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Title: Tactics, Volume I (of 2) - Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Author: Balck, William
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Notes
Text printed in italics has been transcribed _between underscores_,
bold face text =between equal signs=. Text printed in a different
(sans-serif) type has been indicated ~by tildes~. Small capitals have
been replaced with ALL CAPITALS.
Footnotes [513]-[516] were not present in the source document text;
please see the Transcriber’s Notes at the end of this text for more
details.
More Transcriber’s Notes may be found at the end of this text.
TACTICS
BY
~BALCK
Colonel, German Army.~
VOLUME I.
INTRODUCTION AND FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.
TRANSLATED BY
~WALTER KRUEGER,
First Lieutenant 23rd Infantry, U. S. Army,
Instructor Army Service Schools.~
Fourth completely revised edition.
With numerous plates in the text.
U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
1911
COPYRIGHT, 1911,
BY WALTER KRUEGER.
=PRESS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO.,
LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.=
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.
The translation of this book was undertaken at the instance of Major
John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of it in the
course in tactics in the Army Service Schools.
It is an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical
principles in the various armies, discussed in the light of the
tactical views and methods prevailing in Germany, and amplified by
numerous examples from military history.
The professional value of this book to all officers of our Regular Army
and Militia who are endeavoring to gain a working knowledge of tactics,
is so obvious that any comment would be superfluous.
Army Service Schools,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,
December, 1910.
PREFACE.
The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its first edition
in 1896, and for which the preparatory work reached back more than
a decade, now appears in its fourth edition in a completely changed
form. The lessons gained in war and improvements in weapons have
corrected many earlier views. While the Boer war confused the views
on infantry combat and brought forth more lessons in a negative than
in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese war has had a great educating
influence, in that it corroborated the soundness of the lessons
gained in the Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those
lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. The fundamental
principles upon which success depends have remained the same.
For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s wishes for
a new edition. It would not have been difficult to publish long ago
a new edition, based upon the many lessons of war communicated to me
by members of foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But,
after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more inclined
to avail myself once more of the opportunity of gaining practical
experience by service with troops. Pure theoretical reflection is only
too apt to depart from the requirements of practice and to overlook
the friction appearing everywhere. The battalion commander, more than
any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor of his
officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. Moreover, the proximity
of the maneuver ground to my present station gave me an opportunity
of observing the field training of a large number of battalions
and regiments of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with
brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several trips abroad
and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, furnished valuable
suggestions. I postponed issuing the new edition until the publication
of the new Russian and Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our
own excellent regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from
the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was further able
to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian (1905), Belgian (1906),
U. S. (1904), British (1905), and Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations.
This enumeration alone justifies the statement, “completely revised,”
appearing on the title page.
I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign experiences in
detail. The words of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton of the
British Army, to whose writings I owe a great deal, deserve special
attention in studying the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is
a blessing that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably it
is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is finally incapable
of assimilating the lessons gained by other armies. Military attachés
may discover the most important points in the training and employment
of foreign armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but their
comrades will pay no more attention to them than did Napoleon III.
to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army before the outbreak of the
Franco-German war.”
The treatment of the subject matter has remained the same throughout;
it represents, as in the first edition, the principle that tactical
lessons must be deduced from human nature, from the effect of weapons,
and from experience in war, proper regard being had for national
characteristics and historical transmission. _Tactics is psychology._
My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, upon the
works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General Rohne. The publications
of Historical Section I of the Great General Staff and the splendid
works of the late Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited
from military history. An almost too copious literature is already
available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs (_Einzelschriften_)
of the Great General Staff, and of Streffleur, especially “_Urteile und
Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_,” published by the latter, afford a rich
field for research.
It is not difficult to cite examples from military history in support
of any tactical procedure, but such examples require a very careful
sifting before they can be recommended as worthy models for our action
in front of the enemy.
The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal shock action
from the experience gained by them in their combats in Upper Italy in
1859, and the British were not very far removed from completely denying
the feasibility of making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the
desire to avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity
of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians finally had to
learn again the same bitter lessons as at Plevna.
Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears in Athens a
translation in Modern Greek from the pen of Captain Strategos of the
Greek General Staff, well known to many German officers from his War
Academy days.
It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the same kind reception
at home and abroad that was given its three predecessors. For all
communications, suggestions or corrections, directed either to me or to
my publisher, I will be sincerely grateful.
THE AUTHOR.
POSEN, March, 1908.
CONTENTS.
=INTRODUCTION.=
PAGE
=1. War= 1
Eternal peace 1
War the _ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2
Courts of arbitration 3
=2. Strategy and Tactics= 4
Definition of strategy and tactics 4
Relation of strategy to tactics 6
=3. The Method of Instruction= 7
Value of examples 8
Applicatory method 10
Advantages and disadvantages 10
Arrangement of the subject matter 12
=4. Drill Regulations= 13
Instructions for campaign 15
Regulations and the science of combat 15
=THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.=
=I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT= 19
=1. The Importance and Employment of Infantry= 19
Relative strength as compared to other arms 19
Élite infantry. Guards 21
Jägers and riflemen 22
Mountain infantry 23
Machine guns 24
Mounted infantry 25
Patrols and scouting detachments 27
Cyclists 28
Snowshoe runners 30
=2. The Tactical Unit= 32
=3. Organization= 34
The company 34
Peace and war strength 35
The battalion 36
The regiment 37
The brigade 37
=4. Intrenching Tool Equipment= 38
=5. The Load of the Infantryman= 39
Comparison of the loads carried by infantrymen in various
armies 40
=II. THE FORMATIONS= 41
=1. The Issue of Orders= 41
Trumpet signals 41
=2. The Purpose of Formations. Comparison Between Line and
Column= 42
Assembly and route formations 42
Maneuver and combat formations 43
Napoleonic columns 44
Comparison between line and column 44
The origin of column tactics 44
=3. The Company= 46
(_a_) Formation of the company 46
Number of ranks 46
Interval and distance 47
Front and facing distance 48
(_b_) Division of the company into three or four platoons 48
Losses among officers 50
=4. Length of Pace and Marching= 53
Comparison (table) 54
Double time 55
=5. Movements of the Company in Line= 56
=6. The Columns of the Company. Movements in Column. Formation
of Line= 56
Column of twos 56
Column of squads 57
Route column 57
Column of fours 58
Double column of squads 59
Comparison of column of fours with column of squads 59
The importance of the squad 59
The employment of the column of squads 59
Company column 60
Column of platoons 61
Column of sections 61
Guidon flags 63
Posts of platoon commanders 63
Movements in column 64
Suggestions made by Colonel Fumet, French Army 65
=7. The Battalion= 67
Normal formation of the German battalion 67
The color 68
Formations in various armies 69
The value of double column 71
The battalion in route column 72
=8. The Regiment and the Brigade= 73
Formation in line or in echelon 73
=9. Extended Order= 75
Thin and dense skirmish lines 75
(_a_) The formation of the skirmish line 78
(_b_) Movements in skirmish line 81
Advance by rushes 82
Time required for making a rush. Strength of the force making
the rush 83
Rising 84
Short or long rushes 85
Advance by crawling 86
Lessons of the Boer War 88
Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War 89
Provisions of the various regulations relative to the advance
by rushes 90
Fire while in motion 92
Examples of the employment of fire while in motion 93
Examples of the employment of rushes 93
(_c_) Reinforcing the firing line 96
(_d_) Closing up. Assembling. Re-forming 97
=10. Supports= 98
Duties 98
Distance 99
Commander 100
Movements 100
Formation 100
Supports in rear of the firing line or not? 101
=11. Comparison Between Close and Extended Order= 102
Necessity of drill 104
Combat drill 105
Training 105
Training of leaders 109
=III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES= 111
=A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY= 111
=1. The Field Gun= 111
Percussion shrapnel 111
Time shrapnel 112
Shell 115
The French _obus allongé_ 115
=2. The Light Field Howitzer= 116
=3. The Heavy Field Howitzer= 118
=4. Expedients for Minimizing the Effect of Fire= 118
(_a_) Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the
hostile fire 119
(_b_) Minimizing the effect of fire 120
=5. The Results Obtained by Artillery Against Various Targets= 122
French data 123
=6. The Effect of Shrapnel Bullets on Animate Targets= 125
=B. INFANTRY FIRE= 126
=1. The Effect of a Single Projectile on Animate Targets= 126
Explosive effect 127
Tumbling bullets 127
=2. The Effect of “S” Bullets on Materials= 131
=IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE= 132
Stunning and exhaustive effect 132
The engagement at Modder River, Nov. 28, 1899 132
=1. Fire Discipline= 133
The employment of the bayonet; bayonet fencing 134
=2. Fire Control and Fire Direction= 134
Squad leaders 135
Company commanders 136
Uncontrolled fire 136
Russian experiences in the Far East 137
=3. Selection of the Line to be Occupied= 138
=4. The Strength of the Firing Line= 139
=5. Ascertaining Ranges= 140
Influence of the knowledge of the range upon the efficacy of
the fire 140
Ascertaining ranges by pacing or galloping 141
Influence of the terrain upon the length of pace 141
Errors of estimation 142
Provisions of various regulations 143
Memorizing distinguishing marks on the enemy 144
Scaling the range from maps 144
Obtaining the range from other troops 145
Trial volleys fired for the purpose of obtaining proper sight
elevation 145
Range finding instruments 146
=6. Selection of a Target and Time for Opening Fire= 147
Short or long range fire 147
Limit of long range fire 147
The moral effect of withholding the fire 151
Marshal Bugeaud’s narrative 151
Provisions of various regulations 153
General rules for opening fire in attack and defense 154
=7. Pauses in the Fire= 155
=8. Kinds of Fire= 157
Volley fire and fire at will; bursts of fire (_rafales_) 158
The rate of fire 160
The influence of the rate of fire upon the efficacy of fire 161
The volley 163
Bursts of fire (_rafales_) 164
=9. Rear Sight Elevations and Points of Aim= 165
=10. Commands= 166
=11. The Observation of the Fire= 167
=12. The Effect of Fire= 167
Comparison between losses produced by infantry and artillery
fire 167
(_a_) Influence of training 168
(_b_) Influence of the error in estimating the range 170
(_c_) Fire effect as regards time. Number of rounds to be
expended 172
(_d_) Additional influences affecting the accuracy of fire 173
Wolozkoi’s theory of the effect of the constant cone of
misses 173
(_e_) Influence of rifle-rests in firing 178
(_f_) Influence of the ground 179
Danger space and beaten zone 179
Firing upon hill positions 183
Indirect rifle fire 184
Ricochets 185
=13. Losses In Action= 185
Losses in the various formations 186
Losses among officers 189
=14. The Moral Effect of Fire= 191
The impressions produced upon General Bonnal by the battle
of Wörth 191
Surrenders of British troops in South Africa 192
Limit of endurance in battle 193
The “void of the battlefield” 194
Mixing of organizations 195
Fighting power of improvised units 197
Overcoming crises in action 198
=V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION= 201
=1. Normal Procedure= 201
The normal attack 202
Drill attack 204
=2. Concentration, Development, and Deployment for Action= 205
Development for action 207
Deployment for action 209
=3. The Battalion, the Regiment, and the Brigade= 210
The battalion 210
The regiment 214
The brigade 216
Base units 218
Examples of changes of front 220
=4. Distribution in Depth and Frontage of Combat Formations= 222
Dangers of distribution in depth 222
Plevna and Wafangu 222, 223
Distribution in depth necessary during the preparatory stage 224
Contrast between distribution in depth and frontage 225
Dangers of over-extension (Spicheren) 225, 226
Influence of fire effect and morale upon frontage 227, 228
Influence of the task assigned a force 231
Delaying actions. Night attacks. Defense 232, 233
Approximate figures for the extent of front that may be
covered 233
Frontage of the several units 235, 236
The Boer War 238
The Russo-Japanese War 239
Table of troops per km. of front 240
Recapitulation of the most important points governing
frontage 241
Provisions of various regulations 241
=5. Combat Orders= 243
Combat tasks 243
Division of work in staffs 245
=6. Communication on the Battlefield= 246
Signal and wig-wag flags 246
Signal arrangements in the Austrian, French and British
armies 248
=7. Local Reconnaissance of the Infantry= 248
Reconnaissance in force 251
The object of local reconnaissance 251
Scouting detachments 252
=8. The Importance of the Terrain= 254
The attack over an open plain 255
The French group attack 256
Combat sections 257
=VI. MACHINE GUNS= 259
=1. Development of the Arm= 259
Mounting and method of transportation 261, 262
=2. The Power of Machine Guns= 262
Kinds of fire 263
Combat value of machine guns and infantry 267
=3. Infantry Versus Machine Guns= 268
Conduct of troops when exposed to machine gun fire 268, 269
=4. Machine Guns in Germany= 270
Organization 270
Formations 273, 274
Machine gun companies 275
=5. Going Into Position= 276
=6. The Fire Fight= 283
Machine guns in the engagement at the Waterberg 283
=7. Machine Guns in Other Countries= 284
Switzerland 284
Austria 286
England 289
Japan and France 290
Russia 290
Machine guns at Liao Yang, 1904 291
=8. The Employment of Machine Gun Batteries= 293
Rencontre and attack 295
Rear guards 295
Defense 295
Coöperation with cavalry 296
Machine guns versus artillery 297
English views 297
Swiss views 299
=VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY= 301
Deployment for firing 303
Moral effect of a charge 306
Aiming positions 307
Time for opening fire 308
Selection of sight elevation 310
Kind of fire 310
Distribution of fire 311
Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard 311
Advance against cavalry 313
Infantry versus dismounted cavalry 313
Provisions of various regulations 314
=VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY= 316
=1. The Passage of Infantry Through Artillery Lines= 316
=2. The Advance Under Artillery Fire= 318
Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile
fire 318
Fire for effect 320
Formations used by infantry when under artillery fire Russo-
Japanese War 322
Lessons of war 321, 323
=3. Firing on Hostile Artillery in Position= 324
Cover afforded by steel shields 324
=IX. THE ATTACK= 329
Attack and defense compared 329
=1. The Surprise= 330
Examples of surprises 331
=2. The Rencontre= 333
Conduct of the advance guard 334
Issue of orders 336
Conduct of the main body 338
Provisions of various regulations 339
Examples 339
=X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE= 340
=1. Lessons of War= 340
Boer War 340
The infantry attack in the Russo-Japanese War 340
Russian infantry 340
Japanese infantry 341
Examples 343, 344
=2. The Conditions Upon which Success Depends= 345
=3. Preparation of the Attack= 346
Reconnaissance. Preparatory position 346
=4. The Coöperation of Infantry and Artillery in Battle= 351
Preparation of the assault 352
=5. The Point of Attack= 355
=6. Envelopment= 356
Holding attack 357
Launching the enveloping force 359
Separation of holding and flank attacks 361
Provisions of various regulations 362
=7. Removal of Packs= 363
=8. The Employment of Machine Guns= 365
=9. The Conduct of the Attack= 365
The advance of the firing line 365
Distances 368
The fire fight 369
The superiority of fire 370
Fixing bayonets 372
=10. The Assault= 373
The decision to assault 373
The decision to assault emanating from the firing line 375
Fire support during the assault 379
Bayonet fights 382
Wounds produced by cutting weapons 384
Assaulting distances 385
Conduct after a successful attack 385
Conduct after an unsuccessful attack 386
=11. The Use of the Spade in Attack= 387
Sand bags 390
Results of Russian experiments 390
Provisions of various regulations 392
General rules governing the use of the spade in attack 393
=12. The Employment of Reserves= 394
Launching or withholding reserves 395
=13. The Conduct of the Leaders in Action= 399
=14. United Action Versus Tactical Missions= 401
The attack on the “Tannenwäldchen” at Colombey Aug. 14,
1870 402, 403
The attack on Grugies (St. Quentin) 403
The dangers of assigning tasks 405
=XI. THE DEFENSE= 408
=1. The Passive Defense= 409
=2. The Defense Seeking a Decision= 409
Troops required to occupy the position 410
Division of the position into sections 411
Advanced positions 413
=3. Fortifying the Position= 415
Battalion groups 417
Observation of the foreground 420
Clearing the foreground 421
Dummy intrenchments and masks 421
Cover trenches and communicating trenches 421
Obstacles 422
Russian views 422
=4. The Conduct of the Defense= 423
Protection of the flanks 425
Employment of machine guns 425
Occupation of the position 426
=5. The Counter-Attack= 428
Position of the general reserve 429
The moment for making the counter-attack 432
The counter-attack after the position is carried 433
The counter-attack in conjunction with a movement to the rear 434
Frontal counter-attack 436
Provisions of various regulations 438
=XII. THE RETREAT= 440
Breaking off an action 441
Rallying positions 442
=XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS= 445
The delaying action and the holding attack 445
=XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS= 448
The Austrian Drill Regulations of 1903 448
The Italian Drill Regulations of 1903 and 1906 451
The French Drill Regulations of 1904 453
The British Drill Regulations of 1905 459
The Japanese Drill Regulations of 1907 463
The Russian Drill Regulations of 1907 466
The Swiss Drill Regulations of 1908 466
=XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION= 468
=1. Historical Sketch= 468
Table showing ammunition supply of the various armies of the
world 475
=2. Regulations Governing the Supply of Ammunition in Armies= 476
Germany 476
Austria 479
Russia 480
France 480
England 482
Italy 483
=3. What Deductions May Be Made From the Regulations of the
Various Armies= 483
=INDEX= 487
=INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY= 527
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION.
C. D. R. = Cavalry Drill Regulations.
F. A. D. R. = Field Artillery Drill Regulations.
F. A. F. R. = Field Artillery Firing Regulations.
F. S. R. = Field Service Regulations.
Gen. St. W. (_Generalstabswerk_) = German General Staff account of the
Franco-German War (unless otherwise indicated).
I. D. R. = Infantry Drill Regulations.
I. F. R. = Infantry Firing Regulations.
g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains.
kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs.
kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram through a
meter against the force of gravity.
m. = meter = 39.37 in.
km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or ⁵⁄₈ mile.
x = pace.
INTRODUCTION.
1. WAR.
Clausewitz, in his work _On War_, defines war as “a continuation of
state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force
the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable
of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged
honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the
injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of
the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is
no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts
to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to
abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to
abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of
dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual
that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the
national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with
one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880,
to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one;
for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man
develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to
duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would
stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in
1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt
to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period
of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only
the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those
ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish
and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all
desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher
moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain
conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and
enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the
business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise
providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that
war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and
that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism.
* * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits
it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached
to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent
the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the
state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at
stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues,
the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace
nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions
are united in the one thought--the fatherland; they are animated by
that common sentiment of devotion unto death--patriotism--which, once
experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows
the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in
those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A
great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That
is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a
nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and
resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and,
so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the
_ultima ratio_.”
[1] _Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland_, in _Historische
und politische Aufsätze_, New edition, II.
[2] _Das grosze Jahr_, in _Hammerschläge und Historien_.
Since war is the _ultima ratio_ of state policy, and as a sovereign
state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs
and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of
arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a
decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if
the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is
embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able
to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the
possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never
decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the
possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3]
[3] The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for
a settlement of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was
to be enforced by summary proceedings when necessary. The war of
1866 proved that the paragraphs of the constitution mentioned, of
necessity had to fail the moment the vital interests of two powerful
states came into conflict. See VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Geschichte des
Krieges von 1866_, I, p. 115.
The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration
are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh
facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed--as are many proposals
for disarmament--calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.
If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the
question of right between two states at once becomes a question of
might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account
nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have
the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by
fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to
dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power
of public opinion and with the influence of representative government,
has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets,
like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer possible. As a
result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes
part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits
interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt
crushing of the opponent.
[4] “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for
an industrious jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.”
FREDERICK II.
“Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in
which lies our last hope.” MACHIAVELLI, _Il Principe_.
This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the
hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he
will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of
1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary
to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state
is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the
enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order
to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations
will also have to be taken into account in answering this question.
From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will
always be the complete overthrow of the enemy.
2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.
Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope
of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this
direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and
strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each
other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy.
Von Bülow, the author of _The Spirit of Modern Warfare_ (1798)[5],
calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s
sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science
of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz
calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of
the war (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres
d’opérations_”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces
in battle (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de
bataille_”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the
study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles
calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”.
Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “_l’art de
guerre_” instead of the term “_strategy_”. None of these definitions
are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts,
the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor
Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the
science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the
object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in
battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define
strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems
of each: “_Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser
d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer
lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le
tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les
disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège,
d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le
but proposé._”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the application
of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it
is sufficient to define strategy as the _science of the conduct of
war_, tactics as the _science of troop-leading_. Strategy brings about
the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out,
in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics.
Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric
advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a
complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The
German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based
on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of
retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank.
The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the
enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered
with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following
up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the
leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here
that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein
he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their
influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as
the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all
control over them has entirely ceased.”
[5] _Geist des neueren Kriegssystems._
[6] “The art of directing armies In the theater of operations.”
[7] “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.”
[8] “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the
regulation of their activity with reference to battle, has been
included in the term ‘tactics’, while the term strategy is synonymous
with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters as fall into the domain
of tactics.” BLUME, _Strategie_, p. 33.
“Tactics teaches _how_, and strategy _why_, one should fight.”
General V. SCHERFF.
Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of
armies, while the manner of execution belongs to tactics.
[9] “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a
comprehensive glance the entire probable theater of war, establish
the lines of operations and direct the masses on the decisive points.
“It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of
march of the troops, to form them for battle at the various points
determined by strategy, to begin the action, to sustain it, and to
maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” THIERS.
[10] V. MOLTKE, _Tactical Problems, No. 58_ (1878) p. 133.
Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy
a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the
two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to
tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule,
take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to
neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz
not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of
terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper
importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces. Should the
demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield,
the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s
foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces.
Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the
direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in
this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of
tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and
their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools
for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other
hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory
and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy
are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves
to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal MOLTKE.[11]
[11] The view that the direction of attack should be governed by
the possibility of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by
General v. Scherff, who says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced
by the question ‘will the attack here or there be tactically
easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it there be
strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course
with reference to measures on the battlefield.”
3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.
While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the
higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from
which to gather knowledge.[12]
[12] See lecture by Prince HOHENLOHE: _Kriegserfahrung und
Kriegsgeschichte_, Neisse, 1879.
“Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only
true philosophy. Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the
great captains; it is the only means of learning the art of war.”
NAPOLEON I., on April 17th, 1821.
“Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the
memory, provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment
should pass upon.” FREDERICK THE GREAT.
In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal
experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of
our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables
us to appreciate those controlling factors which, in map problems,
do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear
only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from
the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost
invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is
not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a
given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866,
of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “_Les
Autrichiens_,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “_ont fait la guerre sans la
comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont
étudiée._” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever
theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is,
on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows
us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a
position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us
in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated,
instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military
history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and
their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what
the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of
the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences,
doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It
describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military
common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance
the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare
also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military
experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual,
prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic
enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot
suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military
history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect
tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war
the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned
by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The
experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with
caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion
to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has
the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently
acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter
into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept
his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very
difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described
if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means,
as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We
maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a
single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere
allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial
reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author
cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact
that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In
consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a
hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which
would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce,
from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he
publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have
convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the
employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for
thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that
the more recent military history is the most natural source from which
to select examples, inasmuch as recent history alone is sufficiently
known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in
this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper
analysis of these proofs must be left to the student.
[13] _Principes de la Guerre_, 1903.
“The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding
it; the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied
it.”
[14] From _Meinungen und Mahnungen_, Vienna, 1894.
[15] _On War_, II, Chapter 6, p. 111.
See also CLAUSEWITZ’ remarks on “_Criticism_,” II, Chapter 5.
The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the
system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois,
considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which
it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory
system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it,
although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples,
and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the
same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For,
although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected
form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary
manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17]
The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the
individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal
intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a
thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who
has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce
imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from
objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under
the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be
taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing
appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but
the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative
of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the
conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory
which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is
especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines
the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or
inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson
in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical
operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the
means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand
the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with
which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation,
arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be
able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not
lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and
of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of
theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by
the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this
direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to
the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods
must, therefore, supplement each other.
[16] See KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5.
[17] VON BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, p. 17.
[18] “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately
a great number of officers, imagining that they are solving the
question, at once cry out: ‘Everything depends on circumstances;
according to the wind must the sails be set.’ But if you do not know
beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a wind, how can you
set the sail according to the wind?” BUGEAUD, _Aperçus sur quelques
détails de guerre_.
If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character
is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of
unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also
the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to
its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this
character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to
military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength
of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure
of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to
the influences of certain situations such as would be encountered in
war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time
of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however,
very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal
conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This
should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of
these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of
peace.
After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the
purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it
may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office
of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is
still necessary--the study of military history. From this fountain
of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their
material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to
guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as
different from reality as day is from night.”[19]
[19] F. C. V. H. (_Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General_ CONRAD V.
HÖTZENDORF, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). _Zum
Studium der Taktik_, p. 2.
Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics
may be divided into two parts:
1. =Formal tactics=, or that contained in drill regulations. This
portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when
assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations
governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard
to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the
terrain.
2. =Applied tactics=[20] deals with the combined action of the several
arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account
influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field
warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly speaking, be included under
this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21]
pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and
technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the
same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them
lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation
of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a
clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible.
(Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur).
[20] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, Chapter
23. “The higher, Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of
battles--subordinate, or minor tactics, is the manner of fighting, or
the battle-tactics of an arm considered in its details.”
[21] MAJOR GUNDELACH, _Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg_,
Berlin, 1908.
4. DRILL REGULATIONS.
Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and
lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition
which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of
the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his
peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the
psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and
as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons,
however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore,
necessitate new tactics.
It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken
place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but
that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This
doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to
the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome
the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be
remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history
of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive
example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”
[22] MAHAN, _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, pp. 9 and 10.
It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no
matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been
originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short
time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes
are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be
interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing
our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr.
On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements
if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In
his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article
which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not
why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’
It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the
regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in
action.”
It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby
relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which
knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face
of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the
Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical
formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer
weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?
The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the
troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken
infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets
quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and
create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German
war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay
this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these
auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The
initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the
frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even
the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set
forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the
faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.
[23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue
“Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained
according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange
theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences
gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in
1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this
experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870,
the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double
column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had
already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See MOLTKE,
_Feldzug von 1859_, p. 65.
Further development and justification of the principles of the drill
regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain
assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations
should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook
of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is
necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.
“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very
different subjects. The regulations are law, authority--no doubt can
be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the
character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time.
They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly
changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed
be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter
the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction,
which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other
authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of
the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which
is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into
consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and
changing anew.”[24]
[24] KEIM, _Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre_, p. 1.
A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own
drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate
and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different
powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of
experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the
effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless
measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most
important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon
with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great
exertions and great mental agitation. _A doctrine of tactics which does
not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless
pedantry._
THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.
I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.
1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY.
In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and
importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms,
infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared
with the other arms.
In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was
as 1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In
the Swedish army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient.
During the era of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion
between the two principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the
Napoleonic wars as 1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4
per 1,000 men. In the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the
disadvantage of infantry. At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the
relative proportions of the three arms in the German IInd Army were
as follows: cavalry to infantry as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men.
The proportion between the two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps
of the German army, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as
1:18.8; on the first day of the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6;
at the opening of the campaign there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at
the close of the campaign 5.8 guns per 1,000 men. This was still more
marked in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps, which, on October 31st, had
5.8 guns and on December 9th even 11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present
Germany has approximately 6, and France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.
The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark
on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat
formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,”
and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and
trained more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French
army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions,
but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of
regiments of _gardes mobiles_ and volunteers.
Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat
with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in
extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable,
and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it
surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will
power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the
other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through
exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25]
[25] Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71:
Infantry: 69.8; Field Officers: 13.26; Captains: 10.19;
Lieutenants: 3.85%
Artillery: 57.7; „ „ 4.04; „ 4.84;
Lieutenants: 4.52„
Cavalry: 37.5; „ „ 5.61; „ 2.29;
Lieutenants: 3.24„
The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it
can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of
cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone
therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for
reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry
is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions
only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.
The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry
encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the
limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery
when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages.
The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made
in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line)
and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty
and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive
method of recruiting by means of bounties made it necessary to avoid
using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the
expensive personnel for decisive shock action _en masse_. Skirmishing
was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In
Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the
close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed
to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of
infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the
originator of an _élite_ infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he
created one _voltigeur_ and one _grenadier_ company in each battalion.
While battalion tactics predominated, _i.e._, until the close of the
campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At
the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion
a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited
at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material
and received special training in extended order fighting. Following
the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third
rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a
third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the
sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the
most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866
there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter
platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual _élite_ force assembled
in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the
troops, however.
The system of column tactics, which required that every company should
be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment
of _élite_ companies. The Prussian _élite_, consisting of the platoons
formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the
employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The
experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the
extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment
of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an
action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments
and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire
action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even
after its leader has fallen.
Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the
entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges
and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person,
and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty.
The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are
not, strictly speaking, _corps d’élite_, for they are not selected
from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard
receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps
of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous
results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves
constantly under the eye of the emperor.
Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their
use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for
existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare
(_Chasseurs alpins_, _Alpini_)[26], or where they are intended to serve
as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions
are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are
retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of
organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an
attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent
marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever
possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding
important points, and for combat and service of security on difficult
terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it
was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics;
that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that
infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished
as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for
special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the
campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive,
gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where,
contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of
the infantry.[27]
[26] See _Über Gebirgstruppen_, VI, p. 273, and also
_Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen_, 1907, May
to July.
V. GRAEVENITZ, _Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1903.
[27] The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th
Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the
Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the
defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz).
The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role,
frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions
(3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to
escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at
Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at
Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for
the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were
thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged
with those of the infantry.
For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted
on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd
Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the
front of the entire division.
V. MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von
1866_.
KUNZ, _Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege
1870/71_. On page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are
recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions
on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege
positions in front of Paris).
Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops,
requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical
qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor
every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although
the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently
contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by
peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not
suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare,
a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time
ensuring the comfort of the men while at rest, is necessary. The
lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short
exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present
the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special
mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger,
Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The
Italian _Alpini_ (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to
which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have
in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected
corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results.
The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is
worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops
garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups,
each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer
company, and machine guns.
As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to
direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means
of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the
visual signals employed by the navy.
The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the
transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with
its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on
closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is
delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand,
that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance,
which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops,
and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller
independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the
enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine
guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage
of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the enemy and
also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army.
In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the
additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and
of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the
requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point
of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire
of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The
principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however,
that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while
in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the
mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was
not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide
turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the
purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended
their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied
that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care
of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses
which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised
bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical
employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted
infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character
and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones.
Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by
mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on
that of the Boers.
In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks
which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an
improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations;
if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons
became cavalry: for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl
and cannot endure.
The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the
following principles for its employment:
In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be
lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On
account of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater
distances, and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning
movements than infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in
the following cases:
(a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front
of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse
batteries assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the
fire of the cavalry. It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as
possible, tactically important positions. It is to find positions
from which it can bring fire, preferably flanking fire, to bear on
the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat begins. It
is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed nucleus
in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable the
cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves
exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are
charged.
(b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light
mobile reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a
moment’s notice from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending
assistance, or for influencing the action at particular points
and for which other troops are not available on account of the
extraordinary extension of modern lines of battle.
(c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile
column in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in
performing this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in
the service of reconnaissance and patrolling.
The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry
organizations:
In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted
infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and
every brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each
battalion of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon,
consisting of two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40
men, and 54 horses). Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of
mounted infantry is: 28 officers, 630 men, and 676 horses.
The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where climatic
conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in
cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert
a potent influence on the actions of an opponent. As shown by our
experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry
is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to
prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country
return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal
actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the
employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough
horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be
of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry
and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands
for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the
cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling
its own fighting efficiency.
For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are
used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against
the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by
advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance,
secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent
of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm
foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a
large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking.
To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is
always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its
best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes
for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without
a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little
importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however,
when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver,
when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men
prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly
appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during
critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his
courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look
toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of
non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive
his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to
despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it
will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise
a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From
the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely
different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to
a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and
tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their
own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in
the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle.
It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the
mobility which infantry lacks.
If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take
the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain
with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other
soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle
that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be
utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service
and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in
addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the
divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the
formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division
has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be
withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist
detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would
lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an
organization. If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments
could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the
army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts
and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in
the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to
the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material
necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted
to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great
mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else,
the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their
dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road
space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos
take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the
terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only
by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment
cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to
push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary.
[28] Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and 200, GERMAN
F. S. R.
[29] By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry freedom of
action; by advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the
purpose of re-establishing contact with the enemy, of forestalling
him in occupying important points, or of outflanking him: finally, by
coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in covering a retreat,
in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work.
[30] According to the _Italian Regulations of 1904_, the rate of
march of cyclists is as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate,
10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., accelerated rate of march, up to 20
km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 km., without long rests. For
riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required.
In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the
formation of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each
_Bersaglieri_ Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be
employed in supporting a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished
a good deal in surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England
the development of cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers
and their exercises have demonstrated that such units are capable of
expanding in a brief space of time.
In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered
valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division
(1905). Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming
cyclist battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are
advocates of their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the
brutal German battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves
which he would form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry.
According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the
cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of
moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist
companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding
an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to
serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for
reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their
flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with
other arms.
In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is
had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe
or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in
Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is,
however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of
the German mountains.
[31] One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is
without doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment
of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers (Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In
June, 1905, this detachment, consisting of 4 officers, 15 men and
4 guides, all with field equipment, marched around the base of the
“Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. 2,500 m.),
Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the
Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey
which, even in mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced
tourists. In several of these detachments experiments were made with
white covers for uniform and equipment, which enabled individual men
and patrols to approach unseen to within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent.
Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with
snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is
retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of
security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of
maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased
when valleys or abrupt declivities intervene between the forces. The
only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one
can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without
difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the
marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty
which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy
points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings
with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able
to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of
snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting
links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to
move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they
easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as
the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact
with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command
and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.
The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each
ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must
be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled
in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is
increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small
detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is
patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute
for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed
of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This
permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be
employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing
to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary
to acquire proficiency in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be
easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse,
while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground.
When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they
are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in
France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training
school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences
gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for
training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a
body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a
climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included).
[32] During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a
distance of 67 km. in 2³⁄₄ hours.
2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.
By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of
troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing
a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are
personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be
small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single
leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit
to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a
troop[33] (_Eskadron_) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces.
The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be
decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in
action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase
in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in
such extension would make the supervision of the unit too difficult
for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a
troop (_Eskadron_) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately
150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer
of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one
establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and
horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established.
[33] _Eskadron_ has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The
German _Eskadron_ consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139
horses. It is the smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry
and is divided into four Züge (platoons). _Translator._
[34] GENERAL MARMONT, in his _Esprit des Institutions Militaires_,
p. 41, states that experience has shown that the most suitable
strength for a troop is 48 files, divided into four platoons; but, he
recommends that platoons should consist of 16-18 files in order to
maintain this strength throughout a campaign.
[35] _Vorwerke._
While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of
a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is
no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the
movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case
of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an
independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses
the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision,
to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat,
and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining
serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.
To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of
little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs
a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or
cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39]
(company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry
out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible
leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle,
its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division at
least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting
units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry
regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a
compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component
parts independently for combined action against some point.” General
von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of
troops (_Truppenkörper_) is applied to an organization having the
necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which
is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as
can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who
knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the
troop (_Eskadron_), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies
the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to
the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm,
supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders
or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three
arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action,
he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are
“battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and
which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one
themselves.
[36] _Von der Kriegführung_, p. 49.
[37] _Truppeneinheit._
[38] _Kampfgruppen._
[39] _Kampfeinheit._
[40] _Gefechtseinheit._
[41] _Schlachteneinheiten._
[42] _Entwickelung der Taktik_, III, p. 125.
[43] _Grundeinheiten._
3. ORGANIZATION.
The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong
in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength
of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation
based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can
still be obtained. In armies in which companies are composed of more
than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a
margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200
rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching,
detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which
frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it
appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned,
as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no
longer be considered basic units.
===========+=========+===================================++
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | (a) PEACE STRENGTH. ||
|Company. +-----+--+------+------+------+-----++
| | | | | |Offi- | ||
| | |N.| | |cers’ |Hosp.||
| |Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Ser- |Corps||
| |cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|vants.|Men. ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum | 4 |15| 4 | 128 | ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 5 |17| 4 | 142 | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum | 4 |11| 2 | 76 | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum | 4 |14| 2 | 109 | 4 | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,| | | | | | ||
|Bersa- | | | | | | ||
|glieri | 3 |13| ... | 87 | ... | ... ||
| | | | |Musicians (trum- ||
| | | | |peters only) and ||
| | | | |sappers armed with||
| | | | |rifle. ||
|Alpini | 4 |19| ... | 121| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary | 3 |15| 2 | 108| ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 3 |15| 2 | 158| ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs| 3 |21| 2 | 125| ... | ... ||
| | | | | and| | ||
| | ...|..| ...| 150| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- | | | | | | ||
|mately | 3 | 7| ...| 96 | 4 | ... ||
| | | | | | [44] | ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
===========+=========++=========================================++
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || (b) WAR STRENGTH. ||
|Company. ++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
| || | | | | |Lit- | ||
| || |N.| | |Train |ter |Hosp.||
| ||Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Sol- |Bear-|Corps||
| ||cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|diers.|ers. |Men. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 5 |20| 4 | 226 | 4 | 4 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || 4 |19| 4 | 195 | ... | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | 4 Pio- |4 Officers’||
| || | | | neers. | servants. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | | | | | ||
|Bersa- || | | | | | | ||
|glieri || 5 |16| ... | 180 | ... | ... | ... ||
| ||Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers ||
| || armed with rifle. ||
|Alpini || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 4 |28| 4 | 218 | ... | 2 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs|| ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
| || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | | | non-combatants. ||
|mately || 4 |22| ... | 200 | ... | 20 |... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
===========+=========++===============
| ||Difference
| ||between
| ||minimum peace
| ||strength and
| ||war strength.
|Company. ++-----+--+------
| || | |
| || |N.|
| ||Offi-|C.|Pri-
| ||cers.|O.|vates.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 1 | 5| 103
|Maximum || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || ... | 5| 132
|Maximum || 4 Officers’
| || servants.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | |
|Bersa- || | |
|glieri || 2 | 3| 93
| ||Musicians (trum-
| ||peters only) and
| ||sappers armed
| ||with rifle.
|Alpini || ... |..| ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 1 |18| 110
|Maximum || ... | | ...
|Chasseurs|| ... | | ...
| || | |
| || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | |
|mately || 1 |15| 104
| || | |
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
[44] In addition, five non-combatants.
After the heavy losses at =St. Privat=, two companies were combined
into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard
Corps. The administration of the consolidated companies had to
remain distinct on account of the preparation of casualty lists,
recommendations for promotion and decorations. On the day of the
battle of =Orleans=, the strength of the German battalions varied
from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army Corps to 747 men in the 40th
Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after the battle of =Le Mans=,
the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even reduced to 280
men.
The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat
by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the
rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the
battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French
Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies,
because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in
mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units
than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.
As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action
developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was
transformed into combined action of the four companies, the strength
of the company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of
companies in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the
Great was divided for administrative purposes into five companies
and for tactical purposes into eight _pelotons_. The battalion of
the first empire consisted of six _Füsilier_ and two _Voltigeur_
companies, and the Austrian battalion, until the reorganization after
1866, consisted of six companies of which each two formed a division.
Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated in the infantry of
all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German
states), but early in the seventies most of the states adopted the
four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line
and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia
had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment
of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the
exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the
British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however,
be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of
their small size.
In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset
which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The
battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the
regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty,
and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion
is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions,
the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess
the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during
each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do
indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time
of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades
of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly
organized reserve available.
“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its
training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into
three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently
fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D.
R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German
General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments,
whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units
throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently
broken up.
This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment
brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade
commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments,
there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only
by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from
each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of
bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which
may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or
more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the
brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be
maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units
must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force
which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of
infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders
are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for
relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of
peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and,
moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division.
The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have
induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each
of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of
three brigades of four battalions each.
4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]
[45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped
with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68
small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.
Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption
of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in
importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern
infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of
its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit.
There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and
subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not
be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in
view requires it.
What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese,
Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but
experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that
for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m.,
and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching
under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be
impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According
to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with
spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large
number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with
explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.
The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in
each battalion:
+=========+================================+=================+=======
| FOR EARTH WORK. | FOR TIMBER WORK.|
----------+-----------------+--------------+---------+-------+-------
| Small | Large | Small | Large |
| Intrenching | Intrenching | Intrenching |
| Tools. | Tools. | Tools. |
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
|Spades.|Mattocks.|Spades.|Picks.|Hatchets.| Axes. |Total.
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
Germany | 400 | 40 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 8 | 513
Austria | 400 | 64 | 8 | 16 | ... | 8[46]| ...
Italy[47] | 32 | 8 | 36 | 18 | ... | 62 | ...
France[48]| 448 | 128 | ... | ... | ... |... | ...
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+-------
[46] Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and
carpenter tools in addition to their rifles. These men are formed
into a pioneer platoon of 64 men in each regiment.
[47] The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and
12-15 mattocks per company, is contemplated.
[48] The following demolition tools are available in each
battalion: 64 picks, 64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur
sections carry in addition a mattock or a pick apiece, and each
ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a fascine knife, or a saw.
The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed at the
present moment.
5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.
The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of
the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the
“Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load
of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new
experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:
Clothing 5.397 kg.
Equipment[49] 3,964 „
Baggage[50] 5.600 „
Arms and ammunition 8.507 „
Rations (including breakfast). 3.238 „
----------
Total 26.706 kg.
To this must be added intrenching tools:
Small spade and scabbard 0.89 kg.
Hatchet 1.08 „
Mattock 1.48 „
Load with spade 27.596 „
[49] Tent equipment 1.620 kg.
[50] Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269
g. ration on his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two
parts, one containing cocoa paste, the other concentrated extract of
beef (Pemmican).
COMPARISON.[51]
===========+==========+=======+========+=======+=======+===========
| | | |Weight| | Weight
| | | | of | Weight| of
| Without | With |Clothing.|knap- | of | ammu-
| spades. |spades.| |sacks.|rifles.|nition.[52]
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
Germany |26.706 | 27.596| 5.397 |20.919| 4.707 | 4.714 kg.
Austria[53]|26.615 | 26.443| 4.428 |22.187| 4.200 | 4.080 „
Russia |28.216 | 29.206| 4.000 |22.622| 4.576 | 3.426 „
France |26.125 | | 6.222 |19.903| 5.049 | 3.675 „
Italy |29.135[54]| | 5.993 |23.143| 4.505 | 4.320 „
Japan |26.365 | | 3.475 |22.890| 4.435 | 3.600 „
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
[51] According to _Journal of Military Scientific Societies_, 1906.
[52] Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds
per man.
[53] Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front
rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front
rank).
[54] Alpini carry 32.096 kg.
II. THE FORMATIONS.
1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.
Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not
suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the
intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient
free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are
given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the
telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and
the following signals: _To advance_, the leader raises the arm; to
indicate that the command is _to follow him_, he extends his raised arm
in the direction of march; _to halt_, he lowers the arm; _to deploy_,
both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if
necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently
indicated with one extended arm; _to assemble_ his men, the leader
describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also
be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed
upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of
troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader.
(Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a
change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must
be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by
troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service
calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying
those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except
“charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.
During the engagement of =Trautenau= (27th June, 1866), the trumpet
signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian
battalions to withdraw.[55] See also the effect of the signal
“assemble” after the taking of =Problus=.[56] Notice the effect of
the signal “form square” during the assault on the =Forest of Bor=
(=Königgrätz=).[57]
[55] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85.
[56] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16_, p. 230.
[57] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57_, p. 47. HÖNIG,
_Untersuchungen über die Taktik der Zukunft_, 4th Edition, p. 61.
On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded
by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry
Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army
corps. Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a
trumpeter, surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the
alarm signal.[58]
[58] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66_, pp. 48/49.
The village of =Diletz= (action at =Gitschin=, 1866) was to be
evacuated at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade
withdraw.” The signal was, however, understood and carried out
by only three battalions; two battalions, which were at the time
engaged, did not hear it at all and maintained their position until
they were taken in reverse by hostile fire and forced to withdraw.[59]
[59] _Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps_, p. 130.
In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th
Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at =Vionville=, the signal
“assemble” was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further
mischief being averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who
prevented trumpeters from blowing the call and ordered them to blow
“commence firing” instead.[60]
[60] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52_, p. 59.
2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.
The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior
to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the
entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing
troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an
action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of
hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly,
comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road
being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted
messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit
a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce
their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation
existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may
be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of
comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what
extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.
The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across
country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to
cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to
avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and
direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction.
These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a
deployment into line necessary.
Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all
weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not
satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes
every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire
and compels the most extensive deployment.
Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question
belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at
Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six
battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply
demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to
the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an
equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops,
formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable
for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62]
On the other hand, in the battles of the Empire we find columns
formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from
participation in the action, but which were designed to break through
the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps
was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a
single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions
respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack
formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were
deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column
and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their
vulnerability and their fire and shock power.
[61] FRIEDERICH, _Herbstfeldzug, 1813_, I, p. 305.
[62] RENARD, _Considérations sur la tactique de l’infanterie en
Europe_, Paris, 1857.
RÜSTOW, _Geschichte der Infanterie_, II, p. 316.
The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than
the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of
the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock
power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the
influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.
The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The
characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of
the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present
danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the
bold, the column that of the weak.
The column[63] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early
as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application
until the wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used
because the raw levies lacked the training necessary for making
movements in line. Whenever a line formation was used, battalions,
owing to the scarcity of efficient officers, resolved themselves
into disorderly skirmish lines which were exceedingly difficult to
control. The adoption of the column was, therefore, the result of
practical experience, but as a formation it could be justified on
the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development
for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages
of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the
placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in
line. This formation was employed for the first time in the attack
made by a demi-brigade during the battle on the =Tagliamento= (1797),
and subsequently it was used at =Marengo= (attack made by Desaix’s
Division).
[63] The development of the French column tactics is splendidly
portrayed by KUHL in his work _Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796_, p.
46, et seq.
[Illustration]
During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had
a marked _penchant_ for this formation, until it sank more and more
into insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at =Waterloo=,
and Macdonald at =Wagram=). Formations suggesting the above are found
even in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter
platoons of the companies at first in rear of the wings of the
deployed battalion, and later in rear of the outer flank platoons of
the companies).
[Illustration]
On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles,
especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a
line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets
which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On
ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground
rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to
greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64]
[64] At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for
each meter of the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of
the range, so that the second and third platoons of a company in
column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between platoons) would offer a
target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (¹⁄₅ the height of a
man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (¹⁄₄ the height of a man) at 1200 m.
3. THE COMPANY.
(a) Formation of the Company.
(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).
In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height
from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the
entire company is divided into three platoons (_Züge_). When a platoon
consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections
(_Halbzüge_).
In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in
two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right
to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets
the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section
(_Korporalschaft_) under a non-commissioned officer. During the
campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange
companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the
same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of
course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men
according to height from right to left flank, but it would without
doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the
formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85,
German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each
platoon are posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the
rear rank of the company.
[65] The number of ranks is intimately related to the rate of
fire of the infantry weapon. During the days of slow loading, the
necessity of keeping at least a part of the rifles at all times ready
for firing led the Imperialists in the Thirty Years’ war (loading
was executed by 90 motions) to form their musketeers into sixteen
ranks, while Gustavus Adolphus was able to form his infantry into
six ranks owing to the greater loading facility of their rifles.
In the Seven Years’ war the Prussian infantry was formed in three,
that of the Austrians in four ranks, the fourth rank serving as a
reserve. The first rank fired kneeling. The British infantry was the
first to adopt the two rank formation for fire action, forming into
four ranks for shock action and frequently for warding off cavalry
attacks. Emperor Napoleon considered a third rank useless for fire
and shock action and initiated the double rank formation on the eve
of the battle of Leipzig. In 1888 the Prussian infantry--the last to
do so--gave up the three rank formation which had long since lost its
importance in battle and which was retained side by side with the
double rank formation for purposes of parade only.
[Illustration: Germany.]
The _non-commissioned officers_ are posted in the front rank, on the
flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and
Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the
line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In
France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front
rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has
a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment
occupies a space about 75 cm. square.
The German Infantry Drill Regulations define interval (_intervalle_)
as the space between two elements on the same line, and distance as
the space between two elements in the direction of depth. An interval
is measured from the left flank of the element on the right to the
right flank of the element on the left (or vice versa); and distance
in the company and in the battalion is measured from the rear of the
element in front to the head of the element in rear (or vice versa).
If the distance between two elements is equal to their front, the
column is called an “open column”, otherwise it is called a “close
column.”
FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.
===========+=========================+================================
| FRONT. | FACING DISTANCE.
| (Per man.) | (Distance between ranks.)
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Germany |About 0.80 m. Loose elbow|0.80 m. from back of front rank
|contact. |man to breast of rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Austria |About 0.75 m. Files are |120 cm. from heels of front rank
|separated by an interval |man to those of rear rank man
|of the width of a hand. |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 0.88 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Italy |0.70 m. |0.75 m. from breast of front
| |rank man to breast of rear rank
| |man(according to German method
| |of measuring, 0.45 m.) on the
| |march, 1.20 m. (according to
| |German method of measuring,
| |0.90).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
France |0.70 m. including 0.15 m.|1 m. from back or knapsack of
|interval between files. |front rank man to breast of rear
| |rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Russia |0.70 m. Files are |Rear rank man is an arm’s length
|separated by an interval |from back of knapsack of front
|of the width of a hand. |rank man = 60-70 cm.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
England |About 0.80 m. |1.50 m. from heel of front rank
| |man to heel of rear rank man
| |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 1.20 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Switzerland|About 0.75 m. |0.80 m. from back of front rank
| |man to breast of rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Belgium |About 0.80 m. |1 m. from heel of front rank man
| |to heel of rear rank man
| |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 0.70 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Japan |About 0.85 m. |0.75 m. from back (or knapsack)
| |of front rank man to breast of
| |rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons.
In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered as distinct
bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical strength. They are
placed side by side and constitute the company in line. In Germany
and Russia the company is at each formation divided into platoons of
approximately equal strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and
Italy, it is contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn
when once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements are
executed, after preparatory commands given by the company commanders,
by commands of execution or signals given by platoon commanders. The
execution of movements is retarded by this procedure and the movement
itself becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of
commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous,
especially in the weak platoons at peace strength.
[Illustration: France.]
Column of platoons from line (par. 121 German I. D. R.: “Form column
of platoons”) is formed in Austria as follows (Austrian I. D. R. par.
360): At the preparatory command, “Column,” given by the company
commander, the leaders of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th platoons command
at once, as in forming column of fours to the front, “Fours right
(left), column right (left).” At the command “march,” the platoons
step off, each turning in column to the rear, and are conducted to
their new positions, halted, and dressed to the right (left).
The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, and Belgium
excepted, are divided into four platoons; each two platoons may in
addition be combined into a half-company. The German, Japanese, and
Belgian companies are divided into three platoons. “The platoon is not
an independent subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists
of a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes a
force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer commanding
the platoon makes it what it should be. The strength of the platoon is
therefore solely dependent upon the number of officers available.” (VON
SCHERFF).
The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization of the company
is that fewer platoon commanders are required, which fact is well
worthy of attention in the mobilization of units of both Line and
Reserve, especially in view of the extraordinarily heavy casualties
among the troop leaders in the course of a campaign.[66]
[66] See also _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88.
It is only necessary to recall the situation of the Guard Corps and
of the IIIrd Army Corps after the battles around =Metz=, and the
condition of the German troops during the advance to =Le Mans=. On
January 7th, 1871, there were 36 officers with the 57th Infantry, of
which 16 led platoons of the 36 platoons in the first line, and 8
lieutenants commanded companies. On mobilizing, 25 lieutenants were
assigned as platoon commanders and six as company commanders in the
57th Infantry.[67]
[67] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, I, p. 25. For additional facts in
regard to the dwindling of the number of officers consult _Die
sieben Tage von Le Mans_, by V. D. GOLTZ; also _Supplement to
Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1873, p. 368; also VON KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug
an der Loire_, p. 43.
The eight infantry regiments and the Jäger-Battalion of the Xth Army
Corps had, at this time, instead of the required 506 officers, only
286, of which number 174 were for duty. The 22nd Infantry Division
had only 108 officers left; companies and even half-battalions were
led into action by very young officers of the Reserve, and, on many
occasions, even by vice 1st sergeants.
On the morning of August 17th, 1870, the 40th Füsilier Regiment
had two field officers and four captains present for duty. Two
captains, two first lieutenants and eight second lieutenants
(four of these belonging to the Reserve), led companies; only two
lieutenants of the Reserve, one cadet, and four vice 1st sergeants
remained available for duty as platoon commanders. The regiment
participated in the battle of =Gravelotte= with this small number
of officers.[68] The 6th Grenadier Regiment, which, in July, 1870,
had marched out with four field officers, seven captains, six first,
14 second lieutenants, and four cadets, all on the active list,
lost so many officers at =Wörth= and =Sedan= that a field officer
of the 46th Infantry had to take command of the regiment; three
first lieutenants of battalions; and four second lieutenants, two
officers of the Reserve, and six vice 1st sergeants of the companies.
The 12 companies had available five vice 1st sergeants as platoon
commanders. The 1st Battalion of the 58th Infantry had only seven
officers left (including its commander and the adjutant) after its
losses at =Weiszenburg=.[69]
[68] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 162.
[69] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 58_, p. 56.
The 7th Grenadier Regiment lost 40 officers at =Weiszenburg= and
=Wörth=. On August 7th, three captains commanded the battalions and
three officers of the 5th Jäger-Battalion were detailed to command
companies in it.[70] At =Gravelotte= the Füsilier-Battalion of the
1st, the Ist Battalion of the 2nd, and the IInd Battalion of the
3rd Regiment of the Guard lost all of their officers. The French
organizations, having more officers and less men than we, were by no
means so badly off in 1870-71. Upon mobilizing in 1870, the German
army had 13.7 officers to every 1,000 men, the French army, 32.2
officers.
[70] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 122.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that in armies consisting
of militia it is considerably more difficult to command a platoon of
60-70 men than to command one of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably
connected with the four-platoon company is the small size of the
platoons during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance most
regulations permit the three-platoon formation when the company is
small, because platoons consisting of less than ten files are of no
instructional value. An advantage of the three-platoon company is
the simplicity and rapidity with which changes from one formation to
another may be effected.
The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for movements on the
battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 rifles, a target about
25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The four-unit column of platoons is
better suited for movements. With a front of 17 m., its depth is only
15 m., when the distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces
(Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See p. 62).
For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following would be the
forms:
[Illustration]
The other advantages praised by advocates of the four-unit company are:
1. That a smaller platoon is more suitable for field service--that a
picket is perhaps only in the rarest cases to be made 60 men strong.
2. That a small platoon makes a better and more comprehensive
employment of the company in action possible, as the company commander
has an opportunity to use ¹⁄₄, ¹⁄₂, or ³⁄₄ of his company according to
the requirements of the situation, while the three-unit company affords
less favorable combinations, permitting only an employment of ¹⁄₃ or
²⁄₃ of its strength.
These advantages can also be obtained in the German company by the
employment of sections (¹⁄₆, ¹⁄₃, ¹⁄₂, ²⁄₃, ⁵⁄₆) so that the objections
to the three-unit company would appear to be groundless.
The platoons (in Italy called _plotone_, in France, _section_) are
subdivided into sections (_demi-sections_, _Halbzüge_), in Austria
into two skirmish groups (_Schwärme_) of 4-7 files each, and, when
consisting of 16 files, into four skirmish groups (in Italy this is
also done, the groups being called _squadriglio_). In Germany the
platoons are divided into groups or squads of four files each, and
in Russia the platoons are divided into sections of 8-15 files each
and these again into groups or squads of 4-6 men each. If the squad
is to have any importance at all in action, it must have a leader,
and it might easily happen that a mobilized company lacks the number
of leaders necessary to provide one for each group. The withdrawal
from the line of a number of good shots for duty as squad leaders is
compensated for, in our opinion, by the more thorough supervision over
the men. This consideration has, however, apparently caused other
states (Austria and France) not to count on the activity of the squad
leaders in a fire action to the same extent as is the case in Germany.
4. LENGTH OF PACE AND MARCHING.
An extended, swinging step, without haste and without unduly taxing
the lungs, is advantageous in all movements. When accustomed to this
pace on the drill ground, the men will march with practically the
same step on varied ground, and this appears more desirable than to
shorten the step, while at the same time increasing the distance to be
covered in a given time. The length of the pace depends largely upon
the height of the individual, but even small men can maintain a step
of 0.80 m. without undue exertion.[71] In Switzerland the cadence has
been fixed at 116-120 steps per minute “with a view of suiting the
peculiarities and the varying degree of mobility which characterize
the inhabitants of the different cantons.”(!) For purely practical
reasons it is advisable to fix upon some even number of paces in order
that the cadence may be tested with the watch. (Austria excepted). The
longest pace in conjunction with the highest cadence (_Bersaglieri_,
whose march is almost a double time, excepted) is found in England
and Switzerland. Such a performance could not be kept up by a fully
equipped man without impairing health.
[71] When the leg is extended at an angle of 57 degrees the length
of pace would be as follows:
Height of man. Length of leg. Length of foot. Length of pace.
1.6 m. 0.8 m. 0.24 m. = 0.75 m.
1.675 „ 0.857 „ 0.253 „ = 0.776 „
1.70 „ 0.87 „ 0.26 „ = 0.80 „
1.75 „ 0.88 „ 0.26 „ = 0.82 „
===========+====================++====================++
| QUICK TIME. || ACCELERATED TIME. ||
+------+-------------++------+-------------++
| | PER MINUTE. || | PER MINUTE. ||
| +------+------++ +------+------++
|Length|Number| ||Length|Number| ||
| of | of | || of | of | ||
| pace.|paces.| || pace.|paces.| ||
| m. | | m. || m. | | m. ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
Germany | 0.80 | 114 | 91.2 || 0.80 | 120 | 96.00||
| | | || | | ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
Austria | 0.75 | 115 | 86.25|| 0.75 | 125 | 93.75||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
Italy, Line| | | || | | ||
and Alpini | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| ... | ... | ... ||
Bersaglieri| 0.86 | 140 |120. || ... | ... | ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
France | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| 0.80 | 124 | 99.00||
| | | || | | ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
| 0.71 | 118 | 84- || 0.71 | | ||
Russia | | | || | 122 |119. ||
| 0.89 | 122 |109 || 0.89 | | ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
Japan | 0.75 | 114 | 85.5 || ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
England | 0.84 | 128 |107.5 || 0.91 | 128 |116.5 ||
-----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++
| | 116- | 92.8-|| | 120- | 96- ||
Switzerland| 0.80 | | || 0.80 | | ||
| | 120 | 96.00|| | 140 |112 ||
===========+======+======+======++======+======+======++
===========++=====================
|| DOUBLE TIME.
++--------+------------
|| | PER MINUTE.
|| +------+-----
|| Length |Number|
|| of | of |
|| pace. |paces.|
|| m. | | m.
-----------++--------+------+-----
Germany ||0.75- | 170- |127-
||0.90 | 180 |162
-----------++--------+------+-----
Austria ||0.90 | 160 |144
-----------++--------+------+-----
Italy, Line|| | |
and Alpini ||0.90 | 170 |153
Bersaglieri||1.00 | 180 |180
-----------++--------+------+-----
France ||0.30[72]| 180 |136
|| | |
-----------++--------+------+-----
|| | 170- |181-
Russia ||1.066 | |
|| | 181 |192
-----------++--------+------+-----
Japan ||0.85 | 170 |144
-----------++--------+------+-----
England ||1.02 | 180 |183.6
-----------++--------+------+-----
|| | |
Switzerland||0.90 | 160 |144
|| | |
===========++========+======+=====
[72] The following, taken from _La marche du fantassin_ (_Journal
des sciences militaires, 1897_), is here inserted for comparison.
_French Drill Reg. of 1791_ (in force until 1862):
_Pas ordinaire_ 100 paces at 0.65 m. = 65 m. per minute
_Frederick The Great’s
Infantry_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „
_Prussian Drill Reg. of 1812_:
_Ordinary pace_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „
_Accelerated pace_ 108 „ „ 0.70 m. = 75.6 m. „ „
In general, double time is considered of little value. In Austria
double time is to be maintained for periods of two minutes, quick
time of five minutes duration alternating, up to sixteen minutes,
_i.e._, until a distance of 1,726 m. has been covered. In Germany,
an alternating quick and double time march in heavy marching order
is prescribed. A different practice prevails in Italy. According
to the Italian Regulations all troops are to be trained to march
in double time without rest and without knapsacks for 2 kilometers
(with knapsacks, 1 km.); _Bersaglieri_ without knapsacks, 3 km. (with
knapsacks, 1¹⁄₂ km.), also without rest (_i.e._, 13 and 16.8 minutes
respectively). When we consider that in double time with the necessary
alternating step, 2,000 m. can be covered in 17 minutes, and in
accelerated step, in 19-20 minutes, the time gained is unimportant when
compared to the fatigue of the men and the exertion of the lungs, which
interferes with deliberate, accurate firing. During an Austrian firing
test the number of hits fell from 76.5%, attained while advancing in
quick time, to 51% after a period of double time.
The run, without keeping step (_Marsch! Marsch!_) is employed in
rapidly crossing short, fire-swept spaces, in changing quickly from one
formation to another, and in the charge.
5. MOVEMENTS OF THE COMPANY IN LINE.
The commander of the center platoon is the guide.
A change of direction is effected by inclining toward the new direction
(at the command: “Half right, march!” when the angular change of
direction is less than 45 degrees), by indicating a new point to march
on, or by executing a turn.
6. THE COLUMNS OF THE COMPANY; MOVEMENTS IN COLUMN; FORMATION OF LINE.
Column of Twos.[73]
[73] _Reihenkolonne._
Column of twos is formed by facing in the indicated direction. Marching
at attention the depth of an organization in column of twos is equal
to its front when in line. The column of twos is used in marching by
the flank for short distances only, as the march at attention in this
formation unduly fatigues the men. In addition, this formation may be
used, in exceptional cases, on narrow roads; but the column becomes
considerably elongated (as much as 165%), when marching at route step.
Line is formed from column of twos either by facing, or by executing
front into line.
Column of Squads.
This is an open column formed (the company being in line at a halt or
in motion) by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees. It may also
be formed from line at a halt by the squad on the designated flank
moving straight to the front, the others executing a turn of 90 degrees
toward the proper flank, then following the leading squad.[74] Column
of squads may also be formed by executing “Squads right (left), column
right (left).” Line is formed by each squad executing a turn of 90
degrees or by executing front into line (without regard to the original
front).
[74] “Right forward, fours right.” _Translator._
[Illustration: Column of Squads.]
[Illustration: Route Column.]
Route column is formed from column of squads by the squads in each
section closing to facing distance, the file closers, musicians,
and hospital corps men forming ranks of four men, in the gaps thus
created. (Par. 91 German I. D. R.) With the exception of Russia, which
employs a section column, of Switzerland, which uses a column of
squads, and of France, which has adopted a wheel by fours like that of
the cavalry, all other armies employ the _column of fours_[75] as their
march formation.
[75] _Doppelreihenkolonne_.
Column of fours is, as a rule, formed as follows:
The even numbered men place themselves on the right or left of the odd
numbered men by making an appropriate turn, thus forming a column of
fours whose length is equal to the front of the company in line. In the
plate below let the Roman numerals represent front rank men, the Arabic
numerals rear rank men, and the horizontal line the original front
occupied; column of fours will then be formed to the right, in the
different states, as shown:
[Illustration: Austria.
Russia, England, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan.
Italy. Netherlands.]
For the purpose of increasing the front of the column, the double
column of squads, having a width of 8 files, may be employed. This
is formed in practice by placing the columns of two organizations
(companies or battalions) side by side. In large bodies of troops,
the depth of a column is reduced in this manner by one-half. A column
of fours formed by closing on the center instead of by wheeling to a
flank, is employed in Italy and Russia for the purpose of reducing the
front of an organization.
Comparison of Column of Fours with Column of Squads.
The column of fours has the advantage over our column of squads in that
it can be more quickly and easily formed; that the front rank men must
make a turn, while, at the same time, observing the march direction,
can scarcely be considered a disadvantage.
The column of fours and the column of squads have the same depth. The
Austrians consider movements made in column of fours on the battlefield
more clumsy and fatiguing than when made in column of squads, because
checks are transmitted to the whole column of fours owing to its
rigidity, while in column of squads the march is easier, more rapid
and more orderly. The squad organization, moreover, facilitates the
employment of small parties in the service of security and increases
the importance of the squad leader in fire action. For the last named
reason we should not like to dispense with the column of squads.
The Employment of the Column of Squads.
The route column is suitable for movements under frontal artillery
fire, as the cone of dispersion of bursting time shrapnel combines
small lateral spread with great effect in the direction of depth,
and as it is very difficult for the opponent to observe whether a
shot falls short or goes over, unless it strikes just in front of the
column. When artillery can bring a flanking fire to bear on the column
it becomes necessary to neutralize this by placing the platoons side
by side so as not to present an easily observed target to the enemy.
Movements by the flank and changes of front are easily made in column
of squads, and after some practice the deployment into line of
skirmishers from this formation offers no difficulties. This column
is best adapted for movements over varied ground. In column of squads
difficult terrain can be crossed and advantage can be taken of the
most insignificant cover. In addition, it is difficult for an enemy
to observe a force moving in column of squads along the edge of woods
and rows of trees, and such a column entails the least expenditure of
energy on the part of the men. The leaders must insist, however, that
the men cover in file, and that elongation of the column does not take
place. The column of squads or the route column is therefore to be
employed on the battlefield as long as possible.
A column of squads or route column may be shortened by placing the
platoons, each in column of twos or squads, side by side. By this means
the =Company Column= (_Kompagniekolonne_) is formed.
[Illustration]
The normal interval between platoons in this formation, measured from
the leading guide of one platoon to the leading guide of the next in
line, is nine paces. This interval may be increased as required by the
nature of the ground and the intended deployment for action (deployment
on a broader front). Movements in company column are facilitated by
the fact that platoon commanders are posted four paces in front of
the center of their respective platoons. The leading squad follows
the platoon leader, the guide of that squad moving directly in that
officer’s tracks. Thus, small, unimportant deviations, unavoidable on
varied ground, can easily be adjusted, while too definite rules would
tend to restrict the mobility of the platoon commanders in front of
their platoons. The principal thing is that the platoon follow its
leader who guides it without command.
The musicians distribute themselves in rear of the platoons in
readiness for their subsequent duty in action--that of maintaining
communication between the several parts of the company. The intervals
of nine paces between platoons are not rigid, but rather the reverse.
The flexibility of the formation considerably facilitates movements in
difficult country. This “meandering” of the company over the terrain
requires special training. The old, historic company column, in which
the platoons were formed in line one in rear of the other at a distance
of nine paces (Russia 5 paces = 3.55 m., Austria, Italy, France, 6
paces = 4.50 m., and Japan, 8 paces = 6 m.), their commanders on their
respective right flanks, is now called the
Column of Platoons.
Austria, France, and Italy have retained the old designation.
The front of the column of platoons may be decreased by forming column
of sections. The column of sections is suitable as a route formation on
broad roads; the transition from column of sections to column of squads
is not difficult, and for the purpose of passing through occasional
narrow stretches of road, the files on the flanks may be removed. In
most cases it is, however, more desirable to place several columns
abreast than to employ column of sections, because deployment is
facilitated in the former case.
Company in Column of Platoons.
[Illustration: Germany.]
[Illustration: Russia.]
=Russia.= The four squad leaders of each platoon are posted on the
flanks of the rear rank and in the center of each rank. The ranking
non-commissioned officer of each platoon stands on the left flank of
the front rank of his platoon. The 1st sergeant, the guidon bearer,
and one trumpeter, and behind them two drummers, are posted in rear
of the company.
[Illustration: Austria.]
The staves of the guidon flags (_Jalonneurflaggen_) are inserted into
the rifle barrel of a soldier (in case of a battalion into the rifle
barrel of a N. C. O.) and serve to indicate battalions and companies.
According to the color scheme used in Russia: red = 1, blue = 2,
white = 3, green = 4. “R” indicates the number of the regiment in
the division, “B” the number of battalion, and “K” the number of the
company. A red flag is carried by the 1st Company, and a red flag
with one green horizontal and one blue vertical stripe is carried by
the 8th Company of the 1st Regiment of an infantry division. In Japan
and England so-called storm-flags (small national flags) have been
adopted to facilitate mutual recognition of friendly troops.
[Illustration]
Posts of Platoon Commanders.
In Switzerland, in Russia, and in Germany, the post of platoon
commanders is on the flanks of their respective platoons when the
company is in column of platoons. In England and Austria platoon
commanders are posted in rear of their platoons, with the exception of
the commander of the leading platoon, who is posted beside his guide.
In all other states platoon commanders are posted in front of their
platoons. Officers are posted in front of their platoons so as to
facilitate observation on their part, and so that their platoons can
follow them. This position becomes a necessity when the regulations
require that all movements of the company be executed at commands given
by platoon commanders. When they are posted in front of their platoons,
they cannot supervise their men unless they turn around to do so.
The column of platoons is a close column from which line cannot be
formed directly. It has not been found necessary in Germany to provide
an open column permitting prompt deployment toward a flank. The column
of platoons unites the company on the smallest space and facilitates
supervision, but in companies at full war strength it is not well
adapted for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of
cover, on account of the size of the platoons (40 files each). In
platoons at war strength the men look more toward the point upon which
they are to march than upon the enemy, and the deployment of the rear
platoons offers difficulties which occur principally when a deployment
in an oblique direction or one by the whole company becomes necessary.
The column of platoons is formed by the flank platoons placing
themselves in rear of the center platoon. Line is again formed by rear
platoons moving to right and left and abreast of the leading platoon.
The German company column is much more flexible, and the advantage
of a prompt deployment for action, made possible by the fact that
all platoon commanders and the heads of platoons are in the lead and
therefore can see the objective, should not be underestimated. The
company column is formed from line by the center platoon forming column
of squads to the front (or rear), the flank platoons, each in column
of squads, closing on the center platoon, heads of the three columns
on the same line. Company column is formed as follows from column of
platoons: the leading platoon executes squads right (left), column left
(right), the two rear platoons execute squads right (left), and are
led to a position abreast of the leading platoon. Company column from
column of squads is formed by rear platoons moving to the right and
left respectively, and abreast of the leading platoon.
When line is to be formed from company column, the flank platoons
have to incline to the right and left respectively in order to gain
sufficient interval.
Movements in Column.
For marching short distances to a flank, column of twos may be
employed; for longer distances, column of squads (or fours); and the
march direction may be changed by inclining in the proper direction.
* * * * *
Since March 1904, experiments, which deserve to be mentioned here,
have been made in France under the direction of Colonel Fumet, having
for their object the simplification of the drill regulations. In the
experiments a four-rank formation is being considered. In this proposed
scheme the platoon is formed so as to place the four single-rank squads
(_escouades_) in rear of each other at the very close facing distance
of 0.50 m., the leaders of the _escouades_ taking post on the right
flank, a first class private being posted on each flank and in the
center of each _escouade_.
[Illustration: Forming Double Rank from the Four-Rank Formation and the
Reverse Movement.]
[Illustration: Deployment of a Half-Platoon formed in Four Ranks into
Two Half-Platoons formed in Double Rank.]
[Illustration: The Platoon (_section_) in Line.]
[Illustration: Deployment of a Half-Platoon Into Line of Skirmishers.]
[Illustration: The Company.]
The platoon at war strength (50 men) has a front of 8-10 m. and a
depth of 3 m. The movements are very simple. Route column is formed by
simply facing to flank, without first dividing the platoon into squads.
Double rank line may be formed from column of fours, by executing
right and left front into line. The double rank line may be deployed
into half-platoons. Furthermore, a single rank line may be formed by
the men of the rear rank stepping up into the front rank. One drawback
of this scheme is, that, in forming route column, facing distance of
0.80 m. between ranks is to be gradually gained after stepping off.
The deployment of half-platoons into line of skirmishers offers no
difficulties. It is otherwise, however, when the platoon is formed in
four ranks and marching in platoon front, for then line of skirmishers
can be formed only by deploying each rank in turn. The depth of the
column may be decreased by placing platoons (formed in column of twos
or fours) abreast, this expedient affording a suitable route formation
on broad roads. The company is formed by placing the platoons on a
line and abreast of each other at intervals of 2 m. In the battalion,
column of platoons and “mass” are the only formations considered. In
the “mass” formation the companies, each in line, are in rear of each
other.
7. THE BATTALION.
The movements of the battalion have been considerably simplified
in all armies. Battalion drill is, however, necessary, since, as
shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the morning of August 18th,
1870, simultaneous movements of large masses across country will be
unavoidable in future wars on account of the great size of modern
armies.[76]
[76] Additional examples: Advance of the 6th Infantry Division on
Vionville. _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 556. The flank march made by the 3rd
and 4th Bavarian Brigades from La Maladerie toward Schloss Goury (5
km. battle of Loigny). HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 22.
Advance of the 33rd Infantry Brigade from Champdoux against Loigny
(_ibid._, IV, p. 80).
Advance of the 22nd Infantry Division from Lumeau on Poupry, 4.5
km. (_ibid._, IV, p. 139).
Advance of the French to the battle on December 1st, 1870 (_ibid._,
III, p. 164).
Normal Formation of the German Battalion.
The four columns of platoons, or the company columns of a battalion,
may be placed, as dictated by space or purpose, abreast of each other
as a =broad column= (_Breitkolonne_), or in rear of each other as a
=deep column= (_Tiefkolonne_). The numerical order of companies is
immaterial.
[Illustration: Deep Column.]
[Illustration: Broad Column.]
[Illustration]
The deep column is employed for assembling troops if the terrain
necessitates a formation on a narrow front. If sufficient distance is
allowed between companies, line may be formed to a flank, but this
increases the depth of the column to such an extent that movements
at attention are impossible. The deep column may be used as a route
formation in addition to the column of squads. During the change from
route formation to that of action, the deep column formation may be
retained so long as the depth of the whole column does not have to be
further reduced. When necessary, the deep column may be replaced by a
formation in which the four companies, each in route column, are placed
abreast of each other.
The broad column finds proper employment, aside from parades, in cases
where the terrain or the contemplated deployment requires more front
than depth. It is also advisable to assemble the widely scattered
troops in a broad column after an action. The broad column does
not lend itself, however, to the execution of changes of front by
battalion; but should such changes of front become necessary, they are
always to be executed by company.
The color is posted between the right and left center companies, in
broad column, and on the right flank of the third company, in deep
column. In action the color remains with the company with which it
happens to be at the moment.[77] Should this company also join the
firing line, the color accompanies it; but under all circumstances one
squad must remain with the color. (Par. 236 German I. D. R.). It has
been contended that this is a disadvantage, as the enemy can direct
his fire on the color and the men in its vicinity. If the colors, upon
which the soldiers have been sworn, are taken into the field, it is
always better to endure the unavoidable losses incidental to carrying
them, and even to expose them to capture, than to send them back to
a safe place under escort.[78] At the Albrechtshaus farm (Wörth)
the colors served as rallying points around which the disordered
skirmishers rapidly assembled.[79]
[77] In Japan the color joins the battalion commander. British
troops leave their colors in their garrisons. In Russia and France
the color is carried only by one battalion of each regiment.
[78] See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 180,
battle of Wörth. A platoon of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 47th
Infantry was sent to the rear with the color, and a squad of the
Füsilier-Battalion of the 46th Infantry finally had six colors
to guard. In the 88th Infantry, out of a total of 48 sections, 9
sections remained in rear as a guard for 2 colors, but finally 6 of
these sections crossed the Sauer.
[79] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp. 77, 152.
The figures given on pages 72 and 73 of the German Infantry Drill
Regulations illustrate formations with organizations at peace strength.
