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Title: Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life - Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain - Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of - Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are - omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not - been noticed by any editor
Author: Iamblichus, (Chalcidensis)
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life - Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain - Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of - Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are - omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not - been noticed by any editor" ***
IAMBLICHUS’
LIFE OF PYTHAGORAS,
PYTHAGORIC LIFE.
ACCOMPANIED BY
FRAGMENTS OF THE ETHICAL WRITINGS
OF CERTAIN PYTHAGOREANS IN THE DORIC DIALECT;
AND A
_Collection of Pythagoric Sentences_
FROM STOBÆUS AND OTHERS,
WHICH ARE OMITTED BY GALE IN HIS
OPUSCULA MYTHOLOGICA,
AND HAVE NOT BEEN NOTICED BY ANY EDITOR.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.
BY THOMAS TAYLOR.
Approach ye genuine philosophic few,
The Pythagoric Life belongs to you:
But far, far off ye vulgar herd profane;
For Wisdom’s voice is heard by you in vain:
And you, Mind’s lowest link, and darksome end,
Good Rulers, Customs, Laws, alone can mend.
[Illustration: IAMBLICVS PH. PYTHAGORIC]
[Illustration: LONDON:
PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY,
TOOKE’S COURT, CHANCERY LANE;
AND SOLD BY THE AUTHOR,
9, MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH.
1818.]
CONTENTS
The Life, &c.
Chap. I 1
Chap. II 2
Chap. III 9
Chap. IV 12
Chap. V 13
Chap. VI 18
Chap. VII 21
Chap. VIII 23
Chap. IX 28
Chap. X 32
Chap. XI 34
Chap. XII 38
Chap. XIII 40
Chap. XIV 41
Chap. XV 43
Chap. XVI 48
Chap. XVII 50
Chap. XVIII 56
Chap. XIX 66
Chap. XX 69
Chap. XXI 71
Chap. XXII 73
Chap. XXIII 75
Chap. XXIV 77
Chap. XXV 80
Chap. XXVI 83
Chap. XXVII 89
Chap. XXVIII 97
Chap. XXIX 114
Chap. XXX 122
Chap. XXXI 135
Chap. XXXII 151
Chap. XXXIII 162
Chap. XXXIV 170
Chap. XXXV 176
Chap. XXXVI 188
Fragments of the Ethical Writings of Certain Pythagoreans 193
From Hippodamus, the Thurian, in his Treatise on Felicity 195
From Euryphamus, in his Treatise Concerning Human Life 202
From Hipparchus, in his Treatise On Tranquillity 207
From Archytas, in his Treatise Concerning the Good and Happy
Man 212
From Theages, in his Treatise On the Virtues 222
From Metopus, in his Treatise Concerning Virtue 227
From Clinias 231
From Theages, in his Treatise On the Virtues 233
From the Treatise of Archytas On Ethical Erudition 242
From Archytas, in his Treatise On the Good and Happy Man 244
From Crito, in his Treatise On Prudence and Prosperity 245
From Archytas, in his Treatise On the Good and Happy Man 250
From Archytas, in his Treatise On Disciplines 252
From Polus, in his Treatise On Justice 254
Pythagoric Ethical Sentences from Stobæus, which are omitted
in the Opuscula Mythologica, &c. of Gale 259
Select Sentences of Sextus the Pythagorean 268
Pythagoric Sentences, from the Protreptics of Iamblichus 278
Additional Notes 281
INTRODUCTION.
When it is considered that Pythagoras was the father of philosophy,
authentic memoirs of his life cannot fail to be uncommonly interesting
to every lover of wisdom, and particularly to those who reverence the
doctrines of Plato, the most genuine and the best of all his disciples.
And that the following memoirs of Pythagoras by Iamblichus are
authentic, is acknowledged by all the critics, as they are for the most
part obviously derived from sources of very high antiquity; and where
the sources are unknown, there is every reason to believe, from the
great worth and respectability of the biographer, that the information
is perfectly accurate and true.
Of the biographer, indeed, Iamblichus, it is well known to every tyro in
Platonism that he was dignified by all the Platonists that succeeded him
with the epithet of _divine_; and after the encomium passed on him by
the acute Emperor Julian, “_that he was posterior indeed in time, but
not in genius, to Plato_,”[1] all further praise of him would be as
unnecessary, as the defamation of him by certain modern critics is
contemptible and idle. For these _homonculi_ looking solely to his
deficiency in point of style, and not to the magnitude of his intellect,
perceive only his little blemishes, but have not even a glimpse of his
surpassing excellence. They minutely notice the motes that are scattered
in the sunbeams of his genius, but they feel not its invigorating
warmth, they see not its dazzling radiance.
Of this very extraordinary man there is a life extant by Eunapius, the
substance of which I have given in my History of the Restoration of the
Platonic Theology, and to which I refer the English reader. At present I
shall only select from that work the following biographical particulars
respecting our Iamblichus: He was descended of a family equally
illustrious, fortunate, and rich. His country was Chalcis, a city of
Syria, which was called Cœle. He associated with Anatolius who was the
second to Porphyry, but he far excelled him in his attainments, and
ascended to the very summit of philosophy. But after he had been for
some time connected with Anatolius, and most probably found him
insufficient to satisfy the vast desires of his soul, he applied himself
to Porphyry, to whom (says Eunapius) he was in nothing inferior, except
in the structure and power of composition. For his writings were not so
elegant and graceful as those of Porphyry: they were neither agreeable,
nor perspicuous; nor free from impurity of diction. And though they were
not entirely involved in obscurity, and perfectly faulty; yet as Plato
formerly said of Xenocrates, he did not sacrifice to the _Mercurial
Graces_. Hence he is far from detaining the reader with delight, who
merely regards his diction; but will rather avert and dull his
attention, and frustrate his expectation. However, though the surface of
his conceptions is not covered with the flowers of elocution, yet the
depth of them is admirable, and his genius is truly sublime. And
admitting his style to abound in general with those defects, which have
been noticed by the critics, yet it appears to me that the decision of
the anonymous Greek writer respecting his Answer to the Epistle of
Porphyry,[2] is more or less applicable to all his other works. For he
says, ‘that his diction in that Answer is concise and definite, and that
his conceptions are full of efficacy, are elegant, and divine.’[3]
Iamblichus shared in an eminent degree the favor of divinity, on account
of his cultivation of justice; and obtained a numerous multitude of
associates and disciples, who came from all parts of the world, for the
purpose of participating the streams of wisdom, which so plentifully
flowed from the sacred fountain of his wonderful mind. Among these was
Sopater the Syrian,[4] who was most skilful both in speaking and
writing; Eustathius the Cappadocian; and of the Greeks, Theodorus and
Euphrasius. All these were excellent for their virtues and attainments,
as well as many other of his disciples, who were not much inferior to
the former in eloquence; so that it seems wonderful how Iamblichus could
attend to all of them, with such gentleness of manners and benignity of
disposition as he continually displayed.
He performed some few particulars relative to the veneration of divinity
by himself, without his associates and disciples; but was inseparable
from his familiars in most of his operations. He imitated in his diet
the frugal simplicity of the most ancient times; and during his repast,
exhilarated those who were present by his behaviour, and filled them as
with nectar by the sweetness of his discourse.
A celebrated philosopher named Alypius, who was deeply skilled in
dialectic, was contemporary with Iamblichus, but was of such a
diminutive stature, that he exhibited the appearance of a pigmy.
However, his great abilities amply compensated for this trifling defect.
For his body might be said to be consumed into soul; just as the great
Plato says, that divine bodies, unlike those that are mortal, are
situated in souls. Thus also it might be asserted of Alypius, that he
had migrated into soul, and that he was contained and governed by a
nature superior to man. This Alypius had many followers, but his mode of
philosophizing was confined to private conference and disputation,
without committing any of his dogmas to writing. Hence his disciples
gladly applied themselves to Iamblichus, desirous to draw abundantly
from the exuberant streams of his inexhaustible mind. The fame therefore
of each continually increasing, they once accidentally met like two
refulgent stars, and were surrounded by so great a crowd of auditors,
that it resembled some mighty musæum. While Iamblichus on this occasion
waited rather to be interrogated, than to propose a question himself,
Alypius, contrary to the expectation of every one, relinquishing
philosophical discussions, and seeing himself surrounded with a theatre
of men, turned to Iamblichus, and said to him: “Tell me, O philosopher,
is either the rich man unjust, or the heir of the unjust man? For in
this case there is no medium.” But Iamblichus hating the acuteness of
the question, replied: “O most wonderful of all men, this manner of
considering, whether some one excels in externals, is foreign from our
method of philosophizing; since we inquire whether a man abounds in the
virtue which it is proper for him to possess, and which is adapted to a
philosopher.” After he had said this he departed, and at the same time
all the surrounding multitude was immediately dispersed. But Iamblichus,
when he was alone, admired the acuteness of the question, and often
privately resorted to Alypius, whom he very much applauded for his
acumen and sagacity; so that after his decease, he wrote his life. This
Alypius was an Alexandrian by birth, and died in his own country, worn
out with age: and after him Iamblichus,[5] leaving behind him many roots
and fountains of philosophy; which through the cultivation of succeeding
Platonists, produced a fair variety of vigorous branches, and copious
streams.
For an account of the theological writings of Iamblichus, I refer the
reader to my above-mentioned History of the Restoration of the Platonic
Theology; and for accurate critical information concerning all his
works, to the Bibliotheca Græca of Fabricius.
Of the following work, the life of Pythagoras, it is necessary to
observe that the original has been transmitted to us in a very imperfect
state, partly from the numerous verbal errors of the text, partly from
the want of connexion in the things that are narrated, and partly from
many particulars being related in different places, in the very same
words; so that the conjecture of Kuster, one of the German editors of
this work is highly probable, that it had not received the last hand of
Iamblichus, but that others formed this treatise from the confused
materials which they found among his Manuscripts, after his death.
Notwithstanding all its defects, however, it is, as I have before
observed, a most interesting work; and the benefits are inestimable,
which the dissemination of it is calculated to produce. And as two of
the most celebrated critics among the Germans, Kuster and Kiessling,
have given two splendid editions of this work, it is evident they must
have been deeply impressed with a conviction of its value and
importance.
As to the Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, all eulogy of them is
superfluous, when it is considered that, independently of their being
written by very early Pythagoreans, they were some of the sources from
which Aristotle himself derived his consummate knowledge of morality, as
will be at once evident by comparing his Nicomachean Ethics with these
fragments.
With respect to the collection of Pythagoric Sentences in this volume,
it is almost needless to observe that they are incomparably excellent;
and it is deeply to be regretted that the Greek original of the
Sentences of Sextus[6] being lost, the fraudulent Latin version of them
by the Presbyter Ruffinus alone remains. I call it a fraudulent version,
because Ruffinus, wishing to persuade the reader that these Sentences
were written by a bishop of the name of Sixtus, has in many places
perverted and contaminated the meaning of the original. In the
selection, however, which I have made from these Sentences, I have
endeavoured, and I trust not in vain, to give the genuine sense of
Sextus, unmingled with the barbarous and polluted interpolations of
Ruffinus. If the English reader has my translation of the Sentences of
Demophilus, and Mr. Bridgman’s translation of the Golden Sentences of
Democrates, and the Similitudes of Demophilus,[7] he will then be
possessed of all the Pythagoric Sentences that are extant, those alone
of Sextus excepted, which I have not translated, in consequence of the
very impure and spurious state, in which they at present exist.
I deem it also requisite to observe, that the Pythagoric life which is
here delineated, is a specimen of the greatest perfection in virtue and
wisdom, which can be obtained by man in the present state. Hence, it
exhibits piety unadulterated with folly, moral virtue uncontaminated
with vice, science unmingled with sophistry, dignity of mind and manners
unaccompanied with pride, a sublime magnificence in theory, without any
degradation in practice, and a vigor of intellect, which elevates its
possessor to the vision of divinity, and thus deifies while it exalts.
The original of the engraving of the head of Iamblichus in the
title-page, is to be found at the end of a little volume consisting of
Latin translations of Iamblichus De Mysteriis, Proclus On the First
Alcibiades of Plato, &c. &c. &c. 18mo. Genev. 1607. This engraving was
added because it appeared to me to be probable that the original was
copied from an ancient gem. And as it is not impossible that it was, if
it is not genuine, it is at least ornamental.
THE LIFE,
_&c._
CHAP. I.
Since it is usual with all men of sound understandings, to call on
divinity, when entering on any philosophic discussion, it is certainly
much more appropriate to do this in the consideration of that philosophy
which justly receives its denomination from the divine Pythagoras. For
as it derives its origin from the Gods, it cannot be apprehended without
their inspiring aid. To which we may also add, that the beauty and
magnitude of it so greatly surpasses human power, that it is impossible
to survey it by a sudden view; but then alone can any one gradually
collect some portion of this philosophy, when, the Gods being his
leaders, he quietly approaches to it. On all these accounts, therefore,
having invoked the Gods as our leaders, and converting both ourselves
and our discussion to them, we shall acquiesce in whatever they may
command us to do. We shall not, however, make any apology for this sect
having been neglected for a long time, nor for its being concealed by
foreign disciplines, and certain arcane symbols, nor for having been
obscured by false and spurious writings, nor for many other such-like
difficulties by which it has been impeded. For the will of the Gods is
sufficient for us, in conjunction with which it is possible to sustain
things still more arduous than these. But after the Gods, we shall unite
ourselves as to a leader, to the prince and father of this divine
philosophy; of whose origin and country we must rise a little higher in
our investigation.
CHAP. II.
It is said, therefore, that Ancæus who dwelt in Samos in Cephallenia,
was begot by Jupiter, whether he derived the fame of such an honorable
descent through virtue, or through a certain greatness of soul. He
surpassed, however, the rest of the Cephallenians in wisdom and renown.
This Ancæus, therefore, was ordered by the Pythian oracle to form a
colony from Arcadia and Thessaly; and that besides this, taking with him
some of the inhabitants of Athens, Epidaurus, and Chalcis, and placing
himself at their head, he should render an island habitable, which from
the virtue of the soil and land should be called Melamphyllos;[8] and
that he should call the city Samos, on account of Same in Cephallenia.
The oracle, therefore, which was given to him, was as follows: “I order
you, Ancæus, to colonise the marine island Samos instead of Same, and to
call it Phyllas.” But that a colony was collected from these places, is
not only indicated by the honors and sacrifices of the Gods, transferred
into those regions together with the inhabitants, but also by the
kindred families that dwell there, and the associations of the Samians
with each other.
It is said, therefore, that Mnesarchus and Pythaïs, who were the parents
of Pythagoras, descended from the family and alliance of this Ancæus,
who founded the colony. In consequence, however, of this nobility of
birth being celebrated by the citizens, a certain Samian poet says, that
Pythagoras was the son of Apollo. For thus he sings,
Pythaïs, fairest of the Samian tribe,
Bore from th’embraces of the God of day
Renown’d Pythagoras, the friend of Jove.
It is worth while, however, to relate how this report became so
prevalent. The Pythian oracle then had predicted to this Mnesarchus (who
came to Delphi for the purposes of merchandize, with his wife not yet
apparently pregnant, and who inquired of the God concerning the event of
his voyage to Syria) that his voyage would be lucrative and most
conformable to his wishes, but that his wife was now pregnant, and would
bring forth a son surpassing in beauty and wisdom all that ever lived,
and who would be of the greatest advantage to the human race in every
thing pertaining to the life of man. But, when Mnesarchus considered
with himself, that the God, without being interrogated concerning his
son, had informed him by an oracle, that he would possess an illustrious
prerogative, and a gift truly divine, he immediately named his wife
Pythaïs, from her son and the Delphic prophet, instead of Parthenis,
which was her former appellation; and he called the infant, who was soon
after born at Sidon in Phœnicia, Pythagoras; signifying by this
appellation, that such an offspring was predicted to him by the Pythian
Apollo. For we must not regard the assertions of Epimenides, Eudoxus,
and Xenocrates, who suspect that Apollo at that time, becoming connected
with Parthenis, and causing her to be pregnant from not being so, had in
consequence of this predicted concerning Pythagoras, by the Delphic
prophet: for this is by no means to be admitted.[9] Indeed, no one can
doubt that the soul of Pythagoras was sent to mankind from the empire of
Apollo, either being an attendant on the God, of co-arranged with him in
some other more familiar way: for this may be inferred both from his
birth, and the all-various wisdom of his soul. And thus much concerning
the nativity of Pythagoras.
But after his father Mnesarchus had returned from Syria to Samos, with
great wealth, which he had collected from a prosperous navigation, he
built a temple to Apollo, with the inscription of Pythius; and took care
to have his son nourished with various and the best disciplines, at one
time by Creophilus, at another by Pherecydes the Syrian, and at another
by almost all those who presided over sacred concerns, to whom he
earnestly recommended Pythagoras, that he might be as much as possible
sufficiently instructed in divine concerns. He, however, was educated in
such a manner, as to be fortunately the most beautiful and godlike of
all those that have been celebrated in the annals of history. On the
death of his father, likewise, though he was still but a youth, his
aspect was most venerable, and his habits most temperate, so that he was
even reverenced and honored by elderly men; and converted the attention
of all who saw and heard him speak, on himself, and appeared to be an
admirable person to every one who beheld him. Hence it was reasonably
asserted by many, that he was the son of a God. But he being
corroborated by renown of this kind, by the education which he had
received from his infancy, and by his natural deiform appearance, in a
still greater degree evinced that he deserved his present prerogatives.
He was also adorned by piety and disciplines, by a mode of living
transcendency good, by firmness of soul, and by a body in due subjection
to the mandates of reason. In all his words and actions, he discovered
an inimitable quiet and serenity, not being subdued at any time by
anger, or laughter, or emulation, or contention, or any other
perturbation or precipitation of conduct; but he dwelt at Samos like
some beneficent dæmon. Hence, while he was yet a youth, his great renown
having reached Thales at Miletus, and Bias at Priene, men illustrious
for their wisdom, it also extended to the neighbouring cities. To all
which we may add, that the youth was every where celebrated as the
_long-haired Samian_, and was reverenced by the multitude as one under
the influence of divine inspiration. But after he had attained the
eighteenth year of his age, about the period when the tyranny of
Policrates first made its appearance, foreseeing that under such a
government he might receive some impediment in his studies, which
engrossed the whole of his attention, he departed privately by night
with one Hermodamas (whose surname was Creophilus, and who was the
grandson of him who had formerly been the host, friend, and preceptor in
all things of Homer the poet,) to Pherecydes, to Anaximander the natural
philosopher, and to Thales at Miletus. He likewise alternately
associated with each of these philosophers, in such a manner, that they
all loved him, admired his natural endowments, and made him a partaker
of their doctrines. Indeed, after Thales had gladly admitted him to his
intimate confidence, he admired the great difference between him and
other young men, whom Pythagoras left far behind in every
accomplishment. And besides this, Thales increased the reputation
Pythagoras had already acquired, by communicating to him such
disciplines as he was able to impart: and, apologizing for his old age,
and the imbecility of his body, he exhorted him to sail into Egypt, and
associate with the Memphian and Diospolitan[10] priests. For he
confessed that his own reputation for wisdom, was derived from the
instructions of these priests; but that he was neither naturally, nor by
exercise, endued with those excellent prerogatives, which were so
visibly displayed in the person of Pythagoras. Thales, therefore, gladly
announced to him, from all these circumstances, that he would become the
wisest and most divine of all men, if he associated with these Egyptian
priests.
CHAP. III.
Pythagoras, therefore, having been benefited by Thales in other
respects, and especially having learned from him to be sparing of his
time; for the sake of this he entirely abstained from wine and animal
food, and still prior to these from voracity, and confined himself to
such nutriment as was slender and easy of digestion. In consequence of
this, his sleep was short, his soul vigilant and pure, and his body
confirmed in a state of perfect and invariable health. In possession of
such advantages, therefore, he sailed to Sidon, being persuaded that
this was his natural country, and also properly conceiving that he might
easily pass from thence into Egypt. Here he conversed with the prophets
who were the descendants of Mochus the physiologist, and with others,
and also with the Phœnician hierophants. He was likewise initiated in
all the mysteries of Byblus and Tyre, and in the sacred operations which
are performed in many parts of Syria; not engaging in a thing of this
kind for the sake of superstition, as some one may be led to suppose,
but much rather from a love and desire of contemplation, and from an
anxiety that nothing might escape his observation which deserved to be
learnt in the arcana or mysteries of the Gods. Having been previously
instructed therefore in the mysteries of the Phœnicians, which were
derived like a colony and a progeny from the sacred rites in Egypt, and
hoping from this circumstance that he should be a partaker of more
beautiful, divine, and genuine monuments of erudition in Egypt; joyfully
calling to mind also the admonitions of his preceptor Thales, he
immediately embarked for Egypt, through the means of some Egyptian
sailors, who very opportunely at that time landed on the Phœnician coast
under mount Carmelus, in whose temple Pythagoras, separated from all
society, for the most part dwelt. But the sailors gladly received him,
foreseeing that they should acquire great gain by exposing him to sale.
But when, during the voyage, they perceived with what continence and
venerable gravity he conducted himself, in conformity to the mode of
living he had adopted, they were more benevolently disposed towards him.
Observing, likewise, that there was something greater than what pertains
to human nature in the modesty of the youth, they called to mind how
unexpectedly he had appeared to them on their landing, when from the
summit of mount Carmelus, which they knew was more sacred than other
mountains, and inaccessible to the vulgar, he leisurely descended
without looking back, or suffering any delay from precipices or opposing
stones; and that when he came to the boat, he said nothing more than,
“Are you bound for Egypt?” And farther, that on their answering in the
affirmative, he ascended the ship and sate silent the whole time of the
voyage, in that part of the vessel where he was not likely to incommode
the occupations of the sailors. But Pythagoras remained in one and the
same unmoved state for two nights and three days, neither partaking of
food, nor drink, nor sleep, unless perhaps as he sate in that firm and
tranquil condition, he might sleep for a short time unobserved by all
the sailors. To which we may add, that when the sailors considered how,
contrary to their expectations, their voyage had been continued and
uninterrupted, as if some deity had been present; putting all these
things together, they concluded that a divine dæmon had in reality
passed over with them from Syria into Egypt. Hence, speaking both to
Pythagoras and to each other with greater decorum and gentleness than
before, they completed, through a most tranquil sea, the remainder of
their voyage, and at length happily landed on the Egyptian coast. Here
the sailors reverently assisted him in descending from the ship; and
after they had placed him on the purest sand, they raised a certain
temporary altar before him, and heaping on it from their present
abundance the fruits of trees, and presenting him as it were with the
first fruits of their freight, they departed from thence, and hastened
to their destined port. But Pythagoras, whose body through such long
fasting was become weaker, did not oppose the sailors in assisting him
to descend from the ship, and immediately on their departure eat as much
of the fruits as was requisite to restore his decayed strength. From
thence also he arrived safe at the neighbouring lands, constantly
preserving the same tranquillity and modesty of behaviour.
CHAP. IV.
But here, while he frequented all the Egyptian temples with the greatest
diligence and with accurate investigation, he was both admired and loved
by the priests and prophets with whom he associated. And having learnt
with the greatest solicitude every particular, he did not neglect to
hear of any transaction that was celebrated in his own time, or of any
man famous for his wisdom, or any mystery in whatever manner it might be
performed; nor did he omit to visit any place in which he thought
something more excellent might be found. On this account he went to all
the priests, by whom he was furnished with the wisdom which each
possessed. He spent therefore two and twenty years in Egypt, in the
adyta of temples, astronomizing and geometrizing, and was initiated, not
in a superficial or casual manner, in all the mysteries of the Gods,
till at length being taken captive by the soldiers of Cambyses, he was
brought to Babylon. Here he gladly associated with the Magi, was
instructed by them in their venerable knowledge, and learnt from them
the most perfect worship of the Gods. Through their assistance likewise,
he arrived at the summit of arithmetic, music, and other disciplines;
and after associating with them twelve years, he returned to Samos about
the fifty-sixth year of his age.
CHAP. V.
On his return to Samos, however, being known by some of the more aged
inhabitants, he was not less admired than before. For he appeared to
them to be more beautiful and wise, and to possess a divine gracefulness
in a more eminent degree. Hence, he was publicly called upon by his
country to benefit all men, by imparting to them what he knew. Nor was
he averse to this request, but endeavoured to introduce the symbolical
mode of teaching, in a way perfectly similar to the documents by which
he had been instructed in Egypt; though the Samians did not very much
admit this mode of tuition, and did not adhere to him with that
according aptitude which was requisite. Though no one therefore attended
to him, and no one was genuinely desirous of those disciplines which he
endeavoured by all means to introduce among the Greeks, yet he neither
despised nor neglected Samos, because it was his country, and therefore
wished to give his fellow-citizens a taste of the sweetness of the
mathematical disciplines, though they were unwilling to be instructed in
them. With a view to this, therefore, he employed the following method
and artifice. Happening to observe a certain youth, who was a great
lover of gymnastic and other corporeal exercises, but otherwise poor and
in difficult circumstances, playing at ball in the Gymnasium with great
aptness and facility, he thought the young man might easily be persuaded
to attend to him, if he was sufficiently supplied with the necessaries
of life, and freed from the care of procuring them. As soon as the
youth, therefore, left the bath, Pythagoras called him to him, and
promised that he would furnish him with every thing requisite to the
support of his bodily exercise, on condition that he would receive from
him gradually and easily, but continually, so that he might not be
burthened by receiving them at once, certain disciplines, which he said
he had learnt from the Barbarians in his youth, but which now began to
desert him through forgetfulness and the incursions of old age. But the
young man immediately acceded to the conditions, through the hope of
having necessary support. Pythagoras, therefore, endeavoured to instruct
him in the disciplines of arithmetic and geometry, forming each of his
demonstrations in an abacus, and giving the youth three oboli as a
reward for every figure which he learnt. This also he continued to do
for a long time, exciting him to the geometrical theory by the desire of
honour; diligently, and in the best order, giving him (as we have said)
three oboli for every figure which he apprehended. But when the wise man
observed that the elegance, sweetness, and connexion of these
disciplines, to which the youth had been led in a certain orderly path,
had so captivated him that he would not neglect their pursuit though he
should suffer the extremity of want, he pretended poverty, and an
inability of giving him three oboli any longer. But the youth on hearing
this replied, “I am able without these to learn and receive your
disciplines.” Pythagoras then said, “But I have not the means of
procuring sufficient nutriment for myself.” As it is requisite,
therefore, to labour in order to procure daily necessaries and mortal
food, it would not be proper that his attention should be distracted by
the abacus, and by stupid and vain pursuits. The youth, however,
vehemently abhorring the thought of discontinuing his studies, replied:
“I will in future provide for you, and repay your kindness in a way
resembling that of the stork: for I in my turn will give you three oboli
for every figure.” And from this time he was so captivated by these
disciplines, that he alone, of all the Samians, migrated from his
country with Pythagoras, having the same name with him, but being the
son of Eratocles. There are said to be three books of this Samian On
Athletics, in which he orders the Athletæ to feed on flesh instead of
dry figs; which books are very improperly ascribed by some to Pythagoras
the son of Mnesarchus. It is likewise said, that about the same time
Pythagoras was admired at Delos, when he approached to the bloodless
altar, as it is called, of the father Apollo, and worshipped it. After
which he went to all the oracles. He likewise dwelt for some time in
Crete and Sparta, for the purpose of becoming acquainted with their
laws; and, having been an auditor and learner of all these, he returned
home in order to investigate what he had omitted. And in the first
place, indeed, he established a school in the city, which is even now
called the semicircle of Pythagoras; and in which the Samians now
consult about public affairs, conceiving it right to investigate things
just and advantageous in that place which he had constructed who paid
attention to the welfare of all men. He also formed a cavern out of the
city, adapted to his philosophy, in which he spent the greatest part
both of the day and night; employing himself in the investigation of
things useful in disciplines, framing intellectual conceptions after the
same manner as Minos the son of Jupiter. Indeed, he so much surpassed
those who afterwards employed his disciplines, that they conceived
magnificently of themselves, from the knowledge of theorems of small
importance; but Pythagoras gave completion to the science of the
celestial orbs, and unfolded the whole of it by arithmetical and
geometrical demonstrations. He is, however, to be admired in a still
greater degree for what he afterwards accomplished. For when now
philosophy had received a great accession, he was admired by all Greece,
and the best of those who philosophized came to Samos on his account, in
order that they might participate of his erudition. The citizens
likewise employed him in all their embassies, and compelled him to unite
with them in the administration of public affairs. However, as he easily
saw the difficulty of complying with the laws of his country, and at the
same time remaining at home and philosophizing, and considered that all
philosophers before him had passed their life in foreign countries, he
determined to neglect all political occupations; induced to this,
according to the testimony of others, by the negligence of the Samians
in what relates to education, and went into Italy, conceiving that place
to be his proper country, in which men well disposed towards learning
were to be found in the greatest abundance. And such was the success of
his journey, that on his arrival at Crotona, which was the noblest city
in Italy, he had many followers, amounting, as it is said, to the number
of six hundred, who were not only excited by his discourses to the study
of philosophy, but also to an amicable division of the goods of life in
common; from whence they acquired the appellation of _Cœnobitæ_.
CHAP. VI.
And these indeed were such as philosophized. But the greatest part of
his disciples consisted of auditors whom they call _Acusmatici_, who on
his first arrival in Italy, according to Nicomachus, being captivated by
one popular oration alone, exceeded two thousand in number. These, with
their wives and children, being collected into one very large and common
auditory, called Homacoïon, and which for its magnitude resembled a
city, founded a place which was universally called Magna Græcia. This
great multitude of people likewise, receiving laws and mandates from
Pythagoras as so many divine precepts, and without which they engaged in
no occupation, dwelt together with the greatest general concord,
celebrated and ranked by their neighbours among the number of the
blessed. At the same time, as we have already observed, they shared
their possessions in common. Such also was their reverence for
Pythagoras, that they numbered him with the Gods, as a certain
beneficent and most philanthropic dæmon. And some indeed celebrated him
as the Pythian, but others as the Hyperborean Apollo. Some again
considered him as Pæon, but others as one of the dæmons that inhabit the
moon; and others celebrated him as one of the Olympian Gods,[11] who, in
order to benefit and correct the mortal life, appeared to the men of
those times in a human form, in order that he might extend to them the
salutary light of felicity and philosophy. And indeed a greater good
never came, nor ever will come to mankind, than that which was imparted
by the Gods through this Pythagoras. Hence, even now the proverb of _the
long-haired Samian_, is applied to the most venerable man. But Aristotle
relates, in his Treatise On the Pythagoric Philosophy, that such a
division as the following was preserved by the Pythagoreans among their
principal arcana; viz. that of rational animals one kind is a God,
another man, and another such as Pythagoras. And indeed they very
reasonably apprehended him to be a being of this kind, through whom a
right conception and conformable to things themselves was introduced of
Gods, heroes, and dæmons; of the world, the all-various motion of the
spheres and stars, their oppositions, eclipses, and inequalities, their
eccentricities and epicycles; of all the natures contained in the
heavens and the earth, together with those that have an intermediate
subsistence, whether apparent or occult. Nor was there anything (in all
this variety of information) at all contrary to the phenomena, or the
conceptions of intellect. To which we may add, that all such
disciplines, theories, and scientific investigations, as truly
invigorate the eye of the soul, and purify the intellect from the
blindness introduced by studies of a different kind, so as to enable it
to perceive the true principles and causes of the universe, were
unfolded by Pythagoras to the Greeks. But besides all this, the best
polity, popular concord, community of possessions among friends, the
worship of the gods, piety to the dead, legislation, erudition, silence,
abstinence from animals, continence, temperance, sagacity, divinity, and
in one word, whatever is anxiously sought after by the lovers of
learning, was brought to light by Pythagoras. On all these accounts,
therefore, as I have just now said, he was (every where) so
transcendently admired.
CHAP. VII.
It remains therefore after this, that we should relate how he travelled,
what places he first visited, what discourses he made, on what subjects,
and to whom they were addressed; for thus we shall easily apprehend the
nature of his association with the men of that time. It is said then,
that as soon as he came to Italy and Sicily, which cities he understood
had oppressed each other with slavery, partly at some distant period of
past time, and partly at a recent period, he inspired the inhabitants
with a love of liberty, and through the means of his auditors, restored
to independence and liberated Crotona, Sybaris, Catanes, Rhegium,
Himæra, Agrigentum, Tauromenas, and some other cities, for whom also he
established laws, through Charondas the Catanæan, and Zaleucus the
Locrian, by whom they became florishing cities, and afforded an example
worthy of imitation, for a long time, to the neighbouring kingdoms. He
also entirely subverted sedition, discord, and party zeal, not only from
his familiars, and their posterity, for many generations, as we are
informed by history, but, in short, from all the cities in Italy and
Sicily, which were at that time disturbed with intestine and external
contentions. For the following apothegm was always employed by him in
every place, whether in the company of a multitude or a few, which was
similar to the persuasive oracle of a God, and was an epitome and
summary as it were of his own opinions; that we should avoid and
amputate by every possible artifice, by fire and sword, and all-various
contrivances, from the body, disease; from the soul, ignorance; from the
belly, luxury; from a city, sedition; from a house, discord; and at the
same time, from all things, immoderation: through which, with a most
fatherly affection, he reminded each of his disciples of the most
excellent dogmas. Such therefore was the common form of his life at that
time, both in words and actions. If, however, it be requisite to make a
more particular relation of what he did and said, it must be observed,
that he came to Italy in the sixty-second Olympiad, at which time
Eryxidas of Chalcis conquered in the stadium. But immediately on his
arrival he became conspicuous and illustrious, in the same manner as
before, when he sailed to Delos. For there, when he performed his
adorations at the bloodless altar of the father Apollo, he was admired
by the inhabitants of the island.
CHAP. VIII.
At that time also, when he was journeying from Sybaris to Crotona, he
met near the shore with some fishermen, who were then drawing their nets
heavily laden with fishes from the deep, and told them he knew the exact
number of the fish they had caught. But the fishermen promising they
would perform whatever he should order them to do, if the event
corresponded with his prediction, he ordered them, after they had
accurately numbered the fish, to return them alive to the sea: and what
is yet more wonderful, not one of the fish died while he stood on the
shore, though they had been detained from the water a considerable time.
Having therefore paid the fishermen the price of their fish, he departed
for Crotona. But they every where divulged the fact, and having learnt
his name from some children, they told it to all men. Hence those that
heard of this affair were desirous of seeing the stranger, and what they
desired was easily obtained. But they were astonished on surveying his
countenance, and conjectured him to be such a man as he was in reality.
A few days also after this, he entered the Gymnasium, and being
surrounded with a crowd of young men, he is said to have delivered an
oration to them, in which he incited them to pay attention to their
elders, evincing that in the world, in life, in cities, and in nature,
that which has a precedency is more honorable than that which is
consequent in time. As for instance, that the east is more honorable
than the west; the morning than the evening; the beginning than the end;
and generation than corruption. In a similar manner he observed, that
natives were more honorable than strangers, and the leaders of colonies
than the builders of cities: and universally Gods than dæmons; dæmons
than demigods; and heroes than men. Of these likewise he observed, that
the authors of generation are more honorable than their progeny. He said
these things, however, for the sake of proving by induction, that
children should very much esteem their parents, to whom he asserted they
owed as many thanks as a dead man would owe to him who should be able to
bring him back again into light. Afterwards, he observed, that it was
indeed just to love those above all others, and never to give them pain,
who first benefited us, and in the greatest degree. But parents alone
benefit their children prior to their birth, and are the causes to their
offspring of all their upright conduct; and that when children show
themselves to be in no respect inferior to their parents in beneficence
towards them, it is not possible for them in this respect to err. For it
is reasonable to suppose, that the Gods will pardon those who honor
their parent in no less a degree than the divinities themselves; since
we learnt from our parents to honor divinity. Hence Homer also added the
same appellation to the king of the Gods; for he denominates him the
father of Gods and mortals. Many other mythologists also have delivered
to us, that the kings of the Gods have been ambitious to vindicate to
themselves that excessive love which subsists through marriage, in
children towards their parents. And that on this account, they have at
the same time introduced the hypothesis of father and mother among the
Gods,[12] the former indeed generating Minerva, but the latter Vulcan,
who are of a nature contrary to each other, in order that what is most
remote may participate of friendship.
All his auditors likewise having granted that the judgment of the
immortals is most valid, he said he would demonstrate to the Crotonians,
by the example of Hercules the founder of the colony brought to Crotona,
that it is necessary to be voluntarily obedient to the mandates of
parents, as they knew from tradition that the God himself had undertaken
such great labors in consequence of obeying the commands of one older
than himself, and being victorious in what he had undertaken to
accomplish, had instituted in honor of his father the Olympic games. He
also showed them that they should associate with each other in such a
manner, as never to be in a state of hostility to their friends, but to
become most rapidly friends to their enemies; and that they should
exhibit in modesty of behaviour to their elders, the benevolent
disposition of children towards their parents; but in their philanthropy
to others, fraternal love and regard.
In the next place, he spoke concerning temperance, and said, that the
juvenile age should make trial of its nature, this being the period in
which the desires are in the most florishing state. Afterwards, he
exhorted them to consider, that this alone among the virtues was adapted
to a boy and a virgin, to a woman, and to the order of those of a more
advanced age; and that it was especially accommodated to the younger
part of the community. He also added, that this virtue alone
comprehended the goods both of body and soul, as it preserved the health
and also the desire of the most excellent studies. But this is evident
from the opposite. For when the Barbarians and Greeks warred on each
other about Troy, each of them fell into the most dreadful calamities,
through the incontinence of one man, partly in the war itself, and
partly in returning to their native land. And divinity ordained that the
punishment of injustice alone should endure for a thousand and ten
years, predicting by an oracle the capture of Troy, and ordering that
virgins should be annually sent by the Locrians into the temple of
Trojan Minerva. Pythagoras also exhorted young men to the cultivation of
learning, calling on them to observe how absurd it would be that they
should judge the reasoning power to be the most laudable of all things,
and should consult about other things through this, and yet bestow no
time nor labour in the exercise of it; though the attention which is
paid to the body, resembles depraved friends, and rapidly fails; but
erudition, like worthy and good men, endures till death, and for some
persons procures immortal renown after death. These and other
observations of the like kind, were made by Pythagoras, partly from
history, and partly from [philosophic] dogmas, in which he showed that
erudition is a natural excellence of disposition common to those in each
genus, who rank in the first class of human nature. For the discoveries
of these, become erudition to others. But this is naturally so worthy of
pursuit, that with respect to other laudable objects of attainment, it
is not possible to partake of some of them through another person, such
as strength, beauty, health, and fortitude; and others are no longer
possessed by him who imparts them to another, such as wealth, dominion,
and many other things which we shall omit to mention. It is possible,
however, for erudition to be received by another, without in the least
diminishing that which the giver possesses. In a similar manner also,
some goods cannot be possessed by men; but we are capable of being
instructed, according to our own proper and deliberate choice. And in
the next place, he who being thus instructed, engages in the
administration of the affairs of his country, does not do this from
impudence, but from erudition. For by education nearly men differ from
wild beasts, the Greeks from the Barbarians, those that are free from
slaves, and philosophers from the vulgar. And in short, those that have
erudition possess such a transcendency with respect to those that have
not, that seven men have been found from one city, and in one Olympiad,
that were swifter than others in the course; and in the whole of the
habitable part of the globe, those that excelled in wisdom were also
seven in number. But in the following times in which Pythagoras lived,
he alone surpassed all others in philosophy. For he called himself by
this name [viz. a philosopher], instead of a wise man.
CHAP. IX.
And this indeed is what he said to the young men in the Gymnasium. But
when they had told their parents what they had heard, a thousand men
having called Pythagoras into the senate-house, and praised him for what
he had said to their sons, desired him, if he had any thing advantageous
to say to the Crotonians, to unfold it to those who were the leaders of
the administration. He was also the first that advised them to build a
temple to the Muses, in order that they might preserve the existing
concord. For he observed that all these divinities were called by one
common name, [the Muses,] that they subsisted in conjunction with each
other, especially rejoiced in common honors, and in short, that there
was always one and the same choir of the Muses. He likewise farther
observed, that they comprehended in themselves symphony, harmony, rythm,
and all things which procure concord. They also evince that their power
does not alone extend to the most beautiful theorems, but likewise to
the symphony and harmony of things. In the next place, he said it was
necessary they should apprehend that they received their country from
the multitude of the citizens, as a common deposit. Hence, it was
requisite they should so govern it, that they might faithfully transmit
it to their posterity, as an hereditary possession. And that this would
firmly be effected, if they were equal in all things to the citizens,
and surpassed them in nothing else than justice. For men knowing that
every place requires justice, have asserted in fables that Themis has
the same order with Jupiter, that Dice, i. e. justice, is seated by
Pluto, and that Law is established in cities; in order that he who does
not act justly in things which his rank in society requires him to
perform, may at the same time appear to be unjust towards the whole
world. He added, it was proper that the senators should not make use of
any of the Gods for the purpose of an oath, but that their language
should be such as to render them worthy of belief even without oaths.
And likewise, that they should so manage their own domestic affairs, as
to make the government of them the object of their deliberate choice.
That they should also be genuinely disposed towards their own offspring,
as being the only animals that have a sensation of this conception. And
that they should so associate with a wife the companion of life, as to
be mindful that other compacts are engraved in tables and pillars, but
those with wives are inserted in children. That they should likewise
endeavour to be beloved by their offspring, not through nature, of which
they were not the causes, but through deliberate choice: for this is
voluntary beneficence.
He further observed, that they should be careful not to have connexion
with any but their wives, in order that the wives may not bastardize the
race through the neglect and vicious conduct of the husbands. That they
should also consider, that they received their wives from the Vestal
hearth with libations, and brought them home as if they were suppliants,
in the presence of the Gods themselves. And that by orderly conduct and
temperance, they should become examples both to their own families, and
to the city in which they live. That besides this, they should take care
to prevent every one from acting viciously, lest offenders not fearing
the punishment of the laws, should be concealed; and reverencing
beautiful and worthy manners, they should be impelled to justice. He
also exhorted them to expel sluggishness from all their actions; for he
said that opportunity was the only good in every action. But he defined
the divulsion of parents and children from each other, to be the
greatest of injuries. And said, that he ought to be considered as the
most excellent man, who is able to foresee what will be advantageous to
himself; but that he ranks as the next in excellence, who understands
what is useful from things which happen to others. But that he is the
worst of men who waits for the perception of what is best, till he is
himself afflicted. He likewise said, that those who wish to be honored,
will not err if they imitate those that are crowned in the course: for
these do not injure their antagonists, but are alone desirous that they
themselves may obtain the victory. Thus also it is fit that those who
engage in the administration of public affairs, should not be offended
with those that contradict them, but should benefit such as are obedient
to them. He likewise exhorted every one who aspired after true glory, to
be such in reality as he wished to appear to be to others: for counsel
is not so sacred a thing as praise; since the former is only useful
among men, but the latter is for the most part referred to the Gods. And
after all this he added, that their city happened to be founded by
Hercules, at that time when he drove the oxen through Italy, having been
injured by Lacinius; and when giving assistance by night to Croton, he
slew him through ignorance, conceiving him to be an enemy. After which,
Hercules promised that a city should be built about the sepulchre of
Croton, and should be called from him Crotona, when he himself became a
partaker of immortality. Hence Pythagoras said, it was fit that they
should justly return thanks for the benefit they had received. But the
Crotonians, on hearing this, built a temple to the Muses, and dismissed
the harlots which they were accustomed to have. They also requested
Pythagoras to discourse to the boys in the temple of Pythian Apollo, and
to the women in the temple of Juno.
CHAP. X.
Pythagoras, therefore, complying with their wish, is said to have given
the boys the following advice: That they should neither revile any one,
nor take vengeance on those that reviled. He likewise exhorted them to
pay diligent attention to learning, which derives its appellation from
their age. He added, that it was easy for a modest youth to preserve
probity through the whole of life; but that it was difficult for one to
accomplish this, who was not naturally well disposed at that age; or
rather it is impossible that he who begins his course from a bad
impulse, should run well to the end. Besides this, he observed that boys
were most dear to divinity, and hence in times of great drought, they
were sent by cities to implore rain from the Gods, in consequence of the
persuasion that divinity is especially attentive to children; though
such as are permitted to be continually conversant with sacred
ceremonies, scarcely obtain purification in perfection. From this cause
also, the most philanthropic of the Gods, Apollo and Love, are
universally represented in pictures as having the age of boys. It is
likewise acknowledged, that some of the games in which the conquerors
are crowned, were instituted on account of boys; the Pythian, indeed, in
consequence of the serpent Python being slain by a boy; but the Nemean
and Isthmian, on account of the death of Archemorus and Melicerta.
Besides what has been said likewise, while the city of Crotona was
building, Apollo promised to the founder, that he would give him a
progeny, if he brought a colony into Italy; from which inferring that
Apollo providentially attended to the propagation of them, and that all
the Gods paid attention to every age, they ought to render themselves
worthy of their friendship. He added, that they should exercise
themselves in hearing, in order that they may be able to speak. And
farther still, that as soon as they have entered into the path in which
they intend to proceed to old age, they should follow the steps of those
that preceded them, and never contradict those that are older than
themselves. For thus hereafter, they will justly think it right that
neither should they be injured by their juniors. On account of these
exhortations, it must be confessed that he deserved not to be called by
his own name, but that all men should denominate him divine.
CHAP. XI.
