Title: The Nuclear Ship Savannah, First Atomic Merchant Ship
Author: Anonymous
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.


*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Nuclear Ship Savannah, First Atomic Merchant Ship" ***


                                  the
                              nuclear ship
                                SAVANNAH


                      _first atomic merchant ship_


                           one of the world’s
                                 SAFEST
                                 ships


                      U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                   Frederick H. Mueller, _Secretary_

                        MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
          Ralph E. Wilson, _Chairman_, Federal Maritime Board
                      and _Maritime Administrator_

                        ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
                       John A. McCone, _Chairman_

    [Illustration: Multiple advanced electronic and mechanical safety
    devices guard this “atomic heart.”]

  CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOTORS
  HYDRAULIC SCRAM CYLINDERS
  DRIVE LINE LEAD SCREW SECTION
  BUFFER SEAL ENCLOSURE
  BORON STEEL CONTROL RODS
  PRESSURE VESSEL
  OUTLET NOZZLE
  REACTOR CORE
  THERMAL SHIELD
  FUEL ELEMENTS
  FLOW BAFFLE
  SUPPORT RING
  INLET NOZZLE
  PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR


The N.S. SAVANNAH, the first nuclear-powered cargo-passenger ship, is
one of the safest seagoing craft in the world.

This is the result of careful and deliberate planning.

Every appropriate safety device, factor, and technique were sought in
the design and planning stage, and the ship’s construction has probably
been more closely and intensively inspected, tested, and scrutinized
than that of any other merchant ship ever built.


SAFETY POLICY BASIC

The Declaration of Policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 calls upon
the Maritime Administration for the promotion and maintenance of an
American Merchant Marine for trade and defense “composed of the best
equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels.”

The Atomic Energy Commission is engaged in the N.S. SAVANNAH project as
a part of its responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 “to
encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent
with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of
the public.” The Commission has the responsibility of providing a safely
operable nuclear power plant for the vessel; instructions and
regulations for the disposition of wastes; the use, handling, and
disposal of source, special nuclear, and by-product material; and the
health and safety aspects associated with these responsibilities.

Ship safety ashore, abroad, on the high seas, and in port is of major
interest to the Maritime Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission,
the U.S. Coast Guard, the Public Health Service, and such private
agencies as the American Bureau of Shipping.

The N.S. SAVANNAH is constructed to meet or surpass every standard set
by all of these responsible agencies and will have a substantial
built-in safety margin in excess of the most stringent requirements of
applicable standards, which are among the highest in the world. Where
there were no existing standards every precaution in keeping with sound
judgment and engineering experience has been applied in the construction
and safety considerations of the ship.

                   _The N.S. Savannah Is a Safe Ship_

The reputation of American industry and the integrity of the Government
of the United States stand behind this statement.

Following is a detailed listing of the factors that make the N.S.
SAVANNAH so safe:


SAFETY FACTORS

As the world’s first commercial, nonstationary type of nuclear power
plant, the SAVANNAH’s design and construction have resulted in a vessel
with an unprecedented degree of safety. Basically, the safety
considerations concern two separate but closely inter-related factors:

(1) The hull and interior structure surpass the highest standards of
safety, both in the conventional marine sense and in the light of the
additional factors created by the installation of a nuclear propulsion
plant; and

(2) The nuclear propulsion system creates no more hazard to the crew and
passengers, and other ships in a busy port, than any modern conventional
steam propulsion system—actually, in the light of safety factors,
included because of its prototype nature, the N.S. SAVANNAH is as safe
as, and in some respects safer than, a steam-powered vessel that burns
coal or oil.

The basic difference in safety between a nuclear-powered ship and a
conventionally powered ship involves radioactivity which results from
the fission process. Provision has been made to control this
radioactivity on the SAVANNAH under all foreseeable conditions. This
control is accomplished through the following design and operational
features:


HULL AND INTERIOR STRUCTURE

In general, the following safety requirements were used by the
SAVANNAH’s architects, George G. Sharp, Inc., in the design of the ship:

(1) The ship is as safe as, or safer than, any other vessel of its class
with regard to the usual “hazards of the sea”; and

(2) In no credible accident can there be any hazardous release of
radioactivity to the surroundings.