The approximate dimensions of broad and deep columns at war strength
are as follows:
[Illustration]
=Russia.= Numerous formations are prescribed. In addition to route
column, columns with half company front and with company front are
prescribed. Reserve columns are mentioned. These, according to the
number of companies on the same line, are called single platoon
column (deep column), two platoon column (double column), or four
platoon column.
=Austria.= _The mass_, in which the companies of the battalion are
on the same line, each company in company column[80] with intervals
of three paces between companies, is employed for assembling the
battalion in a restricted space in a position in readiness when out
of range of hostile fire, or for assembling the battalion under
cover. The _line of columns_, in which the companies, each in column
or some other suitable formation, are formed abreast of each other at
deploying intervals plus three paces, is also used.
[80] In the Austrian company column (_Kompagniekolonne_), the
platoons, each in line, are formed one in rear of the other. This
formation was formerly called company column (_Kompagniekolonne_)
by the Germans also, but at present they designate it by the term
“column of platoons” (_Zugkolonne_). _Translator._
_The line._ In this formation the companies, each in line, are placed
abreast of each other at intervals of three paces.
_The column._ In this formation the companies are placed in rear of
each other, each either in line or in column, with distances of nine
paces between companies. The companies are numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th, etc., from head to rear, if in column, and from right to left,
if in line.
=Italy.= The formations are like those of Austria, but the double
column has been retained.
=Japan.= The only formations prescribed are the broad and deep column.
=France.= The companies are formed in column or in _ligne de sections
par quatre_, intervals and distances being 10 paces. Distances and
intervals may be increased when required. The _battalion in line_ in
which the companies are formed in line in numerical order, abreast of
each other at intervals of six paces, is only retained as a parade
formation.
_Line of company columns_ (_ligne de colonnes_). Companies abreast
with intervals of six paces.
_Deep column_ (_colonne de bataillon_). The companies in normal
formation in rear of each other at distances of 10 paces.
_Double column_ (_colonne double_). Intervals and distances 10 paces.
The formation in which the companies are abreast of each other, each
in column of fours at deploying intervals, is employed in marching
across country and also under artillery fire. Only the regiment
carries a color, the battalion a guidon (_fanion_).
[Illustration: =Deep Column=
(_colonne de bataillon_).
The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (_ligne de
sections par quatre_).]
[Illustration: =Double Column=
(_colonne double_).]
[Illustration: =Deep Column=
(_colonne de bataillon_).]
[Illustration: =Line of Company Columns=
(_ligne de colonnes_).]
[Illustration: =Double Column=
(_colonne double_).
The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (_ligne de
sections par quatre_).]
=England.= Columns are formed, in view of the (8) weak companies in
a battalion, with company or half-company front at full or reduced
distances (_quarter column_). In actions with savages echelon
formations and the square are also employed.
=Switzerland.= The company is divided into four platoons. The line is
used as an assembly formation and for purposes of parade. The company
column, corresponding to the German formation of the same name, is
used for movements on the battlefield. In both line and company
column the platoons are posted abreast, at intervals of three paces.
Finally the route column is used. This is formed either by wheeling
by squads, or by platoons executing column right (left). On the
battlefield the platoon may be deployed and formed in several lines.
In the battalion, company columns in line of columns, or route
columns in the battalion column, are posted abreast at intervals of
10 paces. Line and double column are abolished.
Opinions are divided as to the value of the double column. Formerly,
when the double column was still the column of attack from which
deployment for fire action had to be made, a discussion of its merits
was of special importance. While Austria abandoned the double column
formation in 1881 and Germany in 1905, Switzerland replaced it by a
column having a front of two platoons (_Plotonkolonne_), and Russia
readopted it again recently. All other states utilize it as of equal
value with the deep column in making movements beyond range of
artillery fire and as an assembly formation in addition to the deep
column. The change from double column to any company column formation
is easier than a like change from the Swiss “Ploton column” (double
column of platoons), which has the same front, since in the double
column two companies can be deployed at the same time toward both
flanks.
The deep column appears to be better adapted for making movements and
for advancing under cover, and, on account of its narrow front, a force
in this formation is better able to adapt itself to the forms of the
ground in hilly or close country than a body of troops in double column
of twice the width of front.
The Battalion in Route Column.
(Par. 316 German F. S. R.).
The companies are formed in route column and follow each other at
distances of 8 m. Mounted officers, musicians,[81] led horses and
vehicles are to be included in actual depths of columns given and not
in the distances. A permanent extension of distances for the purpose of
restricting checks of the march to a single organization is as little
permissible as the permanent elimination or reduction of distances;
distances may be dispensed with temporarily only. The reduction of the
depth of a column, obtained by eliminating distances between elements
entirely, is so small that the rapidity of deployment gained does not,
by any means, compensate for the increased exertion of the troops.[82]
[81] A trumpeter marches in rear of the battalion for the purpose
of blowing “Give way,” when necessary to open one side of the road.
At this signal all the troops close in toward the flank of the guide.
[82] The depth of a brigade of six battalions on the march is
about 2500 m. By eliminating distances between elements a space of
only 100 m. is gained, while by marching in a front of six files,
approximately 750 m. is gained. The march of the 10th Infantry
Division from Weiszenburg to Preuschdorf, on August 5th, 1870, proved
exceedingly fatiguing. The distances between organizations had been
eliminated pursuant to orders. “Some of the rearmost elements had to
double time uphill to keep up whenever the head of the column went
down hill. Great fatigue and many cases of overexertion were the
result.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 37_, p. 124.
During the march the company commander goes wherever his presence may
be necessary for the proper supervision of his company. Neither are
platoon commanders tied to a fixed place; one officer is, however,
required to march in rear of the company. The company ammunition
wagons follow in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in
rear of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train marches
separately.
The depth of the battalion on the march, without field train, is 400
m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m.
=Austria.= Column of fours. Depth of a battalion on the march,
including combat train, 670 paces (502 m.). The distance between
companies is nine paces (6.7 m.).
=France.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The
depth of each rank is reckoned at 1.40 m. on the march (in Germany
1.10 m.), and that of every 100 men at 50 m. Depth of a battalion,
including combat train, on the march is 450 m.
=Russia.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.1 m.). The
battalion without combat train has a depth of 350 paces (249 m.). The
combat train follows in rear of the regiment.
A German regiment of four battalions with combat train has a depth of
1,650 m. on the march; a Russian regiment, a depth of 1,725 paces (@
71 cm.)=1,215 m. (elongation on the march not considered).
=Italy.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The
battalion has a depth of 422 m. on the march.
8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE.
For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and of the brigade
see page 37 _supra_. All movements must be executed in an orderly
manner by regiment and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up
tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at
the same time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base
battalion may be designated.
When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, disposition,
intervals and distances of the tactical units depend upon the terrain
and the intentions of the commander. Frequently the tactical units
(battalions and regiments) are assembled in separate groups.
When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do not dictate
otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep column, are
posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals and distances,
rear battalions covering those in front or the gaps between them. An
appropriate formation will frequently be that in which route columns
are placed abreast and on the same line.
In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed
abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other,
_i.e._, in line or in echelon. When the regiments are formed side by
side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded
by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better
control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first
line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization.
This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may,
however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the
orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the
reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can
influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for
the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each
echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres,
because troops are thrown into action directly from route column.
The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first
line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of
different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is
proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently
abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a
flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84]
When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for
troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by
side.
[83] For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade
in action, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_
(August and September numbers 1877) entitled: _Die Infanterie Brigade
in ihrer Entwickelung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the
employment of regiments in line or in echelon, see Memoir by General
von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in the campaign of 1866.
MOLTKE, _Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.
[84] The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._ I,
p. 310, et seq. The formation, side by side, of the six battalions
of the IIIrd Army Corps in the attack on the hill at Forbach
(Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and would have disrupted
all organizations.
The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route
column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a
flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the
decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset,
invite a more rapid extension of front.
9. EXTENDED ORDER.
Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can
be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and
to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The
deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish
the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of
the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers
are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which
sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in
open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The
strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is
sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action,
and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or
the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of
skirmishers needed (_i.e._, the denser the firing line).[85] If the
enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (_i.e._,
a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be
required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion.
[85] The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship,
and further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at
close quarters, found thin firing lines sufficient.
Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in
action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to
the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D.
R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer
too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire.
Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very thin
firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines
which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire.
Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s
expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with
volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves
too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their
fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by
a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance,
and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily
to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind
than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several
successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each
case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close
proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish
lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once
upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing
lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.).
This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war
and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin
skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be
pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to
make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated.
The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire
with a dense skirmish line.[87]
[86] Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on
February 18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in
two lines of equal strength and separated by a distance of 300 m.,
the remainder following at 400 m. Three battalions of the Highland
Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 m. See my lecture: _Lehren
des Burenkrieges_. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, pp. 43
and 67.
For the Japanese procedure see V. LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der
Japaner_, pp. 44 and 66. BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Sechs Monate
beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. 217.
[87] In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment
against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, BRONSART VON
SCHELLENDORFF (_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 225), says: “Some
500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of
the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for
about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and
fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with
the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150
m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until
this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups
of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the
advanced line.”
It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines,
when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their
strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.
RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.
FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION.
============+===========+=======+======+====+=======+========+=======
| | | | | Hits. | Figures|
| Range & | | | +---+---+ hit. |
Target. | Elevation:|No. of |No. of|Time| | +---+----+Figures
| m. |rifles.|shots.|min.| | % | | % |missed.
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
180 head | 680 | 166 | 1268 | 5 | 54| 4 | 49| 27 | 131
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
1-2 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
90 head | 680 | 166 | 850 | 5 | 35| 4 | 27| 30 | 63
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
3-4 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed
by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the
gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy
of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines
considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is
the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly
distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with
hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures
hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While,
however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the
weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more
perceptible in the smaller force.
(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.
Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at
the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.).
The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction,
either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D.
R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered.
Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework
of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely.
When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish
intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those
of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers
under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons
designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment
being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France,
the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line
may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an
advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished
in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is
continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of
skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is
first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied.
(Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground,
deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to
allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The
number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation.
When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult
for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an
appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into
decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires
complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469
German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger
force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at
once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the
firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this
case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).
Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands
facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders
are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to
maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear
of their platoons (_i.e._, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the
only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear.
In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated
to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of
supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to
prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.
The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader
of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the
musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line
of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon;
but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility
if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he
expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he
wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the
company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.).
The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any
targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so,
communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not
be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and
observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).
Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other
troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should
always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to
the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose
connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other
hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed
flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a
report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be
made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon
and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should
keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be
employed advantageously in such cases.
The =Austrian= deployment is similar to the German, the intervals
between skirmishers being about two paces. In =Italy= the skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (_catena ordinaria_), but this
interval may be increased by order up to three paces (_catena rada_).
The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to
facilitate volley fire by squad. The =French= deployment is similar
to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in
which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In
=England= skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during
the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought,
one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle
per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In =Russia= and
=Japan= the intervals are as ordered. In =Switzerland= skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be
covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the
rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance
of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or
single men, is authorized.
(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.
Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all
movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up,
should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A
careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted
upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized
by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious
advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction.
Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with
the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long
skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the
_base_, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders
maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on
line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of
the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free
to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the
march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by
designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank,
within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes
of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a
temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by
degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).
In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible
only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire
from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing
without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer
appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the
more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible,
the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole
bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an =advance
by rushes=, since the whole distance separating the advancing line
from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be
employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an
advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a
certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position
occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely
and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken
up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it
depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.
[88] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77.
The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without
firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire
will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the
defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes
of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at
each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance
impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further
advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious
infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire
of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases
only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear
desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will
still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire
of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant
losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a
force with the determination to advance.
Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.
The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds
preparation for making a rush.
To cover 80 m., requires 26-30 seconds;
„ „ 40 „ „ 17-20 „
„ „ 25 „ „ 10-15 „
While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in
readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order
to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is
absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the
troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire
at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target
offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very
soon cease of their own accord.
The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive
role here.
The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with
the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of
being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence
and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is
difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines
necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in
addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be
employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of
fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with
the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon.
The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke
auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles
him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have
someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which
he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed
upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that
here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees
the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will,
as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful
attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and
patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those
who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they
are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This
would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice,
if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty
voluntarily.”
The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and
rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best
be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The
formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the
soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during
his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with
him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by
advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward
through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means
of carrying a skirmish line forward.
The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush
forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by
increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded
by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only;
for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments
cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously
fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In
oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere
with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on
the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades.
The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile
skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When
the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate
to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of
artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have
to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under
cover by the hail of shot.
The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to
which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining
ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy
and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from
cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither
consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to
close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the
offensive.” (HÖNIG). The powers of endurance of the men, the character
of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded
by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If
the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to
let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and
the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw
themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an
advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and
nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to
pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of
special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of
peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier
for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the
field.
The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the
enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition
to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with
startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time,
but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time
the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already
have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves
down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then
endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.
The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first.
The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting
stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for
some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring
units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.
The greater the superiority of our fire, _i.e._, the marksmanship which
compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the
rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.
Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the
platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to
rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and
because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try
to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers
have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush,
but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because
of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the
fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best
intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time
of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not
endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.
When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question
presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth
the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance
by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to =crawl
forward=? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface
of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance
made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing
grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the
direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would
also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have
crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit
crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following
results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions:
A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes;
crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an
extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and
the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89]
The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward
once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the
man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure
was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to
execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with
or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will
frequently be able to advance only by crawling.
[89] During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the
fighting line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced
by troops crawling up into the line, and carried forward to within
450 m. of the enemy’s position. An isolated assault was subsequently
repulsed by the Boers.
Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, head
resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of
the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and
straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the
body slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and
the head also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head
is raised only when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is
placed against the shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring,
the man offers a larger target, and, in addition, is not immediately
ready for firing.
In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of
his position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire,
slowly but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling
line is said to have produced an especially disquieting and
paralyzing impression on the immovable defender, who was tied to his
position, because of his inability to inflict perceptible losses
on these small, prone targets, and because, moreover, he himself
was continually under a galling fire. As no assault was made, no
opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against
targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however,
insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As
to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to
resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order
to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew
more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every
energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of
surrender.[90]
[90] Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900.
_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1905, pp. 145 and 149.
One who fought on the Boer side writes as follows: “After we had
crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within
about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving
over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little
credence in these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a
bad experience, we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as
we saw that most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away
their weapons, we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up
with them, I noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like
children. Later, when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of
their troops to some English officers, they stated that it was due to
the uncanny manner of our advance.
“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger
approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off
effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops;
for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the
plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had
had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly
exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to
unnerve their troops.”[91]
[91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_,
in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59.
=Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length,
according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30
to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was
exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward
under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary
to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the
increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]
[92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69.
One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the
British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly.
This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed
fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long
lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups,
on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * *
Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s
attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this
is possible only when the advancing units are small.”
The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those
published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90
m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy
lasts.
Russo-Japanese War.
In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and
very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army
as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the
following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure
of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the
engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning
with 1,000 m.
From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire,
beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the
length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one
rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.
1st rush 132 m., about 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle
2nd „ 58 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
3rd „ 63 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
4th „ 61 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
5th „ 75 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
6th „ 151 „ „ 5 „ „ „ „ „
7th „ 400 „
-----------------------------------------------
940 m., about 95 rounds of ammunition per rifle
If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it
follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.
Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.
=Germany.= (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by rushes,
the following commands are given: (Such) =Platoon (section, squad)
Rush!... Rise!... March! March!= At the command =Rush!= the
skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, and
prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left
hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body
as possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After
a brief pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon
commander jumps up and at the same time commands: =Rise!... March!
March!= At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The
length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D.
R.). While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short
rushes, which are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing,
should also be practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers
rise promptly and simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly.
The rush is terminated by the command “_Position_”; the sight
setting is changed when necessary and fire opened without further
preliminaries. Frequently the new firing position may be indicated
before the rush is made.
=Austria.= Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of the
rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical
situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They
serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.”
=France.= Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover
(_par bonds successifs_).
=England.= (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations
prescribed rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their
length was actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first
engagements of the South African war, in cases where the fire of the
enemy was not especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently
published, state: “Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100
yards (_i.e._, 70-90 m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length.
At decisive ranges, _i.e._, under 540 m., they should be short enough
to afford the enemy no opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on
the skirmishers. When cover is available the advance is made from
cover to cover.” At another place the regulations state: “On open
ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising
simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short
rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy
unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The
rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The
shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have to be,
and the shorter the length of the rushes.”
All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible,
advance beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When
an advance by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or
crawl forward.
=Italy.= Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with
companies, are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits.
When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
main line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run, or if
cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again
at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons
open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the
advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable
to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good
position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.
=Japan.= Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum
length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by units
smaller than a platoon.
=Russia.= Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections,
and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When
sections advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the
section which is to advance first, and also the order in which the
others are to follow. The Russian regulations are the only ones which
prescribe a “movement to the rear by rushes,” at a run.
Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over
plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes
will be impossible. Whether =fire while in motion= ought to be
employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition
for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued
or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken
enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the
attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against
advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5%
hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire
effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to
collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to
the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently
employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding
each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not
in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand,
the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to
rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being
more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under
fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently
result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender
has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is
prescribed).
During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force
advancing from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal
number of rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following
results were obtained:
Regulation attack: Fire while in motion:
Time 26 min. 28 seconds 18 min. 40 seconds
Fire pauses 12 „ 18 „ 7 „ 40 „
Attacker against the defender:
Percentage of hits 7 16.7
Defender against the attacker:
Percentage of hits 9.2 33.
Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from
1,400 to 100 paces:
Attacker 22.7 20.
Defender 32.2 51.2
There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire.
All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short
rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept
well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy.
Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by
flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the
advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery
fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when
the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our
shrapnel.
Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.
The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=.[93]
[93] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50_, p. 212.
This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which
lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by
Prussian artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry.
The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.[94]
[94] Springer, VI, p. 204.
The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was
successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were
taken. With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced
against front and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed.
The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against the
VIth Army Corps in =l’Hay= and =Chevilly=: “The defender’s coolness
and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the
attack, and finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady
volleys delivered by him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”[95]
[95] V. SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, 1, p.
71.
Examples of the Employment of Rushes.
1. Attack on =Le Bourget=, on October 30th, 1870.[96]
[96] HOHENLOHE, _Briefe über Infanterie_, p. 80.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 10, p. 43.
Two battalions of the _Kaiser Franz_ Guard Grenadier Regiment had
to advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le
Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high
potato crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two
companies entirely deployed in the first line, and the battalion
reserves in rear of the center of the line with files at extended
intervals. The second line was formed similarly. The two companies
in the firing line advanced at first without firing, by rushes of
about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each moving forward
beyond the point where the other had halted. When effective range
was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other moved
forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a similar
manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while lying
down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the
village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn
to the interior of the village.
The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were
insignificant.
The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St.
Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack.
2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878.
The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions
(_Drushines_) of Bulgarians, and the _Ugla_, _Vladimir_, and _Kasan_
Regiments, was to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle
battalions armed with Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion
of the _Ugla_ Regiment armed with captured Turkish rifles. The only
artillery available consisted of a mountain battery, while the Turks
were able to bring twenty guns into action.
The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian
firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when
the losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, _without
firing_, from 750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes
were made by the entire firing line; the supports, with files at
extended intervals, did not follow until the firing line had thrown
itself down.
After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from
the reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one
battalion, each battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance
between lines (total depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900
m. on, the advance was made by rushes, the entire force inclining
to the right front. While covered by the fire of the skirmishers of
the firing line in front, the length of the rushes was 100-150 m.
At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading line, extending the line of
the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able to open fire and, after
about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent that the Turks
were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, which was
successful.
Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11
officers and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269
men; the original strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure
of ammunition: 11th Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle.
The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s
fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The
Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the
assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated
to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of
one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between
lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between
files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of
ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[97]
[97] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, III, pp. 168-186.
In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate
engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward”
had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of
small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only
20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward
individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.)
The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at
=Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite
the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc.
In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of
=Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges
south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west
and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how
rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a
few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated
by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just
before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant
fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course
absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by
groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one
in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down
again.”[98]
[98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127.
The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900),
on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes,
then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally
working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching
the last firing position from which the final assault could be
made.[99]
[99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139.
_The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539.
(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.
If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy
losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it
finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it
must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This
may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined
intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred,
by putting men in the intervals (_i.e._, increasing the density of the
line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical
units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever
practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it,
although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and
gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical
because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated
officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line
(replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is
unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be
trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is
not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is
possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even
during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that
the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to
150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the
firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish
line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes,
or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even
by crawling.
=Austria.= Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of
prolonging it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used.
When prolonging the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the
firing line. During an attack efforts should, however, be made to
advance beyond the firing line--“to overreach it.” The other method,
that of filling up the line, is in attack, as a rule, to be used for
the purpose of carrying the line forward, the rush to be made as soon
as the reinforcement reaches the firing line. Signals are prescribed
for prolonging the line without advancing beyond it, for reinforcing
that line and advancing beyond it, and for filling it up and carrying
it forward in a rush.
(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.
(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).
The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in
action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their
leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which
have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common
leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in
motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should
be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and
causes dangerous gaps along the entire front.
If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the
situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order
formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his
unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander
of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held
well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that
effect.
The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy.
The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall
in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).
10. SUPPORTS.
(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).
The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the
first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the
decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question,
be in the first line.
Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a
less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from
the enemy.
It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to
cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and,
in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line
can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack,
and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to
influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the
impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by
sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage.
The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all
probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization
as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in
rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it
will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both
flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile
fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the
power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them
from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself.
The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly
illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front
of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the
firing line forward failed, and the necessary impetus for the decisive
advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing
line.[100]
[100] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 200.
In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the
skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions.
(Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked,
as they increase the volume of fire.
Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon
the terrain.
When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased in the course
of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should
be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to
participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an
action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the
leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.
When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase
distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming
under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line
should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an
attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent,
by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the
defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the
purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short
distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched)
at the points where they are to be employed.
During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of
hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not
simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same
shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more
than 300 m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the
combat approaches.
In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon
cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would
be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the
less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner
in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the
advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In
this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain
permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly
careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it
is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line.
The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and
successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce
it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split
up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to
reunite it at the first opportunity.
The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing
line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts
for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously
with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the
fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as
the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose,
the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw
itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably
weaker.”[101]
[101] _Report of Lieutenant Borsov_, in KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER,
_Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, III, p. 183.
The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column
of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time
or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the
direction of advance. Columns having a narrow front, so long as they
are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range
infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is
advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader
must get his command again entirely under control.
Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?
Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into
firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often
placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly
enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these
were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage
during the first deployment before the situation is clear.
The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports:
1. _The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as
a rule, being able to participate in the action._ This argument is not
well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is
equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw
themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief
that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that
they followed the firing line too closely.
Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the
firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small
angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports
are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated.
2. _The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will
not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will
fail to seize the right moment for advancing._ (This can perhaps never
be avoided).
3. _Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units,
makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire._ These
criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case
impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the
business of platoon commanders.
The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of
targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small
size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can
be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of
sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to
be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force,
need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following
the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The
drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company
were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.
11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.
In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be
led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The
position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of
him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid
of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry
fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the
enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile
fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]
[102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ
close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken
enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations.
Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle
of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment,
formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of
the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered
in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of
about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression
produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and
deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion
had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by
the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr.
35_, p. 23.
In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not
at all exceptional.
On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry,
advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in
half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12
officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and
wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery
and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments
of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II,
p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152.
The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the
29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of
the opponent. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29_, p. 499.
In =extended order= the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he
is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he
expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead,
judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling
his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground,
as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the
skirmisher.
The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the
noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially
in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly
trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for,
as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the
demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out
of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this
initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by
restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.
In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any
direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as
long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in
order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must
be assembled in close order without regard to the previously existing
organization.
In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other
arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103]
as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the
troops show a disposition to get out of hand.
[103] The British _Infantry Training_ contains special regulations
governing “savage warfare,” in which close order battalion formations
are explicitly given the preference (order in echelon, square).
In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross
difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents
of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In
extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power
most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible
targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the _skirmish line_ is the
principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is
initiated and carried through to the end.
Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the
simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian
battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they
were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is
pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian
infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which
they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness.
No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing
its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate
object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in
magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive
discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part
whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was
drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear
tactics in the camp at Boulogne and during the brief pauses between
campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved
equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an
important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to
overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with
this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein
during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his
command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement
until order had been completely restored.
[104] Compare herewith _Der 18. August_, p. 463, in regard to the
importance of discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat.
General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct
methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To
quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly
be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.”
Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended
order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises
the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not
soldiers, _i.e._, _men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of
death_. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this
term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments
which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use
correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category
belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any
position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece,
prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the
ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect,
crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these
things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not
permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of
combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending
any other meaning.
“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher
load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of
aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the
rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the
mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to
exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his
superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no
longer able to follow their example.
“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere;
the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed
with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops
the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance
in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of
his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill
in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of
training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very
considerably.
“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop
the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member
of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened
mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill.
His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the
assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no
soldier.”[105]
[105] V. D. GOLTZ, _Zur Gefechtsausbildung_, p. 26.
The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this
drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral
powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill
troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and
the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness
guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the
elements.”[106]
[106] _Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations_.
“However, when necessity demands the creation of new
organizations--whether militia, volunteers, or _gardes mobiles_,--it
is a great mistake to expect everything from moral factors; even
though hatred of the enemy, enthusiasm for the fatherland, the
republic or for glory, rise to the highest pitch. ‘Victory or
death’ is the watchword when marching out--but neither is quickly
attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting
marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon the
intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the
sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be
annihilated at once by a rapid assault--not at all; the advance is
made very slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to
evaporate during the many hours in which death is constantly faced.”
LAYMAN.
For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of
duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual
to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will
suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to
yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything
else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until
the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by
the side of enthusiasm.
“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work _Drill or
Training_, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops,
and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket
has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined
through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the
outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are
beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive
appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it
down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are
needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain
are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of
self-sacrifice is the important factor.”
It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the
brochure _Drill or Training_, written by Archduke John, to _Drill
and Training_. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and
a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter
time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that
the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are
unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced
sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments
inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can
only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the
present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp
word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of
troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.
The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted
minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in
so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s
fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier
and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of
Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation
to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for
linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war
and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s
Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits,
numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by
leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the
decisive factors for success.
The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to
leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the
victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the
gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced
by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of
the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most
destructive hostile fire.
Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training
of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing,
cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless
offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, _trained to rely upon
themselves_, and _skirmishers having initiative_.” (Par. 2 German I.
D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and
continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D.
R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into
a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158
German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing
self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251
German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the
offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, _forward,
at the enemy, no matter what the cost_.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.).
“The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass
all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par.
327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers
not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of
penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those
who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an
abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the
previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.”
(Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to
shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the
fight _regardless of consequences_ even when the outcome of the battle
is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.).
If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by
discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense
of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not
appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised
form; it makes itself felt rather in the shape of tactical scruples,
whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates
to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the
force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the
fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an
officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the
start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it
may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate
leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the
seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees
in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops
have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to
colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications
of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably
accompanied by great losses.
[107] In this connection and in regard to the British losses in
South Africa, see my lecture: _Die Lehren des Burenkrieges_ (1904),
p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and
Spionskop is interesting. See _The Times History of the War in South
Africa_, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.
III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES.
A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
1. THE FIELD GUN.
The field artillery of all the states that need be considered is armed
with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and capable under peace
conditions of firing as many as twenty shots per minute. Its caliber
varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. (Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia,
7.62, and England, 8.38 cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The
German gun fires shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and
the French 7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the
same weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 and
the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through the action of
combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to 5000, in France and Russia
to 5500 m.). The projectiles have a maximum range of 8000 m., when
percussion fuze is used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which
bursts approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is set
at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with a light
field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg.
(time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg.
(time fuze ranging from 500 to 5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field
howitzers (cal. 14.91 cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of
6870 m.) in the heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5
cm. Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another long
piece of 12 cm. caliber.
=Percussion shrapnel= is used for defense at short range, and in fire
for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range and the nature of
the ground. It is effective against troops lodged in tall timber.
Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently cause the premature burst of
the projectiles.[108]
[108] Engagement of Azay (6th January, 1871). _Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_. HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, I, pp. 16 and
49. _Taktik_, VI, p. 42.
Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately in
front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, depending upon the range).
However, even in this case, the bullets often pass over low targets,
such as skirmishers lying down, and low parapets afford sufficient
protection. An adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is
directed on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields,
terrain covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the ground,
or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the angle of fall
is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece at ranges of 3300 m. and
over) half of the bullets penetrate the ground, the remainder ricochet
and pass on at a greatly reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary
effect of shrapnel is insignificant owing to the smallness of the
bursting charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the
projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.[109]
[109] Consult _Taktik_, VI, p. 45, in regard to the incendiary
effect of projectiles.
[Illustration: Percussion Shrapnel.]
=Time shrapnel= (used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is fairly independent
of the terrain, the burst being easily observed since the bullets are
embedded in a “smoke-producing composition.” The extreme range at which
this projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing
the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, both of
which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, model ’96, may be
effectively employed up to a range of 4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire
is so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short time.
(Par. 630 German F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account
of its certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits
the trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This fuze
also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly advancing
targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short range. The French
Regulations give the width of the beaten zone of a single shrapnel
as 20, that of two from the same piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of
the beaten zone is 300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the
German shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel
(model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines following
250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base charge shrapnel
these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. from the first line. The
German shrapnel gives very good results when set to burst 30 to 150 m.
in front of the target, the height of burst being regulated accordingly
(approximately ¹⁄₃ of the whole number of hundreds of meters of the
range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect may, however,
be expected even when the fuze is set to burst the projectile 300 m. in
front of the target. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.).
Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down from 1000 to
3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and against standing skirmishers
at the same ranges when burst 56 to 45 m. short. The two tables given
below, borrowed from the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery
tactics,[110] give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel,
and of the effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the
target:
======================+=======================================
|When firing at the targets named (1
|skirmisher per m.) with time shrapnel,
TARGETS. |mod. ’96, set to burst 50 m. short, the
|following _hits per shrapnel_ may be
|expected after the adjustment has been
|effected:
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
| 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m.
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Skirmishers standing | 18.4 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 10.4
Skirmishers kneeling | 10.6 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 5.8
Skirmishers lying down| 6.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.5
Head targets | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
======================+=======================================
|When firing at the targets named
TARGETS. |(skirmish line with 1 skirmisher per
|m.), under service conditions, with time
|shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to burst 50-100
|m. short, the following hits per minute
|may be expected on an average:
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
| 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m.
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Skirmishers standing | 364 | 202 | 109 | 46 | 14
Skirmishers kneeling | 210 | 117 | 63 | 27 | 8
Skirmishers lying down| 126 | 70 | 38 | 16 | 5
Head targets | 70 | 39 | 21 | 9 | 3
----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
[110] ROHNE, _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, Berlin, 2nd Edition,
p. 9.
More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel
bursting within 100 m. are disabled. The penetration of shrapnel
bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike
bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for
action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than
100 m. The effect of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with
shields is insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile
employed by artillery against animate objects, provided these are not
located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, or under
bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against such cover on
account of the flatness of the trajectory and the sensitiveness of the
fuze.
Shrapnel is to be supplemented by =shell= filled with explosive charge,
model ’88, which has a great explosive effect at extreme ranges and in
tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 German F. A. F. R., in regard to action
against shielded batteries).
Percussion shell, on account of its very sensitive fuze, bursts on
penetrating the shield, while percussion shrapnel goes entirely
through the shield and bursts about ¹⁄₂ m. in rear of it.
[Illustration: Percussion Shell, Model ’96.]
Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under light splinter
proofs may be reached with time shell burst directly over or close
in front of them. The depth of the beaten zone of this projectile is
small, seldom exceeding 50 m., even when the fire is directed against
targets in the open. About 75% of all the fragments are capable of
inflicting disabling wounds when the interval of burst is short. The
peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful
adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French _obus allongé_,
a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; angle of the cone
of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed only for the destruction
of material objects.[111]
[111] When firing on animate objects, the beaten zone of this
projectile does not exceed a space 50 m. wide and 20 m. deep, but the
concussion of the explosion will undoubtedly be felt at a greater
distance. The explosive effect of the projectile is equivalent to
that of 30 kg. of powder. The explosion of the projectile produces a
cone-shaped crater having a diameter of 2 and a depth of 0.50 m. Ten
melinite shells per running meter are required to destroy a parapet 3
m. thick and 2.30 m. high.
The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts only after
it has pierced thin walls or shields.
[Illustration: Time Shell, Model ’96.]
2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER.
The realization that the power of resistance of a defender lodged in
deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of guns having a flat
trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun capable of high angle fire,
which had been eliminated from the field artillery upon the advent of
rifled cannon.[112]
[112] After March, 1859, the artillery of a mobilized Prussian
army corps consisted of three horse batteries, each armed with six
6-pounder guns and two 7-pounder howitzers; six foot batteries, each
armed with eight 12-pounder guns; and three foot batteries, each
armed with eight 7-pounder howitzers. Thus the artillery of an army
corps numbered 30 howitzers and 66 guns.
For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light field howitzer,
model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (500 jacketed bullets, @
10 g.; time fuze graduated from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7
kg. (0.37 kg. explosive charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500
to 5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to utilize
to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the projectile before
it bursts.
A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a greater number
of hits, when the point of burst is favorably situated, than one fired
from a field gun. However, the projectiles fired from the latter have a
deeper beaten zone on account of the flatter trajectory of the piece,
and a greater penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity.
The German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the effect
of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the principal
ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to 150 m.) from the
target. The effect of shrapnel from the field gun and from the light
field howitzer is considered adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when
bursts are regulated to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in
front of the target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field
gun is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a result
of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst).
But in this connection it is to be borne in mind that the effect of
single shots only is here considered. The shrapnel fire of the field
gun is considerably superior to that of the howitzer. This is due to
the fact that the howitzer fires more slowly than the field gun and
must expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same results.
If, in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries
approximately 2¹⁄₂ times as many shrapnel as the light field howitzer
battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will be 2¹⁄₂ times
as effective, against targets in the open, as that of the latter.
The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself when it
becomes necessary to destroy material objects.
The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is employed
against troops immediately behind cover. The shell is burst immediately
in front of, over, or in rear of the target, which is thus struck by
splinters from above. The more nearly perpendicular the splinters
strike the target, and the greater their number and weight, the greater
will be the effect produced. The angle of the cone of dispersion is
about 200 degrees; with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing
15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges beyond
2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of penetrating the
splinter proof cover usually employed in the field. At ranges under
2100 m. its angle of fall is too small to make an adequate effect
certain.
[Illustration: Time Shell, Model ’98.]
3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER.
The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 kg., containing an
explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with a percussion fuze either
with or without delay action. This shell is designed to penetrate the
roofs of splinter proofs. An earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary
to afford protection against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm.
shell produces a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter,
_i.e._, 2 cu. m. (in made ground this crater is three times this size).
The heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded
batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, is
capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action.
4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF FIRE.
Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable when firing
lines are to be reinforced and when troops intended for the decisive
attack are to be pushed closer to the enemy. Formations calculated to
minimize the effect of the hostile fire must be taken up in time,
since it is not always possible to make use of cover. The efficacy
of the fire depends upon the accurate determination of the range and
height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful observation
of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).[113] The effect of this fire
is considerably increased when the opponent’s infantry, against whom
the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable formations (particularly
broad line formations). Infantry has frequently found it advantageous
to advance in small detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals
in extended order.
[113] The color of uniforms exerts considerable influence on
observation. According to experiments made in France, colors rank
as follows as regards visibility: white (invisible at night), light
blue, alizarine red, green, dark brown, gray, or yellowish brown.
_Schweizer Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie_, 1896, I, p. 39. The
following colors protect against heat, in the order named (in reverse
order against cold): white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet,
black. The position of gray in the list depends upon the amount of
white or black mixed with it.
(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the Hostile Fire.
A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds with percussion
fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to 750 m. The time required for
securing adjustment at the longer ranges is as follows:
At 800-1500 m., on low infantry targets, 1.5 min., 6-9 rounds with
perc. fuze;
At 1700-2250 m., on low infantry targets, 3.7 min., 11 rounds with
perc. fuze;
At 2000-3000 m., on artillery targets, 4.6 min., 11 rounds with
perc. fuze;
Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are very unfavorable
targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for a battery commander
to determine the relative position of bursts on the flank of a column
with respect to the leading element thereof. Such shots are frequently
considered as over. Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to
designate a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery
to secure adjustment.
Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous objects,
as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.[114] Intrenchments
that have just been thrown up should be made to look as nearly as
possible like the surrounding country by covering them with snow, sod,
or brush. It is made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure
adjustment, if our infantry changes position to the front or to a
flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes.
[114] The cutting down of a poplar at Königgrätz decreased the
effect of the Austrian artillery fire, which, previous to this, had
caused rather serious losses. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 2_, p.
36. A similar effect was produced by tearing down a house at Lovtcha.
KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen
Krieg_, I, p. 59.
It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire upon masks,
but difficult to determine the distance between mask and target. It is
an advantage when masks are situated obliquely to a position. As masks
(rows of trees) may cause the premature burst of projectiles having
percussion fuzes, they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they
are to =screen=.[115] When so situated they frequently afford better
protection than actual intrenchments.
[115] Fight of some Prussian batteries against a French battery
masked by chaussee trees at Weiszenburg. See HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche
Artillerie_, I, pp. 13 and 49. The 4th Light and the 4th Heavy
Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery (German) were able to
maintain their position east of Mars-la-Tour, under the fire of
superior hostile artillery, because they were screened by the trees
and the embankment of the chaussee thirty paces in their front.
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschrift_, 25, p. 18.
The sustained bombardment of Schlosz Ladonchamps (situated on
the Moselle flats north of Metz) with 12 cm. guns, which fired 200
shots per day from Oct. 9th to 10th, and 100 per day from Oct. 11th
to 16th, 1870, was unsuccessful, because the percussion shells
were ineffective. This will not be changed in the future by the
adoption of high-explosive shells. According to DICK DE LONLAY,
the garrison of the castle and its park lost only 5-10 men per day
during this time. The defensibility of the castle was not impaired,
although projectiles finally fell into the building itself during
the sustained bombardment. According to the same author (IV, p. 556)
1,022 shells fell into the park and castle of Ladonchamps on October
7th, but only ten men were placed out of action.
(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire.
Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as for example
lines and columns, and positions in which a flank is refused, should be
avoided. It is a good plan to increase the number of targets and to
employ narrow columns (column of twos) that are not too deep. Supports
must be far enough in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being
struck by one and the same shrapnel.
Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese war, platoons
or sections in columns of squads or twos,[116] separated by a maximum
interval of 50 paces, were indeed found more suitable under fire than
line formations, but the losses were nevertheless very serious except
where cover screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them
actual protection.
[116] The advance against Beaumont and the height of Chancy during
the battle of Beaumont. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp. 124 and
238. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 93_, II, p. 97. At Gravelotte
this formation was employed with advantage by the _Königin_ Regiment
during its advance on Amanweiler, and later in the campaign during
the assault on Le Bourget. _Geschichte des Regiments Königin_, pp. 9
and 132.
During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns of twos was
found advantageous on several occasions.[117] This formation has the
following disadvantages, however: it is very susceptible to flanking
fire; the influence of the officers is principally restricted to
the leading elements; intervals are easily lost and on that account
it becomes more difficult to form line. It would seem to be better,
therefore, to advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of
squads, or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos
or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between squads are
easily lost, however, and the company then becomes a dense skirmish
line of from four to six ranks. To echelon the platoons slightly has
very little value on account of the depth of the beaten zone of modern
shrapnel.
[117] This formation is also well adapted for passing through
woods. _Taktik_, VI, p. 108.
In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese war, both
belligerents finally made use of thin successive skirmish lines for
advancing; these lines followed each other at 200-300 m. and united
again on reaching cover.
5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS.
_Germany._ According to computations made by Lieutenant-General
Rohne,[118] the following hits may be expected from every time
shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average of 50 m. short of the
targets named:
=====+=========+=========+======+=================
Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched
m. | | | |Skirmishers.[119]
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
500| 18.4 | 10.6 | 6.4 | 3.5
1000| 14.2 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 2.4
2000| 12. | 6.9 | 4.1 | 2.3
3000| 11. | 6.3 | 3.8 | 2.1
4000| 10. | 5.8 | 3.5 | 1.9
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
[118] _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, p. 9 _et seq._
[119] One skirmish figure per meter.
The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing 50 shots at
500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at 3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m.,
is as follows:
=====+=========+=========+======+=================
Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched
m. | | | |Skirmishers.[120]
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
500| 364 | 210 | 126 | 70
1000| 202 | 117 | 70 | 39
2000| 109 | 63 | 38 | 21
3000| 46 | 27 | 16 | 9
4000| 14 | 8 | 5 | 3
-----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
[120] One skirmish figure per meter.
_France._[121] According to the French Field Artillery Regulations
(footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel covers effectively
a front of 25 m., and a battery of four pieces, a front of 100 m. This
intensity of fire, which is obtained when each piece fires one shot
with proper corrector and range settings (the battery four shots)
Aubrat calls “_Density 4_.” When _rafale_ fire (two shots per piece)
is employed against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting,
density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., the deflection
of the pieces must be changed between successive shots (_tir avec
fauchage_). To obtain density 8 against a front of 150 m., each
piece must fire three shots, as prescribed in the regulations. When
progressive fire (_tir progressif_) is employed, four different ranges
are given, of which only one can be considered effective. When not
sweeping, in this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining
a density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, to one
round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, against a front
of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires one salvo against a target
having a front of 50 m., density 8 is obtained; by firing two salvos,
density 16 is obtained.
[121] The following is taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S essay
on the work of Squadron Commander AUBRAT, _Les exercices de service
en campagne_. The essay mentioned appeared in the December, 1907,
number of _Artilleristische Monatsschriften_.
The _Commission d’études pratiques du tir_ has made a thorough
investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel fire. The following
table gives a general idea of the effect to be expected when firing
against service targets (_i.e._, the percentage of figures one may
expect to hit when employing fire of varying density):
==============================================+=======================
| DENSITY.
TARGETS. +-----+-----+-----+-----
| 4 | 8 | 16 | 32
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
| % | % | % | %
Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or | | | |
a single rank line | 25 | 40 | 65 |----
| | | |
Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire | | | |
but protected by shields of the French type. | | | |
Space between shields and ground not closed | 7.5| 15 | 25 | 40
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun | | | |
crews protected by shields. Space between | | | |
shields and ground not closed | ----| 7.5 | 15 | 25
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, | | | |
but not firing; gun crews protected by | | | |
shields. Space between shields and ground | | | |
closed so that bullets cannot pass through | ----| 0-2 | ----|----
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15%
irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (_tir progressif_;
32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the
open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62
skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men
have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced
by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the
one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when
standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one
_tir progressif_, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect
could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a _rafale_ of eight
rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire.
6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122]
[122] BIRCHER, Colonel and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army
Corps, _Die Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse_, Aarau, 1899. KÜTTNER,
_Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege
1900_. Tübingen, 1900. HILDEBRAND, _Die Verwundungen durch die
modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen_. I (1905). BOHNE, _Über die Wirkung des
Schrapnelschusses_, in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 74, 1902.
The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused
by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the
bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular
at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit;
bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the
introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles
of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.
The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the
striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their
density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration.
The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the
velocity, and, naturally, the effect.
Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put
animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8
kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an
average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is
deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of
12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120
m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and
bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range
from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30
German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a
greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.
It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords protection
against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against
half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops
shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration
of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they
strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity
for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less
than 100 m.
B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123]
[123] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_.
Colonel MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, Austrian Army, _Modernes Schieszwesen_,
1901.
The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm
employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The
adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the
recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing
a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections
made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism,
danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced
against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition
to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect
of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover,
the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial
velocity of the projectile possible.
The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view,
viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective
hit in itself.
1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124]
[124] See _Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte_, 1905, p. 475,
and 1906, p. 412, which contain complete references to military
literature. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 1, 1906.
During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following
small arms and projectiles:
======+=========+=======+=====+=====================+=========
| Rifle. | Model | Cal.| PROJECTILE. |Initial
| |(year).| |Description. |Weight.|Velocity.
| | | mm. | | g. | m.
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
Japan |{Arisaka | ’97 | 6.5 |Hardened lead| 10.5 | 715
|{Murata | ’94 | 8.0 |core with | 15.42 | 564
| | | |copper-nickel| |
Russia| ---- | ’91 | 7.62|jacket. | 13.7 | 615
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
The ballistic qualities of the _Arisaka_ rifle were superior to those
of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about
equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in
every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect
produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges
(within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by
the _Arisaka_ rifle.[125]
[125] “The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces
and consequently destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The
projectile communicates a portion of its energy to the molecules
struck, and these in turn transfer that energy to adjoining ones.
The greater the velocity of the projectile at the moment of impact,
the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in organs
filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with
the greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the
past has never been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the
impression that the projectile has exploded in the body. In order to
produce this effect a velocity of about 350 to 400 m. is required,
which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles of older pattern,
and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle.
Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it
shatters it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to
a considerable extent, all because the bone is filled with a liquid
substance.” ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 69.
At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless
produced by tumbling bullets.[126]
[126] See also _Ricochets_, p. 185 infra.
Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters
varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle,
even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different
density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon
a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet
will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a
series of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second
board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles
which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change
their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on
which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing
the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made
by explosive bullets.
The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two
men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the _Lebel_ rifle on corpses,
it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100
m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and
through 2 bodies at 1200 m.
In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a
basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal
region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh
wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole
made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is
insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles
remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past.
The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by
projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly
perforated.
Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs,
chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127]
[127] “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been
shot in the chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest
railway station, a distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well
except for a slight difficulty in breathing. A lance corporal of
the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having received a similar
wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on a
two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an
extent, however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a
distance of 30 km.” Dr. SELDOWITSCHI in _Wratsch_.
According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in
joints healed without suppuration, the joint and its mobility being
saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was,
as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest
wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few _versts_ to the
dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing.
As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more
serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but
even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so
serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds,
in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were
treated with fair success.
The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated
that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so
serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these
campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable
from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the
certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of
action.
Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time
he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for
the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names
of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December
11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100,
seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty
after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of
154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their
organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could
be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber _Arisaka_
rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those
caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for
example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The
following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian
rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by a scab; after
three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded
were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of
the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for
duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without
splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return
to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When
bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded.
The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable
from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the
adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and
the “D” bullet in France).[128]
[128]
Rifle Rifle
mod. ’88. mod. ’98; Lebel rifle;
“S” bullet. “D” bullet.
Caliber 7.9 mm. 7.9 mm. 8. mm.
Weight of bullet 14.7 g. 10. g. 13.2 g.
Initial velocity 640. m. 860. m. 730. m.
Remaining velocity at 800 m. 270. m. 362. m. 377. m.
Maximum ordinate of trajectory
at 700 m. 3.80 m. 1.85 m. 2.10 m.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, No. 53; _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907. II,
p. 281.
A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious
wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not
inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone
his recovery indefinitely.
=The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.=
======================+====================================
| THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
Of the Total Number +--------+---------+--------------
of Men Hit | Fatally|Instantly|Incapacitated
in Each Case. |injured.|disabled.|for some time.
| % | % | %
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Flesh wounds 800 m | ---- | 36.4 | 27.3
----------+ | |
produced at 1350 m | ---- | 43.8 | 37.3
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Bones struck 800 m | 20.3 | 79.2 | 75.0
----------+ | |
at 1350 m | 11.1 | 88.9 | 88.9
----------------------|--------+---------+--------------
Average | 7.97 | 62.07 | 57.12
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.
The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet
(rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:
60 cm at 100 m.
80 cm at 400 m.
35 cm at 800 m.
10 cm at 1800 m.
In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm.
According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m.,
while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less
thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen
snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m.
thick, were not pierced even at 250 m.
IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.
Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on
the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume
them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is
suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and
terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.
On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and
destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged
period over an extended front. In this case the material losses
suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the
conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the
victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies
and consequently of his determination to fight.
At =Modder River= (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the
British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire
until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[129]
[129] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Die Gefechte in Natal und der
Kap-Kolonie_, 1899.
The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted
in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and
moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually
destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and
continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively
easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack
made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at =Modder
River=: “All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to
be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a
blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft
of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally
certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot.” In regard
to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: “Meantime
the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a
little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to
advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour
fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade,
surprised at =Magersfontain=, fared still worse. The fight growing
out of the surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at
which this action was fought, the Boer method of fire (_i.e._, to
fire only when an enemy raised himself to get better aim, and then to
employ only an effective concentrated fire) necessarily produced a
depressing effect.”
In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that
the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good
marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire
control and fire direction.
1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.
Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction.
It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as
well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the
handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be
maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by
the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action.
=Fire discipline= requires:
Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be
returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful
observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the
ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase
of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and
a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of
ammunition.
The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by
machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed
to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases
suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters
nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the
Russo-Japanese war demonstrate that determined troops will hold a
position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge,
or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples:
Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on
March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18.
Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance,
irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be
crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important
means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of
developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing
advance.”[130]
[130] _Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations._
Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good
individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and
firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in
which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire.
2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.
The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring
about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly
concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the
only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against
whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain
such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges,
the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction
than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate
rear sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of
dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting
the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the
standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.
[131] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 3rd Edition,
p. 85. “The importance of the line shot (_i.e._, a hit on the
vertical stripe through the center of the German bull’s-eye target)
in the marksmanship training of the soldier should by no means be
underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true value. The line
shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the latter
forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting
(_i.e._, hitting the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target)
becomes a moral factor of the highest value in field firing. It
cannot be denied, however, that the importance of the line shot, as
such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to transfer
the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely
failed.” Captain KRAUSE, _Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der
Infanterie_, Berlin, 1904, p. 1.
Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon
commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire
control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the
designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of
fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the
observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be
distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that
are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution
of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual
leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses
in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon.
(Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the
correct _comprehension of the target_, the _distribution of fire_,
the _rate of fire_, and the _employment of the terrain to the best
advantage_, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of
thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably
results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The
platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man
of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad
leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the
proper influence on their skirmishers.[133]
[132] The _Belgian Firing Regulations_ require that the officer
directing and controlling the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The
time necessary to produce a certain effect with a given number of
rifles; 2. The number of rounds necessary to produce a certain effect
in a given period of time; 3. Whether a given target justifies the
expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or the efficacy of
the fire. The requirements of the _Italian Firing Regulations_ are
similar.
[133] Austria: The position of the platoon leader is not so
definitely fixed as in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad
leaders participate in the firing. In skirmish line fire control
and fire direction are to remain as long as possible in the hands
of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged with
concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the
proper time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing
the ammunition. At long ranges he designates the companies that are
to fire, and also the position from which fire is to be opened.
The squad leaders are charged with _constantly supervising_ the setting
of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of
fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.
_The squad leaders participate in the firing only_ when their duties
as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged
engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These
remarks apply also to the range finders.
In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing
when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of
thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset
by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required
in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no
position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure
of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable
to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction
and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading
the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly
supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire.
“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and
designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces
the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the
fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his
platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate
the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain
target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of
the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.).
In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will
frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the
leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the
combat. To provide for such contingencies, the skirmishers must be
taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they
may fire (_not that they must fire_) at all targets within 600 m.; that
between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets
only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire
at all.
In the pamphlet entitled, _Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese
War_, p. 11, et seq., Captain SOLOVIEV, 34th East Siberian Rifle
Regiment, 1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost
ungovernable tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown
themselves down, to open fire without orders; paying attention
neither to the target designated, nor to setting their sights.
“This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning
the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * *
It is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men
have not been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of
hostile projectiles, and the thunder of our own artillery make such a
deafening roar that one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long
firing lines make it extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders;
even squad commanders can not make themselves understood. Volley
firing must therefore be dispensed with.
“Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers,
can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal.
With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this
direction; it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole
length of the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight.
“The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in
proportion to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of
the enemy, especially on the defensive. The men get more and more
restless, their nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer
and greater. In such a moment the leader must make every effort to
keep his men in hand, and prevent the firing from degenerating into a
wild blazing away at nothing. This is always a sign that the leader
has lost control of his troops.
“The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the
nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed
to active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire
discipline ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the
fire the necessary efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle,
the more embittered the fight, the greater the losses, the more
fatigue and nervous strain gain the upper hand, the greater and
more important the role which the officer has to play. The success
of the 200 men under his command depends entirely upon the company
commander. The war in the Far East might well be called the war
of company commanders. The soldiers watch their leader constantly
and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his bearing, his
determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge the
situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the
conduct of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to
great heights, but it may also sink very low. To show depression or
faint-heartedness is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once
communicated to the men, the leader loses control of his command, and
the mischief is done.
“In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander
and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as great a
role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of peace
become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become
second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war.
“I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute
shout, in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously
quieting effect upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here
and there, a remark concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have
the sights not been set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at
once that it is done.’ Because the commander is angry, and notices
neglect, everything goes well, so the men reason, and no danger need
be apprehended. The men quiet down, forget the whistling of the
bullets, set their sights carefully, point their pieces properly, and
aim again.”
3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.
While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum
benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the
determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to
a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon
whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying
action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the
first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.
Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with
constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide
entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To
rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear
subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in
the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable
for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a
much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing
line cannot see the target during an attack, the platoon commander
should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther
to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I.
D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be
the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the
heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the
foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height
to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to
select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in
which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be
avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying
in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience,
while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined
targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single
officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent
of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force;
too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the
losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the
difficulties of fire control and fire direction.
4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.
This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing
line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection
against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is
to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned
to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we
have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority.
On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack
develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for
holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor
to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the
lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing
is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The
French attempt to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the
number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire
to be used.
In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use
“Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country).
The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar
provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of
the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the
latter.
[134] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1,
2; p. 136, par. 6; p. 155, par. 1. See p. 154, infra.
5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.
(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).
Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect
knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the
trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of
the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire,
at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten
zone approximately 100 m. deep--good aim, proper elevation, and careful
firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest
portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire.
The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which
100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5
mm. rifle:
=====================+======================+=======================
| MEASURED RANGE. | ESTIMATED RANGE.
+----------+-----------+----------+------------
| Slow fire| Rapid fire| Slow fire|Rapid fire
| [135] | [135] | [135] | [135]
|Percentage|Percentage |Percentage|Percentage
| of hits. | of hits. | of hits. | of hits.
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
At 500 m. | 21.5 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 11.3
At 1000 m. | 11.1 | 8.1 | 6.5 | 5.3
At 1500 m. | 5. | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2
Average results at-- | | | |
Ranges under 1000 m. | 18.2 | 13.6 | 12.1 | 9.3
Ranges over 1000 m. | 7.1 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 3.2
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
[135] Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute.
Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence
upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the
skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected,
the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone
of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire
decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their
coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171,
infra).
[136] ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der
Infanterie_, p. 13.
The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned:
(_a_) Pacing and galloping;
(_b_) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with
known distances; by estimating part of the distance);
(_c_) Firing trial volleys (ranging);
(_d_) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it
directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;
(_e_) Measuring the range directly on the ground.
Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate
results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man
takes per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of
pace depends upon the character and slope of the ground.[137] In
pacing over varied ground, a man follows the slope line while the
projectile follows an airline. Therefore it would seem that pacing is
only practicable at short ranges when the enemy is not near. The same
is true of galloping over the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump
at a gallop is on an average 3 m.).
[137] Professor RZIHA ascertained the following diminution of the
length of a pace at different degrees of slope:
_Descending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 70 62 56 50 45 30
Number of paces per 100 m. 129 143 161 179 200 222 333
_Ascending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 74 72 70 67 60 50
Number of paces per 100 m. 120 135 138 143 148 166 200
According to Major CZERNY, Austrian Army (_Treffwahrscheinlichkeit_,
in _Streffleur_, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent
of the range.
In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts approximately
to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by
taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing
combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear
sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of
the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced
by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.).
Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in
bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the
man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when
the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling
ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the
other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in
a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when
the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and
against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss
Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are
usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great.
[138] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige
Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition, p. 12.
The following statement is taken from a report made at the British
Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of
estimates under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were
obtained:
--------Error-------- Greater
Correct ±50 yards ±100 yards errors
Officers of the Regular Army 15 49 20 14%
Officers of Militia and
Volunteers 20 44 22 20%
France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of
instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and
non-commissioned officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%.
In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually
short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the majority of
soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain
point.
[139] The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment
on August 18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height
northwest of Amanweiler: “The companies, who supposed the enemy to
be much nearer” (the actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced,
cheering, and were received with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire
(from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad line.” HESSERT.
Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn
fields: “The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish
works were reached was underestimated. One company cheered when
at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces from the hostile works:
the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward at a run.”
KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen
Krieg_.
=Germany.= All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to
800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range
finders) are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid
ranges, and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I.
F. R.).
“Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more
than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the
range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly.
The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as
follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example:
350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.;
over 1000 m., 300 m.”
=Italy.= Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating
the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges
up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable
privates participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted
by an officer in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book.
The following is the classification:
Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and
never 100 m.
Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and in
exceptional cases 150 m.
Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 and
never 200 m.
Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m.
The =Russians= estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer
ranges are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the
first year of their service all the men are drilled in estimating
ranges from 400 to 800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected
men from each company up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers
and men) are to make at least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190
Russian I. F. R.). The result is considered good when the error in
the estimate does not exceed the figure given below at the ranges
named:
Range in paces. Error in paces. Percentage of error.
400 to 1000 paces 50 or 12.5 to 5 %
1000 „ 2000 „ 100 „ 10 „ 5 „
2000 „ 3000 „ 200 „ 10 „ 6.6„
The Russian range finding instrument (_Souchier_) is used by
officers and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in
determining ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent.
In =Switzerland= recruits are trained to estimate distances up to
600 m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned
officers estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500
m. Three weeks after the recruits join, those of the most skilled
in estimating distances--about an eighth of the total number--are
selected to undergo further instruction. For this purpose they are
placed under the orders of an officer charged with this instruction,
who trains them for at least three hours, every other day, in
estimating distances on varied ground. The better half of these men,
regardless of the company to which they may belong, receive further
instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain are to be had with
these men and not only extended marches but even railway journeys not
exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose.
In =Austria= the men are required to estimate distances up to 800
paces (600 m.),_i.e._, up to the range within which they might
frequently have to choose their target independently. Only officers,
non-commissioned officers, and specially skilled men are required to
estimate ranges up to 2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty
determinations at short, mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range
finder,” is not to exceed 12 per cent. The _Roksandic_ range finding
apparatus is said to give errors not exceeding 2-3 per cent when
skillfully used.
To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at
a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual
service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs.
Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action,
and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various
rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s
skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that
the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the
target makes upon him. (England and Austria).
It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly
from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the
scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field,
that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of
dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not
likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers
to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate
maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges
are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a map. Moreover,
artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may
be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a
horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of
a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing
uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.
An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary,
as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and
illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range
of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight
corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long
ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of
temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by
18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on
account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the
selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately
1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their
rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by
18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.
[140] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_,
p. 51, and also par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature
and of the altitude of the battlefield was strikingly illustrated in
the Boer war.
These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the
range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the
proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190
and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland:
fire at will, one round).
To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable
only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target
itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the
bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and,
finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these
preliminary conditions will rarely be fulfilled, it will only in
exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this
method.
When this method is employed, volleys are fired either by sections or
by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target.
For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below
the proper one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of
the target can be expected with certainty. This procedure is then
repeated, as often as necessary, with correspondingly raised or
lowered rear sight leaves, until the correct elevation is obtained.
This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one
of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is
advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by
artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe
the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to
adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled
shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141]
[141] The 32 mm. _Nordenfeld_ machine gun fires a shell weighing
400 g.
The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at
both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (_Hahn_)
has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.).
This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to
1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers
standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently
accurate when the error amounts to
2-3% up to a range of 1000 m.
3¹⁄₂-5% „ „ „ „ 2000 „
3-3¹⁄₂% „ „ „ „ 1500 „
On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before
and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the
range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity,
before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more
restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the
fire fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for
the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to
Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See
p. 137 supra).
6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE.
In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the
fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within
effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to
be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of
ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view
of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target
once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object
of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience
teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own
troops, while it raises that of the enemy.
In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal
determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous,
generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the
most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets
which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the
greatest number of effective hits.
Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising
target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since
the troops following it in close order will in any event come within
range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available,
the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results.
Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be
opened at long or at short ranges.
Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against
low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges over 1200 m. a
decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount
of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect
even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges).
When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective
against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the
highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets
are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off
the target.
The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in
defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the
danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance,
very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful
here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was
armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply
the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only
up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing
long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the
expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish
ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly
trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away
without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the
advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire
is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the
enemy--we want to annihilate him.
Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges
on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire
effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose
of annihilating the enemy.
Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye,
present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should
not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by
utilizing every expedient (rushes with breathing spells, and cover)
until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear
that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without
orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others
continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the
attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of
mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142]
[142] At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the
Highland Brigade advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of
the hostile position. This advance, to be sure, was made under cover
of the fire of the right wing of the 9th Brigade, which had made a
lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position.
Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the
rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any
question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views
are expressed in the German regulations.
Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long
ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in
many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack
failed.
“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately
a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by
Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center
group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the
Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on
the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted
400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They
succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce
them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s
attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon
as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry
it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered
heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in
complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line
(8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward
some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body,
which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m.
of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight
and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up
troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy
of imitation.
The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in
this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated,
which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at
long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within
decisive range of the position of their opponents.
The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an
excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the
long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m.
(Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at
Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even
through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be
compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during
their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders
at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile
position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under
fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]
[143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141.
Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the
latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct
rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper
in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions,
for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is
absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages
above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the
defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of
forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has
systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of
his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its
ranks by suddenly opening fire?
The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when
sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and
when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short
range without firing. “Infantry should never attempt to take the
place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that
arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit
of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should
in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not
suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from
accomplishing his object.
At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when
directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that
it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to
25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing
skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range,
3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F.
R.).
If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using
cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his
attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are
necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the
defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking
force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s
chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as
soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the
position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he
be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the
defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short
ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which
make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the
defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target
for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently
betrays his position prematurely by opening fire.
The _moral effect_ of withholding the fire (_fire surprise_) is very
great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if suddenly
directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still
in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s
position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th
Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899)
or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops
should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to
the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th
Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are,
however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the
defender.
[144] Marshal BUGEAUD gives a very graphic description of the moral
effect of fire in his _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_,
based upon his experiences in the fights with the British in the
Peninsula: “The men began to get excited when still 1,000 m. from
the enemy; they talked to each other; the march became more and more
hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the columns. The
British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor was not
without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the
men shouting: ‘_Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!_’ Shakos
were raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double
time; the ranks became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here
and there; and a few shots were fired from the column. The British
continued to stand immovable, and seemed to pay no attention to us
even when only 300 paces separated the two forces.
“The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to
deal with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld
by the enemy would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled;
the moral power which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises
over confusion, which seeks to drown itself in noise, made itself
felt in our ranks. At this moment, when the highest tension had been
reached, the British line raised its rifles--an indescribable feeling
rooted many of our men to the spot--and began to fire. The volleys,
coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we
wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three
overpowering cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to
the bayonet attack, and everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly
flight.”
[145] The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, pp. 157 to 212.
[146] Dec. 15th, 1870. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 246.
KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug gegen den Loir_, p. 81.
Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the
French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at
ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the
Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by
rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached.
The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an
annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at
extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at Beaune la Rolande; in
the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka
Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni
Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range
zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until
they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the
Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148]
[147] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, pp. 53, 93
and 143. The village was situated in a valley and had only a limited
field of fire.
[148] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp.
86 and 113. As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power
of the needle gun (_Zündnadelgewehr_) at point blank range (280 m.)
corresponds to the effect of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to
900 m. At Nachod the regiments named below suffered in two hours the
losses given:
Loss, men;
Strength; prisoners
Regiment. men. included. Prisoners. Percentage.
20th Infantry 2,500 722 165 28.8%
60th Infantry 2,500 685 185 27.4%
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria.= “_In attack, everything must be done to get as close as
possible to the enemy before fire is opened._” In each fire position
the fire should be delivered with steadiness and without haste.
In _defense_, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets
appear within effective range. Sometimes--especially in minor
operations--it may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and
then open fire on him suddenly.
A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are
situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of
ammunition which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises
that of the enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to
consider whether a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long
range fire should, in any case, be used only when the size of the
target makes an adequate fire effect probable, and when the range is
known, or can be ascertained with accuracy. In long range fire the
use of small units, each expending a large amount of ammunition, is
as a rule to be recommended. The _distribution_ and _concentration_
of fire should be regulated by the officer charged with fire
direction.
“_Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an
enemy in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively
small forces, shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective
manner._” (Fire surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but
especially when the enemy has used up all, or nearly all, of his
reserves, comparatively small detachments, skillfully led, can
contribute materially to success, or even bring about the decision,
if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear and open
fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should
be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are
present.[149]
[149] In minor operations this would be a proper place for the
employment of large scouting detachments, the importance of which
decreases with the size of the contending forces. Such tasks can,
however, be just as well performed by a well-trained body of infantry.
=France.= In _attack_, fire is opened as late as possible, at any
rate not until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the
forward movement. Fire is the only means which makes a further
advance possible.
In _defense_, long range fire may be used under certain
circumstances. “Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range
take the attacker by surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many
men.”
=England= (1905). _Attack._ Infantry is to advance as close as
possible to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be
endured. Fire is decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and
infantry should support each other. Attention is called to the
support afforded advancing skirmishers by the fire of infantry units
and machine guns held in rear. The British are thus the first to
prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing Regulations require that
“fire of position” be practiced by company at a range of 900 m. The
company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) while movable
disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire is to increase
in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level ground
or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire
of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable
occasionally. Aside from its employment in “fire of position,”
long range fire is to be used in attack in the following cases: In
enveloping movements for the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line;
when favorable targets present themselves; in containing actions or
in feints; in concentrated collective fire; and finally in pursuit.
_Defense_: Fire is to be opened at 1000 m. on skirmishers, but it
may be advantageous to withhold it until the hostile line comes
within short range. This will give good results when the enemy is in
ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the attack is made by
poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire tires the eye
and the hand.
=Italy.= In _attack_, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit
of short range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to
open fire before this with a part of the advancing force is only
permissible when necessary to carry the line forward. _Defense._ As
soon as the defender has a chance of obtaining some fire effect,
he should open fire to prevent the attacking infantry from getting
within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) and at mid ranges
(up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. The battalion
commander determines when fire is to be opened.
From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when
infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following =General
Rules=:--
It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional
cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures
the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning,
is of greater importance.
(a) IN ATTACK.
The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an
adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender
may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only
when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be
reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a
pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of
annoying the enemy.
(b) IN DEFENSE.[150]
[150] In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire
on favorable targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m.
Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is
available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive
actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no
artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as
targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the
sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery
is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when
it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in
unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be
sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.
7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151]
[151] A Russian company commander contributes the following in
_Mitteilungen der Infanterie Schieszschulen_: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904,
the fire in one of the trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout
the entire day. The men were finally completely exhausted; their
shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be given some rest,
and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, only to
die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective,
as they were completely exhausted and used up.”
=Swiss.= Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense
to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then
to remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A
prompt resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be
assured.”
=France.= “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and
takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant
resumes his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense
formations on open ground.”
The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction with
reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the
fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at
present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing
spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and
allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of
such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant
readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement
the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If
the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be
resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker
(like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will
in many cases--especially at the beginning of a campaign--be deceived
into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now
advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise
him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire
are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable
the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable
of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease
firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender
should _change his rear sight elevations_ if the attacker advances by
rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to
present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after
a rush, and to utilize this interruption for changing the rear sight
elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the
rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing
an effective fire to bear upon the enemy.
[152] Compare HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher
Strategie_, p. 145, relative to the various opinions entertained in
the staffs of Generals v. Göben and Steinmetz in regard to the pause
in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. _Der 18. August_, pp.
269, 271 and 352.
8. KINDS OF FIRE.
In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of
the _volley_ was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop
the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in
other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern
combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was
used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to
clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.
In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost
exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops
held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views
are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a
volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained.
The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but
were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations
recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much
because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but
out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an
admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It
was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause
waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence
of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional
regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may be employed by
section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one
shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges.
[153] At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders
ordered their men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing
from cover to cover (“_Boer Attack_”) to discontinue that fire, and
to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently avoided presenting
large targets to the British volley fire.
_Germany._ _Volleys_ (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed
by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line
(par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the
organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be
used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective
fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of
trial volleys only in exceptional cases.
“_The highest attainable rate of fire_--the word rapid fire has
been elided--is to be used in attack during the preparation for the
assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a
cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate
collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208
German I. F. R.).
_Fire at will_ is used both in extended and close order.
=Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).= “_Il
n’y a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté._”
NAPOLEON.[154]
[154] “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when
engaged with the enemy.” NAPOLEON.
“It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history
of effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the
so-called volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In
a few instances the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually
their effect was insignificant.” V. BOGUSLAWSKI.
“Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction
of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order
to fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes
a certain amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if
allowed to continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later
perhaps into disorderly flight.
“The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged--some
men even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an
example likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the
point of getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections
drowned the voice of the commander. In such situations only personal
experience and resourcefulness can tell a company commander what
to do. We recommend a course which has always been attended with
success in practice. Let the officer commanding a section jump upon
the parapet and from there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if
the enemy’s fire permits, and his own heart is stout enough, let him
order the next volley from his position on the parapet. When once the
force is again under control, the volleys will be as good as if the
enemy were not so close.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER _Kritische Rückblicke
auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, II, pp. 304 and 310.
In his _Comments on Drill Regulations_ (16th Nov., 1840) Prince
WILLIAM, subsequently Emperor WILLIAM I. of Germany, says:
“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion
that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this
fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after
volley firing, even though not ordered, _because in my opinion it
is impossible to combat human nature_, which finds more security in
rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....”
_Russian experiences in Manchuria._ “At first _volleys_ by formed
bodies of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used.
In the latter, the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to
bring their pieces down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible
to see the enemy--who was advancing by rushes--to change their rear
sight elevations at the whistle signal of their commander.... When at
a distance from the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless
volleys. When the enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The
Russians used only fire at will at ranges under 800 paces. This
enabled the men to fire on individual hostile skirmishers and to
place the boldest out of action.” SOLOVIEV.
=Austria.= _Volleys_ are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close
order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon
targets which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably
be visible for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind
of fire used, the rate of fire being increased or decreased by the
men according to the existing situation. When necessary, the leaders
should regulate the fire; but this should only be done in exceptional
cases as the men are apt to increase rather than diminish the rate of
fire (“Rapid fire”).
The _maximum rate of fire_ is to be employed: “In _attack_, for
the purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in
_defense_, for the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It
is moreover to be used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a
defeated enemy as long as he is within effective range; and, finally,
in fire surprises, repulse of cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with
the enemy.”
=France.= The French _Lebel_ rifle has a cylindrical magazine
situated under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges
which have to be loaded singly. As a rule, _fire with counted
cartridges_ is employed (_feu à cartouches comptées_) for the purpose
of obtaining a “burst of fire” (_rafale_). The _rafale_ consists of
firmly controlled, concentrated, collective fire. Fire at will (_feu
à volonté_) is also used, eight rounds per minute being fired at the
short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be increased up
to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the magazine
(_feu à répétition_). One minute is required to fill the magazine.
Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes
necessary to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are
directed to fire.
=England and Switzerland.= The only fire employed is fire at will.
The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the
target and the range.
=Italy.= Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks).
=Japan and Russia.= (See p. 157, supra).
The Rate of Fire.
As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz.,
_slow fire_, _accelerated fire_, and _rapid fire_. The command “fire
more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing
(or increasing) the rate of fire.
The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of
the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and
the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will
reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (_i.e._, whether the rifle
is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of
fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able
to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.
Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with
which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire
effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. _The desire of
the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time
of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire._ As the rate of
fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen,
it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally
corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover,
as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also
exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the case
may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about
a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition
to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is
invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case,
however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not
necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely
due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be
condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the
product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude
good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load
and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the
same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching.
“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save
ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition.
Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and
lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155]
[155] _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition.
A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of
ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were
delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable,
however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate
for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break
forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or
necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will
present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual
shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the
impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing.
Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results:
Ranges up to 400 m. 5 rounds per minute;
„ from 400- 700 „ 4-5 „ „ „
„ „ 700-1000 „ 3-4 „ „ „
„ „ 1000-1300 „ 2-3 „ „ „
„ „ 1300-1500 „ 1-4 „ „ „
„ over 1500 „ 1 „ „ „
Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire
entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness.
Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity
of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is
calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is
lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to
prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected
rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most
of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,”
which is only calculated to produce confusion.
[156] At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a
long advance at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile
battalion. The men became excited, raised the leaves of their rear
sights, and opened rapid fire, which had no effect whatever, as the
range was only 200 paces. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 27_, p. 95.
The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in
regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157]
[157] Consult also _Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule
seit dem Jahre 1900_, Vienna, 1905. ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die
Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 132.
1. _When the appropriate elevation is used_, two-thirds of the
percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per
minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per
minute.
2. _When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m._,
rapid fire produces almost the _same percentage_ of hits as ordinary
fire at will.
3. _When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m._, rapid fire
produces almost _twice as great a percentage_ of hits as fire at will.
From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not
used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than
ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods
of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at
will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will
be higher.
Of all the different kinds of fire, the _volley_ is best adapted to
meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating
the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of
value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in
preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They
should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or
spread out when exposed to fire at will.
As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces,
the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys.
The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire
unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between
preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon
the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and
the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position
it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution
should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or
kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to
eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack
coolness--mental as well as physical--which is indispensable in every
volley.
The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very
considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a
deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of
the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire
at will, which they will do when their officers are either killed or
wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158]
[158] During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of
the 10th Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for
the purpose of firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good
one, however, and the men at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant
C---- jumped in front of the men to stop the firing, but was shot in
the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire continued along the entire
line.” _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12_, p. 454.
During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always
opened the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had
occurred among the officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the
steady volley fire soon degenerated into wild, hurried fire at will,
which produced no effect whatever.
If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without
any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many
leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to
handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate
movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory
stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not
themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions
many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire.
The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight
elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be
remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point
produces the same results.
The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep
the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to
direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target
according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire
with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This
was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the
sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but
the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while in
Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the
purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in
hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are
regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very
moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual
soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the
three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire
is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely
hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable
targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure
of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for
rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well
directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to
the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild,
uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when
the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might
sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the
enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is
thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may
be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall,
for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the
controversy with one well-aimed blow.”
[159] Temporarily adopted in Germany also.
[160] Par. 194.1 of the _French Infantry Drill Regulations_ of
Dec. 3rd, 1904, states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent
by the fire is much more considerable when the fire is concentrated
and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” Par. 194.4 states: “The
efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is augmented when the
enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The fire is, as
a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent;
and, in exceptional cases, by volleys.”
9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.
In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight
elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the
range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on
this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general
rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in
which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50
m.[161]
[161] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 93, et seq.
In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author
recommends the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the
longer ranges, the employment of combined sights, in which the
elevations differ from each other by 200 m. In peace time the use
of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in which rear sight
elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to
increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable
conditions found on the target range are lacking.
“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper
sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when
the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the
range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short
ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It
should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack,
the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.”
(Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point
is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at
the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve
as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium
and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges
it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When
the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to
distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection
of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the
discretion of the individual skirmishers.
10. COMMANDS.
In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the
regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks
devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the
skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range;
the third directs him to open fire.
11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.
The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of
the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed
strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially
difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike
in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate
leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often
more confusing than valuable.
12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.
COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.
In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71
the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of
Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:
===========+===========================+========================
| PERCENTAGES. | WOUNDS.
+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
| Small | Art’y |Cutting |Serious.|Slight.| Very
|arms fire.| fire. |weapons.| | |slight.
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Guard Div. | 88.42 | 11.50 | 0.08 | 32.17 | 62.49 | 5.34
2d Div. | 89.43 | 7.91 | 2.30 | 44.05 | 54.89 | 1.06
12th Div. | 80.52 | 14.48 | 2.09 | 39.12 | 46.36 | 14.52
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Average | 86.12 | 11.30 | 2.09 | 38.45 | 54.58 | 6.97
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including
killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a
relative value. The following figures express the average losses of
Russians and Japanese:
Losses through rifle fire 85.9%
Losses through artillery fire 11.4%
Losses through cutting weapons 3.2%
Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose
of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly
delivered, for annihilating him.
While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon
the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the
number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison
by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in
deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like
targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per
minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which
is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.
[162] In this connection the following works have been consulted:
_Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th
Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General ROHNE, and _Schieszlehre
für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition (1906), by the same author;
also _Militär-Wochenblatt_ No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute
trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the
conditions of firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by
Lieutenant-General Rohne, they serve as an excellent standard of
comparison, and, when their relative value is considered, as a basis
for tactical deductions.
(a) Influence of Training.
Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing
at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman,
firing at will, may (not _must_) expect a hit from each round fired,
at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350
m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within
600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of
the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such
an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate
them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce
an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over,
the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here
skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of
the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of
the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne
computed (_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 84) that when firing
rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high,
the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of
hits given at the ranges indicated:
=======+========================================
| NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY
+---------------+------------+-----------
Range.|Excellent shots| Fair shots | Poor shots
| Out of 100 rounds fired.
-------+---------------+------------+-----------
1000 m.| 27. | 17.6 | 8.9
1500 m.| 14.2 | 9.7 | 4.8
-------+---------------+------------+-----------
This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the
excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The
figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that
even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.
From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately
ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle
and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only
when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m.
too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental.
In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is
to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree
of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general
way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship
is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not
necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more
value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.
(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.
At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of
the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in
estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss
Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200
m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average
is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range
finding instruments see p. 146, supra.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a
target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under--
“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;
“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to
his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that
the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für
die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 102).
======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
m. | a | b | a | b | a | b
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
400 | 65.1 | 58.5 | 50.4 | 47.8 | 26.6 | 26.4
600 | 46.6 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 26.6 | 16.9 | 15.8
800 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 23.3 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 9.7
1000 | 27. | 7.5 | 17.6 | 7. | 8.9 | 5.9
1200 | 20.5 | 4. | 13.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 3.5
1400 | 16.1 | 2.4 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 2.2
1600 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 1.4
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error,
the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the
marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than
marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”
======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
m. | | |
------+----------------+---------------+---------------
400 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 0.4
600 | 13.7 | 6.3 | 1.1
800 | 19.8 | 9.4 | 2.1
1000 | 19.5 | 10.6 | 3.0
1200 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 3.3
1400 | 13.3 | 8.4 | 3.2
1600 | 11. | 7.2 | 2.
------+----------------+---------------+---------------
(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.
The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a
limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should
therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to
bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The
leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the
ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain
amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only
where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has
been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish
the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since
ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that
of the enemy.
When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed
in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only,
the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following
table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force
out of action:[163]
At a range of 300 m. 3 rounds,
„ „ „ „ 400 „ 5 „
„ „ „ „ 500 „ 6 „
„ „ „ „ 600 „ 7.5 „
„ „ „ „ 700 „ 10 „
„ „ „ „ 800 „ 13 „
„ „ „ „ 900 „ 16 „
„ „ „ „ 1000 „ 25 „
„ „ „ „ 1100 „ 45 „
„ „ „ „ 1200 „ 50 „
„ „ „ „ 1300 „ 57 „
„ „ „ „ 1400 „ 63 „
„ „ „ „ 1500 „ 72 „
„ „ „ „ 1600 „ 80 „
[163] According to ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd
Edition, p. 214.
In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of
7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were
used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds
indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers,
visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The
efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following
data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200
skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3%
hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading
fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%,
and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.
(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.
Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the
trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire
effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement
of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the
sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon
with the =effect of misses= on the field of battle more than with the
really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable
number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian
Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement
for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon
the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely
upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at
the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that
accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher,
according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his
piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a
rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme
angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a
mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the
resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone
increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It
follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles
than in those of older pattern.
[164] _Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht_, 1883.
He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the
skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he
has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be
none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.
Although the theory of the =Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses=, is not
tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact
core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions
indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of
fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain
value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles,
especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and
moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At
the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed
fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits,
100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40%
core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of
the bullets.
According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes
a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming
position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25
minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement
on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal
angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and
this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and
the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude
of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect.
Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues,
the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of
that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will
think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the
individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according
to the magnitude of the danger.
“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant,
and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may
be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur
in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular
case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as
prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction
of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.
“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better
discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an
action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain
extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the
efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and
the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which
Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.
“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to
keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire
their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges
would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined
of the two opponents to advance to the assault.
“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (_i.e._, the delivery of fire
at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in
consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s
fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close
to his position--by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]
[165] F. C. v. II. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 97.
Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed
by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4
degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire
correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper
trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these
figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50%
of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the _Chassepot_ rifle;
at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5
mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are
applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire,
while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.
During the =Franco-German war= the German troops learned by
experience that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on
the attacker at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did
not increase as the skirmishers came closer to his position; that,
on the contrary, the intensity of the hostile fire effect fell off
noticeably at ranges below 600 m.
During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against =St. Privat=,
the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges
from 1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges
from 500-600 m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain
stationary on the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the
enveloping movement made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500
m. corresponds approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees
for the _Chassepot_ rifle. The 20th Infantry Division was molested
by rifle fire from =St. Privat=, during its march from =St. Ail= to
=St. Privat= (the range in this case was 2200 m., which corresponds
to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 minutes for the _Chassepot_
rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, against whom this fire
was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from the French position.
In the =Russo-Turkish war= of 1877-78, the same thing occurred.
Infantry projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were
still 2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of
departure of 14 degrees 30 minutes).
Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond
(5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle
fire were very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from
the hostile position, on the other hand, the losses were remarkably
small, sometimes even ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their
heads under cover altogether.
A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement
at =Slivnica= on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from
the enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the
reserves, stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray
shots.”
It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence
of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision
by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the
firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness
in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war
one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it
tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable
rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire.
This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in
giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every
effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s
fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse
the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head
cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation
of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance.
To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be
built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at
a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition
replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to
resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage
of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the
feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece
without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a
state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”
A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will
still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles
with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its
officers are equal to their task.
(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.
Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher
fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of
the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian
regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients,
to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden
in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges
has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire
delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel
of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand
supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and
when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest,
high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is
also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads
over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as
corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at
short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace
performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses
do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the
ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained
stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese
found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile
fire had no effect.
[166] According to the _Swiss Firing Regulations_ the change in
height in the point of the target struck amounts to ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of the
range.
[167] The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of
subsequent reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on
Spionskop from 3 A. M. until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men
in 18¹⁄₂ hours (one officer to every 18.5 men), _i.e._, 28.2%. See p.
189 infra.
(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]
[168] MONDEIL, _De la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ
de bataille_, Paris, 1900.
So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level
ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the
inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls.
Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of
the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of
sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]
[169] Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S definitions are given below in
explanation of certain technical terms:
“_Danger Space_” is the distance measured along the line of sight
within which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the
target nor falls below the target.
“_Beaten Zone_” is the distance measured along the surface of the
ground within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of
the target.
Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not
been correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space.
In pointing at the bottom line of the target, the aiming position
(_i.e._, the height at which the piece is held) does not affect
the danger space. When pointing at the center of the target the
danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations and
tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low
targets, as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target.
“The evil effects of errors in estimating the range decrease as the
‘danger space’ increases, which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon
the ballistic properties of the rifle, upon the range, and the height
of the target. The danger on the ground in rear of the target fired
upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements and ammunition
over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition
depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.”
The importance of this circumstance is frequently so magnified in
the French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For
example, they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a
height can be covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the
ascent to a plateau by evacuating the military crest and occupying
the reverse slope, keeping the slope facing the enemy under a grazing
fire with the tail ends of the trajectories.
Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane
pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the
beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D,
it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and
the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached
when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the
projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D.
If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be
C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the
angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.
[Illustration]
[170] The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula
deduced by Lieutenant-General ROHNE in his work _Schieszlehre für
Infanterie_, p. 127:
Let α = angle of fall;
γ = angle of slope (rising or falling);
β = beaten zone on level ground;
then
α
----- β = beaten zone on falling ground;
α - γ
α
----- β = beaten zone on rising ground.
α + γ
From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the
appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken
advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops
will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target
on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more
or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will
in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since
each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of
projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect
to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of
considerable depth on the march.
The following data in regard to the increase (diminution)
of the depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of
Lieutenant-General ROHNE on _Das gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen
der Infanterie_, p. 44:
======+===============+================
Range.| Rising Slope. | Falling Slope.
m. | 1° | 2° | 1° | 2°
------+-------+-------+-------+--------
800 | ¹⁄₂ | ¹⁄₃ | ∞ | ∞
1000 | ²⁄₃ | ³⁄₄ | 2 | ∞
1200 | ³⁄₄ | ³⁄₅ | ³⁄₂ | 3
1400 | ⁴⁄₅ | ⁴⁄₆ | ⁴⁄₃ | 2
------+-------+-------+-------+--------
[Illustration]
The above figure, taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S work,
_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 128, shows the influence of
the ground on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a
target, 100, 200 m. etc., in rear of which are other targets of the
same dimensions but situated either on level ground, on a 2-degree
rising slope, or a 1-degree falling slope. On a rising slope of 2
degrees the depth of the beaten zone is decreased by half, and on a
downward slope of 1 degree increased by half.
“The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great
importance to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’
shots for the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in
battle will approximate theirs more nearly than any other. From this
we may deduce that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing
line, less distance will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire
directed at the firing line than on level ground; and that, if the
ground in rear of the firing line slopes downward, the distances must
be increased unless the slope is so great or the hostile trajectories
so flat that bullets pass over the crest, forming a ‘defiladed
space,’ into which no projectiles strike.”
On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (_i.e._, on the
slope of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground,
the slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on
ground falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope
of hills and on plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses.
Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of
the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800
m.) a defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring
supports nearer to the firing line than would be practicable on level
ground. If we assume that each graduation of the rear sight over 600
m. commands a space 100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we
obtain the following depths of the beaten zones at a range of 1500
m., with rifle model ’98 (angle of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes):
Ground rising 1 in 10 = 6° = 50 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 64 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 81 m.
Ground falling 1 in 10 = 6° = 360 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 180 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 113 m.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
The figures on pages 181 and 182 show to what extent the ground is
capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French
assert that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles
in the defense of the park wall at =Villiers=. It was, at any rate,
only an accident that the masses of troops on the west side of the
gently sloping Mamelon de Villiers suffered heavy losses on November
30th, 1870.
General PAQUIÉ of the French Army[171] lays down the following rule:
“When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle
of fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth
of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₄ times greater than on level ground.
When the angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of
fall of the mean trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the
beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₂ times greater than on level ground. When the
lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a
hill at the height of a man, and when the reverse slope of that hill
is equal to ¹⁄₁₀₀ of the range, the depth of the beaten zone will be
five times as great as on level ground.”
[171] See also _Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques
du camp de Châlons_. _Journal des sciences militaires_, Sept.,
Oct., Nov., 1808--_Le Joindre Général. Petit Guide pour les tirs
collectifs_, 1904.
These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to
increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain,
and train the eye in judging such situations.
The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing
on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy
in shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective--as shown in the
action against the French IInd Corps at =Point du Jour= and by the
experiences of the Russians at =Plevna= and =Gorni Dubniac=. This
condition becomes aggravated the smaller the angles of fall of the
projectiles, and the higher the target is situated relative to the
firing position of the attacking party.
Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the
greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top
of the height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as
the position is approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a
_Main Firing Position_. (See Figure, p. 182. Fire effect from A and
from B). For the purpose of determining the favorable range, “D,”
corresponding to a certain height (of the enemy’s position) “H,”
Lieutenant-General ROHNE has deduced the following formula for rifle
model ’88:[172]
D = 15.H + 500.
[172] Capitaine CUGNAC, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work
of Captain KNOBLOCH, _Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen
Höhenstellungen_, _Swiss Monthly Journal_, 1907.
The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at
present crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35
m.) could be effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons
at 1025 m.; a further advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle
model ’98 the formula might be stated: 20. H + 600.
It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible
to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender
must take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope
facing the enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to)
without being himself exposed to view, is of still less value for
use in the field. According to General Warnet of the French Army, if
“p” is the degree of slope expressed in centimeters, the defender
should choose between two points which lie between (p + 5) 1000
and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the
defender should take up his position either 600 or 300 m. in rear of
the main crest. In such a position the defender will, it is true, be
protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but can only
very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration
of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an
opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under
fire. Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the
numerous tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here,
to show the strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic
principle may develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely
forgotten that in war only that which is simple succeeds.
“Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible
from the firing position. In this connection, the following is
taken from the report of Captain KNOBLOCH, Austrian Army,[173] on
_Schieszaufgaben unter feldmäszigen Verhältnissen_:
[173] _Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des
Gefechtswertes unserer Infanterie_, Vienna, 1904. _Feldmäsziges
Schieszen der Infanterie aus versteckten Stellungen._ _Organ der
militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine_, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1906. _Resultate
der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer._ _Mitteilungen
über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens_, No. 12 of 1905.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155.
“Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are
used. These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with
it. It goes without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these
conditions will rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not
be selected at random at some particular elevation, because the angle
between target and aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear
sight leaf, might possibly lead to a negative sight setting.
“In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of
appropriate height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect;
but the aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite
the fact that the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as
trees, woods, factory chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could
be found on the terrain itself. This largely determines the value of
indirect rifle fire in the field.”
This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover,
its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that
we could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison.
Indirect rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do
damage to the enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon.
It remains to mention briefly the effect of =ricochets= which, as
a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is
short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard
ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not
ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows
run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets
almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D”
projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter
their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably
increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range
of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which
they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their
range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the
skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the
consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions
this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing
at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a
man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from
the skirmisher who did the firing.
[174] According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble
even when only grazing small twigs.
13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175]
[175] See _Taktik_, V, p. 76 _et seq._
An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone
of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy
is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead
to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops
impossible.
Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy
when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is
a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to
close order formation must be utilized.
Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental
shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might
therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no
flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the
following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the
formations indicated.
[Illustration:
Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected.
Horizontal axis: Range in meters.
Dash-dot curve: Company Column.[176]
Dotted curve: Line of platoons.[177]
Solid curve: Line of skirmishers.
Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace
intervals.]
[176] In Germany called “Column of Platoons.”
[177] In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals.
According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of
Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained
by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at
intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation
is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at
ranges under 1300 m.
According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following
percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing
old model steel jacketed bullets:
==========================================+===================
| At a range of
+----+----+----+----
|1200|1400|1600|1800
| m. | m. | m. | m.
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----
Platoon (one rank) | 4.4| 3.4| 2.2| 1.4
Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals | 1.2|----|----|----
Platoon in column of fours | 6.6| 3.8| 2.2| 1.3
Platoon in column of twos | 5.6| 3.2| 1.9| 1.1
Company column (German column of platoons)|22.0|18.0|14.0|10.0
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----
[178] _Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, p. 15.
Lieutenant-General ROHNE, in his work, _Schieszlehre für die
Infanterie_, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability
of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire
only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the
appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against--
========+=====+=========+=============
|Line.|Column of|Infantry in
| |platoons.|route column.
--------+-----+---------+-------------
Standing| 116 | 160 | 98
Prone | 20 | 65 | 72
--------+-----+---------+-------------
And against a company deployed in line of platoons:
=========+================+==================+===================
|3 platoons, each| 3 platoons, each |6 sections, each in
|in route column.|in column of twos.| column of twos.
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------
Standing | 57 | 39 | 29
Prone | 28 | 25 | 14
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------
The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus
seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line
lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under
purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable
formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In
this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing
on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single
projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire
the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability,
the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons,
since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.
The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from
10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses
in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an
organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency.
Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as,
for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and
which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will
be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without
going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179]
[179] It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses
spoil troops and their leaders in this respect.
At the battle of =Gravelotte=, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200
sabres, and 732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated
on the German side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the
decisive action. The losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as
follows: 899 officers and 19,260 men; according to arms: infantry,
10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, 5.74%. On the decisive flank,
the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of almost 30%. On this
flank, the Rifles of the Guard (_Gardeschützen_) lost 44%, the 1st
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their enlisted
strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 men.
Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the
18th Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless
they may amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in
single bodies of troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire.
At =Magersfontain=, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of
their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the
officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion
of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth
Highlanders, 23.9%. At =Colenso= (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost
6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, 23.9%.
=Spionskop= (Jan. 24th, 1900):
Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18¹⁄₂ hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2%
Supports 1,600 „ „ 10¹⁄₂ „ 8 „ 95 „ = 6.4%
Reserves 1,500 „ „ 4¹⁄₂ „ 15 „ 170 „ = 12.3%
Staffs ---- ---- 5 „ --- ----
----------------------------------------------------
5,794 men 68 officers, 986 men = 17.5%
This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing
the fire were shot down.
Attacking troops 1 officer for every 18 men
Supports 1 „ „ „ 12 „
Reserves 1 „ „ „ 11 „
--------------------------
1 officer for every 14 men
For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the
Prussian Grenadier Battalion “_von Wedel_,” consisting of 12 officers
and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour
during the battle of =Soor= (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered
by the Grenadier Battalion “_von Münchow_” at =Kesselsdorf= are
possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named
battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.[180]
[180] _Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and
47.
At =Kolin=, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” lost 652 men,
and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, _i.e._,
considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the
battle, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” numbered only 24
men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233,
296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was
undoubtedly very great.[181] At =Kolin=, the infantry lost in all
12,307 men out of 19,000, _i.e._, 65%.
[181] _Ibid._, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20.
The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means
due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders
in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead
their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more
necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous
systems of the men, and the poorer the troops. According to past
experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the
early stages of a war.[182]
[182] See _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358.
The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are
given, in round figures, in the following table:
At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men;
„ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ;
„ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ;
Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses
among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight
of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with
the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost
all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company
commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company
officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in
field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29%
in company officers.”
[183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre
M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115.
On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its
officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about
three-quarters of an hour.
On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its
officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._,
64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%,
that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the
_Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action.
After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the
East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing
line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are
not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle
Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th
only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd
Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one
battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a
private.
14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.
The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of
the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and
as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable
increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such
a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more
than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.
“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain themselves
owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses
which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination
to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of
impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually,
the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed
either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely
replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised;
exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought
of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were
awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could
have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most
surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184]
[184] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 150.
In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General
von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited
or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain
firm will power.”
General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of
Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying,
facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The
shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the
shells bursting in the midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division
in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men.
Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale
faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire
to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were
congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to
joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their
lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number
were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of
wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the
Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos
drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy
was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into
line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had
reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling
commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly
under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They
blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the
foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to
the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against
trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover
by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in
greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the
enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down
by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to
400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly
discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke
enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This
excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the
troops again under control.
The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of
the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions existing in the
theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language.
During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments
of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with
sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men
considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a
difficult situation.
On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for
great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult
to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were
undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact
that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to
isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where
water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit
of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would
have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at
Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable;
not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment,
which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble
resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen,
who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the
commander of the British force did not really know just what action to
take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand
must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded
in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before
permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds.
[185] In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found
all but three of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st,
1900, justified. In the three cases in which the verdict was adverse
only a few men had surrendered. Within a period of eight months
the British lost a total of 1680 officers and 2124 men killed and
wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 officers and
4984 men.
It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are
able to endure. After the Franco-German War it was believed that
troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to
one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be
reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect
of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss
7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander;
and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and
deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg
(loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack.
The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and
the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult
situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of
enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel
has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The
steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct
of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice.
The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this
militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death.
The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous
system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm
of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the
human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by
officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller
than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the
nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the
battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “_void
of the battlefield_”[187] has become especially pronounced since the
introduction of smokeless powder. “_The invisibility of the enemy
directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy
and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined
to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to
hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days
at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800
m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral
depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.”
(General NÉGRIER.)[188]
[186] See SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei_. After the
author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote:
“And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a
certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers
will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will
reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in
regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is
carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about _Courage_,
_ibid._, p. 206.
[187] This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not
new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his _Vertrauten Briefen_
(Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the “void of the
battlefield” in the fights around Metz. BONNAL, _L’art nouveau en
Tactique_, p. 90.
[188] _Revue des deux mondes_, for June, 1902.
The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by--
1. Derangement of tactical units;
2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and
3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.
According to the _History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment_ (p. 113)
immediately after the battle of =St. Privat=, most of the companies
numbered only 30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although,
allowing for losses, there should have been 1922 men. The three
companies of the 39th Füsilier Regiment which had fought in the
=Stiring Wald= at =Spicheren=, numbered only 6 officers and 150
men at the close of the fight in the evening,[189] which means
that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle
of =Colombey=, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment
was assembled, three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men,
respectively. This battalion had lost about 300 men.[190]
[189] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 366.
[190] _Geschichte des Regiments_, p. 347.
The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account
(_Gt. St. W._) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different
infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying
a front of 1200 paces, in the following order:
7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. }
-------, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, }
Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. }
{ 10. 11. 12. 1. 1. 9.10. 4.3. Cos.
{ ------------, ----, ----, -----, -----,
{ 13. 13. 73. 15. 73. Inf.
At =Wörth= 17 different regiments were represented on a front of 5700
paces.
“The assault on =Elsaszhausen= (=Wörth=), after preliminary forest
fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some
cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was
the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear
of it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army
Corps) which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves.
Even the battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical
entities.”[191]
[191] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 268.
At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into
formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers,
easily succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units
disintegrated rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.[192]
[192] For details see KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XVI,
pp. 122, 124, 177, 231-234.
In the =Giefert Wald= (=Spicheren=) out of 32 companies (4
brigades) only four companies fought together as a battalion. In
the little =Wenzelberg Wood= (at =Nachod=) there were engaged 7¹⁄₂
Austrian battalions (belonging to four different regiments) and 2
Jäger-Battalions, all of these troops belonging to three different
brigades.[193] No attempt was made to lead these troops as one body.
[193] _Austrian Gen. St. W._, 1866, III, p. 81.
In the oak wood at =Dubno= (=Skalitz=), there were engaged 12¹⁄₂
and 8¹⁄₂ battalions belonging to four different regiments and to
two different army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up
of the order of battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades,
regiments and battalions. In consequence of this, control was lost to
a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, and the result achieved
was mainly due to the skill and intelligence of the subordinate
leaders--especially that of the commanders of battalions and half
battalions.”[194]
[194] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, II, p. 48.
“The wooded region in rear of =St. Hubert= was thickly infested with
stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to
be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets,
some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present
except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers
riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved
only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of
the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the
valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of =St. Hubert= had increased
to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the
result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196]
[195] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 139.
[196] _Ibid._, p. 167.
“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps
occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east
of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the
enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious
mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197]
[197] _Ibid._, p. 224.
“At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the
46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up
with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments
of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the
capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal
but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a
battalion.”[198]
[198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249.
“In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became
disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around
in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and
sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the
_Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left
flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire
became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to
rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying
along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers
of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish
line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200]
[199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72.
[200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72.
This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers
left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=.
The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third
battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly
continued the advance in complete disorder.
“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a
reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of
the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging
to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of
the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the
companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the
greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201]
[201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154.
“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments,
attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way;
400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the
organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in
Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men
had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single
company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had
disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become
separated from their units.”[202]
[202] _Ibid._, I, pp. 236 and 238.
“Prince IMERETINSKI succeeded in forming stragglers into the
following improvised units:
3 provisional companies of the _Libau_ Regiment.
2 „ „ „ „ _Susdal_ „
2¹⁄₂ „ „ „ „ _Vladimir_ „
1 detachment of 100 men of the _Reval_ Regiment.
“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance
and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203]
[203] _Ibid._, I, p. 243.
“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of
Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians
succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in
companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally
belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the
afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was
made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new
organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204]
[204] _Ibid._, I, p. 258.
The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are,
above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the
deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear
of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing
the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide
of disorder as made by the author of _Summer Nights Dream_ (1888)
(platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing
toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The
disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion.
It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with
illusory ideas.
It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any
officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization;
and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are
requisite for tactical training--a large number of officers being told
to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur
in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of
an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a
prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful
engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a
reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire
from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can
well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed
of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own
officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic.
The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion,
4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at
=Colombey= (14th August, 1870) under French shell and _Chassepot_
fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two
shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20
men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew
shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company
executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another
and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed
at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although
not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with
suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did
everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned
officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its
movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the
perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men,
repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At
that moment the battalion commander--he was called the ‘marble
statue’ on account of his coolness--galloped up on his bay, shouting:
‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’
Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the
words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled
again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color
company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on
the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they
executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and
soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and
4th Companies.”
The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them
its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession
within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company
lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205]
[205] RETZLAFF, _Aus meinem Tagebuch_.
Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example
of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are
of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the
individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common
sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers
into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the
premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.
[206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:
The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against
Italian infantry. _Oesterreichs Kämpfe_, II, p. 74.
The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.
HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, pp. 170,
184, 193 and 215.
_Sedan_, _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1243.
_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the
capture of Servigny).
LEHAUCOURT, _Campagne de la Loire_, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes
Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).
V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION.
1. NORMAL PROCEDURE.
The characteristic tendency of modern times is the liberation of the
individual from antiquated ideas and from the restraint exercised
by ostensibly reactionary governmental power. The key-note of this
tendency, which places individualism above collectivism, is absolute
independence of the individual in municipal and national affairs, in
science and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent
by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be assured by
the sum-total of a number of negative or positive individual efforts,
but only by the simultaneous launching of masses controlled by a
single will. Within these limits the independence of the individual is
permissible, for a commander does not exact apathetic obedience, but,
on the contrary, intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and
this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules.
Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the German Drill
Regulations leave the leader free to dispose of his troops according to
the purpose of the combat and the nature of the ground. In this he is
assisted by the initiative and independent action of his subordinate
leaders. Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite
however, in armies in which the tactical training of commanders and
subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared that the latter
will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where such normal formations
are prescribed, it is assumed that hard and fast rules are requisite
for training; that the average officer cannot be expected to estimate
a situation correctly and arrive at proper decisions; and that the
majority of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are
to render any service at all.
Drill regulations should facilitate quick mutual understanding between
leader and organization and lay down general principles for ordinary
situations, for combat tasks, and for formations, but should not, by
their rules, direct the actions of a leader from the very beginning
into definite grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure,
there is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and that
the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail in war at the
very moment when its presence is most vitally necessary.[207]
[207] “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of
drill and who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the
lame man deprived of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived
of his spectacles.” VON SEIDLITZ.
“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the ground,
therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what might happen in each
particular case.” (FREDERICK THE GREAT). Whether or not a particular
normal procedure is appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but
solely upon the tactical situation.[208]
[208] It is only in cases where precisely identical situations
may be presumed to exist that there can be any question of a normal
procedure. The last stages of the infantry attack in fortress
warfare present features of this nature and on that account a normal
procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of the European
armies.
While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general
manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to
details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe
it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are
advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most
suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of
investigating this point would probably have the strange result that
each representative would concede that what the others desire is
practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself
capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that
all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations
entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been
foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many
details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which
cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises
in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future.
Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they
have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their
regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to
strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on
tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help
yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of
doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity,
because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own
initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same
proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded
universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of
our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future
war may correct their provisions.[210]
[209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc.
p. 42
_British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is
apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations,
the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to
lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal
attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make
themselves felt through losses and failures.”
[210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin,
1906).
The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in
the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down
a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer
will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind
some sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion
of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If such combat
regulations are called “drill attack” (_Schulangriff_), many of the
objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such
definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse
between leader and troops.
“Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (_On
War_, II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should
not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as
good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most
suitable.... By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill,
precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their
part will make the whole machine run easier....
“The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends
to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances
imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and
thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals
(Prince Louis at =Saalfeld=; Tauenzien on the =Dornberg= at =Jena=;
Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of =Kapellendorf=) without
exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great’s system
of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten
into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the
most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has
ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they
involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never before or since
overtaken any army on the battlefield.”
General von Boguslawski[211] demands that the conduct of the attack
be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in
action. He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even
the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present
time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse
the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by
no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the
terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into
offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it
should be flexible.”
[211] _Taktische Darlegungen_, p. 51.
Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal
attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the
basis of troop training--a solid foundation for further development.
In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be
done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack.
The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as
long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such,
however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these
normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training
and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from
the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This,
briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform procedure, which
not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is
absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher
leader.”
General von Scherff states:[212]
“It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of
responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:--
“1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for
battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning
appropriate missions;
“2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of
a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient
provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization
is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally,
“3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed
by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the
drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component
parts.”
[212] _Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff_, Berlin,
1902.
2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[213]
[213] _Aufmarsch_, _Entfaltung_, _Entwicklung_.
Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German
war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from
the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious
systematic =concentration=[214] was invariably employed before
entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies
and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route
column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for
going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly
formation.[215]
[214] “By _concentration_ is meant the passage from route column to
a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of
decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German
I. D. R.)
[215] Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of
Gravelotte, see _Taktik_, III, p. 305.
The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the
Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The
army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again
formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain
the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations.
Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing,
the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth
of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been
done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper
distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only
when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the
former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper
however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in
several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for
decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections).
The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in
close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in
route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go
around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However,
even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable
targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.
[216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307.
The British were surprised in close order formations at
=Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order
to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from
the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements
directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was
done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation
was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no
obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who
stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four
battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a
depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being
300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight
companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals
between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces.
The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in
other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.
[Illustration: =The Formation of a Brigade of Four Battalions of the
6th Infantry Division=
during the advance on =Poplar Grove= on March 7th, 1900. Front about
800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.]
When an engagement is expected, the different elements, each in route
column, are directed upon their several objectives, i.e., the column
is _developed for action_. This is done because it is necessary to
gain a start over the enemy in deployment and advantageous to move
in route column. Thus a =development for action= (_Entfaltung_)[217]
is nothing but an extension of front accomplished by breaking up the
original route column into a number of separate columns. The latter
march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route column.
Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate extension is not
anticipated. During the development for action, preparations should be
made providing for the necessary depth of the combat formation.
[217] The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of
front, “development for action” (_Entfaltung_, pars. 315 and 466),
and “distribution in depth” (_Gliedern_, pars. 287-291 and 427). The
term “to form for attack” (_Auseinanderziehen_, par. 241), means that
troops are given a combat formation both as regards frontage and
depth.
When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the concentration into
an assembly formation should be avoided, since it generally entails a
loss of time and energy, and the development for action chosen instead.
(Par. 315 German I. D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage
of affording a higher degree of readiness for action without letting
the troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from route
column but also from assembly formation.[218]
[218] See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov
on September 2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in _Angriffsverfahren der
Japaner_, by von Lüttwitz.
The development for action should begin as soon as there is danger of
getting under effective artillery fire. The length of time required for
going into action may be reduced by shortening the route column (by
concentrating the troops into deep column); by forming several route
columns abreast, unless column of sections has already been formed; by
clearing the roads of troops; by marching across country; by indicating
beforehand on which side of the infantry the artillery is to be
brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. R.); and, finally, by directing
the heads of the various elements upon their respective objectives.
(Development for action).
In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not
so clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in
rencontres is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it
becomes apparent, during the preparatory stage of the action, that
the enemy has a visible start in deployment.” When time is not
pressing, the regulations prescribe a concentration for action and,
simultaneously therewith, such a grouping of the principal units (if
possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile guns, and
well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only straight to
the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the zone of
hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is
discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place,
in order to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for
artillery, it will be necessary to leave the road and to advance
across country. This will, as a rule, result in widening the front
of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of
placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made,
so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for
reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close
country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially
called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in
defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by
a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions.
The =deployment for action= (_Entwicklung_) consists of forming the
troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers.
As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may
be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation.
It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action
ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of
skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment.
There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the
rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line
proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to
defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case
the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much
as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German
I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I.
D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good
plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: “First
direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable
formation.”
An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching
of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at
=Vionville=) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated
(6th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) is of special interest. The
concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at =Waterloo=, and
of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at =Nehweiler= (=Wörth=),
almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At =Nachod=,
the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration,
lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops
from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced
by parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This
reinforcement, while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient.
During its march to the battlefield of =Gravelotte=, the 3rd Infantry
Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then
it formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of
Rezonville, and from there moved on in echelon formation. The
concentration of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870
(=Spicheren=), was still less justifiable. About noon, when the head
of the brigade reached the exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl,
it received orders to cross the Saar. Upon receiving this order, the
five battalions present concentrated, unfurled their flags and then
marched across country to the railroad bridge of Mattstall. In order
to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed again. The delays
which occurred here led the parts of the force which had crossed
first, to throw themselves into the fight.[219]
[219] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77_, p. 51.
3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE BRIGADE.
When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken up into
companies either by directing the latter upon their respective
objectives, or by forming for attack by command.
When forming for attack by command, the front, the base company,
intervals, distances, and the relation of the companies to each other
must be indicated. The intervals should be sufficiently large to permit
the companies to move unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities
of marching will not be communicated from one to the other.
A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon will suffice
for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies at war strength
would be 150 paces, and between companies at peace strength 100 paces.
Intervals may be increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable
the troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same holds true
for distances. For rules in regard to the distance between the second
and first line, see p. 121, supra. When a battalion has formed line
of companies at long range from the enemy for the purpose of reducing
the effect of the hostile fire, distances should be diminished to
facilitate the transmission of orders.
When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend upon the
purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, some of the
Japanese battalions, stationed at points where the decision was not
sought, were each assigned a front of 800 m. In these cases the four
companies of each battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at
large intervals.
[Illustration]
It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment for particular
situations. In each case the formation of the battalion depends upon
the situation, the purpose of the combat, and the nature of the ground,
the battalion commander having the option of going into action in one,
two, or three lines.
Moreover, the formation depends upon whether--
1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger force; and
whether one or both of its flanks are resting on impassable obstacles;
2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; whether it
is to attack or to stand on the defensive;
3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire or is to take
advantage of the preparation effected by other troops; and, finally,
4. Whether or not it has to fight at night.
=A battalion acting alone=, whose flanks are not resting on natural
obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies successively into
action so as to retain complete organizations for other purposes. It
will seldom be proper for the battalion to form for attack in the
regular manner. When this can be done the battalion should form in
three lines in conformity with its task of initiating, carrying out,
and deciding the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced
by the second company as soon as the situation has become sufficiently
clear. More frequently, the battalion commander will send only a single
company into action, retaining the others for the time being under
cover.
[Illustration]
The =advance guard battalion= of a regiment will, as a rule, be
compelled to develop considerable fire in a _rencontre_ (par. 357
German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance of the enemy,
and for this purpose it will frequently place two companies into
action at once. But since the battalion commander cannot count upon
reinforcements and, moreover, as he does not know on which flank the
combat is subsequently going to develop, he will provisionally retain
the other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them in rear
of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above figure).
[Illustration]
In a =containing action= one should endeavor to employ few rifles
but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, and keep supports and
reserves far in rear so as to minimize the losses. If the force is to
deploy first of all only for fire action, but is later to participate
in the decisive attack, it will be advisable to place two companies in
the first line, one in the second, and one in the third. The companies
in the second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile
fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching one
and then the other company, to exercise an influence on the course of
the action during a longer period than would otherwise be possible.
(See “b”).
[Illustration]
=When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force=, and when
both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports for feeding
the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) and can cover a greater
front. A reserve may either be entirely dispensed with, or made very
weak.
When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened flank
should be protected by echeloning the supports and the reserve in
rear of it. In this position, these echelons are not so apt to be
bullet-stops as when they are placed in rear of the center. Besides,
they can more easily execute enveloping movements and can take a
hostile flank attack in flank. When both flanks are in the air, only
the most essential precautions should be taken on the one flank, while
on the other everything available is united for the decisive attack.
In =defense=, three companies can sometimes be taken into the first
line for the purpose of developing a strong fire, while the fourth
company is held in rear of a threatened flank or in rear of the center.
(See “d”). When it is desired to employ the reserve offensively, only
one or two companies are placed in the first line, the others being
held in reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive.
Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve.
[Illustration]
When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to make an immediate
attack which has been prepared by the fire of other troops, all its
companies may be taken at once into the first line. In this case
the battalion may be formed for attack with its companies at close
intervals. This might also be a suitable combat formation for night
operations. All these formations are subject to change however, as soon
as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary.
The general principles stated for a battalion are also applicable to a
=regiment=. The regiment may either be directly formed for attack, or
the heads of the battalions may be deflected toward the points where
the deployment is to take place. An interval of 300-400 m. between
heads of battalions is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent
deployment. The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the
purpose of the combat.
The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion commanders, but
leaves the latter entire freedom of action in regard to the formation
to be taken up and the manner of deploying. He should interfere with
companies only in exceptional cases. Such interference is justified
only when the conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity
of action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe the proper
channels in communicating an order.
[Illustration: Methods of Forming a Battalion for Attack.]
[Illustration]
In developing the =brigade=[220] for action, the depth of column
begins to exert an influence. Every concentration of the brigade
retards its entry into action. If the longest distance to be covered
in developing the brigade is assigned to the leading element of the
column, the march into action will be accelerated.
[220] For historical references in regard to the importance in
action of the brigade, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für
Armee und Marine_ (August-September number of 1877) entitled, _Die
Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In
regard to the employment of the regiments in line or in echelon, see
MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_.
MOLTKE’S _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.
[Illustration]
When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is to prolong the
flank of the fighting line, its entry into action might be hastened,
perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue the march in the
original direction while the leading regiment takes the longer route.
The rear regiment would then be abreast of the leading one after about
15 minutes. If the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating
lines, the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes,
have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of skirmishers.
When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each regiment is assigned
a separate task (attack of a point, or defense of a section). If the
tasks assigned are definite and harmonize with each other, mutual
coöperation will be assured. The brigade commander ordinarily sends his
orders to the regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste,
correction of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he should
inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade consisting of
two regiments, its commander, in order to be able to influence the
action, will be compelled to retain at least one battalion as a reserve.
Brigades of three regiments[221] (each of three battalions) have an
advantage in this respect. But if such an increase in infantry units
were contemplated, it would be better, for reasons that will be given
later on,[222] to form the additional troops into a third division in
each army corps.
[221] The British division consists of twelve battalions formed
into three brigades.
In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly
marked. The division consists of three brigades, each brigade
of three regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. The
battalions have a strength of only 400 men.
[222] _Taktik_ (_Kriegsgliederung_), III, p. 31, et seq.
Base Units.
The possibility of regulating the movements of a body of troops by
means of a base unit, depends upon a number of preliminary conditions
which will seldom be fulfilled in war:
1. _The leader of the base unit would have to remain unharmed to the
very last._ If he were disabled the command of the unit would devolve
upon the next in rank who would perhaps not join it in every case.
2. _The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus necessary for
a further advance, would have to maintain the direction after the
original base unit had ceased to exist on account of the mixing of
organizations._
3. _The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties during
its advance than the other units of the force._ If the base unit were
to encounter greater difficulties than the other units, this might
serve as an excuse for reducing the rate of advance. In attack, the
organization nearest the enemy, in other words, the one that is led
better and more energetically than the others, is quite naturally
charged with maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization
will be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements in
rear.
The designation of a base unit[223] or unit of direction on the
battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the initiative of
the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. A base unit is only
profitable in night operations, in crossing unfavorable ground (woods),
and in bringing the fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile
fire. “With the entry into action, the importance of the base company
gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. (Par.
242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, it is better to indicate
either the objective on which the troops are to march, or the flank
toward which they are to maintain connection.
[223] “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have
to regulate their movements without thereby being curbed in their
endeavor to advance (base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.)
In France units of direction are prescribed (_la direction est
confidée aux unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles
du terrain_), but their duties are not given in detail. Units of
direction are also prescribed in Austria.
A _change of direction_ of march is executed by wheeling or turning
with the subordinate units toward the new front. (Par. 185 German
I. D. R.). A _change of front_ is effected in the same manner. With
long lines, echeloning and movements by the flank will result, which
can only be rectified gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When
skirmishers have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a
deployment in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion
of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the desired
direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to withdraw, at
the same time, those parts of the former skirmish line which are no
longer necessary.
Examples of Changes of Front.
1. Engagement at =Helmstedt=, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry
had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the
Ütting Hill.[224]
[224] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 54.
2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the
=Niederwald= after crossing the Sauer (battle of =Wörth=).[225]
[225] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262.
3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of
=Loigny-Poupry= (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example
of the conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon
the advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held =Lumeau=. The
33rd Brigade, its battalions in double column, was concentrated south
of =Champdoux=. The division commander retained two battalions as a
reserve and ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter
wheel to the right and to form his command for attack in the general
direction of Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on
the Bavarians defending =Schlosz Goury=. The attack was directed
against the French Division Jauréguiberry, which was attacking
Schlosz Goury. This division first came under fire at 3-400 m. and
then approached to within about 150 m. of the defenders’ position;
strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but otherwise
nothing was done to protect the right.
By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade
would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury,
and, as Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a
fan-shaped extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation,
would have been unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies
at his disposal and decided to advance in a southerly direction
until his second line overlapped the most advanced hostile line, so
that the attack as planned would have struck simultaneously both
the first and second lines of the enemy. The slight loss of time
involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could carry out
his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the
enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade
formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200
m. from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the
brigade after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right.
[Illustration]
As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of
the 76th Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd
Companies of the same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th
and 8th Companies of the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The
center half-battalion, (2nd and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry),
the unit of direction, was ordered to march on the church spire of
Loigny. All the units of the force, with the exception of the IInd
Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of skirmishers. The
1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, 75th Infantry,
covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the eleven
companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line
(approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the
second.
The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy
quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The
attack came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were
taken in flank, and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to
oppose the onslaught of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense,
unwieldy masses of the French were more and more crowded together by
the uninterrupted advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives
to the German marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by
the artillery in position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the
brigade to Ecuillon.
The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The
right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry,
which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to
march on the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing
penetrated into Loigny.[226]
[226] See HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 80; also KUNZ, _Loigny_, p.
105.
4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against the
=Forbach Hill= (=Spicheren=).[227]
[227] _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 356.
4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF COMBAT FORMATIONS.[228]
[228] See _Taktik_, V, _Gefechtslehre_, p. 38.
The infantry combat is decided by the combined action of long firing
lines. Retained forces, not launched against the enemy for the purpose
of crushing him, exert no influence whatever on the decision, since
they only increase losses without contributing to the fire effect. In
the battles of the past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of
the combat (unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing
the flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the short
range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in readiness so close
to the firing line that they could assault _en masse_ at once and
without any diminution of their strength. The deciding factor, which
rested in retained reserves during the Napoleonic era, lies at present
in the firing line.[229]
[229] The French still entertain a contrary opinion.
=Distribution in depth= _is, therefore, only a means to an end; an
expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a
constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault;
to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory
is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting
forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but
it must extend its front during the fight._ To launch an insufficient
number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually is a
fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a superior force
continually with an inferior one, without being able to take advantage
of the superiority which we may actually possess.
The Russian attacks in the battles around =Plevna= are very
instructive in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the =Grivica=
intrenchments were attacked by two columns consisting of nine
battalions. The Ist and IInd Battalions of the 121st Infantry
succeeded in reaching the trench, but then the attack failed. The
IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result Thereupon the
IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were launched, but
these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of the
trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner,
likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by
the entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.[230]
[230] _Russisch-Türkischer Krieg_ (_Gen. St. W._), German
Translation, III, pp. 254 and 264.
On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th
Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the
64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the
31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned
force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army
Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In
spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure
of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was
insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were
again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions
instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and
one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6
battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they
likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only
when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions
lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in
reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous
employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the
Russian infantry.[231]
[231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211.
The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who
advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak
garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the
isolated attacking groups which followed each other.
The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient
fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the
battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu=
(15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced
with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the
first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three
battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development
of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The
2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and
1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to
pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese.
[232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56.
Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory stage of the
fight, as it enables the commander to meet unexpected developments in
the situation. Moreover, it is justifiable so long as the information
in regard to the strength and intentions of the enemy is insufficient.
When reconnaissance work is not thoroughly performed, the force may
be obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally
chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and movements
by the flank can only be made when the front is narrow. Moreover,
after a force is once deployed within the zone of hostile fire, it is
committed to the direction chosen and can only move straight to the
front. Considerable changes of front can only be executed by the lines
in rear. The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and
to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. As the
losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a force can cover a
broader front and keep its supports in closer proximity to the firing
line in the former than in the latter case, especially if it was able
to strengthen its position. The reserve, however, should be kept at a
greater distance from the firing line than in attack, in order that it
may retain complete freedom of movement--in covering the retreat, or in
making a counter-attack--and may not be involved in the fire fight.
The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, give the
impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which the attacking line
can rally, and cover the re-forming of the troops after a successful
attack. The several echelons of the attack formation, except the small
fractions immediately supporting the firing line[233] and covering
its flanks, should have become merged with that line by the time the
decisive moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes up an
unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an advantage; on
the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys in force, exposes
himself to grave danger. _The troops should be sent into action in a
deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear
until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be
thrown in for the assault._
[233] The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the
line is clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172.
=Distribution in depth and frontage= are interdependent; the greater
the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In
every deployment for action the following question awaits solution
by the troop leader: “How deep ought the formation to be and how
great an extension of front is allowable.” The result of the combat
depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad
combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and
flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are
not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of
leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness
of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution
in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the
force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action
with another part of the force in accordance with this information;
and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that
decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the
leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it
gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to
repulse them--something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any
rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in
the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into
play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element
of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take
advantage.
Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth
is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the
opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too
broad a front.
At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order
for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the
=Roten Berg= of the =Spicheren Heights=,[234] it being assumed that
only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade
of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the
action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m.
from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd
Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right
flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th
Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered
a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg
was undoubtedly difficult,[235] this wide extension, which made all
leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the
first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions
against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The
brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th
Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the
battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably
increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following
troops were in the first line on the right wing:[236]
I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and ¹⁄₂3. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos.
-------- ------------ -------------------- --------------
53. Inf. ~=74. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ 77. Inf.
10. 11. and 12. Cos. ¹⁄₂3. Co.
-------------------- ------------
~=39. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~
[234] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.
[235] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 318.
[236] The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade.
The 4th Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the
crow flies, from the left flank of its battalion.
The following troops were in the second line:
Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos.[237] II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn.
------------ ------------------- ------------------------
53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf.
[237] These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the
other companies of their battalion.
This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might
have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar
situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the
Giefert Wald--39²⁄₃ companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th
and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600
m. It is true, the peculiar situation existing on the German side,
operated against a simultaneous employment of the several bodies and
a mixing of units was unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have
been possible to prevent such a complete dissolution of all units,
by François’ Brigade taking up a more suitable formation before
the action commenced. The mistake made here was repeated over and
over again in the other preliminary combats of the campaign, and
invariably led to the same result.[238]
[238] Consult _Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei
Wörth_, KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 10, et seq.
The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at
=Magersfontain= and =Paardeberg= may be traced to the lack of
sufficient reinforcements. At Magersfontain, the four battalions
of the Highland Brigade were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at
Paardeberg on a front of 4000 m.
In deciding how many men are required to occupy or attack a position,
the principal point to be considered is the effect of fire. The
modern long range magazine rifle will, no doubt, enable us to defend
a position with a smaller force than was possible in the past with
the older less improved weapons. However, combats last longer
nowadays, and the shock action of Frederick the Great’s tactics is
no longer practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and
the tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer
occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole force engaged
are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable conditions, certain
organizations may suffer losses quite as great as those incurred in
the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.[239] Instead of the
sanguinary hand-to-hand fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged
fire fight carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly
fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as
possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. This
fire fight is frequently decided by psychological factors and without
the troops suffering material losses.
[239] At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of
93.1%, and twelve other French regiments suffered a loss of over 50%.
To be sure, the losses sustained during the retreat are included
in this total. At Albuera (16th May, 1811), the 57th Regiment
(British) and the Füsilier Brigade lost 70%; in four hours the army
of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which originally
numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained.
“The duration of the combat under modern conditions,” writes General
Négrier,[240] “leads to a considerable mental exhaustion of the troops
which is apparent in nervous lassitude. This explains the impotency
of leader and troops the day after a defeat and even after a victory.
This lassitude is still greater on the day of the battle. While it
is true that this has always been the case, the nervous exhaustion
has grown in an inconceivable manner, its intensity increasing at
the same rate as the invisibility of the opponent. _The invisibility
of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources
of his energy and courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy is
inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression
to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole
days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than
800 m. from the enemy, was not caused by their losses, but by the
moral depression produced within the effective zone of rifle fire.
Another factor, which governs the modern combat at short ranges, the
_impossibility of the commander making his influence felt in lines
which are seriously engaged_, is of still greater importance. _The
influence of the officers who lead these lines is also limited. They
are scarcely able to direct the three or four men nearest them._ The
combat depends upon the individual fighters, and there never has been
a time when the personal efficiency of the individual soldier has
had a greater significance.” We should not forget that this change
occurred during a period in which we no longer fight our battles with
professional soldiers of long service, but, on the contrary, with peace
cadres of our conscript armies raised to war strength by Reservists.
[240] _Revue des deux mondes_, June number, 1902.
Another factor to be considered is the fighting quality of the
opponent. In an action against an enemy who is a match for us, the
necessity for distribution in depth is, of course, greater than when
fighting against poor troops.
General v. Werder could with impunity oppose the newly raised levies
of the French Republic on the =Lisaine= with 1.12 men per meter of
front. The victory was won by this very extraordinary extension of
front, which, if employed in the face of the Imperial army, would
have led to defeat.[241]
[241] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, p. 11.
_Considerations of importance in deciding upon the extent of front to
be covered by a force, similar conditions on both sides being presumed,
are_--
1. _Whether it is compelled to fight an independent action alone_;
2. _Whether it is fighting, from the preparatory to the decisive stage
of the combat, as part of a larger body, with at least one, or perhaps
both flanks secured_;
3. _Whether it has been selected to make the decisive attack against an
enemy already shaken by other troops_.
In the last mentioned case a sudden effect, a short, powerful blow,
is required, and the maximum frontage of all the units employed on
the same line is admissible. But even a force advancing to the final
assault can by no means dispense with distribution in depth; supports
and reserves are needed to carry forward the firing line when it has
been checked, to cover its flanks, and to carry on the pursuit (second
line).
The frontage of an organization whose flanks are secure and which
is acting as a part of a larger force, depends upon other troops;
considerable extension of front is admissible provided the firing line
is constantly maintained at a strength which will enable it to gain a
superiority of fire over the enemy. “While an organization which has
only one flank protected, is less restricted as regards frontage, it
will have to provide for distribution in depth on the exposed flank.
In this case, it is a good plan to move the units held in rear toward
the particular flank (echeloning). Interval and distance increase with
the size of this echelon.” (Par. 290 German I. D. R.). The German
Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 397) further emphasize the fact that,
when well-trained infantry employs its rifles to good advantage in
defense, it is very strong in front; that it can hold a position with
a comparatively small force; and that, in this case, it has only one
weak spot, the flank, which it must seek to protect by distribution
in depth. This view is fully borne out by the recent events in South
Africa and in Manchuria. Under favorable conditions (deliberate
defense), a battalion fighting as part of a larger force may put all
of its companies into the first line, a front of 200 m. being assigned
to each. The battalion can thus defend a front of 800 m. The only
restriction is the requirement that the battalion commander must be
able, at all times, to direct the course of the combat.
An organization acting alone which has to fight an action independently
from beginning to end under varying conditions, cannot employ all of
its available strength in the first line at one time. A distribution
into three parts, viz., firing line, supports, and reserve, is
therefore required. During the preparatory stage, the firing line
should be as weak as possible, while, for sustaining and deciding the
action, the reserve should be as strong as possible. As a rule, this
distribution will not come into existence until the combat has begun;
it must disappear again, during the subsequent course of the fight,
through reinforcement of the troops that initiated the action, thus
resulting in an increase of the combat front.
While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density along the
entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to the fact that
one will endeavor to increase the distribution in depth only at the
point where the decision is sought (offensive wings), while one will
seek to obtain results by a generous expenditure of ammunition at
points where the enemy is only to be contained. When a broad front has
to be held with a weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in
groups. Of the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that
the skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages of a
piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). Frequently,
however, after an action is over, the assault that penetrated a line is
called the main attack, and the one that failed, a demonstration. An
organization fighting alone will generally begin an action by deploying
on a narrow front; it will protect its flanks by distribution in depth;
and, finally, mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make
the assault. The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack
in defense cannot be strong enough.
Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon the frontage is
the task which a force is to perform, _i.e._, whether it is to make an
attack or to stand on the defensive; whether it is to fight a delaying
action or is to withdraw. The object of distribution in depth is to
keep the firing line constantly at the same strength; this requires
stronger reinforcements in attack (owing to the greater losses), than
in defense, and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front.
The number of troops which will be required to hold a given piece of
ground must be determined separately in each case. The strength of the
fighting line depends upon the effect of the hostile fire. Military
history tells us how many troops the leader sent into action in order
to gain the victory, but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of
troops that might have sufficed in the particular case.
In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading battalion
may be fully engaged by the time the next one arrives on the
battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation may require the
employment of longer firing lines than would be deemed proper for the
size of the command when making a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German
I. D. R.). The assailant should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who
is likewise advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to
that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s debouchment
from a defile.
At =Nachod=, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies
in reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon.
The conduct of the advance guard of the 8th Infantry Division
at =Beaumont= is worthy of imitation. In this case, the support
battalion was deployed and the artillery went into position; strong
detachments were retained in rear of the left wing until the main
body had arrived. Likewise, a proper relation existed between
frontage (4 battalions on a front of 1400 m.) and distribution in
depth. According to the General Staff Account of the Franco-German
war (II, p. 1045), the distribution was as follows:
_First line_: 4th Jäger-Battalion, which was subsequently reinforced
by the IInd Battalion, 96th Infantry and the Ist and IInd Battalions,
86th Infantry.
_Support for the Artillery_: Füsilier Battalion, 96th Infantry.
_Reserve_: IIIrd Battalion, 86th Infantry.
We have already mentioned the deployment of the advance guard at
=Spicheren= (p. 226 supra). In that instance the whole force was
thrown in at once, whereas at =Beaumont= the deployment of the
different units was coördinated and proceeded systematically. An
advance guard should be able to repulse an attack and then assume the
offensive without outside assistance. An example which is not worthy
of imitation is the engagement of the 29th Infantry Brigade at the
=Hallue=. The brigade began the fight, without being compelled to do
so, and deployed its 4530 men on a front of 5000 m. The 30th Infantry
Brigade (4070 men) then entered the fight and deployed on a front
of 3000 m. in prolongation of the line of the 29th Brigade. If the
French had made a decisive attack at this point, the 15th Infantry
Division would not have been able to repulse it.
Distribution in depth, for the purpose of warding off an enveloping
movement and for making a counter-attack, is more necessary in defense
than in attack; besides, a greater front may be covered in the former
case on account of the smaller losses. The following factors in part
determine the extent of front to be occupied and the number of troops
required to defend it: (1) the strength, natural or artificial, of the
position; (2) obstacles in its front; (3) salient angles which can be
easily enveloped; (4) the intentions of the commander (_i.e._, whether
he contemplates fighting a purely defensive combat or one including
offensive action).
=Delaying actions= are usually fought at long and medium ranges as
purely passive defensive combats and no provision is made for replacing
casualties, the object of the fight being to avoid a decision. Few
men should, therefore, be placed in the firing line, but these should
be supplied with abundant ammunition. However, as the force desires
to avoid a decisive engagement by withdrawing, distribution in depth
should be provided to protect the flanks and to facilitate breaking off
the action. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). This requires that distances be
great.
=Night attacks=, on account of the element of surprise involved, do not
require great distribution in depth; as a rule, the fight is decided
in a very short time by the collision of the opposing forces. However,
measures must be taken to protect the flanks, to ensure victory, and to
give the first line the impetus necessary to carry it forward in case
it is checked.
The British attack on the Egyptian position at =Tel el Kebir= (1882)
was made by only 11,000 men on a front of about 6 km. After a short
fight the works were taken.
An attempt will now be made to give some approximate figures for the
extent of front that may be occupied in various situations.
Assuming one rifle for every three meters of front occupied, the
following might suffice for temporarily defending a line 1000 m. long:
Firing line 300 rifles
Supports (one platoon in rear of each wing) 120 „
Reserve (two companies) 400 „
----------
Total 820 rifles
Thus 0.8 men per meter would be sufficient. This is borne out by the
Boer War. With a good field of fire, even a thin firing line, provided
with plenty of ammunition, is capable of bringing any attack to a
standstill, at least for the time being.
=A defense seeking a decision= requires fighting at short ranges; the
firing line must be kept constantly at the same strength; losses of
about one-fifth (killed, wounded, and missing) must be reckoned with;
and, finally, a reserve, consisting of about a third of the effective
strength of the force, is required for making the counter-attack.
The firing line is, from the outset, made as dense as possible, and
echelons posted on the flanks must oppose any advance against the
flanks.
The following would thus suffice for defending a front of 1000 m.:
Firing line 1000 men
Replacement of casualties 200 „
Flank protection (2 companies) 400 „
Reserve 800 „
--------
Total 2400 men
Hence, 2.4 rifles per meter of front would be available for defense.
The defense is decided by a successful counter-attack made by the
reserve, whereas the attack requires an additional force to cover and
assure the assembling and re-forming of the troops. The greater force
is naturally required by the attacker, who must be stronger than the
defender at the moment when the assault is made. The following would be
required for making an attack on a front of 1000 m.:
Firing line 1200 rifles
Replacement of casualties (¹⁄₂) 600 „
Flank protection 400 „
Reserve 2000 „
-----------
Total 4200 rifles
This would be equivalent to 4.2 rifles per meter of front.
These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of course, and
should be considered minima.
The number of troops required for attack or defense must be
determined separately for each individual case. At =Lovtcha=, 25
battalions, 92 guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large
a force for attacking 8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At =Gorni
Dubniac=, 3 infantry divisions of the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked
6 weak Turkish battalions having only 4 guns. After the first two
unsuccessful assaults on =Plevna=, the Russians overestimated the
strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated at 80,000
men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, 90,000 men and
400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 Turks and 60
guns.
From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the =maximum
frontage= is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure,
occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is
to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops.
On the other hand, the =maximum distribution in depth= is necessary
for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between
these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore
impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an
attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 373)
accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack at 150 m. and that
of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 m. It is impossible to give a
definite ratio of effective strength to combat frontage. Thus, while
in attack a company puts into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of
its front, the brigade employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units
a proportionally greater number. The necessity for distribution in
depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units
composing it.
In a company, for example, a platoon is sufficient to fulfill, within
certain limits, all the functions of a reserve, while in a larger force
the duties of a reserve are so complex that each task (protecting
the flanks, reinforcing the firing line, giving the impetus for the
assault, and covering the assembling and re-forming of the attacking
force) must be assigned to a separate unit. Moreover, the duration of
a combat, and, in conjunction therewith, the necessity of reinforcing
the firing line and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the
force. During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined
to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity for
reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why 5 to 6 men
will not suffice, during the course of a combat, for a front wherein
only one man can use his rifle. From the foregoing it follows that the
frontage does not increase in proportion to the number of men. Thus,
an army corps would not occupy a front four times that of a brigade,
or twice that of a division. This is best illustrated by doubling or
trebling a plane area when both length and breadth have to be equally
increased.[242]
[242] See _Taktik_, V, p. 46, et seq.
The maximum frontage to be covered in attack by the firing line of
a =company= is fixed at 150 m., in order that the density and fire
power of that line may be constantly maintained during a prolonged and
costly action. During shorter (_i.e._, rear guard actions), or less
costly actions (defense), it is, however, permissible to exceed this
limit. The regulations by no means insist upon a literal interpretation
of this paragraph, since they mention the deployment of the entire
company, when it would certainly occupy a front of about 200 m. There
is no disguising the fact, however, that, when extended on a front of
200 m., it is out of the question for the company commander to lead his
men.
The regulations do not fix the combat frontage of a =battalion=, as it
depends upon the tactical situation, and the battalion commander is
at liberty to place one, two, three, or four companies into the first
line. The frontage of a battalion would thus be 300 meters when making
an independent attack, and not exceeding 600 meters when fighting a
purely defensive action as part of a larger force, in other words, a
mean frontage of 400 meters.
This is also true of the =regiment=. The combat frontage of a regiment
acting alone, will, at the start, seldom exceed that of two battalions
deployed abreast. From this we obtain a frontage of 600-800 m. for the
regiment when it is acting independently, and a frontage of about 1200
m. when it is fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger
force.
Military history tells us that an army corps consisting of 25
battalions, acting as a part of a larger force in a deliberately
planned attack, occupies an average front of 2.5 to 5 km. According
to this, the frontage of a brigade would amount to about 800-1000 m.,
_i.e._, to 6-7.5 rifles per meter of front.
This limit was frequently exceeded during the =Franco-German war=
according to the circumstances under which the brigade went into
action and the commander’s estimate of the situation. If the brigades
had to cover the concentration of the columns in rear, and if the
battalions came into action successively, both brigade and battalion
frontages were frequently very great. The endeavor to close with the
enemy as soon as possible and the desire to bring a large number of
rifles into action, led to enormously increased frontages at the
expense of depth. The brigades which arrived later, entered the line
where other brigades were already engaged, and the result was a
dissolution and admixture of all tactical organizations.
At =Colombey=, the 25th Brigade covered a front of nearly 3 km. with
28 companies, only four or five companies remaining in close order.
Connecting with this brigade on the north, 22 companies, belonging to
two different divisions of the 1st Army Corps, covered a front of 4
km., supported by three or four companies in close order. With such
an overextension of front the offensive or defensive power of a force
is, of course, crippled.
During the battle of =Amiens=, the 3rd Prussian Brigade advanced in
three columns against the heights north of the Luce. On the left, six
companies of the 4th Infantry advanced from Domart, in the center,
four companies from Hangard, and on the right, two companies from
Demnin. A battery and a troop (_Eskadron_) were attached to each
column, and the right column was followed by the 44th Infantry.
The French advanced troops were pushed back without special
difficulty, but at the northern edge of the timber, the
brigade now found itself opposite the French main position
Cachy--Villers-Bretonneux. The attack on this position began at once,
and in a short time the 4th Infantry and two batteries were in action
on the line East corner of the Bois de Hangard--Gentelles (5 km.
long). At the same time, the 44th Infantry with one battery deployed
on a front of about 2000 m. to the right of this line. The right wing
of the 44th Infantry subsequently advanced to attack the trenches
southeast of Villers-Bretonneux and captured them. The enveloped
French left wing withdrew to the village named, and rallied on strong
reserves.
This was the situation when the fight came to a standstill toward 1
o’clock P. M. The brigade fought in a thin line over a mile (four
English miles) long. The reserve only consisted of three companies
of the 4th Infantry, at Gentelles, and four companies of the 44th
Infantry, in rear of the right flank.
A defeat was averted only by the timely interference of other
troops, especially of strong artillery (76 Prussian guns against 24
French).[243]
[243] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 47, et seq.
The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to make it easier
for battalion and regimental commanders to designate combat sections;
the higher leaders reckon with regimental and brigade fronts. In war,
however, the numerical strength varies constantly, and it is therefore
advisable not to reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number
of rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned in drill
regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent of front to
be covered by organizations which act as part of a larger force in an
attack seeking a decision. The extent of front to be covered in other
situations, under favorable or unfavorable attack conditions, requires
in each case a separate estimate.
In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions of front,
which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to avoid the costly frontal
attack.
At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British division under
Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of 12 km.; and during the
attack on Pieters Hill, on February 27th, 1900, the troops under
General Buller (30,000 men) extended over a front of 11 km.
At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of 17 km.
(0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed 25,000 rifles, 5000
troopers, and 116 guns on a front of 32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In
the engagement at Diamond Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under
Lord Roberts (40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties
could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had given up all
thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February 18th, 1900, the 6th
Division and the Brigade of Highlanders succeeded in getting close to
the enemy, but there the attack failed on account of the lack of an
impetus from the rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages
were greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason for this
overextension lies in the fact that a numerically inferior assailant
was desirous of vanquishing the defender, and in order to accomplish
this purpose, he was obliged to make an extensive use of the spade and
to put all rifles into the first line.
===================+=======+=======+======+==========+==========
| | | |Per 10,000|
| Jap. | Russ. |Front-|men.[244] | Per m.
| | | age. |Jap.|Russ.|Jap.|Russ.
-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----
| | | km. | m. | men.
Liao Yang (West and| | | | | | |
South front) |106,700|150,000| 26 |2600| 1750|3.9 | 5.9
| | | | | | |
Shaho |148,000|257,000| 48 |3330| 1980|3. | 5.
| | | | | | |
Mukden (exclusive | | | | | | |
of Yalu Army) |247,000|336,000| 96 |3960| 2970|2.6 | 3.4
-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----
[244] According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the _Journal
of the Officers’ Association_, Tokio.
The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small
reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be
increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the
attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no
means a disadvantage.[245]
[245] At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km.
between the Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by
only one infantry regiment of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry
regiments, and one battalion of artillery. However, the Russians were
fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The insignificant
danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised by
the French regulations.
During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the
necessary reinforcements.
~INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.~[246]
[246] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteristische Reflexionen_.
========+======+=======+=============+==================+================
Rifle. |Year |Battle.|Belligerents.|Per km. of the |Remarks.
| | | |combat frontage. |
| | | +-----+------+-----+
|of | | |Bat- |Esca- |Field|
|the | | |tal- |drons |guns.|
|Cam- | | |ions |@ 150 | |
|paign.| | |@ 900|troop-| |
| | | |ri- |ers. | |
| | | |fles.| | |
--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Muzzle | 1815 |Water- |French | 12 | 19 |46 |After Napoleon’s
loaders.| |loo +-------------+-----+------+-----+concentration
| | |British | 10 | 15 |25 |for battle
| | | | | | |toward noon.
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1859 |Sol- |French and | 7 | 5 |19 |After the victo-
| |ferino |Sardinians | | | |rious advance of
| | +-------------+-----+------+-----+the Austrian
| | |Austrians | 7 | 2.5 |21 |VIIIth Corps to
| | | | | | |S. Martino.
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1866 |Cus- |Austrians | 8 | 2. |17 |
| |tozza | | | | |
--------+ +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Breech | |König- |Prussians | 9.5| 10 |39 |Situation at
loaders | |grätz +-------------+-----+------+-----+noon.
large | | |Austrians | 10 | 8.5 |43 |
caliber.| | |& Saxons | | | |
+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1870 |Wörth |Germans | 9 | 5 |37 |
| +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+
| |Grave- |Germans | 11.5| 9 |46 |
| |lotte +-------------+-----+------+-----+
| |St. |French | 8 | 6.5 |32 |
| |Privat | | | | |
--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
Mag. | 1899 |Colen- |British | 1.5| | 4 |Including 1¹⁄₂
rifles | |so 1st | | | | |heavy guns.
of | |battle,| | | | |
small | |Dec. | | | | |
caliber.| |15th | | | | |
+------+-------+ +-----+------+-----+----------------
| 1900 |Colen- | | 2.5| 1.5 | 7.5 |Including 1¹⁄₂
| |so, 2d | | | | |heavy guns.
| |battle,| | | | |
| |Febru- | | | | |
| |ary | | | | |
| |27th | | | | |
--------+---+--+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
7.6 mm. | M | 1|Febru- |Russians | 1 | 0.4 | *5 |Total extension
against | u | 9|ary | | | | |from the Liao to
6.5 mm. | k | 0|20th | | | | |Tung-wha-sien.
Mag. | d | 5| | | | | |*Incl. 1 heavy
rifles. | e | .| | | | | |gun.
| n | | | +-----+------+-----+----------------
| | | | | 3 | 0.7 | *5.5|Excl. East and
| | | | | | | |West Det. *Incl.
| | | | | | | |3 heavy guns.
| | | +-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------
| | | |Japanese | 3.5| 0.8 |*15.5|Exclusive of the
| | | | | | | |approaching Vth
| | | | | | | |army. *Incl. 2
| | | | | | | |heavy guns.
| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------
| | |March |West |Rus- | 5 | 0.8 |†18 |†Ex- |Excl. of
| | |3d |front.|sians | | | |clu- |Trans-
| | | | | | | | |sive |Baikal
| | | | | | | | |of |Cossack
| | | | | | | | |heavy|Div.
| | | | +------+-----+------+-----+guns.|
| | | | |Japan-| 3.5| 1 |†11.6| |Excl. of
| | | | |ese | | | | |2d Cav.
| | | | | | | | | |Brigade.
| | | +------+------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | | |South |Rus- | 1.7| .5 | †6 | |
| | | |front.|sians | | | | |
| | | | +------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | | | |Japan-| 2.2| .3 | †5.6| |
| | | | |ese | | | | |
| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+ |
| | |March |West |Rus- | 4.6| 0.7 |†15.6| |Excl. of
| | |7th |front.|sians | | | | |Trans-
| | | | | | | | | |Baikal
| | | | | | | | | |Cossack
| | | | | | | | | |Div.
| | | | +------+--- -+------+-----+ |
| | | | |Japan-| 4 | 0.6 |†10.5| |Excl. of
| | | | |ese | | | | |Cav. Div.
--------+---+--+-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------
Let us now recapitulate the most important points which have a bearing
on combat frontage:
1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely fixed, as it
depends upon the situation and the purpose of an action.
2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an extended front
to be obstinately defended with a weak force.
3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the size of the
force.
4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) fighting as part
of a larger force is justified in deploying on a wider front than when
acting alone.
The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the
force and with the number of units composing it Only the result can
decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage was justified in a given
case. A commander will endeavor to hold certain parts of the line with
a weak force, posted in groups, while, at the decisive point, he will
throw in every available man in order to gain the victory.
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria-Hungary.= Frontage depends upon the tactical situation and
the terrain. The frontage of a company acting as part of a larger
force in attack is fixed at about 130-150 paces (97-112 m.). “In
other situations, a greater frontage is, as a rule, permissible.”
The battalion acting as part of a larger force in attack, “is, as
a rule, not to cover a frontage exceeding its own front when in
line”--in peace exercises, 300-400 paces (225-300 m.). With companies
of 200 men, 2 rifles, and in the battalion 2.6 rifles are reckoned
per meter of front. “The increased fighting power of infantry, due
to better fire effect, in general permits a greater frontage to be
covered. This will often be taken advantage of, in order to make
as many troops as possible available for the decisive stage of the
combat. But this frontage should not be so great, that the requisite
power of resistance is weakened, or that tactical coöperation or the
attainment of the object of the combat are impaired.” Further than
this nothing is prescribed.
=France.= Nothing definite is prescribed. The combat is carried on by
groups separated by intervals.
“When _an organisation is acting as part of a larger force_ and has
to advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective,
its commander may from the outset push a strong force into action,
retaining a reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks
of this force is in the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in
rear of the flank which may be threatened. When _an organisation is
acting alone_, and when both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is
pushed forward and a reserve is retained....”
The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be held,
especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions
are those dictated by necessity--always to assure effective control
by the leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical
units.
This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which no
longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.
=Belgium.= The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger
force in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased.
=Japan.= The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical
with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a
company is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding
that of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does
not exceed 1500 m. at the initial deployment.
=Russia.= The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is
governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective
strength, and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No
figures are given for the larger units.
=England.= While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin
firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite
extreme after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the
first line may employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (_i.e._, 90
m.), distributed as firing line, supports, and battalion reserve;
the latter may consist either of one company or of parts of several.
Entire companies are deployed only in exceptional cases, for
instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult to bring
up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses
likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses will
be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the
firing line and the supports combined. In accordance with these
general principles, a battalion may deploy for attack on a front
not exceeding 800 yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed).
A brigade consisting of four battalions will thus be able to cover
either a front of 1400 or one of 2100 m., depending upon the number
of battalions put into the line.
=Italy.= Only general principles are prescribed. “Skill in judging
the proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of
peace by exercises on varied ground and under different situations,
especially when organizations approximately at war strength are used.”
5. COMBAT ORDERS.[247]
[247] V. KIESLING, _Gefechtsbefehle_, Berlin, 1907.
Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct the course
of an action by despatching adjutants from time to time. This must
be borne in mind when issuing a combat order. Such an order can only
regulate the launching of the troops into action and prescribe a task
as a guide for their subsequent conduct. Since leaders change during
the course of the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the
component parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose of
the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander expects
of them; it is not sufficient to order them to occupy a certain
point--they must be told whether or not they are to defend it. An order
which directs troops “to oppose” the enemy, conveys an extremely vague
meaning; it should specify instead whether they are “to attack” the
enemy, or whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate
leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, forces
the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends to attack, or
to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight a delaying action,
or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even the lowest grades must be
informed of this decision of the commander. The troops will perform
anything that is demanded of them in definite terms. On the other hand,
the commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an order
and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative when an order
is not received or the situation changes.
Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German I. D. R.)
and definite combat tasks, each complete in itself (par. 293 German
I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical units to be employed in the
first line (battalions in case of a regiment; regiments, as a rule,
in case of a division). In attack, the order indicates the front upon
which each one of the larger units is to deploy and what portion of the
hostile position it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent
of the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the limits of
which the particular unit must make the most of the accidents of the
ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, unity of action is ensured
by the mutual coöperation of the tactical units fighting abreast of
each other (par. 475 German I. D. R.), and by the designation of a
unit upon which the others regulate their movements, without, however,
thereby being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of
combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander “can shift
the decisive point of the action to any place desired, reinforce where
he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations of the combat, and,
finally, bring about the decision.”
The first orders--those for putting the troops in motion in the desired
direction--are usually verbal; more detailed orders, which are the rule
from the brigade on up, are issued subsequently. (Par. 274 German I.
D. R.). In most cases, the commander knows quite well what he wants,
but only the effort required in expressing in writing what he desires
to say, enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary
clearness. Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order
and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation;
the superior remembers only what he desired to say at the particular
moment, but not the language in which the order was couched. Written
orders minimize the possibility of a misunderstanding. They have the
further advantage that the recipient has in his possession a document
to which he can always refer in case of doubt.
Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, for protecting
flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, since these matters
are attended to as a matter of course, every leader being held
responsible for making proper dispositions, within the limits of his
command, for the performance of these duties. The higher the rank
of the commander, the farther he should stay away from the scene of
battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the course of
the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them,
or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander
selects a position too close to the point where the first line is
engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows
himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range
of vision.[248] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position,
has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication
with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his
subordinates.
[248] This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise
of Kuropatkin. The latter led in person too much and was completely
lost in the details of minor troop-leading.
At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned
among the different members of the staff.
The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy
and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with
the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal
flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme
described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is
furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring
troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders.
The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of
facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is
very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this
is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will,
however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the
day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed.
In =France= this is regulated by _Agents de liaison_. These are to
keep the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the
action of subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders.
“The importance of permanent communication between leader and
subordinate increases with the distances separating troops in action;
the leader’s influence on the course of the combat can be ensured
only by these _agents_.
