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Title: Machine-Gun Tactics
Author: Applin, R. V. K.
Language: English
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Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
placed at the end of the book.
A superscript is denoted by ^, for example 15^x or 12^{th}.
A subscript is denoted by _{x}, for example a_{2} or CHCl_{3}.
Basic fractions are displayed as ½ ⅓ ¼ etc; other fractions are shown
in the form a/b, for example 1/25.
All changes noted in the ERRATA on page vii have been applied to the
etext.
Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.
MACHINE-GUN TACTICS
BY
CAPTAIN R. V. K. APPLIN, D.S.O.
14th (King’s) Hussars
LONDON
HUGH REES, LTD., 119 PALL MALL, S.W.
1910
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
PREFACE
This book, which was begun five years ago, is now published because
I feel that, with all its faults, it may bring into greater
prominence the latent possibilities of the machine gun, and the
vital necessity for the most complete organisation and tactical
training of the detachments.
I desire to express my great indebtedness to Captain C. O. Place,
D.S.O., Royal Engineers, who undertook the work of editing and
preparing the book for the press at a moment’s notice on my sailing
for India.
R. V. K. APPLIN.
R.I.M.S. “NORTHBROOK,”
_December 1st, 1909_.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION 1
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 28
III. WITH INDEPENDENT CAVALRY 57
IV. WITH PROTECTIVE CAVALRY 86
V. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY 105
VI. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY (_cont._) 130
VII. IN FORTRESS WARFARE 144
VIII. IN MINOR OPERATIONS 161
IX. MACHINE GUNS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 187
LIST OF PLATES AND DIAGRAMS
FACING PAGE
MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
FRONT VIEW 224-5
MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
VIEW FROM REAR 224-5
MAP OF PORT ARTHUR 266
PAGE
DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT.
OF BULLETS 5
DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS 6
DIAGRAM TO SHOW FORMATION WHEN COMING INTO POSITION 39
DIAGRAM TO SHOW METHOD OF LAYING BY AIMING POSTS 51
DIAGRAM TO OBTAIN ANGLE OF SIGHT _m_ 53
DIAGRAM OF JAPANESE MACHINE-GUN TRIPOD MOUNT 251
ERRATA
-----------------+-----+-----+--------------------------------------
Error |Page |Line | Correction
-----------------+-----+-----+--------------------------------------
“firing” | 4 | 20 | finding
“to” | 6 | 4 | delete
“short” | 27 | 17 | shorter
“25” | 35 | 20 | 125
“G to O” | 53 | 9 | O to G;
“VIII” | 65 | 26 | I
“training” | 72 | 1 | turning
“distance” | 116 | 5 | distant
“work.” | 160 | 1 | works
“the” | 163 | 2 | delete (_i.e._ “attack in mass”)
“line” (omitted) | 177 | 27 | insert word “line” after “blockhouse”
“portable” | 174 | 28 | potable
(Sentence wrong) | 179 | 27 | “an event which has happened
| | | almost every decade.”
“1 ft.” | 196 | 22 | 1 ft. 6 in.
“natural” | 221 | 5 | mutual
“gear” | 226 | 15 | gun
“ground” | ” | 19 | gun
“screen” | 227 | 13 | screw
“it placed” | 231 | 12 | is
“attacked” | 238 | 8 | attached
·26 | 251 | 3 | ·256
“strap” | 252 | 5 | strip
----------------+----+----+-----------------------------------------
MACHINE-GUN TACTICS
CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION
The modern machine gun is essentially an automatic weapon of
small-arm calibre, capable of firing from 100 to 600 shots a minute
from a light mounting of extreme mobility, and should fulfil the
following qualifications:
1. It should be able to deliver about 400 shots a minute without
loss of accuracy, even with prolonged “continuous” firing.
2. It should be capable of accompanying cavalry and infantry
wherever these arms can go; it should occupy the smallest space,
and be able to come into action quickly at rifle range.
3. It should have a firm mounting, upon which the gun is steady,
and from which it can be aimed rapidly and fired while kneeling,
sitting, or lying.
4. The gun and its mounting must present a small target, and be
light enough for each, and if possible, both, to be carried by one
man for a considerable distance, and should admit of being dragged
by a man crawling or crouching for short distances.
5. It should be in constant readiness for action, and able when
limbered up to open fire in less than thirty seconds.
6. It should be simple, strong, and durable. Mobility and constant
readiness for action are indispensable with cavalry, while
lightness and smallness of target are essential factors.
There are eight main types of machine guns at present in use in the
armies of the world, viz.:
Gun. In use in
Maxim Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, Portugal,
Turkey, Switzerland, and U.S.A.
Hotchkiss France, Japan, Belgium, Norway, Sweden,
Spain, and Portugal.
Perino Italy.
Puteaux France.
Schwarzlose Austria.
Skoda Japan and China.
Madsen Russia, Denmark (Rekyl pattern), and China
(for cavalry).
Colt By several countries in addition to adopted gun.
The principal differences between these guns are: (_a_) The
automatic mechanism. (_b_) Method of loading.
(_a_) may be divided into two classes: 1. _Recoil action_--the
Maxim, Perino, and the Madsen. 2. _Gas-pressure action_--the
Schwarzlose, Hotchkiss, Skoda, and Colt.
(_b_) consists of three classes: 1. _Belt loaders_--the Maxim,
Schwarzlose, and Colt. 2. _Metal clip loaders_--Hotchkiss, Madsen,
Perino, and Puteaux. 3. _Hopper loaders_--the Skoda.
Several of the above countries--notably Russia, Japan, France, and
Austria--have more than one pattern of gun in their service, and
it is difficult to say which they intend finally to adopt; but
Russia, since the war, has ordered several thousand Madsen guns,
and Japan is said to be trying this gun, one of which during the
war fired 25,000 shots in a single day.
The Rexar gun has been purposely omitted; it only weighs 17½ lb.,
but is fired from the shoulder, and is therefore more of the nature
of an automatic rifle than a machine gun. It would take too long
to deal with each of these weapons separately, therefore the Maxim
has been selected as the type with which to discuss the question of
tactics.
In order thoroughly to understand the methods that should govern
the tactical employment of machine guns, and their place in the
battlefield, it is first necessary clearly to realise their nature
and potentialities, and for this purpose we will examine their
principal characteristics. Guns of this class are capable of firing
service small-arm ammunition at the rate of 800 shots in one
minute, but this very high rate of fire is obviously undesirable
for several reasons--the principal, from a military point of view,
being that, however skilfully the gun is handled, a great waste of
ammunition must ensue, and hundreds of shots be wasted in space,
however accurate the fire. These guns are, therefore, regulated
to fire at a maximum rate of from 400 to 500 rounds a minute, or
seven to eight shots a second, but even this is greater than is
necessary to obtain the maximum fire effect; at ordinary targets
100 to 250 rounds a minute, according to the nature of the target,
has been found to give the best results in practice. The “rate of
fire” of a gun must not be confused with the number of rounds that
can be fired from it effectively in one minute; the necessity for
frequent pauses to observe the effect, to correct the elevation and
direction of the fire, prevent a greater number than from 150 to
250 shots being fired effectively in one minute from a gun whose
rate of fire is 450 shots a minute. Colonel Mayne, in his book _The
Infantry Weapon and its Use in War_, says: “The machine gun now in
use can fire about 600 rounds a minute, or ten a second. This is a
far greater rapidity of fire than is really necessary, for it means
that a man or horse is struck several times before falling. It is
a good thing to be able to fire 600 rounds a minute on occasions
(such as for range finding), but a far slower rate of fire (say 100
rounds or even less a minute) is ample for all ordinary tactical
purposes against living beings and animals, whilst causing an
enormous saving of ammunition.”
The extreme range of this type of gun is for all practical purposes
the same as the infantry rifle--about 3,500 yards--though it is
more effective at the longer ranges than an equal volume of rifle
fire, owing to the ease with which the firer can elevate and aim
the gun on its mountings and the stability of this mounting, which
causes it to have a beaten zone of only half the depth and nearly
half the width of that of infantry firing the same number of
rounds. This has been proved again by actual experiment at the
schools of musketry in England, India, and South Africa, while
very elaborate experiments and trials carried out in Germany with
the Maxim gun on the carriage adopted for that service proved that
the beaten zone was only one-sixth of that obtained by infantry,
probably because of the greater stability of their mounting.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM I
TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT. OF BULLETS]
In order that “fire” may be “effective,” it is necessary to bring
the enemy within the zone beaten by 75 per cent. of shots, and
it has been found by experiment that 25 per cent. of shots fall
immediately in front and behind the target, then 12½ per cent., 7½
per cent., and, finally, 5 per cent. scattered far in front and
behind.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM II
TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS]
Infantry usually fire at the rate of three rounds a minute “slow,”
and fifteen rounds a minute “rapid”; “slow” fire is the ordinary
rate, and “rapid” fire can only be effectually maintained for about
four minutes; but this is when the firer is fresh, and has not
been subjected to several hours’ marching and fighting as would be
the case in battle, and it is doubtful if “rapid” fire can be kept
up on service for more than one-and-a-half to two minutes without
becoming wild and consequently ineffective. On the other hand,
“rapid” fire is less tiring to the machine gunner than “deliberate”
fire; the gun is held for him by the mounting, it loads and fires
itself, while elevation and direction are maintained without the
least exertion on his part by the elevating and traversing gears.
In comparing the volume of fire of the machine gun with that of a
body of infantry, it is obvious that “rapid” cannot be taken as
the normal rate of infantry fire, as it can only be used for the
shortest periods, and even then it reduces the users to a state of
inefficiency as regards accuracy in two or three minutes. On the
other hand, “rapid” fire can only be used by the machine gunner on
special occasions, for tactical reasons which will be explained
later, so that it will be necessary to compare “slow” infantry fire
with “deliberate” fire from the machine gun, in order to arrive at
the mean fire volume of each. Seventy shots a minute can easily
be fired “deliberately” from a machine gun, and this could be
increased to 120 by highly trained gunners, but, taking the lower
figure, deliberate fire equals in volume the fire of twenty-four
men using rifles. But it must be always remembered that the object
of the fire fight is to bring a concentrated and overwhelming
fire to bear _at the right moment_ on certain positions of the
enemy, and when the moment arrives machine guns can and will use
the most rapid rate of fire possible, which will be from 250 to
300 rounds a minute or equal to that of 50 or 100 riflemen. Mere
volume of fire, however, is useless without control, accuracy, and
concentration, and it is here that the machine gun is so vastly
superior to the rifle; for amongst 50 men using their rifles there
can only be a small percentage of good shots, while even among the
good shots unforeseen factors, such as fatigue, bad fire positions,
excitement, wrong sighting, failure to see the target, etc., cause
a large percentage of the shots to go astray, and make it very
difficult to concentrate the fire on any particular position of the
enemy.
An object-lesson to illustrate this superiority of the machine gun
has been carried out during each course at the South African school
of musketry under circumstances most favourable to the rifles.
The record of one such test, carried out on September 21st, 1904,
between a Maxim gun mounted on Mark III. tripod and 42 rifles
(Lee Enfield), was published. The machine gun was worked by two
sergeant-instructors, while the 42 rifles were fired by students
who were all, at least, 1st Class shots before joining the school,
and who for five weeks had been receiving daily instruction in
musketry, and had just completed a course of firing both on the
ranges (Table B) and in field-firing, and had gone through a course
of judging distance. The range was unknown--the number of rounds
unlimited, and the rate of fire “rapid.” The time was limited to
one minute, and the firers were allowed to charge their magazines
before starting. The targets were figures representing infantry in
line extended to two paces. The following was the result:
Rounds Figures Percentage
fired. Hits. Percentage. hit. of loss.
Rifles 408 62 15·1 27 54
Maxim 228 69 30·2 32 64
The small number of rounds fired by the Maxim was due to the
necessity of picking up the range by firing small groups of five
or ten shots and observing the strike of the bullets. What is
most interesting is that although the rifles fired nearly twice
as many shots as the machine gun, the latter made actually more
hits, while the percentage of loss inflicted was 10 per cent.
greater. The actual range was 1,000 yards. A similar experiment
was carried out during the annual training for 1908 in the U.S.A.
between 42 “sharpshooters” and a Maxim at the regulation “L”
target. The ranges were 600, 800, 1,000 yards; the sharpshooters
fired an average of 750 rounds at the three distances and made an
average of 429 hits, which gave a collective figure of merit of
59·09. The machine gun also fired 750 rounds, made 601 hits, giving
a collective figure of merit of 79·54, being 22·45 in favour of
the machine gun. The troops were armed with new rifles, and fired
the new “S” bullet, while the machine gun used the old pattern
ammunition and a barrel that had fired at least 7,000 shots. The
gun squad had no previous practice at this target, and the gun was
fired by different men at the several ranges. The collective fire
of the troop was “slow aimed,” while the fire of the machine gun
was “rapid continuous” for the number of rounds at each range. The
machine gun took 30 seconds to fire 250 shots at each range, or a
quarter that of the troop.[1]
The two experiments are particularly interesting, as showing how
closely the results agree, although the conditions are dissimilar
in one respect: viz. that in the first case the number of rounds
was unlimited and the result had to be obtained within one minute;
while in the second case time was unlimited, but the number
of rounds fired by each was the same. The result of the two
experiments show that both in accuracy and rapidity a machine gun
is much superior to 42 picked shots, whether firing the same number
of rounds at known ranges or firing an unlimited number of shots in
a given time at an unknown range. We shall not be wrong, then, if
we say that a machine gun is at least equal to 50 rifles in fire
value,[2] but there are other factors to be considered as well as
fire effect in determining its tactical value, and it is in these
other factors that machine guns are so far superior to riflemen
as to make a reliable estimate of their relative value almost
impossible; these factors are: (1) Mobility; (2) Visibility; (3)
Vulnerability.