The SAVANNAH is designed to a two-compartment standard of subdivision
(i.e., the ship will remain afloat with two main compartments totally
flooded) at a draft of 29 feet, 6 inches. The ship complies with all the
applicable laws of the United States and requirements of the regulatory
bodies and rules in force as to standards of safety.

Structurally, the SAVANNAH differs from conventional passenger-cargo
ships only in that the reactor and containment foundations are
comparatively much heavier than the foundations for normal ship’s
machinery. The heavy longitudinal members are carried well beyond the
reactor space bulkheads to tie with a smooth transition into the
double-bottom structure.

Stability equivalent to that of a conventional passenger-cargo ship with
fuel oil tanks full has been obtained in the SAVANNAH. In addition,
because there is no fuel oil to be consumed in passage, there is less
variation in the stability of the ship during the course of a long
voyage.


VITAL COMPONENTS DUPLICATED

From the standpoint of ship safety, assurance of sufficient power to
maintain steerage and maneuverability is the principal requirement of
the propulsion plant. To this end, duplication of machinery and power
sources on the SAVANNAH has been carried to the fullest practicable
degree. An electric “take-home” motor is installed for emergency
operation. Developing 750 hp (nominal), it is coupled to one of the
high-speed pinions in the reduction gear. A quick-connect coupling
permits engagement in less than 2 minutes. In addition, a temporary
supplementary startup steam plant is installed in No. 7 hold. This plant
is capable of developing 2,000 shp ahead and about 1,750 shp astern,
using the main propulsion unit; in emergencies this steam plant may be
used in lieu of the take-home motor. Using forced circulation boilers,
it can, like the take-home motor, be brought on the line in about 2
minutes. In case of a reactor plant failure, the stored heat in the
reactor system will be available during the interim period, so that at
no time will the SAVANNAH be without power to the shaft.

From the standpoint of conventional ship operation, the SAVANNAH is
designed and constructed to the highest degree of operational safety.

Reactor safety is ensured by the heavy steel containment shell
surrounding the reactor system. This shell is designed to withstand the
pressure surge from the hypothetical example, “maximum credible
accident,” used in nuclear reactor analysis. Thus, any internal accident
will be contained within the reactor containment shell and no hazardous
amount of radioactivity can escape to the environment.

Protection of the containment complex from ship accidents was studied in
detail in establishing the SAVANNAH’s design criteria. In particular,
ship collisions were carefully reviewed and methods developed to predict
structural damage to vessels struck in collision as a function of speed
and displacement of the vessels involved. On the basis of the data
obtained from these studies, the SAVANNAH is designed and constructed to
withstand, without damage to the nuclear reactor compartment, any
collision with any of the ships making up 99 percent of the world’s
merchant fleet.


COLLISION POSSIBILITY LOW

The probability of collision with a ship of this remaining 1 percent
group is extremely low. Considering that the SAVANNAH, as the first
nuclear-powered merchant ship, will be handled with extreme care, the
probability of a dangerous release of radioactivity through collision is
negligible. Because large ships proceed at relatively low speeds in
harbors, and because of the built-in invulnerability of the SAVANNAH,
the probability of a collision of sufficient severity to damage the
reactor compartment is extremely low.

Surrounding the reactor compartment are heavier-than-normal structural
members. The inner-bottom, below the reactor space, is “egg crated” with
transverse floors at every frame; and a deep vertical keel with more
than the usual number of keelsons in the fore and aft direction add to
this strengthening. Outboard of the reactor compartment are two heavy
longitudinal collision bulkheads; outboard of these bulkheads there is
heavier-than-normal plating continuously welded to the beams. Inboard of
the collision bulkheads are collision mats made up of alternate layers
of 1-inch steel and 3-inch redwood planks for a total thickness of 24
inches.

In the event of a collision broadside to the reactor compartment, the
ramming ship would have to penetrate 17 feet of stiffened ship
structure, the collision mat, and the reactor containment vessel, before
reaching the reactor plant.


SINKING, GROUNDING WEIGHED

Other accidents, such as grounding, fire and explosion, and sinking also
were considered in the design and construction of the N.S. SAVANNAH.
Grounding is very similar to collision in its effects, except that the
damage is ordinarily more localized. The heavy reactor and containment
foundations in the inner-bottom provide adequate protection to the
reactor system.

The SAVANNAH, as a passenger ship, is prohibited by Coast Guard
regulation from carrying dangerous and explosive cargo in quantity.

The ship’s fire-protection and fire-fighting systems are fully adequate.