But to the women he is said to have discoursed concerning sacrifices as
follows: In the first place indeed, as they would wish that another
person who intended to pray for them, should be worthy and good, because
the Gods attend to such as these; thus also it is requisite that they
should in the highest degree esteem equity and modesty, in order that
the Gods may be readily disposed to hear their prayers. In the next
place, they should offer to the Gods such things as they have produced
with their own hands, and should bring them to the altars without the
assistance of servants, such as cakes, honey-combs, and frankincense.
But that they should not worship divinity with blood and dead bodies,
nor offer many things at one time, as if they never meant to sacrifice
again. With respect also to their association with men, he exhorted them
to consider that their parents granted to the female nature, that they
should love their husbands in a greater degree than those who were the
sources of their existence. That in consequence of this, they would do
well either not to oppose their husbands, or to think that they have
then vanquished, when they submit to them. Farther still, in the same
assembly also, Pythagoras is said to have made that celebrated
observation, that it is holy for a woman, after having been connected
with her husband, to perform sacred rites on the same day; but that this
is never holy, after she has been connected with any other man. He also
exhorted the women to use words of good omen through the whole of life,
and to endeavor that others may predict good things of them. He likewise
admonished them not to destroy popular renown, nor to blame the writers
of fables, who surveying the justice of women, from their accommodating
others with garments and ornaments, without a witness, when it is
necessary for some other person to use them, and that neither litigation
nor contradiction are produced from this confidence,—have feigned, that
three women used but one eye in common, on account of the facility of
their communion with each other. He farther observed, that he who is
called the wisest of all others, and who gave arrangement to the human
voice, and in short, was the inventor of names, whether he was a God or
a dæmon, or a certain divine man,[13] perceiving that the genus of women
is most adapted to piety, gave to each of their ages the appellation of
some God. Hence he called an unmarried woman _Core_, i. e. Proserpine;
but a bride, _Nympha_; the woman who has brought forth children,
_Mater_; and a grandmother, according to the Doric dialect, _Maia_. In
conformity to which also, the oracles in Dodona and at Delphi, are
unfolded in to light through a woman. But through this praise pertaining
to piety, Pythagoras is said to have produced so great a change in
female attire, that the women no longer dared to clothe themselves with
costly garments, but consecrated many myriads of their vestments in the
temple of Juno. The effect also of this discourse is said to have been
such, that about the region of the Crotonians the fidelity of the
husband to the wife was universally celebrated; [imitating in this
respect] Ulysses, who would not receive immortality from Calypso, on
condition that he should abandon Penelope. Pythagoras therefore also
observed, that it remained for the women to exhibit their probity to
their husbands, in order that they might be equally celebrated with
Ulysses. In short, it is recorded that through the above-mentioned
discourses, Pythagoras obtained no moderate honor and esteem, both in
the city of the Crotonians and throughout Italy.
CHAP. XII.
It is also said, that Pythagoras was the first who called himself a
philosopher; this not being a new name, but previously instructing us in
a useful manner in a thing appropriate to the name. For he said that the
entrance of men into the present life, resembled the progression of a
crowd to some public spectacle. For there men of every description
assemble with different views; one hastening to sell his wares for the
sake of money and gain; but another that he may acquire renown by
exhibiting the strength of his body; and there is also a third class of
men, and those the most liberal, who assemble for the sake of surveying
the places, the beautiful works of art, the specimens of valor, and the
literary productions which are usually exhibited on such occasions. Thus
also in the present life, men of all-various pursuits are collected
together in one and the same place. For some are influenced by the
desire of riches and luxury; others by the love of power and dominion;
and others are possessed with an insane ambition for glory. But the most
pure and unadulterated character, is that of the man who gives himself
to the contemplation of the most beautiful things, and whom it is proper
to call a philosopher.[14] He adds, that the survey of all heaven, and
of the stars that revolve in it, is indeed beautiful, when the order of
them is considered. For they derive this beauty and order by the
participation of the first and the intelligible essence. But that first
essence is the nature of number and reasons [i. e. productive
principles,] which pervades through all things, and according to which
all these [celestial bodies] are elegantly arranged, and fitly adorned.
And wisdom indeed, truly so called, is a certain science which is
conversant with the first beautiful objects,[15] and these divine,
undecaying, and possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence; by the
participation of which other things also may be called beautiful. But
philosophy is the appetition of a thing of this kind. The attention
therefore to erudition is likewise beautiful, which Pythagoras extended,
in order to effect the correction of mankind.
CHAP. XIII.
Moreover, if we may believe in so many ancient and credible historians
as have written concerning him, the words of Pythagoras contained
something of a recalling and admonitory nature, which extended as far as
to irrational animals; by which it may be inferred that learning
predominates in those endued with intellect, since it tames even wild
beasts, and those which are considered to be deprived of reason. For it
is said that Pythagoras detained the Daunian bear which had most
severely injured the inhabitants, and that having gently stroked it with
his hand for a long time, fed it with maze and acorns, and compelled it
by an oath no longer to touch any living thing, he dismissed it. But the
bear immediately after hid herself in the mountains and woods, and was
never seen from that time to attack any irrational animal. Perceiving
likewise an ox at Tarentum feeding in a pasture, and eating among other
things green beans, he advised the herdsman to tell the ox to abstain
from the beans. The herdsman, however, laughed at him, and said that he
did not understand the language of oxen, but if Pythagoras did, it was
in vain to advise him to speak to the ox, but fit that he himself should
advise the animal to abstain from such food. Pythagoras therefore,
approaching to the ear of the ox, and whispering in it for a long time,
not only caused him then to refrain from beans, but it is said that he
never after tasted them. This ox also lived for a long time at Tarentum
near the temple of Juno, where it remained when it was old, and was
called the sacred ox of Pythagoras. It was also fed by those that came
to it with human food. When likewise he happened to be conversing with
his familiars about birds, symbols, and prodigies, and was observing
that all these are the messengers of the Gods, sent by them to those men
who are truly dear to the Gods, he is said to have brought down an eagle
that was flying over Olympia, and after gently stroking, to have
dismissed it. Through these things, therefore, and other things similar
to these, he demonstrated that he possessed the same dominion as
Orpheus, over savage animals, and that he allured and detained them by
the power of voice proceeding from the mouth.
CHAP. XIV.
With him likewise the best principle originated of a guardian attention
to the concerns of men, and which ought to be pre-assumed by those who
intend to learn the truth about other things. For he reminded many of
his familiars, by most clear and evident indications, of the former life
which their soul lived, before it was bound to this body, and
demonstrated by indubitable arguments, that he had been Euphorbus the
son of Panthus, who conquered Patroclus. And he especially praised the
following funeral Homeric verses pertaining to himself, sung them most
elegantly to the lyre, and frequently repeated them.
“The shining circlets of his golden hair,
Which ev’n the Graces might be proud to wear,
Instarr’d with gems and gold, bestrow the shore
With dust dishonor’d, and deform’d with gore.
As the young olive in some sylvan scene,
Crown’d by fresh fountains with eternal green,
Lifts the gay head, in snowy flowrets fair,
And plays and dances to the gentle air;
When lo! a whirlwind from high heav’n invades
The tender plant, and withers all its shades;
It lies uprooted from its genial bed,
A lovely ruin now defac’d and dead.
Thus young, thus beautiful, Euphorbus lay,
While the fierce Spartan tore his arms away.”[16]
But what is related about the shield of this Phrygian Euphorbus, being
dedicated among other Trojan spoils to Argive Juno, we shall omit, as
being of a very popular nature. That, however, which he wished to
indicate through all these particulars is this, that he knew the former
lives which he had lived, and that from hence he commenced his
providential attention to others, reminding them of their former life.
CHAP. XV.
Conceiving, however, that the first attention which should be paid to
men, is that which takes place through the senses; as when some one
perceives beautiful figures and forms, or hears beautiful rythms and
melodies, he established that to be the first erudition which subsists
through music, and also through certain melodies and rythms, from which
the remedies of human manners and passions are obtained, together with
those harmonies of the powers of the soul which it possessed from the
first. He likewise devised medicines calculated to repress and expel the
diseases both of bodies and souls. And by Jupiter that which deserves to
be mentioned above all these particulars is this, that he arranged and
adapted for his disciples what are called apparatus and contrectations,
divinely contriving mixtures of certain diatonic, chromatic, and
euharmonic melodies, through which he easily transferred and circularly
led the passions of the soul into a contrary direction, when they had
recently and in an irrational and clandestine manner been formed; such
as sorrow, rage, and pity, absurd emulation and fear, all-various
desires, angers, and appetites, pride, supineness, and vehemence. For he
corrected each of these by the rule of virtue, attempering them through
appropriate melodies, as through certain salutary medicines. In the
evening, likewise, when his disciples were retiring to sleep, he
liberated them by these means from diurnal perturbations and tumults,
and purified their intellective power from the influxive and effluxive
waves of a corporeal nature; rendered their sleep quiet, and their
dreams pleasing and prophetic. But when they again rose from their bed,
he freed them from nocturnal heaviness, relaxation and torpor, through
certain peculiar songs and modulations, produced either by simply
striking the lyre, or employing the voice. Pythagoras, however, did not
procure for himself a thing of this kind through instruments or the
voice, but employing a certain ineffable divinity, and which it is
difficult to apprehend, he extended his ears, and fixed his intellect in
the sublime symphonies of the world, he alone hearing and understanding,
as it appears, the universal harmony and consonance of the spheres, and
the stars that are moved through them, and which produce a fuller and
more intense melody than any thing effected by mortal sounds.[17] This
melody also was the result of dissimilar and variously differing sounds,
celerities, magnitudes, and intervals, arranged with reference to each
other in a certain most musical ratio, and thus producing a most gentle,
and at the same time variously beautiful motion and convolution. Being
therefore irrigated as it were with this melody, having the reason of
his intellect well arranged through it, and as I may say, exercised, he
determined to exhibit certain images of these things to his disciples as
much as possible, especially producing an imitation of them through
instruments, and through the mere voice alone. For he conceived that by
him alone, of all the inhabitants of the earth, the mundane sounds were
understood and heard, and this from a natural fountain itself and root.
He therefore thought himself worthy to be taught, and to learn something
about the celestial orbs, and to be assimilated to them by desire and
imitation, as being the only one on the earth adapted to this by the
conformation of his body, through the dæmoniacal power that inspired
him. But he apprehended that other men ought to be satisfied in looking
to him, and the gifts he possessed, and in being benefited and corrected
through images and examples, in consequence of their inability to
comprehend truly the first and genuine archetypes of things. Just,
indeed, as to those who are incapable of looking intently at the sun,
through the transcendent splendor of his rays, we contrive to exhibit
the eclipses of that luminary, either in the profundity of still water,
or through melted pitch, or through some darkly-splendid mirror; sparing
the imbecility of their eyes, and devising a method of representing a
certain repercussive light, though less intense than its archetype, to
those who are delighted with a thing of this kind. Empedocles also
appears to have obscurely signified this about Pythagoras, and the
illustrious and divinely-gifted conformation of his body above that of
other men, when he says:
“There was a man among them [i. e. among the Pythagoreans] who was
transcendent in knowledge, who possessed the most ample stores of
intellectual wealth, and who was in the most eminent degree the adjutor
of the works of the wise. For when he extended all the powers of his
intellect, he easily beheld every thing, as far as to ten or twenty ages
of the human race.”
For the words _transcendent_, and _he beheld every thing_, and _the
wealth of intellect_, and the like, especially exhibit the illustrious
nature of the conformation of his mind and body, and its superior
accuracy in seeing, and hearing, and in intellectual perception.
CHAP. XVI.
This adaptation therefore of souls was procured by him through music.
But another purification of the dianoetic part,[18] and at the same time
of the whole soul, through all-various studies, was effected by him as
follows: He conceived generally that labor should be employed about
disciplines and studies, and ordained like a legislator, trials of the
most various nature, punishments, and restraints by fire and sword, for
innate intemperance, and an inexhaustible avidity of possessing; which
he who is depraved can neither suffer nor sustain. Besides these things
also, he ordered his familiars to abstain from all animals, and farther
still from certain foods, which are hostile to the reasoning power, and
impede its genuine energies. He likewise enjoined them continence of
speech, and perfect silence, exercising them for many years in the
subjugation of the tongue, and in a strenuous and assiduous
investigation and resumption of the most difficult theorems. Hence also,
he ordered them to abstain from wine, to be sparing in their food, to
sleep little, and to have an unstudied contempt of, and hostility to
glory, wealth, and the like: to have an unfeigned reverence of those to
whom reverence is due, a genuine similitude and benevolence to those of
the same age with themselves, and an attention and incitation towards
their juniors, free from all envy. With respect to the amity also which
subsists in all things towards all, whether it be that of Gods towards
men through piety and scientific theory, or of dogmas towards each
other, or universally of the soul towards the body, and of the rational
towards the irrational part, through philosophy, and the theory
pertaining to it; or whether it be that of men to each other, of
citizens indeed through sound legislation, but of strangers through a
correct physiology; or of the husband to the wife, or of brothers and
kindred, through unperverted communion; or whether, in short, it be of
all things towards all, and still farther, of certain irrational animals
through justice, and a physical connexion and association; or whether it
be the pacification and conciliation of the body which is of itself
mortal, and of its latent contrary powers, through health, and a diet
and temperance conformable to this, in imitation of the salubrious
condition of the mundane elements;—of the appellation of all these,
which are summarily comprehended in one and the same name, that of
friendship, Pythagoras is acknowledged to have been the inventor and
legislator. And, in short, he was the cause to his disciples of the most
appropriate converse with the Gods, both when they were awake and when
asleep; a thing which never takes place in a soul disturbed by anger, or
pain, or pleasure, or, by Jupiter, by any other base desire, or defiled
by ignorance, which is more unholy and noxious than all these. By all
these inventions, therefore, he divinely healed and purified the soul,
resuscitated and saved its divine part, and conducted to the
intelligible its divine eye, which, as Plato says, is better worth
saving than ten thousand corporeal eyes; for by looking through this
alone, when it is strengthened and clarified by appropriate aids, the
truth pertaining to all beings is perceived. Referring therefore to
this, Pythagoras purified the dianoetic power of the soul. Such also was
the form with him of erudition, and these were the things to which he
directed his view.
CHAP. XVII.
As he therefore thus prepared his disciples for erudition, he did not
immediately receive into the number of his associates those who came to
him for that purpose, till he had made trial of, and judiciously
examined them. Hence in the first place he inquired after what manner
they associated with their parents, and the rest of their relatives. In
the next place he surveyed their unseasonable laughter, their silence,
and their speaking when it was not proper; and farther still, what their
desires were, with whom they associated, how they conversed with them,
in what they especially employed their leisure time in the day, and what
were the subjects of their joy and grief. He likewise surveyed, their
form, their mode of walking, and the whole motion of their body.
Physiognomically also considering the natural indications of their
frame, he made them to be manifest signs of the unapparent manners of
the soul. When, therefore, he had thus made trial of some one, he
suffered him to be neglected for three years, in the mean time observing
how he was disposed with respect to stability, and a true love of
learning, and if he was sufficiently prepared with reference to glory,
so as to despise [popular] honor. After this, he ordered those who came
to him to observe a quinquennial silence, in order that he might
experimentally know how they were affected as to continence of speech,
the subjugation of the tongue being the most difficult of all victories;
as those have unfolded to us who instituted the mysteries. During this
[probationary] time, however, the property of each was disposed of in
common, and was committed to the care of those appointed for this
purpose, who were called politicians, economizers, and legislators. And
with respect to these probationers, those who appeared to be worthy to
participate of his dogmas, from the judgment he had formed of them from
their life and the modesty of their behaviour, after the quinquennial
silence, then became _Esoterics_, and both heard and saw Pythagoras
himself within the veil. For prior to this they participated of his
words through the hearing alone, beyond the veil, without at all seeing
him, giving for a long time a specimen of their peculiar manners. But if
they were rejected they received the double of the wealth which they
brought, and a tomb was raised to them as if they were dead by the
_homacoï_; for thus all the disciples of the man were called. And if
they happened to meet with them afterwards, they behaved to them as if
they were other persons, but said that they were dead, whom they had
modelled by education, in the expectation that they would become truly
good men by the disciplines they would learn. They also were of opinion
that those who were more slow in the acquisition of knowledge, were
badly organized, and, as I may say, imperfect and barren. If, however,
after Pythagoras had physiognomically considered their form, their mode
of walking, and every other motion, and the state of their body, and he
had conceived good hope respecting them; after likewise the quinquennial
silence, and the orgies and initiations from so many disciplines,
together with the ablutions of the soul, and so many and such great
purifications produced from such various theorems, through which the
sagacity and sanctity of the soul is perfectly ingenerated; if, after
all this, some one was found to be still sluggish and of a dull
intellect, they raised to such a one in the school a certain pillar and
monument, (as they are said to have done to Perialus the Thurian, and
Cylon the prince of the Sybarites, who were rejected by them) expelled
him from the _Homacoïon_ or auditory, loading him with a great quantity
of silver and gold. For these were deposited by them in common, and were
committed to the care of certain persons adapted to this purpose, and
who were called Economics, from the office which they bore. And if
afterwards they happened to meet with such a one, they conceived him to
be any other person, than him who according to them was dead. Hence also
Lysis, blaming a certain person named Hipparchus, because he had
communicated the doctrines of the Pythagoreans to the profane, and to
those who acceded to them without disciplines and theory, says as
follows:
“It is reported that you philosophize to every one you may happen to
meet, and publicly, which Pythagoras did not think fit to do. And these
things, indeed, O Hipparchus, you learnt with diligent assiduity, but
you have not preserved them; having tasted, O excellent man, of Sicilian
delicacies, which you ought not to have tasted a second time. If,
therefore, you abandon these, I shall rejoice; but if not, you will be
dead in my opinion. For it will be pious to call to mind the divine and
human precepts of Pythagoras, and not to make the goods of wisdom common
to those, who have not even in a dream their soul purified. For it is
not lawful to extend to every casual person, things which were obtained
with such great labors, and such diligent assiduity, nor to divulge the
mysteries of the Eleusinian Goddesses to the profane. For those who do
either of these, are equally unjust and impious. But it will be well to
consider what a great length of time we consumed in wiping away the
stains which had insinuated themselves into our breasts, till, after the
lapse of some years, we became fit recipients of the doctrines of
Pythagoras. For as dyers previously purify garments, and then fix in the
colors with which they wish them to be imbued, in order that the dye may
not be washed away, and may never become evanescent; after the same
manner also that divine man prepared the souls of those that were lovers
of philosophy, so that they might not deceive him in any of those
beautiful and good qualities which he hoped they would possess. For he
did not impart spurious doctrines, nor snares, in which most of the
sophists, who are at leisure for no good purpose, entangle young men;
but he possessed a scientific knowledge of things human and divine.
These men, however, making his doctrine a pretext, perform many dreadful
deeds, ensnaring youth not in a becoming nor yet in a casual way. Hence
they render their auditors noxious and precipitate. For they infuse
theorems and divine doctrines into confused and turbid manners. Just as
if some one should pour pure and clear water into a deep well full of
mud; for he would disturb the mud, and destroy the clear water. The same
thing likewise takes place between those who teach and those who are
taught after this manner. For dense thickets and which are full of
briars surround the intellect and heart of those who have not been
purely initiated in disciplines, obscure the mild, tranquil, and
reasoning power of the soul, and openly impede the intellective part
from becoming increased and elevated. It is requisite likewise to call
intemperance and avarice the mothers of these thickets; both which are
naturally prolific. From intemperance, therefore, unlawful marriages,
[unjust] desires, corruptions, intoxication, preternatural pleasures,
and certain vehement appetites blossom forth, and which impel their
possessors into profundities and precipices. For now desires have
compelled some not to abstain either from their mothers or their
daughters, and violating law, their country, city, and king, with their
hands as it were bound behind them, they are violently dragged along
like slaves to extreme destruction. But from avarice germinate rapine,
robbery, parricide, sacrilege, sorcery, and such other evils at are the
sisters of these. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to
purify the woods in which these passions have fixed their abode, with
fire and sword, and all the machines of disciplines; and having
liberated the reasoning power from such mighty evils, we may then
implant in and deliver to it something useful and good.” So great and so
necessary was the attention which, according to Pythagoras, ought to be
paid to disciplines prior to philosophy. He likewise ordained that a
singular honor, and the most accurate investigation, should be given to
the teaching and participation of his dogmas, as he judiciously examined
the conceptions of those that came to him, by various documents, and ten
thousand forms of scientific theory.
CHAP. XVIII.
After this we must narrate how, when he had admitted certain persons to
be his disciples, he distributed them into different classes according
to their respective merits. For it was not fit that all of them should
equally participate of the same things, as they were naturally
dissimilar; nor was it indeed right that some should participate of all
the most honorable auditions, but others of none, or should not at all
partake of them. For this would be uncommunicative and unjust. While
therefore he imparted a convenient portion of his discourses to each, he
benefited as much as possible all of them, and preserved the proportion
of justice, by making each a partaker of the auditions according to his
desert. Hence, in conformity to this method, he called some of them
Pythagoreans, but others Pythagorists; just as we denominate some men
Attics, but others Atticists. Having therefore thus aptly divided their
names, some of them he considered to be genuine, but he ordained that
others should show themselves to be the emulators of these. He ordered
therefore that with the Pythagoreans possessions should be shared in
common, and that they should always live together; but that each of the
others should possess his own property apart from the rest, and that
assembling together in the same place, they should mutually be at
leisure for the same pursuits. And thus each of these modes was derived
from Pythagoras, and transmitted to his successors. Again, there were
also with the Pythagoreans two forms of philosophy; for there were
likewise two genera of those that pursued it, the Acusmatici, and the
Mathematici. Of these however the Mathematici are acknowledged to be
Pythagoreans by the rest; but the Mathematici do not admit that the
Acusmatici are so, or that they derived their instruction from
Pythagoras, but from Hippasus. And with respect to Hippasus, some say
that he was a Crotonian, but others a Metapontine. But the philosophy of
the Acusmatici consists in auditions unaccompanied with demonstrations
and a reasoning process; because it merely orders a thing to be done in
a certain way, and that they should endeavour to preserve such other
things as were said by him, as so many divine dogmas. They however
profess that they will not speak of them, and that they are not to be
spoken of; but they conceive those of their sect to be the best
furnished with wisdom, who retained what they had heard more than
others. But all these auditions are divided into three species. For some
of them indeed signify what a thing is; others what it _especially_ is;
but others, what ought, or what ought not, to be done. The auditions
therefore which signify what a thing is, are such as, What are the
islands of the blessed? The sun and moon. What is the oracle at Delphi?
The tetractys. What is harmony? That in which the Syrens subsist.[19]
But the auditions which signify what a thing _especially_ is, are such
as, What is the most just thing? To sacrifice. What is the wisest thing?
Number.[20] But the next to this in wisdom, is that which gives names to
things. What is the wisest of the things that are with us, [i. e. which
pertain to human concerns]? Medicine. What is the most beautiful?
Harmony. What is the most powerful? Mental decision. What is the most
excellent? Felicity. What is that which is most truly asserted? That men
are depraved. Hence they say that Pythagoras praised the Salaminian poet
Hippodomas, because he sings:
Tell, O ye Gods! the source from whence you came,
Say whence, O men! thus evil you became?
These therefore, and such as these, are the auditions of this kind. For
each of these shows what a thing _especially_ is. This however is the
same with what is called the wisdom of the seven wise men. For they
investigated, not what is _simply_ good, but what is _especially_ so;
nor what is difficult, but what is _most_ difficult; viz. for a man to
know himself. Nor did they investigate what is easy, but what is _most_
easy; viz. to do what you are accustomed to do. For it seems that such
auditions as the above, are conformable but posterior in time to such
wisdom as that of the seven wise men; since they were prior to
Pythagoras. The auditions likewise, respecting what should or should not
be done, were such as, That it is necessary to beget children. For it is
necessary to leave those that may worship the Gods after us. That it is
requisite to put the shoe on the right foot first. That it is not proper
to walk in the public ways, nor to dip in a sprinkling vessel, nor to be
washed in a bath. For in all these it is immanifest, whether those who
use them are pure. Others also of this kind are the following: Do not
assist a man in laying a burden down; for it is not proper to be the
cause of not laboring; but assist him in taking it up. Do not draw near
to a woman for the sake of begetting children, if she has gold. Speak
not about Pythagoric[21] concerns without light. Perform libations to
the Gods, from the handle of the cup, for the sake of an auspicious
omen, and in order that you may not drink from the same part [from which
you poured out the liquor.] Wear not the image of God in a ring, in
order that it may not be defiled. For it is a resemblance which ought to
be placed in the house. It is not right to use a woman ill; for she is a
suppliant. On this account also we bring her from the Vestal hearth, and
take her by the right hand. Nor is it proper to sacrifice a white cock;
for this also is a suppliant, and is sacred to the moon. Hence likewise
it announces the hours. To him who asks for counsel, give no other
advice than that which is the best: for counsel is a sacred thing.
Labors are good; but pleasures are in every respect bad. For as we came
into the present life for the purpose of punishment, it is necessary
that we should be punished. It is proper to sacrifice, and to enter
temples unshod. In going to a temple, it is not proper to turn out of
the way; for divinity should not be worshipped in a careless manner. It
is good to sustain, and to have wounds in the breast; but it is bad to
have them behind. The soul of man alone does not enter into those
animals, which it is lawful to kill. Hence it is proper to eat those
animals alone which it is fit to slay, but no other animal whatever. And
such were the auditions of this kind.
The most extended however were those concerning sacrifices, how they
ought to be performed at all other times, and likewise when migrating
from the present life; and concerning sepulture, and in what manner it
is proper to be buried. Of some of these therefore the reason is to be
assigned why they are ordered; such for instance as, it is necessary to
beget children, for the sake of leaving another that may worship the
Gods instead of yourself. But of others no reason is to be assigned. And
of some indeed, the reasons are assumed proximately; but of others,
remotely; such as, that bread is not to be broken, because it
contributes to the judgment in Hades. The probable reasons however,
which are added about things of this kind, are not Pythagoric, but were
devised by some who philosophized differently from the Pythagoreans, and
who endeavoured to adapt probability to what was said. Thus for
instance, with respect to what has been just now mentioned, why bread is
not to be broken, some say that it is not proper to dissolve that which
congregates. For formerly all those that were friends, assembled in a
barbaric manner to one piece of bread. But others say, that it is not
proper, in the beginning of an undertaking, to produce an omen of this
kind by breaking and diminishing. Moreover, all such precepts as define
what is to be done, or what is not to be done, refer to divinity as
their end; and every life is co-arranged so as to _follow God_. This
also is the principle and the doctrine of philosophy. For men act
ridiculously in searching for good any where else than from the Gods.
And when they do so, it is just as if some one, in a country governed by
a king, should reverence one of the citizens who is a magistrate, and
neglect him who is the ruler of all of them. For the Pythagoreans
thought that such men as we have just mentioned, performed a thing of
this kind. For since God is, and is the lord of all things, it is
universally acknowledged that good is to be requested of him. For all
men impart good to those whom they love, and to those with whom they are
delighted; but they give the contrary to good to those to whom they are
contrarily disposed. And such indeed is the wisdom of these precepts.
There was, however, a certain person named Hippomedon, an Ægean, a
Pythagorean and one of the Acusmatici, who asserted that Pythagoras gave
the reasons and demonstrations of all these precepts, but that in
consequence of their being delivered to many, and these such as were of
a more sluggish genius, the demonstrations were taken away, but the
problems themselves were left. Those however of the Pythagoreans that
are called _Mathematici_, acknowledge that these reasons and
demonstrations were added by Pythagoras, and they say still more than
this, and contend that their assertions are true, but affirm that the
following circumstance was the cause of the dissimilitude. Pythagoras,
say they, came from Ionia and Samos, during the tyranny of Polycrates,
Italy being then in a florishing condition; and the first men in the
city became his associates. But, to the more elderly of these, and who
were not at leisure [for philosophy], in consequence of being occupied
by political affairs, the discourse of Pythagoras was not accompanied
with a reasoning process, because it would have been difficult for them
to apprehend his meaning through disciplines and demonstrations; and he
conceived they would nevertheless be benefited by knowing what ought to
be done, though they were destitute of the knowledge of the _why_: just
as those who are under the care of physicians, obtain their health,
though they do not hear the reason of every thing which is to be done to
them. But with the younger part of his associates, and who were able
both to act and learn,—with these he conversed through demonstration and
disciplines. These therefore are the assertions of the Mathematici, but
the former, of the Acusmatici. With respect to Hippasus however
especially, they assert that he was one of the Pythagoreans, but that in
consequence of having divulged and described the method of forming a
sphere from twelve pentagons,[22] he perished in the sea, as an impious
person, but obtained the renown of having made the discovery. In
reality, however, this as well as every thing else pertaining to
geometry, was the invention of _that man_; for thus without mentioning
his name, they denominate Pythagoras. But the Pythagoreans say, that
geometry was divulged from the following circumstance: A certain
Pythagorean happened to lose the wealth which he possessed; and in
consequence of this misfortune, he was permitted to enrich himself from
geometry. But geometry was called by Pythagoras _Historia_. And thus
much concerning the difference of each mode of philosophising, and the
classes of the auditors of Pythagoras. For those who heard him either
within or without the veil, and those who heard him accompanied with
seeing, or without seeing him, and who are divided into interior and
exterior auditors, were no other than these. And it is requisite to
arrange under these, the political, economic and legislative
Pythagoreans.
CHAP. XIX.
Universally, however, it deserves to be known, that Pythagoras
discovered many paths of erudition, and that he delivered an appropriate
portion of wisdom conformable to the proper nature and power of each; of
which the following is the greatest argument. When Abaris, the Scythian,
came from the Hyperboreans, unskilled and uninitiated in the Grecian
learning, and was then of an advanced age, Pythagoras did not introduce
him to erudition through various theorems, but instead of silence,
auscultation for so long a time, and other trials, he immediately
considered him adapted to be an auditor of his dogmas, and instructed
him in the shortest way in his treatise On Nature, and in another
treatise On the Gods. For Abaris came from the Hyperboreans, being a
priest of the Apollo who is there worshipped, an elderly man, and most
wise in sacred concerns; but at that time he was returning from Greece
to his own country, in order that he might consecrate to the God in his
temple among the Hyperboreans, the gold which he had collected. Passing
therefore through Italy, and seeing Pythagoras, he especially
assimilated him to the God of whom he was the priest. And believing that
he was no other than the God himself, and that no man resembled him, but
that he was truly Apollo, both from the venerable indications which he
saw about him, and from those which the priest had known before, he gave
Pythagoras a dart which he took with him when he left the temple, as a
thing that would be useful to him in the difficulties that would befal
him in so long a journey. For he was carried by it, in passing through
inaccessible places, such as rivers, lakes, marshes, mountains, and the
like, and performed through it, as it is said, lustrations, and expelled
pestilence and winds from the cities that requested him to liberate them
from these evils. We are informed, therefore, that Lacedæmon, after
having been purified by him, was no longer infested with pestilence,
though prior to this it had frequently fallen into this evil, through
the baneful nature of the place in which it was built, the mountains of
Taygetus producing a suffocating heat, by being situated above the city,
in the same manner as Cnossus in Crete. And many other similar
particulars are related of the power of Abaris. Pythagoras, however,
receiving the dart, and neither being astonished at the novelty of the
thing, nor asking the reason why it was given to him, but as if he was
in reality a God himself, taking Abaris aside, he showed him his golden
thigh, as an indication that he was not [wholly] deceived [in the
opinion he had formed of him;] and having enumerated to him the several
particulars that were deposited in the temple, he gave him sufficient
reason to believe that he had not badly conjectured [in assimilating him
to Apollo]. Pythagoras also added, that he came [into the regions of
mortality] for the purpose of remedying and benefiting the condition of
mankind, and that on this account he had assumed a human form, lest men
being disturbed by the novelty of his transcendency, should avoid the
discipline which he possessed. He likewise exhorted Abaris to remain in
that place, and to unite with him in correcting [the lives and manners]
of those with whom they might meet; but to share the gold which he had
collected, in common with his associates, who were led by reason to
confirm by their deeds the dogma, _that the possessions of friends are
common_. Thus, therefore, Pythagoras unfolded to Abaris, who remained
with him, as we have just now said, physiology and theology in a
compendious way; and instead of divination by the entrails of beasts, he
delivered to him the art of prognosticating through numbers, conceiving
that this was purer, more divine, and more adapted to the celestial
numbers of the Gods. He delivered also to Abaris other studies which
were adapted to him. That we may return, however, to that for the sake
of which the present treatise was written, Pythagoras endeavoured to
correct and amend different persons, according to the nature and power
of each. All such particulars therefore as these, have neither been
transmitted to the knowledge of men, nor is it easy to narrate all that
has been transmitted to us concerning him.
CHAP. XX.
We shall however exhibit a few specimens, and those the most celebrated,
of the Pythagoric discipline, and also the monuments of the studies in
which those men engaged. In the first place, therefore, Pythagoras in
making trial [of the aptitude of those that came to him] considered
whether they could _echemuthein_, i. e. whether they were able to
refrain from speaking (for this was the word which he used), and
surveyed whether they could conceal in silence and preserve what they
had learnt and heard. In the next place, he observed whether they were
modest. For he was much more anxious that they should be silent than
that they should speak. He likewise directed his attention to every
other particular; such, as whether they were astonished by the energies
of any immoderate passion or desire. Nor did he in a superficial manner
consider how they were affected with respect to anger or desire, or
whether they were contentious or ambitious, or how they were disposed
with reference to friendship or strife. And if on his surveying all
these particulars accurately, they appeared to him to be endued with
worthy manners, then he directed his attention to their facility in
learning and their memory. And in the first place, indeed he considered
whether they were able to follow what was said, with rapidity and
perspicuity; but in the next place, whether a certain love and
temperance attended them towards the disciplines which they were taught.
For he surveyed how they were naturally disposed with respect to
gentleness. But he called this _catartysis_, i. e. _elegance of
manners_. And he considered ferocity as hostile to such a mode of
education. For impudence, shamelessness, intemperance, slothfulness,
slowness in learning, unrestrained licentiousness, disgrace, and the
like, are the attendants on savage manners; but the contraries on
gentleness and mildness. He considered these things, therefore, in
making trial of those that came to him, and in these he exercised the
learners. And those that were adapted to receive the goods of the wisdom
he possessed, he admitted to be his disciples, and thus endeavoured to
elevate them to scientific knowledge. But if he perceived that any one
of them was unadapted, he expelled him as one of another tribe, and a
stranger.
In the next place, I shall speak of the studies which he delivered
through the whole of the day to his associates. For those who committed
themselves to the guidance of his doctrine, acted in the following
manner: they performed their morning walks alone, and in places in which
there happened to be an appropriate solitude and quiet, and where there
were temples and groves, and other things adapted to give delight. For
they thought it was not proper to converse with any one, till they had
rendered their own soul sedate, and had co-harmonised the reasoning
power. For they apprehended it to be a thing of a turbulent nature to
mingle in a crowd as soon as they rose from bed. On this account all the
Pythagoreans always selected for themselves the most sacred places. But
after their morning walk they associated with each other, and especially
in temples, or if this was not possible, in places that resembled them.
This time, likewise, they employed in the discussion of doctrines and
disciplines, and in the correction of their manners.
CHAP. XXI.
After an association of this kind, they turned their attention to the
health of the body. Most of them, however, used unction and the course;
but a less number employed themselves in wrestling in gardens and
groves; others in leaping with leaden weights in their hands, or in
pantomime gesticulations, with a view to the strength of this body,
studiously selecting for this purpose opposite exercises. Their dinner
consisted of bread and honey or the honey-comb; but they did not drink
wine during the day. They also employed the time after dinner in the
political economy pertaining to strangers and guests, conformably to the
mandate of the laws. For they wished to transact all business of this
kind in the hours after dinner. But when it was evening they again
betook themselves to walking; yet not singly as in the morning walk, but
in parties of two or three, calling to mind as they walked, the
disciplines they had learnt, and exercising themselves in beautiful
studies. After they had walked, they made use of the bath; and having
washed themselves, they assembled in the place where they eat together,
and which contained no more than ten who met for this purpose. These,
however, being collected together, libations and sacrifices were
performed with fumigations and frankincense. After this they went to
supper, which they finished before the setting of the sun. But they made
use of wine and maze, and bread, and every kind of food that is eaten
with bread, and likewise raw and boiled herbs. The flesh also of such
animals was placed before them as it was lawful to immolate; but they
rarely fed on fish: for this nutriment was not, for certain causes,
useful to them. In a similar manner also they were of opinion, that the
animal which is not naturally noxious to the human race, should neither
be injured nor slain. But after this supper libations were performed,
and these were succeeded by readings. It was the custom however with
them for the youngest to read, and the eldest ordered what was to be
read, and after what manner. But when they were about to depart, the
cup-bearer poured out a libation for them; and the libation being
performed, the eldest announced to them the following precepts: That a
mild and fruitful plant should neither be injured nor corrupted, nor in
a similar manner, any animal which is not noxious to the human race. And
farther still, that it is necessary to speak piously and form proper
conceptions of the divine, dæmoniacal, and heroic genera; and in a
similar manner, of parents and benefactors. That it is proper likewise
to give assistance to law, and to be hostile to illegality. But these
things being said, each departed to his own place of abode. They also
wore a white and pure garment. And in a similar manner they lay on pure
and white beds, the coverlets of which were made of thread; for they did
not use woollen coverlets. With respect to hunting they did not approve
of it, and therefore did not employ themselves in an exercise of this
kind. Such therefore were the precepts which were daily delivered to the
disciples of Pythagoras, with respect to nutriment and their mode of
living.
CHAP. XXII.
Another mode also of erudition is transmitted to us, which was effected
through Pythagoric precepts, and sentences which extended to human life
and human opinions; a few of which out of many I shall narrate. One of
these therefore contains an exhortation to remove contention and strife
from true friendship, and especially from all friendship, if possible.
But if this is not possible, at least to expel it from paternal
friendship, and universally from that which subsists with elders and
benefactors. For to contend pervicaciously with such as these, anger or
some other similar passion intervening, is not to preserve, [but
destroy] the existing friendship. But they say it is necessary that the
smallest lacerations and ulcerations should take place in friendships.
And that this will be effected, if both the friends know how to yield
and subdue their anger, and especially the younger of the two, and who
belongs to some one of the above-mentioned orders. They likewise thought
it necessary that the corrections and admonitions which they called
_pædartases_, and which the elder employed towards the younger, should
be made with much suavity of manners and great caution; and also that
much solicitude and appropriation should be exhibited in admonitions.
For thus the admonition will become decorous and beneficial. They
likewise say that faith should never be separated from friendship,
neither seriously nor in jest. For it is no longer easy for the existing
friendship to remain in a sane condition, when falsehood once insinuates
itself into the manners of those who assert themselves to be friends.
And again they say, that friendship is not to be rejected on account of
misfortune, or any other imbecility which happens to human life; but
that the only laudable rejection of a friend and of friendship, is that
which takes place through great and incurable vice. Such therefore was
the form of correction with the Pythagoreans through sentences, and
which extended to all the virtues, and to the whole of life.
CHAP. XXIII.
The mode however of teaching through symbols, was considered by
Pythagoras as most necessary. For this form of erudition was cultivated
by nearly all the Greeks, as being most ancient. But it was
transcendently honored by the Egyptians, and adopted by them in the most
diversified manner. Conformably to this, therefore, it will be found,
that great attention was paid to it by Pythagoras, if any one clearly
unfolds the significations and arcane conceptions of the Pythagoric
symbols, and thus developes the great rectitude and truth they contain,
and liberates them from their enigmatic form. For they are adapted
according to a simple and uniform doctrine, to the great geniuses of
these philosophers, and deify in a manner which surpasses human
conception. For those who came from this school, and especially the most
ancient Pythagoreans, and also those young men who were the disciples of
Pythagoras when he was an old man, viz. Philolaus[23] and Eurytus,
Charondas and Zaleucus, and Brysson, the elder Archytas also, and
Aristæus, Lysis and Empedocles, Zanolxis and Epimenides, Milo and
Leucippus, Alcmæon, Hippasus and Thymaridas, and all of that age,
consisting of a multitude of learned men, and who were above measure
excellent,—all these adopted this mode of teaching, in their discourses
with each other, and in their commentaries and annotations. Their
writings also, and all the books which they published, _most of which
have been preserved even to our time_,[24] were not composed by them in
a popular and vulgar diction, and in a manner usual with all other
writers, so as to be immediately understood, but in such a way as not to
be easily apprehended by those that read them. For they adopted that
taciturnity which was instituted by Pythagoras as a law, in concealing
after an arcane mode, divine mysteries from the uninitiated, and
obscuring their writings and conferences with each other. Hence he who
selecting these symbols does not unfold their meaning by an apposite
exposition, will cause those who may happen to meet with them to
consider them as ridiculous and inane, and as full of nugacity and
garrulity. When, however, they are unfolded in a way conformable to
these symbols, and become obvious and clear even to the multitude,
instead of being obscure and dark, then they will be found to be
analogous to prophetic sayings, and to the oracles of the Pythian
Apollo. They will then also exhibit an admirable meaning, and will
produce a divine afflatus in those who unite intellect with erudition.
Nor will it be improper to mention a few of them, in order that this
mode of discipline may become more perspicuous: Enter not into a temple
negligently, nor in short adore carelessly, not even though you should
stand at the very doors themselves. Sacrifice and adore unshod.
Declining from the public ways, walk in unfrequented paths. Speak not
about Pythagoric concerns without light. And such are the outlines of
the mode adopted by Pythagoras of teaching through symbols.
CHAP. XXIV.
Since, however, nutriment greatly contributes to the best discipline,
when it is properly used, and in an orderly manner, let us consider what
Pythagoras also instituted as a law about this. Universally, therefore,
he rejected all such food as is flatulent, and the cause of
perturbation, but he approved of the nutriment contrary to this, and
ordered it to be used, viz. such food as composes and compresses the
habit of the body. Hence, likewise, he thought that millet was a plant
adapted to nutrition. But he altogether rejected such food as is foreign
to the Gods; because it withdraws us from familiarity with the Gods.
Again, according to another mode also, he ordered his disciples to
abstain from such food as is reckoned sacred, as being worthy of honor,
and not to be appropriated to common and human utility. He likewise
exhorted them to abstain from such things as are an impediment to
prophesy, or to the purity and chastity of the soul, or to the habit of
temperance, or of virtue. And lastly, he rejected all such things as are
adverse to sanctity, and which obscure and disturb the other purities of
the soul, and the phantasms which occur in sleep. These things therefore
he instituted as laws in common about nutriment.
Separately, however, he forbade the most contemplative of philosophers,
and who have arrived at the summit of philosophic attainments, the use
of superfluous and unjust food, and ordered them never to eat any thing
animated, nor in short, to drink wine, nor to sacrifice animals to the
Gods, nor by any means to injure animals, but to preserve most
solicitously justice towards them. And he himself lived after this
manner, abstaining from animal food, and adoring altars undefiled with
blood. He was likewise careful in preventing others from destroying
animals that are of a kindred nature with us, and rather corrected and
instructed savage animals through words and deeds, than injured them
through punishment. And farther still, he also injoined those
politicians that were legislators to abstain from animals. For as they
wished to act in the highest degree justly, it is certainly necessary
that they should not injure any kindred animal. Since, how could they
persuade others to act justly, if they themselves were detected in
indulging an insatiable avidity by partaking of animals that are allied
to us? For through the communion of life and the same elements, and the
mixture subsisting from these, they are as it were conjoined to us by a
fraternal alliance. He permitted, however, others whose life was not
entirely purified, sacred and philosophic, to eat of certain animals;
and for these he appointed a definite time of abstinence. These
therefore, he ordered not to eat the heart, nor the brain; and from the
eating of these he entirely prohibited all the Pythagoreans. For these
parts are of a ruling nature, and are as it were certain ladders and
seats of wisdom and life. But other[25] things were considered by him as
sacred on account of the nature of a divine reason. Thus he exhorted his
disciples to abstain from mallows, because this plant is the first
messenger and signal of the sympathy of celestial with terrestrial
natures. Thus, too, he ordered them to abstain from the fish melanurus;
for it is sacred to the terrestrial Gods. And also not to receive the
fish erythinus, through other such like causes. He likewise exhorted
them to abstain from beans, on account of many sacred and physical
causes, and also such causes as pertain to the soul. And he established
as laws other precepts similar to these, beginning through nutriment to
lead men to virtue.
CHAP. XXV.