As a general rule, one mounted officer from every infantry unit,
from the battalion up, reports to the next higher commander for the
purpose of maintaining communication. This officer may detail a
cyclist or trooper to accompany him. He is to be prepared to give all
necessary information in regard to his unit, and to keep in touch
with the general situation in order to inform his immediate superior
in regard to it. He communicates with his own unit either by sending
orderlies with messages, or by carrying the orders of the commander
in person.”
6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the battlefield
only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; even intrenched
connecting posts communicating with one another by means of shouts
or signals do not absolutely ensure communication in a protracted
engagement. Heliographs or signal lamps are valuable only during the
approach to the battlefield and in large battles.[249] The same is
true of the field telegraph, by means of which, for example, division
headquarters may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. In
an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,[250] and
signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone and telegraph
has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at headquarters, since the
coming and going of messengers is eliminated; on the other hand, the
commander is at once informed of every reverse (which may perhaps be
only temporary) and will not always be able to resist the temptation of
leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese made a
very extensive use of the various means of communication, but neglected
to guard against an interruption of their lines of information by
installing signal flag stations. This cannot be dispensed with. In the
Japanese army visual signals[251] were not used, and in the Russian
army they were not adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of
communication did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both
armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, as
now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose of
establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.[252]
[249] See _Taktik_, III, p. 116, et seq.
VON LÖBELL’S _Jahresberichte_ 1906, p. 390: _Employment of
Heliographs and Signal Lamps in Southwest Africa_.
[250] Wig-wag signals have been abolished and Morse signals
prescribed in their stead by Cabinet Orders dated January 16th, 1908.
[251] Sir IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, pp.
173-174, 196, 241 and 323.
[252] The station apparatus furnished by the firm of “Zwietusch” of
Charlottenburg, weighs 5.5 kg. with its battery.
In defensive positions, which are held for a prolonged period,
it is, of course, practicable to establish telephonic connection
with the most advanced line. This was, for example, the case in the
Japanese 10th Division on the morning of March 3rd, 1905 (Mukden).
On this occasion the division commander in rear was informed by
telephone of the presence of wire entanglements in front of the
Russian position, and permission was asked and granted to postpone
the attack.
Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used in
Germany.[253] The signal motions are made in an upright position,
the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being used. This
method of signaling permits communication to be kept up within a radius
of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used at night and in combined land and
naval operations. The wig-wag signals are easily learned and entirely
sufficient for communicating over distances within 3 km.; they also
permit information to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are
employed for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals
possess the additional advantage that they can be made by a man while
in a prone position.[254] Wig-wag signals are a very effective means of
communication and will rarely fail.[255]
[253] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, June number, 1906, and
March number, 1907.
[254] Signals with wig-wag flags can be made by a man lying flat
on his belly or on his back; this is, however, frequently impossible
with outstretched arms and the sender must be content to make the
signals by grasping the staves of the two flags in the middle, then
placing them in appropriate position relative to each other (for
example in making the letters, d, e, k, l, p, u).
[255] The signals prescribed in par. 11 German I. D. R. are very
effective if made with wig-wag flags; if made with signal flags they
require constant observation, without, however, precluding mistakes.
For example, when given with signal flags, the signal “halt” - “h,
h, h,” (.... .... ....) is frequently confused with the signal “the
assault is about to begin” (... ... ...). This mistake is not so apt
to occur when wig-wag flags are used.
When General Stakelberg, after his right flank had been turned at
Wafangu, sent orders to withdraw to General Gerngross, the commander
on the left flank, it took the officer who carried the order through
this mountainous country, nearly an hour to cover the 5 km. which
separated the two commanders. An order sent by means of wig-wag flags
could have reached the leader in question within a few minutes.
A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his
subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him
to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The
permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace,
and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities
of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy
for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does
not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his
wishes.[256]
[256] Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army
with the deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience
of the commander-in-chief was natural perhaps, but, due to his
interference, the enveloping movement skillfully initiated by General
v. d. Tann, could not be executed.
=Austria-Hungary.= “Infantry telegraph detachments” are assigned
to every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.[257]
These detachments are charged with the duty of keeping up the
visual signal and telegraph service in field and mountain warfare.
The Morse alphabet is used in visual signaling and in telegraphic
communication. In this the Austrian regulations differ from the
German. The infantry telegraph detachment attached to an infantry
division is divided into three sections, and is equipped with
telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each section
consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped with
24 km. of wire.
[257] _Streffleur_, 1905, April-May number.
=France.= Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some of
the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of
visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are
expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire).
=England.= Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment.
Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals.
7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.
(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).
It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic
reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in
Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less
good and often deficient, so that in consequence thereof surprises
were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line
when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed
aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom
of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened,
cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the
infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but
this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered
that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything
of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very
things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional
cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to
it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry
reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry
patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of
providing for its own reconnaissance.
The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact
that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted
officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except
for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for
carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the
reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the
slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and,
as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any
value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in
that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being
observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was
in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed,
and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order
formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses.
In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed
in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers
(=Magersfontain=, =Colenso=), which induced it to deploy all of its
lines on a wide front at an early moment.
The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance,
whereas the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so
that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders.
“Local reconnaissance was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These
carefully approached our positions in small groups. One man of each
group laid his rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches,
raised his head and observed, while three or four of his companions,
whom he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches.
Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the ground for
protection. This mode of procedure continued for seven hours.”
The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely
deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that
neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the
Japanese 2nd Division at =Fuchau= and =Kapukai= on March 10th, 1905.
This division advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified
Russian position, was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had
to fight under unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy
losses, from early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation
compelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of the
Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during the battle of =Liao Yang= (2nd
Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater importance
and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle at =Sykwantun=
caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave the position
assigned him on the heights of the =Yentai= mines and to march toward
the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over covered
terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and rear
by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),[258] and thrown back in utter
rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had
been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of
the Japanese.
[258] For details of the attack made by Sasaki’s Brigade, see
GERTSCH, _Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege_, I, sketch 14.
The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect a force from
surprise. This may be accomplished by sending out combat patrols, and
by company commanders riding ahead in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.).
The latter are likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to
selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance
the better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to the
best advantage.
The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when we have to
reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to screen his force.[259]
[259] The attacker’s reconnaissance must be prevented as long as
possible. Frequently patrols in the foreground will suffice for this
purpose. (Par. 406 German I. D. R.)
Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance nor create
the necessary opening through which the leaders can reconnoiter in
person. Stronger forces are requisite, and “reconnaissance companies”
may have to be sent out toward the enemy to serve as a support for the
patrols, to reinforce them when necessary, and to constitute natural
collecting stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the
result of these endeavors to obtain information,[260] for the defender
will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an
attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in this
case, since the information obtained in regard to the position and
strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. 134 German F. S.
R.).
[260] See _Taktik_, IV. p. 214, et seq. The results of the
reconnaissance in force made at Neuville aux Bois were very
unsatisfactory.
In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining information
by means of detachments of all arms which also prevent hostile
reconnaissance. In minor operations the French send out infantry
detachments, which, from secure hiding places, pick off observers,
screen the position of their own force, and prevent the enemy from
using covered avenues of approach. However, these very patrol combats
may cause the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to
the hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined
that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the
details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance.
Then the commander will wish to know whether or not an immediate attack
is feasible, or whether it is advisable to wait until nightfall for
bringing up the infantry. The local reconnaissance determines where
the flanks of the enemy are located; whether the position in front is
the hostile main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy
has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is
posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement
has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[261]
to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the
position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with
or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary
to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[262] In moving to new
firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and
dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a
flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for
permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific
orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may
seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze--Rezonville (battle of
Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the
troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take
advantage of the information gained by those troops.[263]
[261] See _Taktik_, V, p. 243, et seq.
[262] HOPPENSTEDT (_Schlacht der Zukunft_, pp. 134 and 140) draws a
graphic picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality.
The procedure outlined by that author (_Ibid._, p. 122) for
indicating, by means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile
fire, seems practicable. He states: “Holding his flag upright, the
member of the patrol proceeds steadily on his way to Weyer. Now he
has arrived at the point where the road bends slightly toward the
south; his flag descends,” etc.
[263] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 128, et seq.,
p. 243.
The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the
successful “fire surprises” carried out by the Boers at Modder River
on November 28th, 1899, and at Colenso, against Hart’s Brigade
advancing in dense masses, on December 15th, 1899.
The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should
not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but
that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To
the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking
off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been
incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire.
For such tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”[264] after the
Russian pattern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness
in difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank
and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided with
ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can hamper the
reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of their own force,
ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and
finally, having made a skillful lodgment, they can become very annoying
to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room
for such employment is lacking. To form picked men into special
organizations, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The
constant transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during
the second part of the South African war was fatal to the British
infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its good
men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned officers. While
everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an
organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure
become apparent, however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the
absence of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents
the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate
the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat
situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness
going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers.
Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned
officers and brave privates, whose example will revive his courage.”
(Par. 268 German I. D. R.).
[264] V. TETTAU, _Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee_, Berlin,
1901.
HOPPENSTEDT, _Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos_, 1907.
If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a
mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an
entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know
his men only imperfectly.
Before the 95th Infantry (French) made its attack on the brewery
of =l’Amitié= (south of =Noisseville=), on August 31st, 1870, a
reconnoitering detachment had ascertained the strength of the
position and the manner in which it was held by the defender.[265]
[265] _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 192.
=Examples of the successful employment of flanking fire by small
forces:=
The flanking fire, delivered from the =Bois des Ognons= by about
30 men of the 12th Company, 72nd Infantry, compelled the French to
withdraw their left flank. (Combat on the Gorze--Rezonville road,
16th August, 1870).[266]
[266] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 146.
At =Gravelotte-St. Privat=, flanking fire is said to have caused the
withdrawal of nine French battalions which had until then delivered
an effective fire upon the Prussian Guard Artillery.[267]
[267] _Ibid._, 10, p. 24, and 12, p. 24, et seq.
8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN.
The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting unobstructed
view, while the attack requires stretches of ground hidden from the
observation of the enemy and sheltered from his fire, in order that
the troops may be deployed for action at the decisive ranges. A piece
of ground will rarely possess all these advantages, but, nevertheless,
well-trained infantry will be able to defend successfully a piece
of ground that has a poor field of fire, and infantry which is
energetically and skillfully led will be able to cross even an open
plain.
At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor to
keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely be able to take
advantage of available cover, but at a halt and while firing they
will be able to do so. Their taking advantage of the ground should
not lead to a diminution of the energy of the advance, and should
not cause parts of the force to fall behind.[268] “The terrain
exerts considerable influence on the formation of troops. Open
country requires that distances be increased so that the losses may
be minimized, while close country permits distances to be reduced.
The commander should take particular care not to let this advantage
escape him, since it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the
first line promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on
covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.).
[268] This is equally true of ground that is difficult to march
over; the troops must cross it. The evasion of difficult portions of
terrain usually leads to disorder and a dispersion of the troops.
For the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade at Wörth, see KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 101. (Thick underbrush in
the woods on the Fuchshübel.)
An attack over a plain devoid of cover “should be avoided as far as
possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered
to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point
where an approach under cover is practicable. If suitable terrain is
lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over
the open plain.” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). In contrast with the
continuous skirmish lines of the past, which are still favored by the
Austrians, the German regulations permit a gap to be left in the line
where an open plain devoid of cover exists, without thereby implying
that it cannot be crossed. The French regulations (par. 257), contrary
to the German, contemplate that “only weak detachments be left in the
open, fire swept spaces,” and that the troops intended for the fire
fight be pushed forward under available cover, separate groups being
thus formed.[269]
[269] This should be an important hint for the opponent. The lines
of approach may perhaps be sheltered with reference to a certain
point, but there will always be portions of the enemy’s line from
which a fire may be directed upon these avenues of approach and the
troops marching thereon.
“This mode of fighting in groups does away with the continuous firing
lines of the past which no longer fulfill the requirements of modern
battle.
“The rearmost fractions of the force endeavor to avoid open spaces,
or such as are swept by hostile fire, by moving, sometimes in a close
order formation and again widely extended, toward the lines of cover,
without regard to the direction in which the enemy may happen to be.
The unit that finds the advance easiest takes the lead, and all the
others, supported by the fire of their immediate neighbors, endeavor to
follow it.
“Depending upon the character of the terrain and available cover, the
forces deployed for the fire fight will, therefore, advance in a
rather dense formation in the areas favorable for such a procedure,
while weak forces only will be found on open and fire swept ground. The
advance is regulated by designating the objective of the attack and by
stipulating the necessity of mutual coöperation.”
This French group attack owes its existence to the silently accepted
fact that an open plain cannot be crossed when swept by unsubdued
hostile fire; it reckons with an unfavorable terrain such as an
attacker will only find in exceptional cases. We by no means fail to
recognize the fact that individual portions of the attacker’s force,
when favored by the terrain, will be able to advance more quickly than
others, and that other portions may even be compelled to discontinue
their advance for a time; but it seems a precarious proceeding to lay
down this result of the hostile fire effect as a guide in the training
of troops. The group tactics of the Boers stood the test only on the
defensive; they could not prevent individual groups from being attacked
by far superior forces. In an attack, the units favored by the terrain
will constitute the framework upon which the units which are compelled
to advance more slowly, will form. There is, however, danger that these
leading groups will succumb to the superior fire of a defender who is
deployed on a broader front. Although this may not happen, the spirit
of the regulations tempts leaders to drive everything forward, to rush
ahead with isolated parts of the force. An additional drawback of these
systematic group tactics lies in the difficulty of deploying the troops
moving in the narrow avenue of approach. If the French infantry really
desires to avoid the plain and wants to stick principally to cover,
who will guarantee that the great freedom allowed it, will not cause
it to crowd together under cover, lose the direction to its objective,
and become completely mixed up?[270] This danger is the more imminent
since no importance is attached to a more definite limitation of the
frontage to be covered, while wide extension is, on the contrary,
actually preached. The fear of losses will gain the upper hand and
the attack will lose its energy. “It is easy to teach troops to be
over-cautious, but it is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops
against the enemy.” (Sir IAN HAMILTON).
[270] The plentiful cover along the ravine of the Mance brook was
by no means an actual advantage for the Ist Army. The 18th of August
presents the strange phenomenon of the success of the attack on St.
Privat, made over terrain devoid of cover, and the failure of the
attack on the French IInd Corps, made over the most favorable terrain
imaginable.
Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the
advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past =Vionville= on =Flavigny=
and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire
directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and
left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction
designated by the regimental commander.[271] One company of the IInd
Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march
direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault
made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to
the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd
Battalion.--“A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed
from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against
the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of
the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the
35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry)
were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move
in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The
direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies
(the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry).”[272]
[271] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 560.
[272] V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A)
showing lines of advance of the companies.
While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate
the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the
march direction be maintained and that cover be utilized only within
the assigned “combat section”; they leave it to subordinate commanders
to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground.
“Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an
attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible,
or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance
over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an
approach under cover is practicable. _If suitable terrain is lacking
to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open
plain._” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). For purposes of instruction, it
is entirely correct to require “that even on terrain devoid of cover,
well-trained infantry should not open fire until the medium ranges are
reached.” (Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile
fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, should not
impair the energy of the advance and cause portions of the attacking
force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating it. On the other hand, we
should not be afraid to leave gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy
would, in any case, not be able to use them for his own advance.
Thus we have here the German united attack, on the one hand, and
the French group attack, on the other. Since group tactics no
doubt diminish losses, they should be used in delaying actions, in
holding attacks, and in defense; they should unquestionably not be
employed when a concerted, rapid movement of skirmishers to the front
becomes necessary. How should the Vth Corps at Wörth and the Guard
at St. Privat, for instance, have attacked, according to the French
regulations?
VI. MACHINE GUNS.[273]
[273] _Exerzierreglement und Schieszvorschrift für die
Maschinengewehrabteilungen_, 1904.
Captain BRAUN, _Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung_,
Berlin, 1905.
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARM.
The effect of canister had decreased considerably with the introduction
of rifled guns, and this was the more noticeable, because,
simultaneously therewith, the accuracy and rate of fire of the infantry
rifle was greatly increased. The attempts to re-invest the artillery
with its one-time superiority were directed in two channels: one aimed
at perfecting shrapnel, which had been rather neglected up to this
time (England, Prussia, Austria), while the other resurrected the
mediaeval idea of the “barrel-organ gun,” with a view of assembling a
number of rifle barrels and of combining thereby the accuracy of the
small arm with the moral effect of canister. Thus, among others, the
4-10 barreled _Gatling_ gun was invented in America in 1861, it being
the oldest representative of this type of weapon. In order to obtain
a weapon matching the Prussian _needle_ gun, Bavaria adopted the 4
barreled _Feldl_ gun and France the 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_.[274]
The name _canon à balles_, which was given the gun, sufficed to
indicate the manner in which it was intended to be used. As these guns
frequently failed in action, offered the same target and required the
same equipment and approximately the same road space as field guns,
the states who had first adopted them, finally decided to dispense
with them on European theaters of war. The further development of
machine guns was not especially accelerated by the fact that the French
_mitrailleuses_ had not fulfilled the expectations entertained for
them during the Franco-German war, isolated cases excepted,[275] and
that they were quickly silenced by the German artillery, which was
equipped only with percussion shell, as soon as their position was
ascertained. Thus, these guns seemed useful only in colonial wars and
on board war ships for warding off torpedo boats. Although they took up
very little room when in position, they were not considered useful for
flank defense in fortresses, on account of the frequent breakdowns. In
addition to their height, other defects developed; for example, they
could obtain only a very insignificant rate of fire, betrayed their
position by the powder smoke, and lacked the means for ascertaining
ranges.
[274] The 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_, cal. 13 mm., fired volleys at
the rate of 125 rounds per minute. Its fire was considered equivalent
to that of 50 needle guns; its weight was 1,485 kg., each of its
four horses pulling 371 kg.; its maximum range was 3,000 m. Its most
favorable, practical range 500-1,500 m.--A glaring defect of the
gun was that fire pauses occurred whenever cartridges were fed into
the slot and that the lateral spread of its cone of dispersion was
extremely small.
[275] Battle of Gravelotte. _Gen. St. W._, pp. 705-712, 723 and
781. The employment of three Gatling guns in rear of the park wall
of Yoré, during the defense of the plateau of Auvours. (_Revue
d’artillerie_, 1900, p. 297; _Gen. St. W._, IV, p. 817).
The situation changed entirely when a practicable, smokeless powder
was invented, and Hiram Maxim, an American, succeeded in utilizing the
energy of the recoil (a factor neglected up to that time, although
annoying to the marksman) for opening the breech, inserting a fresh
cartridge into the chamber, closing the breech, and automatically
firing the piece.[276] Through this invention it became possible to
fire a maximum of 900 and an average of 500 rounds per minute, from a
single barrel moving laterally back and forth. The desire to obtain a
still greater rate of fire was checked effectively, because of the fact
that with such an increase the danger of jamming increased and the use
of infantry ammunition was precluded. The water in the jacket continues
to be a decided drawback to this type of gun, for it is not always
easily procured, impairs the mechanism by freezing, makes it difficult
to change barrels, and constitutes a considerable weight. If cooling
the barrel by means of water were to be dispensed with, the accuracy of
the piece would rapidly diminish, and, after 1000 rounds of continuous
fire, bullets would tumble even at short ranges. At the present time
water is still the most effective means of cooling the barrel.[277]
[276] Of the other types the following may here be mentioned:
_Hotchkiss_ (France), insufficient cooling of the barrel by air;
_Schwarzlose_ (Austria), machine gun model 7, a very simple weapon
which has only a single spring.
[277] In the _Colt_ Machine Gun, which is not water-cooled, after
500 rounds had been fired, a cartridge inserted into the piece
exploded in seven seconds, and cartridges placed in the chamber a
quarter of an hour later exploded in 20 seconds.
Machine guns fire ordinary small arms ammunition carried in loops on a
canvass belt (weighing 1 kg. when empty), which is generally capable
of holding 250 rounds of 8 mm. cartridges weighing 8.315 kg. These
belts are very carefully manufactured, the material being shrunk, so
as to prevent their shrinking when in use. Two men can refill an empty
belt with 8 mm. cartridges in seven minutes, according to Swedish
experiments, while a belt filling machine can refill one in a still
shorter time. The rate of fire of machine guns is approximately 500
rounds per minute. They are variously mounted,[278] according to
circumstances, on sleds (in which the gun rests on a frame similar
to that of a wheelbarrow), on tripods, or, for mountain warfare, on
basket frames. Although the greatest readiness for firing was obtained
with guns mounted on cavalry carriages (two-wheeled carts, similar to
limbers, and equipped with shafts), which also permitted the greatest
amount of ammunition to be carried along, these guns offered such a
high target that their use, in an infantry action, was entirely out of
the question, leading only to their being quickly silenced. Another
defect was that the guns were unable to follow immediately upon the
heels of the organization to which they were attached. Guns mounted
on light tripods possess the least readiness for firing, as the gun
must be dismounted during each change of position; but tripods are
indispensable in mountain warfare. In India a tripod frame on wheels
is employed. The basket frame, which is very light and is carried on
the back of a soldier, affords nothing but a rest for the gun. This
type of mount has the disadvantage of necessitating, in reality,
freehand firing when the barrel is supported near the muzzle; that
the operator, when firing continuously, becomes greatly fatigued,
and that the accuracy suffers in consequence thereof. The advantages
of the tripod and the wheeled carriage have been skillfully combined
in the carriage adopted in Germany. In this the gun rests on a sled;
this is in turn supported by the carriage proper, which is wheeled.
In exceptional cases the gun may be fired from the carriage, but
ordinarily it is fired from the sled, which is detached from the
carriage for that purpose. This sled permits the gun to be laid at any
desired height and enables it to follow the infantry anywhere during an
action.[279]
[278]
British cavalry machine gun with mount 152.3 kg.
Machine gun with tripod } 16.5 + 18 = 34.5 „
Machine gun with basket frame } latest model 35.0 „
Machine gun with sled } 16.5 + 24 = 40.5 „
[279] The following complement per gun is considered necessary:
Germany 14¹⁄₂ men 9 horses.
Switzerland 8¹⁄₂ men 12 horses.
In the Russo-Japanese war the machine gun detachments of the Russian
cavalry were equipped with _Rexer_ guns which can scarcely be
considered machine guns owing to their slow rate of fire and extreme
heating of the barrel.
Machine guns can be transported upon larger vehicles capable of
being unlimbered; they can also be carried on pack horses or other
pack animals, and for short distances by men. Although pack animal
transportation enables the guns to follow the troops anywhere, the
amount of ammunition that can be carried along is limited, and the
opening of fire is retarded, since gun and tripod must first be
assembled; the opening of fire may even be delayed when a pack animal
falls; ammunition cannot be carried on the gun; and the animals get
sore backs even if pack saddles are carefully adjusted.
2. THE POWER OF MACHINE GUNS.
The machine gun is noted for its adaptability to any terrain, and the
constancy of its high rate of fire as compared with that of a body of
infantry, which decreases with the range, the diminishing visibility
of the target, and prolonged fire. On the other hand, a single jamming
can make a machine gun valueless, at least for the time being. For
this reason, the Germans employ machine guns only in platoons, as a
rule, and the Swiss let both guns of a platoon fire simultaneously
only in exceptional cases. Theoretically, the maximum rate of fire of
600 rounds per minute will rarely be attained; and 200-300 rounds per
minute will usually suffice against prone targets. In Germany volley
and continuous fire are employed; fire by a single piece is used only
to ward off patrols when the machine guns do not want to betray their
position.[280]
[280] The following kinds of fire are used in the countries named
below:
Austria: Single shots; volleys (20-25 rounds); fire by a single
piece.
Switzerland: Fire by a single piece; volleys (20-30 rounds); rapid
fire (volleys of 100 rounds); and fire at will (both pieces of a
platoon simultaneously employing rapid fire). The last-named is
only employed in exceptional cases, for example, when the danger is
imminent and when favorable opportunities offer.
A volley consists of about 25 rounds and is followed by a pause for
observing the effect of the fire. It is employed in adjusting the fire
upon difficult targets in rolling country. Fire for effect consists,
as a general rule, of “continuous fire,” and is interrupted only when
the tactical situation requires it. The water in the jacket should be
renewed and oiling attended to during the pauses in the fire, whether
these grow out of the tactical situation, or are made necessary by
technical considerations.
The fire is either directed upon a point (concentrated fire), the
elevation and direction of the piece being fixed, or it is distributed
over the entire target or over a designated part of the same (sweeping,
and progressive fire).[281]
[281] For example, when sweeping the crest of the parapet of a line
of trenches, or the edge of a wood, both hands move the gun slowly
and evenly from side to side. When searching an area in the direction
of depth and obliquely (progressive fire with sweeping), the left
hand gives the gun the proper horizontal direction, while the right
manipulates the slow motion elevating gear. When firing on rapidly
moving targets--for example skirmish lines advancing by rushes--or
targets advancing over rolling country, both the traversing and
elevating movements may be unclamped. The rapidity with which the gun
is moved, when sweeping or searching, depends upon the range and the
kind of target on which the fire is directed. As a rule, the piece
is moved slowly and steadily. The accuracy of the fire is impaired
when the gun is moved too rapidly. When the fire is well observed,
it might be advantageous, in exceptional cases, when firing against
either stationary or moving targets, to direct the gun, without
aiming, after the bullets have been seen to hit their mark, by
properly manipulating the elevating and traversing apparatus while
the firing is in progress.
The ballistic properties of the gun are the same as those of the
infantry rifle.[282]
[282] The destructive power of the projectiles fired from a machine
gun, as they strike within a small space, is, of course, much greater
than that of the scattered projectiles of a body of infantry. Trees
having a circumference of 30 cm. are felled by machine gun fire in
about 15 seconds at a range of 450 m.
In the machine gun an important factor in the dispersion of infantry
fire--flinching and errors in aiming--is eliminated, while the heating
of its barrel and the vibrations of its carriage in continuous fire do
not produce a corresponding increase in dispersion. On this account
the cone of dispersion of the machine gun is more compact than that
of the infantry rifle and its accuracy at long ranges is therefore
considerably greater than that of the latter.[283] Firing tests
indicate that the accuracy of machine gun fire diminishes only very
slightly with increasing range, provided the appropriate elevation is
used.[284]
[283] According to Austrian experiments the depth of the beaten
zone of a machine gun is only ¹⁄₃ to ¹⁄₂ that produced by the fire of
a platoon of infantry.
[284] The following average results were obtained in experiments
made at the Musketry School, while firing on infantry targets
advancing alternately at quick and double time:
At ranges from 2000-1600 m. 1.72% hits
„ „ „ 1500-1200 m. 2.53% „
Firing against disappearing head targets placed at intervals of
0.60-0.70 m.:
At 600-800 m. 1.89% hits „ 800-1100 m. 1.69% „
In firing first with an elevation of 1800, then with one of 1750 m.
(the range being 2000-1600 m. and 254 rounds being expended per gun),
on 50 advancing, kneeling targets, placed at intervals of 1 m. 3.10%
hits were obtained and 52% figures were placed out of action in 1¹⁄₂
minutes.
In firing at the same targets for 2¹⁄₃ minutes, with an elevation of
1900 m. (304 rounds expended), the result dropped to 0.3% hits and
8.3% figures placed out of action.
In war the influence of the compact cone of dispersion will be still
more potent, for we will then have to reckon with a single, specially
selected machine gun marksman who is well protected, while the
excitement of battle will produce a far different impression upon an
organization composed of men differing materially from each other. The
compactness of the cone of dispersion of the machine gun requires
that the appropriate elevation be used if the fire is to be effective
against well concealed prone skirmishers. This can be accomplished only
in part by employing range finders. Since the probable error of these
instruments is ±5% of the range, this determination is so inaccurate
for machine gun fire that nothing remains but to increase the
dispersion artificially. When it is impossible to observe the strike of
the bullets, the dispersion may be artificially increased by employing
combined sights, two in a single platoon and three in a machine gun
battery (company), and above all by sweeping. The employment of
combined sights would appear to be too rigid a method; sweeping fire is
at any rate better.[285]
[285] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre_, 2nd Ed. p. 185, et
seq.
From general ballistic data, Lieutenant-General ROHNE[286] computes
that the following results would be obtained by a machine gun and a
detachment of skirmishers when firing with the appropriate elevation at
a broad target 1 m. high:--
Machine Detachment
gun of skirmishers
At 500 m. 32.4 16.8% hits
„ 1000 „ 15.3 8.1% „
„ 1500 „ 10.2 5.1% „
„ 2000 „ 6.4 3.2% „
[286] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1901, IV, p. 268.
This nearly double superiority is reversed, however, when the
appropriate elevation is not used:
======+========================================================
|Firing on a target 1 m. high, the following percentages
| of hits may be expected when the error in estimating
| the range is--
Range.| 50 m. | 100 m. | 150 m. | 200 m.
+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------
|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-
| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-
m. | | ers.| | ers.| | ers.| | ers.
------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------
500 | 27.5 | 16.0| 19.0 | 13.8| 7.0 | 11.7| 1.3 | 7.3
1000 | 9.2 | 6.8| 2.0 | 4.8| 0.2 | 2.7| -- | 1.0
1500 | 3.6 | 3.9| 0.2 | 1.8| -- | 0.5| -- | 0.1
2000 | 1.7 | 2.2| -- | 0.8| -- | 0.2| -- | --
------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------
From this it follows that the good qualities of the machine gun can be
utilized to the fullest advantage only when the appropriate elevation
is used. When this is not accurately known, the fire effect of the
machine gun drops down to zero more quickly than that of a skirmish
line. Where local conditions are at all favorable, the determination of
the appropriate elevation is facilitated by observing the strike of the
projectiles in “volley fire.”
According to British firing tests, at ranges from 500-1000 yards an
error of estimation of 100 yards, reduces the effect of the fire
50 per cent. According to firing tests 75% of all shots fired by a
machine gun and body of infantry are distributed as follows:
=====+==================+==================+====================
| Machine gun. | Detachment of |Errors of estimation
| | infantry. | permissible for the
At |Depth of 75% strip|Depth of 75% strip| machine gun.
m. | m. | m. | m.
-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------
450 | 112 | 192 | 54 = 12 %
900 | 63 | 108 | 31 = 3.5%
1350 | 54 | 90 | 27 = 2 %
1800 | 67 | 140 | 31 = 1.8%
-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------
It is clearly apparent that the permissible error of the range finder
is smaller than the depth of the vertical dispersion strip covered by
75% of the bullets.
The difficulty of hitting a target lodged in some feature of the
terrain requires that the machine gun be used first of all against
large targets that are visible for a short time only. When the
appropriate elevation is used, a decisive effect may be confidently
counted on within a short space of time; when an inappropriate
elevation is used and the fire is not properly observed, only
accidental hits can, as a rule, be expected, even when the fire
is directed on tall, dense targets. When the fire is directed on
skirmishers lying down, the effect produced is not commensurate with
the amount of ammunition expended, and a slight error in the elevation
used may nullify the effect entirely. A straight line of trenches,
which is plainly visible, is, on the other hand, an eminently favorable
target. The heating of the barrel, and the difficulty of replenishing
ammunition and renewing the water in the jacket, tend to work against a
participation of machine guns in a protracted fire fight. The machine
gun is not at all suited for carrying on a prolonged fire action.
It is very difficult to determine the relative combat value of a body
of infantry as compared with that of a machine gun. One will not be far
wrong in placing this value between 50 and 60 men.
In experimental field firing at the Swiss Infantry Musketry School, it
was demonstrated that 30-40 skirmishers almost in every case rapidly
gained the upper hand over a machine gun in the open, at 900 m., but
that the infantrymen had small chances of success when the position of
the machine gun could not be accurately determined. In Switzerland a
machine gun is considered equivalent to 50 infantrymen. Skirmishers are
the most difficult target for machine guns to fight, and, at the same
time, they are the most dangerous. When the fire is well observed, a
good effect can, indeed, still be counted on, when the fire is directed
at prone skirmishers at ranges up to 1000 m., but this is not true when
the fire cannot be observed; in the last mentioned case, no effect
worth mentioning is produced.
=Austria.= In a field firing test (which was repeated four times)
between a machine gun (gun pointer covered by a shield) and 30
infantrymen, the following results were obtained at 600 m. in 1¹⁄₂
minutes:
Infantrymen 120 rounds 10 hits (9%)
Machine gun 215 „ 14 „ (7%)[287]
[287] Firing tests of the Army Musketry School at Bruck, a.d.
Leitha, 1905. _Streffleur_, Apl. 1906, p. 524.
=England.= At the Infantry School at Hythe, in a firing test at 300
yards, lasting 5 minutes--perhaps the longest period during which
continuous fire is possible--the power of a Maxim gun was found to
be equivalent to 60 rifles. In field firing this comparative power
dropped down to 25-35 rifles. In this connection, it should be
borne in mind that moral influences do not make themselves felt in
firing under peace conditions, and that, on the other hand, a single
favorable hit can place the machine gun out of action for a long
period, while the skirmishers can keep up the fire.
3. INFANTRY VERSUS MACHINE GUNS.
It will rarely be possible to concentrate upon a machine gun battery
of six guns a fire equivalent to its own. Because of the small
target offered by machine guns, it is necessary for a firing line to
concentrate its fire upon one machine gun at a time, thus gradually
silencing the battery in detail. This procedure is feasible because
it is very difficult for the machine guns to reach with their fire
all parts of a well concealed skirmish line. The normal relation,
unfavorable for the infantry, changes in its favor, however, as machine
guns cannot keep up a high rate of fire for a prolonged period, even
when nothing is considered but ammunition supply; as serious breaks are
especially apt to occur when the gun is worked to its maximum capacity;
and as the ammunition expended in one minute (3600 rounds) cannot
produce an effect unless not only the correct range but also the proper
elevation is accurately known.
The fight against machine guns may be advantageously conducted
according to the following principles:[288]
1. Infantry skirmishers should conceal themselves so well that it will
be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them. Color of
immediate vicinity (shade) and background should be considered; platoon
and other leaders must not stand upright; objects that are clearly
visible should be avoided.
2. It should be made difficult for the hostile machine guns to observe
their fire (ricochets) and to measure the range. (No prominent features
that would facilitate such measurements should be located near the
infantry position).
3. The firing line, as far as this is possible, should not be
continuous; the several parts of the line should be posted in echelon.
4. Kinds of fire: Lively fire at will should be used.
5. Expenditure of ammunition: At least 600 rounds should be expended
against each machine gun.
6. At the outset a single company should concentrate its fire upon a
single machine gun, picking out the one that is most clearly visible.
Machine guns on the flanks are not good targets, as a strong wind may
deflect the fire directed upon them.
[288] Switzerland: Machine guns, “on account of their small gun
squads, are more sensitive to losses than artillery. They cannot
adjust their fire so easily as artillery, but, when once on the
target, the effect of their fire is great.
“The principles governing the combat against artillery are
applicable, in general, to the fight against machine guns. It may be
assumed that at medium ranges, one platoon of infantry will suffice
for silencing one machine gun, provided the platoon of infantry
fights the action under favorable conditions. At short ranges, a few
good marksmen suffice for silencing a machine gun. For this reason
selected men are sent forward, when the situation permits, to sneak
up to the machine guns and to pick off the men serving them.”
The following rules, governing the conduct of infantry when exposed to
machine gun fire, may be deduced from the above:
Even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid
of cover, when exposed within a range of 1500 m. to the unsubdued fire
of machine guns; nothing remains but for them to lie down, and to gain
ground to the front in groups, or one by one.
The same is true of route columns. They can only deploy to the right
and left front at double time, and take cover.
The most unsuitable formation under machine gun fire is the column of
platoons, whether lying down or in motion.[289]
[289] Within ³⁄₄ to 1 minute a column of platoons (lying down)
sustained an average of 4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at
900-1100 m. with 42 and 32%, respectively, figures placed out of
action.
If the column of platoons is reached by effective machine gun fire,
when lying down, line must be formed. The men must not rise, however,
to execute this movement, but the platoons should crawl forward into
line. For the men to rise would mean annihilation.
The low target offered by machine guns makes them a difficult target
for field artillery to hit, in spite of the accuracy with which the
latter can adjust its fire.
4. MACHINE GUNS IN GERMANY.
The German machine gun (drawn by 4 horses driven from the saddle) is
mounted upon a sled which forms the firing frame. On the march, this
sled is placed on a wheeled carriage, from which it must first be
detached (10-15 seconds) before the gun is used; in exceptional cases,
the gun can be fired from the wheeled carriage.
The gun commander is mounted. Two of the gunners are seated on the axle
chest of the carriage, their carbines buckled to the gun carriage; two
are seated on the limber chest, their carbines slung over their backs.
When surprised by a direct attack, all the men that can be spared form
as skirmishers in the intervals between the guns of the machine gun
battery. The machine gun can be served by a single man. The water in
the jacket need not necessarily be renewed when the gun is fired for a
short time only.
The machine guns can be used on any terrain passable for infantry. When
detached from the wheeled carriage they can even surmount considerable
obstacles. In action, they present no larger target than skirmishers
fighting under similar conditions, and are capable of offering more
resistance than infantry.
The sled can be carried or drawn by the men for short distances. The
ammunition, placed in belts holding 250 rounds each, and packed in six
boxes, is similarly drawn on an ammunition sled. If the conditions
permit, the guns may be drawn by horses.
The “fighting battery” consists of six guns, formed into three
platoons, and an ammunition platoon (three ammunition wagons and one
store wagon); the combat train consists of officers’ and other led
horses. The field train consists of one baggage wagon, one ration
(commissary) wagon, one forage wagon, and a second store wagon.
[Illustration: Machine Guns in Germany.
Lead Team Hitched to Gun.
Carrying the Machine Guns.]
The movements and gaits of a machine gun battery are the same as those
of a field battery: the order in line, at close or extended intervals,
in which the guns are abreast, the intervals between them, measured
from center to center, being 5 and 17 paces, respectively. The order in
line, at extended intervals, is used in moving to the front or rear;
the order in line, at close intervals, for assembly, for movements in
that formation, for parking, and for parade. The section column[290] is
the principal maneuver formation on the battlefield; it is employed as
an assembly formation on a road, and as route column. (Par. 320 German
F. S. R.). In section column the guns follow each other at a distance
of four paces. In addition to this column, a column of platoons is
used, in which the platoons follow each other at a distance of 22
paces. (This may be reduced to 6 paces).
[290] The guns are placed in rear of each other, the ammunition
wagons and other vehicles bring up the rear. _Translator_.
A machine gun battery has available 87,300 rounds of ammunition (10,500
rounds with each gun and 8100 rounds in each ammunition wagon, or a
total of 14,550 rounds per gun), which may be drawn forward to the
firing position upon sleds, in boxes holding 250 rounds each. The
ammunition wagons are refilled from the ammunition wagons of the light
ammunition columns of the cavalry division and from the wagons of the
infantry ammunition columns marked with a red stripe, which carry
ammunition for machine gun units. A reserve machine gun is carried with
the ammunition column.
The machine gun battery combines high infantry fire power
(approximately equivalent to that of the skirmishers of a German
cavalry regiment, armed with carbines, or to that of 4-6 platoons of
infantry)[291] with instant readiness for firing, and a mobility which
enables it to follow the mounted arms anywhere. The chance of producing
a sudden fire effect within a short space of time must be especially
utilized, and, therefore, an endeavor should be made to put entire
machine gun batteries into the first line. The employment of single
guns is precluded owing to the danger of breakdowns, and the employment
of platoons is especially proper on the defensive as well as in action
at short range.
[291] A German cavalry regiment at peace strength numbers from 552
to 576 sabers: a platoon of infantry (on a peace footing) numbers
from 48 to 53 men.
In making a comparison between a cavalry regiment and a machine gun
battery, it must be borne in mind that horse holders are deducted
from the strength given for a cavalry regiment. _Translator_.
[Illustration: Order in Line
(extended intervals).]
[Illustration: Column of Platoons
(closed up).]
[Illustration: Section Column.
(Route Column).]
[Illustration: Explanation of Symbols used:]
[Illustration: Order in Line
(close intervals).]
The duties of machine guns naturally grow out of their tactical
advantages. Their fire power should be saved for decisive moments, when
the development of strong fire power at short ranges is requisite, and
when the available time and the situation do not permit of pushing
infantry into action. The machine gun batteries, which constitute
an independent arm, and which are assigned to cavalry and infantry
divisions, are best adapted for these duties.
The heavy matériel and the teams designed for rapid movements make the
machine gun battery less suited for employment in infantry combat,
where such a high degree of mobility is not so necessary. In the
battle on the Shaho an employment of machine guns by platoons in
the first line, came about quite naturally. The guns prepared the
assault, reinforced weak points, and supported the advance. In Germany,
provisional machine gun companies consisting of six two-horse machine
guns, driven from the carriage (these guns cannot be fired from their
carriages), have been adopted for this purpose. These machine gun
companies are principally an auxiliary weapon of the infantry, and,
distributed by platoons to the battalions, or sent into action as a
single unit by the regimental commander, they serve the purpose of
augmenting the fire of the infantry.
Movements at increased gaits are possible in exceptional cases only;
as a rule, the guns follow the infantry at a walk, and in combats
terminating in a defeat, it may frequently be impossible to keep them
from falling into the hands of the enemy. The permanent assignment of
machine guns to battalions does not seem to be advisable.
5. GOING INTO POSITION.
The principles which govern the reconnaissance and occupation of a
position by field artillery are applicable also to machine guns.
The tactical situation determines whether the guns should move
into position under cover or in the open. As a rule, the interval
between two adjacent machine guns in line is 17 paces; but the proper
utilization of favorable cover does not preclude posting the guns close
together. It may likewise be advantageous to post the guns in echelon
on the flanks.
In action the carriages remain, as a rule, in the nearest cover in
rear of the line. The advance from this point is effected by the men
carrying or dragging the detached guns and ammunition sleds; under
certain circumstances, it may also be advisable to have the guns
or ammunition sleds drawn forward by single horses (mounts of gun
commanders). On level ground the ammunition platoon and the wheeled
carriages of the machine guns take post in rear of and as close as
possible to the guns. Whether the two groups are combined, or whether
the machine gun carriages should occupy the nearest, and the ammunition
wagons the more distant cover, depends upon the available cover. The
commander of the machine gun carriages sends full ammunition sleds
to the firing line at an early moment and has empty boxes and belts
brought back.
[Illustration: A Machine Gun Platoon Crawling Into Position.]
[Illustration: Range Finder. A Machine Gun Platoon in Position.]
[Illustration: A Machine Gun Platoon Intrenched.]
6. THE FIRE FIGHT.
The machine gun. squad consists of one gun commander and four
gunners, numbers 1-4; number 2 is the gun pointer. The gun commander
sees that the gun is set up for the prone, sitting, or kneeling fire
position, according to the terrain, supervises the service of the
gun, which can be served in any position of the body, and removes all
obstructions that interfere with its effective use. The gun pointer
handles the gun, _i.e._, he loads it, sets the sight, aims and fires
it. No. 3, who lies to the right of the gun pointer, assists the
latter in these duties, places a box of ammunition on the right of
the gun, and feeds the ammunition belt into the slot. When necessary,
he takes the place of the gun pointer. No. 1 lies in rear of the gun
pointer, keeps his eye on the battery and platoon commanders, and
transmits their orders to the gun commander and gun pointer. No. 4
has charge of the replenishment of ammunition; he takes cover or lies
down 20 paces in rear of, or on a flank of the gun.
The range finders, without special orders to that effect, measure
the range to targets as they appear, or to fixed points, and call
it out to the battery commander. The battery commander designates
the target, the range, and the kind of fire to be used. The platoon
commanders assign a section of the target to each of their guns,
designate the elevation that is to be used, and supervise the service
of the guns; they are especially held responsible that the fire
is directed upon the proper target. Platoon commanders constantly
observe through their field glasses the strike of the bullets and
the enemy. The commander of the gun carriages is charged with their
supervision; he constantly sends forward ammunition, and, when
necessary, men and matériel, into the firing position. When the
detached guns change position, he follows the movement under cover
with the gun carriages, bringing them as close to the firing position
as possible.
After machine gun batteries had been employed at maneuvers as an
auxiliary arm of the cavalry, they did especially good work in the
fights in Southwest Africa,[292] where they were not opposed by
artillery.
[292] _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1904, Nos. 136, 139 and 140.
Through their ability to follow a skirmish line into the densest
thickets, they were a valuable support to the infantry in the close
country in which the African fights took place, where artillery of
necessity had to fail owing to absence of a clear field of view. It
was demonstrated, however, that the machine gun squads became so
engrossed in the work of serving their guns that supporting troops
had to guard them against surprise.
In the engagement at the =Waterberg=, the machine guns did splendid
work in meeting, with an effective volley fire, the sudden, energetic
attacks made by the Hereros against the flank and rear of the
Germans. In two critical moments, during the attack against the left
flank of the advance guard, and during the attack made with a yell
against the right and rear of headquarters, it was principally due
to the machine guns that the enemy, who had come within short range,
was repulsed. Participants of this fight believed that the Hereros
did not dare to make a real attack when machine guns went into action
against them. It had been impossible to avoid using single machine
guns. Just as the enemy was making an attack upon the 11th Company,
machine gun No. 3 (2nd Machine Gun Battery), which had done splendid
work, broke down. This was the only case of jamming that occurred.
Although exposed to a galling hostile fire, the gun commander managed
to change barrels in 30 seconds, and then to resume the firing. The
2nd Machine Gun Battery expended 20,775 rounds of ammunition; the
expenditure of the different guns varied between 7350 and 120 rounds,
according to the part taken by them in the action. The ammunition
supply was certain and steady; no shortage of ammunition, not even a
temporary one, occurred anywhere.
7. MACHINE GUNS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
=Switzerland.= In 1892 Switzerland began to organize four mounted
Maxim machine gun companies, which were assigned to the weak
cavalry brigades (consisting of six troops[293]) on account of the
defensive role of the Swiss cavalry and the lack of batteries of
horse artillery. Three machine gun companies were assigned to the
fortifications on the St. Gotthard and one to St. Moritz for the
purpose of augmenting the fire of the advanced positions belonging to
those fortifications, and to cover the approaches thereto.
[293] Eskadrons.
A Maxim machine gun company consists of 6 officers, 105
non-commissioned officers and privates, 99 horses (24 pack horses
and 24 draft horses), 8 guns mounted on tripods, and 7 vehicles (two
of these are two-horse supply and baggage wagons, one four-horse
field forge with field kitchen, 4 two-horse ammunition wagons, each
carrying 15,520 rounds of ammunition). The guns and the ammunition
are carried on pack animals. A packed gun horse carries a load of 108
kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats. An ammunition horse carries a load
of 123 kg. inclusive of 5 kg. of oats and 8 ammunition boxes (each
holding 250 rounds, or a total of 2000 rounds weighing 90.5 kg.). A
machine gun company of eight guns is divided into four platoons, each
consisting of two guns and four ammunition horses, and the combat
train, consisting of four ammunition wagons and the field kitchen.
Every gun is commanded by a “gun chief,” and two of the five men
belonging to the gun squad are horse holders. After the command
“halt” has been given, 1-1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to get the gun
ready for firing. The company carries 5940 rounds of ammunition for
each gun.
[Illustration: Switzerland.
Machine Gun and Ammunition Horse.
Gun Commander and Gun Ready to Fire.]
Route column from line is formed by the guns moving successively
in the proper direction, the two ammunition pack animals following
directly in rear of the gun to which they belong. The company takes
up a road space of 150 m. For movements off the road the company may
move in “mass,” or with the platoons in “combat formation.” When
in “mass” the platoons, each in route column, are abreast, with
intervals of 10-20 paces between them. When the platoons are in
“combat formation,” the two guns of each are placed abreast at equal
intervals.
[Illustration: Platoon In Route Column.]
The three machine gun companies assigned to the line of
fortifications consist of two to three platoons, each of four guns.
A platoon consists of 2 officers and 60 non-commissioned officers
and privates. The men are armed with rifles and equipped with alpine
sticks. “Gun carriers” (_Waffenwarte_) carry the gun basket, which
weighs 33 kg. The weight of the water in the jacket is only 1 kg.
“Ammunition carriers” (_Munitionswarte_) carry the ammunition in
specially constructed frames, each man carrying 500 rounds.
Kinds of fire: “_Fire by a single gun_” is employed at the opening of
an action to drive away patrols and reconnoitering officers, when it
is not desired to betray the presence of machine guns to the enemy.
“_Volley fire_” is the usual fire employed by machine guns and
corresponds to the volley fire of infantry. After the target and the
elevation have been designated, the platoon commander directs that
fire he opened by calling the name of the gun pointer who is to fire.
A pause is made after every series of 20-30 shots, which is used to
make necessary corrections.
As soon as the proper elevation has been determined, “_rapid fire_”
is opened. In this the _guns of a platoon fire alternately_. The fire
is delivered in series of 100 rounds, and the time during which one
of the guns is not firing is utilized by the non-commissioned officer
with it to examine and oil the mechanism.
The “_fire at will_” (continuous fire) of the machine guns
corresponds to the magazine fire of the infantry. _All the guns fire
simultaneously_ series of 50 to 100 rounds, interrupting the fire for
a moment at the end of each series for the purpose of examining and
oiling the mechanism; then they resume the fire with a new series of
50 to 100 rounds. On account of the great expenditure of ammunition
entailed, and also in order to prevent the premature deterioration
of the matériel, fire at will is used in exceptional cases only, for
example, when danger is imminent, or when favorable opportunities
offer.
“_Progressive fire_” may be employed against narrow, deep targets,
when the range could not be accurately determined. It may also be
employed for searching an area 100-200 m. deep.
=Austria= has begun to organize _cavalry and mountain machine gun
batteries_ consisting of four guns each. The machine gun Model 7
(_Schwarzlose_), with pack animal equipment, has been adopted. The
gun horse carries 500, and each of the two ammunition horses, 1500
rounds of ammunition. During mobilization two ammunition horses
are to be added for each gun. Mountain machine gun batteries are
similarly organized; each ammunition horse carries 2000 rounds of
ammunition. On the gun itself, and on the gun frame, 44 belts, each
holding 250 rounds, or a total of 11,000 rounds, are carried.[294]
[294] The Schwarzlose machine gun weighs 18 kg. exclusive of frame
and the water in the jacket. (The Maxim weighs 28 kg.).
The formations employed by the cavalry machine gun batteries are the
order in line (at close intervals), the combat order, and the route
column.
The mountain machine gun batteries, carrying guns and ammunition
upon pack horses, are equipped with tripod and basket mounts. These
machine gun batteries combine the system of mounting and carrying
employed by the Swiss cavalry and mountain machine gun companies.
Three pack animals are employed to transport each gun with its
ammunition. The gun squad consists of three men. Officers and
non-commissioned officers are mounted; the other men of the battery
are not. Unpacking the guns, posting them, and getting them in
readiness for firing, is managed in a similar manner as in the Swiss
machine gun companies.
The gun adopted for _infantry machine gun batteries_ is the light and
simple Schwarzlose machine gun, Model 7.
Springs Parts of breech Screws & Pins Weights
Maxim 14 35 52 27.5 kg.
Schwarzlose 1 11 13 17.5 „
Tripod mounts and pack animal transportation are necessary in view
of Austrian theaters of war. The batteries consist of four machine
guns.
“The great length of modern battle fronts, and the gaps and local
combats along the latter, would seem to make a distribution of
machine guns along the entire front desirable. Attention is thereby
directed to organizing the machine guns to be employed with the
infantry as ‘Regimental Machine Guns.’ Such an organization would
best ensure the training of this new arm for the infantry combat and
the prompt attainment of an understanding of its employment.
“In the cavalry, the difficulties of organizing, training, and
employing machine guns are considerably greater than in the infantry.
These difficulties are best overcome by organizing the machine guns
assigned to cavalry into independent batteries, and placing them at
the disposal of the higher cavalry commanders.
“In determining upon the size of the machine gun batteries attached
to infantry, an attempt should be made to combine minimum size with
adequate fire effect and maximum mobility. Two machine guns would
seem to be almost the maximum number that should be posted at one
point in an infantry action. From a tactical point of view, it is,
moreover, undesirable to post a greater number at one point, because
gun shields, steam, etc. would frequently form too prominent a
target, for the hostile artillery to forego firing on it promptly and
with telling effect.
“In connection with the desire for more than two machine guns in each
infantry and Jäger organization--about two guns per battalion--the
tremendous increase in ammunition trains should be considered. It
would also be well to bear in mind that we have, as a matter of fact,
not even become accustomed to the numerous ammunition columns of our
rapid fire artillery.
“In the cavalry, the necessity of dividing a machine gun battery
for the purpose of assigning the parts thereof to brigades, and
of assigning machine guns to reconnaissance and other independent
detachments, must be reckoned with. When we bear in mind that single
machine guns are to be used only in exceptional cases, the machine
gun battery intended for the cavalry cannot well be made smaller than
four guns.”[295]
[295] _Streffleur_, January, 1908, p. 114, et seq.
=England.= During the =Boer war= 1-2 machine guns mounted on a high
carriage were assigned to each of the British battalions. These guns
were unsuited to employment in an infantry combat and were quickly
silenced. The campaign demonstrated that these guns could frequently
not be used, and that they stood idle in rear of the line. They were
not combined into detachments for the purpose of supporting the
attack, as should have been done, until the engagement at =Pieters
Hill= (27th Febr., 1900). On account of the long range at which these
guns came into action, the effect of their fire was indeed very
small, but, nevertheless, its moral effect impaired the steadiness
of the Boer aim. Since the great fire power of these guns can be
brought into play only when several of them are employed together,
it is not a good plan to assign single guns to cavalry regiments for
the purpose of supporting the dismounted line in action. Only the
commander of the entire force, and not each battalion commander,
is able to judge where the employment of machine guns would be
advantageous. The proposal to assign machine guns to the artillery
was not followed, as it was justly feared that the machine guns would
then be assigned tasks to which they were not adapted.
At the present time, each battalion has a machine gun platoon
consisting of two guns. Both guns with their tripods, and a portion
of the ammunition, are transported on one wagon drawn by two horses.
They are in addition equipped with a two-horse ammunition cart. The
complement consists of 1 non-commissioned officer, 15 privates, 1
saddle horse, and 4 draft horses.
Each battalion of mounted infantry has a machine gun platoon which is
similarly organized. Each of the four vehicles of this platoon is,
however, drawn by four horses. In addition, this platoon is equipped
with six machine gun pack saddles for transporting the guns on pack
animals. The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 first sergeant, 23
privates, 16 saddle horses, and 16 draft animals.
The machine gun platoon of a cavalry regiment consists of only
one gun, which is carried on a four-horse wagon, and a four-horse
ammunition wagon. The platoon is equipped with three pack saddles.
The complement consists of 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 13
privates, 11 saddle horses, and 8 draft horses.
The following ammunition is carried by the British machine gun
platoons:
======================+========+==========+==========+========
| | In the | In the |
|With the|ammunition| Division | Total
| organ- | column |ammunition| No.
|ization.| of the | column. |rounds.
| |F. A. Bns.| |
----------------------+--------+----------+----------+--------
Infantry M. G. P. | 11,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 31,500
Mtd. Infantry M. G. P.| 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500
Cavalry M. G. P | 19,500 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 39,500
----------------------+--------+----------+----------+--------
=Japan= and =France= seem to have decided to follow the British in
assigning machine gun platoons to regiments. In =Japan=, soon after
the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, the Guard, the 1st, 2nd,
3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, and the two independent cavalry brigades,
had machine gun batteries consisting of 6 guns each. During the
winter 1904-5, 320 machine guns were gradually placed in position,
singly and by platoons, in the fortifications on the Shaho.
=Russia.= At the outbreak of the =Russo-Japanese war=, a machine gun
company was assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 5th East Siberian Rifle
Brigades. This company consisted of 5 officers, 85 combatants, 13
non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 29 draft horses, and eight guns.
The latter were mounted on high carriages, and were protected by
steel shields. Of the ammunition, 1350 rounds, in belts holding 450
rounds each, were carried on each gun carriage, and 4500 rounds
on each of the six two-wheeled ammunition carts. The field train
consisted of nine one-horse carts. The loss of the machine gun
company at the =Yalu= was probably due to the fact that the guns,
mounted on high carriages, were quickly deprived of their mobility
in their second position, after they had, from their first position,
effectively flanked the advance of the Japanese infantry. Immediately
after this first lesson, the high wheeled carriage was apparently
abolished, and the tripod adopted. On September 26th, 1904, the
machine gun companies were reorganized. There were (old) wheeled,
and (newly-organized) so-called “mountain machine gun companies,”
the latter having pack animal transportation. These companies were
assigned to infantry and Rifle divisions and were designated by the
numbers of their divisions.
On December 12th, 1906, the machine gun organization was again
changed, because it was asserted that the assignment of machine gun
companies to divisions hampered the division commander; that the
employment of 8 guns at one point was injudicious; and that so large
a machine gun battery actually induced a scattering of the guns.
Infantry, Reserve, and Rifle regiments are each assigned a machine
gun organization consisting of 4 guns, mounted on tripods, equipped
with 6 mm. steel shields, with pack animal transportation.
Complement: 3 officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 46 privates,
7 non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 21 pack and draft horses (8 of
these for carrying ammunition), 4 ammunition carts, and 5 train
wagons. The personnel is drawn from a regiment in which the men to be
detailed for machine gun duty are trained.
According to an officer who commanded a machine gun company in the
battle of =Liao Yang=[296], his company went into position on August
30th, on the right flank of its division behind an earth embankment
at the south edge of the village of Gutsealing, and 300 m. from the
railroad running in a southwesterly direction. This position was
taken up with the object of preventing the envelopment of the right
flank of the division. Sufficient time was available for cutting
down the kaoliang crop for 650 m. Beyond this range the kaoliang
fields continued for several hundred meters. Directly in front of
the position of the company there was a hill, upon which several
mounted men showed themselves toward 10 A. M. As soon as fire was
opened on them, they threw themselves down in a field covered
with tall kaoliang. When these mounted men had reached a fairly
open space, about 900 m. from the machine gun company, they could
be clearly seen. In rear of them was observed a mountain battery
of artillery, which endeavored to go into position on the hill
mentioned, apparently with a view of directing a flanking fire on
the Russian skirmishers farther to the front than the machine guns.
Fire was opened at once, without first bracketing the target, the
first gun firing at 1200 paces (about 850 m.), and each succeeding
gun increasing the range by 25 paces, thus covering with fire a space
150 m. deep. Immediately after fire was opened on it, the mountain
battery attempted to escape to the right, but succumbed to the fire
of the machine guns. The latter had fired about 1¹⁄₂ minutes, and had
expended 6000 rounds of ammunition. About noon, hostile (Japanese)
skirmishers attempted to cross the railroad embankment, one by one,
apparently with a view of flanking the machine guns. The latter
opened fire on the Japanese, combined sights, and, for a short
period, rapid fire with sweeping being resorted to. The movement
made by the Japanese was discontinued; an advance made by groups
against the front of the machine guns got only as far as the edge of
the cleared kaoliang field. In the open, the skirmishers were unable
to advance a single step; every attempt, on their part, to rise,
was prevented. Whether it would have been possible to advance by
crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, can, of course, not be
determined now.
[296] _Russian Invalid_, October 1904.
At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and
annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire.
At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from
the machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness,
however, in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered.
When their fire became more and more galling, the machine gun
commander decided to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15
men (Reservists and horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to
drive them out. The undertaking was successful. It was found that
this continuous annoying fire had been kept up by only 1 officer and
24 men.
At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a
signal detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry,
directed on this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after
two machine guns, one using an elevation of 1025, the other one of
1075 m., had fired on that point for a short time, the Japanese
disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns succeeded in repulsing an
enveloping movement made against their right flank. This movement was
betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang stalks. Toward 7 P. M.,
the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the machine guns, which
suffered considerable losses, although the personnel was protected by
an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. This fire did not
cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was evacuated
by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night found the
machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company had
lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition,
or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority
of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish
line can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter.
In the defensive position on the =Shaho= and at =Mukden=, machine
guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets
and under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel
ANISINOW, good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050
m., against closed bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry
(_Eskadrons_) up to 1400 m.; against batteries of artillery, halted
in the open, staffs, and columns, the fire was sufficiently effective
up to 1960 m.
8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN BATTERIES.
Machine guns will never be able to replace artillery at long ranges; on
the other hand, they will often find an opportunity to support other
arms with their fire at medium and short ranges.
It has been asserted that machine guns do not always follow the
movements of the firing lines in action, that the commander of a
force is not always able to find a good position for them; and the
question raised whether the space taken up by the machine guns and
their ammunition wagons in a column could not be more profitably filled
by companies of infantry or by a portion of an ammunition column of
corresponding length. To be sure, machine guns are a special arm; the
justification of their existence lies in the combination of constant
readiness for firing with highly developed mobility, so that, held back
under direct control of the commander of a force, they give him the
means wherewith to produce within a short time a sudden effect, in the
nature of a surprise. This is the very purpose for which machine guns
were created. They are not intended for prolonged fire action, not for
accompanying an infantry skirmish line in an advance by rushes, and,
least of all, for fighting well covered firing lines. In addition, the
fact that machine guns make it possible to concentrate fire quickly on
any space, whereby the moral effect is considerably increased, ought
not to be underestimated. It would seem to be advisable to employ
machine guns in conjunction with infantry when it is impossible to
develop a powerful fire on account of the conformation of the ground,
but when such fire is desirable for commanding approaches or defiles;
further, when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example,
in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be pushed far
to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, which can then be
held by a few men during the pauses in the fight.[297] Although machine
gun fire may perhaps be relatively less accurate than that of a body of
infantry, the value of pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy
within a brief space of time should not be underestimated.[298]
[297] At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was
not easy for a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the
shaft of a search light; few men possessed the requisite eyesight to
make this possible. It would no doubt be practicable, however, to
attach such men to the machine guns posted in a defensive position. A
considerable increase in fire effect could thus be obtained.
[298] Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing
from 1200-1100 paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1¹⁄₂, and
machine gun fire, in 3% hits. The three kinds of fire, when directed
against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, in one minute, in 13, 18, and
10% hits, respectively.
Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are employed as
a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend upon whether
it is contemplated to employ them in a purely defensive way for the
purpose of reinforcing the several weak points, or offensively in fire
surprises or in covering the flanks. The distribution by platoons
has the undeniable disadvantage that single guns will frequently
not find an opportunity to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition
supply is increased; and that the combined employment of the several
platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. On
the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons each, an
employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution by platoons is
permissible in a passive defense, the employment of the guns by battery
(company) against the flanks of the attacker permits the mobility and
fire power of the arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a
distribution of machine guns by platoons--if we except colonial and
mountain warfare--is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless
frittering away of fighting units.[299]
[299] Lieutenant ULRICH (retired), who participated in the fighting
in Manchuria, voices the same opinion in _Jahrbücher_, March number,
p. 285:
“The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of
strong machine gun units is one of the most important requirements of
modern battle.”
Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers into play to the
best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, when, from their
position as far forward as possible in the column, they are pushed to
the front to occupy important points and to compel the enemy to deploy
his infantry. The commander should, however, endeavor to withdraw the
machine guns from the fight as soon as his own infantry has deployed,
in order to avoid involving the guns in a protracted fire fight
necessitating an expenditure of a great amount of ammunition and in
which the accuracy of their fire would gradually suffer.[300] The
proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment as a separate
arm, whether they are posted so as to flank an enemy, or are kept
at the disposal of the commander as an ever ready reserve, which
is pushed forward to keep the point to be attacked under fire, to
meet a counter-attack, or--and to this use they are best adapted--to
participate in the pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear
guard actions, since they are able to remain in position longer, for
example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are paralyzed by the
thought of getting away from the enemy in time. Machine guns are much
more independent than infantry on account of their ability to withdraw
at an increased gait. On account of their greater staying power and
the greater intensity of their fire, they increase the delay which
the enemy suffers, as well as the start gained by their own force;
they moreover enable their own force to get away from the enemy and to
escape pursuit.
[300] This applies particularly to machine guns which have air
cooled barrels. After four minutes of continuous fire, part of
the projectiles, and after seven minutes all of the projectiles
fired from a Hotchkiss machine gun go over the target (platoon).
_Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift_, January number, 1907.
In employing machine guns in defense, it must be borne in mind that the
guns are not adapted to carry on protracted fire actions; and that the
advantage of the mobility of machine gun batteries cannot be properly
utilized if they have been assigned, from the outset, a definite
section to defend. As a rule, it will be advisable, in defense, to keep
the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them later,
as necessity requires, even by platoons, to reinforce the defensive
line at threatened points, or, by battery (company), to prevent an
envelopment, or to participate in offensive movements. This does not
preclude the employment of machine guns during the preparatory stage
of the engagement, for example, to command important approaches. When
a covered withdrawal of the guns is assured, it will also be possible
to post machine gun batteries in such a manner in front of, or to a
flank of the main defensive position, that they can suddenly sweep
with their fire the ground on which the opponent will probably place
his artillery. Flanking machine gun fire can sometimes be employed for
sweeping dead angles.
The provisions of the Austrian machine gun regulations correspond in
the main to those of the German Army. In Austria special stress is
laid upon the use of machine guns with cavalry, while in Germany they
are in addition a mobile reserve. Machine gun batteries accomplish the
principal objects which cavalry expects to attain by the assignment
of infantry,[301] viz., relief from fighting on foot, great fire
power, and mobility. Even in reconnaissance duty, machine guns will
be employed to break down the resistance of the enemy in occupied
localities and to augment the resistance of their own force in such
places. During an advance, machine guns should go into position at an
early moment in order to cover as effectively as possible the approach
and the deployment for attack. It is advisable to post the guns of
a machine gun battery together, so as not to have numerous lines of
fire interfere with the movements of the cavalry; this is especially
emphasized by the Austrian regulations. Machine gun batteries, like
horse batteries (artillery), remain with the cavalry divisions during a
battle.
[301] In regard to the employment of machine guns in the maneuvers
of 1905, see _Streffleur_, 1906, May number.
German machine guns are especially adapted for resisting cavalry, while
guns transported upon pack animals are entirely helpless on the march
and when going into position, and require the support of the other
arms. German machine guns, whether on their wheeled carriages or on
their sleds, are capable of warding off cavalry. The fire of the guns
should be distributed over the entire front of the mounted attacking
line. Special attention should be paid to lines following the first
attacking line, to the flanks of the guns themselves, and to covering
the carriages when they are not with the guns. Machine guns are able to
advance on open ground without regard to cavalry, so long as the latter
is not supported by artillery or infantry, or is not so superior in
force that it can attack simultaneously from several directions, or in
several lines.
In action against artillery it should be borne in mind that artillery
possesses an unquestioned superiority of fire at the longer ranges; at
ranges at which machine guns are able to fire at all, they must seek to
find protection under cover, or by distributing the guns. Artillery is
very susceptible to flanking fire. When that arm is to be engaged, the
machine gun sleds should be brought as close as possible to the hostile
batteries. In this case it is, moreover, advisable to have large
intervals between the machine gun platoons. The great mobility of the
machine gun battery, when limbered, will sometimes enable it to take up
a position from which it can flank the enemy. In distributing machine
gun fire it would be well always to assign the same task to two guns.
It is not a good plan to have all the machine guns sweep the entire
front of a firing battery (artillery).
The opinions in regard to machine gun employment in field
warfare--mountain and fortress warfare are not considered
here--differ considerably. In =England= machine guns are attached to
battalions, and Japan of late leans toward this mode of employment.
In =Switzerland= machine guns serve in addition as a substitute for
horse batteries, which their army lacks.
The =English= view is obviously affected by their experience in
colonial wars.
The following are given as the duties of machine guns _in attack_:
1. The machine gun is above all to be employed at long ranges. In
open country it will seldom be possible for the gun to reach a
position in the first line, where, moreover, the gun would offer too
good a target. Covered terrain should be taken advantage of to get
the gun close to the enemy. The advance of infantry may be supported
at long ranges by machine gun fire (fire of position).
2. The delivery of volley fire against any point of the hostile
position.
3. The warding off of counter-attacks or attacks made by cavalry.
4. The utilization of flanking positions.
5. The support of cavalry during delaying actions (ammunition being
in this case a substitute for men) although the fire effect against
low targets is very small.
6. The holding of captured positions.
_In defense_ the isolated employment of machine guns at a distance
from the organization is prohibited and their use against extended
skirmish lines cautioned against. Machine guns are well adapted for
protecting flanks and can be kept back as a reserve to prevent the
advance of hostile reinforcements, to support counter-attacks, to
direct fire against deep and dense targets, and, finally, to support
the firing line in action at short range.
_In defense_ the principal duties of machine guns will consist of--
1. Sweeping obstacles and commanding terrain which is specially
favorable for the attack; flanking of salients.
2. Reinforcing weak points.
3. Firing on advancing hostile reinforcements.
The cavalry regulations, contrary to those of the infantry, also
permit a massed employment of machine guns when ordered by brigade or
division commanders.
“As a rule, it will not be advisable to open fire on isolated mounted
men or small groups of approximately platoon strength, as this would
betray the position prematurely. In action, machine guns may be
employed in conjunction with dismounted skirmishers for the purpose
of forming a supporting point for movements, a rallying position, or
for protecting a flank. Finally, during an attack, machine guns may
support the fire of the horse battery, on the outer flank of which
they go into position, to serve as support, or to facilitate by their
fire a withdrawal.”
These official regulations are not entirely in accord with the views
entertained in the army. The combined use of the machine guns of
a brigade, such as quite naturally resulted in the engagement at
=Pieters Hill=, is advocated by many. At the longer ranges, machine
gun companies are to fire on favorable targets, discontinuing their
fire when their object has been accomplished. In addition they are to
cover the advance or withdrawal of the infantry; to fire on certain
points of the hostile position; to act against the enemy’s flanks in
pursuit; and, in defense, posted in pairs, they are to flank salient
angles and make it difficult for the enemy to approach the obstacles.
In =Switzerland= machine guns are considered an auxiliary arm. “Our
field army should be capable of accepting and sustaining battle in
the mountains and on highland plateaus without necessitating the
creation of numerous special detachments for that purpose. Machine
gun companies should be a tool which can be used in the mountains and
on highland plateaus, and which can be turned over for use to any
organization.”
The platoon is the firing unit; the company commander posts his
platoons at large intervals and regulates their mutual coöperation.
Fire, suddenly delivered from various points, frequently rather
far distant from each other, is considered to have a particularly
demoralizing effect; the scattered posting of the platoons makes it
difficult for the enemy to combat effectively the individual platoons
which are skillfully concealed on the terrain. “The indefinable,
uncanny and confusing aspect of their appearance enhances the effect
of the fire surprise.” The defensive character is here especially
clearly marked, for cavalry which counts in the first place on the
offensive will prefer a combined employment of machine guns, so as
not to be hampered in its movements by the various lines of fire. On
the march, machine guns are posted as far forward as possible in the
column; single platoons may also be attached to troops (_Eskadrons_)
of advance guard cavalry, and, in exceptional cases only, to troops
(_Eskadrons_) of reconnoitering cavalry. Machine guns, supported by
weak cavalry detachments, may be pushed forward to occupy defiles;
moreover, the machine gun company assigned to a cavalry brigade may
be sent into action either as a whole unit, or it may be divided from
the start or during the course of the fight. This machine gun company
may also be attached to regiments, troops (_Eskadrons_) or platoons
of cavalry charged with special missions, in which case it is, as a
rule, broken up into platoons. The premature detaching of machine gun
units is especially cautioned against. “The mobility of the machine
gun unit is such that it is not at all dangerous to hold them back
until the last moment before sending them to the actually threatened
point.”
The regulations deem a special support necessary for the machine
gun batteries when they are sent on independent missions. Single
guns are not to be so used. Machine guns, distributed by platoons,
invest cavalry dismounted for fire action with a special power
of resistance. It will frequently be advantageous to occupy the
enemy in front with weakly supported machine gun batteries, while
maneuvering with the main body of the mounted force so as to gain the
enemy’s weak point, and attacking him there with fire or a charge.
In a cavalry fight Maxim machine gun marksmen, by timely, hold,
and energetic action, will very often be able to create favorable
conditions for their own troops, facilitate the selection of a point
of attack, and retard and interfere with the hostile deployment.
The following statements taken from the regulations for the _Service
and Training of_ =Swiss= _cavalry_ (1904) are of interest:
“Machine guns invest pursuing cavalry with tremendous power.--Their
violent fire, suddenly breaking forth, especially when quickly
delivered at the flanks of the retreating mass, must have an
annihilating effect and convert the retreat into a rout.
“In a retreat, Maxim gun marksmen with their guns can quickly occupy
rallying positions (when possible, flanking), which, thanks to their
mobility, they are capable of holding longer than other arms. Thereby
they facilitate for the other troops the critical breaking off of the
engagement.
“The retreat will proceed with greater steadiness and time will be
gained for organizing resistance and for making that resistance more
obstinate.
“When, during the crisis of battle, every available man joins in the
fight, machine guns may take a hand in it, even when the terrain is
unfavorable for the employment of cavalry, by gaining the flanks at a
rapid gait, turning and firing upon the hostile flank or the hostile
masses launched for the counter-attack.
“It would be incorrect, however, at such a moment, simply to throw
the machine guns into the fighting line or to a flank. By doing this
the mobility of the guns would not be utilized, and they would lose
their character of a mounted arm.
“The assignment of machine guns to cavalry augments the fighting
power and independence of the latter and increases to the utmost its
desire to go ahead, its enterprise and bold initiative. With the aid
of machine guns, our militia cavalry, even when opposed by better
drilled cavalry, can go into battle calmly on our terrain, with the
firm conviction of defeating it.
“But a cavalry leader should never shrink from sacrificing his
machine guns when the object to be attained requires it, and when no
other means remain to save the force. _These weapons should never be
more to him than a welcome and powerful aid toward the fulfillment of
his mission. Cavalry which degenerates into a mere support for its
machine guns has ceased to be cavalry._”
VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[302]
(Par. 451 German I. D. R.).
[302] _Taktik_, II, p. 137: _Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf
Infanterie_. For examples from military history consult the splendid
works of Major KUNZ, especially _Die deutsche Reiterei_, and
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5.
The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to
use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man
even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of
mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly
in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which
retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by
cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while
cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge,
on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its
irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as
there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry
allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier
being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is
energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would
look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge
during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on
the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of
infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous
losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility
is disproportionately greater.” (_Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June
15th, 1882_). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the
greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed
in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation
made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any
rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at
full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between
files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such
charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry
accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in
action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on
the battlefield.
[303] _Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf_, I, p. 55.
The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the
Austrian army at =Custozza= with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans,
may be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry
was not accustomed to field service and lacked training. This small
force of cavalry broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade
(Italian) and struck the route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing
it into complete panic, so that of five battalions only one remained
intact. The three platoons of cavalry, which numbered about 100
sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 horses killed and wounded.
The charge made by three troops (_Eskadrons_) of the Dragoons of the
Guard at =Mars-la-Tour=, to facilitate the retreat of the defeated
38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th Hussars at
=Sapignies= were likewise successful.
Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for warding off
cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry charge passes suffer
losses that scarcely deserve mention. The fight is not hopeless even
when the hostile troopers halt within the ranks of the infantry. When
cavalry has charged through a skirmish line, the latter should be
careful not to face about to fire at the troopers,[304] as that would
give a second cavalry line an opportunity to approach and strike it
unawares.
[304] “The French firing lines through which the cavalry had
charged (evening attack made by Rauch’s Brigade in the direction
of Rezonville on August 16th, 1870) fired after the Hussars, while
the French Infantry units in rear fired in the opposite direction.
The result was a frightful cross-fire, which, while undoubtedly
disastrous for the Hussars, certainly must have worked havoc among
the French.” KUNZ, _Reiterei_, p. 153.
The supports in rear of the first line form the objective of the
cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. These supports
must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless of the skirmishers
in front.
The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when that line is
not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened wing should never
be bent forward since that interferes with the fire of adjacent units.
The task of repulsing an attack directed against a flank had best be
left to the supports in rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill
Regulations (par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk
of the supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing
line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank would
be insignificant; and that at any rate a _new_ firing line could not be
formed within a short time; and, therefore, that a charge against its
flank would be advantageous. This statement should be a warning for us
always to retain echelons or machine guns in rear of the flanks. The
most critical situation for infantry is that in which it is charged by
cavalry while retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports
available to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be
left to each individual to save himself as best he can.
During the battle of =Scheinovo=, three companies of the 11th Russian
Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under
the pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to
charge their left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the
4th Company, which was most seriously threatened, halted and formed
square as if on the parade ground. During this maneuver, all the
officers and many non-commissioned officers were either killed or
wounded. The heavy losses of the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be
ascribed to this halt under the most violent fire of the enemy.[305]
[305] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 166.
When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, however, the hostile
infantry and artillery will have to stop firing, and it may then be
possible to rally or re-form the defeated force, provided the men will
heed their leaders.
Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front or flank for
the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to fire in close
order only when not themselves subjected to hostile fire. The front and
flanks of a body of infantry in proper formation are equally strong,
but, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that a deployment
toward a flank, for the purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt
to impair the steadiness of the men.[306]
[306] General VON SCHERFF (_Kriegslehren_, II, p. 263) believes
that a frontal charge made by cavalry of sufficient strength has
better chances of succeeding than a charge in deep formation against
a flank. In a frontal charge, the suddenly appearing cavalry is
exposed “only to the fire at will of individual skirmishers whose
continuous front masks the fire of units in rear.” In the other case
(charge against a flank) the cavalry receives not only the fire of
the closed bodies first encountered, but also that of the supports
firing through the gaps between these groups. The frontal attacks
executed with superb gallantry by the French cavalry at Sedan rather
prove the opposite.
If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, such as
ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the hostile cavalry.
It is not necessary, however, for the infantry to occupy the obstacle
itself; in fact, it is better to take up a position some distance
away. The shortness of our rifles obliges us to form the firing unit
at right angles to the line of advance of the approaching cavalry,
and to avoid aiming obliquely. The provision contained in a number of
drill regulations, including the French, that the bodies in close order
(supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable,
as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as the French
infantry did in repulsing the charge made by Bredow’s Brigade and
the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). The deployment from “broad”
and “deep” column to meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be
ordered directly by company commanders on the caution of the battalion
commander, the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided
upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for firing and to
protect the flanks by means of echelons.
In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the
commanders of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading
companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for
example, the following scheme would be appropriate:
_The 1st Company_ forms left front into line so that its front is at
right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry;
_The 2nd Company_ forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the
first company;
_The 3rd Company_ forms right front into line, and prolongs the line
of the first company;
_The 4th Company_ also forms right front into line, or is held in
readiness as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the
approaching cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight
platoons.
[Illustration]
It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge directed
against the flank of a marching column (form line by wheeling by
squads). When the cavalry charge is directed against the head or
the tail of a column, as recommended by the German Cavalry Drill
Regulations (par. 350), there will not be time enough, as a rule, for
the entire company or battalion to form line. It will suffice to let
the leading elements form line, the rear elements moving out of the
column and forming in rear of the flanks as supports.
Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation taken up; in
fact the latter is of importance only when it increases the feeling of
security. The morale of an organization is of more importance than the
formation taken up. A proud confidence in victory and morale are the
only factors which decide success, and the training of infantry should
be such as to develop these qualities.
Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a success if it
causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to take up formations
which interfere with the highest development of its fire, or which
offer favorable targets to the hostile infantry and artillery. This
is especially the case where infantry is in the act of beginning an
assault, when the slightest hesitation may jeopardize success. If
cavalry actually begins to charge at this moment, only the bodies
immediately threatened halt at the signal “attention,”[307] and face
the cavalry; the remainder continue the march.
[307] The German army is the only one that employs an appropriate
signal for this purpose. The attack made by the 28th Infantry Brigade
against the wood of Bor at Königgrätz is very instructive in this
connection. HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 56. At the signal,
“cavalry,” the threatened portions of the brigade halted and formed
square. Fortunately the Saxons had already begun to retire from the
edge of the wood. A stray hostile troop (_Eskadron_) had caused all
the trouble.
The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces such a
tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately threatened,
that they either watch the attack passively, or else too many of them
take a hand in repulsing it. This moment, in which the attention of
the troops is so completely riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized
for the purpose of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a
withdrawal.[308] It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s
self the success which the French army could have gained at Waterloo if
infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s cavalry squadrons.
In the battle of Vionville the German infantry fired at the most
incredible angles at the charging French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s
Brigade was making its charge during the same battle, part of the
infantry of the 6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers,
to follow with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking
place on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct,
as natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by
such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of executing
a movement or holding him with our own fire. It also seems absolutely
necessary to support with rifle fire the charge made by one’s own
cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the hostile infantry from firing
undisturbed on our troopers.
[308] “Every leader should carefully watch the progress of a
cavalry charge, and, as soon as he observes that friendly cavalry has
succeeded in penetrating the hostile line or that the enemy is shaken
and directs all of his fire against the charging cavalry, he should
immediately advance to the attack and be upon the enemy with the
bayonet before the latter recovers his senses. Such an attack will
not have been made in vain, even if the cavalry has been repulsed.”
General GURKO’S comments on the maneuvers of 1893.
Prince FREDERICK CHARLES, in his _Winke für die Offiziere der unter
Meinen Befehlen ins Feld rückenden Truppen_ (1870), also demands that
the infantry should quickly follow up cavalry attacks.
There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout should be
kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry drill regulations
recognize that a charge has greater chances of succeeding when it is
made in deep formation, in successive lines, or simultaneously from
several directions. The fire of the infantry is distributed, and,
unless a good lookout is kept, a part of the cavalry, scarcely or not
at all molested by fire, may perhaps succeed in driving the attack
home. This will be the case when infantry allows itself to be enticed
into developing a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is
made, while the main attack comes from another, or from several other
directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ more rifles
in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, while the mere
threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly led infantry to develop an
excessive volume of fire.
On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at a
considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed to
effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. The men
lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by the hostile
troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping on them, besides
which, the danger space is greater than when the men fire standing. In
rolling or close country, where cavalry cannot be seen by men lying
down, the aiming position kneeling or standing should properly be
assumed. The losses inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured.
Horses and riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright
human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling or
prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the charge. What is
of greater importance, however, is that men standing upright can more
easily execute a change of front, fire on passing cavalry, and use
their bayonets in case the cavalry actually penetrates their line. The
British and Italian regulations very properly prescribe that the front
rank of a body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases.
As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the
steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be
advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short
range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is
not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in
the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging
cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge
in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first
volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be
still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were
absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is
necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does
not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to
reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to
carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction
in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit
is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on
charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short
ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks
of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its
fire until the cavalry has come within short range.
[309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted
charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and
coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All
precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate
itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon
cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister V. WÄLDSTATTEN.
[310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at
140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. _Geschichte des Regiments
Nr. 46_, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the
87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. _Gen. St. W._, II, p.
1217.
[311] The _France Militaire_ contains the following statement
in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the
French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907:
“Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber
bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when
a vital organ had been hit. _At Casablanca, horses that had been
hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while._ This
is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as
out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This
is entirely incorrect. _Many wounded horses carry their riders into
the melée and do not die until the day after the fight._ This was
observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.
“Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of
penetrating the hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first
place, they would have to be hit, and that, in itself, is not such
an easy matter. This is still more difficult for the infantry, if it
knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate the dash of
our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in our
peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time
of peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are
training our cavalry for panic in time of war.”
At =Garcia Hernandez= (1812), a French square was broken by a
wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This
is, however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two
ranks. Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line--whether
or not the horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such
an event in exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are
generally insignificant.
The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it
attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its
fire. During the retreat after the battle of =Jena=, on October 28th,
1806, the Grenadier Battalion _Prinz August_, threatened by hostile
cavalry, did not feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and
attempted to cross the Ucker farther down. In the expectation that
a cavalry charge would be made, square was formed and the officers
were told not to fire until the cavalry had approached to within 20
paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry--the brigade which had crossed
at Golmitz as well as the remainder of Beaumont’s Division, under
its commander, in all nine regiments--approached. The first charge
was made by nine troops (_Eskadrons_) under the division commander.
They approached at a gallop. When the expected fire did not come, the
dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that finally they were
going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the command “Fire” was
given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers fell, the rest
galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent charges were
repulsed in a similar manner.”[312]
[312] VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Der Krieg von 1806-7_, II, p. 279. The
charge of the 5th Lancers at Beaumont forms a counterpart of the
above. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 18.
We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the strength of the
infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and whether the latter charges
from several directions or in several successive lines. A small force
of infantry, especially when it may anticipate attacks from several
directions, must open fire sooner than a strong infantry force which
has to contend with an attack coming from one direction only. In the
first mentioned case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by
one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals.
It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not directly
threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry charge made on
another unit; then it is advisable to open fire at an early moment
in order to break the momentum of the charge at long range. (11th
Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan).
This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should be used.
The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, although this
has been done on the drill ground by well trained soldiers without
impairing the continuity or accuracy of the fire. According to the
table of ordinates of the trajectory (par. 23 German I. F. R.), a
bullet fired when the sight is set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the
feet of the horse, does not rise above the height of a mounted trooper
throughout that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the
target however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement
of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain covered with grass
or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the target and aim above that
line. It is better, therefore, to aim at the breast of the horse, with
sights set at 600 m., and to fire as soon as the target gets within 800
m. On account of the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is
not advisable to change sights.
It is a good plan to fire one volley first and then to employ fire at
will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting the onrushing mass
of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the opinion of the leader,
the first shot may be fired. But this waiting is of great importance
to prevent the fire from becoming wild and ineffective. Since the
elimination of powder smoke, there is no reason why other volleys
should be fired after the first, for in the excitement of the fight
the volley cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find
the rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack of
a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a unit to be kept
better in hand, may be an important factor under certain circumstances
however. The volley should, as a rule, be used by supports that are not
exposed to fire. (8th Company of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st
and 2nd Companies of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers
at Sedan).
Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion
of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the center while
charging, no special importance need be attached to the distribution of
the fire.
As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry
consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per minute), should be
a match for 1-3 troops (_Eskadrons_), and a company of infantry, under
favorable conditions, may be able to deal with a cavalry brigade.[313]
Cavalry can become dangerous for infantry only when the infantry is
surprised, finds no opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and
morale, or attempts to reach cover by running.
[313] A German cavalry brigade consists of eight troops
(_Eskadrons_). _Translator_.
The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville.
At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies
of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny
towards the Metz--Mars-la-Tour _chaussee_. As French infantry was
not on the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and
the Guard Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former
regiment went to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been
assigned to it.
The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m.
distance between them, with two troops (_Eskadrons_) in each line, a
fifth troop (_Eskadron_) following as a reserve. Although hampered
in its movements and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage
wagons and other camp litter that covered the ground, the regiment
nevertheless made the charge with superb gallantry.
The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry,
under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their
leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view
at a distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was
received with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop
(_Eskadron_) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians,
but a part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to
the left. It is said, that of the leaders only one officer and one
non-commissioned officer remained in the saddle, and that only
twenty cuirassiers were rallied after the charge. The left troop
(_Eskadron_) missed its objective completely. The Prussian rear rank
faced about and fired on some French troopers who attempted to make
an attack from the rear and who now also received fire from other
units of Prussian infantry.
During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines
had become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke
in two, the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian
infantry and suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which
did not stop the movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German
accounts, to be sure, do not mention that the second line could
not be seen on account of the powder smoke, and that the fire was
discontinued to let the smoke clear away. When the French line was
100 m. away it received the command _chargez_ and the Prussian
infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which shattered the attack,
the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about 10 paces in
front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired
and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just as
little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the
Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd
Infantry and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry,
deployed in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts
of this battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped
by the fire of this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers
was prevented by Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French
regiment, which had begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22
officers, 208 men (36.2% of its strength), and 243 horses. According
to Dick de Lonlay,[314] after this charge, the regiment was able to
form only 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) of 62 troopers each, instead of 5
troops (_Eskadrons_) of 115 troopers each, which would mean a loss
of 248 men. The first line had suffered the heaviest losses; in
the 4th troop (_Eskadron_), which had lost all of its officers and
non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left.
[314] _Français et Allemands_, III, p. 84. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 11. The French _Gen. St. W._,
II, pp. 301-309, gives the losses as 18 officers, 170 men, and 208
horses.
A charge has a better chance of succeeding if it is prepared by
artillery fire.
During the attack made by two troops (_Eskadrons_) of Landwehr
Hussars against the 1st Battalion _Gyulai_ at =Tobitschau=, an
Austrian square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated
it. During the attack of Bredow’s Brigade at =Vionville=, the
artillery was able to send its last shells against the enemy
immediately past the right flank of the cavalry brigade.
The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in all armies,
compels us to consider the case when infantry must advance over open
ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special units must then be
designated, who, by means of long range fire, repulse the cavalry or
keep it at a distance. At Minden (1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry
succeeded in driving the hostile cavalry from the field, and at
Vauxchamps and Etoges (14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry
succeeded in breaking through the French cavalry. It will be easy to
do the same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not very
superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, machine guns, or
artillery.
Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to bring long
range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them by a flank
attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long and medium ranges
is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, and besides, the better
marksmanship of the infantry is bound to make itself felt at short
ranges. When the infantry has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.)
of the dismounted cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will
still be able to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it
to do so (par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can be
effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in the fight.
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=England.= The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost
universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are
immediately threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be
fixed. An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered
when infantry has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced
to retire; and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by
dust, fog, or heavy rain.
=Austria.= _Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from
cavalry charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of
mind, and morale, and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at
short range._
When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should be
ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the
purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and
for better utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly
made from a short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow
formation than to deploy hastily, provided the fire is delivered with
steadiness. As cavalry frequently attacks only for the purpose of
forcing the infantry to discontinue its advance, or to induce it to
take up a close order formation, all units not immediately threatened
by the attack should continue their movement or remain in their
positions.
When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which make
it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions,
companies, or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly
meet the cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support
each other in warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place
themselves within the protected area thus formed.
The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly
utilizing cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary,
fix bayonets. Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as
seems necessary for warding off the attack; the other parts continue
to carry out the task assigned them. The commander retains a part of
his force in readiness for warding off unexpected attacks.
“When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, the
men should assume the position offering the smallest target.
“If a platoon is _directly attacked_ by cavalry, it will only in rare
cases be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.);
_frequently it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come
up close_. When the platoon participates in warding off a cavalry
attack made against another unit, it may open fire at longer ranges.
“Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off
cavalry.”
=France.= Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be,
has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in
superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand,
and makes good use of its fire.
When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old.
Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations
of combat, especially during critical moments.
If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies
by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its
task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack.
Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet
a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even
the boldest cavalry.
When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for
the infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the
purpose of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts.
=Russia.= Nothing prescribed.
=Japan.= Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced to
discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose
of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial
defeat. Only those fractions that are absolutely necessary for
repulsing the cavalry should take up the fight against it.
VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY.
1. THE PASSAGE OF INFANTRY THROUGH ARTILLERY LINES.
The artillery of a mobilized German army corps with its twenty-four
batteries takes up approximately 2500 m. of the front of about 4000
m. available for the corps. When the ground is unfavorable, the front
available for the other arms may be still further reduced. All remedies
suggested for reducing the frontage required by artillery offer no real
solution of the difficulty; in fact, they have resulting drawbacks,
such as the reduction to ten paces of the interval between guns, and
the posting of artillery in two lines, one in rear of the other. On
account of these drawbacks, a commander will avail himself of these
remedies only in case of the most urgent necessity. The question as
to how infantry can best pass through these long artillery lines is
therefore of especial interest. While artillery will generally seek
commanding positions and avoid covered terrain, infantry will make use
of depressions and cover as the natural routes of advance for passing
by batteries in action and for deploying subsequently in front of them.
In this case the solution of the problem is simple. The difficulties
are disproportionately greater when terrain impassable for artillery
is lacking. Nothing could be more desirable for hostile artillery
which has adjusted its fire upon our batteries, than for the intervals
between our guns to become suddenly filled with infantry, whereupon
our artillery, until now under fire, would have to cease firing so
as not to endanger our infantry. This pause in the fire will be more
noticeable, when our artillery has not yet succeeded in gaining a
superiority of fire over the hostile guns; and its length will depend
upon the depth of the infantry formation. In this case the infantry
cannot avoid heavy losses as it must cross the fire-swept space in rear
of the guns, and soon thereafter must enter the zone of the opponent’s
actual “fire for effect,” besides losing for the time being the support
of its own artillery fire. It is obvious that for infantry to advance
in deployed lines through artillery in action, condemns the latter
to long silence, and even exposes it to the danger of being placed
altogether out of action. Infantry can pass through artillery lines at
certain points only, its passage being subject to an agreement between
the infantry and artillery commanders. It is advisable to have those
batteries cease firing whose fire has the least influence on the course
of the artillery combat. It is, however, of the utmost importance
that the fire of all hostile batteries which possibly could fire on
our infantry, be kept down by the increased fire of our artillery. In
this manner, we may perhaps be able to draw the fire of the hostile
artillery away from those points at which our infantry is to pass
through our artillery line. This is especially important. It will also
be advantageous to designate successively, different points in the
artillery line for the passage of infantry. This should be done for two
reasons: first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance
the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may not be
presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged period; second,
in order that movements by the flank on the part of the infantry may
be obviated. The column of squads would be a suitable formation in
which two battalions of infantry could simultaneously pass through the
line of guns approximately within the space occupied by one battery.
These battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line
toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume firing only
when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. in front of them. The
artillery will be able to resume its fire earlier when it is posted in
rear of a crest, and for this reason such points should be selected for
the passage of infantry.
2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.[315]
[315] A lecture delivered by Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH, R.A., at
the Royal Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled,
_Infantry Formations in the Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of
View_, contains some interesting information. The lecture mentioned
appeared in _The Journal of the Royal Artillery_ for February, 1909.
_Translator_.
In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance for
considerable distances under artillery fire without being able to
take advantage of cover. It should guard against being surprised by
artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation.
In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s adjustment
and observation of fire should be avoided. (See p. 119 supra). To this
end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily long near objects that
are clearly visible at a great distance. If it is noticed that the
enemy is beginning to adjust his fire on some prominent feature of
the terrain, that point should be passed as quickly as possible; the
same is true of a plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns,
separated by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are
advantageous. This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously
striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the enemy to judge
the relative position of the smoke from the burst of his shrapnel with
respect to the target. This increases the difficulties of the enemy’s
observation of fire, as it is not easy for him to determine whether his
shots go over or fall short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m.
deep, as used in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses,
owing to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles.
The narrowest possible front should be presented to the enemy when
within his zone of fire.
It is moreover desirable to make the further observation of fire
difficult for the hostile artillery, and to diminish the effect of his
projectiles at the target (see p. 120 supra) by taking up suitable
formations. Broad, shallow formations were suitable against the shell
fire of the past. However, they had the great drawback of considerably
facilitating the observation of shots falling short or going over, as
the smoke from the burst hid the target in the first case, and as
the target appeared silhouetted against the smoke from the burst in
the second. The cone of dispersion of the modern base charge shrapnel
combines comparatively small lateral spread with great effect in depth.
The effect of a well-placed shrapnel may be confined to one target, and
that of projectiles bursting in the intervals reduced by taking up a
formation in which narrow columns (columns of squads) are separated by
wide intervals (up to 50 m.).
[Illustration]
The range is determined or verified by bracketing; that is, by
enclosing the target between shots which, fired at a known difference
of range, strike respectively, short of and beyond the target. In
France this is done either by battery salvo or by piece. In the former
case, the French distribute the fire equally over the entire space
which they wish to cover with fire; hence, they do not direct it upon
the individual columns, especially when they employ indirect laying,
their favorite mode of procedure. It is in this kind of fire especially
that narrow columns, separated by wide intervals, are a great
advantage, because it is pure accident if a projectile falls so that
its burst can be observed. Moreover, when the columns are not abreast
of each other, the observations of bursts may be contradictory. Thus,
in one salvo, “over” and “short” bursts may be obtained, especially
if several bursts could not be reliably observed, and the salvo will
have to be repeated. When a projectile bursts “short,” immediately
in front of the 1st company, for example, it may be assumed that the
next projectile will be fired at a range increased by 100-200 m. The
1st company should therefore move to the front at double time, the 2nd
and 3rd likewise, while the 4th executes platoons front into line and
takes to cover in anticipation of an “over” shot. The “over” meant
for the 1st company will then be the signal for the 4th company to
rush forward. _The following general rule may be given: A projectile
bursting “over” or just “short” of the target requires that the force
fired upon move quickly; a projectile bursting far “short” of the
target requires that cover be taken._ The platoon and squad leaders of
the attacking force should not betray its presence by standing upright;
the force should disappear absolutely without leaving a trace.
A force cannot, in the long run, prevent artillery from effecting an
adjustment of fire upon it; all it can do is to postpone the beginning
of the fire for effect.
Fire for effect is of three kinds:
1. “Progressive fire” (_tir progressif_).[316] In this fire, after
establishing a bracket (as a rule, one of 200 m.), every piece fires
two rounds at each of four ranges, viz., at a range 100 m. less than
the short limit of the bracket, at both ranges of the bracket, and at a
range 100 m. greater than the long limit of the bracket. For example,
if a bracket has been established for the target at 3000 and 3200 m.,
the battery would fire at 2900, 3000, 3200, and 3300 m.
[316] Called “Zone Fire” in our field artillery. _Translator_.
2. “Sweeping” (_fauchage_) is employed when it is desired to cover
a broader zone. In this every gun fires three rounds at each of the
ranges designated. The first round is fired with the line of sight
directed on the right portion of the target (or on the aiming point).
Before firing each of the succeeding rounds, the direction of the piece
is changed to the left by three turns of the traversing handwheel. At
the next range this process is reversed, the direction of the piece
being changed to the right by three turns of the traversing handwheel
after each round. At 2500 m., for example, a battery can cover, in this
manner, a space twice the width of its own front.
3. “Fire at successive ranges” (searching fire). In this fire salvos
or volleys are delivered at the target at a number of ranges to be
designated by the battery commander.[317]
[317] The Belgian Drill Regulations (1907) give the following
details in regard to the fire effect of a French four gun battery: In
“progressive fire” (_tir progressif_), 32 rounds cover a space 100
m. wide and 400 m. deep (1 fragment covers 6 sq. m.). When direct
laying is employed, one fragment covers 2 sq. m. In “progressive fire
with sweeping” (_tir progressif avec fauchage_), 48 shrapnel cover a
space 200 m. wide and 400 m. deep, each fragment covering 8 sq. m.
Depending upon the range, 1¹⁄₂ to 5 minutes are required to secure
adjustment. (See p. 119 supra).
During the Russo-Japanese war, all close order formations proved
unsuitable under artillery fire, except when the terrain afforded
cover. The Japanese infantry recognized very soon that the best
protection against artillery fire lay in constant motion (irregular
rushes made by small units) and in wide extension. The following
procedure, employed at Yoshirei on July 31st, 1904, seems worthy of
imitation:[318] The several platoons of the companies followed each
other in deployed lines at distances of 200-300 m. When they had to
cross open ground in order to reach a designated line, the platoons
sought to advance by squads, whose men were deployed at intervals of
5-10 paces and who moved at a rapid gait interrupted by breathing
spells. The men invariably assembled when cover was reached. The losses
were insignificant. The Russians also made use of a similar procedure
after their first disastrous experiences. In many instances the
platoons ran forward in single rank. “Change of gait and direction, as
well as the use of loose irregular skirmish lines make it difficult for
the artillery to hit anything.” (Par. 450 German I. D. R.).
[318] SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 337.
Formations used by Infantry during the Russo-Japanese War when under
Artillery Fire.
[Illustration: a.
A platoon in route column forms four columns of files.]
[Illustration: b.
A company in column of platoons, each in line of skirmishers with the
men 2-4 m. apart.
(It would be better to use sections instead of platoons).]
[Illustration: c.
The ranks of the sections in each platoon of the company following each
other at a distance of 100 m.
This formation was taken up from company column (German).]
These formations made it possible to advance at a walk to within 3000
m. of a hostile position; beyond that an advance by rushes had to
be resorted to, in which the attacking force avoided showing itself
simultaneously in long lines. The simplest scheme might be to move
forward in column of sections, each section in skirmish line. Formation
“a” is well adapted for quickly crossing fire swept places, and when
there is hope of re-forming the column subsequently. Formation “c”
is suitable for quickly deploying from company column. However, the
last-named formation no longer guarantees a proper leading of the
company, and quite naturally does not absolutely prevent losses. After
the Japanese 5th Brigade (Nambu) had taken possession of Yuhuntun[319]
and the three houses during the night of March 6/7, 1905, the following
dispositions for attack were made by the Russians about noon on the
7th: On the right, the 5th and 10th Rifle Regiments, in five lines,
each consisting of one battalion (total depth of the formation 600 m.);
in the center, the 123rd Infantry (Koslov) of which the companies of
three battalions were deployed in single rank lines, each consisting
of one company, with the men at intervals of from 3 to 5 paces, the
companies in rear of each other at distances of 100 paces; the IVth
Battalion, similarly formed, was posted in echelon to the left rear.
The 124th Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment,
advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, was fired
on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving from 4000 to 2000 m.
The regiment lost about 600 men. This loss is insignificant when the
size of the target (about 600 m. wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered.
The Japanese did not care to become involved in a serious infantry
action and therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better
to advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded no
cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient time, they crossed
such plains singly, one by one, and then assembled under cover for the
attack.
[319] V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 334.
SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken_, p. 310.
Col. CSICSERICS V. BACSANY, _Unser neues Feldgeschütz_, 1907, pp.
17 and 21.
3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION
was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire on
artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small that the
expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.[320] The gap between the
steel shields of the French field gun is not large enough to exert a
noticeable influence. Steel shields, 3 mm. thick, afford protection
against steel jacketed bullets fired at or beyond 300 m.; against
“S” and “D” projectiles they afford protection, it is said, beyond
500 m. only. Machine guns directing continuous fire on a point may
obtain better results. According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate
can be pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel
projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of which is
precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional density, and
difficulty of manufacture).[321] For this reason, it is better to leave
the task of destroying shielded batteries, even when they are in the
open, to one’s own artillery, than to attack them with infantry. The
fire effect of the infantry is not noticeably increased when delivered
obliquely against the front of the battery. (Par. 184 German I. D. R.).
In Germany the gun commander and cannoneer No. 3, who is posted at the
trail, are then especially endangered; but in order to flank the guns
effectively and to reach in rear of the shields with its fire, the
infantry must move to a flank a distance at least equal to ¹⁄₃ of the
range, and even then the fire effect is very small. The effect may even
be entirely nullified when the flanking fire is delivered from the side
on which the caisson bodies are posted. In this case it suffices to
push forward the caisson body to protect the personnel. It is a good
plan for infantry to direct its fire on the limbers and the reserve.
And again, infantry should not let any opportunity pass to fire on
artillery in motion or in the act of limbering or unlimbering within
effective range. Guns moved by hand into positions from which direct
laying can be employed for the purpose of warding off the infantry
attack, offer particularly favorable targets. Infantry that is to
capture artillery must approach its objective by means of irregular
rushes made by small groups, and increase its fire to the utmost
intensity when the limbers are brought up to the guns. The effect of
artillery fire is small under 200 m., in the absence of canister.[322]
[320] Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated
that infantry was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries
so as to render them immobile; it could only interfere with the
_personnel_, but could not demolish the batteries.
[321] _Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und
Geniewesens_, 1907, No. 5.
[322] The capture of the Smolenski Artillery Battalion on October
14th, 1904 (Shaho). _Artilleristische Monatshefte_ for March, 1908.
[Illustration: Germany.
Field Howitzer.
Field Gun.]
[Illustration: France.]
The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. Hubert, during
the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult it is to unlimber
on open ground when under effective infantry and artillery fire; but,
if five limbers with their teams had not stampeded, perhaps it might
have been possible after a while, for the battery to reopen fire.
Hasse’s Battery, also at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving
in a short time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to
continue its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of the
guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover of a garden wall
at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there under enfilading infantry
fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s Battery lost 17 men and 37
horses; Hasse’s Battery, 38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15
men and 40 horses.[323]
[323] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, III, p. 227.
Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range will always
produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s Battery, and in
the two British batteries of Colonel Long at Colenso.[324] These two
batteries did not cease firing because they had suffered too heavily,
but only because they had expended all their limber ammunition and the
caissons were unable to come up. It was impossible for these batteries
to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to
destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great
quantities of ammunition were expended.
[324] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 43.
At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division
suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections were up and
the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun
squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P.
M., _i.e._, within half an hour.” Immediately after the French attack
had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the
advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery)
could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and
34 horses.[325] This example proves again that when artillery has once
managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated
by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than
temporary position in the first line.
[325] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, 8, pp. 44 and 210.
HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 40.
The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance from
hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry screen, even
if only a weak one. In the days when batteries had no shields, this
screen enabled artillery to devote its entire attention to the
principal target without regard to hostile infantry. At the present
time, especially in positions in rear of a crest and in long artillery
lines, the principal object of such a screen is to prevent hostile
patrols from molesting the artillery. Small detachments posted at wide
intervals are sufficient for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now
as in the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to daring,
sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. (Par.
448 German I. D. R.).
At the battle of =Vionville=,[326] about 5 P. M., four horse and
seven field batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near
=Flavigny= with ten French batteries. After this artillery duel had
lasted half an hour, French Guard Infantry advanced to the attack.
This was repulsed by artillery fire at a range of 800 m., but the
fire of the artillery was diverted from its proper objective by the
advance of this infantry. Similarly, at =St. Privat=, two batteries
of the Guard Artillery had to direct their fire on French skirmishers.
[326] _Gen St. W._, I, p. 557.
IX. THE ATTACK.
The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack can annihilate
him. The decision as to whether the force is to attack or stand on
the defensive depends upon the tactical situation and the will of the
commander, and not upon numerical superiority, of which one is not
aware, as a rule, until after the battle.[327] Determined attacks,
again and again repeated, in spite of all failures, are the surest
means of gaining victory and of preventing the enemy from becoming
aware of his superiority. Only pressing reasons (marked hostile
superiority, necessity for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or
the failure of an attack), and never favorable terrain conditions,
should determine a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the
eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. A
commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the purpose of
letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him in turn, reaps only
the disadvantages and never the advantages of both the offensive and
the defensive.
[327] See _Taktik_, V, p. 121, et seq.
The attack may take various forms, depending upon whether the
dispositions have to be made under hostile fire (surprise and
rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced the initiative and
awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or in a position prepared
for defense (deliberately planned attack). In the last case the
attack requires more careful preparation and in many instances even
necessitates the employment of special auxiliaries (such as guns
capable of high angle fire, and engineer trains). However, the advance
of a strong firing line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and
the uninterrupted fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all
attacks.
Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and the rencontre
there is an attack formation more closely resembling the rencontre in
character, which may be called the _abridged attack_.[328] This attack
formation is used in forestalling the enemy in occupying important
points, in preventing enveloping movements, in carrying out flank
attacks, in surprising the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise,
in relieving the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover
appropriate where the conformation of the ground or the time of day
prohibit a use of the rifle.
[328] _Abgekürzter Angriff_.
The first stages of the fight of the 6th Infantry Division at
=Vionville= are of this character. The fire fight was relegated to
the background in view of the constant movement to the front. The
situation prohibited our properly taking advantage of our superior
marksmanship.--The attack on the railroad cut of =Nuits=, during the
late afternoon of December 18th, 1870, progressed similarly.[329]
[329] KUNZ, _Gefecht von Nuits_, p. 19, et seq.
1. THE SURPRISE.[330]
[330] See _Taktik_, V, p. 190.
Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it
will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from
a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly
opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of
the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by
surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation
and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the
opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming to a decision.
Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as possible,
a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to let the
troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. A bold
decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such a critical
situation.[331] It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and open
fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire is still
less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound to lead to a
complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a defeat can only be
averted, in such a case, by assuming the offensive and thus repulsing
the enemy. The decision for attacking directly from route column
(or, when the enemy is still at a distance, at least for deploying
toward the front) is the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares
an ambuscade for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in
numbers, morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he does
not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm the enemy with
fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An impetuous advance may
perhaps intimidate him, and our losses will be less, at any rate, than
if we turn our backs on him and await our fate in what is at best but
a poor position, as it is taken up, as a rule, during the first moment
of panic. However, even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot
avert disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at least
save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the rencontre on the
battlefield.
[331] “No matter how unexpectedly the enemy may appear, you should
never forget that he may be annihilated either with the bayonet or
with fire. The choice between the two is not a difficult one, and the
formation to be adopted is of secondary importance. When the enemy
is at close quarters, always use the bayonet; if he is still at a
distance, fire on him, and then use the bayonet.” DRAGOMIROV.
Examples of Surprises.
The surprise at =Baalon= on September 17th, 1870.[332] The surprise
at =Vouziers= on December 15th, 1870.[333] The conduct of the French
infantry when surprised in its camp at =Beaumont=.
[332] CARDINAL VON WIDDERN, _Krieg an den rückwärtigen
Verbindungen_, I, p. 149.
[333] _Ibid._, II, p. 125.
During the battle of =Noisseville= there occurred an unusually
instructive episode, the disastrous results of which could have been
easily avoided if the mounted officers on duty with the force had
been sent out to reconnoiter. Six companies of the 44th Infantry
(Prussian) were advancing from =Flanville= against =Montoy=. On
the French side, the 62nd Infantry was likewise advancing against
Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when the 44th Infantry (Prussian)
very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. The French regimental
commander decided to attack at once. “The Prussian detachments
advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west slope of
the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly
encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was
immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns
in close order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians
was attacked from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from
the park through the west entrance of the village. The Prussian
skirmish lines were repulsed in an instant, and thrown into complete
confusion. The hostile fire had an annihilating effect on account of
the short range, and the situation was at once completely reversed.
The Prussians sought in vain to gain a firm foothold in the eastern
outskirts of the village of Montoy. Their losses were heavy. The four
companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) of the 44th Infantry numbered
in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 officers and 480 men,
of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) were taken
prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th and
12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective
strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%.”[334]
[334] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 32, et seq.
This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th
Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position
to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence,
the French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from
Flanville, which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering
some losses.
When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, the advantage
rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and advances to the charge
first. This onslaught with cold steel should become second nature
to the troops. In traversing close country, a force should be in a
formation that enables it to develop an adequate fire and to make a
charge in compact formation. A line formation is entirely unsuitable,
as a rule, on account of the difficulties of the terrain to be
overcome, and in a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control
the men.
For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[335]
company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons
advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads
in columns of files. If the platoons or sections were to advance in
single file, the columns would be too long, and it would be next to
impossible to maintain the intervals. The six or eight small columns
of files of a platoon are, on the other hand, close enough together to
keep each other in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed
for firing and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily
than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can exercise
better control over the men than in skirmish line, which invariably
bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, while connection
is not maintained at all at other points and march direction and
cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the Bois de Givodeau during the
battle of Beaumont).[336]
[335] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 117, et seq.
[336] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 125, with sketch. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER,
_Beaumont_, p. 112, et seq.
Examples: The conduct of the infantry of the IXth Army Corps in
passing through the Niederwald of Wörth, may serve as a model. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 108, et seq.
Engagement of La Landrière on January 11th, 1871. _Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 292.
_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 109.
2. THE RENCONTRE.[337]
(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).
[337] See also _Taktik_, V, p. 192, et seq.
“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in war. During
marches in campaign the opponents will frequently not gain detailed
information of each other until they come into actual contact. Thus
the rencontre develops out of a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352
German I. D. R.).
Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision occurs
frequently at a point not intended by either; as every minute brings
the heads of the two columns closer together no time is to be lost.
The commander who desires to wait until he can come to a decision
consonant with the results of the reconnaissance will arrive too late.
The tactical situation in its entirety determines whether or not an
attack should be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting
moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be
any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment
from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but
because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line.
The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to
regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose
of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a
rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander
who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in
throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which
would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed,
may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the
attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part
of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a
definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered
terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while
in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose
that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards
terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon
the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack
alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the
action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that
the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced
troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). _The rencontre increases
the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the
troops._
* * * * *
The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is
most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is
to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable
conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground
be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while
moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold
important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of
the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the
advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying
on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if
they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the
advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should
quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he
should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the
point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances
the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear
so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable
terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the
commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and
then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main
body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior
numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much
easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to
answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard
will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in
regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his
columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer
to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell,
until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment
has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand
caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat
frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has
been most successful in making preparations for going into action by
developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is
artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division
encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this
does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically
concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss
of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. _The general
situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the
commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the
opposing forces._
_Issue of orders._ See _Taktik_, V, p. 197.
The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the
commander (_i.e._, whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for
attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the
location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should
be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently
cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered
at once.
[338] Par. 350 German I. D. R.
The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment
over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank,
by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to
the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance
to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of
deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short
range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the
troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its
fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once
move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions
received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel
the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every
fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against
its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will
instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is
unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable
to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs
should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse
state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements.
But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the
troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile
dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile
position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field
glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can
never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack
home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When
opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably
be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From
here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in
addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in
some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating
losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation.
One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the
training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not
give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the
ground gained, and persevere.[340]
[339] This induces the British _Infantry Training_ to prescribe
that in a rencontre a concentration for attack should invariably be
ordered.
[340] Military history furnishes a multitude of examples of
the fact that a force can persevere in spite of the most galling
fire (St. Privat. Gorni Dubniac). A reverse does not occur, as a
rule, until the advent of unforeseen circumstances. The Brigade of
Highlanders held out for hours at Magersfontain, and an insignificant
change of front on the right flank subsequently caused the whole line
to retire. See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 74.
When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity of
occupying important supporting points and of gaining ground for the
concentration for action, requires a broad front to be covered. (Par.
357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, which will arrive soon thereafter,
will then bring relief to the infantry in critical situations.
In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight is at a
standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may notice that,
although it is impossible to push the attack home without further
reinforcements, the space in which the concentration for action is to
take place, is secured against a hostile attack, or that the enemy has
been deprived of the initiative and has been thrown on the defensive.
This is the moment in which the commander regains the initiative
and in which, by means of an _attack order_, he can dispose of the
troops of the main body as he sees fit. _The “rencontre” differs
from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the latter, the
concentration for action can proceed smoothly as desired by the
commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, for the time being,
dictates the course of action. Therefore the commander should make
efforts to free himself from this restraint, i.e., he should endeavor
to launch his troops in a manner not influenced by the dispositions of
the enemy._
The degree of control which a commander retains over the course of the
combat depends upon the promptness with which he gains a general idea
of the situation. For this, if for no other reason, he should be as
near the head of the column as possible while on the march. The troops
sent first into action, supported by the artillery, must put every
available man into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the
enemy and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an entity.
In any case, the battalions of the main body should not be successively
thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, for the purpose of
overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving the advance guard from
a dilemma. The machine gun batteries, whose employment was particularly
important during the preparatory stage of the fight, should be
withdrawn as early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in
the hands of the commander.
In bringing the main body into action, deployments by the flank should
be avoided. The deployment should be initiated by subordinate units
(in an infantry division, by regiments) moving out of the route column
and toward the objective points determined by the purpose of the
combat.[341]
[341] General VON SCHLICHTING holds a different view in his work
_Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, I, p. 106. “In a rencontre,
the piece on the board of the battlefield can be moved only when the
next one is clear of the march column and ready for action. Further
action is then not only permissible but imperative.”
Provisions of Various Regulations.
In all the regulations, those of Germany excepted, the rencontre is
treated with marked reserve.
=Austria.= “When a collision occurs with an opponent who is likewise
in the act of advancing--_rencontre_--the different parts of the
force and their subdivisions must make strenuous efforts to advance
in the designated direction. In a rencontre, it will be proper to
concentrate the main forces, prior to making the attack, only in case
it becomes apparent during the preparatory stage of the action that
the enemy has gained a visible start in deployment. The endeavor
to forestall the enemy, and the necessity of promptly reinforcing
the troops already engaged, will often curtail or preclude the
preparatory concentration of the main body in a rencontre, and force
the commander to permit at least parts of his approaching troops to
go directly into action.” If conditions are eminently favorable for
the enemy at the point where the collision occurs, it may sometimes
be more desirable to stand provisionally on the defensive with the
advance guard until other troops come up.
“Under such circumstances, it may even be advisable to withdraw the
troops covering the march; but in that event, the relation of the
force to neighboring columns should be considered.”
=France.= The commander should decide promptly whether to attack, to
stand on the defensive, or to avoid an engagement for the time being.
The regulations do not provide for employing the troops directly
from route column. The advance guard is frequently thrown on its own
resources; it is often forced to fight on a very broad front, and
to place all of its troops into action at the very beginning of an
engagement for the purpose of seizing and holding supporting points
necessary for the subsequent deployment.
Examples.
1. The deployment for action of the 5th Infantry Division from the
defile of Gorze, against the French Division Vergé, at the battle of
=Vionville= (16th August, 1870), is especially instructive.[342]
[342] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 549. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 50. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 32, et seq.
_Taktik_, V, p. 210.
2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at =La Thibaudine=
(=Beaumont=). The French concentration for action had progressed
farther than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry
was insufficient.[343]
[343] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 90.
3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at =Trautenau=.[344] Likewise the
fight of the Vth Army Corps at =Nachod= on June 27th, 1866.
[344] _Taktik_, V, p. 206. STROBL, _Trautenau_, p. 8, et seq.
KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, p. 16.
X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE.
1. LESSONS OF WAR.
During the =Boer War= (1899-1902), the British infantry always
attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated
fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British,
their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be
traced to the following causes:--
1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be
surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of
the Guards at =Modder River=). In many instances, the British forces
were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s
Brigade at =Colenso=).
2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted
against each other. (=Modder River=, =Magersfontain=, =Colenso=).
3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire
surprises carried out by small detachments.
4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.
5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions).
The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted
action was a rare exception.
6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of
an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.
7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At
=Magersfontain= only 8¹⁄₂ battalions out of 13, and at =Colenso=
only 6 battalions out of 16¹⁄₂, had been seriously engaged. When
=Spionskop= was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged.
The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.
The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.
The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[345] (Russian I. D. R.
of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep
formations. The bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the
result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the
consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire,
were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the
endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible,
led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary
conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of
the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive
stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of
creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably
with this splendid offensive spirit.
[345] “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive
spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting.” COUNT MARENZI.
The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit
of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy
tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and
initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night
combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was
carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who
left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold
and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected
nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the
Japanese combats were--
1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;
2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of
infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole
front;
3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point
where the decisive attack was not to take place;[346]
[346] The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.
4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;
5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;
6. The absence of pursuit.
The fights at =Wafangu=,[347] as well as the attack made by the Guard
and the 12th Division at the =Yalu=[348] proceeded entirely according
to German pattern.
[347] _Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg_,
Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank
by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive.
[348] _Ibid._, I, p. 79, et seq. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 2.
A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the
Russian artillery--whose ballistic properties were superior to those
of its antagonist--brought a greater number of guns into the field,
and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically
inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[349]
[349] The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing
forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese
confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps
10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more
than the Japanese.
The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the
government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[350]
The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to
maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing
remained for the Japanese--unless they wished to renounce the
offensive entirely--but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in
front. Since the advantages of the attack--superior numbers and the
freedom of choosing the point of attack--were thus dissipated, the
victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As
the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased
more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but
to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness
as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available
precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development
of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward
resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the
purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of
their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese
were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance
of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the
offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although
their movements were retarded thereby.
[350] C. H. _Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und
neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur_, 1907, October number.
The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced
by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly
country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and
long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged
to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth
Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell
to their lot.
Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard
to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[351] Units were
pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each;
and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain
touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if
for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and
in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of
developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to
mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist
army had a special _penchant_ for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[352]
usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances,
begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed
home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but
assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined
to intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify
quickly a captured position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will
find the best lessons applicable to our conditions.
[351] _Streffleur_, 1907, January number.
[352] This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made
“as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance
was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill
Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On
the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length
of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.
Examples.
1. The engagement of the Guard Division at =Yangtsuling= on July
31st, 1904.[353]
[353] GERTSCH, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A
Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 313. _Urteile und Beobachtungen
von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 57.
2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry
Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against =Temple Hill= (=Terrayama=),
which was held by 4-6 companies.[354]
[354] BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, p.
132.--VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 23.
Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and
supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500
m., the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried.
The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated
fire.
3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, 1904,
against a height south of =Huaku= (battle on the =Shaho=).[355]
[355] _Ibid._, p. 24.
4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) under
General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against the
heights south of =Shotasko= (battle on the =Shaho=).
_Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade._
Frontage about 2000 m.
4. Infantry: 29. Infantry:
5. and 6. 4. and 2. 12. and 11. Cos. 10. and 2. Cos.
--------- --------- ----------- ----------
7. and 8. 1. and 3. Cos. 9. and 3. Cos.
Brigade Reserve:
9. and 10. Cos. 11. and 12._ Cos.
--------------- -----------------
4. Infantry. 29. Infantry.
Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed:
1. and 4. Cos. II. Bn.
-------------- and -------------
29. Infantry. 29. Infantry.
First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval
between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces.
The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and
the distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men
that could not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then
followed independently. At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at
will, which lasted for two minutes, and then advanced by rushes
by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the
battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were
absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve
approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between
reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The
last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s position,
and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only
to 235 men.[356]
[356] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24. SIR IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, II. Consult the same work
on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the
Chosenrei Pass.
* * * * *
In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain
devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced.
The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing
lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very
gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion
800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[357] This caused the attack to
falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the
hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to
intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another.
[357] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 47.
Examples.
1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, 1904,
at =Shiliho= (battle on the =Shaho=).[358]
[358] _Ibid._, p. 26.
2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to
9th, north of =Madiapu= (battle of =Mukden=). This division required
three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting
distance of the enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was
constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that
under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[359]
[359] _Ibid._, p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry
Division, in _Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 121.
3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904
(battle of =Mukden=).[360]
[360] BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, pp.
217, et seq., 225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand
bags, consult _ibid._, pp. 236 and 292.
Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons
of the =Russo-Japanese war=, make the following deductions:
“* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance
by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been
done up to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover,
the advantages of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of
the action, and the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and
long range fire on such lines in which it is desirable to advance,
without halting on the way, to within 1000 yards of the enemy. The
necessity of gaining a superiority of fire before advancing to the
assault, and the necessity of an increased supply of ammunition, are
confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated that the bayonet of the
infantryman is still capable of playing an important role in battle.”
2. THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SUCCESS DEPENDS.
The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat
is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that _esprit_
and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than
any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called
upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over
open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said
Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations
that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under
cover. _But every superior commander ought to consider what such an
operation portends._” Heavy losses are unavoidable in a destructive
fire fight lasting for hours.[361] The attack will not succeed so long
as the enemy commands the plain with his fire. The commander of the
attacking force must find ways and means to wrest this command from the
enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated that
an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly prepared by infantry
and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate forces, and is pushed
with determination close to the enemy; and that such an attack is, in
fact, superior to the defensive. The success of an attack on a position
prepared for defense might depend upon the following preliminary
conditions:
(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining the most
favorable direction for the attack.
(b) Occupation of the foreground of the hostile position. When the
foreground is entirely open, an advance must be made under cover of
darkness up to the medium ranges.
(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest coöperation of
infantry and artillery.
(d) Timely determination of the point at which the decisive attack is
to be made.
(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, so as to
allow of delaying the opening of fire until the force is as close as
possible to the enemy.
(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment of
a strong force for the purpose of bringing about a superiority of
infantry fire. The organization detailed to make the attack must have
its entire effective strength available for accomplishing its proper
task, and not be compelled to detach parts for guarding its flanks.
(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the part of the
attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any idea of assuming the
offensive, at least for the time being, the attacker should not allow
the advantage to escape him of choosing time and direction of the
attack.
[361] General VON SCHLICHTING, in his work _Taktische und
strategische Grundsätze_, maintains the opinion--in contrast to
General VON SCHERFF--that open terrain commanded by hostile fire is
impassable for infantry. At any rate, military history has yet to
furnish proof of this.
3. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.
Reconnaissance. Preparatory Position.
“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces the
initiative for the time being. The attacker will then have time to
reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh all the circumstances
that favor the attack. He should not limit himself to reconnaissance
by the cavalry and to observation through field glasses. Mounted
officers’ and infantry officers’ patrols should supplement this
reconnaissance, and complete the information gained as the enemy is
approached.” (Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.).
The local reconnaissance (see p. 248 supra) should be conducted with
all possible care; timely directions should be given in regard to
it during the approach to the battlefield;[362] the activity of the
reconnoitering bodies should continually increase as the enemy is
approached; and the work itself should be divided in a systematic
manner. Excessive thoroughness may retard reconnaissance work to
such an extent, on short winter days especially, that success may be
jeopardized. (Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of action
will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It would be wholly
wrong to postpone the decision for making the attack until something
definite is known of the strength and dispositions of the enemy.
These matters are almost never cleared up until after the battle. The
decision as to whether or not an attack should be made is determined
primarily by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). The
latter may force a commander to advance promptly without permitting
him to await the results of the reconnaissance. The character of the
terrain and the preparation the enemy is known to have made, determine
whether the commander ought to attack at once, whether he ought to
utilize the cover of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops,
or whether he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his
position.
[362] According to experience the reconnaissance work generally
flags during a halt, although that is the very time when an increased
activity is desirable. The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on
August 18th, 1870, from the arrival at Caulre until the advance guard
opened the fight, is particularly instructive. _Der 18. August_, pp.
124, et seq. and 215.
The information required as a basis for this decision will, as a rule,
not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the objections
arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot be avoided, if
it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight into the enemy’s
situation. It cannot be expected that the defender will passively
permit the assailant to gain an insight into his dispositions. A
feint will accomplish nothing; the enemy must be seriously engaged,
so that he will show his hand.[363] Yet in spite of these combats,
misapprehensions are not precluded.
[363] It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on
October 10th, 1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army
before it had completed its concentration for battle. The advance
guards of the Reserve Division and of the 5th Division encountered
advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth Army Corps), and at
Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, however, not
recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been
encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the
night 10/11th October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the
11th. 9th Supplement to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, p. 327.
It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor to
gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find themselves
suddenly within short range of the enemy. In such a situation, the
detachment should maintain its position, as its fire will frequently
facilitate the approach of the other attacking troops. Almost every one
of the more serious engagements furnishes examples illustrating this
feature.[364]
[364] The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the
“three houses” (Yuhuntun near Mukden). _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907,
p. 78. The perseverance of the troops in the Palungshan works,
captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being enveloped on both flanks.
(Port Arthur). _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, 4, pp. 81 and 91.
The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard
Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). _Urteile und
Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 60.
In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being driven back, if
for no other reason, it is advisable to place in readiness an adequate
force of artillery. As the artillery is protected by shields, it can
take up the fight even against superior artillery with better chances
of succeeding than in the past.
If the commander has decided to attack and has determined against
what part of the hostile position the main attack is to be made, the
foreground of the hostile position is at once occupied, and the enemy’s
advanced troops forced back, so as to prevent the defender from gaining
an insight into the dispositions of the assailant.
The assailant should launch as few troops as possible for initiating
the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely in a fire fight with
the infantry of the hostile main position, even if the terrain would
permit a covered approach to short range. If the advanced troops allow
themselves to be enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the
danger of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole
force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for the main
attack.[365]
[365] “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain
permits to the enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose
of opening fire.”
Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue precipitation
in issuing orders may place advanced troops in such an unfavorable
situation. If the defender allows himself to be tricked into assuming
the offensive for the purpose of driving off harassing detachments, so
much the better for the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then
find an opportunity to fire on the enemy.[366]
[366] The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of
French infantry during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der
18. August_, pp. 174 and 179.
=Austria.= “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will
have to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line
may be formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will
nevertheless still abstain from advancing into the zone of effective
fire.” The Austrians usually employ strong covering bodies. The
Germans desire to ensure simultaneous action on the part of all the
troops in opening the combat.
At =Spicheren= the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under
the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only
occupied by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders
to General von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of
Frossard’s Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which
the artillery was posted.[367]
[367] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.
At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the Vth
Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer with
four battalions at =Wörth= and =Spachbach= (1500 m. apart) and to
occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac
Mahon was in position.[368]
[368] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 320.
The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the advance guard,
into a preparatory position, is made in such a manner that units are
opposite their objectives when the subsequent forward movement against
the enemy is begun.[369] This frequently requires a rearrangement of
the forces so that even an assailant who is numerically inferior may
be superior at the decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the
front and flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the
economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to failure, and
is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly superior in numbers
or morale.
[369] The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near
Ste. Marie aux Chênes, against St. Privat. _Der 18. August_ p. 408.
A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on the course
of the combat and makes it difficult to change the direction of the
attack. Route columns, taking advantage of all available cover, will,
therefore, be retained as long as possible, and only subordinate units
permitted to march directly toward their proper objectives, until the
hostile fire compels a more extended deployment (development). The
preparatory position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front
of the hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to
accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and to shield
it from the observation and the fire of the enemy.
In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have to be placed
in a preparatory position when three kilometers or more from the enemy,
even when the latter’s artillery will in all probability be neutralized
by our own.
“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various units into the
preparatory position, it is advisable, especially in close country,
to have them move from one covered position to another. If this is
done, units whose march was favored by the nature of the ground, will
not arrive prematurely within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while
others who had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are
still a considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his
dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance from
one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German I. D. R.).
Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position carefully
prepared for defense will consume several days, the assailant placing
his artillery in position on the first day and reconnoitering under
cover of infantry, which is pushed to the front.[370] The troops of
the first line are pushed forward far enough before daylight so that
they can intrench under cover of darkness and open fire at dawn.
This will be more difficult to accomplish when covering troops or
advanced positions are located in front of the hostile position. If the
assailant has succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops
back upon the main position, an advance to within effective range may
be made during the night in order that the fire fight may be opened on
the succeeding day. Although the chance of taking the enemy by surprise
is eliminated in such a case, the advantage of having diminished the
distance that will have to be crossed under fire remains.[371]
[370] The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail
in _Taktik_, V, p. 237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest
cooperation of field artillery, foot artillery, infantry and pioneers.
[371] The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an
interesting example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this
instance, was made during the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy.
It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, which must
be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the leading line. These
rear echelons must either be intrenched or at least sheltered by masks.
General actions should be avoided at night.
4. THE COÖPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN BATTLE.
Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), the
infantry has to advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. In
doing this the infantry must either pass by or through the artillery
which is already engaged.[372]
[372] See p. 316, et seq.
During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in spite of the
mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced the artillery of both
belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse slope of heights. When this
was neglected and when batteries went into position in the open, within
effective range, they were quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel
caused both sides to advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order
formations at an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively.
This alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished
a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident that the first
few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred coincidentally with
the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, which was superior both
as regards numbers and power. The new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in
contrast with the previous edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the
infantry attack should not be postponed until a superiority of fire
has been gained. Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from
the modern armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile
positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at Plevna
and the British in South Africa).
“_The principal duty of field artillery is to support the infantry
in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably connected
with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, always fight the
targets that are most dangerous for its infantry._” (Par. 364 German F.
A. D. R.).
The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe that the guns
should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry (par. 375), and
that single batteries should accompany the infantry attack to within
close range of the enemy (par. 471). When an assault is to be made, the
infantry expects the artillery to direct its fire against the point of
attack until immediately before the assault begins.
“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with the support
of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable protection, even at
the short ranges. _At the decisive moment the artillery should not
shrink even from the heaviest infantry fire._” (Par. 369 German F. A.
D. R.).
“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery to
consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively
supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is chosen as
an objective will depend upon the situation. As a rule, the hostile
artillery will be the proper objective for our artillery during the
preparatory stage of the action. As the distance between the opposing
infantry forces decreases, it will become more and more necessary for
the artillery to devote itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432
German F. A. D. R.).
If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote itself
for some time to the most important target without regard to the
hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely occupying the latter’s
attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. R.). To silence artillery in a
concealed position requires curved fire and a good deal of ammunition;
but, on the other hand, artillery so posted cannot fire upon advancing
skirmishers.[373] Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant
should force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose
itself to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. D.
R.).
[373] This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted
quickly enough, and that it is difficult to follow moving targets.
Besides, when the targets are small and numerous, they are difficult
to hit.
The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of both sides
will engage each other’s attention with only a small part of their
guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile infantry. It is
obvious that the infantry will very soon demand of its artillery in
definite terms that it should first annihilate the hostile artillery
before the infantry can think of continuing the attack.
The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the fusion of
activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely new departure.
The commencement of the infantry attack is accordingly no longer
dependent upon the result of the artillery combat; on the contrary,
both combats are of equal importance and proceed along parallel lines;
the only danger is that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the
front before a superiority of fire has been gained.
Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned
by the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched
artillery can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional
circumstances, as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as
soon as the hostile fire becomes too hot, and resume its fire again
when that of the enemy abates. The infantry attack should therefore
be launched without awaiting the result of the artillery combat, but
the infantry must insist upon the artillery completely engaging the
attention of the hostile guns during the advance. Another reason for
not awaiting the outcome of the artillery combat, lies in the great
frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful attack made by a division
will then frequently cause the neighboring unit to make an immediate
attack.”
=Austria= (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the
necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long
as the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved
a noticeable success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile
artillery, the infantry attack remains a difficult undertaking.”
=France.= The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action:
The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as
quickly as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely
necessary. The commander should give the order for the attack only
when the preparation is considered sufficient.
=England.= The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing
infantry forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so
as to compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile
batteries have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances
to the attack, the fire is directed upon the point of attack in order
to prepare and to cover the assault.”
=Italy.= The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm
for infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from
the start by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery
or infantry, the attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to
draw its fire upon themselves, in order to facilitate the deployment
of their own infantry. If, on the other hand, the hostile artillery
remains concealed for the purpose of saving its fire for the infantry
when the latter offers a favorable target upon arriving within
effective range, then it would seem advisable for the artillery of
the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only with
enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s
artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the
defender’s artillery is compelled to come into action in order to
support its own infantry against the advance of the attacker’s
infantry.”
The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry and
artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing at all times
with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting guidons),[374]
since the elimination of powder smoke and the adoption of neutral
tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance that, while we have
a signal for increasing the range of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have
none for indicating that the fire is to be concentrated upon certain
points. “Uninterrupted communication with the fighting line in front
must be provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal
or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are primarily
to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the enemy, in order
that the artillery may keep up its fire as long as possible.” (Par. 376
German F. A. D. R.). In England, it has been suggested to indicate the
point upon which fire is to be concentrated, by the colored ball of
smoke of a special projectile. It requires strict attention on the part
of the infantry to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery.
Every opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced
under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. This
is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is to be blinded by
a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of the artillery will either
cause the most advanced line to make a rush, or the troops of the rear
line to come up to the firing line in order to reinforce it or to carry
it forward as much as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable
shield for the infantry (_véritable bouclier de l’infanterie_).”
LANGLOIS.
[374] During the attack on the Waterberg, on August 11th, 1904, the
various units were ordered to carry, on their outer flanks, flags
attached to long poles. These flags were white in Estorffs, red in
v.d. Heyde’s, blue in Müller’s, and green in Deimling’s detachment.
5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.[375]
[375] See _Taktik_, V, p. 138.
The reconnoitering troops are charged with the duty of ascertaining
the parts of the hostile position which can be approached under cover,
which are weaker than the others (frequently true of the flanks),[376]
or which can be enfiladed. The attack will usually be directed
against the weakest point in the hostile position, or that on which
the greatest volume of fire can be concentrated from enfilading or
commanding positions. At all other points of the battlefield, the
assailant will endeavor to deceive the opponent, with weak forces, as
to his true intentions, but, at the decisive point, he should launch
superior numbers. The French regulations contend that such weak points
will only become apparent during the course of the fight, and therefore
separate the troops into a preparatory and a decisive combat group.
[376] Example: The right flank of the French position at Wörth, and
at Roncourt (St. Privat).
The desire to strike the weakest point in the enemy’s line causes
the decisive blow to be directed against a flank, and the numerical
superiority requisite for gaining the superiority of fire, leads to
6. ENVELOPMENT.
(Pars. 392-396 German I. D. R.).
The desire of the attacker to put a superior number of rifles into the
fight, in order to gain a superiority of fire more quickly, naturally
leads to an extension of the firing line and to an overlapping of the
defender’s line. The advantage of overlapping the enemy’s line lies in
the fact that part of the line attacked is exposed to both frontal and
oblique fire. The effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending
the wing of the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line
succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only the
hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment is
brought about with the result that the lines of fire of the assailant
cross each other within the hostile position. If the defender refuses a
wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. This will cause such heavy
losses that the defender will begin to succumb first at the salient
point of his line. A further advantage is gained by a pressure on the
enemy’s line of retreat.
[Illustration]
Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;[377] they may
perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate him.
[377] It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks
made by the Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made
by the 72nd, 40th and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height
of Maison Blanche south of Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-10, p. 128.
For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether the
commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile flank;
individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, regiments,
finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear of the front of the
enemy should not lead the enveloping force to attempt to execute
another enveloping movement when it encounters a newly formed front.
Surprise is, to a certain extent, essential to the success of a flank
attack.[378] The troops holding the enemy in front [secondary attack]
must, therefore, hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance
about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that he
will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. If
this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham from
reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing force with
more troops than are absolutely necessary. In this connection, compare
the conduct of the 1st Army at Königgrätz and of the Prussian Vth Army
Corps at Wörth with the vacillating action of the Russian IIIrd and
Ist Armies at Sandepu.[379] So long as the enemy is not firmly held
in front, he will be able to evade an envelopment by withdrawing. The
combats of the Boers in the Orange Free State furnish numerous examples
of this fact. The Austrian regulations have very properly coined the
term “attack on two fronts”, which better indicates the task of both
parts of an attacking force.
[378] The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of
Forbach at Spicheren by six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. _Gen.
St. W._, I. p. 356. The assault and capture of the Mont de Brune
(Beaumont) by 6¹⁄₂ Prussian companies, which were followed by 4²⁄₃
companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 battalions and 3
batteries; 6 guns were captured. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp.
132 and 227.
[379] _Taktik_. V. p. 42.
Whether the decisive blow is directed against the front or a flank,
depends upon the result of the fire. The advantages offered by an
enveloping movement must not lead to holding the enemy once and for
all in front, while the main attack is directed against his flank. A
frontal attack made in conjunction with a threatening demonstration
against the hostile flank frequently offers far greater prospects
of success.[380] If a superiority is to be employed to advantage,
an envelopment must be made; all objections advanced against the
“enveloping craze” are disposed of by this statement.[381] “A condition
precedent to an envelopment is that the enemy be held in front. For
this purpose a determined demonstration is most effective.” (Par. 392
German I. D. R.).
[380] The attack on Flanville, on September 1st, 1870, is an
instructive example. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 87. _Gen. St. W._, II.
p. 1407.
[381] V. D. GOLTZ, _Das Volk in Waffen_, pp. 328 and 332. BLUME,
_Strategie_, p. 170. MECKEL, _Truppenführung_, p. 221.
The risks involved in an envelopment must not be
overlooked--overextension and dispersion of the troops;[382] the
possibility that the troops fighting in front and those fighting on the
flank, separated from each other, may be defeated in detail, whether
this be brought about by the defender assuming the offensive, or by
the force holding the enemy in front allowing itself to be enticed
into making a premature advance and suffering a defeat before the
envelopment has a chance to become effective.
[382] The attack made by François’ Brigade during the battle of
Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 318. Between 12 and 1 o’clock, this
brigade covered a front of 4000 m. See p. 262, supra.
“The envelopment is effected in the simplest manner if the forces
designated for this task, when still at a distance from the enemy, are
given a march direction that will bring them against the hostile flank.
“When initiated during the development for action or when carried out
by retained reserves, the envelopment is much more difficult.” (Par.
393 German I. D. R.).
In the last-mentioned case it may happen that the force detailed to
make the flank attack strikes the enemy’s front instead of his flank.
The same is true of attempts to envelop with parts of the infantry of
the first line that are already deployed, perhaps already engaged,
when the terrain is not specially favorable for such a movement. Such
movements may, in special cases, be carried out at night. (Enveloping
movements of the divisions of the Japanese IIIrd Army at Mukden). As a
rule, this brings about only an overlapping and flanking of the parts
of the hostile position next adjacent to the wing making the movement,
but does not produce a concentric effect on the hostile flank. Yet,
even weak detachments that reach positions from which they are able to
enfilade the enemy, facilitate the advance to the front.
In starting an enveloping movement when at a considerable distance
from the enemy, the force which is to make it, is directed upon a
point located in rear of the hostile position, approximately where
his reserves are presumed to be. If then the fighting line is further
extended toward the outer flank, the assailant avoids facing the
hostile front directly, and will almost invariably have a start over
the defender in extending the threatened wing. The troops still in the
act of withdrawing from the route column naturally take charge of the
protection of the flanks.[383]
[383] Compare the deployment for action of the 1st Guard Division
at Königgrätz with that of the 4th Japanese Division at Wafangu. In
the last-mentioned case, the leading (10th) brigade was launched
in a very skillful flank attack; the second brigade took charge of
protecting the flank.
If a flank march in front of the enemy should become necessary, it can
be undertaken with sufficient safety only when proper preparations
have been made--distribution in depth, shortening of route columns,
due regard being had to protection of the front and flanks--to permit
a deployment of the force at the right moment and in a suitable
formation toward the hostile side.[384] Within effective range of the
enemy, such a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover
is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force the
troops making the flank march to face to the front.[385]
[384] V. SCHLICHTING. _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_,
I, p. 90, et seq. The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions
against the Hill of Forbach (Spicheren) is especially instructive
in this connection. The attacking force was threatened by hostile
troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment caused the
attacking force to face toward the front of the French position.
As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in
order to be pushed into the fight again at another place. GERNIER,
_Einmarschkämpfe_, p. 184.
[385] Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at
Villermain-Cravant, on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a
violent snow storm and thick weather made it possible for this force
to disengage itself from the enemy and to join the 1st Bavarian Army
Corps at Cravant.
The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French
position on the =Hallue=[386]: The 30th Brigade used the road leading
along the hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its
movement. The leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry,
on debouching from Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying
flanking fire and endeavored to advance in the face of it, while the
brigade commander, energetically carrying out the orders given him,
led the 68th Infantry toward Frechencourt, thus forestalling several
French battalions that were hurrying up from the east. The village
was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry, but a frontal offensive
movement against the hostile main position could not be carried out
from here either, in spite of the inferiority of the French troops.
[386] V. MALACHOWSKI, _Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht_, p.
24, et seq. KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the
conduct of the 15th Infantry Division, which was to hold the enemy in
front and which advanced prematurely before the enveloping movement
of the 16th Division had become effective, consult p. 282 supra, and
_Taktik_, V. p. 163.
Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at once without
being first placed in a preparatory position[387] or whether it should
first be concentrated, depends upon the situation of the troops engaged
in front with the enemy (the necessity of relieving the pressure on
the Ist Army engaged in front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon
the counter-measures taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters
a newly formed front, it would be a mistake for him to attack
successively with the different units.
[387] According to the opinion of General V. SCHLICHTING, a
preparatory position should be taken up. _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze_, III, pp. 133 and 154, et seq. See _Taktik_, V, p. 174.
Whether the troops holding the enemy in front participate in the
assault during an enveloping movement, depends upon circumstances. They
may frequently better ensure the success of the attack by delivering an
enfilading fire than by advancing. The commander should, at any rate,
not lose sight of this advantage. If both groups (the enveloping and
the holding group) advance to the decisive attack, they should do so
simultaneously. The group holding the enemy in front must resist the
temptation of moving to the front before the envelopment can become
effective.[388]
[388] Consult _Der 18. August_, pp. 377, 561 and 590. In regard to
the attack made by the Guard and the Saxons and the premature attack
made by the Guard at St Privat.
The attack on =Ste. Marie aux Chênes=, on August 18th, 1870,[389] and
that made by the 37th Infantry Brigade on =Ladon=[390] are models
worthy of imitation. “The brigade commander personally directed
Lieutenant-Colonel v. Hagen (commanding the troops holding the enemy
in front) to have the signal ‘forward double time’ sounded as soon
as he could see the skirmishers of the 78th Infantry coming over the
heights to the right front.”
[389] The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard received orders “to
form for attack against St. Privat, but not to attack that village
before the expected arrival of the Saxon Corps.” _Der 18. August_,
pp. 167 and 288.
[390] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, III, pp. 58 and 49.
At =Gorni Dubniac=, on October 30th, 1877, the scheme of designating
the moment for attack by means of artillery salvos, failed. During
the attack on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, the simultaneous
advance of Prince Mirski’s troops was regulated by the clock.
If the attacker desires to deliver an effective blow against the
enemy’s flank, _a considerable interval must be left between the troops
charged with the holding attack_ [secondary attack] _and those detailed
to make the flank attack_, when the envelopment is initiated. (Par. 393
German I. D. R.). The width of this gap is increased to a seemingly
dangerous degree by the range of modern weapons, but real danger is not
to be apprehended as a counter-attack of the defender exposes both of
his flanks to an enveloping attack. If the enveloping group continues
to advance, that advance in itself will very soon set a limit to the
enemy’s counter-attack. The seemingly dangerous gap in the line, at
the commencement of an action, is closed more and more as the enemy is
approached. Nevertheless, this gap may induce a cautious leader to draw
the enveloping group closer to the frontal group, thereby impairing
the effectiveness of the envelopment. The flanking groups accomplish
the best results, but in following up tactical objectives, they should
never lose sight of the annihilation of the enemy. The difficulty of
coördinating the action of the separated parts of the line is greater
than the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack against
the frontal group. As a rule, the entry of the enveloping group into
action will be the signal for a general attack. The effectiveness of
the enveloping attack is proportional to the energy with which it is
made, but the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack
increases in the same ratio.
[Illustration]
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria.= When possible, the reserve is to be designated to make the
enveloping movement. (Par. 407 Austrian I. D. R.). When practicable,
a part of the reserve is employed from the start for the envelopment,
and, under certain circumstances, also for the purpose of gaining
positions from which an enfilade fire can be delivered, and for
supporting the advance of the frontal attack. The group holding
the enemy in front may at first fight a purely defensive action to
prevent a hostile counter-attack, to screen our own dispositions, and
finally, by means of a fire fight at effective ranges, to hold the
hostile troops in their position.
=France.= The envelopment is occasionally mentioned in the
regulations (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). The Field
Service Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose different stages
may vary in length depending upon the intentions of the commander,
state, however, that the attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of
the enemy, with superior forces, for the purpose of annihilating him.”
=England.= The importance of flank attacks, even those in which
the defender is subdued by the flanking fire of mounted troops, is
specially mentioned, but, in this connection, it is emphasized that
it is immaterial whether the attack is finally directed against
the front or a flank of the enemy. The holding attack is to be
carried out with energy in front to prevent the enemy from drawing
reinforcements to other points.
=Italy.= While the regulations of 1891 still unqualifiedly
acknowledged that any frontal attack might succeed, the regulations
of 1903 called attention to the importance of the envelopment,
without denying “that the frontal attack might be the decisive one.”
Surprise is an advantageous factor for success, and for this reason,
even covering troops, for example, may have to be dispensed with on
the march.
If a force desires to take the enemy by surprise, it must carefully
take advantage of the ground. The surprise may be made more complete,
if the accompanying frontal attack is energetically pushed. On the
other hand, considerations for the troops in the holding attack, set
a limit to the extension of the flanking movement. The fire power of
the troops in the holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops
themselves defeated by a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of
the general advance arrives. They must pay the strictest attention to
the course of events on the opponent’s side; if the enemy retires, or
shifts parts of his force in order to meet a flank attack, the troops
in the holding attack must act with energy. If such signs are not
apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, be proper only when the
pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt on the enemy’s line.
This is the only way in which “simultaneous action by both attacks
may be ensured, and this is of decisive importance to the successful
issue of the combat.”
7. REMOVAL OF PACKS.
It is advisable for infantry to remove packs for an attack; such
tremendous physical exertions await the troops that everything ought
to be done to reduce the load carried by the individual man.[391] “As
soon as it becomes doubtful whether the troops will be able to perform
the task assigned them in action without such relief, all independent
commanders, and, in organizations larger than a regiment, commanders
of regiments and of higher units, have authority to order the men to
remove their packs. In issuing such an order they should bear in mind
the disadvantages which may result from leaving the packs behind. When
knapsacks are removed, the ammunition and iron rations should be taken
from them. Overcoats, cooking utensils, canteens, bread bags, and
intrenching tools remain on the men.” (Par. 301 German I. D. R.).
[391] Examples from military history in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1902, No. 32.
According to the French Manual of Field Engineering, the skirmishers,
especially when intrenching, may utilize the knapsack as cover.
In a defeat knapsacks will frequently be lost. Thus the Russians,
after the second battle of Plevna, and Frossard’s Corps, after the
battle of Spicheren, lost their knapsacks with camp equipment and iron
rations, and, in consequence thereof, suffered great hardships during
the succeeding days. On the other hand, during their retreat, the
43rd, 44th and 45th Infantry Regiments of the Ist Army Corps managed
to recover without trouble the packs which they had removed before
entering the battle of Trautenau.
The infantry of the Xth Army Corps had left its knapsacks behind
on August 8th, 1870, and did not get them again until the early
part of September. The knapsacks were not hauled on wagons after
the organizations, but were left at the railroad station of St.
Ingbert. On August 6th, 1870, the Würtemberg Field Brigade had left
its knapsacks in a bivouac near Reimersweiler at the risk of never
seeing them again. Among other reasons, General v. d. Tann considered
it impossible for the 2nd Bavarian Division to advance beyond Wörth,
because the organizations might perhaps thereby have been separated
for several days from their baggage, which they had left behind
between Preuschdorf and Görsdorf.
When knapsacks are removed, a detachment will have to be left behind
to guard them, otherwise they may be robbed of their contents.[392]
The troops always consider the trip to the rear to get the baggage
a special hardship; wagons will very rarely be available for this
purpose, as after great battles all the wagons in the entire
neighborhood will be requisitioned for transporting the wounded, and as
supply wagons will, as a rule, not be at hand.
[392] This was neglected by the 20th and 35th Infantries, on August
16th, 1870.
8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS.
In an attack upon a defensive position which is held in force, machine
gun batteries will generally be held in rear for the time being. They
form a mobile reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief, who may
employ it for quickly reinforcing threatened points, for exerting a
pressure upon the wings and flanks of the enemy, and for preparing the
assault. Machine gun companies, either broken up into platoons or not,
as the case may be, endeavor to reach positions from which they can
facilitate the advance of their infantry.
It is especially advantageous if the fire that is directed upon the
point where the hostile position is to be penetrated, comes from a
position permitting a good view, or from an oblique direction, because
the fire will not have to be discontinued even when the infantry
continues its advance or moves to the assault. If such a position,
permitting the greatest fire effect, is reached (at about 800 m. or
less from the hostile position) any further advance of the machine guns
is faulty, because it interrupts the fire and necessitates fresh laying
and adjustment.
Upon the victorious termination of a fight, the machine guns should
participate in the first stages of the pursuit by making an extended
use of their fire. They hurry forward into the captured position, as
soon as it is apparent that the victory has been gained, in order to
support the infantry in holding the position, to cover the infantry
while it is re-forming, and to reduce the last vestige of the enemy’s
resistance. If the attack fails the machine guns cover the retiring
troops.
9. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK.
In an infantry attack, the art of minor troop leading consists of
pushing a firing line, superior to the enemy, to the strip of ground
from which the power of our rifle can be utilized to the best advantage
for vanquishing the enemy; secondly, of bringing up supports, without
exposing them to unnecessary losses, so that they will be promptly
available in case of need. The preparations which the enemy has
made for attaining the maximum fire power (by intrenching, placing
ammunition in readiness, and by ascertaining ranges) must be offset
by employing a superior number of rifles. The commander who brings a
greater number of rifles into action than his opponent, may count on
gaining a superiority of fire quickly and with certainty.
The task of higher troop leading consists of simultaneously launching
the troops against the common objective.
The effect of modern projectiles requires that, on open ground, the
first deployment be made when 4000-5000 m. from the enemy. The best
scheme would be to advance, without halting, to within decisive short
range of the defender, and then to open fire, but, as previously
stated, the defender should endeavor to prevent the assailant from ever
reaching these ranges. This design of the defender must be frustrated;
if artillery is unable to accomplish this, machine guns or a part of
the infantry must enter the fight; but all parts of the force not
required for this fire fight at medium ranges should continue their
movement without interruption.
The most difficult task that infantry may be called upon to perform
consists of advancing over an open plain, in the face of unsubdued
artillery, when the situation does not permit night or the effect of an
envelopment to be awaited.
The first deployment as skirmishers is made for the purpose of
protecting the advancing troops against surprise. Frequently, a squad
or a section per company will suffice for this purpose, but these units
should cover the entire front available for the organization to which
they belong. A uniform and simultaneous advance along the whole line
is impossible however, on account of the diversity of the ground at
various points. When cover is available, skirmish lines may be formed
quickly and pushed forward as entities, but when cover is lacking,
firing lines may have to be deployed slowly and piecemeal. The unit
that has pushed farthest to the front must facilitate with its fire the
advance of those who have encountered greater obstacles in advancing.