_Mobility._--The mobility of the infantry soldier is limited to
the rate at which he can march, which on the battlefield is
about 100 yards a minute or less than three-and-a-half miles an
hour. Doubling may be left out of the question, as it quickly
reduces fire efficiency to a minimum. An experiment made in the
Austrian Army showed that the percentage of hits which was 76·5 per
cent. after an advance in quick time, fell to 51 per cent. after
doubling.[3] The mobility of the machine gun will depend almost
entirely on the way it is carried, and must not be judged by any
particular carriage which may happen to be in use for the time
being in our own service. A short description of these mountings
and their method of transport will be found in Chapter IX., but
none of them are entirely satisfactory.
The infantry carriages are heavy, clumsy, and conspicuous, and
are the least mobile of all; they can hardly be moved out of a
walk without risk, and Marks III. and IV. cannot come into action
without first unharnessing the mule or horse, and they then have to
be dragged into position by the whole detachment--thus presenting
a most conspicuous and vulnerable target at the moment when least
desired and when concealment and invisibility are essential to
tactical success.[4] In the German Official Account of the late
Boer War, issued by the General Staff, is the following criticism
of this carriage:
“Both sides have machine guns, but the rather clumsy mountings
of those used by the British offered too high a target, and so
prevented their being advanced from position to position during the
attack.”
The tripod mounting, which is light and inconspicuous, is carried
with the gun on a limbered wagon; but the advantages of its
lightness and portability are almost neutralised by being carried
on a wagon, thus reducing its mobility by confining it to ground
suitable for wheeled vehicles.
If used on a pack-saddle the difficulty of managing a led animal on
foot in the stress of battle may become insuperable, and moving the
gun in and out of action is entirely dependent on the docility of
the pack-animal. The gun weighs anything from 40 to 60 lb., while
the mountings need not weigh more than 34 lb. The combined weight
of a gun and mounting should never exceed 120 lb. and can be as
little as 74 lb.
In whatever way it is decided to carry the gun, it is a _sine quâ
non_ that it must be at least as mobile as horse artillery. There
is no reason why it should not be as mobile as cavalry, and the
choice remains between a pack-horse with a mounted detachment or
a galloping carriage; and the former is in every way preferable,
principally because it can carry the gun and ammunition across any
country, and can come into action in less than 30 seconds on an
adjustable tripod, which can be carried by hand into any position
and presents a very small, inconspicuous target.
The majority of foreign countries have adopted pack transport for
their machine guns. It is desirable with infantry and absolutely
essential with cavalry. A suitable saddle is, of course,
indispensable, and strong spiral springs to the hooks which hold
the gun and tripod on either side will entirely prevent horses from
straining their backs when galloping across country or jumping
obstacles with the guns. These hooks must be leather-covered and
made to fit the gun exactly, and, in order to do away with the
present cumbersome straps and buckles, they should have a hinged
attachment to close over the gun and lock automatically in such a
way as to admit of its being opened by a single movement when it
is required to dismount the gun. The Swiss and the Americans have
permanently adopted pack transport for the machine guns with their
cavalry, which are able to accompany them over any country without
detriment to either horses or guns; and in the American army the
average time for a well-trained cavalry machine-gun detachment to
go into action front, from mounted formation, unpack, and set up
the guns, load, aim, and open fire, is 25 seconds; while at the
departmental meeting for 1908 the machine guns of the 10th Cavalry,
from the halt in line, _moved forward in section column at a gallop
for 200 yards and went into action and fired a blank shot in 31
seconds_.[5]
This brings us to the second factor--_Visibility_. It is
absolutely necessary for the successful tactical employment of
machine guns that they should be as inconspicuous as possible
when in action; the gun itself is a very small object when close
to the ground, and its visibility will depend almost entirely on
the nature of mounting and its adaptability for use behind cover
of varying heights. All our infantry carriages are so conspicuous
as to be quite unconcealable except in defence, the wheels being
4 ft. 8 in. in diameter and the gun axis 3 ft. 6 in. above the
ground. The Mark IV. tripod is the handiest and least conspicuous
of the mountings at present in use in our service, and although it
weighs 48 lb. it can be carried into almost any position and easily
concealed. It can be adjusted to fire at any desired height between
14½ and 30 in. above the ground level, and consequently can be used
from behind any suitable cover.
_Vulnerability._--The question of vulnerability would appear at
first to depend entirely on visibility; or, in other words, on
the target presented to the enemy’s fire, but this is only true
to a certain extent. To obtain the minimum vulnerability it is
of course necessary to have the gun as low and inconspicuous as
possible, because the less it can be seen and the better cover it
can obtain, the more difficult it will be to locate and hit. But
the true vulnerability of the gun in comparison with infantry lies
in the amount of front they occupy respectively; or in other words,
the breadth of the target exposed to the enemy and the percentage
of loss they can each sustain _without their fire effect being
reduced_. Infantry will never again fight in two ranks in civilised
warfare, and the closest formation possible for a firing line is
one pace per man; 50 men will therefore occupy a front of, roughly,
50 yards; in other words, the target presented to the enemy is 50
yards in breadth, and, provided the elevation is correct, shots
striking anywhere within this 50 yards will be effective. The
machine gun, however, only occupies a front of from 4 ft. to 5
ft. 2 in., or 1/25th _the front offered by infantry having equal
fire effect_. It is on this point that the wonderful tactical
possibilities of the machine gun rests: _the maximum of rifle
fire from the minimum of front_. It is obvious that 10 per cent.
of casualties in the infantry firing line reduce the fire effect
by just that amount, while from 30 to 40 per cent. will probably
silence its fire altogether or render it ineffective. The machine
gun, on the other hand, is unaffected by even 50 per cent. of loss,
while it can suffer 80 per cent. of loss without diminishing its
fire effect, though such a loss would of course cause it to lose
its mobility and seriously affect the morale of the gunners. A
machine-gun detachment consists of from 16 to 24 men, but only two
of them actually work the gun, and one man alone can fire the gun
once it is in action, the second man merely assisting him with the
ammunition, etc., but he is not absolutely necessary to the firing
of the gun. Thus we see that the killing of the gunner only causes
a momentary cessation of fire until another man takes his place,
when the fire is resumed without loss of intensity, accuracy, or
concentration.
We are now in a position to form an accurate estimate of the
potentialities of the machine gun and its true tactical value as
compared with infantry, and we find:
1. Its fire effect 50 rifles at least.
2. Its mobility Cavalry.
3. Its visibility A file (2 men).
4. Its vulnerability Unaffected by 50% of loss.
Before discussing their place in battle and tactical use it will
be necessary to say a few words on the best methods of grouping
the guns and organising their detachments and the training of the
personnel in peace for the duties they will have to perform in war.
In our service two machine guns are issued to each regiment of
cavalry and battalion of infantry, and the detachment consists of:
Cavalry. Infantry.
Subaltern 1 1
Sergeant 1 1
Corporal 1 1
Privates 12 12
Drivers 8 2
Bâtmen 2 -
-- --
25 (1 officer) 17 (1 officer)
This section of two guns is therefore the smallest tactical
unit, and the officer in command is solely responsible for the
training and efficiency of his section. It is therefore absolutely
essential that the machine-gun section commander should be a
subaltern of not less than three years’ service, specially selected
for his keenness, efficiency, and self-reliance, who has passed
the examination “C” for promotion, and who holds the special
machine-gun certificate from a School of Musketry. A “destroyer”
in the Royal Navy is commanded by a very junior officer, but he is
most carefully selected for similar qualities to those mentioned,
and is in addition required to possess the necessary professional
qualifications--consequently it is a command much sought after,
and competition enables the authorities to appoint the pick of the
service and thus obtain the maximum efficiency where efficiency is
the essence of successful employment in war. The best and nothing
but the best is necessary to the successful employment of machine
guns, and the importance of obtaining the very best officers as
section commanders is so great that there is reason to doubt the
utility of having machine guns at all if they are not commanded and
handled by those who are in every way expert in their use.
In order to enable machine-gun sections to be trained in tactics
and to co-operate with larger units in war, it is essential that
they should be trained under a senior officer during peace. The
late Colonel Henderson said of the Volunteers in Mexico: “The
ideal of the battle is a combined effort directed by a well-trained
leader: as individuals they fought well; as organised bodies
capable of manœuvring under fire and of combined effort, they
proved to be comparatively worthless.” This is precisely the case
of regimental machine guns. It is easy enough to use a section or
even a single gun apart from its battery should occasion require,
but it is impossible to improvise a battery from a number of
separate sections. It is therefore essential before attempting the
tactical training of machine guns, much less their tactical use,
to organise them in batteries during peace. For this purpose it is
suggested that when a battalion is brigaded with others, either
for administration or training, the six or eight guns should be
formed into one or two batteries, under a selected field officer,
who would be solely responsible for their peace training and
tactical efficiency, and who would command them on manœuvres and
on service. There would be little or no innovation in this, as
our regimental signallers are at present trained and commanded on
similar lines under the divisional signalling officer. A cavalry
brigade under the present organisation (1909) would have one
battery of six guns, and an infantry brigade two batteries of four
guns each. The batteries of a Division would be commanded by the
divisional machine-gun commander. While such organisation would in
no way prevent the regimental machine-gun section being used with
its own unit as at present, it would ensure a very high standard
of tactical training, and enable the Divisional General to have a
splendid reserve in his own hands for use at the critical moment of
the fight as mobile as cavalry, in fire action more powerful than
infantry, occupying the smallest possible front, yet capable of
delivering a storm of some 10,000 bullets a minute with the maximum
of accuracy and concentration.
The tactics in this book are based on the understanding that the
machine guns are trained on this system, and that they are mounted
on light, adjustable tripods and carried on trained pack-horses
with the entire detachment mounted.
The failure of machine guns is due to two principal causes: (1)
Insufficient training in working the guns. (2) Improper tactical
employment.
It will be obvious that unless the gun can be depended upon to open
fire with certainty and accuracy, and maintain it continuously
without jamming or mechanical failure, it is useless to consider
its tactical employment. The mechanism of the Maxim is somewhat
complicated and delicate, and depends for its proper working
upon the exact adjustment of each part; but no more so than any
other piece of modern machinery--it is far less complicated and
certainly far less delicate than the modern motor-car. Indeed,
the comparison is analogous in several respects, as both require
highly trained operators to ensure their smooth and continuous
working, and each individual machine, whether gun or motor, has
its own peculiarities and requires special study to obtain the best
results. Both are capable of hard and constant employment for long
periods, without breakdown or failure, in the hands of an expert.
No one would think for one moment of engaging a chauffeur for a
high-class motor-car who had less than six months’ training and
experience, and who was not capable of stripping and adjusting
the motors and effecting minor repairs. It would be difficult to
find a machine-gun detachment with a single man who possessed even
these minimum qualifications. Apart from the mechanical knowledge
it must be remembered that the man who fires the gun, known as No.
I. in our service, has in his own hands the fire from 50 rifles,
and on his own judgment and skill as a shot will entirely depend
the effectiveness or otherwise of this fire; it stands to reason
therefore that he should be chosen primarily for his good shooting,
but, in addition to his skill in aiming, he must be a good judge
of distance and possess considerable intelligence, initiative, and
self-reliance; for although he will usually receive orders as to
target, range, rate of fire, and the moment for opening or ceasing
fire, it will often happen that he has to use his own judgment in
these very important matters.
As the gun is generally required to move and come into action
independently of other troops, it must find its own scouts, who not
only have to safeguard it from surprise when moving, but must be
trained to select good positions whence it can come into action.
For this reason the men of the detachment must be trained scouts.
To summarise:
(1) Only marksmen should be chosen.
(2) Trained scouts should be given the preference.
(3) The whole detachment must be trained as range-finders and
scouts.
(4) The whole detachment must be proficient in judging distance.
(5) Only strong men should be selected.
The strength of a machine-gun detachment is given in Chapter IX.
With the tripod mountings and pack transport the best _working_
strength for a machine-gun section will be found to be the
following:--
1 officer, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 20 privates--that is, 1
N.C.O. and 10 men to each gun. It is almost superfluous to say that
the whole detachment must be trained to work and fire the gun, and
should have a very thorough knowledge of its parts and mechanism,
and be experts at remedying failures and effecting minor repairs.
Until the whole detachment are so trained and can detect the cause
of any failure instantly and remedy the same in the minimum time
required, it is useless to attempt tactical training in the field.
The preliminary training will take from three to six months,
according to the ability of the instructor and the time available
daily for work.
It will be found that certain men of the detachment are far more
skilful in laying and firing the gun than others, and it is
undoubtedly sound to specially train these men as gun-layers and to
permanently allot to the two best layers the duties of Nos. 1 and
2 (_i.e._ the firer and his assistant). This should be the post of
honour and coveted accordingly, and the two best gun-layers should
be awarded a distinguishing badge. As no badge is authorised by our
regulations, a lance stripe might be given to the best No. 1 of
each gun.
In training the men of the section in the preliminary details
of working the guns, the following points may be found of use.
First frame a course of instruction for each day which will give
systematic and progressive individual instruction in the following
points: mechanism, name and use of every part, the working of the
mechanism, care of gun, stripping and fitting, loading and firing;
spare-part box, the name of each of its contents and recognition of
every part _when out of the box_; failures, their recognition and
remedy; gun-laying and firing, co-operation between layer, loader,
and observer. This course should last at least three months,
provided not less than two hours a day are available. Drills may
be combined with preliminary instruction at the end of the first
month, and must aim at extreme quickness in dismounting the gun
and opening _aimed_ fire and remounting the gun again. The chief
points in the preliminary training are that _all_ the detachment
are _equally_ instructed. Training on the 20-yard range in barracks
should take place during the third month, and special targets
should be used to teach laying the gun, slow use of elevating
gear and combined sights, traversing fire, fire control, rapid
change of target, indirect fire. During this short-range practice
the failures should be practically demonstrated, and firing on
the range should never take place without making a few artificial
failures to test the efficiency of the detachment. These failures
should be introduced by the officer himself without the knowledge
of the detachment, and should be so arranged as to occur naturally
while firing. They should be timed by him in each case, and the
record time for the remedy of each failure posted up in the
barrack-room with the man’s name. Artificial failures can easily
be made by filing round the base of a cartridge so that it is torn
off when fired; by loosening a bullet in a cartridge, by slightly
flattening a cartridge so as to cause it to jam in the chamber, by
wedging a cartridge in the belt, by introducing a blank cartridge,
and by repacking the asbestos with dry packing. It will be found
that by making two or three such jams every time the gun is taken
out to fire the detachment will soon become expert in recognising
and remedying failures.