In case of sinking, provision has been made to allow for automatic
flooding of the containment shell of the reactor to prevent its collapse
in deep waters. The flooding valves are designed to close upon pressure
equalization so that containment integrity will be maintained even after
sinking. Salvage connections have been installed to allow containment
purging or filling with concrete in case of sinking in shallow water
where recovery or immobilization of the reactor plant seems advisable.

Besides the very latest in navigation and communication equipment,
including true motion radar, the ship is equipped with antiroll
stabilizers. Located outside the hull amidships, the stabilizers are
operated hydraulically by a gyro system capable of sensing sea
conditions and providing counter-forces to reduce the roll. Each
stabilizing fin has a lift of approximately 70 tons at 20 knots speed.


RADIATION SHIELDING

One of the most important features of the SAVANNAH is her radiation
shielding. The main sources of radiation during operation of the
SAVANNAH’s power plant are the reactor itself and the primary coolant
loop lines. The primary coolant which passes through the reactor core is
irradiated, and itself becomes a source of radiation. Both the reactor
and the coolant emit neutrons and gamma rays. There are also radiation
sources of lesser magnitude including process piping, hold-up tanks,
pumps, and demineralizers.

The objective of radiation shielding on the SAVANNAH is twofold: First,
it limits the radiation dose outside the containment to prescribed safe
levels, and second, it reduces the activation of structure within the
containment shell by reactor core neutrons. The latter consideration is
necessary in order that the reactor plant be accessible for maintenance
within 30 minutes after shutdown.

The shielding is divided into a primary shield, which surrounds the
reactor itself, and a secondary shield, which surrounds the entire
containment shell.


PRIMARY SHIELDING

The primary shield, immediately surrounding the reactor pressure vessel,
consists of a 17-foot-high lead-covered steel tank that surrounds the
reactor vessel with a 33-inch water-filled annulus. The tank extends
from a point well below the active core area to a point well above it.
The active core height within the reactor is only 60 inches. Constructed
of carbon steel, the primary shield tank is covered with a layer of lead
varying in thickness from 2 to 4 inches. When the tank is filled with
water, the dose rate outside the primary shielding from core gamma
sources and activated nuclei will not exceed 200 mr per hour 30 minutes
after shutdown. This is sufficiently low to permit entry into the
containment vessel for inspection or maintenance.


SECONDARY SHIELDING

The containment shell completely surrounds the primary (reactor) system,
and serves not only to confine spread of radioactivity in the event of a
rupture of the system but to support the hundreds of tons of lead and
polyethylene of the secondary shield.


CONTAINMENT SHELL

The primary function of the containment shell is to surround the primary
system and provide complete containment of any radioactive matter that
might escape from the system. The design pressure of the vessel was
determined by postulating the instantaneous release and expansion of the
entire contents of the primary system. This approach is highly
conservative because of the improbability of a large rupture.

A study has been made concerning the penetration of the vessel wall by a
piece of debris in an explosion. An analysis of the penetrating power of
high-speed components indicated that the shell would contain the largest
missile that could be expected.

The shell is cylindrical in shape, 35 feet in diameter by 50.5 feet
long, and is centrally located on the ship’s bottom.

The containment shell is sealed at all times during plant operation.
Entry to the shell will be made only after the reactor has been shut
down, the shell purged with air, and the radiation level has dropped
below 200 mr per hour.

The bottom half of the shell rests in a cradle of steel surrounded by a
48-inch-thick wall of reinforced concrete.

The top half of the containment shell is covered by a 6-inch layer of
lead plus a 6-inch layer of polyethylene. During normal power operation,
this reduces the radiation level to less than 0.6 mr per hour at the
nearest point of access by the crew.


CONTAINMENT SHELL AIR CONDITIONING

This system maintains a constant maximum ambient temperature of 140° F.
and a maximum relative humidity of 72 percent inside the containment
shell. The system operates in conjunction with the intermediate cooling
water system, using 95° F. water.

During normal operation, the containment shell is sealed and no outside
air will enter or leave the vessel. Ambient conditions will be
maintained by regulating the cooling water flow as required according to
instrument readings on the control panel.

In all areas where crew members have unlimited access, radiation levels
will be less than 5 rem integrated dosage per year, the recommended
maximum annual exposure of workers in the atomic energy field. Assuming
that passengers would move about the ship, and on the basis of their
calculated average distance from the reactor, the average exposure of a
passenger remaining aboard for a year would be under 0.5 rem, i.e. ¹/₂₀
of the occupational value.

