchy of Berg.]

[Sidenote: Saxony.]

[Sidenote: Smaller States.]

Maximilian Joseph, the Elector of Bavaria, had, by hereditary right,
united the Electorates of the Palatinate and of Bavaria with the Duchy
of Deux-Ponts. He had been educated at the Court of Versailles, but
nevertheless he approved of the doctrines of the French Revolution and
became one of the earliest allies of Napoleon. The arrangements after
the Treaty of Lunéville, which had deprived him of the Palatinate and
of the Duchy of Deux-Ponts, had given him a powerful and concentrated
state. By the Treaty of Pressburg he received in addition the Tyrol and
the cities of Nuremberg and Ratisbon with the title of King. In 1809 he
further received the Principality of Salzburg, which made his kingdom
one of the most powerful in Germany. Possessing the whole of the upper
valley of the Danube, and the valleys of its affluents, Bavaria formed
a strong frontier state against Austria, and to the north marched with
the kingdom of Saxony. King Maximilian Joseph felt that he owed his
power to the French Emperor, and to seal the friendship he gave his
daughter, the Princess Augusta, in marriage to Napoleon’s step-son, the
Viceroy Eugène de Beauharnais. On the western frontier of Bavaria, in
order to check that state if it became too powerful, Napoleon erected
the smaller kingdom of Würtemberg. Frederick, Duke of Würtemberg, like
Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria, had shown himself ready to recognise
the authority of the French Republic and of Napoleon. He had received
considerable additions to his territories with the title of Elector
in 1803, and after the Treaty of Pressburg he received the whole of
Austrian Suabia except the Breisgau and Ortenau with the title of
King. He, too, like the first King of Bavaria, entered into a personal
alliance with Napoleon, and gave his daughter, the Princess Catherine,
in marriage to Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia. The third south
German state which deserves notice is Baden, whose Duke, Charles
Frederick, was made an Elector in 1803, and in 1805 received the
title of Grand Duke with the greater part of Ortenau and the Breisgau
from Austrian Suabia. He, too, formed a family alliance with Napoleon
by the marriage of his heir to Stéphanie de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s
step-daughter. The kingdom of Westphalia, which was formed by Napoleon
for his brother Jerome after the Treaty of Tilsit, was an entirely new
creation, not an enlargement of a former German state like Bavaria
and Würtemberg. It consisted of the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, the
Prussian territories on the left of the Elbe, including the bishoprics
of Paderborn and Hildesheim, the Old Mark of Brandenburg, etc.,
the Duchy of Brunswick, a portion of Hanover, and other scattered
districts. It thus contained the greater part of the valleys of the
Ems, the Weser, and the Oder, but it did not reach the sea, and its
only important fortress was Magdeburg. Jerome, who was appointed its
first king, was not such a capable monarch as his brothers Joseph and
Louis, but he formed an able ministry, of which the most conspicuous
members were Siméon, the famous French jurist, as Minister of Justice,
and the historian, Johann Müller as Minister of Public Instruction.
The Westphalian people did not amalgamate so thoroughly as Napoleon
had expected; but this was not the fault of Jerome’s ministry, which
abolished feudalism, introduced the Civil Code, and regularised the
administration. The Grand Duchy of Berg, which he granted to his
brother-in-law Murat in 1806, was another creation of Napoleon. It
was formed out of the Duchy of Berg ceded by Bavaria, the County of
the Mark and the Bishopric of Münster, detached from Prussia, and of
the Duchy of Nassau. It formed a compact little state of a million
inhabitants, commanding part of the course of the Rhine, with its
capital at Düsseldorf. The key-stone of Napoleon’s policy in Eastern
Germany was Saxony. The Elector of that state had taken part with the
Prussians in the campaign of Jena, but Napoleon nevertheless calculated
that the ruler of Saxony, placed as he was between Prussia and Austria,
must naturally be an ally of France. He, therefore, in spite of his
behaviour in 1806, gave the Elector of Saxony the title of King and
the Circle of Lower Lusatia. After the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon did
yet more for the King of Saxony, whom he created likewise Grand Duke
of Warsaw. Of the smaller states of Germany maintained by Napoleon,
the most important was Hesse-Darmstadt which separated the kingdom
of Westphalia from the Grand Duchy of Berg. As a faithful ally of
Napoleon, the Landgrave Louis X. received some accessions of territory
with the title of Grand Duke. The fourth Grand Duchy after Baden,
Berg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, was the Grand Duchy of Frankfort. This was
conferred upon the Archbishop, Charles de Dalberg. This prelate had
been coadjutor to the Archbishop-Elector of Mayence in the time of the
Revolution. He had succeeded to the Archbishopric in 1802, and in
1803, on the reorganisation of Germany, was the only ecclesiastical
elector retained. He was then given the Bishopric of Ratisbon, and when
that was transferred to Bavaria, was granted instead the Principalities
of Fulda and Hanau and the territory of Aschaffenburg. The last Grand
Duchy was that of Würtzburg, which was conferred on the Archduke
Ferdinand, the former Grand Duke of Tuscany, in exchange for the
Principality of Salzburg given to Bavaria in 1809. These territorial
changes were supplemented by a wholesale destruction of the very small
states. The Knights of the Empire lost their sovereign rights; all the
petty dukes and princes whose territory was enclosed in the larger
states which have been mentioned, were also mediatised, that is to say,
while retaining their rights as lords and their titles, they lost their
immediate sovereignty and became a sort of privileged aristocracy.
This measure, which supplemented the arrangements of 1803, finally
destroyed the ancient system of Germany. The little courts with but few
exceptions disappeared, and Germany became a collection of powerful
states instead of a congeries of feudal principalities.

[Sidenote: Confederation of the Rhine.]

Napoleon endeavoured to concentrate the power of the German princes as
a whole by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, of which he
was officially recognised as Protector. The original Confederation of
the Rhine established in July 1805, consisted of only fifteen princes,
but after Tilsit it comprised thirty-two. The Arch-Chancellor of the
new confederation was Charles de Dalberg, the Grand Duke of Frankfort,
the only ecclesiastic who was acknowledged as a member. It comprised in
all the four kingdoms of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Westphalia, and Saxony,
the five grand duchies and twenty-three principalities. Its policy was
conducted by a Diet sitting at Frankfort composed of two colleges,—the
College of Kings and the College of Princes. The Confederation of
the Rhine, which was mainly situated between the Rhine and the Elbe,
contained a population of twenty million Germans, and was bound by
treaty to contribute a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers to the
armies of Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Poland.]

[Sidenote: Grand Duchy of Warsaw.]

In no respect did Napoleon prove how thoroughly his idea of
re-establishing the ancient Empires of the East and the West had taken
possession of his imagination than in his treatment of Poland. In order
to please the Emperor Alexander he did not insist upon re-establishing
Polish independence. Not only did he neither dare nor wish to deprive
Russia of her Polish provinces, but at Tilsit he even ceded to
Alexander the two Polish circles of Salkief and Tloczow. But though he
dared not establish a powerful independent Poland for fear of offending
Russia, he nevertheless formed, in 1807, a small Polish state under the
name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. By this half measure he failed to
satisfy the Poles, who had looked to him to be the restorer of Polish
independence, and at the same time offended the Emperor Alexander, who
disliked the creation of a Polish state of any size or under any form.
The Grand Duchy of Warsaw eventually contained the whole of Prussian
and the greater part of Austrian Poland, and was placed under the rule
of the King of Saxony as Grand Duke of Warsaw, just as in former days
the Electors of Saxony had been Kings of Poland. In this half-and-half
policy with regard to Poland was to be found the greatest peril to the
newly-formed alliance between Alexander and Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Conference at Erfurt. Sept. 1808.]

For more than a year the alliance between Russia and France, between
Alexander and Napoleon, remained the most important fact of European
polity; but causes of dissension soon arose. On the one hand,
Alexander resented the existence of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and
felt that his subjects had cause to grumble at the sufferings they
endured owing to the Continental Blockade; on the other, there were
not wanting signs that Napoleon’s power had reached its height, and
was now about to decline. The first symptoms of this decline were his
quarrel with the Pope and his intervention in the affairs of Spain.
The first blows struck at his military superiority were the defeat
of the French troops in Portugal by Sir Arthur Wellesley at Vimeiro
and the capitulation of General Dupont to the Spaniards. The Treaty
of Tilsit marked the true zenith of Napoleon’s power; but in spite of
the misfortunes he suffered in 1808, and his wanton intervention in
the affairs of Spain, he still seemed the greatest monarch in Europe.
Feeling his prestige somewhat affected, and fearing the effect upon the
mind of his imaginative ally, Napoleon, trusting in the magnetism of
his presence and his conversation, had recourse to a personal interview
with Alexander at Erfurt in September 1808. There the two masters of
Europe discussed the state of affairs; Napoleon soothed Alexander’s
discontent, and again promised him the Danubian provinces. But the
full confidence which had been established at Tilsit was not restored
at Erfurt. Alexander, in spite of his admiration for the person of
Napoleon, felt distrustful of his policy, and Napoleon deceived himself
when he thought he had regained his ascendency over the mind of the
Russian Emperor. The interviews between the two Emperors formed the
important political side of the Congress of Erfurt; but the features
which dazzled Europe were the grand _fêtes_, the pit full of kings
which listened to Talma, the great French actor, and the obsequiousness
of the high-born German princes to one who, a few years before but a
general of the French Republic, was now master of Europe.

CHAPTER IX

1808–1812

Napoleon’s two reverses between the Treaty of Tilsit and the
Congress of Erfurt—England sends an army to Portugal—Campaign
of Vimeiro and Convention of Cintra—The Revolution in
Spain—Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain—Victory of Medina del
Rio Seco and Capitulation of Baylen—Napoleon in Spain—Sir
John Moore’s advance—Battle of Corunna—The Resurrection
of Austria—Ministry of Stadion—Campaign of Wagram—Treaty
of Vienna—Campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula—Battle
of Talavera—Expedition to Walcheren—Napoleon and the
Pope—Annexation of Rome—Revolution in Sweden—Revolution in
Turkey—Treaty of Bucharest—Greatest Extension of Napoleon’s
dominions—Internal Organisation of his Empire—The new
Nobility—Internal reforms—Law—Finance—Education—Extension
of these reforms through Europe—Disappearance of
Serfdom—Religious Toleration—Reorganisation of
Prussia—Reforms of Stein and Scharnhorst—Revival of
German National feeling—Marriage of Napoleon to the
Archduchess Marie Louise—Birth of the King of Rome—Steady
opposition of England to Napoleon—Policies of Canning and
Castlereagh—Campaigns of 1810 and 1811 in the Peninsula—Signs
of the decline of Napoleon’s power between 1808 and 1812.

The Treaty of Tilsit marked the greatest height of Napoleon’s power in
Europe; at the Congress of Erfurt he seemed, indeed, to be as powerful
as at Tilsit; but during the interval he had experienced two serious
mishaps. The first of which was caused by the fact that England, which
had hitherto fought the French upon the sea, and had met with only
slight success in purely military expeditions, began in 1808 a serious
effort to break the tradition of the invincibility of the French army.

The last important campaign upon the Continent in which an English
army had taken part, was in 1793–1795. Since that time many English
expeditions had been despatched to carry out isolated plans; some of
these expeditions had been crowned with success, such as Abercromby’s
and Hutchinson’s reconquest of Egypt in 1801, and Stuart’s brilliant
little campaign of Maida in 1806; others had been egregious failures,
notably the Duke of York’s campaign in Holland in 1799, and Lord
Cathcart’s landing in Hanover in 1805. Confident in their naval
superiority, the English Ministers, ever since 1795, had paid more
attention to the military occupation of islands than to the despatch
of armies to the mainland. Acting on this policy, the English had
conquered the French West Indies in 1793 and 1795, and again proceeded
in 1809 to reoccupy those which had been restored to France at the
Peace of Amiens. When Spain declared herself the ally of France,
England occupied her chief West Indian possession, the Island of
Trinidad; when the subjection of Holland to France became manifest,
England conquered the Cape of Good Hope in 1797, and again after the
Treaty of Amiens, in 1805. Nor did the English ministers neglect the
more distant possessions of her various enemies. Ceylon and Java were
taken from the Dutch in 1796 and 1807 respectively; the Mauritius was
conquered from France in 1809, and an unsuccessful attempt was made
to conquer Spanish South America, Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, in
1806. But England did not confine her policy of attacking islands to
distant seas; she also established herself firmly in the Mediterranean.
In 1797 Minorca was taken, in 1801 Malta, and eventually in 1805 an
English army, as has been said, garrisoned Sicily. The policy of
Fox was identical with that of Pitt, and favoured small, detached
expeditions; some of these were failures, like the expedition to South
America in 1806, and that to Egypt in 1808, but others attained their
end. Now, however, a new policy began to make way. Instead of isolated
expeditions and the occupation of islands which could be defended
by the English fleets, it was resolved once more, as in 1793, to
disembark a powerful English army on the Continent, and to try military
conclusions with the French.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Vimeiro, 1808.]

[Sidenote: Convention of Cintra. 30th August 1803.]

In order that England should act effectively on the Continent, it was
necessary that her army should have a friendly base of operations.
The failure of the expedition to Bergen in 1799, and of many similar
expeditions, proved that it was impossible to expect complete success
when the disembarking army had to fight from the moment of its landing,
and had to secure its communications with the sea. An opportunity was
afforded for obtaining such a base of operations as was necessary, by
an insurrection breaking out in Portugal against the French invaders.
It has been said that General Junot occupied the whole of Portugal
without much difficulty, except the northern and southern provinces,
which were held by Spanish armies. Junot partitioned out the country
into military governments under French generals, whose oppressive
behaviour exasperated the people. After the outbreak of the revolution
against the French in Spain, the Spanish forces in Portugal retired,
and Oporto at once declared itself independent of France, and elected a
Junta of Government, headed by the Bishop. Isolated risings took place
all over the country. Many French officers and soldiers were murdered,
and the insurgents were punished with the most rigorous cruelty. The
Junta of Oporto was, however, unable to make head against Junot, for
the best regular troops of the Portuguese army had been despatched
to join the Grand Army in Germany. The Junta had therefore to depend
upon undisciplined militia, and feeling the impossibility of combating
the French regular troops in the field, applied for help to England.
This gave the English ministers their opportunity. A force which had
been collected at Cork, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir
Arthur Wellesley, for an expedition to South America, was ordered
instead to proceed to Portugal. He was joined by some other troops, and
disembarked at the mouth of the Mondego river. He marched southwards
towards Lisbon, and defeated a French division at Roriça on the 17th of
August 1808. After receiving further reinforcements, he was attacked by
Junot at Vimeiro on the 21st of August, and won a decisive victory.
On the field of battle Wellesley was superseded by Sir Harry Burrard,
and he in his turn by Sir Hew Dalrymple. Instead of following up the
victory, the latter general concluded the Convention of Cintra, by
which Junot agreed to evacuate Portugal. From a military point of view
this was a poor sequel to the victory of Vimeiro; from a political
point of view it was a signal success. Portugal was freed from the
French as speedily as she had been conquered by them, and England
thus secured a friendly base of operations. The three generals were
all recalled, and Sir John Moore took command of the English army. A
Council of Regency was established, and an English officer, General
Beresford, was sent to organise a Portuguese army, partly under the
command of English officers, and wholly paid by the English Government.

[Sidenote: The Revolution in Spain, 1808.]

[Sidenote: Joseph Bonaparte made King of Spain. 6th June 1808.]

[Sidenote: Capitulation of Baylen. 20th July 1808.]

The loss of Portugal was the first serious reverse which Napoleon had
met with from a trained and disciplined army. But at the same time
he was made to feel the difficulty of overcoming even an unorganised
national rising, with the very best of troops. It has been mentioned
that the King of Spain and the Queen’s favourite, Godoy, were partners
to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which arranged for the dismemberment
of Portugal. Spain had been the consistent ally of France ever since
the Treaty of Basle in 1795, and in the cause of France had lost not
only the islands of Minorca and Trinidad, but two gallant fleets in
the naval battles of Cape St. Vincent and Trafalgar. Nevertheless,
Napoleon deliberately determined to dethrone his faithful ally Charles
IV. It is said that after the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples,
Godoy had made overtures for joining the coalition against France, but
after the victory of Jena the Court of Madrid, if it had ever thought
of opposing the will of Napoleon, became more obsequious than ever.
Court intrigues gave the French Emperor the opportunity he desired
for interfering with the affairs of Spain. The heir to the throne,
Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, hated his mother’s lover, Godoy,
and for sharing in a plot against the favourite was thrown into prison.
He appealed for help to Napoleon, and Charles IV., his father, on his
side also appealed to the French emperor. Napoleon began to move his
troops across the Pyrenees, and a French army under the command of
Murat approached Madrid. The King of Spain was rumoured to be about to
follow the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to leave the
country. The population of Madrid rose in insurrection and maltreated
Godoy, who fell into their hands. Charles IV. then abdicated in favour
of his son, who proceeded to France to obtain the support of Napoleon.
Charles IV. and his Queen followed Ferdinand, and when the Spanish
royal family was assembled at Bayonne, Charles IV. was induced to cede
the crown of Spain to Napoleon, who conferred it on his brother Joseph
Bonaparte, King of Naples, on the 6th of June 1808. But it was one
thing to proclaim Joseph King of Spain and the Indies; it was another
to place him in power. The patriotism of the Spanish people was stirred
to its depths, and the Spaniards declined to accept a new monarch
supported by French troops. In every quarter insurrections broke out
and juntos were formed. Appeals were made to England for help, and
money, arms, ammunition and English officers were disembarked at all
the chief ports of Spain. In the month of May the mob of Madrid drove
out the French soldiers of Murat, who had to retire behind the Ebro.
But mobs and undisciplined militia can never stand against regular
troops. Marshal Bessières defeated the best Spanish army under the
command of General Cuesta at Medina del Rio Seco on the 14th of July
1808, and on the 20th of July Joseph entered Madrid. Before his arrival
at his new capital, flying columns had been sent in every direction,
and one of these on its way to Cadiz met with a serious disaster. This
was the famous Capitulation of Baylen. The French division of General
Dupont was surrounded at that place and forced to capitulate. By the
terms of the Capitulation, Dupont engaged that not only the soldiers
under his immediate command, but also that two fresh divisions which
were coming up should surrender. The Capitulation of Baylen deprived
Napoleon of the services of 18,000 men, but the loss of prestige could
not be estimated by numbers. The Spanish insurgents were greatly
encouraged and rose in every quarter; a guerilla warfare was begun,
which was in the end more fatal to the French army than regular
defeats, and Napoleon had for the first time to fight a nation in arms.
This was an exact reversal of the situation of affairs in the wars of
the French Revolution; at that time it was the French nation in arms
which defeated the disciplined soldiers of the Continental monarchs;
now it was the Spanish nation in arms which counteracted the schemes of
Napoleon. It is almost impossible to estimate the losses experienced
by the French during the war in the Iberian Peninsula; the defeats
inflicted on them by the Anglo-Portuguese army accounted for but a
small portion of this loss; it was the harassing duty of maintaining
garrisons in every town and almost in every posting-house which
exhausted the French army.

[Sidenote: Napoleon in Spain.]

It need hardly be said that Napoleon was far from expecting such
disasters as the Capitulation of Baylen and the Convention of Cintra.
He had been so accustomed to victory that he could not understand
the change in his affairs. He looked upon these two events as having
only a temporary importance, and proceeded to the Congress at Erfurt
with a light heart. Though checked in Spain, he was none the less the
master in Germany, and the monarchs of Central Europe did not know
that he had reached his zenith and was about to decline. The Emperor
Alexander alone seems to have had some suspicion of the truth, for
he entered into fresh relations with England by means of the strong
English party at his Court, which was headed by the Empress-mother. As
soon as the Congress of Erfurt was over, Napoleon proceeded to Spain
in person, accompanied by his Guard and his most experienced troops,
and surrounded by his most famous generals. After the Capitulation
of Baylen, Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid, and with the bulk of
the French army had retreated behind the Ebro. He was there joined
by Napoleon, who had under his command no less than 135,000 men. He
rapidly advanced upon Madrid; Marshal Soult defeated the Spanish Army
of the Centre at Burgos on the 10th of November; Marshal Victor the
Spanish Army of the Left at Espinosa on the 11th of November; and
Marshal Lannes the Army of the Right at Tudela on the 3d of November.
In spite of the snow, the Emperor in person forced the pass of the
Somo Sierra, and on the 13th of December received the capitulation
of Madrid. The victories of his lieutenants and his own rapid and
successful advance on the capital, convinced Napoleon that the
difficulties of the Spanish war had been exaggerated, and the result
of this impression was that he neglected in after years to strengthen
his armies in Spain sufficiently, and attributed all failures to the
incompetence of his generals, instead of to the obstinate tenacity of
his opponents.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s advance.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Corunna. Jan. 16, 1809.]

After occupying Madrid, the Emperor next determined to turn his
strength against the English forces in the Peninsula. Sir John Moore,
who was in command of the English army in Portugal, could not believe
that the Spanish armies were too weak to face the French; but when he
heard that Napoleon was at Madrid, he resolved to make a diversion
in order to prevent him from conquering Andalusia, and to give time
for the Junta of Seville to organise the defence of that province.
Leaving a small division to protect Portugal under Sir John Cradock,
Moore, with the bulk of the English army, invaded north-west Spain and
advanced as far as Salamanca and Toro. Napoleon, as Moore had expected,
put off the invasion of Andalusia and turned against the English. Moore
having thus effected his purpose, then fell back into Galicia. In the
midst of most terrible weather he effected one of the most famous
retreats in history, turning occasionally to face his pursuers, and
fighting several brilliant rear-guard actions. Napoleon conducted the
pursuit in person for some time, but hearing that Austria was preparing
for war, he handed over the command to Soult and suddenly returned
to France. Soult did not come up with the English army until it had
reached Corunna, and was waiting there to embark. A battle was fought
to protect the embarkation of the English, in which Sir John Moore was
killed, and Soult, whose losses during the rapid pursuit had been very
great, turned southwards to occupy Oporto.

[Sidenote: Austria. 1805–1809.]

The Treaty of Pressburg had made a very painful impression, not only
upon the mind of Francis I. of Austria, but also on the Austrian
people. The indignation aroused by the cession of Dalmatia and the loss
of Venice, which had been given to the House of Austria as compensation
for the Milanese, had exasperated the Austrian people. But, on the
other hand, the Hungarians were inclined, like the Poles, to look to
Napoleon as the possible restorer of their national independence. The
policy of the Emperor Francis had been to treat the Hungarians, whom
he had placed under the rule of his brother, the Archduke Joseph,
as semi-independent, and to make as little change as possible in
the Hungarian Constitution. He regarded his German provinces as the
really important portion of his dominions, and gave them his undivided
attention. After the Treaty of Pressburg, the Emperor dismissed his
chancellor and prime minister Cobenzl, and replaced him by Count
Philip Stadion. The new Chancellor was a thorough German, though
descended from a Grisons family, and the main point of his policy was
to rouse the patriotism of the Germans as a nationality against the
French. In fact, from 1805 until the outbreak of war in 1809, Stadion
endeavoured to arouse the national spirit which afterwards made
Germany successful in the final war of liberation against Napoleon.
He circulated patriotic literature, and formulated the idea of German
unity, which he saw must take the place of the extinct notion of the
Holy Roman Empire. He was successful in rousing the German popular
feeling to the greatest height in the German provinces of Austria; but
the time was not yet ripe for the expression of a similar sentiment
throughout the whole of Germany. The weight of the Continental Blockade
was not experienced in its fullest form until after 1809. And the
patriotic feeling which was to have so full a development could not
be stirred up in a moment. But in the German territories of Austria
Stadion was completely successful. The Emperor Francis himself was a
thorough German, and during the progress which he made through his
states in 1808, with his beautiful second wife, the Empress Ludovica,
a princess of Modena, roused the utmost enthusiasm. Ever since the
Peace of Pressburg the Archduke Charles, as Commander-in-Chief, had
been organising the military power of Austria; regiments of volunteers
were formed in Vienna and all the large cities; and the militia for
the first time were disciplined and trained for offensive war, and
not maintained merely for the preservation of the peace. While the
smaller princes of Germany were obsequiously doing honour to Napoleon
at Erfurt, the Emperor of Austria was preparing for war. The successful
insurrection of the Spaniards, and the Capitulation of Baylen,
encouraged Stadion in his belief that if a national feeling could be
roused against the French domination, it would be as successful in
Germany as in Spain. The English Ministry encouraged the attitude of
the Austrian Emperor, and promised not only large subsidies if an
Austrian army would take the field, but also that a powerful diversion
should be made in the Netherlands by an English army. Napoleon heard of
this disposition of Austria in 1808, but at first paid very little heed
to it. During his winter campaign in the Peninsula, however, it became
obvious that the Austrians were in a hurry to come to conclusions with
him, and he therefore hastened back from Spain to make his preparations
for this new war, instead of pursuing the English to Corunna.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Wagram. 1809.]

From both the political and the military point of view, Napoleon was
justified in believing in 1809 that he had little to fear from the
intervention of Austria. The South German princes, like the Kings of
Bavaria and Würtemberg, had been too much favoured by him to desire to
oppose him, and willingly sent their contingents to serve in his ranks.
From the population of his new creation, the kingdom of Westphalia, he
looked for assistance, not opposition, and what remained of Prussia was
occupied by French armies. The Emperor Alexander of Russia, still under
the glamour of the interview at Erfurt, and the grand promises for the
division of the world repeated to him there, showed no inclination to
assist Austria. Indeed, the feeling of opposition between Austria and
Russia, which had shown itself in 1799 and 1800, had been augmented
by the unfortunate campaign of Austerlitz. Each ally blamed the other
for that disaster; the Austrian officers openly declared that they
hated a Russian more than a Frenchman, and the Russians reciprocated
this feeling. Austria’s only ally, therefore, was England. From a
military point of view, the Austrian army had not yet been sufficiently
reorganised, in spite of the efforts of Stadion and the Archduke
Charles, to make a successful resistance to the French; but, as the
event of the campaign showed, it was able to make a better stand than
it had ever made before.

[Sidenote: Battle of Aspern. 21st and 22nd May 1809.]

In April 1809 the Archduke Charles, amid the greatest enthusiasm of
the Austrian people, issued a manifesto to the German race, and at the
head of 170,000 men advanced into Bavaria. At the same time another
army, under the Archduke John, invaded Italy. At that moment Napoleon
had only two _corps d’armée_ in Southern Germany, one under the command
of Marshal Davout at Ratisbon, and the other under Marshal Masséna
at Augsburg. The Archduke Charles intended to get between the two
marshals and defeat them separately. But Napoleon arrived in person,
with some of the finest troops he had been employing in Spain, before
the Archduke could complete his operations. On the 20th of April he
defeated the Austrian left at Abensberg, and on the 22d he routed
the Austrian right under the Archduke in person at Eckmühl. In the
five days’ fighting, which included these battles, the Austrians lost
7000 men in killed and wounded, and 23,000 prisoners. In the result it
was the Austrians, not the French, who were cut in two, and Napoleon
rapidly followed the Austrian left to Vienna. The capital surrendered
on the 12th of May, and Napoleon then resolved to cross the Danube and
attack the main body of the Austrian army under the Archduke Charles.
He attempted to pass the river at the point where is situated midway
the island of Lobau. When the greater part of his army had reached the
island he pushed across to the other bank, and on the 21st and 22nd of
May stormed the villages of Aspern and Essling. But on the evening of
the second fight he found it necessary to withdraw into the island of
Lobau, for his bridges of boats which connected the island with the
right bank of the river had been swept away, and his ammunition had
fallen short. The Tyrolese, too, had risen under Hofer, and Napoleon’s
position was most critical. Nevertheless he determined not to retreat;
the island of Lobau became an entrenched camp; stronger bridges were
thrown from it to the right bank of the Danube; and reinforcements were
summoned from different quarters.

[Sidenote: Battle of Wagram. 6th July 1809.]

The most important of these reinforcements were supplied by the French
Army of Italy, which reached Napoleon in the island of Lobau on the
2nd of July. This army was commanded by the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène
de Beauharnais, whose military adviser and principal subordinate was
General Macdonald. The Viceroy had, before Macdonald reached him, been
checked at Sacilio by the Archduke John, but after Macdonald’s arrival
he pushed on rapidly. A decisive victory, which prevented the Archduke
John from pursuing, was won over the Hungarians at Raab on the 14th of
June, after which Eugène de Beauharnais was enabled safely to join the
Emperor in the island of Lobau. With his army thus increased, Napoleon
crossed to the left bank of the Danube on the morning of the 5th of
July, at the head of 180,000 men, many of whom were Westphalians,
Bavarians, and Italians. On the following day he completely defeated
the Archduke Charles at the battle of Wagram, at which the Austrians
lost more than 30,000 men. Though defeated, the Austrian army was not
disgraced, and Napoleon himself said, when blamed for not following
up his victory, ‘If I had had my veterans of Austerlitz I should have
carried out a manœuvre which, with my present troops, I dare not
execute.’ Had the Archduke John come up in time and placed himself
under his brother’s command, the battle might have had a different
result, and as it was, the Austrian Emperor need not have considered
himself forced to conclude peace.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Vienna. 14th October 1809.]

The Emperor Francis, however, did not dare to risk the further event
of war, and on the 14th of October 1809 he signed the Treaty of
Vienna. By this treaty Austria ceded Trieste, Carniola, Istria, and
a large part of Croatia to Napoleon, who added them to Dalmatia,
which he had acquired at the Treaty of Pressburg, and made out of
them the Government of the Illyrian Provinces. Francis also abandoned
the Tyrolese, and ceded the greater part of Salzburg to the King of
Bavaria, whose army, along with the Saxon contingent under Bernadotte,
had played a great part in winning the victory of Wagram. He had to
give up the whole of Western Galicia; the greater part of this province
was added to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but certain districts were
ceded to the Emperor Alexander, who in reply to the demands of Napoleon
had despatched an army to act in that quarter against the Austrians.
This action had still further incensed the Emperor of Austria against
the Emperor of Russia, while it did not satisfy Napoleon, who
complained that the Russians had not acted with sufficient vigour,
and had been waiting to hear the result of the main campaign in
the neighbourhood of Vienna. In Austria itself the most important
result of the war was the retirement of Count Philip Stadion, who was
succeeded as Chancellor of State by Count Metternich.

[Sidenote: The Peninsular War. 1809.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Talavera. 28th July 1809.]

During the campaign of Wagram the French armies left in Spain had been
continuing their operations. Before the actual outbreak of war with
Austria, Saragossa had been captured on the 21st of February 1809,
after an obstinate siege, which proved to the French the mettle of
their new opponents. The most important operations had been carried
out in three quarters of the Peninsula. In Arragon and Catalonia,
General Gouvion-Saint-Cyr acted with considerable skill in a campaign
of which the main feature was the reduction of small fortresses, and
his successor, General Suchet, steadily pursued the same policy. Both
of these generals invariably defeated any Spanish army which met them
in the field. From Madrid King Joseph had acted in two different
directions. Marshal Moncey took Valencia; Marshal Victor defeated the
Spanish army of the South, which was under the command of Cuesta, at
Medellin; and General Sebastiani approached the frontiers of Andalusia.
But in Portugal the French had again to meet the English, who had in
the previous year defeated them at Vimeiro, and drawn them away to
Corunna. After the departure of Sir John Moore’s army, Marshal Soult
had invaded Portugal from the north and occupied Oporto. There is no
doubt that if he had acted boldly he might have captured Lisbon, which
was only guarded by a feeble division under Sir John Cradock. But Soult
wasted his time in intriguing, it is said, for the throne of Portugal,
until the English Ministry had time to reinforce Cradock, and to
send Sir Arthur Wellesley to command the army in Portugal. Wellesley
speedily dislodged Soult from Oporto, and drove his army in disorder
back into Galicia. He then, following the example of Moore, invaded
Spain, in the expectation of saving Andalusia. He met the French
army in Spain, under the command of Marshal Victor, at Talavera. He
repulsed the French attack on his position on the 28th of July, and
had he been efficiently assisted by the Spaniards under Cuesta he might
have won a great victory. As it was, his success prevented the French
from invading Portugal, but it was not sufficiently decisive to save
Andalusia. The French army was reorganised; the Spaniards were routed
at the battle of Ocana, on the 12th of November, and the whole of the
fertile province of Andalusia, with the exception of Gibraltar and
Cadiz, fell into the hands of the French.

[Sidenote: Expedition to Walcheren. 1809.]

Unfortunately the English Ministers failed to understand immediately
the greatness of the opportunity given to them by Napoleon’s behaviour
in the Peninsula, and instead of concentrating all their military
strength for the support of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was made Viscount
Wellington for his victory of Talavera, they despatched one of the
finest armies that ever left England on the Walcheren Expedition. They
had promised to assist the Emperor of Austria by making a diversion in
the north of Europe. The object of this diversion was Antwerp, on which
city Napoleon was spending vast sums of money in the hope of making it
the commercial rival of London. This expedition, which was placed under
the command of the Earl of Chatham, the elder brother of the younger
Pitt, never reached Antwerp. It was landed in the island of Walcheren,
and took Flushing in August 1809. It met no French army worthy of
the name, but was destroyed as a fighting machine by the pestilences
and fevers of the unhealthy island in which it was quartered. The
expedition took place too late to be of any service to Austria, for the
English army did not disembark until a month after the battle of Wagram
had been fought, and in the want of energy with which it was conducted,
it may almost be classed with the disastrous expedition to Bergen in
1799. At sea, however, the English fleet maintained its pre-eminence.
In this year Guadeloupe, Martinique, and the Mauritius were conquered,
and an attempt was made to burn the French fleet in the Basque Roads by
Lord Cochrane, which might have been completely successful if he had
not been thwarted by the admiral in command, Lord Gambier.

[Sidenote: Napoleon and the Pope.]

It has been said that one of the measures by which Napoleon secured his
ascendency over the minds of the French people was the conclusion of
the Concordat by which the schism which had divided the French Church
was closed. He had at the commencement of his tenure of power treated
the new Pope, Pius VII., with much respect, and the Pope had in return
made the Emperor’s uncle, Fesch, a Cardinal, and had come to Paris to
crown him Emperor. But troubles soon arose between Napoleon and Pius
VII. The Emperor proclaimed himself the successor of Charlemagne, and
wished to restrict the Pope entirely to spiritual affairs. The terms
of the Concordat were not thoroughly carried out. The Pope would not
give Napoleon the supreme authority over the French bishops, which
he desired, and His Holiness looked on the transformation of the
priesthood in France from an independent body into salaried officials
with extreme disfavour. On the Pope’s return to Rome in 1805, he
requested that the French troops should evacuate the whole of the
former States of the Church. Napoleon did not comply with this request,
and not satisfied with ordaining the cession of the Legations of
Bologna and Ferrara to the Kingdom of Italy, he occupied Ancona, and
confiscated the principalities of Ponte Corvo and Benevento, which
he bestowed on Bernadotte and Talleyrand. The declaration of the
Continental Blockade increased the dissatisfaction of the Pope, who
declined to obey it, as he also did a further order in 1806 to expel
from Rome all English, Russian, Swedish, and Sardinian subjects. After
some months of perpetual bickering Napoleon directed General Miollis
to occupy Rome on the 2nd of February 1808. Pius VII., in the cause
of peace, dismissed Cardinal Consalvi, his Secretary of State, but he
could not satisfy the demands of the Emperor, and on the 17th of May
1809 the States of the Church in Italy were declared united to the
French Empire, and Rome was officially decreed to be the Second City of
that Empire. Exasperated by this open insult, Pius VII. excommunicated
the French Emperor. Napoleon, who was at that time in his camp in the
island of Lobau, ordered that the Pope should be removed from Rome.
He was arrested by General Radet on the 6th of July, the day of the
victory of Wagram, and forcibly removed to Savona, near Genoa, where
he was kept as a State prisoner. Pius VII. in his exile consistently
protested against the usurpations of Napoleon, and refused from this
time to give canonical institution to the bishops nominated by the
Emperor. In 1811 Napoleon attempted to put ecclesiastical affairs in
France on a new footing, and summoned a national council or synod of
bishops to meet at Paris. But the Pope refused to negotiate with the
synod, and he was accordingly removed to Fontainebleau in 1812. While
there Napoleon pretended that His Holiness agreed to a new and revised
Concordat which was promulgated as a law on the 13th of February
1813. Pius VII. always denied that he had given his consent to the
new arrangement, which would have deprived him of his most valued
prerogatives, and stated that he had always regarded himself as a
prisoner since his removal from Rome. By his conduct towards the Pope
Napoleon committed a great mistake. He lost the support of the faithful
body of Catholics in France whom he had conciliated in 1801, and he
gave a pretext for his enemies to declare him the enemy of religion.
The Caesarism which had infected his imagination after his great
victories in 1806 and 1807 appeared in his behaviour towards Pius VII.
as well as in his intervention with the affairs of Spain.

[Sidenote: The Revolution in Sweden. 1809.]

The year 1809, which witnessed the campaign of Wagram and the overthrow
of the Pope, was also signalised by a revolution in Sweden, which was
followed by very important results. It has been said that Gustavus
IV. remained faithful to the coalition against Napoleon even after
the Peace of Tilsit. By that peace it was arranged that the Emperor
of Russia should annex Finland. This was carried out in 1808, after a
very weak opposition on the part of the Swedes, and in the same year
Swedish Pomerania was occupied by the French. In spite of these losses
the King of Sweden declared war against Denmark, and then quarrelled
with the general of the English army sent to his assistance. For this
conduct, which seemed conclusive as to the loss of sanity by the King,
the Swedes resolved to dethrone him. At the commencement of 1809 the
Baron Adlersparre, the commander-in-chief of the army sent to invade
Norway, concluded a secret armistice with the Danes, and marched on
Stockholm. On the 13th of March 1809 the King was arrested, and on
the 29th he was forced to sign a deed of abdication. This act was
ratified by the States of Sweden on the 10th of May, and the King’s
uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, was elected King as Charles XIII. A
new constitution of an aristocratic type, restoring the power of the
Swedish nobles which had been severely curtailed by Gustavus III.,
was promulgated, and on the 18th of January 1810 the States elected
as heir to the throne, since the new King had no sons, the Prince
Christian of Holstein-Augustenberg. This young prince died in May
of the same year, and the question then arose as to his successor.
There was no possible prince of the reigning family, and the king was
old and in bad health. It happened that in 1806 the Swedish officers
employed in Hanover had made the acquaintance of Marshal Bernadotte,
who commanded in that quarter, and it was suggested that he should be
elected as Prince Royal. This choice was dictated by a hope that it
would please the French Emperor, for Bernadotte was not only one of
his most distinguished marshals, but was connected with his family,
for both he and Joseph Bonaparte had married daughters of Monsieur
Clary, a tradesman of Marseilles. Bernadotte received the consent of
Napoleon; on the 19th of October 1810 he abjured Catholicism; and on
the 5th of November he was elected Prince Royal by the Swedish Diet. He
was at once charged with the direction of foreign affairs and with the
reorganisation of the Swedish army, and he played an important part in
the overthrow of the French Emperor.

[Sidenote: Turkey.]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Bucharest. 28th May 1812.]

With Sweden and Poland, Turkey had for a long time been considered
as the third barrier against the advance of Russia. Bonaparte, like
earlier French statesmen, had held this view, but after the Peace
of Tilsit he expressed himself as ready and willing to abandon all
three countries to the encroachments of Russia. The loss of Finland
and Pomerania had reduced Sweden to a minor state; the Grand Duchy
of Warsaw was a poor substitute for the Kingdom of Poland, and it is
now necessary to observe the effects upon Turkey of her abandonment
by France. The Sultan, Selim III., had been thrown into a close
alliance with England by Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt when he was
but a general of the French Republic, and still more by his daring
march into Syria. When he became First Consul, Napoleon endeavoured to
destroy the unfavourable opinion entertained of him at Constantinople,
and sent thither as his ambassador one of the ablest of the French
diplomatists, General Sebastiani, who managed to ingratiate himself
with the Porte. The English monopoly of the commerce of the Levant
was displeasing to the Porte, and Pitt failed to induce the Sultan to
enter into the coalition against France in 1805. In 1807 an English
fleet under Sir John Duckworth was sent to compel the Sultan to give
up his friendship with the French. After forcing the passage of the
Dardanelles, it had to retire without achieving its object, and
suffered great loss while sailing down the Straits. This behaviour of
England threw the Turks entirely on the side of France. French officers
were employed to reorganise the Turkish army, and a regular militia was
established. Sultan Selim was a monarch in advance of his times, and
endeavoured to introduce certain reforms, but he roused against him
both the Muhammadan Ulemas and the Janissaries. The former disliked his
civil reforms, the latter his establishment of the militia. Selim was
dethroned, and replaced by Mustapha IV. on the 21st of July 1807. But
the reign of Mustapha was but of short duration. The Pasha of Rustchuk
marched to Constantinople, and when he found that the Sultan Selim
had been assassinated, he dethroned Mustapha and placed his nephew,
Mahmoud II., on the throne of Turkey. The first event of the new reign
was a violent battle between the Janissaries and the freshly organised
militia in the streets of Constantinople, after which Mahmoud executed
his own brother and most of his relations, and established himself
firmly on the throne. The new Sultan, who was a man of extraordinary
vigour, was at once attacked by the Russians, as had been arranged by
the Treaty of Tilsit. Napoleon had pointed out to Alexander that he
could easily annex the Danubian principalities, and he hoped that the
Turks would afford enough occupation to the Russian army to prevent
it from interfering with his projects in Europe. The Russian attack
on Turkey was followed by a treaty of peace between England and the
Porte, in spite of the efforts of the French diplomatists; but the
English, as usual, considered it enough to send subsidies in money
without supplying troops. In 1809 the Turks were defeated at Braila and
Silistria, and by the close of 1810 the Russian army under the command
of Prince Bagration occupied the whole of Wallachia, Moldavia, and
Bessarabia. In 1811 the Russian general Kutuzov crossed the Danube,
and occupied both Silistria and Shumla, and the way was opened to
Constantinople. But, fortunately for the existence of the Turkish
power, Napoleon in 1812 was preparing to invade Russia; the efforts of
the French diplomatists to induce the Sultan Mahmoud to continue the
war were fruitless; the Porte said that it had too often proved the
worthlessness of the French offers of help, and on the 28th of May 1812
a treaty of peace was signed between Russia and Turkey at Bucharest. By
this treaty the Turks ceded part of Bessarabia and Moldavia to Russia,
and acknowledged the Principality of Servia, but its chief importance
in European history is that it relieved the Emperor Alexander from an
important enemy at a moment of crisis, and allowed him to turn all his
strength against the French invaders.

[Sidenote: The Greatest Extension of Napoleon’s Empire. 1809–1812.]

The period from 1809 to 1812, that is, from the Peace of Vienna to
the invasion of Russia, witnessed the greatest extension of the
dominions of Napoleon. But this enormous increase of territory did not
strengthen France; new difficulties appeared with each fresh advance;
and although in 1811 the boundaries of the French power were far more
distended than they were in 1808, the Empire was not so strong. By his
annexations Napoleon abandoned the principle which he had formerly
set before himself. He had declared that the natural boundaries of
France were the Rhine and the Alps, and every annexation beyond those
natural limits was a distinct act of defiance to Europe. From 1806
to 1808 his policy was to surround France with a belt of subject
kingdoms; by his annexations from 1809 to 1812 his borders touched
those of the great Continental powers. In the north Napoleon accepted
the abdication of his brother Louis, who had protested against the
measures taken for maintaining the Continental Blockade, and on the
9th of July 1810 he declared Holland an integral part of the Empire.
Holland was divided into eight departments, and lost its existence as
an independent nation. Then in pursuance of the Continental Blockade,
Napoleon, on the 13th of December 1810, annexed the districts in North
Germany from the borders of Holland to the mouth of the Weser. By
this step he united the whole coast-line from Friesland to Denmark,
and hoped to close entirely the English trade with North Germany.
The districts annexed were the Duchy of Oldenburg, the sea-coast of
Hanover, the territories of the Princes of Salm and Aremberg, and
the free cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. These districts were
divided into four departments, the Ems-Supérieur, the Lippe, the
Bouches-du-Weser, and the Bouches-de-l’Elbe, with their capitals at
Osnabrück, Münster, Bremen, and Hamburg. These annexations showed
what persistent opposition Napoleon met in Germany to the Continental
Blockade, when his own brother Louis could not maintain it in Holland,
and he was afraid to trust the coast-line of Westphalia to his
brother Jerome. Turning further south, Napoleon in 1810 annexed the
Valais, which he had declared independent of Switzerland, under the
name of the Department of the Simplon. In Italy the most flagrant
breach of the former French system was committed. When the kingdom
of Italy was formed in 1805, the Emperor had kept Piedmont under his
own control in order to command both sides of the Alps, and in 1810
he preferred to amalgamate the Ligurian Republic, Parma, the Kingdom
of Etruria, and the States of the Church with his directly-governed
departments in Piedmont, rather than to unite them to the Kingdom of
Italy. These districts were divided into nine departments, and it is
curious to notice such cities as Rome, Genoa, Parma, Florence, Siena,
and Leghorn as capitals of French departments. In all, the French
Empire at its greatest consisted of one hundred and thirty departments
directly administered from Paris, excluding from consideration the
Illyrian provinces and the Ionian Islands, which were not treated as
departments. Mention has already been made of the subject kingdoms,
and it is only to be noted here that Murat, the famous cavalry general
and brother-in-law of Napoleon, was made King of Naples when Joseph
Bonaparte was promoted to the throne of Spain, and that the infant
son of Louis Bonaparte, the former King of Holland, received Murat’s
Grand Duchy of Berg. Napoleon also made his favourite sister, Elisa,
Grand Duchess of Tuscany and Princess of Lucca and Piombino; his second
sister, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla; and his Chief of the Staff and
most trusted subordinate, Marshal Berthier, independent Prince of
Neufchâtel.

[Sidenote: Internal Organisation of the Empire.]