The men should be taught that failures may be divided into two
classes, viz. _avoidable_ and _unavoidable_. The occurrence of
an avoidable failure should be looked upon as a disgrace to the
firer. The _unavoidable_ failures so seldom occur that they are
negligible.
The _avoidable_ failures are those due to (1) Fuzee spring
adjustment. (2) Want of oil. (3) Dirt. (4) Want of water. (5) Bad
packing. (6) Damaged ammunition. (7) Faults in feed due to badly
filled, new, or damaged belts. Each machine gun will be found to
work best with a certain weight of fuzee spring which can only
be found by trial, and this weight will change from time to time
as the gun wears. The machine gunner cannot be considered fit
for further training until he has become so familiar with his
gun that he can instantly tell by the sound if it is working at
its best; just as a chauffeur knows at once if his engines are
running perfectly, and can instantly detect the slightest defect
and make the necessary adjustment of the spark, petrol, or oil
to ensure smooth running. The unavoidable failures are so few
and rare that they will seldom be met with, and can be quickly
remedied, except the breaking of an important part. Failures due
to defective ammunition are extremely rare provided ordinary
precautions are taken to avoid placing damaged cartridges in the
belt. A breakage in any part of the lock can be remedied in a
few seconds by substituting the spare lock which should always
be _on the gun_ in action. The breaking of any other part of the
gun will be an accident of rare occurrence and, provided the gun
is properly inspected before use, may be more properly classified
under accidents than failures. A modern machine gun in the hands
of experts should never jam, while failure of automatic fire will
be rare and momentary. Until this standard has been reached a
machine-gun detachment cannot be considered fit to begin tactical
training. The Japanese in the late war were obliged to improvise
the detachments for their hastily acquired machine guns; and
Captain Matsuda, who commanded the machine guns with Prince Kanin’s
Cavalry Brigade, says: “Whereas at the battle of Peu-si-lau on
October 12th we had some trouble after firing 1,800 rounds, on
March 3rd the guns of one section after firing 11,000 rounds
continued to work perfectly. _The gunners were absolutely familiar
with their weapons._” Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B.,
remarked: “Like a good chauffeur, the Japanese machine gunner knows
all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires and can tell almost by
instinct when anything is going wrong.” It is almost superfluous
to say that the men of the machine-gun detachment must never be
changed or taken for any other work. Nothing has been said of the
necessity for training the detachment in the all-important duties
of scouting, range-taking, and horsemastership during this period,
but of course they are vital to ultimate success and must not be
neglected.
Range practices will follow, and the peculiarities of the gun
and its fire effect must be carefully taught during this period.
The use of traversing and sweeping fire, combined sights, and
observation of fire and the use of deliberate fire in imitation
of rifle fire should be perfected during range practice, so that
they may be carried out under service conditions during the field
practices which follow.
The tactical training should commence as soon as the field
practices have been completed. The course for this should be
carefully mapped out beforehand and should be based upon the
principles given in Chapter II. and in the chapter dealing with
the arm to which the section belongs, and should culminate in
divisional manœuvres. This course might follow the following
headings:
(1) Drill over rough country.
(2) Selecting a position.
(3) Selecting alternate positions.
(4) Taking up a position.
(5) Screening guns.
(6) Making artificial cover.
(7) Mutual support (movement and fire).
(8) Indirect fire.
(9) A battery working on a wide front in mutual support.
No drill for a battery has been authorised yet (1909), but the
simple formations of a troop as laid down in _Cavalry Training_
will be found admirably suited for a battery of machine guns on
pack-horses with mounted detachment.
The writer is fully aware of the condition under which machine guns
are officered and manned at present, and that a great error has
been made in estimating the time required to train the detachments.
The Germans, who have studied the question of machine guns with a
thoroughness far greater than that of any other nation, have made
them a separate arm of their service, under trained and permanent
gunners, and they evidently consider that only specialists can
attain the necessary efficiency.
However this may be, it is certain that the officer, whether
commanding a section or the batteries of a Division, must be a
specialist and a highly trained one.
An officer commanding a company of Russian machine guns in the
Russo-Japanese War, writing his experiences to the _Nouskin
Invalid_, says:
“I have spent three years in studying machine guns, and consider
myself proficient in their use, but I have always been convinced
that the requisite skill and knowledge cannot be acquired in a
shorter time.”
The commanding officer who at present looks upon his machine
guns in much the same light as he regards any other portion of
his first-line transport--a necessary encumbrance taking away an
officer and several men from their proper duties, and a source of
anxiety when the regiment goes into action--would regard them with
very different feelings if assured of their efficiency and relieved
of the responsibility for their tactics and safety. That this is
possible without altering the present organisation has been shown;
that it is absolutely essential for their efficient use in war it
is hoped to demonstrate in the chapters that follow.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
“Each arm has its special characteristics and functions, and is
dependent on the assistance of others; the full power of an army
can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination,
and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand
the characteristics of the other arms.”
The above paragraph from _Field Service Regulations_, Part I.,
1909, aptly illustrates a principle which should be impressed
upon every serious machine-gun student, for the principles of
machine-gun tactics are based upon those of the arm with which they
are co-operating.
The machine gun cannot yet be regarded as a separate “arm” in our
service, nevertheless it possesses a power peculiar to itself;
and until this power is studied and thoroughly understood, the
principles that should govern its employment in the field cannot be
grasped, and consequently its effective use is dependent on chance
or accident, and for every success scored a dozen failures will
occur, any one of which may be fatal. The preceding chapter has
dealt with the peculiarities and power of the machine gun, and it
will be seen that it possesses the fire effect of the infantry arm
while it has several of the characteristics peculiar to artillery;
for instance, it is fired from a mounting by one man, and is moved
from position to position by draught or pack animals.
We have seen that the chief characteristic of the machine gun is
its power of delivering the “maximum fire from the minimum front”;
this fire is of great volume and is highly concentrated, while it
can also be made to sweep a wide lateral surface of ground. The
gun’s narrow frontage in action renders it easy to conceal, and
when discovered it presents a very small and difficult target to
the enemy’s riflemen; on the other hand, when once discovered if it
cannot be moved unseen to another position it is liable to suffer a
prolonged and concentrated fire from the widely scattered riflemen
of the enemy, to which it cannot effectively reply, and which must
in time cause loss. Again, its range being limited, it is powerless
against artillery except under special circumstances at effective
rifle range.
The general principles governing its tactical employment depend
upon three factors, viz. (1) the target, (2) the range, (3) the
position.
The volume and concentration of its fire necessitate a large
and vulnerable target, or ammunition will be expended without
adequate results. The first essential is therefore to obtain this
description of target and to avoid firing on others which may
present themselves.
A large and deep target might justify fire being opened at long
range, but such targets rarely present themselves on the modern
battlefield, and its vulnerability will partly depend on the
closeness of the range and partly on its formation. To obtain a
suitable target of this description _surprise_ is essential, and to
effect a surprise it will be necessary to conceal the gun and its
detachment in a well-chosen position.
Thus we see the three cardinal points for tactical success
are--suitable _target_ at close _range_ from a concealed _position_.
FIRE EFFECT
Napoleon’s maxim, that “fire is everything--the rest is of small
account,” is only applicable to the machine gun when the fire is
_effective_. Nothing is so useless and wasteful as ineffective
machine-gun fire, and the careful study of fire effect and how
to obtain the best results is imperative with this weapon. The
principles so ably stated in Colonel Mayne’s excellent book, _The
Infantry Weapon and its Use in War_, apply almost equally to
machine guns, and should be carefully studied by machine gunners,
particularly those chapters dealing with the employment of fire in
the field.
We have already seen that the range of the machine gun is
practically the same as that of the infantry rifle, but that the
beaten zone is only half the depth and about half the width of the
collective fire of infantry, partly owing to the rigidity of the
mounting, and partly to the fact that the human error is greatly
reduced by being concentrated in the person of a single individual,
instead of being spread over some 50 men of varying temperament,
nerves, and aiming powers.
In addition to these factors, the fire from machine guns is always
“collective” and “concentrated” unless deliberately dispersed
by the firer, while infantry fire is always “individual” and
“dispersed” unless controlled by fire discipline under a leader.
Fire discipline and fire control are in the hands of one man--there
is no need to point out the target to a scattered firing line,
and there is no delay in passing orders down the line, or in the
setting of 50 different sights for the correct elevation. Thus fire
can be opened far more rapidly and accurately than with rifles, and
can be at once directed on a fresh target without ceasing fire,
while the effect can be seen by the firer, who can instantly change
the rate or cease fire altogether.
The beaten zone is perhaps the most important factor in obtaining
effective fire, and the following table, compiled from _Musketry
Regulations_, 1909, gives the zone beaten by 75 per cent. at four
ranges.
RANGES
------------------+--------------------------------------------------
| Zone containing 75 per cent. of shots
| (effective zone).
+-----------+------------+------------+------------
| 500 yards.|1,000 yards.|1,500 yards.|2,000 yards.
------------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
Depth | 150 yds. | 70 yds. | 60 yds. | 50 yds.
Lateral Dispersion| 4 ft. | 8 ft. | 13 ft. | 19 ft.
------------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
It will be seen that the 75 per cent., or effective zone, is
deepest at 500 yards, and gradually decreases as the range
increases up to 2,000 yards; beyond this distance it increases
again in about the same ratio up to 3,000 yards.
The following formula will give the effective zone (75 per cent. of
shots) approximately for all ranges up to 1,500 yards inclusive:
50,000/Range + 20. Example for 1,000 yards: 50,000/1,000 + 20 =
70 yards, which is the depth of the area swept by 75 per cent. of
shots, or the “effective” beaten zone. For ranges beyond 1,500
yards this formula is useless, and after 2,000 the beaten zone
increases in depth, while the angle of descent of the bullets
becomes so steep that the “dangerous space” is reduced to a
minimum; and consequently the zone beaten by 75 per cent. of shots
is no longer the “effective zone,” and it will be necessary to
get the target within the zone beaten by the nucleus, or 50 per
cent. of the shots. This zone at 2,500 yards range is about 50
yards in depth, so an error in estimating the range of more than
25 yards over or under the correct distance will render the fire
“ineffective.” Even at 1,500 yards the “effective zone” (75 per
cent.) is but 60 yards deep, which only allows an error of 30 yards
over or under the correct range--a very small margin, even when
using a range-finding instrument, but without an instrument it is
obviously impossible to “estimate” or “judge” the distance with
sufficient accuracy to ensure bringing the “effective zone” on the
target.
For ranges over 500 yards it is absolutely necessary to know the
range accurately or to find some other method of bringing the
“effective zone” on to the target.
The machine gunner may be likened to the fireman with his
hose-pipe, whose object is to bring the base of his jet of water to
play on a certain spot some distance away from the nozzle of his
pipe. He does not trouble about the distance, he does not require
to know the range; but pointing the nozzle in the direction of the
spot he desires to strike, he elevates or depresses it until he
observes the base of the cone of water falling on the right spot,
and then he holds his pipe so that it continues to fall where he
desires; he does not trouble about the smaller streams and drops of
water that fall short or go beyond, but devotes his whole attention
to keeping the nucleus of the stream--the 75 per cent. or 50 per
cent. zone--falling on his “target.” In precisely the same way the
machine gunner must look upon his stream of bullets as a stream of
water from a hose-pipe, and his object must be to cause the centre
of that stream to play on the target, or, in other words, to bring
the effective cone of fire on the target so that it is the centre
of the beaten zone. This can be done by “observing” the strike of
the nucleus of the shots and altering the elevation accordingly.
On favourable ground fire can be observed by No. 1 up to 800
yards, but No. 2 with the aid of good glasses can observe fire on
favourable ground up to 1,500. This observation of fire is the best
method of obtaining the correct elevation at “effective” ranges
(_i.e._ 1,400 to 600), if the ground is suitable. The procedure
should be as follows: The range should be “estimated” by No. 1, who
should then adjust his sight for 100 or 200 yards less elevation
than the supposed distance, and fire “groups” of 8 or 10 shots; No.
2 observing the strike of the bullets and saying “short” or “over,”
as the case may be, while No. 1 alters the elevation between each
group until No. 2 says “on,” when fire may be continued, still
observed by No. 2, until the desired effect has been attained. No.
1 must be careful to fire his first group of shots short of the
target, as they are much easier to locate than shots which fall
“over.”
If the target is only visible for a short time, the groups may
be “rapid,” but as a rule “deliberate” fire at the quickest rate
should be used, and “rapid” only used when the range has been
found. If the ground is not favourable for the observation of fire,
or the range is too great, this method cannot be used, and it will
be necessary to obtain the range by instruments; but it will not
always be possible to do so, and it is necessary to find some other
reliable way of ensuring that the target is within the “effective”
zone.
Supposing the range to be estimated at 1,400 yards, the effective
zone is about 60 yards in depth--therefore an error of only 30
yards in estimating the range can be permitted. There is but one
way to overcome the difficulty, and that is by _increasing_ the
effective zone; and this can be done by using “combined sights,”
thus making two or more beaten zones which touch each other and
overlap where the effective 75 per cent. of shots of both ends.
There are two ways of using combined sights:
(_a_) The “single gun” method.
(_b_) The “battery” method.
In (_a_), with an estimated range of 1,400 yards, the sights will
be set for 1,300 and aim taken; then the sights will be again
set for 1,500 yards, but without altering the original aim, and
then “rapid” fire opened and the elevating wheel slowly turned to
elevate the gun until the 1,500 yards sighting is aligned on the
target. The result of this operation is to sweep the whole ground
from 1,270 to 1,530 yards with effective fire; and if an error
of 125 yards over or under the correct range has been made, the
target is nevertheless brought within the effective zone by the
combined elevations used. This is the best method for sections or
single guns, and a section can vary this by one gun using 1,250
yards elevation and working up to 1,400, while the other gun begins
at 1,350 and works up to 1,550. The choice of the amount over and
under the estimated range must depend upon the ability of the
person estimating the range and circumstances of the case, but less
than 100 yards over or under should never be used.