Pythagoras was likewise of opinion that music contributed greatly to
health, if it was used in an appropriate manner. For he was accustomed
to employ a purification of this kind, but not in a careless way. And he
called the medicine which is obtained through music by the name of
purification. But he employed such a melody as this about the vernal
season. For he placed in the middle a certain person who played on the
lyre, and seated in a circle round him those who were able to sing. And
thus, when the person in the centre struck the lyre, those that
surrounded him sung certain pæans, through which they were seen to be
delighted, and to become elegant and orderly in their manners. But at
another time they used music in the place of medicine. And there are
certain melodies devised as remedies against the passions of the soul,
and also against despondency and lamentation,[26] which Pythagoras
invented as things that afford the greatest assistance in these
maladies. And again, he employed other melodies against rage and anger,
and against every aberration of the soul. There is also another kind of
modulation invented as a remedy against desires. He likewise used
dancing; but employed the lyre as an instrument for this purpose. For he
conceived that the pipe was calculated to excite insolence, was a
theatrical instrument, and had by no means a liberal sound.[27] Select
verses also of Homer and Hesiod were used by him, for the purpose of
correcting the soul. Among the deeds of Pythagoras likewise, it is said,
that once through the spondaic song of a piper, he extinguished the rage
of a Tauromenian lad, who had been feasting by night, and intended to
burn the vestibule of his mistress, in consequence of seeing her coming
from the house of his rival. For the lad was inflamed and excited [to
this rash attempt] by a Phrygian song; which however Pythagoras most
rapidly suppressed. But Pythagoras, as he was astronomizing, happened to
meet with the Phrygian piper at an unseasonable time of night, and
persuaded him to change his Phrygian for a spondaic song; through which
the fury of the lad being immediately repressed, he returned home in an
orderly manner, though a little before this, he could not be in the
least restrained, nor would in short, bear any admonition; and even
stupidly insulted Pythagoras when he met him. When a certain youth also
rushed with a drawn sword on Anchitus, the host of Empedocles, because,
being a judge, he had publicly condemned his father to death, and would
have slain him as a homicide, Empedocles changed the intention of the
youth, by singing to his lyre that verse of Homer,
Nepenthe, without gall, o’er every ill
Oblivion spreads;——[28]
and thus snatched his host Anchitus from death, and the youth from the
crime of homicide. It is also related that the youth from that time
became the most celebrated of the disciples of Pythagoras. Farther
still, the whole Pythagoric school produced by certain appropriate
songs, what they called _exartysis_ or adaptation, _synarmoge_ or
elegance of manners, and _epaphe_ or contact, usefully conducting the
dispositions of the soul to passions contrary to those which it before
possessed. For when they went to bed they purified the reasoning power
from the perturbations and noises to which it had been exposed during
the day, by certain odes and peculiar songs, and by this means procured
for themselves tranquil sleep, and few and good dreams. But when they
rose from bed, they again liberated themselves from the torpor and
heaviness of sleep, by songs of another kind. Sometimes, also, by
musical sounds alone, unaccompanied with words, they healed the passions
of the soul and certain diseases, enchanting, as they say, in reality.
And it is probable that from hence this name _epode_, i. e. enchantment,
came to be generally used. After this manner, therefore, Pythagoras
through music produced the most beneficial correction of human manners
and lives.
CHAP. XXVI.
Since, however, we are narrating the wisdom employed by Pythagoras in
instructing his disciples, it will not be unappropriate to relate that
which is proximate in a following order to this, viz. how he invented
the harmonic science, and harmonic ratios. But for this purpose we must
begin a little higher. Intently considering once, and reasoning with
himself, whether it would be possible to devise a certain instrumental
assistance to the hearing, which should be firm and unerring, such as
the sight obtains through the compass and the rule, or, by Jupiter,
through a dioptric instrument; or such as the touch obtains through the
balance, or the contrivance of measures;—thus considering, as he was
walking near a brazier’s shop, he heard from a certain divine casualty
the hammers beating out a piece of iron on an anvil, and producing
sounds that accorded with each other, one combination only excepted. But
he recognized in those sounds, the diapason, the diapente, and the
diatessaron, harmony. He saw, however, that the sound which was between
the diatessaron and the diapente was itself by itself dissonant, yet,
nevertheless, gave completion to that which was the greater sound among
them. Being delighted, therefore, to find that the thing which he was
anxious to discover had succeeded to his wishes by divine assistance, he
went into the brazier’s shop, and found by various experiments, that the
difference of sound arose from the magnitude of the hammers, but not
from the force of the strokes, nor from the figure of the hammers, nor
from the transposition of the iron which was beaten. When, therefore, he
had accurately examined the weights and the equal counterpoise of the
hammers, he returned home, and fixed one stake diagonally to the walls,
lest if there were many, a certain difference should arise from this
circumstance, or in short, lest the peculiar nature of each of the
stakes should cause a suspicion of mutation. Afterwards, from this stake
he suspended four chords consisting of the same materials, and of the
same magnitude and thickness, and likewise equally twisted. To the
extremity of each chord also he tied a weight. And when he had so
contrived, that the chords were perfectly equal to each other in length,
he afterwards alternately struck two chords at once, and found the
before-mentioned symphonies, viz. a different symphony in a different
combination. For he discovered that the chord which was stretched by the
greatest weight, produced, when compared with that which was stretched
by the smallest, the symphony diapason. But the former of these weights
was twelve pounds, and the latter six. And, therefore, being in a duple
ratio, it exhibited the consonance diapason; which the weights
themselves rendered apparent. But again, he found that the chord from
which the greatest weight was suspended compared with that from which
the weight next to the smallest depended, and which weight was eight
pounds, produced the symphony diapente. Hence he discovered that this
symphony is in a sesquialter ratio, in which ratio also the weights were
to each other. And he found that the chord which was stretched by the
greatest weight, produced, when compared with that which was next to it
in weight, and was nine pounds, the symphony diatessaron, analogously to
the weights. This ratio, therefore, he discovered to be sesquitertian;
but that of the chord from which a weight of nine pounds was suspended,
to the chord which had the smallest weight [or six pounds,] to be
sesquialter. For 9 is to 6 in a sesquialter ratio. In like manner, the
chord next to that from which the smallest weight depended, was to that
which had the smallest weight, in a sesquitertian ratio, [for it was the
ratio of 8 to 6,] but to the chord which had the greatest weight, in a
sesquialter ratio [for such is the ratio of 12 to 8.] Hence, that which
is between the diapente and the diatessaron, and by which the diapente
exceeds the diatessaron, is proved to be in an epogdoan ratio, or that
of 9 to 8. But either way it may be proved that the diapason is a system
consisting of the diapente in conjunction with the diatessaron, just as
the duple ratio consists of the sesquialter and sesquitertian, as for
instance, 12, 8, and 6; or conversely, of the diatessaron and the
diapente, as in the duple ratio of the sesquitertian and sesquialter
ratios, as for instance 12, 9, and 6. After this manner, therefore, and
in this order, having conformed both his hand and his hearing to the
suspended weights, and having established according to them the ratio of
the habitudes, he transferred by an easy artifice the common suspension
of the chords from the diagonal stake to the limen of the instrument,
which he called _chordotonon_. But he produced by the aid of pegs a
tension of the chords analogous to that effected by the weights.
Employing this method, therefore, as a basis, and as it were an
infallible rule, he afterwards extended the experiment to various
instruments; viz. to the pulsation of patellæ or pans, to pipes and
reeds, to monochords, triangles, and the like. And in all these he found
an immutable concord with the ratio of numbers. But he denominated the
sound which participates of the number 6 _hypate_: that which
participates of the number 8 and is sesquitertian, _mese_; that which
participates of the number 9, but is more acute by a tone than mese, he
called _paramese_, and _epogdous_; but that which participates of the
dodecad, _nete_. Having also filled up the middle spaces with analogous
sounds according to the diatonic genus, he formed an octochord from
symphonious numbers, viz. from the double, the sesquialter, the
sesquitertian, and from the difference of these, the epogdous. And thus
he discovered the [harmonic] progression, which tends by a certain
physical necessity from the most grave [i. e. flat] to the most acute
sound, according to this diatonic genus. For from the diatonic, he
rendered the chromatic and enharmonic genus perspicuous, as we shall
some time or other show when we treat of music. This diatonic genus,
however, appears to have such physical gradations and progressions as
the following; viz. a semitone, a tone, and then a tone; and this is the
diatessaron, being a system consisting of two tones, and of what is
called a semitone. Afterwards, another tone being assumed, viz. the one
which is intermediate, the diapente is produced, which is a system
consisting of three tones and a semitone. In the next place to this is
the system of a semitone, a tone, and a tone, forming another
diatessaron, i. e. another sesquitertian ratio. So that in the more
ancient heptachord indeed, all the sounds, from the most grave, which
are with respect to each other fourths, produce every where with each
other the symphony diatessaron; the semitone receiving by transition,
the first, middle, and third place, according to the tetrachord. In the
Pythagoric octachord, however, which by conjunction is a system of the
tetrachord and pentachord, but if disjoined is a system of two
tetrachords separated from each other, the progression is from the most
grave sound. Hence all the sounds that are by their distance from each
other fifths, produce with each other the symphony diapente; the
semitone successively proceeding into four places, viz. the first,
second, third, and fourth. After this manner, therefore, it is said that
music was discovered by Pythagoras. And having reduced it to a system,
he delivered it to his disciples as subservient to every thing that is
most beautiful.[29]
CHAP. XXVII.
Many also of the political actions of his followers are [deservedly]
praised. For it is reported that the Crotonians being once impelled to
make sumptuous funerals and interments, some one of them said to the
people, that he had heard Pythagoras when he was discoursing about
divine natures observe, that the Olympian Gods attended to the
dispositions of those that sacrificed, and not to the multitude of the
sacrifices; but that, on the contrary, the terrestrial Gods, as being
allotted the government of things less important, rejoiced in banquets
and lamentations, and farther still, in continual libations, in
delicacies, and in celebrating funerals with great expense. Whence, on
account of his wish to receive, Pluto is called Hades. He suffers,
therefore, those that slenderly honor him to remain for a longer time in
the upper world; but he always draws down some one of those who are
disposed to spend profusely in funeral solemnities, in order that he may
obtain the honors which take place in commemoration of the dead. In
consequence of this advice, the Crotonians that heard it were of
opinion, that if they conducted themselves moderately in misfortunes,
they would preserve their own salvation; but that if they were
immoderate in their expenses, they would all of them die prematurely. A
certain person also having been made an arbitrator in an affair in which
there was no witness, led each of the litigants to a certain monument,
and said to one of them, the man who is buried in this monument was
transcendently equitable; in consequence of which the other litigant
prayed that the dead man might obtain much good; but the former said
that the defunct was not at all better for the prayers of his opponent.
Pythagoras, therefore, condemned what the former litigant said, but
asserted that he who praised the dead man for his worth, had done that
which would be of no small importance in his claim to belief. At another
time, in a cause of great moment, he decided that one of the two who had
agreed to settle the affair by arbitration, should pay four talents, but
that the other should receive two. Afterwards, he condemned the
defendant to pay three talents; and thus he appeared to have given a
talent to each of them. Two persons also had fraudulently deposited a
garment with a woman who belonged to a court of justice, and told her
she was not to give it to either of them unless both were present. Some
time after, for the purpose of circumvention, one of them received the
common deposit, and said that it was with the consent of the other. But
the other, who had not been present [when the garment was returned],
acted the part of a sycophant, and related the compact that was made at
the beginning, to the magistrates. A certain Pythagorean, however,
taking up the affair said, that the woman had acted conformably to the
compact, as both parties had been present. Two other persons also
appeared to have a strong friendship for each other, but had fallen into
a silent suspicion through a flatterer of one of them, who told him that
his wife had been corrupted by the other. It so happened however, that a
Pythagorean came into a brazier’s shop, where he who conceived himself
to be injured, was showing to the artist a sword which he had given him
to sharpen, and was indignant with him because it was not sufficiently
sharp. The Pythagorean, therefore, suspecting that the sword was
intended to be used against him who was accused of adultery, said, This
sword is sharper than all things except calumny. This being said, caused
the man to consider with himself [what it was he intended to do], and
not rashly to sin against his friend who was within, and who had been
previously called [by him in order that he might kill him]. A zone also
that had golden ornaments having fallen [at the feet] of a certain
stranger in the temple of Esculapius, and the laws forbidding any one to
take up that which had fallen on the ground, a Pythagorean advised the
stranger, who was indignant at this prohibition, to take away the golden
ornaments which had not fallen to the ground, but to leave the zone,
because this was on the ground.[30] That circumstance, likewise, which
by the ignorant is transferred to other places, is said to have happened
in Crotona, viz. that during a public spectacle, some cranes flew over
the theatre, and one of those who had sailed into the port, said to the
person who sat near him, Do you see the witnesses? which being heard by
a certain Pythagorean, he brought them into the court, consisting of a
thousand magistrates, where being examined, it was found that they had
thrown certain boys into the sea, and that they called the cranes who
flew over the ship [at the time,] witnesses of the deed. When likewise
certain persons who had recently become disciples of Pythagoras were at
variance with each other, he who was the junior of the two came to the
other and said to him, that there was no occasion to refer the affair to
a third person, but that it rested with them to commit their anger to
oblivion. He, therefore, to whom these words were addressed, replied
that he was very much pleased in other respects with what had been said,
but that he was ashamed that, being the elder, he had not first said the
same thing to the other [who was the junior]. We might here also narrate
what is said of Phinthias and Damon,[31] of Plato and Archytas, and
likewise of Clinias and Prorus.[32] Omitting, however, these [for the
present], we shall mention what is related of Eubulus the Messenian, who
when he was sailing homeward, and was taken captive by the Tyrrhenians,
was recognized by Nausitheus a Tyrrhenian and also a Pythagorean,
because he was one of the disciples of Pythagoras, and was taken by him
from the pirates, and brought with great safety to Messena. When the
Carthaginians, also, were about to send more than five thousand soldiers
into a desert island, Miltiades the Carthaginian, perceiving among them
the Argive Possiden (both of them being Pythagoreans), went to him, and
not manifesting what he intended to do, advised him to return to his
native country, with all possible celerity, and having placed him in a
ship that was then sailing near the shore, supplied him with what was
necessary for his voyage, and thus saved the man from the dangers [to
which he was exposed]. In short, he who should relate all that has taken
place among the Pythagoreans in their associations with each other,
would by the length of his narration exceed the proper quantity and the
occasion of his treatise.
I shall therefore rather pass on to show, that some of the Pythagoreans
were political characters, and adapted to govern. For they were
guardians of the laws, and ruled over certain Italian cities, unfolding
to them, and counselling them to adopt the most excellent measures, but
abstaining from public revenues. And though they were greatly
calumniated, yet at the same time the probity of the Pythagoreans, and
the wish of the cities themselves prevailed, so that they were desired
by them to administer their political concerns. But at this time the
most beautiful of polities appear to have existed in Italy and in
Sicily. For Charondas the Catanean, who appears to have been one of the
best legislators, was a Pythagorean; as were also the Locrians Zaleucus
and Timares, who were celebrated for their legislation. Those also who
established the Rheginic polities, that polity which is called
Gymnasiarchic, and that which is denominated from Theocles, are said to
have been Pythagoreans. Phytius likewise, Theocles, Elecaon, and
Aristocrates, excelled among the Pythagoreans in their studies and
manners, which also the cities in those places adopted at those times.
In short, it is asserted that Pythagoras was the inventor of the whole
of political erudition, when he said that nothing is pure among things
that have an existence; but that earth participates of fire, fire of
air, air of water, and water of spirit. And in a similar manner the
beautiful participates of the deformed, the just of the unjust, and
other things conformably to these. From this hypothesis, however, the
reasoning tends to either part. He also said, that there are two motions
of the body and the soul; the one being irrational, but the other the
effect of deliberate choice. That three certain lines also constitute
polities, the extremes of which mutually touch each other, and produce
one right angle; so that one of them has the nature of the
sesquitertian; another that of the diapente; and the third is a medium
between the other two.[33] But when we consider by a reasoning process
the coincidences of the lines with each other, and also of the places
under these, we shall find that they represent the best image of a
polity. Plato has made the glory of this invention his own; for he
clearly says in his Republic, “that the sesquitertian progeny conjoined
with the pentad produces two harmonies.”[34] It is also said, that
Pythagoras cultivated the moderation of the passions, and mediocrity,
and that by the conjunction of a certain precedaneous good, he rendered
the life of each of his disciples happy. And in short, it is said that
he discovered the choice of our good, and of the works adapted to our
nature. It is likewise narrated of him, that he withdrew the Crotonians
from harlots, and universally from an association with women that were
not affianced. For the wives of the Crotonians came to Theano the wife
of Brontinus, one of the Pythagoreans, a woman of a wise and excellent
soul, (and who was the author of that beautiful and admirable saying,
“that it is lawful for a woman to sacrifice on the very day in which she
has risen from the embraces of her husband,” which some ascribe to
Theano the wife of Pythagoras) the Crotonian wives came therefore to
her, and entreated her to persuade Pythagoras to discourse to them on
the continence which was due from them to their husbands. This she
promised to do; and Pythagoras having accordingly made an oration to the
Crotonians, which had the desired effect, the incontinence which then
prevailed was entirely destroyed. It is further related likewise, that
when ambassadors came to the city of the Crotonians from Sybaris, for
the purpose of demanding the exiles, Pythagoras beholding one of the
ambassadors, who with his own hand had slain one of his friends, made
him no answer. But when the man interrogated him, and wished to converse
with him, Pythagoras said, that it was not lawful to discourse with
homicides. Whence also by certain persons he was thought to be Apollo.
All these particulars, therefore, and such as we have a little before
mentioned concerning the destruction of tyrants, and the liberation of
the cities of Italy and Sicily, and many other circumstances, are
indications of the benefits conferred on mankind by Pythagoras in
political concerns.
CHAP. XXVIII.
That which follows after this, we shall no longer discuss generally, but
direct our attention particularly to the works resulting from the
virtues of Pythagoras. And we shall begin in the first place from the
Gods, as it is usual to do, and endeavour to exhibit his piety, and the
admirable works which he performed. Let this, therefore, be one specimen
of his piety, which also we have before mentioned, that he knew what his
soul was, and whence it came into the body, and also its former lives,
and that of these things he gave most evident indications. After this
also, let the following be another specimen; that once passing over the
river Nessus with many of his associates, he spoke to it, and the river
in a distinct and clear voice, in the hearing of all his followers,
answered, _Hail Pythagoras!_ Farther still, nearly all historians of his
life confidently assert, that in one and the same day he was present at
Metapontum in Italy, and Tauromenium in Sicily, and discoursed in common
with his disciples in both places, though these cities are separated
from each other by many stadia both by land and sea, and cannot be
passed through in a great number of days. The report, also, is very much
disseminated, that he showed his golden thigh to the Hyperborean Abaris,
who said that he resembled the Apollo among the Hyperboreans, and of
whom Abaris was the priest; and that he did this in order that Abaris
might apprehend this to be true, and that he was not deceived in his
opinion. Ten thousand other more divine and more admirable particulars
likewise are uniformly and unanimously related of _the man_: such as
infallible predictions of earthquakes, rapid expulsions of pestilence
and violent winds, instantaneous cessations of the effusion of hail, and
a tranquillization of the waves of rivers and seas, in order that his
disciples might easily pass over them. Of which things also, Empedocles
the Agrigentine, Epimenides the Cretan, and Abaris the Hyperborean,
receiving the power of effecting, performed certain miracles of this
kind in many places. Their deeds, however, are manifest. To which we may
add, that Empedocles was surnamed _an expeller of winds_; Epimenides,
_an expiator_; and Abaris, _a walker on air_; because being carried on
the dart which was given to him by the Hyperborean Apollo, he passed
over rivers and seas and inaccessible places, like one walking on the
air. Certain persons likewise are of opinion, that Pythagoras did the
same thing, when in the same day he discoursed with his disciples at
Metapontum and Tauromenium. It is also said, that he predicted there
would be an earthquake from the water of a well which he had tasted; and
that a ship which was sailing with a prosperous wind, would be merged in
the sea. And let these, indeed, be the indications of his piety.
Again, however, assuming a more elevated exordium, I am desirous to
exhibit the principles of the worship of the Gods, which Pythagoras and
his followers established; viz. that all such particulars as they define
with respect to doing or not doing a thing, have for the mark at which
they aim, a consent with divinity. This also is with them the principle,
[of piety] and their whole life is arranged with a view _to follow God_.
The language, too, of their philosophy is this, that men act
ridiculously in exploring good from any other source than the Gods; and
that their conduct in this respect resembles that of a man, who in a
country governed by a king should reverence one of the magistrates in
the city, and neglect him who is the ruler of all of them. For they were
of opinion that such was the conduct of mankind. For since God is, and
is the Lord of all things, it is universally acknowledged that good is
to be requested of him. For all men impart good to those whom they love,
and to those with whom they are delighted; but they give the contrary to
good, to those to whom they are contrarily disposed. It is evident,
therefore, that those things are to be done, in which God delights. It
is, however, not easy for a man to know what these are, unless he
obtains this knowledge from one who has heard God, or has heard God
himself, or procures it through divine art. Hence also, the Pythagoreans
were studious of divination. For this alone is an interpretation of the
benevolence of the Gods. And in short, he will conceive an employment of
this kind to be worthy of regard, who believes that there are Gods; but
he who thinks that either of these is folly, will also be of opinion
that both are foolish. Many of the mandates, however, of the
Pythagoreans were introduced from the mysteries; for they did not
conceive them to be the productions of arrogance, but to originate from
a certain divinity. And in a similar manner, all the Pythagoreans
believe such things as are mythologically related of Aristeas the
Proconesian, and Abaris the Hyperborean, and other particulars of a like
nature. For they consider every thing of this kind to be credible; and
of many [such] things they make trial themselves. They also frequently
recollect such-like particulars as appear to be fabulous, as not
disbelieving in any thing which may be referred to divinity. A certain
person therefore relates, that Eurytus said, that a shepherd feeding his
sheep near the tomb of Philolaus, heard some one singing. But the person
to whom this was related, did not at all disbelieve the narration, but
asked what kind of harmony it was? Both of them, however, were
Pythagoreans, and Eurytus was the disciple of Philolaus. It is likewise
said, that a certain person told Pythagoras, that he appeared to himself
once to converse with his father who was dead, and that he asked
Pythagoras what this indicated? Pythagoras replied, that it indicated
nothing; but that he had in reality conversed with his father. As
therefore, said he, nothing is signified by my now discoursing with you,
so neither is any thing signified by your conversing with your father.
Hence, in all particulars of this kind, they did not think that they
were stupid, but those that disbelieved in them. For they did not
conceive that some things are possible to the Gods, but others
impossible, as those fancy who reason sophistically; but they believed
that all things are possible to the Gods. And this very assertion is the
beginning of the verses, which they ascribe to Linus, and which are as
follow:
All things may be the objects of our hope,
Since nothing hopeless any where is found:
All things with ease Divinity effects,
And nought can frustrate his almighty power.
But they thought that their opinions deserved to be believed, because he
who first promulgated them, was not any casual person, but a God. For
this was one of their questions; What was Pythagoras? For they say that
he was the Hyperborean Apollo; of which this was an indication, that
rising up in the Olympic games, he showed his golden thigh; and also
that he received the Hyperborean Abaris as his guest; and was presented
by him with the dart on which he rode through the air. But it is said
that Abaris came from the Hyperborean regions, in order that he might
collect gold for the temple, and that he predicted a pestilence. He also
dwelt in temples, and was never seen either to eat or drink. It is
likewise said, that rites which purify from evil are performed by the
Lacedæmonians, and that on this account Lacedæmon was never infested
with pestilence. Pythagoras, therefore, caused this Abaris to
acknowledge [that he was more than man,] receiving from him at the same
time the golden dart, without which it was not possible for him to find
his way. In Metapontum also, certain persons praying that they might
obtain what a ship contained that was then sailing into port, Pythagoras
said to them, You will then have a dead body. In Sybaris, too, he caught
a deadly serpent and dismissed it. In a similar manner likewise in
Tyrrhenia, he caught a small serpent, whose bite was fatal. But in
Crotona a white eagle, it is said, suffered Pythagoras to stroke it. A
certain person also wishing to hear him discourse, he said that he could
not, till some sign appeared. And after this a white bear was seen in
Cauconia; the death of which he predicted to one who was about to tell
him that it was dead. He likewise reminded Myllias the Crotonian that he
had been Midas the son of Gordius. And Myllias passed over to the
continent of Asia, in order to perform at the sepulchre [of Midas] those
rites which had been enjoined him by Pythagoras. It is likewise said,
that the person who bought his house, and who dug up that which had been
buried in it, did not dare to tell any one what he saw [on this
occasion]. But instead of suffering for this offence, he was seized at
Crotona for sacrilege, and put to death. For he took away a golden beard
which had fallen from a statue. These things therefore, and others of
the like kind, are related by the Pythagoreans, in order to render their
opinions worthy of belief. And as these are acknowledged to be true, and
it is impossible they should have happened to one man, they consequently
think it is clear, that what is related of Pythagoras, should be
received as pertaining to a being superior to man, and not to a mere
man. This also is the meaning of their enigmatical assertion, that _man,
bird, and another third thing, are bipeds_. For the third thing is
Pythagoras. Such, therefore, was Pythagoras on account of his piety, and
such he was truly thought to be.
With respect to oaths, however, all the Pythagoreans religiously observe
them, being mindful of the Pythagoric precept,
First to th’ immortal Gods thy homage pay,
As they by law are orderly dispos’d;
And reverence thy oath, but honor next
Th’ illustrious heroes.
Hence a certain Pythagorean, being compelled by law to take an oath, yet
in order that he might preserve a Pythagoric dogma, though he would have
sworn religiously, chose instead of swearing to pay three talents, this
being the fine which he was condemned to pay to the defendant. That
Pythagoras however thought that nothing was from chance and fortune, but
that all events happened conformably to divine providence, and
especially to good and pious men, is confirmed by what is related by
Androcydes in his treatise on Pythagoric Symbols, of Thymaridas the
Tarentine, and a Pythagorean. For when through a certain circumstance he
was about to sail from his own country, and his friends who were present
were embracing him, and bidding him farewell, some one said to him, when
he had now ascended into the ship, May such things happen to you from
the Gods, O Thymaridas, as are conformable to your wishes! But he
replied, predict better things; for I should rather wish that such
things may happen to me as are conformable to the will of the Gods. For
he thought it was more scientific and equitable, not to resist or be
indignant with divine providence. If, therefore, any one wishes to learn
what were the sources whence these men derived so much piety, it must be
said, that a perspicuous paradigm of the Pythagoric theology according
to numbers, is in a certain respect to be found in the writings of
Orpheus. Nor is it to be doubted, that Pythagoras receiving auxiliaries
from Orpheus, composed his treatise Concerning the Gods, which on this
account also he inscribed the Sacred Discourse, because it contains the
flower of the most mystical place in Orpheus; whether this work was in
reality written by Pythagoras, as by most authors it is said to have
been, or as some of the Pythagoric school who are both learned and
worthy of belief assert, was composed by Telauges; being taken by him
from the commentaries which were left by Pythagoras himself to his
daughter Damo, the sister of Telauges, and which it is said after her
death were given to Bitale the daughter of Damo, and to Telauges the son
of Pythagoras, and the husband of Bitale, when he was of a mature age.
For when Pythagoras died, he was left very young with his mother Theano.
In this Sacred Discourse also, or treatise concerning the Gods (for it
has both these inscriptions), who it was that delivered to Pythagoras
what is there said concerning the Gods, is rendered manifest. For it
says: “_that Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus was instructed in what
pertains to the Gods, when he celebrated orgies in the Thracian
Libethra, being initiated in them by Aglaophemus; and that Orpheus the
son of Calliope, having learnt wisdom from his mother in the mountain
Pangæus, said, that the eternal essence of number is the most
providential principle of the universe, of heaven and earth, and the
intermediate nature; and farther still, that it is the root of the
permanency of divine natures, of Gods and dæmons_.”[35] From these
things, therefore, it is evident that he learnt from the Orphic writers
that the essence of the Gods is defined by number. _Through the same
numbers also, he produced an admirable fore-knowledge and worship of the
Gods, both which are especially most allied to numbers._ This, however,
may be known from hence; for it is necessary to adduce a certain fact,
in order to procure belief of what is said. When Abaris performed sacred
rites in his accustomed manner, he procured a fore-knowledge of future
events, which is studiously cultivated by all the Barbarians, through
sacrificing animals, and especially birds; for they are of opinion that
the viscera of such animals are subservient to a more accurate
inspection. Pythagoras, therefore, not wishing to suppress his ardent
pursuit of truth, but to impart it to him through a certain safer way,
and without blood and slaughter, and also because he thought that a cock
was sacred to the sun, _furnished him with a consummate knowledge of all
truth, as it is said, through the arithmetical science_. He also
obtained from piety, faith concerning the Gods. For Pythagoras always
proclaimed, that nothing admirable pertaining to the Gods or divine
dogmas should be disbelieved, because the Gods are able to accomplish
all things. And the divine dogmas in which it is requisite to believe,
are those which Pythagoras delivered. Thus, therefore, the Pythagoreans
believed in, and assumed the things about which they dogmatised, because
they were not the progeny of false opinion. Hence Eurytus the Crotonian,
the auditor of Philolaus said, that a shepherd feeding his sheep near
the tomb of Philolaus, heard some one singing. But the person to whom
this was related, did not at all disbelieve the narration, but asked
what kind of harmony it was. Pythagoras himself, also, being asked by a
certain person what was indicated by seeming in sleep to converse with
his father who was dead, answered that it indicated nothing. For
neither, said he, is any thing portended by your speaking with me.
Pythagoras likewise used pure and white garments, and in a similar
manner white and pure coverlids; for he did not use those that were made
of wool. And this custom he also delivered to his auditors. In speaking
also of the natures superior to man, he employed honorable appellations,
and words of good omen, and upon every occasion made mention of and
reverenced the Gods; so that while at supper, he performed libations to
the divinities, and ordered his disciples to celebrate with hymns the
beings that are above us, every day. He paid attention likewise to
rumors and omens, prophecies and lots, and in short, to all casual
circumstances. Moreover, he sacrificed to the Gods with millet, cakes,
honey-combs, and other fumigations. But he did not sacrifice animals,
nor did any one of the contemplative philosophers. His other disciples,
however, viz. the acusmatici, and the politici, were ordered by him to
sacrifice animals, such as a cock, or a lamb, or some other animal
recently born, but not frequently. At the same time they were prohibited
from sacrificing oxen. This also is an indication of the honor which he
paid to the Gods, that he exhorted his disciples never to employ the
names of the Gods uselessly in swearing. On which account also Syllus,
one of the Pythagoreans in Crotona, paid a fine for not swearing, though
he could have sworn without violating truth. An oath too such as the
following is ascribed to the Pythagoreans, as they were unwilling,
through reverence, to name Pythagoras; just as they very much abstained
from using the names of the Gods. But they manifested the man through
the invention of the tetractys,
I swear by him who the tetractys found,
Whence all our wisdom springs, and which contains
Perennial Nature’s fountain, cause, and root.
And, in short, it is said that Pythagoras was emulous of the Orphic mode
of writing and [piety of] disposition; and that he honored the Gods in a
way similar to that of Orpheus, placing them in images and in brass, not
conjoined to our forms, but to divine receptacles;[36] because they
comprehend and provide for all things; and have a nature and morphe
similar to the universe. He also promulgated purifications, and
initiations as they are called, which contain the most accurate
knowledge of the Gods. And farther still, it is said, that he was the
author of a compound divine philosophy and worship of the Gods; having
learnt indeed some things from the followers of Orpheus, but others from
the Egyptian priests; some from the Chaldæans and Magi; some from the
mysteries performed in Eleusis, in Imbrus, Samothracia, and Delos; and
some also from those which are performed by the Celtæ, and in Iberia. It
is also said that the Sacred Discourse of Pythagoras is extant among the
Latins, and is read not to all, nor by all of them, but by those who are
promptly disposed to learn what is excellent, and apply themselves to
nothing base. He likewise ordained that men should make libations
thrice, and observed that Apollo delivered oracles from the tripod,
because the triad is the first number. That sacrifices also should be
made to Venus on the sixth day, because this number is the first that
partakes of every number, and, when divided in every possible way,
receives the power of the numbers subtracted and of those that remain.
But that it is necessary to sacrifice to Hercules on the eighth day of
the month from the beginning, looking in so doing to his being born in
the seventh month. He further asserted, that it was necessary that he
who entered a temple should be clothed with a pure garment, and in which
no one had slept; because sleep in the same manner as the black and the
brown, is an indication of sluggishness; but purity is a sign of
equality and justice in reasoning. He also ordered, that if blood should
be found involuntarily spilt in a temple, a lustration should be made,
either in a golden vessel, or with the water of the sea; the former of
these [i. e. gold] being the most beautiful of things, and a measure by
which the price of all things is regulated; but the latter as he
conceived being the progeny of a moist nature, and the nutriment of the
first and more common matter. He likewise said, that it was not proper
to bring forth children in a temple; because it is not holy that in a
temple the divine part of the soul should be bound to the body. He
further ordained, that on a festive day neither the hair should be cut,
nor the nails paired; not thinking it fit that we should leave the
service of the Gods for the purpose of increasing our good. He also
said, that a louse ought not to be killed in a temple; conceiving that a
divine power ought not to participate of any thing superfluous and
corruptible. But that the Gods should be honored with cedar, laurel,
cypress, oak, and myrtle; and that the body should not be purified with
these, nor should any of them be divided by the teeth. He likewise
ordained, that what is boiled should not be roasted; signifying by this
that mildness is not in want of anger. But he would not suffer the
bodies of the dead to be burned; following in this the Magi, being
unwilling that any thing divine should communicate with a mortal nature.
He likewise thought it was holy for the dead to be carried out in white
garments; obscurely signifying by this the simple and first nature,
according to number and the principle of all things. But above all
things he ordained, that an oath should be taken religiously; since that
which is behind is long.[37] And he said, that it is much more holy to
be injured than to kill a man: for judgment is deposited in Hades, where
the soul and its essence, and the first nature of things are [properly]
estimated. Farther still, he ordered that sepulchral chests [i. e.
biers] should not be made of cypress, because the sceptre of Jupiter was
made of this wood, or for some other mystic reason. He likewise ordained
that libations should be performed before the table of Jupiter the
Saviour, and of Hercules and the Dioscuri; in so doing celebrating
Jupiter as the presiding cause and leader of this nutriment; Hercules,
as the power of nature; and the Dioscuri, as the symphony of all things.
But he said, that libations should not be offered with closed eyes. For
he did not think it fit, that any thing beautiful should be undertaken
with shame and bashfulness. Moreover, when it thundered, he ordained
that the earth should be touched, in remembrance of the generation of
things. But he ordered that temples should be entered from places on the
right hand, and that they should be departed out of from the left hand.
For he asserted that the right hand is the principle of what is called
the odd number, and is divine; but that the left hand is a symbol of the
even number, and of that which is dissolved. And such is the mode which
he is said to have adopted in the cultivation of piety. But other
particulars which we have omitted concerning it, may be conjectured from
what has been said. So that I shall cease to speak further on this
subject.
CHAP. XXIX.
Of his wisdom, however, the commentaries written by the Pythagoreans
afford, in short, the greatest indication; for they adhere to truth in
every thing, and are more concise than all other compositions, so that
they savour of the ancient elegance of style, and the conclusions are
exquisitely deduced with divine science. They are also replete with the
most condensed conceptions, and are in other respects various and
diversified both in the form and the matter. At one and the same time
likewise, they are transcendently excellent, and without any deficiency
in the diction, and are in an eminent degree full of clear and
indubitable arguments, accompanied with scientific demonstration, and as
it is said, the most perfect syllogism; as he will find to be the case,
who, proceeding in such paths as are fit, does not negligently peruse
them. This science, therefore, concerning intelligible natures and the
Gods, Pythagoras delivers in his writings from a supernal origin.
Afterwards, he teaches the whole of physics, and unfolds completely
ethical philosophy and logic. He likewise delivers all-various
disciplines, and the most excellent sciences. And in short there is
nothing pertaining to human knowledge which is not accurately discussed
in these writings. If therefore it is acknowledged, that of the
[Pythagoric] writings which are now in circulation, some were written by
Pythagoras himself, but others consist of what he was heard to say, and
on this account are anonymous, but are referred to Pythagoras as their
author;—if this be the case, it is evident that he was abundantly
skilled in all wisdom. But it is said that he very much applied himself
to geometry among the Egyptians. For with the Egyptians there are many
geometrical problems; since it is necessary that from remote periods,
and from the time of the Gods themselves,[38] on account of the
increments and decrements of the Nile, those that were skilful should
have measured all the Egyptian land which they cultivated. Hence also
geometry derived its name. Neither did they negligently investigate the
theory of the celestial orbs, in which likewise Pythagoras was skilled.
Moreover, all the theorems about lines appear to have been derived from
thence. For it is said that what pertains to computation and numbers,
was discovered in Phœnicia. For some persons refer the theorems about
the celestial bodies to the Egyptians and Chaldeans in common. It is
said therefore, that Pythagoras having received and increased all these
[theories,] imparted the sciences, and at the same time demonstrated
them to his auditors with perspicuity and elegance. And he was the first
indeed that denominated philosophy, and said that it was the desire, and
as it were love of wisdom. But he defined wisdom to be the science of
the truth which is in beings. And he said that beings are immaterial and
eternal natures, and alone possess an efficacious power, such as
incorporeal essences. But that the rest of things are only homonymously
beings, and are so denominated through the participation of real beings,
and such are corporeal and material forms, which are generated and
corrupted, and never truly are. And that wisdom is the science of things
which are properly beings, but not of such as are homonymously so. For
corporeal natures are neither the objects of science nor admit of a
stable knowledge, since they are infinite and incomprehensible by
science, and are as it were, non-beings, when compared with universals,
and are incapable of being properly circumscribed by definition. It is
impossible however to conceive that there should be science of things
which are not naturally the objects of science. Hence it is not probable
that there will be a desire of science which has no subsistence, but
rather that desire will be extended to things which are properly beings,
which exist with invariable permanency, and are always consubsistent
with a true appellation. For it happens that the perception of things
which are homonymously beings, and which are never truly what they seem
to be, follows the apprehension of real beings; just as the knowledge of
particulars follows the science of universals. For he who knows
universals properly, says Archytas, will also have a clear perception of
the nature of particulars. Hence things which have an existence are not
alone, nor only-begotten, nor simple, but they are seen to be various
and multiform. For some of them are intelligible and incorporeal
natures, and which are denominated beings; but others are corporeal and
fall under the perception of sense, and by participation communicate
with that which has a real existence. Concerning all these therefore, he
delivered the most appropriate sciences, and left nothing [pertaining to
them] uninvestigated. _He likewise unfolded to men those sciences which
are common_ [_to all disciplines_,] as for instance the demonstrative,
the definitive, and that which consists in dividing, as may be known
from the Pythagoric commentaries. He was also accustomed to pour forth
sentences resembling Oracles to his familiars in a symbolical manner,
and which in the greatest brevity of words contained the most abundant
and multifarious meaning, like the Pythian Apollo through certain
oracles, or like nature herself through seeds small in bulk, the former
exhibiting conceptions, and the latter effects, innumerable in
multitude, and difficult to be understood. Of this kind is the sentence,
_The beginning is the half of the whole_, which is an apothegm of
Pythagoras himself. But not only in the present hemistich, but in others
of a similar nature, the most divine Pythagoras has concealed the sparks
of truth; depositing as in a treasury for those who are capable of being
enkindled by them, and with a certain brevity of diction, an extension
of theory most ample and difficult to be comprehended, as in the
following hemistich:
All things accord in number:
which he very frequently uttered to all his disciples. Or again,
_Friendship is equality; equality is friendship_. Or in the word
_cosmos_, i. e. _the world_; or by Jupiter, in the word _philosophy_, or
in the so much celebrated word _tetractys_. All these and many other
inventions of the like kind, were devised by Pythagoras for the benefit
and amendment of his associates; and they were considered by those that
understood them to be so venerable, and so much the progeny of divine
inspiration, that the following was adopted as an oath by those that
dwelt together in the common auditory:
I swear by him who the tetractys found,
And to our race reveal’d; the cause and root,
And fount of ever-flowing Nature.
This therefore was the form of his wisdom which is so admirable.
It is also said, that of the sciences which the Pythagoreans honored,
music, medicine and divination, were not among the least. But they were
habitually silent and prompt to hear, and he who was able to hear [in a
proper manner] was praised by them. Of medicine, however, they
especially embraced the diætetic species, and in the exercise of this
were most accurate. And in the first place, indeed, they endeavoured to
learn the indications of symmetry, of labor, food, and repose. In the
next place, with respect to the preparation of food, they were nearly
the first who attempted to employ themselves in it, and to define the
mode in which it should be performed. The Pythagoreans likewise employed
cataplasms more frequently than their predecessors; but they in a less
degree approved of medicated ointments. These however they principally
used in the cure of ulcerations. But incisions and burnings they
admitted the least of all things. Some diseases also they cured by
incantations. Pythagoras, however, thought that music greatly
contributed to health, if it was used in a proper manner. The
Pythagoreans likewise employed select sentences of Homer and Hesiod for
the amendment of souls. But they thought it was necessary to retain and
preserve in the memory things which they had learnt and heard; and that
it was requisite to be furnished with disciplines and auditions, to as
great an extent as there was an ability of learning and remembering; the
former of these being the power by which knowledge is obtained, but the
latter, the power by which it is preserved. Hence, they very much
honored the memory, abundantly exercised, and paid great attention to
it. In learning too, they did not dismiss what they were taught, till
they had firmly comprehended the first rudiments of it; and they
recalled to their memory what they had daily heard, after the following
manner: A Pythagorean never rose from his bed till he had first
recollected the transactions of the former day; and he accomplished this
by endeavouring to remember what he first said, or heard, or ordered his
domestics to do when he was rising, or what was the second and third
thing which he said, heard, or commanded to be done. And the same method
was adopted with respect to the remainder of the day. For again, he
endeavoured to recollect who was the first person that he met, on
leaving his house, or who was the second; and with whom he in the first,
or second, or third place discoursed. And after the same manner he
proceeded in other things. For he endeavoured to resume in his memory
all the events of the whole day, and in the very same order in which
each of them happened to take place. But if they had sufficient leisure
after rising from sleep, they tried after the same manner to recollect
the events of the third preceding day. And thus they endeavoured to
exercise the memory to a great extent. For there is not any thing which
is of greater importance with respect to science, experience and wisdom,
than the ability of remembering. From these studies therefore, it
happened that all Italy was filled with philosophers, and this place,
which before was unknown, was afterwards on account of Pythagoras called
Magna Græcia. Hence also it contained many philosophers, poets, and
legislators. For the rhetorical arts, demonstrative reasonings, and the
laws written by them, were transferred from Italy to Greece. Those
likewise who make mention of physics, adduce as the principal
physiologists Empedocles and the Elean Parmenides. Those too, who wish
to cite sentences, pertaining to the conduct of human life, adduce for
this purpose the conceptions of Epicharmus. And nearly all philosophers
make use of these. Thus much therefore concerning the wisdom of
Pythagoras, how in a certain respect he very much impelled all his
auditors to the pursuit of it, as far as they were adapted to its
participation, and how perfectly it was delivered by him.
CHAP. XXX.
With respect to justice, however, we shall learn in the best manner, how
he cultivated and delivered it to mankind, if we survey it from its
first principle, and from what first causes it germinates, and also
direct our attention to the first cause of injustice. For thus we shall
discover how he avoided the latter, and what methods he adopted in order
that the former might be properly ingenerated in the soul. The principle
of justice therefore, is the common and the equal, through which, in a
way most nearly approximating to one body and one soul, all men may be
co-passive, and may call the same thing mine and thine; as is also
testified by Plato, who learnt this from the Pythagoreans. This
therefore, Pythagoras effected in the best manner, exterminating every
thing private in manners, but increasing that which is common as far as
to ultimate possessions, which are the causes of sedition and tumult.
For all things [with his disciples] were common and the same to all, and
no one possessed any thing private. And he indeed, who approved of this
communion, used common possessions in the most just manner; but he who
did not, received his own property, which he brought to the common
stock, with an addition to it, and departed. And thus he established
justice in the best manner, from the first principle of it.
In the next place, therefore, association with men introduces justice;
but alienation, and a contempt of the common genus, produce injustice.
Wishing therefore to insert this familiarity from afar in men, he also
ordained that his disciples should extend it to animals of the same
genus, and commanded them to consider these as their familiars and
friends; so as neither to injure, nor slay, nor eat any one of them. He
therefore who associates men with animals, because they consist of the
same elements as we do, and participate with us of a more common life,
will in a much greater degree establish fellowship with those who
partake of a soul of the same species, and also of a rational soul. From
this also it is evident that he introduced justice produced from the
most proper principle. Since likewise the want of riches, sometimes
compels many to do something contrary to justice, he well foresaw that
this would be the case, and through economy procured for himself liberal
expenses, and what was just in sufficient abundance. For again, a just
arrangement of domestic concerns is the principle of all good order in
cities. For cities are constituted from houses. It is said therefore,
that Pythagoras himself was the heir of the property of Alcæus, who died
after performing an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, but that
notwithstanding this, he was no less admired for his economy than for
his philosophy. When also he was married, he so educated the daughter
that was born to him, and who was afterwards married to Meno the
Crotonian, that when she was a virgin she was the leader of choirs, but
when a wife she held the first place among those that approached to
altars. It is likewise said, that the Metapontines preserving the
remembrance of Pythagoras after his time, made his house a temple of
Ceres, but the street in which he lived a museum.
Because also insolence, luxury, and a contempt of the laws, frequently
impel men to injustice, on this account he daily exhorted his disciples
to give assistance to law, and to be hostile to illegality. Hence he
made such a division as the following: that what is called luxury, is
the first evil that usually glides into houses and cities; that the
second is insolence; and the third destruction. That hence luxury should
by all possible means be excluded and expelled [from every house and
city,] and that men should be accustomed from their birth to a temperate
and manly life. He farther added, that it is requisite to be purified
from all malediction, whether it be that which is lamentable, or that
which excites hostility, and whether it be of a reviling, or insolent,
or scurrilous nature.
