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Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) - The East-Central Front
Author: Hicks, Norman W., Kuokka, Hubbard D., Montross, Lynn
Language: English
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1950-1953 VOLUME IV (OF 5) ***
[Illustration]
[Illustration: CCF 5th PHASE OFFENSIVE
1st STEP 22 APRIL
2d STEP 16 MAY
]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME IV
_The East-Central Front_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
MAJOR HUBARD D. KUOKKA, USMC
and
MAJOR NORMAN W. HICKS, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1962
Preceding Volumes of
_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation”
Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign”
Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.--Price $2.25 (cloth)
Foreword
Americans everywhere will remember the inspiring conduct of Marines
during Korean operations in 1950. As the fire brigade of the Pusan
Perimeter, the assault troops at Inchon, and the heroic fighters of the
Chosin Reservoir campaign, they established a record in keeping with
the highest traditions of their Corps. No less praiseworthy were the
Marine actions during the protracted land battles of 1951, the second
year of the Korean “police action.”
The 1st Marine Division, supported wherever possible by the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing, helped stem the flood of the Chinese offensive in
April. Then lashing back in vigorous and successful counterattack, the
Marines fought around the Hwachon Reservoir to the mighty fastness of
the Punchbowl. The Punchbowl became familiar terrain to Marines during
the summer of 1951, and the Division suffered its heaviest casualties
of the year fighting in the vicinity of that aptly named circular
depression.
The fighting waxed hot, then cold, as the truce teams negotiated. They
reached no satisfactory agreement, and the fighting again intensified.
Finally, after a year of active campaigning on Korea’s east-central
front, the Marines moved west to occupy positions defending the
approaches to the Korean capital, Seoul.
The year of desperate fighting, uneasy truce, and renewed combat
covered by this volume saw the operational employment of a
Marine-developed technique--assault by helicopter-borne troops. Tactics
were continually being refined to meet the ever changing battle
situation. However, throughout the period, the one constant factor
on which United Nations commanders could rely was the spirit and
professional attitude of Marines, both regular and reserve. This is
their hallmark as fighting men.
[Illustration: (signature)]
DAVID M. SHOUP
_General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Commandant of the Marine Corps._
Reviewed and Approved 20 Nov 1961.
Preface
This is the fourth in a series of five volumes dealing with the
operations of United States Marines in Korea during the period 2 August
1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume IV presents in detail the operations of
the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the former while
operating under Eighth Army control and also as part of IX Corps and X
Corps, USA, and the latter while controlled by the Fifth Air Force.
The period covered in this volume begins in the latter part of December
1950, when the Division rested in the Masan “bean patch,” and continues
through the guerrilla hunt, the Punchbowl fighting, and all other
operations during 1951. The account ends when the Marines move to
positions in the west during March 1952.
Marines did not fight this war alone; they were a part of the huge
Eighth United States Army in Korea. But since this is primarily a
Marine history, the actions of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are
presented only sufficiently to place Marine operations in their proper
perspective.
Many participants in the fighting during this period have generously
contributed to the book by granting interviews, answering inquiries,
and commenting on first draft manuscripts. Their assistance was
invaluable. Although it was not possible to use all the plethora of
detailed comments and information received, the material will go into
Marine Corps archives for possible use and benefit of future historians.
The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of
Colonel Charles W. Harrison, Major Gerald Fink, and Colonel William
M. Miller as successive Heads of the Historical Branch. Production
was accomplished under the direction of Colonel Thomas G. Roe. Major
William T. Hickman wrote some of the preliminary drafts and did much
valuable research and map sketching. Dr. K. Jack Bauer and Mrs.
Elizabeth Tierney assisted the authors in research, and Mr. Truman R.
Strobridge assisted in proofreading and preparing the index.
To the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, as well as Marine officers
and NCOs, who submitted valuable comments and criticisms of preliminary
drafts, thanks are also extended. These suggestions added to the
accuracy and details of the text. Additional assistance was rendered by
personnel of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army; the Division of Naval History, Department of the Navy; and
the Historical Division, Department of the Air Force.
The exacting administrative duties involved in processing the volume
from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form were ably
managed by Miss Kay P. Sue. All manuscript typing was done expertly by
Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood.
The maps contained in this volume were prepared by the Reproduction
Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, and the Historical
Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Official Department of Defense
photographs were used.
The Marine Corps mourns the passing of the prime author of this series
and other admirable works of Marine Corps and military history. Lynn
Montross, after a lengthy illness, died on 28 January 1961.
[Illustration: (signature)]
H. W. BUSE, JR.
_Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._
Contents
_Page_
I Interlude at Masan 1
Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in EUSAK
Reserve--General Ridgway New EUSAK Commander--Ridgway’s
Declaration of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment
Shortages--Marine Air Squadrons in Action--The Air Force
System of Control--X Corps Conference at Kyongju
II The CCF January Offensive 21
UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army
Withdrawals--Marine Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine
Division Assigned Mission--Replacements by Air and
Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields--Red China’s “Hate
America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for Victory
III The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 41
The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to
Bofu--Marine Rice Paddy Patrols--Operations THUNDERBOLT
and ROUNDUP--Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC
Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division--10th NKPA Division
Scattered--New Mission for the Marines
IV Operation KILLER 59
The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in
Action--Planning for the New Operation--The Jump-Off on
21 February--Stiffening of Chinese Resistance--General
Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase Line
ARIZONA--JOC Air Control System Criticised
V Operation RIPPER 79
Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by
Enemy--Second Phase of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW
Units--General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion--1st
KMC Returns to Division--38th Parallel Recrossed by
Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems
VI The CCF Spring Offensive 99
Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied
by KMC Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine
Flank--Marine Air in Support Everywhere--Plugging
the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist
Attacks--Withdrawal to the KANSAS Line--Enemy Stopped in
IX Corps Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps
VII Advance to the Punchbowl 127
Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives
Secured--MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of
the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st MAW in Operation
STRANGLE--KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st Marines
Move up to BROWN Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack
VIII The Truce Talks at Kaesong 153
Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on BADGER
Line--Red Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in
Reserve--Marine Helicopters Take the Lead--Marine Body
Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to K-18--The Division
Back in Action Again
IX Renewal of the Attack 173
Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at
First--Supply Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of
Division Attack--The Mounting Problem of CAS--First
Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight for
Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for
the “Rock”
X The New Warfare of Position 199
Sectors of Major EUSAK Units--Statement by General Van
Fleet--Hill 854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to
Hill 884--Helicopter Operation BLACKBIRD--“To Organize,
Construct, and Defend”--Marine Operations of November
1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea
XI Winter Operations in East Korea 227
Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in
Company Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes
Command--Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored
Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter Operations MULE TRAIN
and CHANGIE-CHANGIE--The Five Days of Operation CLAM-UP
XII The Move to West Korea 247
Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in
Operation MIXMASTER--Operations of Fifteen Months in
Retrospect
Appendixes
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 263
B Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 267
C Command and Staff List 269
D Unit Citations 315
Bibliography 319
Index 325
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 86 and 214.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
1 Korea as a Battlefield 4
2 EUSAK Dispositions, December 1950 9
3 Combat Air Bases 16
4 EUSAK Front Lines, January 1951 23
5 Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 43
6 Operation KILLER 61
7 Area Gained, February-March 1951 77
8 Operation RIPPER Plan 82
9 Operation RIPPER Zone 87
10 CCF Offensive, April 1951 110
11 Actions of 1/1 and 3/1, April 1951 112
12 Night of 16–17 May 1951 124
13 Drive to Yangu, May 1951 129
14 X Corps Routes of Advance, May-June 1951 139
15 1st Marine Division Zone of Action, June-July 1951 140
16 1st MAW Operating Area, May-July 1951 145
17 1st Marine Division Area, September 1951 174
18 X Corps Zone of Action, September 1951 177
19 EUSAK Dispositions, September 1951 200
20 1st Marine Division Situation, September 1951 205
21 HMR-161 Operations 1951 209
22 EUSAK Dispositions, March 1952 252
CHAPTER I
Interlude at Masan
_Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK
_Reserve--General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander--Ridgway’s Declaration
of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages--Marine Air
Squadrons in Action--The Air Force System of Control--X Corps
Conference at Kyongju_
A new chapter in Korean operations began for the 1st Marine Division at
1800 on 16 December 1950 with the opening of the CP at Masan. By the
following afternoon all units of the Division had arrived from Hungnam
with the exception of VMO-6 and small groups of such specialists as the
amphibian tractor troops left behind to assist with the redeployment of
remaining X Corps elements to south Korea.
The 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were separated for
the first time since the Inchon landing. VMF-311, the new Panther jet
squadron, was flying from K-9, an Air Force field near Pusan. Operating
together as an all-Marine carrier group taking part in the Hungnam
redeployment were the three Corsair squadrons: VMF-212 on the CVL
(light carrier) _Bataan_; VMF-214 on the CVE _Sicily_; and VMF-323 on
the CVE _Badoeng Strait_. The two Japan-based night fighter squadrons,
VMF(N)-542 and VMF(N)-513, flying from Itazuke, patrolled the skies
between Japan and Korea.
VMO-6, the observation squadron, consisting of helicopters and OY
fixed-wing planes, was attached to various ships of the Seventh Fleet
for rescue missions when pilots were forced into the sea. A detachment
of Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the
entire Air Defense Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2
(MTACS-2) were also attached to the warships. They assisted in the
control of hundreds of planes that flew over the Hungnam beachhead
daily in support of the final stages of the X Corps evacuation.
The three Marine Corsair squadrons on the _Sicily_, _Badoeng Strait_,
and _Bataan_ represented the entire air strength of Escort Carrier
Task Group (TG) 96.8, commanded by Rear Admiral Richard N. Ruble.
Each squadron came directly under the operational command of the ship
on which it had embarked. Supply, engineering, ordnance, billeting,
and messing were of course provided through naval channels. The only
relationship of the squadrons to their parent organization, MAG-33,
derived from the administration of personnel and the storage of
equipment at Itami.
_Return to the Bean Patch_
Masan, the new Division assembly area, was located about 27 air miles
and 40 road miles west of Pusan on the Bay of Masan, which indents
the southern coast of the peninsula (Map 1). In order to prepare for
the arrival of the Division, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, the
assistant division commander (ADC), had flown from Hungnam with the
advance party on 12 December to make necessary arrangements.
The small seaport, which skirts the bay for about two and a half miles,
was untouched by the war as compared to the ravaged towns of northeast
Korea. It had a protected anchorage, dock facilities, and good rail and
road communications. There was an air strip at Chinhae, a few miles to
the southeast.
Some sort of cycle seemed to have been completed by veterans of the
5th Marines when they found themselves back again in the familiar
surroundings of the Bean Patch on the northern outskirts of Masan.
This large, cultivated field is entitled to capital letters because
of its historical distinction as bivouac area of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade after the battle of the Naktong in August 1950. Barely
four months had passed since that hard fight, but a great deal more
history had been made during the combats of the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin
Reservoir operations.
There was room enough in the Bean Patch for all three infantry
regiments. Headquarters, the 11th Marines, the 1st Signal, 1st Tank,
1st Amtrac, 1st Ordnance, and 1st Motor Transport Battalions were
located on the southern outskirts of town along with the 41 Independent
Commando, Royal Marines. The 1st Combat Service Group, the MP Company,
and the 1st Service, 1st Shore Party, and 1st Engineer Battalions
occupied the dock area of Masan proper. A large building in the center
of town housed the Division hospital, and the 7th Motor Transport
Battalion was assigned to the Changwon area, four miles to the
northeast.[1]
[1] This section is based on 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv)
Historical Diary (_HD_), Dec 50, 1–12; MajGen O. P.
Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine
Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War_
(hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 1239–1242; and BrigGen E. A.
Craig, Comments, 4 Jun 57.
Peaceful as the surroundings may have seemed to troops who had just
completed the 13-day running fight of the Chosin Reservoir Breakout,
the Chidi San mountain mass some 50 miles northwest of Masan had been
for many years the hideout of Korean bandits and outlaws. The Japanese
had never been able to clear them out, and the Republic of Korea had
met with no better success. After the outbreak of civil war, they made
some pretense of aiding the Communist cause but were actually preying
upon the ROK army and police for arms, food, clothing, and other loot.
Operating in prowling bands as large as 50 or 60 men, the guerrillas
were well armed with rifles, machine guns, and at times even mortars.
In order to assure the safety both of its own bivouac areas and the
vital port of Masan, Division promptly initiated measures to maintain
surveillance over a broad belt of countryside which described an arc
from Chinju, some 40 miles west of Masan, around to Changwon (Map 1).
The infantry and artillery regiments and the Division Reconnaissance
Company were all assigned subsectors of this security belt. Daily motor
patrols of not less than platoon strength were to be conducted in
each subsector for the purpose of gaining information about the roads
and the guerrillas as well as discouraging their activities.[2] As it
proved, however, no hostile contacts were made by the Marines during
the entire Masan interlude. The guerrillas preferred to restrict their
attention to the local police and civilian population.
[2] CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 1515, 18 Dec 50.
[Illustration: KOREA
AS A BATTLEFIELD]
_1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK _Reserve_
At 2240 on the 18th a dispatch from Major General Edward M. Almond,
USA, commanding general of X Corps, informed the 1st Marine Division
that it had passed to the operational control of the Eighth Army.[3]
[3] CG X Corps msg X 15292, 18 Dec 50; EUSAK msg
GX-35290-KG00, 19 Dec 50.
Major General Oliver P. Smith reported in one of his first dispatches
to EUSAK that the Marines had received fresh rations on only three
days since landing in Korea. The Division commander invited attention
to the importance of building up the physical condition of men who
had lost weight during the Chosin Reservoir operation. An information
copy went to Commander Naval Forces, Far East, (ComNavFE), who reacted
promptly by ordering a refrigeration ship to Masan with 50,000 rations
of turkey. The G-4 of EUSAK also responded with fresh rations from time
to time until the Marines, in the words of General Smith, “had turkey
coming out of their ears.”[4]
[4] Smith, _Notes_, 1244–1245.
Games of softball and touch football became popular in the crisp,
invigorating weather as the men rapidly recuperated from fatigue and
nervous tension. A series of shows was put on by troupes of U.S. Army
and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas trees and
decorations.
The first Christmas in Korea was observed with a memorable display of
holiday spirit by men who had cause to be thankful. A choir from the
5th Marines serenaded Division Headquarters with carols on Christmas
Eve, and all the next day the commanding general and ADC held open
house for staff officers and unit commanders.[5]
[5] The remainder of this section is based upon Smith,
_Notes_, 1264–1274.
The United States as a whole rejoiced over the news that the last of
105,000 X Corps troops had embarked from Hungnam on 24 December without
a single life being lost as a result of enemy action. President Truman
spoke for the Nation when he sent this message to General MacArthur:
Wish to express my personal thanks to you, Admiral Joy, General
Almond, and all your brave men for the effective operations at
Hungnam. This saving of our men in this isolated beachhead is the
best Christmas present I have ever had.
Photographers and press correspondents flocked to Masan during the
holiday season for pictures and interviews about various aspects of
the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Among them was Captain John Ford, USNR,
a successful motion picture director who had been recalled to active
duty to make a documentary film depicting the role of the Navy and
Marine Corps in Korea. He used scenes in the Masan area for background
material.
General Smith was informed that a motion picture company intended to
produce a feature film entitled “Retreat, Hell,” based on a remark
attributed to him, “Retreat, Hell, we are just attacking in a different
direction!” When asked if these actually were his words, the Division
commander had a diplomatic answer. He said that he had pointed out to
correspondents at Hagaru that the drive to Hamhung was not a typical
withdrawal or retreat, and thus “the statement attributed to me
described my thinking, that of my staff and unit commanders, and my
situation.”
During the Masan interlude Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, USAR, arrived as
a representative of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins
University, which had been employed on military research projects by
the Far East Command. Marshall, a well-known military analyst who had
written several books about World War II operations, based his studies
on personal interviews with scores of participants.
The researcher was given a free hand at Masan. Aided by a stenographer,
he interviewed officers and men from privates to commanding general.
The resulting thousands of words went into a classified report
entitled, “CCF in the Attack (Part II), A Study Based on the Operations
of the 1stMarDiv in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area, 20
November-10 December 1950.”
_General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander_
Shortly after arrival at Masan, General Smith called a conference
of unit commanders and emphasized that their task was to re-equip,
resupply, repair and rehabilitate. Officers and men of replacement
drafts were to be integrated and given unit training as soon as
possible. Both veterans and newcomers were soon training in regimental
areas assigned by Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, the Division G-3, who
arranged for a 200-yard rifle range and a mortar range.
On 23 December came the news that Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker,
the Eighth Army commander, had been killed in a jeep accident. His
successor, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, had commanded
the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in Europe during the final operations of
World War II. Commencing his flight from Washington on the 24th, he
landed at Tokyo just before midnight on Christmas day.[6]
[6] Gen M. B. Ridgway as told to H. M. Martin, _Soldier, The
Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway_ (New York, 1956), 196–211,
hereafter Ridgway, _Memoirs_.
The new commander’s task was made more difficult by the fact that
the Korean conflict, at the end of its first six months, had become
probably the most unpopular military venture of American history, both
at the front and in the United States. From a mere “police action”
at first, the struggle soon developed into a major effort in which
the national pride suffered humiliations as a consequence of military
unpreparedness. Far from building up the morale of the troops, letters
and newspapers from home too often contributed to the doubts of men who
asked themselves these questions:
“Why are we here? And what are we fighting for?”
Some of the answers were scarcely reassuring. It was insinuated, for
instance, that Americans were fighting “to make South Korean real
estate safe for South Koreans.”
“I must say in all frankness,” commented General Ridgway in his
memoirs, “that the spirit of the Eighth Army as I found it on my
arrival gave me deep concern. There was a definite air of nervousness,
of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to
what the future held. There was much ‘looking over the shoulder’ as the
soldiers say.”[7]
[7] _Ibid._, 204–205.
These criticisms were not applicable to the 1st Marine Division.
“Our men were in high spirits and busily engaged in getting ready to
fight again,” commented Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC. “In
my travels around the various units of the Division, and in talking
to the men, I never even once noticed any air of nervousness or
apprehension.... When General Ridgway visited the Division at Masan he
made a tour of the entire camp area and observed training and general
arrangements. He stated that he was quite satisfied with the 1st
Marine Division and its quick comeback after the Chosin fighting.”[8]
[8] LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Retd), ltr of 4 Jun 57. All
letters, typed interviews, and other documentary sources
cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the
Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps.
General Ridgway learned soon after his arrival that the Eighth Army
staff had prepared a plan for a phased withdrawal to Pusan in case of
necessity. He called immediately for a plan of attack. Prospects of
putting it into effect were not bright at the moment, but at least it
served to announce his intentions.
Rumors were rife at this time that a general withdrawal from Korea,
in virtual acknowledgment of defeat, was contemplated. In a letter of
1957, General Douglas MacArthur wrote an emphatic denial: “I have no
means of knowing whether such action may have been seriously considered
in Washington; but, for my own part, I never contemplated such a
withdrawal and made no plans to that effect.”[9]
[9] Gen Douglas MacArthur, ltr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W.
Snedeker.
The front hugged the 38th Parallel during the last week of
December as the Eighth Army held a defensive line along the
Munsan-Chunchon-Yangyang axis (Map 2). Three U.S. divisions were
in a combat zone occupied largely by ROK units. The 24th and 25th
Divisions both reduced a third in strength by casualties, remained in
contact with the enemy in west Korea while the 1st Cavalry Division,
also depleted in numbers, occupied blocking positions to the rear.
Personnel and equipment losses suffered by the 2d Division during the
CCF counteroffensive of late November had rendered it noneffective as
a tactical unit until it could be reinforced and re-equipped, and the
3d and 7th Infantry Divisions had just landed in the Pusan-Ulsan area
after the Hungnam redeployment.[10]
[10] EUSAK Command Report (_Cmd Rpt_), Dec 50.
On 27 December 1950 the commanding general began a three-day tour of
Eighth Army units at the front. He talked to hundreds of soldiers
ranging from privates to unit commanders. There was nothing the matter
with the Eighth Army, he assured them, that confidence wouldn’t cure.
“I told them their soldier forbears would turn over in their graves
if they heard some of the stories I had heard about the behavior of
some of our troop leaders in combat. The job of a commander was to be
up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I
wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalions,
and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the
hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at
night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on.”
[Illustration: MAP 2
EUSAK DISPOSITIONS 31 DEC 1950]
It could never have been said that this professional soldier, the son
of a Regular Army colonel, had failed to set an example in his own
career. As the commander of an airborne division, he had jumped along
with his men in Normandy.
Seldom seen in Korea without a grenade attached to his harness, Ridgway
insisted that it was not a gesture of showmanship. In mobile warfare a
man might be surprised by the enemy when he least expected it, he said,
and a grenade was useful for blasting one’s way out of a tight spot.
_Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith_
After completing his tour of the combat area, the commanding general
concluded that one thing was still lacking. Soldiers of the Eighth Army
hadn’t as yet been given an adequate answer to the questions, “Why are
we here?” and “What are we fighting for?” In the belief that the men
were entitled to an answer from their commanding general, he sat down
in his room and wrote this declaration of faith:
To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that
Korean town or village. Real estate is here, incidental....
The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as
God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall
defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot
their prisoners, enslave their citizens and deride the dignity
of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual
and individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive
with God’s hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead
existence of a Godless world.
If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility
of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight
for freedom for our Korean allies alone and for their national
survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our
own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent
national existence....[11]
[11] Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of
Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51.
The deep conviction of this declaration could not be doubted. But
Ridgway did not confine himself to moral leadership; he also insisted
on a return to sound tactical principles. Upon learning that some of
the infantry commanders in combat sectors had no knowledge of the
enemy’s strength or whereabouts, he ordered that aggressive patrolling
be resumed at once. He directed further that every unit make a resolute
effort to provide a hot reception for the Red Chinese patrols which had
met too little opposition while prodding every night for soft spots
along the thinly held 135-mile United Nations line.[12]
[12] The source for the remainder of this section is Ridgway,
_Memoirs_, 205–207.
In his talks with officers and men, the new commander told them
that too many weapons and vehicles had fallen into the hands of the
enemy during the withdrawals in west Korea. He made it plain that in
the future any man abandoning equipment without good cause would be
court-martialed.
Not only did Ridgway stress the increased use of firepower; he
requested in one of his first messages to the Pentagon that 10
additional battalions of artillery be sent to Korea. These guns were
to provide the tactical punch when he found an opportunity to take the
offensive.
Meanwhile, he had the problem of putting up a defense against a
Chinese Communist offensive expected within a week. On his first day
as Eighth Army commander he sent a request to President Syngman Rhee,
of the Republic of Korea, for 30,000 native laborers to dig field
fortifications. The energetic, 71-year-old Korean patriot provided
the first 10,000 at dawn the following morning and the others during
the next two days. Armed with picks and shovels, this army of toilers
created two broad belts of defense, one to the north and one south
of the river Han. The purpose of the first was to stop the enemy if
American firepower could compensate for lack of numbers, and the second
was a final line to be held resolutely.
_Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages_
Although the Marine ground forces found themselves in the unusual
situation of being 200 miles behind the front, they could be sure that
this respite wouldn’t last. Every effort was being pushed to restore
the Division to combat efficiency by a command and staff acutely
aware of shortages of men and equipment. The effective strength on 29
December 1950 was 1,304 officers and 20,696 men, including 182 attached
U.S. Army troops and 143 Royal Marine Commandos. This total also
included 28 officers and 1,615 men who had arrived in a replacement
draft of 17 December, and 4 officers and 365 men in a draft of three
days later.[13]
[13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are
Smith, _Notes_, 1280–1292, 1294, 1295, 1303; 1stMarDiv
Periodic Logistics Reports (_PLR_) 2, 11.
Authorized Division strength was 1,438 officers and 24,504 men,
indicating a shortage of 134 officers and 3,808 men. Most of the
deficiencies were in the infantry and artillery units--29 officers and
2,951 men in the three infantry regiments, and 38 officers and 538 men
in the artillery.
Division G-1 had been informed by the FMFPac representative in Japan
that about 5,000 casualties were hospitalized there, and an unknown
number had been evacuated to the United States because of overcrowding
of hospitals in Japan. Such factors made it difficult to predict how
many would return to the Division, but G-1 estimated from 500 to 1,000
in January.
The situation in regard to Division equipment might be summed up by
saying that on 23 December there was a serious shortage of practically
all essential items with the single exception of M-1 rifles. Upon
arrival at Masan, units had been required to submit stock status
reports. These lists were forwarded on 23 December to the Commanding
General, Eighth Army, with a notification that requisitions had been
submitted to the 2d Logistical Command, USA, in Pusan. It was requested
that deliveries of supplies and equipment be speeded up, so that the
Division could soon be restored to its former combat efficiency. A
comparison of the totals of selected items on 23 and 31 December as
listed on the following page shows that considerable progress was made
during those eight days.
The 2d Logistical Command in Pusan, commanded by Brigadier General
Crump Garvin, USA, deserved much of the credit for the week’s
restoration of Marine equipment. Progress passed all expectations,
considering that General Garvin was supplying other Eighth Army units
which had lost equipment during their withdrawal.[14]
[14] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr of 4 Jun 57.
There still existed on 29 December a requirement for clothing and
individual equipment, and the spare parts problem remained acute.
Ironically, the fact that the 1st Marine Division had brought most
of its motor transport out from the Chosin Reservoir was a handicap
at Masan. Eighth Army units which had lost their vehicles were given
priority for receiving new ones. This meant that the Marines must make
the best of war-worn trucks.
_Items of _T/E _Shortages _Shortages
equipment_ allowance_ 23 Dec 50_ 31 Dec 50_
Bags, sleeping 23,000 3,585 0
Machine gun, Browning,
Cal. 30, M1919A4 1,398 338 0
BAR, 30 cal. 904 441 0
Carbine, 30 cal., M2 11,084 2,075 0
Launcher, rocket, 3.5″, M20 396 105 0
Howitzer, 105mm 54 8 0
Howitzer, 155mm 18 9 0
Glasses, field, 7×50 1,740 1,305 1,006
Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm 12 7 7
Tank, med., M-26, 90mm 85 16 12
Truck, 1/4 T., 4×4 641 105 58
Truck, 1½ T., 6×6, cargo 54 3 0
Truck, 2½ T., 6×6, cargo 737 124 33
Radio set, SCR 536 474 211 211
Radio set, SCR 619 137 74 49
Telephone, EE8 1,162 58 58
_Marine Air Squadrons in Action_
While the ground forces trained in the Masan area, the Corsair
squadrons and the jet squadron flew combat missions. Support of the
Hungnam redeployment had top priority until 24 December, when the last
of the 105,000 troops were evacuated by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s
Task Force 90. Such totals as 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles,
and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo were also recorded by the U.S.
Navy’s largest operation of the Korean conflict.[15]
[15] ComPhibGruOne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5–10, 25.
No serious trouble was experienced from enemy action during the two
weeks of the redeployment, although G-2 reports warned that several
Chinese divisions were believed to be in the general area. Air strikes
and naval gunfire shared the credit for this result. Nearly 34,000
shells and 12,800 rockets were fired by the support ships, and UN
planes were on station or carrying out missions every moment that
weather permitted. Marine fighters of VMF-212, VMF-214, and VMF-323,
flying from carriers after the closing of Yonpo Airfield, made a
noteworthy contribution to the success of the Hungnam redeployment.[16]
[16] For a derailed account of the “amphibious operation in
reverse,” see the last chapter of Volume III of this
series.
VMF-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski, was
assigned the task of gathering the helicopters of VMO-6 from various
ships of the Seventh Fleet and returning them to the operational
control of the 1st Marine Division at Masan. There the OYs of the
observation squadron were waiting after an overland flight, and Major
Vincent J. Gottschalk’s unit was complete.
With the Hungnam redeployment ended, the Navy offered to make its
primary carrier-borne air effort in support of the Eighth Army. There
was no single over-all commander of Navy and Air Force aviation in
Korea (other than General MacArthur himself) and the two services were
working under a system of mutual agreement and coordination.[17]
[17] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report_ (_PacFlt Interim
Rpt_) No. 2, II, 621–758.
The Far East Air Forces (FEAF), under Lieutenant General George E.
Stratemeyer, was the senior Air Force command in the Far East, on the
same level as ComNavFE, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The largest FEAF
subordinate command was the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Major General
Earle E. Partridge, with headquarters at Taegu, alongside that of the
Eighth Army.
Strictly speaking, land-based Marine air had been under Fifth Air
Force operational control throughout the Chosin Reservoir operation.
Actually a verbal agreement between General Partridge and Major General
Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), had given
the Marines a good deal of latitude in making decisions relative to
close air support. This was often the salvation of Marine units during
the breakout, when every minute counted. Later, during the Hungnam
redeployment, control of Marine aircraft became the responsibility of
Admiral Doyle. His control agency was Tactical Air Control Squadron-1
(TacRon-1) in his flagship, the _Mount McKinley_. TacRon-1 kept in
close touch not only with the 3d infantry Division, USA, defending
the shrinking perimeter, but also with the Eighth Army and Fifth Air
Force.[18]
[18] TacRon-1 War Diary (_WD_), Dec 50.
During the last days of 1950 the four Marine air squadrons were kept
busy. VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ was attached to TF-77. The coastline
of east Korea was its hunting grounds for such missions as knocking
out warehouses, bridges, and railway tunnels between the 38th and 39th
parallels.
Along the west coast, VMF-214 on the _Sicily_ and VMF-323 on the
_Badoeng Strait_ were commanded respectively by Major William M. Lundin
and Major Arnold A. Lund. These squadrons were part of Task Group-95.1
under Vice Admiral Sir William G. Andrews, RN. The Marine aviators
found themselves in an organization made up of Royal Commonwealth
naval forces and of French, Thai, and ROK units. TG-95.1 had the
responsibility for patrolling the western coastline to prohibit
enemy movement by water in military junks and by vehicle along the
littoral.[19]
[19] _HD_s and _WDs_ of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMF-212; _PacFlt
Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1939–1960.
VMF-311, the jet squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Neil R.
MacIntyre, remained the only land-based Marine air unit in Korea. The
Fifth Air Force had made space for it on crowded K-9, seven air miles
northeast of Pusan, when General Harris expressed a desire to keep his
jets in Korea for possible defense against Red air attacks (Map 3).
MacIntyre exercised his prerogative as squadron commander to fly the
unit’s first combat mission on 17 December. He was not, however, the
first Marine aviator to pilot a jet in combat. That distinction went to
Captain Leslie E. Brown on 9 September 1950. Assigned to the Fifth Air
Force’s 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron as an exchange pilot, he made the
first of several routine flights with an F-80 Shooting Star.
On 20 December, 17 officers and 51 enlisted men arrived at K-9 to boost
VMF-311’s total to 27 officer pilots and 95 enlisted men. Under Fifth
Air Force control, they were employed to attack suspected CCF troop
shelters, entrenchments, and gun positions on the eve of the expected
enemy offensive. Missions of the jet planes averaged 12 a day at the
end of the month.
_The Air Force System of Control_
It was seldom realized in the middle of the twentieth century that for
the first time since the Middle Ages, a single human being represented
in his person a decisive tactical unit. Just as the mailed knight on
his barded charger had ruled the battlefields of the medieval world,
so did the pilot of a modern aircraft have the power to put an enemy
battalion to flight with napalm, or to knock out an enemy stronghold
with a 500-pound bomb.
[Illustration: MAP 3
COMBAT AIR BASES
KOREA-JAPAN]
A great deal depended, of course, on how the lightning of this human
thunderbolt was controlled. The Marine Corps and the Air Force had
different ideas on the subject. At the foundation of the Marine system
was the concept that the needs of the ground forces came first,
and control of air support should be exercised by the troops being
supported. In each Marine infantry battalion a tactical air control
party (TACP) included two aviators--one to be employed as a forward air
controller (FAC) at the front, and the other as an air liaison officer
in the battalion supporting arms center (SAC).[20]
[20] The material in this section is derived from the
following sources: _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II,
463–620; Chief. Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical
Air Command, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground
Operations; and CMC, ltr to Dist List re “Analysis of CAS
Systems,” 19 Aug 52.
In an emergency both could quickly be assigned to companies or even
platoons to “talk” air strikes down on the enemy. The normal chain of
command was bypassed in favor of direct radio from the TACP to the
cognizant air control agency that had the authority to cross-check the
request for possible conflict with other operations and to channel
fighter-bombers to the attack.
Intermediate commands kept themselves informed of the over-all air
picture and controlled the employment of aviation by their own
subordinates as they listened in on these requests. They indicated
approval by remaining silent, and disapproval by transmitting a
countermand.
The hub of the Air Force system was the Tactical Air Control Center
(TACC) of the Fifth Air Force-EUSAK Joint Operations Center (JOC),
known by the code name MELLOW. An aviator coming on duty called up
MELLOW and received his instructions from JOC.
FACs were assigned to U.S. Army and British units down to corps,
division, and regimental levels, and to ROK corps and divisions.
Further assignment to smaller front line units was possible but
entailed a good deal of time and advance planning. And even the most
urgent requests had to be channeled through division and regimental
levels to JOC for approval.
If a Marine FAC wasn’t able to control an air strike visually because
of terrain conditions, he called for a “tactical air coordinator,
airborne” (TACA) to locate the target from the air and direct
planes to the attack. The Fifth Air Force also used special airborne
coordinators. Known as “Mosquitoes,” they flew low-winged, two-seater
North American training planes, designated T-6s by the Air Force and
SNJs by the Navy.
This plan was capable under favorable circumstances of providing the
Fifth Air Force-EUSAK tactical air control system with a mobile and
flexible means of directing air power at the front. Its chief weakness,
according to Marine doctrine, lay in the separation of air power from
ground force control. The Air Force claimed the advantage of projecting
tactical air power deep into enemy territory; but as the Marines saw
it, this was deep or interdictory support, and not to be compared to
genuine close air support.
_X Corps Conference at Kyongju_
The command and staff of the 1st Marine Division could only speculate
during this interim period as to what the near future might hold for
them. Rumors had been circulated, during the first week at Masan, that
the Division would be employed as rearguard to cover an Eighth Army
withdrawal from Korea, with Pusan serving as the port of debarkation.
And while plans cannot be made on a basis of rumor, General Smith and
Colonel Bowser went so far as to discuss the possibility seriously. At
last, on 24 December, a more definite prospect loomed when the EUSAK
staff requested the Division to furnish logistical data for a move by
rail and truck to Wonju, some 130 miles north of Masan.
It was not known whether an actual move was contemplated or the
intention was merely to have available a plan for future use if the
occasion warranted. General Smith sent the data but added a strong
recommendation to the effect that any commitment of the Division be
postponed until it was re-equipped and strengthened by replacements.[21]
[21] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Dec 50, 12–13; Smith, _Notes_, 1258–1259.
At this time the Marine general received a copy of a map prepared
by the Eighth Army staff which showed the phase lines of a 200-mile
withdrawal from the combat zone to the Pusan port of debarkation. No
enlightenment as to the employment of the Division was forthcoming
until 27 December 1950, however, when a EUSAK dispatch directed that
the Marines be detached from Eighth Army reserve and reassigned to the
operational control of X Corps.[22]
[22] EUSAK msg GX-20179-K600, 27 Dec 50.
A message of the 28th requested General Smith to attend a conference at
the X Corps CP at Kyongju (about 60 air miles northeast of Masan) on
the 30th. He was directed to bring several members of his staff with
him and to assign a liaison officer to X Corps.[23]
[23] CG X Corps msg X 16070, 28 Dec 50.
Two VMO-6 helicopters flew him to Kyongju along with his G-3, Colonel
Bowser, and his aide, Captain Martin J. Sexton. Tossed by high winds,
they landed just in time to meet General Ridgway, who gave a talk
emphasizing the necessity for reconnaissance and maintaining contact
with the enemy.
The new plan for X Corps employment, as modified after discussion with
the Eighth Army commander, called for the recently reorganized 2d
Infantry Division to be placed under operational control of General
Almond. It was to move out at once to the Wonju front, followed by the
3d and 7th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Marine Division was to stage to
Pohangdong (Map 3) on the east coast, some 65 miles north of Pusan,
with a view to being eventually employed on this same front.[24]
[24] This account of the Kyongju conference is derived from
Smith, _Notes_, 1269–1271.
“Certainly no one could accuse General Almond, the X Corps commander,
of defeatism,” was a tribute paid by General Smith. On the contrary,
the Marine general had sometimes differed with him on the grounds
that he was aggressive to the point of giving too little weight to
logistical considerations and time and space factors.
It was realized at the conference that administrative decisions
must depend to a large extent on the outcome of the impending enemy
offensive. G-2 officers of the Eighth Army, forewarned by prisoner
interrogations, were not surprised when the blow fell shortly before
midnight on the last night of the year.
In spite of Air Force bombings of roads and suspected supply dumps,
the Chinese Reds had been able to mount a great new offensive only
three weeks after the old one ended. Attacking in the bitter cold of
New Year’s Eve, they made penetrations during the first few hours in
ROK-held sectors of the central and eastern fronts. By daybreak it
became evident that Seoul was a major objective, with the UN situation
deteriorating rapidly.
CHAPTER II
The CCF January Offensive
_UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army Withdrawals--Marine
Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine Division Assigned Mission--
Replacements by Air and Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields--
Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for
Victory_
On the last day of 1950 the 1st Marine Division was alerted for two
missions within an hour. At 1425 it was detached from X Corps, after
only four days, and once more assigned to the operational control of
the Eighth Army. The Marines were directed to resume their former
mission of training, reorganizing, and replacing equipment so that
they could be employed either to block enemy penetrations along the
Ulchin-Yongju-Yechon axis (Map 4), or to take over a sector along the
main line of resistance (MLR).
Forty minutes later another EUSAK dispatch alerted the Division to move
to the Pohang-Andong area, where it would be in position to block any
CCF penetration. This warning order came as no surprise, since X Corps
had already contemplated such employment for General Smith’s troops.
In fact, General Craig and Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Edward W.
Snedeker had left Masan that very morning to select assembly areas and
command posts.[25]
[25] EUSAK msgs GX 20332-KG00 and GX 20335-KG00 31 Dec 50;
1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4.
At a conference of G-3 and G-4 officers held at Masan on New Year’s
Day, it was recommended that the administrative headquarters remain in
its present location when the rest of the Division moved up to Pohang.
Although this headquarters had accompanied the Division CP in the past,
it was believed that gains in mobility would result if the large
number of clerical personnel and their increasing bulk of documents
were left behind.[26] In view of the changing situation at the front,
there was less danger of losing valuable records if the headquarters
continued to function at Masan, maintaining contact with the forward CP
by means of daily courier planes. The plan was approved by the Division
commander and worked out to general satisfaction.
[26] Smith, _Notes_, 1315.
_UN Forces Give Ground_
Decisions were made during the first few days of 1951 in an atmosphere
of suspense and strain as adverse reports came from the firing line.
General Ridgway had assumed correctly, on the basis of prisoner
interrogations, that the main Chinese effort would be channeled
down the historical invasion corridor north of Seoul. He made his
dispositions accordingly, and the Eighth Army order of battle on 31
December 1950 (Map 2) was as follows:
U.S. I Corps--Turkish Brigade, U.S. 25th Division, ROK 1st Division,
from left to right northwest of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British 29th
Brigade.
U.S. IX Corps--ROK 6th Division, U.S. 24th Division, from left to right
north of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British Commonwealth 27th Brigade,
U.S. 1st Cavalry Division.
ROK III Corps--ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, from left to right on
central front. In Corps reserve, ROK 7th Division.
ROK II Corps--ROK 3d Division, on east-central front.
ROK I Corps--ROK 9th and Capital Divisions, from left to right on
eastern front.
The U.S. X Corps, comprising the newly reorganized U.S. 2d Infantry
Division at Wonju and the 7th Infantry Division in the Chungju area,
had been given a mission of bolstering the ROK-held line in central and
east Korea and blocking enemy penetrations to the rear.
In Eighth Army reserve was the 187th Airborne RCT, with Thailand
Battalion attached, in the Suwon area. Also under EUSAK operational
control in rear areas were the 1st Marine Division (Masan), the 3d
Infantry Division (Kyongju), the Canadian Battalion (Miryang), and the
New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion (Pusan).
[Illustration: EUSAK FRONT LINES 3 Jan. 51
MAP 4]
Altogether, the United Nations forces in Korea numbered 444,336 men
as of January 1951. The cosmopolitan character of the fight against
Communism is indicated by the aid given to the U.S. and ROK forces
by contingents of combat troops from 13 other nations--Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.[27]
[27] Sources for this section are EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51,
4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65.
Enemy numbers at this time were estimated at a total of 740,000 men in
Korea and nearby Manchuria. Seven CCF armies, the 37th, 38th, 39th,
40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th were identified among the troops attacking
on New Year’s Eve. The NKPA I and V Corps also participated. Estimated
strength of the assaulting forces was 174,000 Chinese and 60,000 North
Koreans.
Previously identified but not reported in contact with U.S. forces on
31 December were the 24th, 48th, 49th, and 65th CCF armies and the NKPA
1st, 3d, and 15th Divisions.
As another possibility which could not be overlooked, the five CCF
armies which had opposed X Corps in northeast Korea might also take
part in the new offensive. Elements of the 20th, 26th, 27th, 30th, and
32d Armies identified in that area early in December, had more than
two weeks in which to reorganize and make their way to the Eighth Army
front. If they got into the fight, it would mean a formidable addition
to the enemy’s forces.
With only five days at his disposal, after arrival in Korea, General
Ridgway’s preparations were limited. His dispositions could not be
blamed, but it was the old story of the chain and its weakest link
as the enemy scored a major breakthrough at the expense of the 1st
ROK Division on the west-central front. Unfortunately, this unit
represented the tactical joint between I Corps and IX Corps. The enemy
widened the gap before dawn and drove on toward Seoul.
Early in the morning the EUSAK commanding general was on the road,
waving his arms in an attempt to stop ROK soldiers streaming rearward
in their vehicles after abandoning crew-served weapons. The short
training period for these troops, their tactical inexperience, and the
language barrier were the dissonant notes tolling the ominous chords of
defeat. The whole front was endangered as the enemy poured through an
ever widening gap, and Ridgway ordered that roadblocks be set up where
MPs could halt the fugitives, rearm them, and send them back to the
front. At his request, President Syngman Rhee appealed to ROK soldiers
over the radio and exhorted them to make a stand. By that time it was
too late to save Seoul, and the commanding general gave orders for its
evacuation.
“The withdrawal was initiated in mid-afternoon on the 3d,” he commented
in retrospect, “I stayed on the bridge site on the north bank until
dark to watch the passage of the most critical loads. These were
the 8-inch howitzers and the British Centurion tanks, both of which
exceeded the safety limits of the bridge under the conditions existing
at the time.”[28]
[28] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 5 Jun 57.
It was a scene of terror and despair that Ridgway never forgot.
Thousands of Korean civilian refugees were making their way over the
thin ice of the river Han, many of them carrying children or old people
on their backs. What impressed the observer most was the uncanny
silence of this mass flight in the freezing winter dusk, broken only
by the sound of a multitude of feet shuffling over the ice--a sound
strangely like a vast whispering. It was as if these derelicts of war
were trying incoherently to confide their misery to someone.
From a strategic viewpoint, the only course left to the Eighth Army was
a continued retirement south of Seoul. “We came back fast,” Ridgway
admitted, “but as a fighting army, not as a running mob. We brought our
dead and wounded with us, and our guns, and our will to fight.”[29]
[29] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 215.
_Further Eighth Army Withdrawals_
EUSAK Fragmentary Operations Plan 20, issued as an order on 4 January,
called for a further withdrawal to Line D (Map 4). In preparation, X
Corps had moved up to the front on the 2d, after assuming operational
control of the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and the ROK 2d, 5th,
and 8th Divisions and occupied a sector between U.S. IX Corps and ROK
III Corps.[30]
[30] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92.
The U.S. 3d Division was attached to I Corps and the 187th Airborne RCT
passed temporarily under operational control of IX Corps.
By 7 January the UN forces had pulled back to a modified Line D
extending from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east and
taking in Yoju and Chechon. General Ridgway sent telegrams to all corps
commanders expressing dissatisfaction with the personnel and material
losses inflicted on the enemy during the withdrawal. “I shall expect,”
each message concluded, “utmost exploitation of every opportunity in
accordance with my basic directive.”
That evening, foreshadowing the offensive operations he was
contemplating, the commanding general ordered a reconnaissance-in-force
by a reinforced infantry regiment north to Osan to search out the
enemy and inflict maximum punishment. No contacts were made, nor did
strong patrols sent out by U.S. IX Corps flush out any sizeable groups
of Chinese. But the Eighth Army had served notice that it intended to
regain the initiative at the first opportunity.
One more blow remained to be absorbed. On the 8th the Communists struck
in the Wonju area with an attack of four divisions. Elements of the
newly reorganized 2d Infantry Division were forced to give up that
important highway and rail center after counterattacks failed. The
enemy now directed his main effort along the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon
corridor, and North Korean guerrilla forces infiltrated through the gap
between the U.S. X Corps and ROK III Corps.
The salient created by this CCF attack caused Line D to be modified
again so that in the center it dipped sharply downward to Chungju
before curving northeast to Samchok (Map 4).
_Marine Aircraft in the Battle_
The pilots and aircrewmen of the three carrier squadrons and the
land-based jet squadron were the only Marines in a position to take an
active part in the battle. With but one TACP per division, close air
support was out of the question for the ROKs on New Year’s Day.
Control facilities were severely strained when scores of UN fliers
made use of the frequencies which the Mosquitoes employed for tactical
air direction. The voices were all in the English language, but with
more than one person doing the sending, shrill side noises sliced in
to garble the whole into a cacophony of jungle sounds. A Mosquito
trying to coach a fighter-bomber attack at the crossings of the Imjin
might be drowned out by a distant pilot calling up a controller in the
Hwachon Reservoir Area.[31]
[31] USAF Hist Study No. 72, _U. S. Air Force Operations in
the Korean Conflict_, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, (hereafter
cited as AHS-72) pp. 188–196. The term “net” denotes a
network of radio stations, all on a single frequency for
a specific purpose.
As a consequence, there was no coordinated air-ground attack in
direct support of the man in the foxhole. Most of the JOC effort was
directed to the enemy’s rear in an effort to block supporting arms,
reinforcements, and supplies.
The two Marine squadrons attached to Admiral Ruble’s carriers were at
sea, some 80 miles south of Inchon when news of the Chinese offensive
filtered through the tedious communication channels from JOC and EUSAK.
Major Lund, CO of VMF-323, led an eight-plane attack which destroyed
enemy trucks and some 40 huts believed to be occupied by CCF troops in
a village south of the Imjin.
Another Marine air mission of New Year’s Day was the flight commanded
by Major Kenneth L. Reusser for the purpose of wiping out a reported
CCF concentration on the central front. Unfortunately, he could not
get verification that the target consisted of enemy troops. Before
a decision could be made, Reusser heard a Mosquito of the 2d ROK
Division calling urgently for any flier in the area to hit another CCF
concentration (this time verified) in a village to the enemy’s rear of
the Chorwon-Hwachon area. Under the Mosquito’s direction the Corsairs
bombed and napalmed the village, then strafed survivors trying to
escape.
VMF-212, flying with Navy (Task Force) TF-77 on the eastern side of
the peninsula, had a busy New Year’s Day. Two eight-plane interdiction
strikes were flown in the morning against rear area targets along the
coastal highways. The afternoon brought an emergency call from JOC,
and the squadron “scrambled” 14 planes which hit the east flank of an
extensive enemy push south of the Hwachon Reservoir.[32]
[32] The term “scramble” in military aviation parlance refers
to an expeditious takeoff in response to an emergency
call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a
pattern rather than a panic.
More than 300 UN fighter-bombers were sent out under JOC, or MELLOW,
control on the embattled first day of 1951. On the west coast TacRon-3
received more calls for air support than TG-96.8 could fill. Rear
Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey sent a request to Admiral Struble in the
_Missouri_ for additional carrier planes, and within a few hours the
Marines of VMF-212 were detached and on their way to the west coast to
join the other two Corsair squadrons of TG-96.8.
All four Marine fighter-bomber squadrons took part daily in air
operations as the Chinese Reds continued their advance south of Seoul.
VMF-311 was badly handicapped, however, by mechanical difficulties.
Engine or radio trouble accounted for five “aborts” of the 15 sorties
launched on 4 January. The remaining pilots could not make radio
contacts with their assigned Mosquito controller, and had little choice
other than to attack targets of opportunity.
The jets continued in action, but it was realized that they were
not giving the maximum of their capabilities. By mid-January the
squadron had become almost ineffective through no fault of its own.
Technical representatives from the companies that had manufactured
both the engine and plane were flown to K-9 (Map 3), and on the 16th
all jets were grounded. These inspectors did not work on the planes;
they were empowered only to report the nature of the trouble to the
airplane companies concerned. The companies in turn reported to BuAir
in Washington, which sent instructions and if necessary mechanics to
Itami, where major aircraft maintenance was done.
Meanwhile, the fall of Seoul meant that the Air Force was evicted by
enemy action from such major fields as Kimpo and K-16 on an island in
the river Han. The Sabre jets and Mosquitoes had to be pulled back, and
soon the F-51s were no longer secure at Suwon from an advancing enemy.
Admiral Thackrey’s Western Deployment Group completed the evacuation
from Inchon of 70,000 tons of supplies, 2,000 vehicles, and about
5,000 troops.[33] As the Navy closed out activities on the west
coast, TG-96.8 sent out its last combat air missions on 7 January.
VMF-214 made its final reconnaissance patrols; VMF-212 flew 25 sorties
in support of UN troops in central Korea; and VMF-323 took part in
a series of Air Force raids on enemy troop assembly areas in the
Hoengsong area.[33]
[33] AHS-72, 47, 48; PhibGru-3 _WD_, Jan 51.
Until the last, the carrier Marines alternated their Eighth Army
support missions with routine CAPs, coastal searches, and airfield
bombings. Admiral Thackrey’s Redeployment Group, including TacRon-3,
completed its task in the Inchon area and departed on the 7th. On
that same day HMS _Theseus_, flying the flag of Admiral Andrewes, was
back in west coast waters as the British pilots resumed their coastal
patrols and naval air support on that side of the peninsula. Within a
week VMF-212 and the _Bataan_ returned to fly alternate tours of duty
with the pilots of the _Theseus_. The other two carrier squadrons found
themselves unemployed for the time being. Not only were they out of a
job, they were also homeless, since the United Nations had been forced
to give up airfields at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul, Kimpo, and Suwon. Only
K-1, K-2, K-4, K-9, K-10, and two small fields near Taegu remained
(Map 2), and they would scarcely serve the needs of FEAF. Thus it was
that VMF-214 and VMF-323 found a temporary haven at Itami, along with
VMF-311 and most of the administrative and service units of the 1st
MAW. There was nothing to do but wait until a new home could be found
for the fighter-bomber squadrons.
_1st Marine Division Assigned Mission_
The Marine aviators might have found some consolation in the fact that
their comrades of the ground forces were also groping in a fog of
uncertainty. At the most critical period of the CCF thrust in the Wonju
area, General Smith was summoned to Taegu on 8 January for a conference
with General Ridgway. The Eighth Army commander proposed to attach one
of the Marine RCTs to X Corps in the Andong area, about 95 air miles
north of Masan. The remainder of the Division would then move to the
Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area, some 60 air miles northeast of Masan (Map
4).
Ridgway asked the Marine general to discuss the prospect with his
staff. He realized, he said, that no commander liked to have his
division split up, and he assured Smith that as soon as the X Corps
zone became stabilized, the RCT would be sent back to him.
They parted with this understanding, but a few hours after his return
by air to Masan the following message was received from Ridgway:
Subsequent your departure, alternate plan occurred to me on which
I would like your views soonest. It follows: 1st Mar Div, under
Army control, move without delay to general area outlined to you
personally today, to take over responsibility at date and hour
to be announced later for protection of MSR between Andong and
Kyongju, both inclusive, and prevent hostile penetration in force
south of Andong-Yongdok road.[34]
[34] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G-1-628-KGG, 8 Jan
51.
At 1115 on the 9th the plan was made official. An Eighth Army dispatch
ordered the 1st Marine Division to move without delay to the Pohang
area (Map 4), remaining under EUSAK control, with the following
missions:
(a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of the Andong-Yongdok
road;
(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and
Uisong.[35]
[35] EUSAK msg GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51.
Based on these directives. Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 on the
9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect
the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity
of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions,
plus other Division elements, were ordered to provide the required
trucks.[36]
[36] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 1-51, 9 Jan 51.
General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 9 January.
He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, where the
Division staff officers and regimental commanders were presented to
him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnaissance
and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Marine
officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth Army units
would be put into effect soon.[37]
[37] Smith, _Notes_, 1279.
Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the
completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan to the
objective area.[38]
[38] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 2-51, 10 Jan 51.
Shortages both of personnel and equipment were much reduced during
the first two weeks of January. Returns to duty of battle and
nonbattle casualties added 945 to the Division strength. Corresponding
improvements had been made in the material readiness of the Division.
Early in January a large resupply shipment arrived from Kobe, and
a Navy cargo ship brought supplies and equipment which had been
left behind at Inchon in October. Thus the situation was generally
satisfactory except for nearly 1,900 gaps in the ranks that remained to
be filled.[39]
[39] Smith, _Notes_, 1285–1286, 1307–1308.
_Replacements by Air and Sea_
Facilities for air transport across the Pacific were limited, since
the Army was also moving replacements to the Far East. A piecemeal
process of shuttling Marines in plane-load increments could not be
completed before 30 January. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
Jr., commanding FMFPac, took a dim view of this delay. It would be
better for the Division, he maintained, to receive even a part of its
replacements before it went back into action. As a compromise, he
proposed a combined air-sea lift which met the approval of Rear Admiral
Arthur H. Radford, commanding Pacific Fleet.
Three replacement drafts were already on the way, with the 3d in Japan
and the 4th and 5th at Camp Pendleton. General Shepherd scraped the
bottom of the manpower barrel so closely that he dug up an additional
700 men from Marine security detachments in Japan, the Philippines, and
other Pacific Ocean bases.
Seven trainloads of Marines from Camp Lejeune arrived at San Francisco
on 10 January to join those from Camp Pendleton. On the same day
230 of these replacements were flown to Hawaii by the Military Air
Transportation Service (MATS), by the R5D’s of Marine VMR-352 and of
Navy VR-5, and by the “Mars” flying boats of Navy VR-9. The next day
799 Marines sailed on the fast transport USNS _General W. O. Darby_.
The remainder were transported at the rate of one plane load a day
by MATS and at the rate of three or four plane loads a day by the
Navy and Marine transport planes of Fleet Logistics Air Wing, Pacific
(FLogAirWingPac).[40]
[40] Material relative to Marine replacements has been derived
from FMFPac _HD_, Dec 50 and Jan 51.
Five days later, on the 16th, the airlift had cleared the last Marine
out of Treasure Island. On 21 January, 1,000 men of the special draft
were already with the 1st Division at Pohang and the 799 on board
_General Darby_ were due to dock at Pusan.
It had been a fast job of coordination by the Navy, Army, Air Force,
and virtually all major units of the Marine Corps. Much of the special
airlift was flown by the R5Ds of VMR-352 and of VMR-152. The former,
commanded by Colonel William B. Steiner, had been flying the El
Toro-Tokyo flights since October, but most of its effort had been in
shuttling between the mainland and Hawaii. VMR-152 had concentrated on
the Hawaii-Japan leg of the long trip. During the Chosin campaign,
the squadron commander, Colonel Deane C. Roberts, had maintained his
headquarters and 10 planes at Itami to support the shuttle to Korea.
He had barely returned to Hawaii from that job when his squadron was
alerted not only for the special lift of Marine replacements but also
for a return to the Far East.[41]
[41] The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50
and Jan 51 historical diaries of VMF-352, VMR-152, 1st
MAW, and FMFPac.
Hawaii had been the bottleneck in this special troop lift. Land and
seaplanes were discharging their human cargo at Barbers Point, Hickam
Air Force Base, and Keehi Lagoon. From there FLogAirWingPac had to
space the planes over the long stretches of sea at approximately
four-hour intervals. The guiding factor was other air traffic over
the same route and the servicing, messing, and rescue capabilities of
Guam and other points along the way, such as tiny Johnston Island. The
latter was barely big enough for its single 6,100-foot runway.
VMR-152 and the Navy’s VR-21 were assigned the mission of flying
the long Hawaii-Japan portion of the big lift. Itami became another
collection center for the airborne replacements and five of the VMR-152
planes were retained there to shuttle the troops the last 300 miles to
K-3, near Pohang (Map 2). On 21 January the troop lift reached virtual
completion, but Admiral Radford authorized the 1st MAW to retain a
couple of R5D’s at Itami a little longer. Thus the Marines were able
to avoid highway and rail traffic jams in Korea by flying men and
materials from troop and supply centers in Japan to K-1, K-3, or K-9.
Looking back at the troop lift from a historical distance, the observer
is most impressed by its demonstration of teamwork on a gigantic scale.
The Marine Corps had functioned as a single great unit, even though a
continent and an ocean separated the vanguard in Korea from the rear
echelons in North Carolina.
_The Move to Japanese Airfields_
The seven remaining UN airfields in Korea were of course not enough
to accommodate the 25 FEAF and Marine tactical squadrons. Logistics
and lack of space proved to be knotty problems. Thirty tank cars of
gasoline a day were needed for normal flight operations of K-2 alone.
Yet it took these cars eight days to make the 120-mile Pusan-Taegu
round trip, such was the strain put on the railway system by the CCF
offensive.
FEAF had standby plans to evacuate Korea entirely in an emergency. Some
of the secondary airfields of the Itazuke complex in Japan had been
reevaluated for this purpose. Originally built by the Japanese for
World War II, they were obsolescent by 1951 and because of weather,
neglect, and misuse badly deteriorated.[42]
[42] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG-33 _HD_s
of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be
designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS-72, 35–37; EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; _PacFlt Interim
Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion
Two (hereafter MCB-2) Report of Activities for Jan 51;
Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58.
The most promising of these secondary airfields were Tsuika, Ozuki, and
Bofu (Map 3), ranging from 30 to 65 miles east of Itazuke and facing
one another around Japan’s Inland Sea. Nearest to Itazuke and on the
same island of Kyushu was Tsuika. Across the narrow Shimonoseki Strait,
on the shore line of Honshu, were Ozuki and Bofu.
General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, informed General MacArthur
that it was necessary to start air operations from Ozuki and Bofu as
soon as possible. A good deal of work had already been done on Tsuika,
even to moving a major Japanese highway in order to lengthen the runway
to 7,000 feet. The Air Force general wanted to repair Ozuki for his
F-51 squadrons, and Bofu was to be reserved for the 1st MAW.
This decision meant a revision of plans for the Marines. MAG-12 had
recently been lifting a hundred men a day to K-1 (Pusan west) with a
view to making it into a major base. These preparations came to an
abrupt halt, pending the final decision on Bofu.
A Marine survey of that World War II airfield showed it to be in
serious disrepair. The Air Force had already rejected it as a base for
night-harassing B-26s. Although the runway was only 7 feet above sea
level, a 720-foot hill complicated the traffic pattern. Nevertheless,
Bofu was considered suitable for the time being, and the Air Force
assured the 1st MAW that its use would be but temporary.
FEAF proposed that the Marines start flying out of Bofu immediately,
operating under field conditions. There were, however, essential
repairs to be made. The 5,300-foot runway remained in fair condition,
but much of the taxiway was not surfaced and couldn’t stand heavy use
by the Corsairs, Three of the four hangars needed extensive repairs,
as did the barracks and mess hall. Fuel would have to be stored in
drums.
The Wing had the capability for minor construction but lacked the
equipment, men, and fiscal authority to handle major work on the
runways and taxiways. The Air Force offered to furnish the labor
and materials, provided that the Navy pay for them. The Navy in its
turn was too limited in funds to restore an Air Force field for only
temporary use by Marines.
Finally, a compromise solved the problem. The Navy agreed to have
the engineering work done by a detachment of its Mobile Construction
Battalion 2 (Seabees) and furnish the concrete for patching the runways
and rebuilding the warm-up aprons. The Air Force was to provide the
pierced steel planking for the runways.
On 15 January MAG-33 sent an advance detachment of 125 officers and men
to Bofu to do some of the preliminary work, and on the following day
the Seabees initiated the heavy construction. The restoration of K-1
was meanwhile resumed by MAG-12.
Until these two fields were made ready, VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ would
be the only Marine squadron in combat.
_Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign_
The middle of January was also a transition period for the 1st Marine
Division. In accordance with Division Orders 1-51 and 2-51, the
movement from Masan commenced at 0545 on 10 January when the first
serial of RCT-1 departed by motor for the Pohang-Andong area. LSTs
898 and 914 sailed the next day with elements of the Tank, Ordnance,
Engineer, and Service Battalions. The new Division CP opened at
Sinhung, about five miles southeast of Pohang, at 1600 on 16 January;
and by the 17th all designated motor and water lifts were completed.
Thus the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were poised
to begin new operations which will be described in the following
chapter.[43]
[43] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51.
By 15 January relative quiet prevailed along the entire front; the
Chinese Reds had shot their bolt. In terms of territorial gains (Map
4) the Communists could claim a victory, for they had inflicted heavy
losses both in troop casualties and equipment on the UN forces. Yet
the CCF January offensive could not compare with the November-December
attacks either in moral or material damage done to the Eighth Army.
This time the UN divisions had withdrawn for the most part in good
order after the rout of ROK units at the outset. Nor were Ridgway’s
troops always driven from their positions by enemy action. Whenever he
had an option between sacrificing men or Korean real estate, it was the
latter he chose. And by his insistence on good combat discipline, he
made the enemy pay an exorbitant price.
Nevertheless, the blunt fact remains that the United Nations forces
had been beaten in spite of an overwhelming superiority in aircraft,
artillery, armor, and transport as well as command of the sea.
Stateside Americans can scarcely be blamed for asking themselves why
their well-equipped divisions had been defeated twice within six weeks
by an Asiatic peasant army using semiguerrilla tactics and depending
largely on small arms, mortars, and light artillery.
The answer cannot be given in simplified terms. Although the Chinese
Reds were represented by a peasant army, it was also a first-rate army
when judged by its own tactical and strategic standards. Military
poverty might be blamed for some of its deficiencies in arms and
equipment, but its semiguerrilla tactics were based on a mobility which
could not be burdened with heavy weapons and transport. The Chinese
coolie in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing better than any
other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an enemy position
in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only Americans who have
had such an experience can realize what a shock it is to be surprised
at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun slugs of gnomelike
attackers who seemed to rise out of the very earth.
Press correspondents were fond of referring to “the human sea tactics
of the Asiatic hordes.” Nothing could be further from the truth. In
reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment.
Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless
succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass but deception and
surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable.
They also had an advantage over Western soldiers in their ability to
withstand hunger and cold while making long night marches. After all,
the rigors of a winter campaign in Korea were not much worse than the
hardships the Chinese peasant had endured all his life. Usually he was
a veteran of at least five years’ combat experience, for China had
known little but war since the Japanese invasion of 1935. Many of Mao
Tse-tung’s troops, in fact, were former Nationalists who had fought for
Chiang Kai-shek.
The Chinese Reds held another advantage in Korean terrain well suited
to their tactical system. This factor has been ably summarized by U.S.
Military Academy historians:
The mountains are high, and the deep gorges between them are a
bar to traffic even when the streams are dry or frozen. Roads are
few, and those that do exist are not suited for heavy traffic.
Transportation then becomes a problem for the pack mule and the
human back rather than the self-propelled vehicle. Telephone
wires are difficult to lay and, with guerrillas on every hand,
are doubly hard to maintain. Even radio is limited by such
terrain, with a considerable reduction in range. In all, most
observers have agreed that American forces have seldom fought in
terrain to which modern means of war are less adaptable.[44]
[44] U.S. Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_, 28–29.
The fanaticism and political indoctrination of the CCF soldier must
also be taken into account. His introduction to Communism began when
he was persuaded that China’s small farms would be taken away from the
hated landlords and divided among the people. This is the first stage
of every Communist upheaval. Next comes a reign of terror calculated
to liquidate the entire class of landlords and small shopkeepers.
Communist China, almost literally wading in blood, had reached this
second phase in 1951, the “year of violence.” Mass trials were held in
which the People’s Tribunals, keyed up to a frenzy of fury, sentenced
group after group of “Capitalist oppressors” to death without bothering
about the evidence. The executions were public spectacles. An estimated
million and a half of them took place in 1951 alone as loudspeakers on
street corners blared out first-hand descriptions.
Drives were organized for everything in Red China. So rapidly did
they multiply that humorless Communist leaders saw no absurdity in
announcing a new drive to reduce the number of drives. And when the
Youth League tried too zealously to please, a drive was launched “to
Correct the Undesirable Habit of Filing False Reports.”[45] Under these
circumstances it is understandable that great emphasis was placed
on Red China’s “Hate America” drive early in 1951. The illiterate
masses were made to believe that Americans practiced all manner of
bestialities, including even cannibalism. This was the indoctrination
of the CCF soldier in Korea, and political commissars with a captain’s
authority were attached to each company to see that no backsliding
occurred. In case of doubt, it was a simple matter to compel the
suspected political deviate to kneel at the roadside and await a bullet
from behind.
[45] Richard L. Walker, _China Under Communism_ (New Haven,
1955), 119, 307.
_A Tactical Formula for Victory_
It might well be inquired where Red China raised the funds, for even
wars waged with human cannon fodder do not come cheaply. Much of the
money was donated by new farm owners as “voluntary” contributions
exceeding by far the rent and taxes of pre-Communist years. The slave
labor of millions of Chinese sent to concentration camps also helped
to foot the bill. In the long run, however, the Communist lords found
perhaps their most effective means in the extortion of ransom from
Chinese living outside the country on pain of torturing or killing
relatives dwelling within its borders. Enormous sums were collected in
spite of the efforts of foreign governments to put an end to this form
of secret terrorism.[46]
[46] _Ibid._, 13.
Altogether, the army of Red China may be appraised as a formidable
instrument on terrain suited to its tactics. Several of America’s
foremost military thinkers were convinced, nevertheless, that Eighth
Army reverses of the first few months in Korea were the penalty paid
for a national preoccupation with airborne atomic weapons at the
expense of preparations for limited wars.
It was only natural that the American public and its political and
military leaders in Washington should have been much concerned about
a weapon with the capability of wiping out a medium-size city in
a minute.[47] Their anxiety was heightened by President Truman’s
announcement on 23 September 1949 that Soviet Russia had exploded an
atomic bomb. A great many Americans, probably a majority, sincerely
believed that it was hardly worthwhile to prepare for an old-fashioned
limited war when the Armageddon of the future would be fought to an
awesome finish with thermonuclear weapons. National policy was shaped
by this line of reasoning; and though we had every opportunity to
study Chinese tactics prior to 1950, few if any preparations were made
to cope with them. The outbreak of Korean hostilities found the four
U.S. skeleton divisions in Japan woefully unready, both morally and
materially.
[47] The day had not yet dawned when the hydrogen bomb would
have a much greater potentiality for frightfulness.
At a later date three high-placed U.S. Army generals, Matthew B.
Ridgway, James M. Gavin, and Maxwell D. Taylor, would retire because
they could not reconcile their views with a national policy which
they interpreted as placing all our strategic eggs in the basket of
intercontinental bombers and guided missiles. Afterwards, as advocates
of preparedness for limited as well as atomic warfare, they published
books presenting their side of the case.[48]
[48] Gen M. B. Ridgway, _Memoirs_ (New York, 1956); Gen J. M.
Gavin, _War and Peace in the Space Age_ (New York, 1958);
Gen M. D. Taylor, _The Uncertain Trumpet_ (New York,
1959).
On 15 January 1951 these developments were still in the future, of
course. But even at the time it had already been made evident that
the armed forces of Red China were not an exception to the age-old
rule that there is no such thing as an invincible army. When they came
up against well trained and led U.S. Army outfits in both of their
offensives, they always had a fight on their hands and frequently a
repulse.
The Marines had proved beyond doubt in their Chosin Reservoir campaign
that the Chinese Reds could be beaten by ground and air firepower
engendered by sound training, discipline, and combat leadership. Five
Chinese armies, of three or four divisions each, were identified in
northeast Korea during the November-December operations. Three of
them were directly or indirectly opposed to the 1st Marine Division,
with a U.S. Army battalion and smaller Army units attached. Yet the
beleaguered American forces seized the initiative and fought their way
for 13 days and 35 miles through enveloping CCF units which had cut the
mountain MSR in five places.
Throughout the CCF January offensive, EUSAK G-2 officers anxiously
sought every scrap of evidence as to the whereabouts of the five CCF
armies identified in northeast Korea as late as 10 December. Even if
reduced by casualties, they would have been a formidable and perhaps
even decisive reinforcement to the seven CCF armies engaged. But they
did not appear. Nor were they encountered again until the middle of
March 1951, when similarly numbered units filled with replacements
reached the front.
The full story may never be known, since the Chinese Reds are not fond
of acknowledging their disasters. But it is a likely conjecture that
the fatal combination of Marine firepower and General Winter created
terrible havoc among Communists who had been so certain of an immediate
victory that they were neither armed, clothed, nor supplied for a
13-day campaign in subzero weather.
CHAPTER III
The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt
_The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to Bofu--Marine Rice
Paddy Patrols--Operations_ THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP_--Action in the
Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_--_10th_
NPKA _Division Scattered--New Mission for the Marines_
On 15 January 1951 a reinforced regiment of the U.S. 25th Infantry
Division drove northward from Line D (Map 4) to a point about half
a mile from Suwon in the I Corps sector. VMF-212, flying from the
CVE _Bataan_, supported the movement along with land-based Air Force
planes. No CCF troops were encountered during a two-day thrust
dignified with the name Operation WOLFHOUND. Its only importance lay in
its distinction as the first Eighth Army counterstroke in reply to the
enemy’s January offensive. Other EUSAK advances were soon to follow,
each more ambitious than the last and bearing a more bristling code
name.
General Ridgway proposed by this means to exert continual and
increasing pressure on an enemy paying for victory with extended supply
lines. Meanwhile, he hoped to build up the morale of his own troops
without asking too much of them at first.
In less than seven weeks, from 1 December 1950 to 15 January 1951, the
Eighth Army had been pushed back an average distance of 200 miles.
Never before in the Nation’s history had an American army given up so
much ground and equipment in so short a time, and damage to morale was
inevitable. Yet the commanding general was confident that a cure would
be effected by better combat leadership and discipline. He planned to
emphasize the need for these remedies until he restored the Eighth Army
to tactical health.
_The New Marine Zone of Operations_
Ridgway agreed with Marine generals that the 1st Marine Division had
come out of its 13-day battle in the Chosin Reservoir area with its
fighting spirit undulled. Minor respiratory ills seemed to be the
only consequences felt by the survivors. “A hacking cough,” recalled
a Marine staff officer long afterwards, “was the symbol of the Bean
Patch.”[49]
[49] MajGen F. M. McAlister ltr, 17 Jun 57.
Such ills soon responded to rest and medical care, and it was a
physically fit division that made the move to the new zone of
operations. About one man out of three in the infantry and artillery
battalions was a newcomer to Korea. These replacements were shaping up
nicely, and the new operation promised to be ideal combat training.
The move took nearly a week. While the other troops proceeded by motor,
LSTs 898 and 914 sailed with elements of the Tank, Ordnance, Engineer,
and Service Battalions. The Division CP opened at Sinhung (Map 5),
about 5 miles southeast of Pohang, on 16 January. By the following day
all designated motor and water lifts were completed.
On the 18th the Marines were assigned a three-fold mission by Division
OpnO 3-51: (1) the protection of the Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR (main
supply route); (2) the securing of Andong and the two airstrips in the
vicinity; and (3) the prevention of hostile penetrations in force to
the south of the Andong-Yongdok road. The following zones of patrol
responsibility were assigned to Marine units:
_Zone A_--RCT-1: an area about 10 miles east and west of the
Uisong-Andong road, including both Uisong and Andong.
_Zone B_--RCT-5: an area some 15 to 20 miles wide astride the
Kyongju-Yongchon-Uisong road, including Kyongju but excluding Uisong.
_Zone C_--RCT-7: an area 20 to 25 miles wide from east to west and
extending north from the latitude of Pohang to the Andong-Yongdok road.
_Zone D_--11th Marines: a strip seven miles wide along the coast
astride the road from Pohang to a point about 10 miles north of Yongdok.
_Zone E_--1st Tank Battalion: the area bounded by the road from
Pohang to Kyongju and thence to the east coast at a point about 19
miles southeast of Pohang.
[Illustration: MAP 5
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
and
Regimental Boundries
During Pohang Guerrilla Hunt]
Keeping open the 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong was
considered the principal mission of the Division. Strong points were
set up at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.
Captured documents indicated that enemy forces in unknown numbers had
already infiltrated through gaps in the eastern sectors of the Eighth
Army’s Line D. Guerrilla activity was reported as far west as Tanyang,
on the MSR of IX Corps, and as far south as Taejon, threatening the
supply line of I Corps. Train ambushes occurred on 13 January in the
Namchang area and to the south of Wonju. Other attacks took place on
the rail line about 60 miles north of Taegu. In expectation of further
attempts, trains were provided with a sandbagged car, pushed ahead of
the engine, to absorb the shock of landmine explosions. Another car was
occupied by guards who had the duty of dealing with direct guerrilla
attacks.[50]
[50] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51.
The tactical problem of the Marines was quite simple--on paper. About
1,600 square miles, most of them standing on end in mountainous
terrain, were included in the new zone of operations. The experience
of World War II had demonstrated how effective guerrilla warfare could
be as an adjunct to large-scale military operations. Officers of the
1st Marine Division had no illusions about their mission, therefore,
when they received unconfirmed reports of NKPA guerrilla infiltrations
behind the EUSAK lines toward Andong.
All uncertainty vanished on 18 January, shortly after the issuing of
OpnO 3-51, when a patrol of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, flushed out
an undetermined number of North Korean troops east of Andong. They took
to their heels so earnestly that the Marines barely managed to catch
three of them after a long chase.
The prisoners identified their unit as the 27th Infantry of the NKPA
10th Infantry Division. The other two regiments, the 25th and 29th,
were also in the general area. All three were supported more in theory
than fact by artillery, mortar, medical, and engineer units organic
to the division. In reality, however, the estimated total of 6,000
troops consisted largely of infantry, A few mortars, according to the
prisoners, were the largest weapons.
Following the Inchon-Seoul operation, the remnants of the badly
mauled NKPA 10th Infantry Division had straggled back across the
38th Parallel to the Hwachon area. There they were reorganized by the
Chinese for guerrilla operations and placed under the command of NKPA
Major General Lee Ban Nam.[51]
[51] 1stMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (_PIR_) 87–94,
17–22 Jan 51.
Late in December the rebuilt division, still short of arms and
equipment, departed Hwachon with a mission of infiltrating through the
UN lines to cut communications and harass rear installations of the
Andong-Taegu area. Shots were exchanged with United Nations troops near
Wonju, but General Lee Ban Nam and his troops contrived to slip to the
east through the mountains. Stealthily moving southward, marching by
night and hiding by day, they were soon in a position to heckle the
rear of the X Corps sector. This advantage did not last long. Before
they could strike a blow, the element of surprise was lost along with
the three prisoners taken by the Marines.
As the Marine units moved into their assigned zones, General Ridgway
flew to Pohang to confer with General Smith. Not only did he express
confidence that the Marines would soon have the situation well under
control; he also suggested the possibility of small amphibious landings
along the east coast. The purpose was to block a possible southward
advance of the three CCF armies that had operated in Northeast Korea
during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.[52]
[52] Units of these armies, it may be recalled, were not
identified again in the CCF order of battle before the
middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of
these enemy troops being used for a surprise stroke had
to be taken into consideration.
The east coast littoral was considered the most likely route of
approach. Smith was of the opinion, however, that an amphibious landing
should be made in strength, if at all. And there the matter rested.[53]
[53] Smith, _Notes_, 1339.