The 5 rem area is relatively small and not in general use. No crew
member will be aboard ship or in the 5 rem area continuously for a full
year, and it is doubtful that any crew member will actually receive an
integrated dose of more than 0.5 rem in a year.


ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

This system supplies power to the reactor system and its auxiliaries and
is designed to operate with a high degree of reliability to assure
reactor safety during all phases of operation and shutdown.

It includes all load control and protective devices, containment wiring,
metering, interlocking and alarms associated with electrical loads for
the reactor system. Power for the system normally is supplied by two
turbine-generators, each rated at 1,500 kw, 0.8 pf, 450-volts, 3 phase
and 60 cycles. For increased reliability, a double bus type arrangement
is used. In the event of a bus fault, an automatic transfer of all vital
loads to the other bus will occur. During normal operation, a circuit
breaker ties the two busses together.


RADIATION MONITORING

The radiation monitoring system of the SAVANNAH keeps a constant check
on the intensity of radiation at various points within the reactor
system as well as areas remote from the power plant. This system is
divided into two areas for this description. They are power-plant
monitoring and health physics monitoring. The latter is covered under
its own heading.


POWER-PLANT MONITORING

Through keeping track of the radiation level at various points in the
reactor system, any abnormalities in operation can be quickly detected
and corrected.

A leak in the heat exchangers, for example, would show up on a radiation
monitor located in the blowdown line from each of the heat exchangers.

The intermediate cooling system, which includes cooling water from the
primary pumps, shield water cooler, containment air cooler, and other
components not directly in the primary loop, is monitored at five
locations. Leakage of primary loop water into the secondary water is
possible only from the pumps and letdown coolers, because of differences
in pressure. Consequently, radiation monitors are located downstream
from the letdown coolers and in each of the return lines from the pump
cooling coils.

The demineralizers are also monitored. When the resin bed is
functioning, the flow downstream (effluent) will have negligible
radioactivity. Consequently, a monitor signal at this point will
indicate when to switch to a new demineralizer. The monitor in the
influent (water entering the demineralizer) measures the activity level
in the primary loop.

The fission product monitor keeps track of fission product activity in
the primary (reactor) system. The monitor consists of a cation and anion
column, an amplifier, and an indicating system. This monitor is located
in the primary coolant flow system.


TANKS HOLD LIQUID WASTE

Power plant liquid wastes are collected in tanks for storage prior to
discharge into a specially designed servicing vessel in port. The liquid
waste collection tanks are monitored. Gaseous wastes will normally be
disposed of at sea through the radio mast, which contains two detectors
for monitoring purposes. They are an air-particle monitor and a
radio-gas monitor, and operate at all times so that gas is vented to the
atmosphere. If gaseous radioactivity should rise above specified limits,
the gas will be diluted to below the limit before being discharged to
atmosphere.

The above monitor stations are the principal ones involved in reactor
system operation. The monitors operate through a system of separate
channels, with each channel responsible for a pre-selected range of
activity. All detectors relay their readings to the main panel in the
control room, where automatic recording and visual observation
instruments are located.

    [Illustration: Surrounded by steel, wood, concrete, the N.S.
    SAVANNAH reactor is safe against any credible accident.]

  STABILIZING BRACKET PORT AND STARBOARD
  POLYETHYLENE
  “C” DECK
  STEEL & REDWOOD COLLISION MAT
  WOOD PAD
  “D” DECK
  CONCRETE
  WATERTIGHT BULKHEAD
  REACTOR COMPARTMENT
  STIFFENING RINGS
  LEAD
  CONTAINMENT VESSEL
  COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD
  CONCRETE
  INNER BOTTOM
  FOUNDATIONS
  FORWARD

Portable monitoring equipment, samplers, and other health physics survey
equipment are provided for access, survey, and maintenance monitoring.


REACTOR CONTROL AND SAFETY SYSTEMS

The design of the control system is such that a malfunction which leads
to an abnormal withdrawal rate of the rods will not result in a
dangerous condition. Studies indicate that the minimum reactor period
resulting from maximum withdrawal of the rods is not less than 30
seconds. The control system is designed to maintain the _net_ reactivity
insertion always less than the delayed neutron fraction.