Besides these, likewise, he established another most beautiful species
of justice, viz. the legislative; which orders indeed what ought to be
done; but forbids what ought not to be done. This species, however, is
more excellent than the judicial form of justice. For it resembles
medicine which heals those that are diseased. It differs from it however
in this, that it does not suffer disease to commence, but pays attention
from afar to the health of the soul. This therefore being the case, the
best of all legislators came from the school of Pythagoras: in the first
place, indeed, Charondas the Catanæan; and in the next place, Zaleucus
and Timaratus, who wrote laws for the Locrians. Besides these likewise
there were Theætetus and Helicaon, Aristocrates, and Phytius, who became
the legislators of the Rhegini. All these likewise obtained from their
citizens honors similar to those of the Gods. For Pythagoras did not act
like Heraclitus, who said that he would write laws for the Ephesians,
and also petulantly[39] said, that in those laws he would order the
citizens to hang themselves. But Pythagoras endeavoured to establish
laws, with great benevolence and political science. Why however is it
requisite to admire these men? For Zamolxis being a Thracian, and the
slave of Pythagoras, after he had heard the discourses of Pythagoras,
having obtained his liberty, and returned to Getæ, gave laws to them, as
we have before observed in the beginning of this work, and exhorted the
citizens to fortitude, _having persuaded them that the soul is immortal.
Hence even at present, all the Galatæ, and Trallians, and many others of
the Barbarians, persuade their children that the soul cannot be
destroyed; but that it remains after death, and that death is not to be
feared, but danger is to be encountered with a firm and manly mind._
Having therefore instructed the Getæ in these things, and written laws
for them, he was considered by them as the greatest of the Gods.
Farther still, he apprehended that the dominion of the Gods was most
efficacious to the establishment of justice, and supernally from this he
constituted a polity and laws, and also justice. It will not however be
foreign to the purpose, to add particularly the manner in which he
thought we ought to conceive of divinity; viz. that we should conceive
that he exists, and that he is so disposed towards the human race, that
be inspects and does not neglect it. And this conception which the
Pythagoreans derived from Pythagoras, they apprehended to be of great
utility. For we require an inspection of this kind, which we do not in
any thing think fit to resist. But such as this is the inspective
government of divinity. Fop if a divine nature is a thing of this kind,
it deserves to have the empire of the universe. For it was rightly said
by the Pythagoreans, that man is an animal [so far as pertains to his
irrational part,] naturally insolent, and various, according to
impulses, desires, and the rest of the passions. He requires therefore
transcendent inspection and government of this kind, from which a
certain castigation and order may be derived. Hence they thought that
every one being conscious of the variety of his nature, should never he
forgetful of piety towards, and the worship of divinity; but should
always place him before the eye of the mind, as inspecting and
diligently observing the conduct of mankind. But after divinity and the
dæmoniacal nature, they thought that every one should pay the greatest
attention to his parents and the laws, and should be obedient to them,
not feignedly, but faithfully. And universally, they thought it
necessary to believe, that nothing is a greater evil than anarchy; since
the human race is not naturally adapted to be saved, when no one rules
over it.
These men also thought it right to adhere to the customs and legal
institutes of their ancestors, even though they should be somewhat
inferior to other customs and laws. For to fly from the existing laws,
and to be studious of innovation, is by no means profitable and
salutary. Pythagoras therefore gave many other specimens of piety to the
Gods, evincing that his life was conformable to his doctrines. Nor will
it be foreign to the purpose to mention one of them, which may serve to
elucidate the rest. But I will relate what Pythagoras said and did
relative to the embassy from Sybaris to Crotona, about demanding the
return of the exiles. For some of his associates were slain by order of
the ambassadors, one of whom slew a part of them with his own hands; but
another was the son of one of those who had excited the sedition, and
who died through disease. When the Crotonians therefore were
deliberating how they should act in this affair, Pythagoras said to his
disciples, that he was not willing the Crotonians should be so greatly
discordant in this affair, and that in his opinion, the ambassadors
should not even lead victims to the altars, much less ought they to drag
suppliants [i. e. the exiles] from them. But when the Sybarites came to
him with their complaints, and the man who had slain some of his
associates with his own hands, was defending his conduct, Pythagoras
said, that he should not answer [an homicide]. Hence, some persons
accused him of asserting that he was Apollo, because prior to this some
one having asked him about a certain object of inquiry, why the thing
was so; he in his turn asked the interrogator, if he would think fit to
inquire of Apollo when he was delivering oracles to him, why he
delivered them? But to another of the ambassadors who appeared to him to
deride his school, in which he taught the return of souls to the
supernal realms, and who said that he would give him an epistle to his
father, as he was about to descend into Hades, and exhorted him to bring
another letter in answer, from his father, when he returned; Pythagoras
replied, that he was not about to descend into the abode of the impious,
where he clearly knew that murderers were punished. But the ambassadors
reviling him, he proceeded to the sea, many persons following him, and
there sprinkled himself with marine water. Some one however of the
Crotonian counsellors, after reviling the rest of the ambassadors,
observed that he understood they had defamed Pythagoras, whom not even a
brute would dare to blaspheme, though all animals should again utter the
same voice as men, which fables report they did in the beginning of
things.
Pythagoras likewise discovered another method of restraining men from
injustice, through the judgment of souls, truly knowing indeed that this
method may be taught, and also knowing that it is useful to the
suppression of justice through fear. He asserted therefore, that it is
much better to be injured than to kill a man; for that judgment is
deposited in Hades, where the soul, and its essence, and the first
nature of beings, are properly estimated. Being desirous, however, to
exhibit in things unequal, without symmetry and infinite, a definite,
equal, and commensurate justice, and to show how it ought to be
exercised, he said, that justice resembles that figure, which is the
only one among geometrical diagrams, that having indeed infinite
compositions of figures, but dissimilarly disposed with reference to
each other, yet has equal demonstrations of power.[40] Since also, there
is a certain justice in making use of another person, such a mode of it
as the following, is said to have been delivered by the Pythagoreans: Of
associations with others, one kind is seasonable, but another is
unseasonable. These likewise are distinguished from each other by
difference of age, desert, the familiarity of alliance, and of
beneficence, and whatever else there may be of the like kind in the
different associations of men with each other. For there is a species of
association, viz. of a younger with a younger person, which does not
appear to be unseasonable; but that of a younger with an elderly person
is unseasonable. For no species of anger, or threatening, or boldness,
is becoming in a younger towards an elderly man, but all unseasonable
conduct of this kind should be cautiously avoided. A similar reasoning
likewise should be adopted with respect to desert. For it is neither
decorous, nor seasonable, to use an unrestrained freedom of speech, or
to adopt any of the above-mentioned modes of conduct, towards a man who
has arrived at the true dignity of consummate virtue. Conformably to
this also, was what he said respecting the association with parents, and
likewise with benefactors. He added, that there is a certain various and
multiform use of an opportune time. For of those that are enraged and
angry, some are so seasonably, but others unseasonably. And again, of
those that aspire after, desire, and are impelled to any thing
appetible, an opportune time is the attendant on some, and an
unseasonable time on others. And the same thing may be said concerning
other passions and actions, dispositions, associations, and meetings. He
farther observed, that an opportune time is _to a certain extent_, to be
taught, and also, that what happens contrary to expectation, is capable
of receiving an artificial discussion; but that when it is considered
universally and simply, none of the above-mentioned particulars pertain
to it. Nearly, however, such things are the attendants on it, as follow
the nature of opportune time, viz. what is called the florid, the
becoming, the adapted, and whatever else there may be homogeneous to
these. He likewise asserted, that principle [or the beginning] is in the
universe unity, and is the most honorable of things; and that in a
similar manner it is so in science, in experience, and in generation.
And again, that the number two is most honorable in a house, in a city,
in a camp, and in all such like systems. But that the nature of
principle is difficult to be surveyed and apprehended in all the
above-mentioned particulars. For in sciences, it is not the province of
any casual understanding to learn and judge, by well surveying the parts
of things, what the nature is of the principle of these. He added, that
it makes a great difference, and that there is danger with respect to
the knowledge of the whole of things, when principle is not rightly
assumed. For none, in short, of the consequent conclusions can be sane,
when the true principle is unknown. The same thing may also be said
respecting a principle of another kind. For neither can a house, or a
city, be well instituted, unless each has a true ruler, who governs
those that voluntarily submit to him. For it is necessary that in both
these the governor should be willing to rule, and the governed to obey.
Just as with respect to disciplines, when they are taught with proper
effect, it is necessary that there should be a concurrence in the will
both of the teacher and learner. For if there is a resistance on the
part of either, the proposed work will never be accomplished in a proper
manner. Thus therefore, he proved, that it was beautiful to be persuaded
by rulers, and to be obedient to preceptors. But he exhibited the
following as the greatest argument through deeds, of the truth of his
observations. He went from Italy to Delos, to Pherecydes the Syrian, who
had been his preceptor, in order that he might afford him some
assistance, as he was then afflicted with what is called the morbus
pedicularis, and he carefully attended him to the time of his death, and
piously performed whatever rites were due to his dead preceptor. So
diligent was he in the discharge of his duties to him from whom he had
received instruction.
Moreover, with respect to compacts and the veracity pertaining to them,
Pythagoras so prepared his disciples for the observance of them, that,
as it is said, Lysis having once performed his adorations in the temple
of Juno, met, as he was departing from it, about the vestibules with
Euryphamus the Syracusan, who was one of his fellow disciples, and was
then entering into the temple. Euryphamus therefore desiring Lysis to
wait for him, till he also had adored the Goddess, Lysis sat down on a
stone seat which was placed there. Euryphamus however having finished
his adoration, and becoming absorbed in certain profound conceptions,
forgot his appointment, and went out of the temple through another gate.
But Lysis waited for him without quitting his seat, the remainder of
that day and the following night, and also the greater part of the next
day. And perhaps he would have staid there for a still longer time,
unless Euryphamus on the following day, had heard in the auditory, that
Lysis was wanted by his associates. Recollecting therefore his compact,
he came to Lysis, and liberated him from his engagement, at the same
time telling him the cause of his forgetfulness, and added, “Some God
produced in me this oblivion, as a trial of your firmness in preserving
your compacts.” Pythagoras likewise ordained abstinence from animal
food, for many other reasons, and likewise because it is productive of
peace. For those who are accustomed to abominate the slaughter of
animals as iniquitous and preternatural, will think it to be much more
unlawful to kill a man, or engage in war. But war is the leader and
legislator of slaughter. For by this it is increased, and becomes strong
and powerful. Not to step also above the beam of the balance, is an
exhortation to justice, announcing, that whatever is just should be
cultivated, as will be shown when we discuss the Pythagoric symbols. It
appears therefore, through all these particulars, that Pythagoras paid
great attention to the exercise of justice, and to the delivery of it to
mankind, both in deeds and in words.
CHAP. XXXI.
It follows, in the next place, that we should speak of temperance, and
show how it was cultivated by Pythagoras, and how he delivered it to his
associates. We have already therefore narrated the common precepts
concerning it, in which it is said that every thing incommensurate
should be cut off with fire and sword. The abstinence also from animal
food, is a precept of the same species; and likewise from certain foods
calculated to produce intemperance, and impeding the vigilance and
genuine energies of the reasoning power. Farther still, to this species
the precept belongs, that sumptuous food should indeed be introduced in
banquets, but should [shortly after] be sent away, and given to the
servants, being placed on the table merely for the sake of punishing the
desires. Likewise, that no liberal and ingenuous woman should wear gold,
but only harlots. And again, the exercise of taciturnity, and perfect
silence, for the purpose of governing the tongue. Likewise a strenuous
and assiduous resumption and investigation of the most difficult
theorems. But on account of all these, we must refer to the same virtue
[i. e. to temperance,] abstinence from wine; paucity of food and sleep;
an inartificial contempt of renown, wealth, and the like; a sincere
reverence towards those to whom reverence is due, but an unfeigned
similitude of behaviour and benevolence towards those of the same age;
an animadversion and exhortation of those that are younger, without
envy; and every thing else of the like kind.
The temperance also of those men, and how Pythagoras taught this virtue,
may be learnt from what Hippobotus and Neanthes narrate of Myllias and
Timycha who were Pythagoreans. For they say that Dionysius the tyrant
could not obtain the friendship of any one of the Pythagoreans, though
he did every thing to accomplish his purpose; for they had observed, and
carefully avoided his monarchical disposition. He sent therefore to the
Pythagoreans, a troop of thirty soldiers, under the command of Eurymenes
the Syracusan, who was the brother of Dion, in order that by treachery
their accustomed migration from Tarentum to Metapontum, might be
opportunely effected for his purpose. For it was usual with them to
change their abode at different seasons of the year, and they chose such
places as were adapted to this migration. In Phalæ therefore, a craggy
part of Tarentum, through which the Pythagoreans must necessarily pass
in their journey, Eurymenes insidiously concealed his troop, and when
the Pythagoreans, expecting no such thing, came to that place about the
middle of the day, the soldiers rushed upon them with shouts, after the
manner of robbers. But the Pythagoreans being disturbed and terrified at
an attack so unexpected, and at the superior number of their enemies
(for the whole number of the Pythagoreans was but ten), and considering
also that they must be taken captive, as they were without arms, and had
to contend with men who were variously armed,—they found that their only
safety was in flight, and they did not conceive that this was foreign to
virtue. For they knew that fortitude, according to the decision of right
reason, is the science of things which are to be avoided and endured.
And this they now obtained. For those who were with Eurymenes, being
heavy-armed, would have abandoned the pursuit of the Pythagoreans, if
the latter in their flight had not arrived at a certain field sown with
beans, and which were in a sufficiently florishing condition. Not being
willing therefore to violate the dogma which ordered them not to touch
beans, they stood still, and from necessity attacked their pursuers with
stones and sticks, and whatever else they happened to meet with, till
they had slain some, and wounded many of them. All the Pythagoreans
however, were at length slain by the spearmen, nor would any one of them
suffer himself to be taken captive, but preferred death to this,
conformably to the mandates of their sect.
Eurymenes therefore, and his soldiers, were beyond measure disturbed on
finding that they should not be able to bring one of the Pythagoreans
alive to Dionysius, though they were sent by him for this purpose alone.
Hence, having piled earth on the slain, and buried them in that place in
a common sepulchre, they turned their steps homeward. As they were
returning, however, they happened to meet with Myllias the Crotonian,
and his wife Timycha the Lacedæmonian, whom the other Pythagoreans had
left behind, because Timycha being pregnant, was now in her sixth[41]
month, and on this account walked leisurely. These therefore, the
soldiers gladly made captive, and led them to the tyrant, paying every
attention to them, in order that they might be brought to him safe. But
the tyrant having learnt what had happened, was greatly dejected, and
said to the two Pythagoreans, You shall obtain from me honors
transcending all others in dignity, if you will consent to reign in
conjunction with me. All his offers however being rejected by Myllias
and Timycha; If then, said he, you will only teach me one thing, I will
dismiss you with a sufficiently safe guard. Myllias therefore asking him
what it was he wished to learn; Dionysius replied, It is this, why your
companions chose rather to die, than to tread on beans? But Myllias
immediately answered, My companions indeed submitted to death, in order
that they might not tread upon beans, but I would rather tread on them,
than tell you the cause of this. Dionysius therefore, being astonished
at this answer, ordered him to be forcibly taken away, but commanded
Timycha to be tortured: for he thought, that as she was a woman,
pregnant, and deprived of her husband, she would easily tell him what he
wanted to know, through fear of the torments. The heroic woman, however,
grinding her tongue with her teeth, bit it off, and spit it at the
tyrant; evincing by this, that though her sex being vanquished by the
torments might be compelled to disclose something which ought to be
concealed in silence, yet the member subservient to the developement of
it, should be entirely cut off. So much difficulty did they make in
admitting foreign friendships, even though they should happen to be
royal.
Similar to these also, were the precepts concerning silence, and which
tended to the exercise of temperance. For the subjugation of the tongue,
is of all other continence the most difficult. The persuading likewise
the Crotonians to abstain from the profane and spurious association with
harlots, pertains to the same virtue. And besides this, the correction
through music, by means of which Pythagoras restored a young man to
temperance, who had become furious through love. The exhortation also,
which leads from lascivious insolence, must be referred to the same
virtue. And these things Pythagoras delivered to the Pythagoreans, he
himself being the cause of them. For they so attended to their bodies,
that they might always remain in the same condition, and not at one time
be lean, but at another, abounding in flesh. For they considered this to
be an indication of an anomalous life. In a similar manner also with
respect to the mind, they were careful that they might not be at one
time cheerful, and at another sad, but that they might be mildly joyful
with uniformity. But they expelled rage, despondency, and perturbation.
_And it was a precept with them, that no human casualties ought to be
unexpected by those who are endued with intellect, but that they should
expect every thing may happen which it is not in their power to
prevent._ But if at any time they were in a rage, or oppressed with
sorrow, or any thing else of this kind, they separated themselves from
the rest of their associates, and each by himself alone, endeavoured to
digest and heal the passion.
This also is said of the Pythagoreans, that no one of them when angry,
either punished a servant, or admonished any free man, but each of them
waited till his mind was restored to its former [tranquil] condition.
But they called _to admonish_, _pædartan_. For they accomplished this
waiting by employing silence and quiet. Hence Spintharus relates of
Archytas the Tarentine, that returning after a certain time from the war
which the city of Tarentum waged against the Messenians, to inspect some
land which belonged to him, and finding that the bailiff and the other
servants, had not paid proper attention to the cultivation of it, but
had greatly neglected it, being enraged, he was so indignant, that he
told his servants it was well for them he was angry; since, if this had
not happened, they would not have escaped the punishment due to so great
an offence. Spintharus likewise says that a similar thing is related of
Clinias. For he also deferred all admonitions and punishments, till his
mind was restored to tranquillity.
It is farther related of the Pythagoreans, that they expelled from
themselves lamentation, weeping, and every thing else of this kind; and
that neither gain, nor desire, nor anger, nor ambition, nor any thing of
a similar nature, became the cause of dissension among them; but that
all the Pythagoreans were so disposed towards each other, as a worthy
father is towards his offspring. This also is a beautiful circumstance,
that they referred every thing to Pythagoras, and called it by his name,
and that they did not ascribe to themselves the glory of their own
inventions, except very rarely. For there are very few whose works are
acknowledged to be their own. The accuracy too, with which they
preserved their writings is admirable. For in so many ages, no one
appears to have met with any of the commentaries of the Pythagoreans,
prior to the time of Philolaus. But he first published those three
celebrated books, which Dion the Syracusan is said to have bought, at
the request of Plato, for a hundred mina. For Philolaus had fallen into
a certain great and severe poverty; and from his alliance to the
Pythagoreans, was a partaker of their writings.
With respect also to opinion,[42] it is related that they spoke of it as
follows: That it is the province of a stupid man to pay attention to the
opinion of every one, and especially to that of the multitude. Far it
belongs to a few only to apprehend and opine rightly; since it is
evident that this pertains to the intelligent alone. But they are few.
It is manifest therefore, that a power of this kind does not extend
itself to the multitude. But it is also stupid to despise the opinion of
every one. For it will happen that he who is so disposed will be
unlearned and incorrigible. It is however necessary that he who is
destitute of science should learn those things of which he is ignorant,
and has no scientific knowledge. And it is likewise necessary that the
learner should pay attention to the opinion of him who possesses
science, and is able to teach. And universally, it is necessary that
those young men who wish to be saved, should attend to the opinion of
their elders, and of those who have lived well. But in the whole of
human life there are certain ages (denominated by them as it is said
_endedasmenæ_) which it is not in the power of any casual person to
connect with each other. For they are expelled by each other, unless
some one conducts a man from his birth, in a beautiful and upright
manner. It is necessary therefore, when a child is educated well, and is
formed to temperance and fortitude, that a great part of his education
should be given to the age of adolescence [which is that of a lad]. In a
similar manner also, when a lad is formed to temperance and fortitude,
it is necessary that a great part of his education should be transferred
to the age of manhood. For that which happens to the multitude is absurd
and ridiculous. For they fancy it is requisite that boys should be
orderly and temperate, and should abstain from every thing which appears
to be troublesome and indecorous; but that when they have arrived at
adolescency, they may for the most part do whatever they please. Hence
there is nearly a conflux of both kinds of errors into this age. For
lads commit many faults which are both puerile and virile. For, in
short, to avoid every kind of sedulity and order, and to pursue every
species of sport, and puerile intemperance and insolence, are most
adapted to the age of a boy. Such a disposition therefore as this, is
derived from the puerile into the following age. But the genus of strong
desires, and of different species of ambition, and in a similar manner
the remaining impulses and dispositions, when they are of a severe and
turbulent nature, are derived from the virile age into that of
adolescency. Hence this of all the ages demands the greatest attention.
And universally, no man ought to be suffered to do whatever he pleases,
but it is always necessary that there should be a certain inspection,
and a legal and elegantly-formed government, to which each of the
citizens is obedient. For the animal, when left to itself and neglected,
rapidly degenerates into vice and depravity.
It is likewise said, that the Pythagoreans frequently inquired and
doubted why we accustom boys to take their food in an orderly and
commensurate manner, and show them that order and symmetry are
beautiful; but that the contraries to these, disorder and
incommensuration, are base; and that he who is given to wine and is
insatiable, is held in great disgrace. For if no one of these is useful
to us when we have arrived at the age of virility, it was in vain that
we were accustomed, when boys, to an order of this kind. And there is
also the same reason concerning the other manners [to which we are
accustomed when boys]. This, therefore, is not seen to happen in other
animals which are disciplined by men; but immediately from the first, a
whelp and a colt are accustomed to, and learn those things which it is
requisite for them to do when they have arrived at the perfection of
their nature. And universally, it is said that the Pythagoreans exhorted
both those they happened to meet, and their familiars, to avoid pleasure
as a thing that required the greatest caution. For nothing so much
deceives us, or precipitates us into error, as this passion. In short,
as it seems, they contended that we should never do any thing with a
view to pleasure as the end. For this scope is, for the most part,
indecorous and noxious. _But they asserted, that especially looking to
the beautiful and decorous, we should do whatever is to be done._[43]
And that in the second place we should look to the advantageous and the
useful. These things, however, require no casual judgment.
With respect to what is called desire, these men are said to have
asserted as follows: That _desire indeed, itself, is a certain tendency,
impulse, and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with something,
or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some
sensitive energy_; but that there is also a desire of the contraries to
these, and this is a desire of the evacuation and absence, and of having
no sensible perception of certain things. That this passion likewise is
various, and is nearly the most multifarious of all those that pertain
to man. But that many human desires are adscititious, and procured by
men themselves. Hence this passion requires the greatest attention, and
no casual care and corporeal exercise. For that the body when empty
should desire food, is natural: and again, it is also natural, that when
filled, it should desire an appropriate evacuation. But to desire
superfluous nutriment, or superfluous and luxurious garments or
coverlids, or habitations, is adscititious. They also reasoned in the
same manner concerning furniture, vessels, servants, and cattle
subservient to food. And universally, with respect to human passions,
they are nearly things of such a kind, as to be nowhere permanent, but
to proceed to infinity. Hence attention should be paid to youth from the
earliest period, in order that they may aspire after such things as are
proper, may avoid vain and superfluous desires, and thus be undisturbed
by, and purified from, such-like appetites, and may despise those who
are objects of contempt, because they are bound to [all-various]
desires. But it must be especially observed, that vain, noxious,
superfluous, and insolent desires subsist with those who have the
greatest power. For there is not any thing so absurd, which the soul of
such boys, men, and women, does not incite them to perform. In short,
the variety of food which is assumed, is most manifold. For there are an
infinite number of fruits, and an infinite multitude of roots, which the
human race uses for food. It likewise uses all-various kinds of flesh;
and it is difficult to find any terrestrial, aerial, or aquatic animal,
which it does not taste. It also employs all-various contrivances in the
preparation of these, and manifold mixtures of juices. Hence it properly
follows that the human tribe is insane and multiform, according to the
motion of the soul, for each kind of food that is introduced into the
body, becomes the cause of a certain peculiar disposition.
We however perceive that some things become immediately the cause of a
great change in quality, as is evident in wine. For when it is drank
abundantly, it makes men at first more cheerful, but afterwards more
insane and indecorous. But men are ignorant of those things which do not
exhibit a power of this kind; though every thing that is eaten is the
cause of a certain peculiar disposition. Hence it requires great wisdom,
to be able to know and perceive, what kind and what quantity of food
ought to be used. This science, however, was at first unfolded by Apollo
and Pæon; but afterwards by Esculapius and his followers.
With respect to generation also, the Pythagoreans are said to have made
the following observations. In the first place, they thought it
necessary to guard against what is called untimely [offspring]. For
neither untimely plants, nor animals, are good; but prior to their
bearing fruit, it is necessary that a certain time should intervene, in
order that seeds and fruit may be produced from strong and perfect
bodies. It is requisite, therefore, that boys and virgins should be
accustomed to labors and exercises, and appropriate endurance, and that
food should be given to them adapted to a life of labor, temperance, and
endurance. But there are many things of this kind in human life, which
it is better to learn at a late period, and among these is the use of
venery. It is necessary, therefore, that a boy should be so educated, as
not to seek after such a connexion as this, within the twentieth year of
his age. But when he arrives at this age, he should use venery rarely.
This however will be the case, if he thinks that a good habit of body is
an honorable and beautiful thing. For intemperance and a good habit of
body, are not very much adapted to subsist together in the same person.
It is also said, that those laws were praised by the Pythagoreans, which
existed prior to their time in Grecian cities, and which prohibited the
having connexion with a woman who is a mother, or a daughter, or a
sister, either in a temple, or in a public place. For it is beautiful
and advantageous that there should be numerous impediments to this
energy. These men also apprehended, as it seems, that preternatural
generations, and those which are effected in conjunction with wanton
insolence, should be entirely prevented from taking place; but that
those should be suffered to remain, which are according to nature, and
subsist with temperance, and which take place in the chaste and legal
procreation of children.
They likewise were of opinion that great providential attention should
be paid by those who beget children, to the future progeny. The first,
therefore, and the greatest care which should be taken by him who
applies himself to the procreation of children is, that he lives
temperately and healthfully, that he neither fills himself with food
unseasonably, nor uses such aliments as may render the habits of the
body worse than they were, and above all things, that he avoids
intoxication. For they thought that depraved seed was produced from a
bad, discordant, and turbid temperament. And universally they were of
opinion, that none but an indolent and inconsiderate person would
attempt to produce an animal, and lead it into existence, without
providing with all possible diligence that its ingress into being and
life might be most elegant and pleasing. For those that are lovers of
dogs, pay every possible attention to the generation of whelps, in order
that they may be produced from such things as are proper, and when it is
proper, and in such a way as is proper, and thus may become a good
offspring. The same attention also is paid by those who are lovers of
birds. And it is evident that others also who are studious about the
procreation of generous animals, endeavour by all possible means, that
the generation of them may not be in vain. It would be absurd therefore
that men should pay no attention to their own offspring, but should both
beget them casually and with perfect carelessness, and, after they are
begotten, nourish and educate them with extreme negligence. For this is
the most powerful and most manifest cause of the vice and depravity of
the greater part of mankind. For with the multitude the procreation of
children is undertaken in a beastly and rash manner. And such were the
assertions, and such the doctrine of these men, which they verified both
in words and deeds, respecting temperance; these precepts having been
originally received by them from Pythagoras himself, like certain
oracles delivered by the Pythian Apollo.
CHAP. XXXII.
With respect to fortitude, however, many of the particulars which have
been already related, appropriately pertain to it; such as the admirable
deeds of Timycha, and of those Pythagoreans who chose to die rather than
transgress the decisions of Pythagoras concerning beans, and other
things conformable to such-like pursuits. Such also are the deeds which
Pythagoras himself generously accomplished, when he travelled everywhere
alone, and underwent immense labors and dangers, choosing to leave his
country, and dwell among strangers. Likewise, when he dissolved
tyrannies, gave an orderly arrangement to confused polities, and
emancipated cities. When also he caused illegality to cease, and impeded
the operations of insolent and tyrannical men; exhibiting himself a
benignant leader to the just and mild, but expelling savage and
licentious men from his association, and refusing even to give them an
answer; gladly, indeed, giving assistance to the former, but with all
his might resisting the latter. Many instances therefore of these things
might be adduced, and of upright actions frequently performed by him.
But the greatest of all these, is what he said and did to Phalaris, with
an invincible freedom of speech. For when he was detained in captivity
by Phalaris, the most cruel of tyrants, a wise man of the Hyperborean
race, whose name was Abaris, was his associate, who came to him for the
sake of conversing with him, and asked him many questions, and
especially such as were of a sacred nature, respecting statues and the
most holy worship, the providence of the Gods, celestial and terrestrial
natures, and many other things of a similar kind. But Pythagoras, being
under the influence of divine inspiration, answered Abaris vehemently,
and with all truth and persuasion, so as to convince those that heard
him. Then, however, Phalaris was inflamed with anger against Abaris,
because he praised Pythagoras, and was ferociously disposed towards
Pythagoras himself. He also dared to utter blasphemies against the Gods
themselves, and such as he was accustomed to pour forth. But Abaris gave
Pythagoras thanks for what he said; and after this, learnt from him that
_all things are suspended from and governed by the heavens; which he
evinced to be the case from many other things, and also from the energy
of sacred rites_. And Abaris was so far from thinking that Pythagoras,
who taught these things, was an enchanter, that he beyond measure
admired him as if he had been a God. To these things, however, Phalaris
replied by endeavouring to subvert divination, and openly denying the
efficacy of the things which are performed in sacred rites. But Abaris
transferred the discourse from these particulars to such as are clearly
apparent to all men; and endeavoured to persuade him that there is a
divine providence, from those circumstances which transcend all human
hope and power, whether they are immense wars, or incurable diseases, or
the corruption of fruits, or the incursions of pestilence, or certain
other things of the like kind, which are most difficult to be borne, and
deplorable, arising from the beneficent energies of certain dæmoniacal
and divine powers.[44]
Phalaris, however, shamelessly and audaciously opposed what was said.
Again therefore Pythagoras, suspecting that Phalaris intended to put him
to death, but at the same time knowing that he was not destined to die
by Phalaris, began to address him with great freedom of speech. For
looking to Abaris he said, that a transition was naturally adapted to
take place from the heavens to aerial and terrestrial beings. And again,
he showed that all things follow the heavens, from instances most known
to all men. He likewise indubitably demonstrated, that the
[deliberative] power of the soul possesses freedom of will. And
proceeding still farther, he amply discussed the perfect energy of
reason and intellect. Afterwards also, with his [usual] freedom of
speech, he spoke concerning tyranny, and all the prerogatives of
fortune, and concerning injustice and human avarice, and solidly taught
him that all these are of no worth. In the next place, he gave him a
divine admonition concerning the most excellent life, and earnestly
entered on a comparison of it with the most depraved life. He likewise
most clearly unfolded to him, how the soul, and its powers and passions,
subsist; _and, what is the most beautiful thing of all, demonstrated to
him that the Gods are not the causes of evils, and that diseases, and
such things as are the calamities of the body, are the seals of
intemperance_; reprehending at the same time mythologists and poets for
what they have badly said in fables [on this subject]. Confuting
Phalaris also, he admonished him, and exhibited to him through works
what the power of heaven is, and the magnitude of that power; and proved
to him by many arguments, that legal punishment is reasonably
established. He likewise clearly showed him what the difference is
between men and other animals; and scientifically discussed internal and
external speech. He also perfectly demonstrated the nature of intellect,
and of the knowledge which descends from it; together with many other
ethical dogmas consequent to these things.
Farther still, he instructed him in what is most beneficial among the
things that are useful in life; and in the mildest manner adapted
admonitions harmonising with these; adding at the same time prohibitions
of what ought not to be done. And that which is the greatest of all, he
unfolded to him the distinction between the productions of fate, and
those of intellect, and also the difference between what is done by
destiny, and what is done by fate. He likewise wisely discussed many
things concerning dæmons, and the immortality of the soul. These things
however pertain to another treatise. But those particulars are more
appropriate to our present purpose which belong to the cultivation of
fortitude. For if, when situated in the midst of dreadful circumstances,
Pythagoras appears to have philosophised with firmness of decision, if
on all sides he resisted and repelled fortune, and strenuously endured
its attacks, and if he employed the greatest freedom of speech towards
him who brought his life into danger, it is evident that he perfectly
despised those things which are thought to be dreadful, and that he
considered them as undeserving of notice. If also, when he expected
according to appearances to be put to death, he entirely despised this,
and was not moved by the expectation of it, it is evident that he was
perfectly free from the dread of death.[45]
He performed however what is still more generous than this, by effecting
the dissolution of tyranny, restraining the tyrant when he was about to
bring the most deplorable calamities on mankind, and liberating Sicily
from the most cruel and imperious power. But that it was Pythagoras who
accomplished this, is evident from the oracles of Apollo, in which it is
predicted that the domination of Phalaris would then be dissolved, when
those that were governed by him should become better men, and be more
concordant with each other; such as they then became, when Pythagoras
was present with them, through the doctrines and instruction which he
imparted to them. A greater proof however of the truth of this, is
derived from the time in which it happened. For on the very same day in
which Phalaris put Pythagoras and Abaris in danger of death, he himself
was slain by stratagem. That also which happened to Epimenides may be an
argument of the truth of these things. For as he, who was the disciple
of Pythagoras, when certain persons intended to destroy him, invoked the
Furies, and the avenging Gods, and by so doing caused all those that
attempted his life, to destroy each other;—thus also Pythagoras, who
gave assistance to mankind, after the manner and with the fortitude of
Hercules, for the benefit of men, punished and occasioned the death of
him who had acted in an insolent and disorderly manner towards others;
and this through the oracles themselves of Apollo, to the series of
which divinity both he and Epimenides spontaneously belonged from their
very birth. And thus far, indeed, we have thought it requisite to
mention this admirable and strenuous deed, the effect of his fortitude.
We shall however adduce another example of it, viz. the salvation of
legitimate opinion; for, preserving this, he performed that which
appeared to him to be just, and which was dictated by right reason, not
being diverted from his intention either by pleasure, or labor, or any
other passion, or danger. His disciples also chose to die rather than
transgress his mandates. And when they were exposed to all-various
fortunes, they preserved invariably the same manners. When also they
were involved in ten thousand calamities, they never deviated from his
precepts. But it was a never-failing exhortation with them, always to
give assistance to law, but to be hostile to illegality, and to be
accustomed from their birth to a life of temperance and fortitude, in
order to restrain and repel luxury. They had also certain melodies which
were devised by them, as remedies against the passions of the soul, and
likewise against despondency and lamentation, which Pythagoras invented,
as affording the greatest assistance in these maladies. And again, they
employed other melodies against rage and anger, through which they gave
intension and remission to these passions, till they reduced them to
moderation, and rendered them commensurate with fortitude. _That,
however, which afforded them the greatest support in generous endurance,
was the persuasion that no human casualties ought to be unexpected by
men who are in the possession of intellect, but that all things ought to
be expected by them, over which they have no absolute power._
Moreover, if at any time they happened to be angry, or sorrowful, they
immediately separated themselves from the rest of their associates, and
each by himself alone strenuously endeavoured to digest and heal the
passion [by which he was oppressed]. They also conceived generally, that
labor should be employed about disciplines and studies, and that they
should be severely exercised in trials of the most various nature, in
punishments and restraints by fire and sword, in order to be liberated
from innate intemperance, and an inexhaustible avidity of possessing;
and that for this purpose, no labors, nor any endurance should be
spared. In order to accomplish this likewise, they generously exercised
abstinence from all animals, and besides this, from certain other kinds
of food. Hence also arose their detention of speech, and their perfect
silence as preparatory to the subjugation of the tongue; in which for
many years they exercised their fortitude. To which also may be added,
their strenuous and assiduous investigation and resumption of the most
difficult theorems; and on account of these things, their abstinence
from wine, their paucity of food and sleep, and their contempt of glory,
wealth, and the like. And in conjunction with all these particulars,
they extended themselves to fortitude.
It is likewise said, that these men expelled lamentations and tears, and
every thing else of this kind. They also abstained from entreaty, from
supplication, and from all such illiberal adulation, as being effeminate
and abject.[46] To the same conception likewise the peculiarity of their
manners must be referred, and that all of them perpetually preserved
among their arcana, the most principal dogmas in which their discipline
was chiefly contained, keeping them with the greatest silence from being
divulged to strangers, committing them unwritten to the memory, and
transmitting them orally to their successors, as if they were the
mysteries of the Gods. Hence it happened, that nothing of their
philosophy worth mentioning, was made public, and that though for a long
time it had been taught and learnt, it was alone known within their
walls. But to those out of their walls, and as I may say, to the
profane, if they happened to be present, these men spoke obscurely to
each other through symbols, of which the celebrated precepts that are
now in circulation retain a vestige; such as, Dig not fire with a sword,
and other symbols of the like kind, which, taken literally, resemble the
tales of old women; but when unfolded, impart a certain admirable and
venerable benefit to those that receive them.
The precept, however, which is of the greatest efficacy of all others to
the attainment of fortitude, is that which has for its most principal
scope the being defended and liberated from those bonds which detain the
intellect in captivity from infancy, and without which no one can learn
or perceive any thing sane or true, through whatever sense he may
energize. For according to the Pythagoreans,
’Tis mind that all things sees and hears;
What else exists is deaf and blind.
But the precept which is next to this in efficacy is that which exhorts
to be beyond measure studious of purifying the intellect, and by various
methods adapting it through mathematical orgies to receive something
divinely beneficial, so as neither to fear a separation from body, nor,
when led to incorporeal natures, to be forced to turn away the eyes,
through their most refulgent splendor,[47] nor to be converted to those
passions which nail and fasten the soul to the body. And, in short,
which urges the soul to be untamed by all those passions which are the
progeny of the realms of generation, and which draw it to an inferior
condition of being. For the exercise and ascent through all these, is
the study of the most perfect fortitude. And such are the instances
adduced by us of the fortitude of Pythagoras, and the Pythagoreans.
CHAP. XXXIII.
With respect to the amity, however, which subsists in all things towards
all, Pythagoras delivered it in the clearest manner. And, the amity of
the Gods indeed towards men, he unfolded through piety and scientific
cultivation; but that of dogmas towards each other, and universally of
the soul towards the body, and of the rational towards the species of
the irrational part, through philosophy, and the theory pertaining to
it. With respect to the amity of men also towards each other; that of
citizens he delivered through sane legislation, but that of strangers
through a correct physiology; and that between man and wife, or
children, or brothers, and kindred, through unperverted communion. In
short, he unfolded the friendship of all things towards all, and still
farther, of certain irrational animals, through justice and a physical
connexion and association. But the pacification and conciliation of the
body, which is of itself mortal, and of its latent contrary powers, he
unfolded through health, and a diet and temperance conformable to this,
in imitation of the salubrious condition of the mundane elements. In all
these, however, Pythagoras is acknowledged to have been the inventor and
legislator of the summary comprehension of them in one and the same
name, which is that of friendship. And indeed he delivered such an
admirable friendship to his associates, that even now those who are
benevolent in the extreme towards each other, are said to belong to the
Pythagoreans. It is necessary therefore to narrate the discipline of
Pythagoras respecting these things, and the precepts which he used
towards his disciples.
These men, then, exhorted others to remove from true friendship, contest
and contention, and if possible, indeed, from all friendship; but if
not, at least from that which is parental, and universally from that
which pertains to seniors and benefactors. For to strive or contend with
such as these, in consequence of anger intervening, or some other
such-like passion, is not the salvation of the existing friendship. But
they said it is requisite that there should be the least possible scars
and ulcers in friendships; and that this will be the case, if those that
are friends know how to soften and subdue anger. If both indeed know
this, or rather the younger of the two, and who ranks in some one of the
above-mentioned orders [their friendship will be more easily preserved].
They also were of opinion, that corrections and admonitions, which they
called _pædartases_, should take place from the elder to the younger
with much suavity and caution; and likewise, that much sedulous and
appropriate attention should be manifested in admonitions. For thus they
will be decorous and beneficial. They also said, that confidence should
never be separated from friendship, neither seriously nor even in jest.
For it is no longer easy for the existing friendship to be in a sane
condition, when falsehood once insinuates itself into the manners of
those that acknowledge themselves to be friends. Again, according to
them, friendship should not be abandoned on account of misfortune, or
any other imbecility to which human life is incident; but they said,
that the only approvable rejection of a friend and friendship, is that
which arises from great and incorrigible vice. Likewise, that hatred
should not be voluntarily entertained against those who are not
perfectly bad; but that if it is once formed, it should be generously
and strenuously retained, unless the object of it changes his manners,
so as to become a better man. That the hostility also should not consist
in words, but in deeds; And that this war is legitimate and holy, when
it is conducted in such a way as it becomes one man to contend with
another.
They likewise said, that we should never, to the utmost of our power,
become the cause of dissension; but that we should as much as possible
avoid the source of it. That in the friendship also, which is intended
to be pure, the greater part of the things pertaining to it ought to be
definite and legitimate. And that these should be properly
distinguished, and should not be casual; and moreover, that we should be
careful that our conversation may never be negligently and casually
performed, but with modesty, benevolence, and good order. Also, that no
passion, such as desire, or anger, be rashly excited, and in a bad and
erroneous manner. And the same thing must be said of the remaining
passions and dispositions.
Moreover, that they did not decline foreign friendships carelessly, but
that they avoided and guarded against them, with the greatest sedulity;
and also, that they rigidly preserved friendship towards each other for
many ages, may be inferred from what Aristoxenus in his treatise On the
Pythagoric life, says he heard from Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily,
when having fallen from monarchy he taught grammar at Corinth. For
Aristoxenus says as follows: “These men as much as possible prohibited
lamentations and tears, and every thing of this kind; and in a similar
manner adulation, entreaty, supplication, and the like. Dionysius,
therefore, having fallen from his tyranny and come to Corinth, narrated
to us the particulars concerning Phintias and Damon the Pythagoreans;
and these were respecting the one being sponsor for the death of the
other. But the mode of the suretyship was as follows: He said that
certain persons, who were familiar with him, had frequently made mention
of the Pythagoreans, defaming and reviling them, calling them arrogant,
and asserting that their gravity, their pretended fidelity, and apathy
would be laid aside, if any one should cause them to fall into [some
great] calamity. Certain persons however contradicting this, and
contention arising on the subject, recourse was had to artifice, and one
of the accusers of Phintias said before him, that he evidently conspired
with certain others against the life of Dionysius. This also was
testified by some that were present, and the charges against Phintias
appeared to be very probable. Phintias therefore was astonished at the
accusation. But when Dionysius had unequivocally said, that he had
accurately explored all these particulars, and that it was necessary
that he should die, Phintias replied, that if it appeared requisite to
him that this should take place, he requested that he would grant him
the remainder of the day, in order that he might settle his own affairs,
and also those of Damon. For those men lived together, and had all
things in common. Phintias, however, being the elder, the management of
the domestic concerns was for the most part undertaken by him. He
requested therefore, that Dionysius would suffer him to depart for this
purpose, and he would appoint Damon for his surety. Dionysius therefore
said that he wondered at the request, and that he asked him whether
there was any man who was willing to become security for the death of
another. But Phintias asserting that there was, Damon was sent for, who,
on hearing what had happened, said that he would become the sponsor, and
that he would remain there till Phintias returned. Dionysius therefore
said, that he was immediately astonished at these circumstances; but
that they who at first introduced the experiment, derided Damon as one
who would be caught, and said sneeringly that he would be the vicarious
stag. When therefore it was near sunset, Phintias came to die; at which
all that were present were astonished and subdued. But Dionysius said,
that having embraced and kissed the men, he requested that they would
receive him as the third into their friendship. They however would by no
means consent to a thing of this kind, though he entreated them to
comply with his request.” And these things are related by Aristoxenus,
who received them from Dionysius himself.
It is also said, that the Pythagoreans endeavoured to perform the
offices of friendship to those of their sect, though they were unknown
to, and had never been seen by each other, when they had received a
certain indication of the participation of the same doctrines; so that
from such friendly offices the assertion may be credited, that worthy
men, even though they should dwell in the most remote parts of the
earth, are mutually friends, and this before they become known to and
salute each other. It is said therefore, that a certain Pythagorean,
travelling through a long and solitary road on foot, came to an inn; and
there, from labor and other all-various causes, fell into a long and
severe disease, so as to be at length in want of the necessaries of
life. The inn-keeper, however, whether from commiseration of the man, or
from benevolence, supplied him with every thing that was requisite,
neither sparing for this purpose any assistance or expense. But the
Pythagorean falling a victim to the disease, wrote a certain symbol,
before he died, in a table, and desired the inn-keeper, if he should
happen to die, to suspend the table near the road, and observe whether
any passenger read the symbol. For that person, said he, will repay you
what you have spent on me, and will also thank you for your kindness.
The inn-keeper, therefore, after the death of the Pythagorean, having
buried, and paid the requisite attention to his body, had neither any
hopes of being repaid, nor of receiving any recompense from some one who
might read the table. At the same time, however, being surprised at the
request of the Pythagorean, he was induced to expose the writing in the
public road. A long time after, therefore, a certain Pythagorean passing
that way, having understood the symbol, and learnt who it was that
placed the table there, and having also investigated every particular,
paid the inn-keeper a much greater sum of money than he had disbursed.