_1st MAW Moves to Bofu_
During the operations of the first few days the Marine ground forces
had to depend for air support on FEAF planes sent by JOC. The 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing had its hands full at this time with housekeeping
activities. Work began at Bofu (Map 3) on 20 January as a Seabee
detachment arrived with its graders and bulldozers. They were assisted
by details of Marines from MAG-33.[54]
[54] This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on
the January historical diaries of the following
organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214;
VMF-323; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)-542; MWSS-1; FMFPac. Another
source is _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969.
The job went ahead with typical Seabee efficiency. While specialists
installed plumbing for the galleys and barracks, other crews graded
taxiways, laid pierced steel planking, and poured concrete to patch up
runways, parking ramps, and warmup aprons.
MAG-12 kept busy at the task of moving men and equipment from Itami
and other Japanese fields to Korea. Aircraft of VMR-152, commanded
by Colonel Deane C. Roberts, provided transportation. Since safety
measures precluded the use of the K-1 runway during construction
activity, K-9 substituted temporarily. As fast as the planes unloaded,
passengers and gear were trucked 15 miles through Pusan to K-1.
It was a transition period in more ways than one for the 1st MAW.
Following are the changes of commanders that took place during the last
2 weeks of January:
Colonel Radford C. West, relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Paul J.
Fontana as commanding officer of MAG-33;
Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole, joined MAG-33 staff as
personnel officer after being relieved of VMF-312 command by
Major Donald P. Frame;
Major Arnold A. Lund of VMF-323, relieved by Major Stanley S.
Nicolay and assigned to General Harris’ staff as assistant
operations officer;
Major William M. Lundin, relieved of VMF-214 command by Major
James A. Feeney, Jr., and transferred to the command of Service
and Maintenance Squadron-33 (SMS-33).
This left only Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski of VMF-212
and Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr., of VMF(N)-542 still in
command of the tactical squadrons they brought to Korea; and the latter
was to be relieved by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson in February.
The only combat operations of the 1st MAW during the week of
housekeeping from 16 to 23 January were carried out by VMF-212 from the
deck of the _Bataan_.[55] This CVL carrier alternated with the British
light fleet carrier HMS _Theseus_ on the Korean west coast blockade.
Their activities were coordinated by Vice Admiral Andrewes, RN,
commanding the group blockading the Korean west coast.
[55] VMF-212 _HD_, Jan 51; USS _Bataan_ (CVL-29) Action Rpt,
“Operations off the West Coast of Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr
51;” USS _Bataan WD_, Jan 51; Col R. W. Wyczawski, interv
of 2 Jun 58.
VMF-212 sent out a morning and afternoon reconnaissance flight each
day up the coastline as far as the 39th parallel. On the trip north
the pilots scanned the coastal waters for small enemy shipping which
might indicate reinforcement from Chinese ports on the Yellow Sea. The
return trip along the highways and railroads of the littoral was made
to detect signs of any new enemy activity on land. Four aircraft flew
each of the two coastal sweeps; eight maintained a defensive patrol
over the carrier itself; and any remaining flights were under control
of JOC, with FEAF Mosquitoes providing liaison between fighter-bombers
and ground forces.
To insure sea room beyond the islands and mudbanks of the west coast,
the _Bataan_ had to stay outside the 100-fathom curve. This meant that
the pilots must fly across 65 to 80 miles of open sea in order to reach
the coast. The winter weather varied from unbelievable to unbearable,
and bulky, uncomfortable survival suits were a necessity. They could be
a death trap, however, if a leak developed or if they were not adjusted
tightly at the throat and wrists. Captain Alfred H. Agan, for instance,
was shot down southeast of Inchon and had to choose between landing in
enemy territory and ditching in the sea. He tried for a small island
offshore but crash-landed into the surf. Before a helicopter from the
_Bataan_ could fly 65 miles to the rescue, he died from the shock of
icy water which partially filled his survival suit.
The pilots of VMF-212 reported an increase in enemy antiaircraft fire,
particularly in CCF rear areas. They were amazed to find troops dug in
along the coast as far back as 50 or 60 miles from the battle lines.
These precautions were the enemy’s tribute to Marine capabilities for
amphibious warfare. The fear of another Inchon caused the Chinese to
immobilize thousands of men on both coasts to guard against another
such decisive landing far behind the front.
On the squadron’s third day of sea operations, three planes were hit
by rifle and machine gun fire on reconnaissance missions. One of them,
flown by Captain Russell G. Patterson, Jr., was shot down behind the
enemy lines but a FEAF helicopter rescued the pilot. First Lieutenant
Alfred J. Ward was not so fortunate. His plane was riddled the
following day by enemy fire and he crashed to his death in the midst of
CCF soldiers.
Not until 22 January did the reconditioning of Bofu reach such an
advanced stage that Lieutenant Colonel Fontana could set up his MAG-33
command post. VMF-312 moved in the next day and the first combat
missions were launched to the vicinity of Seoul, 300 miles away. On
the 24th General Harris established his headquarters. A few hours later
VMF-214 and VMF-323 arrived from Itami, where they had put in an idle
week, with no place to go, after their carrier duty. On the 26th, when
they flew their first missions as land-based squadrons, MAG-33 was back
in business and Bofu was a going concern.
No such claim could have been made for MAG-12 and K-1. Although Colonel
Boeker C. Batterton set up his command post on 27 January 1951, two
more weeks were to pass before the K-1 runway was fit for the flights
to tactical aircraft. Meanwhile, the MAG-12 squadrons had to make out
as best they could at K-9.
_Marine Rice Paddy Patrols_
Operations of the first few days demonstrated to 1st Marine Division
ground forces that locating the enemy was more of a problem than
defeating him. Obviously, the NKPA 10th Division had few if any of
the advantages which make for effective guerrilla warfare. Far from
receiving any voluntary support from the inhabitants, the Korean Reds
had their own movements promptly reported to the Marines. Retaliations
on civilians, such as burning mountain villages, were not calculated
to improve relations. Nor did the enemy possess any of the other
requisites for successful operations in an opponent’s rear--a base,
a source of supply, good communications, and a reliable intelligence
system.
If it came to a fight, there could be little doubt about the outcome.
But Marine staff officers must have been reminded of the old recipe for
rabbit pie which begins, “First, catch your rabbit.”
Such a situation called for systematic patrolling in all Marine zones
of action. Secondary roads and mountain trails were covered by “rice
paddy patrols.” Numbering from four men to a squad, these groups ranged
far and wide on foot in an area that was more often vertical than
horizontal. On a single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 of these rice
paddy patrols in action.[56] No better training for replacements could
have been devised. Sometimes the men were on their own for several
days, depending for supplies on helicopter drops. And while casualties
were light, there was just enough danger from sniping and potential
ambushes to keep the replacements on the alert.
[56] 5thMar _WD_, Jan-Feb 51.
Roads fit for vehicles--especially the 75-mile stretch of MSR from
Pohang to Andong--were under the constant surveillance of motorized
patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105mm howitzer. The
farthest distance was 15 miles between the main Marine strong points at
Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.[57]
[57] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51.
Close air support was seldom needed against such an elusive enemy as
the Marines faced. General Craig put in a request, however, for an
air squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two Marine
all-weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, were General Harris’
first and second choices. They had been flying under Air Force (314th
Air Division) control in the defense of Japan, a mission of dull
routine and waiting for something to break the monotony of patrolling.
The twin-engined F7F-3N Tigercats of VMF(N)-542 were well equipped
with electronics equipment for night interceptor work. VMF(N)-513 flew
F4U-5Ns, the night-fighter modification of the latest Corsair.[58]
[58] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise
noted, is based on 1stMAW _HD_, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513
_HD_, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations
of aircraft designations.
General Harris’ plan for VMF(N)-542 to take over the duties of
VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke had the approval of General Partridge. This made
it possible to send the latter squadron to K-9 at Pusan to replace the
VMF-311 jets, which in turn left for Itami to await corrections of
engineering defects.
VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat missions from K-9 on 22 January. These
consisted of routine armed reconnaissance flights and an occasional
deep support mission for the Eighth Army. Not until the 25th did the
squadron respond to a request from Marine ground forces. And out of 49
combat missions (110 sorties) during the remaining 6 days of the month,
only three (10 sorties) were in support of the 1st Marine Division.
For routine operations the Marine ground forces found the support
of VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY observation planes were
ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be caught before he could
be fought. And the helicopters did their part by dropping supplies,
evacuating casualties, and laying wire.
Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strengthened its administrative
ties with the 1st Marine Division. Although the two organizations had
no common operational commander other than General MacArthur, they
maintained a close liaison. Harris attached two TBM Avengers to VMO-6
for use as radio relays when ground-to-ground communications failed
in the mountainous Pohang-Andong area. He also set up daily courier
flights, at General Smith’s request, to provide fast administrative
liaison between widely dispersed Marine air and ground units in Korea
and Japan.
_Operations_ THUNDERBOLT _and_ ROUNDUP
On 25 January two corps of the Eighth Army jumped off in Operation
THUNDERBOLT. Advancing side by side, I Corps and IX Corps had orders
to launch limited objective attacks and regain solid contact with the
enemy, who was obviously preparing for a new offensive.
The EUSAK commander moved his CP from Taegu to Chonan (Map 1), the
I Corps headquarters, in order to maintain personal control of the
operation. He requested the Navy to step up offshore patrolling on the
west coast as left-flank protection. Emphasis was also placed on aerial
reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, as well as deep support
directed by the Mosquitoes.
Even VMF(N)-542 at Itazuke had orders to conduct long flights to Seoul
and maintain continuous patrols to report any attempt of the enemy to
retire across the frozen Han River. The F7F-3N pilots shot up camp
areas, convoys, and other lucrative targets but found no indications
of large-scale crossings over the ice.[59] So varied were the missions
of the squadron that it came as no surprise to be assigned to naval
gunfire spotting for the USS _St. Paul_ and the other British and
American cruisers shelling Inchon.
[59] VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Jan 51.
All Marine tactical squadrons were in action on 28 January for the
first time since December. Nearly two-thirds of the flights from Bofu
and K-9 were diverted from armed reconnaissance to troop support. A
typical operation was carried out by four VMF-312 planes on their
second day of duty at Bofu. After reporting to MELLOW they were
directed to Mosquito Cobalt, which had received a message that enemy
troops were hiding in a village just north of Suwon, occupied that day
by the U.S. 35th infantry. Under the Mosquito’s direction they bombed,
strafed, and napalmed some 40 buildings containing CCF soldiers.[60]
[60] VMF-312 _HD_, Jan 51.
The fall of Suwon opened the way to Inchon and Seoul as Chinese
resistance stiffened. Eighth Army progress was anything but reckless,
but Ridgway had served notice on the enemy that he held the initiative
and intended to keep it. Operation ROUNDUP followed on the heels of
THUNDERBOLT. Merely a change in name was involved, for the advance
continued at the same prudent pace without any important amendments to
the original mission.
_Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone_
The Marines in the Pohang-Andong zone had their first brush with
the elusive enemy on 22 January. A patrol of the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, flushed out a guerrilla force near Mukkye-dong, several miles
southeast of Andong (Map 5). Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company
deployed for action at sunset and shots were exchanged. The Marines had
no casualties and the enemy could not have suffered many losses before
he disappeared into the winter dusk.
Even at this early date the Korean Reds seemed to have lost confidence
in their guerrilla operations. In a message dated 23 January taken
from a prisoner, the commanding general of the II NKPA Corps directed
General Lee Ban Nam to withdraw if possible. It read as follows:
Get all of your troops out of the enemy encirclement and withdraw
to north of Pyongchang without delay. Liaison team sent with
radio. If you will inform us of your escape route we will assist
by clearing your advance. If you cannot escape, stay in the rear
of enemy as guerrillas.[61]
[61] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 116, Encl 1.
By the 24th an enemy drift southeast from the zones of the 1st and 5th
Marines to 7th Marines territory was apparent. The 1/7 command post and
Company A received scattered mortar fire late that afternoon. Action
picked up the next morning when dawn brought an attack by an estimated
100 guerrillas on the regimental command post. After a brisk 90-minute
fire fight the Korean Reds withdrew to the east, leaving seven dead
behind and taking with them an unknown number of wounded.
Later that morning the 7th Marines teamed up with the National Police
against the Chiso-dong area. Nine bodies were counted as the 3d
battalion seized its objective, but 1/7 was slowed by an entrenched
enemy who offered an unyielding defense. The Marine battalion ground
to a halt just one mile short of Chiso-dong and dug in for the night
as artillery continued to pound the enemy. The air strikes on the 25th
were flown by VMF(N)-513 and VMF-323, both based at K-9, but the pilots
could not contact the FAC and had to make dummy runs over the enemy.
Marine planes and artillery cleared the way on 26 January as 1/7
advanced against scattered opposition. Nearly 400 guerrillas put up a
ragged and futile resistance, but by 1530 Marine firepower prevailed
and Chiso-dong was taken. The 2d Battalion had meanwhile occupied
Hapton-ni, eight miles southeast of Topyong-dong (Map 5). A light enemy
counterattack was repulsed with ease.[62] Altogether, enemy casualties
for the day amounted to 161 KIA or POW.
[62] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for
Jan 51.
The VMF-323 flight led by Captain Don H. Fisher and Captain Floyd K.
Fulton’s VMF(N)-513 flight merit recognition as the first successful
instance of Marine air-ground cooperation since the Chosin Reservoir
campaign.
While the 7th Marines served eviction notices on the enemy in its area,
action elsewhere was light. Task Force Puller[63] hastened on the
26th to Chongja-dong, seven miles northeast of Uisong, to investigate
a police report that 300 enemy had seized the town. A Marine attack,
following an artillery preparation, was planned for 1500. Captain
Thomas J. Bohannon led Able Company in but discovered that the shells
had fallen on empty huts.[64]
[63] Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel
Puller was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. On
that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of RCT-1.
[64] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 50, 11.
During the next few days the rice paddy patrols continued to range
over the countryside, searching out the enemy. Combat units were
sent to areas where the G-2 red arrows indicated an NKPA buildup. On
the morning of the 29th, the 5th Marines tried to organize an attack
on a large enemy force reported near Chachon-dong, 12 miles west of
Topyong-dong. Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie Company, moving out at
night in small foot patrols to maintain secrecy, scoured the area in an
attempt to pin down the enemy.
Marine intelligence reports had warned of a dawn raid on the town for
the purpose of plundering food from the inhabitants and arms from the
Korean police station. First Lieutenant Richard J. Schening, executive
officer, led a scouting force ahead of the main body to reconnoiter
the area. He urged that a trap be set for the enemy, and the company
commander has left a description of one of the most elaborate ambushes
ever attempted by the Marines during the war:
Well before daylight, a cordon was stealthily braided around
Chachon-dong and we settled down to await the raiders. A later
daylight inspection of the deployment showed that the men had
done a splendid job of locating themselves so as to avoid
detection. They were concealed under porches, beneath the
brambles, and in the heaviest foliage and trees. But no guerrilla
attack materialized, probably due to a “grapevine” warning of our
movement and intent.... During the remaining days in the village
we conducted extensive patrolling in an attempt to catch at least
one guerrilla for our effort. Patrols were kept small to maintain
secrecy. We even dressed Marines in clothing worn by the “locals”
and sent them out in the hills with wood-gathering details.
Larger patrols up to a platoon in size were sent on combat
missions at night, One thing was certain: it was easier to talk
about capturing guerrillas than it was to lay a hand on them.[65]
[65] Maj J. R. Jones ltr, 24 Jun 57.
The elusiveness of the enemy could not always be credited to effective
guerrilla tactics. Often it was due to distaste for combat. As
evidence of low NKPA morale, Major Yu Dung Nam, a battalion commander,
was condemned to death and shot late in January because he planned
to surrender, according to POW testimony. Rations were at a bare
subsistence level and typhus had claimed many victims.[66]
[66] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 105, 5 Feb 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 13.
Unrelenting Marine pressure throughout the first week of February
wore the guerrillas down until groups larger than 50 men were
seldom encountered. On the 3d an NKPA second lieutenant surrendered
voluntarily to a RCT-7 patrol and brought three of his men with him.
NKPA morale had sunk so low, he divulged, that all ranks were striving
only for survival. The division commander, Major General Lee Ban Nam,
had apparently become a victim of acute melancholia. He spent nearly
all his time, according to the prisoner, in the solitude of foxholes
dug into the slopes of hills for added protection. There he brooded
constantly over his predicament, but without arriving at any better
solution than alternate hiding and flight.[67]
[67] _Ibid._
Certainly the military situation didn’t offer much to gladden this
Hamlet of the rice paddies, and the Marines continued to give him
fresh causes for pessimism. His footsore remnants eluded RCT-5 only to
stumble into the zone of RCT-1, northeast of Uisong. Neither rest nor
sanctuary awaited them, for the 1st and 2d battalions penetrated into
the mountains near Sangyong to surprise and rout a force estimated at
400 men.[68]
[68] 1stMar _WD_, Feb 51.
_KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_
Late in January the 1st KMC Regiment got into the fight after being
attached once more to the 1st Marine Division by a EUSAK dispatch of
the 21st. Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison headed a new group
of Division liaison and advisory officers as the four KMC battalions
moved out from Chinhae by LST and truck convoy to the Pohang area.
Division OpnO 4-51 (26 January) assigned the regiment Sector F, astride
the Yongdok-Andong road, which had been carved out of Sectors C and D,
held by the 7th and 11th Marines respectively. The KMCs were ordered to
conduct daily patrolling from positions near Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and
Chinandong and prevent enemy concentrations in their sector.[69]
[69] References to the 1st KMC Regt in this chapter are based
on Smith, _Notes_, 1450–1458, and Col C. W. Harrison,
_Narrative_, n.d., 1–15. Previous periods of KMC
attachment to the 1stMarDiv are described in Vols I, II,
and III of this series.
Although the ROK Army and Eighth Army had the responsibility for
supplying the KMCs, it proved necessary for the 1st Marine Division
to cope with some of the gaps in equipment and rations. Contrary to a
prevalent Western belief, Koreans did not subsist on a diet of rice
alone. They were accustomed to having “side dishes” with their rice,
such as eggs, meat, fish, or vegetables. Colonel Kim Sung Eun, the
regimental commander, had an allotment of money for these purchases,
but the sum was insufficient to meet inflation prices even if there
had been enough food left in a district eaten bare. As a consequence,
the KMCs had to get along on a monotonous and vitamin-poor diet until
the ROK Army belatedly came to the rescue with issues of food for side
dishes.
On 29 January the KMC Regiment opened its CP at Yongdok. Regimental
OpnO 1 of that date divided Sector F into three parts, assigning the
western, central, and eastern subsectors to the 3d, 1st, and 2d
Battalions respectively. The 5th Battalion was attached to the 1st
Marines and assigned to patrolling operations in the Andong area.[70]
[70] What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was
designated the 5th because the Korean word for 4th is the
same as the word for death and is considered unlucky.
The first few days of February saw a brief flurry of activity before
NKPA guerrilla resistance breathed its last gasps. Reports that the
remnants of the NKPA 25th and 27th Regiments were in flight toward the
zone of the 5th Marines led to a concentration for a knockout blow,
but the enemy stole away to the north in the vicinity of Topyong-dong.
There he discovered that he had jumped from the frying pan into the
fire. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines closed in from one
side while the 1st and 3d Battalions of the KMC Regiment blocked roads
in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha-dong. Only a wild flight in
small groups saved the guerrillas from annihilation.
The nearest approach to effective NKPA resistance was encountered on 5
February after the 1st and 2d KMC Battalions had established blocking
positions in zone at the request of the 7th Marines, which was driving
the enemy northward. A platoon-size patrol of the 2d KMC Battalion came
up against Korean Reds dug in with 81mm mortars and heavy and light
machine guns a few miles southwest of Yongdok. The KMCs were scattered
with losses of 1 KIA, 8 WIA, and 24 MIA in addition to all arms and
equipment, though the missing men returned later.
It was the single NKPA success of the entire campaign.
An assault was launched the following morning on this enemy stronghold
by a composite KMC battalion, supported by four VMF(N)-513 aircraft
which attacked with rockets and bombs. The largest combat of the
guerrilla hunt appeared to be in the making, but again the enemy
vanished after putting up an ineffectual resistance with small arms and
mortars.[71]
[71] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _HD_,
Feb 51.
An unusual air tactic was tested on 4 February in the 7th Marines zone
when an interpreter in an R4D plane hailed the guerrillas by loud
speaker in their own language with a demand that they surrender or
suffer the consequences. Marine fighter-bombers were on station to back
the threat, and about 150 supposed NKPA soldiers came in with uplifted
hands while VMF-323 planes delivered the consequences to the holdouts
in the form of bombs, rockets, and napalm. Unfortunately, it developed
that practically all of the prisoners were terrified civilians seeking
an escape from the slave labor imposed upon them by the guerrillas.[72]
[72] VMF-323 _HD_, Feb 51.
_10th NKPA Division Scattered_
Reports of enemy activity were received daily from Korean civilians
and police, and seldom was a smaller number than “about two thousand”
mentioned. In reality, Marine patrols had difficulty in tracking down
as many as ten of the skulking, half-starved fugitives split up into
small bands hiding in the hills. On 5 February the situation was summed
up by General Smith in reply to a EUSAK request for an estimate of the
time required to complete the Marine mission:
The original 10th NKPA Div forces in the 1st Marine Division area
have been dispersed into many groups, reduced to an effective
strength of 40 per cent, and are no longer capable of a major
effort while dispersed.... It is considered that the situation
in the Division area is sufficiently in hand to permit the
withdrawal of the Division and the assignment of another mission
at any time a new force to be assigned the responsibility for the
area assumes such responsibility and the 1st Marine Division can
be reassembled.[73]
[73] Smith, _Notes_, 1378.
Patrolling continued as usual in all Marine regimental zones during the
second week in February. Some units, such as the 11th Marines and the
Division Reconnaissance Company, had made few enemy contacts throughout
the operation. But at least the cannoneers had found good pheasant
hunting and enjoyed a change in the bill of fare.
It was just as well that the tactical situation seldom made it
necessary to call for air support at this stage, since the 1st MAW
was once again in the throes of moves which will be described in the
following chapter. Bofu had been only a temporary base for MAG-33
squadrons which were making another transfer to K-9 while MAG-12
completed its shift to K-1.
VMO-6 took care of the reduced air requirements of the Division
adequately. Another helicopter “first” was scored when First Lieutenant
John L. Scott received credit for the first night casualty evacuation
by a HTL (Bell), which then had no instruments for night flying. For
a harrowing moment, however, it would be hard to beat the experience
of Captain Clarence W. Parkins and Corpsman R. E. Krisky. While they
were flying a casualty to the hospital ship _Consolation_, the patient
became wildly delirious. It took the combined efforts of pilot and
corpsman to subdue him and make a safe landing.[74]
[74] VMO-6 _HD_, Feb 51.
Any excitement would have been welcomed by the troops in general. For
the area was as tranquil as if the guerrillas had never troubled its
snowbound heights. Recently arrived Marines might have been pardoned
for concluding that the NKPA 10th Division and its gloomy commander
were but creatures of the imagination--phantoms to be compared to the
crew of the _Flying Dutchman_, that legendary ship condemned to sail on
endlessly until the Day of Judgment. The NKPA 10th Division also seemed
doomed to perpetual flight as its ghostly survivors made their way from
crag to crag of the remote ridgelines.
Thanks to the rice paddy patrols, the replacements were ready for
combat and the Division was organizing a rotation draft for return to
the States. Five officers and 600 men had already been selected on a
basis of combat time, wounds received, and length of service. Major
General Edward A. Craig, who commanded the first Marines to land in
Korea, was given a farewell dinner and congratulated on his second
star. Two new brigadier generals were named, with Lewis B. “Chesty”
Puller relieving Craig as ADC and Gregon A. Williams accompanying him
on the voyage back to the States. Captain Eugene R. “Bud” Hering, (MC)
USN, was also returning with the gratitude of all Marines for his care
of casualties in the “frozen Chosin” campaign.[75]
[75] Smith, _Notes_, 1369.
All Marine missions in the guerrilla hunt had been successfully
accomplished, so that the Division could be relieved at any time by the
2d ROK Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 prisoners.
Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is no doubt
that the total NKPA casualties were crippling. At any rate, the NKPA
10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without accomplishing
any of its objectives. Marine casualties from 18 January to 15
February were 19 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, 148 WIA, and 1,751 of a nonbattle
classification, largely frostbite cases soon restored to duty.[76]
[76] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (_POR_) 18 Jan-15
Feb 51, 71–159.
_New Mission for the Marines_
On 11 February, General Smith flew to Taegu to discuss the next Marine
mission with General Ridgway. The EUSAK commander spoke favorably of
employing the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 24th Infantry Division
in the critical Han River corridor, where recent UN advances had been
made. He also recognized the advantages of committing the Marines
to the east coast, so that they could be held in readiness for an
amphibious operation. A third possibility was the Yoju corridor of the
IX Corps zone (Map 1). As “the most powerful division in Korea,” said
Ridgway, “the Marines would be astride what he considered the logical
route for an expected enemy counterthrust.”[77]
[77] Smith, _Notes_, 1441–1445.
No decision was reached that day. At midnight the CCF attack
materialized; and the central front was the area of decision, as
Ridgway had predicted.
Naturally, the next mission for the Marines had to be reconsidered in
the light of this development. On 12 February EUSAK warning orders
alerted the 1st Marine Division to be prepared to move to Chungju, in
the rear area of the IX Corps front where the heaviest CCF attacks were
taking place. The Division was further directed to make an immediate
reconnaissance of the Chungju area while the 1st KMC Regiment prepared
for a move to Samchok on the east coast and attachment to the ROK
Capitol Division. The following day brought orders from the Eighth
Army to initiate these movements on 15 February 1951.[78] Thus the
Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt came to an end with the Marines on their
way to new employment in the battle line of the Eighth Army.
[78] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51.
CHAPTER IV
Operation Killer
_The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in Action--Planning for
the New Operation--The Jump-Off on 21 February--Stiffening of Chinese
Resistance--General Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase
Line_ ARIZONA_--JOC Air Control System Criticized_
The CCF counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 11 February
1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure exerted during
the previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice beaten during a recent
six-week period and pushed back some 200 miles, EUSAK had shown amazing
powers of recuperation.
“It is hard for me to put into words the magnificent competence, the
fierce, combative, aggressive spirit of that force once it picked
itself off the ground and waded back into the fight,” commented General
Ridgway in retrospect.[79]
[79] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 216.
During Operations THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP he had kept a tight rein on
the Eighth Army by insisting on vigorous artillery preparations and
close lateral contacts between units. On 10 February, however, caution
was relaxed as CCF resistance suddenly collapsed west and south of
Seoul, That day the U.S. 24th Infantry Division forged ahead 11,000
yards to occupy the port of Inchon and Kimpo Airfield, both so wrecked
that weeks of repair would be necessary to make them operational. Seoul
was within sight of the U.S. forces on the left bank of the Han when an
aroused enemy struck back on the subzero night of the 11th.
Apparently the CCF drive on the central front had as its objective the
relieving of UN pressure on the Seoul area to the west. The CCF 40th
and 66th Armies and NKPA V Corps struck in the IX Corps sector north
of Hoengsong (Map 6). Two ROK divisions being dislodged by the initial
blows, their retreat made necessary the withdrawal of other IX Corps
units. As a consequence, Hoengsong had to be abandoned on 12 February
to the Communists hammering out a salient northeast of Wonju.[80]
[80] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51; Smith,
_Notes_, 1462–1465.
The UN forces were not bound by any unrealistic concept of holding
ground to the last ditch. General Ridgway deemed it more important
to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy at a minimum cost in
casualties. While fighting on the defensive, he had already made up
his mind to launch an offensive of his own to catch the Chinese off
balance the moment their counterattack ground to a halt. His new
limited objective operation emphasized the destruction of the enemy’s
fighting strength as the major objective rather than the acquisition
of territory. A high attrition rate would preclude the Communists’
capacity to hold and enable EUSAK commander to recover the critical
hill mass north of Wonju. It was for this purpose, he informed Major
General Bryant E. Moore, IX Corps commanding general, that the 1st
Marine Division would be employed.
“The force which holds Wonju,” he said, “has the situation in hand.”[81]
[81] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec I, 52. Comments by Gen O. P.
Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser,
14 Feb 58.
_The Move to the Chungju Area_
The 1st Marine Division had instructions to report its order of march
to the Eighth Army, and to keep the Taegu headquarters informed of
progress. Meanwhile, the Marines were to remain under EUSAK operational
control but would pass to IX Corps control at a date and hour to be
announced.
General Puller flew to Chungju with a reconnaissance party on 13
February to look over the road and select CP sites. On the following
morning Major Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at
Chungju for patrol duty, and movement by rail and road commenced on the
15th in accordance with Division OpnO 5-51, issued the day before.
[Illustration: MAP 6
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
Operation Killer
Showing Phase I & II Objectives]
The 1st Marines, with the 7th Motor Transport Battalion attached, led
the motor march, and the 5th and 7th Marines followed in that order.
Tracked vehicles were outloaded by rail from Andong and Pohang in a
total of 67 flat cars. Owing to a shortage of cars, Company B and H&S
Company of the 1st Tank Battalion made the move of 120 miles by road.
These tankers claimed the all-time Marine Corps distance record for
armor.[82]
[82] LtCol H. T. Milne, ltr of 3 Dec 57; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb
51.
While the Marine move was in progress, the CCF counterattack went on
full blast along the central front. Driving southeast from the IX Corps
area to the X Corps front, the Chinese cut off and surrounded the 23d
Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division, USA. Colonel Paul Freemen and his
men put up a fight that is one of the classics of the war. Supported by
Marine and Air Force planes, they gave more fire than they received and
held out until rescued by a tank column.[83]
[83] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B. Ridgway,
USA (Ret), 4 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
February was also a transition period for Marine fighter squadrons
which had been more or less on the move since the middle of January.
Even before the transfer to Bofu, it had been decided that K-3, four
miles south of Pohang, was to be the ultimate home of MAG-33. While
awaiting completion of this field, VMFs-214, -312, and -323 would find
temporary lodging at K-1, near Pusan, recently assigned to MAG-12.[84]
[84] The balance of this section, unless otherwise specified,
is derived from the _HD_s for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW,
MAG-33, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, and
VMF-311.
On 6 February, Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, assistant
commanding general of the 1st MAW, radioed General Harris that K-1
would be ready to receive a squadron a day, starting on the 8th. Harris
ordered Squadrons 323, 214, and 312 to make their moves on 8, 9, and 10
February respectively. Transport aircraft were to lift ground crews,
extra pilots, and light equipment directly to K-1. Pilots had orders to
fly combat missions en route.
By the 13th most of the vehicles, heavy equipment, and general supplies
had been loaded on a train for Kobe, there to be transshipped on LSTs
to Pohang. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Fontana set up his MAG-33
command post at K-3 and directed the three fighter squadrons to report
from K-1.
The new field occupied a bench overlooking a wide, sandy beach. Built
originally by the Japanese, the strip had 5,200 feet of concrete
runway. The Air Force had extended it to 5,700 feet with pierced steel
planking. This addition brought the end of the runway to the brink of
a 60-foot drop-off--a hazard in the event of a “hot” landing to the
northwest or too low an approach from the southeast.
Next to arrive at K-3 were the F9F-2Bs of VMF-311. Four weeks of
adjustments at Itami had restored the jets to operative condition. An
advance echelon went ahead to establish squadron living and operating
areas, and the pilots ferried the 19 aircraft. Ground crews and
equipment followed on transport planes.
Plans were made for VMF(N)-513 to move from Itami to K-3 before the end
of the month. The other all-weather squadron, VMF(N)-542, now commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, completed the transfer from
Itami and Itazuke to K-1.
This field was also the destination of the photo pilots of Headquarters
Squadron, 1st MAW, who flew their F7F-3P and F4U-5P fighters from
Itami. Major Donald S. Bush commanded a unit, formerly a squadron,
which had been one of the first aviation organizations to see action in
Korea. Among its accomplishments were the preliminary beach studies for
the Inchon and Wonsan landings.
With the completion of the moves of February 1951, the 1st MAW was
again based on Korean soil. Fifteen types of Marine aircraft were
being flown. For the heavy hauling, the R4D and R5D transports shifted
troops and supplies. Included among the fighters were F9F Panthers, F4U
Corsairs, and two models of F7F Tigercats--a stripped-down photo plane,
and a radar-armed night fighter. Stinson OY Grasshoppers, TBM Avengers,
and Beechcraft SNBs rounded out the list of conventional planes. Three
types of rotary-wing aircraft were represented: the Sikorsky HO3S-1,
and two models of the Bell HTL.[85]
[85] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8.
_Marine Planes in Action_
By 15 February the brief CCF counterstroke had spent its force.
Hoengsong had fallen to Communists who hammered out a salient on a
20-mile front extending as far southward as the outskirts of Wonju (Map
6). But the enemy’s main purpose had failed of accomplishment, for the
grip of the Eighth Army on Inchon and Kimpo Airfield was not shaken.
Nor did the Chinese gain a breathing spell in their preparations for a
third great offensive as a followup to the December and January drives.
More by coincidence than design, the Fifth Air Force launched a new
system of air tactics a few days after the beginning of the CCF
counterstroke. Called “Reconnaissance Plan Fighter,” it was based on
a division of enemy-held Korea into 22 sections. Squadrons were given
the mission of making hourly surveys of the same areas, day after day,
until pilots became so familiar with them that any change hinting at
CCF activity would be noticed at once.[86]
[86] VMF-323 HD, 15 Feb 51.
If these surveys revealed any sign of any enemy concentration, either
of men or supplies, JOC scrambled special bombing strikes against them.
Although Marine fliers could readily see the advantages of covering
the same ground daily, it made for monotony on reconnaissance
missions. Only a highly unusual spectacle would startle a pilot, but
First Lieutenant Weldon R. Mitchell blinked when he saw a camel in
his gunsights.[87] Shaggy little Mongolian horses were no novelty as
ammunition bearers, and after recovering from his first astonishment
the VMF-311 pilot cut loose with .50 caliber machine gun slugs. As he
suspected, the camel’s pack contained ammunition and the animal was all
but vaporized in the explosion.
[87] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8.
Major Bush’s photographic unit had an important part in keeping the
enemy under constant surveillance. The Fifth Air Force directed on
16 February that all photo requests were to be screened by the Fifth
Air Force’s 543d Tactical Support Group at Taegu. Under the tactical
coordination of this Group, the Marine unit was to fill all Navy and
Marine requests. When not on such missions, it would be fitted into the
Fifth Air Force photographic reconnaissance program.[88]
[88] 1st MAW and MAG-12 _HD_s, Feb 51.
Pinpoint photos of suspected troop areas and such terrain features as
defiles, junctions, detours, and bridges were in demand. The fact had
to be faced that the enemy was almost unbelievably clever at camouflage
and concealment. In one instance it was found that the Chinese had
constructed bridge sections which they hid by day and put to use at
night.[89] On another occasion they sank a bridge by means of weights
so that it remained far enough beneath the surface of the water in the
daytime to avoid detection by reconnaissance aircraft.
[89] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, ltr of 14 Jun 57.
When the photo planes carried out missions as far north as MIG
Alley[90] they flew in pairs. A fighter circled overhead to protect the
photo pilot from an enemy air attack while he paid full attention to
the task of “shooting” the terrain with his camera.
[90] MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area
along the Yalu River where Communist jets were active.
_Planning for the New Operation_
Adaptability to changing circumstances had already become perhaps the
outstanding quality of the revitalized Eighth Army. No better example
could be found than the evolution of Operation KILLER, which completed
the cycle from concept to plan and execution in just three days.
On 18 February 1951, General Ridgway learned that the enemy was
apparently withdrawing. IX Corps and X Corps units had probed forward
that morning without meeting any opposition. Before nightfall the
commanding general decided to launch a limited objectives offensive by
the entire Eighth Army. He called a planning conference for the 19th
and set the 21st as D-Day for the new operation.
The 1st Marine Division found itself detached from X Corps on the
19th and placed under the operational control of General Moore of IX
Corps. This was not the first time in Marine Corps history, of course,
when “soldiers of the sea” have fought alongside U.S. Army units in
conventional land warfare. One of the best-known occasions was in World
War I, when two Marine regiments distinguished themselves in France as
a brigade of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.
The Marines had been a part of X Corps in 1950, but always under
tactical circumstances which permitted more or less independent
operations with the support of organic aircraft. Now the Division was
to be closely integrated with the other major IX Corps units, the 24th
Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th ROK Division, and
the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Marine calls for air strikes
would continue to be made through JOC, as they had been since the
Hungnam redeployment.
General Ridgway was on hand for the planning conference held on 19
February in General Moore’s CP at Yoju and attended by officers from
IX and X Corps. General Smith, Colonel McAlister, and Colonel Bowser
represented the 1st Marine Division.
The scheme of maneuver called for the Marines to relieve elements of X
Corps and attack in a northeasterly direction from a line of departure
north of Wonju (Map 6) through the Wonju basin. The object was to cut
off enemy forces which had penetrated south and east of Hoengsong, and
to recover control of the roads running eastward by seizing the high
ground just south of the town.[91]
[91] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 1–2, 20.
In the X Corps zone to the east, on the right flank of the Marines,
the 7th Infantry Division was to attack to the north along the
Yongwol-Pyongchang road. On the other Marine flank would be elements of
the 6th ROK Division.
Simultaneous advances were planned for I Corps to the west, where
patrols had found evidence that Seoul was lightly held.
Two U.S. Army units were designated at the 19 February conference to
support the 1st Marine Division--the 74th Truck Company and the 92d
Armored Field Artillery, then en route to the Chungju area.[92] These
cannoneers and their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F.
Lavoie, USA, were well and favorably known to the Marines, having given
effective support during the Chosin Reservoir operations.
[92] _Ibid._
First Marine Division OpnO 6-51, issued on 20 February, directed the
two assault regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines, to jump off at 0800
on the 21st and seize the first objective, the ridgeline about three
and a half miles south of the high ground dominating Hoengsong (Map
6). RCT-1, with Division Recon Company and C/Engineers attached, was
to pass through elements of the 2d Infantry Division in zone while
RCT-5, with A/Engineers attached, passed through elements of the 187th
Airborne Infantry, USA. RCT-7 had been designated the reserve regiment;
but since it could not arrive from the Pohang-Andong area in time, a
battalion of the 5th Marines was assigned this mission.[93]
[93] _Ibid._, 2, 22, and 1stMarDiv OpnO 6-51.
The objective area was believed to be defended by the 196th Infantry
Division of the 66th CCF Army and unknown elements of the 39th and 40th
CCF Armies. Ahead of the Marines and other IX Corps units lay some
uninviting terrain. Rocky heights and narrow valleys were laced by
swift streams, the largest being the river Som, running from northeast
to southwest through a defile cutting across the western part of the
Division sector. Bordering this twisting stream was the Wonju-Hoengsong
“highway”--a poor dirt road even by Korean standards. Through the right
half of the Division zone an even more primitive road, scarcely fit for
vehicular traffic, wound northeast from Wonju.[94]
[94] _Ibid._, 22–24.
All Eighth Army forces were to be tightly buttoned up and to keep in
close physical contact while maintaining integrity of units. Patrol
observation and reconnaissance were stressed by the EUSAK commanding
general, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in
advancing ahead of schedule. Again, as in previous operations, real
estate was to be secondary to the inflicting of maximum personnel and
materiel damage.
On the eve of Operation KILLER, a message from IX Corps emphasized
to all units the necessity for making sure “that no hostile force of
sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of your forces has been
bypassed. Maintenance of lateral contact between all units is of prime
importance.”[95]
[95] IX Corps msg in 1stMarDiv _In&Out#9_.
Marine ground force and aviation officers alike realized that the
forthcoming offensive would be the first real test of the operational
control of the 1st MAW by the Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army.
General Smith was uneasy about the outlook. On 13 February 1951, the
day he was alerted for the move to Chungju, he had requested in a
message to EUSAK that the 1st MAW be assigned to the support of his
division. Both Marine ground and air officers, he said, believed that
this change would fit into the JOC overall air control system without
any disruption.[96] But no approval of General Smith’s proposal had
been received before D-Day.
[96] CG 1stMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG EUSAK.
_The Jumpoff on 21 February_
From the outset the transport and supply situation was a G-4 officer’s
nightmare. Heavy traffic broke the back of the MSR before the jumpoff,
so that mud delayed the 5th Marines in reaching the line of departure
(LD).
General Puller, the ADC, telephoned the Division commander for a
decision in the event that all elements of the regiment were unable
to arrive in time. This question was already under discussion between
General Moore and General Smith in the new 1st Marine Division CP, just
opened at Wonju. After later reports of troop arrivals reached him,
Smith decided with few minutes to spare that he would attack with only
the troops able to reach the LD in time--three battalions of the 1st
Marines, a battalion of the 5th Marines, two battalions of the 11th
Marines, and a company of tanks. Moore then confirmed 1000 as H-hour
and notified Puller of the decision.
The last-minute arrival of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reminded
Smith of the occasion in France, 32 years before, when the 5th Marines
of World War I had to double-time across the wheat fields in order to
attack on schedule at Soissons on 18 July 1918. For at Wonju the lone
battalion scrambled out of trucks on the double and advanced without
taking time for reorganization.[97]
[97] LtGen O. P. Smith, ltr of 28 Jul 53.
Snarled traffic conditions were complicated by the arrival of
high-ranking officers for the jumpoff. General MacArthur visited the
zone of the 187th Airborne RCT, recently attached to X Corps. General
Ridgway and General Moore were on hand when the Marines attacked. The
EUSAK commander, surveying the scene from a snow-covered embankment,
was disturbed to see a Marine corporal stumbling over an untied shoe
lace while carrying a heavy radio.
“I hesitated just a moment,” commented Ridgway, “knowing that what I
wanted to do might be misconstrued as showmanship. Then I slid down
the bank on my tail, landed right at his feet, knelt down and tied his
shoe. Later, when this incident was reported in the States, there were
some who did report it as a theatrical gesture. This was not true. It
was purely an impulse to help a fighting soldier, a man in trouble.”[98]
[98] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 218–219.
The Eighth Army commander was not the only one to see the advantages
of tobogganing in terrain consisting of mud on the sunny slope of
hills and snow on the shady side. When Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie
Company of 1/5 reached its first steep decline, the Marine leading the
2d Platoon slipped and fell in the snow, sliding about a hundred feet
down the embankment. The man behind him profited from his example to
make a purposeful slide, as did the rest of First Lieutenant William E.
Kerrigan’s men.[99]
[99] Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ltr of 25 May 57.
This was but one of the unwarlike incidents which enlivened the
jumpoff of Operation KILLER. Seldom if ever have Marines taken part
in an offensive which began so inoffensively, for 21 February was
distinguished for lack of enemy resistance in the Marine zone. Only
a few rounds of scattered rifle fire were encountered until late
afternoon. Then the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, leading the column of
attack, had two long-distance fire fights before digging in for the
night. Three Marines were slightly wounded and the enemy withdrew with
such casualties as he may have suffered.[100]
[100] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 4.
The word “light” could never have been applied to the resistance put
up by the weather and terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart,
commanding 3/5, described it as “a mixture of thawing snow, rain, mud,
and slush.” His men spent the night in foxholes half filled with water.
Every one of them was “wet to the bones, including his clothes, parka,
weapons, and ammo.”[101]
[101] Comment by Col J. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57.
The 1st Marines led the attacking column of battalions on 22
February, with 1/1 in the lead. More long-distance small-arms fire
was encountered than on the first day, but again there were no close
contacts with a retreating enemy.[102]
[102] 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51, 4–5.
_Stiffening of Chinese Resistance_
Not until the 23d did either Marine regiment run into determined
opposition. Then the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines,
advancing abreast, had a fight while going up against two hills of a
ridge just south of the first phase objectives.
So far the Marines had found JOC air support satisfactory in quantity.
The statistics show that the Fifth Air Force supported the Eighth Army
during the first phase of Operation KILLER (21–24 February, inclusive)
with an average of 600 sorties a day.[103] There was no room for
complaint until the morning of the 23d, when an air strike the 5th
Marines requested the preceding evening for 0800 failed to materialize
on time. On this occasion the combination of an intense Marine
artillery preparation and light enemy resistance compensated for lack
of air support and the hill was taken with ease.
[103] Statistics are from EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, G-3 Air Rpt.
That afternoon it took a brisk fight to evict an enemy in estimated
battalion strength from log-covered bunkers on the second hill. This
time JOC responded to Marine requests with two effective air strikes.
Sixty Chinese dead were counted, and the Marines reported 1 KIA and 21
WIA.[104]
[104] 2/1 _HD_, 16 Dec 51, 15–16.
On the whole, however, the 5th Marines encountered only slight
resistance. “About all we did was walk--walk--walk!” recalled Captain
Franklin B. Mayer, commanding Easy Company of 2/5. “I don’t think I’ve
ever been so tired or footsore in my life--exception the retreat from
Chosin, but not by much.”[105]
[105] LtCol F. B. Mayer, ltr of 8 May 57.
On the 24th the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines had little
trouble in taking two hills designated as the main Phase 1 objectives.
The 1st Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol into
Hoengsong after artillery preparation and an air strike. Captain Robert
P. Wray, commanding Charlie Company of 1/1 and a platoon of tanks,
entered the ruins of the town only to encounter machine gun and mortar
fire from the hills to the west.[106]
[106] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj
R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57.
When the antennae were shot off two tanks, Wray directed their 90mm
fire by runner and knocked out the enemy positions. After proceeding
further into the town, he was recalled by his battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, because an aerial observer had
reported that Chinese were waiting to ambush the patrol.
An air strike was directed on them while Wray rescued several survivors
of “Massacre Valley,” northwest of Hoengsong, where a U.S. Army truck
convoy had been ambushed during the recent CCF counterattack. The
patrol returned before the ground had completely thawed. Only a few
hours later a jeep passing over the same road was blown up by a land
mine which killed the driver. This was one of the first object lessons
illustrating the danger from enemy mines which were harmless until the
midday sun thawed out the ground.
Chinese artillery fire from the hills north of Hoengsong accounted for
one Marine KIA and four WIA late that afternoon before counter-battery
fire by 2/11 silenced the enemy. This exchange ended the first phase
of Operation KILLER at dusk on 24 February with all preliminary
objectives seized.[107]
[107] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 2, 5–6.
Air support had been rendered, for the most part, by Fifth Air Force
planes. This gave rise to grumbling by Marine ground forces, who felt
that they had been unnecessarily deprived of their own close air
support. The fact was, however, that U.S. Army and British Commonwealth
troops also preferred Marine air and were outspoken about it. As a
disgruntled Marine ground force officer put it, Marine air was “too
good for our own good.”
During the first phase of Operation KILLER most of the sorties by 1st
MAW planes were in support of U.S. Army units. On 23 February the
Marines flew 101 of the Fifth Air Force total of some 800 sorties for
the day.[108] The experience of VMF-312 was fairly typical of the other
Marine fighter-bomber squadrons. In the morning VMF-312 took part in
a 16-plane strike behind the CCF lines. That afternoon two special
flights of four planes each were scrambled in support of 2d and 7th
Infantry Division units of X Corps. The following morning Major Daniel
H. Davis, executive officer of the squadron, scrambled with four
planes and reported to a FAC attached to the Canadian and Australian
battalions of the British Commonwealth Division. These troops were
engaged near Chipyong-ni in the hottest fight of the first phase of
Operation KILLER. After the FAC marked the CCF strongholds with white
phosphorus, the Corsairs came snarling in with napalm, rocket, and
strafing runs just ahead of the infantry. The enemy was driven out of
positions defended by 20mm antipersonnel fire, but Major Davis paid
with his life on his eighth run when he lost a wing and crashed to his
death.
[108] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st
MAW _HD_, 22–24 Feb 51.
_General Smith in Command of IX Corps_
On 24 February 1951 came the news that General Moore had suddenly died
as the indirect result of a helicopter accident. The aircraft had
plunged into the Han River, after hitting a telephone wire, and the IX
Corps commander was rescued unhurt only to die of a heart attack half
an hour afterwards.
Commander of the 8th Infantry Division in European operations of
World War II, General Moore later became Superintendent of the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point. As his successor, pending a permanent
appointment, General Ridgway named General Smith to the command of IX
Corps. When announcing this decision, the Eighth Army commander said,
“General Smith is to be taken into their hearts in IX Corps, and, by
definite action, made to feel that he belongs there.”[109]
[109] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23.
Marines with an interest in Corps history could recall only two similar
occasions when Marines commanded major U.S. Army units. Major General
John A. Lejeune had headed the 2d Infantry Division in World War I, and
Major General Roy S. Geiger led the U.S. Tenth Army to victory during
the closing days of the Okinawa operation after a Japanese shell killed
Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., USA.
On 24 February, with General Puller taking command of the 1st Marine
Division, General Smith flew to Yoju by helicopter to begin his new
duties. His military competence and complete lack of ostentation made
him cordially accepted at the IX Corps CP. The following day General
Ridgway arrived for a conference. Wishing to change the boundary
between IX and X Corps, so as to orient the former more to the north,
he directed the Marine general to reach an agreement with X Corps. He
also asked for a recommendation as to future operations of the Marines,
and General Smith replied that he knew of no better employment for
his division than to continue attacking along the Hoengsong-Hongchon
axis.[110]
[110] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Chronicle of the Operations of
the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months
of the Korean War_, 1950–1951 (MS), (hereafter, Smith,
_Chronicle_), 24–25 Feb 51.
The change in boundaries, as decided at a conference of corps
commanders, meant that in the zone of the 1st Marine Division the 5th
Marines on the right would be pinched out by the 3d ROK Division of X
Corps. On the left, the zone was to be extended by bringing the 7th
Marines into line to the left of the 1st Marines while the 5th Marines
dropped back into reserve.[111]
[111] 5th and 7th Marines _HD_s, Feb 51.
Logistics became the better part of valor on 25 February as Ridgway
called a halt in the fighting until enough ammunition, fuel, and other
supplies could be brought up for a resumption of the attack toward the
final objective, Phase Line ARIZONA (Map 6). Napoleon’s famous remark
that mud should be recognized as a separate element was apt as violent
rains turned all roads into swamps. Operations might have come to a
standstill except for air drops. On the 25th the Combat Air Command
flew 480.7 tons of freight and 1,004 passengers, followed by 604.9
tons and 1,193 passengers the following day.[112] Corps and Division
engineers strove meanwhile with indigenous labor to repair the roads.
[112] FEAF _Operations History_, Vol II, 300–306; Comment by
Col J. H. Partridge, 10 Dec 57.
By a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so that
the EUSAK commanding general could issue orders on 25 February for
the second phase of Operation KILLER to commence on 1 March. He made
it known that he was not satisfied with results so far. The assigned
physical objectives had been taken, but the enemy’s withdrawals had
saved him from the full extent of the personnel and material losses
Ridgway had hoped to inflict. He called on his staff officers,
therefore, for plans aiming at a new operation “having the primary
intent of destroying as many enemy and as much equipment as possible
and, by continued pressure, allowing the enemy no time to mount a
counteroffensive.”[113] A secondary mission was that of outflanking
Seoul and the area between Seoul and the Imjin River, “so that this
territory may be taken either by attack from the east or by enemy
default.”
[113] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53.
The name of the new drive was to be Operation RIPPER, and it was to
jump off as soon as possible after the finish of KILLER.
_The Advance to Phase Line_ ARIZONA
From newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, the
Marines could look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objectives,
the hills to the north of the battered town. Hoengsong occupied a
valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams. Thus a triangular
area of low, flat ground lay between the ruins and the hills which
must be taken in the final phase of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 7th
Marines were the combat units, with the 5th Marines in reserve. (The
KMC Regiment, it may be recalled, had been temporarily detached for
service with the ROK army.)
Before the 1st and 7th Marines could launch their combined attack, the
latter had to fight its way up to the point of junction after relieving
elements of the 6th ROK Division.[114] The scheme of maneuver then
called for Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3/1 to sideslip into
the zone of Major Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7, in order to be in position
for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This meant a crossing of
the river Som for 3/1 and a combined assault with 3/7 on the high
ground along the west bank.
[114] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived
from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar _HD_, Mar
51, 2–6; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons
narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff.
The problem of crossing the river, 200 feet wide and chest-deep at the
most likely site, was turned over to Banning with the explanation that
the engineer company supporting the regiment could not be diverted from
road repairs. To meet this emergency Major Edwin H. Simmons, commanding
Weapons Company of 3/1, produced a field manual with instructions for
building a “Swiss bent bridge.”[115] His Antitank Assault Platoon
was given the task under the command of energetic Technical Sergeant
Carmelo J. Randazzo, a veteran on his third enlistment.
[115] FM 70-10, _Mountain Operations_, 41–46.
There was no lack of trees for timbers, and rolls of telephone wire
were sworn to be beyond salvaging by the battalion communications
officer. The A-shaped bents, or trusses, were lashed together with wire
and enthusiasm, then carried out into the ice-cold water to be attached
to spars and stringers.
It was a great triumph for “war by the book.” Before dark on 28
February two spans, one 120 feet long and another half that length,
were linked by a sandbar in midstream. The improvised bridge stood up
well next morning when the battalion crossed to the west bank. There
3/1 echeloned itself behind 3/7, which gained the first 1,000 yards
under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated air strikes.
On the left, Major James I. Glendinning’s 2d Battalion of the 7th
Marines ran into increasingly stubborn opposition from CCF mortar and
small-arms fire. Before noon the attacks of both battalions of the 7th
Marines were brought almost to a halt in difficult terrain which the
Communists had booby-trapped. Neither artillery nor air strikes had a
decisive effect against an enemy sheltered by log-covered bunkers. So
many delays were encountered that it was decided in mid-afternoon to
postpone the advance until the following morning, 2 March.
Artillery and air strikes supported 2/7, 3/7, and 3/1 as they attacked
at 0800 west of the river. Meanwhile, 1/7 patrolled on the division
left flank while maintaining contact with the 6th ROK Division.
Apparently the enemy put up a hard fight only when he could not
withdraw in time to avoid one. Resistance was light on the west bank,
and east of the river Lieutenant Colonel Allen Sutter’s 2/1, supported
by tanks, had little trouble. His battalion linked up with 3/1 in the
afternoon and dug in after taking its assigned objective, Hill 208,
with casualties of three men wounded.
The only determined opposition of 2 March took place during the
afternoon in the zone of 2/7, There the attackers could only inch
forward over rocky terrain which the enemy defended, ridge by ridge,
in spite of air strikes and 1,600 artillery rounds fired by the 11th
Marines.
At daybreak on the 3d the men of the 1st and 7th Marines could look to
the north and see their final objectives. Five hills lay along Phase
Line ARIZONA from west to east--Hills 536 and 333 in the zone of the
7th Marines, and Hills 321, 335, and 201 in the zone of the 1st Marines.
The last two positions were in the path of 2/1, which seized them after
several brisk fire fights. Casualties of three KIA and 28 WIA were
incurred while inflicting losses of 70 counted CCF dead. The terrain
gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy in taking Hill 321, where the CCF
troops had already begun their withdrawal.
It was in the zone of the 7th Marines that Communist resistance was
hottest. The 1st battalion was summoned to cover the regimental left
flank and aid in the attack of 2/7 on Hill 536 while 3/7 continued its
struggle for Hill 333. Both battalions had their hardest fight of the
entire operation that afternoon. They lost most of the 14 KIA and 104
WIA which the Division reported for 3 March, and the enemy still held
the topographical crests.
The 1st Marines had reached the mopping-up stage on 4 March, while the
7th Marines prepared to go up against an expected last-ditch stand
of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333. The parkas of the assault troops
were powdered with snow as the men moved out to the attack at 0800,
following an intensive artillery preparation. There was something
ominous about the silence in the objective area, but no trap had been
set for the attackers. The Communists actually had pulled out under
cover of darkness, leaving behind only enough outpost troops for
delaying operations.
Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on the 4th for the Marines, though
mopping up continued throughout the following day. Total Marine
casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395--48 KIA, 2 MIA, and 345
WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 prisoners. It is
certain, however, that the actual KIA and WIA figures were much higher,
since the withdrawing Communists buried their dead and took their
wounded with them.
Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit it
with achieving its main purpose--keeping the Communists off balance
while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great
offensive (Map 7). This explains why the enemy as a whole put up a
half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible and
fight another day.
JOC _Air Control System Criticized_
Operation KILLER was the first real test of the JOC system as far
as the Marines were concerned, and both the flying and ground-force
Marines felt that it had shown grave shortcomings. Air support on
1 March proved so disappointing that General Puller, as temporary
commander of the 1st Marine Division, reported the situation to General
Shepherd, commanding FMFPac. His letter is quoted in part as follows:
We are having very little success in obtaining Marine air for
CAS [close air support] missions and practically no success in
having Marine air on station for CAS missions.... Most of our
CAS missions in the current operation have been Air Force or
Navy Carrier planes. They do a good job and we are glad to have
them, but our Marine air, with whom we have trained and operated,
can do a better job. We have attempted to insure that Marine
air would support us, and to cut down the delays in receiving
such support, as evidenced by the attached dispatches. We have
received no decision relative to our requests. Apparently, the
answer is no by default.[116]
[116] Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, Encl. 4. This is a file of
documents in the Marine archives relating to problems of
JOC control in the spring of 1951.
[Illustration: MAP 7]
General Puller’s report was obviously written for the record, since
General Shepherd was present at the 1st Marine Division CP at the time.
He witnessed personally the Marine attacks of 2 and 3 March and the air
support they received. On the 3d, the day of heaviest fighting in the
entire operation, there could be no complaint that few Marine aircraft
supported Marine ground forces. The Corsairs flew 26 CAS sorties that
day and cleared the way more than once for the 2d and 3d Battalions
of the 7th Marines. The trouble was that air support as administered
by JOC was so often late in arriving, even when requested the evening
before. More than once the infantry had to go ahead with only artillery
support. Such delays threw the whole plan of attack out of gear, for
air and artillery had to be closely coordinated to be at their best.
General Shepherd had a series of talks with General Harris. Both then
conferred with General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force.
They requested that he authorize the 1st MAW to keep two planes on
station over the 1st Marine Division whenever it was engaged. General
Partridge did not concur. He maintained that Marine aircraft should be
available to him if needed elsewhere in an emergency. He did consent,
however, to permit 1st MAW armed reconnaissance sorties to check in
with DEVASTATE BAKER for any CAS requests.[117]
[117] Shepherd Papers, Encl 2, a ltr from Gen Shepherd to
CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. DEVASTATE BAKER was the call sign of
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), which
coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air
control parties (TACPS).
This conference did much to clear up the situation. On 5 March no less
than 48 Marine sorties reported to DEVASTATE BAKER, though there was
little need for them in mopping-up operations. And during the next two
weeks an average of 40 sorties a day was maintained.
CHAPTER V
Operation Ripper
_Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by Enemy--Second Phase
of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW Units--General MacArthur Visits
Marine Battalion--1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division--38th Parallel
Recrossed by Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_
The new IX corps commander, Major General William H. Hoge, USA, arrived
at Yoju on 4 March 1951. He relieved General Smith the next day and a
color guard turned out to render honors to the Marine commander when he
returned by helicopter to his own Division CP. Upon Smith’s arrival,
General Puller resumed his former duties as ADC.
The jumpoff of the new operation was scheduled for 0800 on 7 March,
so little time remained for last-minute preparations. The basic plan
called for the drive of IX and X Corps toward the 38th Parallel on the
central front. Protection was to be given on the left flank by I Corps
in the area south and east of Seoul. On the right the ROK divisions had
the mission of maintaining lateral security with a limited northward
advance.
It was no secret that General Ridgway had been disappointed in the
numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation KILLER.
The primary purpose of RIPPER was to inflict as many Communist
casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure to keep the
enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A secondary
purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that city and the
river Imjin, thus compelling the enemy to choose between default and a
defense on unfavorable terms.[118]
[118] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51.
CCF strategy in the early spring of 1951 was obviously conditioned
by preparations for a third great offensive. The enemy’s emphasis on
caution is shown in a translation of a CCF training directive of this
period:
There must absolutely be no hasty or impatient attitude
toward warfare. Consequently, even though we have a thorough
knowledge of the enemy situation and the terrain, if one day is
disadvantageous for us to engage in combat, it should be done the
next day; if day fighting is disadvantageous, fighting should
be conducted at night, and if engagements in a certain terrain
are not to our advantage, another location should be selected
for combat engagement. When the enemy is concentrated and a weak
point is difficult to find, one must be created (by agitating
or confusing them in some way), or wait until the enemy is
deploying. Engagements must be conducted only when the situation
is entirely to our advantage.[119]
[119] IX Corps _PIR_ #169; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 21.
_Light Resistance the First Day_
United Nations forces held a line extending across the peninsula from
Inchon (Map 8) in the west by way of Hoengsong to the east coast in the
vicinity of Chumunjin. The IX Corps order called for the 1st Marine
Division to maintain lateral contact with the 1st Cavalry Division
on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right. Hongchon and
Chunchon, two of the main objectives of Operation RIPPER, lay directly
in the path of the IX Corps advance. Both were important communications
centers which could be utilized to advantage by the enemy for his
forthcoming offensive.
The first phase line in the IX Corps zone was ALBANY. The Marines
did not need a map to locate an objective just beyond Oum Mountain,
a stark 2,900-foot peak about five and a half miles from the line
of departure. Distance in this area was conditioned by terrain, and
it was a natural fortress of wooded hills and swift streams that
confronted the 1st Marine Division. Highways were conspicuous by their
absence, and extensive maintenance would be required to utilize the
Hoengsong-Hongchon road as a MSR. So few and poor were the secondary
roads that it would sometimes prove necessary for vehicles to detour
along the rocky stream beds.[120]
[120] This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived
from the IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ and the 1stMarDiv _WD_ for
Mar 51.
The last offensive had not developed major or prolonged resistance
at any point. Yet that possibility had to be anticipated by Marine
planners. At least the enemy was an old acquaintance--the 66th CCF
Army,[121] commanded by General Show Shiu Kwai. The 196th Division was
on the left and the 197th on the right, with the 198th in reserve.
These units were believed to comprise about 24,000 men.
[121] A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions
supported by artillery, is comparable to a U.S. corps.
Wednesday, 7 March, dawned cold and clear, with snow falling in the
afternoon. The Hoengsong-Hongchon road, winding through Kunsamma Pass,
paralleled the boundary between the two Marine assault regiments, the
7th Marines on the left and the 1st Marines on the right. They jumped
off to attack in line abreast, employing all three battalions when
the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th Marines continued its
patrolling activities in the Hoengsong area as Division reserve.
The 11th Marines had to ration its artillery ammunition, owing to
supply shortages. JOC came to the rescue nobly by ordering MAG-33 to
place 11 flights of four planes each at the disposal of DEVASTATE BAKER
on D-minus-one. These aircraft reported at hourly intervals to work
over targets in the area of the next day’s Marine operations. For the
ground forces, it was an embarrassment of riches. They had more air
support than they could use at times, and DEVASTATE BAKER sent the
surplus to hit reserve concentrations and other targets of opportunity
in the enemy’s rear.[122]
[122] Compilation from 1st MAW Sqdns’ _HD_s, 7 and 8 Mar 51.
The two Marine assault regiments met with light resistance on D-Day.
Both took their objectives with little trouble except for scattered
bursts of machine gun fire. Total casualties for the day were seven men
wounded.
It was like old times to have Marine planes supporting Marine ground
forces. MAG-12 aircraft were on the job the next day, when CCF
resistance stiffened without ever becoming serious. Heavy CCF mortar
and small-arms fire was received by 3/1, supported by Company A of the
1st Tank Battalion. Well placed rounds by the 11th Marines silenced the
enemy in this quarter, and both battalions of the 1st Marines reached
their assigned positions by nightfall.
[Illustration: MAP 8
EUSAK plan for Operation Ripper]
The second day’s advances gave added proof that the enemy was up to his
old trick of putting up a limited defense while pulling back before
the Marines could come to grips. Log bunkers were ideal for these CCF
delaying tactics; each was a little fortress that might enable a squad
to stand off a company while larger CCF units withdrew.
The Marine assault troops found that a preliminary treatment of napalm
from MAG-12 aircraft, followed by well-aimed 90mm fire from the tanks,
did much to soften up the bunkers for an infantry attack with hand
grenades.
Company A of the 7th Marines had the hardest fight of all Marine units
on 8 March. Second Lieutenant Clayton O. Bush and the 2d Platoon led
the attack on the company objective, a hill mass to the left of Oum
San. With 300 yards still to be covered, the Marines were pinned
down by well aimed CCF small-arms and mortar fire, including white
phosphorus. A high explosive shell scored a direct hit on the platoon,
killing two men and wounding three. Bush was evacuated, with his right
arm mangled. First Lieutenant Eugenous Hovatter, the company commander,
ordered the 1st Platoon to pass through the 2d and continue the attack
with air and tank support. The flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles
did much to help the company clear the enemy from the hill and the 7th
Marines reached all assigned regimental objectives for the day.[123]
[123] 7thMar _HD_, Mar 51; VMF-323 _HD_, Mar 51; Capt Clayton
O. Bush, ltr of 11 Aug 57.
The Marine advance came to a halt on 9 March to wait for Army units to
catch up on the right. While the 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines took
blocking positions, the 1st and 7th Marines sent out patrols on both
flanks in an effort to regain lateral contact. For the next two days,
1st Marine Division operations were limited to patrolling. A good deal
of activity took place in the rear, however, as Marine service units
moved up to Hoengsong.
_Seoul Abandoned by Enemy_
The advance was resumed on 11 March after the relief of 2/1 by Major
Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by a platoon
of tanks. Although the enemy withdrew from most of his positions
without putting up much resistance, a patrol of George Company, 3/1,
had a hot fire fight on Hill 549. Opening fire at 50 yards from
camouflaged, log-faced bunkers, the Chinese killed one man and wounded
nine. Marine infantrymen, supported by flat-trajectory 90mm fire,
approached within grenade-throwing range to destroy five bunkers and
kill 16 of the defenders. As the patrol withdrew, it called on the 11th
Marines to finish the job. The cannoneers were credited with several
direct hits.[124]
[124] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 8.
Chinese resistance continued to be light as the two Marine regiments
occupied rather than seized ground on 12 and 13 March. By the 14th all
units were dug in along Phase Line ALBANY.
CCF withdrawals were also reported by other Eighth Army units. On
15 March a patrol from the 1st ROK Division of I Corps found Seoul
abandoned by the enemy. The Chinese Reds had made their choice and UN
forces took over a devastated city with some 200,000 civilians dragging
out a miserable existence in the ruins. Dead power lines dangled over
buildings pounded into rubble, and even such a famous landmark as the
enormous red, brass-studded gates of the American Embassy Compound had
been destroyed.
It was the fourth time that Seoul had changed hands in 9 months of war.
Air reconnaissance having established that the enemy had withdrawn
about 15 miles to entrenched positions in the Uijongbu area, General
Ridgway enlarged the mission of I Corps by directing it to advance on
the left of IX Corps.[125]
[125] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 68–70.
During the first phase of Operation RIPPER, from 7 to 13 March, counted
casualties inflicted on the enemy by X Corps amounted to 6,543 KIA and
216 POW. IX Corps casualties during the same period were reported as
158 KIA, 965 WIA, and 35 MIA--a total of 1,158.[126]
[126] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 35–37.
The total strength of the Eighth Army (less the Marines) was 185,229
officers and men in March 1951. Adding the 25,642 of the 1st Marine
Division, the 4,645 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, plus 11,353 of
the American Air Force and 355 attached from the U.S. Navy, 227,119
Americans were serving in Korea. This does not count 13,475 South
Koreans serving in various U.S. Army divisions.[127]
[127] _Ibid._
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with an authorized total of 728 officers
and 4,216 enlisted men, had an actual strength of 626 and 4,019
respectively on 31 March 1951. Of an authorized 29 officers and 93
enlisted men from the Navy, 22 and 83 in these categories were on
duty.[128]
[128] FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51.
Troops to the number of 21,184 from the ground forces of other United
Nations were represented as follows:
United Kingdom and Australia 10,136
Turkey 4,383
Philippines 1,277
Thailand 1,050
Canada 858
New Zealand 816
Greece 777
France 749
Belgium-Luxembourg 638
Netherlands 500
----------
[129]21,184
[129] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include
personnel in hospitals or clearing stations. UK and
Australian statistics are not separated in available
records.
The 249,815 officers and men of the ROK Army make a total UN combat
strength of 493,503. There were an additional 671 in three noncombat
units: the Danish hospital ship _Jutlandia_, 186; the 60th Indian
Ambulance Group, 329; and the Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit,
156.[130]
[130] _Ibid._
Chinese forces in Korea, including confirmed and probable, totaled 16
armies, each comparable to a U.S. corps. Eight others were reported.
Assuming that these CCF units averaged a field strength of 24,000
officers and men, the total would have been 384,000 for the 16 armies.
The reorganized forces of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) were
credited with five armies. Adding these 120,000 men to the 16 Chinese
armies, the enemy had 504,000 troops in Korea plus whatever might
have been the strength of the eight reported armies and the rear area
service elements. In addition, large reserves stood just over the
border in Manchuria.[131]
[131] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 95.
_Second Phase of the Operation_
With scarcely a pause on Phase Line ALBANY, the second phase of
Operation RIPPER began on 14 March with a drive toward Phase Line
BUFFALO (Map 8). Despite the difficulty of maneuver over muddy roads in
mountainous terrain, an Eighth Army directive of that date called for
a pincers movement to be initiated by means of a rapid advance of the
1st Marine Division on the right and the 1st Cavalry Division on the
left. It was hoped that the Chinese forces south of Hongchon might be
trapped and destroyed after the 187th Airborne Regiment cut off escape
by landing north of the town. General Ridgway having urged his corps
commanders to stress maneuver, IX Corps sent this message to division
commanders:
It is desired that more use be made of maneuver within and
between division zones with a view toward trapping and
annihilating the enemy through such maneuver. Movements should be
less stereotyped; it is not desirable that units always advance
toward the enemy abreast. Well planned and successfully executed
maneuver using companies and battalions has previously been
conducted; this should be extended to include regiments. This
Headquarters is studying and will continue to study and order
into execution the maneuver of divisions with the same intent and
purpose.[132]
[132] IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51.
Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division made rapid
progress toward Phase Line BAKER (Map 9), established by IX Corps as an
intermediate control. Unfortunately for the purposes of the envelopment
maneuver, the Chinese withdrew from the Hongchon area before the
pincers could close or the 187th Airborne make an air drop. CCF
resistance was confined to machine gun fire covering hasty retirements.
The 7th Marines on the left occupied its objective without once calling
for air or artillery support, and the 1st Marines was virtually
unopposed. Division casualties for the 14th were six men wounded.
Flash floods and roads churned into hub-deep mud were the greatest
enemies of progress. Serious as the resulting supply problems were,
they might have been worse but for the efforts of the recently
organized Civil Transport Corps formed from members of the ROK National
Guard who lacked the necessary training for military duties. There was
no shortage of willing indigenous labor, for these auxiliaries received
pay as well as rations and clothing. Formed into companies, they worked
with the wooden “A-frames”--so-called because of their shape--used from
time immemorial in Korea as a rack for carrying heavy burdens.
[Illustration:
USA Photo SC 356353
_Flight From The Foe--A Korean carries his aged father across the
icy Han River in the flight southward to escape the advancing
Communist troops in their drive of January, 1951._
]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158073]
_At the Critical Moment--Above, a Marine tank blasts an enemy
emplacement while a rifleman stands by for the final assault;
below, Marine riflemen hug the ground as they advance under fire
during Operation RIPPER in March, 1951._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 6862]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8064 USMC Photo A 161016]
_Attack--Above, Marine machine gunner climbs a ridge while a
flamethrower operator burns straw to deny cover to the enemy;
below, a young rifleman hurriedly reloads after emptying a clip
at Chinese Communist soldiers._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159023]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155354]
_Supporting The Fighting Man--Above, a group of surgeons are at
work in a minor surgery ward; below, a cargador train carries
ammunition and rations to the front-line companies._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9857]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8756]
_Moving Out--Above, a Marine rifle company, C/1/1, moves to a
rest area after almost two months of fighting; below, camouflaged
Korean Marines on patrol pause to check the route._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 161982]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9458 USMC Photo A 9457]
“_Calling_ DEVASTATE BAKER!”--_Above, forward air controllers
with attacking companies use the call sign of supporting air;
below, a dependable Corsair responds to the infantry’s call._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 133540]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 346714]
“_Launch and Attack”--Above, a Panther jet takes off on a close
air support mission; below, the attack is pressed at close range
on a stubborn enemy by a Tigercat (left) and a Corsair (right)._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 130948 USMC Photo A 7283]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158968]
_Supporting The Troops--Above, a tank commander emerges from his
steel shell in order to scan the hills for targets; below, a
rocket battery harasses the enemy near Chunchon in May, 1951._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155643]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159109]
_Power-Packed Punch--Above, a Marine tank topples Korean trees
while moving into position to support an attack by fire; below, a
rocket battery firing a ripple at night._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 169791]
[Illustration: USMC A 3597]
_Prisoners of War--Above, Marines guarding captured prisoners
awaiting interrogation; and below, after hearing the familiar
order to “saddle up” a Marine awaits the word to move out._
[Illustration: USMC A 159197]
[Illustration: USMC A 9769]
_Random Scenes--Above, the result of what happens when a jeep
runs over an anti-tank mine; and below, a Marine fire direction
control center in operation._
[Illustration: USMC A 155903]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962]
_Aerial Workhorse--Above, after refueling at a mountainside
fuel dump, a Marine helicopter loads men for evacuation; below,
pre-fab bunkers are unloaded on a Korean hillside._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962]
_Have Chopper, Will Travel--Above, Marine helicopter
demonstrating rescue technique; and below, staff officers board
helicopters in preparation for front line inspection trip._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493]
[Illustration: USMC Photo 160193 USMC Photo A 158811]
_Fighting Faces--Above, left, PFC H. W. Hodges pauses to drink
from a “refrigerated” spring; above, right, PFC J. W. Harnsberger
relaxes on the MLR; below, Sgt E. L. Whitlow and Capt W. F.
Whitbeck scan the front for signs of enemy action._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 167904]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 131819]
_Family Reunion--Above, Col W. S. Brown, CO 1st Marines, visits
his son, a Marine corporal; below, left, Capt G. H. Parker
directs an air strike from a tree top observation post; below,
right, PFC K. L. Spriggs receives his Purple Heart._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 132390 USMC Photo A 158743]
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158079]
_Necklace of Boots--Above, a South Korean cargador carries a
necklace of boots to a front line company; below, new thermal
boots are issued to combat troops._
[Illustration: USMC Photo A 157927]
[Illustration: MAP 9
1st Mar Div Zone of Action
Operation Ripper]
The Civil Transport Corps proved to be a boon for the Eighth Army.
Veteran porters could manage a load of 100 to 125 pounds over ground
too rugged for motor vehicles. Several hundred were attached to each
regiment during Operation RIPPER.
Any lingering hope of rounding up Chinese prisoners in the Hongchon
area was blasted on the 15th when evidence of Chinese withdrawal came
in the form of an enemy radio message intercepted at 1230. “We cannot
fight any longer,” the translation read. “We must move back today. We
will move back at 1400. Enemy troops will enter our positions at 1300
or 1400. Enemy troops approaching fast.”[133]
[133] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv; CO 1stMar, 1300 15 Mar 51.
Hongchon fell without a fight to the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines
on the afternoon of 15 March. Major Webb D. Sawyer, the commanding
officer, sent a motor patrol through the ruins without flushing out any
Chinese, but on the return trip a truck was damaged by a “butterfly
bomb.” This led to the discovery that the Hongchon area was covered
with similar explosives that had been dropped by U.S. planes to slow up
the CCF counterattacks in the middle of February.
Butterfly bombs, so-called because of the whirling vanes that
controlled the drop and armed the 4-pound projectiles, could be set for
air or ground bursts. Usually, however, they were dropped in clusters
to remain on the ground until disturbed. Apparently the enemy had not
troubled to clear them from the Hongchon area, and that three-day task
was begun by Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion while 1/7 seized
the high ground northwest of the town.[134]
[134] LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual
9-1980, AF 136–137. This was not the first nor the last
time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs became a
deadly nuisance to friendly forces.