The second method (_b_) is only used where at least four guns are
available, and requires six guns to obtain the best results. The
range is estimated as before, and then each gun uses an elevation
differing by 25 yards from the next: thus, taking 1,400 yards again
as an example of the estimated distance, No. 1 gun will use 1,300;
No. 2, 1,325; No. 3, 1,350, and so on, No. 6 using 1,425 yards.
In this way the effective zone of No. 1 gun, which is 60 yards in
depth, will just overlap the effective zone of No. 2 gun, and so
on right up to No. 6 gun. Thus instead of one small zone of 60
yards of effective fire, we have six guns joining to make one big
effective zone 185 yards deep.
Care must be taken not to use more than 25 yards between sights at
ranges over 1,400 yards, otherwise there will be gaps between each
effective zone, and the fire would be ineffective should the target
happen to be at a spot between any two zones.
The methods of firing the gun are laid down in the official
Handbook, but it may be added that in using “deliberate” fire the
double button should be pressed irregularly so as to imitate rifle
fire, and with a little practice a rate of 120 shots a minute can
easily be attained.
This kind of fire, although it should seldom be used, will
occasionally be serviceable in ranging for observation when it
is desired to do away with the peculiar sound of the machine gun
and thus not disclose its presence prematurely. In covering a
retirement it may also be found useful to deceive the enemy into
believing they are only opposed by riflemen, while reserving its
full fire power until a good target presents itself at close range.
“_Continuous_” fire should be used in “gusts” or bursts of from 15
to 30 shots, a momentary pause being made to observe the effect,
and, if necessary, to correct the aim. The great expenditure
of ammunition caused by “continuous” fire renders its use only
justified when the effect obtained is commensurate, and it should
seldom be adopted until the circumstances justify it. But when a
really good target is found at close range, the ammunition need no
longer be considered until there is nothing left alive to fire at.
Annihilation should always be the final aim of machine-gun fire.
TAKING UP A POSITION
Except under special circumstances, such as for covering fire or
a demonstration, the battery will not move as such into position,
but each section will be given its approximate place and move there
independently, keeping touch, however, by signal or connecting
files with the battery commander and acting in close co-operation
with the other sections.
Positions are of two kinds, viz. (1) positions of observation, (2)
positions of readiness.
The position of observation will usually precede the position of
readiness, and the principal points are the concealment of the guns
and detachments, the facilities for observing the enemy and for
movement in any direction.
The position of readiness will be in the immediate vicinity of the
fire positions, and the guns may be actually in position awaiting
the target.
When moving alone on the march, scouts working in pairs must be
pushed well out ahead and on the exposed flank or flanks, and
they should be trained to use a system of signals to indicate the
following: (1) “All clear”; (2) “Enemy in sight”; (3) “A good
target in sight”; (4) “Cavalry” (prepare for); (5) “Artillery
within range”; (6) “A good gun position.”
Six simple and unmistakable signals can easily be arranged and
learned during peace training, which might prove invaluable in
war, for “opportunity” is everything to the machine gunner, and
is usually so fleeting as to demand instant action in order to
obtain success. On moving to occupy a position as a battery, the
guns will usually be in line at from 10 to 100 yards interval, with
the section commanders leading their sections and the scouts well
ahead; the flank guns must arrange for the protection of the flanks
by scouts in the same manner.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM III
TO SHOW FORMATION WHEN COMING INTO POSITION
aaa. The Position. B. Ground Scouts. C. Battery Commander.
D. Connecting files. E. Section Commanders. ee. Flankers.
F. Guns & Detachments.]
The Germans consider that ground scouts should never go into the
proposed position, as they are likely to expose themselves to
the enemy, and thus “give the position away,” and, as already
pointed out, “surprise” is the essence of success. They say that
the commander of the battery or section, whichever the unit may
be, should alone examine the position and select the place for
his battery or section to come into action--and this is the right
method as a general principle; but in broken or hilly country,
where cover is abundant, and where the position is extensive, a
battery commander can do no more than indicate generally the
positions to be occupied by the sections, and it will then be
advisable for the section commanders to personally select the
positions for their guns. If the cover is good, the range-finders
may next occupy the gun positions and proceed to take ranges. They
must be most careful not to show themselves in the least and should
work from cover to cover, some distance from the gun positions
and not on the same alignment. The ranges must be noted on proper
range cards, and when complete sent to the section commanders.
In open country, where there is no good cover in the position,
the scouts will only approach it sufficiently to ensure that it
is not occupied by the enemy, and will then halt and find a good
position for the guns to be dismounted; the commander, passing
through the scouts, will then reconnoitre the position himself,
and select the place for coming into action. There are two methods
of taking up a position, which depend for their choice upon the
proximity of the enemy and the time at which fire is to be opened.
The first is the “deliberate” method, when the guns are brought
up and the range taken before the target appears. In this case
cover is essential to success, and the guns must be most carefully
concealed, the whole object being to surprise the enemy when the
moment arrives, and thus concealment is of the first importance.
The second method is used when the enemy is in the immediate
vicinity, when the country is open and the position without cover,
or when the position is within artillery range of the enemy. The
guns unlimber and prepare for action immediately in rear of the
gun positions, and as close to them as possible and completely out
of sight of the enemy. The commander alone goes into the position,
and having selected approximately where each gun is to go, he
stations them immediately in rear of their intended places out of
sight and then creeps into the position himself and watches for
the opportune moment; when this arrives, a blast on his whistle
brings the guns up with a rush, no concealment is attempted, but,
fully exposed, each gun opens fire on the nearest target. If the
moment has been rightly judged and the range properly estimated,
60 to 90 seconds is sufficient time to obtain the desired effect,
and before the enemy’s artillery can get the range a second signal
from the commander sends the guns out of action again as rapidly
as they appeared. This is one of the most successful methods of
employing machine guns: there is no risk of being seen before the
target appears, there is no “giving away the position” by careless
scouts, and there is no chance that a powerful pair of glasses will
discover the guns in position before they open fire and turn the
tables by surprising them instead. On the other hand, it requires
very highly trained detachments and a vast amount of peace practice
to ensure its success in war.
Alternative positions are always necessary when the deliberate
method is used, and must be carefully practised in peace--the
principal points to be observed being: (1) That the second
position is suitable for bringing effective fire to bear on the
enemy, and (2) that the gun is able to gain the position without
exposure.
Scouts so often forget that they can work with ease where it is
impossible to carry a gun; and unless the above conditions are
fulfilled, the alternative position will be useless.
The place for dismounting the guns must always be as close to the
fire position as possible without exposing the teams to fire or
view; the reserve ammunition must be brought up to this spot, and
precautions must be taken to prevent the teams being surprised
from the flanks or rear if exposed. Machine guns should never be
advanced for a short distance. If it is desired to obtain a closer
range, nothing is gained by moving two or three hundred yards,
while the guns are exposed to considerable risk. The guns are just
as effective at 1,000 yards as at 800, and when a closer range is
necessary they must await the opportunity for moving up to close
range, _i.e._, 300 or 400 yards, where their fire may be decisive.
COVER
Cover may be of two kinds:
(1) _Cover from fire._
(2) _Cover from view._
Cover from fire must be proof against the projectiles likely to be
used against it--that is, against rifle fire and shrapnel. “Cover
from fire” should also be “cover from view” if possible; it must
be inconspicuous, and should be of the same colour and material as
the background and locality. It must be as low as is compatible
with command, and must never be on the skyline. The following
points in the order given constitute good “cover from fire”:
(1) Bullet proof.
(2) Good field of fire.
(3) Invisibility.
(4) Protection from enfilade fire.
(5) Good line of retreat (under cover).
“Cover from view” is often not cover from fire, and must be used
with great caution; it is the principal means by which guns are
brought up to the fire position without the enemy’s knowledge,
thus effecting a surprise. Cover may be either (1) natural, (2)
artificial, (3) a combination of both.
“Cover from fire” will generally be artificial or a combination of
natural and artificial cover, because natural cover will seldom be
found that is suitable for machine guns, although _partial_ cover
from fire may often be found behind a bank, a rock, or in a ditch.
“_Cover from view_” will generally be natural cover, and will be
used to conceal the guns while approaching a position to occupy
it and, when in position, to effect a surprise. When used in
position to effect a surprise, it must be remembered that the
moment the guns open “rapid” fire the cover is no longer any
protection--indeed, it may be a source of great danger should it
be isolated or conspicuous, such as a patch of scrub in a plain,
or a clump of bushes on a hillside, as it will form a mark to aim
at for every gun and rifle within range. “Cover from view” may be
also “cover from fire,” as when folds in the ground or a ravine
are used to conceal the guns. It may also be artificial cover,
such as screens of boughs and brushwood as used by the Japanese
at Liao-yang to conceal their march, or to hide guns in position.
Hurdles covered with grass, reeds, bush, or branches of trees to
closely imitate the surrounding growth, and placed as screens to
hide the guns until the moment arrives for opening fire, will often
prove a most valuable method of concealing guns in position, and
under favourable circumstances the guns may even open fire from
behind the screens without being discovered. This method requires
constant practice in peace to attain success on service--indeed,
the necessity for the most thorough peace training and constant
practice in all the details of bringing guns into action, making
cover, taking up alternative positions, retiring under mutual
support, etc., cannot be too strongly urged on section commanders.
Little ammunition is available for practice in our own service,
it is true, but there is nothing to prevent constant practice in
this vital duty of the machine gunner; and by getting a few men to
represent the enemy, with an intelligent officer and a pair of good
glasses, most valuable help can be given by criticising the manner
the guns are handled, and the amount of exposure or concealment of
the gun and detachment in taking up a position or making cover.
Artificial cover may be either excavated or built up, or a
combination of both. Excavated cover will usually take the form
of a pit of sufficient size to hold the tripod, ammunition, and
three men, and deep enough to conceal the gun and men not only
from view, but from fire at “effective” range. This form of cover
is particularly good on a level plain, the muzzle of the gun being
just above the surface of the ground. The rear side of the pit may
require to be enlarged to take the long leg of the tripod where
time is limited and the pit has not been made large enough to take
the tripod in any position, but it is advisable to make the pit of
sufficient area to allow the gun to be worked in any direction.
With an adjustable tripod, the pit should be so deep that the gun
is completely concealed below the surface of the ground, and it is
only raised when it is intended to open fire.
Other forms of cover consist of epaulements, trenches, sangars,
etc., which will not differ essentially from those given in the
manual of Military Engineering. In all types of “cover from fire”
care must be taken that the cover is high enough to protect No.
1 from bullets fired at ranges up to 1,400 yards, taking into
consideration the angle of descent of the bullets at that range and
the distance of No. 1 from the cover.
Cover can seldom, if ever, combine all the points enumerated here,
and it will lie with the section commander to discriminate between
them and decide what points he will sacrifice in favour of others
more important: thus it may be necessary, where concealment is the
chief object, to forgo “cover from fire” at the longer ranges in
favour of a low parapet or even none at all. It is only possible
to indicate in outline the principles that should be followed;
practice in training and the experience thus gained alone will make
the reader an expert.
Shields will be found of great value in the final stages of the
battle, when machine guns are pushed up to close range to assist
in the final assault. They are too heavy to carry on the guns, and
should be with the ammunition in the first-line transport, where
they are easily obtained if required.
COVERING FIRE
Machine guns will often be used to cover the advance of infantry
from “long” to “effective” range when the artillery is still
occupied in the artillery duel and the infantry first come under
effective rifle fire from the enemy. The ease with which they can
instantly open and cease fire, concentrate on a particular spot, or
sweep a line of trenches, renders them particularly suited for this
purpose, and the Japanese constantly used them to keep down the
enemy’s rifle fire in this manner during the late war.
The narrow beaten zone enables them to fire safely over the heads
of advancing infantry from all ranges beyond 800 yards, provided
the infantry are at least 200 yards from the enemy fired at. A
study of the table of trajectory in the Appendix to _Manual of
Military Training_ will enable the machine gunner to decide the
circumstances under which the fire is safe in each case.
Positions on the flanks and if possible to the front of the
advancing infantry will render covering fire most effective, but
these positions will rarely be possible. The first consideration
is the concealment of the gun from the enemy’s artillery, which
can easily silence them if exposed. It is also necessary that the
positions selected should be sufficiently commanding to enable the
battery commander to see the attacking infantry during the whole
advance, so as to fire only when they are moving, while at the same
time he must be able to see the position of the enemy’s trenches
and thus direct the fire on any part desired.
INDIRECT FIRE
The best method of using covering fire in the early stages of the
attack is by _indirect fire_ from the reverse slopes of a hill
or from behind a ridge or other feature. This is not difficult
to carry out and in no way lessens the accuracy of the fire or
endangers the troops in front, as the following experiment will
prove.
EXPERIMENT IN INDIRECT FIRE
The following is an extract from an article by First Lieutenant A.
E. Phillips of the 10th Cavalry, from the _Journal_ of the United
States Cavalry Association for July 1909:
“To determine how many, if any, of the bullets from the machine gun
would strike troops in front of an assumed ‘hill’ over which the
gun was to fire, canvas frames were used to represent such objects,
the targets being concealed from view.
“The target consisted of a strip of target cloth 6 ft. high and
15 yards wide, along the bottom edge of which is pasted a row of
kneeling figures with an interval of a yard from centre to centre.
Across the target and parallel to its top edge was drawn a narrow
black line tangent to the tops of the heads of the figures. Value
of hits on any figure = 5; value of hits on the cloth below the
line = 3; value of hits on the cloth above the line = 1. Canvas
frame, 8 ft. high, placed 200 yards in front of the gun. Rapid fire:
_First Experiment_
Range 800 yards
-------+-------------------------------+-----------------------------
| No. of Hits. |
No. of +------+-------+-------+--------+ Remarks.
shots. | Figs.| 5’s. | 3’s. | Total. |
-------+------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------
| | | | |
30 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 22 | Line of sight was 5 ft.