It is likewise related of Clinias the Tarentine, that when he had learnt
that Prorus the Cyrenæan, who was zealously addicted to the Pythagorean
doctrines, was in danger of losing all his property, he sailed to
Cyrene, after having collected a sum of money, and restored the affairs
of Prorus to a better condition, not only incurring, in so doing, a
diminution of his own property, but despising the peril which he was
exposed to in the voyage. After the same manner also, Thestor
Posidoniates, having learnt from report alone, that Thymaridas Parius
the Pythagorean had fallen into poverty, from the possession of great
wealth, is said to have sailed to Parus, after having collected a large
sum of money, and thus reinstated Thymaridas in property. These
therefore are beautiful instances of friendship. _The decisions,
however, of the Pythagoreans respecting the communion of divine goods,
the concord of intellect, and things pertaining to a divine soul, are
much more admirable than the above examples. For they perpetually
exhorted each other, not to divulse the God within them. Hence all the
endeavour of their friendship both in deeds and words, was directed to a
certain divine mixture, to a union with divinity, and to a communion
with intellect and a divine soul._ But it is not possible to find any
thing better than this, either in what is uttered by words, or performed
by deeds. For I am of opinion, that all the goods of friendship are
comprehended in this. Hence, as we have collected in this, as in a
summit, all the prerogatives of the Pythagoric friendship, we shall omit
to say any thing further about it.
CHAP. XXXIV.
Since, however, we have thus generally, and with arrangement, discussed
what pertains to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans; let us after this
narrate such scattered particulars relative to this subject, as do not
fall under the above-mentioned order. It is said, therefore, that each
of the Greeks who joined himself to this community of the Pythagoreans,
was ordered to use his native language. For they did not approve of the
use of a foreign tongue. Foreigners also united themselves to the
Pythagoric sect, viz. the Messenians, the Lucani, Picentini, and the
Romans. And Metrodorus the son of Thyrsus who was the father of
Epicharmus,[48] and who transferred the greater part of his doctrine to
medicine, says in explaining the writings of his father to his brother,
that Epicharmus, and prior to him Pythagoras, conceived that the best
dialect, as well as the best harmony of music, is the Doric; that the
Ionic and the Æolic participate of the chromatic harmony; but that the
Attic dialect is replete with this in a still greater degree. They were
also of opinion, that the Doric dialect, which consists of vocal
letters, is enharmonic.
Fables likewise bear testimony to the antiquity of this dialect. For in
these it is said that Nereus married Doris the daughter of Ocean; by
whom he had fifty daughters, one of which was the mother of Achilles.
Metrodorus also says, that according to some, Hellen was the offspring
of Deucalion, who was the son of Prometheus and Pyrrha the daughter of
Epimetheus; and that from him came Dorus, and Æolus. He farther
observes, that he learnt from the sacred rites of the Babylonians, that
Hellen was the offspring of Jupiter, and that the sons of Hellen were
Dorus, Xuthus, and Æolus; with which narrations Herodotus also accords.
It is difficult, however, for those in more recent times to know
accurately, in particulars so ancient, which of these narrations is to
be preferred. But it may be collected from each of these histories, that
the Doric dialect is acknowledged to be the most ancient; that the Æolic
is next to this, which received its name from Æolus; and that the Ionic
ranks as the third, which derived its appellation from Ion the son of
Xuthus. The Attic is the fourth, which was denominated from Creusa, the
daughter of Erectheus, and is posterior to the former dialects by three
generations, as it existed about the time of the Thracians, and the rape
of Orithyia, as is evident from the testimony of most histories. Orpheus
also, who is the most ancient of the poets, used the Doric dialect.
Of medicine, however, they especially embraced the diætetic species, and
in the exercise of this were most accurate. And in the first place,
indeed, they endeavoured to learn the indications of symmetry, of labor,
food, and repose. In the next place, with respect to the preparation of
food, they were nearly the first who attempted to employ themselves in
it, and to define the mode in which it should be performed. The
Pythagoreans likewise employed cataplasms, more frequently than their
predecessors; but they in a less degree approved of medicated ointments.
These, however, they principally used in the cure of ulcerations. But
incisions and burnings they admitted the least of all things. Some
diseases also they cured by incantations. But they are said to have
objected to those who expose disciplines to sale; who open their souls
like the gates of an inn to every man that approaches to them; and who,
if they do not thus find buyers, diffuse themselves through cities, and,
in short, hire gymnasia and require a reward from young men for those
things which are without price. Pythagoras, however, concealed the
meaning of much that was said by him, in order that those who were
genuinely instructed might clearly be partakers of it; but that others,
as Homer says of Tantalus, might be pained in the midst of what they
heard, in consequence of receiving no delight from thence.
I think also, it was said by the Pythagoreans, respecting those who
teach for the sake of reward, that they show themselves to be worse than
statuaries, or those artists who perform their work sitting. For these,
when some one orders them to make a statue of Hermes, search for wood
adapted to the reception of the proper form; but those pretend that they
can readily produce the works of virtue from every nature.[49] The
Pythagoreans likewise said, that it is more necessary to pay attention
to philosophy, than to parents and agriculture; for it is owing to the
latter, indeed, that we live; but philosophers and preceptors are the
causes of our living well, and becoming wise, in consequence of having
discovered the right mode of discipline and instruction. Nor did they
think fit either to speak or write in such a way, that their conceptions
might be obvious to any casual persons; but Pythagoras is said to have
taught this in the first place to those that came to him, that, being
purified from all incontinence, they should preserve in silence the
doctrines they had heard. It is said, therefore, that he who first
divulged the theory of commensurable and incommensurable quantities, to
those who were unworthy to receive it, was so hated by the Pythagoreans
that they not only expelled him from their common association, and from
living with them, but also constructed a tomb for him, as one who had
migrated from the human and passed into a another life. Others also say,
that the Divine Power was indignant with those who divulged the dogmas
of Pythagoras: for that he perished in the sea, as an impious person,
who rendered manifest the composition of the _icostagonus_; viz. who
delivered the method of inscribing in a sphere the dodecaedron, which is
one of what are called the five solid figures. But according to others,
this happened to him who unfolded the doctrine of irrational and
incommensurable quantities.[50] Moreover, all the Pythagoric discipline
was symbolic, and resembled enigmas and riddles, consisting of
apothegms, in consequence of imitating antiquity in its character; just
as the truly divine and Pythian oracles appear to be in a certain
respect difficult to be understood and explained, to those who
carelessly receive the answers which they give. Such therefore, and so
many are the indications respecting Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,
which may be collected from what is disseminated about them.
CHAP. XXXV.
There were, however, certain persons who were hostile to these men, and
rose against them. That stratagems therefore were employed to destroy
them, during the absence of Pythagoras, is universally acknowledged; but
those that have written on this subject, differ in their account of the
journey which he then undertook. For some say that he went to Pherecydes
the Syrian, but others to Metapontum. Many causes, however, of the
stratagems are enumerated. And one of them, which is said to have
originated from the men called Cylonians, was as follows: Cylon the
Crotonian held the first place among the citizens for birth, renown, and
wealth; but otherwise, he was a severe, violent, and turbulent man, and
of tyrannical manners. He had, however, the greatest desire of being
made a partaker of the Pythagoric life, and having applied himself to
Pythagoras, who was now an elderly man,[51] for this purpose, was
rejected by him on account of the above-mentioned causes. In consequence
of this, therefore, he and his friends exercised violent hostilities
against Pythagoras and his disciples. So vehement likewise and
immoderate[52] was the ambition of Cylon, and of those who arranged
themselves on his side, that it extended itself to the very last of the
Pythagoreans. Pythagoras, therefore, for this cause went to Metapontum,
and there is said to have terminated his life. But those who were called
the Cylonians continued to form stratagems against the Pythagoreans, and
to exhibit indications of all possible malevolence. Nevertheless, for a
certain time the probity of the Pythagoreans subdued [this enmity,] and
also the decision of the cities themselves, so that they were willing
that their political concerns should be managed by the Pythagoreans
[alone]. At length, however, the Cylonians became so hostile to the
men,[53] that setting fire to the house of Milo in which the
Pythagoreans were seated, and were consulting about warlike concerns;
they burnt all the men except two, Archippus and Lysis. For these being
in perfect vigour, and most robust, escaped out of the house. But this
taking place, and no mention being made by the multitude of the calamity
which had happened, the Pythagoreans ceased to pay any further attention
to the affairs of government. This however happened through two causes,
through the negligence of the cities (for they were not at all affected
by so great a calamity taking place) and through the loss of those men
who were most qualified to govern. But of the two Pythagoreans that were
saved, and both of whom were Tarentines, Archippus indeed returned to
Tarentum; but Lysis hating the negligence [of the cities] went into
Greece, and dwelt in the Achaia of Peloponnesus. Afterwards, he migrated
to Thebes, being stimulated by a certain ardent desire [of retreating
thither]; and _there he had for his auditor Epaminondas who called Lysis
his father_. There also Lysis terminated his life. But the rest of the
Pythagoreans, except Archytas of Tarentum, departed from Italy, and
being collected together in Rhegium, there dwelt with each other. The
most celebrated of them, however, were Phanto, Echecrates, Polymnastus,
and Diocles, who were Phlyasians; and Xenophilus Chalcidensis of Thrace.
But in the course of time, when the administration of public affairs
proceeded into a worse condition, these Pythagoreans nevertheless
preserved their pristine manners and disciplines, though the sect began
to fail, till it generously perished. These things, therefore, are
narrated by Aristoxenus.
Nicomachus, however, in other respects accords with Aristoxenus, but as
to the journey of Pythagoras, he says that this stratagem took place,
while Pythagoras was at Delos. For he went there, in order to give
assistance to his preceptor Pherecydes the Syrian who was then afflicted
with the morbus pedicularis, and when he died, performed the necessary
funeral rites. Then, therefore, those who had been rejected by the
Pythagoreans, and to whom monuments had been raised, as if they were
dead, attacked them, and committed all of them to the flames.
Afterwards, they were overwhelmed by the Italians with stones, and
thrown out of the house unburied. At that time, therefore, it happened
that science failed together with those who possessed scientific
knowledge, because till that period, it was preserved by them in their
breasts as something arcane and ineffable. But such things only as were
difficult to be understood, and which were not unfolded, were preserved
in the memory of those who did not belong to the Pythagorean sect; a few
things excepted, which certain Pythagoreans, who happened at that time
to be in foreign lands, preserved as certain sparks of science very
obscure and of difficult investigation. These also, being left by
themselves, and not moderately dejected by the calamity, were scattered
in different places, and no longer endured to have any communion with
the rest of mankind. But they lived alone in solitary places, wherever
they happened to meet with them; and each greatly preferred an
association with himself to that with any other person.
Fearing, however, lest the name of philosophy should be entirely
exterminated from mankind, and that they should on this account incur
the indignation of the Gods, by suffering so great a gift of theirs to
perish, they made an arrangement of certain commentaries and symbols,
and likewise, collected together the writings of the more ancient
Pythagoreans, and of such things as they remembered. These, each left at
his death to his son, or daughter, or wife, with a strict injunction not
to give them to any one out of the family. This mandate therefore, was
for a long time observed, and was transmitted in succession to their
posterity,
Since, however, Apollonius dissents in a certain place respecting these
particulars, and adds many things which we have not mentioned, we shall
also insert his narration of the stratagem employed against the
Pythagoreans. He says, therefore, that the envy of others attended
Pythagoras from his childhood. For as long as he conversed with all that
came to him, he was pleasing to them; but when he associated with his
disciples alone, the favourable opinion which the multitude entertained
of him was diminished. And they permitted him indeed, to pay more
attention to strangers than to themselves; but they were indignant at
his preferring some of their fellow-citizens before others, and they
apprehended that his disciples assembled together with intentions
hostile to them. In the next place, as the young men that were indignant
with him were of high rank, and surpassed others in wealth, and when
they arrived at a proper age, not only held the first honors in their
own families, but also managed the affairs of the city in common, they
formed a large body of men (for they were more than three hundred in
number) and in consequence of this there was but a small part of the
city, which was not conversant with the same manners and the same
pursuits as they were.
Moreover, as long as the Crotonians continued in their own country, and
Pythagoras dwelt with them, that form of government remained which had
been established when the city was founded, but which was not pleasing
to the people, and therefore induced them to seek an occasion of
producing a change. When therefore Sybaris was captured, and the land
taken in the war was not divided by lot, according to the desire of the
multitude, their silent hatred of the Pythagoreans burst forth, and the
populace separated themselves from them. But the leaders of this
dissension were those that were most near to the Pythagoreans, both by
alliance and familiarity. The cause however of the discord was this,
that many of the actions of the Pythagoreans offended these leaders, as
well as casual persons, because these actions had something peculiar in
them when compared with those of others. But in the greatest of these
actions they conceived that disgrace befel themselves alone.
Farther still, no one of the Pythagoreans called Pythagoras by his name,
but while he was alive, when they wished to denote him, they called him
_divine_; and after his death they denominated him _that man_; just as
Homer represents Eumæus when he makes mention of Ulysses, saying,
Him, tho’ he’s absent, yet I fear, O guest,
To name; such is the greatness of my love and care.
Conformably likewise to the precepts of their master, the Pythagoreans
always rose from bed before the rising of the sun; and never wore a ring
in which the image of God was engraved. They also carefully observed to
adore the rising sun, and avoided wearing a ring of the above mentioned
description, lest they should have it about them at funerals, or in some
impure place. In a similar manner, they were attentive to the mandate of
Pythagoras, not to do any thing without previous deliberation and
disquisition; but to form a plan in the morning of what ought to be done
[in the course of the day,] and at night to call to mind the actions of
the day, by this means at one and the same time exploring their conduct,
and exercising their memory. Thus too, they observed the precept, that
if any one of their associates appointed to meet them at a certain
place, they should stay there till he came through the day and the
night; in this again, the Pythagoreans being accustomed to remember what
was said, and not to speak casually. In short Pythagoras ordered them to
be attentive to order and method as long as they lived, and not to
blaspheme at the time of death, but to die with propitious words, such
as are used by those who are sailing out of port into the Adriatic
sea.[54]
The kindred of the Pythagoreans however, were indignant that the
Pythagoreans gave their right hand to those of their own sect alone,
their parents excepted; and that they shared their possessions with each
other in common, but excluded their relations from this fellowship, as
if they were strangers. These, therefore, becoming the sources of the
dissension, the rest readily fell into hostility against the
Pythagoreans. Hippasus, also, Diodorus and Theages said at the same
time, that every citizen ought to be a partaker of the magistracy and
the assembly, and that the rulers should give an account of their
conduct, to those who were elected by lot for this purpose from the
multitude. But the Pythagoreans, Alcimachus, Dimachus, Meton and
Democedes opposed this, and persevered in prohibiting the dissolution of
the polity derived from their ancestors. Those however, who patronized
the multitude, subdued the other party. The multitude therefore, being
assembled together, Cylon and Ninon who were rhetoricians accused the
Pythagoreans. And of these, one belonged to the class of the rich, but
the other was a plebeian. They also divided their harangues between
themselves. But of these harangues, the longer being delivered by Cylon,
Ninon concluded, pretending that he had explored the arcana of the
Pythagoreans, and that he had connected and committed to writing such
particulars as were especially calculated to criminate the Pythagoreans,
and giving a book to ascribe, he ordered him to read it. But the book
was inscribed _the Sacred Discourse_. And the following is a specimen of
what it contained: Friends are to be venerated in the same manner as the
Gods; but others are to be treated as brutes. This very sentence also is
ascribed to Pythagoras by his disciples, and is by them expressed in
verse as follows:
He like the blessed Gods his friends rever’d,
But reckon’d others men of no account.
Homer, too, especially deserves to be praised for calling a king _the
shepherd of the people_. For being a friend to that government in which
the rulers are few, he evinced by this epithet that the rest of men are
cattle. To beans it is requisite to be hostile, as being the leaders of
decision by lot; for by these men were allotted the administration of
affairs. Again, empire should be the object of desire: for they proclaim
that it is better to be one day a bull, than to be an ox for ever. That
the legal institutes of others are laudable; but that they should be
exhorted to use those which are known to themselves. In one word, Ninon
showed that their philosophy was a conspiracy against the multitude, and
therefore exhorted them not to hear the counsellors, but to consider
that they would never have been admitted into the assembly, if the
council of the Pythagoreans had been approved by the session of a
thousand men; so that it was not fit to suffer those to speak, who
prevented to the utmost of their power others from being heard. He
observed, therefore, that they should consider the right hand which was
rejected by the Pythagoreans, as hostile to them, when they gave their
suffrages by an extension of the hands, or calculated the number of the
votes. That they should also consider it to be a disgraceful
circumstance, that they who conquered thirty myriads of men at the river
Tracis, should be vanquished by a thousandth part of the same number
through sedition in the city itself. In short Ninon so exasperated his
hearers by his calumnies, that in a few days after, a great multitude
assembled together intending to attack the Pythagoreans as they were
sacrificing to the Muses in a house near to the temple of Apollo. The
Pythagoreans, however, foreseeing that this would take place, fled to an
inn; but Democedes, with those that had arrived at puberty, withdrew to
Platea. And those that had dissolved the laws made a decree in which
they accused Democedes of compelling the younger part of the community
to the possession of empire, and proclaimed by a cryer that thirty
talents should be given to any one who destroyed him. An engagement also
taking place, and Theages having vanquished Democedes in that contest,
they distributed to him the thirty talents which the city had promised.
But as the city, and the whole region were involved in many evils, the
exiles were brought to judgment, and the power of decision being given
to three cities, viz. to the Tarentines, Metapontines, and the
Caulonians, those that were sent by them to determine the cause were
corrupted by money, as we learn from the chronicles of the Crotonians.
Hence the Crotonians condemned by their own decision those that were
accused, to exile. In consequence, too, of this decision, and the
authority which it conferred on them, they expelled all those from the
city, who were dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs, and at
the same time banished all their families, asserting that it was not fit
to be impious, and that children ought not to be divulsed from their
parents. They likewise abolished loans, and made the land to be
undivided.[55]
Many years after this, when Dinarchus and his associates were slain in
another battle, and Litagus also was dead, who had been the greatest
leader of the seditious, a certain pity and repentance induced the
citizens to recall those Pythagoreans that were left, from exile. For
this purpose, they sent ambassadors from Achaia, and through them became
amicable with the exiles, and consecrated their oaths at Delphi. But the
Pythagoreans who returned from exile were about sixty in number, except
those who were of a more advanced age, among which were some who applied
themselves to medicine, and restored health to those that were sick by a
certain diet; of which method of cure they were themselves the authors.
It happened however, that those Pythagoreans who were saved, and who
were particularly celebrated by the multitude, at that time in which it
was said to the lawless, _This is not the condition of things which was
under Ninon_;—these same Pythagoreans having left the city in order to
procure assistance against the Thurians who invaded the country,
perished in battle, mutually defending each other. But the city was so
changed into a contrary opinion [of the Pythagoreans,] that besides the
praise which it bestowed on them, it apprehended that it would gratify
the Muses in a still greater degree, if it performed a public sacrifice
in the temple of the Muses, which at the request of the Pythagoreans,
they had before constructed in honor of those Goddesses, And thus much
concerning the attack which was made on the Pythagoreans.
CHAP. XXXVI.
The successor, however, of Pythagoras, is acknowledged by all men to
have been Aristæus, the son of Damophon the Crotonian, who existing at
the same time as Pythagoras, was seven ages prior to Plato. Aristæus
likewise, was not only thought worthy to succeed Pythagoras in his
school, but also to educate his children, and marry his wife Theano,
because he was eminently skilled in the Pythagoric dogmas. For
Pythagoras himself is said to have taught in his school, forty years
wanting one, and to have lived nearly one hundred years. But Aristæus,
when much advanced in years, relinquished the school; and after him
Mnesarchus succeeded, who was the son of Pythagoras. Bulagoras succeeded
Mnesarchus, in whose time it happened that the city of the Crotonians
was plundered. Gartydas the Crotonian succeeded Bulagoras, on his return
from a journey which he had undertaken prior to the war. Nevertheless on
account of the calamity of his country, he suffered so much anxiety, as
to die prematurely through grief. But it was the custom with the rest of
the Pythagoreans, when they became very old, to liberate themselves from
the body as from a prison.
Moreover, some time after, Aresas Lucanus, being saved through certain
strangers, undertook the management of the school; and to him came
Diodorus Aspendius, who was received into the school, on account of the
paucity of the Pythagoreans it contained. And in Heraclea, indeed, were
Clinias and Philolaus; but at Metapontum, Theorides and Eurytus; and at
Tarentum Archytas. It is also said that Epicharmus was one of the
foreign auditors; but that he was not one of the school. Having however
arrived at Syracuse, he abstained from philosophizing openly, on account
of the tyranny of Hiero. But he inserted the conceptions of the men in
metre, and published in comedies the occult dogmas of Pythagoras.
Of all the Pythagoreans, however, it is probable that many are unknown
and anonymous. But the following are the names of those that are known
and celebrated: Of the Crotonians, Hippostratus, Dymas, Ægon, Æmon,
Sillus, Cleosthenes, Agelas, Episylus, Phyciadas, Ecphantus, Timæus,
Buthius, Eratus, Itmæus, Rhodippus, Bryas, Evandrus, Myllias, Antimedon,
Ageas, Leophron, Agylus, Onatus, Hipposthenes, Cleophron, Alcmæon,
Damocles, Milon, Menon. Of the Metapontines, Brontinus, Parmiseus,
Orestadas, Leon, Damarmenus, Æneas, Chilas, Melisias, Aristeas, Laphion,
Evandrus, Agesidamus, Xenocades, Euryphemus, Aristomenes, Agesarchus,
Alceas, Xenophantes, Thraseus, Arytus, Epiphron, Eiriscus, Megistias,
Leocydes, Thrasymedes, Euphemus, Procles, Antimenes, Lacritus,
Damotages, Pyrrho, Rhexibius, Alopecus, Astylus, Dacidas, Aliochus,
Lacrates, Glycinus. Of the Agrigentines, Empedocles. Of the Eleatæ,
Parmenides. Of the Tarentines, Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytas, Theodorus,
Aristippus, Lycon, Hestiæus, Polemarchus, Asteas, Clinias, Cleon,
Eurymedon, Arceas, Clinagoras, Archippus, Zopyrus, Euthynus, Dicæarchus,
Philonidas, Phrontidas, Lysis, Lysibius, Dinocrates, Echecrates,
Paction, Acusiladas, Icmus, Pisicrates, Clearatus.
Of the Leontines, Phrynichus, Smichias, Aristoclidas, Clinias,
Abroteles, Pisyrrhydus, Bryas, Evandrus, Archemachus, Mimnomachus,
Achmonidas, Dicas, Carophantidas. Of the Sybarites, Metopus, Hippasus,
Proxenus, Evanor, Deanax, Menestor, Diocles, Empedus, Timasius,
Polemæus, Evæus, Tyrsenus. Of the Carthaginians, Miltiades, Anthen,
Odius, Leocritus. Of the Parians, Æetius, Phænecles, Dexitheus,
Alcimachus, Dinarchus, Meton, Timæus, Timesianax, Amærus, Thymaridas. Of
the Locrians, Gyptius, Xenon, Philodamus, Evetes, Adicus, Sthenonidas,
Sosistratus, Euthynus, Zaleucus, Timares. Of the Posidonians, Athamas,
Simus, Proxenus, Cranous, Myes, Bathylaus, Phædon. Of the Lucani,
Ocellus and Occillus who were brothers, Oresandrus, Cerambus, Dardaneus,
Malion. Of the Ægeans, Hippomedon, Timosthenes, Euelthon, Thrasydamus,
Crito, Polyctor. Of the Lacones, Autocharidas, Cleanor, Eurycrates. Of
the Hyperboreans, Abaris. Of the Rheginenses, Aristides, Demosthenes,
Aristocrates, Phytius, Helicaon, Mnesibulus, Hipparchides, Athosion,
Euthycles, Opsimus. Of the Selinuntians, Calais. Of the Syracusans,
Leptines, Phintias, Damon. Of the Samians, Melissus, Lacon, Archippus,
Glorippus, Heloris, Hippon, Of the Caulonienses, Callibrotus, Dicon,
Nastas, Drymon, Xentas. Of the Phliasians, Diocles, Echecrates,
Polymnastus, Phanton. Of the Sicyonians, Poliades, Demon, Sostratius,
Sosthenes. Of the Cyrenæans, Prorus, Melanippus, Aristangelus,
Theodorus. Of the Cyziceni, Pythodorus, Hipposthenes, Butherus,
Xenophilus. Of the Catanæi, Charondas, Lysiades. Of the Corinthians,
Chrysippus. Of the Tyrrhenians, Nausitheus. Of the Athenians, Neocritus.
And of Pontus, Lyramnus. In all, two hundred and eighteen. [And these,
indeed, are not all the Pythagoreans, but of all of them they are the
most famous.[56]]
But the most illustrious Pythagorean women are Timycha, the wife of
Myllias the Crotonian. Philtis, the daughter of Theophrius the
Crotonian, Byndacis, the sister of Ocellus and Occillus, Lucanians.
Chilonis, the daughter of Chilon the Lacedæmonian. Cratesiclea the
Lacedæmonian, the wife of Cleanor the Lacedæmonian. Theano, the wife of
Brontinus of Metapontum. Mya, the wife of Milon the Crotonian. Lasthenia
the Arcadian. Abrotelia, the daughter of Abroteles the Tarentine.
Echecratia the Phliasian. Tyrsenis, the Sybarite. Pisirrhonde, the
Tarentine. Nisleadusa, the Lacedæmonian. Bryo, the Argive. Babelyma, the
Argive. And Cleæchma, the sister of Autocharidas the Lacedæmonian. In
all seventeen.
FRAGMENTS
OF THE
ETHICAL WRITINGS
OF CERTAIN
PYTHAGOREANS.
FROM
HIPPODAMUS, THE THURIAN,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON FELICITY.
Of animals, some are the recipients of felicity, but others are
incapable of receiving it. And those animals, indeed, are receptive of
it that have reason. For felicity cannot subsist without virtue; and
virtue is first ingenerated in that which possesses reason. But those
animals are incapable of receiving felicity, that are destitute of
reason. For neither can that which is deprived of sight, receive the
work or the virtue of sight; nor can that which is destitute of reason,
be the recipient of the work, or the virtue of that which possesses
reason. With respect to felicity, however, and virtue, the former is as
a work, but the latter as a certain art, to that which possesses reason.
But of animals which possess reason, some are self-perfect, and these
are such as are perfect through themselves, and are indigent of nothing
external, either to their existence, or to their existing well and
beautifully. And such, indeed, is God. Those animals, however, are not
self-perfect, which are not perfect through themselves, but are in want
of external causes to their perfection. And man is an animal of this
kind. Of animals, therefore, which are not self-perfect, some indeed are
perfect, but others are not perfect. And those indeed are perfect which
derive their subsistence both from their own [proper] causes, and from
external causes. And they derive it indeed from their own causes,
because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature and deliberate
choice; but from external causes, because they receive from thence
equitable legislation and good rulers. But the animals which are not
perfect, are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some
one of these, or whose souls are entirely depraved. And such will the
man be who is of a description different from the above.
Moreover, of perfect men there are two differences. For some of them are
naturally perfect; but others are perfect according to life. And those
indeed alone that are good, are naturally perfect. But these are such as
possess virtue. For the virtue of the nature of every thing is a summit
and perfection. Thus the virtue of the eye is the summit and perfection
of the nature of the eye. But the virtue of man is the summit and
perfection of the nature of man. Those also are perfect according to
life, who are not only good, but happy. For felicity, indeed, is the
perfection of human life. But human, life is a system of actions: and:
felicity gives completion to the actions. Virtue also and fortune give
completion to actions; virtue, indeed, according to use; but good
fortune according to prosperity. God therefore is neither good through
learning virtue from any one, nor is he happy through being attended by
good fortune. For he is good by nature, and happy by nature, and always
was and will be, and will never cease to be, such; since he is
incorruptible, and naturally good. But man is neither happy nor good by
nature, but requires discipline and providential care. And in order to
become good, indeed; he requires virtue; but in order to become happy,
good fortune. On this account, human felicity summarily consists of
these two things, viz. of praise, and the predication of beatitude. Of
praise indeed, from virtue; but of the predication of beatitude, from
prosperity. It possesses virtue therefore, through a divine destiny, but
prosperity through a mortal allotment. But mortal are suspended from
divine concerns, and terrestrial from such as are celestial. Things
subordinate, also, are suspended from such as are more excellent. And on
this account, the good man who follows the Gods is happy; but he who
follows mortal natures is miserable. For to him who possesses wisdom,
prosperity is good and useful. It is good, indeed, through his knowledge
of the use of it; but it is useful, through his co-operating with
actions. It is beautiful, therefore, when prosperity is present with
intellect, and when sailing as it were with a prosperous wind, actions
are performed looking to virtue; just as a pilot looks to the motions of
the stars. For thus, he who does this will not only follow God, but will
also co-arrange human with divine good.
This also is evident, that [human] life becomes different from
disposition and action. But it is necessary that the disposition should
be either worthy or depraved; and that action should be attended either
with felicity or misery. And a worthy disposition, indeed, participates
of virtue; but a bad one of vice. With respect to actions, also, those
that are prosperous are attended with felicity; (for they derive their
completion through looking to reason) but those that are unfortunate,
are attended with misery; for they are frustrated of the end. Hence, it
is not only necessary to learn virtue, but also to possess and use it,
either for security, or increase, [of property when it is too little]
or, which is the greatest thing of all, for the emendation of families
and cities. For it is not only necessary to have the possession of
things beautiful, but also the use of them. All these things, however,
will take place, when a man lives in a city that uses equitable laws.
And these, indeed, I say, are what is called the horn of Amalthea. For
all things are contained in equitable legislation. And without this, the
greatest good of human nature can neither be effected, nor, when
effected, be increased and become permanent. For this comprehends in
itself virtue, and the tendency to virtue; because excellent natures are
generated according to it. Manners, likewise, studies, and laws, subsist
through this in the most excellent condition; and besides these,
rightly-deciding reason, and piety and sanctity towards the most
honorable natures. So that it is necessary that he who is to be happy,
and whose life is to be prosperous, should live and die in a country
governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all illegality. At the same
time what has been said is attended with necessity. For man is a part of
society, and hence from the same reasoning, will become entire and
perfect, if he not only associates with others, but associates in a
becoming manner. For some things are naturally adapted to subsist in
many things, and not in one thing; others in one thing, and not in many;
but others both in many, and in one thing, and on this account in one
thing, because in many. For harmony, indeed, and symphony and number,
are naturally adapted to be ingenerated in many things. For nothing
which makes a whole from these parts, is sufficient to itself.[57] But
acuteness of seeing and hearing, and swiftness of feet, subsist in one
thing alone. Felicity, however, and the virtue of soul, subsist both in
one thing and in many, in a whole, and in the universe. And on this
account they subsist in one thing, because they also subsist in many:
and they subsist in many, because they are inherent in a whole and in
the universe. For the orderly distribution of the whole nature of things
methodically arranges each particular. And the orderly distribution of
particulars gives completion to the whole of things and to the universe.
But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and
not the part to the whole. For if the world was not, neither the sun nor
the moon would exist, nor the planets, nor the fixed stars. But the
world existing, each of these also exists.
The truth of this also may be seen in the nature itself of animals. For
if animal had no existence, there would neither be eye, nor mouth, nor
ear. But animal existing, each of these likewise exists. As the whole,
however, is to the part, so is the virtue of the whole to the virtue of
the part. For harmony not existing, and a divine inspection of mundane
affairs, things which are adorned would no longer be able to remain in
an excellent condition. And equitable legislation not existing in a
city, it is not possible for a citizen to be good or happy. Health,
likewise, not existing in the animal, it is not possible for the foot or
the hand to be strong and healthy. For harmony indeed is the virtue of
the world; equitable legislation is the virtue of a city; and health and
strength are the virtue of the body. Each of the parts likewise in these
things is co-arranged on account of the whole and the universe. For the
eyes see on account of the whole body. And the other parts and members
are co-arranged for the sake of the whole [body] and the universe.
FROM
EURYPHAMUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
CONCERNING HUMAN LIFE.
The perfect life of man falls short indeed of the life of God, because
it is not self-perfect, but surpasses that of irrational animals,
because it participates of virtue and felicity. For neither is God in
want of external causes; since being naturally good and happy, he is
perfect from himself; nor any irrational animal. For brutes being
destitute of reason, they are also destitute of the sciences pertaining
to actions. But the nature of man partly consists of his own proper
deliberate choice, and partly is in want of the assistance derived from
divinity. For that which is capable of being fashioned by reason, which
has an intellectual perception of things beautiful and base, can erectly
extend itself from earth, and look to heaven, and can perceive with the
eye of intellect the highest Gods,—that which is capable of all this,
participates likewise of assistance from the Gods. But in consequence of
possessing will, deliberate choice, and a principle of such a kind in
itself as enables it to study virtue, and to be agitated by the storms
of vice, to follow, and also to apostatize from the Gods,—it is likewise
able to be moved by itself. Hence it is a partaker of praise and blame,
honor and ignominy, partly from the Gods and partly from men, according
as it zealously applies itself either to virtue or vice. For the whole
reason of the thing is as follows: Divinity introduced man into the
world as a most exquisite animal, to be reciprocally honored with
himself, and _as the eye of the orderly distribution of things_. Hence
also man gave names to things, becoming himself the character of them.
He likewise invented letters, procuring through these a treasury of
memory. And he imitated the established order of the universe,
co-harmonizing by judicial proceedings and laws the communion of cities.
For no work is performed by men more decorous to the world, or more
worthy of the notice of the Gods, than the apt constitution of a city
governed by good laws, and an orderly distribution of laws and a polity.
For though each man himself by himself is nothing, and is not himself by
himself sufficient to lead a life conformable to the common concord, and
apt composition of a polity, yet he is well adapted to the whole and to
the perfect system of society. For the life of man is the image of a
lyre accurately [harmonized,] and in every respect perfect. For every
lyre requires these three things, apparatus, apt composition, and a
certain musical contrectation. And apparatus indeed, is a preparation of
all the appropriate parts; viz. of the chords, and of the instruments
which co-operate with the well-sounding and striking of the lyre. But
the apt composition is the commixture of the sounds with each other. And
the musical contrectation is the motion of these conformably to the apt
composition. Thus also human life requires these same three things.
Apparatus, indeed, which is the completion of the parts of life. But the
parts of life are the goods of the body, of riches, renown, and friends.
The apt composition is the co-arrangement of these according to virtue
and the laws. And the musical contrectation is the commixture of these
conformably to virtue and the laws; virtue sailing with a prosperous
wind, and having nothing externally resisting it. For felicity does not
consist in being driven from the purpose of voluntary intentions, but in
obtaining them; nor in virtue being without attendants and ministrant
aids; but in completely possessing its own proper powers which are
adapted to actions. For man is not self-perfect, but imperfect. And he
becomes perfect, partly from himself, and partly from an external cause.
He is likewise perfect, either according to nature, or according to
life. And he is perfect indeed according to nature, if he becomes a good
man. For the virtue of each thing is the summit and perfection of the
nature of that thing. Thus the virtue[58] of the eyes is the summit and
perfection of the nature of the eyes; and this is also true of the
virtue of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of man is the summit and
perfection of the nature of man. But man is perfect according to life,
when he becomes happy. For felicity is the perfection and completion of
human goods. Hence, again, virtue and prosperity become the parts of the
life of man. And virtue, indeed, is a part of him so far as he is soul,
but prosperity so far as he is connected with body. But both are parts
of him so far as he is an animal. For it is the province of virtue to
use in a becoming manner the goods which are conformable to nature; but
of prosperity to impart the use of them. And the former, indeed, imparts
deliberate choice and right reason; but the latter, energies and
actions. For to wish what is beautiful in conduct and to endure things
of a dreadful nature, is the proper business of virtue. But it is the
work of prosperity to render deliberate choice successful, and to cause
actions to arrive at the [desired] end. For the general conquers in
conjunction with virtue and good fortune. The pilot sails well in
conjunction with art and prosperous winds. The eye sees well in
conjunction with acuteness of vision[59] and light. And the life of man
becomes most excellent through virtue itself, and prosperity.
FROM
HIPPARCHUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON TRANQUILLITY.
Since men live but for a very short period, if their life is compared
with the whole of time, they will make a most beautiful journey as it
were, if they pass through life with tranquillity. This however they
will possess in the most eminent degree, if they accurately and
scientifically know themselves, viz. if they know that they are mortal
and of a fleshly nature, and that they have a body which is corruptible
and can be easily injured, and which is exposed to every thing most
grievous and severe, even to their latest breath. And in the first
place, let us direct our attention to those things which happen to the
body; and these are pleurisy, inflammation of the lungs, phrensy, gout,
stranguary, dysentery, lethargy, epilepsy, putrid ulcers, and ten
thousand other diseases. But the diseases which happen to the soul are
much greater and more dire than these. For all the iniquitous, evil,
illegal, and impious conduct in the life of man, originates from the
passions of the soul. For through preternatural immoderate desires many
have become subject to unrestrained impulses, and have not refrained
from the most unholy pleasures, arising from being connected with
daughters or even mothers. Many also have been induced to destroy their
fathers, and their own offspring. But what occasion is there to be
prolix in narrating externally impending evils, such as excessive rain,
drought, violent heat and cold; so that frequently from the anomalous
state of the air, pestilence and famine are produced, and all-various
calamities, and whole cities become desolate? Since therefore many
such-like calamities are impendent, we should neither be elevated by the
possession of corporeal goods, which may rapidly be consumed by the
incursions of a small fever, nor with what are conceived to be
prosperous external circumstances, which frequently in their own nature
perish more rapidly than they accede. For all these are uncertain and
unstable, and are found to have their existence in many and various
mutations; and no one of them is permanent, or immutable, or stable, or
indivisible. Hence well considering these things, and also being
persuaded, that if what is present and is imparted to us, is able to
remain for the smallest portion of time, it is as much as we ought to
expect; we shall then live in tranquillity and with hilarity, generously
bearing whatever may befal us.
Now, however, many previously conceiving in imagination, that all that
is present with, and imparted to them by nature and fortune, is better
than it is, and not thinking it to be such as it is in reality, but such
as it is able to become when it has arrived at the summit of excellence,
they burden the soul with many great, nefarious, and stupid evils, when
they are suddenly deprived of [these evanescent goods]. And thus it
happens to them that they lead a most bitter and miserable life. But
this takes place in the loss of riches, or the death of friends or
children, or in the privation of certain other things, which are
conceived by them to be most honorable possessions. Afterwards, weeping
and lamenting, they assert of themselves, that they alone are most
unfortunate and miserable, not remembering that these things have
happened, and even now happen, to many others; nor are they able to
understand the life of those that are now in existence, and of those
that have lived in former times, nor to see in what great calamities and
waves of evils, many of the present time are, and of the past have been
involved. Considering with ourselves therefore, that many having lost
their property, have afterwards on account of this very loss been saved,
since hereafter they might either have fallen into the hands of robbers,
or into the power of a tyrant; that many also who have loved certain
persons, and have been benevolently disposed towards them in the
extreme, have afterwards greatly hated them;—considering all these
things, which have been delivered to us by history, and likewise
learning that many have been destroyed by their children, and by those
that they have most dearly loved; and comparing our own life with that
of those who have been more unhappy than we have been, and taking into
account human casualties [in general] and not only such as happen to
ourselves, we shall pass through life with greater tranquillity. For it
is not lawful that he who is himself a man, should think the calamities
of others easy to be borne, and not his own, since he sees that the
whole of life is naturally exposed to many calamities. Those however,
that weep and lament, besides not being able to recover what they have
lost, or recal to life those that are dead, impel the soul to greater
perturbations, in consequence of its being filled with much depravity.
It is requisite therefore, that, being washed and purified, we should by
all possible contrivances wipe away our inveterate stains by the
reasonings of philosophy. But we shall accomplish this by adhering to
prudence and temperance, being satisfied with our present circumstances,
and not aspiring after many things. For men who procure for themselves a
great abundance [of external goods], do not consider that the enjoyment
of them terminates with the present life. We ought therefore to use the
goods that are present; and by the assistance of the beautiful and
venerable things of which philosophy is the source, we shall be
liberated from the insatiable desire of depraved possessions.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
In the first place, it is requisite to know this, that the good man is
not immediately happy from necessity; but that this is the case with the
man who is both happy and good. For the happy man obtains both praise
and the predication of blessedness; but the good man far as he is good
obtains praise alone. The praise also arises from virtue; but the
predication of blessedness from good fortune. And the worthy man,
indeed, becomes such from the goods which he possesses; but the happy
man is sometimes deprived of his felicity. For the power of virtue is
perfectly free, but that of felicity is subject to restraint. For
long-continued diseases of the body, and deprivations of the senses,
cause the florishing condition of felicity to waste away. God, however,
differs from a good man in this, that God indeed not only possesses
virtue genuine and purified from every mortal passion, but his power
also is unwearied and unrestrained, as being adapted to the most
venerable and magnificent production of eternal works. Man indeed, by
the mortal condition of his nature, not only enjoys this power and this
virtue in a less degree; but sometimes through the want of symmetry[60]
in the goods which he possesses, or through powerful custom, or a
depraved nature, or through many other causes, he is unable to possess
in the extreme a good which is perfectly true.
Since therefore of goods, some are eligible for their own sakes, and not
for the sake of another thing; but others are eligible for the sake of
something else, and not on their own account; there is also a certain
third species of goods, which is eligible both on its own account, and
for the sake of another thing. What, therefore, is the good which is
eligible on its own account, and not for the sake of something else? It
is evident that it is felicity. For we aspire after other things for the
sake of this, but we do not desire this for the sake of any thing else.
Again, what are those goods which we desire indeed for the sake of
something else, but which we do not desire on their own account? It is
evident they are such things as are useful, and pre-eligible goods,
which become the causes of our obtaining things which are eligible [on
their own account]; such as corporeal labors, exercise, and frictions
which are employed for the sake of a good habit of body; and also
reading, meditation, and study, which are undertaken for the sake of
things beautiful and virtue. But what are the things which are eligible
on their own account, and also for the sake of something else? They are
such things as the virtues, and the habits of them, deliberate choice
and actions, and whatever adheres to that which is really beautiful.
Hence, that indeed which is eligible on its own account, and not on
account of something else, is a solitary good and one. But that which is
eligible for its own sake, and for the sake of another thing, is triply
divided. For one part of it indeed subsists about the soul; another
about the body; and another pertains to externals. And that which is
about the soul, consists of the virtues of the soul; that which is about
the body, of the virtues of the body; and that which pertains to
externals, consists of friends, glory, honor, and wealth. There is
likewise a similar reasoning with respect to that which is eligible on
account of something else. For one part of it indeed is effective of the
goods of the soul; another part of it, of the goods of the body; and
that which pertains to externals is the cause of wealth, glory, honor,
and friendship.
That virtue however happens to be eligible for its own sake, is evident
from the following considerations. For if things which are naturally
subordinate, I mean the goods of the body, are eligible for their own
sakes, but the soul is better than the body, it is evident that we love
the goods of the soul on their own account, and not for the sake of the
consequences with which they are attended.
There are likewise three definite times of human life; one of
prosperity; another of adversity; and a third subsisting between these.
Since therefore, he is a good man who possesses and uses virtue; but he
uses it according to three seasons; for he uses it either in adversity,
or in prosperity, or in the time between these; and in adversity indeed
he is unhappy, but in prosperity happy, and in the middle condition, he
is not happy [though he is not miserable];—this being the case, it is
evident that felicity is nothing else than the use of virtue in
prosperity. We now speak, however, of the felicity of man. But man is
not soul alone, but is likewise body. For the animal which consists of
both, and that which is constituted from things of this kind is man. For
though the body is naturally adapted to be the instrument of the soul,
yet this as well as the soul is a part of man [so far as he is an
animal.[61]] Hence of goods also, some are the goods of man, but others,
of the parts of man. And the good of man, indeed, is felicity. But of
the parts of man, the good of the soul is prudence, fortitude, justice,
and temperance. And the good of the body is beauty, health, a good
corporeal habit, and excellence of sensation. With respect to externals
however, wealth, glory, honor, and nobility, are naturally adapted to be
attendant on man, and to follow precedaneous goods. The less, also, are
ministrant to the greater goods. Thus friendship, glory, and wealth, are
ministrant both to the body and the soul; but health, strength, and
excellence of sensation, are subservient to the soul; and prudence [i.
e. wisdom] and justice are ministrant to the intellect of the soul.
_Intellect, however, is the satellite of Deity._ For God is the most
excellent, and the leader and ruler of all things. And for the sake of
these, it is necessary that other goods should be present. For the
general, indeed, is the leader of the army; the pilot, of the ship; God,
of the world; and intellect, of soul. But prudence is the leader of the
felicity pertaining to life. For prudence is nothing else than the
science of the felicity which respects human life, or the science of the
goods which naturally pertain to man.
And the felicity, indeed, and life of God are most excellent; but the
felicity of man consists of science, and virtue, and in the third place
of prosperity[62] corporalized. But I mean by science, the wisdom
pertaining to things divine and demoniacal; and by prudence, the wisdom
pertaining to human concerns, and the affairs of life. For it is
requisite to call the virtues which employ reasonings and
demonstrations, sciences. But it is fit to denominate virtue ethical,
and the best habit of the irrational part of the soul, according to
which we are said to possess certain qualities pertaining to manners;
viz. by which we are called liberal, just, and temperate. But it is
requisite to call prosperity, the preter-rational presence of goods, [or
a supply of goods without the assistance of reason,] and which is not
effected on account of it. Since therefore virtue and science are in our
power, but prosperity is not; and since also felicity consists in the
contemplation and performance of things [truly] beautiful; but
contemplations and actions, when they are not prosperous, are attended
with ministrant offices and necessity, but when they proceed in the
right path, produce delight and felicity; and these things are effected
in prosperity;—this being the case, it is evident that _felicity is
nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity_. Hence the good man
is disposed with respect to prosperity, in the same manner as he who has
an excellent and robust body. For such a one is able to endure heat and
cold, to raise a great burden, and to sustain easily many other
molestations.