_Changes in 1st MAW Units_
Air support for the ground forces continued to be more than adequate in
quantity. Since the agreement between Generals Partridge and Harris, 40
1st MAW sorties a day had been allotted to the 1st Marine Division. The
timing was not all that could have been asked on occasion, but on the
whole the Marine infantry had no complaint.
The 1st MAW had undergone an extensive reshuffling of units on the eve
of Operation RIPPER. VMF(N)-542 was sent back to El Toro, California,
for conversion to F3D jet all weather fighters. The squadron’s F7F-3N’s
and two F-82’s were left with VMF(N)-513. The former commanding officer
of 542, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, assumed command of 513.
He relieved Lieutenant Colonel David C. Wolfe, who returned to the
States.
The California-bound cadre of 542 included 45 officers and 145 enlisted
men under Major Albert L. Clark. VMF(N)-513 was now a composite
squadron, attacking from K-1 during the day with its F4U-5N’s and at
night with its F7F-3N’s.
Another change took place when VMF-312 replaced VMF-212 on the CVE
_Bataan_. The former squadron had been preparing for weeks to perform
carrier duty, so that the change was made without a hitch. VMF-212,
after nearly 3 months on the _Bataan_, established itself at K-3 under
a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Claude H. Welch, who
relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski.
The transportation jam in Korea made necessary the permanent assignment
of a VMR-152 detachment to 1st MAW Headquarters. Transports had
heretofore been sent to the Wing on a temporary basis and returned to
Hawaii when missions were completed.
Mud and inadequate rail facilities doubled the demands on FEAF’S
aerial supply of combat forces. The Wing’s courier service to Marine
air and ground forces scattered over Korea reached the limit of its
capabilities. As a solution General Harris requested a five-plane
VMR-152 detachment on a long-term assignment, and Colonel Deane C.
Roberts took command of this forward echelon at Itami.
It was now possible to handle cargo and troop transport at the cargo
and passenger terminals of all Marine air bases. In one 4-day period,
early in April, approximately 2,000 replacement troops were lifted from
Masan to Hoengsong by the five R5Ds. About a thousand rotated veterans
were flown back on the return trips.[135]
[135] Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st
MAW units are derived from the historical diaries of the
units concerned for February, March, and April 1951.
A further change involved the coordination of the Wing’s air control
organizations. As the enemy’s air power increased, obviously the
problems of UN air defense multiplied. At K-1 the Marine Ground
Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the Air Defense Section of Marine
Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2) were hard pressed to identify
and control the hundreds of aircraft flying daily over Korea.
There was no adequate system of alerting these air defense stations to
the effect that planes were departing or incoming. Many of them failed
to send out their standard identification friend or foe (IFF) signals;
and those that did so were still suspect, since U.S. electronics
equipment on UN planes had fallen into enemy hands. As a consequence
MGCIS-1 was kept busy vectoring air defense fighters to verify that
certain bogeys were friendly transports, B-29s, or enemy bombers.[136]
[136] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1038, 1039. A “bogey” is
an unidentified plane.
In an effort to cope with the situation, General Harris requested that
another Marine ground control intercept squadron, MGCIS-3 be sent to
Korea. He desired that Marine Air Control Group-2 (MACG-2) also be made
available to coordinate the Wing’s air control functions. These units
sailed on 5 March from San Francisco.
Until March 1951 the Air Force’s 606th Aircraft Control and Warning
Squadron had participated in the air surveillance of the Pusan area
from the top of 3,000-foot Chon-San--the encroaching mountain that made
K-9’s traffic pattern so hazardous. This Air Force unit displaced to
Taejon early in March, and the MGCIS-1 commanding officer, Major H. E.
Allen, moved his radio and radar vans to the mountain top to take over
the job.[137]
[137] LtCol H. E. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59.
_General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion_
Following the occupation of Hongchon on the 15th, the Marine ground
forces ran into stiffening enemy opposition during the next two days.
The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines were pinned down by intense
CCF mortar and artillery fire when attacking Hill 356 (Map 9). Three
out of six friendly 81mm mortars were knocked out on 15 March in the 3d
Battalion area, and at dusk 2/7 and 3/7 had barely won a foothold on
the hill.[138]
[138] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51.
The 1st Marines also met opposition which indicated that the enemy
planned to make a stand on the high ground east and north of Hongchon.
An intricate maneuver was executed when Lieutenant Colonel Robert
K. McClelland’s 2/1 swung from the right flank, where no enemy was
encountered, to the extreme left. As a preliminary, the battalion
had to circle to the rear, then move by truck up the MSR and through
the zone of the 7th Marines as far as the village of Yangjimal (Map
9). Dismounting, the men made a difficult march across broken country
toward Hill 246. At 1230 on the 15th the column deployed to attack
Hill 428 in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3d
Battalion.
Easy Company (Captain Jack A. Smith) and Item Company (First Lieutenant
Joseph R. Fisher) engaged in a hot fire fight with the enemy. Both
sides relied chiefly on mortars, but the Chinese had the advantage of
firing from camouflaged bunkers. Smith called for an air strike and
four planes from VMF-214 responded immediately. Fox Company (Captain
Goodwin C. Groff) and Dog Company (Captain Welby D. Cronk) were
committed in the attempt to carry Hill 428, but the enemy continued to
resist stubbornly until dusk. McClelland then ordered a withdrawal to
night defensive positions around Hill 246. The two assault battalions
had suffered 7 KIA and 86 WIA casualties. Counted enemy dead were
reported as 93.[139]
[139] 2/1 _HD_ 16 Dec 50 to 30 Apr 51, 21–22; VMF-214 _HD_ Mar
51, 25–26.
Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Kennedy’s 3/5 was attached to the 1st
Marines to protect the right flank as the Marines prepared to resume
the attack on the morning of the 16th. But the enemy had pulled out
from Hill 428 during the night and patrols advanced more than 300 yards
without making contact.
Another hard action awaited the 7th Marines on the 16th, when Major
Sawyer’s 1st Battalion moved up to Line BAKER (Map 9). The Chinese
resisted so hard on Hill 399 that the Marines had to attack bunker
after bunker with grenades.
The following morning was the occasion of a visit to the front by
General MacArthur. Accompanied by Generals Ridgway and O. P. Smith, he
drove in a jeep from Wonju over the mountain pass to Hongchon, where
Marine engineers were still clearing mines. The jeep stalled after
crossing the Hongchon-gang at a ford and a tow was necessary. This
did not deter the commander in chief, who had asked to visit a Marine
battalion in a combat area. He was taken to the CP of Major Sawyer,
whose 1/7 was mopping up on Hill 399 after the hard fight of the day
before.
Five hours of riding over miserable roads had not daunted the
71-year-old veteran of two World Wars. He seemed fresh and rested as he
shook hands with 1/7 officers. “Although we had not passed the word
regarding General MacArthur’s visit,” commented General Smith, “there
were dozens of cameras in evidence.”[140]
[140] Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Mar 51.
IX Corps orders were received on the 17th for the 1st Marine Division
to attack from Line BAKER to Line BUFFALO (Map 9). The Division plan of
maneuver called for the 5th Marines to pass through and relieve the 7th
Marines while the 1st Marines continued to advance on the right.
Again the enemy chose withdrawal to resistance, and five of the six
Marine battalions reached Line BUFFALO on 20 March after encountering
only sniper fire and a few scattered mortar rounds. Enemy opposition
was reserved for 2/1 on the 19th, when Fox Company was pinned down by
enemy small-arms and mortar fire from a long, narrow ridge running
north and south to the west of Hill 330.
Fortunately for the attackers, a parallel valley enabled a platoon of
tanks from Baker Company, 1st Tank Battalion, to knock out unusually
strong CCF bunkers with direct 90mm fire while Fox Company riflemen
followed along the ridgeline with a grenade attack before the enemy had
time to recover. Thanks to intelligent planning, not a single Marine
was killed or wounded as the battalion dug in for the night on Hill 330.
Adopting the same tactics on the 20th, after artillery preparation
and an air strike by VMF-214 and VMF-323 planes, Easy Company of
2/1 advanced along the ridgeline connecting Hills 330 and 381 while
tanks moved forward on either side providing direct flat-trajectory
90mm fire. By 1315 the Marines had overrun the enemy’s main line of
resistance without a casualty.[141]
[141] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 _HD_, Mar
51.
_1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division_
As the Eighth Army jumped off on 20 March from Line BUFFALO toward
Line CAIRO (Map 9), the 1st KMC Regiment was attached again to the
1st Marine Division. This was the third time that Lieutenant Colonel
Charles W. Harrison had been directed to reorganize and reassemble
a KMC liaison advisory group. The 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds, was placed in
direct artillery support. When the advance was resumed, the KMCs
attacked between the 1st Marines on the right and the 5th Marines on
the left.[142]
[142] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51, 2–3.
The high _esprit de corps_ of the KMCs shines forth from a comment
written in his own English by First Lieutenant Kim Sik Tong: “The KMC
ideal is to complete the mission, regardless of receiving strong enemy
resistance, with endurance and strong united power, and always bearing
in one’s mind the distinction between honor and dishonor.”[143]
[143] 1stKMCRegt _POR_, 24 Mar 51.
The zone of the KMC Regiment was a roadless wilderness, making it
necessary to air-drop ammunition and supplies for the attack on Hill
975. This was the hardest fight of the Division advance to Line CAIRO.
Excellent artillery support was provided for the 2d and 3d Battalions
as they inched their way forward in three days of bitter combat. Not
until the morning of 24 March was the issue decided by maneuver when
the 1st Battalion moved around the left KMC flank into a position
threatening the enemy’s right. Resistance slackened immediately on Hill
975 and the KMCs took their objective without further trouble.
The 1st and 5th Marines were already on Line CAIRO, having met
comparatively light opposition from NKPA troops who had relieved the
66th and 39th CCF Armies. Apparently the enemy was using North Koreans
as expendable delaying elements while massing in the rear for an
offensive that could be expected at any time. A smoke screen, produced
by burning green wood, shrouded the front in an almost constant haze.
Although the objectives of Operation RIPPER had been reached, General
Ridgway planned to continue the UN offensive for the purpose of keeping
the enemy off balance during his offensive preparations. The Eighth
Army had been attacking with few and brief pauses for regrouping even
since 21 February, and the commanding general wished to maintain its
momentum.
An advance of the 1st Marine Division to a new Line CAIRO was ordered
by IX Corps on 26 March. This was simply a northeast extension of the
old line to the boundary between IX and X Corps (Map 9). There was
no need for the 5th Marines to advance, and the 1st Marines and KMC
Regiment moved up to the new line on schedule without opposition.
Eighth Army units had made average gains of about 35 miles during the
last three weeks while driving nearly to the 38th Parallel. On 29
March, General Ridgway published a plan for Operation RUGGED. It was
to be a continuation of the offensive, with Line KANSAS (Map 8) as the
new objective. While other 1st Marine units were being relieved by X
Corps elements, the 7th Marines was to be moved up from reserve near
Hongchon and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for the attack beyond
Chunchon, evacuated by the retreating enemy.[144]
[144] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 18–19.
On 1 April the Marines were informed of sweeping changes in IX Corps
plans. Instead of being relieved, the 1st Marine Division was to
continue forward with two infantry regiments plus the KMCs. Its new
mission called for a relief of the 1st Cavalry Division (with the 7th
Marines attached) north of Chunchon. This modification gave General
Smith the responsibility for nearly 20 miles of front.[145]
[145] Smith, _Chronicle_, 1 Apr 51.
“I visited this front frequently,” commented Major General A. L.
Bowser, the G-3 of that period, “and it was difficult at times to even
locate an infantry battalion.... Visitors from the States or FMFPac
were shocked at the wide frontages.”[146]
[146] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
_38th Parallel Recrossed by Marines_
Further IX Corps instructions on 2 April directed that the 1st Marines
go into Division reserve near Hongchon while the 5th Marines and 1st
KMC Regiment attacked. The deep, swift Soyang-gang, fordable in only a
few places, lay squarely in the path of the 5th Marines. Speculations
as to the method of crossing became rife just as air mattresses were
issued. And though the officers denied any such intent, the troops were
convinced that inflated mattresses would be used.
As it happened, the regimental executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Stewart, worked out a plan that did not include any such novelty. A
narrow ford was discovered that would get the 1st and 2d Battalions
across while the 3d rode in DUKWs. Light enemy opposition of a rear
guard nature was encountered but the regiment completed the operation
without casualties. Stewart reported to the regimental CP and learned
that a jeep waited to take him on the initial lap of his homeward
journey. He was the last man to leave Korea of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, which had landed at Pusan on 2 August 1950.[147]
[147] Col J. L. Stewart, ltr of 25 Oct 57.
After reaching their prescribed objectives, the 5th Marines and KMC
Regiment were relieved on 5 April by elements of the 7th Infantry
Division of X Corps. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines, attached to the 1st
Cavalry Division, advanced northward with the 7th and 8th Cavalry
Regiments. Little opposition developed and on 4 April the Marines were
among the first Eighth Army troops to recross the 38th Parallel.
General Ridgway published another operation plan on 6 April 1951 and
designated new Eighth Army objectives to the northward. The purpose
was to threaten the buildup for the forthcoming CCF offensive that was
taking place behind the enemy lines in the so-called “Iron Triangle.”
This strategic area, one of the few pieces of comparatively level real
estate in central Korea, was bounded by Kumhwa, Chorwon, and Pyongyang
(Map 14). A broad valley containing a network of good roads, it had
been utilized by the Chinese for the massing of supplies and troops.
Experience had proved that interdictory bombing could not prevent
the enemy from nourishing an offensive, even though the FEAF had
complete control of the air over roads and rail lines of a mountainous
peninsula. The Chinese, though hampered in their efforts, had been
able to bring up large quantities of supplies under cover of darkness.
General Ridgway determined, therefore, to launch his ground forces at
objectives threatening the Iron Triangle, thus forcing the enemy to
fight.
On 8 April, in preparation for the new effort, the 1st Marine Division
was directed by IX Corps to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division on Line
KANSAS and prepare to attack toward Line QUANTICO (Map 8).
_Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_
By this time, after three months of various sorts of operational
difficulties, VMF-311 was riding a wave of efficiency. The distance
from the operating base to the combat area emphasized the superior
speed of the F9Fs. The Panther jets could get into action in half the
time required by the Corsairs. The jets were more stable in rocket,
bombing, and strafing runs. They were faster on armed reconnaissance
and often were pouring it into the enemy before he could disperse.
These advantages offset the high fuel consumption of the F9Fs and made
them ideal planes for close air support.
On the morning of 8 April an opportunity arose for the Marine jets to
help the 7th Marines. It started when 3/7 patrols encountered 120mm
mortars, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades employed by an
enemy force dug in on a ridge looming over the road near the west end
of the Hwachon reservoir. The battalion forward air controller radioed
DEVASTATE BAKER at Hongchon for air support.[148]
[148] The following description is from: 7th Mar HD, 8 Apr 51,
5; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574
and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7)
“Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW _HD_, Apr 51, App
VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr.
At the time Major Roy R. Hewitt, an air officer on General Shepherd’s
FMFPac staff, was visiting the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical
Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2). His blow-by-blow report of events is
as follows:
a. At 0900 a request for an air support strike on an enemy mortar
position was received from the 7th Marines. It took the Air
Support Section until 0945 to get through to JOC and then it had
to be shunted through K-1 in order to get the request in.
b. The G-3 1st Marine Air Wing had arranged with JOC to have four
(4) F9F ‘scramble alert’ for use by the 1st Marine Division.
The F9Fs were requested, and JOC authorized their use, but when
Marine Aircraft Group-33 was contacted they informed the Air
Support Section that JOC had already scrambled the aircraft and
sent them to another target.
c. Air Support Section again contacted JOC, and JOC said aircraft
would be on station in one (1) hour. At the end of one (1) hour
JOC was again contacted concerning aircraft. This time JOC said
they would have two (2) flights on station within one (1) hour.
At the end of the second one (1) hour period no aircraft were
received.
d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed
that any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be
requested through the 1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th
Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC notified DEVASTATE BAKER
that any such requests from the 1st Marine Division would not be
honored until the Division went back into action.][149]
[149] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, _op. cit._
During all this time ten Marine planes--six from VMF-311 and four from
VMF-214--had reported in and out of the area. They had been sent by
MELLOW to work under the control of Mosquito STRATEGY, the tactical air
controller (airborne) (TACA) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flights
also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the Marines’ left, hit
troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines’ front, and aided
the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were encountering resistance on
the commanding ground to the right. None of the flights supported the
Marines.
Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the enemy
positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of four
Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt’s report continued:
e. At the end of six (6) hours air support was finally received
by the 7th Marines. It was brought in by a Mosquito who would not
relinquish control of the aircraft to the Forward Air Controller
who could see the target much better than the Mosquito.
f. After having the fighters make a couple of passes the Mosquito
took the fighters and went to another target without having
completely destroyed the position.
This was the beginning of a deterioration in air support for Marine
ground forces that can be charged in large measure to the JOC system
of control. Major Hewitt’s report was read with great interest by
high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers. By now they were devoting
a lot of thought to the breakup of the Marine air-ground team.
CHAPTER VI
The CCF Spring Offensive
_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied by KMC
Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank--Marine Air in Support
Everywhere--Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist
Attacks--Withdrawal to the_ KANSAS _Line--Enemy Stopped in IX Corps
Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_
On 10 April 1951 the 1st Marine Division was poised on Line KANSAS for
a drive to Line QUANTICO. Then a new IX Corps directive put on the
brakes, and for 10 days Marine activities were limited to patrolling
and preparation of defensive works. Boundary adjustments between the
Division and the 6th ROK Division on the left extended the Marine
zone about 2,000 yards to the west; and General O. P. Smith’s CP was
advanced to Sapyong-ni, just south of the 38th Parallel (Map 8).
Out of a blue sky came the announcement on the 11th that General
MacArthur had been recalled by President Truman for failure to give
wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government
and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.
General Ridgway was appointed to the UN command, and he in turn was
relieved on 14 April by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA.
The new Eighth Army commander, youthful in appearance for his 59 years,
was no novice at fighting Communists. In 1949 and 1950 he had been
Director of the Joint Military Aid Group that saved Greece from falling
into the clutches of Communism after Moscow fomented a civil war. Van
Fleet also brought to his new command a World War II reputation as a
vigorous leader with a preference for offensive doctrines.
_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive_
Chinese prisoners taken during the first three weeks of April 1951 told
all they knew with no apparent reluctance, just as Japanese captives
had given information in World War II. Inconsistent as it may seem that
fanatical Asian soldiers should prove so cooperative, such was the
penalty the enemy paid for insisting on resistance to the last ditch.
Since the possibility of surrender was not considered, CCF prisoners
were taught no code of behavior and answered questions freely and
frankly.
POW interrogations were supplemented by captured documents revealing
that the Chinese prided themselves on a new tactical doctrine known
as “the roving defensive,” put into effect in the spring of 1951. It
meant “not to hold your position to the death, but to defend against
the enemy through movement,” explained a secret CCF directive dated 17
March 1951. “Therefore, the wisdom of the roving defensive is based
on exhausting the enemy without regard for the loss or gain of some
fighting area or the immediate fulfillment of our aims.”[150]
[150] This section is based upon the following documents: IX
Corps _CmdRpt_ 5, Apr 51, Sec 3, Intelligence; 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Apr 51; _PIR_ 171, 179, 180.
It was admitted that the CCF soldier must work harder, “because the
troops will have to construct entrenchments and field works in every
place they move.” But the advantages were that “roving warfare can
conserve our power, deplete the enemy’s strength, and secure for us
more favorable conditions for future victory. Meanwhile, the enemy will
make the mistake once again, and collapse on the Korean battlefield.”
The last sentence evidently refers to the UN advance of late November
1950 that was rolled back by a surprise CCF counteroffensive. Chinese
strategists seem to have concluded that their “roving defensive” had
made possible another such offensive victory in the spring of 1951. At
any rate, prisoners questioned by the 1st Marine Division and other IX
Corps units agreed that the CCF 5th Phase Offensive was scheduled to
begin on 22 April 1951. The IX Corps zone was said to be the target
area for an attempted breakthrough.[151]
[151] EUSAK, IX Corps and 1stMarDiv G-2 _PIR_s, 1–20 Apr 51.
Marine G-2 officers recalled that prisoners gave information on the eve
of the CCF offensive in November 1950 that proved to be astonishingly
accurate in the light of later events. For it was a paradox that
the Chinese Reds, so secretive in other respects, let the man in the
ranks know about high-level strategic plans. In the spring of 1951 it
mattered little, since air reconnaissance had kept the Eighth Army well
informed as to the enemy buildup.
Prisoners were taken in the IX Corps zone from the following major CCF
units during the first three weeks of April:
20th Army (58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions), estimated strength,
24,261;
26th Army (76th, 77th, and 78th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 22,222;
39th Army (115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 19,538;
40th Army (118th, 119th, and 120th Divisions), estimated total
strength, 25,319.
The 20th and 26th, it may be recalled, were two of the CCF armies
opposing the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Reservoir breakout.
It was a satisfaction to the Marines that their opponents of December
1950 had evidently needed from three to four months to reorganize and
get back into action.
In CCF reserve on 21 April 1951 were the 42d and 66th Armies, both
located in the Iron Triangle to the enemy’s rear. The former included
the 124th, 125th, and 126th Divisions--the 124th being the unit cut to
pieces from 3 to 7 November 1950 by the 7th Marines in the war’s first
American offensive action against Chinese Red adversaries.
_Hwachon Occupied by KMC Regiment_
At 0700 on the 21st the 1st Marine Division resumed the attack toward
Line QUANTICO with the 7th Marines on the left, the 5th Marines in the
center, the KMC Regiment on the right, and the 1st Marines in reserve.
Negligible resistance awaited the Marines and other IX Corps troops
during advances of 5,000 to 9,000 yards. An ominous quiet hung over the
front as green wood smoke limited visibility to a few hundred yards.
On the Marine left the 6th ROK Division lost touch, opening a gap
of 2,500 yards, according to a message from Corps to the 1st Marine
Division. The ROK commander was ordered by Corps to restore lateral
contact. This incident would be recalled significantly by the Marines
when the CCF blow fell.[152]
[152] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Apr 51, 47–48; CO 7thMar msg to CG
1stMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr 51.
The KMC Regiment had the mission of finishing the fight for control of
the Hwachon Reservoir area. Early in April the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 4th Ranger Company, USA, had been repulsed in attempts to
fight their way across the artificial lake in rubber boats. The enemy
retaliated by opening the penstocks and spillway gates. Considering
that the dam was 275 feet high and the spillway 826 feet long, it is
not surprising that a wall of water 10 feet high roared down the Pukhan
Valley into areas recently occupied by IX Corps units.[153]
[153] Capt D. E. Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam,
Korea,” _The Military Engineer_, Jan-Feb 1952, 7–8.
Both Army and Marine engineers were on the alert, having been warned by
aerial observers. They cut three floating bridges loose from one bank
or another, so that they could ride out the crest of the flood. Thanks
to this precaution, only temporary damage and interruption of traffic
resulted.[154]
[154] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51.
The 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H.
Partridge, was given the mission by Corps of jamming the gates of the
dam at the open position. Compliance would have to wait, of course,
until the KMCs took the dam. Partridge conferred meanwhile with Colonel
Bowser, and it was decided to take no action after the anticipated
capture until a demolitions reconnaissance could be made.[155]
[155] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col J. H.
Partridge, ltr of 17 Mar 58.
As early as 18 April a KMC patrol had crossed the Pukhan into the town
of Hwachon, which was found abandoned except for 11 Chinese soldiers,
who were taken prisoner. Marine engineers installed a floating bridge
on the 21st for the advance of one KMC battalion the next morning. The
other two battalions were to cross the river several miles downstream
by DUKWs.[156]
[156] CO KMC Regt msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in KMC
In&Out #1; Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51.
Corps plans for the attack were made in full realization of air
reconnaissance reports for 20 and 21 April indicating that the enemy
offensive buildup was in its final stages. This intelligence was
gleaned in spite of all enemy efforts to frustrate the airmen. CCF
spotters were placed on mountain tops to give the alarm, and relays
of men fired shots to pass on warnings of approaching planes.
Antiaircraft defenses were increased at such vital spots as bridges
and supply areas. The Communists even went so far as to put out
decoys--fake trucks, tanks, and tank cars--to lure UN fighter-bombers
within range of antiaircraft guns.
These efforts resulted in 16 Marine planes being shot down from 1
to 21 April 1951. Nine of the pilots were killed, one was captured,
three were rescued from enemy territory, one walked back to friendly
outposts, and two managed to bail out or crash-land behind the UN
lines.[157]
[157] Compilation of data from 1stMAW sqdn _HD_s, Apr 51;
_PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1051, 1071.
This total was equivalent to two-thirds of the average tactical
squadron. Because of the disruption to the 1st MAW pilot replacement
program, the Commandant arranged for 20 pilots to be flown to Korea to
augment the normal rotation quotas.[158]
[158] _Ibid._
Direct opposition from enemy aircraft was also on the increase. CCF
flights even reached the EUSAK battle line as unidentified light planes
flew over positions or dropped small bombs. Evidently the enemy was
using well camouflaged airfields in North Korea.
An air battle took place on 20 April when two VMF-312 pilots from
the _Bataan_, Captain Philip C. DeLong and First Lieutenant Harold
D. Daigh, encountered four YAK fighters in the heavily defended
Pyongyang-Chinnanpo area. They gave chase and shot down three of the
enemy planes.[159]
[159] 1st MAW _HD_, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 _HD_, 20 Apr 51.
Marine aircraft were on station when Marine ground forces resumed their
forward movement at 0830 on the morning of 22 April. A CCF prisoner
taken that very afternoon confirmed previous POW statements that the
22d was the opening day of the Fifth Phase Offensive. The front was
quiet, however, as the three Marine infantry regiments advanced almost
at will.
A motorized patrol of Division Reconnaissance Company, led by the
commanding officer, Major Robert L. Autrey, had the initial contact
with the enemy while advancing on the Division left flank. The two
platoons, supported by Marine tanks, found their first indications when
searching a Korean roadside hut. Although the natives denied having
seen any Chinese soldiers. Corporal Paul G. Martin discovered about 50
hidden rice bowls waiting to be washed. Upon being confronted with
this evidence, the terrified Koreans admitted that Chinese soldiers had
reconnoitred the area just before dawn.
Farther up the road, an ammunition dump of hidden mortar shells was
discovered. The enemy had also put up several crude propaganda signs
with such sentiments as YOUR FOLKS LIKE SEE YOU HOME and HALT! FORWARD
MEANS DEATH.
The patrol dismounted and proceeded with caution, guided by an OY
overhead. Although the “choppers” were the favored aircraft of VMO-6,
the OYs also earned the gratitude of the troops on many an occasion
such as this. The pilot gave the alarm just before hidden Communists
opened fire. Thus the Marines of the patrol were enabled to take cover,
and the tanks routed the enemy force with well placed 90mm shells.[160]
[160] Sgt Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 2 Jul 56.
The KMCs met no resistance worth mentioning when they secured the town
of Hwachan and the north bank of the Pukhan just west of the reservoir.
Only light and scattered opposition awaited the 5th Marines (Colonel
Richard M. Hayward) and the 7th Marines (Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.)
on their way to the occupation of assigned objectives on Line QUANTICO.
_CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank_
For weeks the Communist forces in Korea might have been compared to an
antagonist backtracking to get set for taking aim with a shotgun. There
could be no doubt, on the strength of daily G-2 reports, about both
barrels being loaded. And on the night of 22 April the enemy pulled the
trigger.
The KMCs, after taking their objectives, reported a concentration
of enemy small-arms fire. At 1800 the command of the 1st Marine
Division directed a renewal of the advance at 0700, on the morning of
the 23d. This order was cancelled at 2224 by a message calling for
all Marine units to consolidate and patrol in zone, pending further
instructions.[161]
[161] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, 11th Mar, 1st KMC, Tk,
and EngBns, 2224 22 Apr 51 in Div In&Out #21.
One of the reasons for the sudden change was the receipt of a message
by the 1st Marine Division at 2120, informing that the 6th ROK
Division was under heavy attack to the west of the Marines. Meanwhile,
an on-the-spot questioning of a CCF prisoner just taken by the KMCs
convinced the command and staff of the 1st Marine Division that the CCF
5th Phase Offensive was only hours away and gathering momentum. Thanks
to this timely interpretation, all forward Marine units were alerted
two hours before the main blow fell.
It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first
became critical. The 6th ROK Division had never quite succeeded in
closing up the gap on its right and restoring contact with the Marines.
But this failure was trivial as compared to the collapse of the entire
ROK division an hour before midnight, leaving a gap wide enough for a
major breakthrough.
The 1st Marine Division took prompt measures to cope with the
emergency. As early as 2130, the 1st Marines, in reserve just north
of Chunchon, were alerted to move one battalion to contain a possible
enemy threat to the Division left flank. A second message an hour later
called for immediate execution. And at midnight the Division Provost
Marshal was directed to stop ROK stragglers and place them under guard.
The Division Reconnaissance Company received orders to aid the military
police.[162]
[162] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in
Div In&Out #12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51, 6 and 50.
Colonel Francis M. McAlister, commanding the 1st Marines, selected
Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1st Battalion to carry out Division
orders. “By midnight we were all on trucks and rolling on the roads
north,” wrote Second Lieutenant Joseph M. Reisler in a letter home.
“Mile after mile, all the roads were covered with remnants of the ROKs
who had fled. Thousands of them [were] straggling along the roads in
confusion.”[163]
[163] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
Despite these preparations for trouble on the left flank, the KMCs
on the right and the 5th Marines in the center were first in the
Division to come under attack. During the last minutes of 22 April the
2d KMC Battalion had it hot and heavy on Hill 509. To the left the
1st KMC Battalion, partially encircled, notified the 5th Marines of a
penetration.
The effects were felt immediately by 1/5, with its CP in Hwachon. Hill
313 was the key to the town, being located at the Hwachon end of a long
ridge forming a natural avenue of approach from the northeast. Captain
James T. Cronin’s Baker Company of 1/5 had the responsibility for
protecting the CP and shifting troops to the right flank if necessary.
He sent Second Lieutenant Harvey W. Nolan’s platoon to run a race with
the enemy for the occupation of Hill 313. Attached in excess of T/O for
familiarization was Second Lieutenant Patrick T. McGahn.[164]
[164] Sources for this 1/5 action are 5thMar _HD_, Apr 51;
LtCol John L. Hopkins, interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T.
Cronin, ltr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv of 27
Jul 56.
About 220 yards from the summit the slope was so steep that the Marines
clawed their way upward on hands and knees. The company commander
posted the attached light machine gun section while Nolan, McGahn,
and Sergeant William Piner organized the assault. The three squads of
riflemen advanced a few yards, only to be pinned down by well directed
CCF machine gun fire. Another rush brought the Marines closer to the
enemy but a stalemate ensued in the darkness. Seven of the platoon were
killed and 17 wounded.
The situation in the 1/5 area was so serious that Fox Company of 2/5
(Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin) sent reinforcements. At dawn,
however, Hill 313 proved to be abandoned by the enemy. A vigorous KMC
counterstroke had swept the Communists from Hill 509, so that the front
was relatively quiet in this area. The courage and determination of the
KMC Regiment were praised by General Smith, who sent this message on
the morning of the 23d to Colonel Kim, the commanding officer:
Congratulate you and your fine officers and men on dash and
spirit in maintaining your positions against strong enemy
attacks. We are proud of the Korean Marines.[165]
[165] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO KMC Regt, 0910 23 Apr 51.
It is taking no credit away from the KMCs and 5th Marines to point out
that they appear to have been hit by enemy holding attacks. The main
CCF effort was directed at the left of the Division line, held by the
7th Marines.
The heaviest fighting took place in the sector of 1/7 on the extreme
left, commanded by Major Webb D. Sawyer. It was obvious that the
enemy planned to widen the penetration made at the expense of the
6th ROK Division. The 358th Regiment of the 120th Division, CCF 40th
Army, hurled nearly 2,000 men at the Marine battalion. Charlie
Company, commanded by Captain Eugene H. Haffey, took the brunt of the
assault.[166]
[166] This account of the 7th Marines’ fight is based on the
following sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; BrigGen A.
L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col R. G. Davis, Comments,
n.d.; Col H. Nickerson, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26
Feb 58.
The thin battalion line bent under sheer weight of numbers. But it did
not break. It held through three hours of furious fighting, with the
support of Marine and Army artillery, until the 1st Battalion of the
1st Marines came up as reinforcements under the operational control of
the 7th Marines. The newcomers took a position to the left of 1/7, so
that the division flank was no longer completely “in the air.”
This was one of the first examples of the Corps and Division
maneuvering that played such a large part throughout in the blunting of
the CCF offensive. Troops were not left to continue a desperate fight
when a shift of units would ease the pressure.
_Marine Air in Support Everywhere_
At first light on the 23d the FEAF Mosquitoes and fighter-bombers
went into action. The Marines had four two-plane flights of Corsairs
airborne before sun-up. VMF-323 responded to a call from Baker Company,
1/5, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Hill 313. A low-flying
OY of VMO-6, commanded by Major D. W. McFarland, guided the Corsairs
to the withdrawing Chinese, who were worked over thoroughly. VMF-214
planes meanwhile supported 1/7 in that battalion’s desperate fight at
the left of the line.[167]
[167] _HD_s of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMO-6 for Apr 51.
A pilot’s-eye view showed fighting in progress from one coast to
another, although the enemy was making his main effort in the IX
Corps sector. The U.S. 24th Infantry Division, to the left of the 6th
ROK Division, was having to bend its right flank southward to defend
against the CCF penetration. Toward the rear the 27th Brigade of the
British Commonwealth Division, in IX Corps reserve, was being alerted
to meet the Communists head on and bring the breakthrough to a halt.
Elements of the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions on the edge of the Iron
Triangle were giving ground slowly. Seoul was obviously an objective
of CCF units that had crossed the Imjin in the moonlight. But
General Ridgway had decided that the city was not to be abandoned.
“Considerable importance was attached to the retention of Seoul,” he
explained at a later date, “as it then had more value psychologically
than its acquisition had conferred when we were still south of the
Han.”[168]
[168] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 29 Jan 58.
Near the junction of X Corps and I ROK Corps the 7th ROK Division had
been hard hit, although the enemy attack in this area was a secondary
effort. Air support helped this unit to hold its own until it could be
reinforced.
Of the 205 Marine aircraft sorties on 23 April, 153 went to support
the fighting front. The 1st Marine Division received 42 of these CAS
strikes; 24 went to the ROK 7th Division; 59 to I Corps to check
the advance on Seoul; and 28 to pound the Communists crossings the
Imjin.[169]
[169] Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51.
Only about 66 percent of the landing strip at K-3 (Pohang) could be
used; the remainder was being repaired by the Seabees. In order to give
the Panther jets more room, VMF-212 shifted its squadrons for two days
to K-16 near Seoul. A detachment of VMF-323 planes from K-1 (Pusan)
also made the move. Since K-16 was only 30 miles from the combat area
along the Imjin, the Corsairs were able to launch their attacks and
return for rearming and refueling in an hour or less.[170]
[170] VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 _HD_s for Apr 51.
_Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left_
At first light on 23 April the entire left flank of the 1st Marine
Division lay exposed to the Chinese who had poured into the gap left by
the disintegration of the 6th ROK Division. IX Corps orders called for
the ROKs to reassemble on the KANSAS line, but most of them straggled
from 10 to 14 miles behind the positions they held prior to the CCF
attack. The 1st Marine Division ordered Reconnaissance Company to stop
ROK stragglers at the river crossing, and several groups were turned
back.
The reasons for the ROK collapse are variously given. Weak command
and low morale have been blamed for the debacle, yet the shattered
division did not lack for defenders. No less an authority than General
Van Fleet declared himself “... reluctant to criticize the 6th ROK
Division too severely. I do not believe they deliberately threw away
their equipment--I am inclined to believe such equipment was abandoned
due to the terrain, lack of roads and weight. Our check at the time
indicated that the Korean soldiers held on to their hand weapons. It is
interesting to know that General Chang who commanded 6th ROK Division
at the time ... is today [March 1958] Vice Chief of Staff of the Korean
Army.”[171]
[171] Gen J. S. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
As a first step toward setting up a defense in two directions, the 1st
Marine Division received orders from IX Corps to fall back to Line
PENDLETON (Map 10). This was one of the Eighth Army lines assigned to
such profusion that they resembled cracks in a pane of glass. PENDLETON
ran generally southwest to northeast through the 7th Marines sector,
then turned eastward just north of the town of Hwachon.
By occupying this line, the 7th Marines could bend its left to the
south in order to refuse that flank. Still farther to the south, the
1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines were to take positions facing
west. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division would face west as much
as north. On the center and right the KMCs and 5th Marines would find
it necessary to withdraw only about 1,000 yards to take up their new
positions.[172]
[172] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51; MajGen
O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23–24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W.
Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26
Feb 58; Col H. Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27
Apr 58; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B. Mills, interv of
4 Apr 58.
It was up to 1/1 to make the first move toward plugging the gap. At
0130 on the 23d Captain John Coffey’s Baker Company led the way. Moving
north in the darkness along the Pukhan and then west along a tributary,
the long column of vehicles made its first stop about 1,000 yards from
the assigned position. Here the 92d Armored Field Battalion, USA, was
stationed in support of the 6th ROK Division and elements of the 1st
Marine Division. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F.
Lavoie, was an old acquaintance of 1/1, having supported that battalion
during the final days of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. Lavoie was
held in high esteem by the Marines, who found it characteristic of him
that in this fluid situation his cannoneers were formed into a tight
defensive perimeter, ready to fight as infantry if need be.
[Illustration: MAP 10
CCF Offensive Starting 22 April
And Subsequent Marine Withdrawals]
Another Army artillery unit, the 987th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion, had been roughly used by the Chinese who routed the ROK
division. Losses in guns and equipment had resulted, and Coffey moved
with his company about 1,500 yards to the west to assist in extricating
from the mud all the 105s that could be saved. Resistance was
encountered in the form of machine gun fire from Chinese who had set up
a road block.[173]
[173] Sources for operations of the two Army artillery
battalions are: Gen W. M. Hoge, USA (Ret.), ltr of 3 Feb
58; LtCol Leon F. Lavoie, USA, ltr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy
A. Tucker, USA, ltr of 30 Nov 57; LtCol John F. Coffey,
USMC, ltr of 9 Feb 58; Capt Russell A. Gugeler, USA,
_Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 162–173.
Upon returning to 1/1, Coffey found it occupying what was in effect an
outpost to the southwest of the 7th Marines. Baker Company was assigned
to the left of Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company, holding the
curve of a horseshoe-shaped ridge, with Captain Thomas J. Bohannon’s
Able Company on the right. In support, along the comparatively level
ground to the immediate rear, was Weapons Company (Major William L.
Bates).
With 1/1 facing in three directions to block a CCF attack, 1/7 managed
to disengage and withdraw through 3/7, which occupied a position on
Line PENDLETON. VMO-6 helicopters and troops of 2/7 helped to evacuate
the 1/7 casualties incurred during the night’s hard fighting.
During the early morning hours of the 23d the Marines of 3/1 had
boarded trucks to the village of Todun-ni (Map 11) on the west bank of
the Pukhan. Their assigned position was Hill 902, a 3,000-foot height
dominating the surrounding terrain. The Chinese also were interested in
this piece of real estate, since it overlooked the river crossing of
the 1st Marine Division. Pressure to beat the Communists to the crest
mounted as NCOs urged the men to their utmost efforts over steep uphill
trails.
[Illustration: MAP 11
Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902, and Subsequent
Withdrawals, 23–25 April]
The Marines won the race. Once in position, however, it was evident
to Lieutenant Colonel Banning that three ridge lines leading up to
the hill mass would have to be defended. This necessity imposed a
triangular formation, and he placed Captain Horace L. Johnson’s George
Company at the apex, with First Lieutenant William J. Allert’s How
Company on the left, and First Lieutenant William Swanson’s Item
Company on the right. The heavy machine guns of Major Edwin A. Simmons’
Weapons Company were distributed among the rifle companies and the
81mm mortars placed only 10 to 20 yards behind the front lines.[174]
[174] 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar _HD_s, Apr 51; LtCol E. A.
Simmons, interv of 12 Jun 57.
The KMCs and 5th Marines completed their withdrawal without
interference. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division on the afternoon
of 23 April might have been compared to a fishhook with the shank in
the north and the barb curling around to the west and south. The three
Marine battalions plugging the gap were not tied in physically. Major
Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7 was separated by an interval of 1,000 yards from
1/1, and the other two Marine battalions were 5,500 yards apart (Map
11). But at least the 1st Marine Division had formed a new front under
fire and awaited the night’s attacks with confidence.
_Repulse of Communist Attacks_
Bugle calls and green flares at about 2000 announced the presence of
the Chinese to the west of 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge.
“They came on in wave after wave, hundreds of them,” wrote Lieutenant
Reisler, whose platoon held an outpost in advance of Charlie Company.
“They were singing, humming and chanting, ‘Awake, Marine....’ In the
first rush they knocked out both our machine guns and wounded about 10
men, putting a big hole in our lines. We held for about 15 minutes,
under mortar fire, machine gun fire, and those grenades--hundreds of
grenades. There was nothing to do but withdraw to a better position,
which I did. We pulled back about 50 yds. and set up a new line. All
this was in the pitch-black night with Chinese cymbals crashing, horns
blowing, and their god-awful yells.”[175]
[175] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
For four hours the attacks on Horseshoe Ridge were continuous,
particularly along the curve held by Wray’s company. He was reinforced
during the night by squads sent from Coffey’s and Bohannon’s companies.
Wray realized that the integrity of the battalion position depended on
holding the curve of the ridge, but his main problem was bringing up
enough ammunition. Men evacuating casualties to the rear returned with
supplies, but the amount was all too limited until Corporal Leo Marquez
appointed himself a one-man committee. His energy equalled his courage
as he carried grenades and small-arms ammunition all night to the men
on the firing line. Marquez emerged unhurt in spite of bullet holes
through his cartridge belt, helmet, and a heel of his shoe.
About midnight it was the turn of 3/1. These Marines had dug in as best
they could, but the position was too rocky to permit much excavation.
Ammunition for the mortars had to be hand-carried from a point halfway
up the hill.
Several hours of harrassing mortar fire preceded the CCF effort. George
Company, at the apex of the ridge, was almost overwhelmed by the
first Communist waves of assault. The courage of individual Marines
shone forth in the ensuing struggle. Technical Sergeant Harold E.
Wilson, second in command of the center platoon, suffered four painful
wounds but remained in the fight, encouraging his men and guiding
reinforcements from How Company as they arrived.[176]
[176] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51.
Steady artillery support was provided by Colonel McAlister, who
rounded up a jury-rigged liaison party and three forward observer
teams composed mainly of officers from the 987th AFA Battalion. They
registered 11th Marines and 987th Battalion defensive fires which had
a large part in stopping the CCF attack as it lapped around George
Company and hit How and Item on the other two ridges.
Colonel McAlister and Colonel Nickerson paid a visit to the CP of
1/1, which remained under the operational control of the 7th Marines
until morning. The two regimental commanders arranged for artillery
and tank support to cover the gap between 1/1 and 3/7.[177] The enemy,
however, seemed to be wary about infiltrating between the three
battalion outposts. This reluctance owed in large part to the deadly
flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles of Companies A and B of the 1st
Tank Battalion, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Holly F.
Evans, had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne that day.
[177] Col H. Nickerson Jr., ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. West,
comments, n.d.
Attacks on 3/1 and 3/7 also continued throughout the night. At daybreak
the close air support of Marine aircraft prevented further Communist
efforts, though dug-in enemy groups remained within machine gun range.
Identification of Chinese bodies at daybreak indicated that the 359th
and 360th Regiments, 120th Division, 40th CCF Army, had been employed.
_Withdrawal to the Kansas Line_
Now came the problem for the three Marine battalions of letting loose
of the tiger’s tail. Corps orders were received on the morning of
24 April for all units of the Division to pull back to Line KANSAS.
This was in accordance with General Ridgway’s policy, continued by
General Van Fleet, of attaching more importance to destruction of enemy
personnel than the holding of military real estate.
Some of the most seriously wounded men of 1/1 required immediate
evacuation, in spite of the obvious risks. A VMO-6 helicopter piloted
by First Lieutenant Robert E. Matthewson attempted a landing at the
base of Horseshoe Ridge. As he hovered over the panel markings, CCF
small-arms fire mangled the tail rotor. The machine plunged to earth so
badly damaged that it had to be destroyed. Matthewson emerged unhurt
and waved off a helicopter flown by Captain H. G. McRay. Then the
stranded pilot asked for a rifle and gave a good account of himself as
an infantryman.[178]
[178] VMO-6 _HD_ for Apr 51.
While First Lieutenant Norman W. Hicks’ second platoon fought as the
rear guard, First Lieutenant Niel B. Mills’ first platoon of Charlie
Company led the attack down the hill, carrying the wounded behind. In
an attempt to rout the Chinese from a flanking hill, Mills was wounded
in the neck by a bullet that severed an artery. Corpsman E. N. Smith
gripped the end of the artery between his fingers until a hemostat
could be applied, thus saving the lieutenant’s life. Just before losing
consciousness. Mills looked at his watch. It was 1000 and 1/1 had
weathered the storm.[179]
[179] LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59.
The 3d Battalion of the 7th Marines, which had beaten off probing
attacks all night, coordinated its movements with those of the two
Marine battalions as they slowly withdrew toward the Pukhan. Despite
Marine air attacks, the Communists not only followed but infiltrated in
sufficient numbers to threaten the perimeter of Lavoie’s cannoneers.
The training this Army officer had given his men in infantry tactics
now paid off as the perimeter held firm while mowing down the
attackers with point blank 105mm shells at a range of 1,000 yards. The
Marines of Captain Bohannon’s company soon got into the fight, and
the 92d repaid the courtesy by supporting 1/1 and 3/7 during their
withdrawal. Counted CCF dead numbered 179 at a cost to the 92d of 4 KIA
and 11 WIA casualties.[180]
[180] Capt R. A. Gugeler, USA, _Combat Actions in Korea_,
170–172.
As the morning haze lifted, the OYs of VMO-6 spotted for both Army and
Marine artillery, DEVASTATE BAKER fed close support to the forward
air controllers as fast as it could get planes from K-16 at Seoul,
only a 15-minute flight away. Not only 49 Corsairs but also 40 of the
Navy ADs and Air Force F-51s and jets aided the Marine ground forces
in their withdrawal to Line KANSAS. To speed the fighter-bombers to
their targets, some of the Marine pilots were designated tactical air
coordinators, airborne (TACA). Their familiarity with the terrain was
an asset as they led incoming pilots to ground force units most in need
of support.[181]
[181] Summary of data from 1st MAW _HD_s for 24 Apr 51.
It was a confusing day in the air. The mutual radio frequencies
to which planes and ground controllers were pretuned proved to be
inadequate. The consequence was all too often the blocking out of key
information at a frustrating moment. Haze and smoke made for limited
vision. The planes needed a two-mile circle for their attacks, yet the
battalions were at times less than 1,000 yards apart. DEVASTATE BAKER
had to deal with this congested and dangerous situation as best it
could.
In addition to its strong support of Marine ground forces, the 1st MAW
sent 10 sorties to the ROKs in east Korea and 57 to I Corps in its
battle along the Imjin. By this time the Gloucestershire Battalion of
the 29th British Brigade was isolated seven miles behind enemy lines
and receiving all supplies by air-drop. The outlook grew so desperate
that officers ordered their men to break up and make their way back to
the UN lines if they could. Only 40 ever succeeded.
In the former 6th ROK Division sector units of the 27th Brigade of the
British Commonwealth Division had done a magnificent job of stopping
the breakthrough. The 2d Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment
distinguished themselves in this fight, which won a Distinguished Unit
Citation for the division.[182]
[182] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr51, Sec 1, 98, 100, 101; Brig C. N.
Barclay, _The First Commonwealth Division_ (Aldershot,
1954), 69–70.
_Enemy Stopped in IX Corps Sector_
Spring had come at last to war-ravaged Korea and the hills were a
misty green in the sunshine. Looking down from an aircraft on the warm
afternoon of 24 April 1951 the Marine sector resembled a human anthill.
Columns of weary men toiled and strained in every direction. Chaotic
as the scene may have seemed, however, everything had a purpose. The
1st Marine Division was in full control of all troop movements, despite
enemy pressure of the last two nights.
The 5th Marines and KMCs had no opposition as they continued their
withdrawal. Marine air reduced to a minimum the harassing efforts of
the Chinese following the 1st Marines. As front-line units disengaged
and fell back, the length of the main line of resistance was contracted
enough for the 7th Marines to be assigned a reserve role. The 1st and
2d Battalions were given the responsibility for the defense of Chunchon
as well as the crossing sites over the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers. Major
Roach had reached the outskirts of Chunchon when 3/7 was ordered back
across the Chunchon, to be attached to the 1st Marines on the left
flank.[183]
[183] 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51.
Throughout the night of 24–25 April the enemy probed the Marine lines,
seeking in vain a weak spot where a penetration could be made. It
was already evident that the breakthrough in this area had given the
Communists only a short-lived advantage. By the third night they were
definitely stopped. Only minor patrol actions resulted except for two
attacks in company strength on 2/1 at 0050 and 0150. Both were repulsed
with total CCF losses of 25 counted dead.
Contrary to the usual rule, the Marines saw more action during the
daylight hours. A company-size patrol from 1/1 became heavily engaged
at 1350 and three Company A tanks moved up in support. The fight lasted
until 1645, when the enemy broke off action and the tanks evacuated 18
wounded Marines.
Early in the afternoon a 3/1 patrol had advanced only 200 yards along
a ridgeline when it was compelled to withdraw after running into
concentrated mortar and machine gun fire. Sporadic mortar rounds
continued until a direct hit was scored on the battalion CP, wounding
Colonel McAlister, Lieutenant Colonel Banning, Major Reginald R. Myers,
the executive officer, and Major Joseph D. Trompeter, the S-3. Banning
and Myers were evacuated and Trompeter assumed command of 3/1.
Losses of 18 KIA and 82 WIA for 24–25 April brought the casualties of
the 1st Marines to nearly 300 during the past 48 hours.[184]
[184] 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51.
A simple ceremony was held at the 1st Marine Division CP on the
afternoon of the 24th for the relief of General Smith by Major General
Gerald C. Thomas. The new commanding general, a native of Missouri, was
educated at Illinois Wesleyan University and enlisted in the Marine
Corps in May 1917 at the age of 23. Awarded the Silver Star for bravery
at Belleau Wood and Soissons, he was commissioned just before the
Meuse-Argonne offensive, in which he was wounded.
During the next two decades, Thomas chased bandits in Haiti, guarded
the U.S. mails, protected American interests in China, and served as
naval observer in Egypt when Rommel knocked at the gates of Alexandria
in 1941. As operations officer and later chief of staff of the 1st
Marine Division, he participated in the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942.
The next year he became chief of staff of I Marine Amphibious Corps in
the Bougainville operation. Returning to Marine Headquarters in 1944 as
Director of Plans and Policies, he was named commanding general of the
Marines in China three years later.
General Smith had won an enduring place in the hearts of all Marines
for his magnificent leadership as well as resourceful generalship
during the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin Reservoir campaigns. Speaking of the
Marines of April 1951, he paid them this tribute in retrospect:
The unit commanders and staff of the Division deserve great
credit for the manner in which they planned and conducted
the operations which resulted in blunting the Chinese
counteroffensive in our area. In my opinion, it was the most
professional job performed by the Division while it was under my
command.[185]
[185] Gen O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), ltr of 11 Feb 58.
The night of 25–26 April passed in comparative quiet for the Marines.
A few CCF probing attacks and occasional mortar rounds were the extent
of the enemy’s activity. All Marine units had now reached the modified
Line KANSAS, but General Van Fleet desired further withdrawals because
the enemy had cut a lateral road.
IX Corps also directed that the 1st Marine Division be prepared on
the 26th to move back to Chunchon, where it would defend along the
south bank of the Soyang until service units could move out their
large supply dumps. The Division was to tie in on the right with the
lower extension of the Hwachon Reservoir, and contact was made in that
quarter with the French battalion of the 2d Infantry Division, X Corps.
On the Marine left flank the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division
had relieved elements of the British Commonwealth Division.
Marine regimental officers met with Colonel Bowser, G-3, to plan
the continued withdrawal. It was decided that four infantry
battalions--1/1, 2/1, 3/5, and 3/7--were to take positions on the west
bank of the Pukhan to protect the Mojin bridge and ferry sites while
the other units crossed. The execution of the plan went smoothly,
without enemy interference. After all other Marine troops were on the
east side, 3/7 disengaged last of all and forded the chest-deep stream
as a prelude to hiking to Chunchon.[186]
[186] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
2040 27 Apr 51.
The enemy was kept at a discreet distance throughout the night by
continuous artillery fires supplemented by ripples from Captain Eugene
A. Bushe’s Battery C, 1st 4.5´´ Rocket Battalion. An acute shortage
of trucks made it necessary for most of the troops to hike. Then came
the task of organizing the new Division defenses on a line running
northeast and southwest through the northern outskirts of Chunchon (Map
10). Planning continued meanwhile for further withdrawals to positions
astride the Hongchon-Chunchon MSR.[187]
[187] CO IX Corps _IXACT 1370_; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar
_HD_, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51. A “ripple” normally
consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six
launchers.
It was apparent by this time that the enemy had been badly mauled on
the IX Corps front. The Communists were now making a supreme effort to
smash through in the I Corps area and capture Seoul. It was believed
that they had set themselves the goal of taking the city by May Day,
the world-wide Communist holiday.
In this aspiration they were destined to be disappointed. They tried to
work around the Eighth Army’s left flank by crossing the river Han to
the Kimpo Peninsula, but air strikes and the threat of naval gunfire
frustrated them. Another flanking attempt 35 miles to the southeast
met repulse, and before the end of the month it was evident that the
Chinese Reds would not celebrate May Day in Seoul.
Generally speaking, the Eighth Army had kept its major units intact
and inflicted frightful losses on the enemy while trading shell-pocked
ground for Chinese lives. The night of 27–28 April saw little activity
on the IX Corps front, adding to the evidence that the enemy had shot
his bolt. The next day the 1st Marine Division, along with other
Eighth Army forces, continued the withdrawal to the general defensive
line designated NO NAME Line (Map 10). Further withdrawals were not
contemplated, asserted the IX Corps commander, who sent this message to
General Thomas:
It is the intention of CG Eighth Army to hold firmly on general
defense line as outlined in my Operation Plan 17 and my message
9639, and from this line to inflict maximum personnel casualties
by an active defense utilizing artillery and sharp armored
counterattacks. Withdrawal south of this line will be initiated
only on personal direction of Corps commander.[188]
[188] CG IX Corps msg to CG 1stMarDiv with plans for
withdrawal, 28 Apr 51.
FEAF placed the emphasis on armed reconnaissance or interdiction
flights for Marine aircraft during the last few days of April. 1st MAW
pilots reported the killing or wounding of 312 enemy troops on the
29th and 30th, and the destruction of 212 trucks, 6 locomotives, and
80 box cars. On the other side of the ledger, the Wing lost a plane a
day during the first eight days of the CCF offensive. Of the fliers
shot down, five were killed, one was wounded seriously but rescued by
helicopter, and two returned safely from enemy-held territory.[189]
[189] 1st MAW _HD_, Apr51, Pt #1, Chronology 22–30 Apr and App
VI, PORs #46 (23 Apr) and 54 (1 May).
The shortage of vehicles slowed the withdrawal of Marine ground forces,
but by the 30th the 5th Marines, KMC Regiment, and 7th Marines were
deployed from left to right on NO NAME Line. The 1st Marines went into
reserve near Hongchon. On the Division left was the reorganized 6th ROK
Division, and on the right the 2d Infantry Division of X Corps.[190]
[190] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar HD, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_,
Apr 51.
Nobody was in a better position to evaluate Marine maneuvers of the
past week than Colonel Bowser, the G-3, and he had the highest praise.
“Whereas the Chosin withdrawal was more spectacular than the April
‘retrograde,’” he commented seven years later, “the latter was executed
so smoothly and efficiently that a complex and difficult operation was
made to look easy. The entire Division executed everything asked of it
with the calm assurance of veterans.”[191]
[191] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
_1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_
UN estimates of enemy casualties ranged from 70,000 to 100,000. The
Fifth Phase Offensive was an unmitigated defeat for the Communists so
far, but EUSAK G-2 officers warned that this was only the first round.
Seventeen fresh CCF divisions were available for the second.
General Van Fleet called a conference of corps commanders on 30 April
to discuss defensive plans. In the reshuffling of units the 1st Marine
Division was placed for the third time in eight months under the
operational control of X Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Edward
M. Almond. The Marines were to occupy the western sector of X Corps
after its boundary with IX Corps had been shifted about 12 miles to the
west.[192]
[192] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 115–118.
Van Fleet put into effect a reshuffling of units all the way across the
peninsula in preparation for the expected renewal of the CCF offensive.
Thus on 1 May the UN line was as follows from left to right:
_US I Corps_--1 ROK Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th
Infantry Division in line; the 3d Infantry Division and British
29th Brigade in reserve;
_US IX Corps_--British 27th Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, 5th
and 6th ROK Divisions and 7th Infantry Division in line; the
187th Airborne RCT in reserve;
_US X Corps_--1st Marine Division, 2d Infantry Division, 5th and
7th ROK Divisions;
_ROK III Corps_--9th and 3d Divisions;
_ROK I Corps_--Capitol Division and ROK 11th Division.
“I don’t want to lose a company--certainly not a battalion,” Van Fleet
told the corps commanders. “Keep units intact. Small units must be kept
within supporting distance.... Give every consideration to the use of
armor and infantry teams for a limited objective counterthrust. For
greater distances, have ready and use when appropriate, regiments of
infantry protected by artillery and tanks.”[193]
[193] _Ibid._
From the foxhole to the command post a confident new offensive spirit
animated an Eight Army which only four months previously had been
recuperating from two major reverses within two months. The Eighth
Army, in short, had been welded by fire into one of the finest military
instruments of American military history; and the foreign units
attached to it proved on the battlefield that they were picked troops.
With the Hwachon dam now in enemy hands, the Communists had the
capability of closing the gates, thus lowering the water level in the
Pukhan and Han rivers to fording depth. As a countermeasure, EUSAK
asked the Navy to blast the dam. It was a difficult assignment, but
Douglas AD Skyraiders from the _Princeton_ successfully torpedoed the
flood gates on 1 May.[194]
[194] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 766.
An atmosphere of watchful waiting prevailed during the next two weeks
as the Marines on NO NAME Line improved their defensive positions and
patrolled to maintain contact with the enemy. Eighth Army evolved at
this time the “patrol base” concept to deal with an enemy retiring
beyond artillery range. These bases were part of a screen, called
the outpost line of resistance (OPLR), established in front of the
MLR. Their mission was to maintain contact with the enemy by means of
patrols, give warning of an impending attack, and delay its progress as
much as possible.
When it came to artillery ammunition, the 11th Marines found that it
had progressed from a famine to a feast. Where shells had recently
been rationed because of transport difficulties, the Eighth Army
now directed the cannoneers along NO NAME Line to expend a unit
of fire a day. The 11th Marines protested, since the infantry was
seldom in contact with the enemy. One artillery battalion submitted
a tongue-in-cheek report to the effect that the required amount
of ammunition had been fired “in target areas cleared of friendly
patrols.”[195] The requirement was kept in force, however, until the
demands of the renewed CCF offensive resulted in another ammunition
shortage for the 11th Marines.
[195] Col Merritt Adelman, ltr of 10 Feb 58.
Marine tanks were directed by Division to use their 90mm rifles to
supplement 11th Marine howitzers in carrying out Corps fire plans. The
tankers protested that their tubes had nearly reached the end of a
normal life expectancy, with no replacements in sight. This plaint did
not fall upon deaf ears at Corps Headquarters and two Army units, the
96th AFA Battalion and 17th FA Battalion, were assigned to fire the
deep missions.[196]
[196] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG 1stMarDiv msg
to CG X Corps, 9 May 51; X Corps msg X9613, 10 May 51.
Eighth Army staff officers concluded that the enemy would launch
his next effort in the center. Intelligence, according to General
Van Fleet, “had noted for some 2 weeks prior to the May attack
that the Chinese Communists were shifting their units to the
east.” Nevertheless, the blow fell “much farther east than [was]
expected.”[197]
[197] Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
Although the east offered the best prospects of surprise, a rugged
terrain of few roads imposed grave logistical handicaps on the
enemy. Moreover, UN warships dominated the entire eastern littoral.
Despite these disadvantages, an estimated 125,000 Chinese attacked
on the morning of 16 May 1951 in the area of the III and I ROK Corps
between the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the coast. Six CCF divisions
spearheaded an advance on a 20-mile front that broke through the lines
of the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions. Pouring into this gap, the Communists
made a maximum penetration of 30 miles that endangered the right flank
of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.
General Van Fleet took immediate steps to stabilize the front. In one
of the war’s most remarkable maneuvers he sent units of the 3d Infantry
Division, then in reserve southeast of Seoul, on a 70-mile all-night
ride in trucks to the threatened area.[198]
[198] Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive
of 16 May 51 are based on the following sources: EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 12–18; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51; CO
7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51.
The 1st Marine Division was not directly in the path of the enemy
advance. During the early morning hours of 17 May, however, an enemy
column made a thrust that apparently was intended as an end-run attack
on the left flank of the 2d Infantry Division. Avoiding initially the
Chunchon-Hongchon highway, Chinese in estimated regimental strength
slipped behind the patrol base set up by a KMC company just west of the
MSR (Map 12).
For several days Colonel Nickerson and his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis, had been apprehensive over the
security of this road on which the 7th Marines depended for logistical
support. On the afternoon of the 17th they pulled back Lieutenant
Colonel Bernard T. Kelly’s 3/7 (less Company G) to establish a blocking
position, generally rectangular in shape, at the vital Morae-Kogae pass
on the Chunchon road. This move was not completed until sunset and
George Company did not rejoin the battalion until midnight, so that the
enemy probably had no intelligence of the new position. The main road
ran along a shelf on one shoulder of the pass, but the Chinese avoided
it and came by a trail from the northwest (Map 12).
The surprise was mutual. A platoon of D/Tanks, a Weapons Company
platoon, and an Item Company platoon, defending the northern end of
the perimeter, opened up with everything they had. A desperate fire
fight ensued as the enemy replied with a variety of weapons--mortars,
recoilless rifles, satchel charges, grenades, and machine guns.
[Illustration: MAP 12
SITUATION ON THE NIGHT OF 16–17 MAY 1951]
Two CCF soldiers were killed after disabling a Marine tank by a grenade
explosion in the engine compartment. A satchel charge knocked out
another tank, and the enemy made an unsuccessful attempt to kill a
third by rolling up a drum of gasoline and igniting it.
Captain Victor Stoyanow’s Item Company, at the critical point of the
thinly stretched 3/7 perimeter, was hard-pressed. The enemy made a
slight penetration into one platoon position but was repulsed by a
counterattack that Stoyanow led. Marine infantry and tanks were well
supported by artillery that sealed off the Chinese column from the
rear. The action ended at daybreak with the routed enemy seeking only
escape as Marine artillery and mortars continued to find lucrative
targets. Air did not come on station until about 1030, when it added
to the slaughter. Scattered enemy groups finally found a refuge in the
hills, leaving behind 82 prisoners and 112 counted dead. Captures of
enemy equipment included mortars, recoilless rifles, and Russian 76mm
guns and machine guns. Friendly losses were 7 KIA and 19 WIA.[199]
[199] This account of 3/7’s action is derived from 1stMarDiv,
7thMar, 1stTkBn, and 3/7 _HD_s, May 51; Col B. T. Kelly,
interv of 28 Dec 57.
1st MAW squadrons were kept busy furnishing close air support to the
2d Infantry Division and the two ROK divisions hit by the enemy’s May
offensive. Because of the patrolling in the Marine sector, the OYs
of VMO-6 took over much of the task of controlling air strikes. They
flew cover for the infantry-tank patrols, and in the distant areas
controlled almost as many air strikes as they did artillery missions.
From the 1st to the 23d of May, VMO-6 observers controlled 54 air
strikes involving 189 UN planes--159 Navy and Marine F4Us, F9Fs, and
ADs, and 30 Air Force F-80s, F-84s, and F-51s. About 40 percent of the
aircraft controlled by the OYs were non-Marine planes.[200]
[200] VMO-6 _HD_, May 51.
On the 18th the 1st Marine Division, carrying out X Corps orders, began
a maneuver designed to aid the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on the east
by narrowing its front. The 7th Marines pulled back to NO NAME Line to
relieve the 1st Marines, which side-slipped to the east to take over
an area held by the 9th Infantry. The 5th Marines then swung around
from the Division left flank to the extreme right and relieved another
Army regiment, the 38th Infantry. This permitted the 2d Infantry
Division to face east and repulse attacks from that direction.
By noon on 19 May the enemy’s renewed Fifth Phase Offensive had lost
most of its momentum as CCF supplies dwindled to a trickle along a
tenuous line of communications. That same day, when Colonel Wilburt S.
Brown took over the command of the 1st Marines from Colonel McAlister,
all four Marine regiments were in line--from left to right, the KMCs,
the 7th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 5th Marines. A new NO NAME
Line ran more in a east-west direction than the old one with its
northeast to southwest slant. Thus in the east of the Marine sector
the line was moved back some 4,000 yards while remaining virtually
unchanged in the west.
Enough enemy pressure was still being felt by the 2d Infantry Division
so that General Van Fleet ordered a limited offensive by IX Corps to
divert some of the CCF strength. While the rest of the 1st Marine
Division stood fast, the KMC Regiment advanced with IX Corps elements.
At the other end of the line the Marines had the second of their two
fights during the CCF offensive. Major Morse L. Holliday’s 3/5 became
engaged at 0445 on the 20th with elements of the 44th CCF Division.
Chinese in regimental strength were apparently on the way to occupy the
positions of the Marine battalion, unaware of its presence.
This mistake cost them dearly when 3/5 opened up with every weapon at
its disposal while requesting the support of Marine air, rockets, and
artillery. The slaughter lasted until 0930, when the last of the routed
Chinese escaped into the hills. Fifteen were taken prisoner and 152
dead were counted in front of the Marine positions.[201]
[201] 5thMar _HD_, May 51.
From 20 May onward, it grew more apparent every hour that the second
installment of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive had failed even more
conclusively than the first. The enemy had only a narrow penetration
on a secondary front to show for ruinous casualties. Worse yet, from
the Chinese viewpoint, the UN forces were in a position to retaliate
before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The Eighth Army
had come through with relatively light losses, and it was now about to
seize the initiative.
CHAPTER VII
Advance to the Punchbowl
_Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives Secured--MAG-12
Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st
MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE--_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st
Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack_
Only from the air could the effects of the UN counterstroke of May and
June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than a CCF withdrawal;
it was a flight of beaten troops under very little control in some
instances. They were scourged with bullets, rockets, and napalm as
planes swooped down upon them like hawks scattering chickens. And where
it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to surrender voluntarily,
remnants of platoons, companies, and even battalions were now giving up
after throwing down their arms.
There had been nothing like it before, and its like would never
be seen in Korea again. The enemy was on the run! General Van
Fleet, after his retirement, summed up the double-barreled
Chinese spring offensive and the UN counterstroke in these words:
We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten and could
have destroyed his armies. Those days are the ones most vivid in my
memory--great days when all the Eighth Army, and we thought America
too, were inspired to win. In those days in Korea we reached the
heights.[202]
[202] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), “The Truth About Korea,”
_Life_, 11 May 53.
Communist casualties from 15 to 31 May were estimated by the Eighth
Army at 105,000. This figure included 17,000 counted dead and the
unprecedented total of some 10,000 prisoners, most of them Chinese Reds
taken during the last week of the month in frantic efforts to escape.
Such results were a vast departure from past occasions when Mao
Tse-tung’s troops had preferred death to surrender.
In all probability, only the mountainous terrain saved them from a
complete debacle. If the Eighth Army had been able to use its armor for
a mechanized pursuit, it might have struck blows from which the enemy
could not recover. As it was, the Communists escaped disaster by virtue
of the fact that a platoon could often stand off a company or even a
battalion by digging in and defending high ground commanding the only
approach. Every hill was a potential Thermopylae in this craggy land of
few roads.
It was the misfortune of the 1st Marine Division to have perhaps the
least lucrative zone of action in all Korea for the peninsula-wide
turkey shoot. A chaos of jagged peaks and dark, narrow valleys, the
terrain alone was enough to limit an advance. Even so, the Marines
inflicted 1,870 counted KIA casualties on the Communists in May and
captured 593, most of them during the last eight days of the month.
General Almond congratulated the Division for its accomplishment of “a
most arduous battle task. You have denied [the enemy] the opportunity
of regrouping his forces and forced him into a hasty retreat; the
destruction of enemy forces and materiel has been tremendous and many
times greater than our own losses.”[203]
[203] CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51.
_Plan to Cut Off Communists_
The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, released from IX Corps
reserve, arrived in the Hongchon area on 21 May and took a position
between the 1st Marine Division on the left and the 2d Infantry
Division on the right. Two days later X Corps gave the Marines the
mission of securing the important road center of Yanggu at the eastern
end of the Hwachon Reservoir (Map 13). Elements of the 2d Infantry
Division, with the 187th Airborne RCT attached, were meanwhile to drive
northeast to Inje after establishing a bridgehead across the river
Soyang. From Inje the 187th (reinforced) would continue to advance
northeast toward its final objective, Kansong on the coast. After
linking up with I ROK Corps, the Army regiment might be able to pull
the drawstring on a tremendous bag of prisoners--all the CCF forces
south of the Inje-Kansong road. There was, however, a big “if” in the
equation. The Communists were falling back with all haste, and it was
a question whether the bag could be closed in time.
[Illustration: 1st Marine Division Drive To Yanggu
23–31 May
Showing Regimental Routes
MAP 13]
The 1st Marine Division jumped off at 0800 on 23 May with the 1st and
5th Marines abreast, the 1st on the left. Both regiments advanced more
than 5,000 yards against negligible opposition. During the course of
this attack the 1st Marines experimented by calling an air strike
in the hope of detonating an entire mine field. The results were
disappointing. Live mines were blown to new locations, thus changing
the pattern, but few exploded.[204]
[204] 2/1 _HD_, May 51.
The 7th Marines was relieved on the 23d by elements of the 7th Infantry
Division (IX Corps) and moved to the east for employment on the Marine
right flank. The KMC Regiment, relieved by other IX Corps units, went
into Division reserve.[205]
[205] 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51.
The 1st Marines, advancing on the left, reached its objectives, about
two-thirds of the way to the Soyang, by noon on the 26th. The regiment
reverted to Division reserve upon relief by the KMCs. In the right
half of the Division zone, resistance gradually stiffened. On the
24th, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines ran into trouble as
they started their advance toward their initial objective, three hills
about 7,000 yards north of Hangye (Map 12). Both battalions were slowed
by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. They requested immediate
artillery and air support.
Captain John A. Pearson, commanding Item Company, could observe the
enemy on Hill 1051, holding up the attack with flanking fire. He
directed air and artillery on the crest and on the Communists dug in
along the southeastern slopes. Soon the enemy troops were seen retiring
northward. This eased the pressure on the center, and Captain Samuel S.
Smith’s Dog Company managed to work forward and gain the summit of Hill
883 by 1300. Tanks moved up in support and at midnight Colonel Hayward
reported his portion of the Division objective secured.[206]
[206] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51.
The 7th Marines, moving forward in the right rear of the 5th, veered
to the left and drove into the center of the Division zone, reaching
the southern bank of the Soyang by nightfall on the 26th. That same day
2/7 overran an enemy ammunition dump and took 27 CCF prisoners, some
of them wounded men who had been left behind. The captured material
included the following items:
100,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition;
12,000 rounds of mortar ammunition;
1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition;
6,000 pounds of explosive charges;
9,000 hand grenades.
Five U.S. trucks and jeeps were “released to higher headquarters.” Two
CCF trucks, two mules, and a horse were “integrated into the battalion
transportation system and profitably employed thereafter.”[207]
[207] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F.
Meyerhoff, ltr of 8 Aug 58.
The 187th Airborne RCT reported on the 24th that its advance was being
held up by increasing enemy resistance.[208] It was already evident
that the CCF flight had frustrated the plan of cutting off decisively
large numbers in the X Corps zone. Air observation established,
however, that hundreds of Chinese Reds had merely escaped from the
frying pan into the fire. By fleeing westward along the south shore of
the Hwachon Reservoir, they stumbled into the IX Corps zone. There the
remnants of whole units surrendered, in some instances without striking
a blow. Along the route they were pitilessly attacked by UN aircraft.
1st MAW units had never before known such good hunting as during the
last week in May 1951.[209]
[208] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar
In&Out #13.
[209] James T. Stewart, _Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea_
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957)
13–15, 84–86; 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth
Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs),
20–31 May; 1st MAW _HD_ May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORS for 20–31
May; _Ibid._, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27
May, 31 May; EUSAK _Cmd Rept_, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts
5 and 6, Encls 20–31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air.
Despite the “murky instrument weather” of 27 May the all-weather
fighters of VMF(N)-513 reporting the killing of an estimated 425 CCF
soldiers. Two F7F pilots killed or wounded some 200 Chinese Reds in the
I Corps zone. On the following day the 1st MAW claimed a total of 454
KIA casualties inflicted on the enemy.[210]
[210] _Ibid._, VMF(N)-513 HD, 27 May 51.
Estimates of enemy dead by pilots are likely to be over-optimistic,
but there can be no doubt that UN aircraft slaughtered the fleeing
Communists in large numbers. Only poor flying weather saved the enemy
from far worse casualties. So intent were the Chinese on escape that
they violated their usual rule of making troop movements only by night.
When the fog and mist cleared briefly, Marine pilots had glimpses
of CCF units crowding the roads without any attempt at concealment.
Napalm, bombs, and machine guns left heaps of dead and wounded as the
survivors continued their flight, hoping for a return of fog and mist
to protect them.
_Initial Marine Objectives Secured_
As the Marine ground forces advanced, they found fewer and fewer
Chinese Reds opposing them. The explanation was given by a prisoner
from the 12th Division, V Corps, of the North Korean People’s Army
(NKPA). His unit had the mission, he said, of relieving troops in the
Yanggu-Inje area and conducting delaying actions. The purpose was
to allow CCF units to escape a complete disaster and dig in farther
north. The North Koreans, in short, were being sacrificed in rear guard
delaying actions in order that the Chinese Reds might save their own
skins.
U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such
treatment. The answer was that they couldn’t help themselves. The
Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained them
after the NKPA collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under the thumb
of political commissars holding life and death authority over them.
Any NKPA soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty or escape was
certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the firing line had
a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the system had none.
This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when
NKPA troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions.
Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese
Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red
with more tenacity on the defensive.
Because of the stubborn NKPA opposition in East Korea, the Eighth Army
staff and command gave some thought to the possibility of an amphibious
operation in the enemy’s rear by the 1st Marine Division. Plans were
discussed on 28 May for a landing at Tongchon (Map 8). The Marines
were to drive southward along the Tongchon-Kumhwa road to link up
with the IX Corps units attacking toward the northeast along the same
route. After meeting, the two forces would systematically destroy the
pocketed enemy units. It was decided that 6 June would be D-day. And
then, to the great disappointment of Generals Thomas and Almond, the
plan was suddenly cancelled by EUSAK on 29 May after a single day’s
consideration.[211]
[211] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC
(Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA
(Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58.
Another scheme for cutting off large enemy forces was abandoned on 28
May when the 187th Airborne got as far as Inje. Most of the CCF units
having escaped, this regiment was given a new mission of securing the
high ground to the north of Inje.
During the last five days of May the 5th and 7th Marines continued to
advance steadily. On the morning of the 31st the 7th faced the task
of breaking through a stubbornly contested pass leading into Yanggu.
With a battalion on each ridge leading into the pass, Colonel Nickerson
found it a slow yet precarious prelude to get the men down. Adding to
their trials were some 500 enemy 76mm and mortar shells received by the
regiment.
General Van Fleet, an onlooker while visiting the 7th Marines OP, shook
his head wonderingly. “How did you ever get the men up those cliffs?”
he asked Colonel Nickerson.