30 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 19 | below top of obstruction.
| | | | | All shots over.
-------+------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------
_Second Experiment_
Range 1,000 yards
-------+----------------------------------+---------------------------
| No. of Hits. |
No. of +------+-----+-----+---------------+
shots. | Figs.| 5’s.| 3’s.|Total per cent.| Remarks.
| | | | of figs. hit. |
-------+------|-----|-----|---------------+---------------------------
| | | | |
30 | 9 | 11 | 4 | 60 | Line of sight was 3 ft.
30 | 12 | 17 | 7 | 80 | below top of obstruction.
| | | | | All shots over.
-------+------+-----+-----+---------------+---------------------------
_Third Experiment_
Range 1,200 yards
-------+----------------------------------+---------------------------
| No. of Hits. |
No. of +------+-----+-----+---------------+
shots. | Figs.| 5’s.| 3’s.|Total per cent.| Remarks.
| | | | of figs. hit. |
-------+------|-----|-----|---------------+---------------------------
30 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 13 | Line of sight was 3 ft.
30 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 27 | below top of obstruction.
0 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 53 | All shots over.
-------+------+-----+-----+---------------+---------------------------
“It will be noticed no 1’s were made. Assuming the height above
the ground of the average mounted soldier as 8 ft., had a troop
of cavalry mounted been 200 yards in front of the machine guns
in the third experiment, the line of sight would have struck
about the backs of their horses, and all bullets would have gone
over the riders with at least 4 feet to spare, as proved by the
experiment.... The troop mounted could have moved forward to within
100 yards of the target and would not have been struck by the
bullets.”
The methods of carrying out indirect covering fire will vary
according to the nature of the position selected and the way the
guns are to be laid. This is one of the few occasions when a
battery or two may have all their guns in line close together. If
the slope is a steep one, they may be pushed up close to the crest,
but on a gentle slope they must be placed sufficiently far back to
avoid the forward effect of shrapnel bursting on the crest line.
The battery commander will select the position for the guns and
will then give each gun or section a section of front to fire on.
The method of marking off this section is as follows: two iron rods
about 3 ft. long for each gun are painted white, and are then “laid
off” from the gun to the target, in an exact line, the first being
on the reverse slope a few yards short of the crest; the next on or
just behind the crest line. By aligning the gun on the rods, fire
is brought on the centre of the target; should traversing fire be
required, the limits may be marked by similar sticks on either side.
There are two methods of laying the gun. (1) By observation of
fire. (2) By quadrant elevation. The first method has been already
described, and the second must be done by using the following
table in conjunction with an instrument for elevating the gun at
the required angle; but it must be remembered that each gun will
require adjusting to its own angle of elevation to suit its known
error at each range. Thus a gun which is known to require sighting
at 900 yards when firing at 1,000 should receive 1° 10½ and not 1°
25½. When proper instruments are not obtainable, very fair results
may be obtained by using an ordinary clinometer. The necessary
allowance for the height the gun is above the target must be made,
or, in other words, the angle of sight as shown by the clinometer
must be deducted from the quadrant elevation given on the gun.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM IV
TO SHOW METHOD OF LAYING BY AIMING POSTS
aa. Aiming Posts (about 15^x apart and some distance in front
of gun.)
ttt. Targets.]
TABLE OF ELEVATION FOR MAXIM ·303 USING AMMUNITION GIVING 2,000 F.S.
------------+---------------------------
Range. | Angles of elevation on the
| Maxim gun.
------------+---------------------------
200 yards | 0 4·0 0 1
300 ” | 0 9·5 ”
400 ” | 0 17·0 ”
500 ” | 0 25·5 ”
600 ” | 0 35·5 ”
700 ” | 0 45·5 ”
800 ” | 0 57·5 ”
900 ” | 1 10·5 ”
1,000 ” | 1 25·5 ”
1,100 ” | 1 41·5 ”
1,200 ” | 1 57·5 ”
1,300 ” | 2 16·5 ”
1,400 ” | 2 37·5 ”
1,500 ” | 2 59·5 ”
1,600 ” | 3 22·5 ”
1,700 ” | 3 47·5 ”
1,800 ” | 4 14·5 ”
1,900 ” | 4 43·5 ”
2,000 ” | 5 14·5 ”
2,100 ” | 5 42·0 ”
2,200 ” | 6 22·0 ”
2,300 ” | 6 59·0 ”
2,400 ” | 7 40·0 ”
2,500 ” | 8 25·0 ”
2,600 ” | 9 16·0 ”
2,700 ” | 10 18·0 ”
2,800 ” | 11 18·0 ”
------------+---------------------------
What is required is the angle of _quadrant elevation_ to be put on
the gun in order that the shots may strike the target at a known
range. From range table obtain _angle of tangent elevation_; now
if the target is _below_ the guns we must _subtract_ the angle of
sight (_m_), if the target is _above_ the guns we must _add_ the
angle of sight (_m_) to obtain correct angle of quadrant elevation.
_To obtain angle of sight m_
(1) When target is visible from the immediate vicinity of guns the
angle may be measured by pocket clinometer or other mechanical
means; or, if heights can be obtained from a contoured map, from
the formula:
_m_ = (_h_ × 1146)/R
where _h_ = difference in _feet_ of height between guns and target;
R = range in yards.
(2) When target is not visible from immediate vicinity of guns, _m_
may be found from the following formula:
[Illustration: DIAGRAM V
(a_{1} × OG + a_{2} × OT)/GT
Where a_{1} is the angle of sight from O to G; a_{2} is the angle
of sight from O to T.]
Angles of elevation are read plus, angles of depression minus; T
being the target, G the gun, and O the observer.
Before firing it is necessary to ascertain that the trajectory will
clear the intervening crest--_i.e._ see that the angle of slope to
the top of crest is less than the angle of Q.E. at which the gun is
likely to be fired. If there is an obstacle some distance in front
of the guns, to ascertain if the trajectory will clear it make a
liberal estimate of the range to the obstacle and ascertain if the
quadrant elevation to be fired at is greater than that which would
be required to hit the obstacle.
If it is possible to place a mark to aim at near the crest with a
given elevation which will ensure the fire striking the target,
this will much simplify indirect fire, but the combination of
circumstances required to enable this to be done will not often be
found.
When all is ready to open fire the battery commander will take up a
position from which to direct it, and will give the orders to open
and cease fire and name the guns or sections to fire. The section
commanders will watch the fire effect of their guns and give the
orders necessary for correcting elevation or direction. The battery
captain will assist the commanding officer by noting the fire
effect.
It will be seen from the foregoing that considerable practice is
required to enable indirect fire to be efficiently carried out; but
the results obtained in covering the advance of infantry and thus
enabling them to push up quickly to close range, without the delay
and exhaustion caused by a prolonged fire fight, will more than
repay the time spent in perfecting machine-gun detachments in this
duty.
SUMMARY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
_With Cavalry._--To enable it to retain its mobility and do away
with the necessity of dismounting whole squadrons for fire action.
To give it greater power both in attack and defence, and enable
small detachments to hold important strategical or tactical points.
To act as escort to artillery and to assist in the pursuit.
_With Infantry._--To cover the first advance with fire. In attack
they should be held back until the last reserve has been thrown in,
when they must be used to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on
the point selected for assault. Owing to their narrow beaten zone
and great accuracy, they can safely fire over the heads of prone
infantry within 100 yards of the position. A Japanese officer who
commanded a machine-gun battery at the battle of Mukden said on one
occasion he “continued this fire until their attacking infantry
were within 30 metres of the enemy’s position.”[6]
They may also be used to reinforce threatened points, when their
mobility will enable them to arrive at a distant part of the
battlefield with the rapidity of cavalry. They should rarely be
used in the firing line, where their fire, being dispersed, is less
effective than an equal volume of rifle fire, and where they are
at once the target for every rifle. Machine guns can never engage
artillery, and should avoid engaging other machine guns or firing
on a line of skirmishers.
They are particularly useful at night with the outposts, and can be
trained by day on roads, defiles, or bridges, and thus can be used
in the dark to sweep the approaches with accurate fire.
The Golden Rule for Machine Gun Tactics may be thus expressed:
“Conceal your guns, utilise cover, and operate by surprise--for
surprise is the essence of tactical success.”
CHAPTER III
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY
The Germans have resolutely adopted the plan of attaching machine
guns to cavalry, and they seem thus to understand the modern
combination of fire and shock tactics. To the machine gun the
fire action, to the horseman the morale action--so much the more
easy and productive of results, as the machine gun is the more
powerful.--CHIEF OF 2ND BUREAU, French General Staff.
Since this was written it has been generally recognised by the
leading military authorities of the world that the machine gun
is essentially a cavalry weapon; and Colonel Zaleski in a recent
article on the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War goes so far as to
say, “Even their addition to squadrons cannot be carried out too
rapidly, and this weapon would now appear to be indispensable to
cavalry.”
The truth of this statement is obvious to the student of modern
tactics who is also acquainted with the machine gun as organised
and equipped on the Continent and in the United States, where it
is as mobile as the cavalryman himself and as quick in coming into
action.[7] When its true rôle is understood and its tremendous
fire power made full use of, it will go far to render cavalry
independent of the rifle, and to restore to them that dash
and independence of action which made them the terror of the
battlefields of the past.
The following extract from an article in _The Times_ newspaper
of August 23rd, 1905, by their special correspondent with the
Japanese Army in Manchuria, shows the necessity for machine guns by
emphasising the danger of training cavalry to fight as infantry.
“The prime value of cavalry lies in its mobility. As an actual
fighting unit in battle a body of cavalry is much inferior to an
equal body of infantry. The discrepancy is less marked if the
cavalryman carries a rifle, but there is always the encumbrance of
the horses, which require the attention of one man in every four
when the rifle is employed. It being postulated that tactics evolve
themselves into the effort to obtain a superiority of rifle fire,
it is evident that the necessity of dispensing with one quarter of
a body of mounted riflemen before their weapons can be brought to
bear greatly lessens the value of that body. On the other hand, the
mobility of the mounted rifleman compensates for his comparative
ineffectiveness to such a degree, it is believed in the British
Army, that elaborate arrangements have been made for the provision
and training of what is known as mounted infantry. Granted the
value of mounted and mobile men as an auxiliary to infantry, the
question arises, What is the weapon with which they shall be
armed, and what the nature of the training to which they shall
be subjected? These things depend upon whether the mobility of a
mounted man is regarded as secondary to his function as a rifleman,
or whether his weapon be merely adapted to his mobility. In other
words, are mounted men wanted for their riding or their shooting?
The arming of our cavalry with rifles, and certain modifications
in its training, together with the formation of corps of mounted
infantry, show that those who held the ear of the Secretary of
State for War a few years ago pinned their faith to the superior
value of shooting, and regarded mobility in a mounted man only as
a means to an end. If we turn to the conflict now proceeding in
Manchuria, it is found that in one respect it differs considerably
from other great wars, particularly those which have been fought
on level ground. Cavalry has been conspicuous not by its absence,
but by its utter and astonishing ineffectiveness. From Liao-yang
northwards both armies have occupied part of the level plain
traversed by the Liao River. The right of the Russian Army and
the left of the Japanese have faced each other for nearly twelve
months, in country as flat as a billiard-table and as suitable for
cavalry evolutions as any of the low countries in which the famous
leaders of last century made their reputations. Here have been
conditions ideal for the employment of shock tactics; a veritable
jousting-ground where the vaunted Russian cavalry might have run
a-tilt at the sword-worshipping Japanese. Yet no single instance
has been recorded of combat between mounted men, and to the best
of my belief none has occurred.
“Is it, then, that those who advocate the substitution of mounted
infantry for cavalry are in the right; that the lancer, hussar,
and dragoon of picturesque memory have become obsolete in these
days of the breechloading rifle? Almost it would seem so. But
for two important considerations, the case for mounted infantry
might well be deemed as proved. These considerations, however,
are of such a nature as to lead the observer to directly opposite
conclusions: to conclude actually that cavalry pure and simple is
as useful to the army of to-day as it was to the army of Napoleon’s
day; and that it is totally erroneous to suppose that mounted
infantry can be an efficient substitute for cavalry. The cause of
the effectiveness of Japanese cavalry is not far to seek. The men
are the most intelligent of Japanese soldiers, and their many fine
patrol performances are evidence of the sound methods in which
they have been trained. Their weakness lies in the poor quality
of the horses, and the fact that the Russian cavalry outnumbers
them by six to one. Marked inferiority of force, in all forms of
rivalry, is a fatal disadvantage, and it is for this reason that
the Japanese have failed to shine in the rôle which experience has
assigned to cavalry. The Russian cavalry, on the other hand, is
estimated to number 30,000 sabres, a force of mounted men which, in
the circumstances, ought to have made the lives of the Japanese
commanders on the flank of the army a burden to them. Instead of
which, life in the rear of the Japanese front has been a sinecure,
a positive _dolce far niente_, undisturbed even by the distant
flash of any of these sabres. Is this a proof that, if the sabres
had been rifles, something could have been accomplished? Very far
from it. It is because the Russian cavalry, armed as it is with
rifle and--shade of Seydlitz!--bayonet, is trained to fight only
on foot, thereby throwing away its most valuable weapon, mobility,
that it has proved no more effective in the field than a flock of
sheep. That the microscopic force of Japanese cavalry has held
the Russian throughout the campaign--an exceedingly remarkable
performance when it is remembered how indifferently the Japanese
are mounted--testifies clearly enough that there must be something
futile about the arming and training of the Russians.... They
failed as cavalry and they failed as riflemen, and the reason of
the failure was that they are neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good
red herring. They are organised as cavalry, but have been trained
to dismount on service. In peace they are armed with lance and
sword, and in war they are asked to fight with rifle and bayonet.
Truly an absurdity, worthy of one of those nebulous units evolved
by our own Parliamentary reformers. Last month Mishchenko, marching
forty-five miles in four long summer days, again descended on
the Japanese flank, accounted for a couple of companies and a
field hospital, frightened a number of Chinese carters, and
stopped before a thin line of infantry guarding the approaches
to Hsin-minting, where Japanese supplies are stored sky-high.