The administration of this vast empire was purely bureaucratic.
Napoleon endeavoured to establish a hierarchy of civil officials, who
should be as completely under his direct control as the officers of
his army. He ruled the Empire like a general. Implicit obedience to
orders was the only means to promotion in his civil, as well as in his
military, organisation. He delighted in insisting on this comparison.
The Legion of Honour was not a military order, but was conferred with
equal freedom on civil officials, and in all matters the Emperor’s
will could be consulted and was supreme. No subjects were too minute
for his supervision. He reorganised the ancient theatrical company of
the Comédie Française with the same attention to detail as a matter
of State administration. The development of a bureaucracy dependent
on absolutism was in curious contrast to the Constitution of 1791,
and the theories which had prevailed at the beginning of the French
Revolution. Freedom of petition, freedom of the press, individual
liberty, representative institutions, and all the liberties won by the
French people were entirely abolished. The censorship of the press was
re-established, and carried out with more rigour than it had been even
under the Bourbon monarchy. All manuscripts had to be revised before
being sent to the printer, and perfectly innocent allusions, which
might be interpreted into applying condemnation of the existing order
of things, brought upon their authors immediate imprisonment, and the
destruction of their books. Individual liberty ceased to exist; for the
Emperor exiled and imprisoned at his will. The secret police, which
had been organised by Fouché, exercised a minute inquisition into the
most private affairs, and a crowd of spies kept the Emperor informed
of every current of opinion in Paris and throughout the Empire. The
arbitrariness of his government was greatly due to his sensitiveness to
public opinion, and it is narrated that during his enforced residence
in the island of Lobau he was far more exercised in mind by his spies’
reports of the conversations on the subject in the Faubourg St. Germain
than by the movements of the Austrians. Representative institutions
had been practically superseded by the Constitution of the Year VIII.,
but the last vestige of a power which could criticise the Emperor’s
will, the Tribunate, was suppressed in 1808. The Senate became merely a
dignified body to congratulate the Emperor on his victories, and the
Legislative Body registered, without murmuring, all his decrees. It
is a curious fact that, in 1811, Napoleon imitated the most arbitrary
measure of the Committee of Public Safety, and, when the price of corn
rose, he fixed a maximum price for its sale in Paris.

[Sidenote: The Hereditary Principle.]

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Aristocracy.]

Next to his own absolutism Napoleon believed in the principle of
heredity. He showed this primarily in the treatment of his own family.
He not only brought his mother to Paris, and under the title of Madame
Mère endowed her with a large income, but bestowed on his brothers
and sisters, in spite of the marked incapacity of many of them, the
most important posts. The kingdoms given to Joseph, Louis, and Jerome
Bonaparte were accompanied by the intimation that they were to rule
subject to his will, and he exercised an autocratic power over all the
members of his family. For instance, he insisted that Jerome should
divorce his wife, an American lady named Patterson, because his own
consent had not been obtained, and forced him to marry a Würtemberg
princess. His own lack of children greatly grieved him, and he made
various arrangements as to his successor. At one time it was thought
he would nominate his step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais; at another he
selected an infant son of his brother Louis to be his heir, and had him
baptized by the Pope just after his own coronation in 1805; and when
the infant died, he issued a decree, arranging the succession among
his brothers and their children in order of seniority. He created his
brothers, sisters, and step-children Princes of the Empire, and gave
them honorary seats in the Senate and Council of State, and he insisted
upon his wife Josephine surrounding herself with all the pomp of a
monarchical Court. The desire of creating a Court which should outshine
that of the Bourbons caused Napoleon to bid high for the support of
the ancient noble families of France. By bestowing large incomes,
rapid promotion, and repeated favours he was able to get men and women
bearing the oldest names in France to accept office as chamberlains
and lords and ladies-in-waiting, while many scions of former sovereign
families in Germany and the Netherlands did not hesitate to request
admission to such Court offices. But he did not trust solely to the old
nobility to form the splendour of his Court; he always suspected that
they were sneering at him, and endeavoured to counterbalance them by
creating a new nobility. This new nobility was formed entirely from the
men who did him good service, whether in military or civil departments.
By the side of his marshals, most of whom he created dukes, he ranked
his chief diplomatists and ministers, and the example was followed into
inferior ranks. Good service as the _préfet_ of a department led to a
barony as certainly as gallant service in the field at the head of a
regiment, and former members of the Convention, who, as Deputies on
Mission, had exerted unlimited authority, were content to accept the
title of Chevalier of the Empire, the lowest in his new peerage. The
peerage of the Empire was strictly hereditary, though in many instances
the Emperor assumed the right exercised by former kings of granting
permission to adopt an heir. But the new peerage was purely ornamental;
it conferred no political power whatever. Napoleon never dreamt of
creating a House of Lords; he only conceived the notion of balancing
the influence of the old aristocracy by the creation of one dependent
entirely on himself. In his desire to maintain the dignity of his new
nobles, he granted many of them large incomes and vast estates; his
marshals were encouraged to live in the most extravagant fashion by
the repeated payment of their debts; and the grant of a peerage was in
many cases accompanied by what he called a _dotation_, which supplied
an income sufficient to maintain the dignity. Some of these ‘dotations’
were of princely magnificence. They were largely situated in Italy
and Poland, and were intended to make the new possessors independent
barons, like the famous paladins of Charlemagne. Among the most
important of these grants, after the Principality of Neufchâtel, which
was a semi-independent sovereignty, may be noted the Principalities
of Benevento, Ponte Corvo, Parma, Piacenza, and Gaeta, which were
conferred upon Talleyrand, Bernadotte, Cambacérès, Le Brun, and Gaudin.
By these means Napoleon hoped to keep his subordinates faithful to him,
while their influence on opinion would rival that exercised by the old
nobility.

[Sidenote: Internal Reforms. Law.]

[Sidenote: Finance.]

[Sidenote: Education.]

But while wielding an undisputed absolutism, Napoleon looked on his
position in a spirit similar to that of the benevolent despots of the
eighteenth century. Though he would do nothing by the people, he was
ready to do much for them. In the path of legal reform he followed up
the measure taken by the formation of the Civil Code. He had plenty of
learned jurists to carry out his instructions, and the Civil Code was
succeeded, in 1806, by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in
1808 by the Commercial Code, and finally by the Penal Code. These great
codes form an epoch in the legal history of Europe, and have earned
for Napoleon the title of the modern Justinian, though they were only
carried out by his directions, and based on the principles laid down,
and the work done, by the Constituent Assembly and the Convention.
Their great advantage was their simplicity and universality, which
checked the tedious delays inherent in all systems of common or
uncodified law. In jurisdiction Napoleon also followed the example of
the statesmen of the Revolution. He encouraged rapidity in procedure
and in the execution of judgments, and he greatly extended the powers
of the commercial tribunals in which practical men of business had
a voice. In financial matters, as in his legal reforms, Napoleon’s
great aim was to attain simplicity, and he reduced the loss in the
passage of taxes from the taxpayer to the Treasury to a minimum. His
creation of the Bank of France has been mentioned, and by its side
he established the Caisse d’Amortissement, which consisted of the
pecuniary guarantees of all the collectors of the taxes merged into one
fund. These guarantees formed an important sum of money for immediate
use as well as a valuable security. Napoleon further managed to pay off
that portion of the debt left to him by the Republic, which represented
the sums due for the suppression of the old courts of judicature,
etc. With regard to the ordinary debt, he preserved Cambon’s great
creation of the Grand Livre, which enabled every creditor to become
a fund-holder, while the Emperor knew the exact extent of the public
debt. The Emperor’s first steps towards the formation of a national
system of education have been described, but it was not until after
the campaign of Wagram that the system was completed. In 1806 he had
organised the Imperial University, but it did not take its final form
until 1811. This university was not a university in the English sense.
It consisted of the chief professors and teachers, and was intended
to include all the professors and teachers throughout France. It was
placed under the superintendence of a Grand Master, a celebrated man
of letters, Fontanes, and its duty was to superintend the whole course
of higher education. In the Emperor’s own words, he wished to create
a teaching profession organised like the judicial or the military
profession, of which all the professors scattered throughout the
country might feel themselves an integral part. In 1808 he granted the
university an income of 400,000 livres, in addition to the fees, etc.,
and declared in favour of the irremovability of its members. To recruit
this new teaching profession, Napoleon established the Normal School of
Paris for the instruction of those who desired to become professors or
teachers.

[Sidenote: Extension of the system to Germany.]

These great reforms in law, in finance, and in education outlasted
Napoleon’s reconstitution of Europe. Their effect spread far beyond the
actual limits of France. As a direct result of the French Revolution
serfdom disappeared in Switzerland, in Belgium, and in Northern Italy.
Napoleon carried on the work further to the east. In the Kingdom of
Westphalia, and in all the states of Germany which he created or
enlarged, serfdom was entirely abolished. The feudal system was
suppressed wherever the influence of the French extended. Maximilian
Joseph, King of Bavaria, and his minister, Montgelas, carried out the
principles of the French Revolution by abolishing the privileges of
the nobility and the clergy. In every direction the French codes were
either adopted or imitated; the course of justice was made simple and
cheap; education was organised; and the economical rules of the French
administration introduced. In more distant countries the same reforms
were carried out. By the constitution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
the Polish serfs, perhaps the most miserable of all serfs, were freed
from their bondage, and absolute equality before the law decreed. In
Naples Joseph Bonaparte and Murat, and in Spain Joseph Bonaparte by
himself, carried out the same great reforms; and though the reaction
after 1815 tended to replace matters on their former footing, it proved
to be impossible to restore the old evils in their entirety. Not
less admirable was Napoleon’s vindication of the great principle of
religious toleration. In Catholic states such as Bavaria Protestants
received the priceless boon of religious liberty; in Protestant states
like Saxony it was the Catholics who profited by the broad-mindedness
of the French Emperor; and in every country the Jews were relieved
from the degrading position in which they had been kept. In military
organisation the reforms which had made the French army master of the
world were introduced by Napoleon. With the disappearance of the petty
German states disappeared also the feudal armies. Conscription may,
indeed, appear a heavy burden on a state, but in Germany, at any rate,
it created for the first time national armies to take the place of the
ill-disciplined mercenaries who had hitherto been hired by the petty
princes.

[Sidenote: The Organisation of Prussia.]

The most curious feature in the creation of a new Germany, which was
the result of Napoleon’s reforms as much as of his victories, was
the formation of new Prussia. In Germany proper, that is, in Germany
between the Rhine and the Elbe, reforms were introduced under French
supervision, if not always by French agents. In Prussia the reforms
came on the initiative of a great minister. The speedy overthrow of
the famed Prussian army in the campaign of Jena convinced Prussian
statesmen of the necessity for sweeping changes. By the Treaty of
Tilsit Prussia was shorn of all the acquisitions in Central Germany
which she had received as the price of her consistent neutrality, and
was thrust behind the Elbe. On the other side she lost her Polish
provinces. Even the small Prussia thus left was occupied by French
troops, and was forced to pay a war contribution of a hundred and forty
millions as well as to maintain an army of 42,000 men for the service
of Napoleon. It would seem that Prussia was to be driven back into the
position of a second-rate state, but at this juncture Frederick William
III. summoned to his ministry two remarkable men—the Freiherr vom
Stein, a Knight of the Holy Roman Empire and a native of Nassau, and
Scharnhorst, a Hanoverian officer. Neither of these men were Prussians,
but they were both enthusiastic Germans. They believed that Prussia
would yet form the key-stone on which German emancipation from the
power of Napoleon could be reared. They understood that Prussia must
be entirely reconstituted, and that an old-fashioned Prussia could
neither combat Napoleon nor lead the new Germany which he had created.
Stein, therefore, as Minister of the Interior, adapted the reforms
of the French Revolution and of Napoleon to Prussia. He established
equality before the law by the abolition of serfdom, he suppressed the
territorial privileges of the nobility, and he gave permission to the
bourgeois and the peasants to purchase land. He encouraged municipal
life by introducing a system of election to municipal offices, and,
as far as he could, abolished the social privileges of the nobility.
Scharnhorst, as War Minister, reorganised the Prussian army on the
French model. He changed it from an entity independent of the people
into a national army. Since Prussia was only permitted to maintain an
army of 42,000 men, he arranged that as many as possible should obtain
a military training by passing through the ranks for a short period. He
went further than Napoleon. He did not adopt a system of conscription
by which a portion of the population designed by lot should enter
the ranks, but insisted that every citizen was bound to military
service. Between 1807 and 1810, and the system was continued after his
retirement until 1813, Scharnhorst passed a large proportion of the
youth of Prussia through the ranks of the army, and thus formed—what
Napoleon so greatly needed at the crisis of his career—an effective
reserve. It is interesting to observe that it was in the country most
maltreated by Napoleon that the French reforms were most successfully
initiated. Napoleon perceived the danger, and in 1808 he insisted on
the dismissal of Stein, and in 1810 on that of Scharnhorst.

[Sidenote: The revival of German national feeling.]

It is a curious sequel to the benefits conferred upon Germany by
Napoleon directly and by the influence of French principles that their
result was to rouse in Germany, for the first time for many centuries,
a truly national feeling. This was caused chiefly by the suppression of
the Holy Roman Empire, and its being replaced by states large enough
to arouse national patriotism; but it was partly due also to a sense
of national degradation inspired by the presence of French armies, and
to the fact that the benefits conferred were the gift of a foreign
sovereign and not the result of national progress. A universal feeling
of opposition to the French grew up in the hearts of the German people.
The individualist doctrines, which found favour in the eighteenth
century and reached their highest expression in philosophers and poets,
such as Herder and Goethe, gave way to a new national sentiment,
inspired by a new school of poets and political thinkers represented
by Körner and Arndt, by Jahn and Friedrich von Gentz. The new spirit
was mainly developed among the German youth. Secret societies and
clubs were formed to obtain by force the freedom of Germany from the
French, and the dissatisfied souls forgot the benefits they had
received individually in their resentment at their being granted by
France. Austria under the administration of Count Philip Stadion, who
was largely inspired by Gentz, endeavoured, in 1809, to take advantage
of the revival of German national feeling. But Austria was universally
considered as a foreign power whose military prowess was derived from
Hungary, and the Emperor Francis in taking the new title of Emperor of
Austria gave countenance to this idea. The House of Hapsburg was not
regarded as thoroughly German; it was looked on as a foreign dynasty,
whose dominions were mainly inhabited by non-German races; its loyalty
to the Roman Catholic religion caused it to be suspected by the
Protestants; it was blamed for the disorganisation of past centuries;
and contemned for its repeated defeats by the French and its selfish
policy at the time of the treaties of Campo-Formio and Lunéville.

Prussia, on the other hand, though, like Austria, it was not a truly
German state, seemed fitted by history and tradition to embody the
idea of German nationality. Even after the defeat of Jena, Frederick
the Great and his victory over the French at Rossbach were recalled as
distinctively German glories, and the eyes of patriotic Germans were
turned to the diminished power of Prussia as the natural lever for
the creation of a free Germany. The administrative system of Prussia
and its strongly concentrated political theory of the essential unity
of the State, as opposed to the new French idea of the omnipotence
of the people, which was condemned in German eyes as having led to
the absolutism of an adventurer, had always exercised a peculiar
fascination over the best intellects of Germany. It was by means of
statesmen of foreign birth that Prussia was reorganised and prepared
to cope successfully with the power of Napoleon. Stein and Hardenberg,
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, York and Lombard were none of them native
Prussians; yet they were all in turn attracted into the Prussian
service, and were instrumental in bringing about her resurrection as
a German power. The war of 1809 first showed Napoleon that he was
soon to have a national feeling to deal with in Germany as well as in
Spain. While Napoleon was in the neighbourhood of Vienna a Prussian
lieutenant of the name of Katt attempted to seize Magdeburg; a Prussian
major named Schill pillaged the arsenal and treasury of the Duke of
Anhalt, who had often expressed his outspoken admiration for the
French Emperor, and invaded Saxony; and the fourth son of the Duke of
Brunswick, the heir to the duchy which had been absorbed in the kingdom
of Westphalia, raised his Black Legion, which he termed the Army of
Vengeance, and carried on a partisan war. Even the person of Napoleon
was not safe in Germany. A lad named Staps was shot for imagining an
attack on his life at Schönbrunn in 1809, and many other conspiracies
were discovered by the French police. Napoleon despised this ebullition
of popular feeling in Germany, just as he did in Spain, and the
measures which he took against it, such as arbitrary arrests, and the
shooting of the bookseller Palm, only exasperated the new national
patriotism.

[Sidenote: Marriage of Napoleon with Marie Louise, 2nd April 1810.]

The Emperor, as has been said, was a great believer in the hereditary
idea, and his not having children to succeed him was more than a
personal, it was a political subject of grief to him. The campaign
of Wagram had raised him to the height of his power, and he wished
to establish his dynasty on a firm foundation. It was therefore for
personal, for political, and for European motives, that he resolved
on his return from Vienna in 1809 to divorce his wife, the Empress
Josephine. It was from no dislike for his wife, but from a stern
conviction of political necessity that he took this step. He insisted,
that Josephine should preserve her title of Empress, he granted her
Malmaison as her palace, with a large income, and he continued his
favours to his step-children, Eugène de Beauharnais, and Hortense, the
wife of his brother Louis Bonaparte. On the 15th of December 1809 the
divorce was pronounced on the ground that the religious marriage,
which had taken place on the day before his coronation as Emperor, was
not valid because of the absence of witnesses. The Emperor’s first
intention was to wed a Russian grand duchess. He was still enamoured
of his idea of dividing the world with the Emperor Alexander, and
considered that a relationship with that monarch would best ensure
his power. But the Emperor Alexander was beginning to throw off his
infatuation for Napoleon. He now perceived, that in the alliance he had
made, he gave more than he got, and various causes of discontent were
sedulously fomented by his Court and his family. It was further the
custom of the Russian Court for the mothers to have the chief choice
in the disposing of their daughters’ hands. Now the Empress-mother
was a princess of the House of Würtemburg, and had imbibed a profound
hatred for the French Emperor. She persuaded her son to throw various
delays in the path of the Emperor’s desires without actually rejecting
his offer. Under these circumstances, Napoleon abruptly changed his
mind, and at the suggestion, it is said, of Prince Schwartzenberg,
the Austrian ambassador at Paris, demanded the hand of an Austrian
archduchess. The Emperor Francis thought it necessary to yield, and
on the 2nd of April 1810, the marriage took place between the French
Emperor and the young Archduchess Marie Louise. The ceremony was
of the utmost magnificence, and a new Court was formed for the new
Empress, which contained many French nobles who had refused to wait
on Josephine. On the 20th of March 1811, a son was born to the French
Emperor who was created in his cradle King of Rome, and this birth was
regarded by Napoleon as finally cementing his power, both in France and
in Europe.

[Sidenote: The Peninsular War, 1810–1812.]

During the period from the Treaty of Vienna in 1809 to the invasion
of Russia in 1812, Napoleon had but one declared enemy. The English
Ministers, despite the overthrow of Austria and Prussia, and the
alliance between France and Russia, persisted in opposing France.
Just as Pitt and Grenville could not believe in the stability of the
various French revolutionary governments, and therefore maintained
the impossibility of concluding permanent peace with France, so their
successors, Wellesley and Castlereagh, also declined to believe in
the stability of Napoleon’s Empire, and argued that no permanent
peace could be made with him. It is just possible, that while Fox
was in office in 1806, a peace might have been concluded, but the
succession of his victories had inspired Napoleon with a belief in his
own invincibility, and he had no idea of negotiating on any basis but
the complete recognition of his reconstitution of Europe. Finding it
impossible to break the naval power of England, he endeavoured to ruin
her commerce by the Continental Blockade, with the result of increasing
England’s prosperity, and turning the people of the Continent against
him.

Two methods of carrying on the war were supported by Castlereagh and
Canning, who were Secretaries of State in the Portland administration
from 1807 to 1809. Canning believed in rousing the national feeling of
invaded states against the universal conqueror, and for this purpose
sent large sums of money to Spain; Castlereagh, on the other hand,
thought that as France could no longer meet England at sea, England
must meet France on the land. This was the theory which lay at the
bottom of the despatch of the first Portuguese and of the Walcheren
Expeditions, and in spite of the failure of the latter, it has since
been recognised as a correct theory. The victory of Wellington at
Talavera, though it had but little actual result on the course of the
war in Spain, kept Portugal free from French invasion during the year
1809. But it did more, it inspired the English governing class with
the belief that they had at last discovered the right way of fighting
Napoleon, and that they had also found a general. Lord Wellesley,
the elder brother of Wellington, who was Foreign Secretary from 1809
to 1812, supported the new system with all his might, and under his
encouragement Wellington slowly formed the Anglo-Portuguese army by
a series of campaigns into a magnificent fighting machine, which,
though smaller in numbers than the Grand Army of France, equalled it in
discipline and military efficiency.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1810.]

Napoleon, after his successes in 1808, despised the Spanish levies
and the English army. He therefore declined to go in person to the
Peninsula, and sent his greatest marshal, Masséna, to drive the English
out of Portugal. A plan of campaign was formed, by which Masséna was to
penetrate Portugal from the north-east, while Soult was to advance from
Andalusia in the south-east. The two marshals were to meet at Lisbon.
Fortunately for Wellington, not only did Soult not agree with Masséna,
but the latter marshal found it impossible to control his subordinates,
Ney, Junot, and Reynier. Masséna nevertheless marched in the summer of
1810, and Wellington had to fall back before him. On September 27th,
Masséna was repulsed in an attack upon the Anglo-Portuguese position at
Busaco, but the English general felt it necessary to retreat further,
to the lines which he had fortified in the neighbourhood of Lisbon,
which are known as the lines of Torres Vedras. As Wellington retired,
the Portuguese devastated their country, and when Masséna came to a
halt in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, he found it most difficult
to maintain himself on account of the scarcity of provisions. Soult
did not come to his help as he had expected, but only advanced as far
as the city of Badajoz, which he captured. Throughout the winter of
1810–11, Masséna remained in front of Wellington, but, in spite of
reinforcements, he was unable to attack the Anglo-Portuguese lines, and
in the spring of 1811, had to retreat into Spain.

[Sidenote: Campaign of 1811.]

Wellington then divided his army; with one portion he followed Masséna,
and laid siege to Almeida, the other he despatched under Marshal
Beresford to form the siege of Badajoz. In the south of Spain, the
only city which held for the Junta was Cadiz, which was defended by
an Anglo-Spanish army. Marshal Victor was in charge of the besieging
force, which was defeated at Barrosa on the 5th of March 1811. In
spite of this diversion, Wellington had to meet fresh advances by the
main armies of Soult and Masséna. On the 5th of May 1811, he repulsed
Masséna at Fuentes de Onor after a hard-fought battle, which Masséna
might have won had he been properly supported by Marshal Bessières. In
the south, Soult was repulsed by Beresford at the battle of Albuera
on May 16th. After having thus once more freed Portugal from French
invasions, Wellington laid siege successively to Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz. Though these border fortresses remained in French hands,
the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese army surprised Napoleon, who
recalled Masséna in disgrace. But in the east of Spain his generals
met with some success. Suchet in 1810 and 1811 reduced Arragon and
Valencia, took many fortresses, and destroyed the Spanish army in
that quarter, under the command of General Blake, at the battle of
Albufera. Throughout central Spain, though no regular Spanish armies
took the field, the French were harassed by the Spanish guerillas.
These patriotic brigands destroyed the morale of the French troops in
Spain and sapped the strength of Napoleon. All the benefits conferred
by Joseph Bonaparte, the abolition of feudalism and of the Inquisition,
religious tolerance and good laws, counted for nothing. The Spaniards
would receive no benefits from a French monarch imposed on them by
Napoleon, and it was in Spain that Napoleon first felt the effect of a
national opposition, which was at a later date in Russia and in Germany
to destroy his power.

[Sidenote: Conclusion.]

The period from the Conference of Erfurt to the invasion of Russia
seemed to mark the height of Napoleon’s power, but during it are to
be perceived the symptoms of the changes which led to his fall. At
Erfurt, Alexander of Russia was still his firm ally. His power was
bounded by subject kingdoms, and divided by them from the great states
of Europe. In France he was still regarded as the restorer of order
and the supporter of religion. By 1812 the situation had changed. The
Emperor Alexander was no longer his admirer and faithful ally. The
vast extension of the Empire had weakened his power, and the French
people were beginning to discover how dearly they were paying in the
sacrifice of their individual liberty for the glory of one man. His
wanton interference in Spain had raised a new force against him in the
shape of the resistance of a nation, and had afforded the English an
opportunity to meet him on land. In Germany, too, a national spirit
was rising, and Prussia, which he had maltreated, was reorganised, and
ready to set itself at the head of Germany. But there was one cause yet
more significant which was developed during this period—the character
of his soldiers was altered. The Grand Army, which had consisted of
veterans trained in the wars of the Revolution, had wasted away at
Austerlitz and Jena, Eylau and Friedland, and in the Spanish campaigns.
At Wagram he felt how different were the men under his command, and was
forced to depend largely on foreign contingents, of whose fidelity he
could not be certain; and he was to find in 1812 that the conscripts of
the Empire, though full of military ardour and desirous of rivalling
the fame of their predecessors, had not the physical strength, the
solidity, and the experience of the veterans who had made him Emperor
of the French and Master of Europe.

CHAPTER X

1812–1814

[Sidenote: Gradual disagreement between Alexander and Napoleon.]

The causes of the disagreement between Napoleon and the Emperor
Alexander dated back to the Treaty of Tilsit. At that time, though
personally full of enthusiasm for the French conqueror, Alexander
looked with suspicion on the formation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
as a possible first step towards the restoration of Poland. Napoleon
pointed out to him that he could obtain compensation in the direction
of Sweden and of Turkey—a suggestion which led to the conquest of
Finland and eventually of Bessarabia. Though Alexander carried out
the projects proposed to him, he continued to resent the creation of
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and still more the maintenance of French
troops in that quarter. At the Congress of Erfurt Napoleon to some
degree allayed the suspicions of his ally, but on his return to Russia
there can be no doubt that Alexander looked upon himself as duped and
badly treated. The war of 1809 widened the breach. Napoleon complained
that the Russian troops promised for his assistance had not acted with
vigour, and Alexander regarded with open discontent the cession of part
of Austrian Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The dethronement of
the Duke of Oldenburg, who had married Alexander’s favourite sister,
the Grand Duchess Catherine, and the absorption of his Duchy into
the French Empire, in 1810, was another and more personal cause of
disagreement. The delay in granting a Russian grand duchess to him
in marriage was looked on by Napoleon as a personal slight, and his
interference in Spain appeared to the Russian Emperor a sign that
Napoleon could maltreat even his most faithful ally. The carrying
out of the Continental Blockade embittered the situation. Napoleon
complained that the Russians did not adhere loyally to the arrangement
for the exclusion of English commerce. Alexander on his side complained
that his country was being ruined by the blockade, while the French
Emperor granted many licences to Frenchmen to trade with England.

To these political reasons must be added the personal characters of
the two emperors. Napoleon, though he had spoken at Tilsit of dividing
Europe between France and Russia, began, as his power increased, to
devise schemes for securing the Empire of Europe for himself and the
exclusion of Russia from any share. Instead of restoring the Empires
of the East and West, Napoleon arrogated to himself the position of
ruler of Europe, and spoke of thrusting Russia back into Asia. In these
views he was encouraged by many of those surrounding him. His marshals,
finding no profits to be got from Spain, looked forward to enriching
themselves in Russia. His statesmen, either from motives of their own
or to please his personal wishes, declared that France could not be
safe until Russia was crushed. Alexander on his side was surrounded by
bitter enemies of Napoleon. His ministers never wearied of emphasizing
the ruin caused to Russia by the Continental Blockade. The King of
Prussia, whom he had made his personal friend, pleaded for the complete
restoration of his dominions. His family, and especially his mother,
regarded Napoleon as the enemy of the human race; English agents were
perpetually inciting the Russians to declare for commercial freedom;
and three of the most accomplished and most able statesmen in Europe
constantly urged him to war with France, namely, Stein, whom Napoleon
had ordered the King of Prussia to dismiss; Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican,
who had known Napoleon in his youth, and who hated him as a personal
enemy; and Nesselrode, a skilled diplomatist and an intimate friend of
Metternich.

[Sidenote: Policy of Castlereagh.]

These various causes, both political and personal, might not then
have led to war had it not been for the direct intervention of the
English by means of the new Prince Royal of Sweden, Bernadotte. Lord
Castlereagh, in January 1812, returned to office. He advocated the
carrying on of the war against Napoleon, not only by reinforcing
Wellington in the Peninsula, but by subsidizing the monarchs of the
Continent. He therefore despatched three diplomatists to the three
chief courts of the Continent, to endeavour to form a fresh coalition
against Napoleon. These were his brother, Sir Charles Stewart,
ambassador to Berlin, Lord Aberdeen to Vienna, and Lord Cathcart to
St. Petersburg. Lord Cathcart was a distinguished military officer,
and strenuously urged Alexander to declare war, and he brought with
him several English officers to assist in reorganizing the Russian
army, of whom the best known is Sir Robert Wilson. But it was rather
through Sweden than directly that Castlereagh influenced the Emperor
Alexander. Bernadotte, on being elected Prince Royal, had applied to
Sweden the Continental Blockade against England, but he soon perceived
how ruinous that policy was to his new country, and inclined to make
some arrangement with England. Being unable to break with Napoleon
by himself, Bernadotte acted as the intermediary between England and
Russia, and in April 1812 signed a secret treaty with Alexander at
Abo, by which Sweden renounced all claims on Finland on condition that
Russia should promise Norway in its stead. Both England and Russia
approved of this scheme. Frederick VI. of Denmark, who had succeeded
his father, Christian VII., in 1808, had, after the capture of the
Danish fleet in 1807, formed a most intimate alliance with Napoleon,
and Alexander at Abo held out to Bernadotte, not only a hope that he
might have the whole of Denmark as a result of successful war against
the French, but even an expectation that he might eventually receive
the throne of France as a reward for his services. Not less important
than the English intervention in Sweden was the effect of English
influence in Turkey; for it was through English mediation that the
Treaty of Bucharest was signed in May 1812, which allowed the Emperor
of Russia to concentrate all his military power against Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Prussia. The Ministry of Hardenberg.]

Between France and Russia there remained, however, Austria, Poland, and
Prussia. Though Napoleon’s direct domain extended to Lübeck along the
coast, he had not ventured to annex Germany proper, which lies between
the Elbe and the Rhine, or to accept the title of German Emperor, in
addition to that of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, as
had been suggested by the Prince Primate, Dalberg. Yet Germany proper,
owing to his creation of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom
of Westphalia, was so thoroughly under his influence that, from a
military point of view, it might be regarded as part of his Empire.
Austria, Poland, and Prussia were, however, more independent, and his
first effort, when he decided to attack Russia, was to secure their
active co-operation. The Emperor Francis, since the campaign of Wagram,
had abandoned the idea of resistance. He feared and disliked the
Russians; Napoleon was his son-in-law, and he did not intend to oppose
his wishes. He therefore promised willingly enough that an Austrian
army should invade Russia to the south of the direct French invasion.
In the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the Poles cared little for their Grand
Duke, the King of Saxony; they looked to Napoleon for the restoration
of their complete independence, and delighted in the thought of
striking a blow at their old foes, the Russians. In Prussia the
position was more complicated. Reduced as the kingdom was, the reforms
of Stein and Scharnhorst had created a national feeling, which could
not as yet be utilised in attacks on the French soldiers who occupied
the Prussian fortresses. Stein himself had been driven from Prussia by
Napoleon’s orders, but a successor, Hardenberg, completed his work. It
is significant that when Hardenberg was reappointed State Chancellor in
1810, he did not undertake the Foreign Office, as he had done in 1806,
but the ministries of the Finance and the Interior. It was Hardenberg
who in 1810 made the nobles subject to taxation, and brought Stein’s
promised Representative Assemblies into partial use; who, on 23rd
January 1811, suppressed the Teutonic Order, and made its possessions
part of the national domain; and who, on 11th September 1811, achieved
the logical result of Stein’s edict abolishing serfdom by granting
the peasants power to become absolute proprietors of two-thirds of
their holdings on surrendering the other third to the lords in full
recognition of all feudal dues and servitudes.

Hardenberg’s most ardent coadjutor was William von Humboldt. As Stein
and Hardenberg had done the work of the French Revolution in Prussia
by abolishing feudalism and securing equality before the law, so
William von Humboldt established a national system of education in
many respects similar to Napoleon’s creation in France, and reformed
the whole department of public instruction. At the head of the system
was founded the University of Berlin. Prussia had deeply felt the loss
of the University of Halle when that city was separated from Prussia
by the Treaty of Tilsit. Königsberg, though made famous by Kant, was
too distant from the centre of the reduced kingdom to fill its place,
and the new national spirit was concentrated in the new University of
Berlin. Learned men came from all parts of Germany. Savigny, Fichte,
Wolf, Buttmann, Boeckh, Schleiermacher, and Niebuhr all enrolled
themselves as professors; and Germany, not merely Prussia, found a
worthy representative in the world of thought.

In the resurrection of Prussia King Frederick William III. merely
acquiesced in the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg. But his former
leaning to neutrality had given place to a desire for revenge on the
French. In July 1810 he lost his patriotic wife, Queen Louise, and
her death only exasperated his feelings. Nevertheless, he refused to
declare himself on the side of Russia in 1812. The Emperor Alexander
announced his policy of allowing the French to invade, and his
intention of thus drawing Napoleon far from his base, and Frederick
William felt that he was not strong enough to openly oppose the French
Emperor. He was even constrained by the occupation of his fortresses
to go further, and, on 24th February 1812, he signed an offensive and
defensive alliance with Napoleon. By this treaty Prussia was not only
to feed the French armies passing through her dominions to invade
Russia, but to send an army of 30,000 men to act with them. Alexander
was not displeased by this behaviour. He knew that Prussia could not
help itself; he felt a sincere friendship for the hapless king; he
understood that beneath the surface, not only Prussia, but all Germany
was boiling with indignation against the French; and in 1812, when war
was at hand, he summoned the inspirer of German national feeling, the
great Prussian minister, Stein, from his exile in Austria to become his
adviser and coadjutor in his German policy.

[Sidenote: The Invasion of Russia. May 1812.]

Without any actual declaration of war, Russia entered into negotiations
with England, and Napoleon assembled a vast army on the banks of the
Vistula. In May 1812 he entered Germany to take the command, and at
Dresden had interviews with the King of Prussia and the Emperor of
Austria. Of the 325,000 men with whom he crossed the river Niémen and
invaded Russia only 155,000 were French; the remainder were foreign
contingents. He detached to his left Marshal Macdonald, with the
Prussian contingent and some Westphalians and Poles, to attack Riga and
advance on St. Petersburg, with the hope of joining Bernadotte and the
Swedes; he was supported on his right by the Austrian subsidiary force,
and with the centre of his army he advanced in person into Lithuania.
That province being occupied, Napoleon crossed the Dnieper, and on the
18th of August he took Smolensk, in spite of the efforts of a Russian
army of 80,000 men to cover the city. On his extreme right the Austrian
army, under Prince Schwartzenberg, was checked by the arrival of the
Russian army, set free by the Peace of Bucharest. The Russian generals,
Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, in the centre, steadily retreated.

[Sidenote: Battle of Borodino. 7th Sept. 1812.]

This military policy soon reduced the efficiency and numbers of the
French army; for it was drawn further from its base into a barren
country, in which it was harassed by peasants and guerillas, and it
was necessary to leave large divisions to protect the communications.
The Emperor Alexander had approved of this policy, and as the Russian
army retired the people abandoned their villages, as the Portuguese had
done during the invasion of Masséna in 1810. But the Russian soldiers
grumbled at this politic retreat, and the Emperor Alexander resolved
to strike one blow for his capital. Barclay de Tolly was replaced by
Kutuzov, and the Russian army suddenly halted on the banks of the
Mosková. On the 7th of September a most terrible battle was fought
there, which is known as the battle of Borodino. The Russians are said
to have lost 50,000 men, including General Bagration, and it is certain
that the French lost more than 30,000. Nevertheless, the French loss
was proportionately the most; for Napoleon was far away from any
reinforcements, whereas the Russians were fighting in their fatherland.
On the 14th of September the French army occupied Moscow. On the
16th, either by accident or on purpose, fire broke out in the Russian
capital. It raged for three days and three nights, and more than
three-fifths of the city was utterly destroyed. The Emperor Alexander
then entered into negotiations with Napoleon, and, whether he intended
it or not, he kept the French Emperor from moving until too late for
his safety. It was not until the 15th of October that Napoleon saw that
negotiating was waste of time, and started from Moscow. The winter was
an early one. Snow fell heavily. When Smolensk was reached, it was
found that all the provisions stored there had been destroyed. The
retreating army, now in a state of disorganisation, was hunted through
the country, not only by the Russian soldiers, but by the peasantry
returning to their homes. Marshal Ney covered the retreat, and won
on this occasion his title of ‘the bravest of the brave.’ Napoleon,
on being informed that a conspiracy against him, headed by General
Malet, had been discovered in Paris, left the retreating army early in
December. After his departure the cold increased. The retreat became
a rout; Murat, who succeeded to the command, could not keep the army
together; and but very few of the 155,000 Frenchmen who had invaded
Russia recrossed the river Niémen.

[Sidenote: Campaign in the Peninsula. 1812.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Salamanca. 22d July 1812.]

While Napoleon was wrecking one army in Russia, Wellington was
defeating another French army in Spain. Marmont, who had succeeded
Masséna, failed to prevent the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in January,
or that of Badajoz in April, and after a long course of intricate
manœuvres, gave Wellington the opportunity to attack and defeat him
at the battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812. The victory was complete.
Joseph Bonaparte evacuated Madrid, and withdrawing all his troops from
Andalusia fell back behind the Ebro. Wellington occupied Madrid on
August 12, and then with his main army advanced on Burgos. Burgos,
however, resisted all his assaults. The Anglo-Portuguese army had to
retire once more into Portugal, and Joseph Bonaparte for the last
time returned to his capital. While this campaign was being fought
Lord William Bentinck, who commanded the English garrison in Sicily,
was requested to send troops to the eastern coast of Spain to effect
a diversion. But the operations were badly combined; Sir John Murray
was driven from before Tarragona; and at a subsequent date Lord
William Bentinck himself failed to make an impression on Suchet’s army
at Alicante. The victory of Salamanca was a proof of the insecure
foundation on which the throne of Joseph Bonaparte rested. Owing to it
alone he had to leave Madrid, and evacuate the whole of southern Spain;
the military policy of the English ministers was justified; and though
Salamanca cannot be compared with the disasters in Russia, it yet had
its effect in showing the increasing weakness of the French military
power.

[Sidenote: Prussia declares war. 16th March 1813.]

The retreat of the French and their passage of the Niémen enabled
Prussia to throw off the mask of alliance with France. The Prussian
contingent, amounting to 18,000 men, had been placed under the command
of Marshal Macdonald, and was occupied in the siege of Riga. Napoleon
had hoped that this detached army upon his left would be joined by
Bernadotte at the head of the Swedes. But Bernadotte, as has been seen,
had forgotten his French nationality in accepting the position of heir
to the Swedish throne. His first idea was to make himself popular in
Sweden by securing the conquest of Norway to take the place of Finland,
and behind it lay the hope of possibly succeeding Napoleon himself.
In his original communications with the Emperor Alexander, he had
demanded the assistance of a Russian army for the conquest of Norway
as the price of his adhesion to the coalition against Napoleon. When
Alexander would not make a definite promise, Bernadotte applied to his
former sovereign in June 1812, and promised to assist in the French
invasion of Russia, if Napoleon would guarantee to him the possession
of Norway. But the French Emperor would make no compact with his former
marshal, and hoped that he would lend his assistance to the occupation
of St. Petersburg in return for vague promises. Bernadotte therefore
remained neutral, and Macdonald, without the expected help from Sweden,
could get no further than Riga. The retreat of the main French army
from Moscow made it necessary for Macdonald likewise to fall back, and
in the course of his retreat the Prussian contingent, under the command
of General York, deserted, and that general signed the Convention of
Tauroggen, on 30th December 1812, by which he abandoned France without
definitely declaring himself upon the side of Russia. Macdonald, with
his Westphalians and Poles, managed to leave Russia in safety, and
to join the remnants of the main army. But the desertion of York was
a symptom of what was to follow. Stein summoned the Estates of East
Prussia at Königsberg; the Prussians rose _en masse_, and the French
army, pursued by the Russian troops and these new enemies, retreated
behind the Vistula.

Frederick William of Prussia at last threw off the mask, and, on the
7th of February 1813, he called out the reserve which had been formed
by the skilful military policy of Scharnhorst, and ordered the Landwehr
and the Landsturm to join the colours; on 27th February he signed the
Treaty of Kalisch with Russia, promising alliance; on 16th March he
declared war against France; and he joined the headquarters of his
friend Alexander, and lived in his company until the termination of the
war. Prussian enthusiasm grew to its height; the reserves fell in from
every city and district, and the broken French army, which was now left
under the command of Eugène de Beauharnais, retreated first behind the
Oder and then behind the Elbe, leaving powerful garrisons in Dantzic,
Stettin, and the chief Prussian fortresses. The Russians of the army
of the right pursued vigorously, and after driving the French from
Berlin, the Russian generals, Chernishev and Tetterborn, took Hamburg.
The resurrection of Prussia and the rapid retreat of the French caused
Bernadotte to declare himself openly on the side of the allies, and he
crossed the Baltic and entered Germany at the head of a Swedish army of
12,000 men. The King of Prussia’s declaration of war with France was
received with enthusiasm. Two separate Prussian armies were formed,
the first under Bülow to act with the Swedes, and the Russian army of
the right, and to defend Berlin, the other under Blücher in Silesia to
co-operate with the second invading army of the left from Russia. The
command in chief of this latter army was, after the death of Kutuzov in
May, conferred on Barclay de Tolly, while Wittgenstein commanded the
Russian contingent.

[Sidenote: First Campaign of 1813.]

[Sidenote: Armistice of Pleswitz. 3d June 1813.]

In the spring of 1813 Napoleon started for Germany to face the new
coalition. His Westphalian, Bavarian, and Saxon allies were still true
to him and increased their contingents. He called to his assistance the
old soldiers who were employed in the garrisons of Holland and Northern
Germany, and he raised a large number of fresh conscripts, who, in
spite of their youth and inexperience, were at once directed upon
Germany. At the head of 250,000 men, eventually increased to 300,000,
he invaded Saxony. He defeated Wittgenstein at Lutzen or Gross Görschen
on the 2d of May, at which battle his friend, Marshal Bessières was
killed, and Scharnhorst was mortally wounded, and reoccupied Saxony. He
defeated the whole of the allied army of Silesia at Bautzen on the 20th
of May, and established his headquarters at Dresden. Meanwhile Vandamme
had recaptured Hamburg, and, after placing it in a state of defence,
joined the Emperor in Saxony. After these vigorous blows both sides
desired a rest, and on the 3d of June the Armistice of Pleswitz was
signed, and it was agreed that a congress should be held at Prague to
consider if terms of peace could not be arranged. The important point
to be decided at Prague was the position to be adopted by Austria; and
both sides prepared to offer a high price for her active assistance,
for her intervention would probably settle the result of the war.
Napoleon trusted that his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, would
not abandon him, and counted upon the assistance of an Austrian army.
He relied also upon the hereditary hatred of Austria for Prussia, and
promised his father-in-law, as the price of his active assistance,
not only the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, but of the whole
of Silesia, which Frederick the Great had torn from Maria Theresa.
Napoleon was even sanguine enough to count upon the former friendship
which the Emperor Alexander had felt for him, and he hoped that the
invasion of Russia would be forgiven if he guaranteed the possession
of the whole of Poland. The country which would be sacrificed by these
arrangements was Prussia. Napoleon projected the entire extinction of
the Prussian kingdom, and suggested that the kingdom of Westphalia
should be extended to the Oder. That he should venture to offer such
terms showed how entirely Napoleon misunderstood his position. The
Emperor Francis, although his daughter was Napoleon’s wife, could not
forget the humiliations that Austria had undergone, and allowed his
feelings as an Austrian to outweigh his sentiments as a father. The
Emperor Alexander had been entirely cured by the invasion of Russia of
his former infatuation, and now distrusted the French Emperor as much
as he had formerly believed in him; he had struck up an intimacy with
the King of Prussia, and had promised him his restoration to the whole
of his dominions.

[Sidenote: Convention of Reichenbach. 17th June 1813.]

Meanwhile the rulers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia signed a treaty at
Reichenbach on 17th June 1813, by which Austria assumed the position
of a mediator and promised to declare war against France, if the
conditions of peace, which she should offer, were rejected. In return
for this attitude, Austria was given a free hand to negotiate with
the South German States, and the idea of rousing a national German
feeling against France, which was strongly advocated by Stein, was
abandoned. Metternich had no liking for the national idea; it seemed
to him to bear the imprint of the spirit of the French Revolution,
and could only end in disaster to Austria. The rising of Prussia had
indeed been a success, but if it spread through Germany, it might
end in a united Germany with Prussia at its head, and the consequent
depreciation of the Austrian power. The example of Spain, which Stein
and patriotic Germans pointed to, seemed to cut in two ways; if, on
the one hand, it had raised a people in arms against Napoleon, on the
other it had encouraged revolutionary ideas. Both the Emperor Alexander
and King Frederick William felt the weight of these arguments, and the
conception of the war changed from a national uprising to a coalition
of the usual type. Under these circumstances, Napoleon’s propositions
were ignored, and proposals were made to him on the other hand that he
should be content with the natural limits of France, namely, the Rhine
and the Alps; that he should restore the Bourbons to Spain and the
independence of Holland; that he should abandon his position as head of
the Confederation of the Rhine and allow the Pope to return to Rome.
Murat was to remain at Naples, and Jerome on the throne of Westphalia,
and the terms offered were by no means unfavourable to France, though
perhaps hardly justified by the military position of the allies.
Metternich, who perceived that Austria held the key to the position,
brought these terms to Napoleon’s headquarters at Dresden, and informed
the Emperor that if they were not accepted, Austria would join the
coalition against him.