The entire reactor system is protected by the safety system. This system
causes the reactor to terminate power production if a dangerous
operating condition exists. The safety system also contains interlocks
which prevent actions which would otherwise jeopardize the reactor
system.

The control and safety systems are capable of protecting the reactor
system from damage due to any credible accident except a major leak in
the primary loop.

The reactor will “scram” (shut down) automatically from any of seven
causes: (1) shorter than a safe reactor period, (2) excessive power, (3)
excessive rise or fall in reactor pressure, (4) excessive reactor outlet
pressure, (5) loss of flow, (6) loss of power to safety circuits, and
(7) loss of power to control rod drives.


INSTRUMENTS DOUBLE CHECKED

The nuclear instrumentation system provides maximum reliability and
safety, yet minimizes erroneous readings or signals from the monitoring
channels. This is done by using two or more measuring channels in each
operating range, and then interlocking the circuits so that at least two
of them give the same signal of abnormal operating conditions before
initiating a reactor “scram.”

Increased reliability is obtained by using “solid state” instruments or
magnetic amplifier units rather than electron tubes and relays.


REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEM

This system constantly monitors signals from the nuclear and non-nuclear
instrumentation, and when necessary takes corrective action. Corrective
action will be either in the form of “fast insertion” of the control
rods, or in the form of reactor “scram.” Fast insertion takes place at a
rate of 15 inches per minute, while a scram is achieved in 1.6 seconds.

Fast insertion consists of moving all control rods to the full down
position at the fastest rate possible through the electromechanical
drives. For reactor “scram,” all rods are driven to full down position
under the force of a net hydraulic pressure of 1,250 psi.


SHORTER THAN A SAFE PERIOD

The reactor period is a measure of the rate of reactor power increase;
the shorter the period the faster the rise. Ten neutron-measuring
channels, covering the full range from source level to 150 percent of
maximum power, measure neutron intensity (flux level) and its rate of
change. These data are continuously transmitted to the reactor operator
and the automatic control and safety system. Too fast a rate of change,
or shorter than a safe period, will automatically “scram” the reactor.


EXCESSIVE POWER

The amount of power produced is a function of the neutron flux and its
resultant heat generation in the primary loop. The temperature selected
to produce automatic “scram” is 540° F. This temperature “scram” circuit
provides an independent backup to the neutron flux “scram.”


EXCESSIVE RISE OR FALL IN PRESSURE

Too low a pressure could result in boiling of the primary coolant, while
too high a pressure could result in poor heat transfer as well as
placing unnecessary stresses on the reactor’s fuel element core
structure. There are a number of causes for either condition, all of
which would relay a “scram” signal to the operator and to the automatic
safety system.


EXCESSIVE OUTLET PRESSURE

In addition to protection against rapid rate of change in pressure, a
scram circuit is provided to prevent any steady excessive outlet
pressure that could result in damage to the core and related equipment.


LOSS OF FLOW

This condition would result from a mechanical failure in the primary
loop pumps, piping, etc., or by accidentally stopping the pumps when the
reactor is at power, or by loss of power to the pumps. When a single
pump fails to operate for any reason, an alarm is sounded to warn the
operator. If all four pumps fail to operate for any reason, a signal is
sent to the reactor safety system to “scram” the reactor.


LOSS OF POWER TO SAFETY CIRCUITS

The hydraulic drives that operate the “scram” mechanism require reserve
pressure to keep them in the “ready” position for “scram” condition and
are an integral part of the safety circuitry. A power failure in the
safety circuits would automatically put the hydraulic drives into
operation to “scram” the reactor.


LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL ROD DRIVES

Each of the 21 control rods has its own drive mounted vertically on the
upper reactor head. Of these, 9 are servo controlled and 12 are of the
nonservo type. The 9 servo rods have variable speed drives and operate
in two groups in a synchronous manner, according to demand signals from
the reactor system. The 12-rod group can be operated manually or in
groups according to predetermined conditions. All of these operate at a
speed determined by their gearing.

The safety considerations are as follows:

1. Each servo loop contains a monitor that will sound an alarm and
initiate a fast insertion if the rod fails to follow its command signal.

2. Another circuit monitors all nine servo monitors, and should any of
the servo monitors malfunction, an alarm will sound and appropriate
corrective action will be taken through the automatic safety system.