Had he known it, he was within an ace of picking up a number of
distinguished British officers, besides newspaper correspondents,
and a famous general whom the Emperor William has specially
delighted to honour. But an inferior number of riflemen checked the
advance, and no use was made of the mobility of the column, except
to retire by a circuitous route.... So far as my information goes,
the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive
during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bayonet, they are
incapable of wielding the sword; their lances, except in the case
of a small proportion of the Cossacks, have been left in Russia.
So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But
the Japanese communications were an easy mark, and it is one of the
most singular features of Russian tactics that they did not avail
themselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry
they should have been able to destroy Nogi’s communications. Yet
they never made a single attempt at interference.
“The deduction is obvious: either the training or arming must be at
fault. When a mounted man dismounts he sacrifices his mobility to
become a weak infantryman. The Russian cavalry has been trained to
fight dismounted, and the result is that the Russians have divested
themselves of the one arm which, many keen observers believe,
might have availed to turn the tide in their favour. The battle of
Mukden was a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster.
At one period the result hung in the balance, and it is no wild
statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been trained
and armed in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner
consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn
battle. It is my firm belief--a belief shared with many others more
competent to judge--that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry,
had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side,
there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from
his strong position at Liao-yang, and I have no less hesitation in
saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force
as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at
Liao-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria
to-day. _En passant_ it may be remarked that if the Japanese
cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden, it would have proved
a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was,
the Japanese were out-numbered and hence completely ineffective.”
If the writer of this article is correct in his deduction of the
lesson to be learned by cavalry from this war--and his opinion
has since been confirmed by military opinion generally,--it
would appear that the machine gun is just the one thing needed
to give cavalry the fire power of infantry, while retaining
mobility and their proper rôle in all the circumstances of the
modern battlefield. It will therefore be instructive to study
the possibilities of machine guns with cavalry in the various
situations which may arise in the course of a campaign.
The use of machine guns in certain stages of an action is similar
whatever the scale of the operations may be; and to avoid
unnecessary repetition, such phases as the Pursuit, the Retreat,
etc., have only been dealt with once. The tactics of the various
bodies of cavalry are based on the principles laid down in the
Training Manuals, the Independent cavalry being treated in this
chapter, the Divisional and Protective in the next.
While the opposing armies are still at a considerable distance
apart, the Independent Cavalry will gain touch with the enemy
and endeavour to find out such information as may clear up the
strategical situation and afford the main army strategical freedom
of action; they may also carry out special missions such as
cutting the enemy’s communications, carrying out raids, or seizing
important strategical points. This can usually only be accomplished
when the enemy’s cavalry has been defeated. It will therefore be
the first duty of the Independent Cavalry to seek out and defeat
the cavalry of the enemy in order to be free to carry out its
mission.[8]
This Independent Cavalry will never be less than a Division,
while it may consist of two or three Divisions in the case of
a war between any of the Great Powers. The nation that is weak
in cavalry will therefore do well to make up for this deficiency
by the employment of great numbers of machine guns so organised
and equipped that they will be able not only to accompany their
cavalry anywhere, but, in addition, to operate and manœuvre as
self-contained units. They will thus free the cavalry from the
necessity of dismounted action when met by superior numbers,
and from being compelled to detach squadrons to secure tactical
positions to check the enemy, or strategical points of importance
which it may be vital to possess. In addition to this, detached
machine guns may be used in the place of mounted escorts to the
Horse Artillery, and to enable single troops to be used in the
place of contact squadrons without detracting from their offensive
or defensive strength.
The Divisional General of Cavalry will have 24 machine guns under
the present organisation, viz. two guns with each regiment; and
it must be assumed that they have been organised and trained to
work together, as suggested in Chapter I., in order to enable them
to be used as fire units in co-operation with their brigades or
the Division. It will depend upon the nature of the country, the
tactical situation and the strength and morale of the opposing
cavalry, whether the G.O.C. retains all four batteries in his
own hands or gives one or more to the brigade commanders. Every
situation requires its own special treatment, and the following is
only given as one of many possible methods of using machine guns in
the preliminary stages of the cavalry combat. We will assume that a
Cavalry Division is acting as Independent Cavalry and is operating
against an unknown but superior force of cavalry as yet unlocated,
in country such as will be met with in a European campaign.
The formation for the march towards the enemy will of course depend
on the roads available and the general nature of the country, but
an advanced guard of one brigade would be sent out with orders to
push forward tactical reconnoitring patrols supported by contact
troops or squadrons. This brigade might be given two batteries of
machine guns, while the G.O.C. retained two batteries with the
main body, which would probably move as concentrated as possible
in two wings with flank guards, and a battery of machine guns on
each flank. The advanced guard commander would use one battery
of machine guns to give each “contact squadron” a section of two
guns and thus enable it to retain its mobility if held up by rifle
fire. He would keep one battery intact to use in the manner to be
indicated later with his main guard.
We will follow one of these “contact squadrons” and see how the
machine guns may be employed to assist it. In the first place the
squadron now possesses the fire power of an extra hundred rifles
and can therefore afford to send out stronger patrols and give
them more support. The contact squadron, having sent out its
patrols and any detachments necessary for special services, will
sooner or later be called upon to afford active support to one of
its patrols when the latter come in touch with the enemy. Upon the
information furnished by this patrol, as to the strength of the
enemy and the nature of the country, will depend the action to be
taken.
The necessity for brushing aside all opposition and pushing forward
will probably cause the commander of the contact squadron to attack
with vigour, and such a course will compel the enemy to accept the
engagement mounted, or if inferior in strength or morale, to take
up a position for dismounted action and hold the squadron by rifle
fire.
In the first case the squadron with scouts in front will move in
column of troops ready to wheel into line for the attack. The
machine guns should move in line immediately in rear of the rear
troop and as close as possible, so as not to be seen from the
front. The subsequent action of the machine guns must of course
depend on the method of attack of the squadron and the nature of
the country; but the objects in view will be (1) to support the
attack by fire up to the moment of the collision, and then to
bring fire to bear upon the retreating enemy and prevent their
rallying; (2) to take up a position to cover the retirement of the
squadron and enable it to re-form if worsted in the encounter. It
is likely that if the first object is successfully attained and
the fire of the section brought to bear on the enemy’s squadron,
from any range under 800 yards, for only 30 seconds, the effect on
the closed body of horsemen, whether in column or line, would be
such as to throw them into considerable confusion at the moment of
the charge, while any attempt to charge the guns, even by a second
squadron, must be abortive and result in disaster. The squadron
leader should have arranged beforehand with his machine-gun
commander to manœuvre with a view to this co-operation, and will
give the signal a few moments before wheeling into line to attack,
when the machine guns will gallop out to the most suitable flank,
and come into action as rapidly as possible so as to enfilade the
enemy’s advance. The moment the charging squadrons mask the fire
of the guns, they must remount and gallop to a fresh position in
anticipation of the pursuit, in order to bring fire to bear on the
retreating enemy and prevent a rally; or to cover the retirement
of the squadron and enable it to rally and reform. The effect of
his fire and the success or otherwise of the first collision will
enable the section commander to decide instantly which of these
two actions will be necessary. It will be seldom that the country
is so flat that some feature cannot be found giving a good field
of fire or commanding a road, or bridge, or other defile by which
the enemy must retreat, or which they must pass in pursuit, and the
use of such features will greatly assist the action of machine
guns. Although both guns will fire together before the collision,
their subsequent action must be made in mutual support, one gun
firing while the other races to a new position from which it can
overtake and flank the retiring enemy, so that, if possible, one
gun is always firing at effective range while the other is moving.
In the same way, if covering the retreat of their own squadron, one
gun will fire while the other retires to a second position and in
turn covers the retirement of the first. The guns must not hesitate
to separate widely in order to obtain unseen the best possible
positions from which to fire, but must always be able to support
each other. If the country is much broken, opportunities will be
found for concealing the gun in a position from which to enfilade
the pursuing cavalry at short range, or for bringing a cross fire
to bear from both guns on a defile. Such an opportunity skilfully
utilised, when the range has been accurately taken, and fire
reserved until the main body is within close range (600 yards or
less), should be so decisive in its result as to check the pursuit
altogether and possibly turn defeat into victory, if the retiring
squadron has had time to re-form and is in a position to launch a
counter-attack at this moment.
To make full use of machine guns with a squadron, it is necessary
for the squadron leader thoroughly to understand their power and
capabilities, and to anticipate their action and the result likely
to ensue; otherwise he will be unable to do more than passively
accept their support, and will fail to reap the advantage of their
principal characteristic--their ability to surprise and their power
suddenly to overwhelm with fire a superior body of troops.
Should the enemy’s squadron be reinforced or be so superior in
numbers that an attack appears inadvisable, it may be possible with
the assistance of machine guns to equalise matters by concealing
the guns in a donga or behind a ridge, a clump of trees, or group
of rocks, and then manœuvring the squadron so as to draw the enemy
across the front of the guns at close range. The best method of
doing this is to lead the squadron, formed in column of troops,
past the cover selected at a sharp pace, the guns being concealed
on the outer flank or behind the rear troop as circumstances may
require. As the squadron passes the selected spot, the machine guns
will be dropped; and the squadron at the same moment wheeling into
line towards the enemy, will hide the guns from view until they are
concealed by the cover.
The gun horses and the rest of the detachment not actually required
to fire the guns should move on with the squadron, so that no
indication is given the enemy that the guns are not still with the
squadron. If this manœuvre is successfully accomplished, it will
not be difficult to draw the enemy across the guns at close range.
It is a manœuvre well worth practice in peace, but an opposing
squadron should always be used to try to detect the guns and thus
ensure that the concealment is properly carried out.
We will now suppose a case where the enemy takes up a defensive
position and the contact squadron has to force its way through.
The squadron leader’s method of attack must entirely depend on the
strength of the position, the force holding it, and the natural
features of the country in the immediate vicinity; and on his plan
of attack must depend the details of the action of the machine
guns. The general principles governing their employment will remain
the same, however much they may vary in the method of carrying out:
the first is to supplement the rifle fire of the squadron so as to
enable as many men as possible to remain mounted, while holding
the enemy to his position; and the second is to gain superiority
of fire for the squadron at the time and place selected by the
squadron leader. We will suppose the position to be strong and
the enemy to possess machine guns, and that the squadron leader’s
plan is to hold the enemy to his position by a vigorous frontal
attack, while he turns the weaker flank. To do this he may decide
to use his guns for the containing attack supported by a troop,
or to use his squadron for the containing attack and his guns to
turn the flank. Having machine guns in position against him, it
might be advisable to choose the latter course, because machine
guns are less effective against a skirmishing line of attackers,
while his own machine guns are more effective if they can gain the
flank or rear of the enemy’s position and thus enfilade them, and
any movement of mounted troops to repulse the turning movement,
or take their attackers in flank, will afford the machine guns
an opportunity for decisive fire action. Should the machine guns
or one of them succeed in stalking the led horses of the enemy,
their action will probably be decisive, as nothing affords a
machine gun such an easy and effective target as the horses of a
dismounted squadron, while the effect of fire on them is to render
the squadron immobile and to place them out of action as cavalry
altogether.
The method of attack will probably be as follows. Scouts
(dismounted) having been sent forward to reconnoitre and draw fire
to disclose the extent of the position, two troops dismounted and
widely extended will advance to the attack and open a heavy fire
and push the attack as hotly as possible; at the same moment one
troop (mounted) will move slowly round the flank which it is not
intended to attack, keeping wide of the position and closed up,
and in signalling communication with the squadron leader. This
will probably draw attention to this flank, and the troop should
report by signal any movement made by the enemy to check them.
Rapid fire should now be ordered all along the line, and the troop
on the flank should wheel and open out towards the enemy, but not
approach within range if it can be avoided. Under cover of this
demonstration, the machine guns with the remaining troop will work
round the flank selected for attack, the guns being concealed on
the outer flank of the troop and using every bit of cover possible
to prevent being seen. Scouts must precede them, and the troop
should screen their movements and engage the enemy with fire if
opposed. Engagement with the enemy should be avoided as far as
possible until the place selected for attack is reached, and the
position turned. Even now the machine guns must avoid opening fire
with the troop, and must endeavour to find a position from which an
enfilading fire can be brought to bear at close range. Under cover
of the surprise caused by the sudden burst of machine-gun fire, the
second gun must push farther round to the rear, and try to fire on
the led horses or catch the enemy’s guns on the move, for they will
certainly be moved to meet this fresh attack. If the horses cannot
be reached, the second gun must seek the best position to bring a
reverse fire in support of the first gun; and unless a really good
target is obtained, fire should be reserved until the first gun is
discovered and attacked, when its intention to retire must be the
signal for a burst of heavy fire which must be kept up until the
first gun is in a fresh position and ready to open fire to cover
the retirement of the second.
This action will enable the squadron leader to use the troop
feinting on the other flank, which he will have recalled on the
first sign of firing by the flank attack, in order to reinforce the
point where the attack can be pressed home.
The machine guns must avoid engaging those of the enemy, while
always endeavouring to catch them limbered up, _i.e._ when
changing position or while coming into or going out of action, for
then they are most vulnerable. The situation at the moment of the
flank attack is this: The front of the position is attacked by a
strong but widely extended firing line which overlaps the flanks
and compels a strong defensive firing line to check its advance.
If the defender decides to put his machine guns into position here
and to reserve half the squadron for defence of the flanks, the
great extension of the attack renders their fire of little effect
as long as the attack utilises cover and advances by rushes from
the right or left of sections; on the other hand, if he decides to
put the squadron into the firing line and to use his machine guns
to protect his flanks, he has either to divide his guns or wait
till he can see which flank is threatened, and he cannot ignore the
troop which is moving against one. Consequently, he must either
be weaker than the flank attack--in which case it is likely to
succeed; or he must withdraw troops from his position to strengthen
the threatened flank--in which case there should be no difficulty
in pushing home the front attack with the aid of the extra troop;
while the position of the machine guns on the flank and rear
should render his retirement from the position very costly. In all
probability the threat of turning a flank either by mounted troops
or by machine guns will compel the enemy to abandon the position in
the case of a minor engagement between squadrons--especially where
a counter-attack is rendered impossible by the strength of the
frontal attack.