Long, dense firing lines and the supports following them are exposed
to such heavy losses in open country, even at long ranges, that their
advance will soon hesitate. Moreover, the defender will only fire
on targets whose size and density promise a great number of hits.
Therefore, the assailant should endeavor to lead his infantry forward
in loose, disconnected skirmish lines, which are difficult for the
enemy to hit. As a rule, the assailant should not open fire until
after he has been reinforced and has sufficient fire power available.
(Par. 334 German I. D. R.). The situation in which these thin firing
lines are placed is by no means a favorable one, as the defender will
concentrate his fire on the points where the assailant seems to be
filling up his line “for the purpose of overwhelming the defender
permanently by a superiority of fire.” (Par. 413 German I. D. R.). The
skirmishers will then quite naturally open fire for the purpose of
interfering with the cool delivery of the defender’s fire.
Such a piecemeal, almost independent advance, during which the effect
of the accustomed word of command is considerably reduced and control
and supervision of the individual skirmisher is impossible, presupposes
that the troops are well-drilled, individually trained, and, above all,
intelligent. Attention must also be called to the fact that the firing
line can offer but a weak resistance to an enemy advancing unexpectedly
in force. But, in spite of these drawbacks, this mode of advance
has its advantages for crossing a plain devoid of cover. It permits
favorable fire positions to be reached with greater safety, especially
if these positions can be picked out with the aid of field glasses,
than would be the case if dense skirmish lines were led forward
simultaneously.
The advance of the infantry under hostile fire, over open ground, may
accordingly be conducted--
1. At a walk, by long rushes made by strong units (by platoons at
least), supported by powerful artillery fire or by the fire of a
machine gun battery or a detachment of skirmishers posted in a
favorable position;
2. By shorter rushes made by smaller units (“proper only when
conditions demand it”);
3. By crawling, or, in exceptional cases (for example in passing
through fields of standing grain), by employing
4. Fire while in motion.
The fire fight at long ranges and near the extreme limit of mid ranges
is only a means for the purpose of reaching the decisive battle ranges,
and of interfering with the undisturbed delivery of the enemy’s fire.
Fire must be opened at as late a moment as possible. Our firing line
should in any case be strong enough, upon entering the zone of mid
ranges, to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire. Experience has shown
that an assailant who opens fire at “long” ranges rarely reaches short
ranges. (See p. 149 supra).
The distances at which the echelons in rear follow the firing line
should be less (as laid down in the Italian and Russian regulations)
than the distance which separates the firing line of the attacker from
that of the defender. The distances may be increased without danger at
this stage of the combat, as the decision is not imminent, but on the
flanks the supports will have to be brought up closer in order that an
unexpected flank attack may be effectively opposed. All parts of the
attacking force move--as long as possible at a walk--straight to the
front. Subordinate leaders, taking advantage of all available cover,
should endeavor to lead the supports skillfully after the firing line.
This requires that the ground to be crossed be reconnoitered. As a
rule, a movement by the flank upon leaving cover is costlier than an
advance by squads or sections over open ground. Long lines make it
easier for the hostile artillery to adjust and observe its fire, while,
when a greater number of targets of smaller frontage is exposed, this
is made more difficult. For this reason, supports are not led forward
as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, under
certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller units. The
units following in rear remain as long as possible in close order
formations, preferably in route columns. “Man is by nature exceedingly
timid. Soldiers, even those drawn from the educated classes, who were
fully aware of the supreme importance of gaining the victory, broke
down on coming under fire. In close order the moral encouragement due
to the proximity of superiors and comrades kept up their courage.”
(Hessert).[393] Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to
be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which deploy and
follow each other at considerable distances.[394]
[393] “We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal,
and, in doing so, to ignore the psychological element of combat.”
Major-General Stieler.
[394] The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian
reserves at Plevna (11th September, 1877), and during the attack made
by the Guard on Gorni Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the
part of the reserves.
As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders must decide
whether or not it ought to be returned; but the closer one can get to
the enemy without firing a shot, the better. According to the German
F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, uninterrupted forward movement of
skirmish lines in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is
possible only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, even
skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. from the enemy.
Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, which,
in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, and which,
subsequently, is to produce a superiority of fire. As taught by
experience, this cannot be accomplished from a single position, if the
enemy is efficient.
A so-called “main firing position”, which was to be located 400-600
m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the
purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making
use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious
infantry attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first
firing position and the assaulting position, was not appreciated.
=Austria.= (Par. 589 I. D. R.). “When conditions are very favorable,
it might be possible to choose the firing position in which the
decisive fire fight is to be begun, so close to the enemy that the
decision can be gained from it.”
The fire fight must be taken up by enough troops to make it
impossible for the defender, who holds his position strongly, to gain
a superiority of fire over some parts of the attacking force. The
supports will now move closer to the firing line, in order to fill
every gap in that line and to meet every attempt of the defender to
gain the upper hand. The echelons of the second line which have not as
yet been absorbed by the firing line, move up in a similar manner. If
the hostile fire abates, parts of the firing line should endeavor to
get closer to the enemy; they are followed by the next adjoining units.
At this stage of the action the attacker will have to give up, to some
extent, his distribution in depth.
Superiority of fire is an essential condition to victory. It is
attained by better marksmanship, fire control and fire direction, by
taking advantage of cover, and by concentrating a powerful fire against
the decisive point. When the attacker’s troops are not well trained,
a greater number of rifles and more ammunition will be required to
gain this superiority. Accordingly, the attacker will either make an
envelopment or employ fire of position. The attacker possesses a great
advantage, in that he does not need to gain a superiority of fire
along the whole front, but only at a single point. It suffices for
him to contain weak portions of the hostile front with suitable, well
concealed combat groups capable of quickly developing a powerful fire,
while he masses the bulk of his forces against the decisive point. The
defender, who never knows where the decisive blow is going to fall,
ought not to allow himself to be enticed into occupying portions of his
line more weakly than the rest.
The attainment of the superiority of fire requires time, and, in
addition, coolness and patience on the part of the leaders. All the
ammunition that is expended in gaining this superiority is later
compensated for by fewer losses. The heavy losses sustained by the
Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870,
may be traced directly to the fact that the leaders did not know how to
wait.
Superiority of fire[395] is absolutely essential to the success of the
attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead to such
heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach the enemy’s
position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.[396]
[395] For the situation of the British Guard at Modder River
(28th November, 1890), see p. 182 supra. The Guards were closely
hugging the ground at a distance of 800 m. from the enemy. After
29 ammunition carriers had been shot at the very beginning of the
engagement, all attempts to carry orders or ammunition to the firing
line were abandoned. No attempts were made to relieve the pressure by
means of the fire of sharpshooters, by bringing up reinforcements, or
by gaining ground by crawling.
[396] “Battles are won by the superiority of fire.” FREDERICK THE
GREAT in his _Military Testament_, 1768.
During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, the attacker
will have succeeded in working forward little by little until he is
close to the enemy’s position. His superiority will now make itself
felt; the fire from the part of the hostile line that is to be
penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, single groups, then
several, and finally, whole units of the enemy’s line will commence to
crumble away. The attacker should wait until this effect is produced
before he begins the assault; if he does not do this, the attack is
sure to fail.
_Austria._ (Par. 590 I. D. R.). “The close approach of a long firing
line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a
proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, this does not,
under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for
the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a
premature assault may still result in disaster. _As long as the conduct
of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is
crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight
for the superiority of fire._”
Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from easy to
recognize when the defender of a position has been sufficiently subdued
by fire to make an assault feasible, and when the proper moment has
arrived for launching the reserves. It is only necessary to recall the
premature advance of the artillery and cavalry over the ravine of the
Mance brook, on August 18th, 1870.
The cessation of the defender’s fire, in itself, is not a sure
sign that his firing line is shaken, as the attacker is unable to
distinguish between a fire pause ordered by the commander on the
defensive and the forced discontinuance of the fight. Sure indications
are not available until men actually leave the defender’s fighting line
here and there, and attempts of the leaders to hold the wavering ones
are clearly apparent.
At this moment, a leader who has resolved to assault, should order
bayonets fixed.
* * * * *
The temporary interruption of the fire occasioned by fixing bayonets is
of no importance, as the superiority of fire has already been gained.
If bayonets are prematurely ordered to be fixed, the accuracy of the
fire will soon be impaired, as the firing of rifles, weighted down
by the attached bayonets, increases the fatigue of the men. When the
troops are excited, the downward deflection of the bullets caused by
fixing the bayonet can, however, only produce a good effect. It is
best to fix bayonets at the signal “Fix bayonet”. In the excitement
prevailing at the moment, it will be impossible to execute the order
with any uniformity, but it is a good plan, in time of peace, to
require one man of each file to fire while the other one fixes his
bayonet. The approaching reserves fix bayonets while on the march.
10. THE ASSAULT.
“The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the domain of
tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and under what conditions
the assault should be made in war, cannot be formulated. At any rate,
fire tactics are not only an essential factor but also the crowning
act of combat; the assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern
combats show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in
consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are exposed
to the annihilating effect of fire. This lesson was thoroughly learned
by the Austrians in 1866, and by the Russians in front of Plevna. Of
what avail were ‘self-sacrifice’, the ‘unconquerable determination to
gain the victory’, the ‘desire for hand to hand conflict’, and all
the other terms that are employed to prove that the moral factors are
the decisive ones in war? That they are the decisive factors needs
no proof whatever; it follows, as a matter of course, from uniform
training, uniform leadership, and uniform arms. But tactics fit for
use in war, are to furnish, above all else, ways and means, showing
how and by what methods the fighting energy of troops may be preserved
most effectively, and thus contribute directly toward preventing the
premature deterioration of the morale of the troops.”[397]
[397] Colonel KEIM in _von Löbells Jahresberichte_, 1899, II, p.
561.
“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault with fixed
bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A premature advance to the
assault, with all the peculiar features attending it, produces an
aversion against the attack, an undue extension of battle lines, and
makes it impossible for reinforcements to come up, except under cover
of darkness.
The decision for making the assault emanates either from the
subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the commander of the
whole force. The latter may give the impulse for the assault by
launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly the safer procedure. “When
the decision to assault emanates from the commanders in rear, notice
thereof is given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be
repeated by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At this
signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. The parts of
the firing line which are still in rear, move forward, as quickly as
possible, to a position close to the enemy. All reinforcements in rear
hasten straight to the front. As soon as the leading line is to form
for the assault, all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double
time’, all the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force
throw themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. It
should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports
to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s
position. When immediately in front of the enemy, the men should charge
bayonet and, with a cheer, penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348
German I. D. R.).
It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive when the
proper moment for making the assault has arrived, as he is compelled
to remain so far in rear of the fighting line, especially where large
forces are concerned, that he can only follow the general course of
the attack. The first indication which he receives as to whether the
enemy’s fire power has been broken all along the line, is the advance
of his own firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in
time when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, and
it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with sufficient
promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to good account.[398]
[398] “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the
closing of a telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of
constructive theory, which seeks, by this means, to increase the
energy of the first line, but only succeeds in massing too many men
in front of the enemy, a better condition than which the enemy could
not desire.” VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p.
230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the
Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. F. HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden
Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 145. _Der 18. August_, p. 271.
The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take the initiative
in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, especially
if the enemy evacuates the position, that the firing line, quickly
taking advantage of this moment, pass over to the bayonet attack. If
the firing line were to wait until the reserves are up, valuable time
would be lost, under certain circumstances; the enemy might recover
from his temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive
reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the attacker
would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the position unmolested,
retire in good order, and perhaps take up a new position, or at least
evade quickly the pursuing fire of the assailant. The firing line
would be the first, in such a case, to perceive when and where the
resistance of the enemy abates; it should therefore make the most of
this knowledge and throw itself upon the part of the defender’s force
that is in the act of withdrawing.
When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing line, there
is danger that instead of a general attack only a local one will
result. It is impossible to conceive that the whole firing line will
simultaneously consider that the moment for the assault has arrived;
in general, only a part of that line at a time will come to this
conclusion. Such local attacks are hazardous, however, and have some
chance of succeeding only in covered terrain. A local assault made
by a single battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a
considerable portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash
itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly charging
unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile line at some one
point, the defender will at once attack it in vastly superior force
and compel it to retire with heavy loss. Furthermore, the failure is
usually not confined to the one unit. The troops on the right and left
of it, although they are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not
yet shaken him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the
assault, as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule,
when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series
of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good
troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of
definitely gained superiority finally arrives.
The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[399] very aptly
describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of
the tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the
prolonged fight at close range; the time was now ripe for the
decision and the German corps commanders issued orders for the
assault. Before this order reached the leading line, however, the
German general officers on the spot had decided, at about 7:30 P.
M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, as they
considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the signal given by
them, and in many instances of their own accord, the Prussian and
Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, on
the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended by
the enemy.” (=St. Privat=). Consult, _Der 18. August_, pp. 525 and
571.
[399] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 800.
“When the XIth Army Corps issued from the =Niederwald= (near
=Wörth=), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the
direction of =Elsaszhausen= that the troops had to choose between
either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been
gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open
to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in
confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only
three formed and fresh battalions were available.”--“General von Bose
now ordered a general attack. At the signal ‘the whole force will
advance’, the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud
cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”[400]
[400] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.
The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been
gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become
unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any
numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative
of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely
defensive action.
It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the initiative
of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the entire force. In
some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, if disaster is to be
avoided. When a portion of the firing line advances, however, and the
tactical situation in any way permits, neighboring units should at once
conform to the movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in
this case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without regard
to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being repulsed.
(Par. 345, German I. D. R.).
This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters of the
assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” in this
assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault by the entire
line. This might obviously cause the troops to advance prematurely
to the assault, a danger which might be brought about by the junior
platoon commander. No one but the supreme commander, therefore, has
the right to order this signal to be sounded when he wishes a general
assault to be made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill
Regulations (par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides
to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of signals
(s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain the skirmishers
by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general assault all along the
line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. If a unit moves to the assault
contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander, he should possess
enough nerve to look on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much
better for him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the
failure of the general attack by a premature advance.
“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously as
possible, this is not to be understood as meaning that all the units
should penetrate the hostile position at one and the same time. Such
simultaneous action is immaterial, and might, indeed, cause parts of
the line who had a chance of successfully carrying out the assault,
to hesitate because others are still in rear. The power of the attack
would accordingly be impaired. All units that have once started must
continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German I. D. R.).
It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended for the
holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. If they can
bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of attack from an
oblique direction and thereby ensure the success of the attack, they
should make the most of this advantage. (Par. 340 German I. D. R.).
When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, as laid down in
the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers throw themselves
down for the purpose of firing. The supports in the act of moving up
continue their march. If the enemy faces about, all the troops press
after him.
The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack:
“If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens
to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been
assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically,
while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their
fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion
in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to
discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover....
The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without
hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement
has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall
cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that
of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks,
until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive
to be assumed.”
The German Infantry Drill Regulations contain no further rules for the
conduct of the assault. If the physical and moral power of the enemy is
so broken by the preceding fire fight that he commences to evacuate his
position, it is quite immaterial what sort of an assault is made; the
men simply fire and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case
the assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight.
A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically led, will
not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his position by fire alone;
to compel him to evacuate his position will at the very least require
that an assault be threatened.
Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the effect of the
fire fight alone was so great that the assault would strike nothing
but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended position. The assault
was to commence after the enemy had ceased firing and had sought
protection in his trenches. The following statement is made by one who
fought on the Boer side:
“The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived
within 300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a
brief period of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the
assault simultaneously in one long line. This assault, made without
fire support, was repulsed without trouble by the Boer fire. On
several occasions, short lines of our opponent had begun to advance,
but these were in every instance forced to throw themselves down
after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon the whole British line,
in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, began to advance. One
could clearly hear the British leaders call to their men to cease
firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the cheer
‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the whole
hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me like a
grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder and
the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently
happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same
moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but
was soon better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling,
‘Steady boys, steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and
more men fell in the British line, and, when it had arrived within
100 or 80 paces of our position, its energy had spent itself. A
part of the men threw themselves down behind boulders and fired,
while the majority rushed back to the shelter of some bushes; but
even there it was for the most part impossible to hold them. An
assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, even if he is
numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire a number
of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position
the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one
will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under
hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves
without shelter to the hostile fire.”[401]
[401] Supplement 8 to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1901.
The same lesson was learned long ago at =Gorni Dubniac= and at
=Plevna=.
It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of such an
assault. This should be furnished in the first place by the artillery.
In furnishing this support, artillery can employ time fire only until
the infantry arrives within 300 m. of the enemy, while percussion fire
may be continued until the infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy.
During the attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said
to have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if two
or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. The
following statement appears in a British memorial on the lessons of
the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced by artillery fire,
which forced the defenders to take to cover and did not even permit
them to raise their heads above the parapet, was so highly esteemed
by the Japanese infantry that it requested the batteries to continue
firing, without regard to the losses thereby inflicted in its own
ranks, until it had taken the position or unfurled small national flags
as an indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According
to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted in
their infantry by their own guns were insignificant in comparison to
the losses which the defender could inflict by delivering his fire
undisturbed at a range of a few hundred meters, when not kept down by
the attacking artillery.” According to the Austrian regulations, one
unit is to remain halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the
point of attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision
involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to retain
a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, instead of
launching his whole force in the assault.
When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the artillery will
perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry has reached
a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, when the guns
will have to cease firing, and when even the infantry units which
have been left behind to support the attack, will no longer be able
to direct their fire upon the enemy on account of the wide frontage
of the assaulting force. The defender’s troops would have to be poor
indeed, if they would not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has
practically ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose
of emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even though the
fire be unaimed.
If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, while the
attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be compelled to keep
under cover. _This can only be accomplished by employing fire while in
motion._
This fire is practicable because the defender, who has been overwhelmed
in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his works; it is advantageous,
as it is only to compel the enemy to keep under cover. It would
unquestionably be a mistake, and not justifiable in any case, to employ
fire while in motion, when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the
enemy is not completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover,
ready to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault
with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing the
defender from bringing up his reserves.
The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton,
perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good
fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close
up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations
are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the
assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing
this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from
the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw
themselves down instead of continuing the advance. And, if the men
have once thrown themselves down during the assault, they will rise
only for the purpose of retreating.”[402]
[402] In _Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff_, p. 63,
Colonel VON DER GOLTZ makes the following statement in regard to an
experiment: “As the line gradually drew closer to the defender’s
position, the desire of the individual men to get into the hostile
position as quickly as possible, became more and more apparent; the
prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling position,
finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while
in motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized
by the regulations and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its
employment in this case may be traced to the very proper desire of
not allowing the enemy, who has been held down this long, to raise
himself above his parapet. This fire while in motion should not be
confused with the fire while in motion formerly employed by long
skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. The
latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already
overwhelmed, but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an
unshaken opponent.”
=Russia.= The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.)
that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point
at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and
the men form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a
run or by crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is
begun at a greater distance than 35 m. from the hostile position,
fire while in motion is employed, “in order that the enemy may not
regain his senses and may be prevented from rising above his parapet.”
During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable terrain
(Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate fights for the
possession of fortifications (the Grivica Work at Plevna, Scheinovo),
bayonet combats are unavoidable, provided both forces are equally
determined. During the fight for the possession of Servigny, on the
evening of August 31st, 1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred
in the narrow village streets.[403] The Russo-Japanese war also proved
beyond the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain their
positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.[404]
[403] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 51. See p. 134 supra. Fieldmarshal
MOLTKE makes the following observations in regard to the bayonet
fights of the campaign of 1859: “General Niel credits his victory at
Solferino to the use of the bayonet. The question as to how often the
advance to hand to hand conflict is carried out, may be left open. As
a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed that the enemy
will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in regard
to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If
the bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the
campaign of 1859, were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if
the simple prosaic truth could be ascertained, by far the greater
number of these reports would be corrected in so far as to state that
the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided the actual
collision.”
[404] Examples: The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, In
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, VON LÜTTWITZ.--The capture of
works No. 17 and No. 18 by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905
(Mukden).--Description by an eyewitness of a bayonet fight. Sir IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, p. 252.--A bayonet fight
occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th Rifle Regiment
broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the Yalu,
(see _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 131), and in
Bernaul’s Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July
24th, 1904.
The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the line;
frequently isolated groups and then entire units will leave his
line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes effective.
Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable privates will endeavor
to keep the weak-kneed from running away.[405]
[405] At Villepion, Captain von Hoffmann made a wavering section
hold its position by springing toward them, revolver in hand, and
yelling: “I’ll shoot the first man who gets up! my revolver will
hit too, whether Chassepot bullets will hit you is a question.”
_Geschichte des Bayerischen Leibregiments_.
If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but
a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the
decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have
remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker
must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance
of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in
close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.[406]
[406] One must read KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp.
80, 116, 123 and 156, in order to appreciate what an electrifying
influence the beating of drums may have even on retreating lines.
“The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when
undertaken in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by
cheers and beating drums.” BOGUSLAWSKI.
“Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von
Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his men
rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”--“The mere launching of
the attack from the direction of =Point du Jour= sufficed to induce
the well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel
pits, likewise to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.”
HÖNIG.
In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the
conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent;
that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal of his own.
The soldier should not be taught to shrink from the bayonet attack, but
to seek it. If the infantry is deprived of the _arme blanche_, if the
impossibility of bayonet fighting is preached, and the soldier is never
given an opportunity in time of peace of defending himself, man to man,
with his weapon in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed,
which is unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most
essential quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position.
“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness of the
bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be found who are equally
capable of making use of it. Indeed, the bayonet cannot be abolished
for the reason, if for no other, that it is the sole and exclusive
embodiment of that will power which alone, both in war and in every-day
life, attains its object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the
attainment of the object.
“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle
on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be
able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were
to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of
fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled
with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with
the bayonet. With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good
substitute for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only
of troops who do not fear annihilation, _i.e._, troops trained to use
the bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. If
this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure waste
of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with the enemy, if
necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into the air.
“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the enemy
from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally prefer this
mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very little risk of getting
hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an aversion for exposing himself to
danger, _i.e._, he will shrink from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach
too much importance to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained
soldier, who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who
is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight.
Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, but
does not improve his morale.” DRAGOMIROV.
Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced by cutting
weapons:
Campaign of 1859 1.67%
Campaign of 1864 4.0 %
Campaign of 1866 (Prussians) 5.4 %
St. Privat (Germans) 1.0 %
Russo-Turkish war 0.9 %
In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about 150 m. During
the Franco-German war, the assault against Elsaszhausen (battle of
Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.[407] and that against St. Hubert
at 100-200 m. from the enemy.[408] The 107th Infantry, after charging
over a distance of more than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held
by the French north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the
northern outskirts of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be
covered.[409] In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the
center column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a wild,
headlong assault against its outskirts.”[410] The Japanese frequently
had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, but there were also
instances where their assaulting troops had only to cover a few meters
(1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.).
[407] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.
[408] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 127.
[409] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 804.
[410] KUNZ, _Le Bourget_, p. 21.
=If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position=, he will be
at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be in confusion
and exhausted, and a large number of officers will be gone. If the
defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, takes advantage of this moment,
he may be able to turn the tide of the battle. The inclination of
the men to pursue the enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and
making the most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in
all battles. The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his
victorious infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue
the enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or quickly
assembled detachments should advance on the flanks in pursuit of the
enemy. There is a wide difference between a wild, headlong rush after
the enemy and a systematic pursuit. Infantry that rushes headlong to
the front after penetrating a position must be brought back at any
cost, unless it can enter a second position simultaneously with the
enemy.[411]
[411] The conduct of the 47th Infantry Brigade after the capture
of Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der 18. August_, p. 184. The second line
of the position at Düppel was carried by the pursuing victors at the
first rush. _Gen. St. W._, 1864, II, p. 539.
In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker should
re-form his troops without regard to their original arrangement (if
the enemy gives him time enough, the original organizations should
be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish ammunition, and remove
the prisoners. It is a mistake to mass more rifles in the captured
position than can be employed to advantage, as the enemy will in all
probability direct a heavy fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been
decided, the echelons in rear should be halted, so that they can be
employed as occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often
have to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German I. D. R.).
Preparations should be made to the end that hostile counter-attacks
may be at once repulsed. These rules are particularly important when
the position that has been carried is not the main position but only
an advanced post.[412] These measures must be taken independently
by all leaders who participated in the assault, without waiting for
orders from superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as
possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while the enemy
is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with his re-forming,
to prevent his taking up route column, and to overrun his rallying
positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted of a whole series of such
pursuing actions. The arrival of night should by no means be used as an
excuse for discontinuing the pursuit, for night above all else is the
mightiest ally of a bold victor.[413]
[412] See _Taktik_, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken
after the capture of St. Privat. _Der 18. August_, p. 533. The
situation in Fröschweiler; KUNZ. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_,
17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the signals, ‘the whole force
assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded everywhere. How
little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the conduct
of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. _Ibid._, pp. 87-90. The
10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear
to a bivouac which they had left in the morning.
[413] See _Taktik_, V. p. 436.
=If the attack fails=, it will be the duty of the commander to arrest
the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the rear under hostile
fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt these men while they
are exposed to the most effective fire of the enemy. Only when the
nearest cover is reached can there be any question of halting. (Par.
327 German I. D. R.). When cover is not available near at hand, the
exhaustion of the troops will soon stop the flight, or the leaders
may be able to face them again to the front, as soon as the hostile
fire abates. However, the retreating troops will have placed quite a
distance between themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and
the latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to take
full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless the
attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No matter where
the retreating troops come to a halt and face to the front, there they
must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, intrench.
The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of
=St. Privat=,[414] and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at
=Magersfontain=, immediately in front of the Boer position, on
December 11th, 1899, is worthy of imitation.
[414] The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill
is variously given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of
the 1st Guard Regiment) and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See
_History of the 3rd Guard Regiment_, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of
the _1st Guard Regiment_, p. 165; that of the _2nd Guard Regiment_,
p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who still remained,
the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and
self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” _Gen.
St. W._, II, p. 872.
The assault on =Gorni Dubniac= came to a standstill at very short
range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov
Regiments maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian
skirmishers 320 m., from the trench.[415]
[415] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 126.
11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK.
(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).
In every attack there are situations in which it may be advantageous to
use intrenching tools--
1. In fortifying rallying positions.
The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very cautious, fortified the
initial positions from which their attacks were made, in order that
they might have rallying positions in case of defeat.[416]
[416] On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army)
had pushed back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a
position 2700 m. from the new Russian position at Yushuling. From
this position the 12th Division advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian
attack had not taken place. The extended fortifications facing the
Russian Shaho position were made with the same end in view. The war
in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army possessed
sufficient freedom of action. See p. 341, et seq., supra.
2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover of darkness to
within effective range of the enemy for the purpose of opening fire at
daybreak. In this case, the advancing force is, as a rule, instructed
to advance until it comes under hostile fire and then to intrench.[417]
[417] During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the
Canadians were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches
located 500 m. from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down
and to intrench as soon as they were fired upon. This was done
when the force was 100 m. from the enemy. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 60.
The Japanese 45th Infantry, in its advance under cover of darkness
against Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000
m., whereupon the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the
hostile fire abated, the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy
resumed his fire, it intrenched. A third advance brought the regiment
within 500 m. of the defender’s position and it was able to make the
assault during the forenoon of October 12th, 1904.
3. In intrenching an echelon posted to cover advancing infantry.
4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of intrenching tools in
quickly putting captured positions in a state of defense, so often felt
during the Franco-German war and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been
removed by the introduction of portable tools.[418] The necessity of
quickly preparing captured positions for defense presented itself in a
number of instances.
[418] Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later
the French in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion,
on December 1st, 1870 (HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, III, p. 257; KUNZ,
_Loigny_, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, 1871 (_Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the second
ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877
(KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October
11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were
repulsed from the captured position, which had been prepared for
defense. The fights for the possession of the village of Linchinpu
(on the right bank of the Shaho, north of the railway), captured
on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the position had to be
prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (VON TETTAU,
_Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei_, II, p.
136).
5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack when further
advance is impossible, that is, in situations such as confronted the
infantry of the Guard on August 18th when its first attack came to a
standstill. During the attack on Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish
war, the Russian Guard intrenched when a further advance became
impossible. During the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days
later, specific orders were issued for the troops to intrench when
1000-2000 m. from the Turkish works.[419]
[419] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 166.
As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish war, general
instructions were issued to the Russian infantry on the subject of
intrenching in attack. According to these instructions, the spade was
to be used in attack in the following cases: In fortifying a captured
position, as a protection against a possible offensive return of the
defender; in holding supporting points necessary to a continuation of
the attack; and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense.
The order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases,
by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to be observed:
“Every man equipped with a spade and who is not sheltered by some
feature of the terrain, places his rifle on the ground and, lying on
his left side, begins to excavate a hole parallel to his body. This
hole should be as long as the distance from his left elbow to his knee,
as wide as the length of the spade-handle, and as deep as the width of
the blade of the spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front
of his head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. When
this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated hole, and,
lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When he has obtained
sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other man of the file, who
proceeds in a similar fashion.”
The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority, found it
necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, and therefore
made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, or utilized sand
bags,[420] which were carried along. In this manner, they laboriously
worked their way to within assaulting distance of the enemy. In many
instances, this necessitated whole days of fighting when an envelopment
was impossible. Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen
or when the sod was not thick.
[420] See p. 344 supra. Frequently the bags, which could be tied
with a string, were filled near the place where they were to be used.
The advance was considerably retarded by carrying along sand bags.
During the attack on Yuputz, on March 1st, 1905, by the 8th Infantry
Division of the IInd Army, the first sand bag cover was constructed
700 m. and the last 250 m. from the village.
_Results of Russian experiments._ The sand bag employed was made
of coarse linen of grayish green color and when filled and tied,
was approximately 50 cm. long (width of a man’s shoulders), 30-35
cm. wide, and 30-35 cm. high. The filled sand bag weighed 14-20
kg., depending upon the filling material (sand or broken stone).
When filled with sand or broken stone, the sand bag stopped all
projectiles, while, when filled with earth, even two bags placed in
rear of each other did not afford sufficient protection. The sand
bags were scarcely discernible with the naked eye at 400 m. They were
not an easy target to hit, and, even at 300 m., it was difficult to
aim at them.
The men had a distinct aversion against constructing shelter trenches
while lying down. During the war they could be made to intrench only
by great exertions on the part of the officers. The reason for this
is obvious; digging with the small spade while in a prone position
is uncomfortable. The skirmisher considers it much more profitable
to fire than to puzzle out how he can best stir up the soil with the
small spade while in a prone position. Moreover, he knows that at any
moment he may have to make a rush to the front.
The beautiful idea that these trenches were to be used and widened
by the reserves, was usually not carried out. The reserves preferred
to make longer rushes and to take advantage of folds of the ground
rather than occupy themselves with intrenching under hostile fire.
At ranges from 2000-1000 m., single men made short rushes, only 30-40
m. long, as the filled sand bag constituted a considerable load.
Before a man ran forward, he slung his rifle, grasped the sand bag
with one hand at the tied end, with the other at a loop specially
provided for that purpose; then he jumped up, ran forward 30-40 m.,
as rapidly as he could in a crouching position, placed the sand bag
on the ground, and threw himself down behind it. Under effective
hostile fire, at 1000-550 m. (during our peace maneuvers at 420-280
m.), the men then crawl forward, utilizing the sand bag as cover.
The men would rather crawl a greater distance with the sand bag than
intrench while lying down.
From the position of the enemy, the skirmishers lying behind grayish
green sand bags could not be recognized with the naked eye at
2000-1000 m. It is reported that both officers and men were at first
very much disinclined toward making these experiments, but that they
changed their views after one or two exercises, and the principal
apprehension, that of increasing the weight of the field equipment,
disappeared because of the undeniable advantages of the sand bag.
Such cover constructed by the assailant has no greater value than
natural cover found on the ground over which the attack is made; it
affords protection during halts and induces retreating skirmishers to
face to the front again at an earlier moment than would otherwise be
the case.
“It should not be forgotten, however, that time gained is of greater
benefit to the defender than to the assailant. Moreover, the great
difficulty of inducing a firing line which has made a lodgment under
hostile fire, to advance from its laboriously constructed cover,
admonishes us to be cautious in employing the spade during an attack.
The construction of cover ought never to impair the desire for making
an impetuous attack, or destroy the offensive spirit.” (Par. 313 German
I. D. R.).
When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it must detach
half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot be offset by an
increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, range finders, and
musicians, take part in the fight, as the men offer a taller target
while intrenching, and as the newly turned earth facilitates the
enemy’s aim. A superiority of fire that has been gained may thereby be
lost. However, when the defender’s troops have been so shaken that the
assailant can detach half of his rifles with impunity, the latter need
not remain lying on the ground, but can advance, in most cases, closer
to the enemy’s position. The use of the spade is, therefore, proper
only when ground that has been gained is to be held, and when the
enemy’s fire permits intrenching.
=Russia.= In instructions issued by General Kuropatkin, the following
statement in regard to the Japanese infantry appears: “It advances in
widely deployed lines. The firing line advances by short, alternating
rushes, the men then throwing themselves down and intrenching. In
spite of our extraordinarily violent fire, the firing line continues
to advance by alternate rushes, leaves its half completed shelter
trenches and begins to dig new ones. The supports then advance by
alternate rushes, occupy the first line of trenches and complete
them. When the firing line advances from the second line of trenches,
they are occupied by the supports, while the reserves move up into
the first line of trenches. In this manner, the advance is continued
by successive rushes. From this, it is apparent that the infantryman
in the firing line must act on his own initiative in selecting a
point for intrenching.”
=Japan.= In a number of cases, the Japanese conducted an attack in
the manner described. At Liao Yang, on September 1st, 1904, shelter
trenches were dug at 750 and at 530 m. from the Russian position.
The advance beyond this was so managed that the men intrenched after
every rush, finally arriving, in the course of the day, within 300
m. of the enemy. An assault made from this position on the afternoon
of the 2nd was repulsed. The whole Japanese line again faced to the
front on arriving in the shelter trenches which they had dug 300 m.
from the hostile position. The Japanese now perfected their weak
intrenchments and were even able to repulse two counter-attacks
made by the Russians. This was certainly an exceptional case, and,
besides, it involved an attack on a fortified position.
The German Manual of Field Engineering (No. 46) recommends that the
man, when lying on his left side, construct in the first place a
parapet 30 cm. high, as head cover and rifle rest. This produces pits
50 cm. wide, 60 cm. long, and 40 cm. deep, usually deeper in front
than in rear, which makes aiming uncomfortable.
=France.= According to the _Instruction pratique sur les travaux de
campagne_ (24th October, 1906), the men are to improve available
cover; where natural cover is wanting, artificial cover is to
be constructed when the hostile fire compels a halt or the men
are forced to halt to regain their breath. At short ranges, the
skirmishers dig individual pits. It is desirable for the soldier to
use his knapsack as cover while working, and to leave it in position
later also, to get better head cover.
=England.= Although the troops are not equipped with portable
intrenching tools, it is prescribed that captured positions be
fortified; in open country, when the hostile fire is too hot, this is
to be done at night.
The suggestion of creating cover for skirmishers by using the
pits produced by short shell salvos, is a singular one. Detailed
experiments have been made in =Austria=.[421] In instructions issued
by the commander of the XIth Corps, it was recommended that, when
exposed to moderate hostile fire, the soldier should hug the ground
as closely as possible while at work. The intrenching proceeded
most rapidly when the soldier first excavated the ground in front
and threw it forward. But in order to do this, the man has to push
himself backward during the work and must throw the earth some
distance. The parapet is low, but affords sufficient protection.
[421] _Streffleur_, 1906, III, p. 387.
[Illustration]
The task is greater when the soldier lies first on his left, then on
his right side, removes earth from a borrow pit at his right and then
from one on his left, and piles it up in front. As the skirmisher
lies on the natural surface of the ground during this operation, he
naturally constructs a higher parapet.
The following general rules governing the use of the spade in attack
may be laid down:
1. An invariable use of the spade in attack must be unhesitatingly
condemned. The best means of gaining the superiority of fire, and the
best protection against hostile fire, is our own fire.
2. It must not be left to the soldier’s discretion, as to whether or
not he shall intrench. The order for intrenching should in every case
emanate from the supreme commander.
3. As a rule, the spade should be used in those phases of combat that
partake more of a defensive character, in particular--
(a) To protect artillery and prepare rallying positions during the
preparatory stage of the action;
(b) To shelter troops detailed to contain the enemy while enveloping
movements are in progress;
(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile fire by their
own delivered from enfilading or commanding positions;
(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point that has just
been gained, whether this has been captured from the enemy or whether
the attack has come to a standstill at that point and a pause in the
fighting occurs.
4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to trench is
advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack is a purely
frontal one and is made over ground devoid of cover.
12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.[422]
(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).
[422] _Taktik_, V. p. 334, et seq.
The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. It would seem
desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of approach, or the position
one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous
line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the
earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of
fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in
the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of
the enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven
from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be
given by fresh troops; and the success gained by the firing line must
be clinched by a retained assaulting force. The necessity of having
a formed body of troops available, until the fight is in full swing,
to meet unforeseen contingencies, further requires that a reserve
be provided. Organizations should not be broken up any more than is
absolutely necessary. The number of troops which the commander will
retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of information
he has in regard to the situation. During an attack the reserve is
frequently not designated until a preparatory position is taken up. In
attack about ¹⁄₄-¹⁄₃, and in defense ¹⁄₆-¹⁄₂ of the whole force is put
in the reserve, depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a
purely defensive one or the decision is sought.
The reserve enables the commander to “shift the center of gravity of
the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce his line where he
considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally,
to bring about the decision.” (Par. 294 German I. D. R.). As the combat
progresses, the commander must decide whether the situation is such
as to compel him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,[423] or
whether it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose
of gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the attack
fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting in all the
reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a mistake not to employ
the reserve, to keep it in readiness to cover a possible retreat, if
its intervention can yet bring about a favorable termination of the
combat.
[423] See deliberations of General v. d. Tann at Coulmiers. HELVIG,
_Das erste bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 203.
The employment of the reserves by the Russians at =Plevna=, on
September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine
battalions and was too weak to make an impression at one point;
fifteen battalions were detailed to cover the lines of communication
and the artillery (which was not at all in danger). Forty battalions
that did not enter the fight were scattered all over the battlefield,
no one being able to account for their presence.[424] When Skobeleff
had effected a lodgment in the Turkish position, every available
man should have been sent to this point. Although there were 9
battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) available, only
the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in
previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that
more for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of
the success that had been gained.
[424] In the Franco-German war, the same thing happened on the
German side. _Der 18. August_, p. 221.
In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all
their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch
numerous detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely
ignoring existing organizations (this had, indeed, also the
advantage that a suitable leader could be found for carrying a
special mission into execution), and to form strong reserves by
details from any and all imaginable units. These reserves were
frequently not used at all.[425]
[425] On July 31st, 1904, when, in pursuance of orders from General
Headquarters, a regiment and a battery was to be despatched to
Mistshenko’s Cavalry Division, 15 km. away, a provisional regiment
of two battalions was formed, without apparent reason, for the
purpose from the 139th and 140th Infantry Regiments. In regard to the
inclination of the Russians to form detachments, see LÖFFLER, I, pp.
11, 27, 53 and 54.
On March 5th, 1905, the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps
(Zerpitzki) had available one brigade of his 31st Division, one
regiment of his 9th Division, one regiment of the VIIIth Corps, three
Rifle regiments of the mixed Rifle Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and
one regiment of the Vth Siberian Army Corps.[426]
[426] See V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 483.
On October 15th, in the battle on the =Shaho=, the general reserve
of the army consisted of 32 battalions belonging to five different
divisions and five different army corps. In his order for the battle,
Kuropatkin laid particular stress on the necessity of forming
reserves (Army Orders dated August 15th, 1904): “Keeping back more
than half of the force in reserve is the best guarantee for success.”
On December 27th, 1904, he made a similar statement.
The reserves are created to be used; every available man must
participate in the decisive stage of the combat. If the enemy yields
before the reserve is launched, so much the better; if he does not give
way, all the troops that are at hand must be put in. The main thing is
to gain the victory; scruples may be indulged in afterwards. A defeated
commander who leaves the battlefield with troops that are still
partially intact, has not made the most of the means at his disposal
for combat, provided the situation was such that the launching of the
reserves could have secured the victory. As shown by Hastenbeck (1757),
by Idstedt (1850), and by Bapaume, at the moment of the crisis there is
no sharp dividing line between victory and defeat, and the reserves may
decide the fate of the day. The decision of Archduke Albrecht, during
the battle of Custozza (1866), to push his last reserves into the fight
was worthy of a great commander.
In contrast with this, =Russia= (1904): “In employing the general
reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than
the troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to
support this or that section, _but he should in no case use up his
whole reserve before the decision has occurred_.” The failures of
the British in the South African war may likewise be traced in part
to a faulty use of the reserves. Thus, we read in the regulations of
1896: “The reserve should occupy a favorable defensive position in
order to check the enemy in case of defeat; if the attack succeeds,
the reserve should move up into the position and take charge of the
pursuit.”
“Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, after having
made the most inconceivable exertions to swim across a broad, deep
river, shrinks from the last spurt and drowns, although he need only
stretch out his arm to reach the opposite shore.” (DRAGOMIROV).
In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that the whole
available force must be launched at the decisive moment at the decisive
point, and that the commander ought not to detach portions of the force
intended for the decisive blow for tasks of secondary importance.
The launching of L’Estocq’s Corps at =Preussisch-Eylau=, is still a
model worthy of imitation.[427]
[427] LETTOW-VORBECK, _Feldzug von 1806 und 1807_, IV, p. 107.
In the battle of =Vionville=, three battalions and four batteries
were detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived
during the afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in
the action of the 5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed
necessary on the right flank. When the head of the division reached
Tronville, the question was discussed, as to whether it was desirable
first to concentrate the division for action, or to throw the leading
battalions into the Tronville forest, where portions of Lehman’s
Brigade were still holding their ground. As an advance of the French
out of the woods would have endangered the left flank of the Prussian
artillery line, three battalions were at once thrown into the forest,
while the six remaining battalions were kept in reserve for the time
being. Subsequently, three more battalions were sent forward to
reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest
“What a decisive blow the 20th Division could have struck, if it had
been employed in one body!” (V. LIEBERT).[428]
[428] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 595. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 18, p. 580.--V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 146.--Essay by V. LIEBERT published in Supplement of the
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895. From the description contained in
the 4th Supplement of the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895, p. 177. It
appears, at any rate, that the support given by the 39th Half-Brigade
was not absolutely necessary. On the right flank as well, a united
employment of the force for the attack of Hill 970 ought to have
been possible; as it was, regiments were cut up in making isolated
assaults, which had no effect whatever on the outcome of the general
action. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.
The decision is usually brought about by pressure on a flank, but it
might become necessary to accomplish this result by launching large
masses against some point of the hostile front.[429]
[429] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteriemassen im Angriff_.
Colonel CSICSERICS VON BACSANY of the Austrian Army, in a brilliant
study entitled _Die Schlacht_ (Vienna, 1908), argues that with the
increased combat frontage of armies, local successes have no longer
the same Influence on the outcome of the battle as of old. Compare,
for example, the envelopment of the Russian left flank at Liao Yang,
and the penetration of the line at Yuhuntun (Mukden), with the effect
produced by the capture of Chlum and St. Privat on the outcome of the
battles of Königgrätz and Gravelotte, respectively.
The difficulties of accomplishing this are best illustrated by the
situation of the IIIrd Army Corps on the afternoon of August 18th,
1870, when Prince Frederick Charles yielded to the entreaties of
General von Alvensleben and permitted him to advance south of the
Bois de la Cusse.[430] Similar situations resulted in the case of the
Austrian 1st and VIth Army Corps at Königgrätz, the French IIIrd and
IVth Army Corps, on a front of 2.75 km., with the Guards in rear,
between Noisseville and Failly, and, finally, the advance of the
1st East Siberian Rifle Division at Wafangu. The French regulations
likewise contemplate a decisive attack made by large masses on a narrow
front. If these troops which are to clinch the success gained by the
fighting line, are deployed on the front laid down in regulations, they
will be unable to use their weapons. It isn’t mechanical shock action,
but fire effect that decides the battle. In such a mass of troops, only
fractional parts will be able to fire, the major portion is crowded
together and becomes a dense, defenseless target, exposed to all the
psychological impressions produced by crowding human beings into a
narrow space.[431]
[430] _Der 18. August_, pp. 484 and 558, sketches 34 and 35.
[431] The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors
in colonial wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that,
for our purposes, deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat
of the two French brigades at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at
Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). LEHAUCOURT, _Les Expéditions de Tonkin_.
The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st March. 1896).
A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of 1500 m., _i.e._,
put only about ¹⁄₄ of its men in the first line; but no objection can
be made if the brigade, in moving to the final decisive assault, at
once advances on a front of 2500-3000 m.
13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION.
The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the
commander to control and direct all ranks in action by words of command
diminishes. In action, therefore, those means must be adopted that will
facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires first of all the
choice of an appropriate position for the leader.
The beginning of an action should find the leader as far forward as
possible; during the advance to the battlefield, with the advance
guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for neither messages nor reports,
nor a map can adequately take the place of personal inspection of the
situation of the enemy, of neighboring units, and of the ground. So
placed, he can best direct the first deployment, upon which the future
course of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making
prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops from making
detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude
arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit.
During the action, the superior commander can influence the course
of the fight, his personal example excepted, only by employing his
reserves. His place is, therefore, near the reserves, at a point that
can be readily found, and never in the firing line.
A company commander should remain where he believes he can best control
his company, as a rule, perhaps in the firing line. He provides for the
supply and distribution of ammunition that is brought up from the rear,
and regulates the coöperation of the platoons. (Pars. 216, 457 and 458
German I. D. R.).
A battalion commander should only in very exceptional cases take post
in the firing line; he should nearly always remain with parts of the
force that are held back for the time being, but, in any case, where
he can effectively supervise his battalion. The choice of a regimental
commander’s position is influenced by the same considerations; when his
regiment is acting as part of a brigade, he must select his position so
as to facilitate the transmission of orders from brigade headquarters.
The brigade commander will, as a rule, remain near his reserves, at a
point from which he can best overlook the deployment of his brigade.
On account of the fact that extended order fighting predominates,
leaders of all grades must be particularly careful to maintain
connection between the several parts of their command, with each other,
and with adjoining units, and to preserve their influence over their
firing lines. Superior commanders should, in addition, see that their
troops do not get out of hand, and all subordinate leaders, after
carrying out a task assigned them, should endeavor promptly to rejoin
their proper commands, or place themselves at the disposal of the
commander of troops still engaged with the enemy.
These requirements will be fulfilled, if superior commanders order
nothing that they should not and cannot order, and if the officers
charged with the execution of the orders coöperate to attain the
desired end, and do not abuse the freedom of action allowed them.
While subordinate leaders, up to and including company commanders,
are mainly occupied with fire control and fire direction, and should
influence the men by their personal example, superior commanders have
other tasks, which they must not neglect for the purpose of interfering
in the sphere of action of their subordinates. They can influence the
fire action only by sending the necessary forces to those portions
of the firing line whose fire they wish to augment. An interference
on their part with the action of subordinates is permissible only in
case of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes, which would cause the
combat to take a course other than that intended. The larger the unit
commanded by an officer, the greater the latitude that must be allowed
him. The leaders should concentrate their attention upon the general
execution of their special tasks as part of the whole scheme, rather
than upon supervision of details. It is by no means essential for all
parts of the force to employ identical means to attain one and the same
object. Every leader should bear in mind that _omission or neglect are
greater crimes than a mistake made in the choice of means_.
The initiative of leaders of all grades is the foundation of great
victories in war, but this initiative must neither jeopardize unity of
action nor direct the course of events into channels not intended by
the commander.[432]
[432] See _Taktik_, III, p. 174, and V, p. 57, et seq.
The best safeguard against the results of an act of unjustifiable
initiative is to ask oneself: “What orders would my superior have to
give me, if he were in my place and knew what I know?”
14. UNITED ACTION VERSUS TACTICAL MISSIONS.
Although no one disputes that victory depends upon a superiority of
fire at the decisive point, yet there is a great diversity of opinion
as to how this superiority is to be attained.
General Bronsart von Schellendorff states:[433] “Every battle seeks
to bring about a decisive victory, but this is, after all, invariably
the sum of local victories. Successful battle-tactics consist of
correctly estimating the tactical value of these local successes
and of contriving to gain a victory at the decisive point; in other
words, to manage so that the sum-total of positive factors will be
greater than that of the negative factors.”
[433] _Betrachtungen über die zeitgemäsze Fechtweise der
Infanterie_, 1891, p. 36.
In the opinion of the advocates of this course,[434] unity of action
is attainable by practice and study, but not by set formations. If
unity of action could be ensured in all bodies of troops by means
of study and practice, there would seem to be no reason why the
regulations should lay down still more definite rules to govern the
manner in which an attack should be conducted. The matter is not
so simple, however. Bearing in mind the great latitude that the
regulations allow each individual in choosing the formation which he
deems proper in a given case, it is obvious that many very different
procedures may result. This in itself is no drawback, and to a
certain extent this condition must exist, as the task in hand, the
nature of the country, and the existing situation vary. But, if a
given problem can be correctly solved in several ways, it will also
admit of a decidedly incorrect solution; and it is the more likely
to be solved incorrectly, the less study and practice is indulged in
by a large part of the corps of officers, and the less this class of
officers finds in existing regulations as a guide to conduct. When,
in spite of undeniable progress, we see dispersed attacks and an
unquestionably incorrect conduct in every maneuver, and this with a
corps of officers nearly all of whom are professional soldiers, who
have had the advantage of study and practice, what may we expect
in war, where the corps of officers will be very largely composed
of officers of the Reserve and Landwehr, who have but very limited
opportunities for study and practice, but who, after the very first
battle, may have to command companies.
[434] General VON SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze der Gegenwart_. See also the essay in the July number of
_Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1898.
General von Scherff,[435] the chief advocate of “united action,” is
opposed to the “combat with units of command” (_Kommandoeinheiten_)
briefly sketched above. He makes a distinction between battle-tactics
and the tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of
the local successes can by no means gain the victory; that can only
be done by the united launching of adequate forces at the decisive
point. “No weapon in the world will ever alter the fact that five
battalions united in one body have a greater inherent fighting
power than five separate battalions--not to mention twenty separate
companies--always provided that a united body of troops is also
launched as one body.”
[435] _Kriegslehren in Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen der
Neuzeit_, I-IV, _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, 1898.
Examples Illustrating the Necessity of a United Attack.
1. The 26th Infantry Brigade was alarmed and put in march toward the
battlefield to support the advance guard brigade of the VIIth Army
Corps, engaged at =Colombey=. The commander of the 26th Infantry
Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It
was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the
25th Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and
Colligny, and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The
troops already engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and
physical energy was exhausted. It is only too patent that the first
battalion (1st Battalion, 13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was
thrown into the fight to afford at least temporary relief, but this
insufficient reinforcement was involved in the general failure. After
about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade (the IIIrd Battallion,
73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) was concentrating
for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united attack,
only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This
battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the “Tannenwäldchen” at the
“Todten-Allee”, but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall
back with considerable losses, prevented the further advance of the
IInd Battallion of the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier
Battalion of the 13th Infantry, on the bank of the Vallières brook.
“Although the General Staff account of the war is silent on this
subject, we are justified in assuming that only the presence of the
brigade commander, who had learned a lesson from the second local
assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry from
making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the organizations,
the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, proceeded
more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing on
the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a
second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the
IInd Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time.
The result was that the enemy was completely routed.”[436]
[436] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 470. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
41, et seq.
2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated
attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three
different brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a
higher commander been present, a united attack launched by him would
undoubtedly have been successful.[437]
[437] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 631. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p.
271. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.
3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb
of =St. Martin=, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th
Infantry Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a
large body of massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry
Division, in particular the attack made on =Grugies= (battle of =St.
Quentin=) is the antithesis of the above-mentioned attack. Although
the situation did not necessitate the simultaneous launching of the
available forces, the brigade attacked in driblets. The attack made
by these fractions, launched one after another, was not able to
bring about a decision. In the first place, at about 11 A. M., three
companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th Infantry), soon afterwards
supported by the 8th Company of the 29th Infantry, and the 8th
Company of the 69th Infantry, attacked the French position at the
railway embankment and cut. The Prussian troops fought with great
gallantry, the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry making
four attacks, and the other two companies, three. Although these
five companies succeeded in gaining temporary successes, they lacked
a common commander, and were supported from the rear only when they
were thrown back after fighting for three-quarters of an hour.
About noon, the four companies of the Ist Battalion, 29th Infantry,
were brought up, but did not engage until the first line had been
forced back and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry,
at any rate, were out of action for the time being. Incidentally,
it may be mentioned that the Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry
attacked in three groups, the strongest of which consisted of 2-l/2
companies, the weakest of only half a company. Only the strongest
of these groups scored a success, and the Ist Battalion of the 29th
Infantry was completely routed after a bloody fight. The 9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry, did not arrive on the battlefield until
after the companies of the Ist Battalion of this regiment, whose
heroic fight cannot be sufficiently praised, had ceased to exist as
tactical units.
At 12:30 P. M., the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 70th Infantry
were brought up and threw back the French, but were in their turn
defeated. At this moment the 10th and 11th Companies of the 40th
Infantry arrived; these companies were also able to advance, but
their success was a temporary one only.
At 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion of the 40th Infantry appeared,
threw the French back, but was soon attacked by superior forces and
suffered the same fate as its predecessors.
At 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion of the 70th Infantry and the
9th and 12th Companies of the 40th Infantry were brought forward, but
only the former engaged seriously at once--again without success.
A little while later, the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry,
advanced energetically. At about 3:30 P. M., the French made a very
strong counter-attack; all that had been gained seemed about to
be lost again, when the decision was finally brought about by the
vigorous action of the 41st Infantry and a charge made by Reserve
Dragoons.
The capture of Grugies, of the sugar mill, and, a little later, of
Gauchy, now followed.
The resistance of the French was broken. General von Barnekow
had thus, apparently, gained his object; but at what a price? In
this engagement, the launching of troops in driblets may be very
accurately followed:
1. At 11 A. M., five companies were launched in two separate groups
(5th, 6th, and 7th Companies, 69th Infantry--8th Company, 29th
Infantry and 8th Company, 69th Infantry);
2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry)
were also launched in separate groups;
3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry);
4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and 4th
Companies, 70th Infantry);
5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were
pushed in;
6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought
up;
7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the
9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced.
Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually
drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different
detachments, from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division
at Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on
the battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was
exhausted.[438]
[438] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, II, pp. 135 and 212.
Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary
one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally
forced them to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of
partial successes, which became reverses, however, in a very short
time.
_Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required
beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved
the weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster,
without turning the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only
be brought about by simultaneously launching masses._
“The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer
practicable under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the
opposite extreme of extended order, company column tactics, with
which all were sufficiently familiar, since it had been carefully
practiced in minor field exercises in time of peace.” (The attack
made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against =Schlosz Aubigny=, August
14th, 1870[439])
[439] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 466; VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
16; VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p. 18. This
example is the more instructive, as both advocates of these opposing
views show how, in their opinion, the attack should have been made.
The same attack is, moreover, treated in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title _Selbständigkeit und
Auftragsverfahren_.
There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the
continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not
be able to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate
leaders restoring this unity, and “that, in the end, no higher
commander will any longer have the assurance that his wishes will
be carried out.” The battles around Metz during August, 1870, show
a tendency on the part of the infantry to leave behind, in reserve
and in rallying positions, parts of the troops launched to perform a
certain combat task, “to detach parts to maintain communication (very
often not at all endangered) with neighboring detachments”, and to
despatch others to a distance to cover a flank, or to make a wide
turning movement for the purpose of enveloping the enemy’s flank.
To prevent a battle from degenerating into a number of disconnected,
local combats, and to ensure that the enemy will be actually
subjected to the fire of as many rifles as the supreme commander
intended, General von Scherff proposes that the battle formation,
consisting of several echelons separated by fixed distances, be taken
up outside of the zone of hostile fire, and that these echelons
then advance simultaneously and as uninterruptedly as possible upon
the enemy. In this movement the terrain is to be taken advantage of
only so far as the orders permit. In view of the flat trajectory of
the modern rifle, he concedes that fire while in motion, formerly
considered permissible by him at long and medium ranges, may be
replaced by an advance by rushes of the firing line, alternating
with firing in a prone position, the ammunition to be expended at
each halt being fixed by the officer charged with fire direction.
He moreover considers it necessary to have a main firing position,
located approximately at the outer limit of short ranges, for the
purpose of gaining the superiority of fire. Base units must be
designated in order to prevent weak detachments from encountering the
enemy single-handed. Moreover, he intends to keep the advance going
by increasing the fire, and by detailed and definite orders providing
for the constant reinforcement of the firing line by men of the
steadily following supports and reserves. Further, since according to
his proposal, a halt by the rear echelons of an attack that has once
been launched, is excluded on principle, it follows of necessity,
that, for the fire effect of the firing line at the really decisive
ranges, there can remain only a very brief period of time, measurable
in minutes, which is amply sufficient, in his opinion, for the object
to be accomplished.
It is charged that General von Scherff’s proposal[440] (see p. 205
supra) favors a set scheme for conducting every fight. This is not
true; there is quite a difference between “more definitely regulating
the conduct of an attack”, aimed at by the author of _Kriegslehren_,
and the formulation of a normal procedure.
[440] The 10th Supplement of the _Internationale Revue_ 1900, gives
General von Scherff’s ideas on the infantry attack. See also his
_Reglementarische Studien_, p. 58, and _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, p.
102. _Vergleichender Rückblick auf die neueste Tagesliteratur über
den Infanterieangriff_, 1906.
“Where a number of individuals are to coöperate for the purpose of
performing a certain task, the nature of the case requires that
each one be able to picture to himself beforehand the nature of the
task, so that his share in it will appear clear and definite. Each
one must know what he is to do, when and where he should engage,
what his role is to be, etc. etc., or the result will be hopeless
confusion.”--“The drill regulations must supply this picture and the
drill-ground is the place where its general forms should be impressed
upon every individual participating in the performance of a task.”
Experience has taught us that this image of the drill-ground becomes
distorted in war through influences which have almost never permitted
it to appear on the battlefield in its true form. The initiative of
subordinate leaders should overcome the obstacles which stand in the
way of a realization of this ideal image.
=The system of tactical missions= reckons with the sum-total of local
successes, assigns tasks to the different units of command, and
leaves to the latter the choice of the means, without restricting
their independence. The course of the combat can be influenced only
by the action of retained forces, and it is sought to produce united
action by acquainting all leaders with the object of the combat, they
in turn endeavoring to attain this object even though they do so in
different ways.
=The system of united action= seeks to ensure victory by
simultaneously placing in readiness all the forces intended for
the general combat, by an orderly concentration for action, and by
launching the troops at one and the same time, without, however,
requiring all parts of the force to employ the same formations. This
system dictates to the leader the number of troops he should launch.
Since in action everything is ordered as necessity therefor arises,
the result is that the leader loses sight of the general action in
view of the great number of separate orders that must be issued.
In the system of tactical missions, there is danger of arbitrary
action on the part of subordinates, and of dispersion; moreover,
it is not always easy to deploy strong firing lines, and there is
an increased tendency to overestimate the value of cover and, in
consequence, to overstep the assigned frontage.
The system of united action is open to the objection that initiative
of the individual disappears and that the rules laid down in drill
regulations degenerate into a pattern devoid of all spirit.
In =Austria= (1906), Captain Wachtel[441] suggests that, when a
decision is not sought, an attack in groups be made, and that, when a
decision is sought, a united attack be made. In =Switzerland=, Major
Sonderegger[442] advocates a procedure based on that of General von
Scherff.
[441] _Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff_.
[442] _Der ungebremste Infanterieangriff_, 1906.
The initiative of the individual should carry the troops over
difficulties occasioned by the terrain or the enemy. Such checks
occur most frequently from the time a force enters the zone of
effective hostile fire until the assault has been decided upon. In
the author’s opinion, the individualized attack is a concession made,
at the expense of united action, for the purpose of making the attack
succeed at all.
XI. THE DEFENSE.[443]
[443] _Taktik_, V, p. 308. HOPPENSTEDT, _Taktisches Handbuch für
den Infanterieoffizier_, p. 30.
The invariable guiding principle in defense is to make the most
profitable use of fire. This principle governs in the selection of a
position and in strengthening it artificially.
The defender’s object may be--
1. =Temporary occupation= of a piece of ground;
2. =Purely passive defense=, outpost, rear guard, and delaying actions;
3. =Offensive-defensive action=, _i.e._, to bring about a decision by
combining the offensive with the defensive.
In fortress warfare, situations may arise which may make it necessary
to hold a piece of ground obstinately, without it being possible to
assume the offensive. In the French, Russian, and Italian regulations,
only the offensive-defensive is considered. The Italians see in the
defensive nothing but a preparation for the offensive; the Russians
seek to shake the enemy with fire in defense, so that they can
subsequently assume the offensive.
The defensive is dependent upon the terrain, and is subject to the
condition that the locality where the tactical situation requires
a stand to be made offers a position favorable for employing fire
to good advantage, and that the opponent actually attacks where the
defender expects him. The employment of the defensive is restricted
by its dependence on the ground and on the measures of the enemy. Its
employment may frequently be explained by the fact that one of the
contending parties allows itself to be checked to such an extent by the
initiative of the other that it can only offer a passive resistance.
Such passive resistance may here and there score a success by chance
(Plevna, St. Privat), but, as a rule, only the assailant reaps a
benefit from such situations.
1. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE
seeks to avoid a decision, and must therefore endeavor, by opening fire
at an early moment, to prevent the enemy from reaching short ranges.
(See p. 147 supra). It is not absolutely necessary to have a clear
field of fire or strong reserves, but the latter, kept a considerable
distance in rear, must be strong enough to enable the force to
disengage itself from the enemy.
Since only a temporary resistance is to be made, it is permissible for
the force to cover a greater front. The defender should endeavor to
compensate for his numerical inferiority by expending a large amount of
ammunition and by employing machine guns. It is an advantage to have
obstacles in front of the position and cover in rear of it, because the
former retard the enemy’s advance and the latter shelters the troops
from his fire in case of a retreat.
2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION.[444]
[444] During the attack on the large work at Gorni Dubniac, the
Finnland Regiment was unable to advance from its last position, only
70-100 paces distant from the enemy, over the foreground swept by
grazing fire. Several attempted assaults were repulsed.
Decisive results can only be obtained at short and medium ranges. Long
range fire may, indeed, inflict losses on the enemy and delay his
advance, but it cannot repulse him. (See p. 148 supra).
It is not sufficient merely to ward off the attack with fire; the
offensive must be assumed. When this is not done, the assailant can
repair his losses and try another attack. When the defender has
repulsed the enemy, he should follow up this success with an attack.
However, as he will rarely be able to do this with the force at his
disposal, fresh troops will be required. (Beaune la Rolande, Lisaine).
The change from the tactical defensive to the offensive offers the same
difficulties as the corresponding strategical move; but, in the former
case, there is present, in addition, the element of danger and the
difficulty of perceiving the right moment.[445]
[445] _Taktik_, V, p. 320. Compare this with Benedeck’s hesitation
at Königgrätz.
A position is of value only when it compels the enemy to attack,
directs his movements into definite channels, and induces him to make
wide turning movements, which cause him to lose time and produce
favorable conditions for the assumption of the offensive on the part
of the defender. Every position that enables the defender to use all
his weapons, and does not deter the enemy from making an attack, is
suitable for this purpose.
“By placing our troops in an unassailable position, we actually refuse
battle and force the enemy to seek the decision in another manner.
* * * A defensive position approaches its ideal to the extent that
its strength is hidden and opportunity is offered of surprising the
enemy by our tactical combinations. One should endeavor to conceal
the advantages which one intends to derive from the formation of the
ground, just as one hides from the enemy the bulk of one’s troops and
their actual position. This is, indeed, only practicable to a certain
extent, and requires perhaps a peculiar and little used method of
treatment.”[446]
[446] CLAUSEWITZ, _On War_, VI, 12 (_Militär-Klassiker_, p.
364). The Boers were masters of the art of concealing defensive
positions. At Colenso, on the Modder River, and at Magersfontain,
their positions were located in places where neither the British
artillerists nor the reconnoitering detachments suspected them to be.
Modern firearms make the defense so strong in front that it suffices to
hold this part of the position with a weak force supplied with plenty
of ammunition, and provided with weak supports, at a few points, to
replace losses. As these supports have a definite task to perform, they
are posted as near the first line as the available cover permits, in
order to cut down the distance to be traversed by them under fire.
When practicable, they are intrenched within the firing line itself. As
it is advisable to supply these troops with a great deal of ammunition,
some of the ammunition wagons belonging to the battalions held in
reserve may be turned over to them. The general reserve intended for
offensive action should be kept far in rear of the line. When kept too
close to the first line, the defender will be unable to move it to any
point desired, after the direction of the attack becomes apparent.
The defender should examine his position from the point of view of
the attacker, and ask himself, “_With how weak a force may I occupy
the position and still obtain the frontal strength described in the
regulations, and how strong can I make the general reserve so as to
bring about a decision?_”
At some parts of the position, an attack will have good prospects of
succeeding, at others it would encounter difficulties, and, finally,
at others it could not possibly succeed. While many troops are needed
in the first-mentioned portions (sections), comparatively few troops
will suffice to hold those sections which are less favorable for
the attacker (on account of their free field of fire, obstacles,
and the absence of artillery positions in which the attacker can
place his guns). This leads to a division of the defensive position
into sections, each forming a separate unit of command (battalion
or company) and, when necessary, detailing its own reserve (section
reserve). When the frontage of the sections, as determined by the
above-mentioned examination of the position, is considerable, or when
obstacles lie within the position, a further subdivision may become
necessary. This does not imply that the position must be held in
equal strength all along the line; portions of the line that are very
difficult to attack need only be kept under observation. Gaps in the
defensive line are, as a rule, of very little value to the assailant,
as the defender will frequently be able to sweep the space in front of
them from a flank. “In order to keep all parts of the foreground under
observation, and to prevent portions of the hostile force from escaping
the defender’s fire, a division of the foreground corresponding to the
division into sections must be made when necessary.” (Par. 403 German
I. D. R.).
Weak points, _i.e._, points against which the assailant can suddenly
mass superior forces at short range, or in the defense of which a
coöperation of infantry and artillery is impossible, must be specially
strengthened: by obstacles; provision for flanking the hostile advance;
and preparation of supporting points in rear of the position. In
addition, such weak points must be occupied with a strong garrison, by
employing two firing lines, one above the other; reserves; and machine
guns.
Enclosed farm yards (Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870), and small
patches of timber, are best not occupied at all; they are far more
valuable as sham defenses in that they draw the fire of the assailant.
At any rate, it is a question whether, at the last moment, when the
hostile assault must be warded off, it will be possible to occupy such
points.
As a general rule, only a single defensive position, consisting of an
infantry and an artillery line, is selected.
The Russians invariably posted strong advanced detachments in front
of their main defensive positions. As a result, the most serious
fights usually occurred in the positions taken up by these advanced
troops.[447] At =Haicheng=, for example, a strong main position had
been prepared, in which a stand was to be made. In spite of this,
the IInd Siberian Corps was left in a strongly fortified advanced
position west of =Simutcheng=. This corps, in its turn, fortified two
lines of advanced positions far in its front.
[447] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 109. See
_Taktik_, V, p. 305, in regard to the numerous positions in the
valley of the Shaho.
“Thus, on July 31, 1904, only seven battalions of this corps finally
fought at =Daputsi= and =Liadapu=. When they were thrown back by
superior forces, the mistake was made of bringing up fresh troops
to regain the position captured by the enemy. These troops arrived
too late and had to make a difficult attack on the Japanese, who
had already occupied the captured position. Naturally their frontal
attack accomplished nothing.
“The force thus suffered a defeat needlessly, and, although the
defensive had been decided upon, a lot of men were sacrificed in an
attempt to retake an advanced position that had been captured by the
enemy. The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when
its line of retreat was endangered by Mistshenko’s being forced back.
The Russians likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when
news was received that strong hostile forces were advancing against
the left flank of the position.”[448]
[448] See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 41/42, p. 49.
As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy =advanced positions=,[449]
_i.e._, positions lying within effective range of the main position.
Supporting points immediately in front of the main position, projecting
from it like caponiers, and flanking the ground over which the
assailant will have to make his attack, must not be confounded with
these advanced positions. St. Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on
the battlefield of Gravelotte are good examples of both classes of
positions. In order to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it
advantageous to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying
still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing this,
favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful leadership
are essential.
[449] _Taktik_, V, p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to
the contemplated construction of advanced positions in front of
the Shaho position, as the Russians desired to gain time for the
offensive movement to be made by their left wing. The uncertainty
and hesitation produced by the constant changes in orders, and the
excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which allowed
themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal.
In =France= and =Russia= much is expected of advanced positions.
In =England= particular importance is attached to them when they
draw the enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a
counter-attack. The British consider that supporting points lying in
front of the position had best be left unoccupied, unless they can be
supported by artillery fire from the main position.
“Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will
frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible
to gain an approximate idea of the enemy’s strength only by a fight.
For this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of
Belfort, in January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is
to deceive the enemy as to the defender’s strength, and to compel
him to deploy, will have a greater justification now than at that
time. Nowadays, such detachments may cover a considerable front
without danger, especially when they are plentifully supplied with
ammunition. This will make it still more easy to deceive the enemy,
and a skillful defender will know how to make the most of it.”[450]
[450] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_, II, p. 237.
Advanced positions[451] are apt to mask the fire from the main
position, and fights for their possession may easily lead to the defeat
of the troops holding them. The danger of the fight taking place and
being decided in the advanced position must be reckoned with. (Battles
of Ligny and on the Hallue). On the other hand, it may be advantageous
to employ scouting detachments, cyclists, and machine guns, and to
construct dummy intrenchments in front of the main position. (Par. 407
German I. D. R.). The French, more than anyone else, are convinced of
the advantages to be derived from an employment of advanced positions
(for example in deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main
position). In a deliberately planned concentration and advance into
action, such positions are, however, so effectively enveloped that
they do not come into play at all and fall an easy prey to the enemy.
However, we do not wish to deny their occasional usefulness in
cases where it is necessary to gain time for concentration and for
strengthening the main position. In fights for their possession, an
idea may frequently be gained of the intentions and dispositions of the
assailant. Moreover, they offer opportunities for surprising the enemy
with fire, and induce him to make premature attacks and to mass his
troops in the ones he has captured.
[451] Par. 21 German _Manual of Field Engineering_: “Their use is
principally restricted to special cases in fortress warfare.”
Next to a free field of fire (clearing the foreground, and ascertaining
ranges), the determining factors in selecting a position are elbow room
in and in rear of the position, supporting points for the flanks, and
cover. The natural cover available on the ground is made use of as best
suits the purpose of the action.
The line in which the artillery intends to fight the decisive action
constitutes the “framework” of the position. Although artillery will
rarely be able to perform all its tasks in a single position, its first
position is selected with due regard to the position of the hostile
artillery. The most important position is that from which the hostile
infantry attack is to be repulsed. This should be selected far enough
in front of the artillery to enable the latter to fire over it, and to
deprive the assailant’s artillery of the opportunity of hitting the
defender’s infantry and artillery at one and the same time. (Par. 401
German I. D. R.). A distance of 600 m. between infantry and artillery
is considered sufficient for this purpose. In view of the protection
afforded by gun shields against infantry fire, it is scarcely necessary
to post skirmish lines in advance of the artillery. But, where the
infantry line is not continuous in front of the artillery, troops
should be posted, so as to protect the artillery personnel from
being annoyed by hostile patrols. It will seldom be possible for a
commander to do justice to the requirements of both arms; in every
compromise, one or the other arm is only too apt to be placed at a
disadvantage. The needs of the infantry, whose choice of a position is
more restricted, take precedence. While infantry can govern its action
by that of the artillery during the preparatory stage of an attack,
this is impossible in defense, as the infantry is obliged to carry the
fight through to its logical conclusion in the position in which it is
begun.[452]
[452] As the artillery is less restricted in the choice of
positions, and as the final outcome of the fight depends, after all,
on the outcome of the infantry action, the demands of the infantry,
contrary to par. 292 German I. D. R., must be considered in the first
place.
3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.[453]
[453] Germany: _Manual of Field Engineering_, 1905. France:
_Instruction pratique sur les travaux de campagne_ (December 24th,
1906). England: _Manual of Military Engineering_, 1905. Russia:
_Mitteilungen vom Ingenieur Comité_, No. 41 (1906). The Austrian and
Italian regulations are undergoing revision.
The apprehensions formerly entertained in regard to prematurely
fortifying a position, and which are still shared by the French
regulations, are no longer to be found in the new regulations. The
construction of field fortifications requires time, if they are to be
of value, and if they are to give leaders and troops the assurance
that they can be defended by the minimum number of men.[454] Even
intrenchments that have been constructed in vain will frequently prove
useful in deceiving the enemy. In many cases, it will be necessary to
be prepared to meet a hostile attack made from several directions. This
contingency should be taken into account by at least preparing for the
work beforehand.
[454] At 10 A. M., on August 18th, 1870. General Canrobert received
orders to place St. Privat in a state of defense. At 11 A. M., the
first reports of the approach of the Prussian Guard were received,
and at 4 P. M., Ste. Marie aux Chênes was in German hands. Hence,
only five hours were available for these preparations for defense.
“If the situation turns out to be different than was expected, the
intrenchments already constructed should not influence the decisions
of the commander. On the other hand, the consideration that the works
might be built unnecessarily must not cause their construction to be
omitted altogether.” (Par. 311 German I. D. R.).
In the preface to the French regulations, it is emphasized that
intrenching a position ought neither to impair the spirit of the
offensive nor hamper the movement to the front. “Intrenchments are
a means to an end, but not the end itself. They should only be used
when no violence is done thereby to the tactical situation, and one
should never hesitate, for a single moment, to abandon them, if the
situation requires, or to construct others, at another place, if it
becomes necessary.” The men should therefore be trained in handling
the portable intrenching tools, until they can use them skillfully in
any position of the body.
“The use of intrenchments may also be abused. To remain inertly
in a place is just as fatal as to advance without making use of
cover. When temporary halts are made, the commander for the time
being, often placed in that position by chance (_chef du moment,
chef d’unité ou chef de groupe éventuel_), indicates whether or not
intrenchments are to be constructed.”
Battle intrenchments are to protect the soldier against hostile
fire, without hampering him in using his rifle. “They are one of
the factors which ensure economy in men, in that they save a body
of troops from suffering unnecessary losses. But their importance
always recedes before the general requirements of an action, and they
should never in any way interfere with the advance of troops; on the
contrary, intrenchments are to make it possible to bring troops
within effective range of the enemy, without impairing their physical
condition or their morale.”
Intrenchments enable a commander to save troops, which he can use
offensively at the decisive point. They do not fulfill the object
for which they were intended, when they make it easier for the enemy
to pick out the position. “Works which cannot be perceived from the
foreground even through powerful field glasses, afford the most
effective protection against artillery fire.” Trenches should therefore
be deep, have a low parapet, and be properly masked.
The commander indicates when work is to begin. Every unit must intrench
the portion of the defensive line which it is to defend; working
parties, specially detailed from troops not intended for the immediate
defense of the position, can be counted on only when extensive works
are to be constructed.
Continuous lines of trenches are seldom built; it suffices to construct
a line of works with intervals, _i.e._, battalion groups, the intervals
being simply held by a weak force.
These battalion groups (par. 24 German Manual of Field Engineering)
are constructed without regard to any fixed form, as the tactical
employment of the companies requires. They consist of firing trenches
(flanks refused and echelons in rear of the wings), provided with
splinter proofs, and adequate cover trenches, so that all the men, if
possible, will be sheltered from artillery fire.
The aim is, first of all, to construct inconspicuous standing firing
trenches. These should have low parapets and be provided with numerous
traverses to restrict the effect of high explosive shell. In order
that these traverses may not betray the location of the position, they
should not rise above the parapet.[455]
[455] These traverses afford very little shelter against enfilading
fire; it is advisable to keep sand bags in readiness as a protection
in case such fire is received.
Deep, narrow trenches afford the best protection against artillery
fire (the trench should be about 0.60 m. wide at the bottom). Narrow
trenches are especially difficult to pick out from a balloon. In
constructing trenches having no parapet at all, special precautions
must be taken in order that their location may not be betrayed by the
scattered earth or by their rear wall, which will be visible when they
are located on the slope facing the enemy. When the trenches are to
be held for some time, provision must be made for the construction
of splinter proofs,[456] other overhead cover, and loopholes of
observation.