[Sidenote: Austria declares war.]

Napoleon refused with scorn; Castlereagh, through the English
ambassador, Lord Aberdeen, promised large subsidies to Austria; and
on the 1st of August 1813, the Emperor of Austria promised definitely
to join the allies with 200,000 men if Napoleon refused to accept the
terms offered to him. The Congress met at Prague. Caulaincourt, the
French plenipotentiary, stated that he had no power to accept the terms
offered by Francis, and Austria, on the 12th of August, declared war
against France. On the 14th of August, when it was too late, Napoleon
declared his acceptance of the terms, and received the answer that the
whole matter must be referred to the allied monarchs. War in fact was
inevitable, and the Armistice of Pleswitz was at an end.

[Sidenote: Second Campaign of 1813 in Germany.]

The intervention of Austria not only deprived Napoleon of an expected
ally, but endangered his military position in Saxony, as a strong
Austrian army was being concentrated in Bohemia under the command of
Prince Charles von Schwartzenberg. Nevertheless the French Emperor
refused to retire, and prepared at the head of 300,000 men to make face
against the allies in spite of their great superiority in number. The
plan of campaign of the allies was drawn up by Moreau, who had been
induced to leave America and give the advantage of his advice to the
Czar of Russia. There was also upon the staff of the Russian army one
of the ablest strategists in Europe who, like Moreau, had formerly
been an officer in the French army, General Jomini. The plan was to
direct an army from the north, of Prussians, Russians and Swedes, under
Bülow, Chernishev, and Bernadotte, an army from the east of Russians,
called the Army of Poland, which was being formed under Benningsen,
an army from Silesia, of Prussians under Blücher, and Russians under
Wittgenstein, and finally an army of Austrians under Schwartzenberg,
assisted by the Russian main army of Barclay de Tolly, and the Russian
Imperial Guard under the Grand Duke Constantine, upon Dresden. But
Napoleon with his accustomed rapidity of action determined to strike
first, and he detached three corps under Oudinot, Macdonald and
Vandamme, against Bernadotte, Blücher, and Schwartzenberg; Benningsen
was too far in the rear to be dangerous. Oudinot and Macdonald were
defeated by Bernadotte and Blücher at Gross-Beeren and the Katzbach
respectively, on the 23d and 25th of August, and Schwartzenberg,
instead of waiting for the other armies, attacked the French centre at
Dresden. On the 26th and 27th of August a terrible battle was fought,
in which Moreau was mortally wounded. Napoleon was successful, but he
suffered severe losses which he was unable to repair. Three days later
he received the news that Vandamme’s army, which had penetrated into
Bohemia to cut off Schwartzenberg’s communications, had been forced to
capitulate at Kulm to the Russians under Barclay de Tolly. The battle
of Dresden proved to the allies that it was impossible for one of their
armies to overthrow Napoleon unassisted, and they therefore recurred to
their original plan. Napoleon once more endeavoured to break from his
defensive position and struck at Berlin; but Marshal Ney was defeated
by Bernadotte and Bülow at Dennewitz, on 6th September, and he had
to wait while the ring formed round him. The Emperor’s losses during
the first part of this campaign had been immense. He had lost over
10,000 men by the capitulation of Kulm; his young soldiers had been
decimated at the Katzbach and Dennewitz; and the troops of the German
contingents deserted _en masse_. In fact when the operations of the
allies were completed and their armies had concentrated around Leipzig,
to which place he had withdrawn, he had not more than 160,000 men,
whose confidence was shaken by repeated defeats, to oppose to more than
double that number.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Töplitz. 19th Sept. 1813.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Leipzig. 16th-19th October 1813.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Hanau.]

After the battle of Dresden, the army of Schwartzenberg retired into
Bohemia, and the allied monarchs determined to define their position
as to the future. The enormous armies they were concentrating made
them feel sure of success, if they held together. On 9th September the
important Treaty of Töplitz was signed. By this treaty it was agreed
that Prussia and Austria should be restored as nearly as possible to
the limits they had held in 1805, that the Confederation of the Rhine
should be dissolved, and that entire independence should be granted
to the states of southern and western Germany. This decision overcame
the lingering hesitation of the south German monarchs, who had feared
retaliation from the allies for their consistent adhesion to Napoleon.
Of these states, Bavaria was the chief, and on 8th October the Treaty
of Ried was signed between Austria and Bavaria, by which Bavaria
promised the aid of 36,000 men in return for complete indemnity and the
recognition of complete sovereignty in her dominions. Then the allies
in their full strength attacked Napoleon. For three days, from the 16th
to the 19th of October, the terrible battle of Leipzig was fought. The
result was a foregone conclusion, and even without the desertion of the
Saxons in the course of the battle, the ruin of the French army was
certain. Napoleon’s forces were not only defeated, they were destroyed,
and in the utmost disorder the routed French divisions fled in a state
of disorganisation across Germany. At this moment Maximilian Joseph
of Bavaria, whom Napoleon had made a king, declared against him as
he had promised, and not only withdrew the Bavarian contingent, but
endeavoured to check the French retreat. At the battle of Hanau on
October the 30th, however, the remnant of the French army broke through
the Bavarians, and it eventually found safety behind the Rhine.

[Sidenote: Insurrection of Germany against Napoleon 1813.]

The battle of Leipzig was followed by a general rising throughout
central Europe against the French. The secret societies which had
been formed to promote the idea of the freedom of Germany acted in
every direction. Many isolated regiments of the French army were
cut off and the French garrisons in the various German cities were
closely besieged. The benefits which had been conferred by French
administration were forgotten and the people thought only of the
humiliation of the French occupation. Nor was this spirit confined
to Germany. The Dutch rose in rebellion, and declared in all the
chief cities of Holland for the Prince of Orange. That prince at once
left England and set himself at the head of the insurgents, and Lord
Castlereagh a few months later sent to his assistance an English
force under the command of Sir Thomas Graham to reduce the few Dutch
fortresses still occupied by French garrisons. In Italy also an almost
universal insurrection broke out against the French domination. Lord
William Bentinck, who commanded the English army which occupied Sicily,
sailed to Genoa with a powerful force and encouraged the insurgents
in that quarter. Meanwhile an Austrian army under General Hiller
invaded Italy from the north-east and defeated Eugène de Beauharnais
at Valsarno on the 26th of October. Against this unanimity of national
opposition Napoleon could make but little headway; the French people
were tired of the conscription; they had not approved of the invasion
of Russia; and were indisposed at the moment of crisis to support the
Emperor.

[Sidenote: Campaign in the Peninsula 1813.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Vittoria. 21st June.]

[Sidenote: Wellington invades France. Oct. 1813.]

While the French armies were suffering the succession of disasters
which expelled them from Germany, a similar series of catastrophes
occurred in Spain. Wellington broke up from his quarters in the summer
of 1813, and marching in a north-easterly direction attempted to
cut off all communication between France and Madrid. This movement
completely overthrew the French domination in Spain. Joseph Bonaparte
with all the troops he could collect fled from Madrid. He was unable to
defend himself behind the Ebro as in 1812, for the positions on that
river had been skilfully turned. Wellington eventually came up with
the French army at Vittoria. There Marshal Jourdan, who commanded for
King Joseph, endeavoured to resist, but he was completely defeated by
the Anglo-Portuguese army on the 21st of June 1813. This victory drove
the French back into France, for Suchet was likewise obliged to abandon
his conquests in Valencia, and to retire into the mountains of Arragon
and Catalonia. The victory in the field was followed as in Germany
by a burst of national enthusiasm. The Spanish guerillas destroyed
every isolated French post, and even managed to place some serviceable
divisions at the disposition of Wellington. The English general took up
a position on the French frontier between Pampeluna and San Sebastian,
blockading the former and besieging the latter place. To face him Soult
was sent to the south-west of France to defend the frontier. On the
31st of August San Sebastian was stormed; Pampeluna speedily fell;
and Wellington was able to establish a new base of operations, and to
invade France. On the 10th of November the Anglo-Portuguese army drove
Soult from his positions on the Nivelle, and after the battles of the
Nive or Saint Pierre from the 9th to the 13th of December Wellington
invested Bayonne.

[Sidenote: Negotiations for Peace.]

These repeated disasters in different quarters induced Napoleon to
consider the advisability of concluding a peace. He was now only too
ready to accept the terms offered to him at the Congress of Prague.
The allies were by no means so united as they seemed. The Austrian
Minister Metternich, in particular, was not desirous of destroying the
power of France. England had no wish to come to any conclusion which
should disproportionately increase the strength of Russia, and the aim
of all the allied monarchs was to allow France to develop in her own
way as long as she withdrew her pretensions to interfere in Europe.
Metternich’s proposals, in November 1813, were that France should
preserve her natural limits of the Rhine and the Alps, but should
restore all former rulers in Holland, Italy, and Spain. Napoleon gave
evidence of his desire for peace at this period by the dismissal of
his Foreign Secretary, Maret, Duc de Bassano, and the appointment of
Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicenza, who was known to be in favour of peace
and was also a personal friend of the Emperor Alexander, at whose Court
he had been ambassador during the palmy days of the alliance between
France and Russia. The terms of peace offered by Metternich, which
are known as the Proposals of Frankfort, at which city the allied
monarchs were residing, were confided to M. de Saint-Aignan, a French
diplomatist who had been taken prisoner during the advance of the
allies and who was the brother-in-law of Caulaincourt. The proposals
were definitely acceded to by Lord Aberdeen on the part of England and
by Hardenberg on the part of Prussia. The favourable nature of them
was dictated by the fear entertained by the allied monarchs that France
would rise in her might as she had done in 1793 if her borders were
invaded. For this reason the allies remained for some weeks upon the
right bank of the Rhine, concentrating their forces and hesitating to
advance. Napoleon, however, could not understand that he was beaten.
Instead of replying at once to the Proposals of Frankfort, which were
dated the 9th of November, it was not until late in December that he
instructed Caulaincourt to go to the allied quarters and discuss them.
His instructions to Caulaincourt showed how little he appreciated the
position of affairs. He demanded that, in addition to the natural
limits of France, he should hold the cities of Wesel, Cassel opposite
Mayence, and Kehl opposite Strasbourg on the right bank of the Rhine,
which fairly signified that he did not abandon his projects on Germany.
He further demanded that a kingdom should be formed for his brother
Jerome in Germany, and for Eugène de Beauharnais in Italy. Before these
counter-propositions reached the headquarters of the allied monarchs,
they had resolved to invade France, and the opportunity was gone for
ever for France to attain her natural limits under the sanction of
Europe.

[Sidenote: The Invasion of France 1814. First Campaign.]

The attitude of the allies, as indicated in the Proposals of Frankfort,
was mainly dictated by Metternich, who did not desire to see his
Emperor’s son-in-law dethroned or to see France greatly weakened.
But the Emperor Alexander and his friend, the King of Prussia, soon
repented of the assent they had given to Metternich’s ideas. Alexander
desired to invade France as a reply to the invasion of Russia in 1812,
and hoped to occupy Paris as Napoleon had occupied Moscow. The King
of Prussia, and still more his generals and ministers, had felt most
keenly the humiliating condition to which Prussia had been degraded,
and desired to wreak their vengeance on France. It was therefore agreed
that since the Proposals of Frankfort had not been promptly accepted,
the result of a successful invasion of France should be the return of
that country into the limits she possessed at the beginning of the wars
of the Revolution. The attitude of Russia and Prussia was that adopted
by England. Lord Castlereagh heard with dismay, that it was intended
to allow France the limits of the Rhine, for by that concession she
would hold Belgium and Antwerp, which it had been the consistent policy
of all English Ministers for many generations to keep independent of
France. The barrier treaties of former days, and the wars against
Louis XIV. had been sustained for the purpose of keeping France out of
the Belgian Netherlands, and the English cabinet resolved to continue
this classic policy. For this purpose, Lord Castlereagh was in person
despatched to the headquarters of the allied monarchs, with the
greatest powers ever granted to a British statesman. He was given ‘full
powers to negotiate and conclude of his own authority, and without
further consultation with the government, all conventions or treaties,
either for the prosecution of war or for the restoration of peace.’[12]

Lord Castlereagh sailed from Harwich on the 31st of December 1813, on
which day Blücher with the main Prussian army, known as the Army of
Silesia, crossed the Rhine in three columns at Coblentz, Mannheim, and
Mayence. Blücher was supported by three Russian _corps d’armée_, but
it was further south that the main Russian army in conjunction with
the Austrians invaded France under the command of Schwartzenberg. It
was not without some difficulty that the Emperor Alexander was induced
to consent to the violation of the neutrality of Switzerland. But the
military arguments put forward by his generals overcame his scruples.
By marching through Switzerland, Schwartzenberg’s army was enabled to
turn the mountains of the Jura, and to leave the French fortresses
on the Rhine, behind him. This invasion on two distinct lines gave
Napoleon the opportunity of carrying out one of the military manœuvres
of which he was most fond. He concentrated between the two invading
armies a force of between 50,000 and 70,000 men. This was a terrible
falling off from the vast armies with which he had invaded Russia in
1812, and fought the allies in Saxony in 1813; it was a falling off not
only in numbers, but in military efficiency, for with the exception
of the remnant of the Guard, he had only under his command some
regiments of conscripts and national guards untrained to war. At this
period Napoleon bitterly repented the mistake he had made, in leaving
over 150,000 veteran soldiers as garrisons in the various fortresses
in Europe. The presence of these men would very likely have turned
the scale. He had left, for instance, 12,000 men in Hamburg under
the command of Marshal Davout, 16,000 in Magdeburg, 8000 in Dantzic,
and large garrisons in other distant cities, such as Stettin. These
fortresses were blockaded by local militia; their occupation did not
withdraw many regular troops from the allied armies, while it fatally
weakened the resources of France.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Victories in France. 1814.]

Nevertheless, with his boy conscripts and his Guard, Napoleon fought
one of his greatest campaigns. Blücher foolishly scattered his troops,
after his entry into Champagne. Napoleon quickly took advantage of
his mistake. He cut up division after division of Blücher’s army
at Brienne, Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, between the
29th of January and the 14th of February, and then turning against
Schwartzenberg, who had also scattered his forces, he defeated a
Russian division at Nangis, and an Austrian division at Montereau
on the 17th and 18th of February. These rapid blows startled and
disconcerted the allies. Blücher’s army was practically destroyed;
Schwartzenberg fell back, and asked for an armistice; and proposals
were made for the evacuation of France. It was only the constancy of
the Emperor Alexander and the determination of Lord Castlereagh which
induced the allies to persist. Two _corps d’armée_, one of Prussians
under Bülow, the other of Russians under Wintzingerode, were on
Lord Castlereagh’s sole authority detached from Bernadotte’s army
and ordered to reinforce Blücher. Meanwhile, Alexander insisted that
Schwartzenberg should concentrate instead of retiring. In reality,
Napoleon’s successes were more fatal to himself than to the allies,
for they induced him to break off the negotiations at the Congress of
Châtillon.

[Sidenote: Other movements against Napoleon. 1814.]

[Sidenote: Bernadotte.]

While the first campaign of 1814 was being fought out in France, the
movement against Napoleon was becoming general. Bernadotte had after
the victory of Leipzig been placed in command of the army in northern
Germany. Full of the idea which had been suggested to him by the
Emperor Alexander in 1812, that he might succeed Napoleon on the throne
of France, Bernadotte did not wish to appear before his own countrymen
in the light of an invader. He had occupied himself for some weeks
after the battle of Leipzig with blockading Davout in Hamburg, and
fighting the Danes in Holstein. Even if he could not obtain the throne
of France, he was quite resolved to win Norway, and for this purpose he
attacked the Danes, and after some fighting, compelled Frederick VI.
of Denmark to sign the Treaty of Kiel on 14th January 1814, by which
Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden, in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.
Bernadotte even went so far as to negotiate with Davout, to whom he
promised a free passage to France with all his troops as the price of
the surrender of Hamburg. But the Emperor Alexander would not submit to
this, and Bernadotte was imperiously ordered only to leave a blockading
force before Hamburg, and to advance to the French frontier.

[Sidenote: Holland.]

It was at this juncture that Bernadotte was deprived of his two finest
_corps d’armée_, which were ordered up to the assistance of Blücher.
But in addition to the danger threatened by Bernadotte’s army, Napoleon
also met with serious opposition in the Netherlands. The Dutch people
declared for the Prince of Orange, and Holland was quickly lost.
A force under the command of the Prince marched into Belgium, and
besieged Antwerp, which was defended by the former member of the
Committee of Public Safety, Carnot, who, though neglected by Napoleon
in the days of his greatness, had come to the help of France in the
time of her distress. To assist the Prince an English division under
Sir Thomas Graham had, as has been said, been despatched to Holland.
Graham failed to take Bergen-op-Zoom on the 20th of February, but
his presence in the Netherlands not only encouraged the Dutch, but
prevented Napoleon from obtaining help from that quarter.

[Sidenote: Augereau.]

[Sidenote: Wellington wins battle of Orthez. 27th February]

In the south, Marshal Augereau, whom the Emperor had placed in
command at Lyons, was, as he himself said, no longer the Augereau of
Castiglione. He had been directed to make a diversion against the
Austrian left as it entered France with some conscripts and troops
drawn from the former Army of Spain, but he remained inactive, and his
operations were of no assistance to the Emperor. In the south-west
corner of France, Soult was unable to do more than make head against
Wellington and the Anglo-Portuguese army. After the battles of the Nive
or of Saint Pierre, Bayonne was completely invested, and Wellington,
leaving the left of his army to carry on the siege, marched eastwards
against Soult. That marshal had been weakened by the detachments
he had been ordered to send to Augereau, and to Napoleon himself.
Nevertheless, he made a gallant stand at Orthez on the 27th of
February, but was defeated and forced to fall back further into France.

[Sidenote: Italy.]

In Italy the Viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais, who in the retreat from
Russia had given evidence that he was a general of the very first
order, offered a gallant resistance to the Austrians under General
Hiller. But the defection of the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law,
opened the passes of the Tyrol to the Austrians, and Eugène de
Beauharnais was then compelled to retreat. At the commencement of
1814, Metternich entered into negotiations with Murat, the King of
Naples. Through the influence of his wife, Caroline Murat, sister of
Napoleon, with whom Metternich had been in most intimate relations
when he was ambassador at Paris, Murat, in the hope of preserving
his kingdom, issued a violent proclamation against his benefactor,
Napoleon, and advanced to the banks of the Po, at the head of a
Neapolitan army of 80,000 men. This movement caused Eugène de
Beauharnais, whose fidelity to his stepfather shines out in bright
contrast to the treachery of Murat, to fall back still further. He
defeated the Austrians under Marshal Bellegarde on the Mincio on the
8th of February, but was unable to follow up his success owing to the
position of Murat. In his rear, Lord William Bentinck had landed at
Genoa and issued a proclamation promising independence to that city,
and the support of England in securing the independence and unity of
Italy. Napoleon at one time thought of calling Eugène de Beauharnais to
his side, but his rapid victories over the isolated _corps d’armée_ of
the allies in February caused him to abandon this wise project.

[Sidenote: The Congress of Châtillon. 3d Feb.-19th March 1814.]

It has been said that one effect of Napoleon’s victories was to break
up the Congress of Châtillon. It had been suggested that a congress
should meet at Mannheim at the time of the Proposals of Frankfort, but
Napoleon’s delay prevented it from assembling until after the invasion
of France was an accomplished fact. The success of this invasion
altered the attitude of the allies towards France. They saw that the
French nation was not going to arise in its might as it had done in
1793. They heard through sure hands that the people were almost in open
rebellion against the Emperor. The Legislative Body had dared to oppose
his wishes. Everywhere the conscription was evaded, and there was a
muttered feeling throughout France that the country had had enough of
war and that it was time that the blood-tax on the French youth should
cease. Even the army itself was beginning to despair. The Emperor had
lost his prestige in Russia and at Leipzig. His soldiers were not the
veterans of his former wars; his generals and his marshals began to
murmur and to fear that a war _à outrance_ would end in their personal
ruin. Under these circumstances the Congress of Châtillon met on the 3d
of February 1814. The French plenipotentiary was Caulaincourt, the most
upright of Napoleon’s statesmen. The other powers nominated, not their
chief ministers, Metternich, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh,
although they were all at headquarters, but subordinate diplomatists,
namely, Count Philip Stadion, the predecessor of Metternich, for
Austria, William von Humboldt for Prussia, Razumovski for Russia, and
Lord Cathcart, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart for England.

At Châtillon very different conditions from the Proposals of Frankfort
were offered. The main stipulation was that France should return to
her limits before the Revolution. England haughtily declared that the
naval question with regard to the rights of neutrals was not to be
mentioned, and everything was made subject to the great question of
the French limits. Caulaincourt disputed the proposals on the ground
that it was unfair that France should be reduced to the limits she had
held in 1789 while the other powers had been so vastly increased by
the rearrangement of Germany and the partition of Poland. Nevertheless
he was most anxious that Napoleon should accept these proposals. He
granted that they were worse than the Proposals of Frankfort, but
argued that if the war continued they were likely to be worse still.
Napoleon, however, looked upon the Congress as an opportunity for
gaining time. He believed that by his military successes he would avert
the disasters which threatened him, and on the day of the battle of
Montereau, the 18th of February, he wrote that he was only willing
to agree to a peace on the basis of the Frankfort Proposals, and in
his own handwriting he added to his despatch to Caulaincourt, ‘Sign
nothing.’[13] It is worthy of note that in the Proposals of Châtillon
nothing was said about Napoleon himself. The Emperor Francis assumed
that his son-in-law would remain upon the throne of France, and Lord
Castlereagh expressed no view to the contrary. But the English Minister
was absolutely determined not to yield to Napoleon’s demand for the
natural limits of France. England was the paymaster of the coalition,
and Castlereagh having just promised £10,000,000 to pay the military
expenses of 1814 felt that he had the right to insist on his demand.
Napoleon in after years declared that his persistence in retaining
Belgium was the reason for his refusal to accede to the Proposals of
Châtillon. ‘Antwerp,’ he said to Las Cases, ‘was to me a province in
itself; it was the principal cause of my exile to Saint Helena, for
it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the
terms offered at Châtillon. If they would have left it to me peace
would have been concluded.’[14] Metternich wrote to Caulaincourt
pressing the acceptance of the Proposals of Châtillon, but Napoleon
obstinately refused, and the Congress had practically failed by the
beginning of March, though it did not actually break up until the 19th
of that month.

[Sidenote: Attitude of France towards Napoleon.]

The fact that the French nation did not rise in arms against the
invaders has been mentioned as the primary cause for the difference
between the terms offered at Frankfort and at Châtillon. Nothing proves
more completely how thoroughly Napoleon had extinguished the spirit of
the Revolution than the lukewarmness with which his call to arms was
received in 1814. In 1793 the invasion of France had caused a frenzy of
patriotism. The people had submitted to the Reign of Terror, because
it meant a strong government which could expel the English, Prussians,
and Austrians. France was at that time hemmed in by difficulties
infinitely greater than those which she had to face in 1814. Then
she had no great general. In 1814 she possessed one of the greatest
generals the world has ever seen. In 1793 she was torn by civil war
in La Vendée and by brigands in every sparsely populated district. In
1814 she had enjoyed fifteen years of internal tranquillity. In 1793
her finances were utterly disordered, her industries were destroyed,
and the whole country a prey to anarchy. In 1814 she had been for years
the chief nation in Europe, and the wealth of other countries had
been drained to enrich her. But the difference was that in 1793 and
the succeeding years the French people felt that they were fighting
to ward off the interference of foreign nations in their internal
affairs, whereas in 1814 they were called on to defend the power of
a single man who had infringed the rights and the freedom of other
nations. By his bureaucratic system Napoleon had crushed out the power
of popular initiative which had been the strength of the Republic; by
his suppression of individual liberty he had made the majority of the
French people disaffected to his Empire.

[Sidenote: Exhaustion of France.]

There must be considered also the exhaustion of actual physical
resources. In the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, it is estimated that
nearly 750,000 Frenchmen were either killed, wounded, or taken
prisoner. Before that time the Grand Army had been slowly destroyed
on many a field of battle, and there simply were not sufficient men
of military instinct and physical strength to fill the ranks. In
1813 Napoleon enrolled the conscripts whose turn would have come in
1815—mere boys of sixteen, who had melted away after the battle of
Leipzig—and the men he called to the ranks in 1814 were those who had
been passed over by the conscription in previous years, and were too
long inured to civil life to be willing to serve as soldiers.

To the feeling that resistance to the invaders was not a national
duty, must be added a general indisposition to support the Empire. The
opinions which had found vent during the French Revolution had not been
extinguished by the Empire; they had only been suppressed; and all
the educated part of the nation was united in desiring representative
institutions so as to exercise a share in directing the policy of the
government. This opinion showed itself in the Legislative Body which
was summoned in December 1813. Napoleon had announced that his cause
was the cause of France; but in return the leaders of the Legislative
Body only begged him to make peace. A paragraph was inserted in the
report of the Legislative Body upon the Proposals of Frankfort, which
contains the following words: ‘It belongs to the Government according
to the Constitution to propose the most effectual means to repel the
enemy and secure peace. These means will only be effectual if the
French people are convinced that their blood will be shed only to
defend the country and our protective laws. It appears, therefore,
indispensable that at the same time that His Majesty shall propose
the most prompt and efficacious measures for the safety of the State,
the Government should be besought to maintain the entire and constant
execution of the laws which guarantee to the French people the rights
of liberty, security, and property, and to the nation the complete
enjoyment of its political rights. That guarantee appears the most
effectual means for restoring to the French people the energy necessary
for their defence in the present crisis.’ Napoleon was much irritated
by this attack on his arbitrary authority, and although this paragraph
was expunged from the report by 254 votes to 223 he nevertheless
dissolved the Legislative Body in a rage.

[Sidenote: The Bourbons.]

Neither at the Congress of Châtillon nor in the Legislative Body was
a single word said about restoring the Bourbons. They had lost all
credit during their exile. The French people did not want them. The
allied powers did not care about them. By Lord Castlereagh’s orders
Wellington received the Duc d’Angoulême, son of the Comte d’Artois, in
his camp in the south of France, but he distinctly refused to recognise
him in any way whatever. The English general went further and issued
a proclamation in which he declared that the war was being waged for
security to Europe, not for a change of dynasty in France, and that no
interference was either intended or would be permitted in the free
decision of the French people with regard to their internal government.
When the Duc d’Angoulême was favourably received in Bordeaux and the
Mayor of that city hoisted the white flag, Wellington wrote to the
Bourbon prince defining his attitude and censuring the assertion in the
Duke’s proclamation, that he was supported by England.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Chaumont. 1st March 1814.]

In spite of his real weakness Napoleon was so infatuated by his
successes in February 1814 that, as has been said, the Congress came to
an end, but he was not far wrong in his estimation of the effect of his
victories upon the allied monarchs. So profoundly was Schwartzenberg
terrified by the destruction of Blücher’s army and the victories of
Nangis and Montereau that he wished to retreat from France. Differences
between the powers at this juncture threatened to break up the
coalition, and it was only the determination of Lord Castlereagh that
kept them together. The English minister on the 1st of March 1814
concluded the secret Treaty of Chaumont. By this treaty the relations
of the allied monarchs to each other on several points were defined,
and though many fresh causes of dissension arose at a later date, it
was the Treaty of Chaumont which kept the powers together until the
overthrow of Napoleon, and which laid the basis of the final settlement
at Vienna. By this treaty the four great powers, England, Russia,
Austria and Prussia, bound themselves, if France refused to return
within her ancient limits, to form an offensive and defensive alliance.
Each member of the coalition was to maintain 150,000 men in the field,
and England bound herself, in addition to paying her own contingent
and maintaining her navy, to contribute a subsidy of £5,000,000 a year
to be divided equally amongst the other three contracting parties.
As England by this arrangement offered more than twice as much as
any other country, Castlereagh practically became the master of the
coalition. After peace was concluded each of the powers was to furnish
a contingent of 60,000 men if any one of them were attacked. The
resettlement of Europe was to be arranged on the following bases: that
the German Empire should be restored as a federal union; that Holland
and Belgium should be united into a monarchy under the House of Orange;
that Spain should be restored to its ancient sovereign; that Italy
should be divided into independent states; and that Switzerland should
be guaranteed as independent and neutral by all the great powers.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Second Campaign in France. March 1814.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Paris. 30th March 1814.]

[Sidenote: Occupation of Paris by the Allies.]

The result of the Treaty of Chaumont was to stiffen the attitude of
the allies in France. All thought of retreat was abandoned and both
the Austrians under Schwartzenberg, and the Army of Silesia under
Blücher recommenced their advance upon Paris. Napoleon pursued the
tactics which had been crowned with success in the month of February,
and prepared to strike at each of the invading armies in turn. His
first movement as before was against Blücher. The Army of Silesia
had been reduced by the actions of Champaubert, Montmirail, etc.,
from 60,000 to 30,000 men, but it was now increased to more than its
former number by the arrival of Saint Priest’s Russians and of the
two corps of Bülow and Wintzingerode which had been detached from
Bernadotte by Lord Castlereagh. Napoleon was not aware of the extent
of these reinforcements, and he therefore with his army of barely
30,000 men ventured to attack Blücher. On the 7th and 9th of March,
the severe actions of Craonne and Laon were fought. Neither side won
victories, but Napoleon failed to repeat his former successes, which
was tantamount to a defeat. After the battle of Laon both Blücher and
Napoleon reviewed the armies at their disposal, and the disparity of
their strength is shown by the fact that whereas Blücher reviewed
109,000 men, Napoleon found that including all reinforcements, he had
but 46,000. Having failed to check the Prussians, Napoleon turned to
attack Schwartzenberg’s army. On the 20th of March he fought an action
at Arcis-sur-Aube, in which the Russians repulsed the French attack.
The Emperor then resolved on a final effort. He determined to attack
the lines of communication of the invaders, and marched towards the
Vosges Mountains. But the invaders were in too strong force to be
terrified by this manœuvre. A few divisions only were left to watch
him, and the main armies continued their advance on Paris. On March
the 30th, Schwartzenberg and Blücher arrived in front of the French
capital. They had under their command about 200,000 men, whereas
Marshals Marmont and Mortier, who had been charged with the defence of
Paris, could not get under arms more than 28,000 including the National
Guard. In spite of this enormous difference of strength the two
marshals took up a position and prepared to defend Paris. But after the
most obstinate resistance the allies carried the French position after
ten hours’ fighting on the 30th of March, and on the following day
the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia entered Paris. Napoleon
rapidly followed the allied army, but the occupation of Paris was fatal
to his cause. He was ready to continue the war, but his marshals were
not. On the 4th of April Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and Lefebvre had an
interview with the Emperor, and told him that the army would fight no
more. Napoleon was obliged to give heed to their remonstrances, and he
sent Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to make what arrangements might
be possible with the allied monarchs.

[Sidenote: The Provisional Government at Paris.]

On entering Paris the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William
proceeded at once to the residence of Talleyrand. That astute statesman
quickly decided upon a definite policy. He understood that the allies
had hitherto treated with Napoleon, and that they were not favourably
disposed to the Bourbons. He knew that the French nation did not
desire the return of the former dynasty. But he felt that the only
method which would enable France to take up a logical position on the
Continent was by the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. If Louis
XVIII. were accepted as King of France, it would be a contradiction in
terms to their professed belief in hereditary rights, and their hatred
for the results of the Revolution, for the allied monarchs to attack
the unity of France. For this reason Talleyrand persuaded Alexander
that it would be inadmissible either to accept the government of the
Empress Marie Louise in the name of her son, the King of Rome, or
still less to recognise Alexander’s candidate, Bernadotte. In his own
words to the Emperor: ‘Any attempt to create a Regency or to appoint
Bernadotte is a mere intrigue; nothing remains but Bonaparte or the
Bourbons.’ Alexander then declared that he would no longer treat with
Napoleon, and Talleyrand as Vice-Arch-Chancellor of the Empire summoned
the Senate to meet upon the 1st of April.

The Senate at once elected a Provisional Government consisting of
Talleyrand as President and the Comte de Bournonville, former War
Minister of the Republic, the Comte de Jaucourt, a former leader of
the Legislative Assembly, the Abbé de Montesquiou, a former leader of
the Constituent Assembly, and the Duc de Dalberg, nephew of the Prince
Primate of Germany. The Senate then resolved that, whatever government
should be adopted, the sale of the national and ecclesiastical estates
in the days of the Revolution should be ratified, the liberty of
worship and of the press established, and a general amnesty declared.
On the following day the Emperor Alexander addressed the Senate. He
said: ‘It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has
led me hither; my armies have only entered France to repel unjust
aggressions. Your Emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions
when I only wished for peace. I am a friend of the French People; I
impute their faults to their chief alone; I am here with the most
friendly intentions; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You
are charged with one of the most glorious missions which generous men
can discharge,—that of securing the happiness of a great people, in
giving France institutions, at once strong and liberal, with which she
cannot dispense in the advanced state of civilisation to which she has
attained.’ Alexander in conclusion, as a sign of his goodwill, declared
that he would release the 150,000 French prisoners of war then in
Russia.

[Sidenote: Abdication of Napoleon. 6th April 1814.]

That evening the Senate solemnly declared Napoleon to be no longer
Emperor, and formed a Provisional Ministry, including Comte Beugnot,
Minister of the Interior, Baron Louis, Minister of Finance, and General
Dupont, who had been disgraced for the Capitulation of Baylen, Minister
for War. Matters had reached this stage when Napoleon’s emissaries
Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt, arrived at the headquarters of the
allied monarchs. These faithful adherents proposed that Napoleon
should abdicate in favour of his infant son. This offer, which would
have been gladly received some days before, was now rejected, owing
to the influence of Talleyrand, and on April the 6th, when Napoleon
received the news of this rejection, he unconditionally abdicated
at Fontainebleau. This step was made necessary by the fact that the
faithful marshals could not even speak in the name of the whole army on
behalf of Napoleon. Marshal Marmont, who had distinguished himself in
the great battle before Paris, had made separate terms for himself and
placed his army at the disposal of the allies. The desertion of Marmont
deprived Napoleon of the greater part of the forces on which he relied,
and rendered his unconditional abdication necessary.

[Sidenote: Provisional Treaty of Paris. 11th April 1814.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Toulouse. 10th April 1814.]

The abdication of Napoleon was followed by the arrival of Lord
Castlereagh in Paris. The English minister had since the breaking up of
the Congress of Châtillon remained at the headquarters of the Emperor
of Austria at Dijon. It was there that he had entered into intimate
relations with Metternich, relations which were to lead to most
important results. On the 11th of April 1814, the Provisional Treaty
of Paris was signed. It was essentially a treaty between the Emperor
Napoleon, through his plenipotentiaries, and the allied monarchs. It
was not a treaty with France, for Louis XVIII. had not arrived from
England, or been recognised as king, and the Provisional Government
could only enter into provisional arrangements. By this treaty, which
was signed by Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode,
Hardenberg, and Castlereagh, Napoleon renounced for himself and his
descendants the Empire of France and the Kingdom of Italy. He was,
however, to retain the title of Emperor; the island of Elba was erected
into an independent principality for him, and an income of £180,000 a
year was granted to him. The duchies of Parma and Piacenza were secured
in full sovereignty to the Empress Marie Louise, and after her decease
to the King of Rome, and the divorced Empress Josephine was given an
annuity of £40,000 a year. On the day before this treaty was signed,
April 10th, 1814, the Battle of Toulouse was fought. Wellington after
his victory of Orthez had rapidly followed Soult into the heart of
Southern France. When he attacked the French positions in front of
Toulouse, he was ignorant of the great events which had been passing at
Paris and at Fontainebleau, and it was only after his entrance into the
city that he perceived the white cockade was being worn.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Louis XVIII.]

On the 20th of April 1814, Napoleon bade farewell to the Guard at
Fontainebleau, and started for Elba, and on the 24th his successor,
Louis XVIII., who had not entered France since his escape in
1791, landed at Calais. The new King was eminently fitted by his
natural character, which had been matured by his long exile, for a
constitutional monarch, but unfortunately he was surrounded by men who
had shared his exile, and who did not share his placable disposition.
On the 2d of May, when he had reached the neighbourhood of Paris, Louis
XVIII. published what is known as the Declaration of St. Ouen. In this
declaration, he promised a constitution to the French people, which
should provide among other things for a representative government with
two chambers, complete liberty of worship and the press, the right
of the representatives to grant taxation, the inviolability of all
property, including national and ecclesiastical estates, which had
been sold during the Revolution, the responsibility of the ministers,
irremoveability of the judges, and complete equality before the law.
On the following day, he entered Paris amid general rejoicings, for
the French people had forgotten their grievances of olden time in the
memory of their more recent sufferings in the latter years of Napoleon.
He was not in any way treated with by the Provisional Government; his
return was tacitly accepted as inevitable; and he returned to the
Tuileries as of divine right, without any bargain being made with him.

[Sidenote: First Treaty of Paris. 30th May 1814.]

The first important duty which fell to Louis XVIII. was the signature
of a definitive treaty of peace with the allies. The evacuation of
French territory by the invaders had been arranged with the Provisional
Government on the 23d of April, and the foreign troops were already
beginning to retire. By the definitive Treaty of Paris, which was
negotiated by Talleyrand on behalf of Louis XVIII., it was agreed that
France should return to her limits of 1792. By this arrangement, the
early annexations of the Revolution before the outbreak of war were
secured to France. These additions included Avignon and the County of
the Venaissin, which had formerly belonged to the Pope, and several
districts in Alsace, of which the most noteworthy were the Principality
of Montbéliard formerly the property of the King of Würtemberg, and
the Republic of Mulhouse. France also received Chambéry, and part of
Savoy, with certain rectifications of the frontier in the neighbourhood
of Geneva, and on the north-eastern border. All the former French
colonies, except the islands of the Mauritius, Tobago, and Saint Lucia,
were restored to France. With regard to other countries, it was agreed,
as had been laid down in the Treaty of Chaumont, that Germany was to
become a Confederacy instead of an Empire, that Holland and Belgium
were to be united, that Italy was to be divided into independent
states, and that the independence of Switzerland was to be guaranteed
by all the great powers. At the same time that this treaty was signed,
a secret treaty was agreed to between the four invading powers, without
consulting France. This secret treaty dealt largely with the future
apportionment of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine which
had been administered by France ever since 1794. It was roughly agreed
that these provinces should be annexed to Prussia, and it was further
laid down, that Austria should possess the whole of Lombardy, and that
Genoa should be united to Sardinia. The details of this arrangement,
and the many other questions which were certain to arise were
adjourned, and it was settled that they should be considered at a great
congress which was to meet at Vienna.

[Sidenote: Conclusion.]

The two nations which had done the most to overthrow the excessive
power of Napoleon were England and Russia, and the two men most
conspicuously concerned were the Emperor Alexander and Lord
Castlereagh. The two rival German powers, Austria and Prussia,
naturally inclined to different sides. Prussia was the declared ally of
Russia; the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William had formed
one of the romantic personal friendships which Alexander loved; and
the Russian and Prussian ministers were in perfect accord in desiring
to punish France and her allies, and to aggrandise themselves. Austria
on the other hand naturally inclined to support England. Both feared
the increasing preponderance of Russia; both felt that enough had
been done in deposing Napoleon, and did not desire to wreak vengeance
on France; both were inclined to be moderate in their demands. This
rivalry between Russia with Prussia, and Austria with England had
appeared in its incipient stages before the Treaty of Chaumont, and it
was to rise to its height during the Congress of Vienna. The return of
the Bourbons to France was to have an important result on the rivalry
between the allies, and it is a significant proof of the inherent
power of France, and of the greatness of the ascendency which she had
won, that she was enabled at Vienna to act the most decisive part. The
overthrow of Napoleon had not really weakened France; she had lost her
natural territorial limits of the Rhine and the Alps which she might
have obtained but for the stubbornness of Napoleon; nevertheless, she
was still strong enough to be feared, and in the day of her greatest
disaster she was able to exert a greater influence in the affairs of
Europe than she had ever done since the time of Louis XIV.

CHAPTER XL

1814–1815

The
Congress of Vienna—Monarchs and Diplomatists
present—History of the Congress—Treaty between France,
Austria, and England—The Questions of Saxony and
Poland—The German Confederation—Disposition of the
provinces on the left bank of the Rhine—Mayence and
Luxembourg—Reconstitution of Switzerland—Rearrangements
in Italy—Questions of Murat, Genoa, and the Empress Marie
Louise—Sweden—Denmark—Spain—Portugal—England’s share
of the spoil—The Questions of the Slave Trade and the
Navigation of Rivers—Close of the Congress—Preparations
against Napoleon—The first reign of Louis XVIII. in
France—Napoleon’s return from Elba—The Hundred Days—The
Campaign of Waterloo—Occupation of Paris—Second Treaty of
Paris—Napoleon sent to Saint Helena—The Holy Alliance—Return
of Louis XVIII.—Government of the Second Restoration—The
Chambre Introuvable—Reaction in Spain and Naples—Territorial
Results of the Congress of Vienna—The Principle of
Nationality—Permanent Results of the French Revolution
in Europe—The Problem of harmonising the Principles of
Individual and Political Liberty with that of Nationality.

[Sidenote: Congress of Vienna.]

On the 1st of November 1814 the diplomatists who were to resettle
Europe as arranged by the definitive Treaty of Paris met at Vienna.
But many of the monarchs most concerned felt that they could not
give their entire confidence to any diplomatist, however faithful or
distinguished, and they therefore came to Vienna in person to support
their views. The final decision of disputes obviously lay in the hands
of the four powers which by their union had conquered Napoleon. These
four powers solemnly agreed to act in harmony and to prepare all
questions privately, and then lay them before the Congress. In fact
they intended to impose their will upon the smaller states of Europe
just as Napoleon had done. That they did not succeed and that their
concert was broken was due to the extraordinary ability of Talleyrand,
the first French plenipotentiary. The history of the Congress is the
history of Talleyrand’s skilful diplomacy, and the resettlement of
Europe which it effected was therefore largely the work of France.

[Sidenote: Monarchs and Diplomatists present.]

The Emperor Francis of Austria acted as host to his illustrious
guests. The royalties present were the Emperor Alexander of Russia,
with his Empress, the Grand Duke Constantine, and his sisters, the
Grand Duchesses Marie of Saxe-Weimar and Catherine of Oldenburg; the
King of Prussia with his nephew Prince William; the King and Queen of
Bavaria, the King and Crown Prince of Würtemburg, the King of Denmark,
the Prince of Orange, the Grand Dukes of Baden, Saxe-Weimar, and
Hesse-Cassel, the Dukes of Brunswick, Nassau, and Saxe-Coburg. The King
of Saxony was a prisoner of war and absent.

The plenipotentiaries of Russia were Count Razumovski, Count von
Stackelberg, and Count Nesselrode, who were assisted by Stein, the
former Prussian minister, and one of Alexander’s most trusted advisers,
by Pozzo di Borgo, the Corsican, now appointed Russian ambassador to
Paris, by Count Capo d’Istria, the future President of Greece, by
Prince Adam Czartoryski, one of the most patriotic Poles, and by some
of the most famous Russian Generals, such as Chernishev and Wolkonski.
The Austrian plenipotentiaries were Prince Metternich, the State
Chancellor, the Baron von Wessenberg-Ampfingen, and Friedrich von
Gentz, who was appointed to act as Secretary to the Congress.

England was represented by Lord Castlereagh, Lord Cathcart, Lord
Clancarty, and Lord Stewart, Castlereagh’s brother, who as Sir Charles
Stewart had played so great a part in the negotiations in 1813, and who
had been created a peer for his services. The English plenipotentiaries
were also aided by Count von Hardenberg, and Count von Münster,
who were deputed to represent Hanoverian interests. The Prussian
plenipotentiaries were Prince von Hardenberg, the State Chancellor,
and William von Humboldt, who in military matters were advised by
General von Knesebeck. The French representatives, whose part was to be
so important, were Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento, the Duc de Dalberg,
nephew of the Prince Primate, the Marquis de la Tour du Pin, and the
Comte Alexis de Noailles. These were the representatives of the great
powers. Among the representatives of the lesser powers may be noted
from the importance of their action, Cardinal Consalvi, who represented
the Pope, the Count of Labrador for Spain, Count Palmella for Portugal,
Count Bernstorf for Denmark, Count Löwenhielm for Sweden, the Marquis
de Saint-Marsan for Sardinia, the Duke di Campo-Chiaro for Murat,
King of Naples, Ruffo, for Ferdinand King of the Two Sicilies, Prince
von Wrede for Bavaria, Count Wintzingerode for Würtemburg, and Count
von Schulemburg for Saxony. In addition to these plenipotentiaries
representing powers of the first and second rank, were innumerable
representatives of petty principalities, deputies for the free cities
of Germany, and even agents for petty German princes mediatised by
Napoleon in 1806.

[Sidenote: History of the Congress.]

When Talleyrand with the French legation arrived in Vienna he found,
as has been said, that the four great powers had formed a close union
in order to control the Congress. His first step therefore was to set
France forth as the champion of the second-rate states of Europe.
The Count of Labrador, the Spanish representative, strongly resented
the conduct of the great powers in pretending to arrange matters,
as they called it, for the Congress. Talleyrand skilfully made use
of Labrador, and through him and Palmella, Bernstorf and Löwenhielm
managed to upset the preconcerted ideas of the four allies, and
insisted on every matter being brought before the Congress as a whole,
and being prepared by small committees specially selected for that
purpose. His next step was to sow dissension amongst the great powers.
As the champion of the smaller states he had already made France of
considerable importance, and he then claimed that she too had a right
to be treated as a great power and not as an enemy. His argument was
that Europe had fought Napoleon and not France; that Louis XVIII. was
the legitimate monarch of France; and that any disrespect shown to him
or his ambassadors would recoil on the heads of all other legitimate
monarchs. He claimed that France had as much right to make her voice
heard in the resettlement of Europe as any other country, because the
allied monarchs had distinctly recognised that she was only to be
thrust back into her former limits and not to be expunged from the map
of Europe. Having made his claim good on the right of the legitimacy of
his master to speak for France as a great power equal in all respects
to the others, he proceeded to sow dissension among the representatives
of the four allied monarchs. This was not a difficult thing to do, for
the seeds of dissension had long existed. The difference he introduced
was that in speaking as a fifth great power, and as the champion of the
smaller states, France became the arbiter in the chief questions before
the Congress.