The answer was short and simple. “General,” said the regimental
commander, “they climbed.”
As the day wore on, Nickerson called for what his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Davis, described as “a through-the-middle play. A
company of tanks [Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Captain
Richard M. Taylor] was launched up the road with infantry on foot
hugging the protective cover of the steep road embankments. As the
tanks drew fire, the infantry could spot the source and ... quickly
cleaned the enemy out. This rapid thrust caused the enemy defenders to
flee as fire was poured into them from our center force as well as the
flank attackers.”[212]
[212] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; _HD_s for 1stMarDiv,
5thMar and 7thMar for May 51.
By nightfall on the 31st the 7th Marines had control of Yanggu, its
airfield, and the hills surrounding that burnt-out town. The 5th
Marines had reached a point 6,000 yards northeast of Yanggu, astride
the north-south ridgeline between that road center and Inje.
Losses for the 1st Marine Division in May added up to 75 KIA, 8 DOW,
and 731 WIA. The ratio of wounded to killed, it may be noted, is more
than nine-to-one. This proportion, so much more favorable than the
usual ratio, rose to an even more astonishing 15-to-1 in June. Various
explanations have been offered, one of them being the spirit of cool
professionalism of Marines who had learned how to take cover and not
expose themselves to needless risks. But this doesn’t account for the
unusual ratio, and it may perhaps be concluded that the Marines were
simply lucky in this operation.
The comparatively low death rate has also been credited in part to the
alertness with which Marine officers adapted to changing situations.
War is a grim business on the whole, but Colonel Wilburt S. Brown
took an amusing advantage of enemy propaganda accusing Americans
of all manner of crimes against humanity. At the outset he had
requested colored smoke shells for signaling. But upon learning from
POW interrogations that NKPA soldiers were terrified by what they
believed to be frightful new gases, the commanding officer of the 1st
Marines had an added reason for using green, red, and yellow smoke.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman, commanding officer
of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, soon had to inform him that the
inadequate supply was exhausted.[213] It was never renewed during
Brown’s command.
[213] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58.
Major David W. McFarland, commanding officer of VMO-6, also exploited
enemy ignorance. His original purpose in initiating night aerial
observation by OY planes was to improve artillery accuracy. Soon he
noticed that the mere presence of an OY overhead would silence enemy
artillery.
“The aerial observer,” McFarland explained, “was often unable to
determine the location of enemy artillery even though he could see it
firing, because he would be unable to locate map coordinates in the
dark--that is, relating them to the ground. Fortunately, this fact was
unknown to the enemy. From their observation of the OYs in the daytime,
they had found that the safest thing to do whenever an OY was overhead
was to take cover. This they continued to do at night.”[214]
[214] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58.
VMO-6 also put into effect an improvement of 1st Marine Division aerial
photographic service at a time when the 1st MAW photo section had
missions all over the Korean front. Lieutenant Colonel Donald S. Bush,
commanding officer of the section, is credited with the innovation of
mounting a K-17 camera on a OY. Only a 6-inch focal length lens could
be installed on one of these small planes. This meant that in order to
get the same picture as a jet the OY must fly at half the altitude. The
pilot would be in more danger but haze problems were reduced.
The experiment was an immediate success. The Division set up a photo
laboratory near the VMO-6 CP for rapid processing and printing. A
helicopter stood by for rapid delivery to the units concerned.[215]
[215] _Ibid._
Not all the variations in tactics were innovations. Lieutenant Colonel
Bernard T. Kelly, commanding officer of 3/7, revived an old device
on 31 May by using indirect automatic weapons fire with good effect.
Four water-cooled heavy machine guns provided long range (2,600 yards)
plunging fires on the reverse slopes of hills in support of his leading
elements during the final attack on Yanggu.[216]
[216] Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jun 58.
_MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong_
Delay and uncertainty were still the two great stumbling blocks to
adequate air support for the ground forces under the JOC control
system. Marine officers contended that infantry units sometimes
took unnecessary casualties as a consequence. Worse yet, there were
occasions when the expected planes did not arrive at all.
Statistics kept by the 1st MAW and Navy during the spring of 1951
upheld these conclusions. During the Inchon-Seoul operation, the
average delay in receiving air support had been 15 minutes as compared
to 80 minutes in May and June of 1951. Approximately 35 minutes of this
time was required to process the request through JOC. And only 65 to 70
percent of the sorties requested were ever received by Marine ground
forces.[217]
[217] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 523–537.
Generals Shepherd and Harris had discussed the problem during the early
spring of 1951 with General Partridge of the Fifth Air Force. Several
compromises were reached, and for brief periods the 1st Marine Division
received more air support than it could use. Unfortunately, these
periods were at times of the least need. When the chips were down, the
old delays and uncertainties reappeared. General Partridge commented:
The 1st Marine Air Wing was assigned for operational control by
the Fifth Air Force and it was used just as any of the other
units of the Fifth were employed, that is, in support anywhere
along the battle front were it appeared to be most urgently
needed.
In every action such as took place in Korea when the resources
and especially the air resources are far too few, ground
commanders inevitably feel that they are being shortchanged.
They are trying to accomplish their objectives under the most
difficult circumstances and with the minimum number of casualties
and they want all the assistance from the air that they can
get. I am sure I would feel the same in similar circumstances.
However, there was never enough air support to satisfy everyone
and I was most unhappy that this was the case.
From time to time I was called upon to denude one section of the
front of its close air support in order to bolster some other
area where the situation was critical. Sometimes this worked to
the advantage of the Marines as in the case of operations near
the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950, and at other times it
worked to their disadvantage. In retrospect, however, I would
estimate that, day in and day out, the Marine ground units had
more air support than any other division which was engaged.[218]
[218] Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, ltr of 28 Jun 59.
With all due respect to General Partridge, Marine officers felt that
the discussion should not be limited merely to the amount of air
support. It was not so much the amount as the delay and unreliability
under JOC control that constituted the problem as the Marines saw it.
On 24 May, while on one of his periodic tours of the Far East, General
Shepherd brought up the matter of CAS with General Ridgway. He agreed
with the UN commander in chief that it would be improper for a Marine
division to expect the exclusive support of a Marine air wing in Korea.
The main difficulty, he reiterated, lay in the slowness and uncertainty
of getting air support when needed.[219]
[219] _FMFPac Visit_ 21–31 May 51, 5, 6.
At this time an extensive reshuffling of Air Force commanders was in
progress. On 21 May General Partridge relieved Lieutenant General
George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, who had suffered a heart attack.
Partridge in turn was relieved by Major General Edward J. Timberlake,
who assumed temporary command of Fifth Air Force until Major General
Frank E. Everest arrived to take over a few days later.
The 1st MAW was also undergoing changes in command. General Harris
was relieved on 29 May by his deputy commander, Major General Thomas
J. Cushman. Brigadier General William O. Brice, just arrived from the
States, became the Wing’s new deputy commander.
After several “get acquainted” discussions, the new Air Force and 1st
MAW generals agreed on a plan to cut down delays in air support. It was
a simple solution: the aircraft were merely to be brought nearer to
the Marine ground forces. This was to be managed by moving the MAG-12
forward echelon from K-16 at Seoul to K-46 at Hoengsong (Map 16). The
new field, if such it could be called, was nothing more than a stony
dirt strip. But it was only 40 miles, or a 10- to 15-minute flight,
from the firing line. The first missions from the new field were flown
on 27 May. VMFs-214 and -323 kept an average of 12 Corsairs at K-46
thereafter, rotating them from K-1.[220]
[220] MAG-12 _HD_, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; 1st MAW _HD_, May
51, Summary and Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51.
On the surface this seemed to be a practical solution, especially
after a four-plane alert was established at K-46 for use by the 1st
Marine Division when needed. DEVASTATE BAKER was permitted to put in
an alerting call directly to the field. The rub was that JOC must be
called in order to make the original request. Before the planes could
take off, the MAG-12 operations officer at the field was likewise
required to call JOC and confirm the fact that the mission had been
approved.
Communications were poor at first for the 40 miles between the field
and the front. DEVASTATE BAKER got better results by calling 1st MAW
Headquarters at K-1, 140 miles south, and having the Wing call K-46 and
JOC. This meant delays such as General Thomas described in a letter to
General Almond. On 29 May, he said, the 5th and 7th Marines were up
against severe enemy fire in their attack. The TACPS had enemy targets
under observation and were ready to control any aircraft they could
get. The Marines requested 92 sorties and received 55. Of these, 20
were flown by Corsairs or Panther Jets, and 35 by Air Force jets and
Mustangs. And though 55 sorties were considerably less than optimum
air support, practically all arrived from two to four hours late. On
the firing line the enemy’s resistance, concluded General Thomas, was
broken not by air power but by Marine riflemen.[221]
[221] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51.
On other days the new plan made a more encouraging showing. There was,
for instance, the occasion when the OYs discovered an enemy regiment
near the 1st Marine Division right flank. DEVASTATE BAKER called the
1st MAW direct on 31 May for 16 fighters as soon as possible. Wing
called JOC for approval to launch the flight and put in a call to K-46
to alert the planes. In just 48 minutes after the initial call from
DEVASTATE BAKER, 16 pilots had jumped into their flight gear at K-46,
had been briefed, and were airborne on what proved to be a timely
strike with excellent results.[222]
[222] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for 31 May 51.
A new tactic of night air support was introduced late in May when
Marine R4D transports were outfitted to operate as flare planes. Not
only did these unarmed aircraft light up targets along the front lines
for the VMF(N)-513 night fighters; they were also on call for use by
the 1st Marine Division. Later, on 12 June, the Navy provided the 1st
MAW with PB4Y-2 Privateers for the nightly illumination missions.[223]
[223] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 1, App II, 2; Chronology, 31
May; MAG-12 _HD_ Jun 51, Chronology and 12 Jun.
_Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610_
During the heyday of the battleship, every midshipman dreamed of some
glorious future day when he would be on the bridge, directing the naval
maneuver known as crossing the T. In other words, his ships would be in
line of battle, firing converging broadsides on an enemy approaching
in column. Obviously, the enemy would be at a disadvantage until he
executed a 90° turn under fire to bring his battered ships into line to
deliver broadsides of their own.
It was a mountain warfare variation of crossing the T that the Korean
Reds were using against the Marines. Whenever possible, the enemy
made a stand on a hill flanked by transverse ridgelines. He emplaced
hidden machine guns or mortars on these ridgelines to pour a converging
fire into attackers limited by the terrain to a single approach. It
meant that the Marines had to advance through this crossfire before
they could get in position for the final assault on the enemy’s main
position.
There were two tactical antidotes. One was well directed close air
support. The other was the support of tanks advancing parallel to
enemy-held ridgelines and scorching them with the direct fire of 90mm
rifles and 50 caliber machine guns.
[Illustration: X CORPS ROUTES OF ADVANCE DURING EUSAK OPERATIONS
23 MAY-17 JUNE 51
MAP 14]
[Illustration: 1st MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION 4 JUNE-17 JULY 51 AND 19 JUN
51 SITUATION ON BROWN LINE
MAP 15]
On 1 June the two regiments in assault, the 5th and 7th Marines, found
the resistance growing stiffer as they slugged their way forward toward
Line KANSAS (Map 15). Within an hour after jumping off, 2/5 was heavily
engaged with an estimated 200 enemy defending Hill 651 tenaciously. At
noon, after ground assaults had failed, a request was put in for air
support. Four VMF-214 planes led by Captain William T. Kopas bombed and
strafed the target. This attack broke the back of NKPA opposition, and
2/5 moved in to seize the objective.[224]
[224] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the
following sources: X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51; _HD_s of
1st MarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, and VMF-214 for Jun
51.
Early on the morning of the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins’ 1/5
moved out to secure the southwest end of the long ridge line that
stretched northeast from Yanggu (Map 15) and afforded a natural avenue
of approach to Taeam-san and the KANSAS line on the southern rim of
the Punchbowl. The Marine advance got under way at 0915. After two
four-plane strikes by VMF-214 and a “preparation” by 1/11 and the 1st
Rocket Battery, the battalion attacked across a valley with Baker
Company (First Lieutenant William E. Kerrigan) on the right and Charlie
Company (First Lieutenant Robert E. Warner) on the left to seize the
terminal point on the ridge leading to Hill 610 (Map 15). Able Company
(Captain John L. Kelly) followed Charlie as Company C (Captain Richard
M. Taylor) of the 1st Tank Battalion moved into supporting position.
Converging fire from transverse ridges had the Marine riflemen pinned
down until the tankers moved along the valley road running parallel.
Direct 90mm fire into NKPA log bunkers enabled C/1/5 to advance to the
forward slope of Hill 610. The enemy fought back with machine guns and
grenades while directing long-range rifle fire against 2/5, attacking
along a parallel ridge across the valley.
By 1945 the last bunker on Hill 610 had been overrun. Meanwhile, 2/5
had pushed ahead some 5,000 yards to the northeast.
The capture of Hill 610 will never have its glorious page in history.
It was all in the day’s work for Marines who could expect a succession
of such nameless battles as they clawed their way forward. That night
the weary men of 1/5 were not astonished to receive a counterattack
in the darkness. It was all part of the job, too. After driving off
the unseen enemy, the new tenants of Hill 610 snatched a few hours of
sleep. They were on their feet again at dawn, ready to go up against
the next key terrain feature in a rocky area that seemed to be composed
entirely of Hill 610s.
The next knob along the ridge happened to be Hill 680, about 1,000
yards to the northeast. VMF-214 planes from K-46 napalmed and strafed
the enemy, and Able Company led the 1/5 attack. During the air strike
the Koreans had taken to cover in their holes on the reverse.
They were back in previously selected forward slope firing positions by
the time the Marines came in sight. Close-in artillery support enabled
the attackers to get within grenade range and seize the last NKPA
bunker by 1400. Able Company pushed on.
Midway from Hill 680 to the next knob, Hill 692, the advance was
stopped by enemy small-arms and mortar fire. An air strike was
requested on the bunkers holding up the assault, but fog closed in and
the planes were delayed more than two hours.
At 1600, after Able Company had renewed the assault without air
support, four VMF-214 Corsairs started a target run controlled by a
liaison plane from VMO-6. The foremost Marines, almost at the summit
by this time, had to beat a hasty retreat to escape the napalm and
500-pound bombs being dumped on Hill 692. Fortunately, there were no
friendly casualties. Some were caused indirectly, however, when hostile
mortar fire caught Marines withdrawing along a connecting saddle to the
comparatively safe reverse slope of Hill 680. When the danger passed,
Able Company returned to the attack on 692 and routed the remaining
defenders.[225]
[225] 5thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), Jun 51, 35.
The 1st Marine Division made it a policy thereafter that only the
forward air controllers on the ground were to direct close air support
along the front. Control of air strikes farther behind the enemy lines
was reserved for the OYs.
_1st MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE
Sightings of enemy vehicles during the month of May totaled
54,561--seven times those of January. This increase prompted General
Van Fleet to ask the Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet to initiate a
program of cutting off all possible enemy road traffic between the
latitudes 38° 15´ N and 39° 15´ N.
Earlier in 1951 the interdiction program had been aimed chiefly at the
enemy’s rail lines and bridges. The Communists had countered by using
more trucks. The new program, known as Operation STRANGLE, was to be
concentrated against vital road networks. Flight leaders were briefed
to search out critical spots where truck and ox cart traffic could be
stopped. Roads skirting hills were to be blocked by landslides caused
by well placed bombs. Where cliffside roads followed the coast, as they
so often did in East Korea, naval gunfire started avalanches of dirt
and rocks which sometimes reached a depth of 20 feet. Roads running
through a narrow ravine or rice paddy could often be cut by a deep bomb
crater.[226]
[226] Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on _Pac
Flt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chapter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and
on 1st MAW _HD_s, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, G-3 Journal
entries, Assessment Rpts.
The 1st MAW was given the assignment of stopping traffic on three roads
in East Korea--from Wonsan to Pyonggang, from Kojo to Kumhwa, and along
a lateral route linking the two (Map 16). Since Kumhwa and Pyonggang
were two of the three Iron Triangle towns, these roads were of more
than ordinary importance.
The Communists reacted to the new UN pressure by increasing their
flak traps. UN pilots were lured with such bait as mysterious lights,
tempting displays of supposed fuel drums, or damaged UN aircraft that
called for investigation. The cost of the UN in planes and pilots
showed an increase during the first two months of Operation STRANGLE.
From 20 May to the middle of July, 20 Marine planes were shot down.
Six of the pilots returned safely; two were killed and 12 listed as
missing.[227]
[227] 1st MAW _HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33
_HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries.
The demands of Operation STRANGLE added to the emphasis on interdiction
and armed reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force. Statistics compiled
by the 1st Marine Division for 1-17 June 1951 show that 984 close air
support sorties had been requested and 642 received--about 65 percent.
The ratio of Marine planes to other UN aircraft reporting to the
Division was about four to one.[228]
[228] Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG
1stMarDiv.
The statistics of the 1st MAW indicate that out of a total of 1,875
combat sorties flown from 1 to 15 June 1951, about a third were close
air support--651 day CAS and 19 night CAS. Of this number, 377 sorties
went to the 1st Marine Division, which received more than half. Next
in line were the 7th Infantry Division (41 sorties), the 3d Infantry
Division (31 sorties), and the 25th Infantry Division (28 sorties).[229]
[229] 1st MAW _HD_, Jun 51. Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun.
The effect of Operation STRANGLE on the enemy must be left largely
to conjecture. There can be no doubt that it added enormously to the
Communists’ logistical problem. It is equally certain that they solved
these problems to such an extent that their combat units were never
at a decisive handicap for lack of ammunition and other supplies.
Operation STRANGLE, in short, merely added to the evidence that
interdictory air alone was not enough to knock a determined adversary
out of the war, as enthusiasts had predicted at the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea.
_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack_
On the night of 1–2 June, Colonel Nickerson was notified that the 7th
Marines would be relieved next day by the 1st Marines, which would
pass through and continue the attack. The 1st Marines moved into
assembly areas at 0630. Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Hire, commanding
officer of 3/1, went forward at 0800 with his command group to make
a reconnaissance of the area. As his staff paused for a conference
in a supposedly enfiladed location, a Communist mortar barrage hit
the group by complete surprise. The artillery Liaison officer was
killed instantly. His assistant, two forward observers, four company
commanders, the S-3 and 32 enlisted men were wounded. So hard hit was
the battalion that its attack had to be postponed until the following
day.[230]
[230] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51.
The first Division objective was designated X-RAY. 2/1 had the mission
of taking the high point, Hill 516 (Map 15). Across the valley 3/1
advanced up a parallel ridge. Planes from VMF-214 and VMF-323 cleared
the way for the securing of this battalion’s objective at 1900.
Aircraft from these same squadrons also aided 2/1 in over-running the
last opposition on Hill 516, where 80 NKPA dead were counted.[231]
[231] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; _HD_s of
VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51.
[Illustration: MAP 16
1st MARINE AIR WING
OPERATING AREA
23 MAY-15 JULY 1951
UNIT LOCATIONS ON 1 JULY]
The KMC regiment, in reserve only two days, was ordered to relieve
the 5th Marines on 4 June. This would permit Colonel Hayward to shift
over to the right flank, thus extending the 1st Marine Division zone
5,000 yards to the east with a north-south boundary of the Soyang river
valley (Map 15). The purpose of this maneuver was to free 2d Infantry
Division troops for a mission of mopping up in the X Corps rear area.
Three Marine regiments were now in line, the 1st on the left, the
KMCs in the center, the 5th on the right, and the 7th in reserve. A
reshuffling of units also took place in the 1st MAW when VMF-312 ended
its tour of duty on the CVL _Bataan_. The replacement involved a change
of carriers when VMF-323 was alerted for west coast duty on the CVE
_Sicily_ a week later.[232]
[232] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv
_Special Action Report_ (_SAR_), Jun 51.
Ahead of the KMCs stretched the most difficult of the regimental zones
of action--the main mountain range extending northeast from Yanggu
to Hill 1316, known to the Koreans as Taeam-san. Along these ridges
the Chinese had placed North Korean troops with orders to “hold until
death.”[233]
[233] The account of the KMC attack is based upon these
sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51; “KMC Operations in
Korea, Jun 51,” n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, then KMC
senior adviser.
From the air, the ground in front of the KMCs resembled a monstrous
prehistoric lizard, rearing up on its hind legs. The 1st Battalion was
to ascend the tail and the 2d the hind legs. The two would meet at the
rump, Hill 1122 (Map 15). From this position the backbone ran northeast
to the shoulders, Hill 1218. Still farther northeast, along the neck,
was the key terrain feature--Taeam-san, the head of the imagined
reptile.
The 1st and 2d Battalions ran immediately into the opposition of an
estimated NKPA regiment. In an effort to outflank the enemy, the 3d
Battalion swung over to the east and attacked up the ridge forming
the forelegs. Seizure of the shoulders (Hill 1218) would render enemy
positions along the back, rump, hind legs, and tail untenable. Major
General Choe Am Lin, commanding the 12th NKPA Division, was quick to
recognize the tactical worth of this height and exact a stiff price for
it.
That the KMCs could expect little mercy from their fellow countrymen
was demonstrated when the bodies of ten men reported missing were
found. All had been shot in the back of the head.
For five days the fight raged with unabated fury. The terrain limited
the advance to a narrow front, so that the attack resembled the thrust
of a spear rather than a blow from a battering ram. When the KMCs did
gain a brief foothold, the enemy launched a counterattack.
At 2000 on 10 June, after six days of relatively unsuccessful fighting,
the KMCs decided to gamble on a night attack. This had heretofore
been the enemy’s prerogative, and the Korean Reds were caught unaware
in a devastating surprise. Most of the NKPA troops were attending to
housekeeping duties at 0200 when all three KMC battalions fell upon
them like an avalanche. Hill 1122, the rump of the lizard, was seized;
and under pressure the enemy withdrew from the shoulders. This made the
fall of Taeam-san inevitable, and only mopping-up operations remained
for KMCs who had suffered more than 500 casualties. General Thomas sent
the regiment this message on 12 June:
Congratulations to the KMC on a difficult job well done. Your
seizure of objectives on the KANSAS Line from a determined enemy
was a magnificent dash of courage and endurance. Your courageous
and aggressive actions justify our pride in the Korean Marines.
Logistical support of the three regiments in the attack presented a
problem to the Division supply echelons. The KMCs in the center and
the 1st Marines on the left could be supplied over a narrow, winding
mountain road that scaled a high pass before dropping down into an
east-west valley giving relatively easy access to the center and left.
The 5th Marines had to receive its supplies over another mountain road
leading north of Inje, then west into the regimental zone.[234]
[234] The KMC’s drew fuel and ammunition from the 1st Marine
Division and rations from the ROK Army. Other classes of
supplies were obtained generally on a catch-as-catch-can
basis with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan.
Both of the Division supply routes needed a good deal of engineering
work before trucks could move over them freely. Landslides were
frequent and many trucks skidded off the slippery trail while rounding
the hairpin turns.
The 1st Marines moved northward on north-south ridges, and the KMCs in
the center had spurs leading to their objectives. It was the misfortune
of the 5th Marines to have a topographical washboard effect ahead. The
axis of advance was south to north, but the ground on the way to the
final objectives on the KANSAS Line consisted of five sharply defined
ridgelines running northwest to southeast. Instead of attacking along
the ridgelines Colonel Hayward’s men had to climb some 1,200 feet, then
descend 1,200 feet, five separate times while covering an advance of
8,000 yards (Map 15).
Artillery fired for more than two hours on the morning of 6 June to
soften defenses on the next regimental objective, Hill 729. An air
strike was attempted but fog with low-hanging clouds forced the flight
leader to abort the mission. At 1300 the assault battalions moved
across the LD against small-arms and machine gun fire. The fog lifted
sufficiently at 1400 to allow four F9Fs from VMF-311 to deliver an
effective attack. And by 2100 both 2/5 and 3/5 were consolidating their
positions on the first of the five ridges.
This assault is typical of the fighting as the 5th Marines took the
remaining four ridges, one by one, in a slugging assault on an enemy
defending every commanding height. The advance resolved itself into
a pattern as the Korean Reds probed the Marine lines at night and
continued their tough resistance by day. For 10 days the regiment
plugged ahead, step by step, with the support of artillery, air,
mortars, and 75 mm recoilless rifles.[235]
[235] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv and 1stMar, Jun 51.
_1st Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line_
On the left flank, the 1st Marines devoted several days to
consolidating its position and sending out reconnaissance patrols
in preparation for an attack on the ridge just north of the Hwachon
Reservoir. From this height the Communists could look down the throats
of Colonel Brown’s troops.
From 6 to 8 June, Lieutenant Colonel Hire’s 3d Battalion led the attack
against moderate but gathering resistance. A gain of 1,500 yards was
made on the right flank by 2/1, commanded by Major Clarence J. Mabry
after the evacuation of Lieutenant Colonel McClellan, wounded on the
5th. On the left, Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1/1 held fast as
the 5th ROK Regiment, 7th ROK Division, X Corps, passed through on its
way to a new zone of action to the west.
Early on the 9th, as 2/1 was preparing to launch its attack, an intense
artillery and mortar barrage fell upon the lines, followed by the
assault of an estimated NKPA company, The Korean Reds were beaten off
with heavy losses. And though the enemy fire continued, 2/1 jumped off
on schedule, fighting for every inch of ground. Colonel Brown committed
1/1 on the left. It was an all-day fight for both battalions. After
taking one ridge in the morning, it was used as the springboard for
an assault on the second objective. The weapons of the regimental
Anti-Tank Company built up a base of fire that enabled this ridge to be
secured by 1600.
The 5th ROK Regiment took its objectives by the morning of the 10th.
The 1st Marines provided additional fire support by diverting all its
antitank guns and tank rifles to the aid of the ROKs.
The pressure, which had been building up for several days, reached
a new high on 10 June. Late that morning Colonel Brown met General
Almond and the Division G-3, Colonel Richard G. Weede, at a conference.
By 1100 the entire 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines was committed. On
the left, Lieutenant Colonel West had to hold up the 1st Battalion
until 1330, when the ROKs completed the occupation of the high ground
dominating the route of advance.
For several hours it appeared that the Marines had met their match
this time. A tenacious enemy defended log bunkers expertly, refusing
to give ground until evicted by grenade and bayonet attacks. At every
opportunity the Communists counterattacked. So effective was their
resistance that at dusk the two Marine battalions were still short of
their objectives in spite of casualties draining the strength of both
units.
Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff, commanding officer of the 11th Marines,
remained on the telephone for hours with Colonel Brown. He gave all
possible artillery support, not only of his own regiment but also
nearby Corps units. By nightfall, with the attacking battalions
still held up, the atmosphere was tense in the regimental forward
CP. Lieutenant Colonel Adelman, commanding the supporting artillery
battalion, 2/11, helped to coordinate air strikes and artillery with
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, executive officer of the 1st
Marines, and the air liaison officers.
“Everything I had ever hoped to see in years of teaching such
coordination of fires seemed to come true that night,” commented
Colonel Brown at a later date. “I stayed in my regular CP until I was
sure all I could do through Winecoff was done, and then went forward to
see the finale. It was a glorious spectacle, that last bayonet assault.
In the last analysis 2/1 had to take its objective with the bayonet and
hand grenades, crawling up the side of a mountain to get at the enemy.
It was bloody work, the hardest fighting I have ever seen.”[236]
[236] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 8 Jun 58. Other
sources for this section are the _HD_s of 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and VMF-214.
This was no small tribute, coming from a veteran officer whose combat
service included three major wars, not to mention Nicaragua and
China. It was nearly midnight before Mabry’s battalion took its final
objective. Casualties for the day’s attack were 14 KIA and 114 WIA
exclusive of slightly wounded, who were neither counted nor evacuated.
West’s battalion, which seized Hill 802, overlooking the Soyang River,
had won its all-day fight at a cost of 9 KIA and 97 WIA.
Unfailing support had been given throughout the daylight hours by
aircraft of VMF-214. VMF(N)-513 took over on the night shift, and
planes came screeching in as late as 2200 to attack moonlit targets a
hundred yards ahead of the leading infantry elements.
The 1st Marines had outfought and outgamed a tough enemy. Never again,
after the 10th, was the NKPA resistance quite as determined. The 3d
Battalion led the other two during the next few days. There was plenty
of fighting for all three, but the result was never again in doubt.
By the late afternoon of 14 June the regiment was in position on the
BROWN Line. This was the unofficial name for an extension of the KANSAS
Line some 3,000 yards north. It had been requested by Colonel Brown
when he realized that positions along the KANSAS Line were completely
dominated by the next ridge to the north.
The change made necessary a continued advance by the KMCs on the right
to tie in with the 1st Marines. The so-called BROWN Line was then
officially designated the modified KANSAS Line.
_7th Marines Committed to the Attack_
For several days General Thomas had been concerned over the heavy
casualties suffered by his command. In order to give greater impetus
to the Division effort, he decided to commit the reserve infantry
regiment, the 7th Marines (minus one battalion held back as Division
reserve) to complete the occupation of the modified KANSAS Line.
On 8 June, Colonel Nickerson’s regiment (minus 3/7) moved into an
assembly area between the 1st Marines and the KMCs, ready to attack in
the morning. Ahead stretched a narrow but difficult zone of advance up
the valley of the So-chon River (Map 15). Tank-infantry patrols went
forward to select favorable positions for the jumpoff, and engineers
worked throughout the daylight hours to clear the valley roads of
mines. Despite their best efforts, 10 Marine tanks were lost to mines
during the first week.[237]
[237] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the
_HD_s of the 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 for Jun
51.
As the two battalions advanced on the morning of the 9th they came
under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Nevertheless, they secured
Hill 420 and dug in before nightfall.
On the 10th Rooney’s 1/7 advanced along the ridgeline to support
the attack of Meyerhoff’s 2/7 up the valley floor. The maneuver was
carried out successfully in spite of NKPA automatic weapons and mortar
opposition. Contact was established with KMC forward units at dusk.
Sixteen POWs were taken by the 7th Marines and 85 North Korean dead
were counted on the objectives.
The two battalions continued the attack throughout the next week. The
3d Battalion of the 7th Marines remained General Thomas’ sole Division
reserve until he committed it on the afternoon of 18 June.
The newcomers got into the fight just in time for the enemy’s all-out
effort to defend the steep east-west ridge marking the BROWN Line.
The nature of the terrain made maneuver impossible--a frontal assault
was the only answer. Defending the ridge was the 1st Battalion, 41st
Regiment, 12th NKPA Division. Waiting on the reverse slope, the enemy
launched a counterattack when the Marines neared the crest. George
Company, commanded by First Lieutenant William C. Airheart, met five
successive repulses at the hands of superior numbers. Item Company
(First Lieutenant Frank A. Winfrey) also took part in the fifth
assault, and both companies held their ground near the summit when the
fighting ended at dusk. They expected to resume the attack at dawn,
but the enemy had silently withdrawn during the night. All three 7th
Marines battalions occupied their designated positions on the BROWN
Line without further interference.
By early afternoon on the 20th, the Division was in complete control of
the modified KANSAS Line and construction of defenses began in earnest.
The next day the 1st Marines and KMCs extended their right and left
flanks respectively and pinched out the 7th Marines, which dropped back
into reserve.
Thus ended two months of continual hard fighting for the 1st Marine
Division, beginning on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. Few and
far between were the interludes of rest for troops which saw both
defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy’s two drives,
they launched a month-long counterstroke that had the enemy hardpressed
at times for survival. Only the ruthless sacrifice of NKPA troops in
defensive operations enabled the Chinese Reds to recover from the blows
dealt them in late May and early June.
The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire
month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1,044 WIA, most of them
being reported during the first 2 weeks. This was a higher total than
the regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir operation. Reflecting
on the caliber of these men, their regimental commander had this to say:
They were war-wise when I got command; I contributed nothing to
their training because they were in battle when I joined them and
I left them when they came out of the lines for a rest. They used
cover, maneuvered beautifully, used their own and supporting arms
intelligently, were patient and not foolhardy; but when it came
to the point where they had to rely on themselves with bayonet,
hand grenade and sheer guts, they could and did do that too. I
have long ago given up telling people what I saw them do on many
occasions. Nobody believes me, nor would I believe anyone else
telling the same story of other troops.[238]
[238] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr to Maj W. T.
Hickman, 22 Apr 57.
Colonel Brown, of course, paid this tribute to the troops of his
regiment. But it is safe to say that any commanding officer of the 1st
Marine Division would have felt that these sentiments applied equally
to his own men. All the combat Marines of the 60-day battle had shown
themselves to be worthy heirs of the traditions of Belleau Wood,
Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir.
CHAPTER VIII
The Truce Talks at Kaesong
_Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line--Red
Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in Reserve--Marine Helicopters
Take the Lead--Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to
K-18--The Division Back in Action Again_
It is not likely that the date 25 June 1951 meant much to the Marines
on the KANSAS Line. In all probability few of them recalled that it was
the first anniversary of the Communist aggression which started the war
in Korea.
Since that surprise attack on a June Sunday morning in 1950, some
1,250,000 men had been killed, wounded or captured in battle--a million
of them from the Communist forces of Red China and the North Korean
People’s Republic. This was the estimate of J. Donald Kingsley, Korean
reconstruction agent general for the United States. He reckoned the
civilian victims of privation, violence, and disease at two million
dead. Another three million had been made homeless refugees.[239]
[239] This section is based on by Peter Kihss, “One Year in
Korea,” _United Nations World_, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951,
21–23.
On 25 June 1951 the Communists held less territory by 2,100 square
miles than they occupied when they began their onslaught with an
overwhelming local superiority in arms and trained troops. Losses of
Communist equipment during the first year included 391 aircraft, 1,000
pieces of artillery, and many thousands of machine guns, automatic
rifles, and mortars. North Korea, formerly the industrial region of the
peninsula, lay in ruins. Cities, factories, and power plants had been
pounded into rubble.
In short, the thrifty conquest planned by the Koreans and their Soviet
masters had backfired. Not only had the Communist offensives of April
and May been stopped; the United Nations forces had rebounded to win
their greatest victory of the war’s first year. While X Corps was
advancing to the Punchbowl, other major Eighth Army units had also
gained ground. Perhaps the most crushing blow was dealt by I Corps in
its attack on the Iron Triangle. Units of two U.S. infantry divisions
fought their way through extensive mine fields into Chorwon and Kumhwa
on 8 June. By the end of the month, I Corps held defensive positions
about midway between the base and apex of the strategic triangle that
had been the enemy’s main assembly area for the troops and supplies of
his spring offensives.[240]
[240] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51.
On the east-central front, units of IX Corps pushed within 10 miles of
Kumsong while I ROK Corps advanced along the east coast to Chodo-ri.
Thus the UN forces occupied the most favorable line they had held since
the great CCF offensive early in January. From the mouth of the Imjin
this line ran northeast to the middle of the Iron Triangle, eastward
across the mountains to the southern rim of the Punchbowl, then
northeast to the coast of Chodo-ri (Map 14).
_Communists Ask for Truce Talks_
The first anniversary of the Korean conflict was overshadowed two days
earlier by the news that the Communists had taken the initiative in
proposing truce talks. The suggestion was made in a New York radio
address of 23 June by a Soviet delegate to the United Nations--Jacob
Malik, Foreign Minister of the USSR. On the 25th the idea was
unofficially endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist
government. UN officials immediately indicated their willingness
to discuss preliminary terms. The outcome was an agreement that
representatives of both sides would meet on 7 July at Kaesong, then
located between the opposing lines in west Korea.
Why had the Communists been first to ask for a truce conference? Both
Generals Van Fleet and Almond believed that the answer might have
been traced to military necessity rather than any genuine desire for
peace. “I felt at that time that the Chinese Communists and the North
Korean armies were on the most wobbly legs that they had been on to
that date,” said General Almond when interviewed shortly after his
retirement in 1953. “They were punch drunk and ineffective, and I,
personally, thought at that time that it was the time to finish off the
effort.”[241]
[241] _U.S. News and World Report_, 13 Feb 53, 40–41.
Raymond Cartier, representing a Paris newspaper, probably spoke for
most of the correspondents at the front when he suspected that the
proposal for truce talks “was possibly just a crafty trick devised by
the Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled Chinese
armies.”[242]
[242] _UN World_, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10.
It might have been recalled at this time that the Communists had used
truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese Civil War.
In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Nationalist victory were bright,
the enemy took advantage of American peace efforts by agreeing on
several occasions to meet for truce conferences. And while prolonging
the talks by all manner of subterfuges, the Communists profited from
the breathing spells by regrouping their forces and planning new
offensives. Their final triumph, in fact, owed in no small measure to
interludes when the conference table served a military purpose.[243]
[243] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series
30, pp. 352–363.
History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the next
two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer weeks.
Indeed, Admiral C. Turner Joy believed that the war was actually
prolonged rather than shortened as a result of the negotiations.
“Military victory was not impossible nor even unusually difficult
of achievement,” wrote the Senior Delegate and Chief of the UN
Command delegation at the truce talks. “Elimination of the artificial
restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective
blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military victory
in less time than was expended on truce talks.”[244]
[244] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), _How Communists
Negotiate_ (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter
Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_. One of Admiral Joy’s
last services to his country before his death in 1956
was the writing of this book. Other sources for this
section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., “Inside Story of
Our Mistakes in Korea,” _U.S. News and World Report_, 23
Jan 1953, 35–36; E. Weintal, “What Happened at Kaesong
and What is in Prospect,” _Newsweek_, 23 Jul 1951, 38;
Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
Mao Tse-tung’s forces had lost face by the failure of their long
heralded 5th Phase Offensive. They had been badly beaten during the UN
counteroffensive. Pretensions of high CCF morale could no longer be
maintained when troops were laying down their arms without a fight.
Nor could charges of low UN morale be supported when the fighting
spirit of the Eighth Army was being shown every day at the front.
In view of these circumstances, it would appear that the Communists had
poor cards to play against United Nations trumps at a truce conference.
But they played them so craftily, with such a sly sense of propaganda
values, that the victors of the May and June battles were soon made to
appear losers begging for a breathing spell.
To begin with, the Chinese knew that the mere public announcement of
the possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in the
United States, where the war was unpopular. Pressure would be brought
upon Washington to meet the enemy immediately for negotiations. And
while a cease fire remained even a remote prospect, American public
opinion would demand a slackening of offensive military operations with
their attendant casualties.
From the outset it was apparent that the United Nations Command was
no match for the Communists in low cunning. The UN suggested, for
instance, that the truce teams meet on the Danish hospital ship
_Jutlandia_. Here, surely, was neutral ground, since the Danes had no
combat forces in Korea. Moreover, the ship was to be anchored in Wonsan
harbor within range of CCF shore batteries.
The Reds won the first of many such concessions with their refusal.
They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command let
them have it their way. The reason for the Communist decision was soon
made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing Eighth Army,
which meant that an important road center would be immune from attack.
And though the ancient Korean town was originally in no man’s land, the
Communists soon managed to include it within their lines.
All delegates were requested to display white flags on their
vehicles for identification. Communist photographers were on hand
to snap countless pictures of UN delegates which convinced Asia’s
illiterate millions at a glance that the beaten United Nations had
sent representatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other
photographs showed the unarmed UN delegates being herded about Kaesong
by scowling Communist guards with burp guns.
No detail of the stage setting was too trivial to be overlooked.
Oriental custom prescribes that at the peace table the victors face
south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the UN delegates
were seated at Kaesong with a view to enhancing Communist prestige.[245]
[245] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 4–5.
Some of the propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous, “At the
first meeting of the delegates,” Admiral Joy related, “I seated myself
at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The Communists
had provided a chair for me which was considerably shorter than a
standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist delegate,
General Nam Il, protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished
stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam Il with a
chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain-smoking Nam Il puffed
his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glowered down on me, an
obviously torpedoed admiral. This condition of affairs was promptly
rectified when I changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but
not before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.”[246]
[246] _Ibid._
_Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line_
The war went on, of course, during the negotiations. But the tempo was
much reduced as the UN forces consolidated their gains, and the enemy
appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. Generally
speaking, the Eighth Army had shifted from the offensive to the
defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Marine Division occupied
the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its way to the
BROWN Line.
On 22 June all three infantry regiments were directed to establish
battalion-size patrol bases on the BADGER Line--1½ to 2½ miles forward
of their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached
to Colonel Brown and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the
regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish a
patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR.
While these arrangements were being carried out, General Almond called
at the 1st Marines CP. He expressed surprise that the establishment
of patrol bases was being contemplated by EUSAK when some of the
front-line units were still in contact with the enemy.[247]
[247] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51, 55.
Execution of these orders was accordingly suspended. The following
day, however, Division again alerted the infantry regiments to be
prepared to occupy patrol bases on order. This was by direction of
Corps, which in turn had been directed by EUSAK.
The Marine regimental and battalion commanders were not happy about
this turn of affairs. The patrol base concept had been tried out early
in May, during the lull between the enemy’s two offensives, and found
wanting. In theory it was a good means of keeping contact with an
enemy who had pulled back out of mortar and light artillery range. In
practice the enemy had shown that he could bypass patrol bases at night
for probing attacks on the MLR. The bases themselves ran the constant
risk of being surrounded and overwhelmed. As a final objection, a
regiment was often deprived of its reserve battalion, which was the
logical choice for such duty.
In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out on 26 June and established a
patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such a bombardment of
large caliber mortar fire that Colonel Brown pulled the battalion back
to the MLR the following day.[248]
[248] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51.
General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after his
retirement when he summed it up as “an invitation to disaster.”[249] He
could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early in July
that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san.
[249] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting
to note that there was no mention of the patrol base
concept in the then current _Field Service Regulations,
Operations, FM 100-5_, published by the Department of the
Army in August 1949.
This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, afforded
excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and westward into
the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware of these
advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his MLR. This
was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by KMC
reconnaissance patrols.[250]
[250] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section
is based on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 7–11; Col C. W.
Harrison’s account, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July
1951;” Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.
Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning of 7
July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an order
directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the following
day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time for
planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be
relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to
form a composite battalion of the three companies that could most
conveniently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large
proportion of recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival.
There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, fairly
level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The other called
for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the MLR and a
steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san.
Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the right
by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridgeline on
the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes and an
artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded.
The attack jumped off at 1030 on 8 July. All three companies were
greeted by enemy mortar and machine gun fire that pinned down the
company on the right. The two companies on the left won a foothold on
Hill 1100, about a mile in front of Taeu-san. Here the advance ground
to a halt.
These KMCs dug in for the night and repulsed a series of
counterattacks. On the morning of the 9th the KMC regimental commander,
Colonel Kim Tai Shik, committed the entire 1st Battalion to the attack
on the right. It had no better success than the company of the day
before. Meanwhile, the two companies were driven off Hill 1100.
Colonel Gould P. Groves, senior liaison officer with the KMCs,
recommended that the remnants of the two companies be withdrawn. The
1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but it was plain that
the KMC regiment could not come close to Taeu-san. On 12 July the 1st
Marine Division informed X Corps that the position held by the KMCs
just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an advance
patrol base. As far as the Marines were concerned, the sad affair was
permitted to rest there.
As evidence of the valiant effort made by the KMCs, they suffered 222
casualties. A sequel to this story was written late in July after the
2d infantry Division relieved the Marines. X Corps again ordered the
capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base, and it required the commitment of
the major part of the division to accomplish the task.[251]
[251] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv _HD_, Jul 51,
13–19.
Although the fighting had not been severe for other units of the 1st
Marine Division during the first two weeks of July, the casualties
(including KMC losses) were 55 KIA, 360 WIA, and 22 MIA--a total of
437. Relief of the Marines was completed by the 2d Infantry Division
on 15 July, and by the 17th all units were on their way back to
assembly areas in X Corps rear.
It was the second time since the landing of the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade on 2 August 1950 that the Marines had been away from the firing
line for more than a few days.
_Red Herrings at Kaesong_
It is not changing the subject to switch to the truce talks. Kaesong
was actually a second UN front.
After the preliminaries had been settled--most of them to Communist
satisfaction--the UN delegation, headed by Admiral Joy, held a first
meeting on 10 July 1951 with his opposite number, NKPA Major General
Nam Il, and the Communist truce team. This was the first of the talks
that were to drag on for two dreary years.
Nam Il, a Korean native of Manchuria, born in 1911, had been educated
in Russia and had served with the Soviet army in World War II. His
career in Korea began when he arrived as a captain with Soviet
occupation troops in 1945. Rising to power rapidly, he took a prominent
part in the creation of a Soviet puppet state in North Korea.
An atmosphere of sullen hatred surrounded the UN delegates at Kaesong.
The CCF sentinel posted at the entrance to the conference room wore a
gaudy medal which he boasted had been awarded to him “for killing forty
Americans.” When Admiral Joy tried to send a report to General Ridgway,
the messenger was turned back by armed Communist guards. These are
samples of the indignities heaped upon the UN truce team. After several
UN delegates were threatened by guards with burp guns, Joy protested to
Nam Il, “demanding prompt elimination of such crudities.”
In order to give their battered armies more time for recuperation, the
Communist delegates met every issue with delaying tactics. They proved
themselves to be masters of the ancient art of dragging a red herring
across the trail. Going back on their word did not embarrass them in
the least if they found it to their advantage to renege.[252]
[252] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Joy, _How Communists
Negotiate_, 6–10, 129, 140; Carl Berger, _The Korean
Knot_ (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 141–151;
Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
The truce negotiations were bound to have an immediate effect on
military operations. In the United States it seemed a pity to
newspaper readers that American young men should have to die in
battle at a time when headlines were hinting at the possibility of
peace. Mothers wrote to their congressmen, requesting a halt in Korean
operations.
General Van Fleet minced no words after his retirement when he
commented on the effect of the truce talks on strategy:
Instead of getting directives for offensive action, we found our
activities more and more proscribed as time went on. Even in the
matter of straightening out our lines for greater protection,
or capturing hills when the Reds were looking down our throats,
we were limited by orders from the Far East Command in Japan,
presumably acting on directives from Washington.[253]
[253] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), “The Truth About Korea,”
_Life_, 11 May 53, 133.
It was the opinion of Admiral Joy that more UN casualties were suffered
as a consequence of the truce talks than would have resulted from an
offensive taking full advantage of Red China’s military weaknesses in
June 1951.
“As soon as armistice discussions began,” he wrote, “United Nations
Command ground forces slackened their offensive preparations.
Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to
the maximum during the armistice talks.... I feel certain that the
casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years
of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an
offensive in the summer of 1951.”[254]
[254] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 166.
_1st Marine Division in Reserve_
Most of the 1st Marine Division units were in X Corps reserve during
the last two weeks of July 1951. The 5th Marines, however, remained
in “ready reserve” near Inje under the operational control of X
Corps. Toward the end of the month, the 3d Battalion of the 11th
Marines passed to the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division.
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines and Division Reconnaissance Company
displaced to the Yanggu area to aid in the construction of defensive
positions and undergo special training.
1st Marine Division Training Order 2-51, covering the period from 23
July to 20 August 1951, provided for a stiff daily schedule of general
and specialist military subjects. The objectives were “to maintain
each individual and unit of the command at a very high state of
proficiency, while emphasizing rest and rehabilitation of personnel
and repair and maintenance of equipment.... A minimum of 33% of all
technical training was to be conducted at night, stressing individual
and unit night discipline. Formal unit schools and on-the-job training
were utilized extensively.”[255]
[255] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 18.
Most thoroughly covered among general military subjects were mechanical
training, capabilities, tactical employment, and firing of individual
and infantry crew-served weapons. Lectures and demonstrations were
combined to good effect with instruction in basic infantry tactics.
“The prescribed periods of physical conditioning,” the Division
report continued, “were supplemented by extensive organized athletic
programs outside of training hours, resulting in the maintenance of
a high degree of battle conditioning of all hands. Special military
subjects encompassed the whole range of activities necessary to the
accomplishment of any mission assigned the Division. Building from the
duties of the individual Marine, infantry, artillery, engineer, and
tank personnel progressed through small unit employment and tactics as
it applied to their respective specialities. Meanwhile such diverse
training as tank repair and watch repair was conducted in various
units.”[256]
[256] _Ibid._
Fortification came in for study after a tour of the KANSAS Line by
Major General Clovis E. Byers, who had relieved General Almond as X
Corps commander. He listed the weaknesses he found and directed that
“special attention [be] given to the thickness, strength and support
of bunker overheads, and to the proper revetting and draining of
excavations.”[257]
[257] CG X Corps, CITE X 21568.
The KMC Regiment received the most thorough training it had ever
known, considering that it had been in combat continually since its
organization. Each of the Division’s three other regiments sent four
training teams consisting of a lieutenant, an NCO, and an interpreter
to the KMCs on 22 July. The 12 teams had orders to remain until 20
August. Attached to various KMC companies, they acted as advisers for
the entire training period.
Another organization of Koreans that had won its way to favorable
recognition was the newly formed Civil Transport Corps (CTC). The use
of indigenous labor for logistical purposes dated back to March 1951,
when the Eighth Army’s advance was slowed up by supply problems caused
by muddy roads. Plans were made to equip and train a special corps to
assist in the logistical support of combat troops in areas inaccessible
to normal motor transportation.[258]
[258] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 1080110.
The project began on 29 March with 720 South Koreans--all from the
Korean National Guard--being assigned to I Corps. Plans were developed
for a Civil Transport Corps of 82 companies, each containing 240 men.
The CTC was to be supervised by a staff of eight U.S. Army officers and
four enlisted men under the operational control of the Transportation
Section, EUSAK.
The ROK Army had the added responsibility for logistical support, of
hospitalization and medical services other than emergency treatment in
forward areas. Support for the CTC from UN units was to be provided
in a manner similar to that in effect for the ROK forces.[259] No
difficulty was found in filling the CTC ranks, for the pay meant food
and clothing to a Korean and his family.
[259] _Ibid._
The Marines were always astonished at the heavy loads the Korean
cargadores could carry uphill on their “A-frames,” which looked like
sturdy easels with a pair of arm-and-shoulder carrying straps. Humble
and patient, these burden bearers were the only means of supply in
remote combat areas.
_Marine Helicopters Take the Lead_
The truce talks continued to be front-page news in August. Some of
the more impulsive newspaper and radio commentators hinted at the
possibility of a cease fire before the end of summer. As for the Marine
command and staff, they were not so optimistic, judging from this
sentence in a report:
“All Division units were notified on 14 August that requisitions had
been sent to EUSAK for cold weather clothing and equipment.”
The training period afforded an opportunity to glance back over the
first year of fighting in Korea and evaluate the results. There could
be no doubt that the war’s foremost tactical innovation so far was
the combat helicopter. The Marine Corps had taken the lead in its
development when VMO-6, made up of OYs and Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopters
in roughly equal numbers, got into action with the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter. Brigadier General Edward A.
Craig had the historical distinction, insofar as is known, of being
the first commanding general to see the advantages of a “chopper” as a
command vehicle.
Evacuation of casualties was the principal job of the rotary-wing
aircraft, and 1,926 wounded Marines were flown out during the first
year. No less than 701 of these mercy flights took place during the
three months from 1 April to 30 June 1951, covering the period of the
two CCF 5th Phase offensives and the UN counterstroke. By that time
the Bell HTL-4, with its built-in litters on both sides sheltered by
plexiglas hoods, had taken over most of the evacuation missions from
the HO3S-1.
The zeal of the pilots contributed substantially to the successful
results. Captain Dwain L. Redalen gave a demonstration of the VMO-6
spirit at the height of the first CCF offensive in the spring of 1951.
During the 13½ hours from 0600 to 1930 on 23 April, he was in the air
constantly except for intervals of loading or unloading casualties.
Logging a total of 9.6 flight hours, he evacuated 18 wounded men under
enemy fire that left bullet holes in the plexiglas of his HTL-4.[260]
[260] VMO-6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51.
Practically all the helicopter techniques put into effect by VMO-6
had originally been developed by the Marine experimental squadron,
HMX-1, organized late in 1947 at Quantico. Despite the enthusiasm for
rotary-wing aircraft then prevailing, HMX-1 decided that an observation
squadron should combine OYs with helicopters. The wisdom of this
conclusion was proved in Korea, where the test of combat showed that
both types were needed. The OYs were the superiors at reconnaissance
and artillery spot missions, while the helicopters excelled at
transportation and liaison and evacuation flights.
VMO-6 as a whole was the only Marine organization linking the ground
and air commands. An administrative unit of the 1st MAW, the squadron
was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division.[261]
[261] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Elizabeth L. Tierney,
Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, statistics compiled from
VMO-6 reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51;
1stMarDiv type “C” rpt on assault helicopters, 4 Oct 51;
Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (Harper, 1954), based
on Marine records, 151–158.
Thanks to the ability of the helicopter to land “on a dime,” staff
liaison missions and command visits were greatly facilitated. The
helicopter had become the modern general’s steed, and the gap between
staff and line was narrowed by rotary wings.
The importance of wound evacuation missions can hardly be
overestimated. Surgeons stressed the value of time in treating the
shock resulting from severe wounds. The sooner a patient could be made
ready for surgery, the better were his chances of survival. Definitive
care had waited in the past until a casualty was borne on a jolting
stretcher from the firing line to the nearest road to begin a long
ambulance ride. Such a journey might take most of a day, but there were
instances of a helicopter evacuee reaching the operation table only an
hour after being wounded at the front, 15 or 20 miles away.
Captain J. W. McElroy, USNR, commanding the famous hospital ship
_Consolation_, asserted that his experience had “proved conclusively
the superiority of the helicopter method of embarking and evacuating
casualties to and from the ship.”[262] A helicopter loading platform
was installed on the _Consolation_ in July 1951, during an overhaul at
the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in California. Marine helicopter pilots
advised as to landing requirements, and eventually all the hospital
ships had similar platforms.
[262] CO USS _Consolation_ rpt to ComNavFE, 26 Jan 52.
At a conservative estimate, the 1,926 wounded men flown out by VMO-6
helicopters during the squadron’s first year in Korea included several
hundred who might not have survived former methods of evacuation.
_Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea_
Another far-reaching tactical innovation was being launched at this
time as Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN, supervised a
joint Army-Navy three-month field test of Marine armored vests made of
lightweight plastics.
A glance at the past reveals that body armor had never quite vanished
from modern warfare. European cavalry lancers wore steel cuirasses
throughout the 19th century. During the American Civil War two
commercial firms in Connecticut manufactured steel breastplates
purchased by thousands of Union soldiers. So irksome were the weight
and rigidity of this protection, however, that infantrymen soon
discarded it.
World War I dated the first widespread adoption of armor in the 20th
century. The idea was suggested when a French general noted that one of
his men had survived a lethal shell fragment by virtue of wearing an
iron mess bowl under his beret. France led the way, and before the end
of 1915 steel helmets were being issued to all armies on the Western
Front.
When the United States entered the war, General John J. Pershing put in
a request for body armor. Some 30 prototypes using steel or aluminum
plates were submitted but rejected. In every instance the weight and
rigidity were such that too high a price in mobility would be paid for
protection.[263]
[263] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: Rpt of Joint Army-Navy
Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G-4 Files; _Instructional
Information, Vest, Armored_, M-1951, G-4 Files, HQMC;
LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis
Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, ltr of 22 Jun 54; Capt D. G.
McGrew, ltr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, USMC, ltr
of 30 Jun 54.
During the 1930’s new possibilities were opened up by developments in
lightweight plastics. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor interrupted
experiments that were not resumed until 1943. Then a new start was
made with the formation of a joint Army-Navy committee headed by Rear
Admiral Alexander H. Van Kueren and Colonel George F. Doriot.
Wound statistics indicated that the great majority of fatal wounds were
received in a comparatively small area of the body. The following table
shows the regional frequency:
NON-FATAL FATAL
_Percent_ _Percent_
Head 10 Head 20
Chest 10 Chest 50
Abdomen 10 Abdomen 20
Upper Extremity 30 Upper Extremity 5
Lower Extremity 40 Lower Extremity 5
Shell, mortar, or grenade fragments caused 60 percent of the fatal
wounds, the statistics revealed, with the remainder being charged
to rifle or machine gun fire. It was futile to hope for lightweight
protection against high-velocity bullets. But researchers hoped that
plastic body armor could stop enough shell or mortar fragments to
reduce serious wounds to light wounds while preventing light wounds
altogether.
Doron and nylon were the materials approved by the joint Army-Navy
committee. The first, named in honor of Colonel Doriot, consisted of
laminated layers of glass cloth filaments, bonded under heavy pressure
to form a thin, rigid slab. That a 1/8-inch thickness could stop and
partially flatten a submachine gun bullet with a muzzle velocity of
1,150 feet per second was demonstrated by ballistic tests at a range of
eight yards.
The committee recommended 12-ply, laminated, basket-weave nylon for
use where flexibility was required. Both the doron and nylon protected
the wearer by offering enough resistance to absorb the energy of the
missile, which spent itself at the impact. Thus the shock was spread
out over too large a surface for a penetration, although the wearer
could receive a bad bruise. If a penetration did result from a missile
of higher velocity, its effects would be much reduced in severity.
Aircraft pilots and crewmen, who could tolerate more weight than
foot-sloggers, were first to benefit. Flak suits and curtains were
being manufactured in quantity for airmen by 1944, and the Eighth Air
Force claimed a 50 percent reduction in casualties as a result.
The infantry stood most in need of protection. Statistics from 57 U.S.
divisions in the European theater of operations during World War II
indicated that foot soldiers, comprising 68.5 percent of the total
strength, suffered 94.5 percent of the casualties. It was further
established that shell or mortar fragments caused from 61.3 to 80.4
percent of the wounds.
Unfortunately, progress lagged for the ground forces, owing to
conflicting requirements. Several prototype armored vests were
submitted and rejected. The Marine Corps planned to conduct combat
tests in the spring of 1945 by providing the ordinary utility jacket
with sheaths to hold slabs of doron. A battalion of the 2d Marine
Division had been selected to wear the garment on Okinawa, but the
experiment was interrupted by the end of the campaign.
The Navy and Marine Corps renewed their research in 1947 at Camp
Lejeune. There a new ballistics center, established for the development
and evaluation of body armor, was set up by the Naval Medical Field
Research Laboratory (NMFRL). Lieutenant Commander Lewis was placed in
charge of experiments.
Scientific precision seemed more important than haste in time of peace,
and the NMFRL was not ready with an armored vest when Communism
challenged the free world to a showdown in Korea. Five hundred of the
armored utility jackets of the proposed Okinawa test were available,
however, and were air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division during the
Inchon-Seoul operation.
Many of them went astray during the sea lift to Wonsan and subsequent
Chosin Reservoir operation. Only the 50 garments issued to the Division
Reconnaissance Company were worn in combat. And though this unit kept
no records, the doron slabs were credited by Major Walter Gall, the
commanding officer, with saving several lives.
By the summer of 1951, Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his researchers
had designed a new Marine armored vest, weighing about 8½ pounds,
combining curved, overlapping doron plates with flexible pads
of basket-weave nylon. This garment, according to the official
description, was capable of “stopping a .45 caliber USA pistol or
Thompson submachine gun bullet; all the fragments of the U.S. hand
grenade at three feet; 75 percent of the U.S. 81mm mortar at 10 feet;
and full thrust of the American bayonet.”
Only 40 vests were available for field tests in the summer of 1951.
Lewis rotated them among as many wearers as possible in the three
regiments selected for the test, the 5th Marines and the 23d and 38th
regiments of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. There was, as he saw it,
a psychological question to be answered--would body armor win the
acceptance of troops in combat? The hackneyed phrase “bullet-proof
vest,” for instance, put the wearer in a class with the buyer of a
gold brick. Nylon was associated in the minds of the men with alluring
feminine attire rather than protection from shell fragments. Finally,
there could be no denying that undesired weight had been added, that
doron plates hampered movement to some extent, and that nylon pads were
uncomfortably warm for summer wear.
Despite these drawbacks, Lewis found that troop acceptance was all
that could be asked. The locale of the tests was the Inje area and the
approaches to the KANSAS Line in June and early July. “By keeping these
few vests almost constantly in use,” the Medical Service Corps officer
commented, “the maximum amount of troop wear was obtained. Included
in the wide sampling were company aid men, riflemen, BAR men, mortar
(60mm) men, radio (backpack type) men--each carrying his basic weapon,
ammunition load and a one-meal ration.”
When Lewis returned to Camp Lejeune, he reported “that body armor,
protection of some type for the vital anatomic areas, is almost
unanimously _desired by all combat troops_, particularly the combat
veteran of several actual fire fights with the enemy.”[264]
[264] Quotations are from _Instructional Information, Vest
Armored_, M-1951. The italicized words were in the
original.
Infantry body armor had at last made the transition from a dream
to a reality. The M-1951 was put into production by a Philadelphia
sportswear firm. And it was estimated that by the spring of 1952 nearly
all Marines would be protected by the vest in combat.
Saving of American lives, of course, was a primary consideration. But
there was a tactical as well as humanitarian advantage to be gained.
For if body armor could reduce fatal and serious wounds by as much as
50 percent, as NMFRL researchers hoped, it would mean that a large
percentage of the enemy’s best antipersonnel weapons had in effect been
silenced.
_MAG-12 Moves to K-18_
There was no respite for 1st MAW while the 1st Marine Division remained
in reserve. Operation STRANGLE was at its height, and interdiction
flights called for nearly all the resources of Marine aviation during
the summer of 1951.
Close air support missions were made secondary. This principle was
upheld by Air Force Major General Otto P. Weyland:
I might suggest that all of us should keep in mind the
limitations of air forces as well as their capabilities.
Continuous CAS along a static front requires dispersed and
sustained fire power against pinpoint targets. With conventional
weapons there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic
mobility and fire power of air forces against worthwhile
concentrations. In a static situation close support is an
expensive substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest
dividends when the enemy’s sustaining capability has been
crippled and his logistics cut to a minimum while his forces
are immobilized by interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Then
decisive results can be obtained as the close-support effort is
massed in coordination with determined ground action.[265]
[265] Quoted in James T. Stewart, _Air Power, The Decisive
Force in Korea_ (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Company,
1957), 22–23.
Marine aviation officers, of course, would have challenged some of
these opinions. But General Weyland insisted that in the summer and
fall of 1951 “it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated
the bulk of our air effort against interdiction targets in the enemy
rear areas. Otherwise, the available firepower would have been expended
inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along the front,
while the enemy was left to build up his resources to launch and
sustain a general offensive.”[266]
[266] _Ibid._
The UN interdiction program was costly to the Communists. Yet it
remained a stubborn fact that the enemy had not only maintained but
actually increased his flow of supplies in spite of bombings that might
have knocked a Western army out of the war. That was because CCF and
NKPA troops could operate with a minimum of 50 short tons per day per
division--an average of about 10 pounds per man. It was about one-fifth
of the supply requirements for an equal number of U.S. troops.
Try as they might, the UN air forces could not prevent the arrival of
the 2,900 tons of rations, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies needed
every day by the 58 Communist divisions at the front.
The enemy during this period was increasing his own air potential. On
17 June the Fifth Air Force warned that the Communists had stepped up
their number of planes from an estimated 900 in mid-May to 1,050 in
mid-June. Their Korean airfields were being kept under repair in spite
of persistent UN air attacks.
In June enemy light planes made night raids along the UN front lines
and even into the Seoul area. VMF(N)-513 pilots, flying the nightly
combat patrol over Seoul, had several fleeting contacts with these
black-painted raiders. The Marines were unable to close in for the
kill, since the opposing planes were nonmetal and difficult to track
by radar. Soon, however, the VMF(N)-513 pilots had better hunting. On
30 June Captain Edwin B. Long and his radar operator, CWO Robert C.
Buckingham, shot down a black, two-place PO-2 biplane. And on 13 July
Captain Donald L. Fenton destroyed another.[267]
[267] MAG-12 HD, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology, 30 Jun; MAG-12
_HD_, Jul 51, Chronology, 13 Jul.
Despite the Air Force emphasis on interdiction, better close air
support remained a major objective of the 1st MAW. One of the
requirements was a shorter flying distance from air base to combat
area. K-46, the MAG-12 field near Hoengsong, had qualified with respect
to reduced flying time. Maintenance problems caused by the dusty, rocky
runway of this primitive strip led to its abandonment. On 14 July
the squadrons pulled back temporarily to K-1, and on the 26th MAG-12
withdrew its maintenance crews.
The Group’s new field was K-18, a 4,400-foot strip on the east coast
near Kangnung and just south of the 38th Parallel. Situated only 40
miles behind the 1st Marine Division and on the seacoast, the new field
seemed to be ideally located. The runway, reinforced with pierced steel
planking, extended inland from a beach where water-borne supplies could
be delivered, as at K-3.[268]
[268] “Rpt of Visit to Far East by CG, FMFPac, and his staff
during the period 27 August to 12 September 1951,” 17
_ff._
_The Division Back in Action Again_
Political causes had a good deal to do with the renewal of activity for
the 1st Marine Division late in August 1951. Apparently the Communist
armed forces had been given enough time to recuperate from their hard
knocks in May and June. At any rate, the Red delegates walked out on
the truce talks after falsely charging on 22 August that UN planes
had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area by dropping napalm
bombs. Although the Reds were unable to show any credible evidence, the
negotiations came to an abrupt end for the time being.[269]
[269] Berger, _The Korean Knot_, _op. cit._ 144–145.
On the 26th all Marine units received a Division warning that offensive
operations were to be initiated in the immediate future. The effective
strength, of the Division (including the KMCs) had been reported as
1,386 officers and 24,044 enlisted men on 1 August 1951. Attached to
the Division at that time were 165 interpreters and 4,184 Korean CTC
cargadores.
On the 26th the regiments were disposed as follows: the 1st Marines
near Chogutan; the 5th Marines near Inje; the 7th Marines near Yanggu;
and the 1st KMC Regiment at Hangye. Service units and the Division
CP were located along the Hongchon-Hangye road in the vicinity of
Tundong-ni.
The 11th Marines (-), with the 196th FA Battalion, USA, attached,
constituted the 11th Marine Regiment Group, an element of X Corps
artillery. Throughout the training period 2/11 remained under the
control of the 1st Marine Division and 3/11 was attached to the 2d
Infantry Division.
The 5th Marines, 7th Marines, and KMCs were alerted to be prepared
to move up to the combat areas south and west of the Punchbowl on 27
August. The 1st Marines was to remain in Division reserve, and the 11th
Marines reverted to parent control.[270]
[270] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5.
It was only about a five hour motor march from Tundong-ni to the
forward assembly area under normal road and weather conditions. But
recent rains had turned roads into bogs and fordable streams into
torrents. Bridges were weakened by the raging current in the Soyang,
and landslides blocked the road in many places.
The 1st Marine Division was back in action again. But it would have to
fight its first battles against the rain and the mud.
CHAPTER IX
Renewal of the Attack
_Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at First--Supply
Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of Division Attack--The Mounting
Problem of CAS--First Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight
for Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for the “Rock”_
It was to a large extent a new 1st Marine Division on 27 August 1951.
Very few veterans of the Reservoir campaign were left, and even
the Marines of the hard fighting in April and May had been thinned
by casualties and rotation. Whatever the new arrivals lacked in
experience, however, they had made up as far as possible by intensive
and realistic training while the Division was in reserve.
The new Marine zone of action, in the Punchbowl area, was as bleak and
forbidding as any expanse of terrain in Korea. Dominating the Punchbowl
from the north and blocking any movement out of it was YOKE Ridge,
looking somewhat like an alligator on the map (See Map 17). Hill 930
represented the snout. Hill 1000 was the head, and the body extended
eastward through Hills 1026 and 924.
Two smaller hills, 702 and 602, spread off southeast and northeast
respectively to the Soyang River and its unnamed tributary from the
west. On either side of YOKE Ridge were numerous sharp and narrow
ridges. Some of the hills were wooded with enough scrub pine to afford
concealment for outposts and bunkers. Altogether, it was an area
eminently suited to defense.
The defenders were identified by Division G-2 as troops of the 6th
Regiment, 2d Division, II NKPA Corps. Apparently they did not lack
supporting weapons, for 3/7 positions on Hill 680 were hit by an
estimated 200 mortar and artillery rounds during daylight hours of the
30th.
[Illustration: MAP 17
AREA OF 1st MAR DIV
ACTIVITY SEPT 1951
FRONT LINES 30 AUG 51 ON KANSAS
OBJECTIVE LINE HAYS]
_Crossing the Soyang in Flood_
The 7th Marines and KMC Regiment, ordered to relieve U.S. and ROK
Army units on the KANSAS Line, started their march in a downpour on
27 August. The 5th Marines (less 1st Battalion) at Inje had orders to
follow the 7th up the narrow Soyang valley.
Typical of the wet weather difficulties were those experienced by 3/7.
Scheduled to depart early for the forward positions, the companies
struck tents. Trucks failed to arrive and they remained to eat the noon
meal, a gustatorial bonus of all food the galley crew could not carry
with them. Unfortunately, the trucks were delayed further and the men
shivered in the rain as they ate an evening meal of “C” rations.
When the vehicles finally arrived at 2100 the rain had reached
torrential proportions. Progress was so slow over muddy roads that
it took until 0330 on the 28th to reach the CP of the 7th Marines at
Sohwari (Map 18), just southeast of the junction of the Soyang and a
tributary from the east.
The bivouac area assigned to 3/7 for the night proved to be a foot deep
in water, and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly directed his men to catch what
sleep they could in the trucks while he and his staff attempted to
straighten out the snarled traffic situation.[271]
[271] Sources are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5; Col B. T.
Kelly’s contemporary “Notes on my Service in Korea, 14
Apr-13 Sep 1951” (hereafter Kelly, _Notes_).
It took the rest of the night for the 3/7 officers to walk the length
of the convoy, cutting out trucks with less essential cargo. With
only a small space available for a turn-around, the 3/7 vehicles were
ordered to back into it, unload their troops and equipment, and return
along a narrow road, which had been churned into a quagmire.
The battalion assembly area was on the other side of the rain-swollen
Soyang. How Company and the command group managed to cross over a
waist-deep ford, but the crossing was so perilous that DUKWs were
requested for the other two rifle companies. Lieutenant Colonel Louis
C. Griffin’s 2/7 also found the river crossing an operation requiring
DUKWs. By the afternoon of the 29th all elements of the two 7th Marine
battalions were on the west bank, occupying their assigned assembly
areas.
The relief proceeded slowly. Two KMC battalions on the left of the
7th Marines took over the zone formerly held by elements of the 2d
Infantry Division and the 8th ROK Division. The cosmopolitan character
of the Eighth Army was revealed when 2/KMC relieved the French
Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Linguistic chaos was averted
only by the best efforts of the exhausted interpreters.
By the 30th, the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions were behind the line of
departure on Hill 755, ready to attack in the morning. The 2d Battalion
assumed responsibility for the regimental zone on the KANSAS Line.
The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines had meanwhile completed the
relief of elements of the 8th ROK Division. On the other side of the
river Lieutenant Colonel James G. Kelly’s 1/7 had relieved units of the
ROK division on the hill mass a mile and a half north of Tonpyong (Map
17). These Marines were first to come under fire as the enemy sent over
a few mortar rounds after dark on the 29th.
Division OpnO 22-51 directed the two assault regiments, the 7th Marines
and KMCs, to attack at 0600 the following morning and seize their
assigned positions on Corps Objective YOKE, the ridgeline running from
Hill 930 on the west through Hills 1026 and 924 on the east (Map 17).
Objective 1, the hill mass 1½ miles northeast of Tonpyong, was already
occupied by 1/7.
The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was ordered to seize Objective 2,
generally that part of YOKE Ridge east of Hill 924. The KMC Regiment
was assigned Objective 3, consisting of Hills 924 and 1026.
Other 1st Marine Division units had the following missions on 31 August:
_5th Marines_--to patrol the Division zone along the KANSAS Line
and protect defensive installations;
_1st Marines_--to remain in the rear in the Hongchon area in X
Corps reserve;
_1st Tank Battalion_--to move up in readiness to support the
assault regiments;
_Division Reconnaissance Company_--to continue to patrol the
Punchbowl and mop up bypassed enemy.
Land mines were a constant menace to troop movements as the assault
regiments adjusted positions in preparation for the attack. As usual,
neglected “friendly” mines were encountered as well as those planted by
the enemy.[272]
[272] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based
on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep
51; 2/7 and 3/7 _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; Kelly, _Notes_; Col
G. P. Groves, ltr of 8 Apr 58.
[Illustration: X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION
SEPTEMBER 51
FRONT LINES ON 20 SEPT 51 WERE GENERALLY ALONG HAYS LINE
MAP 18]
POW information and air reports indicated a southward movement of two
to three enemy regiments with artillery and supplies. Prisoners stated
that an attack was due on 1 September, leading to the G-2 conjecture
that the enemy’s Sixth Phase Offensive might be about to start.
_Light Resistance at First_
Priority of air support on 31 August was assigned to the two KMC
battalions. They jumped off in column against light to moderate
resistance, with Hill 924 as their first objective. Mine fields gave
the KMCs more trouble at first than scattered NKPA mortar and machine
gun fire. Forward movement and maneuver were restricted as 1/KMC
passed through 3/KMC at 1445 to continue the attack against stiffening
resistance.
On the right 3/7 also encountered light resistance in the morning which
increased as the assault troops neared the objective. The slopes of
Hill 702 proved to be heavily mined, and forward elements of 3/7 were
hit by a concentration of mortar and artillery fire.
East of the river, on the regimental right flank, where Objective 1 had
been occupied without a fight, 1/7 supported the attack of 3/7 with
mortar fire. Both 3/7 and the KMCs were within 1,000 yards of their
objectives late in the afternoon when a halt was called for the day.
Casualties had been light, thanks in large measure to excellent air and
artillery support.
When the attack was resumed on 1 September, 3/KMC moved through
positions of 3/7 to reach a ridgeline on the flank of the regimental
objective. While 3/KMC advanced from the northeast, 1/KMC closed in
from the southeast. Both battalions took heavy losses from enemy mines
and mortars as well as machine guns and automatic weapons fired from
hidden bunkers. The converging attack made slow but steady progress,
however, until one company of 3/KMC drove within 200 meters of the
top of Hill 924 at 1700. Even so, it took four more hours of hard
fighting to secure the objective. That evening 2/KMC was relieved of
its defensive responsibility along the KANSAS Line by 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, enabling the KMC battalion to join in the attack.
Throughout the day 3/7 slugged it out in the vicinity of 702 with an
NKPA battalion. Four counterattacks were launched from Hill 602, the
northeastern fork of YOKE Ridge. More than 500 men were employed in
this effort, some of them penetrating briefly into 3/7 positions. Two
air strikes, called by patrols of 1/7 from across the river, helped to
break up the main NKPA attack, and the 11th Marines (Colonel Custis
Burton, Jr.), poured in a deadly concentration of artillery fire.
Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly’s battalion continued to be engaged
until dusk.
The tenacity of the NKPA defense was demonstrated at the expense of
the KMCs when they were driven from the top of Hill 924 by a surprise
enemy counterattack at midnight. The Korean Marines came back strongly
at daybreak and a terrific fight ensued before the North Koreans were
in turn evicted shortly before noon. As a measure of the artillery
assistance rendered, Major Gordon R. Worthington’s 1st Battalion,
11th Marines, fired 1,682 rounds of 105 ammunition in support of the
KMC’s during the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 2 September. During the
same period Lieutenant Colonel William McReynold’s 3/11 fired 1,400
rounds in support of 3/7. The other battalions of the Marine artillery
regiment, reinforced by the 196th, 937th, and 780th Field Artillery
Battalions, USA, brought the number of rounds to a grand total of 8,400
for this 24-hour period.
After the securing of Hill 924, the 2d Battalion of the KMC Regiment
passed through the 1st and 3d Battalions to spearpoint the attack
west toward Hill 1026. In the zone of 3/7, an NKPA counterattack was
repulsed at 0700 on 2 September. Two hours later George Company,
supported by How Company with mortar and machine gun fire, moved out to
resume the attack on Hill 602. Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly ordered
his battalion heavy machine guns set up in battery to deliver overhead
supporting fires.
In slightly less than two hours the Marines of 3/7 swept the crest
of Hill 602, securing Division Objective 2. Three company-size enemy
counterattacks were repulsed before the North Koreans withdrew to the
north at 1500.