[456] These lie about 0.50 m. below the natural surface of the
ground and accommodate 5-6 men: they are separated from each other by
an earth wall 1 m. thick.
Numerous light splinter proofs are generally to be preferred to a
few larger and stronger ones, as they afford sufficient protection
against shrapnel bullets and fragments. They may be protected against
direct hits from field guns, or other guns having a flat trajectory,
by sloping their roofs to the rear at an angle as nearly as possible
coincident with the angle of fall of those projectiles.
Since field intrenchments are incapable of furnishing protection
against direct hits from guns having a curved trajectory, this object
must be attained by skillfully distributing splinter proofs along the
front. These should be inconspicuous and should not take up too much
room. The comfort of the troops in the trenches should also be provided
for by constructing kitchens, latrines, drainage ditches, and dressing
stations.
In addition, field magazines for storing ammunition should be built,
and alarm arrangements made. Moreover, covered communication should be
provided along the line and to the rear. The front and gaps in the line
may be very effectively flanked by fire from skillfully constructed
refused wings.
In constructing a battalion group of intrenchments, provision will have
to be made, in addition, for the following:
[Illustration: Intrenchments for a Battalion.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench with Cover Trench.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench with Splinter Proofs.]
[Illustration: Profiles.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench in ordinary soil.]
[Illustration: Splinter Proof.]
[Illustration: Communicating Trench.]
[Illustration: Communicating Trench without Parapet.]
[Illustration: Machine Gun Pit.]
1. =Observation of the foreground=, “for the purpose of reconnaissance
and security, as well as for noting the effect of one’s own fire.” In
order that observers may not betray the location of the position, it
is recommended that they be posted at inconspicuous points affording
a sufficiently extended view, and screened from the observation of
the enemy. When they have to be posted in the defensive line, the
terreplein is either lowered in places, so that they can just look over
the parapet, or special observation stations are constructed. Provision
must be made for communication between the several parts of the line
and with the next higher headquarters.
2. =Clearing the foreground.= As a rule, it will be practicable to
employ for this work troops not needed in digging trenches. As time
is lacking in field warfare for extensive work, such as cutting down
embankments and removing dead angles, one will have to be content with
trampling down or burning standing grain, removing objects which the
enemy might use as aiming points, and cutting clearings through woods.
It is not advisable to demolish stone walls and houses, as the debris
is difficult to remove and affords cover to the enemy.
3. =Dummy intrenchments and masks.=[457] These are to deceive the
assailant as to the position and extent of the defensive works.
They should not be located in the same fire swept zone as the
defensive works themselves, and at a distance should look like real
fortifications. Masks are to screen defensive works or troops, without
restricting the fire of the latter. Natural features are best suited
for this purpose, but may be replaced or supplemented by artificial
masks.
[457] _Taktik_, V, p. 291. At Magersfontain, the Boers constructed
dummy trenches on the crest, while the trenches actually held by them
were located at the foot of the slope. The result is well known.
In many cases, it will suffice to place a few skirmishers behind a
parapet that has been hastily thrown up with a plow.
4. =Cover trenches and communicating trenches.= These constitute a
considerable portion of the defensive works. Communicating trenches
may be either covered ways or zigzags, and connect the cover trenches
with the firing trenches. Sortie steps should be provided in order to
facilitate a prompt advance from the trenches. In many cases, it is
impossible to avoid placing firing and cover trenches so close to each
other that the enemy’s shells can strike both simultaneously.
5. =Obstacles.= These need only be constructed when two forces confront
each other for a protracted period. The purpose of obstacles is to hold
the enemy where he will be exposed to the most deadly fire; retard his
advance; compel him to confine his movements to certain avenues of
approach (this is especially valuable in night combats); and eliminate
dead angles in front of the position. The presence of extensive
obstacles forces the enemy to advance systematically. As a rule, they
can only be removed by pioneers. They should not be located too near
the position, as they are apt to be damaged by artillery fire directed
at the position, and interfere with the defender’s fire. When they
are too far in front of the position, the defender will not be able
to guard them and prevent their destruction. In general, they should
not be more than 200 m. from the position. It is better to construct
several lines of small obstacles than a single line of large ones. The
requirement that obstacles must not interfere with the defender’s fire,
must not afford the enemy an opportunity to approach under cover, and
must remain intact under hostile artillery fire, is best met by marshy
ground and by wire entanglements. Obstacles should be provided with a
slight glacis in order to prevent artillery fire from destroying them
prematurely. When wire entanglements are too high, they are easily seen
at a distance, and, although they are little damaged by artillery fire,
the attacker can make preparations to remove them.
Russian Views.
A defensive position consists of an advanced position, a fighting
line with firing trenches and batteries, supporting points in rear,
and, finally, a fourth line, which serves as a rallying position.
The key to a position, which lay formerly in the line of supporting
points, lies at present in the firing trenches in which supporting
points must be provided. (Colonel Golenkin advocates the use of
semi-circular works as supporting points, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Mordovin large closed works). “These semi-circular works are in
a sense the anchors by means of which the firing line clings to
the position which it has occupied.” It does not matter if the
enemy penetrates the first line and captures one or two of these
supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and
the second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat
indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated
into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able
to sustain the counter-attack made by the defender’s reserves, and
its temporary success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this
may be accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely
essential. Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number
than is employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose.
According to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are
essential in order to check an enemy who has penetrated the first
line, and to facilitate the defender’s final retreat in case of
necessity.
Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions
for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks,
and, finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either
to serve “reconnaissance purposes,” by forcing the enemy to an early
deployment, or to do duty as “caponiers” from which a flanking fire
may be brought to bear on the foreground.
Advanced positions, doing duty as “caponiers,” are invariably to
consist of closed works, those serving “reconnaissance purposes” of
open works. The latter are to be defended “to the last ditch,” and
are not to be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or
less, but the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a
bayonet fight.
In contrast with this distribution in depth--2 km., in the model
given--Lieutenant-Colonel Jabel, whose views are based on the same
experiences, advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He
states: “The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks,
as well as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery
fire in particular, produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that
the decisive action could be fought only in a single line. With its
capture, further fighting had only small prospects of success * * *”
“When firing trenches have been constructed at the points where the
best effect can be obtained from long and short range fire, they
should not be evacuated prematurely, but held, in order to make the
most of this fire effect, until the enemy arrives close enough to use
his bayonets. If the troops holding the trenches retire immediately
before the bayonet fight, their retreat invariably becomes a rout,
and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, after leaving
their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open to the
hostile fire.”
4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE.
In his _Tactical Handbook_, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a method,
well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of artillery fire
on a defensive position. He believes that dummy intrenchments, not
too conspicuously located, partially, but not skillfully masked and
occupied, will deceive the attacker’s artillery for some time, at any
rate, until the advanced troops of the attacker induce the defenders to
man their parapet and expose themselves to shrapnel fire. The “defense
should be conducted in such a manner that the garrison of the main
position will not need to expose itself to the enemy’s artillery fire
as soon as his advanced troops appear.” Major Hoppenstedt believes that
this can be attained, in hill positions, by conducting the fire fight,
at long and medium ranges, from positions in rear, the defender moving
up into the main position, specially prepared for this purpose, when
the attacker disappears in the defiladed spaces in front of it. The
objection to this method is that it necessitates too large a force to
hold the position.
“In a protracted, obstinate fight, the defender’s trenches,
exposed to the combined hostile infantry and artillery fire, will
finally become filled with dead and wounded, and it will rarely
be practicable to remove them. The arrival of reinforcements will
increase the confusion and the losses, and the fighting energy of the
troops will decrease with tremendous rapidity. This is one of the
greatest disadvantages of the defense as compared with the attack and
its constantly moving lines.
“In such cases, which will be typical at points where the attacker
intends to penetrate the line, it may be a real act of salvation for
the defender’s firing line to rush to the front.
“In fighting at short ranges, especially just before the assailant
makes his assault, such a rush to the front on the part of the
defender’s line, may be a good move for another reason. As is well
known, the attacker’s artillery must change targets when its infantry
arrives within a certain distance of the defender’s position. The
Germans (par. 446 I. D. R.) fix this point at 300 m. from the enemy,
and the French, whose guns have a flatter trajectory, fix it at 500
m. In attacking a hill position, when the fire is well observed, the
distance of this point from the position will be considerably greater.
“But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be,
skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point
fixed by the regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid
interfering with the fire of its artillery. Under such circumstances,
it may be a skillful move for a defender who is still full of fight,
to decrease the distance which separates him from the hostile
infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may escape from the hostile
artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures his vision. If he
finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, for he will
then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.”
The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger of a sudden
attack being directed against a flank. The assailant will endeavor to
avoid making an attack against the front of a position prepared for
defense, when such an attack has small chances of succeeding, and seek
the decision by attacking a flank, where conditions are, to a certain
extent at least, equalized. The danger of a flank attack increases
with the length of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move
to prolong the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat)
for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power of extension
is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and the wing attacked will
then be so weak and attenuated that it will not be capable of offering
serious resistance.
To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise promises little
success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will make itself felt,
first of all, at the salient thus formed (see p. 357 supra), and his
convergent artillery and infantry fire, which may even enfilade parts
of the line, will paralyze all tactical movements of the defender at
this point.
By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only postpone
the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope with an
envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different manner.
The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping force by
posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring about a decision
by employing the reserve offensively. However, for carrying out these
measures, more time is required than for merely refusing a flank. Time
may be gained by making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with
strong detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the
flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could think of
attacking the main position.
* * * * *
In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne in mind that
they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire fights, and that the
mobility of the machine gun batteries cannot be utilized when, from the
very start, they are assigned a section to defend.
In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the machine
guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, when necessary,
to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, to prevent
envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to participate in an offensive
movement.
This does not preclude their coming into action at the very opening of
an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary to command important
avenues of approach.
When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be possible to
post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in front or on a flank of
the main position, that they can bring a sudden fire to bear on the
area in which the opponent will in all probability post his artillery.
Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep defiladed spaces in
front of the defensive line.
* * * * *
If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation of the
position should not be longer deferred. It is always risky to occupy
the position in the face of hostile batteries, especially as the fire
of the defender’s guns is masked by the skirmishers moving forward. If
the defender can manage to give the attacker the impression that the
position is still unoccupied, perhaps thereby inducing him to advance
less cautiously, and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral
effect far exceeding the material success may be counted upon.[458]
The firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will
have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the troops should
not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively insignificant in
defense, and as it is important to develop a heavy fire so as to make
it difficult for the enemy to gain the fire superiority. The principles
governing the moment for opening fire have already been discussed (pp.
147 and 154 supra).
[458] Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899.
Engagement at Colenso, on December 15th, 1899.
The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority of fire.
This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire from a large
number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s force in motion. The
defender should make the most of the advantage which his preparedness
gives him. The attacker’s firing line with its supports forms the
target. A departure from this rule is in order, in the case of a French
assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the reserves
and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable for the
defender to discontinue his fire and to take cover when the assailant
lies down and fires; but, while under cover, everything should be
prepared for resuming the fire when the enemy rises to continue his
advance (p. 156 supra).
If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from reaching the
extreme limit of short ranges, the commander must decide whether to
continue the fight until a decision is reached, or whether to break off
the action.
When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, it will be too
late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain in rear of the
position is especially favorable, or other troops can take a hand in
the fight to cover the withdrawal. The onrushing assailant is received
with accelerated fire; the defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk
a fight at close quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is
already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”
While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for the defender to
step upon the rear wall of the trench so that the latter would become
an obstacle for the attacker. But this scheme can only be employed when
the troops are completely in hand.
While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost intensity by
the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the general reserve,
which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to bring about the decision
by advancing to attack. On arriving close enough to assault, the attack
reaches its most critical stage, and even a counter-attack made by a
comparatively small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense.
5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.[459]
[459] See F.C. V. H. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 418 et seq.
In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well
posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the
force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong
defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at
another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813,
and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in
Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June,
1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because
Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the
position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality).
Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the
act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming
the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative
strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may
still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack
can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major
portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position
and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success.
[460] Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. 1805 (_Schlachterfolg_, p. 28);
Salamanca, 1812.
The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense,
but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action
is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the
assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter
case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile
forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the
commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the
enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461]
[461] The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of
Noisseville. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 41.
Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make
itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it.
As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should
launch his reserves for the counter-attack.
The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole
force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in
numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack
remains almost always the only remedy.
“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can
best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile
attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of
the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as
a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both
flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves
in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment,
while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other
for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general
reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off
a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German
I. D. R.).
The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the
position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet
cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire
directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually
involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the
measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him
to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines
the position of the general reserve.
Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position
of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken
to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to
its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to
advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can
be made rapidly and with uniformity.
Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to direct his
attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should
be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the
troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile
fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making
a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of
the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone
of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This
interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the
counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when
the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender.
This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the
position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition,
the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the
assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is
posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should
be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing
line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is
posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped
together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action
(refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a
flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the
assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position,
and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a
flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it
will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity
of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope
of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may
frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant
to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the
position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so
doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in
rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must
similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to
protect themselves against a flank attack.
[Illustration]
It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve.
This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of
resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any
case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough
to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying
the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of
ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance
must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in
order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The
question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how
strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each
particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to
produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force,
as it could then be checked by weak detachments.
While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either--
1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy
during its forward movement; or
2. Take up the attack formation from the start.
The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small,
of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes
to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.
The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the
counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation
is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes
in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation
seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction--straight
to the front.
It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should
be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no
special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general
reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to
throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the
counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is
under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is
made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of
the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed,
exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to
take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions
may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be
checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their
fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always
repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps
still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never
produce decisive results.
A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the
position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such
supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact
that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion,
will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable
number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such
an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing
is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position.
Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of
such _retours offensifs_, this may be explained by the fact that the
counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is
but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against
him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to
re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to
make a counter-attack.
Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into =Servigny=
under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town
systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out
again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[462]
[462] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 52. _Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p.
181.
The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle
of =Wörth= (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade)
pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery
fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French
counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of
the =Niederwald=, was discontinued at a timely moment.[463] The
well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at
=Wörth=, after the capture of =Elsaszhausen=, was successful and is
especially instructive.[464] The attack made by General de Sonis for
the purpose of retaking =Loigny= was undertaken too late and with
inadequate forces.[465] The same is true of the counter-attack made
by the 3rd Bavarian Division on =Zella= (4th July, 1866).
[463] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.
[464] _Ibid._, XVI, p. 187, et seq.
[465] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 124.
The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be
successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet
it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined
with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy
to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they
should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at
close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain
reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last
moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time
when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.”
The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the
right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how
long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance,
no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the
counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the
reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually
up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires
wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the
situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching
the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the
result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him
from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger
the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the
more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will
not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and
accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive
action.
We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack
should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as
well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank
of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does
not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made.
A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the
start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not
supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the
defeat of the defender’s entire force.
A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of the
3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries
which had gone into action near =Goury= (battle of =Loigny=). The
Ist and IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions,
12th Infantry, and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and
when the batteries finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing
back the French battalions immediately opposing it. The twenty-one
companies now made the mistake of attacking =Ecuillon=, which they
occupied. The attacking force had traversed about 2000 m., and as
there were no reserves and flank echelons, the Bavarians were obliged
to give way before an assault made by seven fresh battalions against
their unprotected left flank. The mistake of pushing forward too far,
and the lack of supports in rear of the exposed flank, was bound to
exact a penalty, as soon as the French were in a position to advance
on their own account.[466]
[466] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 43.
A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near
=Tsinortun=. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division
advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of
enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The
commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve
(apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a
counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian
counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which
followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire.
The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the
140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the
Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest
as regards the Japanese method of attack.[467]
[467] LÖFFLER, _Allgemeine Lage_, I, pp. 68 and 69. V. HOEN, _Der
russisch-japanische Krieg_, in _Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen
Vereins_, p. 166. NIESSEL, _Enseignements tactiques_, p. 158.
So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against
the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who
has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a
counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral
factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in
rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot
quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468]
[468] Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s
flank: Battle of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack
made by 21 companies of the 4th Brigade at Goury (HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 55), and that made by the Ist Battalion,
10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry,
at Goury (_ibid._, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’
Brigade (_ibid._, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made
by the garrison of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General
Sonis: the brilliant flank attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th
Infantry, during the battle of Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (KUNZ,
_Orleans_, p. 148); and the counter-attack made by General Bataille
on the Stiring Wald during the battle of Spicheren. The last-named
counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception and
execution. (_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, pp. 93 and 96).
Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, _i.e._, one made straight
to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to
the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of
success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where
the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the
defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the
attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes
apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of
movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually
preceded by wavering.[469]
[469] “The defender will only be able to make a frontal
counter-attack from his position when he has repulsed the assault and
has made the most of fire action, or when it is important to drive
away the enemy who has been brought to a standstill in front of the
defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may lead to the loss
of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.).
The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during
the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel
says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring
up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the
utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves
itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix
bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of
retreat.”
[470] _Lehre von der Truppenführung_.
This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of
=Elsaszhausen= against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps
appearing at the northern edge of the =Niederwald=. The success they
met with at the start induced the French to continue their advance,
and when a reverse occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen
was taken by the Hessians without difficulty.[471]
[471] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 121, et seq.
Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line
of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently
successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the
attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry.
Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the
support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads.
However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool,
meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short
ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of
his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the
result.[472]
[472] The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples
of this. (_Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, pp. 75 and 234).
In both cases the defender’s frontal counter-attack forced the
assailant to face about; but at Soor a second line of infantry, and
at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally turned the
scale in favor of the assailant.
Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender
still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept
in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the
decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force,
and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a
frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with
altogether.
Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully
by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century.
(In these counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then
advanced to the assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made
during the battles of =Vimiero=, =Maida=, =Busaco=, and especially
=Waterloo=.[473]
[473] At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and
the British Guards repulsed the French attack. VON OLLECH, _Feldzug
von 1815_, pp. 230 and 247. See also note p. 151 supra.
At =Beaumont=, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the
French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to
waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance
caused the French to retire.[474]
[474] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 53.
In the battles of the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, frontal
counter-attacks were successfully made in several instances.
In the engagement at =Kazeljevo= (5th September, 1877), the frontal
counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far
inferior, saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were
obstructed by their trains, which had gone astray.[475]
[475] SPRINGER, _Der russisch-türkische Krieg_, III, p. 171.
The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of
=Gorni Bugarov= (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment,
which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments,
occupied a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans,
on the road leading from =Orchanie= to =Sofia=. The Russians allowed
the Turks to approach to very short range before they opened fire,
which was immediately followed by a counter-attack all along the
line. This seems to have been the result of the initiative of the
several battalion commanders. The Turks (15 battalions) faced about
and retired on Sofia. The Russian infantry was led back to its first
position.[476]
[476] _Ibid._, VII, p. 134.
On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment
of the Russian Guard at =Tashkessen= was repulsed by the frontal
counter-attack made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.[477]
[477] BAKER-PASHA, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 57.
During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very
frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were
invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the
latter found cover in previously constructed trenches.
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria-Hungary.= If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander
should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general reserve
for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case,
the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the
opponent advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy
and carry out the counter-attack with determination by directing a
powerful fire against the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement
on one flank is absolutely essential to the execution of the
counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided; the
enemy is to be annihilated by fire.
When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general
reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing
the troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops
making an enveloping attack on the position.
=France.= The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
counter-attack is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
offensive return.
A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon
as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful
and suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the
first line, will, at the very least, check the enemy until the
fighting line has had time to recover.
Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him, then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press
on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected
and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank
by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure
has frequently been successful. “If the attacker presses forward
too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position,
fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from
view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged
increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic
counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels
him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until
he has had time to recover.”
“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”
=England.= The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison
of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the
general reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive
counter-attack. The moment when the attacker has used up his
reserves and is about to assault is generally considered as the most
propitious for making the counter-attack.
=Japan.= The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans.
“The better the position, the location and construction of the
intrenchments, and the distribution of troops, the greater the
number of men that can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the
stronger the general reserve available for an offensive movement. By
this means the chances of victory are increased. * * * Frequently
there is danger that the defender will be committed to purely passive
defense, and that freedom of action will be lost. Therefore, when the
proper moment arrives, the decisive counter-attack should be made.”
XII. THE RETREAT.
(Par. 426 German I. D. R.).
A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; only the
presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting line should
induce a commander to come to the weighty decision of reaching
it by running. (Russia). On account of the great range of modern
weapons, defeated troops, on open ground, cannot escape from fire
by running.[478] No rules can be laid down in regulations as to the
conduct of a retreat after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is
no longer possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops
in position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire in
a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,[479] and cannot
re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at least abates. (Par.
428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which is moved to the rear at a timely
moment, and all available cavalry should cover the retreat of the
infantry, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from making the most of
its opportunities for effective action.
[478] Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be
underestimated. See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p.
49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to the panic created in a skirmish
line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett (Wörth). This skirmish
line was running to the rear toward a rallying position and the panic
was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! March! March!”
The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of a mounted
field officer. Major v. Below.
[479] The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and
roughly handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to
its left rear through the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused
the two regiments to change places. (The attack made by the 38th
Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 25,
p. 35.
To order a retreat at the right moment requires military instinct;
rules cannot be laid down in regard to it.
“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are either withdrawn by
order or defeated, can no longer choose their line of retreat. If the
enemy pursues, they must retire perpendicularly to their former front,
without changing formation, and need a force on which they can rally
in order to prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that
a systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force still has
some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, for a force
intended for decisive action to retain a reserve for covering the
retreat instead of employing it for the purpose of gaining the victory.”
To break off the action by systematically relieving the troops engaged
with the enemy,[480] is only possible if the force still has reserves
available, if cavalry and artillery are in a position to take a hand in
the fight, or if the troops that have been withdrawn are sheltered from
the enemy’s fire by features of the ground--all of which depends in
many cases on chance.
[480] _Taktik_, V, p. 344.
It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense than in
attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches closer with
every moment. This brings up the question, as to whether it would not
be better for the defender to hold out until darkness sets in than
expose his troops to the incalculable results of a retreat under fire.
When the assailant has once entered the zone of short ranges, the
defender will no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the
defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should be begun
at the point where the enemy is not pressing his attack, or where he
has been unable to gain a superiority of fire. When a withdrawal is
made, the whole local front should retire at once and simultaneously;
it would be a mistake to reduce gradually the strength of the units
engaged, for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to
annihilate completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot maintain
its position, a platoon certainly could not do so.
[Illustration]
As soon as the commander decides to break off the action, the reserve,
if one is still available, should be sent to the rear to take up a
rallying position, which should be so situated that it can make its
influence felt as soon as the main position is evacuated. As every
defeated force, or one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to
the rear, the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding
it to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a flank
of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position can be
advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, but this will only
be practicable in minor engagements. The distance of the rallying
position from the main defensive position should be such as to compel
the enemy to advance again under fire, and prevent his carrying both
the main defensive position and the rallying position at one rush. On
the other hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear
that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they enter its
effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying position are
also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good plan for them to engage
the enemy from the start at too short a range. “It is most desirable
when artillery and machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this
purpose, while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The
mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 German I. D.
R.).
The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all
dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without
precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite
to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line
should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve
is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying
position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first
rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is
not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line
should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can
still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit
of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as
soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order
to retard the enemy’s advance.
The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy’s advance
long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form,
so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been
accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless
there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state
of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary,
but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable
position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally
necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible.
“The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to
a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to
be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the
different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured
himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in
order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[481] The
rest is the business of subordinate leaders.” (Par. 432 German I. D.
R.). The latter remain with their organizations for the purpose of
maintaining order and cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants
and officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear
ahead of the troops.[482]
[481] This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of
other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all
blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. V. SCHLICHTING, I,
p. 115. See _Taktik_, V, p. 350.
[482] For the conduct of a retreat, see _Taktik_, V, p. 373, et seq.
XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS.
THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING ATTACK.
Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the defender,
and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by force of arms, it is
obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” or “held” only when he permits
this to be done. It is difficult to conduct a delaying action or a
holding attack, because our training, which is based on offensive
action, causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage.
In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding attacks, the
offensive intention predominates. The latter may consist of merely
threatening the enemy with an attack, or of seriously engaging him.
(Par. 392 German I. D. R.). Both the delaying action and the holding
attack aim at deceiving the enemy.[483] Accordingly, the characteristic
features of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of
ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few rifles,
in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of our force. In
both combats, troops require considerable distribution in depth. The
object of a delaying action is to gain time until the troops in rear
can deploy, neighboring columns can come up, or a turning movement
can become effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a
delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so that
they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is still more
necessary in a holding attack,[484] in order that the troops may be
able to repulse a counter-attack made by the enemy, or, by attacking
him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. A force fighting a delaying
action should keep its supports far to the rear, while a force charged
with holding the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly
employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an influence
on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). Since a
delaying action is to be fought at long ranges, a field of fire is
only required at those ranges; defiladed spaces in the foreground may
frequently be a positive advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so
long as it is necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding
attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; the violent
fire breaking forth from time to time must teach the defender that a
force is lying in waiting opposite him, ready to rush forward at a
moment’s notice.
[483] This is still more pronounced In demonstrations. (_Taktik_,
V, p. 11). “Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions,
but they may consist of offensive action. The regulations do not lay
down specific rules either for them or for other more rare methods
of combat; accordingly, their conduct will vary with the situation.”
(Par. 420, German I. D. R.).
[484] _Taktik_, V, p. 161.
The object of threatening with an attack may frequently be accomplished
by engaging the enemy with several detachments which are separated
by intervals. (Par. 288 German I. D. R.). The negative object of
preventing the enemy from withdrawing may be accomplished with a
weak force; the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up
his reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive
point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A determined
commander will not allow himself to be held by demonstrations. The
manner in which the Vth Army Corps forced the French to bring up their
reserves into the first line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation.
The size of the group charged with holding the enemy depends upon the
extent of front to be covered and the probable duration of the combat.
The conduct of such a force will vary considerably, depending upon the
distance to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When
the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the enemy
energetically.
=England.= The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the
direction in which the main attack will be made, and, when the
crisis of the action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from
those parts of his front which are only threatened and opposing the
decisive attack with nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops
making the holding attack should act vigorously, as soon as the
attack develops, and be in readiness to transform their demonstration
instantly into a real attack.
XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS.
THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.[485]
[485] The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry
Drill Regulations are skillfully compared by Major-General
REGENSPURSKY V. REGENY, Austrian Army, in an article entitled _Die
taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements für die k. k. Fusztruppen
vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem deutschen Reglement 1906_.
(_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8).
ATTACK.
Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense
are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been
revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his
main body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body
farther to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive.
The =attack on a position prepared for defense=, even after the
attacker’s artillery has succeeded in paving the way for its
infantry, consists of a laborious advance from one firing position
to another. The question as to whether an attack is feasible without
the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect that it
will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has
sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations
divide the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance
to the decisive firing position (the main firing position), and the
decisive action.
The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views
considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here
merely be made to point out several differences. The combat formation
necessary for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during
the preparatory stage, so that, when the forward movement commences,
the troops need only move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a
division, by appropriately combining “tactical units”, echelons are
formed, whose strength depends upon the purpose of the combat, the
information of the enemy, and the relation of the division to other
bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). Rules for the employment
of thin or dense firing lines are not given. “The attacker should
advance impetuously to the point where he can employ his rifles
effectively,” (Par. 582).
“In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective
range of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par.
323). When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open
fire independently, if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it
finds a good opportunity for firing which the company commander has
overlooked. (Par. 338). Unless the battalion commander has reserved
to himself the right of designating the moment for opening fire, the
company commanders direct when fire shall be opened, and conduct the
fire fight at mid and short ranges. At long ranges, the battalion
commander designates the companies that are to fire.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a
rule, volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but
may also be used in skirmish line to test the range. According to
par. 331, the rate of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and
686, fire surprises are authorized.
When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to =advance by
rushes=. These are to be made by alternate units moving forward,
supported by the fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in
exceptional cases to be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The
length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and
the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of
the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing
position.” (Par. 313).
Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by
=crawling=. This is considered especially useful in rectifying
alignments. (Par. 196).
For =envelopment=, see p. 362 supra.
For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 393 supra.
=Assault.= “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who
occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s
superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances,
furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of
penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature
assault may still result in disaster.
“As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear
indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for
the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of
fire. In doing this, the commander should not hesitate to put in
his last man if necessary. The assault--in case the enemy still
offers resistance--should not be made until the attack has been
pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, and the power of
resistance of the enemy is palpably broken.
“It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act
of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation
strained to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no
longer any chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment,
honor and salvation lie wholly in moving to the front.
“When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be
carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical
stage of the action, may nullify the previous success, and must
therefore be quickly overcome by the reserves, if any are still
available, taking a hand in the fight.” (Pars. 590-592).
The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from
the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the
units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops
are to conform to the movement of that line. The following provision,
which applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German
regulations, viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s
force should, whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it
upon any hostile reserves that may appear.”
DEFENSE.
The regulations governing the =defense seeking a decision= differ
but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work
of preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the
direction in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known.
The assailant is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining
information of the position and the measures taken for strengthening
it. This is to be accomplished by pushing small detachments to the
front to hamper the enemy’s advance.
In the past, =advanced positions= were decidedly opposed by the
Austrians, but at present their use is recommended in cases where
time is to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where
fire from such positions would inflict considerable losses on the
enemy. However, the regulations seek to obviate the danger of the
principal fight taking place in the advanced position instead of in
the main position, by adding: “But such a measure should not cause
the commander to swerve from the firm determination to carry out his
original intention.”
The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it
possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while
the remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the
actual decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist
every temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than
for carrying out the =counter-attack=, which should be ordered when
the assailant is under the most effective fire of the position. The
general reserve should then be quickly deployed and should make its
attack with determination, by directing a violent fire against the
flank of the enemy. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided.
The garrison is only charged with the task of annihilating the enemy
with its fire, which should be increased to the utmost intensity.
THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.[486]
[486] Major-General MIKULICZ RADECKI, Austrian Army, _Das neue
Exerzierreglement der italienischen Infanterie_, Vienna, 1906. V.
GRÄVENITZ, _Die neueren taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische
Heer_, in _Vierteljahrsheft_, 1905, I, p. 90, et seq. _Der
Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene_, in _Streffleur_,
1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special
pamphlet form).
P. RATH, _Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur_, in _Militärische
Welt_, 1907, January-February number.
ATTACK.
The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in
Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many
defiles, causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.[487]
The regulations emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of
infantry and artillery.
[487] Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against
the hostile forces which it encounters in its march, whether its
action be to determine, as quickly as possible, the strength of the
opponent and to save its main body from an unnecessary delay, or
whether it be to deceive the opponent as to the location of its own
forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a surprise. (Par.
37).
Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up
in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken
up until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the
leading element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed
formation. To neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible
as the action progresses, the firing line is formed into groups
separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, although this increases the
casualties. These intervals may be increased, when required, to 10
paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing line are usually
at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to advance
until increased casualties force it to open fire.
=Kinds of fire.= Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used
when the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The
battalion commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as
soon as it is certain that a good effect can be produced. When two
targets appear, the fire is to be directed upon the one promising the
best results (_i.e._, not necessarily the one that is tactically most
important). “In order that the intensity of the fire may correspond
to the requirements of the tactical situation existing at the moment,
officers, by reason of their tactical training, should be able to
state approximately how many rounds are necessary to produce the
desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character of the
target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as
the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From
these estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in
order to bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.”
The =advance by rushes= may be made either at a walk or at a run, but
the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted.
The following points are considered especially important: The time
for making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by
a whole unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon
various circumstances, which the leader, alter due consideration
of the terrain and the hostile fire, as well as of the physical
condition and morale of his men, is to judge in each particular case.
In doing this, he is to bear in mind that the rush must be made as
unobserved by the enemy as possible, so that the latter cannot direct
his lire upon the advancing unit.
The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line
which are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority
of fire over the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units
which could only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and
useless losses, are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed
ahead, support these with their fire, and then advance in turn under
cover of the fire of the others.
As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are
to be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The
length of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run,
depends upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire
is to be opened at once.
When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
firing line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run.
or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open
fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading
echelons open fire at once from their new positions, so as to
facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances
make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have
reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon
the enemy.
At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile
fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups
consisting of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining
flanks of neighboring units cease firing, so as not to injure the men
of the advancing unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead,
while squad leaders see that all of the men move forward.
Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the
firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are
to carry that line forward, to come up in that formation.
The =assault= is to be made either in close or extended order to the
tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers.
The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained
by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the
participation of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat.
When engaged with an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position,
only a part of the leading line is to be launched against certain
sections (_tratti_) of the defensive position, while other parts, by
means of rapid fire, prevent the enemy from supporting the threatened
sections. In conjunction with this frequently emphasized scheme of
penetrating several specially important sections of the hostile
position, the regulations express the view--by no means generally
considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously chosen
points will force the enemy to retreat.
The assault is, as a rule, to be made by order of the commander of
the whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault
is suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (_attenti_), and
at the command “to the assault” (_per l’assalto_), the men throw
themselves with loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets
and the beating of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already
gotten so close to the enemy that further waiting would be useless,
it advances to the assault, after getting permission therefor, or,
otherwise, on its own responsibility. All the rest of the troops are
to join in this movement.
DEFENSE.
So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy
will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as
possible. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack=.
Long range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open
terrain devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened
until the enemy arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened,
all the supports are to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is
undertaken by the first line only in exceptional cases.
THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904.
ATTACK.
Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference
for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might
produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination
towards shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term
“shock troops” has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The
forward movement alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is
the element that executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army
as a probable opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance
with mixed detachments. The regulations do not touch upon the tactics
of the rencontre, and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the
advance guard than the German regulations.[488] The advance guard
is to occupy supporting points, under cover of which the main body
can deploy, and to complete the reconnaissance by its fight. The
necessity of infantry detachments completing the reconnaissance made
by the cavalry is particularly emphasized.
[488] See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R.
Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in the
manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The danger
of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German
regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The
French regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat
elements, and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain
devoid of cover is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French
attack does not lie in the firing line--the fight for the superiority
of fire is not mentioned--but in maneuvering troops cautiously led
after the firing line. The defender is to be engaged all along the
line and, when the weak points of his position are recognized, the
commander-in-chief is to give the order for the assault.
This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the
French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A
brigade is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st
regiment in the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third
battalion (_troupe d’entrainement_); the 2nd regiment follows at a
like distance as a reserve.
The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the
infantry preparation (_préparation_), the decisive action (_l’action
décisive_), and the completion (_l’achèvement_).
=The artillery in the preparatory action.= The artillery is to
endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible,
without, however, expending more ammunition than is absolutely
necessary.... The commander is not to give the order for the attack
until the preparation is considered sufficient.
The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful
manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered
and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached
to every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner
in which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely
separated parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong
hostile firing line, and may be defeated in detail.
The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations
issued in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix,
formerly commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice
President of the Supreme War Council.
=Assembly.= The division is assembled in division square (_carré de
division_), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the
regiments in line of double columns or in line of company columns,
abreast or in echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which
successive lines are pushed forward without any attempt to envelop
(in other words a pure frontal attack), the division is concentrated
with the brigades abreast, their regiments in echelon. If a flank
attack is to be made, in which the leading brigade must be protected
by an echelon and a reserve ready for any eventuality, the division
is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, their regiments
abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a road in
rear of the _carré_. The pioneer company is divided into four parts,
corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled troops,
for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during the
forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled
force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and
cavalry.
=Preparations for the advance in mass formation.= During the
concentration, mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of
the terrain which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed
division, and later these officers act as guides.
Preparatory attack formation.
=A. Pure frontal attack.= The leading regiment in each brigade is to
have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to
be echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions
are to be protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of
cavalry. The second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in
rear of the inner flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional
cavalry is to be held in rear of the division, in readiness to
advance to the right or the left.
=B. Flank attack.= The two regiments of the leading brigade are to
furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third
regiment is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the
fourth regiment is to form the general reserve. The cavalry is to
reconnoiter on the outer flank. In this case, as well as in a pure
frontal attack, the artillery is to take up a position from which it
can support the attack. Drummers, trumpeters, and bands, are to march
with the general reserve. The regulations state that it is absolutely
essential for infantry units to be sheltered from hostile observation
during their forward movement, and that they must remain under
control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops are not to
deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According
to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at 5000
m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move by a
flank, but only straight to the front.
The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause
lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when
necessary, from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast
rules or normal formations are prescribed for this advance.
The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot.
When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as
the only means of making a further advance possible.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will (_feu à volonté_), principally used at
short ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire
with counted cartridges (_feu à cartouches comptées_), the number
being given (this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (_feu
à répétition_); and the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley
fire has been again prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (_rafales_) are
typical of French fire tactics. (See p. 164 supra).
After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but
the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made.
The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry
combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They
emphasize that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by
means of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At
the point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile
troops as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight,
while the troops in the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance
impetuously.
A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features
all along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated
by the regulations, are very apt to fail prematurely. This is
particularly likely to happen because some of the troops will fall
behind, while others are able to push ahead more rapidly. These
attacks are to destroy the power of resistance of the enemy and to
exhaust him physically. The leading units are to cover with their
fire the advance of those who are less favored by the terrain.[489]
During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill at a
range of 600 to 800 m.
[489] According to DENCAUSSE, in _Journal des Sciences Militaires_,
1906, and November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor
to approach within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing
a shot.
The supports (_renforts_) follow in a similar manner, ready to move
up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or
independently in case the situation requires it. Their entry into
action is in a general way determined by the commander of the whole
force. They are to augment the fire power of the firing line or
to carry it forward. The efforts of all are to be directed toward
constantly keeping up the advance.
At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports,
will be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points,
and to effect a lodgment on the ground captured. At other points
the attacking group will be too weak to push the attack home. In
such a case, the troops are to effect a lodgment on the terrain
(_s’accrochent sur le sol_) in rear of the nearest cover, as close
as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain themselves
there until artillery or neighboring troops can support them. The
fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that an
attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these
usually protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a
decisive attack at some points. The infantry should endeavor to
compensate for its numerical inferiority by skillfully utilizing the
ground and intrenchments, by great activity, and, above all else, by
invincible pertinacity. The supporting point will thus become the
center of the fight of a separate combat group.”
The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize
fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the
artillery and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat,
the commander must decide where the retained troops should be
launched for the assault. The selection of a point of attack is
essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of
character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be
regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close
order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting
troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best
advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are
to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation
in order to give to that line, as _troupes d’assaut_, the impetus for
the assault.
According to Thomas de Colligny,[490] formerly general staff officer
of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an
assault should form in four lines, each consisting of one company;
the distance between lines being 150 m., and the front covered
likewise 150 m. Each of the three leading lines should be formed
in line of platoons in columns of route at deploying intervals
sufficient to allow single rank line to be formed, and the fourth
line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals between platoons.
When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding one is to carry
it forward. If the French believe such close order formations to be
indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more extensive use of
cover.
[490] _Conseils à mon bataillon_, p. 107.
Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General
Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One
regiment, on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (_avant ligne_),
in rear of that, the assaulting troops (_troupes d’assaut_). First
line: one regiment, its twelve company columns abreast; second line:
one regiment, its three battalions in double column at extended
intervals, 300 m. in rear of the first line; third line: the fourth
regiment, its battalions in route column abreast of each other, 300
m. in rear of the second line. While, during our peace maneuvers, we
continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line in the expectation that
his supports and reserve will in the end enter our zone of fire, it
might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, to direct
our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible.
=Envelopment.= This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations
(for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service
Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in
length depending upon the intentions of the commander, state that the
attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior
forces for the purpose of annihilating him.”
For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 392 supra.
DEFENSE.
The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced
positions, and advanced posts[491] (intended to prevent hostile
reconnaissance), and numerous counter-attacks.
[491] These frequently consist of detachments of all arms
(_détachements de couverture ou de contact_). General BONNAL.
(_Deutsche Revue_, December number, 1907) says: “The French
regulation--in contrast to the German--provide in defense for
detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the purpose
of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him
on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have
their advantages and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the
opinion that in sending out advanced detachments one must exercise
great care in order that these may not be defeated in detail, for
this is invariably detrimental to the whole force.”
For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its
supports, and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended
for offensive action. In addition to calling attention to the
necessity of overwhelming with fire the hostile troops advancing over
open ground, the regulations recommend that the fire be withheld
occasionally and that the enemy be allowed to run into the greatly
accelerated fire which is unexpectedly directed upon him. The fire is
to be discontinued as soon as the enemy takes to cover, and is to be
increased to the utmost intensity when he moves in dense formation
over open ground. The supports are to be used to augment the fire
power of the firing line.
=Counter-attack.= General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is
met by the offensive return (_retour offensif_), the flank attack
by the counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander
should ride ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what
counter-measures he should take. The artillery can render the most
effective assistance by registering its fire upon the points at which
the enemy will probably advance, and by preventing him from leaving
his position. If the attack is successful, the local reserve advances
beyond the firing line, which has entered the hostile position, and
fires upon the retreating enemy. The general reserve now becomes the
local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms and becomes the
general reserve.”
The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
=counter-attack= is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
=offensive return=. (For details see p. 439 supra).
Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him. then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on,
in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and
reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by
fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has
frequently been successful.
“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”
THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.[492]
[492] _Infantry Training._ _Combined
Training_.--_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1906, III, _The Development of the
Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War_.
ATTACK.
The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive
battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment
made in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his
main position, and paves the way for a further advance; every advance
must be thoroughly prepared and systematically carried out.”
In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions
is used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the
protection of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a
“preparatory formation”, the battalions in one or more lines of
“quarter columns” (column of companies). As soon as the commander
has decided which flank of the enemy he will envelop, against which
portion of the enemy’s line he will launch his decisive attack,
he assembles his subordinate commanders to receive the orders.
According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible to issue
orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as a
general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented
by verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention
to the peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile
counter-attack is possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade
commander designates the position to be taken up by the machine
guns, and gives directions to them in regard to supporting the
advance by long range fire. A base battalion is to be designated.
When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack is assigned
to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion is
led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given
a compass direction. Every leader is to provide independently for
reconnaissance and for communication by signal flags and also by
telephone; a mounted signal corps man accompanies the brigade
commander.
Every unit is formed in three lines for attack.
The =first line=, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports,
is made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than
one-fourth of the whole force.
The =second line=, the reserves of the firing line, is under the
orders of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce
the firing line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The
second line is to fill up the firing line to the maximum density,
_i.e._, to one man per yard of front (0.9 m.).
The =third line=, the general reserve, is to assure the success of
the attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than
one-fourth of the whole force.[493] “The general reserve is directly
under the orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables
him to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward
off counter-attacks. If the attack succeeds, the general reserve
pushes forward rapidly to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails,
it serves as a rallying force, but before the commander decides
to leave behind even a part of it, he should consider whether, by
launching all the troops at his disposal, he could break down the
resistance of the defender. The commander can only exercise an
influence on the course of the action by means of a reserve. If he
keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power
to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore
the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to
meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the
additional strength required to drive the attack home.”
[493] According to the old regulations, a part of the general
reserve had to remain in rear in rallying positions. (See p. 397
supra).
In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under
the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault,
it is advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying
position. Even a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least
half a company at his disposal. The British were not without reason
censured because their flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa
on account of the lack of energy of the frontal groups, and their
new regulations accordingly contain detailed rules for the conduct
of the “holding attack”. The troops holding the enemy in front are
to threaten him for the time being. This is to be accomplished by
wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by occasional bursts of
lire (_rafales_), by employing machine guns, by retaining supports
far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing to
decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main
attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order
to deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be
launched and that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See p.
447 supra).
Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no
longer given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more
front than when acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive
attack, a battalion in the first line may put 125 rifles on every 100
yards (90 m.) of front; these are distributed between firing line,
supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist of one or
more companies. Entire companies are only deployed in exceptional
cases, for example on open ground, where it is difficult to bring
up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses to
be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, in all
probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line
plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a
front not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A
brigade of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m.,
depending upon the number of battalions engaged.
When the force arrives within 4 or 5 km. of the enemy, the battalions
are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first
line is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn
protected by scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther,
they lie down and await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter
advances under cover of the supporting fire of infantry, machine
guns, and artillery. Fire of position is considered necessary. Fire
at will is from now on used. This is to vary in intensity according
to the character of the target, and the range. It is to increase to
special violence when the attacking infantry advances over level
ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be discontinued when
the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line is to advance
as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive losses.
Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, but
small losses are to be borne.
After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with
more rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by
controlled fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according
to the regulations, at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of
effective fire, all the troops are to deploy. In consequence of
this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work forward independently, are
scattered all over the terrain over which the attack is being made.
At the initial deployment, the interval between skirmishers is to
be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where the decision
is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or three
yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2¹⁄₂-3¹⁄₂ paces). Another paragraph
of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one
rifle per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those
entertained by them immediately after the South African war, have
undergone a noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of
a firing line; dense firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are
at present deemed essential to a decisive fight, while the fire of
widely extended lines is considered ineffective. The intervals may
vary considerably, but the regulations state that it should be borne
in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight are increased and
the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; moreover,
that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated,
an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity of
moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the
men be trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a
difficult situation, and to do everything in their power to carry
out the original intentions of the commander.
=Rushes= over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92
m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an
example given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards
(22 m.) long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is
to be continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no
opportunity to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are
to be made from one covering feature to another.
“On open ground and within effective range, long lines of
skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even
when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may
take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire
is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the
enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing unit
will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”
The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to
advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads
are unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly.
The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the
strength of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of
platoons at full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer
comparatively small losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200
m.). The troops are to deploy before reaching effective ranges
(1200-600 m.), as they will otherwise suffer serious losses. At
decisive ranges the firing line is to be filled up to its maximum
density.
The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the
=assault=; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops
is considered particularly important. The order for the assault is
to be given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of
conducting it is left to company commanders.
When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are
to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting
distance, where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single
field guns are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a
brief but violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn.
DEFENSE.
In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports,
and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons
for the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The
object of =advanced positions= is to mislead, deceive, and check
the enemy. They are to be evacuated before the troops in them
become seriously engaged. It is not considered necessary for the
=main position= to consist of a continuous line of trenches; every
platoon and even every squad may have its own trench. The principal
requirements are good field of fire and mutual support by oblique or
enfilade fire.
The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the
field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state
that, under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad
front, but that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong
garrison is required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as
dummy intrenchments, are not to be constructed so as to stand out
against the horizon. The importance of masking firing trenches, and
of constructing overhead cover is emphasized; special cover trenches
for the supports may be constructed in rear of the crest.
Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also
considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short
range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the
assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his
attack with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing
tires the eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a
=counter-attack= made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks
by section reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the
British to make the section reserves very strong has been frequently
observed. The final stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s
day, of a counter-attack all along the line. As soon as the opponent
has arrived within assaulting distance, the troops holding the
position are to fix bayonets and, after delivering magazine fire, are
to make a short frontal counter-attack.
THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.
ATTACK.
The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but take
their peculiar theater of war into consideration.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used.
=Rushes= are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the
regulations admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making
rushes that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m.,
their value will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise
to avoid sending forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that
the advance may not be too much retarded and the difficulties of
leading increased.
The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be
possible “to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this
account, the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the
assault with cold steel. They further state that, when the enemy can
be kept down by artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will
be easy; that, as it is difficult to obtain a timely effect from
artillery fire directed upon an enemy who takes advantage of cover or
who occupies a fortified position, the infantry cannot wait for the
successful termination of the artillery combat, but, on the contrary,
should advance while that combat is in progress, for only by so doing
can it count upon the effective coöperation of its artillery. But,
nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, even if
it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the artillery.
The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position
prepared for defense.
=Rencontre.= The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the
advance guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time,
deliberate attack; that the commander should promptly decide what
to do, even if the situation is not entirely clear; and that, when
practicable, the main body should be launched as an entity. A fight
against a superior enemy is only to be avoided, for the time being,
in case the latter has gained a start in deployment.
=Attack on a position prepared for defense.= The commander frames
his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance,
and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory
position, where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable,
combat sections to the different units. In order that they may
utilize the covering features of the ground to the best advantage,
the different units are to avoid advancing abreast. On account of
the difficulties attending an advance over ground swept by hostile
fire, it is considered desirable for the troops to take advantage
of the cover afforded by darkness. In order that, in such a case,
serious lateral displacements of the troops may be avoided, the
fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to endeavor to
drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main position.
The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to be
made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense,
there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by
intrenching successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances
permit, an attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to
the enemy’s position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is
to be designated during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and
detailed preparations are to be made for the advance. As soon as the
troops arrive during the night in the selected position, they are to
construct cover quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard
that intrenching tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is
to be had to the sand bags that are carried along. The men engaged in
digging trenches are at all times to be ready for action.
The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an
assaulting position should make the =assault= immediately at dawn or
should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and
that, if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend
on the suddenness and rapidity with which it is carried out. The
reconnaissance of the position and the work of removing obstacles is
to be completed, if possible, during the night, so that avenues of
approach will be open for the assaulting troops.
If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and
if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the
night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at
night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it
will depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly,
directly from the last firing position, or whether it is carried
out upon the completion of works of approach. When necessary the
assaulting bodies are to carry along hand grenades and demolition
tools, the latter being selected in conformity with the results of
the reconnaissance.
The regulations state that to have captured a position does not
suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the
victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile
position are to continue the advance until they again find a field
of fire, whereupon they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The
troops which do not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly,
secure the captured position, take requisite measures for security,
and make preparations to meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are
not to be assembled in large bodies at points exposed to hostile
artillery fire. As soon as the enemy has gotten out of range, all the
troops are promptly to resume the forward movement, and are to pursue
him vigorously so far as due regard for cohesion and order permits.
=Intrenching tools= are to be used in attacks on fortified positions,
and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy.
DEFENSE.
In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide
for economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and
a general reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect
the flanks. Dummy intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make
it difficult for the enemy to gain information of the defensive
position. The Japanese views in regard to =advanced positions= are
not so pronounced as the German, for, while their regulations mention
the combat of the outposts pushed forward from the position, the
danger of advanced positions is not especially emphasized.
The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has
fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position
with the bayonet.
Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position
from that of the artillery. If information is received that the
attacker has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting
position, small detachments are to advance and prevent him from
strengthening his position.
THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.
The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training
and combat.
THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908.
ATTACK.
There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German
regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the
combat and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander
in deciding whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The
regulations state that decisive results are only offered by the
attack; that considerations of a presumable hostile superiority and
other apparently unfavorable conditions should not diminish the
energy of the attack; and that the decision to launch the troops
should never be made dependent upon the receipt of reports in regard
to the enemy.
The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation
or the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The
regulations state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon
superiority of fire and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous
advance and an unswerving determination to win are of just as much
importance. The conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon
whether it is made in a rencontre or on a position prepared for
defense.
The views entertained in regard to the =rencontre= coincide with
the German views. The regulations say that the result of the
reconnaissance should not be awaited, because success depends largely
upon prompt action. The commander may launch parts of his main body
in succession, as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating
in close country, when it is necessary to gain ground quickly on
debouching from a defile, or when the enemy makes an impetuous
advance. The commander is to direct all his efforts toward throwing
the enemy upon the defensive, and then to launch the main body as an
entity.
The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only
discuss the =attack on a fortified position=; various modifications
of the attack, depending upon the preparations made by the enemy,
are authorized. Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by
darkness, and an extensive use is to be made of =intrenching tools=.
The regulations state that an assault by day only has a chance of
succeeding when the defender is completely subdued, and when only
insignificant obstacles and defenses are encountered. When this is
not the case, the day is to be used for making preparations for the
attack, and the night for executing it.
DEFENSE.
The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the
deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating
an assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of
gaining time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the
direction in which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt,
or when the commander intends to assail the enemy while the latter
is in the act of deploying. In the =defense seeking a decision=,
advanced positions are not to be used, because it is believed that
the employment of detachments of troops in front of the defensive
position will weaken the latter, and a hostile enveloping attack will
soon force the advanced troops to fall back upon the main position.
The regulations point out that if the advanced troops are supported
by fire from the main position, the latter will be prematurely
disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced troops is,
however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive the
enemy, or to support the cavalry.
The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be
constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to
fire are not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter.
XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.[494]
[494] Lieutenant-Colonel KOVARIK, _Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren
Systems für den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf_, Berlin, 1903.
1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.
The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital importance to
the infantry. To solve it correctly means to assure the success of the
infantry in fire action. The first question that needs consideration
is, whether the experiences of past wars show that the ammunition at
present carried by the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances,
even when ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time
because all the roads are choked with troops.
For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the
=Franco-German war=, in which breechloaders were used for the
first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80
cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20
additional rounds per man.[495]
[495] Historical data given by D. GÜNTHER in _Die Entwickelung der
Feuertaktik der Infanterie_, 1902.
When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any
campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could
ever have taken place. In the =Franco-German war=, the expenditure
of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000
rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44
per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about
58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of
ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon
discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking,
the only information available being the record of the number of
rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to
the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with
them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each
man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how
much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no
record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount
of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known,
that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place,
an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs.
This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition
column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in
unbroken packages on the battlefield of =Hühnerwasser=.
A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops,
on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes
filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at
=Sedan=),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the
rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on
January 19th, 1871, in the battle at =Mont Valérien=, and in the 38th
Brigade, at the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=).[497]
[496] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1175.
[497] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, II, p. 259.
The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard
to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements.
Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule,
cannot lay claim to trustworthiness.
The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war
was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the
Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery.
Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.
“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of
the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more
rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the
difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently
increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these
circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops
fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was
no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened
that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack
of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred
at the battle of =Mars-la-Tour= in the infantry of the IIIrd Army
Corps.”[498]
[498] _Gen. St. W._, V, p. 1460.
On August 16th, at the battle of =Vionville=, the Prussian IIIrd Army
Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486
cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet,
in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the
battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded,
each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200
rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the
afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred.
[499] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 32.
The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition
during the battle of =Vionville= are taken from _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Beispiele_, 8 and 9, by Major KUNZ:
IInd Bn. Leib Regt. 12,749 rounds for 850 rifles, or 15 per rifle.
Ist Bn. 40th Inf. 35,000 „ „ 450 „ „ 78 „ „
IInd Bn. 40th Inf. 6,650 „ „ 350 „ „ 19 „ „
IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf. 4,520 „ „ 300 „ „ 15 „ „
A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the
Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in
front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient
ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to
inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd
Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after
they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two
hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses:
Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500]
[500] For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at
Beaumont, see HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 184.
The defense of the stone wall at =Buzanval= by the 50th Infantry
(German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate
defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy
at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent,
nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire
discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine
hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v.
Boguslawski says:
“The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately
determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note
showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not
fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far
the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the
6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no
record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle.
To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of
ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180
men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges.
He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition
originally supplied him.
“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into
billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume
that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten
rounds per hour.”
In the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=, some of the companies of the
56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In
the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able
to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons
near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such
assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by
the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the
battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was
distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging
to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but,
in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition
carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at
the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought
almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men--about
80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously
directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the
fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition
to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well
disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition
promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing
it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In
consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery,
men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or
less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was
almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men--80 rounds
per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened
packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position
occupied by the 38th Brigade.
The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition
expended at =St. Privat= by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August
19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820,
and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition
supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken
into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be
considered excessive.[501]
[501] _Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz_, p. 250.
At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard
managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition,
without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which
were left intact.[502]
[502] _Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons_, p. 121.
The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably
greater in all the battles. At =Champigny=, every French infantry
soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove
sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the
Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st
was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27
rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition
was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division,
against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim
that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In
the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general
of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503]
Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz
on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of
Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of
ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed
information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the
25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead
of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and
3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men--9% hits). The statement made
in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French
soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot
be substantiated by French records.
[503] HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 159.
[504] PAQUIÉ, _Le tir en terrain varié_, p. 39.
The expenditure of ammunition in the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=,
amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side.
The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure
of ammunition are available. In the engagement at =Aiaslar=, on
August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at
=Karahassankioi=, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man.
On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122
rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the
Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in
his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional
rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by
the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an
organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available,
and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.
In front of =Plevna=, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in
six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition
carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on =Plevna=, they
expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505]
In the engagement at =Lovtcha=, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired
during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that
his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the
ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to
which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up
the necessary ammunition.[506]
[505] Details given in the German translation of the Russian _Gen.
St. W._ (Vienna), III, pp. 330-331.
[506] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 88.
On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack
on the =Omar Bey Tabia=, expended the following ammunition:
63rd Infantry[507] 55,296 rounds, or 21 per rifle
119th „ [507] 99,744 „ „ 43 „ „
64th „ 24,650 „ „ 10 „ „
115th „ 45,360 „ „ 24 „ „
[507] These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1¹⁄₂ hours.
In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition
than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short
at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the
Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations,
after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as
apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead
and wounded.
During the assault on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, each man of
the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an
average of 2 rounds per man, per minute.
The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles
than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at =Gorni Dubniac=, each
man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact,
that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed
3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while
the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280
men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100
rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside
a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at =Tashkessen=
(31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend
Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle
Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).
[508] Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack
mules carrying 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from
100 to 120 rounds on his person.
[509] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 170.
[510] BAKER, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 160.
There is very little information available in regard to the
expenditure of ammunition during the =Russo-Japanese war=. The
Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8
one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and
the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds
each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210
rounds per man. In the engagement at =Hamatan= (=Yalu=), several
Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of
rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd
and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without
difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a
thoroughly reliable report published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
September 24th, 1905:
During the battle of =Liao Yang=, which lasted six days, the 138th
Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On
September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other
words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other
regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition
was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to
withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day
and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October
13th to 18th, at =Linshinpu=, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800
rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting
within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at
15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian
position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and
250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle
of =Liao Yang= (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended
416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions),
250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less
than 160 rounds per rifle.
[511] _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei._
The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in
addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of
ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which
were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The
Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man
should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going
into action. In the engagement at =Kinchau= (26th November, 1904),
the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143
rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512]
[512] _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, I. p. 224.
Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 rounds of
ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, cases may arise
where troops could fire a greater number of rounds to good advantage.
This must be taken into account when determining the number of rounds
with which the infantryman should be supplied--on his person and in the
ammunition wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the supply can
be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition columns after a
battle, so long as it is still possible to assign a separate road to
each army corps. When this is no longer practicable, the ammunition
columns will encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in supplying
the infantry with ammunition.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD.
========++=======+=====+=======+============+======+=======++
~Coun- || Year | Cal-| Weight| System |Weight| Weight||
try.~ || of |iber.|of car-| of loading | of | of ||
|| con- | |tridge.| | clip.| clip ||
|| struc-| | | | |filled.||
|| tion. | | | | | ||
|| | mm. | g. | | g. | g. ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~GER- || 1905 | 7.9 | 27.19 |Mag. in rear| 7 | 126 ||
MANY~ || S. | | |of barrel, | | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~AUS- || 1895 | 8. | 28.35 |Mag. in rear|Frame | 158.25||
TRIA~ || | | |of barrel, | 16.5 | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |frame | | ||
|| | | |holding 5 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ITALY~ || 1891 | 6.5 | 22. |Mag. in rear| 12 | 138 ||
||Car- | | |of barrel, | | ||
||can- | | |loaded with | | ||
||Mann- | | |frame | | ||
||licher.| | |holding 6 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ENG- || 1908 | 7.71| 27.5 |Mag. in rear| Clip | 150 ||
LAND~ ||Lee- | | |of barrel, | 12.5 | ||
||En- | | |loaded with | | ||
||field. | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
|| | | |[514] | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~FRANCE~|| 1886- | 8. | 29. |Mag. under | -- | -- ||
|| 98, | | |barrel, car-| | ||
||1905 D | | |tridges | | ||
||Lebel. | | |loaded | | ||
|| | | |singly. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~RUSSIA~|| 1891 | 7.62| 25.812|Mag. in rear| 9.6 | 137 ||
[516] ||(Three | | |of barrel, | | ||
||line | | |loaded with | | ||
||rifle).| | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~JAPAN~ || 1897 | 6.50| 22.4 |Mag. in rear| 8.5 | 120 ||
[516] ||Arisaka| | |of barrel, | | ||
||(Meidji| | |loaded with | | ||
|| 80). | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
========++==================++===========++=================++
~Coun- || Number of rounds || Ammunition|| Number of rounds||
try.~ || carried by a man.|| wagons. || carried by ammu-||
|| || || nition wagons. ||
|| || || No. ||
|| Weight|| || per rifle.||
|| No. kg. || ||No. [513]||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~GER- || 150 | ||4 Company || 14,400 | 77 ||
MANY~ ||N. C. O. 45| ||ammunition || | ||
||Trum- |4.5 ||wagons. || | ||
||peter 90| || || | ||
||Drummer 30| || || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~AUS- || 120 | ||4 Company || 9,450 | 47.2||
TRIA~ ||N. C. O. 40| 4.31||ammunition || | ||
|| | ||wagons. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~ITALY~ || 162 | ||Infantry of the line, | ||
||Sergt. and |3.736||in field train | 24 ||
||Trum- | ||Alpini, on pack animals | ||
||peter 126| ||and on carts |244 ||
||Inf. | || | ||
||Pioneers 108| || | ||
--------++------------+-----++------------------------+-----++
~ENG- || 115 |3.48 ||8 Pack animals |250 ||
LAND~ || | ||8 Ammunition wagons | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~FRANCE~|| 120 | ||4 Company || 16,384 | 82 ||
||N. C. O. 56|3.48 ||ammunition || or | ||
|| | ||wagons. || 19,000 | ||
|| | || || [515] | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~RUSSIA~|| 120 |3.33 ||24 am. ||In each of | ||
[516] || | ||carts: ||the 8 1- | ||
|| | ||Ist ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 8 || 6000 |=36 ||
|| | ||1-horse ||In each of | ||
|| | ||carts ||the 16 2- | ||
|| | ||IInd ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 16|| 14,400 |=30 ||
|| | ||2-horse || | -- ||
|| | ||carts || | 66 ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~JAPAN~ || 120 |2.9 ||Each com- || 16,000 | 80 ||
[516] || | ||pany has || | ||
|| | ||one cart. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
========++===============++=============+===========
~Coun- ||Reserve supply.|| Supply | Supply
try.~ || || available | available
|| || in a | in an
|| || division. |army corps.
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~GER- ||Each of the 34 || 150 | 150
MANY~ ||am. wagons of || 77 | 77
||the 4 inf. am. || --- | 144
||columns of an || 227 | ---
||army corps, || | 361
||carries 23,000 || |
||rounds or 144 || |
||per rifle. || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~AUS- ||Each division ||16 battalions|3 divisions
TRIA~ ||has one div. ||of 800 rifles| 224
||am. park of 30 ||each. | 18
||am. wagons, || 120 | ---
||which carry || 47.2 |about 242
||769,500 rounds || 57 |
||or 57 per || ----- |
||rifle. || 224. |
||The corps am. || |
||park same || |
||strength as a || |
||div. park. || |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ITALY~ ||In the 3rd sec-||Line: | Alpi-|Inf. of the
||tion of the am.|| | ni: |line:
||column, 40 || 162 | 162 | 162
||rounds per || 24 | 244 | 24
||rifle; || 40 | 90 | 40
||In the Arty. || --- | --- | 45
||park of the || 226 | 496 | ---
||army corps, 45 || | | 271
||rounds per || | |
||rifle; || | |
||In the Alpini || | |
||am. column, 90 || | |
||rounds per || | |
||rifle. || | |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ENG- ||In the division|| 115 |400 rounds
LAND~ ||am. column, 125|| 250 |per 1,000
||rounds per || 125 |rifles.
||rifle. || --- |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~FRANCE~||In the corps || 120 | 110
||am. park: || 82 | ---
||Ist || --- | 312
||echelon 44.2|| 202 |
||IInd || |
||echelon 66.2|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~RUSSIA~||In the light || 120 | 267
[516] ||Arty. park 81|| 66 | 164
||In the reserve || 81 | ---
||park 164|| --- | 431
|| ---|| 267 |
|| 245|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~JAPAN~ || -- || -- | --
[516] || || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the
number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles
specified:
{ Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket 85 rounds
Paper Shells { Prussian rifled infantry musket (new model) 55 „
{ Prussian needle gun M/41-69 78 „
{ French chassepot rifle M/66 90 „
{ Infantry rifle M/71 69 „
Metal Shells { Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81 98 „
{ Rifle, M/98 with loading clips 103 „
The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:
=Germany=: =45= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;
=Austria=: =20= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;
=Russia=: =30= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to
the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve
cartridge box attached to the knapsack;
=France=: =120= rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and
one behind;
=England=: In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding
=15= rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder
belt holding =50= rounds);
=Japan=: =30= rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and
=60= rounds in the cartridge box behind.
2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES.
GERMANY.
(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.)
On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition wagons
of the battalions, as this renders supervision easier, and enables
the battalion commander to regulate the replenishment of ammunition.
Companies acting alone, as well as those forming the support of an
advance guard, are followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not
seem desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or of a
brigade on account of the distance separating the different battalions.
During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition should be taken
out of the knapsacks, and the contents of the ammunition wagons
distributed among the men. The men carry this extra ammunition in their
haversacks and in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc.
The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of
track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the
ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to
carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned
within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors
in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments
(to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of
cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15
cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25
kg.
As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man,
according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1
non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the
ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take
post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the
other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the
bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of
two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a
bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four
minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the
left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the
third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can
carry 21.8 kg.
Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition wagon.
These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued too soon, this additional
burden causes considerable inconvenience, and consequently reduces
the marching power of the men. The leader must also decide what shall
be done with the ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely,
and the troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition
wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the mounted
wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. When refilled,
they rejoin their proper organizations. If requested, ammunition must
be issued to any body of troops.
On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have been emptied,
follow the movements of the several companies and take up a position
under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster, as close as possible to the
firing line--never more than 800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases,
this must be done without regard to losses. The firing line is supplied
with ammunition, when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward.
When the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact is
communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the signal “m”.
This signal, when made to the front by the troops in rear, signifies,
“ammunition is coming up at once.”
In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to the firing line
by individual men, the latter should invariably be detailed from troops
in rear which have not as yet been engaged. These men must endeavor to
reach the firing line by rushes or by crawling, and must then remain
with that line.
It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the ammunition
taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly replaced. The higher
commanders would do well to provide a reserve supply of ammunition,
until the arrival of the ammunition columns, by assembling the
ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.).
It will also be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons
of the troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all
probability, expend a large amount of ammunition.
The ammunition should be removed from the dead and wounded. If this is
done by the men of an advancing skirmish line, there is danger that the
forward movement will be retarded, and that some of the men will take
advantage of this opportunity to make themselves “scarce.” Officers
and men should endeavor to replenish ammunition at every opportunity,
without awaiting specific orders to that effect, and, in general, see
that not only the prescribed number of rounds, but, on the contrary, as
much ammunition as possible is on hand in the organization.
When the force is to stand on the defensive, especially if the position
to be occupied has been prepared for defense, ammunition should
be deposited all along the firing line. (Cartridge boxes or other
utensils may be used as receptacles). It is advisable to use first the
cartridges carried in caps, haversacks, coat and trousers’ pockets. The
contents of the right cartridge box are saved for decisive moments when
great rapidity of fire is essential. In replenishing ammunition, the
right cartridge box is filled first, then the left, and the surplus is
accommodated in haversack, coat and trousers’ pockets.
AUSTRIA.
(Par. 70 Regulations of 1903).
The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention.
If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional
rounds before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each
non-commissioned officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition
wagon, so that the latter is about half emptied.[517] This brings
the total amount carried by each soldier up to 140 rounds, and
increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and that of the
non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into action,
the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion
reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the
attention of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion
reserve has been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons
accompany the regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the
wagons maintain intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are
either placed under the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the
senior supply officer present with them, as may be directed by the
battalion commander.
[517] The company ammunition wagon carries 9,450 rounds of
ammunition, packed in seven compartments. It consists of a body and a
limber, has a width of track of 1.13 m., and is supplied with eight
sacks which serve to carry ammunition to the troops. During the day
its position is indicated by a red flag, and at night by a green
lantern.
In attack, it will, as a rule, only be possible to replenish
ammunition until troops get within about 1,000 paces (750 m.) of the
enemy. From this point on, however, it will be extremely difficult to
supply ammunition. Every lull in the fight must be taken advantage
of to replenish ammunition. The firing line receives a fresh supply
of ammunition through reinforcements or through small detachments
under non-commissioned officers sent forward from the reserves. These
detachments, after distributing the ammunition they have brought
up, remain with the firing line. The companies engaged in the fire
fight later take advantage of every opportunity to replenish and to
redistribute ammunition.
In defense, all the ammunition wagons may be emptied before the
action begins, and sent to the rear to be refilled. The ammunition
should be deposited in the vicinity of the firing line. The
subsequent replenishment of the supply should be managed as in an
attack. If ammunition is very urgently needed by the firing line,
and when no other remedy suggests itself, a part of the ammunition
of the reserves may be turned over to the firing line. Special
detachments should be detailed to remove the ammunition from the
dead and wounded. Wounded men who are able to walk to the dressing
station, turn over their ammunition to their comrades.
If another organization requests to be furnished ammunition, the
entire amount required, or a part thereof, depending upon the urgency
of the case and the amount available, should be turned over to it.
RUSSIA.[518]
[518] In each battalion, the ammunition wagon of the 2nd company
carries 108 explosive cartridges, weighing 200 g. each, and that of
the 3rd company carries 48 fuzes.
The ammunition carried in the cartridge boxes of the men may prove
insufficient during an action. On open ground the ammunition
wagons, assembled by regiment, accompany the regimental reserve,
and in covered terrain, they are assembled by battalion, and follow
the battalion reserve. When practicable, their position is to be
indicated during the day by red flags placed on their flank, and at
night by green lanterns. In defense, an adequate supply of ammunition
should be deposited in rear of the firing line, or should be at
once distributed among the men. In attack, the ammunition supply of
the firing line and of the supports is to be replenished when they
enter ranges under 700 m. The best means of preventing shortage of
ammunition is to husband it at long ranges. Ammunition wagons are not
to be emptied and their contents distributed before an action begins;
on the contrary, the ammunition is to be issued during the fight, one
wagon after another being emptied. Ammunition may be sent forward
from the reserve to the firing line, the men who carry it remaining
with that line. On the other hand--and this seems to be the method
most frequently employed--men from the firing line may be sent to
the rear for ammunition. The men of the reserves at once turn over
one-half of their cartridges to these men, who are then assembled and
sent forward under the command of a non-commissioned officer. The
ammunition is carried forward in sacks--so-called “bashlicks.”
FRANCE.
Each company has one ammunition wagon, which is a part of the combat
train (_train de combat_), and carries 16,384 Lebel cartridges, and
36 intrenching tools. It can carry 19,000 rounds of the new “D”
ammunition,[519] So long as any ammunition remains in the ammunition
wagons, they remain under all circumstances with their battalion.
They are assembled in battalion groups on the left flank of their
battalion. When the battalion is broken up for advance, flank,
rear guard, or outpost work, they remain with the main body of the
battalion. When the companies are separated for a protracted period,
the battalion commander decides whether or not the ammunition
wagons should accompany their respective companies. The ammunition
in the wagons is, as a general rule, to be distributed before the
commencement of an action. If this is impossible when the force
is taken by surprise, the commander of the group of ammunition
wagons must bring them up as close as possible under cover, and
the battalion commander must supervise the distribution of the
ammunition. In quarters and on the march, the ammunition is to be
replenished by taking the ammunition from the sick, from the men
detailed away, or from the supply carried by the baggage wagon.[520]
The ammunition in the baggage wagon is only to be used when all these
other sources are exhausted. When an encounter with the enemy may
be expected, and only a short march is anticipated, the ammunition
carried in the baggage wagons may be distributed before starting.
[519] The company ammunition wagon Model 1893 weighs 287 kg.
when empty, and 770 kg. when filled. It carries 14,400 rounds of
ammunition (net capacity 48%) or 66 rounds per rifle.
[520] The baggage wagon weighs 450 kg. when empty, and 1054 kg.
when loaded. It carries 36 intrenching tools, and a tool chest. Its
net capacity is 45%. Forty knapsacks may be transported on this wagon
in lieu of the ammunition.
Any further replenishment of ammunition is to be ordered by the
division commander. The empty company ammunition wagons are assembled
in regimental groups and follow at least 1,000 m. in rear of the
regimental reserve. At each halt, the wagon train is to prepare for
defense. The regimental commander is to regulate the distribution of
the ammunition sent forward by the ammunition columns.
When this distribution cannot be made for some reason or other, the
wagons, assembled in groups of four, follow their battalions. It is
the duty of the battalion commander to keep the firing line supplied
with ammunition. The contents of the company ammunition wagons are
not to be replenished from the ammunition columns during an action.
The ammunition is to be removed from the dead and wounded.
The source of the ammunition supply is the corps ammunition park,
which is divided into three echelons, as follows:
1st echelon consists of two infantry ammunition columns and marches
at the head of the combat train of the troops engaged;
IInd echelon consists of three infantry ammunition columns;
IIIrd echelon carries artillery ammunition only.
Two infantry ammunition columns of the 1st echelon, which, as a
rule, constitutes the “ammunition supply center” at the commencement
of an action, march at the head of the combat train (_train de
combat_). A half-filled infantry ammunition column must at all times
be available at this “ammunition supply center.” Ammunition wagons
of the infantry ammunition column are sent forward at the request
of the division commander to the position taken up by the company
ammunition wagons. The latter are generally posted not more than
1,000 m. in the rear of the fighting line, and parts of each infantry
ammunition column (usually one ammunition wagon for each battalion)
are posted by an officer not more than 1,500 m. in rear of these.
The empty company ammunition wagons are not refilled, the ammunition
being sent forward directly from the ammunition columns. As soon as
the infantry ammunition columns are informed which organizations they
are to supply, they send out non-commissioned officers to locate the
ammunition wagons of those organizations and establish communication
with them. The commander of the ammunition column directs where empty
ammunition wagons are to assemble. In emergencies, wagons of the
infantry ammunition column may also drive close up to the fighting
line. In this case, empty wagons assemble near the groups of company
ammunition wagons, and from there they are sent back in trains to the
ammunition column to which they belong.
Every opportunity, such as a lull in the fight, or an abatement of
the hostile fire, etc., must be utilized to distribute the ammunition
of the company wagons or of the ammunition column.
It is prohibited to send wagons or men to the rear for the purpose of
bringing up ammunition on the battlefield. All men sent forward with
ammunition should remain in the firing line.
ENGLAND.
The British infantryman is usually provided with 115, and each
machine gun with 3,500 rounds of ammunition. Each battalion is, in
addition, provided with 8 pack animals, each carrying two ammunition
chests containing 4,400 cartridges (77 kg.), and with 8 ammunition
wagons.
On the march, the pack animals and half of the ammunition wagons
follow immediately in rear of the battalion. The (16) remaining
wagons form a reserve ammunition column at the disposal of the
brigade commander, and march at the tail of the brigade. When an
engagement is anticipated, 50 additional rounds (1.3 kg.) may be
issued to each man before leaving camp. During an action, one pack
animal and two ammunition wagons follow each half-battalion. Empty
company ammunition wagons are refilled from the brigade reserve
ammunition column. When the wagons of the latter are empty, they are
replaced by filled wagons from the ammunition column. The teams are
not transferred with the wagons, but remain with the organization to
which they belong.
Ammunition wagons are expected to approach to within about 900
m. of the firing line, and pack animals to within 450 m. One
non-commissioned officer and two or three privates are to be detailed
from each company to bring up ammunition. Each man is to carry a sack
containing 600 cartridges (16 kg.). That this method of supplying
ammunition is practicable under fire is shown by the distinguished
conduct lists for =Paardeberg=, where men were praised or decorated
for endurance and fearlessness in bringing up ammunition. (See p. 371
supra). The men who bring up ammunition may be kept in the firing
line when the ground is devoid of cover.
The division ammunition columns, although they carry both infantry
and artillery ammunition, constitute an integral part of the
artillery battalions.
ITALY.
When an encounter with the enemy is anticipated, the ammunition
wagons are to be emptied, the men detailed to carry ammunition are
to remove their packs, and each one of them is to carry ammunition
weighing about 7.5 kg.
The packs are to be removed only in case of urgent necessity.