3. “Scram” action starts in the safety system and is independent of
operator control. Once started, a “scram” action cannot be stopped.

4. For conditions that do not warrant “scram” action, a fast insertion
serves to reduce power and permit the operator to correct the condition
without a complete shutdown. A manual fast insertion can be made by the
operator.

The electrical circuits controlling the reactor control rods are
monitored, and an electrical failure in one or more circuits will result
in a fast insertion or “scram” action. Should electrical power to the
control rod drives fail completely, the hydraulic drives will be
actuated.


WASTE STORAGE AND HANDLING

This system drains and collects, until safe for removal, all drainage
from the reactor system that might be radioactive. Drainage may result
from a leak, or be part of the normal drainage accumulation during
initial fill and testing, normal startup, operation and shutdown, and
decontamination.

The drainage and storage system consists of two pumps, valves, piping,
containment drain tank, and four waste storage tanks. The total capacity
of the tanks is 1,350 cubic feet. This is approximately 80 percent more
than the maximum operational leakage and drainage for a 100-day period.
Provisions are made to take samples from any of the five tanks at any
time.

After sampling indicates sufficiently low level of activity, the fluid
will be pumped to special dock facilities for transfer to inland waste
disposal sites. No waste will be discharged at sea under present
operating plans.

A special 129-foot vessel, the NSV ATOMIC SERVANT, will service the
Savannah’s reactor and handle the radioactive wastes.

The majority of the potentially radioactive gases vent into a central
manifold. Here they are monitored, diluted by fan-driven air and
discharged up the radio mast after passing through a series of filters.
During normal operation, the manifold is vented continuously. However,
if the radiation monitor indicates activity levels too high for
satisfactory dilution, the gases can be diverted into the containment
shell.


GAS FILTERED, MONITORED

The region between the containment vessel and the secondary shielding is
ventilated with a 4,000 cfm fan which discharges about half way up the
radio mast. This gas is not expected to be radioactive but as an added
precaution it is monitored to determine if radioactivity is present.

All gases released through the radio mast are filtered to remove
particulate matter.

The containment shell air is purged with fresh air periodically at sea
and prior to entry by the ship’s engineering crew. During normal
operation the only radioactive gas in the shell is argon-41, at a
concentration less than the maximum permissible level for continuous
occupational exposure. The only potential sources of activity in the
containment air above tolerance levels would be fission products and
these are not present during normal operation. However, as previously
described, prior to purging, air samples will be analyzed to ascertain
the activity levels.


HEALTH PHYSICS MONITORING SYSTEM

This system provides radiation protection to crew and passengers through
constant monitoring for any abnormalities in radiation levels that might
occur. This is accomplished through a system of 12 radiation detector
units in the following locations: A-deck, outside doctor’s office;
B-deck, aft passageway; B-deck, port passageway; C-deck, port
passageway; C-deck, aft passageway; D-deck, starboard passageway;
D-deck, both fore and aft bulkheads and at tanktop level, the port,
starboard, fore and aft passageways.

These 12 monitor units feed their readings into 2 channels, with 6
monitors on each channel according to a predetermined sequence. A
manually operated detector permits switching to any one monitor to allow
observation and study of that station for as long as desired. By means
of a recorder on each channel, a permanent record of the 12 monitoring
stations can be obtained.

The detectors are calibrated and maintained periodically by operating
personnel using a standardized cobalt-60 source.

Ionization chambers located at the points of entry into the containment
vessel will determine when it is safe to enter the vessel. In addition,
anyone entering the vessel will carry a portable monitor to determine
the dose rate at the point he will be working.

In addition to the installed detectors, there is a full complement of
portable equipment to make any specific investigations required. The
equipment is used to check decontamination results and to monitor
contaminated spaces during maintenance. Health physics personnel,
equipped with portable equipment, accompany all groups working any area
that might contain radioactivity.

The health physics laboratory aboard the ship is outfitted for all tests
required during the operation of the reactor plant.


AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

_Sampling System._ This system provides a means for removing liquid
samples from the primary loop to determine the effectiveness of the
purification system. Samples will be taken from both the inlet and
outlet flow of the primary demineralizers.

_Intermediate Cooling System._ The primary function is to provide clean
cooling water to the various reactor system components. A secondary
function is to maintain water in the annular primary shield tank.