The 2d KMC Battalion fought its way to a point within 800 yards of Hill
1026 before dusk. So aggressive and persistent was the NKPA defense
that several light enemy probing attacks were launched during the night
of 2–3 September, not only against forward Marine elements but also
against the 5th Marines units on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear.
The front was where you found it.
While 3/7 constructed emplacements and obstacles on Hill 602, the KMCs
continued their attack on the morning of 3 September toward Hill 1026.
With the extending of the 7th Marines zone to the left to decrease the
width of the KMC front, 2/7 was brought up from regimental reserve to
help cover a new sector that included Hill 924.
The attack led by 2/KMC collided with a large-scale enemy
counterattack. It was nip and tuck for 3½ hours before the North
Koreans broke, but, by midmorning, the KMCs were in possession of
Division Objective 3 and consolidating for defense. They were not a
moment too soon in these preparations, for the enemy counterattacked at
1230 and put up a hot fight for two hours before retiring.
This action completed the battle for Corps Objective YOKE. At 1800 on
3 September, the 1st Marine Division was in full possession of the
HAYS Line, dominating the entire northern rim of the Punchbowl (Map
18). Reports from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and 5th ROK Division,
attacking in sectors to the west, indicated that the pressure exerted
by the Marines was assisting these units. Large gains had been made on
the west side of the Punchbowl against comparatively light resistance.
On 4 September, with all objectives consolidated, 1st Marine Division
units patrolled northward from defensive positions. Plans were being
formed for the second phase of the Division attack--the advance to
seize the next series of commanding ridgelines, 4,000 to 7,000 yards
forward of the present MLR.
The victory in the four-day battle had not been bought cheaply. A total
of 109 Marine KIA and 494 WIA (including KMCs) was reported. NKPA
casualties for the period were 656 counted KIA and 40 prisoners.
As evidence that the enemy had profited by the breathing spell during
the Kaesong truce talks, it was estimated that NKPA artillery fire in
the Punchbowl sector almost equalled the firepower provided by the
organic Marine artillery and the guns of attached U.S. Army units. NKPA
strength in mortars and machine guns also compared favorably with that
of Marines.
_Supply Problems Cause Delay_
Logistical shortages made it necessary for the 1st Marine Division to
call a six-day halt and build up a new reserve of artillery and mortar
ammunition.
During the first phase of the Division attack, the main burden of
transport and supply had fallen upon three Marine units--the 1st
Ordnance Battalion (Major Harold C. Borth), the 1st Motor Transport
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman), and the 7th
Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Cagle). The
extraordinary expenditure of artillery shells for these four days posed
a resupply problem that was aggravated by an almost impassable supply
route. The three Marine battalions had to strain every resource to meet
minimal requirements.
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, a U.S. Army installation manned
by elements of the Marine 1st Ordnance Battalion, was located about
five miles behind the gun positions. From this dump it was 48 miles
to Hongchon, the source of supplies for ASP 60-B. A well maintained,
two-lane dirt road led from that base to Inje, but northward it
deteriorated into a narrow, twisting trail following the Soyang valley.
Recent rains, resulting in earth slides and mudholes, had reduced the
road to such a condition that the round trip between ASP 60-B and
Hongchon took 25 hours.[273]
[273] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 7.
As an added complication, it was necessary to build up a 10-day reserve
of ammunition at ASP 60-B so that Division transport would be available
for lifting 2,000 rotated troops to Chunchon some time between 3 and
15 September. This meant that 50 to 60 Marine trucks must be employed
daily to haul ammunition, with the result of a drastic shortage of
motor transport for other purposes.
Only human transport was available for supplying Marines on the firing
line. X Corps started the month of September with 20,070 Korean Service
Corps, the successor to CTC, and civilian contract laborers--the
equivalent in numbers of a U.S. Army infantry division. Even so, 14
air drops were necessary during the month, only one of which went to a
Marine unit. This took place on 1 September, when 20 Air Force cargo
planes from Japan dropped ammunition and rations to the KMCs. A 90
percent recovery was reported.[274]
[274] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 41–42; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51,
5–6.
It generally took a full day in the 1st Marine Division zone during
the first week of September for a cargador to complete the trip from
a battalion supply point to the front lines and return. This made it
necessary to assign from 150 to 250 Korean laborers to each infantry
battalion. And as the Marines advanced farther into the rugged Korean
highlands, the logistic problem was increased.
_Resumption of Division Attack_
Enemy groups moving southward into the zone of the 1st Marine
Division during the six-day lull were sighted by air observation. POW
interrogations and other G-2 sources established that the 2d NKPA
Division, II Corps, had been relieved by the 1st NKPA Division, III
Corps. Accurate 76mm fire from well-hidden guns was received by the
Marines throughout the interlude, and patrols ran into brisk mortar
fire when they approached too near to enemy bunkers on Hill 673.
For the second time, during the night of 4–5 September, 5th Marines
units were assailed on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear of the
7th Marines troops similarly deployed along the HAYS Line. Yet a
large 7th Marines patrol ranged forward some 2,000 yards the next
day without enemy contacts. A like result was reported by a patrol
representing almost the entire strength of the Division Reconnaissance
Company (Major Robert L. Autry) after it scoured the area north of the
Punchbowl.[275]
[275] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based
on the following sources: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 38–53;
X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51,
8–14; 7th Mar _HD_, Sep 51; 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns of 7th
Mar, _HD_s for Sep 51.
1st Marine Division OpnO 23-51, issued on the morning of 9 September,
called for the 7th Marines to jump off at 0300 on the 11th and attack
Objectives ABLE and BAKER--Hills 673 and 749 respectively--white
maintaining contact with the 8th ROK Division on the right. Other
Division units were given these missions:
_1st Marines_--to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon
to Division control; to be prepared to pass through the 7th
Marines, when that regiment secured its objectives, and
continue the attack to seize Objective CHARLIE, the ridgeline
leading northwest from Hill 1052.
_5th Marines_--to maintain one company on KANSAS line while
occupying positions in Division reserve along HAYS Line in rear
of 7th Marines.
_KMC Regiment_--to patrol aggressively on Division left to exert
pressure on enemy defenses south and southeast of Objective
CHARLIE.
_11th Marines_--to displace forward to support attack of the 7th
Marines.
_Division Reconnaissance Company_--to patrol northward in the
Soyang valley as far as Hwanggi to deny the enemy this area.
The area ahead of the 7th Marines was ideal for defense. From YOKE
Ridge the assault troops had to descend into a narrow valley formed
by a small tributary of the Soyang-gang, cross the stream, and climb
Kanmubong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of terrain
was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 980, and 1052 (Map
17). Thus the attack of the 7th Marines had as its primary purpose
the securing of initial objectives on Kanmubong Ridge that would give
access to the main NKPA defense line, some 4,000 yards to the north.
The 7th Marines was to seize the eastern tip (Objective ABLE) of this
commanding terrain feature and “run the ridge” to Hill 749, Objective
BAKER. While Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin’s 2/7 maintained its
patrolling activities on the left, tied in with the KMCs, Lieutenant
Colonel B. T. Kelly’s 3/7 in the center and Lieutenant Colonel J. G.
Kelly’s 1/7 on the right were to attack.
As an intermediate regimental objective on the way to Kanmubong Ridge,
the 680-meter hill directly north of B. T. Kelly’s position on Hill 602
was assigned to his battalion. He ordered How Company to move forward
under cover of darkness and be prepared to attack at dawn. Rain and
poor visibility delayed the attempt until surprise was lost, and after
a fierce fire fight How Company was stopped halfway up the southeast
spur.
In order to relieve the pressure, the battalion commander directed Item
Company to attack on the left up the southwest spur. This maneuver
enabled How Company to inch forward under heavy mortar and machine gun
fire to a point with 50 yards of the topographical crest. Item Company
became confused in the “fog of war” and finally wound up on How’s spur
at 1245.
Twice the two companies made a combined assault after artillery and
mortar preparation and air strikes with napalm, rocket, and strafing
fire. Both times the North Koreans swarmed out of their bunkers to
drive the Marines halfway back to the original jump off line. It was
anybody’s fight when the two battered companies dug in at dusk.
Across the valley to the east, J. G. Kelly’s 1/7 had no better fortune
in its attack on Hill 673. Heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire kept
the assault troops pinned down until they consolidated for the night.
With both attacking battalions in trouble, Colonel Nickerson ordered
2/7 to advance up the narrow valley separating them. His plan called
for the reserve battalion to move under cover of darkness around the
left flank of 1/7 and into a position behind the enemy before wheeling
to the northeast to trap the North Koreans defending Hill 673.
The maneuver succeeded brilliantly. Griffin’s troops were undetected as
they filed northward during the night, making every effort to maintain
silence. By daybreak on 12 September 2/7 had two platoons in position
behind the enemy to lead the attack.[276]
[276] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58.
The assault exploded with complete surprise as 2/7 swept to the crest
of Hill 673 against confused and ineffectual opposition. Griffin’s
battalion and 1/7 had the enemy between them, but the jaws of the trap
could not close in time because of NKPA mine fields. Thus 1/7 continued
to be held up on the forward approaches to Hill 673 by NKPA mortar
and small-arms fire. Grenades were the most effective weapons as J.
G. Kelly’s men slugged their way to the summit at 1415 while 2/7 was
attacking Objective BAKER, Hill 749.
On the other side of the valley, 3/7 had seized its initial objective.
While How and Item Companies attacked up the southeast spur, where they
had been stopped the day before, George Company launched a surprise
assault up the southwest spur. This was the blow that broke the enemy’s
will to resist. George Company knocked out seven active enemy bunkers,
one by one, thus taking the pressure off the troops on the other spur.
At 1028 all three companies met on the summit.
The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, radioed that Objective BAKER had
been secured at 1710 after a hard fight, but this report proved to
be premature. Enough NKPA troops to give the Marines a good deal of
trouble were still holding the wooded slopes of Hill 749, and it would
take the attack of a fresh battalion to dislodge them. Along the
ridgeline from Hill 673 to Hill 749, an undetermined number of enemy
soldiers had been caught between 2/7 and 1/7, and events were to prove
that they would resist as long as a man remained alive.
Casualties of the 1st Marine Division on 11 and 12 September were 22
KIA and 245 WIA, nearly all of them being suffered by the assault
regiment. Enemy losses included 30 counted KIA and 22 prisoners.
_The Mounting Problem of CAS_
With the Division in reserve from 15 July until the latter part of
August, close air support (CAS) was not a vital problem; however,
upon return to the Punchbowl area the situation became serious. The
difficulties arose from the time lag between the request for air
support to the time the planes arrived over target. The 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing operating under the control of the Fifth Air Force was
busily employed on interdiction missions. On 30 August, a tactical air
observer, spotting what appeared to be a division of NKPA troops moving
toward the Marines, hurriedly flashed back a request for a multi-plane
strike. The enemy troops were beyond artillery range, but they were
bunched up--a good target for a concentrated air strike. It was more
than three hours later that four fighter bombers arrived on the scene;
by that time, the enemy formation had dispersed and the desired number
of casualties could not be inflicted.[277]
[277] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1)
“Observations on Close Air Support for the 1st Marine
Division during 5–23 September 1951.”
The reason for this lack of timely air support was apparent. Most
of the UN air power was being funneled into Operation STRANGLE, the
interdiction operation designed to cut off the enemy’s vehicular and
rail traffic in the narrow waist of North Korea. With the emphasis on
air interdiction, close air support sorties were limited to only 96 per
day for the entire Eighth Army.[278] The 1st Marine Division received
only a proportionate share.
[278] _PacFlt interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv
_SAR_, Jun 51.
Marine close air support was needed because of the enemy’s determined
resistance to the Division’s attack. The Reds hurled frequent night
counterattacks and pounded the Marine positions with artillery and
mortars hidden in the precipitous Punchbowl area. At one time it was
estimated that the enemy was using 92 pieces of artillery. The Marines
had only 72 field pieces, but in one 24-hour period they expended more
than 11,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on a 6,000-yard frontage.
The enemy emplacements, hewn out of solid rock, were hard to knock out.
To support the hard-working infantrymen, Marine Aircraft Group 12
(MAG-12) had moved VMF-214 and VMF-312 from the Pusan area to K-18,
an airfield on the east coast at Kangnung. By moving closer to the
Division area, planes were able to extend their time over the target
area and render more effective support to the infantry. Also, Marine
Air Support Radar Team One (MASRT-1) was sent to Korea and established
positions to support the Division. Using its support radar the team
began to evaluate its capability of guiding unseen fighter-bombers at
night or under conditions of poor visibility.[279]
[279] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–18; Chap. 10,
10–12, Chap. 15, 15–20, 60–61; Gen G. C. Thomas interv,
21 Jan 59.
Even though the Corsairs at K-18 were less than 50 miles from the 1st
Marine Division, very few were available to the Marines. Operation
STRANGLE, in full swing, was not achieving the desired results. Since
sightings of enemy vehicles were increasing, more and more Marine and
Navy air sorties were channeled into interdiction. During 18 days of
rugged fighting from 3 to 21 September, forward air controllers made
182 tactical air requests. Fighter-bombers were provided on 127 of
these requests; however, in only 24 instances did the planes arrive
when needed. The average delay time in getting CAS in response to
requests during September was slightly less than two hours, but in 49
cases the planes were more than two hours late.[280] As a consequence,
General Thomas reported, many of the 1,621 casualties suffered by the
1st Marine Division during the hard fighting in September were due
to inadequate close air support. Furthermore, he said, the tactical
capabilities of his battalions were strongly restricted.
[280] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–14.
During the planning of attacks, infantry commanders almost always
desired and requested close air support. It was also desirable to have
planes on station overhead should an immediate CAS need arise, for the
lack of an air strike when needed could jeopardize success. However,
with restricted availability of CAS planes due to participation in
STRANGLE, many times desired air cover was not to be had. Attacks under
those circumstances were often costly.
_First Helicopter Supply Operation of History_
The relief of the three battalions of the 7th Marines by their
corresponding numbers of Colonel Thomas A. Wornham’s 1st Marines took
place during the night of 12–13 September. By daybreak 3/1 and 1/1
had assumed responsibility for the zones of 3/7 and 1/7, which were
on their way to Division reserve at Wontong-ni at the junction of the
Inje and Kansong roads. In the center, however, 2/1 could not complete
the relief of 2/7. Not only was that battalion engaged most of the day
with the enemy, but the units were separated--one company south of Hill
749 being unable to join the other two companies on separate spurs
northwest of that height. All three were under persistent NKPA mortar
and 76mm fire.[281]
[281] Sources for this section are as follows: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_,
Sep 51, 35–53; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Sep 51, 10–16; 1st Marines _HD_, Sep 51; 1/1, 2/1,
and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51; Class “C” Rpt, _Employment of
Assault Helicopters_, 1–6; Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the
Sky_ (New York, 1954), 159–162, (hereafter _Cavalry of
the Sky_).
The attack of the 1st Marines, originally scheduled for 0500 on 13
September, had been changed to 0900 by Division orders. One reason
for the postponement was the serious shortage of ammunition and other
supplies after the urgent demands of the last two days. Another reason
was the inability of VMO-6 helicopters, lifting two wounded men at
most, to cope with the mounting casualty lists. Enemy interdiction
of roads added in several instances to the complications of a major
logistical problem, particularly in the zone of Lieutenant Colonel
Franklin B. Nihart’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.
The hour had struck for HMR-161, and the world’s first large-scale
helicopter supply operation in a combat zone would soon be under way.
It was not the development of a day. On the contrary, its roots went
all the way back to 1945, when the atomic bomb of Hiroshima rendered
obsolescent in 10 seconds a system of amphibious assault tactics that
had been 10 years in the making. Obviously, the concentrations of
transports, warships, and aircraft carriers that had made possible the
Saipan and Iwo Jima landings would be sitting ducks for an enemy armed
with atomic weapons.
The problem was left on the doorstep of the Marine Corps Schools, which
had reared the Fleet Marine Force from infancy to maturity during the
1930’s. A Special Board and Secretariat were appointed for studies.
They assigned two general missions to Marine Helicopter Experimental
Squadron 1 (HMX-1), organized late in 1947 before the first rotary-wing
aircraft had been delivered. These missions were:
(1) Develop techniques and tactics in connection with the
movement of assault troops by helicopter in amphibious operations;
(2) Evaluate a small helicopter as a replacement for the present
OY type aircraft to be used for gunfire spotting, observation,
and liaison missions in connection with amphibious operation.[282]
[282] CMC ltr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47.
The second mission resulted in the small Sikorsky and Bell helicopters
of VMO-6 which landed in Korea with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
in August 1950. Although it was originally believed that rotary wing
aircraft might replace the OYs, combat experience soon demonstrated
that the best results were obtained by retaining both types in fairly
equal numbers.
Landing exercises under simulated combat conditions were conducted
by HMX-1 in fulfillment of the first mission. At first the squadron
had only three-place helicopters. Later, when the usefulness of the
helicopter was fully realized, even the new 10-place “choppers” were
never available in sufficient numbers. The capacity designations of
these machines, however, were more ideal than real, for the helicopters
could lift only four to six men in addition to the pilot, copilot,
and crewman. Despite such drawbacks, HMX-1 developed tactical and
logistical techniques for helicopter landings to be made from widely
dispersed carriers against an enemy using atomic weapons.
Belated deliveries of aircraft delayed the commissioning of the world’s
first transport helicopter squadron, HMR-161, until 15 January 1951
at El Toro. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring was designated the
commanding officer and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell the
executive officer.
Nearly three months passed before the first three transport
helicopters arrived. The squadron was gradually built up to a
strength of 43 officers and 244 enlisted men with a full complement
of 15 HRS-1 helicopters. These Sikorsky aircraft, designed to
Marine specifications, were simply an enlarged three-place HO3S in
configuration, with a similar main rotor and vertical tail rotor. About
62 feet long with maximum extension of rotor blades, the HRS-1 was
11½ feet wide with the blades folded. Following are some of the other
statistics:
Gross weight at sea level, 7,000 pounds; cruising speed, 60 knots;
payload at sea level, 1,420 pounds; troop-lifting capacity, four to
six men with full combat equipment or three to five casualties in
litters.[283] Capabilities varied, of course, according to such factors
as altitude, temperature, and pilot experience.
[283] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 157.
Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 arrived in Korea on the last
day of August, and by the 10th of September it had moved up to the
front, sharing Airfield X-83 (see Map 18) with VMO-6.[284] The 11th
was devoted to reconnaissance flights in search of landing sites, and
on the 12th the transport squadron was ready for its first combat
mission. A new means of logistical and tactical support that was to
revolutionize operations and create front page headlines had arrived in
Korea.
[284] Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an “X” designation and
fields in the “K” category were major installations.
Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated
“A.”
Prior to the squadron’s arrival, the Division chief of staff, Colonel
Victor H. Krulak, had held numerous planning conferences with Division
staff officers, and preparations for the employment of HMR-161 had
made noteworthy progress. Then General Thomas ordered executed the
first operation of the squadron under combat conditions, and the major
logistical problem of moving supplies and evacuating casualties was
well on the way to being solved. At 1600 on 13 September 1951--a date
that would have historical significance--Operation WINDMILL I was set
in motion.
Lieutenant Colonel Herring had attended the final planning conference
at Division headquarters at 0830 on the 13th, and he was told that the
operation would involve a lift of one day’s supplies to 2/1 over a
distance of seven miles. The commanding officer of 2/1 was to select
suitable landing points and the commanding officer of 1st Shore Party
Battalion had the responsibility of providing support teams to operate
at the embarkation and landing points.[285]
[285] LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61.
Only two days had been available for training and rehearsals, but not
a minute was wasted. All morning on the 13th the embarkation point
section separated the supplies into balanced loads of about 800 pounds
per helicopter. Loading commenced at 1520. Half an hour later, seven
aircraft were ready to depart while four others went ahead to carry the
landing point section to the previously reconnoitered site.
The route followed the valleys as much as possible, so that the
helicopters were in defilade most of the way. Smoke was laid down by
the 11th Marines for concealment.
The landing point section managed in 20 minutes to clear an area of
20 × 40 feet (later enlarged to 100 × 100 feet) and mark it with
fluorescent panels. At 1610 the first HRS-1 hovered with cargo nets
suspended from a hook released by manual control. A few minutes later
it took off with five walking wounded and two litter cases.
Each helicopter carried out as many casualties as possible, depending
on the amount of gasoline in the fuel tanks. Only 30 minutes passed
from the time one Marine was wounded and the time of his arrival at a
hospital clearing station 17 miles behind the firing line.
Radio provided communications between helicopters in flight, HMR-161
headquarters, 2/1 CP, and the Shore Party team at the landing site.
Fifteen aircraft were employed for one hour, three for two hours, and
one for two hours and 45 minutes--a total of 28 flights in over-all
time of 2½ hours. The helicopters landed at intervals of two minutes
and took off as soon as the landing point section could put the
casualties aboard. And though an altitude of 2,100 feet restricted
loads, 18,848 pounds of cargo had been lifted into the area and 74
casualties evacuated when the last “chopper” returned to X-83 at 1840.
To even the most pessimistic observer Operation WINDMILL I was a
complete success, so successful that a similar operation, WINDMILL II
was conducted on the 19th. Two days later the first helicopter lift of
combat troops was completed. A new era of military transport had dawned.
_The Fight for Hill 749_
Although 2/1 alone had 240 Korean cargadores attached, the 7½ tons of
helicopter-borne supplies, largely ammunition, were vitally needed
by the two assault battalions of the 1st Marines. After relieving
Fox Company of 2/7 south of Hill 749 at 1100 on the 13th, Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart’s 2/1 jumped off to the attack an hour later. Stiff
opposition was encountered from the beginning. The relief of the
remaining two companies of 2/7 was complicated by the fact that they
were some 400 yards from the position reported, on the reverse slope of
Hill 749. Throughout the day these Marines were heavily engaged with
the enemy.[286]
[286] Sources for this section are the same as for the previous
section except when otherwise noted.
On the left of 2/1, the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La
Hue) could not make much progress toward its regimental objective, Hill
751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749. A second attack of 2/1
at 1500 drove to the summit of that height after fierce fighting with
small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. There was still much
fighting to be done before the entire objective would be secured since
many enemy bunkers hidden among the trees remained to be neutralized.
At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7
companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took
until 2025 for Nihart’s men to complete the relief after fighting for
every foot of ground.
Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the
fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because
of the danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant
Colonel Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds
and Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly
H. Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six
enemy bunkers. The 4.2″ mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 28 WP
rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing mine fields.
Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night,
and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300
enemy. Colonel Wornham’s regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14
September. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward
against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and
automatic weapons fire.
NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749,
where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took
constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling
3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat
trajectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were
directed against NKPA bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029
rounds.
The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 48
hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action took
a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The principal
fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of
Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a heavy
artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was
stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery
coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. The
assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th
Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective BAKER yet
remained to be secured.
The Marines could not help paying reluctant tribute to the skill as
well as obstinacy of the NKPA defense. Enemy bunkers were so stoutly
constructed that the North Koreans did not hesitate to direct well
aimed mortar fire on their own positions when the Marines closed in for
the final attack.
NKPA fields of fire were laid out for the utmost effect. Marines with
recent memories of college football referred to the enemy’s effective
use of terrain as the “North Korean T Formation.” On Hill 749, for
example, the main ridgeline leading to the summit was crossed by
another wooded ridgeline at right angles. Attackers fighting their way
up the leg of the “T” came under deadly crossfire from the head of the
imaginary letter--a transverse ridgeline bristling with mortars and
machine guns positioned in bunkers.
In accordance with Division OpnO 25-51, the 5th Marines (Colonel
Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on 15 September in
preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the attack.
The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in turn would relieve 1/1 (Major Edgar
F. Carney, Jr.), so that it could pass through 2/1 and carry on the
assault to complete the securing of Hill 749.
The KMCs and Division Recon Company were to relieve the 5th Marines of
responsibility for the HAYS Line, while the 7th Marines remained in
reserve at Wontong-ni.
The comparative quiet of the 15th was shattered a minute after midnight
when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 2/1 off Hill
749. The NKPA hurricane barrage that preceded the attempt, according
to the Division report, “reached an intensity that was estimated to
surpass that of any barrage yet encountered by the 1st Marine Division
in Korea.”[287]
[287] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–20.
The thinned companies of 2/1 took a frightful pounding from 76mm,
105mm, and 122mm artillery supplemented by 82mm and 120mm mortars.
Bugles and whistles were the signal for the onslaught. It was stopped
by weary Marines who demonstrated at NKPA expense that they, too, could
put up a resolute defensive fight.
Wave after wave of attackers dashed itself at the thinned Marine
platoons, only to shatter against a resistance that could be bent
but not broken. The fight was noteworthy for examples of individual
valor. When one of the forward Marine platoons was compelled to give
ground slowly, Corporal Joseph Vittori of Fox Company rushed through
the withdrawing troops to lead a successful local counterattack. As
the all-night fight continued, “he leaped from one foxhole to another,
covering each foxhole in turn as casualties continued to mount, manning
a machine gun when the gunner was struck down and making repeated trips
through the heaviest shell fire to replenish ammunition.”[288]
[288] Jane Blakeney, ed., _Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps,
1861–1955_ (Washington, 1957), Joseph Vittori Medal of
Honor Citation, 45.
Vittori was mortally wounded during the last few minutes of the
fight, thus becoming the second Marine of 2/1 within a 48-hour period
to win the Medal of Honor. His predecessor was Pfc Edward Gomez of
Easy Company. When an enemy grenade landed in the midst of his squad
on 14 September, he “unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and,
diving into the ditch with the deadly missile, absorbed the shattering
violence of the explosion in his own body.”[289]
[289] _Ibid._, Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38.
Not until 0400 on the 16th did the enemy waves of attack subside on
Hill 749. NKPA strength was estimated at a regiment. A combined assault
by an estimated 150 enemy on 3/1 positions to the west in the vicinity
of Hill 751 was repulsed shortly after midnight, as were three lesser
efforts during the early morning hours of the 16th.
When the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved out at 0830 to pass through
2/1 and continue the fight, it was the first day of command for
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.[290] The passage of lines was slowed
by enemy mortar fire, and NKPA resistance stiffened as 1/1 attacked
along the ridgeline leading toward Hill 749. At 1800, after a hard
day’s fighting, Objective BAKER was occupied and defensive positions
were organized for the night.
[290] On 14 September, LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr., the previous
commanding officer of 1/1, was severely wounded while
reconnoitering forward positions. He was evacuated,
and the executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr.,
commanded until LtCol John E. Gorman assumed command at
noon on the 16th.
Thus was the attack of the 1st Marines terminated. Around Hill 751, 3/1
remained in control. The regiment’s other two battalions, 1/1 and 2/1,
held a defensive line about 1,500 yards long on both sides of Hill 749.
Hill 749 had finally been secured. A number of mutually supporting
hidden enemy bunkers had been knocked out in a ruthless battle of
extermination, and veterans of the World War II Pacific conflict were
reminded of occasions when Japanese resistance flared up in similar
fashion after ground was thought to be secure.
Casualties of the 1st Marine Division during the four-day fight for
Hill 749, most of them suffered by the attacking regiment, were 90 KIA,
714 WIA, and 1 MIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 771 counted
KIA (although more than twice that number were estimated KIA) and 81
prisoners.
_5th Marines Attack Hill 812_
Division OpnO 25-51 assigned the 5th Marines the mission of passing
through 3/1 in the vicinity of Hill 751 and attacking to secure
Objective DOG, the bare, brown hill mass which loomed approximately
1,000 yards ahead. The last few hundred yards were certain to be long
ones, for the main east-west ridgeline leading to Hill 812 was crossed
by a north-south ridgeline--the leg and head of another “T” formation.
Again, as on Hill 749, the attackers had to fight their way through a
vicious crossfire.
Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff’s 2/5 on the right had the main
effort. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Donald R.
Kennedy) was to advance on Stiff’s left with the mission of supporting
his attack on Objective DOG, prepared to seize Hill 980 on order.
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston’s 1/5 remained in regimental
reserve.[291]
[291] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified are
as follows: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–23; 5thMar _HD_,
Sep 51, 14–19; 1st, 2d, and 3dBn, 5th Mar, _HD_, Sep
51; LtCol Houston Stiff, interv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P.
Averill, “Final Objective,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, vol.
40, no. 8 (Aug 56), 10–16.
Fox Company spearheaded the 2/5 attack by moving initially up the low
ground between Hill 673 on the right hand and 680 on the left. Owing to
delays in completing the relief of 1st Marines elements, it was early
afternoon on 16 September before the assault got underway. Progress was
slow against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, and a halt came at 1700
for regrouping and evacuation of casualties.
Dog Company, in support on the ridge to the left, sighted troops
approaching the objective and requested that the positions of the
assault company be identified. In order to pinpoint the locations,
a white phosphorous grenade was used as a mark. It attracted the
attention of aircraft summoned by 3/5 against Hill 980 (Map 17), from
which fire had been received. The planes, assuming that another target
had been designated, attacked the forward platoons of Fox Company with
napalm and machine guns. By a miracle, recognition panels were put out
before a single casualty resulted, but the men found it a harrowing
experience.
Darkness fell before the attack could be resumed, and Fox Company
pulled back along the ridgeline to set up a perimeter defense and
evacuate the wounded. The night passed without enemy action. Bright
moonlight made for unusual visibility which discouraged enemy attacks
and permitted the Marine assault platoons more sleep than might
otherwise have been expected.
Regimental orders called for 2/5 to resume the attack at 0400 on the
17th, supported by the fires of 3/5, while 1/5 continued in reserve.
Fox Company of 2/5 had some difficulty in orienting itself after the
confusion of the night before and was delayed until 0700 in jumping
off. This proved to be a stroke of luck, for dawn gave the Marines a
good view of unsuspecting enemy troops eating breakfast and making
ready for the day’s fighting. Fox Company called artillery on them with
good effect.
Surprise gave the attack an opening advantage and rapid progress was
made at first along the main ridgeline leading west to Hill 812. Then
Fox Company was stopped by the crossfire from the head of the “T.” Easy
Company passed through at 0830 to continue the assault, reinforced by a
platoon of Fox Company that had become Separated from its parent unit,
although it kept in touch by radio.
An air strike was called but did not materialize. After waiting for
it in vain, Easy Company drove toward the summit with the support of
artillery and mortars.
Two hours after passing through Fox Company, the attackers had advanced
only about a hundred yards against the NKPA crossfire. At 1100,
Lieutenant Colonel Stiff ordered an all-out drive for the objective,
following a preliminary barrage of everything that could be thrown
at the enemy--artillery, 75mm recoilless, rockets, and 81mm and 4.2″
mortars. As soon as the bombardment lifted, Easy Company was to drive
straight ahead along the ridgeline while the 2d Platoon of Fox Company
made a flank attack.
This maneuver turned the trick. The blow on the flank took the enemy
by surprise, and in just 36 minutes the assault troops were on the
summit after a hard fight at close quarters with automatic weapons and
grenades. Since regimental orders had specified “before nightfall,”
Objective DOG had been seized ahead of schedule.
With scarcely a pause, Easy Company continued along the ridgeline
leading west from Hill 812 toward Hill 980. Remarkably fast progress
was made against an enemy who appeared to be thrown off balance.
Permission was asked to seize Hill 980. The regimental commander
refused because of instructions from Division to the effect that this
position could not be defended while the enemy remained in possession
of Hill 1052, the key terrain feature. Easy Company was directed to
withdraw 600 yards toward Hill 812.
Late in the evening of 17 September, Colonel Weede directed his two
assault battalions to consolidate on the best ground in their present
locations and prepare to hold a defensive line.
When the brakes were put on the attack, 3/5 was strung out over a wide
area to the north of Hill 751. This battalion was not tied in with 2/5,
which occupied positions coordinated for the defense of Hill 812--Easy
Company to the west, on the ridgeline leading to 980; Dog and Weapons
Company to the south, protecting the left flank; and Fox Company to the
east.
Both Easy and Fox Companies were under fire from Hills 980 and 1052,
and daytime movement on 812 was restricted to the northern slope. Even
so, sniping shots from well aimed North Korean 76mm mountain guns
inflicted a number of casualties.
_The Struggle for the “Rock”_
An abrupt change in the enemy’s strategy became evident throughout
these September operations. Where he had previously contented himself
with an elastic defense, every position was now bitterly fought for and
held to the last man. When it was lost, counterattacks were launched in
efforts to regain it.
One of these attempts hit the western outpost of 2/5’s Easy Company at
0430 on 18 September, compelling the Marines to give ground. A second
counterattack at 0840 was repulsed. Enemy fire from Hills 980 and 1042
continued all day long, and Colonel Stiff’s battalion suffered most
of the 16 KIA and 98 WIA casualties reported by the Division for 18
September.
The night of 18–19 September passed in comparative quiet, but at
daylight the enemy on Hills 980 and 1052 was still looking down the
throats of the 2/5 Marines. None of the participants will ever forget
a landmark known simply as “the Rock”--a huge granite knob athwart the
ridgeline approximately 700 yards west of Hill 812. Only 12 feet high,
its location made it visible from afar. The Marines outposted the top
and eastern side, while the enemy held tenaciously to the western side.
Along the northern slope of the ridge leading west to the Rock were the
only positions affording protection to the dug-in forward elements of
the battalion.
The need for fortification materials such as sand bags, barbed wire,
and mines aggravated the already serious supply problems of 2/5.
A request for helicopter support was sent at 1100 on the 19th and
approved immediately by General Thomas. Loading commenced early the
same afternoon, and Operation WINDMILL II was launched. A total of
12,180 pounds were lifted by 10 HRS-1 aircraft in 16 flights during the
overall time of one hour.[292]
[292] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162.
Again, on 19 September, 2/5 incurred most of the casualties reported
by the Division. During the day 1/5, after relieving the 1st and 2d
Battalions of the 1st Marines, moved up on the right of 2/5 to occupy a
defensive line stretching two miles east along the ridge almost to the
Soyang-gang.
NKPA action was confined to incessant long-range fire during the
daylight hours of the 19th, but at 0315 the following morning the
enemy made a desperate effort to retake Hill 812. After a brief but
intense mortar and artillery barrage, North Koreans in at least company
strength came pouring around the northern side of the Rock to attack
with grenades and burp guns at close range. The left platoon of Easy
Company counterattacked but was pushed back by superior numbers to
positions on the left flank of the hill.
The enemy immediately took possession of evacuated ground which enabled
him to fire into the front lines of Easy Company. At 0500 another
Marine counterattack began, with Easy Company making a frontal assault
and the 2d Platoon of Fox Company striking the enemy flank. It was
the same platoon that had delivered the flank attack resulting in the
capture of Hill 812. Again 2/Fox struck the decisive blow with grenades
and automatic weapons. The surprise was too much for enemy troops who
hastened back to their own side of the Rock, leaving 60 counted dead
behind.[293]
[293] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded
during the three-day attack were incurred for the must
part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular.
Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA
(265 counted) and 113 prisoners.
This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three Marine
regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the KMC Regiment
patrolled aggressively on the Division left flank. Three of the four
Division objectives had been secured after savage fights, but Objective
CHARLIE (the ridgeline northwest of Hill 1052 in the KMC zone) had yet
to be attacked when Division OpnO 26-51 put an abrupt stop to offensive
movement.
Not only was the fight west of Hill 812 the last action of the 1st
Marine Division’s nine-day battle; it was the last action of mobility
for Marines in Korea. As time went on, it would become more and more
apparent that 20 September 1951 dated a turning point in the Korean
conflict. On that day the warfare of movement came to an end, and the
warfare of position began.
CHAPTER X
The New Warfare of Position
_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units--Statement by General Van Fleet--Hill
854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884--Helicopter
Operation_ BLACKBIRD--_“To Organize, Construct, and Defend”--Marine
Operations of November 1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_
Two and a half weeks of hard fighting had taken place along the X Corps
front when General James A. Van Fleet paid a visit on 16 September
1951. The commanding general of EUSAK wished to inspect the operations
and determine the morale of the 1st Marine Division and 2d Infantry
Division, both of which had suffered heavy casualties. He found the
morale of these X Corps units good and had no adverse criticisms of
their operations. While on this tour of inspection, however, he issued
the following three directives to X Corps:
(1) That replacements would be integrated into units only when
the battalion or larger-sized unit to which they were assigned
was in reserve;
(2) that certain ‘choke points’ [General Van Fleet pointed
out the locations on the map] be interdicted to prevent enemy
reinforcements or withdrawals through these points;
(3) _that the Corps Commander firm up his line by 20 September
and to plan no further offensives after that date_, as it was
unprofitable to continue the bitter operation.[294]
[294] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47. Other sources for this
chapter are comments and criticisms by the following
officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Marines. Ranks in
each instance are those held at the time of interview or
correspondence.
General J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas,
Lieutenant General J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H.
Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels G. P. Groves,
B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H. Tinsley, F. B.
Nihart, G. D. Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, J. F. Stamm, F. P.
Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. Edwards, J. G.
Kelly; Major R. L. Autry.
[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
20 SEPTEMBER 1951
MAP 19]
Italics have been added to emphasize the importance of 20 September
1951 as the turning point when a warfare of position replaced a warfare
of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in
Korea. There are few dates as important in the entire history of the
war.
General Van Fleet reiterated his instructions on the 18th in a
confirming directive to the effect that X Corps continue making limited
attacks “until 20 September, after which ... units were to firm up the
existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[295]
[295] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 53.
_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units_
At this turning point the Eighth Army had 14 divisions from four corps
committed along a 125-mile front across the peninsula. These units were
distributed (Map 19) as follows:
U.S. I CORPS
_ROK 1st Division_ holding the left anchor in the Munsan-ni area
and controlling the 5th KMC Battalion on the Kimpo Peninsula;
_British 1st Commonwealth Division_ across the river Imjin to the
northeast;
_U.S. 1st Cavalry Division_ (Greek and Thai Battalions attached)
still farther to the northeast in the Yonchon area;
_U.S. 3rd Infantry Division_ (Belgian Battalion and Philippine
20th BCT attached) having the responsibility for the vital
Chorwon area;
U.S. IX CORPS
_U.S. 25th Infantry Division_ (Turkish Brigade attached)
defending the area west of Kumhwa;
_ROK 2d Division_ holding a sector east of Kumhwa;
_U.S. 7th Infantry Division_ (Ethiopian Battalion attached) on
the right;
_ROK 6th Division_ with a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan
River, the Corps boundary;
_U.S. 24th Infantry Division_ (Colombian Battalion attached) in
Corps reserve south of Hwachon;
U.S. X CORPS
_ROK 8th Division_ on the left flank;
_U.S. 2d Infantry Division_ (French and Netherlands Battalions
attached) in left-central portion of Corps front;
_ROK 5th Division_ occupying a narrow sector to the east;
_U.S. 1st Marine Division_ holding eastern portion of the Corps
sector;
ROK I CORPS
_ROK 11th Division_ responsible for left of the Corps front;
_ROK Capitol Division_ holding the line eastward to the Sea of
Japan;
_ROK 3d Division_ in reserve at Yangyang for a period of
training.[296]
[296] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Oct 31, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv _HD_,
Sep 51, 3.
Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps
front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical
sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended its
line eastward to relieve the 8th ROK Division on the extreme right of
the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Division
on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 2d Infantry
Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines.
_Statement by General Van Fleet_
“Theirs not to reason why” could never have been written about American
fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have always taken
a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical decisions
governing their operations. This applies with particular force to the
Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of operations above
the division level.
As if in direct reply to unspoken questions, the commanding general of
the Eighth Army made a statement on 30 September explaining the purpose
of his strategy. “My basic mission during the past four months,” he
said, “has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of Eighth Army
will not be destroyed.... Each loaded enemy weapon was a definite
threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we knock out as many
of those weapons as we could find....”
“In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula,” continued
General Van Fleet, “we have taken many casualties.... It was mandatory
that we control the high ground features, so that we could look down
the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform our task of
destruction.... In seizing these hills we lost men, but in losing a
comparative few we saved other thousands.”
Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by UN ground forces
alone from 25 May to 25 September, were announced as 188,237 by the
EUSAK commander. “As we open our autumn campaign,” he added, “the
enemy potential along the front line has been sharply reduced by our
hill-hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea are not liquidated
but they are badly crippled.”[297]
[297] _Ibid._, 29–30.
Even so, EUSAK G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 1951 with
more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and available
as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one NKPA corps were
capable of reinforcing the units on the MLR or participating in an
offensive. The enemy also had an estimated 7,000 men in guerrilla
forces behind the UN lines.[298]
[298] _Ibid._, 7–9 and Plate No. 4.
The maximum strength of UN forces in Korea during October was 607,300.
This total included 236,871 U.S. Army troops, 21,020 Fifth Air Force
personnel, 30,913 U.S. Marines (including 5,386 officers and men of the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing), 286,000 men in ROK units, and 32,172 Allied
troops.[299]
[299] _Ibid._, 5–6, and Plate No. 1.
Although it might appear that the opposing forces were about equal,
it must be remembered that well over one-fourth of the UN troops were
engaged in administrative or maintenance duties behind the front. Thus
the Communists had a numerical advantage of at least four to three on
the firing line. This was not at all unusual, since they had enjoyed a
preponderance in manpower from the beginning.
_Hill 854 Secured by 3/1_
In accordance with EUSAK instructions, X Corps OI-235 directed the 1st
Marine Division to organize and construct defensive positions after
relieving the 8th ROK Division on the right and taking over its sector.
On the Corps boundary, elements of the 11th ROK Division, I ROK Corps,
were to be relieved on Hill 884 (Map 20). This meant the addition of
some 9,000 yards to the Marine front, making a total of about 22,800
yards or more than 13 miles.
First Marine Division OpnO 27-51, issued on 18 September, relayed the
X Corps directions. It also called for such offensive action as might
be necessary to complete the securing of Hill 854, in the sector of
the 8th ROK Division, if not in friendly hands at the time of the
relief.[300]
[300] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3.
That the enemy had put up a desperate fight to hold this position
is indicated by the EUSAK report for 15–16 September: “The ROK 8th
Division, employing all three regiments, attacked against heavy and
stubborn resistance to wrest Hill 854 from the three battalions of
North Koreans who held the position. The ROK 21st Regiment forced one
of these battalions to withdraw and occupied a part of the hill, but
at the close of the day were engaged in heavy hand-to-hand fighting to
retain the position.”[301]
[301] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47.
On 20 September, after three weeks of continual combat, the major units
of the 1st Marine Division were disposed from left to right (Map 20) as
follows:
1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dae Shik, commanding; Colonel Walter N.
Flournoy, senior adviser) occupying the HAYS line on the left flank and
patrolling vigorously to the north;
5th Marines (Colonel Richard G. Weede) holding a wide sector in the
center, with Hill 812 as the principal terrain feature;
1st Marines (Colonel Thomas A. Wornham) in process of extending
eastward to the Corps boundary just beyond Hill 884;
7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Wermuth) in Division reserve at
Wontong-ni.[302]
[302] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3–4, 18–22.
Division OpnO 27-51 designated the 1st Marines to relieve the ROKs
on Hill 854 and complete the seizure of that terrain feature, if
necessary. As a preliminary, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines
(Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston) took over the front of the 1st
Marines on the HAYS line. This enabled 1/1 and 3/1 to enlarge the
Division sector by side-slipping to the east while Lieutenant Colonel
Franklin B. Nihart’s 2/1 went into immediate reserve just behind the
main line of resistance.[303]
[303] The balance of this section is based on the 1stMarDiv
_HD_, Sep 51, 18–24, and on 1/1 and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51.
The 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E.
Gorman) relieved two battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment in the Hill
854 area. No opposition from the enemy was encountered, but the
Marines suffered 11 casualties from mines as a consequence of incorrect
charts supplied by the ROKs.
[Illustration: 1st MARINE DIVISION ZONE OF ACTION SITUATION ON 20
SEPT 51
MAP 20]
By this time it had become an open question whether “friendly” mines
did more harm to friend or foe. Certain it was, at any rate, that the
prevailing system--or lack of system--resulted in Marine casualties
during nearly every offensive operation in zones where the action
shifted back and forth.
Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La Hue’s 3/1 relieved two battalions of
the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the ROKs had fought their way to the
summit of Hill 854, the ridgeline to the southwest remained in the
enemy’s hands. An attack by 3/1 was planned for 1530 on 20 September,
supported by artillery and an air strike. Delays in the arrival of the
planes caused a postponement until 1720. How Company jumped off and had
advanced 50 yards when a man was killed and another wounded by mines.
The attack was called off at dusk so that the ROKs could remove the
explosives they had planted.
Air support was requested for 0700 on the morning of the 21st, but it
was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived for a strike directed by
an observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air controller. At 1220,
following a 10-minute artillery preparation, How Company spearpointed
a battalion attack which met stiff resistance. Another air strike was
requested but did not materialize. The assault continued with mortar
and artillery support until 1745, when How Company reported the ridge
line secured.
Casualties of 3/1 for the two days were nine KIA and 55 WIA. Enemy
losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA,
and 29 prisoners.[304]
[304] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1
historical diaries for September 1951.
“A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the
battalion sector,” the 3/1 report for the 23d concluded, “most of these
being U.S. types which were placed by ROK troops, with only a few enemy
mines scattered in the central portion of the sector.”[305]
[305] 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51, 8.
_Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884_
Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines to
extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of the
11th Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances this
would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving troops
merely to climb Hill 884 (Map 20), The position was accessible only on
foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores.
Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a
reconnaissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission to
the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop lift by
helicopter.
He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been
undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft.
Large-scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage.
Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, commanding officer of HMR-101,
had but 48 hours for preparation. He and his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell, worked out a tactical and
loading plan with the commanding officer of Recon Company, Major
Ephraim Kirby-Smith, and the acting Division Embarkation Officer, First
Lieutenant Richard C. Higgs.[306]
[306] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are
the following: DivReconCo _HD_, 1stShorePartyBn _HD_,
HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of
Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162–165.
An air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two acceptable
locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a
sheer drop on two sides. About 100 yards apart and some 300 feet below
the topographical crest, each could be cleared sufficiently for the
landing of a single aircraft.
Major Kirby-Smith decided on the order in which troops of his company
and attached units would be landed. The assignment and loading
tables were completed on 20 September in time for a rehearsal. All
participants were instructed as to their team numbers and embarkation
points.
H-Hour of Operation SUMMIT (Map 21) was set for 1000 on 21 September.
The plan called for a preliminary landing of a Recon Company rifle
squad to provide security. Next, a landing point team from the 1st
Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards) had the
mission of clearing the two sites. These two groups were to disembark
from hovering helicopters by means of knotted 30-foot ropes. Strong
winds at the 2,900-foot altitude made landing quite hazardous.
The execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog so prevalent
at this time of year. As soon as the two landing sites were cleared
(about 40 minutes), word was transmitted by radio for the loading to
begin at Field X-83 (Map 21), about 14 miles southwest of Hill 884 by
the defiladed route of flight.
Control over the landings and takeoffs on the two Hill 884 sites was
exercised by a hovering helicopter. Aircraft landed at 30-second
intervals, each carrying five fully equipped men who disembarked in
average time of 20 seconds. Two radio nets maintained communications
between the landing sites and orbiting aircraft. Voice contact could
not be established between the landing point team and X-83, however,
and it became necessary for a helicopter to return within sight of the
field to restore communications for incoming aircraft.
A total of 224 men, including a heavy machine gun platoon from 2/7, was
lifted in flight time of 31.2 hours and over-all time of four hours. In
addition, 17,772 pounds of cargo were landed.
Operation SUMMIT ended with the laying of two telephone lines between
Recon Company on Hill 884 and the CP of the 1st Marines, about eight
miles to the rear. Fifteen minutes were required for dropping each
line. The ROKs, following their relief, proceeded on foot to their own
Corps area.
From a tactical viewpoint, the importance of Hill 884 lay in its
domination of enemy-held terrain. The difficulty of reaching the remote
position had been overcome by the helicopter, and Operation SUMMIT was
recorded in front page headlines by Stateside newspapers.
Congratulations poured in from all sides. Lieutenant General Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, complimented HMR-161 on
“a bright new chapter in the employment of helicopters by Marines.”
Major General Clovis E. Byers, commanding X Corps, praised the “organic
and attached units of the 1st Marine Division that participated in
the first relief of units on the battle position. Your imaginative
experiment with this kind of transport is certain to be of lasting
value to all the services.”[307]
[307] Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR-161 _HD_,
Sep 51.
Nobody was more enthusiastic than General Thomas. “Operation SUMMIT,
the first helicopter-borne landing of a combat unit in history, was an
outstanding success,” said his message. “To all who took part, well
done!”
[Illustration: HMR-161
OPERATIONS
1951
MAP 21]
_Helicopter Operation_ BLACKBIRD
It is not surprising, considering their training, that the Marines
found it a difficult transition from offensive to defensive operations
after 20 September. As evidence that patrols were conducted with
customary aggressiveness, Marine casualties (including the 1st KMC
Regiment) for the last 10 days of the month were 59 KIA, 1 MIA, and 331
WIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 505 counted KIA, and 237
prisoners.
1st Marine Division casualties of 2,416 (including 594 reported by the
KMCs) for September as a whole were the most severe suffered during
any month of the war so far with the exception of December 1950 and
June 1951. NKPA losses of the month were 2,799 counted KIA and 557
prisoners.[308]
[308] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 31–32.
On the 23d the 1st Marines extended to the eastern boundary of X Corps
and relieved the Division Reconnaissance Company on Hill 884. That same
day the enemy was treated to a novelty when 100 well aimed 16-inch
projectiles, fired from a range of 40,000 yards, roared in like meteors
on his positions in the area of Hill 951 (Map 20). Naval gunfire from
the USS _New Jersey_ was being conducted by Marine spotters in forward
OPs, who reported good coverage for the 2,000-pound rounds. Ammunition
dumps and artillery pieces were destroyed while NKPA troops in the open
suffered heavy personnel casualties, according to observers.
Several more bombardments were contributed by the _New Jersey_ at
the request of 1/1 and 3/1 during the balance of the month. Marine
and attached Army artillery also gave excellent support with fire
so accurate as to break up enemy counterattacks before they could
be launched. Ammunition restrictions hampered the efforts of the
11th Marines (Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.) but the cannoneers never
failed to respond to an emergency. The 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans) continued to show good
results with direct observed fire on enemy bunkers. Air support in
September, concluded the Division report, was “generally inadequate and
unsatisfactory.”[309]
[309] _Ibid._
By the last week of September the Division right (east) flank was well
protected, considering the rugged terrain. Not as much could be said
for the other flank, northwest of the Punchbowl, where the sector of
the Marines joined that of the 5th ROK Division. Since the Division
sector was divided by high, roadless mountains, there was no rapid
way of moving reserves other than by helicopter. In short, the 1st
Marine Division was hard pressed to man a 22,800-yard MLR while keeping
in reserve enough troops to help defend this sensitive area in an
emergency.
Plans were completed by General Thomas and the Division staff for the
rapid displacement of a company from 2/1, the reserve battalion of the
1st Marines, to meet any such threat. Since a surprise attack was most
likely to occur at night, it was decided that a helicopter lift of an
element of the Division reserve should be made in the darkness of 27
September after a detailed daytime rehearsal.[310]
[310] The remainder of this section is based upon the Type “C”
Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II,
1–9; HMR-161 and 1stShorePartyBn _HD_, Sep and Oct 51;
_Cavalry of the Sky_, 165–167.
In contrast to former Marine helicopters, which had no night-flying
aids, the HRS-1 was equipped with few attitude of flight instruments.
They were primitive compared to the sophisticated instrumentation of
fixed-wing planes, and Lieutenant Colonel Herring sent his pilots on
preliminary night indoctrination flights to memorize terrain features.
The route, five air miles in length, amounted to a round trip of 13
miles because of the detours necessary for purposes of concealment. The
aircraft were to take off from a dry river bed southeast of Hill 702
(Map 21) and land near the northwestern rim of the Punchbowl, where the
troops would march a mile to their final assembly area.
The infantry unit selected for Operation BLACKBIRD was Easy Company
of 2/1, commanded by Second Lieutenant William K. Rockey. Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart and Major Carl E. Walker, the battalion commander and
his executive officer, supervised the daylight rehearsal on the morning
of the 27th. Six helicopters lifted 200 men in the overall time of two
hours and 10 minutes to a landing site of 50 by 100 feet cleared by a
team of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. The troops were proceeding on
foot to their assembly area when an antipersonnel mine wounded a man.
Nihart called a halt immediately and investigation revealed that the
area was filled with mines. Plans were changed to abandon the march,
although the landing site remained the same.
Operation BLACKBIRD got under way at 1930 on 27 September. The night
was dark when the first HRS-1 took off with five combat-equipped men.
Three-minute intervals were required between aircraft operating on a
shuttle system, so as to avoid the danger of collisions. Different
altitudes were assigned to outgoing and incoming helicopters which
used running lights only two minutes before entering or leaving the
debarkation zone.
A total of 223 troops were landed in over-all time of two hours and
20 minutes instead of the nine hours a movement by foot would have
required. Nevertheless, some of the results were not reassuring.
Rotor wash blew out many of the flare pots lighting the embarkation
area, and the battery-powered beach lanterns on the landing site
proved inadequate. Pilots were temporarily blinded by the glare on
windshields; and artillery flashes bothered them while making their way
through three mountain passes. Fortunately, good radio communications
aided pilots who had trouble in locating the landing site in spite of
night rehearsals.
Operation BLACKBIRD remained the only night helicopter troop lift
during the war in Korea. “Present equipment,” said the Marine report,
“indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night lifts
should be limited to movements within friendly territory.”[311]
[311] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “The Employment of Assault
Helicopters,” Part II, 4.
“_To Organize, Construct and Defend_”
“The Division continued to organize, construct and defend positions
along a 13½-mile front; patrol forward of the MLR and screen rear
areas; and maintain one U.S. Marine regiment which could not be
committed without authority from X Corps in a reserve area 17 miles
behind the lines.”
The above quotation, from the opening paragraph of the report of the
1st Marine Division for October 1951, sums up in a nutshell the new
trend of operations since 20 September. It is significant that for
the first time in 1951 the Division Historical Diary departs from a
daily account of events and divides the month into two equal parts
for a chronicle of operations. Not enough had happened to justify a
day-by-day summary.
This does not mean that the Marines neglected any opportunity to do
the enemy hurt. It means only that the opportunities of defensive
warfare were limited as compared to the preceding six months of
offensive operations. That the Marines made the best of such
opportunities is shown by the fact that the ratio of enemy to friendly
casualties increased from the 4-to-1 of September to the 20-to-1 of
October, even though the totals of the former month were larger.[312]
[312] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 1–3.
As a result of his new defensive policies, the enemy often avoided
a fight. Day after day passed during the first two weeks of October
without far-ranging Marine patrols being able to make contact.
Line MINNESOTA, the new MLR (Map 20), ran roughly parallel to the
hays line but included advanced positions taken in the September
offensive. During the first 10 days of October the 2d Battalion of the
1st Marines continued to be the Division forward reserve in readiness
for a quick shift to any threatened point in the MLR, and the Division
Reconnaissance Company had the mission of maintaining daily contact
with the 11th ROK Division on the Marines’ right flank.
It might seem that the 7th Marines, 17 miles to the rear at Wontong-ni,
would be entirely becalmed. Yet this regiment saw as much action on
some days as any of the three regiments ranging forward of the MLR.
The explanation was that the rear area was infested with elusive North
Korean guerrillas who kept the 7th Marines patrols busy.
Early in October the question arose as to how quickly a reserve
battalion could be shifted from one point to another. By this time
a company-size helicopter lift had become commonplace, having been
successfully completed twice by HMR-161 since Operation SUMMIT. It
remained to be seen whether a battalion could be transported with
comparable celerity, and, on 9 October, Division issued an order
warning of 3/7’s move.
The 7th Marines was due to exchange places with the 5th Marines on
the 11th after relieving that regiment in the center of the Division
front. While 1/7 and 2/7 completed a conventional relief of their
opposite numbers, 3/7 was selected for a helicopter lift. Lieutenant
Colonel Edwards, the new commanding officer, had recently commanded the
Shore Party Battalion and helped to train its landing site and loading
point teams. He took part in the planning along with Colonel Krulak,
Lieutenant Colonels Herring and Mitchell, and the new commanding
officer of the Shore Party Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel George G.
Pafford.
Planning went on as if for an amphibious operation. Assignment and
loading tables were worked out, and each Marine of the six-man
embarkation teams had his designated place in the helicopter. On 10
October all officers and men of 3/7 attended a familiarization class at
which trial teams were loaded.
Operation BUMBLEBEE began at 1000 on the 11th. Field X-77 (Map 21)
had been selected as the loading zone because of its proximity to the
assembly area of the 7th Marines. The landing site was just behind the
5th Marines MLR, northeast of Hill 702. A flight path of 15 miles took
advantage of the concealment afforded by valleys and defiladed areas.
The two dispatchers in the loading zone were provided with a checkoff
flight list containing the names of every team of 3/7. In order to
avoid delays, replacements could be summoned from a casual pool to fill
understrength teams to plane capacity. Average time for loading was 20
seconds.
Ten to 12 minutes were required for the flight. As the helicopters
landed at intervals of a minute, a team could exit and allow the craft
to be airborne in an average time of 17 seconds. “Time was saved,”
according to one Marine report, “when the Shore Party personnel, after
opening the door, vigorously assisted the passengers by grasping their
arms and starting them away from the craft. The last man out checked to
see if any gear had been forgotten. Guides furnished by the battalion
directed the passengers toward their respective company assembly areas,
thus keeping the landing areas clear at all times.”[313]
[313] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,”
Part II, 5–9. Other sources for Operation BUMBLEBEE are
HMR-161 and 1st ShorePartyBn _HD_, Oct 51, and _Cavalry
of the Sky_, 167–170.
Twelve helicopters were employed in 156 flights. The flight time was
65.9 hours and over-all time five hours and 50 minutes. A total weight
of 229,920 pounds included 958 combat-equipped troops averaging 240
pounds.
[Illustration:
DD MC A 132540
_Helicopter In The Hills--A large Sikorsky helicopter hovers over
the mountainous terrain of Korea. This type of aircraft has been
extensively used for many types of transport missions._]
[Illustration: DD MC A 131324]
_Generals Confer--Above, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (left) and
MajGen Field Harris discuss the situation in April, 1952. Below,
MajGen John T. Selden (right) briefs Army MajGen R. D. Palmer._
[Illustration: DD MC A 159084]
[Illustration: DD MC A 8410]
_On The Planning Level--Above, BrigGen Whaling, MajGen Thomas,
and BrigGen Puller enjoy a bit of humor, while, below, MajGen
Thomas, LtGen Shephard, and Col Wade pose for the photographer._
[Illustration: DD MC A 157916]
[Illustration: DD MC A 161585]
_Ready For Action--Above, a Marine 105mm howitzer battery
preparing to fire a mission. Below, exterior and interior views
of a heavy and light machine gun emplacement._
[Illustration: DD MC A 155525 DD MC A 169584]
[Illustration: DD MC A 6953 DD MC A 6754]
_Going Up--Above, left and right, Marines move into position on
one of the many Korean hills. Below, a section of the MLR in
March, 1952._
[Illustration: DD MC A 160250]
[Illustration: DD MC A 159304]
_The Lifeline--Above, a view of the MSR of the 1st Marine
Division during January, 1952. Below, during the rainy season it
is difficult to move supplies over the poor roads._
[Illustration: DD MC A 164552]
[Illustration: DD MC A 162316]
_Terrain Features--Above, a Marine helicopter flies behind
ice-covered slopes to avoid enemy fire. Below, an enemy
stronghold nicknamed “Luke The Gook’s Castle.”_
[Illustration: DD MC A 160572]
[Illustration: USN 439970 USN 441346]
_Panmunjom “Talkathon”--Above (left) Gen Nam Il starts for the
truce talks. Above (right) United Nations’ sentries. Below, the
Chinese and North Korean Communist negotiators._
[Illustration: USN 431929]
[Illustration: USN 432414]
_Watchful Waiting--Above, MajGen L. C. Cragie and VAdm C. T. Joy
talk to correspondents at Panmunjom. Below, Communist and UN
sentries walk posts around the peace talk site._
[Illustration: USN 935646 USN 435646]
[Illustration: DD MC A 163575 DD MC A 164145]
_Lifesaver--Above, bruised Marines show the armored vests that
saved their lives. Below, a .45 caliber bullet test-fired into
cotton contrasted with three removed from an armored vest._
[Illustration: DD MC A 46216]
[Illustration: DD MC A 168081]
_Torso Protection--Above, a Marine rifleman lies prone to exhibit
the protective torso armor. Below, a helicopter evacuates a
corpsman who was wounded while treating a buddy._
[Illustration: DD MC A 167282]
[Illustration: DD MC A 156301]
_Papa-sans and Pills--Above, a group of Korean patriarchs gaze
curiously at a Marine tank. Below, an Army nurse administers
medication to a grimacing Marine._
[Illustration: SC 358063]
[Illustration: DD MC A 159786]
_A Dog’s Life--Above, Marines line up with their pets all packed
and ready to go. Below, troops gather for the ever-welcome mail
call._
[Illustration: DD MC A 7468]
[Illustration: DD MC A 6843]
_At The Front--Above, Marines advance across a fog-filled valley
while supported by machine gun fire. Below, a group of Communist
prisoners wait for interrogation by trained experts._
[Illustration: DD MC A 157686]
[Illustration: DD MC A 408351]
_CCF Propaganda--Above, one of the thousands of
attractively-colored CCF Christmas cards dropped on the_ MLR _in
December, 1951. Below, a mortar observer crew in action._
[Illustration: DD MC A 6627]
[Illustration: DD MC A 162989]
_Life’s Little Problems--PFC Henry A. Friday pauses to rest in
a trench and reflect upon the progress of his own particular
efforts towards fighting the Communists._
These statistics of Operation BUMBLEBEE made it certain that Stateside
headlines would proclaim another Marine “first.” Only four days later
HMR-161 demonstrated its ability to carry out on short notice an
emergency resupply and evacuation operation in a combat zone. Help
was requested in the IX Corps sector to the west for a completely
surrounded ROK unit in need of ammunition and of casualty evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell led six HRS-1 aircraft which flew in 19,000
pounds of ammunition. Lieutenant Donald L. Hilian (MC), USN, surgeon of
HMR-161, landed to supervise the evacuation of 24 wounded ROKs, several
of whom would otherwise have died. Captains James T. Cotton and Albert
A. Black made four flights each into the beleaguered area, and all
Marine pilots of Operation WEDGE were congratulated in person by Major
General Claude F. Ferenbaugh, commanding general of IX Corps.[314]
[314] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 171.
Seven infantry battalions, with 2/1 in immediate reserve, manned the
MLR from 1 to 13 October--three KMC battalions on the left of the
Division sector; two 5th Marines battalions (relieved by the 7th
Marines on the 11th) in the center; and two 1st Marines battalions on
the right. Scout and sniper teams were employed throughout the period,
with contacts few and far between. More destruction was inflicted on
the enemy by observed artillery, tank, and mortar fire.[315]
[315] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise
specified, is based on the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 3–12.
A new emphasis was placed on psychological warfare during these
defensive operations. Eighty-seven NKPA soldiers surrendered from 1 to
13 October, but whether they responded to leaflets fired by the 11th
Marines could not be determined.
Early in October the 1st Marine Division was granted permission
by EUSAK to use Sokcho-ri (Map 19) as a port of embarkation and
debarkation instead of Pusan. The change proved satisfactory even
though troops had to be lightered from ship to shore. A 68-mile truck
movement through the I ROK Corps zone replaced the airlift of 200 miles
from Pusan to Chunchon, followed by a motor march of 70 miles. It was
estimated that the new routing would add from 8,000 to 10,000 man-days
a month to the combat potential of the Division.
An improvement in logistics resulted when the Division asked and
received permission from EUSAK to use field K-50 near Sokcho-ri for an
airhead instead of K-51 at Inje. Although the Marines were limited to
five or six sorties a day while sharing K-50 with I ROK Corps, they
were able to transfer many airhead activities to the new field.
The mission of the Division remained essentially unchanged from 14
to 31 October. Foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory,
and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and
artillery, were launched at every opportunity.
Typical of these operations was the raid staged on 16 October by
elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, (Lieutenant Colonel James
G. Kelly) supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers. Captain
John R. McMahon’s Charlie Company was the principal unit involved. The
Marine column had as its objective an NKPA strong point overlooking the
village of Changhang (Map 2) on the east and the flats on both sides of
the Soyang-gang to the south and southwest. Captain McMahon’s mission
was “to reduce all fortifications and installations ...” [and] “...
to seize, occupy and hold ground until the area was thoroughly mined,
booby-trapped and infested with trip flares.”[316]
[316] This account of the raid is derived from the 1/7 _HD_,
Oct 51, and the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7.
A small-scale battle flared up for a few minutes as the enemy put up a
stiff resistance with artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.
Superior Marine firepower soon prevailed, and at 1540 the attackers
reached their objective. During the next hour and 20 minutes enemy
installations were destroyed and the strong point rendered untenable by
mines and booby traps. The Marines withdrew at 1700 after sustaining
casualties of 3 KIA and 18 WIA. Enemy losses were 35 counted KIA.
The next day a reinforced KMC company, supported by tanks, air,
artillery, and engineers made a similar raid on enemy positions about
875 yards northwest of Hill 751 and 1,500 yards south of Hill 1052 (Map
20). Twenty-five NKPA bunkers were destroyed with losses to the enemy
of 15 counted KIA, 3 prisoners, and 5 captured machine guns.[317]
[317] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7–8.
On 21 October the front of the 1st Marine Division was reduced a mile
when elements of the 3d ROK Division relieved the 2d KMC Battalion on
the Marine left flank in accordance with instructions of X Corps. Six
infantry battalions now manned an MLR of 12¼ miles.
A strong enemy position, menacing the forward elements, had developed
to the north of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines’ sector. Three days
of reconnaissance and detailed preparation preceded the destructive
raid carried out on 30 October. Captain George E. Lawrence’s Charlie
Company, reinforced with heavy machine guns, was held up by NKPA
resistance in estimated company strength. The Marines fought their
way up a ridgeline, throwing white phosphorus grenades into enemy
bunkers. Pinned down momentarily by NKPA mortar and small-arms fire,
they reached a defiladed position and withdrew under cover of Marine
artillery, air, mortars, and heavy machine guns. At a cost of only one
WIA, the raiders inflicted 65 counted KIA casualties on the enemy and
destroyed an estimated 40 NKPA bunkers.[318]
[318] 1/1 _HD_, Oct 51, 16; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7.
All three Marine regiments on Line MINNESOTA were directed by General
Thomas to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own weapons in the
form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October the 3d Battalion of the
1st Marines feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a
brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded
an NKPA bugle call as a signal for enemy troops to rush out of bunkers
and man open trenches. Thus exposed, they became the victims of intense
Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA
and 48 WIA casualties.
During the last 2 weeks of October, 11 missions were fired by the
battleship USS _New Jersey_ and 41 missions by the heavy cruiser USS
_Toledo_. Appreciation was expressed in a message to the _Toledo_ by
General Thomas: “Your accurate and effective fire during period 24–29
October made an important contribution to operations of this division.
Many thanks and come again.”[319]
[319] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS _Toledo_, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3
msgs, Oct 51.
Antiguerrilla raids behind the MLR were carried out by Marine ground
forces relying upon HMR-161 helicopters for transportation. In
Operation BUSHBEATER teams from 1/1 were landed on the Division’s east
flank to sweep westward toward the Soyang-gang on 22 October while
teams from Recon Company patrolled from the opposite direction.
Operations HOUSEBURNER I and II were planned to deprive guerrillas of
shelter during the coming winter. As the name implies, helicopter-borne
teams set Korean huts afire with flame throwers and incendiary
grenades.[320]
[320] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 172–173.
Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were
believed to comprise the 2d Division, II NKPA Corps, the 1st and
15th Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. NKPA
casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Marine Division
as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, and 571
prisoners. The Marines (including the 1st KMC Regiment) suffered losses
of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA.[321]
[321] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 2.
_Marine Operations of November 1951_
On 1 November 1951 the front line strength of the opposing forces
was nearly equal--195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy. In
reserves the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with nine
CCF armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four NKPA corps. All
were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault troops
for a great offensive.[322]
[322] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 9.
Even though the Eighth Army was committed to a warfare of position,
General Van Fleet meant to keep the initiative. “If we had stagnated
on any one of our many positions since the tide turned in April,”
he said in a recorded statement of 3 November, “the hydra-headed
Communists--who seem to grow two soldiers for each one cut down--would
soon have been at our throats. With the enemy’s prolific capacity
posing an ever-present threat, we had no choice but to destroy the
menace before it matured.”[323]
[323] _Ibid._, 32.
Throughout November the 1st Marine Division continued to occupy the
eastern portion of the X Corps defense sector in east-central Korea.
From left to right the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 1st Marines
held the 12¼-mile MLR with two battalions each. The 5th Marines
remained in reserve until the 11th, when it relieved the 1st Marines.
That regiment went into the new reserve area at Mago-ri (Map 19).[324]
[324] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise
specified, is derived from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Nov 51,
1–20.
Elements of the 1st, 15th, and 19th Divisions, III NKPA Corps, manned
the opposing lines. The Marines continued to organize artillery- and
air-supported tank-infantry-engineer task forces in company strength
for raids. Squad-size patrols were sent out nightly to ambush the
enemy, employing ruses whenever possible.
The howitzers of the 11th Marines and the 90mm rifles of the 1st
Tank Battalion were kept busy throughout the month. On 7–8 November,
for instance, Marine artillery fired 257 observed missions in 24
hours--including 34 on enemy artillery positions, 32 on mortar
positions, 25 on bunkers, 22 on machine gun positions, 4 in support
of friendly patrols, 3 on supply dumps, 2 on trucks, and 1 each on a
bridge, a CP, and a 57mm recoilless rifle position.
In spite of such daily pounding, aerial photographs proved that NKPA
defenses in depth had become more intricate and formidable in November
1951 than during any previous month.
On the 7th the 14th Replacement Draft added 2,756 officers and men
to the 1st Marine Division. Within a few hours 2,066 officers and
men of the 10th Rotation Draft were detached. And on the 27th the
11th Rotation Draft represented a further loss of 2,468 Marines whose
departure was hastened so that they could be home by Christmas.
A note of grim humor crept into proceedings on 9 November. Division
OpnO 50-51 directed that all supporting arms and weapons commemorate
the Marine Corps Birthday the next day by firing a TOT on Hill 1052,
the key enemy observation point overlooking the friendly sector.[325]
While the cruiser USS _Los Angeles_ contributed naval gunfire, the
Commanding General of 1st MAW, Major General Christian F. Schilt, led
an air strike of 83 Marine planes to blast this enemy strong point.
[325] The initials TOT stand for Time on Target--an artillery
order calling for all guns to time their firing so that
projectiles will hit the target simultaneously.
The performance was embellished on the 10th when Marine tanks, mortars,
and machine guns added their fire to the grand crescendo of exploding
shells and bombs. The Communists were also bombarded with 50,000
leaflets inviting them to the Marine birthday dinner that evening.
Twenty Korean Reds actually did surrender, though some doubt remained
whether they had responded to the invitation or the TOT. General Van
Fleet sent a message to all Marines in his command, congratulating them
on “a job well done” in Korea.[326]
[326] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 42.
On 11 November the 5th Marines carried out its relief of the 1st
Marines on Line MINNESOTA. This was the occasion for the largest
helicopter troop lift so far, involving the transportation of nearly
2,000 combat-equipped men.
Operation SWITCH began at 0635 on D-Day when three helicopters took off
from Field X-83 with Shore Party specialists to signal aircraft into
landing sites and supervise the unloading and reloading of troops.
Twelve helicopters were employed, each carrying five men and supplies
from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W.
Norton), and returning to Field X-83 with a like load from Lieutenant
Colonel Clifford E. Quilici’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.[327]
[327] HMR-161 _HD_, Nov 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 174.
Naval gunfire from the USS _New Jersey_ helped to keep the enemy quiet
during the relief. All told, 950 men were flown to Hill 884--soon to be
known unofficially as “Mount Helicopter”--and 952 lifted to Field X-83
in return flights. Total flight time was 95.6 hours and over-all time
10 hours. Once again the Marine Corps had made tactical history.
Ground forces operations throughout November seldom varied from the
familiar pattern of squad-size patrols nightly and an occasional
daytime raid by a company-size task force with the support of artillery
and air. Supporting arms kept enemy strongholds under almost constant
fire, and North Korean activity in the construction or improvement of
bunkers provided frequent targets of opportunity.
Contacts seemed to be avoided by enemy troops. On the night of 29
November, for instance, 11 Marine ambush patrols ranged from 1,500
to 2,500 yards ahead of the MLR with only a single contact before
returning at daybreak. One enemy KIA was inflicted and one prisoner
taken at a cost of four Marine WIA casualties.
Total Marine casualties (including the KMCs) during November were
34 KIA and 250 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 408 counted and 1,728
estimated KIA, 2,235 estimated WIA, and 104 prisoners.
_The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_
Marine operations in December were shaped in advance by the resumption
of armistice negotiations. This time Panmunjom was agreed upon as a
conference site instead of Kaesong. Literally a wide place in the road,
the tiny hamlet was located just north of the 38th Parallel between
Munsan and Kaesong (Map 19). In the lack of houses, tents provided
shelter for the UN and Communist delegates who renewed their meetings
on 25 October 1951 for the first time since the Reds walked out at
Kaesong on 23 August.
Discussions during November were largely devoted to the question of
a cease fire based upon a line of demarcation. On the 23d it was
agreed to accept a line linking up the farthest points of repeated
contacts up to 2,000 yards forward of the United Nations MLR. Three
days later, representatives of both sides initialed maps to indicate
acceptances.[328]
[328] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the
following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., _Panmunjom,
The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations_
(New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; _Joy, How
Communists Negotiate_, 40–52.
The effect of the so-called cease fire on EUSAK operations was
immediate. General Van Fleet sent his corps commanders a letter of
instructions warning that active defensive operations were to continue
until a full armistice had been concluded. If such an event took place
within 30 days after 27 November 1951, the demarcation line would not
be altered. But if an agreement had not been reached by that time, the
line would be revised in accordance with actual changes.[329]
[329] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 58.
EUSAK instructions to corps commanders were relayed in a X Corps
message of 27 November to the 1st Marine Division:
_Part 1._ The conference at Panmunjom has fixed a military
demarcation line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities
within a 30-day period.
_Part II._ Every US, UN, and ROK soldier will be informed that
hostilities will continue until armistice agreement is signed.
_Part III._ While negotiations continue, X Corps will: (1)
Demonstrate its willingness to reach an agreement by reducing
operations to those which are essential to insure maintenance of
present positions. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to
enemy assault are authorized, but other clearly offensive actions
will be taken only by direction of this Headquarters; patrolling
only to that line beyond which contact has been repeatedly
established; limiting supporting fires, including air strikes,
to destruction of those targets which appear to constitute a
major threat, or to improve the enemy’s offensive capability.
(2) Prepare for offensive action by: Conserving ammunition;
maintaining combat effectiveness through intensified training;
preparation for and rehearsal of limited-objective attacks, to be
launched near the end of the 30-day period in order to improve
the MLR.
_Part IV._ Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary
casualties.[330]
[330] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 15–16.
In view of these instructions, it is understandable that a lull set
in along the X Corps front in December 1951. Most of the cold weather
clothing had been issued during the preceding month, and work was
largely completed for the “winterizing” of bunkers. It remained only
to improve defensive installations as front line elements continued
to send out patrols to maintain pressure against the enemy. And since
the Communists were putting similar military policies into effect, both
sides kept in contact with relatively small units.[331]
[331] The source for the remainder of this section, unless
otherwise stated, is the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Dec 51, 1–17.
The enemy also busied himself with extending already formidable
defenses in depth. And though he did not seek a fight, he showed no
hesitation about accepting one.
From 5 to 20 Marine patrols went out nightly during December, some of
them manning night outposts called “duck blinds;”[332] occasional raids
continued with relatively few contacts. In the rear of the Division
area, helicopter patrols continued against guerrillas.
[332] LtCol Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-3 dtd 3 Feb 1959.
The 13 aircraft of HMR-161 had a busy month with 390 missions and 621
flights. Six thousand pounds of rations, 9,000 pounds of fuel oil in
drums, 15,000 pounds of fortification material, and 15,000 pounds of
cold weather clothing were among the supplies flown to the front.