Since therefore felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity, we must
speak concerning virtue and prosperity, and in the first place
concerning prosperity. For of goods, some indeed do not admit of excess,
and this is the case with virtue. For there is not any virtue which is
excessive, nor any worthy man who is beyond measure good. For virtue has
the fit and becoming for a rule, and is the habit of the decorous in
practical concerns. But prosperity receives excess and diminution. And
when it is excessive indeed, it generates certain vices, and removes a
man from his natural habit; so that he frequently through this opposes
the constitution of virtue. And this is not only the case with
prosperity, but many other causes likewise may effect the same thing.
For it is by no means proper to wonder, that some of those who play on
the pipe should be arrogant men, who, bidding farewell to truth, ensnare
by a certain false imagination those who are unskilled in music; and to
disbelieve that a thing of this kind does not take place in virtue. For
the more venerable a thing is, so much the more numerous are those that
pretend to the possession of it. For there are many things which distort
the habit and form of virtue; some of which are insidious arts and
affectation; others are kindred physical passions, which sometimes
produce an indecorum[63] contrary to the true disposition [of virtue.]
This also is effected through manners in which men have been nurtured
for a long time; and it not unfrequently happens that it is produced
through youth or old age, and through prosperity or adversity; and by
other very numerous ways. Hence, we ought never to wonder, if sometimes
a distorted judgment is formed of all things, the true disposition being
changed.[64] Thus we see that the most excellent carpenter frequently
errs in the works which are the subjects of his art; and this is also
the case with the general, the pilot, the painter, and in short, with
all artists. And yet at the same time we do not deprive them of the
habit which they possess. For as we do not rank among bad men him who at
certain times acts intemperately, or unjustly, or timidly; so neither do
we place him in the class of good men, who does something right in
things pertaining to temperance, or justice, or fortitude. But it must
be said that the conduct of bad men in things of this kind is casually
right, and that good men [sometimes] err. A true judgment however [in
these instances] is to be formed, not by looking to a certain occasion,
or to a certain extent of time, but to the whole of life. But as
indigence and excess are injurious to the body, yet excess and what are
called superfluities, are naturally adapted to produce greater diseases
[than those caused by indigence]; thus also prosperity or adversity
injure the soul, when they unseasonably happen; yet that which is called
by all men prosperity, is naturally adapted to produce greater diseases
[than adversity], since it intoxicates like wine the reasoning power of
good men.
Hence it is more difficult to bear prosperity in a becoming manner than
adversity. For all men when they continue in adversity, are seen for the
most part to be moderate and orderly in their manners; but in prosperity
they are brave, magnificent, and magnanimous [when they bear it in a
becoming manner]. For adversity has the power of contracting and
depressing the soul; but prosperity, on the contrary, elevates and
expands it. Hence all those that are unfortunate, are in their manners
cautious and prudent; but those that are fortunate are insolent and
confident. But the boundary of prosperity, is that which a good man
would deliberately choose to co-operate with him in his own proper
actions; just as the [proper] magnitude of a ship, and the [proper]
magnitude of a rudder, are such as will enable a good pilot to sail over
a great extent of sea, and to accomplish a great voyage. An excess of
prosperity, however, is not naturally adapted to be vanquished by, but
to vanquish the soul. For as a [very] splendid light causes an
obscuration of sight in the eyes; thus also excessive prosperity darkens
the intellect of the soul. And thus much may suffice concerning
prosperity.
FROM
THEAGES,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON THE VIRTUES.
The order of the soul subsists in such a way, that one part of it is the
reasoning power, another is anger, and another is desire. And the
reasoning power, indeed, has dominion over knowledge; anger over
impetus; and desire intrepidly rules over the appetitions of the soul.
When therefore these three parts pass into one, and exhibit one
appropriate composition, then virtue and concord are produced in the
soul. But when they are divulsed from each other by sedition, then vice
and discord are produced in the soul. It is necessary, however, that
virtue should have these three things, viz. reason, power, and
deliberate choice. The virtue, therefore, of the reasoning power of the
soul is prudence; for it is a habit of judging and contemplating. But
the virtue of the irascible part, is fortitude; for it is a habit of
resisting, and enduring things of a dreadful nature. And the virtue of
the epithymetic or appetitive part is temperance; for it is a moderation
and detention of the pleasures which arise through the body. But the
virtue of the whole soul is justice. For men indeed become bad, either
through vice, or through incontinence, or through a natural ferocity.
But they injure each other, either through gain, or through pleasure, or
through ambition. Vice, therefore, more appropriately belongs to the
reasoning part of the soul. For prudence indeed is similar to art; but
vice to pernicious art. For it invents contrivances for the purpose of
acting unjustly. But incontinence rather pertains to the appetitive part
of the soul. For continence consists in subduing, and incontinence in
not subduing pleasures. And ferocity pertains to the irascible part of
the soul. For when some one, through acting ill from desire, is
gratified not as a man should be, but as a wild beast, then a thing of
this kind is denominated ferocity. The effects also of these
dispositions are consequent to the things for the sake of which they are
performed. For avarice is consequent to vice; but vice is consequent to
the reasoning part of the soul. And ambition, indeed, follows from the
irascible part; and this becoming excessive, generates ferocity. Again,
pleasure pertains to the appetitive part; but this being sought after
more vehemently, generates incontinence. Hence, since the acting
unjustly is produced from so many causes, it is evident that acting
justly is effected through an equal number of causes. For virtue,
indeed, is naturally beneficent and profitable; but vice is productive
of evil, and is noxious.
Since, however, of the parts of the soul, one is the leader, but the
other follows, and the virtues and the vices subsist about these, and in
these; it is evident that with respect to the virtues also, some are
leaders, others are followers, and others, are composed from these. And
the leaders, indeed, are such as prudence; but the followers are such as
fortitude and temperance; and the composites from these, are such as
justice. The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for the
virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the passions, one is
voluntary, but another is involuntary. And the voluntary, indeed, is
pleasure; but the involuntary is pain. Men also, who have the political
virtues, give intension and remission to these, co-harmonizing the other
parts of the soul, to that part which possesses reason. But the boundary
of this co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from
accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that
which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is
more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive,
subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the
conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male.
For the latter sows, generating a soul; but the former alone imparts
matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational
subsists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are
co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as
a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a
dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants. But intellect
being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a
prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent,[65]
investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it
according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the
possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and
more honorable than itself. For _the knowledge of things divine and most
honorable, is the principle, cause, and rule of human blessedness_.
FROM
METOPUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
CONCERNING VIRTUE.
The virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every
being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according
to the proper nature of its virtue. Thus the virtue of a horse, is that
which leads the nature of a horse to its summit. And the same reasoning
is applicable to the several parts of a thing. Thus the virtue of the
eyes is acuteness of vision: and this in the nature of the eyes is the
summit. The virtue of the ears also, is acuteness of hearing: and this
is the summit of the nature of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of the
feet is swiftness: and this is the summit of the nature of the feet. It
is necessary however, that every virtue should have these three things,
reason, power, and deliberate choice; reason indeed, by which it judges
and contemplates; power, by which it prohibits and vanquishes; and
deliberate choice, by which it loves and delights in [what is proper].
To judge therefore, and contemplate, pertain to the dianoetic part of
the soul; but to prohibit and vanquish are the peculiarity of the
irrational[66] part of the soul; and to love and delight in what is
proper, pertain to both the rational and irrational parts. For
deliberate choice consists of dianoia [or the discursive energy of
reason] and appetite. Dianoia therefore, belongs to the rational, but
appetite to the irrational part of the soul. The multitude however, of
all the virtues, may be perceived from the parts of the soul; and in a
similar manner the generation and nature of virtue. For of the parts of
the soul, there are two that rank as the first, viz. the rational and
the irrational parts. And the rational part indeed, is that by which we
judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are
impelled and desire. These however, are either concordant or discordant
with each other. But the contest and dissonance between them, are
produced through excess and defect. It is evident therefore, that when
the rational vanquishes the irrational part of the soul, endurance and
continence are produced; and that when the former leads, and the latter
follows, and both accord with each other, then virtue is generated.
Hence, endurance and continence are generated accompanied with pain; but
endurance resists pain, and continence pleasure. Incontinence however,
and effeminacy, neither resist nor vanquish [pleasure]. And on this
account it happens that men fly from good through pain, but reject it
through pleasure. Praise likewise, and blame, and every thing beautiful
in human conduct are produced in these parts of the soul. And in short,
the nature of virtue derives its subsistence after this manner.
The species however, and the parts of it, may be surveyed as follows:
Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational;
the latter is divided into the irascible and appetitive. And the
rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but
the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire. And of
this, that which is as it were adapted to defend us, and revenge
incidental molestations, is denominated the irascible part; but that
which is as it were orectic of, and desires to preserve the proper
constitution of the body, is the appetitive part. It is evident
therefore, that the multitude of the virtues, their differences, and
their peculiarities, follow conformably to these parts of the soul.
FROM CLINIAS.
Every virtue is perfected, as was shown by us in the beginning, from
reason, deliberate choice, and power. Each of these, however, is not by
itself a part of virtue, but the cause of it. Such therefore, as have
the intellective and gnostic part of virtue,[67] are denominated skilful
and intelligent; but such as have the ethical and pre-elective part of
it, are denominated useful and equitable.[68] Since however, man is
naturally adapted to act unjustly from exciting causes; and these are
three, the love of pleasure in corporeal enjoyments; avarice, in the
accumulation of wealth; and ambition, in surpassing those that are equal
and similar to him;—this being the case, it is necessary to know, that
it is possible to oppose to these such things as procure fear, shame,
and desire in men; viz. fear through the laws, shame through the Gods,
and desire through the energies of reason. Hence, it is necessary that
youth should be taught from the first to honor the Gods and the laws.
For from these, it will be manifest, that every human work, and every
kind of human life, by the participation of sanctity and piety, will
sail prosperously [over the sea of generation].
FROM
THEAGES,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON THE VIRTUES.
The principles of all virtue are three; knowledge, power, and deliberate
choice. And knowledge indeed, is that by which we contemplate and form a
judgment of things; power is as it were a certain strength of the
nature[69] from which we derive our subsistence, and is that which gives
stability to our actions; and deliberate choice is as it were certain
hands of the soul by which we are impelled to, and lay hold on the
objects of our choice. The order of the soul also subsists as follows:
One part of it is the reasoning power, another part is anger, and
another is desire. And the reasoning power indeed, is that which has
dominion over knowledge; anger is that which rules over the ardent
impulses of the soul; and desire is that which willingly rules over
appetite. When therefore, these three pass into one, so as to exhibit
one co-adaptation, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul; but
when they are seditious, and divulsed from each other, then vice and
discord are generated in the soul. And when the reasoning power prevails
over the irrational parts of the soul, then endurance and continence are
produced; endurance indeed, in the retention of pains; but continence in
the abstinence from pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul
prevail over the reasoning power, then effeminacy and incontinence are
produced; effeminacy indeed, in flying from pain; but incontinence, in
the being vanquished by pleasures. When however, the better part of the
soul governs, but the less excellent part is governed; and the former
leads, but the latter follows, and both consent, and are concordant with
each other, then virtue and every good are generated in the whole soul.
When likewise the appetitive follows the reasoning part of the soul,
then temperance is produced; but when this is the case with the
irascible part, fortitude is produced; and when it takes place in all
the parts of the soul, then justice is the result. For justice is that
which separates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each
other. And justice is a certain established order of the apt conjunction
of the parts of the soul, and perfect and supreme virtue. For every good
is contained in this; but the other goods of the soul cannot subsist
without this. Hence justice possesses great strength both among Gods and
men. For this virtue contains the bond by which the whole and the
universe are held together, and also by which Gods and men are
connected. Justice therefore, is said to be Themis among the celestial,
but Dice among the terrestrial Gods; and Law among men. These assertions
however, are indications and symbols, that justice is the supreme
virtue. Hence virtue, when it consists in contemplating and judging, is
called prudence; when in sustaining things of a dreadful nature, it is
denominated fortitude; when in restraining pleasure, temperance; and
when in abstaining from gain, and from injuring our neighbours, justice.
Moreover, the arrangement of virtue according to right reason, and the
transgression of it contrary to right reason, produce [in the former
case] a tendency to the decorous as the final mark, and [in the latter]
the frustration of it. The decorous however, is that which ought to be.
But this does not require either addition or ablation; since it is that
which it is requisite to be. But of the indecorous there are two
species; one of which is excess, and the other defect. And excess
indeed, is more, but deficiency is less, than is decorous. Virtue also,
is a certain habit of the decorous. Hence it is directly, both a summit
and a medium. For thus, things that are decorous are both media and
summits. They are media indeed, because they fall between excess and
deficiency; but they are summits, because they do not require either
addition or ablation. For they are the very things themselves which they
ought to be.
Since however, the virtue of manners is conversant with the passions,
but of the passions pleasure and pain are supreme, it is evident that
virtue does not consist in extirpating the passions of the soul,
pleasure and pain, but in co-harmonizing them. For neither does health,
which is a certain apt mixture of the powers of the body, consist in
expelling the cold and the hot, the moist and the dry; but in these
being [appropriately] mingled together. For it is as it were, a certain
symmetry of these. Thus too, in music, concord does not consist in
expelling the sharp and the flat; but when these are co-harmonized, then
concord is produced, and dissonance is exterminated. In a similar
manner, the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, being harmoniously
mingled together, health is produced, and disease destroyed. But when
anger, and desire are co-harmonized, the vices and the [other] passions
are extirpated, and the virtues and manners are ingenerated. Deliberate
choice however, in beautiful conduct, is the greatest peculiarity of the
virtue of manners. For it is possible to use reason and power without
virtue; but it is not possible to use deliberate choice without it. For
deliberate choice indicates the dignity of manners. Hence also, the
reasoning power subduing _by force_ anger and desire, produces
continence and endurance. And again, when the reasoning power is
violently dethroned by the irrational parts, then incontinence and
effeminacy are produced. Such dispositions however, of the soul as
these, are half-perfect virtues, and half-perfect vices. For the
reasoning power of the soul is [according to its natural subsistence] in
a healthy, but the irrational parts are in a diseased condition. And so
far indeed, as anger and desire are governed and led by the rational
part of the soul, continence and endurance become virtues; but so far as
this is effected by violence, and not voluntarily, they become vices.
For it is necessary that virtue should perform such things as are fit,
not with pain, but with pleasure. Again, so far as anger and desire
govern the reasoning power, effeminacy and incontinence are produced,
which are certain vices. But so far, as they gratify the passions with
pain, knowing that they are erroneous, in consequence of the eye of the
soul being sane,—so far as this is the case, they are not vices. Hence,
it is evident that virtue must necessarily perform what is fit
voluntarily; that which is involuntary indeed, not being without pain
and fear; and that which is voluntary, not subsisting without pleasure
and delight.
By division also it will at the same time be found that this is the
case. For knowledge and the perception of things, are the province of
the rational part of the soul; but power pertains to the irrational
part. For not to be able to resist pain, or to vanquish pleasure, is the
peculiarity of the irrational part of the soul. But deliberate choice
subsists in both these, viz. in the rational; and also in the irrational
part. For it consists of dianoia and appetite; of which, dianoia indeed,
pertains to the rational, but appetite to the irrational part. Hence
every virtue consists in a co-adaptation of the parts of the soul; and
both will and deliberate choice, entirely subsist in virtue.
Universally therefore, virtue is a certain co-adaptation of the
irrational parts of the soul to the rational part. Virtue however, is
produced through pleasure and pain receiving the boundary of that which
is fit. For true virtue is nothing else than the habit of that which is
fit. But the fit, or the decorous, is that which ought to be; and the
unfit, or indecorous, is that which ought not to be. Of the indecorous
however, there are two species, viz. excess and defect. And excess
indeed, is more than is fit; but defect is less than is fit. But since
the fit is that which ought to be, it is both a summit and a middle. It
is a summit indeed, because it neither requires ablation, nor addition;
but it is a middle, because it subsists between excess and defect. The
fit, however, and the unfit, are to each other as the equal and the
unequal that which is arranged, and that which is without arrangement;
and both the two former and the two latter are finite and infinite.[70]
On this account, the parts of the unequal are referred to the middle,
but not to each other. For the angle is called obtuse which is greater
than a right angle; but that is called acute, which is less than a right
angle. The right line also [in a circle] is greater, which surpasses
that which is drawn from the center. And the day is longer indeed, which
exceeds that of the equinox. Diseases, likewise, of the body are
generated, through the body becoming more hot or more cold [than is
proper]. For that which is more hot [than is fit] exceeds moderation;
and that which is more cold [than is fit] is below mediocrity. The soul
also, and such things as pertain to it, have this disposition and
analogy. For audacity indeed, is an excess of the decorous in the
endurance of things of a dreadful nature; but timidity is a deficiency
of the, decorous. And prodigality is an excess of what is fit in the
expenditure of money; but illiberality is a deficiency in this. And rage
indeed, is an excess of the decorous in the impulse of the irascible
part of the soul; but insensibility is a deficiency of this. The same
reasoning likewise applies to the opposition of the other dispositions
of the soul. It is necessary however, that virtue, since it is a habit
of the decorous, and a medium of the passions, should neither be
[wholly] impassive, nor immoderately passive. For impassivity indeed,
causes the soul to be unimpelled, and to be without an enthusiastic
tendency to the beautiful in conduct; but immoderate passivity causes it
to be full of perturbation, and inconsiderate. It is necessary
therefore, that passion should so present itself to the view, in virtue,
as shadow and outline in a picture. For the animated and the delicate,
and that which imitates the truth, in conjunction with goodness of
colors, are especially effected in a picture through these [i. e.
through shadow and outline]. But the passions of the soul are animated
by the natural incitation and enthusiasm of virtue. For virtue is
generated from the passions, and when generated, again subsists together
with them; just as that which is well harmonized consists of the sharp
and the flat, that which is well mingled consists of the hot and the
cold, and that which is in equilibrium derives its equality of weight
from the heavy and the light. It is not therefore necessary to take away
the passions of the soul; for neither would this be profitable; but it
is requisite that they should be co-harmonized with the rational part,
in conjunction with fitness and mediocrity.
FROM
THE TREATISE OF
ARCHYTAS
ON ETHICAL ERUDITION.
I say that virtue will be found sufficient to the avoidance of
infelicity, and vice to the non-attainment of felicity, if we
judiciously consider the habits [by which these are produced]. For it is
necessary that the bad man should always be miserable; whether he is in
affluence, for he employs it badly; or whether he is in penury; just as
the blind man, whether he has light, and the most splendid visible
object before him, or whether he is in the dark [is always necessarily
without sight]. But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does
not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither
does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without
light. Life, however, is divided into two paths; one of which is more
arduous, and in which the patient Ulysses walked; but the other is more
free from molestation, and is that in which Nestor proceeded. I say
therefore that virtue desires the latter, but is able to proceed in the
former of these paths. The nature however of felicity proclaims it to be
a desirable and stable life, because it gives perfection to the decision
of the soul. Hence the virtuous man who does not obtain such a life as
this, is not indeed happy, nor yet entirely miserable. No one therefore
will dare to say that the good man should be exempt from disease, and
pain, and sorrow. For as we leave certain painful things to the body, so
likewise we must permit them to be present with the soul. The sorrows,
however, of fools are most irrational; but those of wise men proceed
only as far as reason, which gives limitation to things, permits.
Moreover, the boast of apathy dissolves the generosity of virtue, when
it opposes itself to things of an indifferent nature, and not to evils
such as death, and pain, and poverty. For things which are not evils are
easily vanquished. We should therefore exercise ourselves in the
mediocrity of the passions, as we shall then equally avoid
insensibility, and too much passivity, and shall not speak higher of our
nature than we ought.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
I say then that the good man is one who uses in a beautiful manner great
things and opportunities. He likewise is able to bear well both
prosperity and adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstances also,
he becomes worthy of the condition in which he is placed; and when his
fortune is changed, receives it in a proper manner. In short, on all
occasions, he contends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor does
he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may happen], but likewise
those who confide in and contend together with him.
FROM
CRITO,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
PRUDENCE AND PROSPERITY.
Prudence and prosperity subsist, with reference to each other, as
follows: Prudence indeed is effable and possesses reason; for it is
something orderly and definite. But prosperity is ineffable and
irrational; for it is something disorderly and indefinite. And prudence,
indeed, is prior, but prosperity is posterior in beginning and in power.
For the former is naturally adapted to govern and define; but the latter
to be governed and defined. Moreover, both prudence and prosperity
receive co-adaptation, since they concur in one and the same thing. For
it is always necessary that the thing which bounds and co-arranges,
should have a nature which is effable and participates of reason; but
that the thing which is bounded and co-arranged, should be naturally
ineffable and irrational. For the reason of the nature of the infinite
and of that which bounds, thus subsists in all things. For infinites are
always naturally disposed to be bounded and co-arranged by things which
possess reason and prudence, since the former have the order of matter
and essence with relation to the latter. But finites are co-arranged and
bounded from themselves, since they have the order of cause, and of that
which is energetic.
The co-adaptation, however, of these natures in different things,
produces a great and various difference of co-adapted substances. For in
the comprehension of the whole of things, the co-adaptation of both the
natures, i. e. of the nature which is always moved, and of that which is
always passive, is the world. For it is not possible for the whole and
the universe to be otherwise saved, than by that which is generated
being co-adapted to that which is divine, and that which is always
passive to that which is always moved.[71] In man, likewise, the
co-adaptation of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, is
virtue. For it is not possible in these, when there is sedition in both
the parts, that virtue should have a subsistence. In a city also, the
co-adaptation of the governors to the governed, produces strength and
concord. For to govern is the peculiarity of the better nature; but to
be governed, is easier to the subordinate [than to the more excellent]
nature. And strength and concord are common to both. There is, however,
the same mode of adaptation in the universe and in a family: for
allurements[72] and erudition concur with reason in one and the same
thing; and likewise pains and pleasures, prosperity and adversity. For
the life of man requires intension and remission, sorrow and gladness,
prosperity and adversity. For some things are able to collect and retain
the intellect to industry and wisdom; but others impart relaxation and
delight, and thus render the intellect vigorous and prompt to action. If
however one of these prevails in life, then the life of man becomes of
one part, and verges to one part, tending either to sorrow and
difficulty, or to remission and levity. But the co-adaptation of all
these ought to subsist with reference to prudence. For this separates
and distinguishes[73] bound and infinity in actions. Hence prudence is
the leader and mother of the other virtues. For all of them are
co-harmonized and co-arranged with reference to the reason and law of
this virtue. And now my discussion of this subject is terminated. For
the irrational and the effable are in all things. And the latter defines
and bounds; but the former is defined and bounded. That, however, which
consists of both these, is the apt composition of the whole and the
universe.
The following beautiful fragment of Crito on Prudence, is from the
Physical Eclogues of Stobæus, p. 198, and is omitted by Gale in
his Collection of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments in Opusc. Mythol.
&c.
God fashioned man in such a way as to render it manifest, that he is not
through the want of power, or of deliberate choice, incapable of being
impelled to what is beautiful in conduct. For he implanted in him a
principle of such a kind as to comprehend at one and the same time the
possible and the pre-eligible; so that man might be the cause of power,
and the possession of good, but God of impulse and incitation according
to right reason. On this account also, he made him tend to heaven, gave
him an intellective power, and implanted in him a sight called
intellect, which is capable of beholding God. For it is not possible
without God to discover that which is best and most beautiful, nor
without intellect to see God, since every mortal nature is established
in conjunction with a kindred privation of intellect. This however is
not imparted to it by God, but by the essence of generation, and by that
impulse of the soul which is without deliberate choice.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
The prudent [i. e. the wise] man will especially become so as follows:
In the first place, being naturally sagacious, possessing a good memory,
and being a lover of labor, he should exercise his dianoetic power
immediately from his youth in reasonings and disciplines, and in
accurate theories, and adhere to genuine philosophy. But after this he
should acquire knowledge and experience in what pertains to the Gods,
the laws, and human lives. For there are two things from which the
disposition of prudence is produced; one of which consists in obtaining
a mathematical and gnostic habit; but the other, in a man perceiving by
himself many theorems and things, and understanding other things through
a certain different mode. For neither is he sufficient to the possession
of prudence, who immediately from his youth has exercised his dianoetic
power in reasonings and disciplines; nor he who being destitute of
these, has heard and has been conversant with a multitude of things. But
the latter will have his dianoetic power blind, through judging of
particulars; and the former through always surveying universals. For as
in computations the amount of the whole is obtained by the addition of
the parts, thus also in things, reason is able to delineate the theory
of universals; but experience has the power of forming a judgment of
particulars.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON DISCIPLINES.
It is necessary that you should become scientific, either by learning
from another person, or by discovering yourself the things of which you
have a scientific knowledge. If, therefore, you learn from another
person, that which you learn is foreign; but what you discover yourself
is through yourself, and is your own. Moreover, if you investigate,
discovery will be easy, and soon obtained; but if you do not know how to
investigate, discovery will be to you impossible. And [right] reasoning
indeed, when discovered, causes sedition to cease, and increases
concord. For through this the inexhaustible desire of possessing is
suppressed, and equality prevails; since by this we obtain what is just
in contracts. Hence, on account of this, the poor receive from those who
are able to give; and the rich give to those that are in want, both of
them believing that through this they shall obtain the equal. This
however will be a rule and an impediment to those that act unjustly,
viz. that men who possess scientific knowledge will appease their anger,
prior to the commission of an injury, being persuaded that the
perpetrators of it will not be concealed when it is committed; but that
those who do not possess scientific knowledge, becoming manifest in the
commission of an injury, will be restrained from acting unjustly.
FROM
POLUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON JUSTICE.
It appears to me that the justice which subsists among men, may be
called the mother and the nurse of the other virtues. For without this a
man can neither be temperate, nor brave, nor prudent. For it is the
harmony and peace, in conjunction with elegance, of the whole soul. The
strength however of this virtue will become more manifest, if we direct
our attention to the other habits. For they have a partial utility, and
which is referred to one thing; but this is referred to whole systems,
and to a multitude. In the world therefore, it conducts the whole
government of things, and is providence, harmony, and Dice, by the
decree of a certain genus of Gods. But in a city it is justly called
peace, and equitable legislation. And in a house, it is the concord
between the husband and wife; the benevolence of the servant towards the
master; and the anxious care of the master for the welfare of the
servant. In the body likewise, which is the first and dearest thing to
all animals, [so far as they are animals,] it is the health and
intireness of all the parts. But in the soul, it is the wisdom, which
among men subsists from science and justice. If therefore, this virtue
thus disciplines and saves both the whole and the parts [of every thing]
rendering things concordant and familiar with each other, how is it
possible it should not be called by the decision of all men, the mother
and the nurse of all things?
The following fragments also, from the Treatise of Archytas on Wisdom,
are preserved by Iamblichus, in the 3rd Chapter of his
Protreptics, or Exhortations to Philosophy.
“Archytas therefore, in the beginning of his Treatise on Wisdom, exhorts
to the possession of it as follows:
1. “Wisdom as much excels in all human affairs as the sight does the
[other] corporeal senses, intellect the soul, and the sun the stars. For
the sight is the most far-darting, and the most multiform of all the
senses; intellect is the supreme part of the soul, judging by reason and
dianoïa what is fit, and existing as the sight and power of the most
honorable things; and the sun is the eye and soul of things which have a
natural subsistence. For through it all things become visible, are
generated, and rise into existence.[74] Deriving also their roots, and
being generated from thence, they are nourished, increased and excited
by it in conjunction with sense.
2. “Man was generated by far the wisest of all [terrestrial] animals.
For he is able to contemplate the things which exist, and to obtain from
all things science and wisdom. To which also it may be added, that
divinity has engraved and exhibited in him the system of universal
reason, in which all the forms of things in existence are distributed,
and the significations of nouns and verbs. For a place is assigned for
the sounds of the voice, viz. the pharynx, the mouth, and the nostrils.
But as man was generated the instrument of the sounds, through which
nouns and verbs are signified, so likewise of the conceptions which are
beheld in the things that have an existence. And this appears to me to
be the work of wisdom, for the accomplishment of which man was generated
and constituted, and received organs and powers from divinity.
3. “Man was generated and constituted, for the purpose of contemplating
the reason of the whole of nature, and in order that, being himself the
work of wisdom, he might survey the wisdom of the things which
exist.—For if the reason of man is contemplative of the reason of the
whole of nature, and the wisdom also of man perceives and contemplates
the wisdom of the things in existence,—this being acknowledged, it is at
the same time demonstrated, that man is a part of universal reason, and
of the whole of the intellectual nature.
4. “Wisdom is not conversant with a certain definite existing thing, but
is simply conversant with all the things that exist. And it is
requisite, that it should not first investigate the principles of
itself, but the common principles of all beings. For wisdom so subsists
with reference to all beings, that it is the province of it to know and
contemplate the universal accidents of all things. And on this account
wisdom discovers the principles of all beings.
5. “Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are
contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and
con-numerate them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men, and to
possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he will also have
discovered a beautiful place of survey, from which it will be possible
to behold divinity, and all things that are in co-ordination with, and
successive to him, subsisting separately, or distinct from each
other.[75] Having likewise entered this most ample road, being impelled
in a right direction by intellect, and having arrived at the end of his
course, he will have conjoined beginnings with ends, and will know that
God is the principle, middle, and end, of all things which are
accomplished according to justice and right reason.”[76]
PYTHAGORIC ETHICAL SENTENCES
FROM
STOBÆUS,
_Which are omitted in the Opuscula Mythologica, &c. of Gale._
Do not even _think_ of doing what ought not to be done.
Choose rather to be strong in soul than in body.
Be persuaded that things of a laborious nature contribute more than
pleasures to virtue.
Every passion of the soul is most hostile to its salvation.
It is difficult to walk at one and the same time in many paths of
life.[77]
Pythagoras said, it is requisite to choose the most excellent life; for
custom will make it pleasant. Wealth is an infirm anchor, glory is still
more infirm; and in a similar manner the body, dominion, and honor. For
all these are imbecile and powerless. What then are powerful anchors?
Prudence, magnanimity, fortitude. These no tempest can shake. This is
the law of God, that virtue is the only thing that is strong; and that
every thing else is a trifle.
All the parts of human life, in the same manner as those of a statue,
ought to be beautiful.
A statue indeed standing on its basis, but a worthy man on the subject
of his deliberate choice, ought to be immovable.
Frankincense ought to be given to the Gods, but praise to good men.
It is requisite to defend those who are unjustly accused of having acted
injuriously, but to praise those who excel in a certain good.
Neither will the horse be judged to be generous, that is sumptuously
adorned, but the horse whose nature is illustrious; nor is the man
worthy who possesses great wealth, but he whose soul is generous.
When the wise man opens his mouth, the beauties of his soul present
themselves to the view, like the statues in a temple.[78]
Remind yourself that all men assert that wisdom is the greatest good,
but that there are few who strenuously endeavour to obtain this greatest
good.[79] Pythagoras.
Be sober, and remember to be disposed to believe; for these are the
nerves of wisdom. Epicharmus.
It is better to live lying on the grass, confiding in divinity and
yourself, than to lie on a golden bed with perturbation.
You will not be in want of any thing, which it is in the power of
Fortune to give and take away.[80]
Despise all those things, which when liberated from the body you will
not want; and exercising yourself in those things of which when
liberated from the body you will be in want, invoke the Gods to become
your helpers.[81]
Neither is it possible to conceal fire in a garment, nor a base
deviation from rectitude in time.
Wind indeed increases fire, but custom love.[82]
Those alone are dear to divinity, who are hostile to injustice.[83]
Those things which the body necessarily requires, are easily to be
procured by all men, without labor and molestation; but those things to
the attainment of which labor and molestation are requisite, are objects
of desire, not to the body, but to depraved opinion. Aristoxenus Pythag.
Stob. p. 132.
Of desire also, he [i. e. Pythagoras] said as follows: This passion is
various, laborious, and very multiform. Of desires however, some are
acquired and adventitious, but others are connascent. But he defined
desire itself to be a certain tendency and impulse of the soul, and an
appetite of a plenitude or presence of sense, or of an emptiness and
absence of it, and of non-perception. He also said, that there are three
most known species of erroneous and depraved desire, viz. the
indecorous, the incommensurate, and the unseasonable. For desire is
either immediately indecorous, troublesome, and illiberal; or it is not
absolutely so, but is more vehement and lasting than is fit. Or in the
third place, it is impelled when it is not proper; and to objects to
which it ought not to tend. Ex Aristoxeni Pythag. Sententiis. Stob. p.
132.
Endeavour not to conceal your errors by words, but to remedy them by
reproofs. Pythagoras. Stob. p. 146.
It is not so difficult to err, as not to reprove him who errs.
Pythagoras. Stob. p. 147.
As a bodily disease cannot be healed, if it is concealed, or praised;
thus also, neither can a remedy be applied to a diseased soul, which is
badly guarded and protected. Pythagoras. Stob. p. 147.
The grace of freedom of speech, like beauty in season, is productive of
greater delight.
It is not proper either to have a blunt sword, or to use freedom of
speech ineffectually.
Neither is the sun to be taken from the world, nor freedom of speech
from erudition.
As it is possible for one who is clothed with a sordid robe, to have a
good habit of body; thus also he whose life is poor may possess freedom
of speech.[84]
Be rather delighted with those that reprove, than with those that
flatter you; but avoid flatterers, as worse than enemies. Pythagoras.
Stob. p. 149.
The life of the avaricious resembles a funeral banquet. For though it
has all things [requisite to a feast,] yet no one present rejoices.
Stob. p. 155.[85]
Acquire continence as the greatest strength and wealth. Pythagoras.
Stob. p. 156.
“Not frequently man from man,” is one of the exhortations of Pythagoras;
by which he obscurely signifies, that it is not proper to be frequently
engaged in venereal connexions. Stob. p. 156.
It is impossible that he can be free who is a slave to his passions.
Pythagoras. Stob. 165.
Pythagoras said, that intoxication is the meditation of insanity. Stob.
p. 165.
Pythagoras being asked, how a lover of wine might be cured of
intoxication, answered, if he frequently surveys what his actions were
when he was intoxicated. Stob. p. 165.
Pythagoras said, that it was either requisite to be silent, or to say
something better than silence. Stob. p. 215.
Let it be more eligible to you to throw a stone in vain, than to utter
an idle word. Pythagoras. Stob. p. 215.
Do not say a few things in many words, but much in a few words.
Pythagoras. Stob. p. 216.
Genius is to men either a good or an evil dæmon. Epicharmus. Stob. p.
220.
Pythagoras being asked, how a man ought to conduct himself towards his
country, when it had acted iniquitously with respect to him, replied, as
to a mother. Stob. p. 227.
Travelling teaches a man frugality, and the way in which he may be
sufficient to himself. For bread made of milk and flower, and a bed of
grass, are the sweetest remedies of hunger and labor.
To the wise man every land is eligible as a place of residence; for the
whole world is the country of the worthy soul.[86] Stob. p. 231.
Pythagoras said, that luxury entered into cities in the first place,
afterwards satiety, then lascivious insolence, and after all these
destruction. Stob. p. 247.
Pythagoras said, that of cities that was the best, which contained
worthy men. Stob. p. 247.
Do those things which you judge to be beautiful, though in doing them
you should be without renown. For the rabble is a bad judge of a good
thing. [Despise therefore the reprehension of those whose praise you
despise.] Demophilus. Stob. p. 310.[87]
Those that do not punish bad men, wish that good men may be injured.
Pythagoras. Stob. p. 321.
It is not possible for a horse to be governed without a bridle, or
riches without prudence. Pythagoras. Stob. p. 513.
It is the same thing to think greatly of yourself in prosperity, as to
contend in the race in a slippery road. Stob. p. 563.
There is not any gate of wealth so secure, which the opportunity of
Fortune may not open. Stob. p. 563.[88]
Expel by reasoning the unrestrained grief of a torpid soul. Stob. p.
572.
It is the province of a wise man to bear poverty with equanimity. Stob.
p. 572.[89]
Spare your life, lest you consume it with sorrow and care. Pythagoras.
Stob. p. 616.
Nor will I be silent as to this particular, that it appeared both to
Plato and Pythagoras, that old age was not to be considered with
reference to an egress from the present life, but to the beginning of a
blessed life. From Phavorinus on Old Age. Stob. p. 585.
The two following extracts are from Clemens Alexandrinus in Stromat.
lib. 3. p. 413.
The ancient theologists and priests testify that the soul is conjoined
to the body through a certain punishment, and that it is buried in this
body as in a sepulchre. Philolaus.
Whatever we see when awake is death; and when asleep, a dream.
Pythagoras.
SELECT SENTENCES
OF
SEXTUS THE PYTHAGOREAN.
To neglect things of the smallest consequence, is not the least thing in
human life.
The wise man, and the despiser of wealth, resembles God.
Do not investigate the name of God, because you will not find it. For
every thing which is called by a name, receives its appellation from
that which is more worthy than itself,[90] so that it is one person that
calls, and another that hears. Who is it, therefore, that has given a
name to God? God, however, is not a name to God, but an indication of
what we conceive of him.
God is a light incapable of receiving its contrary [darkness.]
You have in yourself something similar to God, and therefore use
yourself as the temple of God, on account of that which in you resembles
God.
Honor God above all things, that he may rule over you.
Whatever you honor above all things, that which you so honor will have
dominion over you. But if you give yourself to the domination of God,
you will thus have dominion over all things.
The greatest honor which can be paid to God, is to know and imitate him.
There is not any thing, indeed, which wholly resembles God; nevertheless
the imitation of him as much as possible by an inferior nature is
grateful to him.
God, indeed, is not in want of any thing, but the wise man is in want of
God alone. He, therefore, who is in want but of few things, and those
necessary, emulates him who is in want of nothing.
Endeavour to be great in the estimation of divinity, but among men avoid
envy.
The wise man whose estimation with men was but small while he was
living, will be renowned when he is dead.
Consider all the time to be lost to you in which you do not think of
divinity.
A good intellect is the choir of divinity.
A bad intellect is the choir of evil dæmons.
Honor that which is just, on this very account that it is just.
You will not be concealed from divinity when you act unjustly, nor even
when you think of acting so.
The foundation of piety is continence; but the summit of piety is the
love of God.
Wish that what is expedient and not what is pleasing may happen to you.
Such as you wish your neighbour to be to you, such also be you to your
neighbours.
That which God gives you, no one can take away.
Neither do nor even think of that which you are not willing God should
know.
Before you do any thing think of God, that his light may precede your
energies.
The soul is illuminated by the recollection of deity.
The use of all animals as food is indifferent, but it is more rational
to abstain from them.
God is not the author of any evil.
You should not possess more than the use of the body requires.
Possess those things which no one can take from you.
Bear that which is necessary, as it is necessary.
Ask those things of God which it is worthy of God to bestow.
The reason which is in you, is the light of your life.
Ask those things of God, which you cannot receive from man.
Wish that those things which labor ought to precede, may be possessed by
you after labor.
Be not anxious to please the multitude.
It is not proper to despise those things of which we shall be in want
after the dissolution[91] of the body.
You should not ask of divinity that which, when you have obtained, you
will not perpetually possess.
Accustom your soul after [it has conceived all that is great of]
divinity, to conceive something great of itself.
Esteem nothing to be precious, which a bad man may take from you.
He is dear to divinity, who considers those things alone to be precious,
which are esteemed to be so by divinity.
Every thing which is more than necessary to man, is hostile to him.
He who loves that which is not expedient, will not love that which is
expedient.
The intellect of the wise man is always with divinity.
God dwells in the intellect of the wise man.
Every desire is insatiable, and therefore is always in want.
The wise man is always similar to himself.
The knowledge and imitation of divinity, are alone sufficient to
beatitude.
Use lying as poison.
Nothing is so peculiar to wisdom as truth.
When you preside over men, remember that divinity also presides over
you.
Be persuaded that the end of life, is to live conformably to divinity.
Depraved affections are the beginnings of sorrows.
An evil disposition is the disease of the soul; but injustice and
impiety are the death of it.
Use all men in such a way, as if you were the common curator of all
things after God.
He who uses mankind badly, uses himself badly.
Wish that you may be able to benefit your enemies.
Endure all things, in order that you may live conformably to God.
By honoring a wise man, you will honor yourself.
In all your actions place God before your eyes.[92]
You are permitted to refuse matrimony, in order that you may live
incessantly adhering to God.[93] If, however, as one knowing the battle,
you are willing to fight, take a wife, and beget children.
To live, indeed, is not in our power, but to live rightly is.
Be unwilling to admit accusations against the man who is studious of
wisdom.
If you wish to live with hilarity, be unwilling to do many things. For
in a multitude of actions you will be minor.
Every cup should be sweet to you which extinguishes thirst.
Fly from intoxication as you would from insanity.
No good originates from the body.
Think that you suffer a great punishment when you obtain the object of
corporeal desire; for the attainment of such objects never satisfies
desire.
Invoke God as a witness to whatever you do.
The bad man does not think there is a providence.
Assert that which possesses wisdom in you, to be the [true] man.[94]
The wise man participates of God.
Where that which is wise in you resides, there also is your good.
That which is not noxious to the soul, is not noxious to man.
He who unjustly expels a wise man from the body, confers a benefit on
him by his iniquity. For he thus becomes liberated as it were, from
bonds.
The fear of death renders a man sad through the ignorance of his soul.
You will not possess intellect, till you understand that you have it.
Think that your body is the garment of your soul; and therefore preserve
it pure.
Impure dæmons vindicate to themselves the impure soul.
Speak not of God to every man.
It is dangerous, and the danger is not small, to speak of God even
things which are true.
A true assertion respecting God, is an assertion of God.
You should not dare to speak of God to the multitude.
He does not know God who does not worship him.
The man who is worthy of God is also a God among men.
It is better to have nothing, than to possess much and impart it to no
one.
He who thinks that there is a God, and that nothing is taken care of by
him, differs in no respect from him who does not believe that there is a
God.
He honors God in the best manner who renders his intellect as much as
possible similar to God.
If you injure no one, you will fear no one.
No one is wise who looks downward to the earth.
To lie is to deceive in life, and to be deceived.
Recognise what God is, and what that is in you which recognises God.
It is not death, but a bad life, that destroys the soul.
If you know him by whom you were made, you will know yourself.
It is not possible for a man to live conformable to divinity, unless he
acts modestly, well, and justly.
Divine wisdom is true science.
You should not dare to speak of God to an impure soul.
The wise man follows God, and God follows the soul of the wise man.
A king rejoices in those whom he governs, and therefore God rejoices in
the wise man. He who governs likewise, is inseparable from those whom he
governs; and therefore God is inseparable from the soul of the wise man,
which he defends and governs.
The wise man is governed by God, and on this account is blessed.
A scientific knowledge of God causes a man to use few words.
To use many words when speaking of God, produces an ignorance of God.
The man who possesses a knowledge of God, will not be very ambitious.
The erudite,[95] chaste, and wise soul, is the prophet of the truth of
God.
Accustom yourself always to look to Divinity.
A wise intellect is the mirror of God.
PYTHAGORIC SENTENCES,
FROM THE
PROTREPTICS OF IAMBLICHUS.[96]
As we live through soul, it must be said that by the virtue of this we
live well; just as because we see through the eyes, we see well through
the virtue of these.
It must not be thought that gold can be injured by rust, or virtue by
baseness.
We should betake ourselves to virtue as to an inviolable temple, in
order that we may not be exposed to any ignoble insolence of soul with
respect to our communion with, and continuance in life.
We should confide in Virtue as in a chaste wife; but trust to Fortune as
to an inconstant mistress.
It is better that virtue should be received accompanied with poverty,
than wealth with violence; and frugality with health, than veracity with
disease.
An abundance of nutriment is noxious to the body; but the body is
preserved when the soul is disposed in a becoming manner.
It is equally dangerous to give a sword to a madman, and power to a
depraved man.
As it is better for a part of the body which contains purulent matter to
be burnt, than to continue in the state in which it is, thus also it is
better for a depraved man to die than to live.
The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed as much as possible, as if
they were ambrosia and nectar. For the pleasure arising from them is
genuine, incorruptible, and divine. They are also capable of producing
magnanimity; and though they cannot make us eternal beings, yet they
enable us to obtain a scientific knowledge of eternal natures.
If vigor of sensation is considered by us to be an eligible thing, we
should much more strenuously endeavour to obtain prudence; for it is as
it were the sensitive vigor of the practical intellect which we contain.
And as through the former we are not deceived in sensible perceptions,
so through the latter we avoid false reasoning in practical affairs.
We shall venerate Divinity in a proper manner, if we render the
intellect that is in us pure from all vice, as from a certain stain.
A temple, indeed, should be adorned with gifts, but the soul with
disciplines.
As the lesser mysteries are to be delivered before the greater, thus
also discipline must precede philosophy.
The fruits of the earth, indeed, are annually imparted, but the fruits
of philosophy at every part of the year.
As land is especially to be attended to by him who wishes to obtain from
it the most excellent fruit, thus also the greatest attention should be
paid to the soul, in order that it may produce fruit worthy of its
nature.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
P. 50. _Better worth saving than ten thousand corporeal eyes._
Iamblichus here alludes to what Plato says in the seventh book of his
Republic, respecting the mathematical disciplines. For he there says,
“that the soul through these disciplines has an organ purified and
enlightened, which is blinded and buried by studies of another kind, an
organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes
visible through this alone.”