When this is ordered, however, the soldier first removes all the
cartridges and the emergency ration from his pack. The ammunition
knapsacks, which are always to be taken along, are, however, carried
in turn by all the soldiers of the company.
The advancing units that are in need of ammunition, may demand it
from troops ordered to remain behind. They take along their own
ammunition carriers. The latter, assembled in a squad, distribute the
ammunition along the firing line, and remain with that line. In the
first lull that occurs, they assemble again as a squad and take part
as such in the action.
The empty ammunition knapsacks belonging to organizations in reserve
are to be refilled as rapidly as possible from the ammunition wagons
sent forward from the ammunition park to the fighting line.
The ammunition of the dead and wounded is to be removed ind
distributed among the remaining men. During pauses in the fire, the
ammunition is to be equalized in all organizations engaged in the
fire fight.
The ammunition wagons of the echelons in rear are to approach the
fighting line as far as the available cover permits. Their position
is to be indicated by flags. The ammunition carriers are to come to
these wagons to refill the empty ammunition knapsacks.
3. WHAT DEDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THE REGULATIONS OF THE VARIOUS
ARMIES.
1. The contents of the ammunition wagons should be distributed at the
commencement of an action. This should not be done too early as the
packing and unpacking of ammunition takes time, and as the soldier
will not march so well when loaded down at the wrong time with 60 to
75 additional cartridges (1.8 to 2.4 kg.), unequally distributed in
haversack and pockets. It is also a good plan to issue as many rounds
of ammunition to the non-commissioned officers as to the men. During a
fight this ammunition can then be distributed to the men.
2. As soon as the ammunition wagons have been refilled from the
ammunition columns, which have been brought up, they should at once
endeavor to rejoin their battalions and should then follow as close
as possible in rear of the latter. The expenditure of ammunition
will never be equally distributed along the line; therefore, if the
battalion commander retains all four ammunition wagons directly under
his own orders, he will be better able to equalize the supply of
ammunition than would be the case if each ammunition wagon, as soon as
it is refilled, were to follow its own company, which, in many cases,
it will scarcely find again.
3. It is the duty of the commander to assign a few ammunition wagons
belonging to organizations held in reserve to bodies of troops which
will in all probability need a greater quantity of ammunition.
4. The organization must be in possession of an adequate supply of
ammunition on entering the zone of effective fire, i.e., at a distance
of 600 m. from the enemy. The sending of individual men to the rear
for the purpose of bringing up ammunition will only be practicable
in rare cases. As a rule, the violence of the hostile fire will make
this impossible. Only the best men can be sent back. It is asking too
much to expect them to cross twice the zone swept by hostile fire.
Moreover, the best men are needed in the firing line to encourage
the weaker element, and to replace disabled squad leaders. Under no
circumstances should the firing line be withdrawn to get ammunition
from the ammunition wagons, as an attack made unexpectedly by the enemy
might find the position unoccupied and thus cause its loss.[521] It is
a general principle that ammunition must be sent forward from the rear.
[521] Examples: The loss of the park at Coulmiers (HELVIG, _Das 1.
bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 202). The engagement at Daix on January
21st, 1871 (_Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 61_, p. 174). KUNZ,
_Loigny-Poupry_, p. 77.
5. The ammunition can be removed from the dead and wounded only
in defense, or in attack when the forward movement has come to a
standstill. In an advance, it cannot be done without retarding the
movement and without affording individual men an excuse to remain
behind.
6. The bringing up of ammunition by individual men, left to their
own devises, is not to be recommended, as it facilitates “shirking”;
moreover, if one of the men is disabled, the ammunition he carries
will never reach the firing line. Ammunition should either be sent
to the firing line with each support, or it should be carried by
detachments sent forward in thin skirmish lines under the command of
non-commissioned officers. These detachments should remain with the
firing line.
7. Whether or not signals for informing the troops in rear of a
shortage of ammunition in the firing line will fulfill the expectations
entertained for them, can only be determined by the test of war.
INDEX.
A.
ACCELERATED FIRE, effect of 162
ACCELERATED TIME, in various armies (tables) 54
ACCURACY, effect of, in collective fire 169
ACTION
Breaking off an 441
Conduct and duties of the leaders in 399
Containing 445
Delaying 445
ADJUSTMENT, artillery fire 319
ADVANCE
Crawling--see Crawling
Fire while in motion 92, 93
Firing line in attack 366
Formations suitable for, through timber 332
Impulse from the rear 95
Infantry under artillery fire 321
Rushes--see Rushes
Skirmish line 76
ADVANCE BY CRAWLING--see Crawling
ADVANCE BY RUSHES--see Rushes
ADVANCE GUARD.
Battalion, formation for attack 212
Conduct in a rencontre 334
Conduct of, France 454
Italy 451
ADVANCED POSITIONS 413
Austria 450
Danger of fight being decided in 414
England 462
Examples of 412
Example of attack on 348
Japan 465
Russia 413
ADVANCED TROOPS 349
AGENTS DE LIAISON 245
AIM, points of 165
AIMING POSITION, warding off cavalry 307
ALPINI 22, 24
ALTITUDE, effect of, on ranges 145
AMMUNITION
Expenditure and supply of 468
Franco-German War 468
Russo-Japanese War 473
Russo-Turkish War 472
Expenditure of, during advance by rushes 90
How carried by soldier in various armies 476
Knapsacks 483
Machine guns 261
Austria 288
England 290
Switzerland 284
Germany 273
Rate of fire versus waste of 161
Shortage of, examples 469
Supply and distribution in action 400
Supply, Austria 475, 479
Deductions from various regulations 483
Defense 400
England 475, 482
France 475, 480
Germany 475, 476
Italy 475, 483
Japan 475
Russia 475, 480
Various armies (table) 475
Wagon--see Ammunition Wagons,
Weight of, in various armies (table) 40
AMMUNITION CARTS--see Ammunition Wagons
AMMUNITION KNAPSACKS 483
AMMUNITION WAGONS 72
Austria 479
England 482
France 480
Germany 477
Italy 483
Russia 480
APPLICATORY METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 10, 11
APPLIED TACTICS 12, 13
ARBITRATION, Courts of 3
ARMY CORPS, frontage in attack 236
ARTILLERY,
Adjustment of fire 319
Cavalry charge supported by 313
Combat of infantry against 316
Combat of machine guns against 297
Combination fuses 113
Coöperation with infantry 351, 354
Effect of fire (France) 123, 124, 321
Field guns, in various armies 111
Fire at successive ranges 321
Fire diverted by advancing infantry 327
Fire effect of French 4-gun battery 321
Fire effect of (French data) 123, 124
Fire for effect 320
Howitzer, heavy field 118
Light field 116
Infantry screen 327
Line, distance from infantry line in defense 415
Losses, Franco-German War 20
Percentage of 188
Under infantry fire 326, 327
Percussion shell (Model 96) 115
Percussion shrapnel 111
Positions in defense 414
Preparatory action (France) in attack 454
Progressive fire 320
Searching fire 321
Shields, protection afforded by 324
Shrapnel 112, 113
Effect of (table) 114, 122
Sweeping fire 321
Time required for adjusting the fire 119
Time shell (Model 96) 116
(Model 98) 118
Time shrapnel 112, 113
Unlimbering under infantry fire 326
Zone fire 320
ASSAULT 373
Austria 449
Conduct of the 374
Decision to make an 373
England 462
Examples 376
Fire support 379
Fire while in motion 381
France 457
Guidons 355
Italy 452
Japan 464
Moment for making the 374
Pursuit after successful 385
Successful, conduct after 385
Trumpet signal, fix bayonet 377
Unsuccessful, conduct after 386
ASSAULTING DISTANCE 385, 424
ASSEMBLY FORMATIONS 42
France (_carré de division_) 454
ATTACK 329
Abridged 330
Advance of the firing line 366
Advance guard, conduct of the--in a rencontre 334
Advanced troops 349
Assault 352, 373, 374, 399
Assaulting distance 385, 424
Austria 448
Brigade, frontage of a, in 399
Column 44, 45
Comparison with defense 329
Conditions upon which success depends 345
Conduct of the 365
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354
Decision to assault 373
Deliberately planned, comparison with rencontre 334, 338
Deployment, initial 366
Distances 368
Of supports from firing line 99
Duration of the 351
England 459
Envelopment 356
Examples
Boer War 340
Russo-Japanese War 340, 345
Fire fight 368
Fixing bayonets 372
Formation for, of a battalion 211, 212, 213
France 453
Advance in mass formation 455
Group attack 255
Preparatory attack formation 455
Frontage 234
Army corps 236
Battalion 236
Brigade 235, 236, 399
Company 96, 235, 236
Gaps in the line 239
General rules for use of intrenching tools 393
Higher troop leading, duties 366
Holding 357, 445
Intrenching tools, use of 387
Infantry against dismounted cavalry 313
Italy 451
Japan 463
I. Army 342
Influences determining tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341
Launching the enveloping force 359
Lessons of the Boer War 340
Russo-Japanese War 340
Local reconnaissance in 347
Machine guns in 365
Methods of forming a battalion for (plates) 215, 216
Minor troop leading, duties 365
Moment for making the assault 374
Normal attack 203, 204, 205
Number of men required 234
On an enemy deployed for defense 340
Orders, issue of, in rencontre 36
Over plain devoid of cover 255
Point of 355
Position of commander in 399
Preparation by infantry and artillery (France) 454
Preparation of the 346
Preparatory position, advance into 350
Provisions of various regulations in re use of spade in 392
Pure frontal 357
Range finding instruments, employment in 146
Reconnaissance 346
In force 347
Rencontre 333
Compared with deliberately planned attack 338
Conduct of main body in a 336
Reserve, strength of 395
Reserves, employment of 394
Rules for the advance under fire 367
Sand bag cover 344, 390
Secondary 357
Separation of holding and flank attacks 361
Signal (fix bayonet) 377
Spade, use of, in 387, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466
Successful, conduct after 385
Superiority of fire, necessity of 370, 371
Supports, advance of 368
Distance from firing line 99
Surprise 330
Switzerland 466
Time for opening fire, general rules 155
Troop leading, duties of 365, 366
United, examples illustrating necessity of a 402
Unsuccessful, conduct after 386
ATTACK ON A POSITION PREPARED FOR DEFENSE
Austria 448
Japan 464
Switzerland 466
AUSTRIA
Advanced positions 450
Advanced troops 349
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 479
Assault 449
Attack 448
Attack on a position prepared for defense 448
Battalion, formations of the 69, 72
Column of platoons, how formed 49
(plate) 62
Company, strength of (table) 35
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354
Counter-attack 438, 450
Crawling 449
Defense 450
Seeking a decision 450
Development for action 208
Envelopment 362, 449
Fire control and fire discipline 135
Fire, kinds of 159
Time for opening 153
While in motion, experiments with 92
Firing line, method of reinforcing the 96
Position, choice of 370
Frontage 241
Front and facing distance 48
Infantry combat 448-450
Infantry versus cavalry 314
Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39
Kinds of fire 449
Load carried by a soldier 40
Machine gun 288
Ammunition supply 288
And infantry, relative fire effect of 267
Fire, kinds of 263
Formations 288
Organization 288
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Ranges, ascertaining 144
Reinforcing the firing line, method of 96
Rencontre 339, 448
Rushes 90, 449
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Superiority of fire 371
Supply of ammunition 475, 479
Telegraph detachments 248
Use of spade in attack 392, 449
B.
BASE UNIT 218
Advantages and disadvantages 218, 219
Of combat, designation of 244
BATTALION
Acting alone, formation for attack 212
Advance guard, formation for attack 212
Attack formation, France 457
Austrian, formation of the 69, 72
Broad column (with plates) 67, 68
Commander, duties in action 400
Post in action 400
Deep column (with plates) 67, 68
Depth on the march 72
English, formation of the 71
Formation, in a containing action 213
Forming for attack 211
French, formation of the (with plates) 70
Frontage in attack and defense 236
German, formation of the 67, 68
Group intrenchments 417
Historical development 36
Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39
Intrenchments for a 419, 421
Italian, formation of the 70
Japanese, formation of the 70
Method of forming for attack (plates) 215, 216
Movements of the 67
Normal formation 67
Organization of the 36, 37
Part of a larger force, formation in attack 213
In defense 213
Route column, formation 72
Provisions of various regulations 73
Russian, formations of the 69
Swiss, formations of the 71
BATTALION COMMANDER
Duties in action 400
Post in action 400
BATTLE UNIT 34
BAYONET FENCING 134
BAYONET FIGHTS 382
BEATEN ZONE 179
Definition 179
Depth at various angles of slope--General Paquié’s rule for
determining 183
Formulae for computing depth of 180
Increase and diminution of (table) 181
BELGIUM
Fire control and fire direction 135
Frontage 242
Front and facing distance 48
BREAKING OFF AN ACTION 441
BRIGADE 37
Attack formation of a French 454
Cavalry, strength of 311
Combat formation 74
Development for action (with plate) 216, 217
Formations 73, 74
Frontage in attack 235, 236, 399
Importance 37, 38
Movements 73, 74
Three-unit organization 218
BROAD COLUMN (with plate) 67
C.
CADENCE 53, 54
CAVALRY
Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311
Charge supported by artillery 313
Charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313
Combat of infantry against 301
Provisions of various regulations 314, 315
Combat of machine guns against 296
Dismounted, infantry attack against 313
Losses
Charge of French cavalry at Vionville 312
Franco-German War 20
Percentage of 188
Massed employment 313
Moral effect of a charge 306
Regiment, strength of German 273
Relative strength as compared to infantry 311
CHANGE OF DIRECTION, how executed 219
CHANGE OF FRONT
Examples of 220, 221
How executed 219
CHASSEURS ALPINS 22
CLEARING THE FOREGROUND 421
CLOSE COLUMN, definition 47
CLOSE ORDER
Battalion 67
Brigade 73
Company 56
Compared with extended order 102
Regiment 73
CLOSE ORDER FORMATIONS,
Effect of fire on 102, 103
Value of 103, 104
COLLECTIVE FIRE 169
COLOR, position of the 68
COLT MACHINE GUN 261
COLUMN
Attack in 44, 45
Battalion in route 72
Broad (with plate) 67
Close, definition of 47
Comparison with line 42-45
Deep (with plates) 67, 68
Dimensions of broad and deep (plate) 69
Double 71
French double (plate) 70
Open, definition of 47
Route (machine gun battery) 273, 274
Section (machine gun battery) 273, 274
COLUMN OF FOURS 58
How formed (plate) 58
And squads compared 59
COLUMN OF PLATOONS 61
How formed 49
Machine gun battery 273, 274
(plate) 62
Vulnerability of 186, 187
COLUMN OF SQUADS 57
Employment of 59
(plates) 57
COLUMN OF TWOS 56
COLUMNS, line of company, France (plate) 70
COMBAT
Conduct and duties of the leaders 399
Drill, importance of 105
Duration of 178
Frontage--see Frontage.
Infantry 448-467
Austria 448-450
France 453-459
Italy 451-453
Japan 463-465
Japanese, Characteristics of 341
Russia 466
Switzerland 466-467
Versus artillery 316
Versus cavalry 301
Versus machine guns 268
Machine Guns 296, 297
Versus artillery 297
Versus cavalry 296
Orders 243, 244
Necessity for written 244
Patrols 80, 250
Sections 257
Assignment of 243
Division of a position into 411
Tasks, assignment of 243
Train (machine guns) 270
Unit 34
COMBAT DRILL, importance of 105
COMBAT FRONTAGE--see Frontage
COMBAT ORDERS 243
Items that should not appear in 244
Written, necessity for 244
COMBAT PATROLS 250
COMBAT SECTIONS 257
Division of a position into 411
COMBAT TRAIN, machine gun 270
COMBAT UNIT 34
COMBINED SIGHTS, use of 166
COMMANDER
Battalion, post of, in action 400
Company, post of, in action 400
Conduct in action 399
Interference with subordinates 401
Post of, in action 399
Post of, in rencontre 398
Regimental, post of, in action 400
Selection of a position during combat 244
COMMANDS 41
Fire 166
COMMUNICATING TRENCHES 421
COMMUNICATION
With neighboring troops and next higher headquarters 245
On the battlefield 246
COMPANY 34
Ammunition wagons 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483
Austrian, in column of platoons (plate) 62
Columns of the 56
Commander, duties in action 400
Post in action 400
Dimensions of the 3 and 4 platoon company (plate) 52
Division into platoons, sections, squads 46-53
3 or 4 platoons 48, 53
Formation of the 46, 47
French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66
In line (plate) 49
Frontage in attack 235
Attack and defense 96
Defense and rear guard actions 236
German,
In column of platoons (plate) 62
In column of squads (plate) 57
In company column (plate) 60
In line (plate) 47
In route column (plate) 57
Movements in line and column 56
Non-commissioned officers, posts of, in various armies 47
Organization of the 34, 35
Range finders, post of 46, 47
Russian, in column of platoons (plate) 62
Strength of the 24, 35
In the various armies (table) 35
COMPANY AMMUNITION WAGONS 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483
COMPANY COLUMN (with plates) 60
Value of 186, 187
COMPANY COMMANDER,
Duties in action 400
Post in action 400
CONCENTRATED FIRE, machine guns 263
CONCENTRATION
For action 205
French, into _carré de division_, in attack 454
CONE OF DISPERSION, machine gun fire 264
CONE OF MISSES, Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant 173
CONTAINING ACTIONS 445
Delaying action and holding attack compared 445
COÖPERATION
Formation of a battalion in 213
Infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354
Difficulties of 354
Provisions of various regulations 354
COUNTER-ATTACK 378, 428, 453
After position is carried 433
Austria 410
Decision brought about by the 234
England 463
Examples of 433, 435, 436, 437, 438
France 439, 458
Frontal 436
In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434
Moment for making 432, 434
Moral effect of 436
Provisions of various regulations 438, 439
COURTS OF ARBITRATION 3
COVER
Sand bag 344, 390
Trenches 421
Use of 256
By firing line 138
COVER TRENCHES 421
CRAWLING 86
Austria 49
How executed 87, 88
CUTTING WEAPONS, wounds produced by (%) 384
CYCLISTS 28, 29, 30, 414
Depth of detachment of 29
Rate of march of 29
Use of, on battlefield 246
D.
“D” BULLET
Data regarding 130
Effect on steel shields 324
DANGER, effect of 195
DANGER SPACE, definition 179
DEEP COLUMN (with plates) 67, 68
French (with plates) 70
DEFENSE 408
Advanced positions 413
Ammunition supply 410
Austria 450
Battalion group intrenchments 417
Clearing the foreground 421
Combat sections, division of the position into 411
Communicating trenches 419, 420, 421
Company, frontage of 96
Comparison with attack 329
Conduct of the 423
Counter-attack 234, 428
After position is carried 433
Frontal 436
Moment for making 432, 434
Cover trenches 419-421
Distance of general reserve from defensive line 430
Distribution in depth in 232
Dummy intrenchments 421
England 462
Field magazines 418
Fire fight 427
Firing trenches 417
Flanks, protection of the 425
Formation of a battalion 213, 214
Fortifying the position 415
Framework of the position 414
France 458
Frontage in 232, 233
Frontage of a battalion 236
Company 96, 236
Frontal counter-attack 436
Gaps in the line 411
General reserve, location of the 411
Position of the 429
Strength of the 431
Interval between general reserve and defensive line 430
Intrenching, time essential for 416
Intrenchments, purpose of 416, 417
Italy 453
Japan 465
Long range fire, use of 150
Machine guns 295, 425
Masks 421
Number of men required in temporary 233
Observation of the foreground 420
Obstacles, construction of 421
Occupation of the position 426
Offensive,
Assumption of the 428
--defensive 408
Necessity of assuming the 409
Passive 409
Position,
Advanced 413
Determining factors in selecting a 414
Division of the, into sections 411
Fortifying the 415
Framework of the 414
Requirements of a 410
Purely passive 408
Range finding instruments, employment of 146
Refusing a flank 425
Reserve, strength of 395
Russia 422
Section reserves 411
Sections, division of the position into 411
Seeking a decision 233, 234, 409, 450, 467
Splinter proofs 418, 419, 420
Superiority of fire 427
Supports 410
Switzerland 467
Temporary,
Frontage in 233
Number of men required in 233
Occupation of a position 408
Terrain, character of, required by 254
Time for opening fire, in (general rules) 155
Traverses 417
Trenches (dimensions) 418, 420
Troops required to occupy the position 410, 411
Weak points, strengthening of 412
DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION 409
Austria 450
Frontage 233, 234
Number of men required 234
Switzerland 467
DELAYING ACTION 445
Compared with holding attack 445
Distribution in depth in 232
Frontage in 232
DEMOLITION TOOLS 39
DEPLOYMENT 78, 80, 209
For action 209
France, from 4-rank formation (with plate) 65, 66
Initial, in attack 366
Provisions of various regulations 80
DEPTH
Battalion on the march 72
Cyclist detachment 29
Distribution in 222-225, 235, 237, 241, 242
DEVELOPMENT FOR ACTION 207
Brigade 216, 217
DISARMAMENT, proposals for 3
DISCIPLINE and the moral factors 107, 108
DISPERSION 33
DISTANCE,
Definition of 47
Assaulting 385, 424
Attack 368
Between elements in the battalion 72, 73
Facing, in various armies (table) 48
General reserve from defensive line 430
Support from firing line in attack 99
DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH 222
Maximum, when necessary 235
Necessity for 224
Necessity for, increase with size of force 241
Provisions of various regulations 241, 242
Relation to frontage 225
Examples 223, 237
DIVISION, attack formation, France 457
DOUBLE COLUMN, France (with plates) 70
DOUBLE TIME 55
In various armies (table) 54
DRILL AND TRAINING 105, 106
DRILL ATTACK 204
DRILL, importance of combat 105
DRILL REGULATIONS 13-16
Provisions of various--see under name of country
DUMMY INTRENCHMENTS 421, 423
E.
ECHELON FORMATION 73, 74
EFFECT OF FIRE 167
As regards time 172
At medium ranges 151
Influence of the elevation selected 162
On artillery when unlimbering 326
On close order formations 102, 103
On thin and dense skirmish lines 77
Standard of measurement of the 168
EFFICACY OF FIRE 140
Against hill positions 183
Dependent upon accuracy 156
Influence of the ground on 179
Influence of training 168
ELEVATIONS, rear sight 165, 310
ÉLITE TROOPS 21, 22
ENGLAND
Advanced positions 413, 462
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 482
Assault 462
Attack 459
Battalion, formations of the 71
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354
Counter-attack 439, 463
Defense 462
Envelopment 362
Fire fight in attack 461
Fire of position 154
Fire, time for opening 154
Kinds of 160
Frontage 242
In attack 460
Front and facing distance 48
Frontal counter-attack 463
Group intrenchments 462
Holding attack 447
Infantry combat 459-463
Versus cavalry 314
Intrenching in attack 392
Local counter-attack 463
Machine guns 289
Ammunition supply 290
And infantry, relative fire effect 266, 267
Organization 290
Views on 297
Mounted infantry 26
Normal attack 203
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Rallying position 460
Reserves, use of, prior to Boer War 397
Rushes 91, 462
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Supply of ammunition 475, 482
Telephone detachments 248
Use of spade in attack 392
ENVELOPMENT 356
Austria 362, 449
Dangers involved 358
England 363
Examples of 357-361
France 362, 457
Italy 363
Provisions of various regulations 362, 363
ESKADRONS
Number in German brigade 311
Strength of 32
ESTIMATING DISTANCES--see Range
EQUIPMENT 38-40
Intrenching tool 38-40
Tent, weight of 40
Weight of, in various armies (table) 40
EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION 468
Examples from military history 468-474
Franco-German War 468
Russo-Japanese War 473
Russo-Turkish War 472
EXPLOSIVES 39, 480
EXTENDED ORDER 75
Compared with close order 102
Movements in 81
F.
FACING DISTANCE, in various armies (table) 48
FIELD ARTILLERY--see Artillery
FIELD GUN 111
FIELD MAGAZINES 418
FIELD TRAIN 72
Machine guns 270
FIGHTING UNIT 33
FILE CLOSERS, position of 46, 47
FIRE
Accelerated, effect of 162
Beaten zone, definition 179
Collective, effect of accuracy in 169
Combined sights 166
Commands for firing 166
Constant cone of misses, Wolozkoi’s theory of the 173
Continuous, fatigue produced by 155
Control 134
Curve of hits obtained by various marksmen 170
Danger space, definition 179
Direction 134
Discipline 133
Distribution of, against charging cavalry 311
Effect 167
As regards time 172
At medium ranges 151
Influence of the elevation selected on 162
On artillery when unlimbering 326
On close order formations 102, 103
On thin and dense skirmish lines 77
Efficacy of 140
Against hill positions 183
Dependent upon accuracy 156
Influence of the ground on 179
Influence of training on 168
Elevations and points of aim 165
To be used in warding off cavalry charges 310
Employment of infantry 132
Expedients for minimizing the effect of hostile 118
Flanking 254
Formula for determining favorable range for firing against hill
positions 183
Hits obtained by various marksmen (table) 171
Hostile, expedients for minimizing effect of 118
Formations suitable under 120, 121
Hurried, effect of 162
Increasing difficulties in adjusting hostile artillery fire 119
Indirect 184
Infantry 126
Against charging cavalry 308
And machine gun, relative value of 265-267
Employment of 132
Influences affecting accuracy of 173
Influence of the ground on efficacy of 179
Kinds of 157
Austria 449
France 455
Italy 451
Japan 463
Provisions of various regulations 158-160
Russo-Japanese War 157
To be used in warding off a cavalry charge 310
Long range 148, 150-153, 176
Losses produced by long range fire 176
Machine gun--see Machine Guns
Marksmanship, effect of, in collective 169
Misses
Effect of 173
Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of 173
Moral effect of 191, 227
On charging cavalry 309
Number of rounds to be expended to accomplish a certain result 172
Oblique, effect of, against shielded batteries 324
Observation of 167
Pauses in 155
Preparation 149
Provisions of various regulations in re kinds of 158
Time for opening 153
Rafale 164
Rate of 160
At various ranges 162
Versus waste of ammunition 161
Ricochets, effect of 185
Rifle-rests, influence of 178
Superiority of, in defense 427
Time for opening 147
General rules 155
On charging cavalry 308
Provisions of various regulations 153
Training, influence of, on efficacy of 168
Trial volleys 164
Volley, value of 157, 163
With counted cartridges 164
Withholding the 151
Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of misses 173
FIRE AT SUCCESSIVE RANGES 321
FIRE EFFECT 167
As regards time 172
At medium ranges 151
Influence of the elevation selected, on 162
On artillery when unlimbering 326
On close order formations 102, 103
On thin and dense skirmish lines 77
Standard of measurement of the 168
FIRE FIGHT
Attack 368, 369, 461
Defense 427
Machine guns 283
Superiority of fire in attack 370-371
FIRE FOR EFFECT 320
FIRE OF POSITION 140
Infantry 85
Machine guns 85
FIRE WHILE IN MOTION 92, 381
Austrian experiments with 92
Examples of employment of 93
Losses when using 92
FIRING LINE
Advance in attack 366
Assembling the 97
Closing in 97
Dense 75
Prolonging the 96
Re-forming the 97
Reinforcing the, method of 96
Selection of line to be occupied by 138
Strength and density 75
Strength of the 139
Use of cover by the 138
FIRING TRENCHES 417, 419, 420
FIXING BAYONETS 372
Signal for, in assault 377
FLAGS, Guidon 62, 63
FLANK ATTACK
Separation from holding attack 361
France 455
FLANKS, protection of the, in defense 425
FOREGROUND, division into sections 411
FORMAL TACTICS 12
FORMATIONS 42
Advance through woods 332
Assembly 42, 454
Austria 49, 52, 58, 62, 69, 72
Battalion 67-73
Battle 43
Belgium 58
Brigade 73-74
England 58, 71
France 49, 65, 66, 70, 73, 454
Germany 47, 52, 57, 60, 62, 67, 68, 72
Infantry under artillery fire 318, 321-324
Influence of various rifles on density of 240
Italy 58, 70, 73
Japan 58, 70
Line and column, comparison of 43
Machine guns 273, 274
Austria 288
Germany 273, 274
Switzerland 287
Netherlands 58
Provisions of various regulations 69-71
Purpose of 42
Regiment 73, 74
Route 42
Russia 58, 62, 69, 73
Sweden 58
Switzerland 71
Tactical, importance of 108
Troops in rear of firing line 186
Vulnerability of various 181, 186, 187
Warding off a cavalry charge 302
FORTIFYING THE POSITION 415
Russia 422
FORTRESS WARFARE 13
FOURS, column of 58
Compared with column of squads 59
How formed 58
FRAMEWORK OF A POSITION 414
FRANCE
Advance guard, conduct of the 454
Advance in mass formation in attack 455
Advanced positions 413
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 480
Artillery fire, effect of 123, 124
Assembly (_carré de division_) 454
Assault 457
Attack 453
Artillery in the preparatory action 454
Formation
Battalion 457
Brigade 454
Division 457
Infantry preparation 454
Battalion, formation of the (with plate) 70
Company (plate) 49
Strength of (table) 35
_Contre attaque_ 439
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 334
Counter-attack 378, 439, 458
In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434
Defense 458
Envelopment 363, 457
Fire, kinds of 159, 455
Fire pauses 156
Fire, time for opening 154
Flank attack 455
Frontage 241, 242
Front and facing distance 48
Group attack 255
Group combat 241, 242
Infantry combat 453-459
Infantry versus cavalry 315
Intrenching in attack 457
Intrenching, tool equipment (table) 39
Intrenchments 416
Kinds of fire 159, 455
Line of company columns 70
Load carried by soldier 40
Machine guns 290
Offensive return 458
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Platoon in 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66
Preparatory attack formation 455
Pure frontal attack 455
Rafale fire 164
Rencontre 339
_Retour offensif_ 439
Rushes 90, 91
Signal detachments 248
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Supply of ammunition 475, 480
Supports, conduct in attack 456
Units of direction 219
Use of spade in attack 392, 457
Vulnerability of various formations 187
FRONTAGE
Army corps in attack 236
Attack 234
England 460
Austria 241
Battalion in attack and defense 236
Belgium 242
Brigade in attack 235, 399
Combat formations 222
Company in attack 235, 236
Attack and defense 96
Defense 236
Rear guard action 236
Considerations governing in attack 229
Defense, factors governing in 232
Seeking a decision 233, 234
Temporary 233
England 242, 460
Examples 223, 237
France 241
Gaps in the line 239, 411
Italy 242
Japan 242
Maximum, when justifiable 235
Overextension of 238
Provisions of various regulations 241, 242
Regiment 236
Relation to distribution in depth 225
Resumé of most important points governing 241
Russia 242
Russo-Japanese War 239
Various battles 240
FRONTAL COUNTER-ATTACK 436
England 463
Examples of 437, 438
FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE in various countries (table) 48
G.
GAPS IN THE ATTACKING LINE 239
GAPS IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE 411
GATLING GUN 259
GENERAL RESERVE
Distance from defensive line 430
Interval from flank of defensive line 430
Position of the, in defense 411, 429
Strength in defense 431
GERMANY
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 476
Battalion, formations of the 67, 68
Broad column (plate) 67
Cavalry brigade, number of _Eskadrons_ in 311
Column of platoons (plate) 62
Column of squads and route column (plate) 57
Company (plate) 47
Strength of (table) 35
Company column (plate) 60
Concentration, defense 205
Deep column (plate) 67, 68
Development for action, defense 207
Distribution in depth, defense 207
_Eskadron_, strength of 32
Fire, kinds of 158
Front and facing distance 48
Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39
Load carried by soldier 40
Machine guns--see Machine Guns
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Ranges, ascertaining 143
Rushes 90
Supply of ammunition 475, 476
“To form for attack,” definition 207
GROUND, influence of the 179
GROUP INTRENCHMENTS 417
England 462
Switzerland 467
GUARDS 22
GUIDON FLAGS 62, 63
Examples of the use of 355
H.
HATCHET, weight of the 40
HEADQUARTERS, distribution of work at 245
HELIOGRAPH, use of, on the battlefield 246
HISTORY--see Military History
HITS
Number of, obtained by various marksmen (table) 169
Curves of hits (plate) 170
Percentage of, standard of measurement of effect of fire 168
HOLDING ATTACK 357
Compared with delaying action 445
Separation from flank attack 361
Strength of 446
HOTCHKISS MACHINE GUN 260
HOWITZER
Heavy field 118
Light field 116
I.
INDIVIDUALISM, influence of, on tactics 201
INDIRECT FIRE 184
INFANTRY FIRE--see Fire
INFLUENCE OF THE GROUND 179
INFANTRY
Advance under artillery fire 318
Advance under fire, rules for 367
Attack
In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340-345
On dismounted cavalry 313
Combat
According to various drill regulations 448-467
Against artillery 316
Cavalry 301
Provisions of various regulations 314-315
Machine guns, general principles 268
In Russo-Japanese War 341
Value of, as compared with machine guns 267
Conduct under machine gun fire 269
Coöperation with artillery 351, 354
Cyclists 28, 29, 30
Deployment 201
For firing on charging cavalry 303
Élite 21
Equipment, weight of (table) in various armies 40
Fire, effect of, against shielded batteries 324, 325
Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265
Fire of position 85
Firing on artillery in position 324
Formations for advancing under artillery fire 318, 321, 324
Importance and employment of 19-32
Japanese, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341
Load carried 39
Local reconnaissance of the 248
Losses in Franco-German War 20
Percentage of 188
Manner of fighting 19, 20
Method of warding off a cavalry charge 304
Mounted infantry 25, 26, 27
Passage through artillery lines 316
Proportion to other arms 19
Relative strength as compared to cavalry 311
Russian, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 340
Screen for artillery 327
Tactical unit 32-34
Tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341
Time for opening fire on charging cavalry 308
INFANTRY COMBAT
Austria 448-450
England 459-463
France 453-459
Italy 451-453
Japan 463-465
Russia 466
Switzerland 466-467
INFANTRY SCREEN 327
INFORMATION OFFICERS 245
INSTRUCTION
Method of 7-13
Applicatory (or inductive) 10, 11
Deductive 11
Maneuvers 8, 12
Map problems 8, 11
Military history, study of 7, 8
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGNS 15
INTERVAL
Between general reserve and flank of defensive line 430
Definition 47
INTRENCHING IN ATTACK
Austria 392, 449
England 392
France 392, 457
Germany 392
Japan 392, 465
Russia 392
Switzerland 466
INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT 38-40
In various armies (table) 39
INTRENCHING TOOLS
General rules for use in attack 393
Use of in attack 387
Provisions of various regulations 392, 393
INTRENCHMENTS
Battalion groups of 417
Communicating trenches 419, 421
Cover trenches 419, 421
Dimensions 418, 420
Dummy 421, 423
Field magazines 418
Firing trenches 417, 419, 420
Foreground, clearing the 421
Observation of the 420
Masks 421
Narrow trenches 418
Obstacles, construction of 421
Purpose 416
Splinter proofs 418, 420
Traverses 417
IRON RATION, weight of 40
ITALY
Advance guard, conduct of the 451
Ammunition knapsacks 483
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 483
Assault 452
Attack 451
Battalion, formations of the 70
Company, strength of (table) 35
Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354
Counter-attack 453
Cyclists, rate of march of 29
Defense 453
Envelopment 362
Fire, kinds of 160
Time for opening 154
Frontage 242
Front and facing distance 48
Infantry combat 451-453
Intrenching tool equipment 39
Kinds of fire 451
Load carried by soldier 40
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Ranges, ascertaining 143
Rushes 91, 452
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Supply of ammunition 475, 483
Vulnerability of various formations 186
J.
JAPAN
Advance in skirmish line 76, 77
Advanced positions 465
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Assault 464
Attack 463
On a position prepared for defense 464
In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341, 342
Battalion, formations of the 70
Combat, characteristics of 341
Counter-attack 439
Defense 465
Fire, kinds of 160
Frontage 242
Front and facing distance 48
Infantry
Combat 463-465
Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341
Versus cavalry 315
Intrenching in attack 392, 465
Kinds of fire 463
Load carried by soldier 40
Machine guns 290
Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54
Pursuit 465
Rencontre 464
Rushes 91, 463
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Use of spade in attack 392, 466
JÄGER 21-23
K.
KAISERJÄGER 24
KINDS OF FIRE--see Fire
KNAPSACKS
Ammunition 483
Loss of 364
Weight of, in various armies (table) 40
L.
LEADERS
Conduct in action 399
Duties in action 399, 400, 401
Posts in action 399
LEADING--see Troop Leading
LESSONS OF THE BOER WAR, in re
Attack 340
Rushes 88, 89
LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, in re
Attack 340
Fire control and fire direction 137
Formations under artillery fire 321-324
Rushes 89, 90
LINE
Comparison with column 42-45
Vulnerability of the 187
LINE FORMATION 73, 74
LINE OF COMPANY COLUMNS, French (with plate) 70
LINE OF PLATOONS, vulnerability of 186
LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE--see Reconnaissance
LONG RANGE FIRE 148, 150-153, 176
LOSSES
Artillery under infantry fire 326, 327
British, in Boer War 193
Examples 20, 36, 45, 50, 51, 153, 167, 168, 176, 178, 188,
189, 190, 193, 227, 312, 324
Franco-German War (by arm) 20
French Cuirassiers in charge at Vionville 312
In action 185
Infantry under artillery fire 324
Percentage of 186, 188, 189, 227
Produced by
Long range fire 176
Artillery and infantry fire, comparison 167, 168
Officers and men, comparison 189, 190
Skirmish line 81
When using fire while in motion 92
M.
MACHINE GUNS 259
Ammunition 261
Supply
Austria 288
Battery 273
England 290
Germany 273
Russia 291
Switzerland 284
Transportation of 270
Assignment to cavalry 296
Attack, employment in 365
Austria 288
Basket mount 261
Battery (Germany)
Ammunition supply 273
Column of platoons 273, 274
Combat train 276
Employment of 293
Field train 270
Fighting 270
Formations 273, 274
Movements and gaits 273
Order in line 273, 274
Organization 270
Relative combat value 273
Route column 273, 274
Section column 273, 274
Belts, ammunition 261
Cavalry 261
Colt 261
Column of platoons 273, 274
Combat
Against artillery 297
Cavalry 296
Of infantry against, general principles 268
Train 270
Value as compared with skirmishers 267
Companies
Germany 275
Russia 290
Switzerland 284
Cone of dispersion 264
Crawling into position (illustration) 277
Defense 414
Employment in 425
Development, historical 259
Employment of 263
English views on employment of 297
Examples of employment of 283
Feldl gun 219
Field train 270
Fighting battery 270
Fire 263
Austria 263
Comparison with infantry fire 265-267
Concentrated 263
Cone of dispersion 264
Effect of 264, 294
Germany 263
Kinds of 263, 287-288
Progressive 263
Rate of 261
Sweeping 263
Switzerland 263, 287
Formations
Austria 288
Germany 273, 274
Switzerland 287
Fire effect 264, 294
As compared with a body of skirmishers 265
Fire fight 283
Fire of position 85
France 290
Gatling 259
Germany 270
Going into position 276
Historical development 259
Hotchkiss 260
In position (illustration) 279
Intrenched (illustration) 281
Japan 290
Kinds of fire
Austria 263, 288
Germany 263
Switzerland 263, 287, 288
Mitrailleuse 259
Mountain batteries 288
Mounting, method of 261, 284
Organization
Austria 288
England 290
Germany 270, 271, 275
Russia 291
Switzerland 284
Order in line 273-274
Progressive fire 263
Russia 290
Schwarzlose 260
Searching fire 263
Section column 273, 274
Sled mount 261
Sweeping fire 263
Swiss views on employment of 299
Tripod mount 261
Various countries 284-293
Weights of various, with mounts 261
MAGAZINES--see Field Magazines
MAIN BODY, conduct in a rencontre 336
MAIN FIRING POSITION 369
MANEUVERS 8, 12
MAP PROBLEMS 8, 11
MARCH, rate of, cyclists 29
MARCHING, length of pace and 53
MARKSMANSHIP, value of 169
MASKS 421
Influence of 120
MATTOCK, weight of 40
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, effect of, on range 145
METHOD OF INSTRUCTION--see Instruction
MILITARY HISTORY, EXAMPLES FROM
Abridged attack 330
Advance, impulse from the rear 95
Advanced positions 412
Attack on 348
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 89, 90, 468, 474
Artillery fire diverted from proper objective by advancing
infantry 327
Artillery supporting a cavalry charge 313
Under infantry fire 326-327
Assault 376, 409
Assaulting guidons, use of 355
Attack 340-345
Formation of a brigade 207
Battalions, strength of 36
Cavalry charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313
Changes of front 320, 321
Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311
Close order formation, effect of fire on 102, 103
Column as attack formation 44, 45
Combats, duration of 178
Companies, consolidation of 36
Concentration for action 205, 209, 210
Counter-attack
After position is carried 433
Against a hostile flank 435, 436
Cover,
Construction of, in attack 344
Use of 257
Defensive position, location of 410
Deployment 206
Of reserves 369
Distribution in depth and frontage 222, 223, 226
Dummy trenches 421
Effect of danger 195-200
Fire on charging cavalry 308
Envelopment 357, 358, 359, 360, 361
Expenditure and supply of ammunition 468-474
Fatigue produced by continuous fire 155
Fire,
Effect of 132
Kinds of, used in Russo-Japanese War 157, 159
Russo-Turkish War 158, 159
Withholding the 151, 152
Fire control and fire direction, difficulties of 137
Fire effect on close order formations 102, 103
Fire pauses 156
Fire preparation 149
Fire support during an assault 380
Fire while in motion 93
Flank attack 357
Flanking fire 354
Formations suitable under fire 121
Under artillery fire 321, 322, 323, 324
Frontage 231, 232
And distribution in depth 237
In Russo-Japanese War 239
Of battalions at Mukden 211
Overextension of 238
Frontal counter attacks 437, 438
Gaps in the line 239
Improvised units, use of 197
Influence of various rifles on density of battle formations 24
Length of rushes and expenditure of ammunition 89-90
Lessons of the Boer War, in re attack 340
Russo-Japanese War, in re attack 340
Local reconnaissance 250, 253
Long range fire 149, 150, 151, 152, 153
In defense 155
Losses 36, 50, 51, 153, 332
Percentage of 188, 189, 227
Produced by infantry and artillery fire 167
Long range fire 176
Relative, officers to men 189, 190
Under artillery fire 324
Machine guns, employment of 260, 275, 283, 289, 290
Masks, effect of 120
Mistakes caused by trumpet signals 42
Mixing of organizations 195, 226
Moral effect of a cavalry charge 306
Fire 426
Gen. Bennal’s impressions at Wörth 191
On charging cavalry 309
Number of troops required for attack and defense 234
Passage through timber 333
Ranges, underestimation of 142
Removal of packs 364
Rencontre 339
Reserves, employment of 340, 395, 396, 397
Rushes, employment of 93, 94, 95
Length of 89, 90
Sand bags, use of, in attack 344, 390
Study of 7-8
Surprise 208, 250, 252, 331, 340
Surrender of British troops in Boer War 192
Telephone communication at Mukden 247
Temperature, effect of 145
Trumpet signals, mistakes caused by 42
United attack, necessity of 402
Use of spade in attack 387, 388
Value of 8, 9, 10
Void of the battlefield 194
Volleys, use of 164
Woods, passage through 333
Wounds
Produced by cutting weapons 384
Character of 128, 129
MINOR TACTICS 12
MISSES, effect of; Wolozkoi’s theory 173
MITRAILLEUSE 259
MIXING OF ORGANIZATIONS 195, 226
How prevented 96, 97
MORAL EFFECT
Cavalry charge 306
Counter-attack 436
Fire 191, 227
On charging cavalry 309
MORAL FACTORS and discipline 107, 108
MOUNTAIN TROOPS 23
MOUNTAIN WARFARE 23
MOUNTED INFANTRY 25, 26, 27
MOUNTED MESSENGERS, use on battlefield 246
MUSICIANS
Duties in skirmish line 79
Posts in skirmish line 79
N.
NEEDLE GUN, compared with rifle, model 98, as regards flatness of
trajectory 153
NETHERLANDS, column of fours 58
NIGHT ATTACKS, distribution in depth 233
NIGHT OPERATIONS, close order formations, importance of 104
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, posts of, in various armies 47
NORMAL ATTACK 203
v. Boguslawski’s views 204
Clausewitz’s views 204
v. Scherff’s views 205
NORMAL FORMATIONS, necessity for, in some countries 201
O.
OBSERVATION OF THE FOREGROUND 420
Compared with deliberately planned attack 334, 338
OBSERVATION STATIONS 421
OBSTACLES 422
OBUS ALLONGÉ 115
OFFENSIVE
Assumption of the 428
In defense 409
Spirit of the 109, 110
OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE 408
OFFENSIVE RETURN (France) 439, 458
OFFICERS
Demeanor, influence of 84
Losses among 50, 51
Franco-German War (by arm) 20
Relative to men 189, 190
OPEN COLUMN, depth of 47
ORDER IN LINE, machine gun batteries 273, 274
ORDERS 41
Combat 243, 244
Contents of 41
Issue of 41
In a rencontre 336
ORGANIZATION 34
Battalion 36, 37
Brigade 37, 38
Company 34, 35
In various armies (table) 35
Machine guns,
Austria 288
England 290
France 290
Germany 270
Japan 290
Russia 290
Switzerland 284
Mounted infantry (England) 26
Regiment 37
ORGANIZATIONS
Mixing of 195, 226
How prevented 96, 97
Use of improvised 197
P.
PACE
Diminution of length of, on various slopes 141
Length of, and marching 53
In various armies (table) 54
PACES, number of, per minute 54
PACKS, removal of 363, 364
PANIC 27, 107, 441
PASSIVE DEFENSE 408, 409
PATROLS 27
Combat 80
PEACE, eternal 1
PENETRATION, “S” bullet 131
PLATOON
Column of twos, vulnerability of 187
Commander, post in close order 63
Skirmish line 79
French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66
Infantry, strength of the German 273
One-rank, vulnerability of the 187
PLATOONS
Column of (with plate) 61, 62
How formed 49
Machine gun battery 273, 274
Division of the company into 46
Three or four platoons 48
POSITION
Advance into a preparatory 350
Advanced 413
Battalion groups of intrenchments 417
Communicating trenches 421
Cover trenches 421
Determining factors in selecting a 414
Dummy intrenchments 421
Foreground, clearing the 421
Division into sections 411
Observation of the 420
Fortifying the 415
Framework of the 414
Gaps in the defensive 411
Intrenchments 418-422
Masks 421
Obstacles, construction of 421
Occupation of the 426
Rallying 442
Requisites of a defensive 410
Russian views in re defensive 422
Sections, divisions into 411
Temporary occupation 408
POSTS
Battalion commander in action 400
Commander in a rencontre 338
Company commander in action 400
Musicians in skirmish line 79, 80
Non-commissioned officers in close order 47
Platoon commanders in close order 63
Skirmish line 79
Range finders in close order 46, 47
Skirmish line 79, 80
Squad leaders in close order 46, 47
Skirmish line 79
Regimental commander in action 400
PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT 352
PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 346
By artillery, provisions of various regulations 354
PREPARATORY POSITION 350
PROGRESSIVE FIRE
Artillery 320
Machine guns 263
PURE FRONTAL ATTACK 357
France 455
PURSUIT 385
Japan 465
Q.
QUICK TIME, in various armies (table) 54
R.
RAFALE 158, 164
RALLYING POSITION 442
England 460
Occupation of the 443
RANGE
Altitude, effect of, on the 145
Ascertaining the 140
Pacing and galloping 141
Provisions of various regulations 143
Ascertaining the 140
Range finding instruments 146
Trial volleys 145
Error of estimation 141
Formulae for determining favorable range for firing against hill
positions 183
Influence of error in estimating the 170
Knowledge of the 140
Meteorological conditions, effect of 145
Range finding instruments, permissible error 146
Trial volleys 145
RANGE FINDERS
Classification 143
Duties in machine gun detachments 283
Post in close order 46, 47
Skirmish line 79, 80
RANGE FINDING INSTRUMENTS
Errors permissible 146
Principle of construction 146
RANGING--see Range
RANKS, influence of rate of fire upon the number of 46
RATIONS, weight of 40
REAR GUARD ACTION, frontage of a company in 236
RECONNAISSANCE
Companies 251
Detachments of all arms 251
In attack 346
In force 251, 347
Local, in attack 347
Object of 250
Of the infantry 248
Patrols and scouting detachments 27
REGIMENT 37
Cavalry, strength of German 273
Combat frontage 236
Formation for attack 214
Formations 73, 74
Importance 37
Organization 37
REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
Duties in action 400
Post in action 400
REGULATIONS--see Drill Regulations
REMOVAL OF PACKS 363, 364
RENCONTRE 333
Advance guard, conduct of the 334
Austria 448
Commander, position of 338
Conduct of main body 336
Examples of 339
Japan 464
Machine guns, examples of, in a 295, 338
Main body, launching of the 338
Orders, issue of 336
Provisions of various regulations 339
Use of echelon formation in 74
Switzerland 466
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, influence of, on war 3
RESERVE
Employment of, in attack 394
Examples of employment of 340, 395, 396, 397
General, distance from defensive line 430
Interval from flank of defensive line 430
Position in defense 429
Strength of, in defense 431
In retreat 442
Launching or withholding the 396
Section 411
Size of, in various units 235
Strength of the (in attack and defense) 395
RETREAT
Direction of 440, 442
Rallying position 442
Reserve 442
RICOCHETS, effect of 185
RIFLE--see Rifles
RIFLEMEN 22
RIFLE-RESTS, influence of 178
RIFLES
Automatic 126
Influence of various, on density of battle formations (table) 240
Used in Russo-Japanese War 127
Weight of, in various armies (table) 40
ROAD SPACE--see Depth
ROUTE COLUMN (with plate) 57
Battalion in 72
Machine gun battery 273, 274
RUSHES
Advance by 82
Austria 449
England 462
Examples of the employment of 93, 94, 95
Gait to be employed in 82, 86
How made in various armies 90, 91
Italy 452
Japan 91, 463
Length of 83
Lessons of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars 88, 89, 90
Long or short 85, 86
Preparation for 83
Provisions of various regulations 90-91
Russia 91
Short or long 85, 86
Strength of the rushing unit 83
Time required for 83
RUSSIA
Advanced positions 413
Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476
Ammunition supply 475
Regulations in re 480
Assault 381
Battalion, formations of the 69, 73
Column of platoons (plate) 62
Company, strength of (table) 35
Defensive position, views on 422
Fire, kinds of 160
Frontage 242
Front and facing distance 48
Infantry
Combat 466
Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340
Versus cavalry 315
Intrenching tool equipment of Russian companies 38
Load carried by soldier 40
Machine guns 290
Pace, length and number per minute 54
Ranges, ascertaining 143
Rushes 91
Sandbag cover, results of experiments 390
Skirmish line, formation of 80
Supply of ammunition 475, 480
Use of general reserve 397
Spade in attack 392
S.
“S” BULLET
Effect on corpses 130
Materials 131
Steel shields 324
SAND BAGS 344, 390
Results of Russian experiments 390
SCHWARZLOSE MACHINE GUN 260
SCOUTING DETACHMENTS 27, 28, 414
Use of, in reconnaissance 252
SEARCHING FIRE
Artillery 321
Machine guns 263
SECONDARY ATTACK 357
SECTIONS
Assignment of combat 243
Defensive position, division into combat 411
Division of the platoon into 46
SECTION COLUMN, machine gun battery 273, 274
SHARPSHOOTER PLATOONS 21
SHELL
Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117
Percussion (Model 96) 115
Time (Model 96) 116
(Model 98) 118
SHIELDS
Protection afforded by 324
SHRAPNEL
Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117
Effect (tables) 114, 122
On animate targets 125
Incendiary effect 112
Percussion 111, 112
Time 112
SIGNAL LAMPS, use of, on battlefield 246
SIGNALS 41
Advance 41
Assemble 41
Attention 41
Charge 41
Deploy 41
Employment of, by combat patrols 80
Fix bayonet 41, 377
Halt 41
Misunderstanding of 42
Trumpet 41
SITUATION, estimate of the 11
SKI DETACHMENTS 30, 31, 32
SKI RUNNERS 30, 31, 32
SKIRMISH LINES
Boer advance in thin 75
Cover, use of 256
Efficacy of fire against thin and dense (table) 77
Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265
Formation of 78
In various armies 80
Gaits of 81
Japanese advance in thin 76, 77
Losses 81
Movements in 81, 82
Thin and dense 76, 77
Vulnerability of 186, 187
SNOW SHOE MARCHING 30, 31
SPADE
Use of, in attack 387, 388, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466
Small, weight of 40
SPLINTER PROOFS 418, 420
SQUAD LEADERS
Posts in close order 46, 47
Skirmish line 79
SQUADS
Column of, compared with column of fours 59
(Plate) 57
Division of the company into 46
Machine gun, composition and duties of members of (Germany) 283
STAFFS, division of work in 245
STRATEGY
Definitions of 4, 5, 6
Relation of tactics to 6, 7
SUPERIORITY OF FIRE 370, 371, 427
SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION
Austria 475, 479
Deductions from various regulations 483
England 475, 482
France 475, 480
Germany 475, 476
Italy 475, 483
Japan 475
Russia 475, 480
Various armies (table) 475
SUPPORTS 98, 99
Advance of 100
In attack 368
Advantages of 102
Arguments against 101, 102
Commander, duties of 100
Conduct, French regulations 455
Defense 410
Deployment in attack 369
Distance from firing line 98, 99
Duties 98
Formations 100
Movements 100
Necessity 98
Purpose 98
SURPRISE 330
Examples of 331
SURRENDER, British troops in Boer War 192
SWEDEN, column of fours 58
SWEEPING FIRE
Artillery 321
Machine guns 263
T.
TACTICAL FORMATIONS, Importance of 108
TACTICAL MISSIONS, compared with united action 401
TACTICAL UNIT 32, 33, 34
TACTICS
Applied 12, 13
Changes in 13, 14
Definitions of 4, 5, 6
Formal 12
Grand 12
Japanese infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341
Minor 12
Relation of strategy to 6-7
Russian infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340
TARGET, selection of a 147
TASKS
Assignment of 218
Dangers of assigning 405
TELEGRAPH, FIELD, use of, on battlefield 246
TELEPHONE, FIELD, use of, in infantry combat 246
TEMPORARY OCCUPATION of a position 408
TERRAIN, importance of 254
TIMBER, advance through 332
TRAINING and drill 105, 106
Influence of, on efficacy of fire 168
TRAVERSES 417
TRENCHES 416-420
Dimensions 418
TROOP LEADING
Duties of higher 366
Minor 365
TROOP UNIT 34
TRUMPET SIGNALS 41
TWOS, column of 56
U.
UNIFORM, color of, influence on visibility 119
UNITED ACTION
Compared with tactical missions 401
Dangers of 405
UNITED STATES, three-unit organization 38, 218
UNIVERSAL SERVICE, influence of, on war 4
USE OF SPADE IN ATTACK 387
Austria 449
France 457
Japan 465
Provisions of various regulations 392
Switzerland 466
V.
VOID OF THE BATTLEFIELD 194
VOLLEY
Value of the 157, 163
Trial 145
VULNERABILITY of various formations 186, 187
W.
WAR 2, 3, 4
Importance and necessity of 2
Influence of representative government in reducing number of
wars 3
Influence of universal service on 4
Lessons of, in re attack 340
Rushes 88, 89
Purpose of 4
_Ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2, 3
WEAPONS, changes and improvements in 13
WIGWAG FLAGS, use of, in infantry action 246
WIRE CUTTERS 39
WITHDRAWAL 441
Conduct of a 441
WOLOZKOI’S THEORY of the constant cone of misses 173
WOODS, advance through 332
WOUNDS
Produced by cutting weapons, (%) 384
Infantry and artillery fire, comparison 167
Jacketed bullets 129
Shrapnel bullets 125
Small arms in Russo-Japanese War, character of 127, 128
Z.
ZONE FIRE, artillery 320
INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY.
A.
=~Aiaslar~=, August 25, 1877. PAGE
Ammunition, expenditure of 472
=~Albuera~=, 1811.
Losses 227
=~Amiens~=, November 27, 1870.
Frontage 237
=~Austerlitz.~=
Attacking column, formation 44
=~Azay~=, January 6, 1871.
Masks, effect of 112
B.
=~Baalon~=, September 17, 1870.
Surprise 331
=~Beaumont~=, August 30, 1870.
Advance guard, deployment of 231, 232
Artillery, losses of the 327
Cavalry charge 309
Deployment of an advance guard 231, 232
Distribution in depth 231, 232
Flank attack 357
Frontage 231, 232
Frontal counter-attack 437
Ineffective rapid fire at short ranges 162
Line of platoons in columns of twos 121
Losses, artillery under infantry fire 327
Rencontre 339
Surprise 331
Woods, passage through 333
=~Beaune la Bolande~=, November 28, 1870.
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 470
Shortage of 469
Short range fire 153
Withholding the fire 152
=~Belmont~=, November 22, 1899.
Night march 351
=~Boer War~=--see South African War (1899-1902).
=~Busaco.~=
Frontal counter-attack 437
=~Buzanval~=, January 19, 1871.
Ammunition, expenditure of 470
C.
=~Casablanca~=, 1907.
Effect of infantry fire on charging cavalry 308
=~Chagey~=, January 11, 1871.
Short range fire 153
=~Champigny~=, November 30, 1870.
Ammunition, expenditure and supply 471
Influence of the ground on efficacy of fire 183
Jägers, employment of 23
=~Chevilly~=, November 30, 1870.
Fire while in motion 93
=~Chlum~= (Königgrätz), 1866.
Flank attack 357
=~Colenso~=, December 15, 1899.
Artillery under infantry fire 326
Boer position, location of 410
Density of battle line 240
Insufficient reconnaissance 340
Losses 189
Officers 190
Moral effect of fire 152, 426
Pure frontal attack 340
Reconnaissance, lack of local 249
Reserves, use of 340
Surprise 340
Withholding the fire, moral effect 152
=~Colombey~=, August 14, 1870.
Attack on Aubigny 405
On the “Tannenwäldchen” 403
Frontage 237
Losses 195
Mixing of organizations 195
Moral effect of fire 199
=~Coulmiers~=, November 9, 1870.
Ammunition supply 484
Reserve, employment of the 395
=~Coulomiers~=, December 15, 1870.
Withholding the fire 152
=~Custozza~=, 1866.
Battle lines, density of 240
Cavalry charge 302
Moral effect of a 200
Reserves, employment of 396
D.
=~Daix~=, November 26, 1870.
Ammunition, supply of 484
=~Datshishiao~=, July 24, 1904.
Bayonet fight 382
=~Diamond Hill~=, 1900.
Frontage 238
=~Doornkop~=, May 29, 1900.
Opening fire 150
E.
=~Etoges~=, 1814.
Infantry versus cavalry 313
F.
=~Franco-German War~= (1870-71).
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 468
Close order formations, impossibility of employing, in first
line 102
Fire, efficacy of 176
Frontages 237
Losses among officers, percentage of (by arm) 20
Officers, number of, per 1000 men 51
Proportion of the various arms 19
=~Fuchau~=, 1905.
Local reconnaissance 250
G.
=~Garcia Hernandez~=, 1812.
Cavalry charge 309
=~Gitschin~=, 1866.
Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42
=~Gorni Bugarov~=, January 1, 1878.
Frontal counter-attack 438
Short range fire 153
=~Gorni Dubniac~=, October 24, 1877.
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473
Assault, inability to 409
Fire, ineffectiveness of uphill 183
Intrenching in attack 389
Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 223
Perseverance under fire 387
Reserves, deployment of 369
Rushes, advance by 95
Signal for attack, failure of 361
Strength, relative, of opposing forces 234
=~Gravelotte~= (St. Privat).
Advance to the battlefield 67
Ammunition, expenditure 471
Artillery under infantry fire 326
Assault 376
Assaulting distance 385
Attack made by the III. Army Corps 398
Battle lines, density of 240
Close order formations under fire 103
Columns of twos, line of 121
Companies, consolidation of 36
Concentration for action 210
Density of battle lines 240
Enfilade fire 254
Envelopment 361
Fire,
Artillery under infantry 326
Close order formation under 103
Columns of twos, line of, under 121
Enfilade 254
Long range 152
Pause 156
Perseverance under 108, 387
Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183
Flanking fire 254
Infantry fire, artillery under 326
Intrenchments, construction of 388
Losses, aggregate and detail 188
At various ranges 176
Franz regiment 195
Officers 33, 51, 190
Lull in the fight at Point du Jour 156
March formations 67
Mitrailleuses, employment of 260
Mixing of organizations 196
Officers, losses among 33, 51, 190
Organizations, mixing of 196
Ranges, underestimation of 142
Reconnaissance, relaxing in the 347
Reserves 398
Stragglers 196
Uphill fire against trenches, ineffectiveness of 183
H.
=~Haicheng~=, 1904.
Advanced positions, several lines of 412
=~Hallue~=, December 23, 1870.
Envelopment 6
Attempted, by first line 360
Frontage 232
=~l’Hay~=, September 30, 1870.
Fire while in motion 93
=~Helmstedt~=, July 25, 1866.
Change of front 220
=~Hühnerwasser~=, 1866.
Ammunition found on the battlefield 469
K.
=~Karahassankioi~=, August 23, 1877.
Ammunition, expenditure of 472
=~Katzbach~=, August 26, 1813.
Attack in line 108
=~Kazeljevo.~=
Frontal counter-attack 438
=~Kesselsdorf~=, 1745.
Frontal counter-attack 437
Losses 189
=~Kinchau~=, November 26, 1904.
Ammunition, expenditure of 474
Assaulting distance 385
=~Kolin~=, 1757.
Losses 189
=~Königgrätz~=, July 3, 1866.
Adjustment of fire facilitated by a poplar 120
Advance to the battlefield 205
Battle lines, density of 240
Cavalry charge, moral effect of a 306
Flank attack 357, 359
Jägers, employment of 23
Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42
L.
=~Ladon~=, November 26, 1870.
Envelopment 361
=~Ladonchamps~= (near Metz).
Artillery fire, ineffectiveness of 120
=~Ladysmith~=, 1900.
Supports 98
=~Le Bourget~=, October 30, 1870.
Assaulting distance 385
Columns of twos, line of 121
Rushes 93, 94
=~Le Mans.~=
Battalions, strength of 36
Gatling guns 260
Officers, number present for duty 50
=~Liao Yang~=, 1904.
Ammunition, expenditure of 473, 474
Battle lines, density of 239
Fire 155
Frontage 239
Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 392
Machine guns 291
Strength of opposing forces 341
Surprise 208, 250
=~Linshinpu~=, 1904.
Ammunition, expenditure of 473
=~Lisaine.~=
Frontage 228
=~Loigny~=, December 2, 1870.
Advance to the battlefield 67
Counter-attack 433, 435, 436
Intrenching tools, lack of 388
Wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade 220
=~Lovtcha~=, September 1, 1877.
Ammunition, expenditure of 472
Mixing of organizations 197
Registration mark for artillery fire 120
Rushes 95
Strength of opposing forces 234
M.
=~Magersfontain~=, December 11, 1899.
Boer position, location of 410
Convalescence of wounded 129
Dummy trenches 421
Fire surprise 133
Frontage 227, 238
Lack of reinforcements 227
Losses 189
Officers 190
Perseverance under fire 137, 387
Pure frontal attack 340
Reconnaissance, lack of local 249
Reinforcements, lack of 227
Reserves, employment of 340
Withholding the fire, moral effect of 152
=~Maida.~=
Frontal counter-attack 437
=~Marengo~=, 1800.
Attacking column, formation of 45
=~Mars-la-Tour~=--see Vionville.
=~Minden~=, 1757.
Infantry versus cavalry 313
=~Modder River~=, November 28, 1899.
Boer position, location of 410
Fire fight 132, 371
Moral effect of fire 426
Opening fire at long range 150
Perseverance under fire 132
Pure frontal attack 340
Reconnaissance, lack of 252, 340
Surprise 252, 340
=~Montoy~= (Noisseville).
Surprise 332
=~Mont Valérien~=, January 19, 1871.
Ammunition, shortage of 469
=~Mukden~=, 1905.
Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77
Assault with cold steel 134
Attack, mode of Japanese 343, 344
Battle lines, density of 239, 240
Bayonet fights 382
Construction of cover in attack 344
Frontage 239
Gaps in the attacking line 239
Machine guns 292
Perseverance under fire 348
Reserves 395, 396
Sand bags, use of, in attack 344
Skirmish lines, thin 76, 77
Strength of opposing forces 341
Telephone communication 247
N.
=~Nachod~=, 1866.
Bayonet attack 153
Concentration 209
Frontage 231
Losses 153
Mixing of organizations 196
Rencontre 339
=~Nicholson’s Neck~=, October 24, 1899.
Crawling 87, 88
Volleys, ineffectiveness of 157
=~Noisseville.~=
Bayonet fight 382
Counter-attack 429, 433
Flank attack 358
Intrenching tools, lack of 388
Losses 332
Reconnaissance 253
Surprise 331
=~Nuits~=, December 18, 1870.
Abridged attack 330
O.
=~Oerrshikiatsy~= (Shaho), 1904.
Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388
=~Orleans~=, December 3, 1870.
Counter-attack 436
Strength of German battalions 36
P.
=~Paardeberg~=, February 18, 1900.
Advance without firing 149
Convalescence of wounded 129
Crawling 87
Distribution in depth, lack of 238
Frontage 76, 227
Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388
Opening fire at long range 150
Reinforcements, lack of 227
Skirmish lines, thin 76
=~Pieters Hill~=, February 27, 1900.
Fire support 380
Frontage 238
Machine guns 289, 298
=~Plevna~=, 1877.
Ammunition, expenditure of 472
Attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223
Bayonet fights 382
Combat impressions 191
Fire, opening 152
Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183
While in motion 93
Improvised units 197, 198
Intrenching tools, use of 388
Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223
Knapsacks, loss of 364
Losses among officers 190
At various ranges 152, 177
Mixing of organizations 197
Officers, losses among 190
Opening fire at long range 152
Ranges, underestimation of 142
Reserves, deployment of 369
Employment of 395
Rushes 95
Strength of opposing forces 234
Underestimation of ranges 142
Volleys 158
=~Podol~=, June 26, 1866.
Jägers 23
=~Poplar Grove~=, March 7, 1900.
Advance in attack formation 206
Attack formation of a brigade 207
Frontage 238
R.
=~Russo-Japanese War.~=
Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473
Formations under artillery fire 321, 322
Frontage 238
Infantry attack 137, 340
Local reconnaissance 250
Machine guns 290
Rushes 89
Strength of opposing forces 341
Wounds, character of 128
=~Russo-Turkish War~=, 1877-78.
Ammunition, expenditure of 472
Attacks 222, 223
Frontal counter-attacks 438
Losses 176
S.
=~St. Privat~=--see Gravelotte.
=~St. Quentin~=, January 19, 1871.
Attack on Grugies, isolated 403
Bayonet attack 103
=~Sandepu~=, 1904.
Losses among officers 190
=~Sapignies.~=
Cavalry charge 302
=~Scheinovo~=, January 9, 1878.
Ammunition, expenditure of 94, 95, 473
Cavalry charge 303
Losses 94, 95
Rushes 94, 95
Simultaneous attack 361
=~Sedan.~=
Ammunition, expenditure of 469
Cavalry charge 308, 310, 311
Losses among officers 51
Mixing of organizations 197
Packs, removal of 469
=~Shaho~=, 1904.
Advanced positions 348
Artillery, capture of 326
Attack formation of a brigade 343
Battle lines, density of 239
Frontage 239
Infantry attack 343
Intrenching tools, use of 388
Machine guns 292
Reserves 396
=~Shiliho~=, 1905.
Attack 344
Rushes 90
=~Shipka Pass~=, 1877.
Short range fire 153
=~Skalitz~=, 1812.
Jägers 23
Mixing of organizations 196
=~Slivnica~=, November 17 and 19, 1885.
Losses at long ranges 177
=~Solferino~=, 1859.
Bayonet fight 382
Battle lines, density of 240
=~Soor~=, 1745.
Losses 189
Frontal counter-attack 437
=~Soor~=, 1866.
Jägers 23
=~South African War~= (1899-1902).
Assaults 379
Crawling 87, 88
Front, overextension of 238
Lessons gained from the 88, 340
Machine guns 289
Mounted infantry 25
Rushes 88
Skirmish lines, thin 75
Surrenders 192
Wounds, character of 129
=~Spicheren.~=
Advance in assembly formation 210
Ammunition, expenditure of 469
Attack, orders for 349
Change of front 220
Concentration 210
Counter-attack 436
Envelopment 357, 358, 360
Formation in echelon and in line 74, 226
Front, change of 220
Frontage 226
Knapsacks, loss of 364
Losses 195
Mixing of organizations 196, 226
Orders for attack 349
Stragglers 195
=~Spionskop~=, 1900.
Crawling 88
Losses at short ranges, insignificant 178, 189
Reserves 340
T.
=~Tagliamento~=, 1797.
Attack formations 45
=~Tashkessen~=, January 1, 1878.
Ammunition, expenditure of 473
Frontal counter-attack 438
=~Tel el Kebir~=, 1882.
Night attack 233
=~Terrayama~= (Temple Hill), October 11, 1904.
Attack 343
Bayonet fight 382
Intrenching tools, use of 388
=~Tobitschau~=, 1866.
Cavalry charge 313
=~Towan~=, 1904.
Perseverance under fire 348
=~Trautenau~=, 1866.
Bayonet attack 153
Jägers 23
Packs, removal of 364
Rencontre 339
Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42
=~Tsinortun~=, August 26, 1904.
Counter-attack 435
=~Tugela~= (Pieters Hill), 1900.
Rushes 95
=~Tuminling Pass~=, 1904.
Losses, officers 190
V.
=~Vauxchamps~=, February 14, 1814.
Infantry versus cavalry 313
=~Villepion~=, December 1, 1870.
Holding wavering troops 382
Intrenching tools, use of 388
=~Villermain-Cravant~=, 1870.
Flank march along hostile front 360
=~Villiers~=, October 30, 1870.
Influence of the ground on the efficacy of fire 183
=~Vimiero.~=
Frontal counter-attack 437
=~Vionville.~=
Abridged attack 330
Advance in broad formations 67
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 469, 470
Artillery fire diverted by infantry 327
Cavalry charge 302, 304, 311, 313
Moral effect of 302
Preparation by artillery fire 313
Close order formations, losses in 102, 103
Concentration 209
Cover, use of 257
Direction of retreat 440
Flanking fire 254
Losses in close order formations 102, 103
Officers 190
Masks 120
Moral effect of a cavalry charge 302, 303
Packs, removal of 364
Rencontre 339
Reserves, employment of 397
Retreat 440
Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42
United attack, necessity of a 403
Volley fire, ineffectiveness of 164
=~Vouziers~=, December 15, 1870.
Surprise 331
W.
=~Wafangu~=, June 15, 1904.
Attack 341
Communication 247
Distribution in depth, excessive 223
Envelopment 341, 359
=~Wagram~=, 1809.
Attacking column, formation of 44, 45
=~Waterberg~=, 1904.
Assaulting guidons 355
Machine guns, employment of 283
=~Waterloo~=, 1815.
Attacking column, formation of 44, 45
Battle lines, density of 240
Concentration 209
Frontal counter-attack 437
=~Weiszenburg~=, August 2, 1870.
Losses among officers 51, 190
Masks 120
=~Wörth~=, August 6, 1870.
Assault 376
Assaulting distance 385
Attack, orders to 349
Battle lines, density of 240
Cavalry charge 310, 311
Change of front 220
Colors 69
Concentration 209
Counter-attack 433
Distance, elimination of, during advance 72
Distribution in depth 224
Fire while in motion 93
Interference by the commander-in-chief 248
Losses 227
Officers 51
Relative, officers and men 190
Mixing of organizations 196
Moral effect of fire 191
Officers, losses among 51
Orders to attack 349
Packs, removal of 364
Panic 440
Passage through woods 333
Reserve, employment of the 395
Stragglers 196
Supports 224
Uphill fire 183
Woods, passage through 254
Y.
=~Yalu~=, 1904.
Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473
Attack 341
Bayonet fight 382
Losses, officers 190
Machine guns 291
=~Yangtsuling~=, 1904.
Attack 343
=~Yoshirei~=, July 31, 1904.
Formations under artillery fire 321, 323
=~Yuhuntun~=, 1905.
Perseverance under fire 348
=~Yuputz~=, March 1, 1905.
Sand bags, use of 390
=~Yushuling~=, 1904.
Intrenching tools, use of 388
Z.
=~Zella.~=
Counter-attack 433
Transcriber’s Notes
Depending on the hard- and software used to read this text, not all
elements may display as intended.
The language used in this text is that of the printed book, including
the use of inconsistent, erroneous, unusual or archaic spelling,
hyphenation, capitalisation, punctuation, etc., except as indicated
under Changes below. This applies to proper and geographical names
and non-English words and phrases as well; accents and diacriticals
have not been added or corrected unless mentioned below.
The use of physical units has not been corrected; for example, the
author regularly uses m for speed, kgm for energy, etc.
In addition to the abbreviations given on page xxi, the book
regularly uses differently abbreviated or shortened titles (sometimes
single words) or translations of references; this has not been
standardised.
Page ix, Table of Contents: the differences between the Table of
Contents and the headings in the text have not been rectified. Apart
from (minor) differences in wording, not all headings in the text
occur in the Table of Contents, and not all entries in the Table of
Contents occur as headings in the text. Any auto-generated Table of
Contents may therefore differ from the one on page ix ff.
Page 71, “in double column of twice the width of front”: the source
document was unclear at this point, the text might also have read “in
double column or twice the width of front”.
Page 183, 187: (Général) Le Joindre is the author of the publication,
but his name is presented here as part of the title.
Page 195, troop diagram: due to width restrictions, the diagram had
to be split into two rows (as it was in the printed book).
Page 475: The table appears to contain totals that do not agree with
the data provided. Since it is not clear where the error was made,
these calculations have been left as they were: row Germany, last
column; row Austria, last column but one; row France, last column.
The table contains footnote markers, but there are no corresponding
footnotes on this or the following pages. In an earlier edition of
the book, the footnotes (using the numbering from the table in this
text) were as follows:
[513] The strength of a company is assumed as 200 men (England
excepted).
[514] 10 Cartridges packed in a box.
[515] New “D” ammunition.
[516] During the Russo-Japanese war.
Changes made
Some minor obvious typographical and punctuation errors have been
corrected silently; some tables have been split or re-arranged for
better readability.
Footnotes and illustrations have been moved outside text paragraphs.
Spaced and non-spaced and italicised or regular “i.e.”
and “Ibid./ibid.” have been standardised to “_i.e._” and
“_Ibid._”/“_ibid._” “Minarelli Fitzgerald” has been standardised to
“Minarelli-Fitzgerald”.
Page 8: “sans le comprendre” and “sans le faire” changed to “sans la
comprendre” and “sans la faire”.
Various pages: “Wald und Ortsgefecht” and “Gruppen und
Einheitsangriff” have been changed to “Wald- und Ortsgefecht“ and
“Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff”.
Page 11, footnote [18]: opening quote marks inserted before When one
attempts ....
Page 93: closing quote marks inserted after ... (300-400 paces).
Page 143, footnote [139]: closing quote mark deleted at end of
footnote.
Page 162: “_... seit dem Jahre_, 1900,” changed to “_ ... seit dem
Jahre 1900_,”
Page 180: B′, C′ and D′ in the text have been changed to B, C and D
cf. the illustration. Footnote [170]: angles have been transcribed α,
β and γ for consistency with the illustration and the text.
Page 195: Negrier changed to Négrier; footnote anchor [191] inserted.
Page 229: closing quote mark inserted after ... the size of this
echelon.
Page 253: “Patrouillen und Radfahrkommandos” changed to “Patrouillen-
und Radfahr-Kommandos”.
Page 257: “and that cover to be utilized only” changed to “and that
cover be utilized only”.
Page 265, table: the column header “Machine gun” has been considered
to be a heading a single column only.
Page 304, footnote [306]: closing quote mark inserted after ... of
units in rear.
Page 324: “Csicseries v. Bacsany” changed to “Csicserics v. Bacsany”;
“Feldgeschüts” changed to “Feldgeschütz”.
Page 354: closing quote mark inserted after ... the advance of the
attacker’s infantry.
Page 355: “veritable bouclier” changed to “véritable bouclier”.
Page 395: “Helwig” changed to “Helvig”.
Page 399: footnote [430]: “_pp._ 484 and 558” changed to “pp. 484 and
558”; footnote [431]: “Les Expéditions de Tonkins” changed to “Les
Expéditions de Tonkin”.
Page 429: closing quote mark inserted after ... or for making a
counter-attack.
Page 458, footnote [491]: “détachments de couverture” changed to
“détachements de couverture”.
Indexes: some entries moved to their proper alphabetical order.
Page 513: page number 363 changed to 263 (entry Machine guns, Kinds
of fire, Switzerland).
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