The division between the great powers was caused by the desire of
Russia and Prussia for the aggrandisement of their territories. The
Emperor Alexander wished to receive the whole of Poland. His idea,
which was inspired by his friend, Prince Adam Czartoryski, was to
form Poland into an independent kingdom ruled, however, by himself as
Emperor of Russia. The Poles were to have a new Constitution based
on that propounded in 1791, and the Czar of Russia was to be also
King of Poland, just as in former days the Electors of Saxony had
been Kings of Poland, but he was to be an hereditary, not an elected,
sovereign. To form once more a united Poland, Austria and Prussia were
to surrender their gains in the three partitions of Poland. Austria
was to receive compensation for her loss of Galicia in Italy; Prussia
was to be compensated for the loss of Prussian Poland by receiving
the whole of Saxony. As it had been already arranged that Prussia was
to receive the bulk of the Rhenish territory on the left bank of the
Rhine in addition to her great extensions of 1803, the result would be
to make Prussia by far the greatest power in Germany. Talleyrand was
acute enough to perceive that Lord Castlereagh did not approve of the
extension of the influence of Russia, and that Metternich was equally
indisposed to allow Prussia to obtain such a wholesale aggrandisement.
Saxony had been the faithful ally of France to the very last, and
Talleyrand felt that it would be an indelible stain on the French name
if it were thus sacrificed. He was cordially supported in this view by
his new master, for though the King of Saxony had been the faithful
ally of Napoleon, Louis XVIII. did not forget that his own mother was
a Saxon princess. Working, therefore, on the feelings of Castlereagh
and Metternich, he induced England and Austria to declare against the
scheme of Russia and Prussia.

The Emperor Alexander and Frederick William blustered loudly; they
declared that they were in actual military possession of Poland and of
Saxony, and that they would hold those states by force of arms against
all comers. In answer, Talleyrand, Castlereagh, and Metternich signed
a treaty of mutual alliance between France, England, and Austria, on
the 3d of January 1815. By this secret treaty the three powers bound
themselves to resist by arms the schemes of Russia and Prussia, and
in the face of their determined opposition the Emperor Alexander gave
way. Immediately Napoleon returned from Elba he found the draft treaty
between the three powers on the table of Louis XVIII. and at once sent
it to Alexander. That monarch, confronted with the danger threatened by
Napoleon’s landing in France, contented himself with showing the draft
to Metternich and then threw it in the fire. The whole of this strange
story is of the utmost interest; it proves not only the ability of
Talleyrand, but the inherent strength of France. It is most significant
that within a few months after the occupation of Paris by the allies
for the first time France should again be recognised as a great power,
and form the main factor in breaking up the cohesion of the alliance,
which had been formed against her.

[Sidenote: Secret Treaty of 3d Jan. 1815]

[Sidenote: Treaty of Ghent. Dec. 24, 1814.]

[Sidenote: Settlement of Saxony.]

The result of Talleyrand’s skilful policy was thus to unite England,
Austria, and France, supported by many of the secondary states, such
as Bavaria and Spain, against the pretensions of Prussia and Russia.
Powerful armies were immediately set on foot. France in particular
raised her military forces from 130,000 to 200,000 men, and her new
army was in every way superior to that with which Napoleon had fought
his defensive campaigns in 1814, for it contained the veteran soldiers
who had been blockaded in the distant fortresses or had been prisoners
of war. England too was enabled to make adequate preparations, for on
December the 24th, 1814, a treaty had been signed at Ghent between the
United States and England which put an end to the war which had been
proceeding ever since 1812 on account of England’s naval pretensions.
Bavaria also promised to put in the field 30,000 men for every 100,000
supplied by Austria. Although the secret treaty of January 3d was not
divulged until after the return of Napoleon from Elba, the determined
attitude of the opposition caused the Emperor Alexander to give way.
It was decided that instead of the whole of Saxony, Prussia should
only receive the district of Lusatia, together with the towns of
Torgau and Wittenberg; a territory which embraced half the area of
Saxony and one-third of its population. The King of Saxony, who had
been treated as a prisoner of war, and whom the Emperor of Russia had
even threatened to send to Siberia, was released from captivity, and
induced by the Duke of Wellington, who succeeded Lord Castlereagh as
English plenipotentiary in February 1815, to agree to these terms.
The salvation of Saxony was a matter of great gratification to Louis
XVIII., who remembered that though the king had been the faithful ally
of Napoleon, he was also his own near relative.

[Sidenote: Settlement of Poland.]

Since Prussia was obliged to give up her claim to the whole of Saxony,
Russia also had to withdraw from her scheme of uniting the whole of
Poland. Nevertheless, Russia retained the lion’s share of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw; in 1774 her frontier had reached the Dwina and the
Dnieper; in 1793 she obtained half of Lithuania as far as Wilna; in
1795 she annexed the rest of Lithuania and touched the Niémen and the
Bug; in 1809 Napoleon had granted her the territory containing the
sources of the Bug; and now in 1815 her borders crossed the Vistula,
and by the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, including that
city, penetrated for some distance between Eastern Prussia and Galicia.
Prussia received back its share of the two first partitions of Poland,
with the addition of the province of Posen and the city of Thorn, but
lost Warsaw and its share in the last partition; while Austria received
Cracow, which was to be administered as a free city. Alexander was
deeply disappointed by the frustration of his Polish schemes, but he
nevertheless kept his promise to Prince Adam Czartoryski and granted a
representative constitution and a measure of independence to Russian
Poland.

[Sidenote: The Germanic Confederation.]

Though the great diplomatic struggle arose over the combined question
of Saxony and Poland, the most important work of the Congress was
not confined to it alone. Committees were appointed to make new
arrangements for Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and to settle other
miscellaneous questions. Of these committees the most important was
that which reorganised Germany. It had been arranged by the secret
articles of the Treaty of Paris that a Germanic Confederation should
take the place of the Holy Roman Empire. The example of Napoleon and
his institution of the Confederation of the Rhine was followed and
developed. Instead of the hundreds of small states which had existed
at the commencement of the French Revolution, Germany, apart from
Austria and Prussia, was organised into only thirty-eight states. These
were the four kingdoms of Hanover, Bavaria, Würtemburg, and Saxony;
the seven grand duchies of Baden, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin,
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxe-Weimar;
the nine duchies of Nassau, Brunswick, Saxe-Gotha, Saxe-Coburg,
Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Hildburghausen, Anhalt-Dessau, Anhalt-Bernburg,
and Anhalt-Köthen; eleven principalities, two of Schwartzburg, two of
Hohenzollern, two of Lippe, two of Reuss, Hesse-Homburg, Liechtenstein,
and Waldeck, and the four free cities of Hamburg, Frankfort, Bremen,
and Lübeck. The number of thirty-eight was made up by the duchies of
Holstein and Lauenburg, belonging to the King of Denmark, and the grand
duchy of Luxembourg, granted to the King of the Netherlands. In its
organisation the Germanic Confederation resembled the Confederation
of the Rhine. The Diet of the Confederation was to be always presided
over by Austria and was to consist of two Chambers. The Ordinary
Assembly was composed of seventeen members, one for each of the larger
states, one for the free cities combined, one for Brunswick, one for
Nassau, one for the four duchies of Saxony united, one for the three
duchies of Anhalt united, and one for the smaller principalities. This
Assembly was to sit permanently at Frankfort and to settle all ordinary
matters. In addition there was to be a General Assembly to be summoned
intermittently for important subjects, consisting of sixty-nine
members returned by the different states in proportion to their size
and population. Each state was to be supreme in internal matters, but
private wars against each other were forbidden as well as external wars
by individual states on powers outside the limits of the Confederacy.
In the territorial arrangements of the new Confederation, the most
important point is the disappearance of all ecclesiastical states. The
Prince-Primacy, which Napoleon had established in his Confederation of
the Rhine, was not maintained, and Dalberg, who had filled that office
throughout the Empire, was restricted to his ecclesiastical functions.

[Sidenote: Territorial arrangements on the Rhine.]

The most difficult problem to be decided was the final disposition of
the districts on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been ruled by
France ever since 1794. It had been settled by the secret articles at
Paris that these dominions should be used for the establishment of
strong powers upon the borders of France. The main difficulty was as
to the disposition of the important border fortresses of Mayence and
Luxembourg. Prussia laid claim to both these places, but was strongly
resisted by Austria, France, and the smaller states of Germany. It was
eventually resolved that Prussia should receive the northern territory
on the left bank of the Rhine, stretching from Elten to Coblentz, and
including Cologne, Trèves, and Aix-la-Chapelle. In compensation for
the Tyrol and Salzburg, which she was forced to return to Austria, and
in recognition of her former sovereignty in the Palatinate, Bavaria
was granted a district from the Prussian borders to Alsace, including
Mayence, which was designated Rhenish Bavaria. Finally, Luxembourg was
formed into a grand duchy, and given as a German state to the House
of Orange. It was not united to the new kingdom of the Netherlands,
which was formed out of Holland and Belgium, but was to retain its
independence under the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands. The
union of the provinces of the Netherlands was one of the favourite
schemes of England, and was carried into effect in spite of the
well-known feeling of opposition between the Catholic provinces of
Belgium and the Protestant provinces of Holland.

[Sidenote: Switzerland.]

As in its reorganisation of Germany, so in the settlement of
Switzerland, the Congress of Vienna followed the example set by
Napoleon. The Emperor had quite given up the idea which had fascinated
the French Directory of forming Switzerland into a Republic, one
and indivisible. He had yielded to the wishes of the Swiss people
themselves, and organised them on the basis of a confederation of
independent cantons. The Congress of Vienna continued Napoleon’s
policy of forbidding the existence of subject cantons in spite of
the protests of the Canton of Berne. Napoleon’s cantons of Argau,
Thurgau, Saint-Gall, the Grisons, the Ticino, and the Pays de Vaud were
maintained, but the number of the cantons was raised from nineteen to
twenty-two by the formation of the three new cantons of Geneva, the
Valais, and Neufchâtel, which had formed part of the French Empire.
The Canton of Berne received in reply to its importunities the greater
part of the former Bishopric of Basle. The Swiss Confederation as
thus constituted was placed under the guarantee of the great powers
and declared neutral for ever. The Helvetic Constitution, which was
promulgated by a Federal Act dated the 7th of April 1815, was not quite
so liberal as Napoleon’s Constitution. Greater independence was secured
in that the constitutions of the separate cantons and organic reforms
in them had not to be submitted to the Federal Diet. The prohibition
against internal custom houses was removed. The presidency of the
Diet was reserved to Zurich, Berne, and Lucerne alternately, and the
Helvetic Diet became a Congress of Delegates like the Germanic Diet
rather than a Legislative Assembly. It is to be noted that in spite of
the declaration of the Congress of Vienna, Prussia refused to renounce
her claims on her former territory of Neufchâtel, the independence of
which as a Swiss canton was not recognised by her until 1857.

[Sidenote: Italy.]

The resettlement of Italy presented more than one special problem. The
most difficult of these to solve was caused by the engagements entered
into by the allies with Murat in 1814. Talleyrand, on behalf of the
King of France, insisted on the dethronement and expulsion of Murat,
while Metternich from friendship for Caroline Murat wished to retain
him in his kingdom. The Emperor Alexander, whoever prided himself on
his fidelity to his engagements, wished to protect Murat, and had
at Vienna struck up a warm friendship with Eugène de Beauharnais,
Napoleon’s Viceroy of Italy. Murat, ungrateful though he was personally
toward Napoleon, had yet imbibed his master’s ideas in favour of the
unity and independence of Italy. During the campaign of 1814, he had
led his army to the banks of the Po, and he persisted in remaining
there after the Congress of Vienna had met. But the diplomatists at
Vienna had no wish to accept the great idea of Italian unity. Murat’s
aspirations in this direction were most annoying to them, and it was
with real pleasure that they heard after the landing of Napoleon from
Elba that Murat had by an indiscreet proclamation given them an excuse
for an open declaration of war. The Duke di Campo-Chiaro, Murat’s
representative at Vienna, had kept him informed of the differences
between the allied powers, and an indiscreet note asking whether he was
to be considered as at peace or at war with the House of Bourbon gave
the plenipotentiaries their opportunity. War was immediately declared
against him; an Austrian army defeated him at Tolentino on the 3d
of May 1815, and he was forced to fly from Italy. The acceptance of
Murat’s ambassador, who spoke in his name as King of the Two Sicilies,
made it difficult for the Congress to know how to treat with Ruffo
who had been sent as ambassador by Ferdinand, the Bourbon King of the
Two Sicilies, who had maintained his power in the island of Sicily
through the presence of the English garrison. Acting on the ground
of legitimacy, it was difficult to reject Ferdinand’s claims, which
were warmly supported by France and Spain, but Murat’s ill-considered
behaviour solved the difficulty, and after his defeat Ferdinand was
recognised as King of the Two Sicilies. Murat, later in the year,
landed in his former dominions, but he was taken prisoner and promptly
shot.

Another Italian question which presented considerable difficulty was
the disposal of Genoa and the surrounding territory. When Lord William
Bentinck occupied that city, he had in the name of England promised
it independence and even hinted at the unity of Italy. Castlereagh
unfortunately felt it to be his duty to disavow Bentinck’s declaration,
and Genoa was united to Piedmont as part of the kingdom of Sardinia.
The third difficult question was the creation of a state for the
Empress Marie Louise. An independent sovereignty had been promised to
her. She was naturally supported by her father, the Emperor Francis
of Austria, and was ably represented at Vienna by her future husband,
Count Neipperg. It was eventually resolved that she should receive the
duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, but the succession was not
secured to her son, the King of Rome, but was granted to the rightful
heir, the King of Etruria, who, until the succession fell in, was to
rule at Lucca. The other arrangements in Italy were comparatively
simple. Austria received the whole of Venetia and Lombardy, in the
place of Mantua and the Milanese, which she had possessed before 1789.
The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, with the principality of Piombino, was
restored to the Grand Duke Ferdinand, the uncle of the Emperor Francis
of Austria, with the eventual succession to the Duchy of Lucca. The
Pope received back his dominions including the Legations of Bologna
and Ferrara, and Duke Francis, the grandson of Hercules III., was
recognised as Duke of Modena, to which duchy he would have succeeded
had not Napoleon absorbed it in his kingdom of Italy.

[Sidenote: Other States.]

[Sidenote: Sweden.]

[Sidenote: Denmark.]

[Sidenote: Spain.]

[Sidenote: Portugal.]

[Sidenote: England.]

The arrangements with regard to the other states of Europe made at
the Congress of Vienna were comparatively unimportant, and did not
present the same difficult problems as the resettlement of Germany,
Switzerland, and Italy. Norway in spite of its disinclination was
definitely ceded to Sweden, but Bernadotte had to restore to France the
West-Indian island of Guadeloupe, which had been handed over to him
by England in 1813, as part of the price of his alliance. Denmark had
by the Treaty of Kiel with Bernadotte been promised Swedish Pomerania
in the place of Norway. This promise was not carried out. Denmark
like Saxony had been too faithful an ally of Napoleon not to be made
to suffer. Swedish Pomerania was given to Prussia, and Denmark only
received the small Duchy of Lauenburg. By these arrangements both
Sweden and Denmark were greatly weakened, and the Scandinavian States,
by the loss of Finland and Pomerania, surrendered to their powerful
neighbours, Prussia and Russia, the command of the Baltic Sea. Spain,
owing to the ability of the Count of Labrador, and the support of
Talleyrand, not only lost nothing except the island of Trinidad, which
had been conquered by England, but was allowed to retain the district
round Olivenza, which had been ceded to her by Portugal in 1801. The
desertion of Portugal by England in this particular is the chief blot
on Lord Castlereagh’s policy at Vienna. The Portuguese army had fought
gallantly with Wellington, and there was no reason why she should have
been forced to consent to the definite cession of Olivenza to Spain
when other countries were winning back their former borders. Portugal
was also made to surrender French Guiana and Cayenne to France.
England, though she had borne the chief pecuniary stress of the war
and had been more instrumental than any other power in overthrowing
Napoleon, received less compensation than any other country. She kept
Malta, thus settling the question which led to the rupture of the
Peace of Amiens; she received Heligoland, which was ceded to her by
Denmark, as commanding the mouth of the Elbe; and she was also granted
the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, which enabled her to close
the Adriatic. Among colonial possessions England took from France the
Mauritius, Tobago, and Saint Lucia, but she returned Martinique and the
Isle of Bourbon, and forced Sweden and Portugal to restore Guadeloupe
and French Guiana. With regard to Holland, England retained Ceylon and
the Cape of Good Hope, but she restored Java, Curaçao, and the other
Dutch possessions. In the West Indies also, she retained, as has been
said, the former Spanish island of Trinidad.

[Sidenote: The Slave Trade.]

[Sidenote: The Navigation of Rivers.]

One reason for Castlereagh’s moderation at Vienna is to be found
in the pressure that was exerted upon him in England to secure the
abolition of the slave trade. It is a curious fact that while the
English plenipotentiary was taking such an important share in the
resettlement of Europe, the English people were mainly interested in
the question of the slave trade. The great changes which were leading
to new combinations in Europe, the aggrandisement of Prussia, the
reconstitution of Germany, the extension of Austria, all passed without
notice, but meetings, in Lord Castlereagh’s own words, were held in
nearly every village to insist upon his exerting his authority to
abolish the trade in negro slaves. Castlereagh therefore lent his
best efforts, in obedience to his constituents, to this end. The
other ambassadors could not understand why he troubled so much about
what seemed to them a trivial matter. They suspected a deep design,
and thought that the reason of England’s humanity was that her West
Indian colonies were well stocked with negroes, whereas the islands
she was restoring were empty of them. The plenipotentiaries of other
powers possessing colonies in the tropics therefore refused to comply
with Castlereagh’s request and it was eventually settled that the
slave trade should be abolished by France after five, and by Spain
after eight years. Castlereagh had to be content with this concession,
but to satisfy his English constituents he got a declaration condemning
the slave trade assented to by all the powers at the Congress. Another
point of great importance which was settled at the Congress of Vienna
was with regard to the navigation of rivers which flow through more
than one state. It had been the custom for all the petty sovereigns to
impose such heavy tolls on river traffic that such rivers as the Rhine
were made practically useless for commerce. This question was discussed
by a committee at the Congress, and a code for the international
regulation of rivers was drawn up and generally agreed to.

[Sidenote: Close of the Congress of Vienna. June 1815.]

These matters took long to discuss, and might have taken longer had
not the news arrived at the beginning of March 1815 that Napoleon had
left Elba and become once more undisputed ruler of France. In the month
of February the Duke of Wellington had succeeded Lord Castlereagh as
English representative at Vienna, for the latter nobleman had to return
to London to take his place in Parliament. At the news of the striking
event of Napoleon’s being once more at the head of a French army all
jealousies at Vienna ceased for the time. The Duke of Wellington was
taken into consultation by the allied monarchs, and it was resolved
to carry into effect the provisions of the Treaty of Chaumont. The
great armies which had been prepared for a struggle amongst themselves
were now turned by the allies against France. A treaty of alliance
was signed at Vienna between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England,
on the 25th of March 1815, by which those powers promised to furnish
180,000 men each for the prosecution of war, and stipulated that
none of them should lay down arms until the power of Napoleon was
completely destroyed. It was arranged that three armies should invade
France, the first of 250,000 Austrians, Russians, and Bavarians under
Schwartzenberg across the Upper Rhine, the second of 150,000 Prussians
under Blücher across the Lower Rhine, and the third of 150,000 English,
Hanoverians and Dutch from the Netherlands. Subsidies to the extent of
£11,000,000 were promised by England to the allies. These arrangements
made, the allied monarchs and their ministers left Vienna. But the
final general Act of the Congress was not drawn up and signed until the
8th of June 1815, ten days before the battle of Waterloo.

[Sidenote: The First Reign of Louis XVIII.]

It has been said that the allied armies after the abdication of
Napoleon at Fontainebleau had retired and left France to the rule of
Louis XVIII. That King on returning to France had made most liberal
promises in the declaration known as the Declaration of Saint Ouen.
These principles were embodied in a Charter, which was granted on the
4th of June 1814. By this Charter representative institutions and
entire individual liberty were promised, and also the maintenance of
the administrative creations of the Empire. Under the new Constitution
there were to be two chambers, the one of hereditary peers, the other
of elected representatives. The promises of the Charter were very fair,
and had they been duly carried out, France might have been entirely
contented, but unfortunately for himself Louis XVIII. had not learned
experience in his exile. In spite of the Charter he regarded himself as
a ruler by right divine. _Emigrés_, even _émigrés_ who had borne arms
against France and consistently abused their fatherland, were promoted
to the highest offices in the State. The King surrounded himself with
reactionary courtiers, and what was worse with reactionary ministers.
The favour shown to returned _émigrés_, the haughty attitude of the
Princes of the blood, and the violent proclamations of the returned
bishops and clergy made the people of France fear that the promises
made in the Charter were but a sham, and that the next step would
be that the estates of the Church and of the Crown which had been
sold during the Revolution would be resumed. The feeling of distrust
was universal. The rule of Louis XVIII. had been accepted only as a
guarantee of peace. It was never popular, and the former subordinates
of Napoleon began to regret the Imperial _régime_. If this was the
feeling among the civil population, it was still more keenly felt
in the army. Prisoners of war, and the blockaded garrisons, who had
returned to France, felt sure that Napoleon’s defeat in 1814 had been
but accidental and wished to try conclusions once more with Europe.
In all ranks a desire was expressed to wipe out the disgrace of the
occupation of Paris by the allies.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s return from Elba. March, 1815.]

On the 1st of March 1815, Napoleon, who had been informed of the
universal feeling in France, landed in the Gulf of San Juan, and began
the short reign which is known as the Hundred Days. He was accompanied
by the 800 men of the Guard whom he had been allowed to have at Elba,
and was received with the utmost enthusiasm by all classes. His journey
through France was a triumphal procession. The King’s brother, the
Comte d’Artois, vainly attempted to organise resistance at Lyons.
Marshal Ney, who had promised to arrest his patron, joined him with the
army under his command on the 17th of March, and on the 20th Napoleon
re-entered Paris and took up his quarters at the Tuileries. Louis
XVIII. had fled on the news of Ney’s defection, and escaping from
France took shelter at Ghent. Napoleon had learnt bitter lessons from
his misfortunes. He declared that he would grant full and complete
individual liberty, and also the freedom of the press, and on the 23d
of April he promulgated what he called the Additional Act consecrating
these principles. He felt his error in depending too entirely upon his
bureaucracy, and he appealed on the ground of patriotism to the men
of the Revolution whom he had in the days of his power carefully kept
from office. These men rallied round him, and he appointed their most
noteworthy representative, Carnot, his Minister of the Interior. He
declared his acceptance of the two chambers ordained by the Charter,
and most of the peers created by Louis XVIII. took the oath of
allegiance once again to Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Campaign of Waterloo. June 1815.]

After rousing national enthusiasm by appeals to patriotism and by
the liberal provisions of the Additional Act, Napoleon organised
his army, and in his favourite fashion decided to strike before any
invasion of France took place. Of the three armies prepared for the
invasion the one nearest within reach was that commanded by the Duke
of Wellington. That General on leaving Vienna had been placed at the
head of a miscellaneous force of English, Hanoverians, Dutch, and
Belgians. He greatly regretted the absence of most of his veterans of
the Peninsula who were still in America, and complained of the number
of raw troops under his command. He agreed to act in harmony with the
Prussians under Blücher, who brought his army into the Netherlands.
Napoleon determined to strike before Wellington and Blücher had united.
He crossed the frontier at the head of 130,000 men, and by his skilful
and rapid movements practically surprised the allied generals. On the
16th of June 1815, he defeated Blücher at Ligny, while Ney with his
left fought a drawn battle with the English advanced divisions at
Quatre Bras. By these engagements the English and Prussian armies were
separated. Napoleon then resolved to attack the English with the bulk
of his army, and detached Marshal Grouchy to pursue the Prussians.
Blücher, however, promised to come to Wellington’s assistance if the
English were attacked, and Wellington relying on this promise took up
his position at Waterloo. On the 18th of June the battle of Waterloo
was fought. The English army held its position in spite of repeated and
furious attacks, until Blücher came up on the French right. Unable to
continue the struggle against two foes, the French army was obliged to
give way, and after the repulse of the Guard, which might have covered
his retreat, Napoleon recognised that he was completely routed. He fled
to Paris, and on the 22d of June he abdicated in favour of his son, the
King of Rome. He nominated an executive commission of government, and
then went on board ship in the hope of escaping to America. In this
project he failed, and on 15th July he surrendered to Captain Maitland
on board H.M.S. _Bellerophon_. The army of Wellington and Blücher
pursued the defeated foe, but the rout had been too complete for the
French to make another stand. Cambrai the only place that attempted to
resist was easily taken, and on the 3d of July Wellington and Blücher
reoccupied Paris. Meanwhile the grand army of Schwartzenberg had also
invaded France, and the country was once more in the possession of the
allies.

[Sidenote: Second Treaty of Paris. 20th Nov. 1815.]

The terms of the second Treaty of Paris proved that the allied monarchs
understood the difference between the opposition made by France
to Europe in 1814 and 1815. In 1814 the Treaty of Paris which was
then concluded was, if not particularly liberal to France, at least
perfectly just. The allied monarchs and their ministers had appreciated
the fact that in 1814 they were fighting Napoleon and not France. The
campaign of 1815 had been of a different character. The French nation
and not merely the French army had given proof of their attachment both
to the Empire and to Napoleon’s person. It was therefore considered
necessary, not only to impose harsher terms upon France, but to exact
securities for the future. Several schemes were proposed, of which
one was to detach Alsace, Lorraine, and French Flanders, if not the
whole of Picardy, and to reduce the limits of France to what they were
before the conquests of Louis XIV. This scheme, which was earnestly
supported by Prussia, who hoped to get the lion’s share of the
districts taken from France, was warmly opposed by Austria and England.
The latter power was not to be bribed by the proposed extension of
the frontier of its new creation, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. And
the former objected entirely to any increase of the power of Prussia.
Lord Castlereagh in his opposition to these extravagant suggestions
of Prussia was supported by the Emperor Alexander and his minister,
Nesselrode, and eventually it was agreed that France should be
reduced to its exact limits of 1789. This meant that France lost all
the cessions made to it in 1814, except Avignon and the Venaissin.
Chambéry and the part of Savoy then granted to France were restored
to the King of Sardinia; the districts in the neighbourhood of Geneva
were also returned to that canton, and the fortress of Huningen on the
borders of Switzerland was ordered to be dismantled; and the various
rectifications of the frontier on the eastern and north-eastern borders
were no longer sanctioned. A war contribution of 700,000,000 francs was
laid upon France, in addition to which she was to maintain, at the cost
of 250,000,000 francs a year, an army of 150,000 men in the possession
of her chief frontier fortresses for a period of five years.

[Sidenote: Napoleon sent to St. Helena.]

These were the most important conditions of peace contained in the
second Treaty of Paris, which was signed on 20th of November 1815.
But what France felt more bitterly than pecuniary contributions, or
even the loss of territory, was the decision of the allied powers that
the numerous pictures and works of art, which had been accumulated
in Paris during the wars of the Revolution and the Empire, should be
returned to their former owners. The Prussians were not satisfied with
this, they wished to punish Paris more severely. Blücher was only
prevented by the intervention of Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of
Wellington from exacting a contribution of a 110,000,000 francs from
the inhabitants of Paris alone. The Prussians even made preparations
to blow up the Bridge of Jena, whose name perpetuated their greatest
military humiliation, and were only prevented from their purpose by the
expressed determination of Louis XVIII. to stand upon the bridge and
be blown up with it if they persisted, and Blücher had to be satisfied
with the alteration of the name of the bridge from the Bridge of Jena
to the Bridge of the Military School. The question of the disposition
of the person of Napoleon was one of some difficulty. He reached Torbay
on board the _Bellerophon_ on the 24th of July 1815, and the English
Ministers did not know what to do with their illustrious prisoner. They
dared not trust him in any part of Europe or America from which he
could repeat his expedition from Elba. Blücher loudly declared that he
ought to be shot at Vincennes like the Duc d’Enghien, but the English
Government thought it would be sufficient to confine him on an isolated
island. For this purpose they borrowed the island of Saint Helena from
the East India Company, and on the 8th of August, Napoleon set sail for
his place of exile on board H.M.S. _Northumberland_.

[Sidenote: The Holy Alliance. Sept. 1815]

A month after the departure of Napoleon for St. Helena, the Emperor
Alexander, the Emperor Francis, and King Frederick William signed the
treaty which is known as the Holy Alliance. By this treaty it was
declared that the Christian religion was the sole base of government,
and the contracting monarchs promised to aid each other on all
occasions like brothers, and to recommend to their peoples the exercise
of the duties of the Christian religion. Lord Castlereagh declined
on behalf of the Prince Regent to join the Holy Alliance, but on the
28th of November 1815, after the signature of the Peace of Paris, he
agreed to an alliance that should include all the four powers, of which
the aims were to keep from the throne of France either Napoleon or
any relation of his, to combine together for the security of their
separate states, and the general tranquillity of Europe, and to hold at
fixed dates congresses for the settlement of disputed questions.

[Sidenote: The Second Restoration of Louis XVIII. July 1815.]

The second restoration of Louis XVIII. differed from the first as the
second Treaty of Paris differed from its predecessor. After the events
of the Hundred Days, the Bourbon King could no more delude himself
with the idea that he was welcome to the people of France. He owed his
seat upon the throne only to the absence of Napoleon and the presence
of the allied armies in France, and he prepared on this occasion to
punish those who had deserted him. He refused to grant an amnesty, and
on the 24th of July 1815, he proscribed fifty-seven of the leading men
in France, of whom nineteen were ordered to be tried by court-martial,
and thirty-eight were banished. The most illustrious of the victims who
perished under this proscription was Marshal Ney, who was shot at Paris
on the 7th of December, after being condemned to death by the Chamber
of Peers. This procedure was rendered necessary because it would have
been difficult to find a court-martial to condemn the bravest of the
French marshals. Marshal Moncey, who was nominated to preside over
such a court-martial, refused in an eloquent letter which caused him
to be sent to prison for three months. Far worse than these executions
was the result of the outbreak of brigandage in the south of France.
Under the pretext of being Royalists, the Companies of Jehu, which had
ravaged the south of France in the days of the Thermidorians and of
the Directory, again set to work. Political, religious, and personal
passions excited to massacre. Pillage and murder were rife throughout
the south of France, and among the victims who were slain in this White
Terror of 1815 were Marshal Brune, and Generals Ramel and Lagarde.
Special courts were formed by a law voted on the 12th of December 1815,
to punish political offences. These provost’s courts were as severe and
almost as unjust as the revolutionary tribunals in the provinces during
the Reign of Terror, and many hundreds of executions took place.
Finally, in January 1816, what was ironically called a Law of Amnesty
was passed. This law, from the list of its exceptions, was practically
a gigantic proscription. Among others, all surviving members of the
Convention who had voted for the death of Louis XVI. were exiled if
they had in any way accepted the authority of Napoleon during the
Hundred Days, which most of them had done. Under this Law of Amnesty
most of the great statesmen who had been concerned in the government of
France since 1793 were driven into exile. Conspicuous among them were
Carnot, Merlin of Douai, Sieyès, Cambacérès, and David, the greatest
painter of his time.

[Sidenote: Government of the Second Restoration.]

Restored for a second time to the throne of France, Louis XVIII.
declined to take warning from the result of his former policy. He again
showered his favours on returned _émigrés_, and pursued a thoroughly
reactionary policy. As soon as he was firmly seated at the Tuileries,
with the Prussians and the English encamped round Paris, he dismissed
Talleyrand and Fouché from office and formed a new and strongly
Royalist ministry under the presidency of the Duc de Richelieu, who had
spent the last twenty years of his life in exile as one of the chief
administrators of Russia. The king avowed his intention of keeping
the promises he made in the Charter of 1814, but those promises were
carried out in such a way as to make them absolutely illusory. He took
advantage of the general adhesion given to Napoleon on his return from
Elba to exclude from the Upper Chamber or House of Peers most of the
leading men in France, leaving the majority entirely in the hands of
former _émigrés_, and of men who by the excess of their royalism wished
to palliate their offence in not having emigrated. The Lower House,
or Chamber of Representatives, even exceeded the House of Peers in
its violent royalism. The deputies, chiefly elected under the direct
pressure of threats of vengeance, were ready to adopt any reactionary
measure suggested to them. Louis XVIII. gave this Assembly the name of
the ‘Chambre Introuvable,’ which he intended as a compliment, but which
has survived as a term of derision. Among the first laws voted were the
suspension of individual liberty, and of the liberty of the press, and
the request was then made that the King, in his goodness, would revise
fourteen articles of the Charter which were too liberal. But even this
chamber, aided by the presence of foreign armies, could not make France
revert to the condition in which it had been before 1789. A hint of the
resumption of ecclesiastical or national domains would have set the
whole country in an uproar, and the Chamber had to be satisfied with
voting a large sum of money out of the ordinary taxes as compensation
to the _émigrés_ for their sufferings in exile.

[Sidenote: The Reaction in Spain.]

[Sidenote: Naples.]

The spirit of reaction went much further in Spain than in France.
Ferdinand VII., on returning to his capital in May 1814, issued a
proclamation attacking the Cortes, which had done so much to recover
the country from the hands of the French. In his own words: ‘A Cortes
convoked in a manner never before known in Spain has been profiting by
my captivity in France, and has usurped my rights by imposing on my
people an anarchical and seditious Constitution based on the democratic
principles of the French Revolution.’ The King of Spain then proceeded
to annul by his own absolute authority everything that had been done
during his absence. He re-established the Inquisition, and proscribed
and condemned to death all who had taken part in reforming the
institutions of Spain, whether under the authority of Joseph Bonaparte
or under that of the National Cortes. Many hundreds, if not thousands,
of Spanish patriots were put to death in a vain attempt of Ferdinand
VII. to restore things as they had been in former days. The attempt to
carry out a complete reaction resulted in utter failure. Insurrections
broke out in all directions, and the Spanish colonies in South America
took advantage of the troubles in the fatherland to strike a blow for
their own freedom. It is satisfactory to be able to state that the head
of the third reigning branch of the House of Bourbon behaved with more
moderation and wisdom than Ferdinand VII. of Spain or Louis XVIII.
of France. Ferdinand IV., King of the Two Sicilies, returned to his
capital at Naples in June 1815. He can hardly be blamed for ordering
the execution of Murat whom he had always regarded as a usurper, and
it is greatly to his credit that he made some endeavour to retain
the excellent administration on the French system which had been
established by Joseph Bonaparte and Murat.

[Sidenote: Results of the Congress of Vienna.]

The final overthrow of Napoleon and his exile to St. Helena allowed the
new system for the government of Europe as laid down by the Congress
of Vienna to be tried. That system may be roughly designated as the
system of the Great Powers. Before 1789, certain states, such as
France and England and Spain, were, from fortuitous circumstances, or
the course of their history, larger, more united, and therefore more
fitted for war, than others, but the greater part of the Continent
was split up into small, and in the case of Germany, into very small
states. Several of these small states, such as Sweden and Holland,
had at different times exercised a very considerable influence, and
the policy of Frederick the Great had added another to them, in the
military state of Prussia. At the Congress of Vienna the tendency
was to diminish the number and power of the secondary states, and to
destroy minute sovereignties. Sweden and Denmark were relegated to the
rank of third-rate powers; the petty principalities of Germany were
built up into third-rate states. Austria and Prussia were established
as great powers, but the increase of their territory brought with it
dissimilar results. Prussia became the preponderant state of Germany,
while Austria, whose Imperial House had so long held the position
of Holy Roman Emperor, became less German, and now depended for its
strength on its Italian, Magyar, and Slavonic provinces. The irruption
of Russia into the European comity of nations was another significant
feature. By its annexation of the greater part of the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw, Russia thrust itself between Prussia and Austria territorially,
while its leading share in the overthrow of Napoleon made its place as
a European power unassailable. It may be doubted if the policy of Peter
the Great and the Empress Catherine was thus carried out. The tendency
of those rulers was to make the Baltic and the Black Sea Russian lakes,
and to build up an Empire of the East; affairs in Central Europe only
interested them in so far as they prevented interference with their
Eastern designs, and did not lead to the erection of powerful states on
the Russian border.

[Sidenote: The Principle of Nationality.]

Nothing is more remarkable in the settlement of Europe by the Congress
of Vienna than the entire neglect of the principle of nationality. Yet
it was the sentiment of national patriotism which had enabled France to
repulse Europe in arms, and had trained the soldiers with whom Napoleon
had given the law to the Continent and had overthrown the mercenary
armies of his opponents. It was the principle of nationality which had
crippled Napoleon’s finest armies in Spain, and which had produced
his expulsion from Russia. It was the feeling of intense national
patriotism which had made the Prussian army of 1813, and enabled
Prussia after its deepest humiliation to take rank as a first-class
power. But the diplomatists at Vienna treated the idea as without
force. They had not learnt the great lesson of the French Revolution,
that the first result of rousing a national consciousness of political
liberty is to create a spirit of national patriotism. The Congress of
Vienna trampled such notions under foot. The partition of Poland was
consecrated by Europe; Italy was placed under foreign rulers; Belgium
and Holland, in spite of the hereditary opposition of centuries, were
united under one king. The territories on the left bank of the Rhine,
which were happy under French rule, and had been an integral part of
France for twenty years, were roughly torn away, and divided between
Prussia, Bavaria, and the House of Orange, under the fancied necessity,
induced by the exploded notion of maintaining the balance of power in
Europe, of building up a bulwark against France. Such short-sighted
policy was certain to be undone. Holland and Belgium separated; Italy
became united; Poland maintained the consciousness of her national
unity, and has more than once endeavoured to regain her independence;
France has never ceased to yearn after her ‘natural’ frontier,
the Rhine; the states of Germany have developed a national German
patriotism which has led to the creation of the modern German Empire.
This feeling of conscious nationality was the result of the French
Revolution and the wars of Napoleon; its existence is the strength of
England, France, Russia, and Germany, its absence is the weakness of
Austria. In so far as the spirit of nationality was neglected at the
Congress of Vienna, its work was but temporary; in its resurrection,
which has filled the history of the present century, the work of the
French Revolution has been permanent.

[Sidenote: Permanent results of the French Revolution.]

But after all, the growth of the spirit of nationality is only a
secondary result of the French Revolution upon Europe; it did not
arise in France until foreign powers attempted to interfere with the
development of the French people after their own fashion; it did not
arise in Europe until Napoleon began to interfere with the development
of other nations. The primary results of the French Revolution,—the
recognition of individual liberty, which implied the abolition of
serfdom and of social privileges; the establishment of political
liberty, which implied the abolition of despots, however benevolent,
and of political privileges; the maintenance of the doctrine of the
sovereignty of the people, which implied the right of the people,
through their representatives, to govern themselves,—have also survived
the Congress of Vienna. When Europe tried to interfere, the French
people sacrificed these great gains to the spirit of nationality,
and bowed before the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety and
of Napoleon; they have since regained them. The French taught these
principles to the rest of Europe, and the history of Europe since 1815
has been the history of their growth side by side with the idea of
nationality. How the two, liberty and nationality, can be preserved in
harmony is the great problem of the future; the history of Europe from
1789 to 1815 affords many examples of the difficulty of the problem and
of the dangers which beset its solution.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

THE RULERS AND MINISTERS OF THE GREAT POWERS OF EUROPE, 1789–1815.

(_Capitals indicate Rulers; small capitals, Chief Ministers; and
italics, Foreign Ministers._

+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-----+
| | | | |
| Prussia. | Russia. | Spain. | |
+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-----+
|FREDERICK WILLIAM II.|CATHERINE II. (since |CHARLES IV. (since |1789.|
| (since 1786). | 1762). | Dec. 1788). | |
| _Hertzberg_ | _Ostermann_ |FLORIDA BLANCA | |
| (since 1756). | (since 1775). | (since 1773). | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | |1790.|
| _Schulemburg_ (May).| | |1791.|
| | | | |
|HAUGWITZ (Oct.) | |ARANDA (July). |1792.|
| | |GODOY (Nov.) | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | |1793.|
| | | |1794.|
| | | | |
| | | |1795.|
| | | | |
| |PAUL I. (Nov.) | |1796.|
| | OSTERMANN. | | |
| | _Panine._ | | |
|FREDERICK WILLIAM | | |1797.|
| III. (Nov.) | | | |
| | | _Saavedra_ (March). |1798.|
| | | _Urquijo_ (August). | |
| | | |1799.|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | |GODOY (Dec.) |1800.|
| |ALEXANDER I. (Mar.) | |1801.|
| | PANINE. | | |
| | _Kotchoubey._ | | |
| | | | |
| | VORONZOV. | |1802.|
| | | |1803.|
|HARDENBERG (Aug.) | _Adam Czartoryski_ | |1804.|
| | (May). | | |
| | | |1805.|
|HAUGWITZ (Feb.) | _Baron Budberg_ | |1806.|
|HARDENBERG (Nov.) | (Aug.) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|STEIN (July). | _Roumianzov_ (Sept.)| |1807.|
| _Goltz_ (July). | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | |JOSEPH BONAPARTE. |1808.|
| | | AZANZA. | |
| | | |1809.|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|HARDENBERG (July). |ROUMIANZOV. | |1810.|
| | _Nesselrode._ | | |
| | | |1811.|
| | | |1812.|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | |1813.|
| | |FERDINAND VII. |1814.|
| | | | |
+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-----+

APPENDIX II.

THE RULERS OF THE SECOND-RATE POWERS OF EUROPE, 1789–1815.

+----+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Sweden. | Denmark. | Turkey. | Portugal. |
| | | | | |
+----+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
|1789|Gustavus III. |Christian VII. |Abdul Hamid. |Maria I. |
| | (Since 1771.) | (Since 1766.) | (Since 1774.) |(Since 1777.) |
| | | |Selim III. | |
| | | | (April.) | |
|1790| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1791| | | | |
| |Gustavus IV. | | | |
|1792| (March.) | | | |
| | | | | |
|1793| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1794| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1795| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1796| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1797| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1798| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1799| | | |_Prince John, |
| | | | | Regent._ |
|1800| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1801| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1802| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1803| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1804| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1805| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1806| | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
|1807| | |Mustapha IV. | |
| | | | (May.) | |
|1808| |Frederick VI. |Mahmoud II. | |
| | | (March.) | (July.) | |
|1809|Charles XIII. | | | |
| | (May.) | | | |
|1810|_Bernadotte, | | | |
| | Prince Royal | | | |
| | (Aug.)_ | | | |
|1811| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1812| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1813| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1814| | | | |
| | | | | |
|1815| | | | |
+----+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+

+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----+
| Sardinia. | The Two | Bavaria. | Würtemburg. | |
| | Sicilies. | | | |
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----+
|Victor Amadeus |Ferdinand IV. |Charles |Charles Eugène. |1789|
| III. (Since | (Since 1759.) |Theodore. (Since| (Since 1735.) | |
| 1773.) | | 1777.) | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | |1790|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1791|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1792|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1793|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1794|
| | | | | |
| | | |Frederick |1795|
| | | | Eugène. (Oct.) | |
|Charles Emmanuel| | | |1796|
| IV. (Oct.) | | | | |
| | | |Frederick I. |1797|
| | | | (Dec.) | |
| | | | |1798|
| | | | | |
| | |Maximilian | |1799|
| | | Joseph. | | |
| | | | |1800|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1801|
| | | | | |
|Victor Emmanuel | | | |1802|
| I. (June.) | | | | |
| | | | |1803|
| |----------------| | | |
| | Naples. | | |1804|
| |----------------| | | |
| | | | |1805|
| | | | | |
| |Joseph | | |1806|
| | Bonaparte | | | |
| | (March.) | | | |
| | | | |1807|
| | | | | |
| |Joachim Murat. | | |1808|
| | (August.) | | | |
| | | | |1809|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1810|
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | |1811|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1812|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1813|
| | | | | |
| |Ferdinand IV | | |1814|
| | | | | |
| | | | |1815|
+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----+

APPENDIX III.

THE FAMILY OF NAPOLEON.

Letizia Ramolino,
b. 1750, d. 1839.
----+-------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------+
| | | | | |
LUCIEN, LOUIS, JÉROME, ÉLISA, PAULINE, CAROLINE,
b. 1775, b. 1778, b. 1784, b. 1777, b. 1780, b. 1782,
d. 1840, d. 1846, d. 1860, d. 1820, d. 1825, d. 1839,
Prince of King of King of Grand Duchess of =(1800),
Canino, Holland Westphalia Duchess of Guastalla Joachim
=(1794), (1806–1810) (1807–1814) Tuscany (1808–1814), Murat,
Christine =(1802), =(1803) (1808–1814), =(1801), King of
Boyer, Hortense Eliza =(1797), Charles Naples
=(1802), de Beau- Patterson Felix Leclerc, (1808–1814),
Alexandrine harnais. =(1807) Baciocchi, =(1803), |
de Bleschamp, | Catherine | Camillo, |
| | of Würtem- | Prince and had
| | burg. and had Borghese. issue.
and had | | issue. |
issue. | | |
| | Napoleon,
| | b. 1801,
| | d. 1804.
| |
| +------+--------+---------+
| | | |
| Jérome Napoleon Mathilde,
| Napoleon, Joseph, b. 1820,
| b. 1814, _Prince =Prince
| d. 1847. Napoleon_ Demidov.
| b. 1822,
| d. 1890,
| =(1859),
| Clothilde
| of Savoy.
| |
| +---------+---------+
----------+-------+ | | |
| | | |
NAPOLEON III.,==(1853) Eugénie Victor Louis Lætitia,
b. 1808, d. 1873. | de Montijo. Napoleon, Napoleon, b. 1866,
Emperor of the | b. 1862. b. 1864. =Duke of
French (1851–1870).| Aosta.
|
Napoleon Eugène,
Prince Imperial,
(1856–1879).