When touch has been gained by the contact squadrons and the enemy
found in force, they will either be compelled by superior numbers
to fall back or they must be at once supported; in either case the
advanced guard will now become engaged and will endeavour to break
through the advanced guard of the enemy, or, if in touch with the
main body of the enemy’s cavalry, will endeavour to prevent him
breaking through till their own Cavalry Division comes up.
If it is decided to attack, the action will follow much the same
lines as that of the contact squadrons, but on a larger scale and
with the addition of artillery; and the machine guns will be used
in much the same way to support the mounted attack up to the moment
of the charge, for which purpose the machine guns working in pairs
on the opposite flank to the artillery must be pushed forward to
occupy positions from which to bring fire to bear on the hostile
squadrons while manœuvring prior to the attack. The whole battery
may be used for this purpose if the ground favours their action;
or a single section only, while the remainder are held back as a
reserve to complete a successful charge or to cover the retirement
of the brigade in the event of failure.
The officer commanding the machine-gun battery will remain with the
brigadier and must be perfectly acquainted with his plans, and will
receive from him direct orders as to the way the guns are to be
employed to support the attack. The details for carrying out these
orders should be left to the battery commander, who will issue his
own instructions to the section commanders, who should also be
told the brigadier’s plans. The section commanders must be given a
free hand in selecting fire positions and in all details relating
to coming into action and opening and ceasing fire--the battery
commander’s orders only indicating the flank and extent of the
positions of observation for each section, the method of action and
the object to be attained. Under special circumstances he may order
certain specific action such as reservation of fire, simultaneous
fire on a given signal, or concentration of fire of a certain
target; but it must be remembered that definite orders of this
nature tie the hands of section commanders, and tend to paralyse
their action and destroy initiative, and can be justified on rare
occasions only. Should the enemy take up a defensive position,
the machine guns will be used to economise dismounted men and to
bring a sudden and intense fire to bear on the defenders when they
attempt to retire from the position. Cavalry will not “assault” a
position, but rather try to compel the defender to retire from it
by turning a flank and threatening his led horses or his line of
retreat, while he is held to his ground by fire. Some guns should
also be held in reserve to meet a counter-attack or to be launched
in pursuit when the enemy attempts to retire. The machine guns
with the contact squadrons will be available, as these squadrons
become merged in the main guard, and they must now be used to hold
tactical positions of importance and to hinder the march of the
main body of the enemy by seizing all rising ground in front or to
a flank of the approaching cavalry.
The Division will now have concentrated and joined the advanced
guard, and will be manœuvring in anticipation of the cavalry
combat. All the machine guns, except those holding positions in
front, will now be concentrated under the Divisional General. They
will be used at this stage in conjunction with the artillery--but
not in their vicinity--to support the deployment of the Division
by their fire, and they must necessarily be concentrated and
employed as batteries in order not to hinder the deployment and
free manœuvre of their own cavalry. The flank opposite to that of
the artillery must be used, and “positions of observation” must be
maintained where the guns are concealed from view and if possible
from artillery fire.
The officer commanding the machine guns of the Division should
remain with the G.O.C., and must be perfectly acquainted with his
plans and intentions. As a rule fire will not be opened in the
first instance except by his order. Officers commanding batteries
must be where they can best direct their fire and at the same time
be in signalling communication with their Chief. Ranges will be
taken from the “position of observation,” but should the guns have
to gallop to a fresh position and fire at once, the opportunity
for using combined sights by the battery if the range be unknown
and the time limited should not be neglected. Rising ground is very
important at this stage, for it enables fire to be maintained until
just before the collision.
Should the ground permit of the machine-gun batteries approaching
the enemy unseen, and enable them to reserve their fire from a
concealed position until the closed bodies of the enemy’s squadrons
come within effective range, the result should be so decisive as to
render the attack of the Division successful, even against greatly
superior numbers. The machine guns should render the envelopment of
a flank by a superior force impossible, and their great mobility
will enable them to meet easily any movement of this kind.
They should avoid the enemy’s artillery, which alone can put them
out of action, but they must boldly engage it within effective
ranges should it open fire on the cavalry.
The defeat of the independent cavalry alone will be of little
value, and it will be necessary to ensure their complete
destruction to enable the exact situation of the enemy’s forces
to be discovered. A close and relentless pursuit is therefore
imperative, and it must be remembered that machine guns with
cavalry are far more effective in the pursuit than cavalry alone,
because they move with the same speed; but whereas cavalry can only
use the sword or lance against others similarly armed and capable
of defending themselves, and both men and horses are equally
subject to exhaustion, the machine guns on overtaking the enemy
are able to shoot down men and horses without any more effort than
is needed to set up the guns and work the elevating and traversing
gear. The exhaustion of men and horses has no effect upon the
accuracy or intensity of the fire, while the result is further to
scatter and disperse bodies that may still retain any cohesion.
IN THE PURSUIT
There are many instances in war when cavalry flushed with victory
and exhausted in the pursuit have been themselves caught and ridden
down by troops that have rallied or by fresh supports; but machine
guns have nothing to fear from cavalry, and can confidently await
their attack while covering the retirement of their own cavalry.
The longer they are in action, the more time there is for their own
horses to recover their “wind,” and be ready to carry their guns
out of action at a speed which renders pursuit useless. It must
be remembered also that the machine guns with cavalry cannot be
distinguished from that arm at a distance even when moving alone,
while it is impossible to do so when they are with their regiment
or brigade.
The machine guns must anticipate the pursuit and race off to
positions on the flanks and rear from which they can best cut off,
and if possible annihilate, the retreating squadrons; no effort
must be spared to inflict the maximum loss, and guns must be
pushed up to close range even at the risk of being ridden down.
The troops reserved for the pursuit should have their machine guns
with them, as their co-operation will be of the greatest service,
and regiments will probably act separately, and may be directed to
special points to intercept the enemy or prevent reinforcements
coming up.
The Independent Cavalry, having defeated and scattered the enemy’s
cavalry, are now in a position to send out strategical patrols;
and having “torn aside the veil” are able to see the dispositions
of his main armies, and are free to undertake raids on his
communications and to harass and delay the march of his columns.
Raids are only justified when some specific object can be
attained, and are only likely to be effective during the course
of operations, when both armies are in touch and awaiting
reinforcements to renew hostilities.
The cavalry will in most cases be more profitably employed in
attacking the enemy’s main columns in flank or rear, and thus
hindering their march by causing premature deployment. This action
will bring the independent cavalry in contact with infantry. The
machine guns can now be used to supplement the fire action and
to enable as many squadrons as possible to remain mounted. They
should be employed as separate units or attached to squadrons
according to the nature of the engagement and the force to which
they are opposed. Usually they will be held back in the preliminary
stages of the dismounted fight, until the action has developed
sufficiently to enable the general situation to be seen, when they
will be sent forward under cover to positions from which they can
develop superiority of fire, by concentrating against the enemy’s
strongest points. This will not prevent the use of a few guns with
the advanced guard to seize and hold important points, and nothing
should prevent machine guns from seizing the key of the position,
the moment this can be discovered.
The four batteries of machine guns of the Division may be allotted
as follows: With the advanced guard, one battery; with the main
body (for use in firing line), two batteries; with the G.O.C. (in
reserve), one battery.
TO COVER RETIREMENT
This reserve battery will enable the G.O.C. not only to reinforce
a particular point or cover the retirement with a rapidity and
effectiveness that no other form of reserve could do, but to use
it to turn a flank or to meet a counter-attack without exposing
his squadrons to fire during the movement. The security they
are able to afford to the horses of the squadrons in the firing
line will justify their occupying “positions of observation” on
the rear flanks, from which they can protect them while waiting
other employment. The deployment of the enemy’s infantry and the
development of his fire will compel the cavalry commanders to
break off the engagement; and to do this without loss under the
heavy rifle fire to which he will now be subjected, this fire must
be temporarily checked or rendered ineffective. Every machine gun
will therefore be brought up to such positions as will enable them
to sweep the enemy’s firing lines, and under a simultaneous fire
from the 24 guns the dismounted men will be able to retire from
the firing line and regain their horses. The retirement of the
machine guns must be effected in the usual way, each section acting
independently and retiring by alternate guns--no gun moving till
the other is ready in a fresh position to open fire. The sections
on the flanks should retire first, as they are better able to
protect the centre by a cross fire.
COVER IN FIRING LINE
When the country is flat or the features devoid of natural
cover, it will be necessary to provide pits for the machine guns
practically in the firing line. If this is carried out with skill,
the guns may be perfectly concealed, and protected even from
artillery fire. These pits should be made along the whole front and
as widely scattered as possible, and when a gun is discovered by
the artillery it should immediately be lowered into the pit, out of
sight, where it will be perfectly safe, until the artillery directs
its fire elsewhere. The following instance from the Russo-Japanese
War is an illustration of the skilful handling of machine guns
under such conditions.
EXAMPLE FROM RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
On June 8th, 1905, at Wan-ching, General Samsonov had two cavalry
regiments and a machine-gun section of four guns. During the
dismounted action these machine guns were concealed in the firing
line, two in the centre 100 yards apart, and one on each flank
about 400 yards away. When the firing line retired, the machine
guns opened fire and held the position alone; and so well had they
been posted, that although attacked by infantry, which advanced
to within 300 yards of the position, supported by artillery which
brought a heavy fire to bear on the front occupied by the machine
guns, they were able to hold their ground for nearly three hours,
when the Japanese abandoned the attack and fell back. It would be
interesting to know if this astonishing success of machine guns,
enabling the cavalry to defeat infantry supported by artillery in a
fight of several hours’ duration, without risking their personnel
or abandoning their mobility, was due to the use of natural cover
or, as seems more probable, to the use of pits which would have
afforded protection from artillery fire as well as concealment.
IN THE BATTLE
The hostile columns having arrived within striking distance, the
battle will now take place, during which the Independent Cavalry
will usually occupy a position in front and on the flank of the
main line of battle. From here they will be able to co-operate by
attacking on the flank, from which they can bring fire to bear
concentrically with the main attack, while such a position favours
pursuit on parallel lines, and is also a suitable one from which to
prevent pursuit in the event of a retreat.[9] The machine guns will
now assemble in batteries under their G.O.C., who will use them,
as the occasion may demand, to hold “positions of observation,” to
protect his front and flank in the early stages of the battle, and
later, in conjunction with a few dismounted squadrons, to envelop
the enemy’s flank and bring a powerful volume of fire to assist
the main infantry attack, or to draw troops away from the point
selected for assault.
“The climax of the infantry attack is the assault which is made
possible by superiority of fire,”[10] and the cavalry commander
will be justified in using his 24 machine guns in assisting to
attain this object, provided that in doing so they remain under his
immediate orders and in a position from which they are instantly
available for the pursuit.
We have already seen how machine guns should co-operate in
the pursuit, and their mobility will render them even more
effective when pursuing infantry. The following example from the
Russo-Japanese War may be of interest in this connection.
EXAMPLE OF MACHINE GUNS USED IN PURSUIT
A Russian infantry battalion which was retreating by a pontoon
bridge across the Taitzu River was almost annihilated by a Japanese
cavalry regiment, accompanied by machine guns, which swept the
bridge; “and for the first time in this war,” adds the _Standard_
correspondent with Kuroki’s army, “a machine gun was used with
decisive effect.”
CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE PROTECTIVE CAVALRY
Each army will usually be divided into several columns, each
preceded by its advanced guard, the whole covered by the Protective
Cavalry. The bulk of the latter will be scattered or remain
concentrated according to the size of the zone in which it is to
operate, the nature of the ground, and the first dispositions of
the enemy. The veil thus formed will only be torn aside when the
artillery and infantry of the advanced guards open fire.[11]
It is probable that the side which is weak in cavalry will dispense
with Independent Cavalry altogether, and will meet the Independent
Cavalry of the enemy with their Protective Cavalry supported by
machine guns. The Japanese, who were outnumbered by six to one,
were unable to use Independent Cavalry, and during the early stages
of the war supported their cavalry by infantry. The Russians, who
possessed masses of cavalry, used them principally as Protective
Cavalry, if we except the raids made by the Division under
Lieutenant-General Mishchenko after the fall of Port Arthur. The
Protective Cavalry will therefore, in such a case, not only have to
prevent the enemy’s Independent Cavalry from obtaining information
by penetrating their screen, but will also have the task of
obtaining information as to the enemy’s numbers and direction of
march. That they are able to do this even in the face of greatly
superior numbers has been proved by the Japanese, whose cavalry,
outnumbered and badly horsed as they were, succeeded throughout the
war in a remarkable degree in penetrating the enemy’s screen and
obtaining information. The Russians, on the other hand, in spite of
their masses of cavalry, failed not only to destroy the diminutive
force opposed to them, but even to penetrate their thin veil or
obtain any information of what was taking place behind it.
Are we not in precisely the same position as the Japanese in our
numerical weakness in cavalry, and should we not be confronted by
the same problem in the event of war with a military nation?
Let us, then, see how the Japanese Protective Cavalry was able to
fulfil its mission in spite of the vastly superior numbers of its
opponents. In the first place the Japanese cavalry is trained in
the orthodox cavalry spirit, which is highly developed; suppleness
and power to manœuvre for the delivery of the attack is the chief
aim, while the charge is regarded as the culmination of manœuvre.