Personnel to the number of 2,022 were lifted, and cargo to the amount
of 149,477 pounds.
The first breakthrough in truce negotiations, at Kaesong, occurred on
18 December, when lists of prisoners held by both sides were exchanged.
Prior to this exchange of lists the UN Command could only speculate on
the number carried as missing in action who were in reality held as
prisoners of war. The Communists had previously reported only a few
dozen names, and then only if it suited their propaganda purposes.
Radio Peking, in releasing names piecemeal, had broadcast recordings
made by UN prisoners under duress. Far Eastern monitors reported these
broadcasts were slanted to give the Communist viewpoint.
The 18 December list of 3,198 American POWs revealed only 61 Marines
including 2 Navy hospital corpsmen. (Information received from 18
Marines who gained their freedom in May 1951 was sketchy concerning
others held at the time and was never accredited as official or
authoritative.)[333] Interestingly enough when the Communist
negotiators saw the list given them by the UN representative they
became irate and tried to withdraw their list. The names of the Chinese
and Korean prisoners had been Anglicized and caused considerable
difficulty in retranslating the names into oriental characters.
[333] Maj J. Angus MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” MS
available in Historical Archives, G-3, HQMC.
Negotiations hit a snag at this point, and no other list was offered by
the Red officials until the first prisoner exchange (Operation LITTLE
SWITCH in April 1953). Notwithstanding the protracted and exasperating
tactics of the Reds at the truce table, the exchange of prisoner of war
lists presaged infinitely better treatment to the UN prisoners than had
been accorded them prior to that time. The so-called lenient treatment
policy by the Chinese, promulgated in July 1951, was initiated after
the exchange of lists.[334]
[334] Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec 1960; Extract of Interim
Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative
to 30 Jun 1953, 18.
The lists given by the Communists did not include several Marines
captured during the months of October, November, or December of 1951.
The families of these men were to sit in anguish waiting for these
names until April of 1953. These and other instances of perfidy and
treachery at the truce table by the Communist negotiators were to
become legion.[335]
[335] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 104–105; Maj J. A.
MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” _op. cit._
On 19 December the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major William E. Baugh)
was relieved just behind the MLR by Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1/5
in helicopter Operation FAREWELL. It was the last flight in Korea for
Lieutenant Colonel Herring, who returned to Quantico as commanding
officer of Marine Helicopter Experimental Squadron (HMX)-1. His relief
as commander of HMR-1 was Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, and Lieutenant
Colonel Mitchell remained as executive officer.[336]
[336] HMR-161 _HD_, Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 175–176.
Two of the original 15 HRS-1 aircraft had been damaged
in accidents, but one was later restored to action with
parts cannibalized from the other.
The Marine helicopters of VMO-6 had also been setting records during
the last half of 1951 under four commanding officers, Major David W.
McFarland (5 April-5 October), Major Allan H. Ringblom (6 October-31
October), Major Edward R. Polgrean (1 November-25 November), and Major
Kenneth C. Smedley (26 November-31 January 1952). A total of 1,096
Marine wounded had been flown out during this period, many of whom
would otherwise have lost their lives.[337]
[337] VMO-6 _HD_, Jun-Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 146,
180–181.
The supposed vulnerability of the helicopter was whittled down to a
myth by VMO-6 experience. Returning from a front line mission with
bullet holes was too commonplace for mention, yet the year 1951
passed without a single helicopter pilot being lost to enemy action,
even though several aircraft were shot down. The experience of these
12 months also proved anew the wisdom of combining rotary-wing and
fixed-wing aircraft in an observation squadron in fairly equal numbers.
When it came to reconnaissance and artillery spotting, the nimble
little OYs and OEs (both types are light observation planes) were much
better suited than the “choppers.”
As for close air support, increased Air Force emphasis on an
interdiction campaign beyond artillery ranges added to the limitations
imposed on Marine requests. Of the 22 strikes requested in December
1951, only five were approved.
From the 1st to the 10th, units of the Division along the MLR consisted
from left to right of the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 5th
Marines. The only major change took place on the 11th, when the 1st
Marines relieved the 7th and the latter went into Division reserve.
Enemy units were believed to be the 1st, 15th, and 19th (soon relieved
by the 47th) NKPA Divisions with an estimated strength of 25,750.
Permission was rarely granted by X Corps for Marine raids to cross
the EUSAK military limiting line known as Line DUCK, which generally
coincided with the line of demarcation. Christmas passed like any
other day except for the holiday feast. Nineteen patrols went out on
Christmas Eve, two of which had brief fire fights with enemy patrols
before returning at dawn. During the day 40 rounds of naval gunfire
from the heavy cruiser USS _St. Paul_ were credited with destroying
seven enemy bunkers.
More than a third of the Marines partaking of Christmas turkey were
comparative newcomers who had reached Korea since the warfare of
movement ended on 20 September. The 15th Replacement Draft brought 38
officers and 2,278 men early in December, and 127 officers and 1,805
men departed with the 12th Rotation Draft. No Marines who had arrived
prior to 1 January 1951 were left among the 1,495 officers and 23,040
men in Korea at the close of the year.
Heavy snow on 26 December impeded foot-patrol activity and increased
the danger of mines. Next day, when the 30-day cease-fire agreement
ended, it was announced at Panmunjom that the terms had been renewed
and that operational restrictions would be extended indefinitely.
Thus December came to an end on a note of troubled uncertainty. Not a
single large-scale combat had been reported, yet 24 Marines were killed
(including KMCs) and 139 wounded in patrol actions. That the enemy had
sometimes succeeded in the grim quest of both sides for prisoners is
shown by the unwonted entry of eight Marines missing in action. NKPA
losses for the month consisted of 246 counted KIA, and 56 prisoners.
The year 1951 passed into history at 2400 on 31 December as the 11th
Marines saluted 1952 by firing a “toast” at enemy strongholds. The
thud of the snow-muffled howitzers was also a fitting farewell to the
past year of a war that was not officially a war. Indications were
that it would doubtless be concluded by a peace that was not a peace,
judging from the attitude of the Communist delegates at Panmunjom.
And meanwhile the Marines and other Eighth Army troops would keep on
fighting in accordance with the terms of a cease fire was not a cease
fire.
CHAPTER XI
Winter Operations in East Korea
_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in Company
Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command--Boot, Combat,
Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter
Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE_--The Fire Days of
Operation_ CLAM-UP
As the New Year began, the 1st Marine Division occupied practically
the same front it had held along Line MINNESOTA for the last three
months (Map 20) and would continue to hold for the next two and a half.
The major units were disposed from left to right on 1 January 1952 as
follows:
1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dong Ha commanding, LtCol Alfred H.
Marks, senior advisor);
1st Marines (Colonel Sidney S. Wade);
5th Marines (Colonel Frank P. Hager, Jr.);
11th Marines (Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill) in artillery support.
The 7th Marines (Colonel John J. Wermuth) was in reserve until 10
January, when it relieved the 5th Marines on line. That regiment then
went into reserve and could not be committed to action without the
approval of X Corps.[338]
[338] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 1–2.
Tactical units not organic to the 1st Marine Division but attached at
this time were, in addition to the 1st KMC Regiment, the 1st Korean
Artillery Battalion, the 1st Platoon, 92d U.S. Army Searchlight
Company, and Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Battalion.
The new Korean artillery battalion consisted of two medium (155mm) and
two light (105mm) howitzer batteries. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, approved a plan for
placing this unit in the Punchbowl on 9 January to reinforce Lieutenant
Colonel Sherman W. Parry’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.
Enemy units opposing the 1st Marine Division up to 23 January 1952
were the 1st, 15th, and 47th NKPA Divisions with an estimated combined
strength of 25,750 men. On the 23d the 15th Division was relieved by
the 45th.
The enemy, according to the Division report, showed “greater caution
than he had in previous months, and friendly outposts and ambuscades
noted fewer contacts. His harassing mortar and artillery fires
increased in volume through the month. Meanwhile, extensive efforts to
improve his defenses continued with particular attention being given to
reverse slope installations.”[339]
[339] _Ibid._, 1, 6, 7.
_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve_
The new year was but a few minutes old when the first Marine action
took place. Captain Charles W. McDonald’s Baker Company had been
directed by Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. Norton, commanding the 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines, to send out an ambush patrol on New Year’s Eve.
A rifle squad, a light machine gun squad, an interpreter, and a
corpsman composed the little column wearing white camouflage clothing
which made the men all but invisible against a background of snow.
After getting into position, the patrol settled down for the usual
long wait. Darkness was the enemy’s element, and Marine ambushers ran
the risk of being ambushed themselves. This time, however, a six-man
North Korean patrol came within five yards before the Marines let the
enemy have it with machine gun and rifle fire which inflicted one KIA
and four estimated WIA casualties. Efforts to take a prisoner were
frustrated as the NKPA survivors melted away into the darkness. The
Baker Company patrol returned without casualties at 0400.[340]
[340] 1/5 _HD_, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 3.
Marine operations were still limited by the EUSAK “cease fire”
directive which went into effect for a month on 27 November 1951 in
accordance with a decision reached during the armistice negotiations
at Panmunjom. UN and Communist delegates agreed on a line of
demarcation, known to the Eighth Army as Line DUCK. It linked up points
of repeated EUSAK patrol contacts, not to exceed 2,000 yards beyond
the MLR. Operations past this line, running generally parallel with
Line MINNESOTA, could not be launched without permission from corps
commanders.
When the agreement expired on 27 December, it was renewed indefinitely.
Actually, it brought about few changes in the warfare of position which
had replaced a warfare of movement on 20 September 1951. Each Marine
infantry regiment on the MLR continued to send out several squad-size
patrols nightly for such purposes as ambush, reconnaissance, and taking
prisoners. Raids were employed for special missions where formidable
enemy resistance might be expected. These forces usually ranged from
a platoon to a company in strength, reinforced by supporting weapons.
Operations of this sort were planned with meticulous thoroughness and
carried out with minimal risks.
_Marine Raid in Company Strength_
The first company-size raid of the new year was conducted by units
of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Spencer
H. Pratt) in the darkness of 1–2 January 1952. Captain James B. Ord,
Jr.’s How Company was alerted on 30 December to prepare for a night
raid with a mission of reconnaissance and capturing or destroying any
enemy that might be encountered. On the afternoon of the 30th, Ord made
a preliminary reconnaissance with Second Lieutenants Milo J. See and
John E. Watson, commanding the 2d and 3d Platoons respectively. That
evening the company commander held a briefing at his OP (observation
post) which was attended by the sergeants and squad leaders of the two
platoons selected for the raid.[341]
[341] Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise
specified, are Maj J. B. Ord, Jr., intervs of 3 Sep and
24 Oct 58; and Appendix VI, 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, a
five-page special action report of the operation.
This command group carried out a second reconnaissance forward of the
MLR on 31 December, proceeding until they ran into enemy sniper fire.
Captain Ord requested aerial reconnaissance and three missions were
flown by observation planes of Major Kenneth C. Smedley’s VMO-6.
Line DUCK and the assigned battalion sector limited the objective area.
On a basis of these restrictions as well as reconnaissance reports,
Ord recommended an operational area containing three objectives, each
of which represented a point where the enemy was not likely to be
encountered. These objectives were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Pratt
and formed the basis of the battalion order.
The task organization for the raid included two attached How Company
units, the machine gun platoon (-), and 60mm mortar section, commanded
by Second Lieutenants John D. Koutsandreas and James J. Hughes
respectively. Another infantry unit, the 1st Platoon of Item Company,
3/1 (Second Lieutenant William E. Harper), was also attached.
First Lieutenant Francis E. White, How Company executive officer,
remained at the OP with the tactical air-control party, which had an
observation plane on strip alert in case the raiders ran into artillery
or mortar fire. A forward air controller with radioman accompanied
the raiding party as well as artillery, 4.2″, and 81mm mortar forward
observers. An interpreter, the assistant battalion surgeon, and a
corpsman were included, and wiremen had the assignment of laying a line.
Hill 812 (Map 20) was the jumping-off place for the column of files in
ghostly white snow suits with hoods. Boots were dark in contrast but
the snow was deep enough to hide them. The drifts slowed up the wiremen
and an infantry fire team protected them at their work.
The first objective consisted of bunkers and suspected mortar positions
which had been reported by tactical air observers as recently occupied
by the enemy. They were empty when the raiding party reached them,
and the Marine column proceeded toward Objective 2, an ambush site
overlooking and commanding a crossing of the Soyang-gang.
The selected area for the support group was located nearby, and there
the machine gun section and riflemen took positions on a nose with the
wiremen, radiomen, and corpsman in the center. While these elements
peeled off, the raiding party continued toward the ambush site, where
it was planned to lie in wait two hours for the enemy. A suspected mine
field had to be crossed and Captain Ord directed his men to advance in
single file, stepping carefully in the footprints ahead. Twelve Marines
had passed safely when the 13th became the victim of a mine explosion.
The corpsman found broken bones but none of the usual torn flesh and
hemorrhaging, thanks to the new thermal boots issued during the winter
of 1951–1952.[342]
[342] Later in the chapter this innovation will be described.
The temperature was zero with a sharp wind blowing. Some of the Marines
had to shed clothing to keep the casualty warm during the forced
immobility, and the raiding party commander broke radio silence by
requesting permission of Captain Ord, in the support group area, to
pull back to that position and set up the ambush.
Permission was granted by Ord after radio consultation with the
battalion commander on the How Company OP. The raiding party remained
in ambush formation on Objective 2 for two hours without seeing or
hearing an enemy. By that time the condition of the mine casualty had
deteriorated to such an extent that Lieutenant Colonel Pratt gave
permission for a return to the MLR without proceeding to Objective 3.
He directed that the raiders split and take two routes in the hope of
capturing a prisoner, since a light enemy probing attack on the MLR
had just been reported by Item Company of 3/1. This proved to be a
fortunate decision, for two NKPA soldiers were seized. The main object
of the raid had thus been fulfilled, even though little action was seen
during the five-hour operation.
Raids of this sort may seem anticlimactic when compared to the fights
in the same area during the first three weeks of September. But the
Marines were showing adaptability in conforming to a warfare of
position that was contrary to all their offensive training. Careful
reconnaissance, detailed planning, and minimal risks--these were the
elements of defensive tactics in which large forces had to content
themselves with small gains.
_Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command_
On 11 January 1952 the 1st Marine Division had its second change of
command in Korea when Major General John T. Selden relieved General
Thomas. The new commanding general was born at Richmond, Virginia, and
educated there at McGuire’s University School. Before the United States
entered World War I, he tried to join the Canadian Army but was warned
that he would lose his American citizenship. In January 1915, at the
age of 21, he enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps and saw two
years of active duty on jungle patrols in Haiti. Commissioned as a
second lieutenant in 1918, he served in ocean convoys during World War
I.
Sea duty, China duty, and more Haiti duty occupied him during the
postwar years. The outbreak of World War II found him a Scouting Force
Marine Officer aboard the _Indianapolis_. After that he had three main
assignments: personnel and intelligence officer of I Marine Amphibious
Corps; commanding officer of the 5th Marines in the New Britain
operation; and chief of staff of the 1st Marine Division at Peleliu.
Brigadier General William J. Whaling remained on duty as Assistant
Division Commander. The new staff officers were Colonel Richard G.
Weede, Chief of Staff; Colonel Walter N. Flournoy, G-1; Lieutenant
Colonel James H. Tinsley, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle, G-3;
and Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., G-4.
A change of FMFPac command had taken place on 1 January. Lieutenant
General Franklin H. Hart relieved General Shepherd, who became
Commandant of the Marine Corps as General Cates finished his four-year
term. General Hart paid his first visit to the 1st Marine Division late
in January.
The new FMFPac commander found the Marines occupying essentially the
same positions they had defended since late September. About two-thirds
of the 12¼-mile MLR on Line MINNESOTA (Map 20) was good defensive
ground. It had been strengthened by an elaborate system of trenches and
bunkers behind miles of barbed wire.[343]
[343] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are
the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan, Feb, and Mar 52, and _PacFlt
Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX.
In the left-central portion of the Marine sector, the enemy held the
dominating terrain. This was particularly true of the rugged area just
west of Hill 812, where the opposing trenches were only 50 to 150 yards
apart. There a fire-raked landmark, known to the Marines as Luke the
Gook’s Castle, had been made into a strong point by the enemy. Its base
was a maze of trenches and bunkers, and the 20-foot granite knob could
have been taken only at an excessive cost in casualties. Although this
bastion was hit repeatedly by almost every type of supporting ordnance,
it was never completely destroyed nor denied to the enemy.
Operations of trench warfare had inevitably shaken down into a daily
routine of sniping by day and patrols or raids by night. Marine
artillery, mortars, and stationary tank fire, occasionally reinforced
by naval guns, played an increasingly important part in the coordinated
destruction of NKPA defenses. As a result the enemy was limited for the
most part to well camouflaged reverse slope positions.
Because of the 1st Marine Division’s defensive mission and the
constant rotation of the more experienced personnel back to the United
States, it was considered that men assigned to infantry elements, in
particular, needed additional training in small unit leadership and
offensive tactics. Consequently the regiments were rotated at monthly
intervals to the reserve area near Wontong-ni, where Camp Tripoli
had been established for training. An average of 84 NCOs a week
completed a 168-hour special course of instruction over a four-week
period. The program for the rank and file was so intensive, according
to one report, that “it was considered a relief by some Marines to
cease training and return to the relatively quiet life on the front
lines.”[344]
[344] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX, 9–11.
The truce talks at Panmunjom continued to influence operations at the
front. A demilitarized zone having been proposed in anticipation of
an armistice, preparations were begun by the 1st Marine Division to
develop the defenses along Line ICELAND, generally conforming to the
Line KANSAS of Marine fights early in September. It was to be used as
a new line of defense if the UN and Communist delegates reached an
agreement.
Perhaps because other offensive tactics were so curtailed,
psychological warfare had its heyday in the winter months of 1952.
Propaganda leaflets were dropped from planes or fired by 105mm
howitzers. At vantage points along the front, loud speakers bombarded
the Communists with surrender appeals in their own language. The
effects could not be evaluated with any degree of certainty, but it was
hoped that the enemy did not respond with the amused indifference shown
by the Marines toward Red propaganda.
_Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated_
The average low temperature for January 1952, was 11 degrees
Fahrenheit. This was mild weather as compared to the subzero readings
of the previous winter. Only 10 slight frostbite cases were reported
for the month in contrast to the 3,083 nonbattle casualties, nearly
all frostbite cases, incurred during the two weeks (27 November to 10
December 1950) of the Chosin Reservoir breakout.
The improvement in January 1952 could not be credited entirely to more
clement weather. It was due in greater measure to one of the most
noteworthy innovations of the Korean war--the insulated rubber combat
boot, which proved much superior to the shoe pac of the past winter.
U.S. Army experiments dated back to 1944. They were dropped three years
later after efforts to perfect a boot with sealed insulation failed
to meet the test of long marches. The Navy had more promising results
with the boot during the winter of 1948–1949 when Arctic clothing
tests were conducted at Point Barrow, Alaska. Army and Navy tests at
Mt. Washington, New Hampshire, the following winter were inconclusive.
Marine Corps tests were held during the first four months of 1951 at
the following places: MCEB, Quantico; Fort Churchill, Manitoba; Big
Delta, Alaska; Pickel Meadows, California; and the Naval Medical Field
Research Laboratory (NMFRL), Camp Lejeune.
“In addition to engineering tests,” states the Marine report, “the
insulated rubber boots have been worn by test subjects selected from
a variety of backgrounds; under conditions of activity varying from
strenuous marching for 20 miles to complete immobility; in ambient
temperatures from 58° to -42° F.; over terrain ranging from soft snow
[to] hard snow, ice, sand, rocky ground, mud, gravel, water, and iced
river banks; for periods of time corresponding to a normal working day
and more than 72 hours. As now constructed, the insulated rubber boot,
employing the vapor barrier principle, meets the requirements outlined
previously and is satisfactory for use by Marine Corps ground troops in
cold climate areas, supplanting the shoe-pac combination....”[345]
[345] LtCol G. W. Hardwick, “Summary of Marine Corps Experience
with IRB [Insulated Rubber Boot], Rpt of 8 May 1951.”
Other sources for the development of the boot, also found
in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps, are as follows:
G. E. Folk, Abstract of Bowdoin College Rpt, Jun 1951,
“The Penetration of Water into the Human Foot;” G-4 Rpt,
“Resume of Activity re Insulated Rubber Boot,” 7 Feb
1952; G-4 Rpt, “Boot, Rubber, Insulated, Cold Weather,”
28 Nov 51; G-4 Rpt, “Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insulated,
Rubber,” n.d.; MajGen J. T. Selden memo to CMC, 26 Apr 52.
The distinguishing feature of the “thermal boot,” as it came to be
popularly known, is an air space between the inner and outer layers
of wool pile insulation, both of which are completely sealed off by
latex from any contact with moisture. This air space, under pressure,
produces a vapor barrier such that heat cannot readily escape when it
is emitted from the foot. Thus the wearer of the boot supplies his
own warmth, which is retained as long as he is active, regardless of
prevailing temperatures. If, however, the walls of the air space are
punctured and the insulation becomes wet, the moisture collected within
the boot freezes at low temperatures if the wearer remains inactive. In
such cases, severe frostbite may result.
Some of the tests were spectacular. One subject poured water containing
pieces of ice into his boots and donned frozen socks before putting on
the footgear. After 10 minutes of walking, the ice in the boots had
turned to warm water, and there was no harmful effect on the man.
Another subject waded across a knee-deep creek at a temperature of
zero. Before he had marched a mile in the snow, his feet had warmed the
water in the boots, although his pants were frozen so stiff that he
could scarcely walk.
Seldom has a military innovation been tested so thoroughly and
scientifically in such a short time. Colonels Ion M. Bethel and John
F. Stamm of Marine Corps Headquarters took a leading part in the
development and procurement phases along with Lieutenant Colonel Gordon
A. Hardwick. Major Vernon D. Boyd and Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. were
active in the troop acceptance tests.
A good many “bugs” had to be eliminated before the boot met with
complete Marine approval. The manufacturer’s modifications were
effected with minimal delay.
It is perhaps needless to add that the thermal boot was not foolproof.
Protection continued in subzero weather for at least an hour after
the termination of activity, but it was inviting frostbite to remain
motionless much longer. Socks had to be changed every 12 hours, and
foot cleanliness and hygiene could not be neglected.
If a few such simple rules were observed, a man had virtually perfect
frostbite protection in the coldest weather. In fact, it was seriously
proposed that a Marine casualty of this sort should be charged with
misconduct if he acquired his frostbite while provided with thermal
boots and a change of socks.
In view of the tests and negotiations with the manufacturers, it was a
marvel of promptness when the first shipment of boots reached the 1st
Marine Division in August 1951, long before the advent of cold weather.
Distribution to the Division was completed by 15 November. Throughout
the winter the experience of all units concerned was reported to
Division headquarters. And in a memorandum of 26 August 1952 to the
Commandant, General Selden expressed his approval: “The boot, rubber,
insulated, is considered an excellent item of cold weather equipment.
It is far superior to the shoe pac.”
The acceptance by the rank and file went so far that the “Mickey Mouse
boot,” as it was sometimes dubbed, acquired a reputation for protecting
the wearer against antipersonnel mines. Some wounds apparently were
reduced in severity by this protection, but it could not be claimed
that the boot qualified as armor.
Production by the manufacturer kept pace with Division and Air Wing
requirements in Korea. By 14 December 1951 about 90,000 pairs of boots
and 2,000 patching kits had been received at San Francisco--more than
enough to take care of the 6,500 pairs needed monthly for resupply
under combat conditions.
The thermal boot was here to stay.
_500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea_
Marine body armor was just then about to meet its first large-scale
test in the field. It had cleared its preliminary hurdle during the
tests from 14 June to 13 October 1951 (see Chapter VIII) when a joint
Army-Navy Medical Commission endorsed 40 vests worn in action by troops
of the 5th Marines and two Army infantry regiments.
On 9 November, at Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine officers were
briefed on the successful results in Korea by the two Navy officers
who helped supervise the tests, Commander John S. Cowan (MC) USN, and
Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN.
That same day the commanding general of FMFPac stated an
operational requirement for 500 armored vests to be sent to the 1st
Marine Division. And on 16 November the Commandant approved the
standardization and procurement of vests to be designed by the Naval
Medical Field Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune and air-shipped to
Korea not later than 31 January 1952.[346]
[346] Sources for this section, except when otherwise
specified, are the following: ACofS, G-4, Rpts of 2 Jan,
29 Feb, and 15 May 52 (in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine
Corps); Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCEB, Quantico, Va.,
3 Jan 1952; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, ltr of 30 Jun 1954;
LtCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 1954.
So many problems remained to be solved that it was nip and tuck whether
Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his NMFRL colleagues would make the
deadline. On 11 December 1951 another body armor meeting was held
at Marine Corps Headquarters, attended by Marine representatives.
Lieutenant Commander Lewis and Mr. John F. Quinlan, reporting for the
NMFRL, explained that as a consequence of changes in design to speed up
manufacture, samples submitted to them weighed as much as 10 pounds.
Under no circumstances, said Lewis, would he approve a vest weighing
more than eight pounds, since its success depended so much on troop
acceptance. Despite the fact that only a few weeks remained before the
deadline, Lewis exhibited a vest that he and Quinlan had redesigned by
working around the clock until the armor came within the weight limit
without any sacrifice in protection. This vest was immediately put into
production as the M-1951.
A plastic fibre manufacturer agreed to supply 70,000 Doron plates, and
a Philadelphia sportswear company contracted to manufacture the first
500 vests, plus an additional 2,500 to be delivered by 30 March 1952.
The M-1951 was described in Marine reports as “a zippered, vest-type,
sleeveless jacket constructed of water-resistant nylon incorporating
two types of armor. One, a flexible pad of basket-weave nylon, covers
the upper chest and shoulder girdle; the other, overlapping curved
Doron plates, covers the lower chest, back and abdomen. These Doron
plates consist of several layers of fibre glass cloth, bonded or
laminated together with a resin.... Although the ballistic properties
of the flexible pads of basket-weave nylon and the Doron plates are
virtually the same, by using the rigid plates where flexibility is not
mandatory the problem of protrusion and the resultant wounds under the
armor is reduced.”[347]
[347] ACofS, G-4, “Instructional Information, Vest, Armored,
M-1951,” 5–6.
Marine wearers of the M-1951 were warned that it would not stop rifle
or machine gun bullets unless they had lost much of their velocity at
long ranges. The vest was protection against most grenade, mortar, and
artillery fragments, as well as .45 caliber pistol and burp gun slugs
of less than 1,000 feet per second initial muzzle velocity. Wearers did
not escape entirely unscathed, for the impact of the fragment or slug
left painful bruises.
It was a close squeak but the first 500 vests reached Korea with only
a few days to spare. Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. accompanied the
shipment as project officer with a mission of supervising and observing
the use made of the M-1951 in action. His first letter to Headquarters
Marine Corps, dated 4 February 1952, commented that “up to tonight we
have had nine men hit while wearing the vest. One was killed outright
as a 120mm mortar round landed right in his lap. However, the other
eight showed excellent results. All of the eight were wounded in
other places not covered by the vest--but they are all WIA instead of
KIA.”[348]
[348] Capt D. W. McGrew, Jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, ltr of 4
Feb 52.
Captain McGrew cited the instance of a Pfc of the 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines, wounded by the explosion of an 82mm mortar shell only 15 feet
in front of him. He received several fragments in the face and his leg
was fractured. But there were some 45 holes in his vest, without any
penetrations. Fifteen of the fragments had been large enough to inflict
mortal chest or abdomen wounds.
The 500 vests were issued only to troops in particularly hazardous
situations, such as patrols to the enemy lines. Upon returning from a
patrol or raid, the wearers turned in their armor to be worn by other
Marines under fire.
“The reaction of the user to the vest,” reported McGrew, “is closely
related to the amount of enemy activity. In sectors of the OPLR and
MLR [outpost and main lines of resistance] where heavy incoming mortar
and artillery fire was received, there were no complaints regarding
the weight or restrictive features of the vest. In other sectors where
there was little or no enemy activity, approximately 15 percent of the
personnel complained that the vest was heavy and restricted movement to
some degree. Approximately 2 percent of the wearers in these sectors
thought the vest was not worth the trouble and would wear it only when
ordered to do so.”[349]
[349] ACofS, G-4, “Report of Field Test of Armored Vest,
M-1951,” 15 May 51.
The project officer believed that a “significant reduction” in KIA
casualties could be credited to the M-1951, but that WIA figures were
only slightly lessened. That was because so many wearers were wounded
who would have been killed save for the armor. Captain McGrew listed
the following case histories, confirmed by medical officers:
Men who would have been killed instead of wounded if they had
lacked armor protection--23:
Men who had potentially severe wounds reduced to superficial
wounds--29;
Men who had superficial wounds prevented altogether--31.
The project officer had no opportunity to compare the casualties of
vest wearers with those of an equal number of unprotected Marines
taking part in the same action. It was his conclusion, based on
observation, that “use of the vest by all personnel who are habitually
forward of battalion command posts may result in as much as a 30
percent reduction in battle casualties. Because many WIA cases are
the result of wounds of the extremities and/or multiple wounds, there
probably will not be a large reduction of casualties in this category.
It is believed that the largest reduction will occur in the KIA
category and that this reduction will be substantial.”[350]
[350] _Ibid._
The introduction of body armor was not heralded in the press by page
one headlines such as had announced the first transport helicopter
operations in Korea. Occasionally a photograph on page eight showed a
Marine grinning triumphantly while pointing to a hole in his armored
vest and holding aloft the jagged mortar fragment that might otherwise
have killed him. But it is safe to say that a majority of Stateside
newspaper readers and radio listeners in 1951 were unaware of the
Marine revival of armor adapted to 20th-century warfare.
Press correspondents in Korea did not appear to grasp the tactical
significance of an innovation which they regarded entirely as a
humanitarian achievement. From a strictly military viewpoint, however,
it was apparent that if the M-1951 could reduce casualties by 30
percent, as Captain McGrew estimated (and his estimate was later
regarded as conservative), it would mean that a like reduction had been
effected in the destructive potential of the enemy’s best antipersonnel
weapons. It was as if the Marines were able to slip behind the enemy’s
lines and silence 3 out of 10 of his howitzers, mortars, burp guns, and
grenades.
This was of particular importance in overcoming the numerical
superiority of the Communists. Not only did each American wound
casualty reduce the effectiveness of a unit, but four or more comrades
were often neutralized as stretcher bearers in Korean mountain terrain.
If body armor could prevent 3 casualties out of 10, therefore, it
would be a significant addition to a unit’s numerical strength as well
as combat morale.
Any doubts about Marine troop acceptance of the M-1951 were laid to
rest by the approval of the 500 vests issued early in February 1952. An
additional 2,500 arrived early in March and on the 13th of that month
the Division ordered 25,000 more. The armored vest, like the thermal
boot, had needed only a thorough trial to become standard equipment.
_Helicopter Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE
The combat helicopter, oldest of the three Marine tactical innovations
in Korea, had already managed to make routine performances out of
operations that once claimed headlines. Battalion troop lifts were no
longer a novelty, and supplying a front-line company by air was taken
for granted. But nothing quite as ambitious as Operation MULETRAIN had
ever been attempted--the mission of completely supplying a battalion on
the MLR for a week with a daily average of four helicopters.
Hill 884 was again the objective. Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon’s HMR-161
was given the task of flying tentage, stoves, rations, and ammunition
from supply dumps to the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.
It was the first opportunity for HMR-161 to try out improvements in
helicopter “flying crane” techniques credited to Major Charles E.
Cornwell. He had adapted the underslung nets, controlled manually
from the cabin, which did a better job than the pallet, or portable
platform, for many types of cargo.
An average altitude of 2,300 feet for the five landing places made it
necessary to reduce the payload to 850 pounds. Yet HMR-161 handled
the assignment during the first week of 1952 with about one-third of
its aircraft while the remainder went about routine chores. So well
did four helicopters keep ahead of schedule that sometimes they flew
in more cargo than could be immediately unloaded at the objectives.
Following are the statistics of the seven days:
Pounds lifted, 150,730; Hours of flight time, 91.7; Loads lifted,
219; Average of miles flown, 9.6
Three days later, Operation CHANGIE-CHANGIE began on 10 January 1952.
Like Operation BUMBLEBEE three months earlier, this was a battalion
relief lift. Yet it differed from its predecessors in that troops
were to be flown from Field X-83 to sites on the company instead of
battalion level, the former being only 200 yards behind the front
line.[351]
[351] Sources for the helicopter operations described in this
section are the following: HMR-161, _HD_, Jan and Feb 51;
_Cavalry of the Sky_, 176–175. Veterans of the Korean
conflict will recall that “changie-changie” meant “swap”
in the pidgin English serving as a conversational medium
between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable
to a relief operation.
In December the loading zone and landing site duties formerly assigned
to a platoon of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, were taken over by the
1st Air Delivery Platoon, Service Command, FMFPac. First Lieutenant
William A. Reavis and 35 enlisted men had a mission “to prepare
and deliver supplies by air, whether by parachute, air freight,
or helicopter.” These specialists were in charge during Operation
CHANGIE-CHANGIE when the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel
Edward G. Kurdziel) relieved Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1st Battalion,
5th Marines. The operation was conducted smoothly by helicopters flying
in defilade throughout the approach, landing, and return phases.
Operation MOUSETRAP, from 14 to 17 January, was planned primarily as
a test of the ability of HMR-161 to launch an antiguerrilla attack on
short notice. Colonel McCutcheon and Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell were
alerted at 0100 in regard to a two-company lift scheduled for 1000
that same morning. With “only minor difficulties” they transported 500
Marines to a landing site cleared by the Air Delivery Platoon. Three
similar troop movements were completed by HMR-161 during the next three
days.
If ever a bronze plaque is awarded in commemoration of the first
history-making helicopter troop and supply lifts, it would be fitting
to install it on Hill 884. That bleak and roadless height had its fifth
large-scale operation on 24 February when Lieutenant Colonel Harold
C. Howard’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved the 2d Battalion,
of that same regiment on “Mount Helicopter.” Operation ROTATE was
completed without incident as further evidence that battalion reliefs
by helicopter were now routine.
In spite of the demands made upon HMR-161 helicopters in cold weather
and mountainous terrain, it is noteworthy that no serious mechanical
defects had developed. This six-month record came to an end on 24
February 1952 when Captain John R. Irwin was returning from Seoul to
X-83. Warned by alarming vibrations, he landed to discover that the
broken remnants of the tail assembly had dropped behind him in the snow.
Four days later, while flying a load of logs for bunkers, Captain
Calvin G. Alston’s aircraft was so shaken by vibrations that he
suspected damage from enemy artillery fragments. He made a forced
landing in the snow only to discover another instance of a tail
assembly breakdown.
Colonel McCutcheon grounded all HMR-161 aircraft until the trouble
could be corrected. Not until 14 March, after 16 modified tail
assemblies had been flown to Korea did the Marine transport helicopter
squadron take to the air again.
_The Five Days of Operation_ CLAM-UP
Ground operations continued with little change during February and
the first two weeks of March. The only departure from the well-worn
tactical norm came on 10 February, when EUSAK put Operation CLAM-UP
into effect across the entire UN front.
The purpose was to feign a withdrawal and lure the enemy into sending
out patrols which would yield prisoners to Eighth Army units. A EUSAK
letter of instruction, dated 4 February 1952, asserted that “a policy
of aggressive patrolling has led the enemy to rely upon our patrols
for the maintenance of contact. This situation enables him to maintain
contact without subjecting his troops to the hazard of capture or
casualty.”[352]
[352] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon
the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 1–12; and _PacFlt Interim
Rpt_ No. 4, 9–11 to 9–14.
All corps were directed to “... attempt to decoy the enemy into
dispatching patrols against our lines and ambush and capture such
patrols.”
First Marine Division orders called for an elaborate series of
deceptions. Immediately prior to CLAM-UP, on 9–10 February, the 11th
Marines fired 471 harrassing and interdiction missions, as if to
cover a large-scale withdrawal. Over 12,000 artillery rounds were
expended.[353] Then CLAM-UP commenced, and the three regiments on the
MLR--from left to right, the KMCs, 1st Marines, and 7th Marines--did
their part to hoodwink the enemy. Reserve battalions executed daylight
marches on foot to the rear and returned after dark by means of motor
lifts. The 5th Marines, in Division reserve at Camp Tripoli, executed
similar feigned withdrawals.
[353] 11thMar _HD_, Feb 52, 13; Col B. T. Hemphill comments, 20
Jan 59.
After the Marine cannoneers completed their supposed covering fires,
the front was plunged into an eerie silence. It did not take long,
of course, for the enemy’s curiosity to be aroused. NKPA patrols
reconnoitred the Marine lines on the night of 10–11 February without
being fired upon. The following night a patrol attempted to draw Marine
fire in the Hill 812 area by advertising its presence with loud talk.
The enemy’s fire was not returned until the patrol attacked a Marine
position with white phosphorous grenades. In sheer self-defense the
Marines retaliated, and the North Koreans made a hurried exit, leaving
behind 10 dead and 2 wounded men who became prisoners.
At first light on the 12th another enemy patrol tried to penetrate the
wire in front of a 1st Marines position and paid the penalty with nine
men killed and three wounded in a 15-minute fire fight.
On 13 February the Marines were pounded with the month’s heaviest
concentration of NKPA fire--344 artillery and 1,469 mortar rounds. Thus
did the enemy serve notice of his realization that Marine positions on
the MLR were being held in strength. NKPA patrol actions on the nights
of the 13th and 14th were launched at Marine trenches on Hills 812 and
854 at the estimated cost of heavy casualties.
When Operation CLAM-UP came to an end on 15 February, it had admittedly
fallen short of EUSAK expectations. Although NKPA patrol losses had
been considerable, they were offset by fewer casualties in rear areas
enjoying a five-day immunity from UN artillery fire. Worse yet, the
enemy was enabled during this period of grace to bring up ammunition
and other supplies without interference. As a final disillusionment, it
was reckoned that across the whole Eighth Army front the Communists had
lost fewer prisoners than during the preceding five-day period.
In the Marine combat zone a gain was recorded in enemy casualties.
General Selden congratulated the Division on “the fire discipline
practiced by MLR troops and by platoon and company commanders. As a
consequence of the fire discipline, the line companies were able to
kill 56 enemy and wound 54.” These totals, it was pointed out, were
larger than the losses normally inflicted on the enemy in a five-day
period.[354]
[354] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 3.
On the other hand, five deserters from the mortar company of the 1st
Battalion, 91st Regiment, 45th NKPA Division revealed that advantage
had been taken of Operation CLAM-UP by detailing mortar personnel and
men from the rifle companies to carry ammunition. During the five-day
lull, according to the prisoners, 2,600 rounds were brought up for the
company’s nine mortars.[355]
[355] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ No. 486, Feb 52.
After the brief flurry of Operation CLAM-UP the front quickly settled
down to its old routine of patrols. An average of eight Marine night
ambush patrols and five daylight reconnaissance patrols forward of the
MLR was maintained. The results left much to be desired. Of the last
110 ambuscades and 75 reconnaissance patrols reported in February, only
1 of the former and 6 of the latter claimed contacts. All but one of
the contacts had negligible results.
The Marine fire attack did the enemy more damage. Artillery fired 679
observed missions during the month--211 on troops, 175 on bunkers, 121
on mortars, 96 on artillery, and 75 on such miscellaneous targets as
OPs, vehicles, machine guns, and supply points. This total was recorded
in spite of an ammunition shortage which would ultimately become the
subject of debate in Congress.
Even with supplies of ammunition limited by X Corps orders, Marine
artillery drove the enemy from untenable forward-slope positions to
underground fortifications on the reverse slope.
Naval gunfire was limited by the extreme range to the Division zone
of action.[356] Only large targets forward and to the right of center
could be taken under fire. Even so, the _Wisconsin_ and the _St.
Paul_ scored some devastating hits in February on enemy reverse slope
positions.
[356] The battleship _Wisconsin_ had a main battery of 16-inch
guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy
cruiser _St. Paul_ had a main battery of 8-inch guns with
a maximum range of 16 miles.
On one occasion, the _Wisconsin_ erroneously calculated its deflection.
Two 16-inch rounds landed between the front line and the 3/7 mortar
positions before the fire could be stopped. Fortunately, no one was
injured. The _Wisconsin_ Marine officer happened to be visiting the
Division CP that day, and on hearing the news he came up to 3/7 and
collected a large shell fragment. He stated that he intended to mount
the jagged piece of steel in the ship’s CIC room as a reminder to
future gunners to make no errors in plot.
Observed direct fire by the 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion
(Major Walter E. Reynolds, Jr.) continued to be effective against NKPA
bunkers and gun emplacements. Utilizing the high ground along the MLR,
particularly on Hills 812 and 854, tanks sniped at the enemy both by
day and night.
This was made possible by the powerful lights of a platoon from the
92d U.S. Army Searchlight Company, attached to the 11th Marines. The
mountainous terrain in East Korea was not particularly suited to
“artificial moonlight”--the indirect illumination of a large area which
results from “bouncing” the rays of searchlights off low-lying clouds.
But direct illumination permitted aimed 90mm fire in the darkness and
had the further advantage of blinding the enemy to the tanks themselves
as well as to troop movements behind them. Not a single light was shot
out during the winter in spite of persistent NKPA attempts.
The lessons taught by battlefield illumination in Korea were to be
incorporated into two instructive bulletins after the war. “The enemy
does _not_ have any better night vision than we do,” asserted USMC
Landing Force Bulletin No. 6. “No racial or national group of people
has any inherent physical advantage over another as to capability for
seeing in darkness....[357] The apparent advantage which the enemy
sometimes displays in night operations is due only to a difference
in training. In the case of the Oriental soldier, or the Eskimo, for
example, training usually begins early in life, where he does not have
the convenience of artificial light to the degree we have, and has been
forced to make maximum use of his natural night vision in many of his
normal activities.
“U.S. Forces have conducted many successful night operations after
adequate training. Some units have reported that after intensive night
training, personnel have become so proficient that they sometimes
prefer night operations to daylight operations.”
[357] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night
Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No.
18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56.
In support of this conclusion, records for the winter of 1951–1952
reveal that the Marines held their own very well in the night combats
of no man’s land, where the outcome depended upon immediate decisions
based upon seeing in the dark.
Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, were
23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. Enemy losses
were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 606 estimated WIA,
and 63 prisoners.[358]
[358] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for
this chapter are comments and criticism by the following
officers: (Ranks listed are those held at time of
interview or comment.) Gen G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T.
Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J.
H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T.
Hemphill.
After a winter of positional warfare, the Marines could recall with
better understanding the tales their fathers had told them about
France in World War I. For history was staging one of its repetitions;
and, allowing for improvements in weapons, the trenches of Korea in
1951–1952 differed but slightly from the trenches of the Western Front
in 1917–1918.
CHAPTER XII
The Move to West Korea
_Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in Operation_
MIXMASTER--_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_
No chronicle of activities in Korea would be complete without a
discussion of the truce talks which began in the summer of 1951.
When the Communists proposed these meetings early in June, their
motives were transparent; they were hurt, staggering, and badly in
need of a breathing spell. Pretending a sudden interest in peace, the
hard-pressed enemy requested talks at Kaesong for the purposes of
recuperation.
The enemy would never admit the real damage he suffered. A typical
excuse for the smashing CCF defeat was given in a book by Wilford G.
Burchett, an Australian Communist who was a press correspondent behind
the Chinese lines.
“Immediately prior to the beginning of the talks,” he explained,
“the Korean-Chinese troops had withdrawn extensively along the East
Coast, hoping to entice the Americans as deep as possible into a trap
which would be sprung and would cut them off by an encircling move.
The Americans were seriously nibbling at the bait when the proposal
for cease-fire talks was made. The line was immediately frozen and
Korean-Chinese troops started to dig in.”[359]
[359] Wilford G. Burchett: _This Monstrous War_ (Melbourne,
1953): J. Waters, 121–122. Burchett was a Communist free
lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers. He wrote
several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in
the Korean War.
This beginning of static warfare was unquestionably the great turning
point of a war whose course from that time on was to be decided at
the conference table of Kaesong and later Panmunjom. Any doubts as to
the actual motives of the Communists might have been dispelled upon
reading in Burchett’s book this naive boast of the advantage taken of
the truce talks by the Reds:
Digging in is an understatement of the way the Korean-Chinese
troops literally burrowed into the mountains, constructed two
and three story dwellings underground, linked mountains and
hills by underground tunnels and carved deep communication
trenches linking flank with flank and front with rear. They raked
the insides out of mountains as you would rake ashes out of a
furnace. Each hill, mountain or ridge was connected with its
neighbors by deep, zig-zagged inter-communication trenches, at
least two yards below ground level and with yard-high antiblast
walls. In emergency, troops could be switched from hill-top
to hill-top with the enemy never knowing. Similar trenches
extended well to the rear, so that supplies could be brought
up and withdrawals if necessary made in comparative safety....
Everything was deep underground with many yards of rock and earth
between them and shells and bombs, atomic or otherwise. Back of
the front line positions, similar scooped-out mountain ridges
stretched all the way back to Pyongyang and further. It was
against these positions that Van Fleet began hurling his troops
in August, 1951.[360]
[360] _Ibid._ General Van Fleet did not “hurl” his troops
against anything. He began limited offensives for the
purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining
offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, ltr of 28
Feb 59.
The breathing spell provided by preliminary truce talk discussions gave
the Communists an opportunity they had not previously enjoyed. Not only
did they have time to prepare sturdy and effective entrenchments, but
they were able to bring up additional mortars and artillery to equal
those of the Allied forces. As a further advantage, while “free from
the compulsion of impending military disaster,”[361] they made use
of the interlude to reorganize and train NKPA divisions to a new and
increased level of effectiveness.
[361] C. Turner Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 28.
Communists are never embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement
already reached, and once having accomplished their intermediate goal,
the Red delegates broke off the Kaesong talks for a while. Once the
pressure on them was reduced, the enemy was in a position to try to
obtain the most favorable terms for armistice talks, even if it meant
prolonging the fighting.
The change in tactics soon became apparent. “Since the opening of the
Kaesong conference,” commented a FECom G-2 report, “the enemy has
deviated from his usual tactics of ‘flexible defense’ which he so
skilfully employed during the buildup period prior to all his past
offensives--to that of a more orthodox ‘fixed defense.’ Where the enemy
in the past has defended key terrain features with relatively small
groups to delay friendly forces, he has now changed over to tactics of
a fixed line of defense to be defended at all costs.”[362]
[362] FECom G-2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51.
“The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armistice Conference
by the Communists was in connection with the exchange of prisoners of
war,”[363] which subject will be discussed in Volume V of this series.
The United Nations contended that all prisoners should be “screened”
to determine whether they wished to return to their side of origin. No
prisoner was to be returned against his wishes. The Communists claimed
this treatment consisted of a reign of terror in which CCF prisoners
were held at gunpoint.
[363] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 53.
Some prisoners held in UN camps rioted and injuries and deaths
resulted. This provided the Communists with excellent propaganda on
which to denounce our principles of no forced repatriation.[364] In
the end, after a delay of more than 14 months of war, the Communists
finally did accept this principle, and an armistice was achieved.
[364] _Ibid._
The Communist delaying tactics were not entirely without benefits
to the Allied forces, for the major part of the 1st Marine Division
had the opportunity to go into reserve and engage in several weeks’
intensive training. While the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was busily
participating in the interdiction activities of Operation STRANGLE,
General Van Fleet and his ground commanders felt frustrated over their
orders to “sit tight” rather than attack and prevent further enemy
buildup.
An agreement to resume cease-fire talks, this time at Panmunjom, led to
a EUSAK order which committed the 1st Marine Division and other major
units to a defensive stand behind a fixed line of demarcation on 20
September 1951 (Map 19). Further negotiations resulted in a month’s
lull which was brought about by the fact that the delegates could
not agree on where the lines would remain if the fighting stopped.
The United States delegates pressed for a settlement within a 30-day
period. The Communists continued to stall. The United States then
consented to accept the present (then current) demarcation line if the
Communists agreed within the 30-day period.[365]
[365] Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59.
The significance of these dates was to become more and more plain as
the conflict dragged on into 1952 with both sides on the defensive,
limiting themselves to the raids and patrols of positional warfare
while the appointed representatives haggled for a truce. Although the
Marines did not realize it, the war had already turned into a contest
of watchful waiting and fierce local fights.
This line of demarcation left the Eighth Army holding a MLR across
one of the narrowest parts of the peninsula (Map 22). Just behind
the Communist MLR the peninsula bulged to the west. This meant that
the enemy had to devote much of his effort to mining the waters and
defense of many beaches against a surprise amphibious attack, and it
necessitated keeping in operation long and vulnerable supply lines.
It is probable that a UN breakthrough or successful amphibious
operation could have been mounted at this time,[366] for several high
ranking officers expressed such opinions. All the necessary ingredients
were available, yet the high level decision for such an operation was
not made.
[366] BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59.
_Tactical Innovations_
Until World War II, it had been a deserved reproach throughout the
brief history of our country that Americans were never prepared at the
outset of a war. A welcome departure from this tenet came in 1942 when
the Marine Corps and Navy introduced the new amphibious tactics they
had developed during the 1930s. Victory in the Pacific War was due in
large measure to the techniques, landing craft, and vehicles of the
Navy-Marine Corps ship-to-shore attack.
As a result, North Africa, Europe, and the Japanese-occupied islands of
the Pacific were opened to invasion without a single major reverse. In
contrast, Hitler’s _Wehrmacht_ lacked both the techniques and equipment
to launch a cross-channel attack on England in 1940, and Operation SEA
LION was of necessity abandoned by an army that dominated the rest of
Europe as a result of victories in land warfare.
Again, in Korea, the Marines demonstrated their foresightedness
by taking a prominent part in the development of such important
innovations as combat helicopters, body armor, and thermal
footwear.[367] By the first month in 1952 the combat helicopter had
proved to be of immeasurable assistance in modern warfare, in the
beginning of the Korean War the “chopper” was initially used for
command and liaison flights and reconnaissance missions. Evacuation of
casualties and rescue missions also became routine duties, and within
a short time the helicopter became the favorite “workhorse” for a
variety of tasks. In September of 1951 tactical troop movements began.
These operations made newspaper headlines everywhere.
[367] Previous chapters discuss the background and development
of these innovations.
Of greater tactical importance, at least in the opinion of the
front-line rifleman, was the physical protection provided him. The
armored vest and the new thermal boots were first tested by Marines
late in 1951 and soon came to be highly desired items of equipment.
The fighting men in Korea would not disagree with Benjamin Franklin’s
statement that “there never was a good war,” but modern inventions
certainly improved conditions by providing for the safety and comfort
of the fighting men. Marine transport helicopters and body armor were
of particular importance because they added to the human resources
of UN forces opposed by an enemy with a contempt for life, based on
seemingly endless reserves of manpower. UN commanders in their fight
against the Communist forces could not recklessly expend lives as did
the enemy; therefore, the Allies had need of tactical innovations and
life-saving devices in order to compensate for a lack of numbers.
_The Marines in Operation_ MIXMASTER
In the spring of 1952, when the UN and Communist forces were facing
each other from static positions and fighting local engagements,
Operation MIXMASTER took place. MIXMASTER was a complicated
rearrangement of UN divisions across the entire Korean front during
March, and involved the shuffling of about 200,000 men and their
equipment over distances from 25 to 180 miles. It was a severe test of
Eighth Army mobility.[368]
[368] Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59.
General Van Fleet visited the 1st Marine Division CP on 12 March 1952,
and announced an important command decision. After six months of
defensive warfare in the same sector along Line MINNESOTA (20 September
1951 to 16 March 1952) the Division was to move across the peninsula to
West Korea.
[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
15 MARCH 1952
MAP 22]
The Marines had orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take
over a sector at the extreme left of the Eighth Army line under the
operational control of I Corps (Map 22). There they would have the
responsibility for blocking Korea’s historic invasion route to Seoul.
The reasons behind this EUSAK decision were summarized in the 1st
Marine Division report as follows:
(1) The abandonment of plans to carry out an amphibious
envelopment somewhere on the east coast;
(2) Concern over weaknesses in the Kimpo area defenses;
(3) The overall situation would not permit loss of ground on the
EUSAK left (South Korea) as this would endanger the capital at
Seoul; that if retraction of lines was necessary, territory could
better be sacrificed on the right (North Korea) where the country
was mountainous and had little economic or strategic value.[369]
[369] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52, 1–2.
Up to this time the four corps of the Eighth Army had defended a
125-mile front across the peninsula (Map 22) with the following units
in line from left to right on 15 March 1952.
I CORPS--ROK 1st Division; British Commonwealth Division; U.S. 3d
Infantry Division (-); U.S. 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma
National Guard); ROK 9th Division. In reserve were the ROK 8th
Division and RCT-65 of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division.
IX CORPS--U.S. 2d Infantry Division; ROK 2d Division; U.S. 40th
Infantry Division (California National Guard); ROK 3d Division.
In reserve were the U.S. 7th Infantry Division (-), RCT-17 of
that Division, and the ROK Capitol Division.
X CORPS--ROK 7th Division; U.S. 25th Infantry Division; U.S. 1st
Marine Division (including 1st KMC Regiment). In reserve was
the ROK 6th Division (-).
I ROK CORPS--ROK 5th Division (-). In reserve was the ROK 11th
Division (-).[370]
[370] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 52, 13–14.
Allowing for a few changes, these were the positions held by major
EUSAK units through the winter of 1951–1952.
The Marine move was launched by Division Operation Plan 2-52 and
provided that the 1st Marine Division would be relieved by the 8th ROK
Division as a preliminary to movement overland and by sea to the relief
of the 1st ROK Division and defense of Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps
sector in the west. According to verbal orders later confirmed by EUSAK
OI 272, transportation by truck and ship was specified, and the move
was to be completed prior to 1 April.[371]
[371] Sources for this section are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52,
9–10; 1st MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52; 7th MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52.
Obviously such a transplacement--moving entire divisions great
distances from one sector of the MLR to another--necessitated careful
timing and close coordination, but the planners involved were equal to
the task. In referring to detailed plans by the Division G-3 Section
(Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle) and the G-4 Section (Colonel
Robert A. McGill), several unit commanders expressed the opinion that
“the move from east to west was a masterpiece of logistical efficiency
with no unnecessary paper work and no undue harrassment.”[372]
[372] Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others.
In addition to transporting the Division, the arrival of replacements
and departure of personnel to be rotated to the United States were
smoothly coordinated into the over-all plan. The transport _General
W. H. Gordon_ anchored at Sokcho-ri on 16 March with 174 officers and
1,135 enlisted men of the 18th Replacement Draft. The newly arrived
Marines scarcely had time to drop their seabags before they joined the
motor march to West Korea. The _Gordon_ departed with 103 officers and
1,135 Marines homeward bound, and the 2d Logistical Command (Army)
received a 1st Marine Division request to route the 19th Replacement
Draft, due in April, to Inchon instead of Sokcho-ri.
At K-50, near Sokcho-ri on the east coast, air freight and passenger
service was discontinued and diverted to the new Division airhead,
K-16, at Seoul. The Division railhead was changed to Munsan-ni (Map 22).
The first Marine unit to depart for West Korea was the KMC Regiment
with its organic battalion of artillery. Since the artillery had
to be moved and repositioned all across the front with as little
interruption as possible in overall support available at any one time,
the 11th Marines CO planned to move his battalions directly into
their new firing positions. This was preceded by an initial detailed
reconnaissance.
Elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry sideslipped to the right and assumed
responsibility for the Marine sector on the 17th (Map 22), and the KMCs
and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines moved into their new positions on
18 March. The other artillery battalions followed at two-day intervals,
all battalions firing from their new positions by 24 March.
The movement of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion (less Company A),
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. O’Neill, was an unforgettable
experience. Embarking on LSTs manned by a skeleton Japanese crew, the
vessels headed for the Kimpo Peninsula. The weather was squally and
foggy throughout, and the ships were completely blacked out at night
with no facilities for emergency transmission of messages. There were
many navigational hazards, but in spite of this, and the lack of
adequate navigational equipment, the LSTs arrived at their destination
without incident.
Two days later, on 20 September, the 1st Tank Battalion and the
antitank companies of the three infantry regiments also took the sea
route to the new Division area in the west.
Division Operation Order 8-52, dated 18 March, directed the 1st Marines
to proceed by motor march from the Division reserve area at Camp
TRIPOLI to the new Division area east of Munsan-ni, and there to move
into front line positions. The 7th Marines, after being relieved on the
20th by elements of the 8th ROK Division, assembled at Camp TRIPOLI
and moved by truck to West Korea. Colonel Austin R. Brunelli, who had
replaced Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., as chief of staff, moved the
forward CP personnel and prepared the new Division command post.
After being relieved by the ROKs on the 23d, the 5th Marines departed
their east coast area. Two days later the regiment arrived in the
Munsan-ni area behind the 7th Marines and the remaining elements of the
artillery regiment.
The 5th Marines had originally been scheduled to occupy reserve
positions on the Kimpo Peninsula, but plans were changed en route. The
commanding general and his G-3 were appalled at the Division sector’s
width, and after General Selden had a chance to inspect the areas to
be defended and talk over the situation with the commanders of the 1st
and 7th Marines (Col Sidney S. Wade and Col Russell E. Honsowetz), he
decided that the 5th Marines should go into the line.[373]
[373] _Ibid._
A few hours after the 5th Marines convoy left the east coast on their
140-mile trans-Korea move, helicopters picked up the regimental and
battalion commanders from their respective vehicles in the convoy
and took them to the new Division CP. There they were assigned new
defensive sectors and immediately reconnoitered the ground while
awaiting the arrival of their units. By the time the regiment arrived,
all preparations were made for them to move into positions and relieve
a portion of the thinly stretched line of the 1st Marines.
It had been a busy week for the 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions,
commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman and
Major Herbert E. Pierce. Two hundred Division trucks and a like number
of U.S. Army vehicles made up the long columns that shuttled back and
forth across the peninsula. The plan provided for moving an infantry
regiment every third day. For the drivers this meant a 140-mile trip,
a return trip the following day, and a one-day layover for maintenance
before commencing the new cycle. The artillery battalions, by order of
X Corps, were retained until the latest possible date.
The statistics of Operation MIXMASTER are impressive. It took 5,716
truck loads and 80 DUKW loads to move most of the Division personnel,
gear, and supplies. Sixty-three lowboys (flat-bed trailers) and 83
railroad cars were also utilized in addition to hundreds of jeeps and
jeep trailers. Three LSDs and 11 LSTs sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon
with the heaviest equipment.
During the previous winter a sizable number of prefabricated shelters
had been set up for supporting and headquarters units. Since timber,
logs, and salvage materials were in short supply, the 1st Marine
Division moved large quantities of these materials to the west coast
in order to live as comfortably as possible under static warfare
conditions.
The operations of the 1st Marine Division in defense of the western
sector of Line JAMESTOWN do not come within the scope of Volume IV. The
account of Marine activities in the new sector, under the operational
control of I Corps, will be discussed in the fifth and final volume of
this series.
_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_
During 1951 the Korean War became a most unpopular military venture
among Americans. As a consequence, letters and newspapers from home
caused a certain amount of anxiety among citizen-soldiers in Korea. To
counter any spirit of doubt which may have arisen, military leaders
issued frank and honest replies to inquiring politicians.
The _esprit de corps_ of Marines was high, and they were well aware
of their purpose in Korea. One noted author, on spending a couple of
days among front-line Marines during January of 1952, told a group of
officers at the Division CP that he “was impressed with the morale of
the Marines on the MLR.” He stated that he “had been prepared to find
that they didn’t know what they were fighting for or why they were
there.” However, he was encouraged to find that they knew exactly their
purpose in the Korean fighting.[374]
[374] Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James
Michener’s visit to 1stMarDiv, ltr of 23 Mar 59.
The period of nearly 15 months covered by Volume IV was at that time
the longest stretch of land warfare ever experienced by a major Marine
unit. Even during the numerous island-hopping campaigns of World War
II, the periods of combat were relatively brief for each.
Glancing back over the year 1951 with the benefit of hindsight,
it is evident that Marine “uncommon valor” during this period was
supplemented by such outstanding innovations as helicopter-borne
assaults and lightweight body armor, concepts brought to fruition by
the pressure of combat.
It is also apparent that Marine training, both for officers and
enlisted men, paid off handsomely under the demands of practically
every type of land warfare. The Division chalked up a commendable
record of service fighting on the east-central front. Since the UN
commander desired to have EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped
division near a coast offering a suitable selection of landing
beaches, the Division was originally positioned in the east. Not since
the Inchon landing, however, had the Marines been employed in their
specialty, amphibious assault.
Subsequent to the unprecedented Chosin Reservoir campaign of late 1950
the Division reorganized and refitted in South Korea near Masan. Then
in January and February of 1951 came the prolonged guerrilla-hunting
campaign (Map 5) some 60 air miles north of Masan. Division operations
in this area covered more than 1,000 square miles.[375]
[375] Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 28 Jan 59.
The mountainous terrain offered cover and concealment for the
clandestine operations of far too many enemy groups. A solution to
this problem was found in “rice paddy patrols”--groups ranging from a
fire team to a squad in size which penetrated the mountain areas on
foot to flush out small enemy bands. In retrospect, had one squadron
of helicopters been available at that time, and its quick lift
capabilities utilized, the increased mobility and surveillance would
have made quite a difference in the conduct of the action.
Although land-based Marine air power had been under operational control
of the Fifth Air Force during the Chosin Reservoir fighting, a verbal
agreement allowed the 1st MAW commander to provide directly necessary
support to the 1st Marine Division. At the same time, carrier-based
Marine planes were flying on the west coast along with other Allied
planes harrassing enemy traffic.
During the guerrilla hunt VMO-6 planes provided air support to the 1st
Marine Division while Marine attack aircraft were busy elsewhere along
the Eighth Army front. Marine pilots, operating under JOC control, felt
frustrated because they were unable to provide the timely close air
support desired by the infantry. The Marine viewpoint held that too
many links in the Air Force system of control caused an excessive delay
in bringing air power over the target. This system continued for the
remainder of the year.
As an operation, the guerrilla hunt was merely a series of minor
engagements, but it accomplished its purpose of clearing out most of
the North Korean irregulars who had been a constant threat in the
Eighth Army’s rear. In addition, the numerous small patrols provided
excellent training for the newly arrived replacements.
The Eighth Army seemed to gain new vitality under General Ridgway.
On the 18th of February, when the general learned that the enemy was
withdrawing, he ordered a limited offensive. Operation KILLER began
three days later, and was followed by Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The
purpose of these operations was twofold: (1) General Ridgway wanted
to restore his army’s fighting spirit after its two defeats during
the 1950–1951 winter; and (2) he wished to keep the Chinese Reds off
balance while they prepared for another Communist offensive.
For the Marines these two operations were an experience with a strictly
limited offensive. The advance was “buttoned up” as major units paid
close attention to lateral contact. As the advance continued in March
and April, mud proved to be an adversary second only to a formidable
enemy using delaying tactics, and the Division as a whole had a
thorough workout in the logistics of the offensive under adverse
conditions.
In early April the Division, as part of the Eighth Army, crossed the
38th parallel and continued the attack to the north, the purpose being
to threaten the suspected enemy buildup for an offensive. EUSAK forces
rolled onward while the enemy, using his roving defensive tactics,
fought vigorously and withdrew.
The long-expected enemy counterblow fell on the night of 22 April and
resulted in the 1st Marine Division bearing the brunt of a 48-hour
attack (Map 10). This opening CCF assault in the IX Corps area of
east-central Korea was intended to throw the Eighth Army off balance as
a preliminary to aiming the main blow at I Corps in west Korea.
The CCF attack opened a hole in the MLR large enough for a major
breakthrough, and the Communists apparently expected to exploit
this success to the fullest. However, the Allied line pulled back,
consolidated, and held, as the Division’s reserve regiment was thrown
in to stem the tide. As the Marine flank was refused, the units on
the left found themselves facing to the west while stopping the enemy
thrust. Slowly, trading space for time, the Marines contained the enemy
attack while the entire Eighth Army line organized new positions.
The enemy effort ground to a halt in the east-central sector, and the
Chinese Reds were contravened in their attempt to take Seoul by May
Day. Surprise and impetus were lost on the western front when they
struck several days later, only to be stopped with frightful losses
after a few gains on regimental fronts. The Allied line now held firm.
The Division’s war of maneuver had worked well in halting this round
of the CCF offensive, but the Communists were far from finished. As 17
enemy divisions were still available to attack, the Marine division was
shifted to the east on 1 May in preparation for an expected battle.
On the 16th of May the Chinese offensive again opened, with the enemy
hitting more to the east than had been expected, and making a deep
but narrow penetration near the coast. The Marines moved eastward,
established blocking positions, and engaged fringe units of the drive.
This allowed the right flank Army division to move farther east and
brake the enemy’s rush.
The enemy was dangerously overextended when the UN counterstroke hit
him late in May. For a month the Eighth Army attacked and advanced, the
Marines slugging ahead day after day in the X Corps zone of action.
CCF casualties mounted high, and Marine veterans of only a few months
of Korean service saw scores of enemy corpses left behind on the
battlefield as the enemy withdrew northward.
This great UN counteroffensive netted prisoners all along the EUSAK
front as remnants of CCF platoons and even companies threw down
their arms. Marines captured their share. Upwards of 10,000 Chinese
surrendered to the Allies in a 10-day period--more prisoners than had
been taken up to this time.
As the Chinese withdrew northward they left determined NKPA troops
behind. The 1st Marine Division moved slowly forward, fighting for
every inch of ground. So fierce was the enemy’s resistance that at
times during June the division commander was forced to commit all four
regiments (the KMCs included) in the attack at the same time in order
to seize designated objectives. This was a modification of accepted
tactical doctrine, necessitated by the situation.
Throughout March, April, and part of May, Marine pilots continued to
provide close air support not only for the 1st Marine Division, but
also for other Allied units as directed by JOC. From the beginning
of Operation STRANGLE on 20 May this interdiction effort had first
priority, and close air support to all infantry units was secondary.
Difficulties in air-ground communication continued as radio frequencies
were heavily burdened with traffic. Although the 1st Marine Division
received a proportionate share of the few air support missions flown,
the frustrating time lag between requests for air support and the
arrival of planes on target continued into the next year.
Some planes were always available for front line support, although
rarely ever enough according to infantrymen’s opinion. When they had
the chance, 1st MAW pilots viciously attacked the fleeing enemy to
ease the way for advancing ground troops. During June the unrelenting
pressure of combined air-ground attacks sometimes caused large groups
of enemy to surrender. Marines also captured thousands of rounds of
enemy ammunition and other equipment.
By the last week in June the Marines had entrenched themselves along
the Division’s assigned portion of the MLR and “caught their breath”
after two months of hard fighting. In driving from the Hwachon
Reservoir area to the Punchbowl, they had employed practically every
weapon and tactic that could be used in an all-out offensive. The
Division then settled down to stable positions for a while, and some
units had the opportunity to go into reserve and train.
It was a recharged 1st Marine Division (the 5th and 11th Marines did
not go into reserve during this period) which moved back into the lines
at the end of August. The offensive which opened northeast of the
Punchbowl on the 30th and lasted with few and brief interludes until 20
September was the equal of the June fighting in sustained ferocity.
All four infantry regiments (including the KMCs) went up against
seemingly impregnable opposition.
The enemy’s “stubborn defense of strong positions and many well-placed
log and earth bunkers was similar to the tenacious tactics of the
Japanese in World War II,” according to a Navy report. “His artillery
and mortar fires were effective, his minefields continued to be
hazardous for many weeks, and his ability to dig in and fortify his
positions [was] always impressive.”[376]
[376] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, 15–25.
After the 20th of September the EUSAK commander ordered that no further
offensives be launched and that the MLR be stabilized. This was a
period of aggressive patrolling, local attacks for more advantageous
pieces of terrain, and watchful waiting to determine the outcome of
truce negotiations. In spite of Operation STRANGLE, enemy vehicular
movements increased at the end of the year, but 1st MAW pilots
continually attempted to provide more support for all the infantry
divisions.
The mission of the 1st Marine Division at this time was to organize,
construct, and defend its sector of the MLR, a front of more than 13
miles. Although there were heavy local skirmishes, during the latter
months of 1951 and the first 3 months of 1952, no great offensive
drives were launched. Essentially, the Marines were engaged in an
aggressive defense of their positions until they moved to West Korea.
While all Marines were hoping that the conflict would soon end, there
was no slackening of the customary vigilance. All hands remembered
General Ridgway’s words of the previous year, that it was “... a fight
for our own freedom, our own survival ...,”[377] and this was their
creed.
[377] See Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1.
These lines would have made a fitting epitaph for Marines who gave
their lives in Korea. They had as worthy a cause as any fighting men of
our history, for it had become increasingly plain since World War II
that a stand must eventually be made against Communist encroachments.
By going halfway around the world to fight the enemy on his own
doorstep, Americans may well have spared themselves a more bloody and
costly future struggle nearer to their own homeland if not actually
on their own soil. The designs of Red China and Soviet Russia were
unmasked in Korea, and the people of the United States awakened to
their peril after neglecting the Nation’s defenses since 1945. To that
extent, therefore, the operations in Korea were a defeat for Communism.
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
ADC--Assistant Division Commander
AdmO--Administrative Order
AD--Douglas “Skyraider” single engine attack plane
AF--Air Force
AH--Hospital Ship
AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon
AirO--Air Officer
AirSptSec--Air Support Section
AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion
AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion
AT--Antitank
AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company
AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company
BB--Battleship
BLT--Battalion Landing Team
Bn--Battalion
Btry--Battery
BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
C-47--Douglas Transport used by Air Force (same as R4D)
CA--Heavy Cruiser
CCF--Chinese Communist Forces
CG--Commanding General
CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CL--Light Cruiser
CO--Commanding Officer
Co--Company
ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing
ComNavFe--Commander Naval Forces Far East
ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet
ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One
ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet
ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort
Force
CP--Command Post
CR--Command Report
C/S--Chief of Staff
CSG--Combat Service Group
CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
CTF--Commander Task Force
CTG--Commander Task Group
CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier
DD--Destroyer
DE--Destroyer Escort
Det--Detachment
DOW--Died of Wounds
EmbO--Embarkation Order/Officer
EngrBn--Engineer Battalion
EUSAK--Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA)
FAC--Forward Air Controller
FAF--Fifth Air Force
FEAF--Far East Air Force
FECOM--Far East Command
F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter-Bomber
F4U-5N--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Night Fighter
F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter
FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO--Forward Observer
FragOrder--Fragmentary Order
Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon
GHQ--General Headquarters
Gru--Group
H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company
HD--Historical Diary
Hedron--Headquarters Squadron
HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter
HqBn--Headquarters Battalion
HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA)
Interv--Interview
ISUM--Intelligence Summary
JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMS--Japanese Minesweeper
JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group
JTF--Joint Task Force
KIA--Killed in Action
KMC--Korean Marine Corps
Ln--Liaison
LSD--Landing Ship, Dock
LSM--Landing Ship, Medium
LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket
LST--Landing Ship, Tank
LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank-Casualty Evacuation
LSU--Landing Ship, Utility
Ltr--Letter
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked
MAG--Marine Aircraft Group
MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing
MS--Manuscript
MedBn--Medical Battalion
MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company (USA)
MIA--Missing in Action
MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA)
MLR--Main Line of Resistance, the main front line
Mosquito--North American AT-6 “Texan” Trainer;
Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and Target Spotting
MP--Military Police
MRO--Movement Report Office
Msg--Message
MSR--Main Supply Route
MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion
NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group
NavFE--Naval Forces Far East
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer
NK--North Korea(n)
NKPA--North Korean People’s Army
N.d.--Date not given
N.t.--Time not given
O--Officer; Order
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
OI--Operation Instruction
OpnO--Operation Order
OpnPlan--Operation Plan
OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion
OY--Consolidated-Vultee Single-Engine Light Observation Plane
PhibGru--Amphibious Group
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report
PLA--People’s Liberation Army
Plat--Platoon
POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
POR--Periodic Operation Report
POW--Prisoner of War
QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA)
R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine designation of
C-47)
R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport
RCT--Regimental Combat Team
Recon--Reconnaissance
Reinf--Reinforced
RktBn--Rocket Battalion
RM--Royal Marines
ROK--Republic of Korea
R&O File--Records and Orders File
ROKA--Republic of Korea Army
ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy
Rpt--Report
SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator
SAR--Special Action Report
Sec--Section
SecDef--Secretary of Defense
ServBn--Service Battalion
SigBn--Signal Battalion
SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company
SitRpt--Situation Report
SP--Shore Party
SMC--Marine Supply Squadron
TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator;
Tactical Air Commander
TACP--Tactical Air Control Party
Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center
T-AP--Transport operated by MSTS
TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Single-Engine Torpedo Bomber.
Also used for Utility Purposes.
TE--Task Element
T/E--Table of Equipment
Tel--Telephone Message
TF--Task Force
TG--Task Group
TkBn--Tank Battalion
Trk--Truck
T/O--Table of Organization
TU--Task Unit
UDT--Underwater Demolition Team
U/F--Unit of Fire
UN--United Nations
UNC--United Nations Command
URpt--Unit Report
USA--United States Army
USAR--United States Army Reserve
USAF--United States Air Force
USMC--United States Marine Corps
USMCR--United States Marine Corps Reserve
USN--United States Navy
USNR--United States Navy Reserve
VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron
VMF(N)--Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron
VMO--Marine Observation Squadron
VMR--Marine Transport Squadron
WD--War Diary
WD Sum--War Diary Summary
WIA--Wounded in Action
APPENDIX B
Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division
Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the
effective strength of the 1st Marine Division throughout the period
1951–1952.