P. 58. _That in which the Sirens subsist._
“The divine Plato, (says Proclus in his MS. Scholia on the Cratylus,)
knew that there are three kinds of Sirens; the _celestial_, which is
under the government of Jupiter; _that which produces generation_, and
is under the government of Neptune; and _that which is cathartic_, and
is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these to incline
all things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when
the soul is in the heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the
divine life which florishes there. But it is proper that souls living in
generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they
may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when
souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through
intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the
kingdom of Hades there are Gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were
round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.” See more
concerning the Sirens in my translation of Proclus on the Theology of
Plato, Book the 6th.
P. 60. _That it is requisite to put the shoe on the right foot first._
This audition is taken from what forms the 12th Symbol in the
Protreptics of Iamblichus, and is as follows: “When stretching forth
your feet to have your sandals put on, first extend your right foot; but
when about to use a foot bath, first extend your left foot.” “This
Symbol, (says Iamblichus,) exhorts to practical prudence, admonishing us
to place worthy actions about us as right-handed; but entirely to lay
aside and throw away such as are base, as being left-handed.”
P. 60. _That it is not proper to walk in the public ways._
This is the 5th Symbol in the Protreptics of Iamblichus, but is there
differently expressed: for it is, “Declining from the public ways, walk
in unfrequented paths.” On which Iamblichus observes: “I think that this
Symbol also contributes to the same thing as the preceding, [which is,
‘Disbelieve, nothing wonderful concerning the Gods, nor concerning
divine dogmas’]. For this exhorts us to abandon a popular and merely
human life; but thinks fit that we should pursue a separate and divine
life. It also signifies that it is necessary to look above common
opinions; but very much to esteem such as are private and arcane; and
that we should despise merely human delight; but ardently pursue that
felicitous mode of conduct which adheres to the divine will. It likewise
exhorts us to dismiss human manners as popular, and to exchange for
these the religious cultivation of the Gods, as transcending a popular
life.”
P. 61. _Do not assist a man in laying a burden down._
This in the Protreptics is the 11th Symbol, and is explained by
Iamblichus as follows: “This Symbol exhorts to fortitude; for whoever
takes up a burden, signifies that he undertakes an action of labor and
energy; but he who lays one down, of rest and remission. So that the
Symbol has the following meaning; Do not become either to yourself or
another the cause of an indolent and effeminate mode of conduct; for
every useful thing is acquired by labor. But the Pythagoreans celebrate
this Symbol as Herculean, thus denominating it from the labors of
Hercules. For during his association with men, he frequently returned
from fire and every thing dreadful, indignantly rejecting indolence. For
rectitude of conduct is produced from acting and operating, but not from
sluggishness.”
P. 61. _Do not draw near to a woman for the sake of begetting children,
if she has gold._
In the Protreptics of Iamblichus (Symbol 35.) this is expressed as
follows: “Draw not near to that which has gold, in order to produce
children.” On which Iamblichus observes: “The Symbol does not here speak
of a woman, but of that sect and philosophy which has much of the
corporeal in it, and a gravitating tendency downwards. For gold is the
heaviest of all things in the earth, and pursues a tendency to the
middle, which is the peculiarity of corporeal weight. But the term to
_draw near_, not only signifies to be connected with, but always to
approach towards, and to be seated near another.”
P. 61. _Speak not about Pythagoric concerns without light._
This is the 13th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by
Iamblichus: “This Symbol exhorts to the possession of intellectual
prudence. For this is similar to the light of the soul, to which being
indefinite it gives bound, and leads, as it were, from darkness into
light. It is proper, therefore, to place intellect as the leader of
every thing beautiful in life, but especially in Pythagoric dogmas; for
these cannot be known without light.”
P. 61. _Wear not the image of God in a ring._
This in the Protreptics is the 24th Symbol; but instead of _wear_, it is
there _inscribe_. But Iamblichus’ explanation of it is as follows: “This
Symbol conformably to the foregoing conception, employs the following
exhortation: Philosophize, and before every thing consider the Gods as
having an incorporeal subsistence. For this is the most principal root
of the Pythagoric dogmas, from which nearly all of them are suspended,
and by which they are strengthened even to the end. Do not therefore
think that the Gods use such forms as are corporeal, or that they are
received by a material subject, and by body as a material bond, like
other animals. But the engravings in rings exhibit the bond which
subsists through the ring, its corporeal nature and sensible form, and
the view as it were of some partial animal, which becomes apparent
through the engraving; from which especially we should separate the
genus of the Gods, as being eternal and intelligible, and always
subsisting according to the same and in a similar manner, as we have
particularly, most fully, and scientifically shown in our treatise
concerning the Gods.”[97]
P. 61. _Nor is it proper to sacrifice a white cock; for this also is a
suppliant, and is sacred to the moon._
In the Protreptics, the 18th Symbol is partly the same with, and partly
different from this. For it is, “Nourish a cock; but sacrifice it not;
for it is sacred to the sun and the moon.” And Iamblichus explains it as
follows: “This Symbol advises us to nourish and strengthen the body and
not neglect it, dissolving and destroying the mighty tokens of the
union, connexion, sympathy, and consent of the world. So that it exhorts
us to engage in the contemplation and philosophy of the universe. For
though the truth concerning the universe is naturally occult, and
sufficiently difficult of investigation, it must, however, at the same
time, be inquired into and investigated by man, and especially through
philosophy. For it is truly impossible to be discovered through any
other pursuit. But philosophy receiving certain sparks, and as it were
viatica, from nature, excites and expands them into magnitude, rendering
them more conspicuous through the disciplines which it possesses. Hence,
therefore, we should philosophize.”
P. 61. _It is proper to sacrifice, and to enter temples, unshod._
This in the Protreptics is the 3rd Symbol; but is thus enunciated by
Iamblichus, “Sacrifice and adore unshod.” On which Iamblichus observes:
“This Symbol signifies that we ought to worship the Gods, and acquire a
knowledge of them in an orderly and modest manner, and in a way not
surpassing our condition on the earth. It also signifies that, in
worshipping them, and acquiring this knowledge, we should be free from
bonds, and properly liberated. But the Symbol exhorts that sacrifice and
adoration should be performed not only in the body, but also in the
energies of the soul; so that these energies may neither be detained by
passions, nor by the imbecility of the body, nor by generation, with
which we are externally surrounded. But every thing pertaining to us
should be properly liberated, and prepared, for the participation of the
Gods.”
P. 77. _Enter not into a temple negligently, nor, in short, adore
carelessly, not even though you should stand at the very doors
themselves._
This in the Protreptics is the 2nd Symbol, and is explained by
Iamblichus as follows: “If the similar is friendly and allied to the
similar, it is evident that since the Gods have a most principal essence
among wholes, we ought to make the worship of them a principal object.
But he who does this for the sake of any thing else, gives a secondary
rank to that which takes the precedency of all things, and subverts the
whole order of religious worship and knowledge. Besides, it is not
proper to rank illustrious goods in the subordinate condition of human
utility, nor to place our concerns in the order of an end, but things
more excellent, whether they be works or conceptions, in the condition
of an appendage.”
P. 79. _These, therefore, he ordered not to eat the heart._
This is the 30th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by
Iamblichus: “This Symbol signifies that it is not proper to divulse the
union and consent of the universe. And still further, it signifies this,
Be not envious, but philanthropic, and communicative: and from this it
exhorts us to philosophize. For philosophy alone among the sciences and
arts, is neither pained with the goods of others, nor rejoices in the
evils of neighbours, these being allied and familiar by nature, subject
to the like passions, and exposed to one common fortune. It likewise
evinces that the future is equally unlooked for by all men. Hence, it
exhorts us to sympathy and mutual love, and to be truly communicative,
as it becomes rational animals.”
P. 79. _Nor the brain._
This is the 31st Symbol in the Protreptics, and which Iamblichus thus
explains: “This Symbol also resembles the former: for the brain is the
ruling instrument of intellectual prudence. The Symbol, therefore,
obscurely signifies that we ought not to dilacerate nor mangle things
and dogmas, which have been the objects of judicious deliberation. But
these will be such as have been the subject of intellectual
consideration, becoming thus equal to objects of a scientific nature.
For things of this kind are to be surveyed, not through the instruments
of the irrational form of the soul, such as the heart and the liver; but
through the pure rational nature. Hence, to dilacerate these by
opposition, is inconsiderate folly; but the Symbol rather exhorts us to
venerate the fountain of intelligence, and the most proximate organ of
intellectual perception, through which we shall possess contemplation,
science, and wisdom; and by which we shall truly philosophize, and
neither confound nor obscure the vestiges which philosophy produces.”
P. 79. _To abstain from mallows, &c._
The 38th Symbol in the Protreptics is: “Transplant mallows in your
garden, but eat them not.” On which Iamblichus observes as follows:
“This Symbol obscurely signifies that plants of this kind turn with the
sun, and it thinks fit that this should be noticed by us. It also adds,
_transplant_, that is to say, observe its nature, its tendency towards,
and sympathy with, the sun; but rest not satisfied, nor dwelt upon this,
but transfer, and as it were transplant your conception to kindred
plants and pot-herbs, and also to animals which are not kindred, to
stones and rivers, and, in short, to natures of every kind. For you will
find them to be prolific and multiform, and admirably abundant; and this
to one who begins from the mallows, as from a root and principle, is
significant of the union and consent of the world. Not only, therefore,
do not destroy or obliterate observations of this kind; but increase and
multiply them as if they were transplanted.”
P. 80. _Thus too he ordered them to abstain from the fish
Melanurus._[98]
The 6th Symbol in the Protreptics is, “Abstain from melanurus; for it
belongs to the terrestrial Gods.” And this, according to Iamblichus,
admonishes us to embrace the celestial journey, to conjoin ourselves to
the intellectual Gods, to become separated from a material nature, and
to be led as it were in a circular profession to an immaterial and pure
life. It further exhorts us to adopt the most excellent worship of the
Gods, and especially that which pertains to the primary[99] Gods.
P. 80. _And also not to receive the fish Erythynus._
This in the Protreptics is the 33rd Symbol, and which Iamblichus thus
explains: “This Symbol seems to be merely referred to the etymology of
the name. Receive not an unblushing and impudent man; nor on the
contrary one stupidly astonished, and who in every thing blushes, and is
humble in the extreme, through the imbecility of his intellect and
reasoning power. Hence this also is understood, Be not yourself such a
one.”
P. 80. _He likewise exhorted them to abstain from beans._
In the Protreptics this is the 37th Symbol; and Iamblichus has not
developed for us the more mystical signification of this symbol. For he
only says that “it admonishes us to beware of every thing which is
corruptive of our converse with the Gods and divine prophecy.” But
Aristotle appears to have assigned the true mystical reason why the
Pythagoreans abstained from beans. For he says, (apud Laert.) “that
Pythagoras considered beans as a symbol of generation [i. e. of the
whole of a visible and corporeal nature,] which subsists according to a
right line, and is without inflection; because a bean alone of almost
all spermatic plants, is perforated through the whole of it, and is not
obstructed by any intervening joints.” Hence he adds, “it resembles the
gates of Hades.” For these are perpetually open without any impediment
to souls descending into generation. The exhortation, therefore, to
abstain from beans, is equivalent to admonishing us to beware of a
continued and perpetual descent into the realms of generation. Hence the
true meaning of the following celebrated lines in Virgil;
——facilis descensus Averno.
Noctes atque dies patet atri janua Ditis:
Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est.
i. e.
The gates of Hell are open night and day,
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way;
But to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this, the mighty task and labor lies.
Dryden.
P. 98. _Such as infallible predictions of earthquakes, rapid expulsions
of pestilence, &c. &c._
Since Pythagoras, as Iamblichus informs us, p. 9. was initiated in all
the mysteries of Byblus and Tyre, in the sacred operations of the
Syrians, and in the mysteries of the Phœnicians, and also (p. 12.) that
he spent two and twenty years in the adyta of temples in Egypt,
associated with the Magi in Babylon, and was instructed by them in their
venerable knowledge;—it is not at all wonderful that he was skilled in
magic or theurgy, and was therefore able to perform things which surpass
_merely human power_, and which appear to be perfectly incredible to the
vulgar. For “magic,” (as we learn from Psellus in his MS. treatise on
Dæmons) “formed the last part of the sacerdotal science.” He farther
likewise informs us, “that magic investigates the nature, power, and
quality of every thing sublunary; viz. of the elements and their parts,
of animals, all-various plants, and their fruits, of stones, and herbs:
and in short, it explores the essence and power of every thing. From
hence, therefore, it produces its effects. And it forms statues which
procure health, makes all-various figures, and things which become the
instruments of disease. If asserts too, that eagles and dragons
contribute to health; but that cats, dogs, and crows, are symbols of
vigilance, to which therefore they contribute. But for the fashioning of
certain parts, wax and clay are used. Often, too, celestial fire is made
to appear through magic; and then statues laugh, and lamps are
spontaneously enkindled.” See the original in the Notes to my Pausanias,
p. 325. And that theurgy was employed by the ancients in their
mysteries, I have fully proved in my treatise On the Eleusinian and
Bacchic Mysteries.[100]
Conformably to this, Plato also in the First Alcibiades says, that the
magic of Zoroaster consisted in the worship of the Gods, on which
passage, I shall present the reader with what I have said, in the first
volume of my Plato, p. 63, as it will enable him to see that the theurgy
of the ancients is founded in a theory equally scientific and sublime.
“The following account of magic by Proclus, originally formed, as it
appears to me, a part of the Commentary written by him on the present
passage. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is extant on this
dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it; and this
Dissertation on Magic, which is only extant in Latin, was published by
Ficinus the translator, immediately after his Excerpta from this
Commentary. So that it seems highly probable, that the manuscript from
which Ficinus translated his Excerpta, was much more perfect, than that
which has been preserved to us, in consequence of containing this
account of the magic of the ancients.
“In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which
is apparent in sensible forms, to that which is divine; so the ancient
priests, when they considered that there is a certain alliance and
sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to
occult powers, and discovered that all things subsist in all, they
fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity.
Thus they recognized things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the
subordinate in the supreme: in the celestial regions, terrene properties
subsisting in a causal and celestial manner; and in earth celestial
properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how shall we
account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the
sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb, but
selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity to
her motion? It is because all things pray, and hymn the leaders of their
respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some
in a natural, and others after a sensible manner. Hence the sun-flower,
as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the sun; so that
if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he
would perceive something composed by a sound of this kind, in honor of
its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence, too, we may
behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene
quality; but in the celestial regions, all plants, and stones, and
animals, possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial
nature. Now the ancients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of
things, applied for occult purposes, both celestial and terrene natures,
by means of which, through a certain similitude, they deduced divine
virtues into this inferior abode. For, indeed, similitude itself is a
sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus,
if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though
it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the
flame will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated
paper we may compare, to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors;
and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things
according to time, place, and matter. But the procession of fire into
the paper, aptly represents the presence of divine light, to that nature
which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper
may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination
of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards like the
enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine seed.
“Again, the lotus, before the rising of the sun, folds its leaves into
itself, but gradually expands them on its rising: unfolding them in
proportion to the sun’s ascent to the zenith; but as gradually
contracting them, as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this
plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less
to honor the sun, than men by the gesture of their eye-lids, and the
motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of
supernal light, is not only visible in plants, which possess nothing
more than a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the
sun-stone, by its golden rays, imitates those of the sun; but the stone
called the eye of heaven, or of the sun, has a figure similar to the
pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus too
the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the moon when horned, by
a certain change of itself, follows the lunar motion. Lastly, the stone
called helioselenus, i. e. of the sun and moon, imitates, after a
manner, the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its color.
So that all things are full of divine natures; terrestrial natures
receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial of
supercelestial essences;[101] while every order of things proceeds
gradually in a beautiful descent from the highest to the lowest. For
whatever particulars are collected into one above the order of things,
are afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed
under their various ruling divinities.
“In the next place, there are many solar animals, such as lions and
cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar
divinity; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors
in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power.
Hence it is said, that a cock is very much feared, and as it were
reverenced, by a lion; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter
or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order. For thus
we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a
cock than with a lion. This will be evident from considering that the
cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the rising
sun, when he bends his course to us from the antipodes; and that solar
angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who though they are
without shape, yet present themselves to us who are connected with
shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes too there are dæmons with a
leonine front, who, when a cock is placed before them, unless they are
of a solar order, suddenly disappear; and this, because those natures
which have an inferior rank in the same order, always reverence their
superiors; just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are
accustomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing
base.
“In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the
sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner
imitate the solar rays, as the palm and the date; some the fiery nature
of the sun, as the laurel; and others a different property. For, indeed,
we may perceive that the properties which are collected in the sun, are
every where distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar
order; that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones.
Hence the authors of the ancient priesthood discovered from things
apparent, the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things
and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because
they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though
not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power, of
which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things
together, they attracted upon us a supernal influx; and by the
composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to
that one which is above many; and composed statues from the mixture of
various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this,
they collected composite odours, by a divine art, into one,
comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a
divine essence; considering that division debilitates each of these, but
that mingling them together, restores them to the idea of their
exemplar.
“But sometimes one herb, or one stone, is sufficient to a divine
operation. Thus, a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden
appearance of some superior power; but a laurel, raccinum, (or a thorny
kind of sprig) the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the
jasper, operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to
divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence, the
ancient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to each
other, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy
and antipathy; purifying when it was requisite with sulphur and bitumen,
and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies, from the
sharpness of its odour; but marine water, on account of its fiery
portion. Besides this, in the worship of the Gods, they offered animals,
and other substances congruous to their nature; and received, in the
first place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances
and operations; and by these natural substances they convoked into their
presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards, they
proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly,
indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly by their own industry,
interpreting convenient symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence
of the Gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their
operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship
of the Gods.”
It will doubtless be objected by most of the present period, who believe
in nothing beyond the information of their senses, that plants, animals,
and stones, no longer possess those wonderful sympathetic powers, which
are mentioned by Proclus in the above extract. In answer to any such
objector, whose _little_ soul, (in the language of the Emperor Julian)
is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, it
must be said, that this is not at all wonderful at a period, when, as
the author of the Asclepian dialogue justly observes, “there is a
lamentable departure of divinity from man, when nothing worthy of
heaven, or celestial concerns, is heard or believed, and when every
divine voice is by a _necessary_ silence dumb.”[102] But to the
philosophic reader, it must be observed, that as in the realms of
generation, or in other words, the sublunary region, wholes, viz. the
spheres of the different elements, remain perpetually according to
nature; but their parts are sometimes according, and sometimes contrary
to nature; this must also be true of the parts of the earth. When those
circulations therefore take place, during which the parts of the earth
subsist according to nature, and which are justly called, by Plato,
fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones, magically
sympathize with superior natures, in consequence of a more abundant
participation of them, through a greater degree of aptitude to receive,
and alliance to the participated powers. But during those circulations,
in which the parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature, as at
present, and which Plato calls barren periods, the powers of plants,
animals, and stones, no longer possess a magic sympathy, and
consequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.
P. 106. _The eternal essence of number is the most providential
principle of the universe_, &c.
The following account of the manner in which the Pythagoreans
philosophized about numbers, is extracted from my Theoretic Arithmetic,
and the information contained in it is principally derived from the
great Syrianus.
“The Pythagoreans, turning from the vulgar paths, and delivering their
philosophy in secret to those alone who were worthy to receive it,
exhibited it to others through mathematical names. Hence, they called
forms, numbers, as things which are the first separated from impartible
union; for the natures which are above forms, are also above
separation.[103] The all-perfect multitude of forms, therefore, they
obscurely signified through the duad; but they indicated the first
formal principles by the monad and duad, as not being numbers; and also
by the first triad and tetrad, as being the first numbers, the one being
odd, and the other even, from which by addition the decad is generated;
for the sum of 1, 2, 3, and 4, is ten. But after numbers, in secondary
and multifarious lives, introducing geometrical prior to physical
magnitudes; these also they referred to numbers, as to formal causes and
the principles of these; referring the point indeed, as being
impartible, to the monad; but a line, as the first interval, to the
duad; and again, a superficies, as having a more abundant interval, to
the triad; and a solid to the tetrad. They also called, as is evident
from the testimony of Aristotle, the first length the duad; for it is
not simply length, but the _first_ length, in order that by this they
might signify _cause_. In a similar manner also, they denominated the
_first_ breadth, the triad; and the _first_ depth the tetrad. They also
referred to formal principles all psychical knowledge. And intellectual
knowledge indeed, as being contracted according to impartible union,
they referred to the monad; but scientific knowledge, as being evolved,
and as proceeding from cause to the thing caused, yet through the
inerratic, and always through the same things, they referred to the
duad; and opinion to the triad, because the power of it is not always
directed to the same thing, but at one time inclines to the true, and at
another to the false. And they referred sense to the tetrad, because it
has an apprehension of bodies; for in the duad, indeed, there is one
interval from one monad to the other; but in the triad there are two
intervals from any one monad to the rest; and in the tetrad there are
three. They referred, therefore, to principles every thing knowable,
viz. beings, and the gnostic powers of these. But they divided beings
not according to breadth, but according to depth; into intelligibles,
objects of science, objects of opinion, and sensibles. In a similar
manner, also, they divided knowledge into intellect, science, opinion,
and sense. The extremity, therefore, of the intelligible triad, or
animal itself, as it is called by Plato in the Timæus, is assumed from
the division of the objects of knowledge, manifesting the intelligible
order, in which forms themselves, viz. the first forms and the
principles of these, are contained, viz. the idea of the one itself, of
the first length, which is the duad itself, and also the ideas of the
first breadth and the first depth; (for in common the term _first_ is
adapted to all of them), viz. to the triad itself, and the tetrad
itself.
“Again, the Pythagoreans and Plato did not denominate idea from one
thing, and ideal number from another. But since the assertion is
eminently true, that all things are similar to number, it is evident
that number, and especially every ideal number, was denominated on
account of its paradigmatic peculiarity. If any one, however, wishes to
apprehend this from the appellation itself, it is easy to infer that
idea was so called, from rendering as it were its participants similar
to itself, and imparting to them _form_, _order_, _beauty_, and _unity_;
and this in consequence of always preserving the same form, expanding
its own power to the infinity of particulars, and investing with the
same species its eternal participants. _Number_ also, since it imparts
proportion and elegant arrangement to all things, was allotted this
appellation. For the ancients, says Syrianus,[104] call to _adapt_ or
_compose_ αρσαι _arsai_, whence is derived αριθμος _arithmos number_.
Hence αναρσιον anarsion among the Greeks signifies _incomposite_. Hence
too, those Grecian sayings, _you will adapt the balance_, _they placed
number together with them_, and also _number and friendship_. From all
which number was called by the Greeks _arithmos_, as that which measures
and orderly arranges all things, and unites them in amicable league.
“Farther still, some of the Pythagoreans discoursed about inseparable
numbers alone, i. e. numbers which are inseparable from mundane natures,
but others about such as have a subsistence separate from the universe,
in which as paradigms they saw those numbers are contained, which are
perfected by nature. But others, making a distinction between the two,
unfolded their doctrine in a more clear and perfect manner. If it be
requisite, however, to speak concerning the difference of these monads,
and their privation of difference, we must say that the monads which
subsist in quantity, are by no means to be extended to essential
numbers; but when we call essential numbers monads, we must assert that
all of them mutually differ from each other by _difference_ itself, and
that they possess a privation of difference from _sameness_. It is
evident also, that those which are in the same order, are contained
through mutual comparison, in _sameness_ rather than in difference, but
that those which are in different orders are conversant with much
diversity, through the dominion of _difference_.
“Again, the Pythagoreans asserted that nature produces sensibles by
numbers; but then these numbers were not mathematical but physical; and
as they spoke symbolically, it is not improbable that they demonstrated
every property of sensibles by mathematical names. However, says
Syrianus, to ascribe to them a knowledge of sensible numbers alone, is
not only ridiculous, but highly impious. For they received indeed, from
the theology of Orpheus, the principles of intelligible and intellectual
numbers, they assigned them an abundant progression, and extended their
dominion as far as to sensibles themselves.”
Again, their conceptions about mathematical and physical number, were as
follow:
“As in every thing, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, one thing
corresponds to matter, and another to form, in any number, as for
instance the pentad, its five monads, and in short its quantity, and the
number which is the subject of participation, are derived from the duad
itself; but its form, i. e. the pentad itself, is from the monad; for
every form is a monad, and unites its subject quantity. The pentad
itself, therefore, which is a monad, proceeds from the principal monad,
forms its subject quantity, which is itself formless, and connects it to
its own form. For there are two principles of mathematical numbers in
our souls: the monad, which comprehends in itself all the forms of
numbers, and corresponds to the monad in intellectual natures; and the
duad, which is a certain generative principle of infinite power, and
which on this account, as being the image of the never-failing and
intelligible duad, is called indefinite. While this proceeds to all
things, it is not deserted in its course by the monad, but that which
proceeds from the monad continually distinguishes and forms boundless
quantity, gives a specific distinction to all its orderly progressions,
and incessantly adorns them with forms. And as in mundane natures, there
is neither any thing formless, nor any vacuum among the species of
things, so likewise in mathematical number, neither is any quantity left
innumerable; for thus the forming power of the monad would be vanquished
by the indefinite duad, nor does any medium intervene between the
consequent numbers, and the well-disposed energy of the monad.
“Neither, therefore, does the pentad consist of substance and accident,
as a white man; nor of genus and difference, as man of animal and biped;
nor of five monads mutually touching each other, like a bundle of wood;
nor of things mingled, like a drink made from wine and honey; nor of
things sustaining position, as stones by their position complete the
house; nor lastly, as things numerable, for these are nothing else than
particulars. But it does not follow that numbers themselves, because
they consist of indivisible monads, have nothing else besides monads,
(for the multitude of points in continued quantity is an indivisible
multitude, yet it is not on this account that there is a completion of
something else from the points themselves); but this takes place because
there is something in them which corresponds to matter, and something
which corresponds to form. Lastly, when we unite the triad with the
tetrad, we say that we make seven. The assertion, however, is not true:
for monads conjoined with monads, produce indeed the subject of the
number 7, but nothing more. Who then imparts the heptadic form to these
monads? Who is it also that gives the form of a bed to a certain number
of pieces of wood? Shall we not say that the soul of the carpenter, from
the art which he possesses, fashions the wood, so as to receive the form
of a bed, and that the numerative soul, from possessing in herself a
monad which has the relation of a principle, gives form and subsistence
to all numbers? But in this only consists the difference, that the
carpenter’s art is not naturally inherent in us, and requires manual
operation, because it is conversant with sensible matter; but the
numerative art is naturally present with us, and is therefore possessed
by all men, and has an intellectual matter which it instantaneously
invests with form. And this is that which deceives the multitude, who
think that the heptad is nothing besides seven monads. For the
imagination of the vulgar, unless it first sees a thing unadorned,
afterwards the supervening energy of the adorner, and lastly, above all
the thing itself, perfect and formed, cannot be persuaded that it has
two natures, one formless, the other formal, and still further, that
which beyond these imparts form; but asserts, that the subject is one,
and without generation. Hence, perhaps, the ancient theologists and
Plato ascribed temporal generations to things without generation, and to
things which are perpetually adorned, and regularly disposed, privation
of order and ornament, the erroneous and the boundless, that they might
lead men to the knowledge of a formal and effective cause. It is,
therefore, by no means wonderful, that though seven sensible monads are
never without the heptad, these should be distinguished by science, and
that the former should have the relation of a subject, and be analogous
to matter, but the latter should correspond to species and form.
“Again, as when water is changed into air, the water does not become
air, or the subject of air, but that which was the subject of water
becomes the subject of air, so when one number unites itself with
another, as for instance the triad with the duad, the species or forms
of the two numbers are not mingled, except in their immaterial reasons
(or productive principles), in which at the same time that they are
separate, they are not impeded from being united, but the quantities of
the two numbers which are placed together, become the subject of the
pentad. The triad, therefore, is one, and also the tetrad, even in
mathematical numbers: for though in the ennead or number nine, you may
conceive a first, second, and third triad, yet you see one thing thrice
assumed; and in short, in the ennead there is nothing but the form of
the ennead in the quantity of nine monads. But if you mentally separate
its subject, (for form is impartible) you will immediately invest it
with forms corresponding to its division; for our soul cannot endure to
see that which is formless, unadorned, especially as she possesses the
power of investing it with ornament.
“Since also separate numbers possess a demiurgic or fabricative power,
which mathematical numbers imitate, the sensible world likewise contains
images of those numbers by which it is adorned; so that all things are
in all, but in an appropriate manner in each. The sensible world,
therefore, subsists from immaterial and energetic reasons, and from more
ancient causes. But those who do not admit that nature herself is full
of productive powers, lest they should be obliged to double things
themselves, these wonder how from things void of magnitude and gravity,
magnitude and gravity are composed; though they are never composed from
things of this kind which are void of gravity and magnitude, as from
parts. But magnitude is generated from essentially impartible elements;
since form and matter are the elements of bodies; and still much more is
it generated from those truer causes which are considered in demiurgic
reasons and forms. Is it not therefore necessary that all dimensions,
and all moving masses, must from these receive their generation? For
either bodies are unbegotten, like incorporeal natures; or of things
with interval, things without interval are the causes; of partibles
impartibles; and of sensibles and contraries, things insensible and void
of contact: and we must assent to those who assert that things
possessing magnitude are thus generated from impartibles. Hence the
Pythagorean Eurytus, and his followers, beholding the images of things
themselves in numbers, rightly attributed certain numbers to certain
things, according to their peculiarity. In consequence of this, he said
that a particular number is the boundary of this plant, and again,
another number of this animal; just as of a triangle 6 is the boundary,
of a square 9, and of a cube 8. As the musician, too, harmonizes his
lyre through mathematical numbers, so nature through her own natural
numbers, orderly arranges, and modulates her productions.
“Indeed, that numbers are participated by the heavens, and that there is
a solar number, and also a lunar number, is manifest according to the
adage, even to the blind. For the restitutions of the heavenly bodies to
their pristine state (αποκαταστασεις) would not always be effected
through the same things, and in the same manner, unless one and the same
number bad dominion in each. Yet all these contribute to the procession
of the celestial spheres, and are contained by their perfect number. But
there is also a certain natural number belonging to every animal. For
things of the same species would not be distinguished by organs after
the same manner, nor would they arrive at puberty and old age about the
same time, or generate, nor would the fœtus be nourished or increase,
according to regular periods, unless they were detained by the same
measure of nature. According to the best of the Pythagoreans also, Plato
himself, number is the cause of better and worse generations. Hence
though the Pythagoreans sometimes speak of the squares and cubes of
natural numbers, they do not make them to be monadic, such as the number
9, and the number 27; but they signify through these names, from
similitude, the progression of natural numbers into, and dominion about,
generations. In like manner, though they call them equal or double, they
exhibit the dominion and symphony of ideas in these numbers. Hence
different things do not use the same number, so far as they are
different, nor do the same things use a different number, so far as they
are the same.
“In short, physical numbers are material forms divided about the subject
which receives them. But material powers are the sources of connexion
and modification to bodies. For form is one thing, and the power
proceeding from it another. For form itself is indeed impartible and
essential; but being extended, and becoming bulky, it emits from itself,
as if it were a blast, material powers which are certain qualities.
Thus, for instance, in fire, the form and essence of it is impartible,
and is truly the image of the cause of fire: for in partible natures,
the impartible has a subsistence. But from form which is impartible in
fire, and which subsists in it as number, an extension of it accompanied
with interval takes place about matter, from which the powers of fire
are emitted, such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something
else of the like kind. And these qualities are indeed essential, but are
by no means the essence of fire. For essences do not proceed from
qualities, nor are essence and power the same thing. But the essential
every where precedes power. And from this being one the multitude of
powers proceeds, and the distributed from that which is undistributed;
just as many energies are the progeny of one power.”
P. 107. _For Pythagoras always proclaimed, that nothing admirable
pertaining to the Gods or divine dogmas, should be disbelieved._
This in the Protreptics forms the fourth symbol, and is thus explained
by Iamblichus:—“This dogma sufficiently venerates and unfolds the
transcendency of the Gods, affording us a viaticum, and recalling to our
memory that we ought not to estimate divine power from our judgment. But
it is likely that some things should appear difficult and impossible to
us, in consequence of our corporeal subsistence, and from our being
conversant with generation and corruption; from our having a momentary
existence; from being subject to a variety of diseases; from the
smallness of our habitation; from our gravitating tendency to the
middle; from our somnolency, indigence and repletion; from our want of
counsel and our imbecility; from the impediments of our soul, and a
variety of other circumstances, although our nature possesses many
illustrious prerogatives. At the same time however we perfectly fall
short of the Gods, and neither possess the same power with them, nor
equal virtue. This symbol therefore in a particular manner introduces
the knowledge of the Gods, as beings who are able to effect all things.
On this account it exhorts us to disbelieve nothing concerning the Gods.
It also adds, nor about divine dogmas; viz. those belonging to the
Pythagoric philosophy. For these being secured by disciplines and
scientific theory, are alone true and free from falsehood, being
corroborated by all-various demonstration, accompanied with necessity.
The same symbol, also, is capable of exhorting us to the science
concerning the Gods: for it urges us to acquire a science of that kind,
through which we shall be in no respect deficient in things asserted
about the Gods. It is also able to exhort the same things concerning
divine dogmas, and a disciplinative progression. For disciplines alone
give eyes to, and produce light about, all things, in him who intends to
consider and survey them. For from the participation of disciplines, one
thing before all others is effected, viz. a belief in the nature,
essence, and power of the Gods, and also in those Pythagoric dogmas,
which appear to be prodigious to such as have not been introduced to,
and are uninitiated in, disciplines; So that the precept _disbelieve
not_ is equivalent to _participate_ and _acquire_ those things through
which you will not disbelieve; that is to say, acquire disciplines and
scientific demonstrations.”
P. 88. _After this manner therefore it is said that music was discovered
by Pythagoras._
The following particulars relative to music are added for the purpose of
elucidating what is said about it in this chapter.
“Take two brazen chords, such as are used in harps; for those chords
which are made from the intestines of sheep are for the most part either
false or obnoxious to the change of the air,
[Illustration: A—————————B
C—————————D
|
E]
“Let these chords be perfectly equal, and equally stretched, so as to be
in unison, i. e. so that there may be only one sound, though there are
two strings. But it is requisite that they should be placed upon some
oblong and polished rule. The ancients called this rule an harmonic
rule, or also a monochord, by which instrument all consonances and
dissonances, and likewise musical intervals, were tried. Let now one of
these chords be bisected in E. Afterwards under the point E place what
is vulgarly called the _tactus_, but which was denominated by the
ancients, from its figure, a hemisphere. The tactus, therefore, being
placed under E, press there the chord, so that one half of it only, as
for instance ED, may be wholly struck and resound. Having therefore
struck each of the chords at the same time, viz. the whole of AB, and
the half ED, so that they may resound at one and the same time, you will
hear the sweetest of all consonances, composed from the sound of the
whole chord AB, and the sound of the half ED. This consonance the
ancients called diapason, i. e. _through all_ [the chords], because in
the musical instruments of the ancients, the two extreme chords, i. e.
the most grave, and the most acute of all the chords, contained this
consonance; so that, from the gravest chord having made a transition
through all the chords to the supreme and most acute of all, they would
hear this sweetest consonance. It was, likewise, said to be in a duple
ratio of the proportion of one sound to the other. For the sound of the
chord AB is doubly greater or more grave than the sound of the half ED.
For as sounding bodies are to each other, so are their sounds. But the
chord AB is the double of ED. This, however, is now commonly called the
octave, because from the first sound, and that the gravest, which is
called _ut_, as far as to that sound which corresponds to it in the
consonance diapason, there are these eight sounds, _ut_, _re_, _mi_,
_fa_, _sol_, _re_, _mi_, _fa_. And of these the first ut, and the last
_fa_, which is the eighth, produce the consonance diapason, or the
double, or the octave.
“Again, let the same chord CD be divided into three equal parts in the
points F, G.
[Illustration: A————————————B
C————————————D
| |
F G]
“FD, therefore, will be two-thirds as well of the whole CD as of the
whole AB. Let the tactus now be placed in F, and let AB and FD be struck
at the same time, and a consonance very sweet and perfect will indeed be
heard, yet not so sweet as the diapason. This the ancients called
diapente (i. e. through five chords), because the first and the fifth
chord produce this consonance. But according to proportion it is called
sesquialter, because the chord AB is sesquialter to FD, and consequently
the sounds of these chords also are in the same ratio. But sesquialter
ratio is when the greater quantity AB contains the less FD once, and the
half of it besides. It is, indeed, commonly called the fifth, because it
is composed from the first sound _ut_, and the fifth, _sol_.
“Again, let the same chord be cut into four equal parts in the points H,
E, I,
[Illustration: A——————————————————————————B
C——————————————————————————D
| | | | | | | | |
K L H F M N E G I]
“so that the chord HD, may be three-fourths of the whole CD. The tactus,
therefore, being placed in H, let AB and HD be struck at one and the
same time, and a consonance will be heard, indeed, yet more imperfect
than the preceding two. This was called by the ancients diatessaron, i.
e. through four chords or sounds, for a similar reason to that by which
the former were denominated. With reference, however, to the ratio of
the chords and sounds, it is called sesquitertian, because the greater
AB contains the less once, and a third part of it besides. But it is now
commonly called a fourth, because it is found between the first sound
_ut_, and the fourth _fa_. If now the point F be added in the preceding
figure, and at one and the same time two chords HD and FD are compared
in arithmetical ratios, we shall find that the greater HD will have to
the less FD a sesquioctave[105] ratio, and the sound of the greater HD
to the less FD will have the same ratio, i. e. in modern terms, that
between _fa_ and _sol_ there is a sesquioctave ratio. But if these two
sounds are heard together, they will be discordant to the ear. Again,
the distance between these sounds _fa_, _sol_, or between the chords HD
and FD, or between the two harmonic intervals HD and FD, the ratio of
which was sesquioctave, was called by the ancients a tone. Afterwards
they divided the whole of CD into nine equal parts, the first of which
is divided in K, so that the whole CD may have to the remainder KD,
which contains eight of those parts, a sesquioctave ratio. This, in like
manner, will be the interval of a tone, the first sound of which, i. e,
of the whole CD, is now called _ut_, but the second sound of the rest of
the chord KD is called _re_. Afterwards they in a similar manner divided
the remainder KD into nine parts, the first part of which is marked in
the point L. And for the same reason between the chord KD and the chord
KD, and their sounds, there will be a sesquioctave ratio. The sound of
the chord LD is now called _mi_; but the interval which remains between
the chord LD and the chord HD has not a sesquioctave ratio, but less
than it almost by half, and therefore an interval of this kind was
called a semitone, and also diesis or a division. But that interval
which remains between the points F and E they divided after the same
manner, as the space between C and H was divided, and they again found
the same sounds. Let those divisions be marked by the points M and N;
and here, also, between N and E, or between _mi_ and _fa_, there is in
like manner another semitone. These eight sounds, therefore, are _ut_,
_re_, _mi_, _fa_, _sol_, _re_, _mi_, _fa_, which compose the whole
diapason. For as we have before observed, between _ut_ and the last _fa_
is the consonance diapason, or between the chord CD or AB, and the chord
ED. But from the intervals which are between the sounds there are two
semitones, viz. one between _mi_ and _fa_, denoted by the letters L, N,
and the other between the last _mi_ and _fa_, denoted by the letters N,
E. The remaining five intervals are entire tones. It must, also, be
observed, that from _ut_ to the first _sol_ is the consonance diapente,
which contains three tonic intervals, and one semitone; nevertheless in
all there are five sounds, _ut_, _re_, _mi_, _fa_, _sol_.
“Again, from _sol_ to the last _fa_ there are four sounds, _sol_, _re_,
_mi_, _fa_, which are perfectly similar to the first four, _ut_, _re_,
_mi_, _fa_. Nevertheless these are more grave, but those are more acute.
And as from _ut_ to the first _fa_ is the diatessaron, so likewise from
_sol_ to the last _fa_ is another diatessaron, from which, in the last
place, it must be observed, it follows that the two consonances
diatessaron and diapente constitute the whole diapason; or that the
diapason is divided into one diatessaron, and one diapente. For from
_ut_ to _sol_ is the diapente, but from _sol_ to the last _fa_ is the
diatessaron. This will also be the case if we should say that from _ut_
to the first _fa_ is the diatessaron, as is evident from the division of
the chord; but from the first _fa_ to the last _fa_ is the diapente, as
is evident from the four intervals of the chord, three of which are
tones, and the remaining interval is a semitone, which also in the other
diapente were contained between _ut_ and _sol_.
“Now again, let the tactus be placed in I; but I is the fourth part of
the whole CD. Let, also, AB and ID be struck at one and the same time,
and the sweetest consonance, called bisdiapason, will be produced; which
is so denominated, because it is composed from two diapasons, of which
the first is between AB or CD, and ED, but the second is between ED and
ID; for the ratio of these is double as well as of those. The ratio,
also, of the bisdiapason is quadruple, as is evident from the division;
and is commonly called a fifteenth, because from the first _ut_ to this
sound, which is also denominated _fa_, there would be fifteen sounds, if
the interval EI were divided after the same manner as the first CE is
divided.
“Farther still, let GD be a third part of the whole CD, and let the
tactus be placed in G. Then at one and the same time let AB and GD be
struck, and a sweet consonance will be heard, which is called
diapasondiapente, because it is composed from one diapason contained by
the interval CE, or the two chords CD, ED, and one diapente, contained
by the interval EG, or the chords ED, GD. For the chord ED is
sesquialter to the chord GD; which ratio constitutes the nature of the
diapente. The proportion, also, of this consonance is triple. For the
chord AB or CD is triple of GD; and it is commonly called the twelfth,
because between _ut_ and _sol_, denoted by the letter G, there would be
twelve sounds, if the interval EG received its divisions. From all which
it is manifest by the experience of the ear, that there are altogether
five consonances, three simple, the diapason, the diapente, and the
diatessaron; but two composite, the bisdiapason, and the
diapasondiapente.”
In the last place, it is necessary to observe that those ancient Greeks
differently denominated these sounds, _ut_, _re_, &c. For the first,
i. e. the gravest sound or chord, which is now called _ut_, they,
denominated hypate, and the others in the following order:
Ut, Hypate, i. e. Principalis.
Re, Parhypate, — Postprincipalis.
Mi, Lychanos, — Index.
Fa, Mese, — Media.
Sol, Paramese, — Postmedia.
Re, Trite, — Tertia.
Mi, Paranete, — Antepenultima.
Fa, Nete, — Ultima, vel suprema.
P. 109. _I swear by him who the tetractys found._
The tetrad was called by the Pythagoreans every number, because it
comprehends in itself all the numbers as far as to the decad, and the
decad itself; for the sum of 1, 2, 3, and 4, is 10. Hence both the decad
and the tetrad were said by them to be every number; the decad indeed in
energy, but the tetrad in capacity. The sum likewise of these four
numbers was said by them to constitute the tetractys, in which all
harmonic ratios are included. For 4 to 1, which is a quadruple ratio,
forms the symphony bisdiapason; the ratio of 3 to 2, which is
sesquialter, forms the symphony diapente; 4 to 3, which is
sesquitertian, the symphony diatessaron; and 2 to 1, which is a duple
ratio, forms the diapason.
In consequence, however, of the great veneration paid to the tetractys
by the Pythagoreans, it will be proper to give it a more ample
discussion, and for this purpose to show from Theo of Smyrna,[106] how
many tetractys there are: “The tetractys,” says he, “was not only
principally honored by the Pythagoreans, because all symphonies are
found to exist within it, but also because it appears to contain the
nature of all things.” Hence the following was their oath: “Not by him
who delivered to our soul the tetractys, which contains the fountain and
root of everlasting nature.” But by him who delivered the tetractys they
mean Pythagoras; for the doctrine concerning it appears to have been his
invention. The above-mentioned tetractys, therefore, is seen in the
composition of the first numbers 1. 2. 3. 4. But the second tetractys
arises from the increase by multiplication of even and odd numbers
beginning from the monad.
Of these, the monad is assumed as the first, because, as we have before
observed, it is the principle of all even, odd, and evenly-odd numbers,
and the nature of it is simple. But the three successive numbers receive
their composition according to the even and the odd; because every
number is not alone even, nor alone odd. Hence the even and the odd
receive two tetractys, according to multiplication; the even indeed, in
a duple ratio; for 2 is the first of even numbers, and increases from
the monad by duplication. But the odd number is increased in a triple
ratio; for 3 is the first of odd numbers, and is itself increased from
the monad by triplication. Hence the monad is common to both these,
being itself even and odd. The second number, however, in even and
double numbers is 2; but in odd and triple numbers 3. The third among
even numbers is 4; but among odd numbers is 9. And the fourth among even
numbers is 8; but among odd numbers is 27.
{ 1. 2. 4. 8. }
{ 1. 3. 9. 27. }
In these numbers the more perfect ratios of symphonies are found; and in
these also a tone is comprehended. The monad, however, contains the
productive principle of a point. But the second numbers 2 and 3 contain
the principle of a side, since they are incomposite, and first, are
measured by the monad, and naturally measure a right line. The third
terms are 4 and 9, which are in power a square superficies, since they
are equally equal. And the fourth terms 8 and 27 being equally equally
equal, are in power a cube. Hence from these numbers, and this
tetractys, the increase takes place from a point to a solid. For a side
follows after a point, a superficies after a side, and a solid after a
superficies. In these numbers also, Plato in the Timæus constitutes the
soul. But the last of these seven numbers, i. e. 27, is equal to all the
numbers that precede it; for 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 8 + 9 = 27. There are,
therefore, two tetractys of numbers, one of which subsists by addition,
but the other by multiplication, and they comprehend musical,
geometrical, and arithmetical ratios, from which also the harmony of the
universe consists.