APPENDIX IV.

NAPOLEON’S MARSHALS.

+-------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+------------
| | | General | General |
| Names. | Born. | of | of | MARSHAL.
| | | Brigade. | Division. |
+-------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+------------
|BERTHIER, |20 Nov. 1753 |22 May 1792 |13 June 1795 |19 May 1804
| Louis Alexandre. | | (Maréchal | |
| | | de Camp) | |
| | | | |
|MURAT, Joachim. |25 March 1767|10 May 1796 |25 July 1799 | „
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|MONCEY, Bon |31 July 1754 |18 Feb. 1794 | 9 June 1794 | „
| Adrien Jeannot. | | | |
| | | | |
|JOURDAN, Jean |29 April 1762|27 May 1793 |30 July 1793 | „
|Baptiste. | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|MASSÉNA, André. | 6 May 1756 |22 Aug. 1793 |20 Dec. 1793 | „
| | | | |
| | | | |
|AUGEREAU, Charles |21 Oct. 1757 | .. |25 Dec. 1793 | „
| Pierre François. | | | |
| | | | |
|BERNADOTTE, Jean |26 Jan. 1763 |26 June 1794 |22 Oct. 1794 | „
| Baptiste Jules. | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|SOULT, Jean de |29 March 1769|11 Oct. 1794 |21 April 1799| „
| Dieu Nicolas. | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|BRUNE, Guillaume |13 May 1763 | .. |17 Aug. 1797 | „
| Marie Anne. | | | |
| | | | |
|LANNES, Jean. |11 April 1769|17 March 1797|10 May 1799 | „
| | | | |
| | | | |
|MORTIER, Adolphe |13 Feb. 1768 |23 Feb. 1799 |25 Sept. 1799| „
| Édouard Casimir | | | |
| Joseph. | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|NEY, Michel. |10 Jan. 1769 | 1 Aug. 1796 |28 March 1799| „
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|DAVOUT, Louis |10 May 1770 |24 Sept. 1794| 3 July 1800 | „
| Nicolas. | | | |
| | | | |
|BESSIÈRES, Jean | 6 Aug. 1768 |18 July 1800 |13 Sept. 1802| „
| Baptiste. | | | |
| | | | |
|KELLERMANN, |28 May 1735 |9 March 1788 |19 March 1792| „
| François | | (Maréchal | (Lieut.- |
| Christophe. | | de Camp) | General) |
| | | | |
|LEFEBVRE, François |15 Oct. 1755 | 2 Dec. 1793 |10 Jan. 1794 | „
| Joseph. | | | |
| | | | |
|PÉRIGNON, Dominique|31 May 1754 | .. |25 Dec. 1793 | „
| Catherine de. | | | |
| | | | |
|SÉRURIER, Jean | 8 Dec. 1742 |22 Aug. 1793 |13 June 1795 | „
| Mathieu | | | |
| Philibert. | | | |
| | | | |
|VICTOR, Victor | 7 Dec. 1764 |20 Dec. 1793 |10 March 1797|13 July 1807
| Claude Perrin, | | | |
| _called_. | | | |
| | | | |
|MACDONALD, Jacques |17 Nov. 1765 |26 Aug. 1793 |28 Nov. 1794 |12 July 1809
| Étienne Joseph | | | |
| Alexandre. | | | |
| | | | |
|OUDINOT, Nicolas |25 April 1767|14 |June 1794|12 April 1799| „
| Charles. | | | |
| | | | |
|MARMONT, Auguste |20 July 1774 |10 June 1798 | 9 Sept. 1800| „
| Frédéric Louis | | | |
| Viesse de. | | | |
| | | | |
|SUCHET, Louis |2 March 1770 |23 March 1798|10 July 1799 | 8 July 1811
| Gabriel. | | | |
| | | | |
|GOUVION-SAINT-CYR, |13 April 1764|10 June 1794 | 2 Sept. 1794|27 Aug. 1812
| Laurent. | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|PONIATOWSKI, | 7 May 1762 | .. | .. | Oct. 1813
| Joseph, Prince. | | | |
| | | | |
|GROUCHY, |23 Oct. 1766 |7 Sept. 1792 |13 June 1795 |17 Apr. 1815
| Emmanuel de. | | | |
+-------------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+------------

APPENDIX V.

NAPOLEON’S MINISTERS DURING THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE 1799–1814.

+-----+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------
| | Foreign Affairs. | Interior. | Finances. | War.
+-----+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------
|1799.|9 Nov. Charles |12 Nov. Pierre Simon|10 Nov. Martin |10 Nov. Louis
| |Maurice de | LAPLACE. | Michel | Alexandre BERTHIER.
| |TALLEYRAND-PÉRIGORD.| (Count 24 April | Charles GAUDIN. |
| |(Prince of Benevento| 1808.) | (Count 26 April |
| | 5 June 1806.) | | 1808; Duke of Gaeta|
| | | | 15 Aug. 1809.) |
| | | | |
| „ | „ |25 Dec. Lucien | „ | „
| | | BONAPARTE. | |
| | | | |
|1800.| „ | „ | „ |12 April. Lazare
| | | | | Nicolas
| | | | | Marguerite CARNOT.
| | | | |
| „ | „ |6 Nov. Jean Antoine | „ |8 Oct. Louis
| | | CHAPTAL. | | Alexandre BERTHIER.
| | | (Count 26 April | | (Prince of
| | | 1808; | | Neufchâtel
| | | Count of Chanteloup| | 13 March 1806;
| | | 25 March 1810.) | | Prince of Wagram
| | | | | 31 Dec. 1809.)
| | | | |
|1801.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1802.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1803.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1804.| „ |1 Aug. Jean Baptiste| „ | „
| | | Nompère de | |
| | | CHAMPAGNY. | |
| | | | |
|1805.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1806.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1807.|8 Aug. Jean Baptiste|9 Aug. Emmanuel | „ |9 Aug. Henrí Jacques
| | Nompère de | CRETET. (Count of | | Guillaume CLARKE.
| |CHAMPAGNY. (Count 24| Champmol 26 | | (Count of Hunebourg
| | April 1808; | April 1808.) | | 24 April 1808; Duke
| | Duke of Cadore | | | of Feltre 15 Aug.
| | 15 Aug. 1809.) | | | 1809.)
| | | | |
|1808.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1809.| „ |1 Oct. Jean Pierre | „ | „
| | | Bachasson de | |
| | | MONTALIVET. | |
| | | (Comte 27 Nov. | |
| | | 1808.) | |
| | | | |
|1810.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1811.|17 April. Hugues | „ | „ | „
| | Bernard MARET. | | |
| | (Count 3 May 1809; | | |
| | Duke of Bassano | | |
| | 15 Aug. 1809.) | | |
| | | | |
|1812.| „ | „ | „ | „
| | | | |
|1813.|20 Nov. Armand | „ | „ | „
| | Augustin Louis | | |
| | CAULAINCOURT. (Duke| | |
| | of Vicenza 7 June | | |
| | 1808.) | | |
| | | | |
|1814.| „ | „ | „ | „
+-----+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------

+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+-----+
| Marine. | Justice. | Police. | Public Worship. | |
+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+-----|
| 24 Nov. Pierre |19 July. Jean | 20 July. Joseph | |1799.|
| Alexandre | Jacques Régis | FOUCHÉ. | | |
| Laurent FORFAIT. | CAMBACÉRES. (Duke | | | |
| | of Parma 24 April | | | |
| | 1808.) | | | |
| | | | | |
| „ |25 Dec. André Joseph| | | „ |
| | ABRIAL. | | | |
| | (Count 26 April | | | |
| | 1808.) | | | |
| „ | | | |1800.|
| | | | | |
| „ | | | | „ |
| | | | | |
|1 Oct. Denis DECRÈS.| | | |1801.|
| (Count June 1808; | | | | |
|Duke 28 April 1813.)| | | | |
| | | | | |
| „ |15 Sept. Claude |15 Sept. (_Ministry | |1802.|
| | Ambroise REGNIER. | abolished._) | | |
| | (Count 24 April | | | |
| |1808; Duke of Massa | | | |
| | 15 Aug. 1809.) | | | |
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | | |1803.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ |10 July. Joseph | July. Jean Étienne |1804.|
| | | FOUCHÉ. (Count 24 | Marie PORTALIS. | |
| | | April 1808; | | |
| | | Duke of Otranto | | |
| | | 15 Aug. 1809.) | | |
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1805.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1806.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | Aug. Félix Julíen |1807.|
| | | | Jean BIGOT DE | |
| | | | PRÉAMENEU. | |
| | | | (Count 24 April | |
| | | | 1808.) | |
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1808.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1809.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | June 8. Anne Jean | „ |1810.|
| | | Marie René SAVARY.| | |
| | | (Duke of Rovigo | | |
| | | 1808.) | | |
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1811.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1812.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | „ | „ |1813.|
| | | | | |
| „ | „ | | |1814.|
+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+-----+

APPENDIX VI.

CONCORDANCE OF THE REPUBLICAN AND GREGORIAN CALENDARS

(Extracted from Stephens’ _History of the French Revolution_, vol. ii.
(Longmans and Co.))

NOTE.--Each month in the Republican Calendar consisted of _thirty_ days.

MAPS.

Map 1. Europe in 1789.
„ 2. Europe in 1803.
„ 3. Europe in 1810.
„ 4. Europe in 1815.

These maps are intended to show the limits of the principal states of
Europe at the beginning of 1789, after the rearrangement in 1803, at
the height of Napoleon’s power in 1810, and according to the settlement
made by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

The same colouring has been preserved through the series of maps in
order that the boundaries of each country may be compared at these
different dates.

The red line in Map 1 marks the boundary of the Holy Roman Empire.

The area in Germany left uncoloured—in all four maps—was occupied by
various states too small in size to be indicated by colours.

[Illustration: EUROPE IN 1789.

Period VII. John Bartholomew & Co., Edin^r.

_The Red line marks the limits of the Holy Roman Empire._]

[Illustration: EUROPE IN 1803.

Period VII. John Bartholomew & Co., Edin^r.]

[Illustration: EUROPE IN 1810.

Period VII. John Bartholomew & Co., Edin^r.]

[Illustration: EUROPE IN 1815.

Period VII. John Bartholomew & Co., Edin^r.]

INDEX

The dates given in brackets are those of the birth and death of the
person indexed; where only the date of death is known it is preceded by
a ♰.

Full names and titles are given.

Proper names commencing with ‘da,’ ‘de,’ ‘d’,’ are indexed under the
succeeding initial letter.

Abdul Hamid (1725–89), Sultan of Turkey, 44.

Abensberg, battle of (20 April 1809), 272.

Abercromby, Sir Ralph, English general (1735–1801), 224.

Aberdeen, George Gordon, Earl of, English diplomatist (1784–1860),
301, 311, 316, 323.

Abo, treaty of (April 1812), 302.

Aboukir Bay, French fleet defeated in, by Nelson (1 August 1798), 195.

Abrantes, Duke of. _See_ Junot.

Abrial, André Joseph, Comte, French statesman (1750–1828), 216.

Acre, siege of (1799), 208.

Acton, Joseph, Neapolitan statesman (1737–1808), 23.

Adda, the, Bonaparte forces the passage of, at Lodi (1796), 174;
Suvórov, at Cassano (1799), 203.

Addington, Henry, Viscount Sidmouth, English statesman (1757–1844),
225.

Additional Act, the, declared by Napoleon (23 April 1815), 352.

Adige, the, Italy up to, ceded to Austria by treaty of Campo-Formio
(1797), 192;
by treaty of Lunéville (1801), 220;
Austrian positions on, turned by Macdonald (1800), 219.

Adlersparre, George, Baron, Swedish general (1760–1837), 279.

Aix-la-Chapelle, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35, 150, 230,
344.

Albuera, battle of (16 May 1811), 297.

Albufera, battle of (26 Dec. 1811), 297.

—— Duke of. _See_ Suchet.

Aldenhoven, battle of (2 Oct. 1794), 150.

Alessandria, fortress built at, by Victor Amadeus III., 27, 203, 204,
218.

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia (1777–1825), attitude at his
accession, 234;
joins coalition against France, 242, 243;
defeated at Austerlitz, 244;
at Eylau and Friedland, 248, 249;
interview with Napoleon at Tilsit, 249, 250;
makes treaty of Tilsit, 250;
conquers Finland, 254, 278;
acquisitions in Poland, and dislike of Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 261;
interview with Napoleon at Erfurt, 262;
conduct in 1809, 274;
war with Turkey, 281;
makes treaty of Bucharest, 281;
refuses a sister to Napoleon, 294;
causes of dissension with Napoleon, 299–301;
makes treaty of Abo with Bernadotte, 302;
summons Stein to his Court, 304;
his policy of retreat before Napoleon (1812), 305;
fights battle of Borodino, 305;
negotiates with Napoleon, 306;
forms friendship with Frederick William III. of Prussia, 308;
distrust of Napoleon, 310;
agrees to Proposals of Frankfort, 316;
desires to invade France, 317;
refuses to retreat, 319, 320;
enters Paris, 329;
influenced by Talleyrand, 329, 330;
speech to the French Senate, 330, 331;
greatness of his share in overthrowing Napoleon, 334;
at the Congress of Vienna, 337;
his desire for the whole of Poland, 339;
forced to give way, 340, 341;
gave constitution to Poland, 342;
protected Murat and Eugène de Beauharnais, 345;
signs treaty against Napoleon (1815), 350;
opposes partition of France, 354;
joins the Holy Alliance, 355.

Alexandria, 195, 224.

Alicante, Bentinck repulsed at (1812), 307.

Alkmaar, Convention of (18 Oct. 1799), 205.

Almeida, siege of (1811), 296.

Alps, French reach the summit of Mont Cenis (1795), 151;
Suvórov crosses (1799), 204, 205;
Bonaparte (1800), 218;
Macdonald (1800), 219.

Alsace, rights of the Princes of the Empire in, 79;
proposals of Mirabeau and Merlin, 80;
letter of Leopold on, 89, 90;
_conclusion_ of the Diet of the Empire on, 108;
invaded by Würmser, 130, 139;
recovered by the French (1794), 140;
proposal to detach from France (1815), 354.

Altdorf, Suvórov reaches (1799), 204.

Altenkirchen, battle of (20 Sept. 1796), 178.

Alton, Richard, Count d’, Austrian general (1732–90), 43, 47, 48, 63,
64.

Alvensleben, Philip Charles, Count von, Prussian statesman
(1745–1802), 153, 170, 179.

Alvinzi (Alvinczy), Joseph, Austrian general (1735–1810), 176.

America, South, 264, 358.

—— United States of. _See_ United States.

_Ami du Peuple,_ Marat’s journal, 61.

Amiens, treaty of (1802), 225.

Amnesty, general, decreed by the Convention (1795), 166.

—— law of, promulgated (1815), 357.

Amsterdam, 32, 149, 255.

Ancients, Council of. _See_ Council.

Ancona, 175, 207, 277.

Angoulême, Maria Thérèse Charlotte, Duchess of, daughter of Louis XVI.
(1778–1851), 168.

—— Louis Antoine, Duke of, son of the Comte d’Artois (1775–1844), 326,
327.

Anhalt, the Dukes of, Princes of the Empire (1789), 34, 343.

Anhalt-Köthen, Louis, Duke of (1761–1819), 293.

Anhalt-Zerbst, the Empress Catherine, a princess of, 18.

Ankarström, John James, Swedish officer (1761–1792), 110.

Anselme, Jacques Bernard Modeste d’, French general (1740–1812), 117.

Anspach, Napoleon violates Prussian neutrality by marching through
(1805), 244.

Antwerp, riot against the Austrians suppressed at (1788), 47;
abandoned to the Belgian patriots (1789), 64;
Napoleon’s buildings at, 276;
Carnot’s defence of (1814), 321;
its retention cause of Napoleon’s fall, 324.

Aoust, Eustache, Comte d’, French general (1764–94), 140.

Appenzell, democratic canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte
(1803), 228.

Aranda, Don Pedro Pablo Abaracay Bolea, Count of, Spanish statesman
(1718–99), 4, 21, 126.

Archbishop-Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, 34, 39, 40.

Arcis-sur-Aube battle of (20 March 1814), 328.

Arcola, battle of (16 Nov. 1796), 176.

Aremberg, Louis Engelbert, Duke of (1750–1820), 93.

—— Prosper Louis, Duke of (1785–1863), 282.

Argau, canton of Switzerland, formed by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
recognised by Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Aristocracy, Napoleon’s, 286.

Armistices: Cherasco (1796), 174;
Foligno (1796), 175;
Giurgevo (1790), 88; Pleswitz (1813), 309.

Arndt, Ernest Maurice, German poet (1769–1862), 291.

Arragon, Suchet’s campaigns in, 275, 295.

Arras, atrocities of Le Bon at (1794), 139.

Artois, Charles Philippe, Comte d’, younger brother of Louis XVI.,
afterwards King Charles X. of France (1757–1836), 55, 59, 102,
139, 167, 172, 351.

Aschaffenburg, principality of, granted to the Elector of Mayence,
225, 260.

Aspern or Essling, battle of (21, 22 May 1809), 273.

Assignats issued in France, 74;
their effect, 98.

Aubert-Dubayet, Jean Baptiste Annibal, French general (1759–1797),
166, 182.

Auckland, William Eden, Lord, English diplomatist (1744–1814), 65, 93.

Auerstädt, battle of (14 Oct. 1806), 247.

—— Duke of. _See_ Davout.

Augereau, Charles Pierre François, Duke of Castiglione, French general
(1757–1816), 191, 219, 321; App. iv.

Augsburg, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34.

—— bishopric of, merged in Bavaria (1803), 227.

—— city of, a free city of the Empire (1789), 35;
taken by Moreau (1800), 219;
maintained as a free city (1803), 226;
Masséna’s headquarters (1809), 272.

Augusta, Princess, of Bavaria married to Eugène de Beauharnais, 258.

Augustus, Prince, of Prussia (1779–1843), 337.

Aulic Council, the, 35.

Austerlitz, battle of (2 Dec. 1805), 244.

Austria, position in 1789, 14–17;
influence in the Empire, 35;
obtained cessions by the treaty of Sistova (1791), 88;
got nothing in the second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
received Cracow, etc. at third partition of Poland (1795), 152;
received Venice for Lombardy by treaty of Campo-Formio (1797), 192;
and by treaty of Lunéville (1801), 220;
obtained Trent and Brixen, but lost much influence in the
resettlement of Germany (1803), 226;
formed into an empire (1805), 236;
lost Venice, Istria, the Tyrol, etc. by treaty of Pressburg (1805),
245;
lost Trieste, Galicia, Salzburg, etc. by treaty of Vienna (1809),
274;
at Congress of Vienna (1814) got back Cracow, 342, and Lombardy and
Venetia, 347.
_See_ Francis II., Joseph II., Leopold II.

Austrian Netherlands. _See_ Belgium.

Auvergne, movement against the Convention in (1793), 131.

Avignon, city of, wishes to join France (1790), 76;
secured to France by first treaty of Paris (1814), 333;
and by second treaty of Paris (1815), 354.

Babeuf, François Noël (Gracchus), French socialist (1764–97), 181.

Badajoz, treaty of (1801), 223;
taken by Soult (1810), 296;
by Wellington (1812), 306.

Baden, condition in 1789, 37;
made an electorate (1803), 225;
increased by the secularisations (1803), 227;
made a grand duchy (1806), 245;
received Ortenau and the Breisgau (1809), 258;
a state of the Confederation of the Rhine (1808), 260;
of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.
_See_ Charles Frederick, Charles Louis Frederick.

Bagration, Peter, Prince, Russian general (1762–1812), 281, 305.

Bailly, Jean Sylvain, French statesman (1736–93), 53, 59, 138.

Baird, Sir David, English general (1757–1829), 224.

Ball, Sir Alexander John, English admiral (1759–1809), 195.

Baltic Sea, effort to exclude English commerce from, 222;
command of, given to Russia and Prussia by the Congress of Vienna,
347.

Bamberg, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34.

—— bishopric of, merged in Bavaria (1803), 227.

Bank of France, founded by Bonaparte, 215.

Bantry Bay, French expedition to (1796), 185.

Barbé-Marbois, François, Comte de, French statesman (1745–1837), 188,
191, 214.

Barclay de Tolly, Michael, Prince, Russian general (1755–1818), 305,
309, 313.

Barentin, Charles Louis François de
Paule de, French minister (1738–1819), 51.

Barère, Bertrand, French orator (1755–1841), 117, 133, 134, 145, 149,
155.

Barnave, Antoine Pierre Joseph
Marie, French politician (1761–93), 100.

Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas,
Comte de, French statesman (1755–1829), 147, 164, 165;
nominates Bonaparte to command the armyof Italy, 174;
his attitude as a Director, 181;
co-operates in _coup d’état_ of Fructidor 1797, 191;
only original Director left (July 1799), 209, 210;
resigns (Nov. 1799), 211.

Barrosa, battle of (5 March 1811), 297.

Bartenstein, treaty of (April 1807), 248.

Barthélemy, François, Marquis de,
French diplomatist (1747–1830), 156, 188, 189, 191.

Basire, Claude, French politician (1764–94), 117.

Basle, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical
prince of the Holy Roman Empire, 34, 41;
with fiefs in Alsace, 79.

—— bishopric of, part ceded to Baden (1803), 227;
part to canton of Berne (1815), 345.

—— canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228.

—— treaties of (1795), 156, 157.

Basque Roads, affair in the (1809), 276.

Bassano, Duke of. _See_ Maret.

Bastille, capture of the (14 July 1789), 57, 58.

Batavian Republic founded (1795), 150;
imitates the French constitutions, 193;
turned into the kingdom of Holland (1806), 254, 255.

Battles: Abensberg (1809), 272;
Albuera (1811), 297;
Albufera (1811), 297;
Aldenhoven (1794), 150;
Alexandria (1801), 224;
Altenkirchen (1796), 178;
Arcis-sur-Aube (1814), 328;
Arcola (1796), 176;
Aspern (Essling) (1809), 273;
Auerstädt (1806), 247;
Austerlitz (1805), 244;
Barrosa (1811), 297;
Bautzen (1813), 309;
Bergen (1799), 205;
Biberach (1800), 219;
Borodino (1812), 305;
Braila (1809), 281;
Brienne (1814), 319;
Burgos (1808), 269;
Busaco (1810), 296;
Cairo (1799), 208;
Caldiero (1796), 176;
Caldiero (1805), 244;
Camperdown (1797), 194;
Cassano (1799), 203;
Castiglione (1796), 175;
Ceva (1796), 174;
Champaubert (1814), 319;
Copenhagen (1801), 222;
Corunna (1809), 270;
Craonne (1814), 328;
Dego (1796), 174;
Dennewitz (1813), 313;
Dresden (1813), 312;
Dubienka (1792), 122;
Eckmühl (1809), 273;
Elchingen (1805), 244;
Engen (1800), 219;
Espinosa (1808), 269;
Essling (Aspern) (1809), 273;
Ettlingen (1796), 178;
Eylau (1807), 248;
Famars (1793), 130;
Figueras (1794), 150;
First of June (1794), 145;
Fleurus (1794), 144;
Foksany (1788), 45;
Friedland (1807), 249;
Fuentes de Onor (1811), 297;
the Geisberg (1793), 140;
Genola (1799), 204;
Giurgevo (1790), 88;
Gross-Beeren (1813), 312;
Gross-Gorschen (Lützen) (1813), 309;
Hanau (1813), 314;
Heliopolis (1800), 224;
Hohenlinden (1800), 219;
Hondschoten (1793), 140;
Jemmappes (1792), 118;
Jena (1806), 247;
Kaiserslautern (1794), 144;
the Katzbach (1813), 312;
Kioge (1807), 252;
Laon (1814), 328;
Leipzig (1813), 314;
Ligny (1815), 352;
Loano (1795), 151, 173;
Lodi (1796), 174;
Lützen (Gross-Gorschen) (1813), 309;
Maciejowice (1794), 152;
Magnano (1799), 202;
Maida (1806), 256;
Marengo (1800), 218;
Matchin (1791), 96;
Medellin (1809), 275;
Medina del Rio Seco (1808), 267;
Millesimo (1796), 174;
the Mincio (1814), 322;
Mœskirchen (1800), 219;
Mondovi (1796), 174;
Montebello (1800), 218;
Montenotte (1796), 174;
Montereau (1814), 319;
Montmirail (1814), 319;
Mount Tabor (1799), 208;
Nangis (1814), 319;
Neerwinden (1793), 127;
Neumarkt (1797), 186;
the Nile (Aboukir Bay) (1798), 195;
the Nive (1813), 316;
the Nivelle (1813), 316;
Novi (1799), 204;
Ocana (1809), 276;
Orthez (1814), 321;
Pacy-sur-Eure (1793), 131;
Paris (1814), 329;
the Pyramids (1798), 195;
Quatre Bras (1815), 352;
Raab (1809), 273;
Raclawice (1794), 151;
Rivoli (1797), 176;
Roliça (1808), 265;
the Rymnik (1788), 45;
Sacilio (1809), 273;
St. Vincent (1797), 183;
Salamanca (1812), 306;
Saorgio (1794), 144;
Silistria (1809), 281;
Stockach (1799), 202;
Svenska Sound (1790), 95;
Talavera (1809), 275, 276;
Tobac (1788), 45;
Tolentino (1815), 346;
Toulouse (1814), 332;
Trafalgar (1805), 245;
the Trebbia (1799), 203;
Tudela (1808), 269;
Unzmarkt (1797), 186;
Valmy (1792), 115;
Valsarno (1813), 315;
Vauchamps (1814), 319;
Vimeiro (1808), 265, 266;
Vittoria (1813), 315;
Wagram (1809), 274;
Waterloo (1815), 353;
Wattignies (1793), 140;
Zielence (1792), 121, 122;
Zurich (1799), 204.

Bautzen, battle of (20 May 1813), 309.

Bavaria, the Emperor Joseph’s designs on, 16, 17;
its Elector also Elector Palatine, 34;
condition in 1789, 37;
invaded by Moreau (1796), 178;
treaty of Pfaffenhofen, 180;
promised to Austria by Bonaparte (1797), 193;
occupied by Moreau (1800), 219;
increased by the secularisations (1803), 227;
invaded by the Austrians (1805), 243;
receives the Tyrol and becomes a kingdom (1806), 245;
receives Salzburg (1809), 257;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
invaded by the Austrians (1809), 272;
great internal reforms, 289;
member of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342;
receives Mayence for the Tyrol (1815), 344. _See_ Charles Theodore,
Maximilian Joseph.

Baylen, capitulation of (1808), 267, 268.

Bayonne besieged by the English (1813, 1814), 316, 321.

Beauharnais, Eugène de, step-son of Napoleon (1781–1824), 236, 238,
239, 244, 255, 256, 273, 308, 315, 321, 322, 345.

Beaulieu, Jean Pierre, Baron de, Austrian general (1725–1820), 174.

Beccaria, Cæsar Bonesana, Marquis de, Italian philosopher (1738–94),
26.

Belgium, opposition to the Emperor Joseph’s reforms in (1788), 15;
his apparent success, 43;
armed resistance in, 47;
abolition of Belgian liberties, 47, 48;
the Austrians driven from (1789), 64;
the Belgian Republic formed (Jan. 1790), 65;
struggle between the Van der Nootists and Vonckists, 92, 93;
reconquered by the Austrians (Dec. 1790), 94;
conquered by the French under Dumouriez (1792), 118;
annexed to the French Republic, 118;
rises against the French (1793), 126;
Dumouriez driven from (1793), 127;
reconquered by the French (1794), 144;
organised as part of the French Republic, 150;
cession to France agreed to by Austria at Leoben, 186;
and at Campo-Formio (1797), 192, 193;
organised into nine French departments, 230;
England insists on its separation from France, 318;
invaded by the Prince of Orange (1814), 321;
Napoleon refuses to give up, 324;
united with Holland into the kingdom of the Netherlands (1815), 344,
360.

Belgrade, taken by the Austrians (1789), 45.

Bellegarde, Henri, Comte de, Austrian general (1755–1831), on the
Mincio (1814), 322.

Belluno, Duke of. _See_ Victor.

Bender, city of, taken by the Russians (1789), 45.

—— Blaise Colombeau, Baron, Austrian general (1713–98), 65, 93, 94.

Benevento, principality of, belonged to the Pope in 1789, 24;
Talleyrand made prince of, 277.

Benezech, Pierre, French administrator (1745–1802), 166.

Benningsen, Levin Augustus Theophilus, Count, Russian general
(1745–1826), 221, 248, 249, 311.

Bentinck, Lord William Charles Cavendish, English general (1774–1839),
307, 315, 322, 346.

Beresford, William Carr, Viscount, English general (1770–1856), 266,
297.

Berg, grand duchy of, created for Murat (1806), its extent, 252;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
conferred on son of Louis Bonaparte (1808), 283.

Bergen, battles of (19 Sept. and 2 Oct. 1799), 205.

Bergen-op-Zoom, English repulsed from (1814), 321.

Berlin, occupied by Napoleon (1806), 247;
decree issued at (1807), 251;
University of, founded, 303, 304;
the French driven from (1813), 308.

Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste Jules, Prince of Ponte Corvo (1806), Prince
Royal of Sweden (1810), King Charles XIV. of Sweden (1818),
(1764–1844), French ambassador to Austria (1798), 197;
insulted at Vienna, 198;
Minister of War (1799), 210;
attacked by the Russians (1807), 247;
commanded the Saxons at Wagram (1809), 274;
Prince of Ponte Corvo, 277;
elected Prince Royal of Sweden (1810), 279;
signs treaty of Abo with Emperor Alexander (1812), 302;
intrigues with Napoleon, 307, 308;
invaded Germany (1813), 309;
wins battle of Gross-Beeren, 312;
and of Dennewitz, 313;
defeated the Danes and exchanged Pomerania for Norway (1814), 320;
rejected for throne of France, 330;
got Norway, but had to give up Guadeloupe (1815), 347;
one of Napoleon’s marshals, App. iv.

Bernard, Great St., Bonaparte crosses (1800), 218.

—— Little St., French reach the summit of (1795), 151.

—— of Saintes, Adrien Antoine, French politician (1750–1819), 139.

Berne, chief oligarchical canton of Switzerland in 1789, 41;
occupies Geneva (1792), 125;
occupied by the French (1798), 199;
Vaud and Argau separated from (1803), 228;
obtained part of the Bishopric of Basle (1815), 345.

Bernis, François Joachim de Pierre, Cardinal de, French statesman
(1715–94), 19.

Bernstorf, Count Andrew, Danish statesman (1735–97), 32, 46, 120.

—— Count Christian, Danish statesman (1769–1835), 338.

Berthier, Louis Alexandre, Prince of Neufchâtel and Wagram, French
general (1753–1815), 200, 216, 241, 239, 283, App. iv.

—— de Sauvigny, Louis Bénigne François, French administrator
(1742–89), 59.

Bessarabia, conquered by the Russians under Potemkin (1789), 45;
under Bagration (1810), 281;
part of, ceded to Russia by treaty of Bucharest, 281.

Bessières, Jean Baptiste, Duke of Istria, French general (1768–1813),
267, 297, 309, App. iv.

Beugnot, Jacques Claude, Comte, French administrator (1761–1835), 331.

Biberach, battle of (9 May 1800), 219.

Bidassoa, the passage of, forced by the Spaniards (1739), 130;
by the French (1794), 140.

Bigot de Préameneu, Félix Julien Jean, Comte, French jurist
(1747–1825), 215.

Bilbao, taken by the French (1795), 151.

Billaud-Varenne, Jacques Nicolas, French statesman (1756–1819), 193,
134, 138, 139, 147, 149, 155.

Biron, Armand Louis de Gontaut, Duc de, French general (1747–93), 138.

Bischofswerder, Hans Rudolf, Baron von, Prussian statesman (♰1803),
31, 87.

Bishops, the Prince of Germany, 34, 39.

Black Legion of Brunswick raised, 293.

Blake, Joachim, Spanish general (♰1827), defeated at Albufera (1811),
247.

Blücher, Gebhard Lebrecht von, Prince of Wahlstatt, Prussian general
(1742–1819), 309, 312, 318, 319, 328, 329, 350, 352, 353, 355.

Boeckh, Augustus, German scholar (1785–1861), 304.

Bohemia, opposition to Joseph’s reforms in, 15;
the reforms suspended, 66;
pacified by Leopold, 84.

Boissy-d’Anglas, François Antoine, Comte, French statesman
(1756–1826), 155, 165, 168, 182.

Bologna, belonged to the Pope, 24;
occupied by Bonaparte (1796), 175;
merged in the Cisalpine Republic, 192;
in the kingdom of Italy, 255;
restored to the Pope (1815), 347.

Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen of Naples. _See_ Caroline.

Bonaparte, Elisa (1777–1820), 283.

—— Jerome (1784–1860), King of Westphalia. _See_ Jerome.

—— Joseph (1768–1844), 239 (1806), 255. _See_ Joseph.

—— Louis (1778–1846), 239, 254, 255. _See_ Louis.

—— Lucien (1775–1840), 210, 216, 223.

—— Napoleon (1769–1821) at the siege of Toulon (1793), 140;
brings up artillery for the defence of the Convention (1795), 164;
defeats the insurgents of Vendémiaire, 165;
appointed to the command of the army of Italy (1796), 174;
defeats the Sardinians, 174;
conquers Lombardy, 174;
makes armistice with the Pope, 175;
defeats the Austrians at Castiglione, 175, at Arcola and Rivoli,
176;
invades the Tyrol and signs Preliminaries of Leoben, 186;
opposed the Clichians, 189;
sends Augereau to Paris to help the Directors, 191;
formed the Cisalpine Republic, 192;
signs treaty of Campo-Formio (1797), 192;
commands army of the Interior, 194;
takes Malta and invades Egypt (1798), 195;
campaign in Syria (1799), 208;
returns to France, 208;
makes _coup d’état_ of 18 Brumaire, 210, 211;
provisional First Consul, 211;
First Consul, 214;
internal policy, 215;
forms the Bank of France and Code Civil, 215;
foreign policy, 216, 217;
wins battle of Marengo and conquers Italy, 218;
First Consul of the Cisalpine Republic, 220;
his Spanish policy, 223;
concludes the treaty of Amiens (1802), 225;
reorganises Switzerland, 228;
Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, 229;
makes Concordat with the Pope, 229;
forms the prefectures, 230;
educational reforms, 231;
First Consul for life (1802), 232;
arrests the English in France and occupies Hanover (1803), 233;
execution of the Duc d’Enghien (1804), 235;
Emperor of the French (1804), 236. _See_ Napoleon.

—— Pauline, Princess Borghese (1780–1825), 283.

Bonn, the university of, 40, 150.

Bonnier-d’Alco, Ange Elisabeth Louis Antoine, French politician
(1749–1799), 202.

Bordeaux, 131, 327.

Borodino, battle of (7 Sept. 1812), 305.

Bosnia, invaded by the Austrians (1788), 43.

Bouillé, François Claude Amour, Marquis de, French general
(1739–1800), 72, 97, 98, 100.

Boulogne, Napoleon’s camp at (1804–5), 241, 242.

Bourbon, Isle of (Réunion), restored to France (1815), 348.

Bourdon, Léonard Jean Joseph, French politician (1758–1816), 147.

Bourdon de Vatry, Marc Antoine, French administrator (1761–1828), 210.

Bourges, federalist army proposed to be formed at (1793), 131, 132.

Bournonville, Pierre de Riel, Comte de, French general (1752–1821),
330.

Brabant, Constitution of, abolished by the Emperor Joseph (1789), 47.

Braila, battle of (1810), 281.

Branicki, Francis Xavier, Polish statesman (♰1819), 121.

Braschi, Giovanni Angelo. _See_ Pius VI., Pope.

Breda, 48, 64.

Breisgau, the, granted to the Duke of Modena (1803), 226;
to the Grand Duke of Baden (1805), 258.

Bremen, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
retained its independence (1803), 226;
annexed to Napoleon’s Empire (1810), 282;
one of the four free cities of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
343.

Brescia formed part of the Cisalpine Republic, 192.

Brest, blockaded by English fleet, 184;
French fleet at, unable to break the blockade (1805), 242.

Brienne, battle of (29th Jan. 1814), 319.

Brigandage rife in France under the Directory, 181;
put down by the Consulate, 215;
rife in Calabria, 256.

Brissot, Jean Pierre, French politician (1754–1793), 101, 106, 107,
116, 129.

Brissotin section of the Girondin party in the Convention, 116.

Brittany, opposition to the Convention in, 131;
pacified by Hoche, 180, 181.

Brixen, bishopric of, united to Austria (1803), 226.

Broglie, Victor François, Duc de, French general (1718–1804), 56.

Bruges, 64.

Bruix, Eustache, French admiral (1759–1805), 196.

Brumaire, _coup d’état_ of the 18th (1799), 210, 211.

Brune, Guillaume Marie Anne, French general (1763–1815), 199, 205,
219, 254, 356, App. iv.

Brunswick, Duchy of, merged in kingdom of Westphalia (1806), 258;
a member of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.

Brunswick-Lüneburg, Duke of. _See_ Charles William Ferdinand.

Brunswick-Oels, Duke of. _See_ Frederick William.

Brussels, 15, 47, 48, 64, 94, 118, 144.

Bucharest, 45, 281.

Buenos Ayres, 264.

Bülow, Frederick William von, Prussian general (1755–1816), 309, 312,
313;
detached to join Blücher in France (1814), 319, 320, 328.

Burgos, battle of (10 Nov. 1808), 269;
Wellington fails to take (1812), and retreats from, 307.

Burke, Edmund, English orator (1730–97), 120.

Burrard, Sir Harry, English general (1755–1815), 266.

Busaco, battle of (27 Sept. 1810), 296.

Buttmann, Philip Charles, German scholar (1764–1829), 304.

Buzot, François Nicolas Léonard, French politician (1760–94), 116.

Buzotins, a section of the Girondins, 116.

Cabarrus, François, Spanish statesman (1752–1810), 21.

Cadiz, besieged by the French (1810–12), 296, 297.

Cadore, Duke of. _See_ Champagny.

Cadoudal, Georges, Chouan leader (1771–1804), 234, 235.

Caen, army organised by the Girondins against the Convention at
(1793), 131.

Caillard, Antoine Bernard, French diplomatist (1737–1807), 215.

Cairo, taken by Bonaparte (1798), 195;
the Mamelukes defeated at (1799), 208;
taken by the English (1801), 224.

Caisse d’amortissement founded, 287, 288.

Calabria, brigandage in, encouraged by the English, 256.

Calder, Sir Robert, English admiral (1745–1818), his action (1805),
242.

Caldiero, battle of (12 Nov. 1796), 176;
battle of (30 Oct. 1805), 244.

Cambacérès, Jean Jacques Régis, Duke of Parma, French statesman
(1753–1824), 156, 159, 166, 182, 210, 214, 239, 287, 357.

Cambon, Joseph, French statesman (1754–1820), 129, 133, 288.

Cambrai, 353.

Camperdown, battle of (11 Oct. 1797), 194.

Campo-Chiaro, Duke of, Neapolitan statesman, 338, 346.

Campo-Formio, treaty of (17 Oct. 1797), 192, 193.

Campomanes, Don Pedro Rodriguez, Count of, Spanish statesman
(1723–1802), 21.

Canning, George, English statesman (1770–1827), 295.

Cantons of Switzerland, 228, 345.

Cape of Good Hope taken by the English (1805), 264;
retained by them (1815), 348.

Capitulations: of Ulm (1805), 243;
of Baylen (1808), 267, 268;
of Kulm (1813), 313.

Capo d’Istria, John, Count, Greek statesman (1776–1831), 337.

Carniola ceded to Napoleon (1809), 274.

Carnot, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite, French statesman (1753–1823), 133,
134, 140, 148, 165, 177, 181, 191, 214, 216, 321, 352, 357.

Caroline, Marie, Queen of the Two Sicilies (1752–1814), 23.

—— Murat, Queen of Naples (1782–1839), 322, 345.

Carrier, Jean Baptiste, French politician (1756–1794), 139, 141, 149.

Cassano, battle of (27 April 1799), 203.

Castiglione, battle of (15 Aug. 1796), 175.

—— Duke of. _See_ Augereau.

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, Marquis of Londonderry, English
statesman (1769–1822), his views on the way to carry on the war
with Napoleon, 295;
returns to office (1812), 301;
his policy to form a fresh coalition, 301, 302;
efforts to get Austria to join (1813), 311;
sends expedition to Holland, 314;
sent with full powers to France (1814), 318;
persists in the war and calls up reinforcements for Blücher, 319,
320;
opposition to the retention of Belgium by France, 324;
signs treaty of Chaumont, 327;
friendship with Metternich, 331;
signs treaty of Paris, 332;
one of the two men who did most to overthrow Napoleon, 334;
English representative at the Congress of Vienna (1814), 337;
signs treaty with France and Austria against Russia and Prussia,
340;
disavows Bentinck’s Italian proclamation, 346;
gets the Slave Trade condemned, 349;
succeeded by Wellington at Vienna, 349;
opposes Prussia’s schemes for punishing France (1815), 354;
refuses to join the Holy Alliance, 355.

Catalonia, 144, 150, 151, 275.

Cathcart, William Schaw, Lord, English general (1755–1843), 264, 301,
323, 337.

Catherine II., Empress of Russia (1729–96) a benevolent despot, 4;
attitude to other Powers of Europe (1789), 12, 13;
alliance with Joseph II., 17;
extension of Russia under, 18;
policy in Poland, 18;
internal policy, 19;
war with the Turks (1789–90), 43–45;
with the Swedes (1789–90), 45, 46;
deprived of the Austrian alliance by Leopold, 95;
makes peace with Sweden at Verela (1790), 95, 96;
with the Turks at Jassy (1792), 96;
attitude towards the French Revolution, 109, 121;
invades Poland (1793), 121;
signs second partition of Poland, 122;
asserts she is fighting Jacobinism in Poland, 125;
invades Poland (1795), 151;
extinguishes independence of Poland, 152;
receives the Comte d’Artois, 172;
death (1796), 185.

Catherine, Grand Duchess of Oldenburg, Queen of Würtemburg
(1788–1819), 300, 337.

—— Princess, of Würtemburg (1783–1835), marries Jerome Bonaparte, King
of Westphalia (1807), 258.

Cattaro, mouths of the river, ceded by Russia to France at Tilsit
(1807), 250.

Caulaincourt, Armand Augustin Louis de, Duke of Vicenza, French
statesman (1772–1827), 234, 239, 311, 316, 317, 323, 324, 329,
331, 332.

Cayenne restored to France (1814), 348.

Ceva, battle of (16 April 1796), 174.

Ceylon, taken by the English (1796), 264;
retained in 1815, 348.

Chabot, François, French politician (1759–94), 117.

Chalier, Marie Joseph, French politician (1747–93), 131.

Chambéry, annexed to France (1814), 333;
restored to King of Sardinia (1815), 354.

‘Chambre Introuvable’ (1815), 357, 358.

Champagny, Jean Baptiste Nompère de, Duke of Cadore, French statesman
(1756–1834), 241.

Champaubert, battle of (10 Feb. 1814), 319.

Champ de Mars, Paris, massacre of (17 July 1791), 101.

Championnet, Jean Etienne, French general (1762–1800), 200, 203, 204.

Chaptal, Jean Antoine, Comte, French administrator (1756–1832), 216,
241.

Charles III., King of Spain (1716–88), benevolent despot, his reforms,
4, 21;
commenced his career as a reforming monarch at Naples, 23.

—— IV., King of Spain (1748–1819), 21, 77, 79, 193, 126, 157, 183,
223, 232, 252, 253, 267.

—— XIII., King of Sweden, formerly Duke of Sudermania (1748–1818), 46,
110, 120, 171, 253, 279.

—— II., King of Etruria (1799–1863), 253, 347.

Charles Augustus, Duke of Saxe-Weimar (1757–1828), 38, 337, 342.

—— Emmanuel IV., King of Sardinia (1751–1819), 200.

—— Eugène, Duke of Würtemburg, (1728–93), 37, 38.

—— Frederick, Margrave of Baden-Baden and Baden-Durlach (1728–1811),
37, 79, 167, 180, 225, 227, 245, 258, 260.

—— Louis Frederick, Grand Duke of Baden (1786–1816), 258, 337, 342.

—— Theodore, Elector of Bavaria and Elector Palatine (1729–99), 37, 172, 180.

—— William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Prussian general
(1735–1806), 32, 113, 114, 115, 116, 126, 246.

—— Archduke, Austrian general (1771–1847), elected Grand Duke of
Belgium (1790), 94;
commands the Austrian army in Germany (1796), 177;
repulses Jourdan and Moreau, 178;
effect of his success, 180;
commands Austrian army in the Tyrol (1797), 185;
defeated by Bonaparte, and signs Preliminaries of Leoben, 186;
defeats Jourdan (1799), 202;
and advances to the Rhine, 204;
forced to retreat, 205;
campaign against Moreau (1800), superseded, 219;
invades Italy (1805), 243;
defeated at Caldiero, 244;
reorganises Austrian army, 271;
invades Bavaria (1809), 272;
defeated at Eckmühl, 273;
fights battle of Aspern, 273;
defeated at Wagram, 274.

Charter, the, of 4 June 1814, 350.

Chatham, John Pitt, Earl of, English general (1756–1820), 276.

Châtillon, Congress of (1814), 323, 324.

Chaumette, Pierre Gaspard, French politician (1763–94), 141.

Chaumont, treaty of (1 March 1814), 327, 328.

Chauvelin, François Bernard, Marquis de, French politician
(1766–1832), 120.

Cherasco, armistice of (28 April 1796), 174.