----------+-------+--------+--------+-------
|Organic|Attached|Attached|
Date | USMC | U.S. | KMC | Total
|and USN| Army | |
----------+-------+--------+--------+-------
30 Mar 51 | 25,831| 236 | 3,128 | 29,195
| | | |
30 May 51 | 25,820| 302 | 3,266 | 29,388
| | | |
30 Sep 51 | 24,160| 54 | 3,035 | 27,249
| | | |
30 Mar 52 | 26,140| 59 | 4,378 | 30,577
----------+-------+--------+--------+-------
APPENDIX C
Command and Staff List December 1950-March 1952 1st Marine Division
Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith (to 23 Feb
1951)
BrigGen Lewis B. Puller (from 24
Feb)
MajGen Oliver P. Smith (from 5 Mar)
MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (from 25
Apr)
MajGen John T. Selden (from 11 Jan
1952)
Asst Division Commander BrigGen Edward A. Craig (to 20 Jan
1951)
MajGen Edward A. Craig (from 21
Jan)
BrigGen Lewis B. Puller (from 2
Feb)
BrigGen William J. Whaling (from
20 May)
Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams (to 22 Jan
1951)
BrigGen Gregon A. Williams (from
23 Jan)
Col Edward W. Snedeker (from 27
Jan)
Col Francis M. McAlister (from 23
May)
Col Richard G. Weede (from 10 Jun)
Col Victor H. Krulak (from 29 Jun)
Col Richard G. Weede (from 26 Nov)
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 15
Feb 1952)
Col Austin R. Brunelli (from 23
Mar)
G-1 LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold (to 13
Feb 1951)
Col Bryghte D. Godbold (from 14
Feb)
Col Wesley M. Platt (from 31 May)
Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Sep)
Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 20
Nov)
G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. (to 5
Feb 1951)
LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman (from
6 Feb)
LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (from 8 Mar)
LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 13
Aug)
G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., (to 7
May 1951)
Col Richard G. Weede (from 8 May)
Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 30 Jul)
LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 14 Nov)
G-4 Col Francis M. McAlister (to 25
Jan 1951)
LtCol Charles L. Banks (from 26
Jan)
Col Charles L. Banks (from 14 Feb)
Col Frank P. Hager (from 24 May)
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 19
Nov)
Col Robert A. McGill (from 9 Feb
1952)
_Special Staff_
Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello (to 18 Feb
1951)
LtCol Foster C. LaHue (from 19 Feb)
LtCol Homer E. Hire (from 19 Jun)
Maj James K. Young (from 15 Oct)
Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp (to 20 Apr 1951)
LtCol Edward V. Finn (from 21 Apr)
Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26
Sep 1951)
LtCol Michiel Dobervich (from 27
Sep)
Anti-Tank Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 27 Apr 1951)
Maj William L. Bates (from 28 Apr)
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep)
Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 9 Nov)
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 31 Dec)
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 2 Mar
1952)
Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun
1951)
Maj George M. Warnke (from 16 Jun)
LtCol John T. O’Neill (from 2 Oct)
Artillery Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar
1951)
Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar)
LtCol Custis Burton, Jr. (from 5
Aug)
LtCol George B. Thomas (from 8 Nov)
LtCol Dale H. Heely (from 1 Jan
1952)
Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 11 Jan)
Col Frederick P. Henderson (from
27 Mar)
Chaplain Cmdr Robert M. Schwyhart, USN (to
17 Feb 1951)
Cmdr Francis W. Kelly, USN (from
18 Feb)
Cmdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN
(from 8 Oct)
Chemical Warfare and Radiological
Defense Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 15 Jul 1951)
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep)
Maj Luther H. Hake (from 21 Nov)
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 31 Dec)
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 29 Feb
1952)
Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith, USN (to 20 May
1951)
Cmdr James L. Bradley, USN (from
21 May)
Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (from
15 Jul)
Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse (to 9 Mar 1951)
LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 10
Mar)
LtCol Clifford E. Quilici (from 11
Aug)
LtCol Corbin L. West (from 26 Oct)
LtCol John H. Papurca (from 6 Dec)
Engineer Officer LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun
1951)
LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 11 Jun)
LtCol August L. Vogt (from 19 Sep)
Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C. Conley (to 16 May
1951)
1stLt Frank C. Trumble (from 17
May)
1stLt George W. Krahn (from 29 Aug)
Capt Robert W. Schmidt (from 26
Oct)
Capt Robert J. McKay (from 6 Mar
1952)
Capt Benjamin Reed (from 26 Mar)
Food Director LtCol Norman R. Nickerson (to 6
May 1951)
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 7
May)
1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (from 16
Aug)
Historical Officer 1stLt John M. Patrick (to 26 Jun
1951)
1stLt Theodore L. Richardson (from
27 Jun)
2dLt Francis X. Goss (from 8 Jan
1952)
Inspector Col John A. White (to 26 Apr 1951)
Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Apr)
LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 21
Jun)
Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30
Jun)
LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 1 Oct)
Col William K. Davenport, Jr.
(from 19 Nov)
Legal Officer LtCol Albert H. Schierman (to 8
May 1951)
LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood
(from 9 May)
Cmdr Geoffrey E. Carlisle, USN
(from 28 Oct)
LtCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (from 6
Mar 1952)
Motor Transport Officer LtCol Henry W. Seeley, Jr. (to 26
Jun 1951)
LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 27
Jun)
Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 17 Aug)
Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 3 Jan
1952)
Naval Gunfire Officer LtCol Loren S. Fraser (to 12 Aug
1951)
Maj Charles A. Lipot (from 13 Aug)
Maj John V. Downes (from 23 Mar
1952)
Ordnance Officer Capt Donald L. Shenaut (to 9 Jul
1951)
Maj Frank W. Keith (from 10 Jul)
Maj James M. Rogers (from 1 Nov)
Maj Harold G. Borth (from 11 Jan
1952)
Postal Officer Maj Frederick Bove (to 13 May 1951)
1stLt Robert P. Sanders (from 14
May)
1stLt Robert W. Blum (from 26 Jul)
1stLt Edward D. Geizer, Jr. (from
10 Aug)
CWO George C. Hunter (from 9 Feb
1952)
Provost Marshall Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr
1951)
Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21
Apr)
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 6 Aug)
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18
Oct)
Public Information Officer Capt Michael C. Capraro (to 14 Apr
1951)
1stLt Jeremiah A. O’Leary, Jr.
(from 15 Apr)
1stLt Robert S. Gray (from 27 Dec)
Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May
1951)
LtCol Horace S. Figuers (from 11
May)
LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 7 Jul)
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29
Sep)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 20
Dec)
LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (from 9
Mar 1952)
Signal Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 7 Jun
1951)
LtCol Jino J. D’Alessandro (from 8
Jun)
Special Services Officer LtCol John M. Bathum (to 10 Sep
1951)
Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 11
Sep)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 28
Oct)
1stLt Joseph H. McDannold (from 20
Dec)
Capt John W. Algeo (from 16 Feb
1952)
LtCol John E. Gorman (from 9 Mar)
Supply Officer Col Gordon E. Hendricks (to 29 Jun
1951)
Col Chester R. Allen (from 30 Jun)
Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN (to 24
Jan 1951)
Cmdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (from
25 Jan 1951)
Capt Louis R. Kirkpatrick, USN
(from 10 Jul 1951)
Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 22 Apr
1951)
LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 23 Apr)
Maj Walter E. Reynolds (from 9 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Division Rear
Echelon Headquarters Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 23 Jul
1951)
Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 24 Jul
to 19 Nov)
_Headquarters Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr (to 23 Apr
1951)
LtCol William P. Alston (from 24
Apr)
Col Gould P. Groves (from 11 May)
LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 29
Jun)
LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 29 Aug)
Col William K. Davenport, Jr.
(from 19 Nov)
Maj Corbin L. West (from 15 Jan
1952)
Col Robert T. Stivers (from 18 Feb)
Executive Officer Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug
1951)
Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 16
Aug)
Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec)
Capt “J” E. Hancey (from 22 Jan
1952)
Maj Corbin L. West (from 18 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug
1951)
Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 16
Aug)
Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec)
Capt “J” E. Hancey (from 21 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Military Police
Company Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr
1951)
Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21
Apr)
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 19 Sep)
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18
October)
Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance
Company Maj Walter Gall (to 26 Mar 1951)
Capt Robert L. Autry (from 27 Mar)
Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (from 10
Sep)
_1st Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Lewis B. Puller (to 24 Jan
1951)
Col Francis M. McAlister (from 25
Jan)
Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 19 May)
Col Thomas A. Wornham (from 18 Jul)
Col Sidney S. Wade (from 13 Oct)
Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert (to 7 Jan
1951)
LtCol Alan Sutter (from 8 Jan)
LtCol Robert W. Rickert (from 16
Jan)
LtCol Alan Sutter (from 12 Feb)
LtCol Donald M. Schmuck (from 31
May)
LtCol John A. McAlister (from 3
Sep)
LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 7
Jan 1952)
S-1 Capt William G. Reeves (to 8 Jan
1951)
Capt David M. Cox (from 9 Jan)
Capt John S. Court (from 5 Sep)
Maj Elizia M. Cable (from 21 Oct)
Capt Thomas C. Palmer (from 12 Feb
1952)
Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 28 Feb)
S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian (to 10 May
1951)
Capt Glenn F. Miller (from 11 May)
Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from 2
Oct)
Capt Fred K. Cottrell (from 15 Dec)
Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 4 Mar
1952)
S-3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan (to 20 Jul
1951)
Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 21
Jul)
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 4 Mar
1952)
S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady (to 27 Apr
1951)
Capt Augustine B. Reynolds, Jr.
(from 28 Apr)
Maj Thomas A. Burns (from 5 Jul)
Maj John L. Kelly (from 5 Oct)
Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 27
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Maj Robert K. McClelland (to 11
Mar 1951)
Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 Mar)
Capt George E. Petro (from 11 May)
1stLt Roscoe L. Barrett, Jr. (from
15 Aug)
1stLt James L. Burnett (from 3 Oct)
Capt James P. Egan (from 23 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank
Company Capt George E. Petro (to 10 May
1951)
1stLt John A. Dudrey (from 11 May)
1stLt Magness W. Marshall (from 2
Oct)
Capt Frederick A. Hale (from 27
Nov)
Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar
Company Capt Frank J. Faureck (to 8 Feb
1951)
1stLt Edward E. Kauffer (from 9
Feb)
Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 5 Mar)
Capt Edward E. Kauffer (from 4 Jun)
1stLt Robert W. Jorn (from 9 Aug)
1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 2 Oct)
Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from
23 Dec)
Capt George E. Lawrence (from 18
Mar 1952)
_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Donald M. Schmuck (to 27 Feb
1951)
LtCol Robley E. West (from 28 Feb)
Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 15 Jun)
LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr. (from 7
Jul)
Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 14
Sep)
LtCol John E. Gorman (from 16 Sep)
LtCol John H. Papurca (from 7 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Robley E. West (to 27 Feb 1951)
Maj David W. Bridges (from 28 Feb)
Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 10 Jun)
Maj Wesley C. Noren (from 15 Jun)
Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 20
Jul)
Maj Leo V. Gross (from 18 Dec)
Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 4 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt William B. Hopkins (to 30 Jan
1951)
1stLt Bruce E. Geisert (from 31
Jan)
1stLt Norman W. Hicks (from 1 Jul)
1stLt John B. Franklin (from 18
Aug)
1stLt Stuart P. Barr, Jr. (from 22
Oct)
1stLt Nicholas J. Sheppard (from
28 Nov)
1stLt Harry A. Spaight (from 26
Dec)
Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Feb
1952)
2ndLt Vinton L. Spencer (from 4
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Capt Robert H. Barrow (to 30 Jan
1951)
Capt Thomas J. Bohannon (from 31
Jan)
1stLt Calvin R. Baker (from 1 Jul)
Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Oct)
1stLt Clifton M. Grubbs (from 20
Feb 1952)
Capt Anthony Novak (from 17 Mar)
1stLt Morace M. Dritley (from 26
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Wesley C. Noren (to 12 Mar
1951)
Capt John F. Coffey (from 13 Mar)
1stLt James H. Cowan, Jr. (from 8
Jun)
1stLt Robert G. Work (from 1 Aug)
1stLt Richard S. Kitchen (from 18
Aug)
Capt Roy J. Wride (from 16 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company
C Capt Robert P. Wray (to 9 May
1951)
1stLt William A. Craven (from 10
May)
1stLt William F. Koehnlein (from
12 Jun)
Capt Michael D. Harvath (from 21
Jul)
Capt George E. Lawrence (from 10
Oct)
Capt Kenneth F. Swiger (from 7 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj William L. Bates (to 28 Feb
1951)
1stLt William F. Koehnlein (from 1
Mar)
Capt Wesley C. Noren (from 13 Mar)
Maj John F. Coffey (from 8 Jun)
Capt Benjamin W. Muntz (from 5 Jul)
Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 14
Jul)
Maj John F. Morris (from 14 Aug)
Maj Fletcher B. Wycoff (from 9 Sep)
Capt James P. Egan (from 27 Dec)
Capt George E. Lawrence (from 21
Feb 1952)
1stLt Joseph E. Lee (from 18 Mar)
Maj Stanley N. McLeod (from 27 Mar)
_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter (to 7 Jan 1951)
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 8 Jan)
LtCol Allan Sutter (from 15 Jan)
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 13 Feb)
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from
15 Mar)
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 5 Jun)
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from
20 Jun)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 14
Aug)
LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 28
Oct)
LtCol Theil H. Fisher (from 3 Jan
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry (to 7 Jan
1951)
Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 8 Jan)
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Jan)
Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 13
Feb)
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Mar)
Maj Jules M. Rouse (from 10 Jun)
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 6 Aug)
Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 26 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt Raymond DeWees, Jr. (to 9 Sep
1951)
2dLt Robert A. Arning (from 10 Sep)
1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from
30 Oct)
1stLt Frank E. Guthrie (from 3 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company D
Capt Welby W. Cronk (to 4 Mar 1951)
1stLt Theodore Culpepper (from 5
Mar)
1stLt Alexander L. Michaux, Jr.
(from 19 Apr)
1stLt Jay “J” Thomas (from 11 Jun)
1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from
9 Aug)
1stLt Robert E. Lundberg (from 15
Sep)
2dLt Arthur H. Woodruff (from 25
Sep)
1stLt Richard A. Bonifas (from 5
Oct)
1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from
16 Oct)
Capt Richard A. Bonifas (from 30
Oct)
1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 3 Nov)
Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 13
Nov)
Capt John H. Lauck (from 26 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company E
Capt Jack A. Smith (to 9 Mar 1951)
1stLt Johnny L. Carter (from 10
Mar)
1stLt Donald L. Evans, Jr. (from 9
Aug)
Capt Ralph V. Harper (from 14 Aug)
1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 14 Sep)
2dLt William K. Rockey (from 25
Sep)
1stLt Kenneth E. Will (from 5 Oct)
Capt James H. Reeder (from 16 Oct)
Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from
21 Feb 1952)
Capt Jack H. Hagler (from 17 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company F
Capt Goodwin C. Groff (to 9 Jun
1951)
1stLt Patrick McGrotty (from 10
Jun)
Capt Frederick A. Hale, Jr. (from
4 Sep)
Capt Neville G. Hall, Jr. (from 21
Nov)
1stLt John A. Barry (from 29 Dec)
1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 11 Mar
1952)
Capt Victor A. Kleber, Jr. (from
18 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Capt William A. Kerr (to 28 Feb
1951)
1stLt Russell A. Davidson (from 1
Mar)
Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 May)
Capt Russell A. Davidson (from 2
Jul)
Maj John I. Kelly (from 22 Jul)
Maj William S. Witt (from 5 Oct)
Capt John W. Algeo (from 20 Nov)
Maj William S. Witt (from 20 Jan
1952)
Capt John W. Algeo (from 3 Feb)
1stLt Clarence G. Moody, Jr. (from
17 Feb)
Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from
18 Mar)
_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge (to 15 Feb
1951)
LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 16
Feb)
Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 25
Apr)
Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 8 May)
LtCol Homer E. Hire (from 15 May)
LtCol Foster C. LaHue (from 19 Jul)
LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (from 13
Nov)
Executive Officer Maj Reginald R. Myers (to 25 Apr)
Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 26 Apr)
Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 15
May)
Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 7 Jun)
Maj Rodney V. Reighard (from 22
July)
Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 3 Oct)
Maj Robert V. Perkins (from 4 Jan
52)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt Roy N. Courington (to 16 Feb
1951)
1stLt Edgar A. Crum (from 17 Feb)
1stLt Daniel R. Evans (from 3 Mar)
Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (from
20 Mar)
1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 9 Aug)
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 1 Sep)
2dLt Joseph D. Reed (from 3 Oct)
2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 4 Jan
1952)
Capt Harold R. Connolly (from 22
Feb)
Capt Donald C. Mack (from 15 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company G
Capt Carl L. Sitter (to 13 Feb
1951)
1stLt Horace L. Johnson (from 14
Feb)
1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 26 May)
1stLt Fred G. Redmon (from 1 Jun)
Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 5 Jun)
1stLt Harold R. Connolly (from 20
Jul)
Capt Fred A. Kraus (from 8 Nov)
1stLt Richard A. Krajnyak (from 19
Feb 1952)
Capt Wilford L. Stone (from 17 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company H
Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (to
19 Mar 1951)
1stLt William J. Allert (from 20
Mar)
1stLt Daniel R. Evans (from 8 May)
1stLt James L. Burnett (from 8 Jun)
1stLt Herbert M. Anderson (from 15
Jun)
1stLt James L. Burnett (from 21
Sep)
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 3 Oct)
Capt James B. Ord, Jr. (from 17
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company I
1stLt Joseph R. Fisher (to 7 Apr
1951)
1stLt William Swanson (from 8 Apr)
Capt Stone W. Quillian (from 15
May)
1stLt Norbert D. Carlson (from 5
Aug)
Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 7 Sep)
Capt Donald C. Mack (from 19 Jan
1952)
Capt Richard B. Smith (from 22 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj Edwin H. Simmons (to 25 Apr
1951)
1stLt James F. Williams (from 26
Apr)
Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 6 Jun)
Maj Henry Brzezinski (from 19 Jun)
Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 6 Aug)
Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 31 Aug)
1stLt Thomas C. Holleman (from 2
Oct)
Maj Robert V. Perkins (from 15 Nov)
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 4 Jan
1952)
1stLt Hugh P. Murphy (from 25 Jan)
_5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray (to 23 Jan
1951)
Col Raymond L. Murray (from 24 Jan)
Col Richard W. Hayward (from 14
Mar)
Col Richard G. Weede (from 7 Aug)
Col Frank P. Hager, Jr. (from 19
Nov)
Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (from
23 Feb 1952)
Executive Officer LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (to 13 Feb
1951)
LtCol John W. Stevens, II (from 14
Feb)
LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14
Mar)
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 4
Apr)
LtCol Francis H. Cooper (from 17
Jun)
LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 22
Sep)
LtCol John T. Rooney (from 13 Dec)
LtCol John A. Saxten (from 19 Mar
1952)
S-1 Capt Alton C. Weed (to 1 Mar 1951)
Capt Jack E. Hawthorn (from 2 Mar)
Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (from
17 Mar)
Capt Harley L. Grant (from 25 Aug)
S-2 1stLt Richard M. Woodard (to 3 Feb
1951)
Capt Eugene F. Langan (from 4 Feb)
Maj Nicholas G. W. Thorne (from 9
Aug)
Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 17
Nov)
Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 31 Jan
1952)
S-3 Maj Lawrence W. Smith, Jr. (to 8
Mar 1951)
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 9 Mar)
LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 24 Jun)
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr.
(from 11 Jul)
Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 10 Oct)
Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from
15 Dec)
S-4 Maj Harold Wallace (to 9 Mar 1951)
Maj William E. Baugh (from 10 Mar)
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 11 Aug)
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 22 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt Jack E. Hanthorn (to 1 Mar
1951)
1stLt Richard M. Woodard (from 2
Mar)
1stLt Lee J. Cary (from 22 Jun)
Capt Howard H. Dismeier (from 12
Sep)
1stLt George “T” Capatanos (from 1
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Antitank Company
1stLt Almarion S. Bailey (to 8 Apr
1951)
1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 9 Apr)
1stLt William E. Kerrigan (from 23
Jul)
Capt Edgar F. Moore, Jr. (from 15
Aug)
Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar
Company 1stLt Robert M. Lucy (to 25 Feb
1951)
1stLt Robert H. Uskurait (from 26
Feb)
1stLt John A. Buchanan (from 11
Sep)
Capt Yale B. Davis (from 29 Dec)
_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 20
Feb 1951)
LtCol John W. Hopkins (from 21 Feb)
LtCol William P. Alston (from 21
Jun)
Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Nov)
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 25 Nov)
LtCol Kirt W. Norton (from 2 Dec)
LtCol Louis N. King (from 13 Jan
1952)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 12
Feb)
Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson (to 8 Apr 1951)
Maj Donald J. Kendall, Jr. (from 9
Apr)
Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Aug)
Maj Robert L. Autry (from 9 Nov)
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 2 Dec)
Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 31
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (to 11
Mar 1951)
2dLt Robert H. Corbet (from 12 Mar)
1stLt Andrew V. Marusak (from 29
Mar)
1stLt Frank J. Meers (from 12 Jul)
2dLt Vincent B. Murphy, Jr. (from
3 Oct)
1stLt Parks H. Simpson (from 25
Oct)
1stLt Thomas J. Hermes (from 13
Nov)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Capt Almond H. Sollom (to 5 Mar
1951)
1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (from 6 Mar)
Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 6
Apr)
Maj Albert Hartman (from 13 Apr)
Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (from 8
May)
1stLt Frank J. Meers (from 4 Jun)
Capt Lucian F. May (from 12 Jul)
Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from 1
Sep)
Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 9 Nov)
Capt Nicholas G. W. Thorne (from
17 Nov)
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 31 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company A
1stLt Loren R. Smith (to 16 Feb
1951)
Capt Walter E. G. Godenius (from
17 Feb)
Capt John L. Kelly (from 9 Apr)
Capt Richard M. Woodard (from 1
Jul)
Capt Eugene F. Langan (from 12 Aug)
Capt Frederick B. Clunie (from 5
Nov)
1stLt Merrill Waide, Jr. (from 24
Jan 1952)
1stLt Ernest S. Lee (from 18 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company B
1stLt John R. Hancock (to 7 Feb
1951)
1stLt Michael V. Palatas (from 8
Feb)
1stLt James T. Cronin (from 17 Feb)
1stLt William E. Kerrigan (from 8
Jun)
1stLt Stuart H. Wright (from 30
Jun)
1stLt John A. Hayes (from 12 Jul)
Capt Louis R. Daze (from 21 Jul)
Capt Charles M. MacDonald, Jr.
(from 21 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Capt Jack R. Jones (to 8 May 1951)
1stLt Richard J. Schening (from 9
May)
1stLt Robert E. Warner (from 29
May)
Capt Lucian F. May (from 4 Sep)
Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 22 Jan
1952)
_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise (to 19 Feb
1951)
LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 20 Feb)
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr.
(from 24 Jun)
LtCol Houston Stiff (from 8 Jul)
Maj William E. Baugh (from 3 Dec)
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 27
Dec)
LtCol William P. Cushing (from 14
Mar 1952)
Executive Officer Maj John L. Hopkins (to 20 Feb
1951)
Maj Theodore F. Spiker (from 21
Feb)
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr.
(from 9 Apr)
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 25 Jun)
Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 3 Sep)
Maj Robert W. Rynerson (from 9 Sep)
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 26 Sep)
Maj William L. Sims (from 9 Dec)
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 27 Dec)
Maj William P. Cushing (from 21
Feb 1952)
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 14 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt Franklin B. Mayer (to 9 Jan
1951)
1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (from 10
Jan)
Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 21
Feb)
1stLt John R. Hinds (from 2 Jul)
1stLt Richard T. Hauar (from 12
Jul)
1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 8
Aug)
1stLt Dexter H. Kimball (from 25
Sep)
1stLt Otis “Z” McConnell, Jr.
(from 23 Dec)
1stLt Emmett T. Hill, Jr. (from 15
Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company D
Capt Samuel S. Smith (to 11 Jun
1951)
1stLt John P. Cooney (from 12 Jun)
Capt Ray N. Joens (from 28 Jun)
Capt Victor Sawina (from 26 Sep)
1stLt Tom G. Fagles (from 7 Oct)
Capt Philip A. Davis (from 23 Dec)
1stLt Emmitt T. Hill (from 13 Feb
1952)
Capt William A. Harper (from 25
Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company E
1stLt James F. Roberts (to 9 Jan
1951)
Capt Franklin B. Mayer (from 10
Jan)
Capt William E. Melby (from 9 Apr)
1stLt Bernard W. Christofferson
(from 20 Apr)
1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 12 Jun)
Capt William E. Melby (from 18 Jun)
1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 9 Jul)
Capt William L. Wallace (from 3
Aug)
Capt Warren H. Allen (from 3 Oct)
1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 18 Oct)
Capt Charles C. Matthews (from 4
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company F
1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (to 8 Jan
1951)
1stLt George Janiszewski (from 9
Jan)
Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 20
Jan)
1stLt George Janiszewski (from 20
Feb)
1stLt James H. Honeycutt, Jr.
(from 9 Apr)
1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 23
Jul)
Capt William E. Melby (from 11 Aug)
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 4
Nov)
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 14 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj Glen E. Martin (to 19 Feb 1951)
Capt John Stepanovich (from 20 Feb)
Capt Elliot B. Lima (from 6 Apr)
1stLt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from
17 Aug)
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 15 Sep)
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 25
Sep)
Maj William L. Sims (from 4 Nov)
Capt William A. Harper (from 23
Dec)
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 25 Feb
1952)
Capt Russell L. Silverthorn (from
16 Mar)
_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett (to 13 Feb
1951)
LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14
Feb)
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 14
Mar)
Maj Morse “L” Holladay (from 4 Apr)
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 16
Jun)
Maj William E. Baugh (from 23 Sep)
LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 13
Oct)
LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from
25 Feb 1952)
Capt Philip A. Davis (from 23 Dec)
1stLt Emmitt T. Hill (from 13 Feb
1952)
Capt William A. Harper (from 25
Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company E
1stLt James F. Roberts (to 9 Jan
1951)
Capt Franklin B. Mayer (from 10
Jan)
Capt William E. Melby (from 9 Apr)
1stLt Bernard W. Christofferson
(from 20 Apr)
1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 12 Jun)
Capt William E. Melby (from 18 Jun)
1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 9 Jul)
Capt William L. Wallace (from 3
Aug)
Capt Warren H. Allen (from 3 Oct)
1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 18 Oct)
Capt Charles C. Matthews (from 4
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company F
1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (to 8 Jan
1951)
1stLt George Janiszewski (from 9
Jan)
Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 20
Jan)
1stLt George Janiszewski (from 20
Feb)
1stLt James H. Honeycutt, Jr.
(from 9 Apr)
1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 23
Jul)
Capt William E. Melby (from 11 Aug)
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 4
Nov)
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 14 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj Glen E. Martin (to 19 Feb 1951)
Capt John Stepanovich (from 20 Feb)
Capt Elliot B. Lima (from 6 Apr)
1stLt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from
17 Aug)
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 15 Sep)
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 25
Sep)
Maj William L. Sims (from 4 Nov)
Capt William A. Harper (from 23
Dec)
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 25 Feb
1952)
Capt Russell L. Silverthorn (from
16 Mar)
_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett (to 13 Feb
1951)
LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14
Feb)
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 14
Mar)
Maj Morse “L” Holladay (from 4 Apr)
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 16
Jun)
Maj William E. Baugh (from 23 Sep)
LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 13
Oct)
LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from
25 Feb 1952)
_7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg (to 15 Apr
1951)
Col Herman Nickerson, Jr. (from 16
Apr)
LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 20 Sep)
Col John J. Wermuth (from 13 Dec)
Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 11
Mar 1952)
Executive Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 3 Jun
1951)
LtCol Woodrow M. Kessler (from 4
Jun)
LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 30 Jun)
LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 20 Sep)
LtCol James G. Kelly (from 3 Nov)
LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 2 Dec)
LtCol John D. Wiggins (from 23 Feb
1952)
S-1 Capt John R. Grove (to 15 Apr 1951)
Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 16 Apr)
Maj Robert R. Sedgwick (from 5 Sep)
Capt William K. Dormady (from 5
Jan 1952)
S-2 Capt John D. Bradbeer (to 4 Jul
1951)
Capt Walter E. Lange (from 5 Jul)
Capt Clifford E. McCollam (from 29
Jul)
Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 25 Aug)
1stLt George W. Barnes (from 8 Nov)
Capt Donald E. Euchert (from 19
Dec)
Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 17
Mar 1952)
S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II (to 8
Jan 1951)
Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 9 Jun)
Maj George Codrea (from 22 Sep)
S-4 Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 8 Jan
1951)
Maj William E. Voorhies (from 9
Jan)
Maj John D. Bradbeer (from 5 Jul)
Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 5 Oct)
Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 3 Jan
1952)
Maj James K. Linnan (from 19 Jan)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company 2dLt Arthur R. Mooney (to 17 Feb
1951)
1stLt Harrol Kiser (from 18 Feb)
1stLt John C. Beauparlant (from 6
Mar)
1stLt Welton R. Abell (from 14 Mar)
Capt James J. Bott (from 19 Mar)
Capt Thomas A. Robesky (from 9 May)
Capt Walter R. Anderson (from 18
Jun)
Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 5 Sep)
Capt Donald S. McClellan (from 20
Sep)
Capt David A. McKay (from 28 Nov)
Capt Robert C. Hendrickson (from
17 Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Antitank Company
1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 5 May
1951)
1stLt Raymond J. Eldridge (from 6
Mar)
Capt Thomas Santamaria (from 19
Apr)
1stLt Francis W. Tief (from 13 May)
1stLt William F. Dyroff (from 10
Aug)
Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar
Company Maj Rodney V. Reighard (to 1 Jul
1951)
1stLt Samuel E. Piercy (from 2 Jul)
Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 24 Sep)
Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 28 Nov)
Capt John F. McMahon, Jr. (from 28
Dec)
_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 25 Apr 1951)
LtCol John T. Rooney (from 26 Apr)
LtCol James G. Kelly (from 23 Aug)
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 8 Nov)
LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (from
28 Feb 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (to 20 Feb
1951)
Maj Thomas B. Tighe (from 21 Feb)
Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (from 24
Mar)
Maj Thomas B. Tighe (from 26 May)
Maj Robert J. Poison (from 5 Jul)
Maj George Codrea (from 4 Aug)
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 15 Sep)
Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 8 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company 1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul (to 19 Jan
1951)
Capt John C. Johnson (from 20 Jan)
Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 18 Mar)
1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (from
28 Mar)
Capt Donald F. J. Field (from 11
May)
Capt Wilburt R. Gaul (from 7 Jun)
1stLt Robert C. Taylor (from 9 Aug)
Capt Orville E. Brauss (from 24
Nov)
1stLt Guy R. Cassell (from 14 Dec)
1stLt Edward L. Nadeau (from 1 Jan
1952)
Capt Seneker Woll (from 18 Jan)
2dLt Henry D. Bruns (from 10 Feb)
2dLt Lawrence P. Flynn (from 9 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company A
1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (to 27
Mar 1951)
Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 28 Mar)
1stLt Van D. Bell (from 3 Jun)
Capt Everett Hampton (from 2 Sep)
2dLt Carl F. Ullrich (from 2 Jan
1952)
Capt Earl W. Thompson (from 27 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt James J. Bott (to 5 Mar 1951)
Capt John C. Johnston (from 6 Mar)
1stLt Orville W. Brauss (from 22
Jul)
1stLt Dean F. Johnson (from 23 Aug)
1stLt James W. Sweeney (from 14
Sep)
Capt Henry A. Glockner (from 29
Sep)
1stLt Donald L. Smith (from 14 Dec)
1stLt “J” Alan Myers (from 1 Jan
1952)
1stLt Donald M. Russ (from 14 Feb)
Capt Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr. (from
28 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Capt John F. Morris (to 17 Jan
1951)
Capt Eugene H. Haffey (from 18 Jan)
Capt Daniel F. J. Field (from 8
Jun)
1stLt Donald E. Euckert (from 23
Jul)
Capt John F. McMahon (from 10 Aug)
Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from
21 Nov)
Capt Seneker Woll (from 7 Jan 1952)
Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from
18 Jan)
Capt Roger L. Johnson (from 3 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj William E. Voorhies (to 5 Jan
1951)
Capt Robert J. Poison (from 6 Jan)
Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 12 Jan)
Maj Robert J. Poison (from 15 May)
Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 5 Jul)
Capt John C. Johnston (from 5 Aug)
Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 5 Nov)
Capt John R. McMahon (from 22 Nov)
1stLt Guy R. Cassell (from 31 Dec)
Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from 4
Jan 1952)
1stLt Frank P. Shannon (from 18
Jan)
1stLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 16
Feb)
_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bayer (to 15 Feb
1951)
Maj James I. Glendinning (from 16
Feb)
LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (from 21
Mar)
LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 21
Jul)
LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 11 Nov)
Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 1 Dec)
LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 27 Feb
1952)
Executive Officer Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. (to 2
Jan 1951)
Maj James I. Glendinning, Jr.
(from 3 Jan)
Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. (from
20 May)
Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 4 Jul)
Maj Edwin Madsen (from 2 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company 1stLt Kent D. Thorup (to 19 Jan
1951)
Capt Jerome D. Gordon (from 20 Jan)
1stLt Kent D. Thorup (from 6 Feb)
Capt Thomas “A” Robesky (from 15
Mar)
1stLt Joseph R. Walsh (from 8 May)
1stLt George G. Flood (from 8 Jun)
1stLt John J. Robinson, Jr. (from
1 Sep)
Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from 5
Nov)
1stLt Donald D. MacLachlan (from
16 Dec)
1stLt Edward R. Hannon (from 27
Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company D
1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr. (to 1
Jan 1951)
Capt Patsy Algieri (from 2 Jan)
Capt Jerome D. Gordon (from 8 Feb)
Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 7 Apr)
1stLt Thomas W. Burke (from 21 Jul)
Capt John H. Chafee (from 15 Sep)
Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from
15 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company E
1stLt David H. Vanderwart (to 21
Jan 1951)
1stLt Robert T. Bey (from 22 Jan)
Capt Walter R. Anderson, Jr. (from
8 Feb)
Capt Merlin T. Matthews (from 17
Feb)
1stLt Robert W. Schmidt (from 14
Jun)
1stLt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from
18 Sep)
Capt Embree W. Maxson (from 5 Oct)
Capt Donald McGuire (from 21 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company F
1stLt Ronald J. Rice (to 1 Mar
1951)
1stLt Ross R. Minor (from 2 Mar)
Capt Raymond N. Bowman (from 6 Mar)
1stLt Ross R. Minor (from 1 May)
Capt Donald S. McClellan (from 23
Jun)
1stLt Don G. Phelan (from 24 Aug)
Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 14
Oct)
1stLt Rex C. Wells (from 17 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj Joseph L. Abel (to 7 Jan 1951)
Maj James P. Metzler (from 8 Jan)
Capt John R. Grove (from 19 Apr)
Capt Harry L. Givens (from 20 May)
Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 8 Aug)
Capt David A. McKay (from 24 Sep)
Capt Waiter Oberg (from 26 Nov)
1stLt Elmer R. Phillips (from 17
Feb 1952)
Maj Dennis D. Nicholson (from 16
Mar)
Capt Owen G. Jackson, Jr. (from 30
Mar)
_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (to 13
Jan 1951)
LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (from 14
Jan)
Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 16
Feb)
LtCol Bernard T, Kelly (from 8 May)
LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 4 Oct)
LtCol Houston Stiff (from 12 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 8 Jan 1951)
Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 9
Jan)
Maj Warren Morris (from 16 Feb)
Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jul)
Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 4 Aug)
Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 6 Aug)
Maj Franklin G. Bacon (from 3 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company 1stLt Samuel B. Abston (to 7 Jan
1951)
Capt John DeCloud (from 8 Jan)
1stLt Samuel D. Miller (from 5 Mar)
1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 15
May)
1stLt Robert H. Starek (from 25
May)
1stLt William R. Bennett (from 21
Jul)
1stLt Dennis E. Youngblood (from 6
Oct)
1stLt Raymond B. McGill (from 28
Nov)
Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 2 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company G
1stLt George R. Earnest (to 31 Dec
1950)
Capt Walter E. Lange (from 1 Jan
1951)
1stLt George R. Earnest (from 11
Mar)
1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 22
Mar)
Capt William C. Airheart (from 28
Mar)
1stLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 22
Jul)
Capt Robert C. Hendrickson (from
12 Aug)
Capt Thomas D. Smith, Jr. (from 14
Dec)
1stLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 11
Feb 1952)
Capt Thomas P. O’Callaghan (from
23 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company H
1stLt William C. Airheart (to 19
Jan 1951)
Capt James A. Hoey, Jr. (from 20
Jan)
Capt Reed T. King (from 5 Jun)
1stLt Dwight A. Young (from 4 Aug)
Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 9 Nov)
1stLt William B. Stengle (from 22
Feb 1952)
Capt William B. Cosgrove (from 17
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company I
Capt Howard L. Mabie (to 15 Feb
1951)
1stLt Alfred I. Thomas (from 16
Feb)
1stLt Victor Stoyanow (from 29 Mar)
1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 5 Jun)
1stLt Thomas N. Preston (from 20
Jun)
1stLt Richard L. Shell (from 23
Jul)
Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 5
Sep)
Capt Clifford G. Moore (from 14
Sep)
1stLt Charles H. Hammett (from 27
Dec)
1stLt Hubert McEntyre (from 2 Mar
1952)
Capt Gifford S. Horton (from 9 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Weapons Company
Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr. (to 16
Feb 1951)
Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 17 Feb)
1stLt Frederick Van Brunt (from 8
Apr)
Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 19 Apr)
Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jun)
1stLt Alfred I. Thomas (from 4 Jul)
Capt Claudie “M” Hollingsworth
(from 8 Jul)
Capt William C. Airheart (from 12
Aug)
Capt Theodore E. Metzger (from 4
Nov)
Capt Thomas P. O’Callaghan (from
27 Dec)
1stLt Louis A. Mann (from 22 Feb
1952)
_11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar
1951)
Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar)
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 5 Aug)
Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 17 Nov)
Col Frederick P. Henderson (from
27 Mar 1952)
Executive Officer LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (to 5 Mar
1951)
LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (from 6
Mar)
LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (from 7 May)
LtCol Merritt Adelman (from 13 Jun)
LtCol Albert H. Potter (from 15
Aug)
LtCol Lewis A. Jones (from 23 Nov)
S-1 Maj Floyd M. McCorkle (to 10 Jun
1951)
Capt Arthur L. Jackson (from 11
Jun)
1stLt Jessie R. Collins (from 2
Oct)
S-2 Capt William T. Phillips (to 26
Aug 1951)
Capt Vernon K. Ausherman (from 27
Aug)
Capt Phillip A. Schloss, Jr. (from
17 Dec)
Capt Marshall R. Hunter, Jr. (from
20 Feb 1952)
S-3 LtCol James O. Appleyard (to 19
Jul 1951)
LtCol William H. Gilliam (from 20
Jul)
LtCol William F. Pala (from 18 Nov)
S-4 Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 5 Feb
1951)
Maj Thomas M. Coggins (from 6 Feb)
Maj Benjamin W. Muntz (from 23 Jul)
Capt Robert B. Carney (from 14 Sep)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Battery Capt Clarence E. Hixon (to 7 Apr
1951)
1stLt Thomas C. Thompson (from 8
Apr)
Capt Richard L. McDaniel (from 22
Aug)
Maj Claudie “M” Hollingsworth
(from 24 Sep)
2dLt Chester E. Reese (from 17 Nov)
1stLt Samuel S. Rockwood (from 9
Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Service Battery
Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 5 Feb
1951)
1stLt Fred Rea (from 6 Feb)
1stLt John F. Gresham (from 21 May)
2dLt Chester E. Reese (from 7 Nov)
Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 17
Nov)
Capt William B. Tom (from 16 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Battery C, 1st
4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion 1stLt Eugene A. Busche (to 11 Jul
1951)
1stLt Edward A. Bailey (from 12
Jul)
1stLt Stephen R. Mihalic (from 2
Nov)
1stLt Edward J. Pierson (from 30
Mar 1952)
_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Harvey A. Feehan (to 30 Mar
1951)
Maj Thomas F. Cave, Jr. (from 31
Mar)
Maj Gordon R. Worthington (from 8
Aug)
LtCol Sherman W. Parry (from 13
Sep)
LtCol James R. Haynes (from 30 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Thomas F. Cave (to 30 Mar 1951)
Maj Gordon R. Worthington (from 31
Mar)
Maj George J. Kovich, Jr. (from 8
Aug)
Maj Harold E. Nelson (from 17 Sep)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Battery Capt Haskell C. Baker (to 2 Jan
1951)
Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (from 3
Jan)
Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 3 May)
Capt John McCaffrey (from 2 Jul)
Capt Rodman E. Street (from 17 Oct)
1stLt Charles D. Branson (from 26
Dec)
1stLt Harley “B” Riley (from 1 Feb
1952)
1stLt Joseph P. McDermott, Jr.
(from 26 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Service Battery
Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (to 1
Jan 1951)
1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch (from 2
Jan)
Capt Philip D. Higby (from 1 Mar)
Capt Mont G. Kenney (from 9 Jul)
Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from 9
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Battery A
Capt James D. Jordan (to 1 Apr
1951)
Capt Mont G. Kenney (from 2 Apr)
Capt Philip D. Higby (from 10 Jul)
Capt Joseph A. Goeke (from 22 Jul)
1stLt Richard J. Randolph, Jr.
(from 11 Sep)
1stLt Robert O. Martin, Jr. (from
3 Oct)
Capt Duane W. Skow (from 9 Nov)
Capt Rodman E. Street (from 24 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Battery B
Capt Gilbert N. Powell (to 12 Jun
1951)
Capt Charles D. Corpening (from 13
Jun)
Capt Leslie C. Procter, Jr. (from
27 Aug)
1stLt Donald T. Clark (from 13 Dec)
1stLt Jefferson S. Smith (from 1
Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer, Battery C
Capt William J. Nichols, Jr. (to
14 Feb 1951)
Capt Haskell C. Baker (from 15 Feb)
Capt Glenn L. Tole (from 14 Jul)
Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from
12 Sep)
1stLt Harold H. Ramsour (from 5
Jan 1952)
Capt James C. Gasser (from 26 Mar
1952)
_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger (to 4
Mar 1951)
Maj Jack C. Newell (from 5 Mar)
LtCol Merritt Adelman (from 14 Mar)
LtCol Dale H. Heely (from 13 Jun)
LtCol George B. Thomas (from 1 Jan
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Neal C. Newell (to 15 Mar 1951)
Maj Bruce E. Keith (from 16 Mar)
Maj Horace W. Card, Jr. (from 12
May)
Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 4 Aug)
Maj Claudie “M” Hollingsworth
(from 14 Aug)
Maj Frank W. Keith (from 11 Sep)
Maj James R. Haynes (from 1 Nov)
Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 29 Nov)
Maj James R. Haynes (from 15 Dec)
Maj Morris R. Snead (from 29 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Battery Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (to 27
Jun 1951)
1stLt Howard A. Blancheri (from 28
Jun)
Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 3 Oct)
1stLt John J. Scollay (from 29 Oct)
2dLt Arthur H. Westing (from 15
Jan 1952)
2dLt John E. Buynak (from 16 Feb)
1stLt Ivan B. Clevinger (from 13
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Service Battery
Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (to
24 Feb 1951)
Capt William D. Gibson (from 25
Feb)
1stLt Walter L. Blocker (from 30
Jun)
Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 20
Jul)
1stLt Robert E. Santee (from 6 Oct)
1stLt Donald F. Schaller (from 3
Feb 1952)
1stLt James W. Bell (from 16 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Battery D
Capt Richard E. Roach (to 18 Mar
1951)
Capt William D. Stubbs, Jr. (from
19 Mar)
Capt Walter L. Blocker, Jr. (from
4 Aug)
1stLt John M. Hoben (from 4 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Battery E
Capt Richard N. Aufmann (to 25 Feb
1951)
Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from
26 Feb)
Capt Robt. E. Dawson (from 2 Apr)
Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from
27 Apr)
Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (from
28 Jun)
1stLt Albert “G” Harris, III (from
7 Aug)
Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 11
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Battery F
1stLt Howard A. Blancheri (to 20
Jan 1951)
Capt George J. Kovtch, Jr. (from
21 Jan)
Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 3 May)
Capt William D. Gibson (from 30
Jun)
1stLt James F. Shea (from 13 Aug)
1stLt James W. Bell (from 8 Nov)
Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 24 Nov)
Capt John S. Adamson (from 24 Dec)
1stLt Frederick A. Koch, Jr. (from
31 Dec)
_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Francis F. Parry (to 6 Feb
1951)
LtCol William McReynolds (from 7
Feb)
Maj James R. Haynes (from 6 Sep)
LtCol James F. Coady (from 23 Oct)
LtCol Henry E. Barnes (from 2 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. (to 14
Jul 1951)
Maj Stephen K. Pawloski (from 15
Jul)
Maj James R. Haynes (from 16 Aug)
Maj Carl A. Neilson (from 6 Sep)
Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from
1 Dec)
Maj Charles A. Lipot (from 4 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Battery 1stLt John J. Brackett (to 20 Jan
1951)
1stLt Eugene H. Brown (from 21 Jan)
1stLt Robert C. Cameron (from 6
Apr)
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 21
May)
1stLt Robert H. Maurer (from 2 Aug)
1stLt Thomas E. Driscoll (from 18
Aug)
1stLt Hugh W. Manning (from 6 Sep)
2dLt John B. Buynak (from 7 Oct)
Capt Thomas L. Sullivan (from 20
Nov)
2dLt Thomas P. McGeeney, Jr. (from
3 Jan 1952)
2dLt Albert E. Shaw, Jr. (from 19
Feb)
1stLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from
14 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Service Battery
Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 25 Feb
1951)
1stLt Lawrence T. Kane (from 26
Feb)
1stLt David D. Metcalf (from 4 Apr)
Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 10
Sep)
Capt Charles J. Small (from 27 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Battery G
Capt Ernest W. Payne (to 14 Jul
1951)
Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 15
Jul)
1stLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 6
Sep)
1stLt Mervyn E. Kerstner (from 11
Sep)
1stLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 15
Sep)
1stLt Edward S. McCabe (from 1 Nov)
1stLt Joseph M. Vosmik (from 13
Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Battery H
Capt Mason D. McQuiston (to 24 Aug
1951)
Capt David D. Metcalf (from 25 Aug)
1stLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from
1 Nov)
1stLt George E. Chambers, Jr.
(from 21 Jan 1952)
1stLt Russell E. Blagg (from 17
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Battery I
Capt Robert T. Patterson, Jr, (to
13 Jun 1951)
Capt Floyd R. Jaggears (from 14
Jun)
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 2
Aug)
1stLt Homer C. Wright (from 12 Aug)
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 25
Aug)
1stLt Homer C. Wright (from 9 Sep)
1stLt Charles R. Davidson, Jr.
(from 19 Feb 1952)
_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds (to 6 Feb
1951)
Maj Maurice J. Coffey (from 7 Feb)
Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. (from 16
Jul)
LtCol Louis A. Jones (from 6 Sep)
LtCol William M. Gilliam (from 24
Nov)
Executive Officer Maj Maurice J. Coffey (to 6 Feb
1951)
Maj Donald V. Anderson (from 7 Feb)
Maj Bernard W. Giebler (from 17
Aug)
LtCol Bruce F. Hillan (from 24 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Battery 1stLt Michael B. Wier (to 10 Jun
1951)
1stLt Frank P. Zarzeka (from 11
Jun)
1stLt Arthur Coburn (from 21 Aug)
1stLt Paul R. Joyce (from 28 Aug)
1stLt Thomas C. Thompson, Jr.
(from 25 Nov)
1stLt Earl C. Senter (from 10 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Service Battery
Capt Aldor B. Elmquist (to 9 Jun
1951)
1stLt Matthew J. Dennin (from 10
Jun)
1stLt William A. Mazzarella (from
1 Jul)
Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 2 Sep)
Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 8 Sep)
Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 16
Oct)
1stLt Leland B. Elton (from 19 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Battery K
Capt Arthur D. Challacombe, Jr.
(to 4 Aug 1951)
1stLt Albert E. Coffeen (from 5
Aug)
1stLt Paul M. Rice (from 23 Dec)
1stLt William L. Jesse (from 17
Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Battery L
Capt Armond G. Daddazio (to 15 Apr
1951)
Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 16 Apr)
Capt William M. Sigler, Jr. (from
7 Sep)
1stLt Dennis Manko (from 28 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Battery M
Capt Vernon W. Shapiro (to 3 Feb
1951)
Capt Charles E. Walker (from 14
Feb)
Capt Walter E. Magon (from 18 Jun)
1stLt George C. Briggs, Jr. (from
28 Nov)
1stLt Louis M. Dunklin (from 10
Feb 1952)
1stLt Billy J. White (from 18 Mar)
_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26
Sep 1951)
LtCol Michiel Dobervich (from 27
Sep)
Executive Officer Maj Arthur J. Barrett (to 14 Sep
1951)
Maj William L. Eubank (from 15 Sep)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Frank E. Granucci (to 12 Jun
1951)
Capt Lawrence H. Woods (from 13
Jun)
Capt Thomas J. Melcher (from 15
Sep)
1stLt Richard R. Myers (from 9 Jan
1952)
1stLt William H. Gatlin (from 10
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Maj James P. Treadwell (to 6 Apr
1951)
Maj Thomas H. Boler (from 7 Apr)
Capt Harry A. Steinmeyer (from 1
May)
Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 17
May)
Capt Robert L. Stuford (from 10
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Russell Hamlet (to 11 Apr
1951)
Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 12
Apr)
Capt John C. Crawley (from 17 May)
Capt Carl L. Hill (from 10 Jun)
Capt Harold W. Stroschein (from 1
Jan 1952)
Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 10 Jan)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Maj Arthur J. Noonan (to 8 Aug
1951)
Maj William L. Eubank (from 9 Aug)
Maj Edward C. Nelson (from 10 Sep)
Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 19 Dec)
Capt Robert T. Johnson (from 9 Jan
1952)
_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun
1951)
Maj George M. Warnke (from 16 Jun)
LtCol John T. O’Neill (from 2 Oct)
Executive Officer Maj Richard G. Warga (to 7 Apr
1951)
Maj George M. Warnke (from 8 Apr)
Maj Bernard G. Thobe (from 16 Jun)
Maj Robert J. Murphy (from 1 Oct)
Maj David Young (from 6 Jan 1952)
LtCol James L. Jones (from 29 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Roger B. Thompson (to 10 May
1951)
1stLt Jean T. Fox (from 11 May)
Capt Richard P. Greene (from 18
Jun)
1stLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 12
Oct)
2dLt Newton C. Tullis (from 2 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Capt Bernard G. Thobe (to 25 Apr
1951)
1stLt Clyde P. Guy (from 26 Apr)
Maj Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (from 5
Sep)
Maj David Foos (from 3 Oct)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Lewis E. Bolts (to 26 Jun
1951)
Maj Ralph H. Platt (from 27 Jun)
Maj John M. Scarborough (from 3
Oct)
Capt John B. Harney (from 10 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Service Company
Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (to 4 Sep
1951)
1stLt Presley K. Saine (from 5 Sep)
2dLt John A. Boone (from 5 Nov)
Capt William H. Chandler (from 16
Mar 1952)
_1st Combat Service Group_
Commanding Officer Col John N. Cook, Jr. (to 10 Jun
1951)
LtCol John M. Brickley (from 10
Jun)
Col Joseph P. Sayers (from 9 Aug)
Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30
Sep)
Executive Officer LtCol Edward A. Clark (to 17 Jan
1951)
LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood
(from 18 Jan)
LtCol John H. Brickley (from 9 May)
Maj Murray F. Rose (from 11 Jun)
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from
17 Aug)
Maj John R. Blackett (from 1 Sep)
LtCol Robert T. Stivers (from 22
Oct)
LtCol James G. Kelly (from 6 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Francis L. Miller (to 11 Apr
1951)
Capt Raymond E. Wase (from 12 Apr)
Capt Billie G. Hagan (from 19 Apr)
Capt George M. Zellick (from 22
Jul)
1stLt William P. Lacy (from 21 Sep)
Capt James H. Shaw (from 15 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Maintenance
Company Maj Edward H. Voorhees (to 19 May
1951)
1stLt Donald M. Dackins (from 20
May)
Maj Berny L. Thurman (from 3 Sep)
Capt Warren H. Allen (from 25 Nov)
Maj John R. Blackett (from 31 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Supply Company
Maj Robert W. Hengesbach (to 17
Apr 1951)
Capt Bernard L. Keiter (from 18
Apr)
1stLt John Spiropoulas (from 24
Nov)
Maj William D. Porter (from 29 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Support Company
Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr. (to 22
Jan 1951)
Maj James T. Breen (from 23 Jan)
Maj Mason H. Morse (from 10 Oct)
Maj Howard T. Pittman (from 4 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Truck Company
Capt Jack W. Temple (to 10 Jun
1951)
1stLt Cecil C. Spencer (from 11
Jun)
1stLt Frank W. Dickel (from 7 Jul)
1stLt James H. Shaw (from 8 Sep)
Capt Jacob Stocker (from 24 Sep)
Commanding Officer, 1st Fumigation
and Bath Platoon 1stLt James L. Dumas (to 14 Aug
1951)
1stLt Raymond S. Eason (from 15
Aug)
1stLt Roger B. Meade (from 6 Sep)
Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery
Platoon Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame (to
10 Jun 1951)
2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 11 Jun)
CWO John T. Eakes (from 26 Jun)
1stLt William A. Reavis (from 30
Dec)
2dLt William S. Daniels (from 7
Feb 1952)
_1st Engineer Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun
1951)
LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 11 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Richard M. Elliott (to 1 Feb
1951)
Maj Emile P. Moses, Jr. (from 2
Feb)
Maj Grover C. Williams (from 4 Aug)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Edward D. Newton (to 24 Mar
1951)
1stLt Gerald W. Wade (from 25 Mar)
1stLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 16 Jun)
Capt Leonard L. Schultz (from 22
Aug)
Capt Donald F. Draeger (from 24
Nov)
Capt Robert W. Hurley (from 20 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Service Company
Capt Phillip A. Terrell, Jr. (to
25 Mar 1951)
Maj Richard M. Elliott (from 26
Mar)
Maj Louis L. Ball (from 6 Sep)
Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 10 Jan
1952)
1stLt Arthur L. Rourke (from 9 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Capt William B. Gould (to 20 Apr
1951)
Capt Harold R. Gingher (from 21
Apr)
1stLt George L. Bowman (from 15
Jun)
1stLt Floyd L. Vuillemot (from 1
Oct)
Capt Walter L. Hill (from 5 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Orville L. Bibb (to 25 Mar
1951)
Capt Phillip A. Terrill, Jr. (from
26 Mar 1951)
1stLt Gerald W. Wade (from 17 Oct)
1stLt Clyde R. Kolahan (from 1 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 15 Aug
1951)
1stLt Robert L. Brown (from 16 Aug)
1stLt Robert J. Hickson (from 4
Nov)
Commanding Officer, Company D
Capt Byron C. Turner (to 30 May
1951)
Capt Edward D. Newton (from 31 May)
Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 29 Jun)
1stLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 23 Sep)
1stLt John J. Killelea (from 23
Dec)
_1st Medical Battalion_
Commanding Officer Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (to 22
Jan 1951)
Cdr Clifford A. Stevenson, USN
(from 23 Jan)
Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN
(from 23 Sep)
Executive Officer Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8
Jan 1951)
LtCdr Gustave T. Anderson, USN
(from 9 Jan)
Cdr George A. Schlesinger, USN
(from 4 Jul)
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9
Aug)
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from
28 Oct)
Cdr James C. Luce, USN (from 28
Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8
Jan 1951)
LtCdr Gustav T. Anderson, USN
(from 9 Jan)
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 7
Jun)
Cdr George C. Schlesinger, USN
(from 4 Jul)
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9
Aug)
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from
28 Oct)
Lt Edgar F. Bechtel, USN (from 16
Dec)
Lt(jg) Charles P. Richardson, USN
(from 21 Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN (to 3
Mar 1951)
Cdr Philip L. Nova, USN (from 4
Mar)
Cdr James A. Addison, USN (from 18
Apr)
LtCdr Arvin T. Henderson, USN
(from 22 Sep)
Commanding Officer, Company B
LtCdr James A. Kaufman, USN (to 12
Jun 1951)
LtCdr Francis M. Morgan, USN (from
13 Jun)
Lt James F. Mumma, USN (from 11
Aug)
Lt Robert Fahrner, USN (from 17
Sep)
Lt John T. St. Mary, USN (from 20
Sep)
Lt(jg) Leroy F. Von Lackum, USN
(from 15 Oct)
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from
8 Nov)
CWO William R. Lipscomb, USN (from
27 Nov)
WO Clarence B. Mohler, USN (from 7
Dec)
WO William R. Stanberry, USN (from
22 Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN (to 8
Jan 1951)
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9
Jan)
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from
6 Jun)
Lt John P. McDonald, USN (from 28
Oct)
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from
27 Nov)
Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN
(from 26 Dec)
LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN
(from 11 Jan 1952)
Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN
(from 7 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Company D
LtCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN (to
7 Jan 1951)
LtCdr Daniel M. Pino, USN (from 8
Jan)
Lt(jg) Hermes C. Grillo, USN (from
10 Aug)
Lt(jg) Powell H. Perkins, USN
(from 8 Dec)
LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN
(from 6 Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company E
LtCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN (to
8 Jan 1951)
LtCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (from 9
Jan)
LtCdr Robert G. Allen, USN (from
13 Jun)
Lt Robert J. Fahrner, USN (from 9
Sep)
LtCdr Clifford R. Hall, USN (from
17 Oct)
_1st Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Olin L. Beall (to 15 Mar
1951)
LtCol John R. Barreiro, Jr. (from
16 Mar)
LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 18
Aug)
Executive Officer Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr. (to 15
Mar 1951)
Maj Edward L. Roberts (from 16 Mar)
Maj Eero Nori (from 6 Aug)
Capt Howard Dismeier (from 3 Feb
1952)
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 7 Mar)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Capt George B. Loveday (to 4 May
1951)
1stLt John C. O’Connell (from 5
May)
2dLt Walter R. Gustafson (from 21
Jul)
1stLt John C. O’Connell (from 17
Aug)
Capt Seneker Woll (from 1 Sep)
1stLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Capt Arthur W. Ecklund (to 3 May
1951)
1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum (from 4
May)
Capt Arnold T. Reed (from 4 Sep)
1stLt Walter A. Knopp (from 30 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt James C. Camp, Jr. (to 9 Aug
1951)
1stLt Marshall “A” Webb, Jr. (from
10 Aug)
1stLt Gerald W. Gruber (from 13
Sep)
Commanding Officer, Company C
1stLt Norman E. Stow (to 15 Aug
1951)
Capt Joe P. England (from 16 Aug)
Commanding Officer, Company D
1stLt William D. Pothoff (to 8 Oct
1951)
1stLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Oct)
Capt Leroy P. Oetter (from 17 Oct)
Commanding Officer, Automotive
Support Company 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum (to 16
Feb 1951)
Capt Walter J. Desel, Jr. (from 17
Feb)
1stLt Marshall “A” Webb, Jr. (from
14 May)
Capt Leon Serkin (from 1 Aug)
Capt Charles R. Godwin (from 4 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Automotive
Maintenance Company Maj Edward L. Roberts (to 15 Mar
1951)
Capt Victor E. Sellers (from 16
Mar)
Capt Ira N. Hayes (from 10 Apr)
Capt Harold L. Mayfield (from 3
Aug)
Maj Marion D. Grush (from 5 Nov)
_7th Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Carl J. Cagle (to 1 Oct 1951)
Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 2 Oct)
Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 3 Jan
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson (to 26 Jul
1951)
Capt Joseph L. Bunker (from 27 Jul)
Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 19 Sep)
Maj Ben Sutts (from 2 Oct)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company 2dLt Henry F. Finney (to 13 Jan
1951)
2dLt Palmer B. Fordham (from 14
Jan)
1stLt Richard J. Keeling (from 10
Feb)
1stLt Earl H. Johnson (from 10 Apr)
1stLt Louis C. Tauber (from 13 Aug)
1stLt Kenneth F. Smith (from 1 Sep)
Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Capt Ira N. Hayes (to 8 Apr 1951)
1stLt Landon E Christian (from 9
Apr)
Capt Robert B. Stone (from 8 Aug)
Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Sep)
Capt Kenneth F. Smith (from 1 Jan
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Clovis M. Jones (to 11 Mar
1951)
1stLt Lawrence C. Norton (from 12
Mar)
1stLt John B. Wilson (from 1 Sep)
1stLt Clyde H. Loveday, Jr. (from
15 Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Capt Fred B. Rogers (to 16 Apr
1951)
1stLt Oscar A. Bosma (from 17 Apr)
1stLt Richard C. O’Dowd (from 6
Jun)
Capt Roscoe C. Hibbard (from 23
Nov)
Capt Clifton G. Moore (from 28 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company D
Capt Joseph L. Bunker (to 26 Jul
1951)
1stLt Hubert J. Thomas (from 27
Jul)
1stLt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1
Sep)
Capt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1 Jan
1952)
_1st Ordnance Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams (to 31 Aug
1951)
Maj Harold C. Borth (from 1 Sep)
Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr. (to 5
Jul 1951)
Capt Theodore Tunis (from 6 Jul)
Capt Gordon H. Moore (from 1 Aug)
Maj Harold C. Borth (from 13 Aug)
Maj Eugene Anderson (from 1 Sep)
Capt Thomas J. Belt, Jr. (from 1
Jan 1952)
Capt Frederick V. Osborn (from 6
Feb)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Gordon H. Moore (to 9 Sep
1951)
2dLt Willie B. Hayter, Jr. (from
10 Sep)
1stLt Henry “H” Best, Jr. (from 7
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Ordnance Supply
Company 1stLt Victor F. Brown (to 10 Aug
1951)
Capt Simon W. Vevurka (from 11 Aug)
Capt Thomas J. Belt (from 1 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Ammunition
Company Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 6 Apr
1951)
Capt Robert C. Holder (from 7 Apr)
Capt David A. Malinsky (from 12
Sep)
Capt Chester D. Brown, Jr. (from 4
Jan 1952)
Capt Cecil B. Smith (from 21 Feb)
Commanding Officer, Ordnance
Maintenance Company Capt George L. Williams (to 15 Aug
1951)
Maj James H. Pierce (from 16 Aug)
1stLt Charles B. Haslam (from 10
Dec)
Capt William E. L. Donner (from 20
Jan 1952)
Capt Dwight H. Sawin, Jr. (from 17
Mar)
_1st Service Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Charles L. Banks (to 11 Jan
1951)
Col Gould P. Groves (from 12 Jan)
LtCol Horace E. Knapp (from 27 Mar)
LtCol Woodrow M. Kessler (from 6
Jul)
LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 3
Mar 1952)
Executive Officer Maj John R. Stone (to 18 Jun 1951)
Capt Victor E. Johnson, Jr. (from
19 Jun)
Maj Louis G. Monville (from 3 Jul)
Maj George E. Allison (from 18 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company Capt Morse “L” Holladay (to 20 Jan
1951)
1stLt Robert E. Follendorf (from
21 Jan)
1stLt James B. Lichtenberger (from
3 Sep)
1stLt Peter N. Pappas (from 10 Oct)
Capt John E. Welch (from 31 Dec)
1stLt Joseph D. Walker (from 10
Jan 1952)
1stLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 10
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Supply Company
Capt Robert A. Morehead (to 13 Apr
1951)
Capt George K. Reid (from 14 Apr)
Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 27
May)
Capt Milton W. Magee (from 6 Jun)
Maj James R. Fury (from 13 Aug)
Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 26
Dec)
Capt John H. Tomlinson (from 11
Mar 1952)
Commanding Officer, Support Company
Capt Thomas M. Sagar (to 22 Jan
1951)
Capt Morse “L” Holladay (from 23
Jan)
1stLt Victor E. Johnson (from 30
Mar)
Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 7
Jun)
1stLt Glenn P. Gasaway (from 2 Jul)
1stLt Robert W. Blum (from 3 Sep)
Capt Robert E. Moyer (from 1 Oct)
1stLt Jack A. Mackenzie (from 13
Nov)
1stLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 21
Dec)
1stLt Barry D. Diamond (from 8 Jan
1952)
Capt Seneker Woll (from 10 Mar)
_1st Shore Party Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May
1951)
LtCol Horace H. Figuers (from 11
May)
LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 17
Jul)
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29
Sep)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 20
Dec)
LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (from 9
Mar 1952)
Executive Officer LtCol Horace H. Figuers (to 10 May
1951)
Maj John G. Dibble (from 11 May)
Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7
Aug)
Maj Joseph T. Smith, Jr. (from 6
Sep)
Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7
Nov)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters and
Service Company Maj James I. Glendinning, Jr. (to
2 Jan 1951)
Maj George A. Smith (from 3 Jan)
Maj Burt A. Lewis (from 19 May)
Maj William T. Miller (from 20 Jun)
1stLt Robert H. During (from 20
Aug)
Maj Edson W. Card (from 29 Aug)
Maj Paul R. Nugent (from 12 Sep)
Capt Quentin H. Kravig (from 19
Jan 1952)
Commanding Officer, Company A
Maj Charles E. Ingram (to 1 Jul
1951)
Maj Orville L. Bibb (from 2 Jul)
Capt Calvin Wall (from 10 Aug)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Maj Henry Brezinski (to 17 Jun
1951)
Capt William A. Reno (from 18 Jun)
Maj Charles E. Ingram (from 3 Jul)
Maj George W. Ellis, Jr. (from 29
Jul)
Capt Francis V. Clifford (from 8
Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Maj Murray F. Rose (to 9 Jun 1951)
Capt Henry J. Jadrich (from 10 Jun)
Maj Burt A. Lewis, Jr. (from 21
Jun)
Maj Edson W. Card (from 4 Aug)
Capt William A. Reno (from 29 Aug)
Maj Edson W. Card (from 8 Sep)
Capt Robert T. Weis (from 12 Dec)
_1st Signal Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 6 Apr
1951)
Maj Richard A. Glaeser (from 7 Apr)
Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 31 Aug)
LtCol John E. Morris (from 20 Oct)
Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson (to 9 Mar
1951)
Maj Richard A. Glaeser (from 10
Mar)
Capt Marion J. Griffin (from 7 Apr)
Maj Robert W. Nelson (from 20 Apr)
Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 20 Oct)
Maj Ernest C. Bennett (from 12 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company 2dLt Merle W. Allen (to 1 Mar 1951)
1stLt Raymond B. Spicer (from 2
Mar)
2dLt Richard D. Alexander (from 18
Jun)
1stLt Frank J. Cerny (from 16 Aug)
Commanding Officer, Signal Company
Maj Richard A. Glaeser (to 8 Mar
1951)
Capt John H. McGuire (from 9 Mar)
Maj Harold S. Hill (from 17 Aug)
Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 1 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, ANGLICO
Maj Frederick N. Steinhauser (to
24 Oct 1951)
Maj Walter R. Miller (from 25 Oct)
LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 13 Feb
1952)
_1st Tank Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 21 Apr
1951)
LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 22 Apr)
Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from
9 Feb 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Philip C. Morell (to 2 Sep
1951)
Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from
3 Sep)
Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (from 9
Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer, Headquarters
Company 1stLt John B. Lund (to 21 Sep 1951)
Capt Robert S. Grether (from 22
Sep)
1stLt Jack D. Sheldon (from 10 Mar
1952)
Commanding Officer, Service Company
Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 3 Jul
1951)
Maj George W. Bubb (from 4 Jul)
Maj Edward C. Nelson (from 27 Dec)
Capt Robt. H. Vogel (from 9 Feb
1952)
Commanding Officer, Company A
1stLt Robert J. Craig (to 20 Jan
1951)
Maj Arthur M. Hale (from 21 Jan)
Capt Robert M. Krippner (from 31
Mar)
Capt John E. Scanlon (from 17 Apr)
Capt Joseph W. Luker (from 14 Jun)
Capt Robert S. Grether (from 3 Sep)
Capt Albert W. Snell (from 21 Sep)
1stLt William E. Young (from 19
Feb 1952)
Capt Milton L. Raphael (from 10
Mar)
Commanding Officer, Company B
Capt Bruce F. Williams (to 1 Jul
1951)
Capt Paul F. Curtis (from 2 Jul)
Capt John E. Lund (from 2 Oct)
1stLt Paul A. Wood (from 5 Nov)
Capt Jack J. Jackson (from 29 Dec)
Commanding Officer, Company C
Capt Richard M. Taylor (to 5 Aug
1951)
Maj Walter Moore (from 6 Aug)
Capt Thomas W. Clark (from 21 Nov)
Commanding Officer, Company D
Capt Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr. (to 2
Sep 1951)
Capt James L. Carey (from 3 Sep)
Capt Charles A. Sooter (from 28
Nov)
_Marine Observation Squadron 6_
Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk (to 31
Mar 1951)
Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 1
Apr)
Maj David W. McFarland (from 5 Apr)
Maj Allan H. Ringblom (from 6 Oct)
Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 1 Nov)
Maj Kenneth G. Smedley (from 1 Feb
1952)
Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from
11 Feb)
LtCol William T. Herring (from 27
Feb)
Executive Officer Capt Andrew L. McVicars (to 13 Jan
1951)
Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 14
Jan)
Capt Kenneth C. Smedley (from 21
Jul)
Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from
21 Nov)
_Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161_
Commanding Officer LtCol George W. Herring (to 17 Dec
1951)
Col Keith B. McCutcheon (from 18
Dec)
Executive Officer Maj William P. Mitchell (to 19 Mar
1952)
Maj James R. Dyer (from 20 Mar)
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (1st MAW)
1 January 1951–31 March 1952
Commanding General MajGen Field Harris (to 28 May
1951)
BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman (from 29
May)
MajGen Christian F. Schilt (from
27 Jul)
Asst Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman
(to 28 May 1951)
BrigGen William O. Brice (from 29
May)
BrigGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner
(from 29 Sep)
Chief of Staff Col Caleb T. Bailey (to 18 Aug 1951)
Col Arthur F. Binney (from 19 Aug)
Col Carson A. Roberts (from 2 Jan
1952)
Col Arthur F. Binney (from 26 Mar)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Raymond E. Hopper (to 10 Feb
1951)
Col Alexander G. Bunker (from 11
Feb)
LtCol Owen M. Hines (from 1 Nov)
Col Robert O. Bisson (from 27 Feb
1952)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col Roger T. Carleson (to 18 Feb
1951)
LtCol Winson V. Crockett (from 19
Feb)
Capt John E. Buckle (from 21 Jun)
Capt William G. Redel (from 1 Aug)
LtCol Chester A. Henry, Jr. (from
1 Sep)
LtCol John W. Stage (from 12 Jan
1952)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Edward C. Dyer (to 28 Feb 1951)
LtCol Howard A. York (from 1 Mar)
LtCol Neil R. MacIntyre (from 12
Mar)
Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from
26 Jun)
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 19
Aug)
Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from 7
Sep)
Col Guy M. Morrows (from 14 Sep)
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 21
Jan 1952)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Thomas J. Noon (to 14 May 1951)
Col Wallace T. Breakey (from 15
May)
LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 21 Jul)
Col Luther S. Moore (from 5 Sep)
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 7 Jan
1952)
Col Robert E. Galer (from 12 Mar)
_Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)_
Commanding Officer Col Frank G. Dailey (to 29 Dec
1950)
LtCol Radford C. West (from 30 Dec)
LtCol Paul J. Fontana (from 15 Jan
1951)
LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr.
(acting) (from 2 Apr)
Col Guy M. Morrow (from 9 Apr)
Col Carson A. Roberts (from 31 Jul)
Col Arthur F. Binney (from 2 Jan
1952)
Col Martin A. Severson (from 27
Mar)
Executive Officer LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr. (to 18
May 1951)
LtCol James B. Moore (from 19 May)
LtCol Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 14
Jul)
LtCol John W. Stage (from 2 Sep)
LtCol Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 12
Jan 1952)
LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 6 Feb)
_Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Nathan T. Post (to 10 Jan
1952)
LtCol Finley T. Clarke, Jr. (from
11 Jan)
Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 27
Mar)
Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshbarger (to 24
Apr 1952)
_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (2 Dec
1951 to 21 Jan 1952)
Maj Zadik Collier (from 22 Jan)
Executive Officer Maj Alton C. Bennett (to 4 Dec
1951)
Maj Zadik Collier (from 5 Dec)
Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 22 Jan
1952)
_Headquarters Squadron 33 (HQSQ, MAG-33)_
Commanding Officer Capt Grover C. McClure, Jr. (to 14
Apr 1951)
Maj William D. Armstrong (from 15
Apr)
Maj Raymond F. Scherer (from 28
Jul)
Maj Morgan C. Webb, III (from 27
Aug)
Capt Allen R. Schutter (from 27
Mar 1952)
_Marine Service Squadron 33 (SMS-33)_[378]
Commanding Officer LtCol James C. Lindsay (to 23 Jan
1951)
Maj Edward J. Montagne (from 24
Jan)
Maj William M. Lundin (from 26 Jan)
Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. (from 1
Apr)
LtCol Allen T. Barnum (from 2 Jul)
LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (from 12
Nov)
Executive Officer Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (to 13
Mar 1951)[379]
Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr.[380]
(from 2 Jul)
Maj George K. Harshbarger (from 7
Aug)
_Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)_
Commanding Officer Col Boeker C. Batterton (to 28 May
1951)
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 29
May)
Col Richard C. Mangrum (from 1 Aug)
Col Luther S. Moore (from 2 Jan
1952)
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 1 Apr)
Executive Officer LtCol Donald K. Yost (to 24 Feb
1951)
LtCol Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from
25 Feb)
LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski (from
26 Jun)
LtCol William G. Thrash (from 18
Jul)
LtCol Hugh M. Elwood (from 8 Aug)
LtCol Jens C. Aggerbeck, Jr. (from
17 Nov)
LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 27 Feb
1952)
_Headquarters Squadron, (HQSQ, MAG-12)_
Commanding Officer Maj John E. Hays (to 31 Dec 1950)
Capt William E. Lesage (from 1 Jan
1951)
Maj Bradley K. Schwarz (from 4 Apr)
Maj David P. John (from 2 Sep)
Capt Joseph E. Givens (from 9 Oct)
Capt George Byers, Jr. (from 1 Feb
1952)
_Marine Service Squadron 12 (SMS-12)[381]_
Commanding Officer LtCol Charles E. McLean, Jr. (to
28 Jul 1951)
Maj Perry L. Shuman (from 29 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Joseph W. Mackin (to 2 Apr
1951)
Maj Howard W. Bollmann (from 3 Apr)
Maj Raphael Ahern (from 8 Aug)
Maj Robert E. Wall (from 3 Oct)
_Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)_ (Commissioned 1 Dec 1951)
Commanding Officer Maj Perry L. Shuman (to 5 Jan
1952)[382]
Maj Robert L. Bryson (from 6 Jan)
LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 1 Mar)
Executive Officer Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (to 18
Dec 1951)
Maj Robert L. Bryson (from 19 Dec)
Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 6
Jan 1952)
Maj Robert A. Collett (from 1 Mar)
_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)_
(Commissioned 1 Dec 1951)
Commanding Officer Maj Robert E. Wall (to 10 Feb 1952)
LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 11 Feb)
LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 1 Mar)
Executive Officer Capt Kenneth A. Anderson (to 26
Dec 1951)
Maj “S” “D” G. Peterson (from 27
Dec)[383]
Maj Robert E. Wall (from Feb/Mar
1952)[383]
_Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)_ (Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953)
and
_Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)_ (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer CWO Aubrey D. Taylor (to 23 Jan
1951)
LtCol James C. Lindsay (from 24
Jan)
Col Roger T. Carleson (from 19 Feb)
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 9 Sep)
Col John Wehle (from 7 Jan 1952)
Executive Officer None shown prior to 19 Feb 1951.
LtCol James C. Lindsay (to 16 Jul
1951)
LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 17 Jul)
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 13 Nov)
LtCol Robert M. Haynes (from 2 Dec)
LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 15
Mar 1952)
_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1)_
Commanding Officer Maj Harold E. Allen (to 10 Jun
1951)
LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 11
Jun)
Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 18
Aug)
LtCol William T. Herring (from 18
Sep)
Maj Milton M. Cook (from 1 Feb
1952)
LtCol Herbert D. Raymond, Jr.
(from 16 Feb)
Maj Fred A. Steele (from 28 Mar)
Executive Officer Maj Richard Hey, Jr. (to 3 Apr
1951)
Maj Casper F. Hegner (from 4 Apr)
Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 31
Jul)
Maj William T. Porter (from 21 Nov)
Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 11
Dec)
Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from 2
Feb 1952)
Maj Fred A. Steele (from 16 Feb)
Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from
28 Mar)
_Marine Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152)_
Commanding Officer Col Deane C. Roberts (to 15 Jul
1951)
LtCol John S. Carter (from 16 Jul)
Col William B. Steiner (from 27
Jul)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212) redesignated Marine Attack
Squadron 212 (VMA-212) on 10 Jun 1952_
Commanding Officer LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski (to 9
Mar 1951)
LtCol Claude H. Welch (from 10 Mar)
LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 21
Aug)
LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 11 Dec)
LtCol Robert L. Bryson (from 1 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. (to 18
Mar 1951)
Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (from
19 Mar)
Maj Joseph W. Mackin (from 13 Apr)
Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 16
Jul)
Maj William H. Rankin (from 20 Sep)
Maj Robert A. Collett (from 11 Dec)
Maj Richard B. Elliott (from 23
Feb 1952)
_1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion_ Arrived Pusan, Korea--29 Aug 1951
Battalion Commander LtCol Charles W. May (KIA) (to 21
Dec 1951)
LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 22
Dec)
Col John F. Dunlap (from 30 Jan
1952)
Col Max C. Chapman (from 23 Mar)
Executive Officer Maj Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 21 Dec
1951)
None shown 22–25 Dec 1951.