But the third tetractys is that which according to the same analogy or
proportion comprehends the nature of all magnitude. For what the monad
was in the former tetractys, that a point is in this. What the numbers 2
and 3, which are in power a side, were in the former tetractys, that the
extended species of a line, the circular and the right, are in this; the
right line indeed subsisting in conformity to the even number, since it
is terminated[107] by two points; but the circular in conformity to the
odd number, because it is comprehended by one line which has no end. But
what in the former tetractys the square numbers 4 and 9 were, that the
two-fold species of planes, the rectilinear and the circular, are in
this. And what the cube numbers 8 and 27 were in the former, the one
being an even, but the other an odd number, that the two solids, one of
which has a hollow superficies, as the sphere and the cylinder, but the
other a plane superficies, as the cube and pyramid, are in this
tetractys. Hence, this is the third tetractys, which gives completion to
every magnitude, from a point, a line, a superficies, and a solid.
The fourth tetractys is of the simple bodies fire, air, water, and
earth, which have an analogy according to numbers. For what the monad
was in the first tetractys, that fire is in this. But the duad is air,
the triad is water, and the tetrad is earth. For such is the nature of
the elements according to tenuity and density of parts. Hence fire has
to air the ratio of 1 to 2; but to water, the ratio of 1 to 3; and to
earth, the ratio of 1 to 4. In other respects also they are analogous to
each other.
The fifth tetractys is of the figures of the simple bodies. For the
pyramid, indeed, is the figure of fire; the octaedron, of air; the
icosaedron, of water; and the cube, of earth.
The sixth tetractys is of things rising into existence through the
vegetative life. And the seed, indeed, is analogous to the monad and a
point. But if it increases in length it is analogous to the duad and a
line; if in breadth, to the triad and a superficies; but if in
thickness, to the tetrad and a solid.
The seventh tetractys is of communities; of which the principle indeed,
and as it were monad, is man; the duad is a house; the triad a street;
and the tetrad a city. For a nation consists of these. And these indeed
are the material and sensible tetractys.
The eighth tetractys consists of the powers which form a judgment of
things material and sensible, and which are of a certain intelligible
nature. And these are, intellect, science, opinion, and sense. And
intellect, indeed, corresponds in its essence to the monad; but science
to the duad; for science is the science of a certain thing. Opinion
subsists between science and ignorance; but sense is as the tetrad. For
the touch which is common to all the senses being fourfold, all the
senses energize according to contact.
The ninth tetractys is that from which the animal is composed, the soul
and the body. For the parts of the soul, indeed, are the rational, the
irascible, and the epithymetic, or that which desires external good; and
the fourth is the body in which the soul subsists.
The tenth tetractys is of the seasons of the year, through which all
things rise into existence, viz. the spring, the summer, the autumn, and
the winter.
And the eleventh is of the ages of man, viz. of the infant, the lad, the
man, and the old man.
Hence there are eleven tetractys. The first is that which subsists
according to the composition of numbers. The second, according to the
multiplication of numbers. The third subsists according to magnitude.
The fourth is of the simple bodies. The fifth is of figures. The sixth
is of things rising into existence through the vegetative life. The
seventh is of communities. The eighth is the judicial power. The ninth
is of the parts of the animal. The tenth is of the seasons of the year.
And the eleventh is of the ages of man. All of them however are
proportional to each other. For what the monad is in the first and
second tetractys, that a point is in the third; fire in the fourth; a
pyramid in the fifth; seed in the sixth; man in the seventh; intellect
in the eighth; and so of the rest. Thus, for instance, the first
tetractys is 1. 2. 3. 4. The second is the monad, a side, a square, and
a cube. The third is a point, a line, a superficies, and a solid. The
fourth is fire, air, water, earth. The fifth the pyramid, the octaedron,
the icosaedron, and the cube. The sixth, seed, length, breadth and
depth. The seventh, man, a house, a street, a city. The eighth,
intellect, science, opinion, sense. The ninth, the rational, the
irascible, and the epithymetic parts, and the body. The tenth, the
spring, summer, autumn, winter. The eleventh, the infant, the lad, the
man, and the old man.
The world also, which is composed from these tetractys, is perfect,
being elegantly arranged in geometrical, harmonical, and arithmetical
proportion; comprehending every power, all the nature of number, every
magnitude, and every simple and composite body. But it is perfect,
because all things are the parts of it, but it is not itself the part of
any thing. Hence, the Pythagoreans are said to have first used the
before-mentioned oath, and also the assertion that “all things are
assimilated to number.”
P. 111. _This number is the first that partakes of every number, and
when divided in every possible way, receives the power of the
numbers subtracted, and of those that remain._
Because 6 consists of 1, 2 and 3, the two first of which are the
principles of all number, and also because 2 and 3 are the first even
and odd, which are the sources of all the species of numbers; the number
6 may be said to partake of every number. In what Iamblichus afterwards
adds, I suppose he alludes to 6 being a perfect number and therefore
equal to all its parts.
P. 134. _Not to step above the beam of the balance._
This is the 14th Symbol in the Protreptics of Iamblichus, whose
explanation of it is as follows: “This symbol exhorts us to the exercise
of justice, to the honoring equality and moderation in an admirable
degree, and to the knowledge of justice as the most perfect virtue, to
which the other virtues give completion, and without which none of the
rest are of any advantage. It also admonishes us, that it is proper to
know this virtue not in a careless manner, but through theorems and
scientific demonstrations. But this knowledge is the business of no
other art and science than the Pythagoric philosophy alone, which in a
transcendent degree honors disciplines before every thing else.”
The following extract also from my Theoretic Arithmetic, (p. 194.), will
in a still greater degree elucidate this symbol. The information
contained in it is derived from the anonymous author of a very valuable
work entitled Θεολογουμενα Αριθμητικης _Theologumena Arithmeticæ_, and
which has lately been reprinted at Leipsic, “The Pythagoreans called the
pentad providence and justice, because it equalizes things unequal,
justice being a medium between excess and defect, just as 5 is the
middle of all the numbers that are equally distant from it on both sides
as far as to the decad, some of which it surpasses, and by others is
surpassed, as may be seen in the following arrangement:
1. 4. 7.
2. 5. 8.
3. 6. 9.
“For here, as in the middle of the beam of a balance, 5 does not depart
from the line of the equilibrium, while one scale is raised, and the
other is depressed.
“In the following arrangement also, viz. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, it
will be found that the sum of the numbers which are posterior, is triple
the sum of those that are prior to 5; for 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 = 30; but 1 + 2
+ 3 + 4 = 10. If therefore the numbers on each side of 5 represent the
beam of a balance, 5 being the tongue of it, when a weight depresses the
beam, an obtuse angle is produced by the depressed part with the tongue,
and an acute angle by the elevated part of the beam. Hence it is worse
to do than to suffer an injury: and the authors of the injury verge
downward as it were to the infernal regions; but the injured tend upward
as it were to the Gods, imploring the divine assistance. Hence the
meaning of the Pythagoric symbol is obvious, “Pass not above the beam of
the balance.” Since however injustice pertains to inequality, in order
to correct this, equalization is requisite, that the beam of the balance
may remain on both sides without obliquity. But equalization is effected
by addition and subtraction. Thus if 4 is added to 5, and 4 is also
taken from 5, the number 9 will be produced on one side, and 1 on the
other, each of which is equally distant from 5. Thus too, if 3 is added
to 5, and is also subtracted from it, on the one side 8 will be
produced, and on the other 2. If 2 is added to 5, and likewise taken
from it, 7 and 3 will be produced. And by adding 1 to 5, and subtracting
3 from it, 6 and 4 will be the result; in all which instances, the
numbers produced are equidistant from 5, and the sum of each couple is
equal to 10.”
P. 161. _Such as dig not fire with a sword._
This is the 9th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by
Iamblichus. “This symbol exhorts to prudence. For it excites in us an
appropriate conception with respect to the propriety of not opposing
sharp words to a man full of fire and wrath, nor contending with him.
For frequently by words you will agitate and disturb an ignorant man,
and will yourself suffer things dreadful and unpleasant.” Heraclitus
also testifies to the truth of this symbol. For he says, “It is
difficult to fight with anger: for whatever is necessary to be done
redeems the soul.” And this he says truly. For many, by gratifying
anger, have changed the condition of their soul, and have made death
preferable to life. But by governing the tongue, and being quiet,
friendship is produced from strife, the fire of anger being
extinguished; and you yourself will not appear to be destitute of
intellect.”
P. 200. _But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the
part, and not the part to the whole._
For whole co-subverts, but is not co-subverted by part: since if whole
is taken away, part also is taken away; but the contrary does not
follow.
P. 231. _Such therefore as hope the intellective and gnostic part of
virtue, are denominated skilful and intelligent; but such as have
the ethical and pre-elective part of it, are denominated useful
and equitable._
The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my
Translation of the Phædo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the
physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the
temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather
pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations
from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they
are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in
the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these,
are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the
virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be
found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments,
and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato
delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to
reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the
political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are
scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational
part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through
fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power,
(or the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning all the parts
of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato
speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above
these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone,
withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments
of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these
instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato
particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phædo. Prior to these however
are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself
to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be
induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to
become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses
both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the
political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according
to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to
intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.
According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues
besides these, viz, the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first
illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which
illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain
respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes, as it were,
solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by
intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but
afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes
uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business
indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to
intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when
possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the
subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the
ethical virtues, we know the fate of the Universe, because fate is
conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under
fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to
the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane
affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing
the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic
intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues;
justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the
cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic.
Observe too, that Plato in the Phædo calls the physical virtues servile,
because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical
σκιογραφιαι _adumbrations_, because their possessors only know _that_
the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know _why_ they are
so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the
cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true
virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political
are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that
the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the
cathartic virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in
the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this
account he accords with the Orphic verses, that
The soul that uninitiated dies,
Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.
For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues.
Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato
means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the
Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in
matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we
rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at
the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death,
because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred
rites.
All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being
every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the
characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things
subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of
justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of
prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil.
Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For
many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all
goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior, to things which
sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there
should be natures which always participate them. In what order,
therefore, do the virtues appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For
virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are
the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles
conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul
subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the
virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to that which is
disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic
order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say,
Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered
according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is
enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the Timæus?
And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the
tower of Saturn, who is a _pure_ intellect.
As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less
novel than important, the following discussion of them from the Αφορμαι
προς τα νοητα, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, of Porphyry, is added
for the sake of the genuinely philosophic reader:
“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and
another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is
called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other
virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate
from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which
consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by
following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is
becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with
neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship,
political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part;
fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and
symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each
of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and
being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative
life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they
are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from
corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are
the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political
virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of
purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these,
should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with
body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize
alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection
through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly
passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure
from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to
fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is
no resistance [from the irrational part,] justice is produced. The
disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed
in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man
conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic
virtues, is beheld in apathy;[108] the end of which is a similitude to
God.
“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but
another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are
surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for
they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of
purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being
purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting
from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that
which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is
defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after
purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also
was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is
boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become
situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being
united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things
subordinate to itself. Its evil also is two-fold; the one arising from
an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this
with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which
liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are
honorable. But the cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from
evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul
when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of
it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true]
being; but this will not be the case unless conversion, precedes.
“There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and
political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing
intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the
contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice
consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and
energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of
the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy; according to a
similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally
impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others,
alternately follow each other.
“The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting
in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and
exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the
similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things
subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but
intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is
converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of
its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[109]]. But fortitude is
sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of
power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed,
some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are
paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being
filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and
becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others
are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving
measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in
the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also
necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the
less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the
greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far
as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the
virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different
virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to
the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the
scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the
remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists
analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes
according to the practical virtues, is a _worthy_ man: but he who
energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is _a dæmoniacal man_, or
is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the intellectual
virtues alone, is _a God_. But he who energizes according to the
paradigmatic virtues, _is the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought
especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may
obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to
the more honorable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what
degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body,
and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may so
effected, and to what extent, must now be said.
“In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to
acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it,
know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different
essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this
foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it different
places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with
respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to
sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the
enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is
dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense[110]
in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of
sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy;
from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. _This, however,
will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of
them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that
[the rational part] may not be impeded [in its energies._] Pain also
must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly
diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not co-passive
with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away; and
must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed,
deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated
motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. _That however which
is unpremeditated is imbecile and small._ All fear, likewise, must be
expelled. For he who acquires this purification, will fear nothing.
Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger
therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the
desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far
as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks.
Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions;
_but if this should take place, it must only be as far as to that
precipitate imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the
intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must be liberated from all
these [corporeal propensities.] He must likewise endeavour that what is
moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved
without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions
themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the
reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the
purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those
in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferior
part will so venerate reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all
moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and
will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only
moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy, for when
co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him
who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved, when reason imparts
excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature.]”
P. 279. _The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed, as much as
possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar, &c. &c._
This Sentence in the original of Arcerius is as follows: των κατα
φιλοσοφιαν θεωρηματων απολαυστεον, εφ’ οσον οιον, καθαπερ αμβροσιας και
νεκταρος· ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και το θειον το μεγαλοψυχον
δυναται τε ποιειν, και ει μη αïδιους, αïδιων γε επιστημονας.
In the edition of the Protreptics by Kiessling, which I did not see,
till the greater part of this work was printed, σοφιαν is substituted
for φιλοσοφιαν, but in my opinion very erroneously; and this German
editor, from not perceiving the necessity of reading ακηρατον τε γαρ το
απ’ αυτων ηδυ και θειον, το μεγαλοψυχον, κ. λ. instead of retaining the
reading of Arcerius, has made nonsense of this part of the Sentence. For
his version of it is: “Nam et sincera est eorum dulcedo, et divinam
naturam, animum magnum efficere possunt.”
FOOTNOTES
[1]Οιδα μεν ουν και Πλατωνα τον μεγαν, και μετα τουτον ανδρα τοις
χρονοις μεν, ου τῃ μην φυσει, καταδεεστερον, τον Χαλκιδεα φημι τον
Ιαμβλιχον, κ. λ. Julian. Orat. IV.
Thus too the celebrated Bullialdus, in his Notes on Theo of Smyrna,
speaks of Iamblichus as a man of a most acute genius.
[2]There is a Greek and Latin edition of this admirable work by Gale,
under the title of Iamblichus De Mysteriis.
[3]Αλλα και το της λεξεως κομματικον, και αφοριστικον, και το των
εννοιων πραγματικον, και γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, κ. λ. See the
Testimonies prefixed by Gale to his edition of the above-mentioned
work.
[4]This Sopater succeeded Plotinus in his philosophical school.
[5]The exact time of Iamblichus’ death is unknown. It is however certain
that it was during the reign of Constantine; and according to the
accurate Fabricius, prior to the year of Christ 333. Vid. Biblioth.
Græc. Tom. IV. p. 283.
[6]This Sextus is probably the same that Seneca so greatly extols, and
from whom he derives many of those admirable sentences with which
his works abound. Vid. Senecæ Epistolas, 59, 64, 98, et lib. 2 de
Irâ, c. 36, et lib. 3. c. 36.
[7]All these were published in one vol. 12mo. by Mr. Bridgman, under the
title of Translations from the Greek, in the year 1804, and well
deserve to be perused by the liberal reader.
[8]i. e. Having black leaves.
[9]i. e. It must not be admitted, that Apollo was actually connected
with Pythaïs; for this would be absurd in the extreme; but the
assertion of Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates must be considered
as one of those mythological narrations in which heroes are said to
have Gods for their fathers, or Goddesses for their mothers, and the
true meaning of it is as follows: According to the ancient theology,
between those perpetual attendants of a divine nature called
_essential_ heroes, who are impassive and pure, and the bulk of
human souls who descend to earth with passivity and impurity, it is
necessary there should be an order of human souls who descend with
impassivity and purity. For as there is no vacuum either in
incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that the last link
of a superior order, should coalesce with the summit of one
proximately inferior. These souls were called by the ancients,
_terrestrial_ heroes, on account of their high degree of proximity
and alliance to such as are essentially heroes. Hercules, Theseus,
Pythagoras, Plato, &c. were souls of this kind, who descended into
mortality both to benefit other souls, and in compliance with that
necessity by which all natures inferior to the perpetual attendants
of the Gods are at times obliged to descend.
But as, according to the arcana of ancient theology, every God
beginning from on high produces his proper series as far as to the
last of things, and this series comprehends many essences different
from each other, such as Dæmoniacal, Heroical, Nymphical, and the
like; the lowest powers of these orders, have a great communion and
physical sympathy with the human race, and contribute to the
perfection of all their natural operations, and particularly to
their procreations. “Hence” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Crat.)
“it often appears, that _heroes_ are generated from the mixture of
these powers with mankind; for those that possess a certain
prerogative above human nature, are properly denominated _heroes_.”
He adds: “Not only a dæmoniacal genus of this kind sympathizes
physically with men, but other kinds sympathize with other natures,
as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags
or serpents.”
Olympiodorus, in his life of Plato, observes of that philosopher,
“That an Apolloniacal spectre is said to have had connexion with
Perictione his mother, and that appearing in the night to his father
Aristo, it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the
time of her pregnancy; which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like
account of the divine origin of Plato, is also given by Apuleius,
Plutarch, and Hesychius.
[10]i. e. The priests of Jupiter.
[11]From what has been said in the note, p. 4, respecting the divine
origin of Pythagoras, it follows that he was a _terrestrial hero_
belonging to the series of Apollo. Thus too the Esculapius who once
lived on the earth, and was the inventor of medicine, proceeded,
according to the ancient mythology, from the God Esculapius, who
subsists in Apollo, just as the hero Bacchus proceeded from the
Bacchus who subsists in Jupiter. Hence the Emperor Julian (apud
Cyril.) says of Esculapius: “I had almost forgotten the greatest of
the gifts of Jupiter and the Sun, but I have very properly reserved
it to the last. For it is not peculiar to us only, but is common
also, I think, to our kindred the Greeks. For Jupiter, in
intelligibles, generated from himself Esculapius; but he was
unfolded into light on the earth, through the prolific light of the
sun. He therefore, proceeding from heaven to the earth, appeared
uniformly in a human shape about Epidaurus. But thence becoming
multiplied in his progressions, he extended his saving right hand to
all the earth. He came to Pergamus, to Ionia, to Tarentum, and
afterwards to Rome. Thence he went to the island Co, afterwards to
Ægas, and at length to wherever there is land and sea. Nor did we
individually, but collectively, experience his beneficence. And at
one and the same time, he corrected souls that were wandering in
error, and bodies that were infirm.”
[12]Those Gods, according to the Orphic theology, that contain in
themselves the first principle of stability, sameness, and being,
and who also were the suppliers of conversion to all things, are of
a male characteristic; but those that are the causes of all-various
progressions, separations, and measures of life, are of a feminine
peculiarity.
[13]This inventor of names was called by the Egyptians Theuth, as we are
informed by Plato in the Philebus and Phædrus; in the latter of
which dialogues, Socrates says: “I have heard, that about Naucratis
in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Gods of the Egyptians, to
whom a bird was sacred, which they call Ibis; but the name of the
dæmon himself was Theuth. According to tradition, this God first
discovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and astronomy,
the games of chess and hazard, and likewise letters.” On this
passage I observe as follows, in Vol. 3. of my translation of Plato:
The genus of disciplines belonging to Mercury, contains gymnastic,
music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the art of speaking and
writing. This God, as he is the source of invention, is called the
son of Maia; because _investigation_, which is implied by _Maia_,
produces _invention_: and as unfolding the will of Jupiter, who is
an intellectual God, he is the cause of mathesis or discipline. He
first subsists in Jupiter, the artificer of the world; next among
the supermundane Gods; in the third place, among the liberated Gods;
fourthly, in the planet Mercury; fifthly, in the Mercurial order of
dæmons; sixthly, in human souls, who are the attendants of this God;
and in the seventh degree, his properties subsist in certain
animals, such as the ibis, the ape, and sagacious dogs. The
narration of Socrates in this place, is both allegorical and
anagogic or reductory. Naucratis is a region of Egypt eminently
subject to the influence of Mercury, though the whole of Egypt is
allotted to this divinity. Likewise, in this city a man once
florished full of the Mercurial power, because his soul formerly
existed in the heavens of the Mercurial order. But he was first
called Theuth, that is, Mercury, and a God, because his soul
subsisted according to the perfect similitude of this divinity. But
afterwards a dæmon, because from the God Mercury, through a
Mercurial dæmon, gifts of this kind are transmitted to a Mercurial
soul.
[14]Iamblichus derived this very beautiful passage from Heraclides
Ponticus, as is evident from Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. v. 3. who
relates the same thing of Pythagoras, from the aforesaid author.
[15]i. e. With intelligibles properly so called.
[16]Iliad, lib. 17. The translation by Pope.
[17]“The Pythagoreans,” says Simplicius, in his Commentary on the 2d
book of Aristotle’s treatise On the Heavens, said, “that an harmonic
sound was produced from the motion of the celestial bodies, and they
scientifically collected this from the analogy of their intervals;
since not only the ratios of the sun and moon, of Venus and Mercury,
but also of the other stars, were discovered by them.” Simplicius
adds, “Perhaps the objection of Aristotle to this assertion of the
Pythagoreans, may be solved according to the philosophy of those
men, as follows:
“All things are not commensurate with each other, nor is every thing
sensible to every thing, even in the sublunary region. This is
evident from dogs who scent animals at a great distance, and which
are not smelt by men. How much more, therefore, in things which are
separated by so great an interval as those which are incorruptible
from the corruptible, and celestial from terrestrial natures, is it
true to say, that the sound of divine bodies is not audible by
terrestrial ears? But if any one like Pythagoras, who is reported to
have heard this harmony, should have his terrestrial body exempt
from him, and his luminous and celestial vehicle[17a] and the senses
which it contains purified, either through a good allotment, or
through probity of life, or through a perfection arising from sacred
operations, such a one will perceive things invisible to others, and
will hear things inaudible by others. With respect to divine and
immaterial bodies, however, if any sound is produced by them, it is
neither percussive nor destructive, but it excites the powers and
energies of sublunary sounds, and perfects the sense which is
co-ordinate with them. It has also a certain analogy to the sound
which concurs with the motion of terrestrial bodies. But the sound
which is with us in consequence of the sonorific nature of the air,
is a certain energy of the motion of their impassive sound. If,
then, air is not passive there, it is evident that neither will the
sound which is there be passive. Pythagoras, however, seems to have
said that he heard the celestial harmony, as understanding the
harmonic proportions in numbers, of the heavenly bodies, and that
which is audible in them. Some one, however, may very properly doubt
why the stars are seen by our visive sense, but the sound of them is
not heard by our ears? To this we reply that neither do we see the
stars themselves; for we do not see their magnitudes, or their
figures, or their surpassing beauty. Neither do we see the motion
through which the sound is produced; but we see as it were such an
illumination of them, as that of the light of the sun about the
earth, the sun himself not being seen by us. Perhaps too, neither
will it be wonderful, that the visive sense, as being more
immaterial, subsisting rather according to energy than according to
passion, and very much transcending the other senses, should be
thought worthy to receive the splendor and illumination of the
celestial bodies, but that the other senses should not be adapted
for this purpose. Of these, however, and such like particulars, if
any one can assign more probable causes, let him be considered as a
friend, and not as an enemy.”
[17a]The soul has three vehicles, one etherial, another aerial, and the
third this terrestrial body. The first, which is luminous and
celestial, is connate with the essence of the soul, and in which
alone it resides in a state of bliss in the stars. In the second, it
suffers the punishment of its sins after death. And from the third
it becomes an inhabitant of earth.
[18]i. e. Of the discursive energy of reason, or that part of the soul
that reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its
reasoning from intellect.
[19]Kuster, one of the editors of this Life of Pythagoras, not
perceiving that these auditions are both questions and answers, has
made them to be questions only, and in consequence of this was
completely at a loss to conceive the meaning of οπερ εστιν η
αρμονια, εν ῃ αι Σειρηνες. Hence, he thinks it should be, τι εστιν η
αρμονια ῃ ηδον αι Σειρηνες; but is not satisfied with this reading
after all. Something I have no doubt is wanting; but the sense of
the passage is, I conceive, that which is given in the above
translation.
[20]“Pythagoras,” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Cratylum,) “being
asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number; and being
asked what was the next in wisdom, said, he who gave names to
things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible
order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for
there that which is the first, and properly number, subsists after
the superessential one.[20a] This likewise supplies the measures of
essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge
which is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself,
subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence,
are the same, so there also number and wisdom are the same. But by
the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed
subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first
intellect, but possesses the images and essential transitive reasons
of them as statues of beings. Being, therefore, is imparted to all
things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with
wisdom; but that they are denominated is from soul, which imitates
intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business
of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to
intellect and the nature of things.”
[20a]i. e. Number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of
the intelligible order. For number according to hyparxis or essence,
subsists at the summit of the order which is intelligible and at the
same time intellectual. See the 3d book of my translation of Proclus
on the Theology of Plato.
[21]The words περι πυθαγορειων are omitted in the original, but from the
Protrept. of Iamblichus evidently ought to be inserted.
[22]The same thing is said by the Pythagoreans to have befallen the
person who first divulged the theory of incommensurable quantities.
See the first scholium on the 10th book of Euclid’s Elements, in
Commandine’s edition, fol. 1572.
[23]Iamblichus, in this list of Pythagoreans, must not be supposed to
enumerate those only who were contemporary with Pythagoras: since,
if he did, he contradicts what he says of Philolaus in Chap. 31.
viz. “that he was many ages posterior to Pythagoras;” but those in
general who came from the school of Pythagoras, and were his most
celebrated disciples.
[24]From this passage it is evident that Iamblichus had many sources of
information, which are unknown to modern critics; and this
circumstance alone ought to check their pedagogical impertinence.
[25]For αυτα here I read, conformably to the version of Obrechtus, αλλα.
[26]For δηγμους here, I read οδυρμους; as I do not see what morsus has
to do with this place. Obrechtus has in his version “pectorisque
morsus;” but I have no doubt _lamentations_ is the proper word,
which aptly associates with despondency.
[27]“Well-instituted polities,” (says Proclus in MS. Comment. in
Alcibiad. prior.) “are averse to the art of playing on
wind-instruments; and therefore neither does Plato admit it. The
cause of this is the variety of this instrument, the pipe, which
shows that the art which uses it should be avoided. For instruments
called Panarmonia, and those consisting of many strings, are
imitations of pipes. For every hole of the pipe emits, as they say,
three sounds at least; but if the cavity above the holes be opened,
then each hole will emit more than three sounds.”
[28]Odyss. lib. 4.
[29]Iamblichus derived what he has said in this chapter about music,
from Nicomachus.
[30]The first part of this sentence in the original is ξενου τινος
εκβεβληκοτος εν Ασκληπιειῳ Ζωνην χρυσιον εχουσαν, and in translating
it I have followed the version of Obrechtus, because it appeared to
me to convey the meaning of Iamblichus, though the translation is
certainly forced, and not such as the natural construction of the
words will admit. The translation of Arcerius is, “Cum hospes quidam
in æde Æsculapii fœminam zonam auream habentem ejecisset;” and this
is perfectly conformable to the natural construction of the words,
but then it is void of sense.
[31]This history is copiously narrated in chap. 33.
[32]See chap. 33.
[33]These lines are as the numbers 4, 3, 2. For 4 to 3 is sesquitertian,
3 to 2 is sesquialter, and 2 is an arithmetical medium between 4 and
3.
[34]For an explanation of this assertion of Plato in the Republic, see
my Theoretic Arithmetic.
[35]“The Pythagoreans,” (says Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 13.)
“received from the theology of Orpheus, the principles of
intelligible and intellectual numbers, they assigned them an
abundant progression, and extended their dominion as far as to
sensibles themselves.” Hence that proverb was peculiar to the
Pythagoreans, that _all things are assimilated to number_.
Pythagoras, therefore, in the Sacred Discourse, clearly says, that
“number is the ruler of forms and ideas, and is the cause of Gods
and dæmons.” He also supposes, that “to the most ancient and
artificially ruling deity, number is the canon, the artificial
reason, the intellect also, and the most undeviating balance of the
composition and generation of all things.” αυτος μεν Πυθαγορας, εν
τῳ ιερῳ λογῳ, διαρρηδην μορφων και ιδεων κραντορα τον αριθμον ελεγεν
ειναι, και θεων και δαιμονων αιτιον· και τῳ πρεσβυτατῳ και
κρατιστευοντι τεχνιτῃ θεῳ κανονα, και λογον τεχνικον, νουν τε και
σταθμαν ακλινεσταταν τον αριθμον υπεικε συστασιος και γενεσεως των
παντων. Syrianus adds, “But Philolaus declared that number is the
governing and self-begotten bond of the eternal permanency of
mundane natures.” Φιλολαυς δε, της των κοσμικων αιωνιας διαμονης την
κρατιστευουσαν και αυτογενη συοχην ειναι απεφῃνατο τον αριθμον. “And
Hippasus, and all those who were destined to a quinquennial silence,
called number the judicial instrument of the maker of the universe,
and the first paradigm of mundane fabrication.” οι δε περι Ιππασον
ακουσματικοι ειπον κριτικον κοσμουργου θεου οργανον, και παραδειγμα
πρωτον κοσμοποιϊας. “But how is it possible they could have spoken
thus sublimely of number, unless they had considered it as
possessing an essence separate from sensible, and a transcendency
fabricative, and at the same time paradigmatic?”
[36]i. e. To spheres; Iamblichus indicating by this, that Pythagoras as
well as Orpheus considered a spherical figure as the most
appropriate image of divinity. For the universe is spherical; and,
as Iamblichus afterwards observes, the Gods have a nature and
_morphe_ similar to the universe; _morphe_, as we learn from
Simplicius, pertaining to the color, figure, and magnitude of
superficies. Keissling, having no conception of this meaning, and
supposing the whole passage to be corrupt, has made nonsense of it
by his alterations. For according to his version, Pythagoras, after
the manner of Orpheus, worshipped the Gods not bound to a human
form, but _to divine numbers_. For instead of ιδρυμασι he reads
αριθμοις. But divine numbers both according to Orpheus and
Pythagoras are the Gods themselves.
[37]i. e. Futurity is long; Pythagoras signifying by this, that those
who do not take an oath religiously, will be punished in some future
period, if they are not at present.
[38]i. e. From the time in which the Gods are fabulously said to have
reigned in Egypt.
[39]I wonder that the learned Obrechtus should translate ηβηδον, _cum
omni juventute sua_. Had his translation, which is on the whole very
excellent, been reviewed by English or Scotch critics, they would
have immediately said from this circumstance, that he did not
understand Greek.
[40]Iamblichus here alludes to a right-angled triangle, and the
Pythagoric theorem of 47. 1 of Euclid. For the square described on
the longest side is equal to the two squares described on the two
other sides. The longest side therefore is said by geometricians to
be equal in power to the powers of the other sides. This however
Kiessling not understanding, says, “that power is the space
contained between the concurring lines of figures, and is the area
of the triangle.” “Δυναμις idem est, quod εμβαδον, spatium, quod
infra concurrentes lineas figurarum continetur, area trigoni.” But
Kiessling, though a good verbalist, is a bad geometrician, and no
philosopher.
[41]In the original δεκατον _the tenth month_; but as it very seldom
happens that a woman is in a state of pregnancy more than nine
months, it appears to me that for δεκατον we should read εκτον _the
sixth month_, as in the above translation.
[42]Obrechtus by translating περι δε δοξης in this place, “De fama et
gloria,” has evidently mistaken the meaning of Iamblichus.
[43]The wise and magnanimous Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics and
Stoics, among the ancients, looked to virtue as its own reward, and
performed what is right, because it is right to do so. And though
they firmly believed in the immortality of the soul, their conduct
was not at all influenced by the hope of future reward. This great
truth indeed, that virtue brings with it its own recompense, is
almost at present obsolete; and it is no unusual thing to hear a
man, when afflicted, exclaiming with Methodistical cant,
“The many troubles that I meet,
In getting to a Mercy-seat!”
[44]These energies are called beneficent, because they are of a
purifying character. Hence Plato in the Timæus says, that a deluge
is the consequence of the Gods _purifying_ the earth by water.
[45]Iamblichus a little before informs us, that Pythagoras suspected
that Phalaris intended to put him to death, but at the same time
knew that he was not destined to die by Phalaris. This being the
case therefore, Pythagoras has no claim to fortitude in this
instance, in being free from the fear of death. But he has great
claim to it, when it is considered that he was in the power of a
tyrant who might have caused him to suffer tortures worse than
death.
[46]i. e. _Humble_ (ταπεινης ουσης.) With the Pythagoreans, therefore,
humility was no virtue, though in modern times it is considered to
be the greatest of the virtues. With Aristotle likewise it is no
virtue; for in his Nicomachean Ethics he says, “that all humble men
are flatterers, and all flatterers are humble.”
[47]See the Cave of Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic.
[48]The original is, Μητροδωρος τε ο Θυρσου του πατρος Επιχαρμου, which
Obrechtus erroneously translates, “Metrodorus Epicharmi filius
Thyrsi nepos.”
[49]This observation applies also to those of the present day, who, from
a profound ignorance of human nature, attempt to enlighten by
education the _lowest_ class of mankind. For this, as I have
elsewhere observed, is an attempt to break the golden chain of
beings, to disorganise society, and to render the vulgar
dissatisfied with the servile situations in which God and nature
intended them to be placed. See p. 73. of the introduction to my
translation of Select Works of Plotinus.
[50]This also is asserted, as I have before observed, in the Scholia on
the 10th book of Commandine’s edition of Euclid’s Elements, p. 122.
[51]Obrechtus has omitted to translate the words ηδη πρεσβυτην οντα,
“being now an elderly man.”
[52]In the original ακρατος, which Obrechtus very erroneously translates
_impotens_.
[53]i. e. To the Pythagoreans.
[54]The whole of this paragraph, the greater part of which is a
repetition of what has been said elsewhere, does not certainly
belong to this place.
[55]In the original, και την γην αναδαστον εποιησαν, which Obrechtus
erroneously translates, “et agrorum divisionem introduxerunt.”
[56]The words within the brackets are from a Latin Manuscript, which was
in the possession of Fabricius.
[57]In the original, ουδεν γαρ αυταρκες, ο τουτων των μοριων ποιει το
ολον. This Canter erroneously translates, “Quandoquidem horum nulla
pars totum queat constituere.” And Gale has noticed the error.
[58]Gale says in his notes, that after οφθαλμων he adds φυσιος, but he
should evidently have added αρετα, as in the above translation.
[59]In the original συν τᾳ οξυδορκιᾳ, which Canter very defectively
translates, _videndi facultate_.
[60]For ου μετριαν here, I read ασυμμετριαν.
[61]i. e. So far as he is considered as energizing in conjunction with
the body; but so far as he has an energy independent of the body,
viz. so far as he is a rational soul, the body is not to be
considered as a part of his essence. And the energy of the rational
soul by itself alone, without any assistance from the corporeal
organs, constitutes the true man, into the definition of which body
does not enter.
[62]Canter, in his version of these Pythagoric fragments, uniformly
translates ευτυχια _felicitas_, contrary to the obvious meaning of
the word, as is evident in this, and many other passages. It is also
directly contrary to what Aristotle says in cap. 13. lib. 7. of his
Nicomachean Ethics: δια δε το προσδεισθαι της τυχης, δοκει τισι
ταυτον ειναι η ευτυχια τῃ ευδαιμονιᾳ, ουκ ουσα· επει και αυτη
υπερβαλλουσα, εμποδιος εστι. i. e. “Because felicity requires
fortune, it appears to some persons that prosperity is the same with
felicity. This however is not the case; since prosperity, when it is
excessive, is an impediment to felicity.” But Canter did not, I
believe, pretend to have any knowledge of philosophy: and Gale, who
did, has not corrected him in this and many other places in which he
has erred through the want of this knowledge. Gale however, though
verbally learned, was but a garrulous smatterer in philosophy, as is
evident from his notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis.
[63]For επιπρεπειαν here, I read απρεπειαν.
[64]In the original, ωστε ουδεποκα δει θαυμαινεν, ει παντ’
αντεστραμμενως ενιοκα κρινεται, τας αληθινας διαθεσιος
μεταπιπτοισας, which Canter erroneously translates as follows:
“Quocirca mirandum non est, si cuncta nonnunquam, verâ affectione
mutatâ, aliter eveniunt.” Nor is the error noticed by Gale.
[65]i. e. In the etherial vehicle of the soul, which when the soul
energizes intellectually is spherical, and is moved circularly. This
vehicle also is αυγοειδης, or luciform, throughout diaphanous, and
of a star-like nature. Hence Marcus Antoninus beautifully observes:
σφαιρα ψυχης αυτοειδης, (lege αυγοειδης) οταν μητε εκτεινηται επι
τι, μητε εσω συντρεχῃ μητε συνιζανῃ, αλλα φωτι λαμπηται, ῳ την
αληθειαν ορᾳ την παντων, και την εν αυτῃ. Lib. II. i. e. “The sphere
of the soul is then luciform, when the soul is neither extended to
any thing [external] nor inwardly concurs with it, nor is depressed
by it, but is illuminated with a light by which she sees the truth
of all things, and the truth that is in herself.”
[66]M. Meibomius observes, that Canter did not see that λογιστικω should
be written in this place for αλογω. Canter however was right in
retaining αλογω. For the dianoetic is the same with the logistic
part of the soul; and it is evident that a part of the soul
different from the dianoetic is here intended to be signified.
Besides, as Aristotle shows in his Nicomachean Ethics, when the
irrational becomes obedient to the rational part of the soul, the
former then prohibits and vanquishes base appetites in conjunction
with the latter.
[67]viz. Such as have the theoretic virtues.
[68]i. e. Such as have the ethical and political virtues.
[69]The original is, α δε δυναμις, οιον αλκα τις τω σκανεος, ᾳ
υφισταμεθα, και εμμενομες τοις πραγμασιν. This sentence in its
present state is certainly unintelligible. For σκανεος therefore, I
read φυσεως, and then the sense will be as in the above translation.
The version of Canter is certainly absurd; for it is, “Facultas
tanquam robur et causæ, quo ferimus, et in rebus permanemus.” And
Gale, as usual, takes no notice of the absurdity.
[70]viz., The equal and that which is arranged, belong to the order of
bound, and the unequal and that which is without arrangement, to the
order of infinity. And bound and infinity are the two great
principles of things after the ineffable cause of all. See the third
book of my translation of Proclus, On the Theology of Plato.
[71]viz. The salvation of the universe arises from the co-adaptation of
the sublunary region to the heavens.
[72]In the Greek επῳδας; on which Gale observes, “Forte αμαθιας, nisi
aliud subsit mysterium.” But it appears to me that there is no
occasion to substitute any other word for επῳδας. For in the
education of youth, it is certainly requisite to unite allurement
with erudition. And the substitution of αμαθιας, _ignorance_, is
monstrous.
[73]In the original αυτα γαρ α διενεργουσα, instead of which Gale
proposes to read αυτα γαρ αδε ενεργοισα, which still leaves the
sentence involved in obscurity. But if for διενεργουσα we read
διοριζουσα as in the above translation, the meaning is clear.
[74]For νοηται in this place, I read φυεται.
[75]Neither of the Latin translators North and Arcerius have understood
this passage, and therefore have erroneously translated it. For the
original is: και παντα τα εν τᾳ συστοιχειᾳ και ταξει τα εκεινου
κατακεχωρισμενα. This North translates: “Atque omnia in rerum serie
et ordine ab illo separata.” But Arcerius: “Atque omnia quæ sunt in
naturæ cognatione ordineque ab illo separata.” By the things however
co-ordinate with, and successive to God, Archytas means the other
Gods, who, though subordinate to the supreme, yet in consequence of
partaking of the same nature, are said to be co-ordinate with him.
Gale, likewise, did not perceive the error of the Latin translators.
[76]Plato says this of God in his Laws.
[77]The above sentences are from Stobæi Sententiæ, p. 3. (the edition
that of 1609,) and are ascribed to Pythagoras.
[78]The above seven sentences are to be found in p. 4. of Stobæus, and
as it appears to me are erroneously ascribed to Socrates. For I
conceive them to have been written either by Democrates or
Demophilus.
[79]Stob. p. 48.
[80]Hence the dogma of the Stoics derived its origin, that the wise man
is independent of Fortune.
[81]Stob. p. 65. These three sentences are ascribed to Pythagoras.
[82]Stob. p. 80. These two sentences are ascribed to Socrates, but I
have no doubt originally formed a part of the sentences of
Demophilus.
[83]Stob. p. 104. This sentence is ascribed to Democritus in Stobæus,
but has doubtless either Democrates or Demophilus for its author.
[84]Stob. p. 147. The above four sentences, are in Stobæus ascribed to
Socrates; but I refer them either to Democrates or Demophilus.
[85]This sentence in Stobæus is ascribed to Socrates, as is also the one
which immediately precedes it, viz. “The wealth of the avaricious
man, like the sun descending under the earth, delights no living
thing.” But as this sentence is to be found among the Similitudes of
Demophilus, there can be no doubt of the other belonging to the same
work.
[86]This and the preceding sentence, are in Stobæus ascribed to
Democritus, but I attribute them to Democrates or Demophilus.
[87]This sentence in Stobæus is ascribed to Pythagoras, but, excepting
the part within the brackets, is to be found among the sentences of
Demophilus.
[88]This sentence in Stobæus, is ascribed to Democritus, and that
immediately preceding it, to Socrates; but I ascribe both of them to
Democrates, or Demophilus.
[89]This and the preceding sentences, together with two other sentences
that accompany them, are in Stobæus ascribed to Democritus; but as
the other two are to be found in the Collection of Democrates, there
can be no doubt that all of them are from the same author.
[90]For as every cause of existence to a thing, is better than that
thing, so far as the one is cause and the other effect; thus also
that which gives a name to any thing is better than the thing named,
so far as it is named, i. e. so far as pertains to its possession of
a name. For the nominator is the cause, and the name the effect.
[91]In the Latin it is “post _dispositionem_ corporis.” But for
_dispositionem_ it is evidently necessary to read _dissolutionem_.
[92]This is conformable to the well-known Pythagoric precept, “Follow
God.”
[93]“We can by no other means,” (says Porphyry De Abstinen. lib. I.)
“obtain the true end of a contemplative, intellectual life than by
_adhering_ to God, if I may be allowed the expression, as if
fastened by a nail, at the same time being torn away and separated
from body and corporeal delights; having procured safety from our
deeds, and not from the mere attention to words.”
[94]But intellect is the recipient of wisdom, and therefore intellect is
the true man. This also is asserted by Aristotle.
[95]In the Latin _fidelis_; but as Ruffinus, the Latin translator of
these sentences, frequently adulterates the true meaning of Sextus,
by substituting one word for another, I have no doubt that in this
sentence the original was πεπαιδευμενος _eruditus_, and not πιστος
_fidelis_. My reason for so thinking is, that in one of the
sentences of Demophilus it is said, “that the life of _ignorant_ men
is a disgrace,” των αμαθων ονειδος ειναι τον βιον; and this in the
sentences of Sextus is, “Hominum _infidelium_ vita, opprobrium est.”
If, therefore, Ruffinus translates αμαθων, _infidelium_, there is
every reason to suppose that he would translate πεπαιδευμενος,
_fidelis_.
[96]Several of these sentences as published by Arcerius, are in a very
defective state; but which, as the learned reader will perceive, I
have endeavoured to amend in my translation of them.
[97]This work is unfortunately lost.
[98]According to Ælian and Suidas also, _melanurus_ is a fish; but as
the word signifies that which has a black termination, it is very
appropriately used as a symbol of a material nature.
[99]viz. Those Gods that are characterized by the _intelligible_, and
_intellect_. See my translation of Proclus, On the Theology of
Plato.
[100]See the second edition of this work in Nos. 15 and 16 of the
Pamphleteer.
[101]i. e. Natures which are not connected with body.
[102]See an extract of some length, and of the greatest importance, from
this dialogue, in my translation of Select Works of Plotinus, p.
553, &c.
[103]Forms subsist at the extremity of the intelligible triad, which
triad consists of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_. But being and
life, with all they contain, subsist here involved in impartible
union. See my Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
[104]In Aristot. Metaphys. Lib. 13.
[105]Because ¾ is to ⅔ as 9 to 8.
[106]In Mathemat. p. 147.
[107]Instead of περιττουται, it is necessary to read περατουται; the
necessity of which emendation, I wonder the learned Bullialdus did
not observe.
[108]This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of
the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the
passions to reason.
[109]The words και δικαιοσυνη are omitted in the original. But it is
evident from Plotinus, that they ought to be inserted.
[110]Instead of κατ’ αυτην here, it is necessary to read κατ’ αισθησιν.
THE END.
Transcriber’s Notes
—Silently corrected a few typos.
—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
is public-domain in the country of publication.
—Added a Table of Contents based on the chapter headings in the text.
—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
_underscores_.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life - Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain - Pythagoreans in the Doric dialect; and a collection of - Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaeus and others, which are - omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and have not - been noticed by any editor" ***
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