Chernishev, Alexander, Count, Russian general, 308, 312, 313, 337.

Chestret, M., elected burgomaster of Liége (1789), 49.

Chiaramonti, Gregorio Barnaba Luigi. _See_ Pius VII., Pope.

Choczim, taken by the Austrians and Russians (1788), 43.

Choiseul, Etienne François, Duc de, French statesman (1719–85), made
the ‘Pacte de Famille’ with Spain, 14.

Christian VII., King of Denmark (1749–1808), 32, 46, 171.

Cintra, Convention of (30 Aug. 1808), 266.

Circles, the executive divisions of the Holy Roman Empire, 36;
abolished (1803), 225.

Cisalpine Republic, 192, 203, 220, 255.

Ciudad Rodrigo, taken by Wellington (Jan. 1812), 306.

Clancarty, Richard Trench, Earl of, English diplomatist (1767–1837),
337.

Clarke, Henri Jacques Guillaume, Duke of Feltre, French general
(1765–1818), 241.

Clavière, Etienne, French politician (1735–93), 41, 114, 125.

Clement Wenceslas of Saxony, Archbishop-Elector of Trèves in 1789, 40.

Clementine Museum at Rome reorganised by Pope Pius VI., 24.

Clerfayt, François Sébastien Charles Joseph de Croix, Comte de,
Austrian general (1733–98), 88, 150, 172.

Clichian party, 182, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191.

Club, Cordeliers. _See_ Cordeliers.

—— de Clichy, 182, 187.

—— Jacobin. _See_ Jacobin.

—— of 1789, 101.

Cobenzl, Count Louis, Austrian statesman (1753–1808), 192, 220, 233,
243, 270.

—— Count Philip, Austrian statesman (1741–1810), 126.

Coblentz, 150, 230, 344.

Coburg, Frederick Josias of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, Prince of, Austrian
general (1737–1815), 43, 44, 45, 88, 127, 130, 144.

Cochon de Lapparent, Charles, French administrator (1749–1825), 182,
191.

Cochrane, Thomas, Lord, Earl of Dundonald, English admiral
(1775–1860), 276.

Code, Civil, bases of, laid by the Convention, 156;
Bonaparte’s commission to draw up, 215.

Codes of law promulgated by Napoleon, 287.

Colli, Louis Leonard Gaspard Venance, Baron, Sardinian general
(1760–1811), 174.

Colloredo, Count Jerome, Prince-Archbishop of Salzburg in 1789, 39.

Collot-d’Herbois, Jean Marie, French politician (1750–96), 117, 133,
134, 138, 147, 149, 155.

Cologne, Archbishop of, an Elector in the Holy Roman Empire, 34.

—— archbishopric of, excellently ruled in 1789, 40;
merged in France, 225;
ceded to Prussia (1815), 344.

—— city of, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
taken by the French (1794), 150;
ceded to Prussia (1815), 344.

Committee of General Defence, 127.

—— of General Security, 135, 136, 146, 148.

—— of Mercy, 143.

—— of Public Safety, the first chosen (April 1793), 127, 128;
its work, 132, 133;
formation of the Great, 133;
growth of its power, 134;
its system of government—the Reign of Terror, 135;
its instruments—the Committee of General Security, 135, 136;
the deputies on mission, 136, 137;
laws of the Suspects and the Maximum, 137;
the Revolutionary Tribunal, 137, 138;
its power organised, 138, 139;
its success, 139–141;
opposition to, 141–143;
overthrows the Hébertists, 142;
the Dantonists, 145;
its triumphs on land, 143, 144;
failure at sea, 144, 145;
Robespierre’s position in, 146;
renewed by a quarter monthly after Robespierre’s fall, 148;
its supremacy maintained, but its system changed, 148, 149;
filled by members of the Plain, 156.

Commune of Paris overthrows the monarchy (Aug. 1792), 115;
its energy, 114;
insists on expulsion of the Girondins (June 1793), 129;
becomes Hébertist and opposes the Committee of Public Safety, 141;
becomes Robespierrist, and is decimated by the Convention, 147.

Conclusum of the Empire, how arrived at, 33, 34.

Concordat between the Pope and Bonaparte (1802), 229, 230, 277.

Condé, taken by the Austrians (1793), 130.

Condé, Louis Joseph de Bourbon, Prince de, French general (1736–1818),
106, 167, 178, 206, 207.

Condillac, Etienne-Bonnot, Abbé de, French philosopher (1715–80), 25.

Conegliano, Duke of. _See_ Moncey.

Confederation, Germanic. _See_ Germanic.

—— of the Rhine. _See_ Rhine.

—— of Switzerland. _See_ Switzerland.

—— of Targovitsa, asks Catherine to intervene in Poland (1795), 121.

Conferences:
Erfurt (1808), 262;
Pilnitz (1791), 102;
Reichenbach, (1790), 87;
Tilsit (1807), 249, 250.

Congresses:
Châtillon (1814), 323, 324;
the Hague (1799), 93, 94;
Prague (1813), 311;
Rastadt (1798), 186, 192, 202;
Reichenbach (1790), 87;
Sistova (1790), 88;
Vienna (1814–15), 336–350.

Consalvi, Hercules, Cardinal, Italian statesman (1757–1824), 277, 337.

Conscription, established in France (1798), 201;
in Germany, 289.

Constance, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34.

—— bishopric of, merged in Grand Duchy of Baden (1803), 227.

—— city of, taken by Massena (1799), 205.

Constantine, Grand Duke, brother of the Emperor Alexander (1779–1831),
312, 337.

Constantinople, great riot at (1807), 281.

Constituent Assembly:
the Tiers Etat declares itself the National Assembly (June 1789),
53;
oath of the Tennis Court, and Séance Royale, 54;
session of 4 August, 60;
makes the Constitution of 1791, 68–73;
authority passed to, 97;
discredited the executive, 98;
dissolved (1791), 105.

Constitution, the French, of 1791, 68–73;
revised, 101;
completed, 103;
compared with the Polish of 1791, 104, 105;
its local arrangements confirmed by the Constitution of the Year
III., 162.

—— the French, of 1793, 132, 138, 141.

—— the French, of the Year III. (1795), 156, 159, 160, 161, 162.

—— the French, of the Year VIII. (1799), 212–214;
the Consulate, 213;
the Legislature, 214, 215.

—— the French, of the Empire (1805), 240.

—— the French, promised by the Charter (1814), 350.

—— the Polish, of 1791, 104, 105;
abrogated, 122.

Consulate, the, in France, 213.

Consuls, the (1799–1804), Bonaparte, Cambacérès, Le Brun, 214.

—— the Provisional (1799), Bonaparte, Sieyès, Roger Ducos, 211.

Continental Blockade against England, 250, 251, 255, 261, 282, 300,
301.

Convention, National, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 127, 132, 134, 147,
155, 163, 164, 165, 166.

Conventions: Alexandria (1800), 218;
Alkmaar (1799), 205;
Cintra (1808), 268;
Leoben (1797), 186;
Reichenbach (1790), 87, 88;
Tauroggen (1812), 308.

Copenhagen, battle of (2 April 1801), 222;
bombarded and the Danish fleet seized by the English (1807), 252.

Cordeliers Club at Paris, 101, 141.

Corfu, occupied by the French (1797), 192.
_See_ Ionian Islands.

Cornwallis, Charles, Marquis, English general (1738–1805), 197.

Corsica, ceded to France by Genoa (1768), 27;
occupied by the English (1793), 145;
abandoned by them (1796), 183.

Corunna, battle of (16 Jan. 1809), 270.

_Corvée_, or forced labour, 5, 6, 16.

Council of Ancients, established in France (1795), 161, 162, 189, 190,
209, 210, 211.

Council of Five Hundred, established in France (1795), 161, 162, 182,
189, 190, 209, 210, 211.

—— of State, established in France under the Consulate (1799), 213,
231, 240.

Court, Napoleon’s, 238, 239, 285, 286.

Couthon, Georges Auguste, French politician (1756–94), 133, 135, 147.

Cracow, university of, reorganised, 104;
Kosciuszko raises standard of Polish independence at (1794), 151;
given to Austria at third partition of Poland (1795), 152;
joined to Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1809), 274;
given to Austria as a free city (1815), 342.

Cradock, Sir John Francis, Lord Howden, English general (1762–1839),
269, 275.

Craonne, battle of (7 March 1814), 328.

Croatia ceded to Napoleon (1809), 274.

Cuesta, Don Gregorio Garcia de la, Spanish general (1740–1812), 267,
275, 276.

Curaçao, restored to Holland by England (1815), 348.

Custine, Adam Philippe, Comte de, French general (1740–93), 118, 138.

Czartoryski, Prince Adam George, Polish statesman (1770–1865), 337,
339.

Dalberg, Charles Theodore de, German prelate (1744–1817),
Co-adjutor-Archbishop-Elector of Mayence in 1789, 39;
retained as Arch-Chancellor of the Empire with new territory (1803),
225;
Grand Duke of Frankfort (1806), 259;
received Fulda and Hanau and became Prince Primate of the
Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
suggested that Napoleon should be Emperor of Germany, 302;
lost his territorial sovereignty (1815), 343.

—— Emeric Joseph, Duc de, French statesman (1773–1833), 330, 338.

Dalmatia, belonged to Venice in 1789, 27;
ceded to Austria (1797), 192;
annexed by Napoleon (1805), 245.
_See_ Illyrian Provinces.

—— Duke of. _See_ Soult.

Dalrymple, Sir Hew Whiteford, English general (1750–1830), 266.

Danton, George Jacques, French statesman (1759–94), 101, 107, 114,
117, 120, 127, 129, 133, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143.

Dantzic promised to Prussia by the treaty of Warsaw, 85;
the Poles refuse to surrender, 87;
given to Prussia at second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
besieged and taken by the French (1806), 247, 248;
French garrison left in 1812, 308;
besieged (1812–14), 319.

—— Duke of. _See_ Lefebvre.

Danubian Principalities, the, promised to Alexander by Napoleon
(1807), 250.

Dardanelles, the, forced by an English fleet (1807), 280.

Daru, Pierre Antoine Noël Bruno, Comte, French administrator
(1767–1829), 241.

Daunou, Pierre Claude François, French politician (1761–1840), 156.

Dauphiné, influence of the Assembly in (1788), on the elections to the
States-General in France, 51.

David, Jacques Louis, French painter (1748–1825), 357.

Davout, Louis Nicolas, Duke of Auerstädt, Prince of Eckmühl, French
general (1770–1823), 247, 272, 319, 320, App. iv.

Debry, Jean Antoine, French politician (1760–1834), 202.

Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), 60.

—— of Saint Ouen (1814), 332, 333.

Decrès, Denis, Duke, French admiral (1761–1820), 216, 240.

Defermon, Joseph, Comte, French administrator (1756–1831), 240.

Dego, battle of (15 April 1796), 174.

Delacroix, Charles, French politician (1740–1805), 166, 189, 190.

Demarcation, line of, protecting Northern Germany, agreed to at treaty
of Basle between France and Prussia (1795), 157;
its effect on the position of Prussia, 170;
proposal to extend (1796), 179;
violated by the occupation of Hanover (1804), 242;
this violation leads Prussia to prepare for war, 246.

Denmark, under Russian influence in 1789, 13;
its prosperity and reforms, 32;
the king a member of the Holy Roman Empire as Duke of Holstein, 34;
attacks Sweden (1788), but forced to make peace, 46;
remains neutral during the general war with France, 120, 124, 171;
joins League of the North and is attacked by England (1801), 222;
Copenhagen bombarded and the Danish fleet seized by England (1807),
254;
Sweden declares war against (1808), 279;
a faithful ally of Napoleon, 302;
invaded by Bernadotte and forced to exchange Norway for Swedish
Pomerania (1814), 320;
gets the Duchy of Lauenburg for Swedish Pomerania (1815), 347;
cedes Heligoland to England (1815), 348.

Dennewitz, battle of (6 Sept. 1813), 313.

Deputies of the Convention sent on mission, 128;
put down the Girondin movement, 131;
an instrument of the Reign of Terror; their work—in the provinces,
136;
with the armies, 136, 137.

Desaix, Louis Charles Antoine, French general (1768–1800), 178, 208,
219.

Desmoulins, Camille, French politician (1762–94), 56, 133, 142, 143.

Despots, the benevolent, of the eighteenth century, 4, 5;
the Emperor Joseph II., 15, 16;
the Empress Catherine of Russia, 19;
Charles III. of Spain, 21;
Leopold of Tuscany, 24;
Ferdinand of Parma, 25;
Frederick the Great of Prussia, 29;
Gustavus III. of Sweden, 33;
Charles Theodore of Bavaria and Charles Frederick of Baden, 37.

Deux-Ponts (Zweibrücken), duchy of, 38, 79;
merged in France (1803), 227.

Diderot, Denis, French philosopher (1713–84), 4, 9, 19.

Diet, the Imperial, of the Holy Roman Empire (Reichstag), 33, 35.

Diet, the, of the Confederation of the Rhine (1806), 260.

—— the, of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Dignitaries, the Grand, of Napoleon’s Empire, 239.

Dillon, Arthur, French general (1750–94), 115.

—— Theobald, French general (1743–92), 111.

Directors, the, of the French Republic (1795–99): elected Oct. 1795,
Barras, Carnot, Letourneur, Revellière-Lépeaux, Reubell, 165, 166;
May 1797, Barthélémy succeeds Letourneur, 188;
Sept. 1797, François de Neufchâteau and Merlin of Douai succeed
Barthélémy and Carnot, 191;
May 1798, Treilhard succeeds François de Neufchâteau, 195;
May 1799, Sieyès succeeds Reubell, 209;
June 1799, Ducos, Gohier, and Moulin succeed Merlin of Douai,
Revellière-Lépeaux, and Treilhard, 211.

Directory, the, its functions as established by the Constitution of
the Year III., 160, 161;
foreign policy left to Reubell, 169, 179;
military affairs to Carnot, 177;
its internal policy, 180, 181;
struggle with the Clichians, 189, 190;
_coup d’état_ of Fructidor 1797, 191;
interferes in the elections of 1798 to the Legislature, 196;
its weakness (1799), 209;
struggle with the Legislature (1799), 209;
abolished 18 Brumaire (1799), 211.

Dombrowski, John Henry, Polish general (1755–1818), 206.

‘Dotations,’ 286.

Dresden, battle of (27 Aug. 1813), 312.

Drouet, Jean Baptiste, French politician (1763–1824), 168.

Dubienka, battle of (17 July 1792), 122.

Dubitza taken by the Austrians (1788), 43.

Dubois-Crancé, Edmond Louis Alexis, French politician (1747–1814),
210.

Duckworth, Sir John Thomas, English admiral (1747–1817), 280.

Ducos, Roger, French politician (1754–1816), 209, 211.

Dugommier, Jean François Coquille, French general (1721–94), 140, 144,
150, 151.

Dumont, André, French politician (1764–1836), 139.

Dumouriez, Charles François, French general (1739–1823), 110, 111,
112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 126, 127.

Duncan, Adam, Viscount, English admiral (1731–1804), 193, 194.

Dunkirk besieged by the Duke of (1793), 130;
relieved by Houchard, 140.

‘Duodecimo duchies’ of Germany in 1789, 40.

Duphot, Léonard, French general (1770–97), 200.

Dupont de l’Étang, Pierre, Comte, French general (1765–1838), 267,
268, 331.

Dufort, Amédee Bretagne Malo, Comte de, French courtier (1770–1836),
99.

Duroc, Géraud Christophe Michel, Duke of Friuli, French general
(1772–1813), 217, 234, 239.

Düsseldorf, 37, 172, 259.

Ecclesiastical princes of the Holy Roman Empire, 34, 39, 40;
their states secularised (1803), 170.

Eckmühl, battle of (22 April 1809), 273.

—— Prince of. _See_ Davout.

Education, national system established before 1789 in Spain, 21;
in Portugal, 22;
in Tuscany, 24;
in Parma, 25;
in Lombardy, 26;
in Denmark, 32;
in Baden, 37;
attempted in Poland, 104;
reforms in, attempted by the Convention in France, 156;
Bonaparte’s scheme of, 231;
Napoleon’s system of, 258;
established in Prussia by Humboldt, 303, 304.

Egypt, conquered by Bonaparte (1798), 195;
his administration of, and reconquest (1799), 208;
French expelled from, by the English (1801), 224;
failure of English expedition to (1808), 264.

Ehrenbreitstein, fortress, taken by Marceau (1795), 172.

Elba, declared a French island, 230;
granted to Napoleon (1814), 332;
his escape from (1815), 349, 351.

Elchingen, battle of (20 Oct. 1805), 244.

—— Duke of. _See_ Ney.

Elections, the, to the States-General in France (1789), 50, 51.

Electors, the eight, of the Holy Roman Empire in 1789, 34;
the ten established in 1803, 225.

Elizabeth, Madame, sister of Louis XVI. (1764–94), 61, 68.

Elliot, Hugh, English diplomatist (1752–1830), 78.

Elsinore, batteries at, passed by the English fleet (1801), 222.

Elten, abbey of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227;
and again (1815), 344.

Elwangen, the Abbot of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34.

_Emigrés_, Belgian, strong measures taken against (1789), 48.

—— French, 59, 63, 81, 97, 106, 108, 109, 113, 137, 154, 166, 167,
169, 172, 188, 214, 215, 351, 357, 358.
_See_ Condé.

Emperor of the French, Napoleon declares himself (1804), 236;
refuses to be Emperor of Germany, 302.

—— Holy Roman, position of, 34;
Francis II. abandons the title of (1804), 236.
_See_ Francis II., Joseph II., Leopold II.

Empire, Holy Roman, 17, 33–36, 79–80, 108, 121, 193, 225–227.

—— Napoleon’s, its establishment, 237, 238;
Grand Dignitaries of, 239;
institutions and administrative system, 240;
greatest extension of (1810), 282, 283.

Engen, battle of (3 May 1800), 219.

Enghien, Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duc d’ (1722–1804), shot at
Vincennes, 235.

England, condition of, 8;
Member of the Triple Alliance, 13, 32;
alliance with Portugal, 21;
condition in 1789, 27, 28;
looks favourably on the French Revolution, 63;
the affair of Nootka Sound, 77, 78;
the Emperor Leopold appeals to, 86;
attitude towards the French Republic, 120;
France declares war against (1793), 120;
paymaster of the coalition against France, 125, 126;
occupies Toulon, 139;
and Corsica, 145;
withdrew subsidies from Prussia, 153;
national feeling in, against France, 154;
supported the French _émigrés_, 154, 166, 167;
did not wish for peace with France, 169;
Spain declares war against, 183;
attempts at peace, 184, 190;
blockades and defeats the Dutch fleet, 193, 194;
takes Minorca and Malta, 195;
forms the second coalition, 197;
Bonaparte attacks her commerce through the Neutral League of the
North, 222;
drives the French out of Egypt, 224;
the Peace of Amiens, 225;
recommencement of the war with France, 233;
Napoleon’s project of invading, 241, 242;
forms the third coalition, 243;
the Continental Blockade against and its effect, 251;
seizes the Danish fleet, 252;
decides to actively intervene on the Continent, 263, 295;
hitherto contented with taking colonies and detached expeditions,
264;
sends an army to Portugal, 265, 266;
promises subsidies to Austria (1809), 271;
the Walcheren Expedition, 276;
Castlereagh’s and Canning’s theories, 295;
forms fresh coalition, 301, 302;
greatness of her share in overthrowing Napoleon, 334;
colonial gains made at the Congress of Vienna, 348;
insists on abolition of the Slave Trade, 348, 349;
refuses to join the Holy Alliance, 355. _See_ Castlereagh, Pitt.

Erfurt, bishopric of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227.

—— conference at (1808), 262.

Erthal, Baron Francis Louis of, Prince-Bishop of Bamberg and Würtzburg
in 1789, 39.

—— Baron Frederick Charles of, Archbishop-Elector of Mayence and
Prince-Bishop of Worms in 1789, 39.

Espinosa, battle of (11 Nov. 1808), 269.

Essen, abbey of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227.

Essling or Aspern, battle of (21, 22 May 1809), 273.

—— Prince of. _See_ Massena.

Esterhazy, Nicholas Joseph, Prince (1714–90), 91.

Etruria, kingdom of, 220, 253. _See_ Louis.

Ettlingen, battle of (June 1796), 178.

Eugène de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy. _See_ Beauharnais.

Ewart, Joseph, English diplomatist (1760–92), English representative
at the Congress of Reichenbach (1790), 87.

Eylau, battle of (8 Feb. 1807), 248.

Fabry, M., elected burgomaster of Liége (1789), 49.

Famars, battle of (24 May 1793), 130.

Faypoult, Guillaume Charles, French administrator (1752–1817), 166,
182.

Felino, Marquis of. _See_ Tillot.

Feltre, Duke of. _See_ Clarke.

Féraud, Jean, French politician (1764–1795), killed in rising of 1
Prairial, 155.

Ferdinand VII., King of Spain (1784–1833), 267, 358.

—— IV., King of the Two Sicilies (1751–1825), 23, 120, 121, 171, 200,
203, 256, 264, 346, 359.

—— III., Grand Duke of Tuscany, second son of the Emperor Leopold
(1769–1824), 83, 120, 157, 171, 200, 206, 220, 225, 226, 260, 347.

—— Duke of Parma and Piacenza, 25, 174, 175.

—— Archduke, third son of Maria Theresa (1754–1806), 26.

Ferrara, Legation of, belonged to the Pope in 1789, 24;
occupied by Bonaparte (1796), 175;
part of the Cisalpine Republic (1797), 192;
of the kingdom of Italy (1805), 255;
restored to the Pope (1815), 347.

Ferrari, Raphael di, Doge of Genoa in 1789, 27.

Fersen, Axel, Count (1759–1810), 113, 152.

Fesch, Joseph, uncle of Napoleon (1763–1839), 239, 277.

Feudalism, 3, 6, 8, 28, 60, 199, 256, 259, 288, 289, 290, 297, 303,
361.

Fichte, John Theophilus, German philosopher (1762–1814), 304.

Figueras, battle of (20 Nov. 1794), 150, 151.

Filangieri, Gaetano, Neapolitan political writer (1752–88), 23.

Finance, Napoleon’s system of, 287, 288.

Finland, belonged to Sweden (1789), 32;
campaigns of Gustavus III. in 1788, 45, 46;
(1790), 95;
conquered by the Emperor Alexander (1808), 250, 254, 279;
ceded to Russia by Bernadotte in exchange for Norway (1812), 302.

Firmian, Charles Joseph, Count, Austrian statesman (1716–82), 26.

Fitzherbert, Alleyne, Lord St. Helens, English diplomatist
(1753–1839), 78.

Five Hundred, Council of. _See_ Council.

Flanders, the Estates of, declare their independence of Austria
(1789), 64.

Flesselles, Jacques de, French administrator (1721–89), 58.

Fleurus, battle of (26 June 1794), 144.

Florence, 200, 283.
_See_ Tuscany.

Florida Blanca, Joseph Monino, Count of, Spanish statesman
(1728–1809), 21, 77, 78.

Flushing taken by the English (1809), 276.

Foksany, battle of (31 July 1789), 45.

Foligno, armistice of, between the Pope and Bonaparte (1796), 175.

Fontainebleau, treaty of (1808), 252, 253;
Pope Pius VII. taken to, 278;
Napoleon abdicates at (1814), 331.

Fontanes, Louis de, French writer (1757–1821), 288.

Forfait, Pierre Alexandre Laurent, French administrator (1752–1807),
216.

Fouché, Joseph, Duke of Otranto, French politician (1763–1820), 210,
216, 241, 357.

Foullon de Doué, Joseph François, French administrator (1715–89), 59.

Fox, Charles James, English statesman (1749–1806), 245, 247, 264.

France, serfdom and feudalism practically extinct, 6;
why the Revolution broke out, 8;
position in 1789, 19, 20;
elections to the States-General (1789), 49, 51;
result of the capture of the Bastille in (July 1789), 59, 60;
divided into departments, 68, 69;
state of, in 1791, 98;
effect of the flight to Varennes on, 101, 102;
wishes for war, 107;
exasperated by Brunswick’s proclamation, 113;
invaded (1792), 114;
(1793), 130;
opposition to the Convention (1793), 131, 132;
submits to the Reign of Terror, 141;
becomes a vast arsenal, 143;
after the victory of Fleurus rejects the Terror, 148;
detests the Convention because of the Terror (1795), 163;
but would not rise against it, 164;
internal peace established (1796), 180;
state of (1796), 181;
acquiesced in the _coup d’état_ of Fructidor (1797), 191;
state of (1798), weary of politics, 196;
welcomed Bonaparte’s return (1799), 210;
pacified under the Consulate, 215;
organisation into prefectures, 230;
popularity of Bonaparte in (1802), 231;
enthusiastically welcomes the Empire, 237;
conduct to the Pope damaged Napoleon’s popularity in, 278;
Napoleon’s autocratic rule in, abolition of individual liberty and
representative institutions, 284;
indisposed to support Napoleon (1813), 315;
would not rise to defend France in 1814 as in 1793, 322;
weary of the military policy of Napoleon and physically exhausted,
324–326;
reduced to its limits of 1792, 333;
distrusts Louis XVIII., 351;
welcomes Napoleon back (1815), 351, 352;
difference of its attitude in 1814 and 1815, 353, 354;
reduced to its limits of 1789, 354;
reactionary government of Louis XVIII., 357, 358.

Francis II., Holy Roman Emperor, 1. Emperor of Austria (1768–1835),
succeeded his father Leopold (1792), 110;
elected and crowned Emperor, 112;
war with France, 112, 113;
loses Belgium, 118;
regarded himself as duped by being left out of second partition of
Poland (1793), 122;
makes Thugut his Foreign Minister, 126;
his armies invade France, 130, 139;
repulsed, 140;
receives Cracow and rest of Galicia at final partition of Poland
(1795), 152;
change in his attitude towards France, 153, 154;
exchanges French prisoners for Madame Royale, 168;
appealed to his people’s patriotism against Bonaparte (1796), 176;
signs Convention of Leoben (1797), 186;
and treaty of Campo-Formio (1797), 192;
again prepares for war with France (1798), 197, 201;
was more afraid of Russia than France, 206;
signs treaty of Lunéville and dismisses Thugut (1801), 220;
declares himself Emperor of Austria (1804), 236;
forms coalition with Russia and England, and invades Italy and
Bavaria (1805), 243;
signs treaty of Pressburg, 245;
prepares for a fresh war, and tries to rouse a national German
spirit, 270, 271;
invades Italy and Bavaria (1809), 272;
makes treaty of Vienna, and dismisses Stadion, 274;
appoints Metternich State Chancellor, 275;
gives his daughter Marie Louise to Napoleon, 294;
invades Russia as Napoleon’s ally (1812), 303;
attempts to mediate between Napoleon and the allies, 310;
declares war against Napoleon (1813), 311;
does not want to overthrow Napoleon (1814), 316, 317, 324;
signs treaty of Chaumont, 327;
inclined to side with England against Russia and Prussia, 334;
receives the allied monarchs at Vienna (1814), 337;
signs secret treaty with England and France (3 Jan. 1815), 340;
obtains the duchy of Parma for his daughter Marie Louise, 346, 347;
joins the Holy Alliance, 355;
greatly weakened actually if not territorially by the great war,
359.

Francis IV., of Este, grandson of Hercules III., Duke of Modena
(1779–1846), 347.

—— Prince, of Prussia, (1797), 189.

François de Neufchâteau, Nicolas, Comte, French politician
(1750–1828), 190, 191, 195, 196.

Franconia invaded by Jourdan (1796), 177, 178;
by Napoleon (1805), 244.

Frankenberg, Cardinal, Archbishop of Malines, 47, 65.

Frankfort-on-the-Main, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
Leopold crowned Emperor at (1790), 89;
Francis crowned Emperor at (1792), 112;
held to ransom by Custine (1792), 118;
taken by Jourdan (1796), 177;
maintained as a free city (1803), 226;
the Proposals of (1813), 316;
maintained as a free city and member of the Germanic Confederation
(1815), 343.

Frankfort, Grand Duchy of, created (1806), 259, 260.

Frederick II., King of Prussia, ‘the Great’ (1712–86), typical
benevolent despot, 4, 29;
decay of Prussia after his reign, 5;
opposed Austrian scheme of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria, 16, 17;
Joseph’s admiration for, 17;
suggested the partition of Poland, 18;
his policy, 30.

—— VI., King of Denmark (1768–1839), 32, 302, 320, 337, 347.

—— I., Duke, afterwards King, of Würtemburg (1754–1816), 225, 245,
258, 347.

—— Augustus I., Elector, afterwards King, of Saxony (1750–1827), 38,
179, 250, 259, 261, 274, 341.

—— Eugène, Duke of Würtemburg (♰1797), 180.

—— William II., King of Prussia (1744–97), his character and policy,
30, 31;
intrigues with the Turks against Austria, 45;
encourages the Belgian patriots, 48, 64;
occupies Liége, 63;
sends help to the Belgians, 65;
makes treaty with the Poles, 85;
intrigues against Austria, 85, 86;
makes Convention of Reichenbach (1790), 87;
won over by Leopold, 88;
signs Declaration of Pilnitz with Leopold, 105;
and treaty with Leopold, 109;
refuses to break with Austria, 111;
directed the policy of the Emperor Francis (1792), 112;
orders retreat from France, 116;
invades Poland and signs second partition (1793), 122;
makes Haugwitz his minister, 126;
driven from Warsaw (1794), 151;
receives Warsaw in final partition of Poland (1795), 152;
yields to the anti-Austrian party at his Court, and becomes slack in
the war against France, 153;
signs treaty of Basle with France (1795), 157;
refuses to make alliance with France (1796), 170;
signs secret supplement to the treaty of Basle, 179;
death, 197.

Frederick William III., King of Prussia (1770–1840), accession (1797),
197;
insists on strict neutrality, 197;
attitude in 1799, 206;
admires Bonaparte, but refuses to make alliance with him, 217;
his territorial accessions (1803), 227;
persists in his neutrality, 234, 242;
inclines to war (1805), 246;
utterly defeated by Napoleon at Jena, 247;
signs treaty of Bartenstein with Russia, 248;
spared by Napoleon on the intercession of Alexander, 250;
summoned Stein and Scharnhorst to office, 290;
forced to dismiss Stein, 301;
obliged to sign alliance with Napoleon (1812), 304;
calls out the Landwehr and declares war against Napoleon (1813),
308;
desires to be revenged on France, 317;
enters Paris (1814), 329;
his intimacy with the Emperor Alexander, 334;
present at the Congress of Vienna, 337;
desires the whole of Saxony, 339, 340;
gets a portion only, 341;
with part of Poland, but not Warsaw, 342;
and Rhenish Prussia, 344;
joins the Holy Alliance, 355.

Frederick William, Duke of Brunswick-Oels (1771–1815), 293, 337.

Free Cities of the Holy Roman Empire in 1789, their College in the
Diet, 34, 35;
reduced to six (1803), 226;
reduced to four (1815), 343.

Freisingen, bishopric of, merged in Bavaria (1803), 227.

Fréjus, Napoleon landed at, on his return from Egypt (1799), 209.

French philosophers of the 18th century contrasted with the German, 9.

Fréron, Louis Stanislas, French politician (1765–1802), 147, 155, 182.

Fribourg, canton of Switzerland, 228.

Friedland, battle of (14 June 1807), 249.

Friuli, Duke of. _See_ Duroc.

Fructidor, _coup d’état_ of 18th (4th Sept. 1797), 191.

Fuentes de Onor, battle of (5 May 1811), 297.

Fulda, bishopric of (1803), 227, 260.

Gaeta, siege and capture by the French (1806), 256.

—— Duke of. _See_ Gaudin.

Galicia, Western, obtained by Austria at third partition of Poland
(1795), 152;
ceded to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1809), 274;
restored to Austria (1815), 342.

Gambier, James, Lord, English admiral (1756–1833), 277.

Gasparin, Thomas Augustin de, French politician (1750–93), 133.

Gaudin, Martin Michel Charles, Duke of Gaeta, French statesman
(1756–1844), 215, 216, 240, 287.

Geisberg, battle of the (26 Dec. 1793), 140.

Geneva, its condition as an independent republic in 1789, 41;
occupied by the Bernese troops (1792), 125;
united to France, 228, 230;
made a canton of Switzerland by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 345.

Genoa, its position in 1789, 27;
formed into the Liguria Republic (1797), 192;
besieged by the Austrians (1799), 203, 206, 218;
annexed to Napoleon’s Empire, 243, 255;
capital of a French department, 283;
occupied by the English (1814), 315;
his proclamation at, 322;
united to the kingdom of Sardinia (1815), 346.

Genola, battle of (4 Nov. 1799), 204.

Gensonné, Armand, French politician (1758–93), 106.

Gentz, Friedrich von, German statesman (1764–1832), 291, 292, 337.

George III., King of England (1738–1820), 120.

Germanic Confederation formed (1815), 342, 343.

Germany, condition of, in 1789, 33–40;
spread of revolutionary ideas in, 109;
resettlement of (1803), 225–227;
Napoleon’s rearrangement of (1806), 257–261;
Stadion’s attempt to rouse a national spirit in, 270, 271;
reforms made in, under French influence, 288, 289;
growth of a national spirit against the French in, 291–295;
national rising in, 314;
resettled at Congress of Vienna, 342, 345.
_See_ Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia, Saxony, Würtemburg.

German literary movement at Weimar, 38.

German philosophers of the 18th century compared with the French, 9.

Germinal, Riot of the 12th (1 April 1795), in Paris, 155.

Ghent, 64, 341, 352.

Girondins, French political party, in the Legislative Assembly, 106;
in favour of war, 107;
their sections in the Convention, 116;
attacked the Mountain, 117;
views on the King’s trial, 119;
struggle with the Mountain, 128, 129;
overthrown (2 June 1793), 129;
attempt to raise the provinces of France against the Convention,
131;
the leaders guillotined, 138;
recall of the survivors to the Convention (1795), 154;
they obtain power, 155.

Giurgevo, battle of (8 July 1790), 88;
armistice of (19 Sept. 1790), 88.

Glarus, 228.

Gnesen, province of, ceded to Prussia at second partition of Poland
(1793), 123.

Goa, 224.

Gobel, Jean Baptiste Joseph, French bishop (1727–94), 70, 141.

Godoy, Don Manuel de, Prince of the Peace, Spanish statesman
(1767–1851), 77, 126, 154, 157, 183, 255, 266, 267.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, German poet (1749–1832), 9, 10, 38.

Gohier, Louis Jerome, French politician (1746–1830), 209, 211.

Goltz, Bernhard William, Baron von, Prussian statesman (1730–95), 86.

Göttingen, university of, 39.

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Laurent, French general (1764–1830), 275, App. iv.

Graham, Sir Thomas, Lord Lynedoch, English general (1751–1843), 314,
321.

Grand Elector, proposed by Sieyès in 1799 but rejected by Bonaparte,
213.

Grand Livre, Cambon’s creation of, continued by Napoleon, 288.

Greece, 257.

Grégoire, Henri, French politician (1750–1831), 53.

Grenelle, plot to attack the camp of (1796), 181.

Grenville, Thomas, English diplomatist (1755–1846), 197.

—— William Wyndham, Lord, English statesman (1759–1834), Pitt’s
foreign secretary (1790–1801), 120, 166, 167, 169.

Grisons, republic of the, 41;
occupied by the Archduke Charles (1799), 202;
Suvórov in, 205;
Macdonald invades (1800), 218, 219;
formed into a canton of Switzerland by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
and retained by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Grodno, Diet of (24 Sept. 1793), second partition of Poland agreed to
at, 122.

Gross-Beeren, battle of (23 Aug. 1813), 312.

Gross-Gorschen (Lützen), battle of (2 May 1813), 309.

Grouchy, Emmanuel, Marquis de, French general (1766–1847), 353,
App. iv.

Guadeloupe, French West India island, conquered by the English, 154;
restored to France by treaty of Amiens (1802), 232;
reconquered by the English (1810), 276;
returned to France by Sweden (1815), 347.

Guadet, Marguerite Élie, French politician (1758–94), 106, 129.

Guastalla, duchy of, granted to Pauline Bonaparte by Napoleon, 283;
granted with Parma to the Empress Marie Louise (1815), 347.

Guerilla warfare against the French in Spain, 268, 297.

Guiana, 155, 191, 223, 232, 348.

Gustavus III., King of Sweden (1746–92), a benevolent despot of the
18th century, 4;
his _coup d’état_ of 1772 and reforms, 33;
invades Russian Finland (1788), 45;
makes peace with Denmark (1789), 46;
overthrows the power of the nobility, 46;
sympathy with Marie Antoinette, 67, 68;
defeated by the Russians (1790), 95;
makes treaty of Verela with the Empress Catherine (1790), 95, 96;
proposes to rescue the French royal family, 109;
murdered, 110.

Gustavus IV., King of Sweden (1778–1837), 110, 243, 253, 254, 279.

Hague, the, the Stadtholder driven from (1787), 31;
congress at (1790), 93, 94;
capital moved from, to Amsterdam by Louis Bonaparte, 255.

Hainault, Estates of, suppressed by the Emperor Joseph (1789), 47.

Hamburg, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
English trade removed from Amsterdam to, 184;
retained its independence (1803), 226;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282;
taken by the Russians (1813), 308;
recovered by Vandamme, 309;
defended by Davout (1813–14), 319, 320;
a free city of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Hanau granted to Dalberg, Grand Duke of Frankfort (1806), 260;
battle of (30 Oct. 1813), 314.

Hanover, Electorate of, independently administered under the King of
England, 38, 39;
bishopric of Osnabrück merged in (1803), 227;
occupied by the French under Mortier (1803), 233, 242;
promised to Prussia and offered to England by Napoleon (1806), 247;
part of, merged in kingdom of Westphalia, 258;
and part annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282;
a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.

Hanriot, François, French politician (1761–94), 129, 147.

Hardenberg, Charles Augustus, Count afterwards Prince von, Prussian
statesman (1750–1822), negotiated treaty of Basle (1795), 157;
opposed alliance with France (1796), 170;
became Minister for Foreign Affairs (1803), 234;
and State Chancellor (1807), 248;
completes the work of Stein (1809), 303;
accedes to the Proposals of Frankfort (1813), 316;
signs Provisional Treaty of Paris (1814), 332;
Prussian Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), 337.

—— William, Count von, Hanoverian statesman (1754–1826), 337.

Harris, Sir James, Earl of Malmesbury. _See_ Malmesbury.

Hassan Pasha, Turkish admiral, 45.

Hatry, Jacques Maurice, French general (1740–1802), 193.

Haugwitz, Christian Henry Charles, Count von, Prussian statesman,
(1752–1832) a partisan of France and enemy of Austria, 111;
appointed Foreign Minister (1792), 126;
in favour of peace with the French Republic, 153;
but against an alliance (1796), 170;
advocated a compromise, 179;
dismissed as too friendly to France (1803), 234;
signs treaty of Schönbrunn (1805), 247;
finally dismissed (1807), 248.

Hébert, Jacques René, French politician (1755–94), 141, 142.

Hébertists, the, 141, 142.

Heidelberg ceded to Baden, 227.

Heligoland, ceded by Denmark to England (1815), 348.

Heliopolis, battle of (20 March 1800), 224.

Helvetian Republic founded (1798), 199;
replaced by the Confederation of Switzerland (1803), 228.

Henry, Prince, of Prussia (1726–1802), 111.

Hérault-Séchelles, Marie Jean, French politician (1760–94), 133.

Hercules III., Duke of Modena (1727–1803), 25, 26, 174, 175, 192, 226.

Herder, Johann Gottfried, German philosopher (1744–1803), 9, 38.

Herford, abbey of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227.

Hermann, Russian general, defeated at Bergen (1799), 205.

Hertzberg, Ewald Frederick, Count von, Prussian statesman (1725–1795),
30, 31, 85, 87, 88.

Hesse-Cassel, its condition in 1789, 38;
made an electorate (1803), 225;
increased in size, 227;
merged in the kingdom of Westphalia, 250, 258;
a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.
_See_ William IX.

Hesse-Darmstadt, increased in size (1803), 227;
made a Grand Duchy (1806), 259;
a state of the Confederation of the Rhine (1806), 260;
of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.
_See_ Louis X.

Hesse-Homburg, a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Hildesheim, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34.

Hildesheim, bishopric of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227;
in the kingdom of Westphalia (1807), 258.

Hiller, John, Baron von, Austrian general (1754–1819), 315.

Hoche, Lazare, French general (1768–97), 140, 154, 180, 181, 185, 186,
189, 191, 193, 194.

Hoensbroeck, Count Cæsar Constantine Francis de, Prince-Bishop of
Liége, 39, 49, 95.

Hofer, Andrew, Tyrolese patriot (1767–1810), 273.

Hohenlinden, battle of (3 Dec. 1800), 219.

Hohenlohe-Bartenstein, Prince of, one of the chief Princes of the
Empire in Alsace, 79.

Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, Prince of, Austrian general, 45.

Hohenzollern, two principalities of, states of the Germanic
Confederation (1815), 343.

Holland [the United Netherlands], a member of the Triple Alliance, 13;
position in 1789, 31;
revolution in (1787) 31, 32;
put down by Prussia, 32;
designs of Dumouriez on, 119, 120;
France declares war against (1793), 120;
failure of Dumouriez to invade (1793), 126;
conquered by Pichegru (1794–95), 149;
organised as the Batavian Republic, 150;
effect of its conquest on England, 184;
Delacroix sent as ambassador to, 190;
Hoche’s scheme of invading England from, 193;
its fleet destroyed at Camperdown (1797), 194;
invaded by English and Russians (1799), 205;
its changes of government, 254;
Louis Bonaparte, King of (1806), 254, 255;
colonies taken by England, 264;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282;
rises against the French (1813–14), 314, 320, 321;
joined to Belgium as the kingdom of the Netherlands (1815), 344.

—— kingdom of, formed for Louis Bonaparte, 254;
his administration (1806–1810), 254, 255.

Holstein, duchy of, 34, 343.

Holstein-Gottorp, Prince Peter of, Prince-Bishop of Lübeck in 1789,
39.

Holy Alliance, the, 355.

Hondschoten, battle of (7 Sept. 1793), 140.

Hood, Samuel, Lord, English admiral (1724–1816), 139.

Houchard, Jean Nicolas, French general (1740–93), 138, 140.

Howe, Richard, Earl, English admiral (1725–99), 145.

Humbert, Jean Joseph Amable, French general (1755–1823), 197.

Humboldt, William, Baron von, Prussian statesman (1767–1835), 303,
304, 323;
at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), 338.

Hundred Days, the (March-June 1815), 351–353.

Hungary, opposition to the Emperor Joseph’s reforms in, 15, 16;
abolition of serfdom, 16;
Joseph’s dying concessions to, 66;
policy of the Emperor Leopold in, 90–92;
looked with favour on Napoleon, 270.

Huningen, fortress to be dismantled by second treaty of Paris (1815),
354.

Hutchinson, John, Lord, afterwards Earl of Donoughmore, English
general (1757–1832), 224.

Igelström, Joseph, Count, Russian general (♰1817), 151, 152.

Illyrian Provinces, Napoleon’s, formed (1805), ruled by Marmont, 245,
256;
the Ionian islands added to (1807), 256;
increased (1809), 274;
given to Austria (1815), 347.

Income tax imposed in France (1800), 215.

India, Bonaparte’s projects on (1798), 194;
the Emperor Paul’s plans for invading, 220, 221.

‘Infernal Columns’ despatched to La Vendée, 141.

‘Infernal Machine,’ plot of the (1800), 231.

Inquisition, the Holy, 21, 22, 25, 297, 358.

Ionian Islands belonged to Venice in 1789, 27;
ceded to France (1797), 192;
taken by the Russians (1798), 207;
ceded to France by the treaty of Tilsit (1807), 250;
added to the Illyrian Provinces, 256;
given to England (1815), 348.

Ireland, Hoche’s expedition to (1796), 185;
Humbert’s (1798), 197.

Iron crown of Italy assumed by Napoleon (1805), 238.

Ismail, besieged by the Russians (1789), 45;
stormed (1790), 96.

Istria ceded to Austria (1797), 192;
annexed by Napoleon, 245.

—— Duke of. _See_ Bessières.

Italian unity, idea of, in the 18th century, 22;
promised by Bentinck (1813), 322;
defended by Murat (1814), 344.

Italy, condition of, in 1789, 22–27;
Bonaparte’s arrangements in North, 192;
conquered by the French (1798–99), 200;
reconquered by Bonaparte (1800), 218, 219;
kingdom of, Napoleon’s, 238, 255;
rises against Napoleon (1813–14), 314, 315;
settlement of, at Vienna (1815), 345–347.
_See_ Genoa, Lombardy, Lucca, Modena, Naples, Parma, Rome, Sardinia,
Sicily, Tuscany, Venice.

Jablonowski, Ladislas, Polish statesman (1769–1802), 87.

Jachvill, Prince, 221.

Jacobin Club, growth of its importance in France, 100, 105;
debates on the war question in, 107;
Hébertists expelled from (1793), 142;
the headquarters of Robespierre’s party, 147;
closed (1794), 149.

Jaffa taken by Bonaparte (1799), 208.

Jahn, Frederick Louis, German publicist (1778–1852), 291.

Janissaries, the, dethrone the Sultan Selim III. (1807), 280;
fight the new militia in Constantinople, 281.

Janssens, John William, Dutch general (1762–1835), 155.

Jassy, treaty of (9 Jan. 1792), 96.

Jaucourt, Arnail François, Marquis de, French statesman (1757–1852),
330.

Java, taken by the English (1811), 264;
restored to Holland (1815), 348.

Javogues, Claude, French politician (1759–96), 139.

Jeanbon or Jean Bon (André) called Saint-André. _See_ Saint-André.

Jehu, companies of, ravage the south of France in 1796, 181;
in 1815, 356.

Jemmappes, battle of (6 Nov. 1792), 118.

Jena, university of, 38;
battle of (14 Oct. 1806), 247.

Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia (1784–1860), 258, 259.

Jervis, Sir John, Earl St. Vincent, English admiral (1734–1823), 183.

Jesuits expelled from Spain by Aranda, 21;
from Portugal by Pombal, 22;
from Naples by Tanucci, 23.

Jeunesse Dorée or Fréronienne, important political part played by, in
Paris (1794–95), 155.

Jews, toleration to, insisted on by Napoleon, 289.

John VI., King of Portugal (1769–1826), 22, 120, 223, 252, 253.

—— Archduke, seventh son of the Emperor Leopold (1782–1863), 219, 272,
273, 274.

Jomini, Henri, Baron, French general (1779–1862), 312.

Joseph II., Emperor (1741–90), typical benevolent despot of the 18th
century, 4;
preferred Russia to France, 12;
position in 1789, 14–17;
internal policy, 15, 16;
abolition of serfdom, 16;
foreign policy, 16, 17;
German policy, 17, 35;
alliance with Russia, 17;
attacks the Turks, 17;
the Pope’s visit to, 24;
defeated by the Turks (1788), 43;
prophecy in Jan. 1789, 44;
policy in Belgium, 46–48;
death and character, 66;
why he failed, 67;
comparison between, and Louis XVI., 67, 68.

Joseph Bonaparte, elder brother of Napoleon (1768–1844), King of
Naples (1806), his good administration, 256;
King of Spain (1808), 267;
his reforms, 289, 297;
driven from Madrid (1812), 306;
returned, 307;
finally retired from Madrid, defeated at Vittoria (1813), 315.

Joseph, Archduke, fourth son of the Emperor Leopold (1776–1847), 270.

Josephine, the Empress, first wife of Napoleon (1763–1814), 285, 293,
332.

Joubert, Barthélemy Catherine, French general (1769–99), 186, 200,
204.

Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, Comte, French general (1762–1833), 140, 144,
150, 172, 177, 178, 202, 315, App. iv.

Journalists, rise of their importance in Paris (1789), 61.

Jovellanos, Don Gaspar Melchior de, Spanish statesman (1744–1811), 21.

Joyeuse Entrée or Constitution of Brabant, abrogated by the Emperor
Joseph (1789), 47.

Junot, Andoche, Duke of Abrantes, French general (1771–1813), 253,
265, 266, 296.

Kaiserslautern, battle of (19 Aug. 1794), 144.

Kalisch, ceded to Prussia in second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
treaty of (27 Feb. 1813), 308.

Kalkreuth, Frederick Adolphus, Count von, Prussian general
(1737–1818), 153.

Kant, Immanuel, German philosopher (1724–1804), 9.

Katt, Lieutenant, Prussian officer, attacked Magdeburg (1809), 293.

Katzbach, battle of the (25 Aug. 1813), 312.

Kaunitz, Wenceslas, Prince von, Austrian statesman (1711–94), made the
treaty of 1756 with France, 19;
at the Congress of Reichenbach (1790), 87;
wrote the despatch and letter which led to war with France, 108,
109;
practically succeeded by Thugut (1792), 126.

Keller, Dorotheus Louis Christopher, Count, Prussian statesman
(1757–1827), 65, 93.

Kellermann, François Christophe, Duke of Valmy, French general
(1735–1820), 115, App. iv.

—— François Étienne, French general (1770–1835), 218.

Kempten, Abbot of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34.

Kiel, treaty of (14 Jan. 1814), 320.

Kioge, Danes defeated at, by the English (1807), 252.

Klagenfurt, Joubert joins Bonaparte at (1797), 186.

Kléber, Jean Baptiste, French general (1753–1800), 150, 172, 208, 224.

Knesebeck, Charles Frederick, Baron von, Prussian general (1768–1844),
33.

Knights of the Holy Roman Empire, 40;
deprived of their sovereign rights by Napoleon, 260.

Kolichev, Nicholas, Russian diplomatist (♰1813), 198, 217.

Kollontai, Hugh, Polish statesman (1752–1812), 104, 122.

Königsberg, Estates of East Prussia summoned at, by Stein (1813), 308.

Körner, Charles Theodore, German poet (1791–1813), 291.

Korsakov, Alexander Rymski, Russian general (1753–1840), 204.

Kosciuszko, Thaddeus, Polish patriot (1746–1817), defeated by Suvórov
at Dubienka (1792), 122;
raises standard of Polish independence at Cracow, and takes Warsaw
(1794), 151;
defeated by the Russians, wounded and taken prisoner at Maciejowice
(1795), 152;
welcomed in Paris, 206.

Kray, Paul, Baron, Austrian general (1735–1804), 202.

Kulm, capitulation of (1813), 313.

Kutuzov, Michael Larivonovitch Golenitchev, Prince, Russian general
(1745–1813), 96, 281, 305;
death (1813), 309.

Labrador, Pedro Gomez Ravelo, Count of, Spanish statesman (1775–1850),
338, 347.

Lacuée de Cessac, Gérard Jean, Comte, French administrator
(1752–1841), 241.

Lafayette, Marie Jean Paul Roch Yves Gilbert Motier, Marquis de,
French general (1757–1834), leads the minority of the nobility in
the States-General to join the Tiers État (June 1789), 54;
commandant of the National Guard of Paris, 59;
brings Louis XVI. to Paris (6 Oct. 1789), 62;
got Mirabeau’s proposition on ministers rejected, 72;
most influential man in France (1790), 73;
fires on the people (17 July 1791), on the Champ de Mars, 101;
placed in command of an army on the frontier (1792), 107;
offers to help the king (July 1792), 112;
deserts, 114.

Lagarde, Marie Jacques Martin, French general (♰1815), 356.

La Harpe, Frederick Cæsar de, Swiss statesman (1754–1838), 234.

La Marck, Auguste Marie Raymond, Comte de (1753–1833), 72, 73.

Lambesc, Charles Eugène de Lorraine, Prince de, French officer
(1751–1825), 57.

Lambrechts, Charles Joseph Mathieu, Comte, French politician
(1753–1823), 191.

Lameth, Alexandre Theodore Victor, Vicomte de, French politician
(1760–1829), 100.

Lampredi, Giovanni Maria, Italian jurist (1732–93), 24.

Landau, siege of, relieved by Pichegru (1793), 140.

Lanjunais, Jean Denis, Comte, French politician (1753–1827), 154.

Lannes, Jean, Duke of Montebello, French general (1769–1809), 218,
269, App. iv.

Laon, battle of (9 March 1814), 328.

La Place, Pierre Simon, French astronomer (1749–1827), 216.

La Tour du Pin Gouvernet, Frédéric, Marquis de, French diplomatist
(1750–1837), 338.

Lauenburg, Duchy of, a state of the Germanic Confederation, granted to
the King of Denmark (1815), 347.

League of the Princes, formed by Frederick the Great, 30, 35;
joined by the Archbishop-Elector of Mayence, 39.

La Bon, Ghislain Joseph François, French politician (1765–95), 139.

Le Brun, Charles François, Duke of Piacenza, French statesman
(1739–1824), 214, 239, 287.

Lebrun Tondu, Pierre Henri Hélène, French politician (1763–93), 114.

Le Chapelier, Isaac Gui René, French politician (1754–94), 52, 100.

Leclerc, Victor Emmanuel, French general (1772–1802), 223, 232.

Lecourbe, Claude Joseph, Comte, French general (1760–1815), 204.

Leeds, Francis Godolphin Osborne, Duke of, English statesman
(1751–99), 28.

Lefebvre, François Joseph, Duke of Dantzic, French general
(1755–1820), 248, 329, App. iv.

Legations, the. _See_ Bologna, Ferrara.

Leghorn, its prosperity promoted by the Grand Duke Leopold, 27;
capital of a French department, 283.

Legion of Honour, the, 284.

Legislative Assembly, the, in France (1791–92), 105, 106, 108, 111,
113, 114.

—— Body, the (Corps Législatif), 214, 240, 285, 322, 326.

Legislature, the French, under the Constitution of the Year III. _See_
Council of Ancients, Council of Five Hundred.

—— the French, under the Constitution of the Year VIII. _See_
Legislative Body, Senate, Tribunate.

Leiningen, the Prince of, one of chief princes holding fiefs of the
Empire in Alsace, 79.

Leipzig, battle of (16–19 Oct. 1813), 314.

Lenoir-Laroche, Jean Jacques, French administrator (1749–1825), 190.

Leoben, the Preliminaries of, signed 17th April 1797, 186;
arrangements of, followed in the treaty of Campo-Formio, 192.

Leopold II., Emperor (1747–92), typical benevolent despot of the 18th
century, 4;
considered the French the enemies of Austria, 12;
his administration as Grand Duke of Tuscany (1765–90), 24, 25, 83;
implored by Marie Antoinette to interfere in France, 81;
succeeds Joseph II. (1790), 83;
his internal policy, 83, 84;
position of Austria, 84;
appeals to England against Prussia, 86;
signs Convention of Reichenbach (1790), 87, 88;
makes armistice with the Turks, 88;
and treaty of Sistova (1791), 89;
elected and crowned Emperor, 89;
letter to Louis XVI. on the rights of the Princes of the Empire in
Alsace, 89, 90;
his policy towards Hungary, 90–92;
crowned King of Hungary, 91;
reconquers Belgium (1790), 94;
occupies Liége, 95;
his position in 1791, 97;
promises to intervene in France, 99;
issues Manifesto of Padua, 102;
signs Declaration of Pilnitz, 103;
his letter and despatch to Louis XVI., 108, 109;
makes an alliance with Prussia against France, 109;
death (1 March 1792), 110.

Leopold, Archduke, fourth son of the Emperor Leopold (1774–94), 91.

Le Quesnoy, besieged by the Austrians (1793), 130.

Lessart, Antoine de Valdec de, French statesman (1742–92), 109.

Letourneur, Charles Louis François Honoré, French statesman
(1751–1817), 165, 182, 188.

Letourneux, Pierre, French administrator (1761–1805), 191.

‘Liberum Veto,’ the, in Poland, 18;
abolished by Polish Constitution of 1791, 104.

Lichtenstein, a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Liége, revolution in (Aug. 1789), 49;
occupied by the Prussians (1790), 63;
by the Austrians (1791), 94, 95;
by Dumouriez (1792), 118.

Ligne, Charles Joseph, Prince de, Austrian general (1734–1814), 65.

Ligny, battle of (16 June 1815), 352.

Ligurian Republic founded by Bonaparte (1797), 192;
the Doge appointed by France (1801), 220;
annexed to Napoleon’s Empire, 243, 283.

Lille, besieged by the Austrians (1792), 114, 118;
conference at (1797), 190.

Limburg, occupied by the Austrians under Bender (1790), 93.

—— Count Augustus of, Prince-Bishop of Spires in 1789, 39.

Limon, Geoffroi, Marquis de, French _émigrés_ (♰1799), 113.

Lindet, Jean Baptiste Robert, French statesman (1743–1825), 132, 133,
148, 210.

Lippe, two principalities of, states of the Germanic Confederation
(1815), 343.

Lisbon, occupied by the French under Junot (1807), 253.

Lithuania, conquered by Napoleon (1812), 305;
absorbed in Russia, 342.

Llanos, Don Juan Gomez, minister of the Duke of Parma, 25.

Loano, battle of (24 Nov. 1795), 151, 173.

Lobau, Napoleon in the island of (1809), 273.

Locke, John, English philosopher (1632–1704), 9.

Lodi, battle of (10 May 1796), 174.

Lombardy, belonged to Austria in 1789, its good administration, 26;
conquered by Bonaparte (1796), 174;
formed part of the Cisalpine Republic (1797), 192;
occupied by the Austrians (1799), 206;
reconquered by Bonaparte (1800), 218;
formed part of the kingdom of Italy (1805), 255;
restored to Austria (1815), 347.

Loménie de Brienne, Étienne Charles, Cardinal de, French statesman
(1727–1794), 49, 51, 70.

Longwy, taken by the Prussians (27 Aug. 1792), 114.

Loudon, Gideon Ernest, Count, Austrian general (1716–90), 43, 45, 88.

Louis XV., King of France (1710–1774), 19.

—— XVI., King of France (1754–93), 20, 49, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62,
67, 68, 75, 76, 99, 100, 103, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 139.

—— XVII., _de jure_ King of France (1785–95), 168.

—— XVIII., King of France (1755–1824), 26, 102, 166, 167, 188, 206,
217, 332, 333, 340, 341, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356–358.

—— I., King of Etruria (1773–1803), 220, 232.

—— Bonaparte, King of Holland (1777–1846), 254, 255, 282, 283.

—— X., Landgrave, afterwards Grand Duke, of Hesse-Darmstadt
(1753–1830), 79, 227, 259, 260, 342.

—— Philippe, Duke of Orleans, afterwards King of the French
(1773–1850), 189.

—— Louis Dominique, Baron, French statesman (1755–1837), 240, 331.

Louisa, Queen of Prussia (1776–1810), 246, 304.

Louisiana, ceded by Spain to France (1801), 232;
sold by Napoleon to the United States, 242.

Loustalot, Elysée, French journalist (1762–90), 61.

Louvain, 15, 48, 64.

Louverture, Toussaint (1743–1803), 232.

Louvet, Jean Baptiste, French politician (1760–97), 117, 154.

Löwenhielm, Gustavus Charles Frederick, Count von, Swedish diplomatist
(1771–1856), 338.

Lübeck, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
retained its independence (1803), 226;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 302;
as a free city member of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Lucca, Republic of, in 1789, 27;
annexed by Napoleon (1805), 243, 255;
Elisa Bonaparte, Duchess of, 283;
made a Grand Duchy for the King of Etruria with reversion to
Tuscany (1815), 347.

Lucchesini, Jerome, Prussian diplomatist (1752–1825), 31, 85, 87, 88,
89, 153.

Lucerne, canton of Switzerland maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
one of the three meeting-places of the Helvetian Diet (1815), 345.

Lückner, Nicolas, Baron, French general (1722–94), 107.

Ludovica, the Empress, third wife of the Emperor Francis II.
(1772–1816), 271.

Lunéville, treaty of (9 Feb. 1801), 219, 220.

Lusatia, annexed to Saxony (1806), 259;
to Prussia (1815), 341.

Lützen (Gross-Gorschen), battle of (2 May 1813), 309.

Luxembourg, the Austrians retreat to, from Belgium (1789), 64;
made into a Grand Duchy (1815), 343;
and given to the King of the Netherlands, 344.

Lynedoch, Sir Thomas Graham, Lord. _See_ Graham.

Lyons rises in insurrection against the Convention (1793), 131;
taken, 140.

Macdonald, Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre, Duke of Taranto, French
general (1765–1840), 203, 219, 273, 305, 306, 308, 312, 329, 331,
332.

Maciejowice, battle of (12 Oct. 1794), 152.

Mack, Charles, Baron, Austrian general (1752–1828), 200, 243, 244.

Mackintosh, Sir James, English statesman (1765–1832), 233.

Madame Royale. _See_ Angoulême, Duchess of.

Madeira, occupied by the English (1801), 223, 224.

Maestricht, besieged by Miranda (1793), 126;
taken by Kléber (1794), 150.

Magdeburg formed part of the kingdom of Westphalia, 258;
Katt’s attack on, 293;
French garrison in, besieged (1814), 319.

Magnano, battle of (5 April 1799), 202.

Mahmoud II., Sultan of Turkey (1785–1839), 281.

Maida, battle of (4 July 1806), 256.

Maillard, Stanislas, French politician (1763–94), 62.

Maillebois, Yves Marie Desmarets, Comte de, French general
(1715–1791), 31, 32.

Maitland, Sir Frederick Lewis, English captain (1779–1839), 353.

Malet, Claude François, French general (1754–1812), 306.

Malines, riots against Joseph’s reforms at (1788), 47;
abandoned to the Belgian patriots, 64.

Malmaison, château of, settled on the Empress Josephine, 293.

Malmesbury, Sir James Harris, Earl of, English diplomatist
(1746–1820), 32, 184, 190.

Malta, taken by Bonaparte (1798), 195;
by the English (1800), 195, 204;
the Emperor Paul Grand Master of the Knights of, 207, 217;
a cause of the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, 225;
England refuses to surrender, 233;
granted to England at the Congress of Vienna (1815), 348.

Mamelukes defeated by Bonaparte at the battle of the Pyramids (1798),
195;
at the battle of Cairo (1799), 208.

Manifesto of Padua issued by the Emperor Leopold (5 July 1791), 102.

Mannheim, university of, 37;
taken by Pichegru (1795), 172;
given to Baden (1803), 227.

Mantua, Leopold’s interview with Durfort at, 99;
besieged by Bonaparte (1796–97), 175, 176;
part of the Cisalpine Republic, 192;
besieged by Suvórov (1799), 203.

Marat, Jean Paul, French statesman (1744–93), 61, 101, 107, 117, 155.

Marceau, François Séverin Desgraviers, French general (1769–96), 172;
killed at Altenkirchen (1796), 178.

Marengo, battle of (14 June 1800), 218.

Maret, Hugues Bernard, Duke of Bassano, French statesman (1763–1839),
241, 316.

Maria I., Queen of Portugal (1734–1816), 22, 253.

—— Beatrice of Este, heiress of Modena, married to the Archduke
Ferdinand, 25, 26.

—— Theresa, the Empress (1717–80), 19.

Marie, Grand Duchess of Saxe-Weimar, sister of the Emperor Alexander,
present at the Congress of Vienna, 337.

—— Amélie, Duchess of Parma, daughter of Maria Theresa, 25.

—— Antoinette, Queen of France, daughter of Maria Theresa (1755–93),
disliked in France as an Austrian, 12;
opposes Necker, 55;
urges Louis XVI. to oppose the Assembly, 61, 68;
wishes her brother Leopold to interfere in France, 75, 80, 81;
unpopularity increased by Prussian intrigues, 86;
admiration of Gustavus III. of Sweden for, 95;
demands Leopold’s aid, 99;
escapes to Varennes, 99, 100;
reveals French plan of campaign to Austria, 112;
ordered to be sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal for trial, 134;
guillotined, 138.

—— Caroline, Queen of the Two Sicilies, daughter of Maria Theresa.
_See_ Caroline.

—— Louise, the Empress, Napoleon’s second wife (1791–1847), 294, 330,
332, 346, 347.

—— —— Queen of Spain (1754–1819), 77, 267.

Marmont, Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de, Duke of Ragusa, French
general (1774–1852), 245, 256, 306, 329, 331, App. iv.

Marseillaise, the, 113.

Marseilles opposes the Convention (1793), 151.

Marshals, Napoleon’s, 239;
list of, App. iv.

Martinique, French West India island, taken by the English, 154;
restored to France (1802), 252;
again taken by the English (1809), 276;
restored to France (1815), 348.

Massa, Duke of. _See_ Regnier.

—— Principality of, merged in the Duchy of Modena, 25.

Massacres in the prisons of Paris (Sept. 1792), 115.

Masséna, André, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling, French general
(1758–1817), 204, 218, 221, 244, 272, 296, 297, App. iv.

Matchin, battle of (9 July 1791), 96.

Maubeuge besieged by the Austrians (1793), 140.

Mauprat, M. de, reforming minister in Parma, 25.

Mauritius, the island of the, taken by the English (1809), 264, 276;
ceded to England by the first Treaty of Paris (1814), 333;
by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 348.

Maximilian, Archduke, third son of Maria Theresa, Elector-Archbishop
of Cologne in 1789, 40.

—— Joseph, Elector, afterwards King, of Bavaria (1770–1825), his
power increased by the secularisations (1803), 227;
receives Swabia and the Tyrol and takes the title of king (1806),
245;
receives Salzburg (1809), 257;
marries a daughter to Eugène de Beauharnais, 258;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
sends troops to serve under Napoleon at Wagram, 274;
signs Treaty of Ried against Napoleon (8 Oct. 1813), 313, 314;
attacks Napoleon and is defeated at Hanau, 314;
opens the passes through the Tyrol into Italy to the Austrians, 321;
agrees to support Austria and England against Russia and Prussia
(1815), 341;
member of the Germanic Confederation, 342;
gives up the Tyrol and Salzburg to Austria, and receives Rhenish
Bavaria (1815), 344.

Maximum, Law of the, in France, 128;
an instrument of the Terror, 137;
abolished by the Thermidorians, 149;
temporarily imposed by Napoleon, 285.

Mayence, the Archbishop-Elector of, Chancellor of the Holy Roman
Empire, and President of the College of Prince, 54.

—— archbishopric-electorate of, condition in 1789, 39;
merged in France (1801), 193;
given to Bavaria (1815), 344.

—— city of, taken by the French under Custine (1792), 118;
by the Prussians after a long siege (1793), 130;
besieged by Kléber in vain (1795), 172;
taken by the French under Hatry (1797), 193;
capital of a French department, 230;
ceded to Bavaria (1815), 344.

Mecklenburg, the duchies of, their backward state in 1789, 38;
made grand duchies and members of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
342.

Medellin, battle of (28 March 1809), 275.

Medina del Rio Seco, battle of (14 July 1808), 267.

Melas, Michael Baron von, Austrian general (1730–1806), 175, 204, 218.

Menou, Jacques François, Baron de, French general (1750–1810), 156,
224.

Mercy-Argenteau, Florimond Claude, Comte de, Austrian diplomatist
(1722–94), 93, 94, 99.

Merlin [de Douai], Philippe Antoine, Comte, French statesman
(1754–1838), 80, 137, 148, 149, 156, 159, 166, 182, 191, 209, 357.

—— [de Thionville], Antoine Christophe, French politician (1762–1833),
117.

Methuen Treaty, its effect on Portugal, 14, 21, 252.

Metternich, Clement Wenceslas Lothaire, Count, afterwards Prince, von,
Austrian statesman (1773–1859), becomes State Chancellor of
Austria (1809), 275;
opposes Stein’s idea of rousing the national spirit of Germany
against Napoleon, 310, 311;
brings terms agreed on at Reichenbach to Napoleon at Dresden (1813),
311;
lays down the Proposals of Frankfort, 316;
intrigues with Murat, 322;
presses terms offered at Châtillon, 324;
becomes intimate with Castlereagh, 331;
signs Provisional Treaty of Paris, 332;
Austrian representative at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), 338;
signs treaty of alliance with England and France against Russia and
Prussia (3 Jan. 1815), 340.

Middle classes in Europe in the 18th century, 7.

Milan, university of, 26;
taken by Bonaparte (1796), 174;
meeting of Lombard delegates at, 175;
taken by Suvórov (1799), 203;
by Bonaparte (1800), 218;
Napoleon crowned King of Italy at (1805), 238;
issues Decree of, establishing the Continental Blockade against
England (1808), 251.

Milanese, the. _See_ Lombardy.

Miles, William Augustus, English diplomatist (1754–1817), 78.

Millesimo, battle of (13 April 1796), 174.

Mincio, battle of the (8 Feb. 1814), 322.

Ministers of the French Directory, 166, 182, 190, 191, 210;
of the Consulate, 216;
of the Empire, 240, 241.

Minorca taken by the English (1798), 195, 264.

Minsk, province of, ceded to Russia at the second partition of Poland
(1793), 122.

Miollis, Sextius Alexandre François, Comte, French general
(1759–1829), 277.

Miot de Melito, André François, Comte, French administrator
(1762–1841), 256.

Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de, French statesman
(1749–1791), 54, 56, 60, 61, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 98, 99.

Mirabeau, Victor Riqueti, Marquis de, French economist (1715–89), 25.

Miranda, Don Francisco, French general (1750–1816), 126, 127.

Mirandola, principality of, united with Modena in 1789, 25.

Mittau, Louis XVIII. settled at, by the Emperor Paul (1797), 206;
ordered to leave (1802), 217.

Modena, duchy of, condition in 1789, 25, 26;
conquered by Bonaparte (1796), 174;
part of the Cisalpine Republic, 192;
of the kingdom of Italy, 255;
granted to Ferdinand IV., 347.

Moeskirch, battle of (5 May 1800), 218.

Moldavia, conquered by the Austrians (1789), 45;
by the Russians (1810), 281;
part of, ceded to Russia (1812), 281.

Möllendorf, Richard Joachim Heinrich, Count von, Prussian general
(1725–1816), 153.

Moncey, Bon Adrien Jeannot de, Duke of Conegliano, French general
(1754–1842), 151, 275, 356, App. iv.

Mondovi, battle of (22 April 1796), 174.

Monge, Gaspard, Comte, French mathematician (1746–1818), 114.

Montbéliard, ceded by Würtermburg to France, 227;
merged in the department of the Doubs, 230;
secured to France by the first treaty of Paris, 333.

Mont-Blanc, Savoy organised as the French department of the, 230.

—— Cenis, 151.

Montebello, battle of (4 June 1800), 218.

—— Duke of. _See_ Lannes.

Montenotte, battle of (12 April 1796), 174.

Montereau, battle of (18 Feb. 1814), 319.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, French philosopher
(1689–1755), 9.

Montesquiou-Fézensac, Anne Pierre, Marquis de, French general
(1739–98), 117.

—— —— François Nicolas, Abbé-Duc de, French politician (1757–1832),
330.

Monte Video, English expedition to (1806), 264.

Montgelas, Maximilian Joseph Garnerin, Comte de, Bavarian statesman
(1759–1838), 289.

Montluçon, Bonaparte’s treaty with the Vendéan leaders at (1800),
215.

Montmirail, battle of (11 Feb. 1814), 319.

Montmorin-Saint-Hérem, Armand Marc, Comte de, French statesman
(1745–92), 78.

Mont-Terrible, department of, merged in the department of the
Haut-Rhin, 230.

Moore, Sir John, English general (1761–1809), 254, 266, 269, 270.

Moreau, Jean Victor, French general (1761–1813), 168, 178, 186, 193,
194, 203, 211, 218, 219, 234, 235, 312.

Moreaux, Jean René, French general (1758–95), 144, 150.

Morkov, Arcadius Ivanovitch, Count, Russian diplomatist, (♰1827),
243.

Mortier, Adolphe Edouard Casimir Joseph, Duke of Treviso, French
general (1768–1835), 233, 329, App. iv.

Moscow, occupied by Napoleon (1812), 306.

Moskowa, Prince of the. _See_ Ney.

Moulin, Jean François Auguste, French general (1752–1810), 209.

Mounier, Jean Joseph, French statesman (1758–1806), 51, 55.

Mountain, the French political party, germs in the Jacobin Club
(1792), 107;
the party in the Convention, 116, 117;
attacked by the Girondins, 117;
struggle with the Girondins, 128, 129;
as a party ceases to exist (1795), 156.

Mount Tabor, battle of (16 April 1799), 208.

Mulhouse, Republic of, merged in the Haut-Rhin, 230;
secured to France (1814), 333.

Müller, Jacques Léonard, Baron, French general (1749–1824), 140.

—— Johann von, German historian (1752–1809), 259.

Munich, taken by the French under Moreau (1800), 219.

Münster, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34.

—— bishopric of, part of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227;
in the Grand Duchy of Berg (1806), 259;
part of, annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282.

—— city of, capital of a French department, 282.

—— Ernest Frederick, Count von, Hanoverian diplomatist (1766–1841),
337.

Murat, Joachim, Grand Duke of Berg, King of Naples, French general
(1771–1815), 239, 259, 267, 283, 306, 322, 345, 346, App. iv.

Murbach, the Abbot of, one of the chief Princes of the Empire in
Alsace, 79.

Murray, Sir John, English general (♰1827), 307.

Musæus, John Charles Augustus, German author (1735–87), 38.

Mustapha IV., Sultan of Turkey (1779–1808), 280, 281.

Mysticism in the 18th century, 10.

Namur, riots against Joseph’s reforms at (1789), 48.

Nancy, Bouillé suppresses a military mutiny at (Aug. 1790), 72, 97,
98.

Nangis, battle of (17 Feb. 1814), 319.

Nantes, Carrier’s atrocities at (1793), 139, 141.

Naples, reforms of Tanucci in, 23;
occupied by the French (1798), and the Parthenopean Republic
founded, 200;
evacuated by the French (1799), and the revenge of Ferdinand, 203;
attacked by Napoleon (1804), 242;
Joseph Bonaparte’s rule in, 256;
Murat king of, 283;
Ferdinand returns to (1814), 346, 359;
behaves moderately, 359.

Napoleon (1769–1821), crowned Emperor, 238;
his Court, 239;
his ministers, 240, 241;
the camp at Boulogne, 241;
organises the Grand Army, 241, 242;
wins the battle of Austerlitz, 244;
crushes Prussia at Jena, 247;
defeats the Russians at Eylau and Friedland, 248, 249;
holds interview with Alexander at Tilsit, 249, 250;
the Continental Blockade against England, 251;
his rearrangement of Europe, 254–257;
Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
his Polish policy, 261;
the Conference at Erfurt, 262;
makes his brother King of Spain, 267;
takes Madrid, 269;
defeats the Austrians (1809), 272–274;
quarrel with the Pope, 277, 278;
greatest extension of his Empire (1810), 282, 283;
his administration, 283–285;
belief in heredity, 285, 286;
aristocracy, 286, 287;
reforms, 287, 288;
divorces Josephine, 293;
marries Marie Louise, 294;
his differences with Alexander, 299–301;
invades Russia (1812), 305;
his retreat, 306;
first campaign of 1813 in Saxony, 309;
refuses the terms offered him by the allies, 311;
second campaign of 1813 in Saxony, 312, 313;
defeated at Leipzig, 314;
first defensive campaign of 1814 in France, 319;
rejects the terms offered by the allies at Châtillon, 323, 324;
second defensive campaign of 1814 in France, 328, 329;
abdicates, 331;
leaves Elba and returns to France (1815), 351;
defeated at Waterloo, 353;
sent to St. Helena, 355.
_See_ Bonaparte.

Napoleon, King of Rome, birth of, 294;
granted succession to Parma by the Provisional Treaty of Paris
(1814), 332;
but not by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 347.

Narbonne-Lara, Comte Louis de, French politician (1755–1813), 106,
107, 109.

Nassau, duchy of, increased in 1803, 227;
merged in the Grand Duchy of Berg (1806), 259;
a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.

Nassau-Siegen, Prince Charles Henry Nicholas Otho of, Russian admiral
(1745–1809), 44, 95.

National Assembly. _See_ Constituent Assembly.

—— Guards formed in Paris, 57;
throughout France, 59.

Nationality, the principle of, 2, 3;
extinct in 18th-century Germany, 40;
made the French successful and the Poles fail, 153;
roused against Napoleon in Spain, 298;
in Germany, 293, 314;
rejected by the Congress of Vienna, 360.

Natural limits of France, the Rhine and the Alps, claimed at Basle
(1795), 157;
demanded by the Directory, 170;
recognised secretly by Prussia, 179;
by the Preliminaries of Leoben, 186;
by the Treaty of Campo-Formio, 192;
by the Treaty of Lunéville, 220;
abandoned by Napoleon’s annexations, 282;
offered by the allies at Dresden, 311;
at Frankfort, 316;
opposed by Castlereagh, 318, 324.

Necker, Jacques, French statesman (1732–1804), 49, 51, 56, 58, 61, 74.

Neipperg, Albert Adam, Count (1774–1829), 346, 347.

Nelson, Horatio, Viscount, English admiral (1758–1805), 183, 195, 222,
242, 244, 245.

Nesselrode, Charles Robert, Count, Russian statesman (1780–1863), 301,
332, 337.

Netherlands, Austrian. _See_ Belgium.

—— The Protestant, or the United Provinces. _See_ Holland.

—— Kingdom of the, formed (1815), 344.

Neufchâtel, belonged to Prussia in 1789, 41;
Berthier created Prince-Duke of, 283, 286;
made a Canton of Switzerland (1815), 345.

Neumarkt, battle of (20 March 1797), 186.

Neutral League of the North, the, 222.

Ney, Michel, Duke of Elchingen, Prince of the Moskowa, French general
(1769–1815), 244, 296, 306, 313, 329, 332, 351, 352, 356, App. iv.

Nice, port of, improved by Victor Amadeus III., 26;
taken by the French (1792), 117;
annexed, 118;
formally ceded to France, 174;
formed into a department, 230;
restored to Sardinia (1814), 333.

Niebuhr, Barthold George, German historian (1776–1831), 304.

Nile, battle of the (1 Aug. 1798), 195.

Nimeguen, 149.

Nive, battle of the (9–13 Dec. 1813), 316.

Nivelle, battle of the (10 Nov. 1813), 316.

Noailles, Comte Alexis de, French diplomatist (1783–1835), 338.

Nobility, the European, in the 18th century, 7.

Nootka Sound, 77–9.

Nore, mutiny at the, 183, 193.

Normal School of Paris, founded by Napoleon, 288.

Normandy, the rising in, against the Convention, suppressed, 132, 133.

Norway, 32, 302, 320, 347.

Novi (Bosnia) taken by Loudon (1788), 43.

—— (Italy), battle of (15 Aug. 1799), 204.

Noyades at Nantes, 139.

Nuremberg, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, 35;
retained its independence (1803), 226;
granted to Bavaria (1806), 257.

Oath of the Tennis Court (20 June 1789), 54.

Ocana, battle of (12 Nov. 1809), 276.

Ochakov (Oczakoff), 43, 44, 96.

Oldenburg, duchy of (1815), 282, 300, 342.

Olivenza ceded by Portugal to Spain (1801), 223;
left to Spain by the Congress of Vienna, 348.

Oporto, rising against the French at (1808), 265;
taken by Soult, 270;
recaptured by Wellesley (1809), 275.

Orange, Prince of. _See_ William V., William VI.

Orleans, Louis Philippe Joseph, Duke of (1747–93), 57, 138.

Orsova besieged by the Austrians (1789), 45;
taken by the Prince of Coburg (1789), 88;
ceded to Austria (1791), 88.

Ortenau given to Baden (1807), 258.

Orthez, battle of (27 Feb. 1814), 321.

Osnabrück, the Duke of York bishop of, in 1789, 39;
merged in Hanover (1803), 227;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282.

Ostend taken by the Belgian patriots (1789), 64.

Otranto, Duke of. _See_ Fouché.

Oudinot, Nicolas Charles, Duke of Reggio, French general (1767–1847),
312, 329, App. iv.

Paciaudi, Paolo Maria, Italian scholar (1710–85), 25.

Pacte de Famille, the, between France and Spain, 14, 20, 77–79.

Pacy, the Norman insurgents against the Convention defeated at (13
July 1793), 131.

Paderborn, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34.

—— bishopric of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227;
in the kingdom of Westphalia (1807), 258.

Padua, Manifesto of, 102.

Pahlen, Peter, Count von der, Russian general (♰1826), 221.

Palestine, conquered by Bonaparte (1799), 208.

Palm, John Philip, German bookseller (♰1806), 293.

Palmella, Pedro de Sousa-Holstein, Count, afterwards Duke, of,
Portuguese statesman (1786–1850), 338.

Pampeluna besieged and taken by Wellington (1813), 315, 316.

Paoli, Pascal, Corsican patriot (1726–1807), 27, 145.

Papacy, the, its temporal power in the 18th century, 24.

Paris, takes part in the Revolution, 56;
riot of 12 July (1789), 57;
the taking of the Bastille, 57, 58;
the King brought to (6 Oct. 1789), 62;
keeps the King prisoner in the Tuileries, 99;
massacre of 17 July (1791), 101;
invades the Tuileries (20 June 1792), 112;
takes the Tuileries (10 Aug. 1792), 113;
massacres in (Sept. 1792), 115;
people of, refuse to support Robespierre, 147;
fights against the Convention, 13 Vendémiaire, 164, 165;
welcomes the Empire, 238;
battle of (1814), 239;
occupied by the allies, 239;
provisional treaty of, 331, 332;
return of Louis XVIII. to, 333;
first treaty of, 333, 334;
return of Napoleon to (1815), 351;
reoccupied by the allies, 353;
second treaty of, 353, 354.

Parker, Sir Hyde, English admiral (1739–1807), 222.

Parma, city of, capital of a French department, 283.

—— Duke of. _See_ Cambacérès.

—— and Piacenza, Duchess of. _See_ Marie Louise.

—— ——, Duke of. _See_ Ferdinand, Louis.

—— ——, duchies of, well governed in the 18th century, 25;
conquered by Bonaparte (1796), 174;
exchanged for kingdom of Etruria (1801), 220;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 283;
granted to Marie Louise by the Provisional Treaty of Paris (1814),
332;
by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 347.

Parthenopean Republic, founded (1798), 200;
overthrown (1799), 203.

Passau, bishopric of, merged in Bavaria (1801), 227.

Paul, Emperor, of Russia (1754–1801), his accession (1796), 185;
inclines to war with France, 198;
declares war against France (1798), 202;
receives Louis XVIII., 204;
withdraws his troops from the Continent, 206;
becomes Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, 207;
quarrels with Austria and England, 207;
makes peace with France, 207;
admiration for Bonaparte, 216, 217;
schemes for an invasion of India, 220, 221;
forms Neutral League of the North, 221, 222;
assassinated, 222.

Pavia, the university of, 26.

Peace, Prince of the. _See_ Godoy.

Peltier, Jean Gabriel, French journalist (1765–1825), 133.

Peninsular War: campaign of 1808, 265, 266;
of 1809, 275, 276;
of 1810, 296;
of 1811, 296, 297;
of 1812, 306, 307;
of 1813, 315.

_Père Duchesne_, 142.

Pérignon, Dominique Catherine, Comte, French general (1754–1818), 183,
App. iv.

Pesth, 90, 91.

Pétiet, Claude, French administrator (1749–1805), 182, 190.

Pétion, Jérome, French politician (1753–94), 78, 86.

Pfaffenhofen, treaty of (1796), 180.

Philosophers, the eighteenth century, 4, 9, 17, 38.

Piacenza, Duchy of. _See_ Parma.

—— Duke of. _See_ Le Brun.

Pichegru, Charles, French general (1761–1804), 140, 144, 149, 167,
172, 188, 191, 234, 235.

Piedmont, part of the kingdom of Sardinia in 1789, 26;
left to Victor Amadeus (1797), 192;
occupied by the French under Joubert (1798), 200;
occupied by the Austrians (1799), 206;
conquered by Bonaparte (1800), 218;
annexed to France (1801), 220, 230, 255.

Pigot, Sir Henry, English general (1752–1840), 195.

Pilnitz, Conference between the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick
William at (1791), 102;
the Declaration of, 103;
its effect on France, 106.

Pisa, the university of, 24, 200.

Pitt, William, English statesman (1759–1806), 28, 45, 78, 86, 97, 120,
125, 126, 166, 167, 169, 184, 189, 190, 225, 243, 245, 264.

Pius VI., Giovanni Angelo Braschi, Pope (1717–99), 24, 66, 76, 175,
177, 200, 203, 217.

—— VII., Gregorio Barnabé Luigi Chiaramonti, Pope (1742–1834), 217,
220, 229, 230, 238, 277, 278, 347.

Plain, deputies of the Centre in the Convention called the, 117, 129,
156.

Pleswitz, armistice of (3 June 1813), 309.

Plettenberg, the Baron of, Prince-Bishop of Münster in 1789, 39.

Pléville de Peley, Georges René, French admiral (1726–1805), 190, 196.

Podolia, province of, taken by Russia at the second partition of
Poland (1793), 122.

Poland, its extinction impending in 1789, 14;
Catherine’s policy in the first partition of, 18;
Prussia’s share of, and aims on, 30;
treaty of Warsaw with Prussia, 85;
refuses to surrender Thorn and Dantzic (1790), 87;
attempts at reform, 103, 104;
the Constitution of 1791, 104, 105;
invaded by the Russians (1792), 121;
attacked by the Prussians (1793), 122;
second partition of (1793), 122;
causes of the failure of the attempt at constitutional reform, 123;
insurrection in (1794), 151;
victory of the Russians, 151, 152;
final partition and extinction of Polish independence (1795), 152;
comparison between French and Polish revolutions, 152, 153;
looked favourably on by the Directory, 206;
Napoleon’s campaign in 1807, 248, 249;
Napoleon’s Polish policy, 261;
creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 261;
serfdom abolished in, 289;
the Emperor Alexander’s ideas on (1814), 339;
final rearrangement of (1815), 342.

Police, Ministry of General, established in France (1796), 182;
abolished under the Consulate, but restored under the Empire, 241.

Polignac, Armand Jules Marie Heraclius, Comte, afterwards Duc de,
French politician (1771–1847), 235.

Polish Legion formed for the service of France (1797), 206.

Pombal, Sebastian José de Carvalho-Mello, Marquis of, Portuguese
statesman (1699–1782), 22.

Pomerania, Prussian, its backward state in 1789, 29.

—— Swedish, possession of, gave the King of Sweden a voice in the Diet
of the Empire, 34;
occupied by the French under Brune (1808), 250, 254, 279;
exchanged for Norway by the treaty of Kiel (1814), 320;
given to Prussia by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 347.

Pompadour, Jeanne Antoinette Poisson, Marquise de (1721–64), 19.

Poniatowski, Joseph, Prince, Polish patriot, French general
(1762–1813), 121, 122, App. iv.

—— Stanislas, King of Poland (1732–98), 104, 122, 151, 152.

Ponte Corvo, principality of, belonged to the Pope in 1789, 24;
Bernadotte made Prince of (1806), 277.

Pontine marshes drained by Pope Pius VI., 24.

Popes. _See_ Pius VI., Pius VII.

Porentruy, district of, merged in the department of the Haut-Rhin,
230.

Portalis, Jean Etienne Marie, French statesman (1745–1807), 214, 215.

Portugal, its condition in 1789, 14, 21, 22;
declares war against the French Republic (1793), 120;
treaty of San Ildefonso (1796), 183;
England comes to the help of, 184;
attacked by Spain, and forced to cede Olivenza by the treaty of
Badajoz (1801), 223;
Napoleon’s schemes against, 252;
to be divided by treaty of Fontainebleau (1807), 252, 253;
conquered by the French, 253;
rises in insurrection against the French, 265;
English army sent to, 265;
freed from the French by the Convention of Cintra, 266;
invaded by the French under Masséna (1810), 296;
their repulse (1811), 297;
deserted by Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna (1815), 348.

Portuguese Legion, formed by Junot, for the service of France, 253.

Posen, province of, taken by Prussia in the second partition of Poland
(1793), 122;
given back to Prussia (1815), 342.

Potemkin, Gregory Alexandrovitch, Prince, Russian statesman
(1736–1791), 43, 44, 45, 96.

Potocki, Stanislas Felix, Polish statesman (1745–1805), 121.

Potsdam, treaty of (3 Nov. 1805), 247.

Pozzo di Borgo, Charles Andrew, Count, Russian diplomatist
(1764–1842), 301, 337.

Praga, suburb of Warsaw, stormed by Suvórov (4 Nov. 1794), 152.

Prague, congress of (1813), 311.

Prairial, the insurrection of 1st, in Paris (1795), 155, 156.

Prefectures, Bonaparte’s establishment of, in France, 230.

Preliminaries of Leoben signed (17 April 1797), 186.

Pressburg, treaty of (26 Dec. 1805), 245.

Prieur [of the Côte-d’Or], Claude Antoine, French statesman
(1763–1832), 133, 134.

—— [of the Marne], Pierre Louis, French statesman (1760–1827), 133.

Prince-Bishops of the Holy Roman Empire, 39, 40.

_Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard_, Rousseau’s, 10.

Proposals of Frankfort (1813), 316, 317.

Provera, John Nicholas, Baron, Austrian general (1747–1801), 176.

Prussia, administrative decay in, 5;
serfdom in, 5;
a member of the Triple Alliance, 13;
condition in 1789, 28–30;
policy of, 30, 31;
intervention in Holland (1787), 32;
influence in the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, 34;
position of, in 1789, 84;
anti-Austrian policy, 84–86;
alliance with Austria against France (1792), 109;
its share in the second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
in the third partition of Poland (1795), 152;
more anti-Austrian than anti-French, 152;
makes treaty of Basle with the French Republic (1795), 156, 157;
becomes protector of North Germany, by the conclusion of the line of
demarcation, 170, 171;
its great increase in importance by the secularisations of 1803,
227;
neutrality violated by the French (1805), 244;
advantages obtained by its policy of neutrality, 246;
desires to fight France, 246, 247;
crushed at Jena, and occupied by the French, 247;
deprived of its Rhenish Westphalian and Polish provinces (1807),
250;
reorganisation of, under Stein and Scharnhorst, 289–291;
becomes the recognised leader of the revived German national spirit,
292;
Stein’s reforms completed by Hardenberg, 303;
foundation of the University of Berlin, 303, 304;
obliged to allow Napoleon to traverse it, and to send him a contingent
(1812), 304;
rises against the French, 308, 309;
receives part of Saxony (1815), 341;
and part of Prussian Poland, 342;
obtains large Rhenish province, 344;
gets Swedish Pomerania, 347;
as a result of the period becomes the preponderant German power,
359.
_See_ Frederick William II., Frederick William III.

Public Safety, Committee of. _See_ Committee.

Pyramids, battle of the (21 July 1798), 195.

Pyrenees, campaigns in the, 133, 140, 144, 150, 151, 315, 316.

Quatre Bras, battle of (16 June 1815), 352.

Quedlinburg, abbey of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227.

Quiberon Bay, defeat of the French _émigrés_ at (June 1794), 154.

Quinette, Nicolas Marie, Baron, French administrator (1762–1821), 210.

Raab, battle of (14 June 1809), 273.

Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Jean Paul, French politician (1743–93), 52.

Raclawice, battle of (4 April 1794), 151.

Radet, Étienne, Baron, French general (1762–1825), 278.

Ragusa, Duke of. _See_ Marmont.

Ramel, Jean Pierre, French general (1768–1815), 356.

—— de Nogaret, Jacques, French politician (1760–1819), 182.

Rapinat, Jacques, French administrator (1750–1818), 199, 209.

Rasomovski, Andrew, Count, afterwards Prince, Russian diplomatist
(1751–1836), 323, 337.

Rastadt, Congress at, 186, 192, 202.

Ratisbon, bishopric of, granted to the Elector of Mayence (1803), 225;
to the King of Bavaria (1805), 260.