Maj David H. Simmons (from 26 Dec)
LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 30
Jan 1952)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-311)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Neil R. MacIntyre (to 10 Mar
1951)
LtCol John F. Kinney (from 11 Mar)
Maj Frank S. Hoffecker (from 28
Jul)
LtCol James B. Moore (from 1 Aug)
LtCol John S. Payne (from 1 Dec)
LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 27
Feb 1952)
Executive Officer Maj John R. Stack (to 20 Feb 1951)
Maj Samuel Richards, Jr. (from 21
Feb)
Maj Samuel B. Folsom, Jr. (from
Apr)[384]
Maj Frank S. Hoffecker, Jr. (from
1 Jun) (KIA)
Maj Frank C. Drury (from 25 Aug)
Maj Carroll E. McCullah (from 1
Jan 1952)
Maj Jay E. McDonald (from 16 Feb)
_Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)_
Commanding Officer LtCol David C. Wolfe (to 22 Feb
1951)
LtCol James R. Anderson (from 23
Feb)
LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 1 Jul)
LtCol Allen T. Barnum (from 22 Nov)
Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 1 Feb
1952)
LtCol John R. Burnett (from 1 Mar)
Executive Officer Maj Albert L. Clark (to 18 Dec
1950)
Maj George B. Herlihy (from 19 Dec)
Maj William G. Johnson[385] (from
Feb 1951)
Maj Evans C. Carlson (from 23 Apr)
Maj John E. Reynolds (from 7 May)
Maj Leo F. Tatro, Jr. (from 25 Aug)
Maj Judson C. Richardson, Jr.
(MIA) (from 4 Oct)
Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 14 Dec)
Maj Leroy T. Frey (from 1 Feb 1952)
Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 1 Mar)
_Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542 (VMF(N)-542)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr. (to 5
Feb 1951)
LtCol James R. Anderson (from 6
Feb)
Maj Albert L. Clark (from 23
Feb)[386]
LtCol Peter D. Lambrecht (from 24
Mar)
Executive Officer Maj Robert T. Whitten (to 23 Jan
1951)
LtCol James R. Anderson (from 24
Jan)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323) redesignated Marine Attack
Squadron 323 (VMA-323) on 30 Jun 1952_
Commanding Officer Maj Arnold A. Lund (to 24 Jan 1951)
Maj Stanley S. Nicolay (from 25
Jan)
Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Mar)
Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 3 May)
LtCol George F. Vaughan (from 25
Sep)
Maj John L. Dexter (from 26 Oct)
LtCol Richard L. Blume (from 16
Jan 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Johnson (to 31 Jan
1951)
Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Feb)
Maj Wilbur F. Evans, Jr. (from 1
Mar)
Maj John L. Dexter (from 7 Jul)
Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 25
Oct)
Maj Andrew J. Voyles (from 22 Nov)
Maj Howard E. Cook (from 18 Dec)
Maj Herbert D. Raymond, Jr. (from
13 Jan 1952)
Maj Howard E. Cook (from 14 Feb)
Maj William A. Weir (from 16 Mar)
_Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)_ (Arrived Korea 11 Apr 1951)
Commanding Officer LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 10
Apr 1951)
Col Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (from
30 Apr)
Col Martin A. Severson (from 1 Jan
1952)
Col Frederick R. Payne, Jr. (from
1 Mar)
Executive Officer None shown during period LtCol
Brilliant was CO.
LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 30
Apr 1951)
LtCol Joseph W. Kean (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 4 Dec)
LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 6 Feb
1952)
_Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)_
Commanding Officer Maj Christian C. Lee (to 30 Apr
1951)
Maj James A. Etheridge (from 1 May)
Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 6
May)
Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 28 May)
LtCol Henry W. Bransom (from 25
Jun)
LtCol Hensley Williams (from 1 Dec
1951)
Executive Officer Maj Harlen E. Hood (to Mar/Apr
1951)
Maj James A. Etheridge (from 26
Apr)[387]
Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 1 May)
Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 28
May)
Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 23 Sep)
_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3)_
Commanding Officer Maj Raymond H. George (to 15 Feb
1951)
Maj Jack R. Moore (from 16 Feb)
LtCol Hoyle R. Barr (from 1 Nov)
LtCol Owen W. Hines (from 2 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj David M. Hudson (to 15 Aug
1951)
Maj Daniel L. Cummings (from 16
Aug)
Maj James H. Foster (from 17 Feb
1952)
_Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)_
(Departed El Toro--2 Oct 1951 for Korea; 21 Oct 1951 reported to CG,
1stMAW, for duty; 22 Oct 1951 CO arrived Pohang (K-3), Korea.)
Commanding Officer LtCol Alfred N. Gordon (KIA) (to
17 Nov 1951)
Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 18
Nov)
LtCol Phillip B. May (from 1 Dec)
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr.
(from 15 Mar 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 17
Nov 1951)
Maj Edward B. Harrison (from 18
Nov)
Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 1
Dec)
Maj Edward B. Harrison (from 1 Jan
1952)
Maj Richard J. Flynn, Jr. (from 15
Feb)
Maj Henry W. Horst (from 26 Mar)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214)_
Commanding Officer Maj William M. Lundin (to 25 Jan
1951)
Maj James A. Feeley, Jr. (from 26
Jan)
Maj Edward Ochoa (from 5 May)
LtCol James W. Poindexter (from 16
May)
Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 4
Nov)[388]
Executive Officer Maj Edward Ochoa (to 31 Jan 1951)
Maj Hugh B. Calahan (from 1 Feb)
Maj Herbert C. Langenfeld[389]
(from 1 Jun)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)_ (Arrived Pohang (K-3), Korea
on 25 Feb 1952)
Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas M. Coles (25 Feb-20
May 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (25 Feb-26
Apr 1952)
_Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF-312) redesignated Marine Attack Squadron
(VMA-312) on 1 Mar 1952_
Commanding Officer LtCol “J” Frank Cole (to 28 Jan
1951)
Maj Donald P. Frame (KIA) (from 29
Jan)
Maj Frank H. Presley (from 4 Apr)
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 20 Jun)
LtCol Harry W. Reed (KIA) (from 22
Jul)
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 31 Jul)
LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 15 Aug)
LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (from
8 Jan 1952)
Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Presley (to 3 Apr
1951)
Capt Phillip C. DeLong (from 4 Apr)
Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from
22 Jun)
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 22 Jul)
Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from
31 Jul)
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 14 Aug)
Maj James H. Crutchfield (KIA)
(from 25 Oct)
Maj Jay W. Hubbard (from 4 Nov)
Maj Richard J. Webster (from 19
Dec)[390]
Maj Fred A. Steele (from Jan
1952)[390]
Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (from
28 Jan)
Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 30
Mar)
_Photographic Unit--commissioned Marine Photographic Squadron 1
(VMJ-1) on 25 Feb 1952_
Commanding Officer Maj Donald S. Bush (to 14 Jun 1951)
Maj Edgar L. Smith (from 15 Jun)
Maj James W. Dougherty (from 27
Jul)
Capt Edward A. Fitzgerald (from 29
Oct)
LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 12 Nov)
Maj Robert R. Read (from 26 Mar
1952)
Executive Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 25 Mar 1952)
Maj Albert E. James (from 26 Mar)
_HQSQ, 1st MAW_
Commanding Officer Capt Earl B. Sumerlin, Jr. (to 12
Jan 1951)
Maj John A. Reeder (from 13 Jan)
Capt Edwin H. McCaleb, III (from
17 Jun)
Maj Herbert C. Langenfeld (from
11 Oct)
Maj Earl C. Miles (from 2 Dec)
[378] SMS disestablished 1 Dec 1951--concurrently MABS-33 and
MAMS-33 formed.
[379] No Exec listed after Montagne was detached sometime in
March 1951 until July 1951. Thompson came aboard 13 Mar
1951 which may well be date that Montagne was detached as
Exec--however, nothing is recorded to this effect.
[380] It is quite possible and logical that Thompson was Exec
from 13 Mar-2 Apr 1951--when he became CO.
[381] SMS-12 disestablished 1 Dec 1951--concurrently MABS-12
and MAMS-12 formed and commissioned.
[382] Narrative of Jan 1952 CD MABS-12 states Shuman det 4 Jan
1952 and Bryson on same date took over as CO. Assumption
of command order states that 6 Jan 1952 was date Bryson
became CO.
[383] These dates are those from the Station Lists--the diary
records nothing (except in the case of Beatty (20 Feb
1952)) that would either prove or disprove these dates as
being correct.
[384] The absence of a specific date indicates that no specific
date of assignment is shown in unit records.
[385] The absence of specific dates indicates that no specific
assignment dates can be found in existing records.
[386] VMF(N)-542: At sea bound for United States 12–21 Mar
1951--arrived El Toro, 24 Mar 1951.
[387] His date of attachment is vague.
[388] VMF-214 departed Korea for Itami on 4 Nov 1951--en route
to USA (El Toro) aboard the _Lenawee_, 8–27 Nov 1951.
[389] Records do not indicate specific date.
[390] Records do not indicate specific date.
APPENDIX D
Unit Citations
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor
forces in Korea during the periods 21 to 26 April, 16 May to
30 June, and 11 to 25 September 1951. Spearheading the first
counteroffensive in the spring of 1951, the First Marine
Division, Reinforced, engaged the enemy in the mountainous
center of Korea in a brilliant series of actions unparalleled
in the history of the Marine Corps, destroying and routing
hostile forces with an unrelenting drive of seventy miles north
from Wonju. During the period 21 to 26 April, the full force
of the enemy counteroffensive was met by the Division, north
of the Hwachon Reservoir. Although major units flanking the
Marine Division were destroyed or driven back by the force of
this attack, the Division held firm against the attackers,
repelling the onslaught from three directions and preventing the
encirclement of the key center of the lines. Following a rapid
regrouping of friendly forces in close contact with the enemy,
the First Marine Division, Reinforced, was committed into the
flanks of the massive enemy penetration and, from 16 May to 30
June, was locked in violent and crucial battle which resulted
in the enemy being driven back to the north with disastrous
losses to his forces in the number of killed, wounded and
captured. Carrying out a series of devastating assaults, the
Division succeeded in reducing the enemy’s main fortified complex
dominating the 38th Parallel. In the final significant offensive
of the action in Korea, from 11 to 25 September 1951, the First
Marine Division, Reinforced, completed the destruction of the
enemy forces in Eastern Korea by advancing the front against a
final desperate enemy defense in the ‘Punch Bowl’ area in heavy
action which completed the liberation of South Korea in this
locality. With the enemy’s major defenses reduced, his forces on
the central front decimated, and the advantage of terrain and
the tactical initiative passing to friendly forces, he never
again recovered sufficiently to resume the offensive in Korea.
The outstanding courage, resourcefulness and aggressive fighting
spirit of the officers and men of the First Marine Division,
Reinforced, reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the
United States Naval Service.”
The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division
participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in
Korea during the cited periods:
FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: “C” Battery, 1st
4.5 Rocket Battalion; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored
Amphibian Battalion; “A” Company, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion
(Redesignated 1st Amphibian Truck Company 18 July 1951); Team
#1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st Fumigation and
Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 1st
Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company;
1st Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company.
UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army
Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32d Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th
Truck Co; 513th Truck Co; 1st Ord Medium Maint Co, USA; 3d Plt,
86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to operational control of 11th
Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, was attached to 7th
MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92d Army Engr Searchlight
Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163d MIS Det USA; TLO Det USA; UNMACK
Civil Affairs Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155
Howitzer); 623d Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn “C” Btry; 204th
Field Arty Bn “B” Btry; 84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th
US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2d US
Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn;
Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty Bn “A” Btry; 69th
Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field
Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; Prov
Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 32d RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA;
Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; Co B, 1st Bn, 31st
Inf, USA; 2d Bn, 31st Inf, USA (less Co E).
For the President,
CHARLES S. THOMAS
_Secretary of the Navy_
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor
forces in Korea from 8 March to 30 April, 18 May to 30 June, and
3 August to 29 September 1951. Carrying out ‘round-the-clock’
combat flights during these periods, often under hazardous
conditions of weather and terrain, the First Marine Aircraft
Wing, Reinforced, provided unparalleled close air support for
friendly ground forces, effectively reducing the enemy’s power
to resist and contributing materially to the sweeping victories
achieved by our ground forces. Operating continuously in the
most advanced areas under fire, the Wing consistently maintained
a high degree of combat readiness and struck savage blows to
inflict tremendous damage and heavy casualties upon the enemy.
Individually capable and determined, the gallant officers and men
of this indomitable team achieved a distinctive combat record
during a period of vital operations against a stubborn foe. This
record is a lasting tribute to the courage and fighting spirit of
all members of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, and
reflects the highest credit upon the United States Naval Service.”
All organic units (excepting Marine Fighting Squadrons 214 and
323 for the periods 8 March to 30 April 1951 and 18 May to 30
June 1951, and Marine Observation Squadron 6 for the entire three
periods) and the following reinforcing units of the First Marine
Aircraft Wing participated in operations against enemy aggressor
forces in Korea during one or more of the above cited periods:
1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and Ground Control
Approach Unit 41M.
For the President,
CHARLES S. THOMAS
_Secretary of the Navy_
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Index
Adelman, LtCol Merritt, 122_n_, 134, 149
A-frames, 86, 163
Agan, Capt Alfred H., 47
Air attack, enemy, 65
Air battle, 103
Air control, 97
1st MAW, 89
System, USAF, 18
System, USMC, 18
Aircraft, 46, 47, 63, 71, 83, 89, 96, 117, 125, 131, 137, 159,
188–190, 208.
_See_ Helicopters and Communist Forces.
AD (Skyraiders), 116, 122, 125
B-26, 33
B-29, 90
F3D (SkyKnight), 89
F4U (Corsair), 13, 27, 33, 49, 63, 71, 78, 89, 96, 107, 108, 116,
125, 137, 142, 186
F7F (Tigercat), 49, 50, 63, 89, 131
F9F (Panther), 63, 96, 108, 125, 137, 148
F-51 (Mustang), 28, 33, 116, 125, 137, 206
F-80 (Shooting Star), 15, 97, 125
F-82, 89
F-84, 125
Jets, 15, 49, 63, 96
Marine, 63, 78, 103, 108, 120
Mars, 31
Mosquito, 18, 26–28, 47, 50, 51, 97, 107
Observation planes
OEs, 224
OYs, 1, 14, 49, 63, 104, 107, 116, 125, 134, 137, 142, 164,
187, 188, 224
PB4Y-2, 138
PO-2, 170
R4D, 55, 63, 138
R5D, 31, 32, 63, 89
Sabre jets, 28
SNB (Beechcraft), 63
SNJ, 18
TBM (Avenger), 50, 63
T-6, 18
Transports, 31
Air drop, 73, 93, 116, 181
Air Fields
Bofu, repair of, 33
Kimpo, 28, 29, 59, 64
K-1, 29, 32, 33, 35, 46, 48, 56, 62, 63, 89, 96, 108, 137, 171
K-2, 29, 32
K-3, 32, 62, 63, 89, 108, 171
K-4, 29
K-9, 1, 15, 28, 29, 32, 46, 48–50, 52, 56, 90
K-10, 29
K-16, 28, 108, 116, 137, 254
K-18, 171, 185, 186
K-46, 137, 138, 142, 170
K-50, 215, 254
K-51, 215
X-77, 214
X-83, 189, 208, 219, 220, 241, 242
Seoul, 29
Suwon, 28, 29
Tsuika, 33_n_
Wonsan, 29
Yonpo, 29
Air Force, 28, 31, 33, 34, 63, 76, 170, 224
Eighth Air Force, 167
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 14, 29, 32, 33, 45, 47, 95
Commander, 33
Combat Air Command, 73
Military Air Transport Service, 31
Fifth Air Force, 14, 15, 18, 49, 64, 67, 69, 78, 135, 142, 143,
170, 185, 257
Control, 15
543d Tactical Support Group, 64
8th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 15
606th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 90
Airheart, 1stLt William C., 151
Air Liaison officer, 17
Air lift, 31, 32, 215
Troop, 32
Air mattresses, 94
Air observation, 182
Air operations
Control, 26
United Nations, 33
Air reconnaissance, 49, 50, 64, 78, 84, 101, 143, 207
Armed, 96
Patrols, 28
United States, 47
Air strike, 17, 69, 70, 75, 91, 92, 119, 125, 130, 142, 148, 149, 159,
179, 183, 185, 186, 195, 206, 219, 221
Control, 17, 142
Interdiction, 27, 144
Tactics, 64
United States, 13, 52
U. S. Marine Corps, 65, 70, 74, 115
Air support, 27, 28, 45, 69, 76, 78, 81, 86, 96, 97, 108, 130,
135–138, 141, 142, 148, 150, 178, 185, 191, 206, 210,
220, 258, 260
Close, 14, 18, 26, 27, 49, 71, 76, 78, 96, 108, 114, 125, 136,
142–144, 169, 170, 185, 186, 224, 258, 260
Control of, 14, 15, 17, 136
Air Force, 17
Marine Corps, 17
Deep, 49, 50
Interdictory, 18
Naval (British), 28
Reconnaissance, 64
United States, 56, 71, 83
ALBANY, Phase Line, 80, 84, 85
Allen, BrigGen C. R., 246_n_
Allen, Maj H. E., 90, 90_n_
Allert, 1stLt William J., 111
Almond, MajGen Edward M., 5, 19, 121, 128, 133, 133_n_, 137, 149,
154, 157, 162
Alston, LtCol William P., 194, 204, 242
Ambushes, 70, 217, 229, 231, 242
Chinese Communist Forces, 44
Marine, U.S., 53
North Korean People’s Army, 49
American Civil War, 165
Americans, Fighting for Korea, 7
Ammunition, 72, 122, 144, 170, 179, 181, 187, 190, 193, 210, 214, 221,
243, 244, 260
Artillery, 185
Mortar, 180
11th Marines, 122
Dump, 104, 210
Enemy, 130
Mortars, 114, 244
Shells, 104
Shortage, 244
Small-arms, 114
Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, 181
United States, 64, 93, 122
U. S. Marine Corps, 113
Amphibious
Assault, 257
Attack, 250
Landing, 45, 47
Operation, 250
Tactics, 250
Anderson, LtCol James R., 46, 63, 89
Andong, 29, 42, 44, 49, 51, 55, 62, 66
Andong-Taegu area, 45
Andrewes, VAdm Sir William G., RN, 15, 28, 46
Antiaircraft
Defenses, 103
Fire, enemy, 47
ARIZONA, Phase Line, 73, 75
Armor, body, 165, 166, 168, 169, 237–239, 251, 257. _See_ Vest, Armored.
Army, U. S., Strength figures, 11
Army, U. S. Units
Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 5, 8, 10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25–27, 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 44, 49, 51, 54, 58–60, 63, 65,
67, 69, 84, 86, 92, 93, 109, 119, 121, 122, 127, 128, 132,
133, 156–158, 163, 176, 185, 201, 203, 215, 218, 225, 242,
243, 250–253, 258, 259
Commander, 7, 11, 12, 19, 41, 50, 58, 60, 67, 68, 72, 73, 99, 120,
199, 202, 261
Fortifications, 11
Morale, 7, 8, 156
Tactics, 8
Transportation Section, 163
Units, supply of, 12
Tenth Army, 72
I Corps, 22, 24, 25, 44, 50, 66, 79, 84, 108, 116, 119, 121, 131,
154, 163, 201, 251, 253, 256, 259
Headquarters, 50
IX Corps, 22, 24–26, 44, 50, 58, 60, 62, 65–67, 72, 79, 80, 84, 86,
93–95, 99–102, 107–109, 118, 121, 126, 128, 130–132, 154,
201, 214, 253, 259
Commander, 60, 71, 79, 215
Command Post, 72
X Corps, 1, 5, 19, 21, 22, 24–26, 29, 45, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 79,
93, 94, 108, 120, 121, 125, 128, 131, 146, 149, 154, 158,
159, 161, 181, 199, 201, 206, 210, 212, 216, 218, 221, 224,
227, 253, 256, 259
Commander, 162
Command post, 19
Evacuation, 2, 5
XVIII Airborne Corps, 7
1st Cavalry Division, 8, 22, 65, 80, 86, 94–97, 102, 119, 121, 201
2d Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 26, 62, 65, 66, 71, 72, 80,
119–121, 123, 125, 126, 128, 146, 159, 161, 168, 171, 173,
176, 180, 202, 253
Morale, 199
3d Infantry Division, 8, 14, 19, 22, 25, 121, 123, 144, 201, 253
7th Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 66, 71, 72, 95, 121, 130, 144,
201, 217, 253
24th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 58, 59, 65, 107, 121, 201
25th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 41, 107, 121, 144, 201, 253, 254
40th Infantry Division, 253
45th Infantry Division, 253
2d Logistical Command, 12, 254
5th Cavalry Regiment, 119
7th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97
8th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97
9th Infantry Regiment, 126
17th Regimental Combat Team, 253
23d Regiment, 62, 168
35th Regiment, 51
38th Regiment, 126, 168
65th Regimental Combat Team, 253
187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 22, 25, 66, 68, 86, 121,
128, 131, 133
17th Field Artillery Battalion, 122
92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 66, 109
96th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 122
196th Field Artillery Battalion, 171
987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 111, 114
92d U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 227
4th Ranger Company, 102
74th Truck Company, 66
U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 245
Artillery, 159, 176, 195
Army, 11, 59, 107, 116, 121, 210
Chinese Communist Forces, 70, 90, 134
Marine, 52, 69, 70, 74–76, 86, 92, 107, 114, 116, 125, 180, 183,
210, 218, 244
North Korea People’s Army, 180
Support, 78, 92, 93, 114, 130, 142, 148, 149, 178, 191, 195,
206, 220, 227
Atomic bomb, 37, 187
Australia, 24
Autrey, Maj Robert L., 103, 182, 199_n_
Averill, Maj Gerald P., 194_n_
BADGER Line, 157
_Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 1, 2, 15
BAKER, Phase Line, 86, 91, 92
Banning, LtCol Virgil W., 74, 91, 111, 117, 118
Barclay, Brig C. N., 116_n_
Barbed wire, 197, 232
_Bataan_ (CVL), USS, 1, 2, 14, 28, 35, 41, 46, 47, 89, 103, 146
Bates, Maj William L., 111
Batterton, Col Boeker C., 48
Baugh, Maj William E., 223
Bay of Masan, 2
Bayonet assault, 150
Bean Patch, 2, 3
Belgium, 24
Bell. _See_ Helicopters.
Belleau Wood, 118, 152
Berger, Carl, 160_n_, 171_n_
Bethel, Col Ion M., 235
Black, Capt Albert A., 215
Blakeney, Jane, 193_n_
Bofu, 33, 35, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 62
Bohannon, Capt Thomas J., 52, 111, 113, 116
Booby traps, 206
Borth, Maj Harold C., 181
Bougainville, 118
Bowser, Col Alpha L., 7, 18, 19, 60_n_, 62_n_, 94, 94_n_, 102, 102_n_,
107_n_, 120_n_
Boyd, Maj Vernon D., 235
Brice, BrigGen William O., 136
Bridges, 64, 102, 103
Enemy, 143
Floating, 102
Improvised, 74
Korean, 15
Sections, 64
Swiss bent, 74
Brown, Capt Leslie E., 15
Brown, Col Wilburt S., 126, 134, 134_n_, 148–150, 150_n_, 152,
152_n_, 157, 158
BROWN Line, 150, 151, 157
Brunelli, Col Austin R., 255
Buckingham, CWO Robert C., 170
Buckner, LtGen Simon Bolivar, 72
BUFFALO, Phase Line, 85, 92
Bugles, NKPA, 192, 217
Bunkers, 184, 191, 192, 194, 210, 217, 219, 221, 224, 230, 232, 242,
244, 245, 261
Chinese Communist Forces, 70, 75, 83, 91, 92
Enemy, 149
North Korean People’s Army, 141, 142, 182, 183, 191, 216, 220
Burchett, Wilford G., 247, 247_n_, 248
Burton, Col Custis, Jr., 179, 210, 232, 255
Bush, 2dLt Clayton O., 83, 83_n_
Bush, Maj Donald S., 63, 64, 134
Bushe, Capt Eugene A., 119
Butterfly bombs, USMC, 88
Byers, MajGen Clovis E., 162, 208
C Rations, 175
Cagle, LtCol Carl J., 181
CAIRO, Phase Line, 92, 93
Camel, 64
Cameras, 92
K-17 camera, 134
Camp Lejeune, 31, 167, 168, 234, 236
Camp Pendleton, 31
Camp Tripoli, 233, 243, 255
Canada, 24
Cargadores, 163, 173, 181, 190
Cargo ship, USN, 30
Carney, Maj Edgar F., Jr., 192, 193_n_
Cartier, Raymond, 155
Casualties, 210, 213, 220, 221, 238, 239, 243
Chinese Communist Forces, 38, 70, 75, 76, 79, 83, 84, 91, 116, 118,
121, 125–128, 131, 259
Eighth Air Force, 167
Enemy, 153, 202, 206, 210, 216, 220, 246, 259
Evacuating of, 165, 189, 190, 214
Korean Marine Corps, 55, 147, 159
IX Corps, 84
Non-Battle, 234
North Korean (NKPA), 51, 52, 57, 146, 180, 184, 194, 198, 210, 217,
220, 225, 228
X Corps, 84
United Nations, 34, 161, 202
United States, 60, 156
U. S. Marine Corps, 30, 49, 51, 57, 69, 70, 75, 76, 81, 83, 86, 91,
111, 116, 118, 125, 131, 133, 143, 150–152, 159, 173, 178,
180, 184, 186, 193, 194, 196, 199, 206, 210, 216,
218, 220, 246
Evacuation of, 164
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 232
Chachon-dong, 52
Chaegok-tong, 54
Chang, Gen, 109
Changhang, 216
Changwon, 3
Chechon, 26
Chiang Kai-shek, 36
Chidi San mountain mass, 3
China, Red, 261
Funds for war, 37
“Hate America” Campaign, 35, 36
Chinandong, 54
Chinese Civil War, 155
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 6, 58, 59, 85, 123, 128, 154
Air strike, 15
Armies, 45
Attack, 26
Bugle calls, 113
Concentration, 27
Counterstroke, 63
Entrenchments, 15, 248
Equipment, 39, 153
Gun positions, 15
Infiltration, 35
Logistical, 144
Morale, 155
Offensive, 11, 15, 19, 33, 107, 120–122, 126, 152, 164, 259
Fifth Phase, 103, 105, 121, 126, 155, 164
January, 19, 34, 41, 154
Sixth Phase, 178
Penetration, 21
Road block, 111
Shore batteries, 156
Soldier, 35
Strategy, 35, 80, 101
Strength figures, 218
Supply
Dumps, 19
Lines, 41
Tactics, 35–38, 100, 248
Human Sea, 35
Troops, 27, 41, 50, 51, 170
Shelters, 15
Uniform, 35
YAK fighter, 103
Units
20th Army, 24, 101
24th Army, 24
26th Army, 24, 101
27th Army, 24
30th Army, 24
32d Army, 24
37th Army, 24
38th Army, 24
39th Army, 24, 66, 93, 101
40th Army, 24, 60, 66, 101, 106, 115
42d Army, 24, 101
48th Army, 24
49th Army, 24
50th Army, 24
65th Army, 24
66th Army, 24, 60, 66, 81, 93, 101
44th Division, 126
58th Division, 101
59th Division, 101
60th Division, 101
76th Division, 101
77th Division, 101
78th Division, 101
115th Division, 101
116th Division, 101
117th Division, 101
118th Division, 101
119th Division, 101
120th Division, 101, 106, 115
124th Division, 101
125th Division, 101
126th Division, 101
196th Division, 66, 81
197th Division, 81
198th Division, 81
358th Regiment, 106
359th Regiment, 115
360th Regiment, 115
Chinese Nationalists, 36
Chinhae, 2, 54
Chinju, 3
Chiso-dong, 52
Chodo-ri, 154
Choe, MajGen Am Lin, 146
Chogutan, 171
Chongja-dong, 52
Chon-San, 90
Chorwon, 95, 154, 201
Hwachon area, 27
Chosin, 70
Breakout, 3, 14, 101, 109, 234
Campaign, 6, 32, 38, 42, 45, 52, 57, 118, 257
Fighting, 8
Operation, 2, 5, 152, 168
Reservoir, 12, 66, 136, 152, 257
Withdrawal, 120
Christmas in Korea, 5
Chumunjin, 80
Chunchon, 8, 80, 94, 117, 119, 181, 215
Chunchon-Hongchon highway, 123
Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon corridor, 26
Chungju, 22, 26, 58, 60, 66, 67
Chipyong-ni, 71
Clark, Maj Albert L., 89
Clothing
Camouflage, 228
Cold weather, 163, 221, 222
Coffey, Capt John, 109, 109_n_, 111, 111_n_,
113
Cole, LtCol Frank J., 46
Commander Naval Forces, Far East (Com NavFE), 5
_See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN.
Communications, 137, 208
Air-ground, 260
Communist
Cause, 3
Delaying tactics, 249
Photographers, 156, 157
Truce Team, 160
_Consolation_ (AH), USS, 57, 165
Cornwell, Maj Charles E., 240
Correspondents, at Hagaru, 6
Cotton, Capt James T., 215
Cowan, Cdr John S., 236
Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 2, 3_n_, 7, 8_n_, 12_n_, 21, 49, 57, 164
Cronin, Capt James T., 106, 106_n_
Cronk, Capt Welby D., 91
Culhane, Col Thomas A., Jr., 254_n_
Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 136
Daigh, 1stLt Harold D., 103
Davis, Maj Daniel H., 71
Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 107_n_, 123, 133
Delegates
Communist, 171, 220, 225, 229, 233
Delaying tactics, 160
United States, 248, 249
DeLong, Capt Philip C., 103
Demolitions, 102
DEVASTATE BAKER, 96
Doriot, Col George F., 166, 167
Doyle, RAdm James H., 13, 14
DUCK, Line, 224, 229, 230
Edwards, LtCol Harry W., 189_n_, 199_n_, 207, 213, 222_n_
El Toro, California, 88, 188
England, 250
Equipment
Eighth Army, 12
Shortages, 30
USMC, 12
Shortages, 11, 12
Worn, 13
Ethiopia, 24
Evacuation, 115
Casualties, 164, 165, 250
Hungnam, 5
Evans, LtCol Holly F., 114, 191, 210
Everest, MajGen Frank E., 136
Feeney, Maj James A., Jr., 46
Fenton, Capt Donald L., 170
Ferenbaugh, MajGen Claude F., 215
Fink, Maj Gerald, 223_n_
Fisher, Capt Don H., 52
Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 91
Flak traps, 143
Flares
CCF, 113
Trip, 216
Flournoy, Col Walter N., 204, 232
_Flying Dutchman_ (legendary ship), 57
Fontana, LtCol Paul J., 46, 47, 62
Ford, Capt John, USNR, 6
Forward Air Controller (FAC), 17, 52, 71, 96, 97, 116, 142,
186, 206, 230
Forward Observers, 144
Forward OPs, 210
Fowler, Capt Delbert M., 102_n_
Frame, Maj Donald P., 46
France, 24, 65, 68, 246
Franklin, Benjamin, 251
Freeman, Col Paul, 62
French, 202
Fresh Rations, Marines, 5
Frostbite, 234, 235
Casualty, Medical, 57
Fulton, Capt Floyd K., 52
Gall, Maj Walter, 60, 83, 168
Garvin, BrigGen Crump, 12
Gases, 134
Gasoline, 32, 34, 72, 170, 190, 222
Gavin, Gen James M., 38, 38_n_
Gayle, LtCol Gordon D., 199_n_, 232, 254
Geiger, MajGen Roy S., 72
_General Darby_, USNS, 31
_General W. H. Gordon_, USS, 254
Glendinning, Maj James I., 74
Gomez, Pfc Edward, 193, 193_n_
Gorman, LtCol John E., 193, 193_n_, 204, 240
Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 14
Greece, 24, 99
Griffin, LtCol Louis C., 175, 183, 184
Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 91
Groves, Col Gould P., 158_n_, 159, 176_n_, 199_n_
Guadalcanal campaign, 118, 152
Guam, 32
Guerrillas, 36, 44, 203, 213, 222, 257, 258
Anti-, 241
Communist, 3
Communist Chinese Forces, 35, 44, 51
Enemy, 53, 57, 58
North Korean People’s Army, 26, 44, 45, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56
Gugeler, Capt Russell A., 111_n_, 116_n_
Haffey, Capt Eugene H., 107
Hagaru-ri, 6
Hager, Col Frank P., Jr., 199_n_, 227
Haiti, 118, 232
Hamhung, 6
Han River, 11, 25, 28, 50, 58, 59, 71, 108, 119, 122
Hangye, 130, 171
Hardwick, LtCol Gordon A., 166_n_, 234_n_, 235, 237_n_, 238_n_
Harper, 2dLt William E., 230
Harris, MajGen Field, 14, 15, 46, 48, 49, 50, 62, 78, 88, 89,
90, 135, 136
Harrison, LtCol Charles W., 54, 54_n_, 92, 93_n_, 102_n_, 146_n_, 158_n_
Hart, LtGen Franklin H., 232
Hawaii, 89
HAYS Line, 180, 182, 192, 204, 213
Hayward, Col Richard W., 130, 146, 148
Heely, LtCol Dale H., 191
Helicopter, 1, 14, 47, 72, 79, 111, 115, 135, 164, 165, 187–190, 207,
208, 211, 212, 214, 219, 220, 223, 240, 241, 250, 251, 257
Evacuating of casualties, 49, 56
Laying wire, 49
Lift, 211, 213
Troop, 207, 212
HO3S-1, 63, 164, 188
HTL, 59, 63, 164, 188
Helmets, steel, 166
Hemostat, 115
Hemphill, Col Bruce T., 199_n_, 227, 242_n_, 246_n_, 251_n_
Hering, Capt Eugene R. (MC), USNR, 57
Herring, LtCol George W., 188, 189, 207, 211, 213, 223
Hewitt, Maj Roy R., 96, 96_n_, 97
Hickman, Maj William T., 152_n_
Hicks, 1stLt Norman W., 115, 115_n_, 223_n_
Higgs, 1stLt Richard C., 207
Highways, 80
Coastal, 27
Japanese, 33
Traffic jams, 32
Hilian, Lt Donald L., (MC), USN, 215
Hill 201, 75
Hill 208, 75
Hill 246, 91
Hill 313, 105–107
Hill 321, 75
Hill 330, 92
Hill 333, 75
Hill 335, 75
Hill 356, 90
Hill 381, 92
Hill 399, 91
Hill 420, 151
Hill 428, 91
Hill 509, 105, 106
Hill 516, 144, 146
Hill 536, 75
Hill 549, 83
Hill 602, 173, 178, 179, 183
Hill 610, 141, 142
Hill 651, 141
Hill 673, 182–184, 194
Hill 680, 142, 173
Hill 692, 142
Hill 702, 173, 178, 211, 214
Hill 749, 182–184, 187, 190–194
Hill 751, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 216
Hill 755, 176
Hill 761, 157, 158
Hill 802, 150
Hill 812, 183, 194–198, 204, 230, 232, 243, 245. _See_ Kanmubong Ridge
Hill 854, 204, 206, 243, 245
Hill 883, 130
Hill 884, 203, 204, 206, 208, 210, 220, 240, 241.
_See_ “Mount Helicopter”
Hill 902, 111
Hill 924, 173, 176, 178–180
Hill 930, 173, 176
Hill 951, 210
Hill 975, 93
Hill 980, 183, 194–197
Hill 1000, 173
Hill 1001, 159
Hill 1026, 173, 176, 179, 180
Hill 1042, 196
Hill 1051, 130
Hill 1052, 182, 183, 196–198, 216, 219
Hill 1100, 159
Hill 1122, 146, 147
Hill 1218, 146
Hill 1316, 146
Hire, LtCol Homer E., 144, 148
Hiroshima, 187
Hoengsong, 28, 60, 63, 66, 70, 72–74, 80–83, 89, 137, 170
Hoengsong-Hongchon road, 80, 81
Hoge, MajGen William H., 79, 111_n_
Holliday, Maj Morse L., 126
Hongchon, 72, 80, 86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 120, 128, 176, 181
Hongchon-Hangye road, 171
Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 255
Hopkins, LtCol John L., 106_n_, 141
Hospital
Clearing Station, 190
Japan, 12
Ships, 165
Horseshoe Ridge, 113, 115
Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., 83
Howard, LtCol Harold C., 241
Hughes, James J., 230
Hungnam, 2
Beachhead, 2
Evacuation of, 2, 5
Redeployment, 1, 8, 13, 14, 65
Hwachon, 45, 102, 105, 109, 122, 201
Reservoir, 27, 96, 102, 119, 128, 131, 148, 260
Hwanggi, 182
Illinois Wesleyan University, 118
Imjin, 26, 27, 107, 108, 116, 154, 201
River, 73, 79
Inchon, 27, 28, 30, 47, 50, 51, 59, 63, 80, 254, 256
Evacuation of, 28
Landing, 1, 63, 257
Inchon-Seoul, 118
Operation, 2, 44, 135, 168
_Indianapolis_ (CA), USS, 232
Inje, 128, 133, 147, 161, 168, 171, 175, 181, 187, 215
Inje-Kansong road, 128
Innovations, 257
Body armor, 239
Helicopter, 164, 240
Tactical, 165, 251
Iron Triangle, 95, 101, 107, 143, 154
Irwin, Capt John R., 242
Itami, 2, 28, 29, 32, 48, 49, 63, 89
Itazuke, 1, 33, 49, 50, 63
Iwo Jima, 152, 187
Japan, 1, 12, 33, 50
JAMESTOWN, Line, 253, 256
Johnson, Capt Horace L., 111
Johnston Island, 32
Jones, Capt Jack R., 52, 68
Jones, Maj Jack R., 53_n_
JOC (FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations Center), 17, 27, 45, 47, 64, 65, 67,
69, 70, 78, 81, 96, 135–138, 258, 260
Air Control, 67, 76, 97, 135
Joy, VAdm C. Turner (ComNavFE), 5, 14, 155, 157, 157_n_, 160, 160_n_,
161, 161_n_, 221_n_, 223_n_, 248_n_, 249_n_
Junks, enemy, 15
_Jutlandia_, Danish Hospital Ship, 85, 156
Kaesong, 154, 156, 157, 160, 171, 180, 220, 222, 247, 248
Kangnung, 171, 185
Kanmubong Ridge, 183, _See_ Hill 812.
KANSAS Line, 94, 95, 99, 108, 115, 116, 118, 141, 147, 148, 150–153,
162, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 233
Kansong, 128, 187
Kelly, LtCol Bernard T., 123, 125_n_, 135, 135_n_, 175, 175_n_,
176_n_, 179, 183
Kelly, LtCol James G., 176, 183, 184, 199_n_, 216
Kelly, Capt John L., 141
Kelsey, LtCol John V., 191
Kennedy, LtCol Donald R., 91, 194
Kerrigan, 1stLt William E., 68, 68_n_, 141
Kihss, Peter, 153_n_
Kim, Col Dae Shik, 204
Kim, Col Dong Ha, 106, 227
Kim, 1stLt SikTong, 93
Kim, Col Sung Eun, 54
Kimpo, 253
Peninsula, 119, 201, 254, 255
Kingsley, J. Donald, 153
Kirby-Smith, Maj Ephraim, 207
Kirkpatrick, Capt Louis P., (MC), USN, 166_n_
Knapp, LtCol Horace E., Jr., 193_n_
Kobe, 30, 62, 143
Kopas, Capt William T., 141
Korea, 1
North
North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 52, 53. 55, 85, 154
Irregulars, 258
Morale, 53
Soldiers, 55
Strategy, 196
Strength figures, 218
Troops, 132, 147, 152, 170, 184, 185, 260
Units
I Corps, 24
II Corps, 51, 173, 182
III Corps, 182, 217
V Corps, 24, 60, 132
1st Division, 24, 182, 217, 218, 228
2d Division, 182, 217
3d Division, 24
10th Division, 44, 45, 48, 56, 57
12th Division, 132, 146
15th Division, 24, 217, 218, 224, 228
19th Division, 218, 224
45th Division, 228
47th Division, 224, 228
6th Regiment, 173
25th Regiment, 44, 55
27th Regiment, 44, 55
29th Regiment, 44
41st Regiment, 151
91st Regiment, 244
Korea,
South
Republic of Korea, 3, 11
Army (ROKA), 3, 19, 26, 54, 73, 108, 116, 163, 206
Units
I Corps, 22, 108, 121, 123, 128, 154, 202, 215, 253
II Corps, 22
III Corps, 22, 25, 26, 121, 123
Civil Transport Corps, 86, 162, 163, 181
Korean Service Corps, 181
Capital Division, 22, 58, 121, 202, 253
1st Division, 22, 24, 84, 121, 201, 251, 253
2d Division, 22, 25, 27, 57, 201, 253
3d Division, 22, 72, 121, 202, 216, 253
5th Division, 22, 25, 121, 123, 180, 202, 211, 253
6th Division, 22, 65, 66, 74, 97, 99, 101, 105–109, 116, 120,
121, 201, 253
7th Division, 22, 108, 121, 123, 148, 202, 253
8th Division, 22, 25, 176, 182, 201–204, 253, 255
9th Division, 22, 121, 253
11th Division, 121, 202, 203, 213, 253
5th Regiment, 148, 149
10th Regiment, 204
11th Regiment, 207
21st Regiment, 204, 206
National Guard, 86, 163
Soldiers, Lack of training, 24
Marine Corps (KMC), 54, 93, 94, 102, 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 126,
146–148, 150–152, 158, 159, 162, 171, 176, 178–181, 183,
243, 254, 260
1st Regiment, 54, 58, 73, 92–95, 101, 102, 106, 120, 126, 130,
146, 147, 158, 159, 162, 171, 175, 176, 178, 182, 198, 204,
210, 218, 224, 227, 246, 253, 254
1st Battalion, 54, 55, 105, 146, 159, 176, 178
2d Battalion, 55, 93, 146, 176, 178–180, 216
3d Battalion, 54, 93, 146, 176, 178
5th Battalion, 55, 201
1st Korean Artillery Battalion, 227
Diet, 54
Police, 3, 52, 53
Korean entertainers, 5
Korean War, police action, 7
Koto-ri, 6
Koutsandreas, 2dLt John D., 230
Krisky, Corpsman R. E., 57
Krulak, Col Victor H., 189, 199_n_, 213, 250_n_
Kumhwa, 95, 143, 154, 201
Kumsong, 154
Kunsamma Pass, 81
Kurdziel, LtCol Edward G., 184_n_, 241
Kyongju, 19, 22, 29, 30, 42
Kyongju-Yungchon-Uisong road, 42
La Hue, LtCol Foster C., 190, 206
Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., Jr., 66, 109, 115
Lawrence, Capt George E., 216
Lee, Maj Gen Ban Nam, 45, 51, 53
Lejeune, MajGen John A., 72
Lewis, LCdr Frederick J. (MSC), USN, 165, 167, 168, 236, 237, 237_n_
ICELAND, Line, 233
Litters, 188
Litzenberg, MajGen Homer L., 64_n_
Logistics, 72, 73, 180, 182, 215, 258. _See_ Supplies.
Long, Capt Edwin B., 170
_Los Angeles_ (CA), USS, 219
Lund, Maj Arnold A., 15, 27, 46
Lundin, Maj William M., 15, 46
Mabry, Maj Clarence J., 148
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 5, 8, 8_n_, 14, 33,
50, 68, 91, 92
Recall of, 99
MacDonald, Maj J. Angus, 222_n_, 223_n_
MacIntyre, LtCol Neil R., 15
Mago-ri, 218
Main line of resistance (MLR), 21, 122, 157–159, 180, 203, 204,
211–218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 229, 231, 232, 238, 240, 243,
245, 250, 253, 259–261
Main Supply Route (MSR), 29, 30, 38, 42, 44, 67, 80, 91, 123
Hongchon-Chunchon, 119
Malik, Jacob, Foreign Minister of the USSR, 154
Manchuria, 85, 160
Mao Tse-tung, 36, 128, 155
Marine Corps, U. S.
Role in Korea, 6, 32
Units
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 12, 31, 241
1st Air Delivery Platoon, 241
1st Combat Service Group, 3, 241
1st 4.5 Rocket Battalion, 119, 227
Battery C, 119
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 30, 60, 181, 255
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1, 14, 29, 32, 33, 33_n_, 34, 45, 46,
50, 56, 62, 63, 67, 71, 78, 84, 88, 89, 96, 103, 116, 120,
125, 131, 134–138, 143, 146, 164, 169, 170, 185, 203, 219,
249, 260, 261
Commanding Officer, 257
Headquarters Squadron, 63
Marine Air Control Group-2, 90
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1, 1, 89, 90
Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-3, 90
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2, 1, 2, 89, 96
Air Defense Section, 89
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 33, 35, 46, 48, 56, 60, 81, 83, 137,
170, 171, 185
Marine Aircraft Group 33, 2, 33_n_, 34, 45–48, 56, 62, 81, 96
Service Squadron 33, 46
HMR-161, 187–190, 207, 208, 213–215, 217, 222, 240–242
HMX-1, 164, 187, 188, 223
HRS-1, 188, 189, 107, 211, 212, 214
MASRT-1, 186
VMF-152, 31, 32
VMF-212, 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 35, 41, 46, 47, 89, 108
VMF-214, 1, 13, 15, 28, 29, 46, 48, 62, 91, 92, 96, 107, 137, 141,
142, 144, 150, 185
VMF-311, 1, 15, 28, 29, 49, 63, 64, 95, 96, 148
VMF-312, 46, 47, 50, 62, 71, 89, 103, 146, 185
VMF-323, 1, 14, 15, 27–29, 46, 48, 52, 55, 62, 92, 107, 108,
137, 144, 146
VMF-352, 31
VMF(N)-513, 1, 49, 52, 55, 63, 89, 131, 138, 150, 170
VMF(N)-542, 1, 46, 49, 50, 63, 88
VMO-6, 1, 14, 49, 50, 56, 104, 107, 111, 115, 116, 125, 134, 135,
142, 164, 165, 187–189, 206, 223, 229, 258
VMR-152, 31, 32, 46, 89
VMR-352, 31
I Marine Amphibious Corps, 118, 232
1st Provisional Marine Brigade 2, 95, 160, 164, 188
1st Marine Division, 1, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29–31, 34,
35, 38, 42, 44, 48–50, 54, 56–60, 65–67, 72, 76, 78, 80, 83,
84, 86, 88, 92–96, 99, 101, 105, 108, 109, 111, 113, 117,
118, 120–123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132–135, 137, 138,
142–144, 146, 147, 152, 157, 159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 171,
173, 176, 180–182, 184–186, 192, 194, 198, 202–204, 208,
211, 212, 215–219, 221, 227, 228, 231–233, 236, 242, 249,
253, 254, 256–261
Assembly area at Masan, 2, 17
Administrative headquarters at Masan, 1, 22
Commander, 22, 260
Command Posts, 21, 22, 34, 42, 68, 78, 79, 244, 251, 255, 256
EUSAK Control, 5
Equipment, Shortage of, 12
Fresh rations, 5
Headquarters, 3, 5
Hospital, 3
Military Police Company, 3
Morale, 7, 199
Personnel, Shortage of, 11
Reconnaissance Company, 3, 56, 60, 66, 83, 103, 105, 108, 161,
168, 176, 182, 192, 207, 208, 210, 213, 217
Security Measures, 3
Strength figures, 11, 12
1st Marines, 30, 34, 42, 51, 54, 60, 66, 68–75, 81, 83, 86, 90–94,
101, 105, 117, 120, 125, 126, 130, 134, 144, 146–152, 157,
171, 176, 182, 186, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 204, 210, 211,
215, 218, 219, 224, 227, 229, 243, 255
Commanding Officer, 255
Command Post, 157, 208
Antitank Company, 149
1st Battalion, 51, 69, 70, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113–117, 119,
148–150, 187, 192, 193, 197, 204, 210, 216, 217, 240
Command Post, 114
Company A, 111
Company B, 111
Company C, 51, 70, 111, 113, 115, 216
Weapons Company, 111
2d Battalion, 55, 69, 75, 83, 90, 117, 119, 144, 148–150, 187,
189–193, 197, 204, 211, 213, 215, 220
Commanding Officer, 150, 189
Command Post, 190
Company D, 91
Company E, 91, 92, 211
Company F, 91, 92, 193
3d Battalion, 44, 55, 74, 75, 81, 91, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118,
144, 148, 150, 157, 158, 186, 191–194, 204, 206,
210, 217, 229
Company G, 83, 111, 114
Company H, 111, 114, 206, 229–231
Company I, 91, 111, 114, 230, 231
Weapons Company, 74, 111
5th Marines, 2, 5, 42, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 62, 66–70, 72, 73, 81,
92–95, 101, 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 120, 126, 130, 133,
137, 141, 146–148, 161, 168, 171, 175, 176, 179, 182, 192,
194, 204, 213–215, 218, 219, 224, 227, 232, 236,
243, 255, 260
1st Battalion, 54, 68–70, 94, 106, 141, 175, 194, 195, 197, 204,
220, 228, 241
Command Post, 105
Company A, 141, 142
Company B, 107, 141, 228
Company C, 52, 68, 141
2d Battalion, 54, 70, 94, 130, 141, 148, 194–197, 223
Company D, 130, 194, 196
Company F, 106, 194–197
Weapons Company, 196
3d Battalion, 69, 70, 91, 94, 119, 126, 130, 148, 178, 194–196
7th Marines, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 62, 66, 72–75, 81, 83, 86, 91,
92, 94–97, 101, 106, 107, 109, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 125,
126, 130, 133, 137, 141, 144, 146, 151, 152, 161, 171, 175,
176, 180, 182, 183, 186, 192, 204, 213–215, 218, 224,
227, 243, 255
Commanding Officer, 255
Command Post, 175
Outpost, 133
1st Battalion, 52, 75, 88, 91, 106, 107, 111, 117, 151, 176,
178, 179, 183, 184, 187, 213, 216, 241
Command Post, 51, 91
Company A, 51, 52, 83
Company C, 107, 216
2d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 111, 117, 130, 151, 175, 176,
180, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 208, 213, 238, 241
Company F, 190
3d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 96, 97, 111, 113–115, 117,
119, 123, 125, 135, 151, 157, 173, 175, 176, 178, 179, 183,
184, 187, 213, 214, 244
Company G, 123, 151, 179, 184
Company H, 175, 179, 183, 184
Company I, 125, 151, 183, 184
11th Marines, 3, 42, 54, 56, 68, 75, 81, 84, 114, 122, 149, 171,
179, 182, 189, 191, 192, 210, 215, 218, 225, 227, 242,
245, 254, 260
1st Battalion, 141, 179, 228, 254
2d Battalion, 70, 134, 149, 171, 191
3d Battalion, 92, 161, 171, 179
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1, 3
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, 254
1st Engineer Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 102
Company C, 191
Company D, 88
1st Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 30, 181, 255
1st Ordnance Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 181, 230
1st Signal Battalion, 3
1st Service Battalion, 3, 34, 42
1st Shore Party Battalion, 3, 189, 207, 211, 213, 241
1st Tank Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 62, 176, 210, 218, 245, 255
Company A, 81, 114
Company B, 62, 92, 114
Company C, 133, 141
H & S Company, 62
_See also_ Replacement Drafts and Rotation Drafts.
2d Marine Division, 167
Marks, LtCol Alfred H., 227
Marquez, Cpl Leo, 113, 114
Marshall, Col S. L. A., 6
Martin, LtCol Glen E., 106
Martin, Cpl Paul G., 103, 104_n_
Masan, 1–3, 5–7, 12–14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 30, 34, 89, 257
Massacre Valley, 70
Matthewson, 1stLt Robert E., 115
Mayer, Capt Franklin B., 70, 70_n_
McAlister, Col Francis M, 42_n_, 52_n_, 66, 105, 114, 117, 126
McClelland, LtCol Robert K., 90, 91, 148
McCutcheon, Col Keith B., 199_n_, 223, 240, 241, 242
McDonald, Capt Charles W., 228
McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, 165
McFarland, Maj David W., 107, 134, 134_n_, 223
McGahn, 2dLt Patrick T., 106, 106_n_
McGill, Col Robert A., 254
McGrew, Capt David G., Jr., 166_n_, 235, 238, 238_n_, 239
McGuire’s University School, 231
McMahon, Capt John R., 216
McRay, Capt H. G., 115
McReynolds, LtCol William, 92, 179
MELLOW, Code Name, 17. _See_ JOC.
Meuse-Argonne offensive, 118
Meyerhoff, Col Wilbur F., 74_n_, 107_n_, 109_n_, 131_n_, 151
Michener, James, 257_n_
MIG Alley, 65
Mills, 1stLt Niel B., 109_n_, 115
Milne, LtCol Harry T., 62_n_, 114
Mine fields, 130, 191, 230, 261
NKPA, 184
Mines, 130, 151, 178, 197, 206, 211, 224
Antipersonnel, 211, 236
Enemy, 206
Friendly, 206
MINNESOTA Line, 213, 217, 219, 227,229, 232, 251
Miryang, 22
_Missouri_ (BB), USS, 27
Mitchell, 1stLt Weldon R., 64
Mitchell, LtCol William P., 188, 199_n_, 207, 213, 214, 223, 241
Mojin, 119
Mongolian horses, 64
Montross, Lynn, 164_n_, 187_n_, 207_n_
Moore, MajGen Bryant E., 60, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72
Morae-Kogae, 123
Moscow, 99
Mount Helicopter, 220. _See_ Hill 884.
_Mount McKinley_ (AGC), USS, 14
Mountain warfare, 138
Mukkye-dong, 51
Munsan, 8, 220
Munsan-ni, 201, 255
Murray, Col James C., 155_n_, 160_n_
Myers, Maj Reginald R., 117, 118
Naktong, Battle of, 2
Nam Il, Gen, 157, 160
Napoleon, 73
Native laborers, 11
Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, 167, 169, 234, 236, 237
Naval gunfire, 13, 50, 119, 143, 210, 219, 220, 244
Navy, U. S., 5, 28, 34, 135, 138, 167, 234
Role in Korea, 6
Units
Naval Forces Far East, 5
Commander, (ComNavFE), _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy.
Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 31, 32
Seventh Fleet, 142
Tactical Air Control Squadron-1, 14
Tactical Air Control Squadron-3, 27, 28
Task Force 77, 14, 27
Task Force 90, 13
Commander, 13. _See also_ RAdm J. H. Doyle.
Task Group 95.1, 15
Escort Carrier Task Group 96.8, 2, 27, 28
Western Deployment Group, 28 _See_ RAdm Lyman A. Thackrey.
Mobile Construction Battalion 2 (Seabees), 34, 35, 45, 46
VR-5, 31
VR-9, 31
VR-21, 32
Netherlands, 24, 202
New Britain operation, 232
_New Jersey_ (BB), USS, 210, 217, 220
New Zealand, 24
Nicaragua, 150
Nickerson, Col Herman, Jr., 107_n_, 109_n_, 114, 114_n_, 123, 133,
144, 151, 183
Nicolay, Maj Stanley S., 46
Nihart, LtCol Franklin B., 187, 190, 191, 199_n_, 204, 211,
246_n_, 257_n_
Nolan, 2dLt Harvey W., 106
NO NAME Line, 120, 122, 125, 126
Noon, Col Thomas J., 33_n_
Norton, LtCol Kirt W., 220, 223, 228, 241
Objective 1, 176, 178
Objective 2, 176, 179, 230, 231
Objective 3, 176, 180, 231
Objective ABLE, 182, 183. _See also_ Hill 673.
Objective BAKER, 182–184, 192, 193. _See also_ Hill 749.
Objective CHARLIE, 182, 198
Objective DOG, 194, 196
Objective YOKE, 176, 180
Okinawa, 72, 167
O’Neill, LtCol John T., 254
Operation BLACKBIRD, 211, 212
Operation BUMBLEBEE, 214, 241
Operation BUSHBEATER, 217
Operation CHANGIE-CHANGIE, 241
Operation CLAM-UP, 242–244
Operation FAREWELL, 223
Operation HOUSEBURNER I, 217
Operation HOUSEBURNER II, 217
Operation KILLER, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 258
Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 223
Operation MIXMASTER, 251, 256
Operation MOUSETRAP, 241
Operation MULETRAIN, 240
Operation ROTATE, 241
Operation ROUNDUP, 51, 59
Operation RIPPER, 73, 79, 80, 84, 85, 88, 93, 258
Operation RUGGED, 94
Operation SEA LION, 250
Operation STRANGLE, 143, 144, 169, 185, 186, 249, 260, 261
Operation SUMMIT, 207, 208, 213
Operation SWITCH, 219
Operation THUNDERBOLT, 50, 51, 59
Operation WEDGE, 215
Operation WINDMILL I, 189, 190
Operation WINDMILL II, 190, 197
Operation WOLFHOUND, 41
Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, 6
Outpost, 244
Line of Resistance, 122, 238
Ord, Capt James B., 229, 229_n_, 230, 231
Osan, 26
Oum Mountain, 80
Oum San, 83
Ozuki, 33
Paekcha-dong, 55
Pafford, LtCol George G., 213
Parka, 69, 75
Parkins, Capt Clarence W., 57
Parry, LtCol Sherman W., 228
Partridge, MajGen Earle E., 14, 49, 78, 88_n_, 135, 136, 136_n_
Partridge, Col John H., 73_n_, 102, 102_n_
Patrols, 91, 102, 104, 117, 122, 179, 182, 210, 213, 218–220, 222,
224, 225, 228, 229, 232, 238, 242–244, 249, 258
Aggressive tactics, 11
Air, 49, 50
Ambush, 220, 228, 244
Bases, 157–159
Concept, 158
Chinese Communist Forces, 11
Coastal, British, 28
Enemy, 224
1st Marines, 70
1st ROK Division, 84
Foot, 215, 224
C/1/5, 52
Helicopter, 222
Jungle, 232
Marine, 53, 56, 70
Motor, 49, 88, 103
Reconnaissance, 67, 148, 158, 244
Rice paddy, 257
RCT-7, 53
Sea, 50
3/1, 44
United States, 66, 70, 83
United States Army, 3, 26
Panel markings, 115
Panmunjom, 220, 221, 224, 225, 229, 233, 247, 249
Patterson, Capt Russell G., Jr., 47
Pearson, Capt John A., 130
Pearl Harbor, 166
Peleliu, 232
PENDLETON, Phase Line, 109, 111
Pentagon, 11
People’s Tribunal, China, 36
Pershing, Gen John J., 166
Philippines, 24
Photo laboratory, 135
Pierce, Maj Herbert E., 256
Piner, Sgt William, 106
Plans and Orders
EUSAK
Operation Plan 20, 25
Operation Instruction (OI)-272, 253
IX Corps
Operation Plan 17, 120
X Corps
Operation Instruction 235, 203
1st Marine Division
Operation Order 1-51, 30, 34
Operation Order 2-51, 30, 34
Operation Order 3-51, 42, 44
Operation Order 4-51, 54
Operation Order 5-51, 60
Operation Order 6-51, 66
Operation Order 22-51, 176
Operation Order 23-51, 182
Operation Order 25-51, 192, 194
Operation Order 26-51, 198
Operation Order 27-51, 204, 206
Operation Order 50-51, 219
Operation Order 2-52, 253
Operation Order 8-52, 255
Training Order 2-51, 161
Planes, Marine, 219. _See also_ Aircraft.
Pohang, 21, 30–34, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 54, 62, 66
Pohang-Andong, 50
Pohangdong, 19
Pohang-Kyongju road, 42
Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR, 42, 44, 49
Police action, Korean War, 7
Political commissars, NKPA, 132
Political indoctrination of the CCF soldier, 36
Polgrean, Maj Edward R., 223
Port of debarkation, Pusan, 18
Pratt, LtCol Spencer H., 229–231
_Princeton_ (CV), USS, 122
Prisoners, 56, 222, 229, 243
Chinese Communist Forces, 100, 101, 103, 131, 249, 260
Interrogations, 19, 22
NKPA, 44, 45, 57, 132
UN, 222, 223
of War (POWs), 151, 176
American, 222
Exchange, 249
Interrogations, 53, 100, 134, 182
Press correspondents, 6, 35, 239, 247
Privateers, 138
Propaganda, 156, 157, 222, 233
Chinese, 104, 249
Chinese Communist Forces, 134
Psychological warfare, 215, 233
Pukhan, 102, 109, 111, 115, 119
River, 117, 122, 201
Valley, 102
Puller, Col Lewis B., 52_n_, 57, 60, 67, 68, 72, 76, 78, 79
Punchbowl, 141, 154, 158, 173, 176, 180, 182, 185, 211, 228, 260
Pusan, 2, 8, 12, 15, 19, 22, 46, 49, 62, 90, 95, 108, 185, 215
Air Force Field at, 1
Perimeter, 164
Port of debarkation, 18
Withdrawal to, 8
Pyongchang, 51
Pyonggang, 143
Pyongtaek, 26
Pyongyang, 95, 248
Pyongyang-Chinnanpo, 103
Quantico, Virginia, 164, 223, 234
QUANTICO, Phase Line, 95, 99
Quilici, LtCol Clifford E., 220
Quinlan, John F., 237
Radford, Adm Arthur H., 31, 32
Radio, 36, 68, 116, 168, 190, 195, 231
CCF/NKPA, 51
Trouble in Jets, 28
Rail, 89
Traffic jams, 32
Transportation, 60
Railhead at Munsan-ni, 254
Railroads, enemy, 143
Railway system, South Korea, 33
Tunnels, North Korea, 15
Randazzo, TSgt Carmelo J., 74
Rations, 170, 181, 222
USMC, 54
Reavis, 1stLt William A., 241
Reconnaissance, 229
Redalen, Capt Dwail L., 164
Refrigeration ship, UN, 5
Refugees, 13, 25, 153
Reisler, 2dLt Joseph M., 105, 105_n_, 113
Replacement Drafts, USMC, 6, 31
14th Replacement Draft, 219
15th Replacement Draft, 224
18th Replacement Draft, 254
19th Replacement Draft, 254
Replacements, 258
Airborne, 32
Chinese Communist Forces, 38
U. S., 42
U. S. M. C., 18, 31, 32, 48, 49, 57, 89, 214
Reusser, Maj Kenneth L., 27
Reynolds, Maj Walter E., Jr., 245
Rhee, President Syngman, 11, 25
Rice paddy patrols, 48, 52, 57. _See also_ Patrols.
Ridgway, LtGen Matthew B., 6, 7, 7_n_, 8, 10, 11, 11_n_, 19, 22, 24,
25, 25_n_, 26, 29, 30, 38, 38_n_, 41, 42, 45, 51, 58, 59,
59_n_, 60, 62_n_, 65, 68, 72, 73, 79, 84, 86, 91, 93–95, 99,
108, 115, 136, 160, 258, 261, 261_n_
Declaration of Faith, 10
Moral Leadership, 10
Strategy, 35
Tactics, 11
Ringblom, Maj Allan H., 223
Roach, Maj Maurice E., 74, 113, 117
Road
Andong-Yongdok, 30
Center at Yanggu, 133
Networks, 143
Traffic, 143
Transportation, 60
Roadblocks, U. S., 24
Roads, 48, 66, 73, 86, 95, 123, 143, 163, 181
Roberts, Col Deane C., 32, 46, 89
Rockey, 2dLt William K., 211
Rooney, Col John T., 107_n_, 109_n_, 151
Rotation draft, USMC, 57
10th Rotation Draft, 219
11th Rotation Draft, 219
12th Rotation Draft, 224
27th Rotation Draft, 219
Rubber boats, 102
Ruble, RAdm Richard W., 27
Russia, 160
Soviet, 37, 261
Saipan, 187
Samchok, 26, 58
Samgo-ri, 55
Sangyong, 54
Sapyong-ni, 99
Sawyer, Maj Webb D., 88, 88_n_, 91, 106
Schening, 1stLt Richard J., 53
Schilt, MajGen Christian F., 219
Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., 70, 149
Scott, 1stLt John L., 56
See, 2dLt Milo J., 229
Selden, MajGen John T., 199_n_, 231, 234_n_, 236, 243, 255
Seoul, 19, 22, 24, 28, 47, 50, 51, 59, 66, 73, 79, 84, 107, 108, 119,
123, 137, 170, 242, 253, 254, 259
Evacuation of, 25
Historic invasion route, 253
UN Airfield at, 29
Sexton, Capt Martin J., 19
Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C., Jr., 31, 76, 76_n_, 78, 78_n_, 96, 96_n_,
135, 136, 208, 232
Ships
LSD, 256
LST, 254–256
LST 898, 34, 42
LST 914, 34, 42
_See also_ Ship by name.
Shoes, 114
Lace, 68
Show, Gen Shin Kwai, 81
_Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 2, 15, 146
Sikorsky. See Helicopters.
Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 74, 74_n_, 111, 113_n_
Sinhung, 34, 42
Smedley, Maj Kenneth C., 223, 229
Smith, Corpsman E. N., 115
Smith, Capt Jack A., 91
Smith, Capt Samuel S., 130
Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 3_n_, 5, 5_n_, 6, 12_n_, 18, 18_n_, 19,
19_n_, 21, 22_n_, 29, 30, 30_n_, 45, 45_n_, 50, 54_n_, 56,
56_n_, 57_n_, 58, 58_n_, 60_n_, 66, 67, 68, 68_n_, 72, 79,
91, 92, 92_n_, 94, 94_n_, 99, 106, 106_n_, 118, 118_n_, 257
Smoke, 116
Screen, 93
Shells, 134
Snedeker, Col Edward W., 8_n_, 21, 109_n_
Sniper, 215
Fire, 92, 229
Sniping, 196, 232
NKPA, 49
Snows, 69, 228, 230, 234
So-chon River, 151, 158
Sohwari, 175
Soissons, 118
Sokcho-ri, 215, 254, 256
Som River, 66, 74
South Africa, 24
Soyang, 119, 128, 130, 175
Bridgehead, 128
River, 94, 117, 146, 150, 173, 197, 216, 217, 230
Valley, 175, 181, 182
Stamm, Col John F., 199_n_, 235, 246_n_
Steiner, Col William B., 31
Stewart, James T., 131_n_, 169_n_
Stewart, LtCol Joseph L., 69, 69_n_, 94, 95_n_
Stiff, LtCol Houston, 194, 195
Stoyanow, Capt Victor, 125
_St. Paul_ (CA), USS, 50, 224, 244
Strategy
Effect of tire truce talks, 161
Limited war, 36, 37, 38
Nuclear war, 36, 37, 38
Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., 14, 33, 136
Strongholds, CCF, 71
Struble, VAdm Arthur D., 27
Supplies, 72, 95, 144, 147, 154, 170, 171, 176, 181, 187, 189, 190,
220, 222, 241, 243
_See_ Logistics.
Dumps, 119, 219
U. S., 30, 62, 95
USMC, 48, 113
Surrender message, 55
Survival suits, 47
Sutter, LtCol Allan, 75
Suwon, 22, 41, 50, 51
UN Airfield at, 29
Swanson, 1stLt William, 111
Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 17
Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), 17, 26, 137
Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) (TACA), 97
Tactical Air Coordinator, Airborne (TACA), 17, 116
Tactics, 10, 258
Advantage, 169
Aggressive patrolling, 11
CCF, 83, 138
Delaying, 258
Eighth Army, 8
Firepower, 11
Marine Corps, 138, 260
NKPA, 192
Plan of Attack, 8
Ridgway, 11
Taeam-san, 141, 146, 147
Taegu, 14, 29, 44, 58, 60, 64
Taejon, 44, 90
Taeu-san, 158, 159
Tanks, 83, 131, 191, 245
British Centurion, 25
Column, USA, 62
Fake, CCF, 103
Infantry patrols, 151
Support, 138
US, 121
USMC, 68, 70, 75, 83, 92, 104, 114, 117, 122, 125, 130, 133, 219
Tanyang, 44
Task Force Puller, 52
Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 38, 38_n_
Taylor, Capt Richard M., 133, 141
Telephone, 158, 208
Wire, 36, 71, 74
Thailand, 24
Thackrey, RAdm Lyman A., 27, 28
Thermal boots, 231, 234–236, 240, 250, 251
Innovations, 234
Thermopylae, 128
_Theseus_, HMS, 28, 29, 46
Thirty-eighth Parallel, 8, 15, 45, 79, 220, 258
Thirty-ninth Parallel, 15
Thomas, MajGen Gerald C., 118, 120, 133, 133_n_, 137, 147, 150, 151,
158, 158_n_, 186, 186_n_, 189, 197, 199_n_, 207, 208, 211,
217, 228, 231, 246_n_
Tierney, Elizabeth L., 164_n_
Timberlake, MajGen Edward J., 136
Tim, Col Tai Shik, 159
Tinsley, LtCol James H., 119_n_, 232, 246_n_
Todun-ni, 111
_Toledo_ (CA), USS, 217
Tongchon, proposed landing at, 132
Tongchon-Kumhwa road, 132
Tonpyong, 176
Topyong-dong, 52, 55
Transportation, 36, 46, 89
Highways, 47
Human, 181
Motor, 42, 163, 181
Motor lift, 42
Railroads, 47
Roads, 36
Trains, 44
Water lift, 42
_See_ Logistics.
Treasure Island, 31
Trenches, 217, 232, 246, 248
Marine, 243
Warfare, 232
Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 117, 118
Truce, 160
Talks, 154–156, 161, 163, 171, 180, 222, 233, 247–249, 261
Truman, President Harry S., 5, 37, 99
Tsuika, 33
Tucker, LtCol Roy A., 111_n_
Tundong-ni, 171
Turkey, 24
Typhus, 53
Uihung, 30
Uijongbu, 84
Uisong, 30, 42, 44, 49, 52, 54
Uisong-Andong road, 42
Ulsan, 8
United Kingdom, 24
United Nations (UN), 29, 156
Delegates, 156, 160, 220, 229, 233
Forces, 24, 35, 60, 80, 126, 154, 161, 163
Commander, 257
Strength figures, 85, 218
Truce Team, 160
Units
British Commonwealth
1st Commonwealth Division, 71, 116, 119, 201, 253
27th Brigade, 22, 65, 107, 116, 121
29th Brigade, 22, 116, 121
Royal Australian Regiment, 116
Canadian Battalion, 22
Canadian Light Infantry, Princess Patricia, 116
Gloucestershire Battalion, 116
Independent Commandos, Royal Marines, 11, 12
41 Independent Commando, 3
New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion, 22
Royal commonwealth naval forces, 15
Belgian Battalion, 201
Colombian Battalion, 201
EUSAK. _See_ Army Units.
Ethiopian Battalion, 201
French Battalion, 176
French Units, 15
Greek Battalion, 201
60th Indian Ambulance Group, 85
Philippine 20th BCT, 201
Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit, 85
Thai units, 15
Thailand Battalion, 22, 201
Turkish Brigade, 22, 201
Van Fleet, LtGen James A., 99, 109, 109_n_, 115, 118, 121–123, 123_n_,
126, 127, 127_n_, 133 142, 154, 161, 161_n_, 199_n_, 201,
202, 218, 219, 221, 248, 248_n_, 249, 251
Van Kueren, RAdm Alexander H., 166
Van Ryzin, BrigGen William J., 136_n_
Vatcher, William H., Jr., 155_n_, 221_n_
Vehicles, 142, 175, 186, 244
DUKWs, 94, 102, 175
EUSAK, 12
Enemy, 15
Jeep, 70, 91, 94, 131, 256
Trailers, 256
Ox cart, CCF, 143
Tank cars, 32
Tracked, USMC, 62
Trucks, 105, 119, 131, 175, 181, 215, 256
Convoy, 54, 70
Enemy, 131, 143
Fake, CCF, 103
USMC, 30, 147
U. S., 13, 62
Vests, armored, 165, 167, 168, 236–238, 240, 251. _See_ Armor, body.
Vittori, Cpl Joseph, 193, 193_n_
Volcansek, LtCol Max J., Jr., 46
Wade, Col Sidney S., 119_n_, 227, 246_n_, 255
Walker, Maj Carl E., 211
Walker, Richard L., 36_n_
Walker, LtGen Walton H., 7
Ward, 1stLt Alfred J., 47
Warehouses, Korean, 15
Warfare
Land, 250, 257
Movement, of, 198, 201, 224, 229
Position, of, 198, 201, 218, 229, 231
Static, 247
Trench, 232
Warner, 1stLt Robert E., 141
Warships, UN, 123. _See_ Ships.
Washington, D. C., 7, 8, 28, 156, 161
Watson, 2dLt John E., 229
Weapons
CCF, 35
Antiaircraft guns, 103
Artillery, 35, 248
Automatic weapons, 96
Booby traps, 74
Burp guns, 156, 160
Enemy mines, 70
Grenades, 35, 96, 125
Land mines, 70
Explosions, 44
Machine gun, 47, 70, 106, 125, 130, 138
Mines, 74
Mortars, 35, 74, 81, 83, 125, 130, 138, 144, 248
Fire, 92
120mm, 96
Rifle, 47
Recoilless, 125
Russian 76mm guns, 125
Satchel charges, 125
Small arms, 35, 81, 83, 92, 96
Fire, 74
NKPA
Artillery, 44, 149, 151, 191
Automatic, 151
Burp, 197
Grenades, l4l, 197
Machine guns, 55, 141, 178, 180, 192
Mortars, 44, 51, 55, 142, 149, 151, 179, 180, 184, 187,
191, 192, 217
76mm, 187, 192, 196
81mm, 55
82mm, 192
105mm, 192
120mm, 192
122mm, 192
Rifle, 141
Small arms, 55, 142, 184, 217
ROKA
105 mm Howitzer, 227
155 mm Howitzer, 227
United States, 69
Army Artillery, 11
Grenade, 10
Howitzer, 277
Napalm, 17, 27, 51, 55, 71, 83, 132, 142, 171, 183, 195
Pistol, 168
Thompson submachine gun, 168
USMC
Air, 217, _See_ Aircraft.
Antitank guns, 149
Artillery, 148, 217
Bayonet, 149, 150, 168
Bombs, 142, 143
Napalm, 27
Booby traps, 216
Flame throwers, 217
Grenades, 83, 91, 92, 149, 150, 168, 184, 195, 217
105mm Howitzer. 49, 233
Machine guns, 135, 179, 216, 217
Mines, 176, 216. _See also_ Mines.
Mortars, 148, 206, 217
4.2″ Mortars, 191, 195
81mm Mortars, 90, 113, 168, 195
Rifles, 115
M-1, 12
75mm Recoilless, 148, 195
90mm, 210
Tank, 149
Rockets, 195
Weather, 25, 33, 39, 69, 131, 233–235, 255
Weede, Col Richard G., 149, 192, 196, 199_n_, 204, 232
_Wehrmacht_, 250
Weintal, E., 155_n_
Wermuth, LtCol John J., 204, 227
Welch, LtCol Claude H., 89
Wertman, LtCol Howard E., 181, 255
West Point, 72
West, Col Radford C., 46
West, LtCol Robley E., 105, 148, 149
Weyland, MajGen Otto P., 169
Whaling, BrigGen William J., 232
White, 1stLt Francis E., 230
Williams, BrigGen Gregon A., 57
Wilson, TSgt Harold E., 114
Winecoff, Col Joseph L., 149, 150
Winfrey, 1stLt Frank A., 151
Wire laying, 230
_Wisconsin_, (BB), USS, 244
Whistles, NPKA, 192
Wolfe, LtCol David C., 89
Wonju, 18, 19, 22, 29, 44, 45, 59, 60, 63, 66–68, 91
Highway and rail center at, 26
Wonju-Hoengsong highway, 67
Wonsan, 143, 156, 168
Landing, 63
UN airfield at, 29
Wontong-ni, 187, 192, 204, 213, 233
Wornham, Col Thomas A., 186, 191, 204
Worthington, Maj Gordon R., 179
World War I, 65, 68, 72, 166, 231, 232, 246
World War II, 6, 7, 33, 44, 72, 99, 100, 160, 167, 194, 232,
250, 257, 261
Wound statistics, 166
Wray, Capt Robert P., 51, 70, 70_n_, 109_n_, 111, 113, 115_n_
Wyczawski, LtCol Richard W., 14, 46, 46_n_, 89
Yanggu, 128, 133, 135, 141, 146, 161, 171, 202
Road center at, 132
Yanggu-Inje, 132
Yangjimal, 91
Yangyang, 8, 202
Yoju, 26, 66, 72, 79
Corridor, 58
YOKE Ridge, 173, 176, 178, 183. _See also_ Objective YOKE.
Yonchon, 201
Yongchon, 30, 44, 49
Yongdok, 42, 54, 55
Yongdok-Andong road, 54
Yongwol-Pyongchang road, 66
Yonpo Airfield, 14, 29
Yu, Maj Dung Nam, 53
Yudam-ni area, 6
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962-0 634040
[Illustration: UN COUNTERSTROKE OF 23 MAY 51]
[Illustration]
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
the corresponding illustrations.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references. Discrepancies between index entries and the text they
reference were resolved in favor of the referenced text.
Page 241, footnote 351 (originally footnote 14): “176–175” was printed
that way.
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