The system consists of two separate flow circuits: a sea water circuit
and a fresh water circuit. Each of these circuits contains two pumps and
two coolers, plus other necessary components. The pumps and coolers are
arranged in parallel, permitting either pump to supply water to either
cooler.

In the sea water circuit, inlet temperature is 85° F and outlet
temperature is 106° F. The fresh water enters its coolers at 143° F and
leaves at 95° F.

Components outside and inside of the containment vessel are cooled by
one or the other of these intermediate cooling circuits.


EXTRA EMERGENCY POWER

Two auxiliary 750-kw diesel generator sets are on standby to provide the
following: (1) Power to the main bus for operating those loads needed to
supply cooling for decay-heat removal after a scram or shutdown, (2)
emergency “take-home” power should the nuclear power plant become
inoperative, (3) power for reactor startup, and (4) spare generating
capacity for normal operation should a turbine generator become
inoperative.

In the event of a reactor “scram,” these generators will automatically
start and synchronize on the main bus bar to supply and distribute power
to the components used for reactor cooling.

A 300-kw emergency diesel generator is also available to supply power to
the 450-volt emergency switchboard. This source will operate in case
both the main turbine generators and auxiliary diesel generators do not.
Loads connected to the emergency switchboard include lighting, low speed
windings of the primary coolant pumps, and the emergency cooling system.

A battery protected source will also provide power to those loads that
require an especially dependable power source with no interruption due
to loss or switching of auxiliary power.


TAKE-HOME POWER

As mentioned, in the electrical system there are two 750-kw diesel
generator sets installed in the engine room. If any emergency
“take-home” power is required, either diesel generator can be used to
operate a 750-hp wound rotor motor, which is connected to the ship’s
propeller, through the reduction gears.

Each diesel generator is sized to furnish adequate power for reactor
decay heat removal, lighting, and necessary ship service.


N.S. SAVANNAH MANNED FOR SAFETY

To assure that the first nuclear-propelled merchant ship will be
completely safe, it is manned by well-trained, competent personnel whose
duty and responsibility it is to operate the ship safely and
efficiently.

Every mechanical and electrical safety device of modern navigation is at
the disposal of the SAVANNAH’s crew to insure the safety and integrity
of the ship.

The men who will handle the SAVANNAH ashore and afloat will have had the
advantage of the specialized and extensive training program conducted by
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Maritime Administration, and the
private contractors who built the N.S. SAVANNAH and her reactor.

The ship’s master and officers are men of long experience on the sea
whose backgrounds assure sound and stable assessment and judgment under
all possible conditions.

All of the factors herein discussed make it possible for the United
States Government to say of the N.S. SAVANNAH, as she ushers in the
atomic age on the world’s essential trade routes, that this unique and
wonderful vessel is unquestionably one of the world’s safest ships.


THE NUCLEAR SHIP SAVANNAH IS DESIGNED AND BUILT TO THESE SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS

_APPLICABLE CODES OF_:

  1. U.S. Coast Guard
  2. American Bureau of Shipping
  3. Maritime Administration
  4. U.S. Public Health Service
  5. American Institute of Electrical Engineers Marine Code
  6. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

_SAFETY REVIEW BY_:

1. AEC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

_DESIGN REVIEW BY_:

  1. U.S. Coast Guard
  2. Maritime Administration
  3. AEC
    (A) Oak Ridge National Laboratory
    (B) Electric Boat Company
  4. American Bureau of Shipping

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960    O—562017

    [Illustration: The N.S. SAVANNAH’s construction meets ultimate
    standards of health and environmental safety.]

  PASSENGER DINING ROOM
  CREW QUARTERS
  MAIN LOUNGE
  PASSENGER STATEROOMS
  REACTOR HATCH
  REACTOR AUX. HATCH
  CREW QUARTERS
  CARGO HOLD
  MACHINERY CONTROL CENTER
  ENGINE ROOM
  SHIP’S PROVISIONS
  STABILIZER SPACE
  CARGO HOLD
  REACTOR CONTAINMENT VESSEL

    [Illustration: The N.S. SAVANNAH—world’s first atomic merchant
    ship—pride of the American Merchant Marine—model of maritime
    safety.]



                          Transcriber’s Notes


—Silently corrected a few typos.

—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
  is public-domain in the country of publication.

—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
  _underscores_.





*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Nuclear Ship Savannah, First Atomic Merchant Ship" ***

Copyright 2023 LibraryBlog. All rights reserved.