—— a free city of the Holy Roman Empire, where the Imperial Diet met,
35, 225, 257.

Reason, the Worship of, in Paris, 141;
attacked by Danton and Robespierre, 142.

Receivers-general of taxes, their establishment under the Consulate,
215.

Reden, Baron, Dutch diplomatist (♰1799), 87.

Regency, Portuguese, formed (1808), 266.

Reggio, duchy of, belonged to the Duke of Modena in 1789, 25;
merged in the Cisalpine Republic (1797), 192.

—— Duke of. _See_ Oudinot.

Regnier, Claude Ambroise, Duke of Massa, French statesman (1736–1814),
216, 239, 240, 241.

Reichenbach, conference, Congress and convention of (June 1790), 87,
88;
treaty of (17 June 1813), 310.

Reichskammergericht. _See_ Tribunal, Imperial.

Reichstag. _See_ Diet, Imperial.

Reign of Terror in France. _See_ Terror.

Reinhard, Charles Frédéric, Comte, French diplomatist (1761–1837),
210.

Renier, Paolo (♰1789), Doge of Venice in 1789, 27.

Repnin, Nicholas Vassilievitch, Prince, Russian general (1734–1801),
44, 96.

Retreats, famous military: Moreau’s, from Bavaria (1796), 178;
Moore’s, from Salamanca (1808–09), 269, 270;
Napoleon’s, from Moscow (1812), 306.

Reubell, Jean François, French statesman (1747–1807), 150, 156, 165,
169, 179, 181, 191, 209.

Réunion, island of (Isle of Bourbon), restored to France (1815), 348.

Reuss, the principalities of, states of the Germanic Confederation
(1815), 343.

Reuss, Prince Anton von (1738–96), 87.

Réveillon, Jean (1796), sack of his house at Paris (June 1789), 56.

Revellière-Lépeaux, Louis Marie de la, French statesman (1753–1824),
165, 171, 181, 182, 209.

Revolution, the reasons why it began in France, 7, 8.
_See_ France.

Revolutionary Propaganda, decreed by the Convention (18 Nov. 1792),
118;
its effect on the character of the war, 125;
the decree repealed (16 May 1793), 133;
idea adopted by the Hébertists, 141;
formally abandoned by the Thermidorian Committee of Public Safety,
148, 159.

—— Tribunal. _See_ Tribunal.

_Révolutions de Paris_, important journal edited by Loustalot, 61.

Reynier, Jean Louis Ebenezer, Comte, French general (1771–1814), 256,
296.

Rhine, the, declared the natural boundary of France, 157;
crossed by Moreau (1796), 178;
by Moreau (1797), 186;
by Blücher (1813), 318.

—— Confederation of the, formed by Napoleon (1806), 245;
its members, 260, 261;
replaced by the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342, 343.

Ricci, Scipio de, Bishop of Pistoia, Italian statesman (1741–1810),
24, 83.

Richelieu, Armand Emmanuel Sophie Septimanie du Plessis, Duc de,
French statesman (1766–1822), 357.

Ried, treaty of (8 Oct. 1813), 313, 314.

Riga, besieged by the French under Macdonald (1812), 307.

Rivers, stipulations on the navigation of, 349.

Rivière, Charles François de Riffardeau, Marquis, afterwards Duc de,
French _émigré_ (1763–1827), 235.

Rivoli, battle of (14 Jan. 1797), 176.
—— Duke of. _See_ Masséna.

Roberjot, Claude, French politician (1753–99), 202.

Robespierre, Maximilien Marie Isidore de, French statesman
(1758–1794), opposes intervention of France on behalf of Spain
(1790), 78;
moves motion preventing election of deputies of the Constituent to
the Legislative Assembly, 105;
opposes war with Austria, 105;
a leader in the Convention, 117;
attacked by Louvet, 117;
views on the King’s trial, 119;
his struggle with the Girondins, 129;
member of the Committee of Public Safety, 133;
his position and character, 134, 135;
attacks the Hébertists, 142;
establishes the Worship of the Supreme Being, 146;
overthrown in Thermidor (1794), 146, 147;
guillotined, 147.

Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de, French general
(1725–1807), 107.

Rödt, Baron of, Prince-Bishop of Constance in 1789, 39.

Roggenbach, Baron Joseph Sigismund of, Prince-Bishop of Basle in 1789
(♰1794), 39.

Roland de la Platière, Jean Marie, French administrator (1734–93),
110, 112, 114.

—— Manon Jeanne, Madame (1754–93), her salon, 116.

Roliça, battle of (17 Aug. 1808), 265.

Romagna, the, part of the Cisalpine Republic (1797), 192.

Roman Empire, the Holy. _See_ Empire.

Roman Republic, the, established (1798), 200;
overthrown (1799), 203.

Rome, administration of the Popes at, 24;
occupied by French troops (1798), 200;
evacuated by them, 203;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 255;
declared the second city of the Empire, 277, 278;
capital of a French department, 283;
restored to the Pope (1815), 347.

Rosas, taken by the French (3 Feb. 1795), 150, 151.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Genevese philosopher (1712–78), 9, 10, 41,
146.

Roussillon, 130, 140.

Ruffo, Alvaro, Commander, afterwards Prince, Neapolitan diplomatist
(♰1825), 338, 346.

Rügen, island of, belonged to Sweden in 1789, 32.
_See_ Pomerania, Swedish.

Rumford, Benjamin Thompson, Count, Bavarian statesman (1753–1814), 37.

Russia, condition and growth of, under Catherine, 18, 19;
invaded by the Swedes (1788–90), 45, 95;
obtains increase of territory by the treaty of Jassy (1792), 96;
her share in the second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
in the third partition (1795), 152;
accession of Paul, 185, 198;
her intervention in the war with France and its results, 206, 207;
disapproves of war with England, 221;
murder of Paul (1801), 221;
trade of, 234;
joins the coalition against Napoleon (1805), 242, 243;
defeated at Eylau, 248;
and Friedland, 249;
results, 249;
cessions made to, by the treaty of Tilsit, 249, 250, 261;
grumbles at the Continental Blockade, 261, 300;
attitude towards Austria (1809), 272;
annexes Finland, 278, 299, 302;
its cessions from the Turks in 1812, 281;
incited by England to war with France, 301;
invaded by Napoleon (1812), 305, 306;
drives out the French, 306;
its share in the overthrow of Napoleon, 334;
its annexations from Poland (1815), 341, 342;
a result of the period its taking a prominent place in European
polity, 359, 360.
_See_ Alexander, Catherine, Paul.

Russian Armament, the (1788), 45.

Rymnik, battle of the (12 Aug. 1789), 45.

Sacilio, battle of (16 April 1809), 273.

Safety, Public, Committee of. _See_ Committee.

Saint-Aignan, Paul Hippolyte de Beauvilliers, Marquis de, French
diplomatist (1782–1831), 316.

Saint-André, André Jeanbon, _called_, French administrator
(1749–1813), 133.

Saint Bernard, the Great, 218.

Saint Bernard, the Little, 151.

Saint-Claude, abbey of, in the Jura, 6.

Saint-Cloud, the Councils removed to from Paris, 210;
Bonaparte’s _coup d’état_ of 18 Brumaire (1799) at, 211.

Saint-Cyr, Laurent Gouvion de. _See_ Gouvion.

Saint-Gall, the canton of, created by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
recognised by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Saint-Gothard, Suvórov’s passage of the (1799), 204.

Saint Helena, Napoleon deported to (1815), 355.

Saint-Helens, Alleyne Fitzherbert, Lord. _See_ Fitzherbert.

Saint-Just, Louis Léon Antoine Florelle de, French politician
(1767–94), 133, 135, 138, 140, 142, 147.

Saint Lucia, island of, ceded to France (1783), 19;
restored to England by the first treaty of Paris (1814), 333;
by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 348.

Saint-Marsan, Filippo Antonio Maria Asinari, Marquis de, Italian
diplomatist (1761–1828), 338.

Saint Ouen, Declaration of (2 May 1814), 332, 333.

Saint-Petersburg, threatened by the Swedes (1790), 95.

Saint Priest, Guillaume Emmanuel Guignard, Comte de, French _émigré_,
Russian general (1776–1814), 328.

Saint-Vincent, battle of (14 Feb. 1797), 183.

Saint-Vincent, Sir John Jervis, Earl. _See_ Jervis.

Salamanca, Moore’s advance to (1808), 269;
battle of (22 July 1812), 306.

Saliceti, Christophe, French politician (1757–1809), 256.

Salkief, circle of, in Poland, ceded to Russia (1807), 261.

Salm, petty German principalities (1789), 34;
territories in Germany annexed by Napoleon (1810), 282.

—— Salm, Constantine Alexander, Prince of (1762–1828), 79.

Salomon, Gabriel René, French politician (♰1792), 60.

Salzburg, the Archbishop of, alternate president of the College of
Princes in 1789, 34.

Salzburg, archbishopric of, made into an electorate for the Grand Duke
Ferdinand of Tuscany (1803), 225, 229;
ceded to Bavaria (1809), 257, 274;
restored to Austria (1815), 344.

San Domingo, Bonaparte’s attempt to reconquer (1802), 232.

—— Ildefonso, treaty of (19 Aug. 1796), 183.

—— Sebastian, threatened by the French (1794), 144;
taken by the French (1795), 157;
stormed by Wellington (1813), 315, 316.

Saorgio, battle of (29 April 1794), 144.

Saragossa, siege of (1809), 275.

Sardinia, kingdom of, condition in 1789, 26, 27;
attacked by the French (1792), 117;
subsidised by England, 126;
restored to Victor Emmanuel I., with the addition of Genoa, 346;
got back Savoy (1815), 354.
_See_ Charles Emmanuel III., Victor Amadeus IV., Victor Emmanuel I.,
_also_ Nice, Piedmont, Savoy.

Savigny, Frederick Charles von, German jurist (1779–1861), 304.

Savona, Pope Pius VII. imprisoned at, 278.

Savoy, part of the kingdom of Sardinia in 1789, 26;
conquered by the French (1792), 117;
annexed to France, 118;
ceded by the King of Sardinia (1797), 174;
made into the department of Mont-Blanc, 230;
left to France (1814), 333;
restored to the King of Sardinia (1815), 354.

Saxe-Coburg, duchy of, a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
342.

—— —— Saalfeld, Prince Francis Josias of. _See_ Coburg, Prince of.

—— Gotha, duchy of, a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

—— Hildburghausen, duchy of, a state of the Germanic Confederation
(1815), 343.

—— Meiningen, duchy of, a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
343.

Saxe-Teschen, Duke Albert of, Austrian general (1738–1822), 113.

Saxe-Weimar, duchy of, 38;
made a Grand Duchy and a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
342.
_See_ Charles Augustus.

Saxony, electorate of, its condition in 1789, 38;
receives Lower Lusatia, and made a kingdom (1806), 259;
a state of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
invaded by Schill (1809), 293;
occupied by Napoleon (1813), 309;
proposition to merge it in Prussia rejected (1814), 339, 340;
part of, ceded to Prussia (1815), 341;
a state of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.
_See_ Frederick Augustus.

Schaffhausen, Thurgau, separated from the canton of, by Bonaparte
(1803), 228.

Scharnhorst, Gerard David von, Prussian general (1755–1813),
reorganised the Prussian army, 290, 291, 308;
mortally wounded at Lützen, 309.

Scheldt, navigation of the, declared free by the National Convention,
118.

Schérer, Barthélemy Louis Joseph, French general (1747–1804), 173,
190, 202, 203.

Schill, Friedrich, Prussian officer (1773–1809), 293.

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich, German poet (1759–1805), 9, 38.

Schimmelpenninck, Roger John, Count, Dutch statesman (1761–1825), 254.

Schleiermacher, Ernst Friedrich, German philosopher (1779–1834), 304.

Schlieffen, Friedrich von, Prussian general (♰1791), 63, 65, 94, 95.

Schönbrunn, treaty of (15 Feb. 1806), 247.

Schönfeld, Wilhelm Christoph von, Prussian general (♰1797), 65, 93.

Schulenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, Count von, Prussian statesman
(1730–1802), 126.

—— —— Albert, Count von, Saxon diplomatist (1772–1853), 338.

Schulz, pastor of Gielsdorf, the case of, 10.

Schwartzberg, two principalities of, recognised as states of the
Germanic Confederation (1815), 343.

Schwartzenberg, Prince Charles Philip von, Austrian general
(1771–1820), 294, 305, 312, 313, 318, 319, 320, 328, 329, 350,
353.

Schweitz, canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228.

Séance Royale, held by Louis XVI. (23 June 1789), 54.

Sebastiani, François Horace Bastien, Comte, French general
(1772–1851), 275, 280.

Secularisation of the ecclesiastical states of the Empire proposed by
France, 170;
agreed to at Lunéville (1801), 220;
its tendency, 226;
carried out (1803), and its effects, 226, 227.

Security, General, Committee of. _See_ Committee.

Selim III., Sultan of the Ottoman Turks (1761–1808), 44, 88, 89, 96,
280, 281.

Senate of France, established by the Constitution of the Year VIII.,
its functions, 214;
given power to dissolve the Tribunate and Legislative Body (1803),
232;
offers the title of Emperor to Napoleon (1804), 236;
its position under the Empire, 240, 284;
appoints a Provisional Government (1814), 330;
declares Napoleon dethroned, 331.

Serfdom in Europe in the 18th century, 5, 6;
abolished in Hungary by Joseph II., 16;
the Russian peasant partly protected from, by his village
organisation, 19;
prevalent in Prussia, 29, 30;
abolished in Denmark (1788), 32;
abolished in Baden (1783), 37;
its existence a cause of the failure of the Poles to maintain their
independence, 152;
disappeared from Central Europe under the influence of the French
Revolution and Napoleon, 288, 289;
abolished in Prussia by Stein, 290;
its general abolition a permanent result of the period, 361.

Sérurier, Jean Mathieu Philibert, French general (1742–1819), App. iv.

Servan, Joseph, French general (1741–1808), 114.

Servia, conquered by the Austrians under Loudon (1789), 45;
independence recognised by the Turks (1812), 281.

Shumla, 281.

Sicily, not much affected by Tanucci’s reforms, 23;
held by the English for Ferdinand IV., 256, 264.

Sidmouth, Henry Addington, Viscount. _See_ Addington.

Sieges: Acre (1799), 208;
Alessandria (1799), 203, 204;
Alexandria (1801), 224;
Almeida (1811), 296;
Antwerp (1814), 321;
Badajoz (1812), 306;
Bayonne (1814), 316, 321;
Bender (1789), 45;
Burgos(1812), 307;
Cadiz (1810–12), 296, 297;
Cairo (1801), 224;
Ciudad Rodrigo (1812), 306;
Condé (1793), 130;
Dantzic (1806–7), 248, 249;
Dantzic (1813–14), 319;
Dunkirk (1793), 130, 140;
Gaeta (1807), 256;
Genoa (1799–1800), 205, 206, 218;
Giurgevo (1790), 88;
Hamburg (1813–14), 319, 320;
Ismail (1789–90), 45, 96;
Landau (1793), 140;
Le Quesnoy (1793), 130;
Lille (1792), 114, 118;
Lyons (1793), 131, 140;
Magdeburg (1813–14), 319;
Mantua (1796–97), 175, 176;
Mantua (1799), 203;
Maubeuge (1793), 140;
Mayence (1793), 130;
Mayence (1795), 172;
Mayence (1797), 193;
Ochakov (1788), 43, 44;
Orsova (1789–90), 45, 88;
Pampeluna (1813), 316;
Riga (1812), 307;
San Sebastian (1813), 315, 316;
Saragossa (1809), 275;
Stettin (1813–14), 319;
Tarragona (1812), 307;
Toulon (1793), 140;
Valenciennes (1793), 130;
Warsaw (1794), 151, 152.

Siena, 24, 283.

Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph, Comte, French statesman (1748–1836), 53, 54,
60, 150, 156, 159, 165, 166, 182, 197, 209, 219, 211, 213, 357.

Silesia, the Prussian Army of, formed under Blücher (1813), 309;
defeated the French at the Katzbach, 319;
crosses the Rhine, 318;
cut to pieces by Napoleon, 319.

Silistria, taken by Kutuzov (1811), 281.

Siméon, Joseph Jerome, Comte, French administrator (1749–1842), 259.

Sistova, congress of (1790–91), 88;
treaty of (4 Aug. 1791), 89.

Slave trade, the Negro, condemned by the Congress of Vienna at the
demand of Castlereagh (1815), 348, 349.

Smith, Sir William Sidney, English admiral (1764–1840), 145, 208.

Smolensk, 305, 306.

Socialism opposed even by the Hébertists, 141.

Soleure, canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228.

Soltikov, Ivan, Count, Russian general (1736–1805), 43.

Somo Sierra, Napoleon forces the pass of the (1808), 269.

Sotin de la Coindière, Pierre, French administrator (1764–1810),
Minister of Police (1797), 190.

Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, Duke of Dalmatia, French general
(1769–1851), 269, 270, 275, 296, 297, 315, 316, 321, 332, App. iv.

Sovereignty of the people, the doctrine of, 2.

Spain, allied to France by the Pacte de Famille, 14;
its condition in 1789, 20, 21;
the reforms of Aranda, 21;
demands the help of France against England in the Nootka Sound
affair (1790), 78;
declares war against France (1793), 119;
subsidised by England, 126;
invades France, 130;
defeated by the French (1794), 140;
invaded by the French (1795), 144;
weary of the war with France, 154;
makes peace with France at Basle (1795), 157;
makes alliance with France at San Ildefonso, and attacks England,
183;
fleet defeated off Cape St. Vincent (1797), 183;
Bonaparte’s communications with, 223;
attacks Portugal, and gets Olivenza by the treaty of Badajoz (1801),
223;
cedes Louisiana to France, 232;
agrees at Fontainebleau for the partition of Portugal, 252, 253;
course of politics in, 266, 267;
Napoleon makes Joseph Bonaparte king of (1808), 267;
the Spanish people rise against the French, 267, 268;
Napoleon in Spain, 268–70;
the guerilla war against the French, 297;
evacuated by the French (1813), 315;
lost Trinidad, but kept Olivenza at the Congress of Vienna
(1814–15), 348;
reactionary policy of Ferdinand VII. in (1815), 358.
_See_ Charles IV., Ferdinand VII., Joseph, Peninsular War.

Spanish Armament, the (1790), 78.

Spielmann, Anton, Baron von, Austrian diplomatist (♰1738–1813),
Austrian representative at Reichenbach (1790), 87.

Spires, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34;
and one of the Princes holding largest fiefs in Alsace, 79.

—— bishopric of, the portion on the right bank of the Rhine merged in
Baden (1803), 227.

—— city of, taken by Custine (1792), 118.

Splügen pass, forced by Macdonald (1800), 219.

Stäblo, Abbot of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34.

Stackelberg, Gustavus, Count von, Russian diplomatist (♰1825), 337.

Stadion, John Philip Charles Joseph, Count, Austrian statesman
(1763–1824), tried to rouse Germany against Napoleon, 270, 271;
succeeded by Metternich (1809), 275;
inspired by Gentz, 292;
Austrian plenipotentiary at Châtillon (1814), 323.

Staps, Friedrich (1792–1809), schemed to assassinate Napoleon, 293.

State, doctrine of the, 4, 292.

States of the Church. _See_ Papal States.

States-General of France, summoned (1788), 43;
a financial expedient, 49, 50;
the elections to, 50, 51;
struggle between the Orders, 52, 53;
declares itself the National Assembly, 53.
_See_ Constituent Assembly.

Stein, Henry Frederick Charles, Freiherr von, Prussian statesman
(1757–1831), a Knight of the Empire, 40;
his reforms in Prussia, 290;
dismissed by Napoleon’s orders, 291;
pressed Alexander to war with Napoleon, 301;
his work completed by Hardenberg, 303;
at the Russian headquarters (1812), 304;
summoned the Estates of Prussia at Königsberg, 308;
his idea of rousing a German national spirit abandoned by the allied
monarchs (1813), 310;
present at the Congress of Vienna, 337.

Stéphanie Tascher de la Pagerie (1789–1860), married to the Hereditary
Grand Duke of Baden (1806), 258.

Stettin, French garrison left in (1813), 308;
besieged (1813–14), 319.

Stewart, Hon. Sir Charles, afterwards Lord, English general and
diplomatist (1778–1854), 301, 323, 337.

—— Robert, Viscount Castlereagh. _See_ Castlereagh.

Stockach, battle of (25 March 1799), 202.

Stralsund, taken by the French (1807), 250.

Strasbourg, Archbishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 34;
one of chief Princes of the Empire in Alsace, 79.

—— archbishopric of, the portion on the right bank of the Rhine ceded
to Baden (1803), 227.

Stuart, Hon. Sir Charles, English general (1753–1801), 184, 195.

—— Sir John, English general (1762–1810), 256.

Stuttgart, 37, 38, 178.

Suchet, Louis Gabriel, Duke of Albufera, French general (1770–1826),
275, 297, 307, 315, App. iv.

Sudermania, Duke of. _See_ Charles XIII., King of Sweden.

Supreme Being, Worship of the, established by Robespierre (1794), 146.

Suspects, Law of the, 137.

Suvórov, Alexander Vassilivitch, Count, afterwards Prince, Russian
general (1729–1800), gallantry at the siege of Ochákov (1788), 44;
defeats the Turks at Foksany and the Rymnik (1789), 45;
stormed Ismail, and served at Matchin (1790–91), 96;
defeated the Poles at Zielence and Dubienka (1792), 121, 122;
defeated Kosciuszko at Maciejowice, and took Warsaw (1794), 152;
defeats the French at Cassano and the Trebbia, and conquers Northern
Italy (1799), 203;
defeats Joubert at Novi, and crosses the Alps, 204;
repulsed by the French, 205;
accuses the Austrians of causing his failure, 207.

Svenska Sound, battle of (9 July 1790), 95.

Swabia, part ceded to Bavaria, 245;
part to Würtemburg, 258.

Sweden, its condition in 1789, 32, 33;
at war with Russia and Denmark, 45, 46;
makes peace with the Danes (1789), 46;
the _coup d’état_ of Gustavus III. (1789), 46;
peace with Russia, 95, 96;
death of Gustavus III., 110;
neutral in the war against France, 120, 124, 171;
loses Pomerania and Finland, 250, 254;
revolution in, and dethronement of Gustavus IV. (1809), 278, 279;
Bernadotte elected Prince Royal (1810), 279;
exchanges Pomerania for Norway by the treaty of Kiel (1814), 320;
cession of Norway confirmed by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 347.
_See_ Bernadotte, Charles XIII., Gustavus III., Gustavus IV.

Switzerland, its condition in 1789, 41;
its neutrality in the war against France, 120, 125, 171;
headquarters of French diplomacy, 156;
and of the _émigrés_ diplomacy, 166, 167;
revolution of 1798, 198, 199;
invaded by the French and the Helvetian Republic formed, 199;
Masséna’s campaign in (1799), 204, 205;
reorganised by Bonaparte as the Confederation of Switzerland (1803),
228, 229;
neutrality of, violated by the allies (1814), 318;
independence and neutrality guaranteed by the treaty of Paris
(1814), 334;
reorganised, and given a fresh constitution by the Congress of
Vienna (1815), 344, 345.

Syria, Bonaparte’s campaign in (1799), 208.

Tagliamento, Bonaparte forces the passage of the (16 March 1797), 185,
186.

Talavera, battle of (27 July 1809), 275.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de, Bishop of Autun, afterwards
Prince of Benevento, French statesman (1754–1838), consecrates the
Constitutional bishops in France (1790), 70;
appointed Foreign Minister (1797), and advocated the _coup d’état_
of 18 Fructidor, 190;
resigned (1799), 210;
advised Bonaparte to the _coup d’état_ of 18 Brumaire, 210;
Foreign Minister under the Consulate, 216;
Grand Chamberlain of the Empire, 239;
Foreign Minister under the Empire, 241;
created Prince of Benevento, 277;
his policy after the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, 329, 330;
President of the Provisional Government of France, 330;
gets the Bourbons accepted, 331;
negotiates the first treaty of Paris, 333;
French plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), 338;
his masterly attitude, 338, 339;
signs treaty with Austria and England against Russia and Prussia (3
Jan. 1815), 340;
dismissed by Louis XVIII. (1815), 357.

Tallien, Jean Lambert, French politician (1769–1820), 166.

Talma, François Joseph, French actor (1763–1826), 262.

Tanucci, Bernardo, Marquis, Italian statesman (1698–1783), 4, 23.

Taranto, Duke of. _See_ Macdonald.

Targovitsa, Confederation of, asks Catherine’s aid to overthrow the
Polish Constitution of 1791, 121.

Tarragona, English failure before (1812), 307.

Tauroggen, convention of (1812), 308.

Temeswar, the Banat of, invaded by the Turks (1788), 43.

Tennis Court, Oath of the (20 June 1789), 54.

Terror, the Reign of, weapons of, forged, 128;
Robespierre deemed the author of, 135, 147;
the system of, 135–138;
the deputies on mission, 136, 137;
revolutionary tribunal, 137, 138;
the Terror in the provinces, 138, 139;
excused by France because of the success of the Committee of Public
Safety against the foreign foes, 141;
Danton believed it too stringent, 143;
rose to its height (June-July 1794), 145, 146;
system abandoned, 148.

—— the White, in France (1815), 356, 357.

Tetterborn, Baron von, Russian general (♰1836), 308.

Teutonic Order, the, suppressed by Hardenberg in Prussia, 303.

Texel, Dutch fleet in the, captured by French hussars (1795), 149;
blockaded by the English fleet, 184, 193;
defeated in the battle of Camperdown (1797), 194;
captured by the English (1799), 205.

Theo-philanthropy, new religion started in France, 181, 182.

Thermidor, overthrow of Robespierre on the 9th, 147.

Thermidorians, rule of the, 148, 149, 154–157;
their foreign policy, 156, 157.

Thompson, Benjamin, Count Rumford. _See_ Rumford.

Thorn, promised to Prussia by the Poles (1790), 85;
but not surrendered (1791), 87;
obtained by Prussia at the second partition of Poland (1793), 122;
restored to Prussia by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 342.

Thouret, Jacques Guillaume, French politician (1746–94), 100.

Thugut, Franz Maria, Baron, Austrian statesman (1734–1818), becomes
Austrian Foreign Minister, 126;
his policy, 153, 154;
in favour of continuing the war with France, 169;
delayed the treaty of Campo-Formio as long as he could, 192;
retired from office, 220.

Thurgau, canton of, formed by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
recognised by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Thuriot de la Rozière, Jacques Alexis, French politician (1758–1829),
133.

Thurn and Taxis, Prince of, as Imperial Commissary, summoned the Diet
of the Empire (1792), 108.

Ticino, canton of, formed by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
recognised by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Tiers État, Order of the, in the States-General, its struggle with the
privileged Orders, 51, 53;
declares itself the National Assembly, 53.

Tillot, Guillaume Léon du, Marquis of Felino, Italian statesman
(1711–1774), 25.

Tilsit, the meeting of Napoleon and Alexander at, 249, 250;
the treaty of (7 July 1807), 250.

Tirlemont, 48, 64.

Titles abolished in France by the Constituent Assembly, 60.

Tloczow, circle of, ceded to Russia (1807), 26.

Tobac, battle of (1789), 45.

Tobago, ceded by England to France (1783), 19;
ceded to England by the treaty of Paris (1814), 333;
cession recognised by the Congress of Vienna, 348.

Tolentino, treaty of (19 Feb. 1797), 177;
battle of (3 May 1815), 346.

Toleration, Napoleon insists on religious, in Europe, 289.

Töplitz, treaty of (9 Sept. 1813), 313.

Torgau ceded by Saxony to Prussia (1815), 341.

Torres Vedras, Masséna repulsed from the lines of (1810), 296.

Tortona, fortress of, built by Victor Amadeus III., 27.

Toulon, 139, 140.

Toulouse, battle of (10 April 1814), 332.

Trafalgar, battle of (21 Oct. 1805), 244, 245.

Trautmannsdorf, Count Albert von, Austrian statesman (1749–1817), 47,
64.

Treaties: Amiens (1802), 225;
Badajoz (1801), 223;
Bartenstein (1807), 248;
Basle (1795), 156, 157;
Bucharest (1812), 281;
Campo-Formio (1797), 192, 193;
Chaumont (1814), 327, 328;
Fontainebleau (1807), 252, 253;
Ghent (1814), 341;
Jassy (1792), 96;
Kalisch (1813), 308;
Kiel (1814), 320;
Lunéville (1801), 219, 220;
Paris, Provisional (1814), 331, 332;
Paris, First (1814), 333, 334;
Paris, Second (1815), 353, 354;
Pfaffenhofen (1796), 180;
Potsdam (1805), 247;
Pressburg (1805), 245;
Reichenbach (1813), 310;
Ried (1813), 313, 314;
San Ildefonso (1796), 183;
Schönbrunn (1806), 247;
of 3 Jan. 1815, secret, 341;
of 1756, 11, 12, 19;
Sistova (1791), 89;
Tilsit (1807), 250;
Tolentino (1797), 177;
Töplitz (1813), 313;
Verela (1790), 95–96;
Versailles (1783), 13, 19, 28;
Vienna (1809), 274;
Vienna (1815), 350;
Warsaw (1790), 85.

Trebbia, battle of the (17–19 June 1799), 203.

Treilhard, Jean Baptiste, Comte, French statesman (1742–1810), 148,
166, 195, 209.

Trent, Macdonald joined by Brune at (1800), 219.

—— bishopric of, granted to Austria (1803), 226.

Trèves, the Archbishop of, an Elector in 1789, 34;
one of the chief Princes of the Empire, with fiefs in Alsace, 79;
electorate abolished (1803), 225.

—— city of, taken by the French (1795), 150;
capital of a French department, 230.

—— electorate of, well governed in 1789, 40;
conquered by the French under Moreaux (1795), 150;
ceded to France, 193, 225;
given to Prussia (1815), 344.

Treviso, Duke of. _See_ Mortier.

Tribunal, the Imperial, of the Holy Roman Empire
(Reichskammergericht), 35.

—— the Revolutionary, of Paris, established (March 1793), 128;
its powers and effect, 137;
its system of work, 138;
its powers increased (June 1794), 146, 147;
condemns Carrier, 149.

Tribunate, formed by the Constitution of the Year VIII., its
functions, 214;
reduced to fifty members (1805), 240;
suppressed (1808), 284.

Trieste ceded to Napoleon (1809), 274.

Trinidad, island of, taken by the English (1797), 264;
ceded to England by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 348.

Triple Alliance, the, of England, Holland, and Prussia, formed 1788,
13, 32.

Tronchet, François Denis, French jurist (1726–1806), 215.

Truguet, Laurent Jean François, Comte, French admiral (1752–1839),
166, 190.

Tudela, battle of (23 Nov. 1808), 269.

Tuileries, Palace at Paris, 62, 99, 100, 112, 113, 129, 155, 164, 165.

Turin, observatory at, built by Victor Amadeus III., 26;
threatened by Bonaparte (1796), 174;
occupied by Suvórov (1799), 203.

Turkey, travelling to decay, 14;
Joseph declares war against, 17;
campaign of 1788 against the Russians and Austrians, 43, 44;
accession of Sultan Selim (1789), 44;
campaign of 1789, 45;
Prussia negotiates with, 45, 85;
campaign of 1790 against the Austrians, 88;
treaty of Sistova (1791), 89;
campaign of 1790–91 against the Russians, 96;
treaty of Jassy (1792), 96;
looked with favour on the French Revolution, 171;
defeated by Bonaparte in Syria and Egypt (1799), 208;
French army in Illyria to threaten, 256;
its general policy (1796–1807), 280;
revolution in, and accession of Mahmoud (1807–08), 280, 281;
war with Russia (1809–12), 281;
treaty of Bucharest (1812), 281.
_See_ Abdul Hamid, Mahmoud, Mustapha, Selim.

Turreau, Louis Marie, Baron, French general (1756–1816), 141.

Tuscany, its prosperity under the Grand Duke Leopold, 24, 25;
declares war against France (1793), 120;
makes peace with France, 157, 171;
occupied by the French (1799), 200;
evacuated by them, 203;
restored to the Grand Duke Ferdinand (1800), 206;
made into the kingdom of Etruria (1801), 220;
annexed to Napoleon’s Empire (1808), 255;
Elisa Bonaparte, Grand Duchess of, 283;
restored to Ferdinand (1815), 347.
_See_ Ferdinand II., Leopold.

Two Sicilies, kingdom of the. _See_ Naples.

Tyrol, the opposition to Joseph’s reforms in, 15;
Joseph suspends his edicts, 66;
pacified by Leopold (1790), 84;
invaded by Bonaparte (1797), 186;
by Macdonald (1800), 219;
ceded to Bavaria (1805), 245;
Hofer’s insurrection in (1809), 273, 274;
restored to Austria by Bavaria (1815), 344.

Ulm, 35, 243, 244.

United States of America, 145, 159, 160, 242, 341.

Universities: Berlin, 303, 304;
Bonn, 40;
Cracow, 105;
Göttingen, 39;
Jena, 38;
Mannheim, 37;
Milan, 26;
Parma, 25;
Pavia, 26;
Pisa, 24;
Siena, 24.

University of France founded by Napoleon, its constitution, 288.

Unterwalden, canton of Switzerland maintained by Bonaparte (1803),
228.

Unzmarkt, battle of (22 March 1797), 186.

Uri, a canton of Switzerland, 41, 228.

Vadier, Marc Guillaume Alexis, French politician (1736–1828), 149,
155.

Valais, the, declared an independent Republic (1803), 228;
annexed by Napoleon (1810), 283;
made a canton of Switzerland by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 345.

Valence, Pope Pius VI. dies at (1798), 203.

Valencia, taken by Moncey (1809), 275.

Valenciennes, taken by the English and Austrians (1793), 130.

Valmy, battle of (20 Sept. 1792), 115.

—— Duke of. _See_ Kellermann.

Valsarno, battle of (26 Oct. 1813), 315.

Vancouver Island, the affair of Nootka Sound (1790), 77, 78;
the Spaniards claim, 79.

Vandamme, Dominique René, Comte, French general (1770–1830), 309, 312,
313.

Van der Mersch, John Andrew, Belgian general (1734–92), 48, 64, 93.

Van der Noot, Henry Charles Nicholas, Belgian statesman (1735–1827),
48, 64, 65, 92, 93, 94.

Vandernootists or Statists, Belgian political party, 47, 48, 92, 93.

Van der Spiegel, John, Baron, Dutch statesman, Grand Pensionary of
Holland, 65, 93.

Varennes, the flight of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette from Paris
(June 1791), stopped at, 100.

Vauchamps, battle of (14 Feb. 1814), 319.

Vaud, Pays de, revolts against Berne (1798), 199;
made an independent canton of Switzerland by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
recognised by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 344.

Venaissin, the county of the, 76, 333, 354.

Vendée, La, the insurrection in, 128, 130, 131, 141, 143, 180, 181,
215.

Vendémiaire, the insurrection of 13th (5 Oct. 1795), in Paris, 164,
165.

Venice, condition of the Republic in 1789, 27;
remained neutral in the war against the French Republic, 124;
promised to Austria in exchange for Lombardy at Leoben, 186;
occupied by Bonaparte (1797), 191, 192;
ceded the Ionian Islands to France, 192;
ceded to Austria by the Treaty of Campo-Formio (1797), 192;
conclave met at (1799), 206;
occupied by Brune (1800), 219;
ceded to Austria by the Treaty of Lunéville (1801), 220;
ceded to the kingdom of Italy by the Treaty of Pressburg (1805),
245, 255;
granted to Austria by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 347.

Verdun, taken by the Prussians (1792), 114, 115.

Verela, treaty of (14 Aug. 1790), 95, 96.

Vergniaud, Pierre Victurnien, French politician (1753–93), 106, 114,
116, 129.

Verona, belonged to Venice in 1789, 27;
punished by Bonaparte for the murder of French soldiers (1796), 191;
Schérer attacked at, 202.

Versailles, the States-General meets at (May 1789), 51;
invaded by the women of Paris (5 Oct. 1789), 62.

—— the treaty of (1783), 13, 19, 28.

Veto, the question of the, in the Constituent Assembly, 61.

Vicenza, Duke of. _See_ Caulaincourt.

Victor Amadeus III., King of Sardinia (1726–96), 26, 27, 63, 117, 126,
173, 174.

—— Emmanuel I., King of Sardinia (1759–1824), 346, 354.

—— Victor Claude Perrin, _called_, French general (1764–1841), 269,
275, 276, 297, App. iv.

Vienna, the inscription on the Emperor Joseph’s statue at, 66;
Bernadotte insulted at (1798), 198;
the French approach (1801), 219;
occupied by Napoleon (1805), 244;
and (1809), 273;
treaty of (1809), 274;
and (1815), 350.

—— the Congress of, 336, 350, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345,
347, 348, 349.

_Vieux Cordelier_, the, 142, 143.

Villeneuve, Pierre Charles Jean Baptiste Silvestre de, French admiral
(1763–1806), 242, 244, 245.

Vimeiro, battle of (21 Aug. 1808), 265, 266.

Vins, Charles, Baron de, Austrian general (♰1794), 88.

Virtue, Reign of, Robespierre’s belief in a, 146.

Visconti, Ennius Quirinus, Italian antiquary (1751–1818), 24.

Vittoria, taken by the French (1795), 151;
battle of (21 June 1813), 315.

Volhynia, province of, ceded to Russia at the second partition of
Poland (1793), 122.

Volta, Alessandro, Italian man of science (1745–1827), 26.

Voltaire, François Marie, Arouet de, French philosopher (1694–1778),
6, 9.

Vonck, Francis, Belgian politician (1752–1797), 48, 93.

Vonckists, Belgian political party, 48, 65, 92, 93.

Vyborg, the Swedish fleet blockaded in the Gulf of (1790), 95.

Wagram, battle of (6 July 1809), 274.

Walcheren, the English expedition to (1809), 276.

Waldeck, principality of, a state of the Germanic Confederation
(1815), 343.

—— Prince Christian Augustus of, Austrian general (1744–98), 184.

Wallachia, invaded by the Austrians (1789), 45;
conquered by the Russians (1810), 281.

Warsaw, treaty made at, between the Poles and Prussia (29 March 1790),
85;
occupied by Kosciuszko (1794), 151;
besieged by the Prussians, 151;
taken by the Russians, 152;
ceded to Prussia (1795), 152;
Napoleon enters (1807), 248;
given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna (1815), 342.

Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, founded by Napoleon (1807), 259, 261;
Western Galicia ceded to, by Austria (1809), 274;
dissolved (1815), 342.

Waterloo, battle of (18 June 1815), 353.

Watteville, Nicholas Rodolphe de, Swiss statesman (1760–1832), 228.

Wattignies, battle of (16 Oct. 1793), 140.

Weimar, headquarters of the German literary movement, 38.
_See_ Saxe-Weimar.

Wellesley, Hon. Sir Arthur, Duke of Wellington. _See_ Wellington.

—— Richard, Marquis, English statesman (1760–1842), 295.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, English general (1769–1852),
defeated the Danish army at Kioge (1807), 252;
sent to Portugal (1808), 265;
defeats the French at Roliça and Vimeiro, 265, 266;
recalled, 266;
again sent to Portugal (1809), 275;
takes Oporto, 275;
defeats the French at Talavera, 275, 276;
forms the Anglo-Portuguese army, 296;
campaign of 1810, 1811, 296, 297;
campaign of 1812 and victory of Salamanca, 306;
wins battle of Vittoria (1813), 315;
invades France, and wins battles of the Nivelle and the Nive (1813),
316;
wins battle of Orthez (1814), 321;
his attitude towards the Duc d’Angoulême, 326, 327;
defeats Soult at Toulouse, 332;
succeeds Castlereagh as English plenipotentiary at the Congress of
Vienna (1815), 341, 349;
signs the treaty of Vienna, 350;
takes command of the allied armies in Belgium, 352;
defeats Napoleon at Waterloo, 353.

Werden, abbey of, merged in Prussia (1803), 227.

Wessenberg-Ampfingen, Johann Philip, Baron von, Austrian diplomatist
(1773–1858), 337.

West India Islands, the French, taken by the English, 154;
restored at the Peace of Amiens (1802), 232;
recaptured (1809), 264;
restored except Saint Lucia and Tobago (1815), 348.

Westphalia, kingdom of, formed by Napoleon (1807), 250;
its limits, 258;
administration, 258, 259;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260.

Wetzlar, seat of the Imperial Tribunal of the Empire, 35;
taken by Hoche (1796), 186;
merged in the electorate of Mayence (1803), 225.

White Terror in France in 1815, 356, 357.

Wickham, William, English diplomatist (1768–1845), 166, 167, 182.

Widdin, the Pasha of, defeated at Foksany (1789), 45.

Wieland, Christoph Martin, German poet (1733–1813), 38.

William V., Prince of Orange, and Stadtholder of the United
Netherlands (1748–1806), 31, 32, 149, 179, 227.

—— VI., Prince of Orange, and I. King of the Netherlands (1772–1843),
314, 320, 321, 344.

—— Prince Royal, afterwards King, of Würtemburg (1781–1864), 337.

—— IX., Landgrave, afterwards Elector and Grand Duke of Hesse-Cassel
(1743–1821), 6, 38, 157, 225, 227, 250, 258, 337;
made a Grand Duke and member of the Germanic Confederation (1815),
342.

—— Prince, of Prussia, afterwards German Emperor (1797–1888), 337.

Wilson, Sir Robert Thomas, English general (1777–1849), 301.

Wintzingerode, Ferdinand, Baron, Russian general (1770–1818), 319,
320, 328, 338.

Wissembourg, lines of, stormed by the Austrians (1793), 139.

Wittenberg, ceded to Prussia by Saxony (1815), 341.

Wittgenstein, Louis Adolphus Peter, Prince of Sayn-, Russian general
(1769–1843), 309.

Wolf, Frederick Augustus, German scholar (1759–1824), 304.

Wolkonski, Nicholas, Prince Repnin-, Russian general (1778–1845), 337.

Worms, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman Empire,
34;
one of the chief princes in Alsace, 79.

—— city of, headquarters of Condé’s army of French _émigrés_, 106;
taken by Custine, 118.

Worship of Reason at Paris (1793), 142.

—— of the Supreme Being, 146.

Wrede, Charles Philip, Prince von, Bavarian general (1767–1838), 338.

Würmser, Dagobert Sigismund, Count, Austrian general (1724–97), 40,
130, 139, 140, 175, 176.

Würtemburg, duchy of, condition in 1789, 37, 38;
invaded by Moreau (1796), 180;
made an electorate (1803), 225;
receives extension of territory, 227;
invaded by Napoleon (1805), 244;
made a kingdom (1806), 245;
receives Austrian Swabia, 258;
state of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260;
of the Germanic Confederation (1815), 342.
_See_ Charles Eugène, Frederick, Frederick Eugène.

Würtzburg, Bishop of, an ecclesiastical Prince of the Holy Roman
Empire, 35.

Würtzburg, bishopric of, merged in Bavaria (1803), 227;
exchanged for Salzburg (1809), and made a Grand Duchy, 260;
a state of the Confederation of the Rhine, 260.

—— city of, taken by Jourdan (1796), 177.

York, Frederick, Duke of, English general (1763–1827), 39, 127, 130,
140, 205.

—— von Wartenburg, John David Louis, Count, Prussian general
(1759–1830), 308.

Zettin, taken by the Austrians (1790), 88.

Zielence, battle of (18 June 1792), 122.

Zubov, Prince Plato, Russian statesman (1767–1822), 221.

Zug, canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228.

Zurich, battle of (26 Sept. 1799), 204.

—— canton of Switzerland, maintained by Bonaparte (1803), 228;
made one of the presiding cantons of the Helvetian Diet (1815), 345.

Zweibrücken. _See_ Deux-Ponts.

+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| FOOTNOTES: |
| |
| [1] _Joseph II. und Leopold von Toscana._ By the Ritter von |
| Arneth: Vienna, 1872. |
| |
| [2] Vehse’s _Memoirs of the Court, Aristocracy, and Diplomacy |
| of Austria_, English translation. London, 1856, vol. ii. p. 305. |
| |
| [3] _Memoirs of the Court Aristocracy and Diplomacy of |
| Austria_, by E. Vehse, translated by Franz Demmler. London: |
| 1856, vol. ii. p. 334. |
| |
| [4] _L’Europe et la Révolution Française_, by Albert Sorel, |
| vol. ii. p. 50. |
| |
| [5] _A History of the French Revolution_, by H. Morse Stephens. |
| Vol. i., chapter i. gives a detailed account of the method of |
| election. |
| |
| [6] On Mirabeau’s proposed Ministries, see _A History of the |
| French Revolution_, by H. Morse Stephens, vol. i., pp. 246 and |
| 247. |
| |
| [7] Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution Française_, vol. ii. p. |
| 69. |
| |
| [8] Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution Française_, vol. ii. p. |
| 194, footnote. |
| |
| [9] Coxe’s _Hist. of House of Austria_, ed. 1847, vol. iii. p. |
| 552, footnote. |
| |
| [10] _Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807: Diplomatische |
| Correspondenzen._ Ed. by P. Bailleu, vol. i. p. 41. |
| |
| [11] Bailleu, _op. cit._ vol. i. p. 48. |
| |
| [12] Alison’s _Lives of Lord Castlereagh, and Sir Charles |
| Stewart_, vol. ii p. 241. |
| |
| [13] Fain, _Manuscrit de l’An_ 1813, pp. 297, 298. |
| |
| [14] Las Cases, _Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène_, vol. vii. pp. 56, |
| 57. |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+

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PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

General Editor—ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.,
Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

The object of this series is to present in separate Volumes a
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Transcriber’s Notes:

- Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
- Text enclosed by equals is in bold font (=bold=).
- Blank pages have been removed.
- Advertisements have been moved to the back.
- Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected.
- Some spelling and hyphenation variations have been made consistent.
- Appendix tables left split over two pages due to excessive width.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Revolutionary Europe 1789-1815" ***

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