Swordsmanship, horsemanship, and independent scouting are the
features of individual training, while only thirty rounds per
annum are fired in the musketry course, from the carbine with
which they are armed in addition to the sword. The consequence is
that the whole cavalry is saturated with a spirit of enterprise
and daring, and a firm belief in its superiority to all other arms
in manœuvre and offence. It was this spirit and confidence that
enabled them, when outnumbered and deprived of their swordsmanship,
to retain their dash and mobility, while using their carbines from
behind village walls against the hosts they were unable to ride
down. It must be remembered that the Japanese had practically
no machine guns at the beginning of the war, and those hastily
purchased after hostilities broke out were required at Port
Arthur. Consequently, the Japanese had to solve the problem of
how to oppose the masses of Russian cavalry with their few but
highly trained squadrons, and their solution was to hold up the
Russian cavalry by fire on every possible occasion, and to be
held up by them as seldom as possible. For this purpose they were
closely supported by infantry; and it is of interest to remember
how our own light infantry were used in much the same way in the
Peninsula--the 13th Light Infantry being actually mounted for the
purpose. Can we ignore the lesson? Is it not plain that machine
guns would not only have done the work of the carbine and rifle
far more effectively, but instead of depriving the cavalry of much
of their mobility and preventing them from being made full use
of--as undoubtedly was the case--they would have enabled them to
go anywhere with the certainty of being able to defend themselves
against a greatly superior force of cavalry.
The action of Protective Cavalry on a large scale is so similar to
that of Independent Cavalry--especially in the matter of patrols
and contact squadrons--that it will be unnecessary to reconsider
these duties. In speaking of the duties of the Protective
Cavalry, _Field Service Regulations_, 1909, Part I., Chapter V.,
observes: “These functions of the Protective Cavalry will entail
principally defensive action, and will necessitate extension over
a considerable front; but the commander must dispose his force in
sufficient depth to enable it, with the assistance of the advanced
guards of the columns in rear, to check any attempt to break
through and surprise the main body.”
It is obvious that fire action is here indicated, and a preceding
paragraph states that mounted infantry will usually accompany the
Protective Cavalry, though it is to be doubted if it will be found
possible to provide horses for this purpose in time of war.
Machine guns, however, will provide the necessary fire power
without requiring many men or horses, and the use of a few extra
batteries of machine guns with the Protective Cavalry would give
them all the stiffening and defensive power of infantry without
detracting from their mobility as cavalry. If the Japanese have
taught us anything, it is this--that our cavalry, small as it is,
if properly supported by strong and well-trained batteries of
mobile machine guns, will be able to more than hold its own against
greatly superior numbers in a European campaign. To attain such an
end we should at once organise cavalry machine-gun batteries, and
attach two batteries to each brigade in addition to the guns they
already possess. This would give each cavalry brigade the fire
power of a battalion of infantry (900 rifles), while in no way
detracting from their mobility, as they would only occupy the road
space of two extra squadrons, and move just as rapidly over any
country. The alternative is to follow Colonel Zaleski’s advice and
attach two machine guns to each squadron, which would give the same
number of guns, but would be likely to detract from the efficiency
of both guns and squadrons. We are, however, dealing with existing
organisation, and, however much we may desire to increase the
efficiency of our Protective Cavalry, we have only one battery of
six guns with each brigade instead of the visionary three. Let us
see how we may use them to the best advantage.
Supposing the Protective Cavalry to consist of one brigade, they
will probably be extended to form a screen over a considerable
front. The exact formation and method of advance will entirely
depend upon the proximity of the enemy, his strength, and the
nature of the country. We will suppose the country open and both
flanks exposed and the enemy in the immediate vicinity, the
contact squadrons or patrols having gained touch with him. The
duties of the Protective Cavalry are the tactical reconnaissance,
and the occupation of positions of tactical importance to the
infantry and artillery.
With so small a number of machine guns as a single battery, it will
be necessary to decide where they may be most usefully employed,
and a great deal must depend on the particular situation. If the
tactical reconnaissance is incomplete, they may be used in the
first instance to hold the enemy in front while the squadrons move
round the flanks to complete the information required. If used in
this manner, they must be handled with dash, and, working in widely
extended pairs--two in the centre and two on each flank--must push
forward and try to surprise the enemy in close formation, moving
from position to position and never remaining stationary after
fire has been opened, provided cover exists to hide movement. Six
guns co-operating in a vigorous offensive, unopposed by artillery,
can push up to close range and do immense damage, while the enemy
should be quite unable to decide what numbers are opposed to him.
A ridge, a gully, a road with good hedges parallel to the front,
is sufficient to conceal the movement of machine guns; and as they
have nothing to fear from cavalry and can always retire if galled
by rifle fire, they can dominate the situation if handled according
to the principles already laid down for them.
Where the tactical reconnaissance has already been completed and
the principal object is to protect the force covered, machine guns
will be found most valuable to support the flanks should an attempt
be made to turn them, as their mobility enables them to be sent to
a distant point with great rapidity, and their concentrated fire at
once makes itself felt at a threatened point and turns the scale
in a fire fight with astonishing suddenness. This mobility renders
them particularly suitable for seizing and holding positions until
the main body comes up.
When used for this duty the battery or section commander, as the
case may be, should receive definite orders as to the importance
of the position he is sent to hold and how long he is expected to
remain there. The position should be carefully reconnoitred by
scouts before the guns approach it, and steps should be taken at
once to entrench the guns and teams against artillery fire if the
position is to be held for any time. Alternative positions for
each gun, with concealed approaches, should be constructed, and
the guns carefully hidden by erecting screens in front of them, or
by placing them behind bushes, which are then cut almost through
the stem, so that they can be instantly removed to open fire.
Ranges must be taken and carefully written down, with their compass
bearings to conspicuous marks. The flanks must be protected, and
dead ground made good by posting one gun to sweep it. The gun
horses and detachment not on duty should be posted well to the
flank and rear where they can obtain the best shelter from view and
fire. Signalling communication should be established with the rear
and flanks when possible.
Very definite instructions must be given as to when and on what
targets fire is to be opened, and the temptation to fire at patrols
or small bodies of the enemy must be resisted. Fire should only be
opened in the first instance by the order of the senior officer
present, and in all cases should be reserved as long as possible.
The battery of machine guns may also be used during the cavalry
combat as already described in the last chapter, and when used as
a reserve on a flank, should take up “positions of observation” if
the ground permits, from which they can repulse a flank attack,
while remaining ready to move off at a moment’s notice to any point
where they may be required.
Machine-gun commanders with the Protective Cavalry must bear
in mind that their object must always be to help their cavalry
in attaining the end in view, be it reconnaissance, attack, or
resistance, and that close co-operation with the cavalry commander
is essential. The most brilliant action causing loss or defeat to a
portion of the enemy is useless if it does not directly further the
object of the Protective Cavalry; and if we are unable to give here
many examples from recent campaigns, it is principally due to this
want of co-operation and consequent inability to make effective use
of the machine guns.
The report made by Captain Golochtchanov, who commanded a
detachment of six machine guns attached to the 11th Orenburg
Cossacks during the last few months of the war, contains a vivid
description of the reconnaissance of the Japanese position made on
August 14th, 1905, at Sitasi, by the regiment forming the advanced
guard of Major-General Grêkow. “At about 4 a.m. the Russian cavalry
attacked the Japanese outposts, consisting of three companies of
infantry and two squadrons. While waiting for the situation to be
cleared up, the machine guns were kept in reserve. Two and then
four were sent against the enemy’s flank; the Japanese retired
from position to position. At one o’clock the fight stopped; the
Russians had carried three villages and determined the line and
direction of the enemy’s trenches. Their task was accomplished. On
the Russian side there were only 100 rifles in the firing line,
with four machine guns.”[12]
“Instead of marching at a uniform rate and distance in front of
the main army it may be advantageous at times for portions of the
Protective Cavalry to move rapidly forward to some natural feature,
such as a ridge or river, along which it will establish posts of
observation, the intervening country being watched by patrols, the
line being divided into sections with suitable supports for each.
The remainder of the force will continue to maintain a line of
observation in rear, until the new line of observation is taken
up; it will then concentrate and move up to support the latter, or
pass through it to form a more advanced line.”[13]
When this method of advance is used the machine guns working as
independent sections should be used to hold important features,
such as bridge-heads, defiles, passes, and villages in the line of
observation. If positions are carefully selected whence effective
fire can be brought to bear on points which the enemy must pass in
close order, and the usual procedure as to cover, concealment, and
range-taking is observed, the mounted troops may be spared much
fatigue and given opportunities for resting men and horses.
USE OF MACHINE GUNS IN A RETREAT
During the battle the Protective Cavalry will be used in the way
already described in the previous chapter, in which we also dealt
with the Pursuit; we will therefore now see how they may be used to
assist a Retreat.
“When retreat appears inevitable the routes to the rallying
position should never be so close to the battlefield as to come at
once under the fire of the enemy. It should be occupied as soon as
possible by some portion of the artillery, and by complete infantry
units. _The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong
force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance_,
and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible,
of a rear guard in support of the mounted troops, will move as
rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and
there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately to secure any
bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat,
at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force.
Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest
danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s
mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they
should take precautions that _all ground commanding their line
of retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”[14] The action of the
Protective Cavalry is indicated in the first paragraph quoted in
italics, while the second gives the only method by which a retreat
can be rendered successful or secure. In no phase of modern war
are machine guns so valuable as during a retreat, and it is quite
probable that, properly organised and handled, they may make the
pursuit so difficult and costly as to render the retreat a far
less dangerous undertaking than it has been in the past. It is not
difficult to realise that an arm possessing such great mobility,
together with rapidity and concentration of fire, before which no
closed bodies can exist at effective range, will be able not merely
to check and delay pursuing cavalry, but may even prevent any
effective pursuit by mounted men alone.
The lack of machine guns on the side of the Russians in the late
war renders this point still to be proved by a future campaign; but
it is well known that the machine guns with the 1st Siberian Army
Corps constantly checked the Japanese pursuit, and more than once
rendered a flanking movement abortive.
The moment that it is evident that a retreat is necessary it
will be the duty of the Protective Cavalry commander immediately
to collect all his cavalry, with a view to checking the enemy’s
advance, and at the same time he should apply to the G.O.C. for
as many machine guns as he can spare, and this is certainly the
occasion when all the mounted machine-gun batteries should be sent
to the commander of the rear guard.
The first step will be to allot one or more batteries to the troops
forming the two flank guards and to the main guard covering the
centre. The general situation at this moment will of course govern
their use. “The commander will determine, in accordance with the
features of the ground, whether delay is best brought about by
the occupation of positions blocking or flanking the enemy’s line
of advance and the employment of fire action, or by a vigorous
and timely attack by a body of horsemen. Frequently, however,
opportunities may be offered for acting wide on the flanks, where
even the threat of a mounted attack or a sudden dash from ambush
may cause the enemy’s pursuit to be delayed without the force
becoming too deeply committed.”[15] In either case the important
thing for machine guns to do at this stage is quickly to seize
ground from which to bring effective fire to bear across a wide
extent of front. Dealing first with the commander of the batteries
allotted to the centre, he will consult the O.C. cavalry and
arrange with him his plan of action. It is of the first importance
to stop the forward movement of the enemy on the direct line of
retreat, as this is the easiest line of pursuit and the one upon
which the most shaken portion of the troops will be found. The
probable course of action for the machine guns here will be to
break up into sections and form a line along the nearest feature of
ground immediately in rear, from which fire can be brought to sweep
the front and check direct pursuit. The more broken the country and
the more commanding the ridge or other features, the more effectual
will be the check, for at this stage guns will certainly be
prominent in the pursuit and shelter from their fire will be very
necessary.
The fact that the machine guns are working in pairs on a very wide
front should make it exceedingly difficult for artillery to locate
them, except singly, and thus it will take them a considerable time
to silence more than one or two of the scattered line of guns.
Alternative positions and the constant change to a fresh one after
opening fire will render the majority of the machine guns capable
of remaining in action until closely engaged by the infantry. This
will cause considerable delay, and by the time a serious infantry
attack develops the machine guns will be able to retire to a fresh
position. In anticipation of this, the battery commanders will have
sent scouts to the rear directly the guns are in position, and they
should personally examine the new line to be taken up, and select
the gun positions for each section. One scout should remain in the
new position of each section and the other return to the gun horses
of his section, to guide them when the moment for retiring takes
place.
The gun horses should be as near the guns in action as possible;
but should the position be such that this is impossible without
exposing the horses to fire, then all the spare rifles of the
gun-team must be used to open rapid fire to conceal the fact that
the gun is being moved. The guns of each section must arrange with
each other to cover their own retirement, but the battery commander
must issue the order in the first instance and will arrange which
sections move first.
Where the pressure is great and co-operation difficult, it may
be advisable to retire by half sections along the whole front at
the same moment; thus the right guns of sections may be ordered
to retire on a given signal, while the left guns cover them by a
heavy continuous fire. If this method of retirement is adopted, it
will be necessary for the second position to be within long range
of the first, which is not always advisable in covering a retreat.
It will seldom be possible to select a concealed position in the
early stages of the retreat, but it must be borne in mind that if
a concealed position can be occupied, and fire reserved until the
pursuing cavalry are at close range, the effect of such a surprise
will do much to check the pursuit, and impose such caution on the
enemy that they will hesitate to press on without those precautions
which necessitate deployments and thus cause much delay.
The machine guns allotted to the flanks should form the supports
to the cavalry there; and if two batteries are available on each
flank, one should accompany the cavalry to enable it to remain
mounted, while they provide the fire action necessary to support it
in the attack and to cover its retirement in the face of superior
numbers. The detail of such action has already been given with
the Independent Cavalry. The other batteries will break up into
sections and move parallel to the line of retreat in single file
at wide intervals, keeping touch with the cavalry by scouts on the
outer flank. The object of this battery is to seize and hold good
positions on the flank of the line of retreat until the main body
has passed. The scouts of the rear section of this battery should
get into touch with the scouts of the flank gun of the centre
battery from time to time, to ensure proper co-operation between
the various batteries.
The importance of concealed positions from which to ambush the
pursuers must not blind machine-gun commanders to the necessity
for seizing and holding to the last possible moment, even at
the risk of capture, every position from which the retreat can
be effectually covered and the pursuit delayed. Should a river
or other natural obstacle be encountered on the line of retreat,
machine guns must freely sacrifice themselves in covering the
retirement of the cavalry across the bridge or beyond the obstacle.
Cavalry is the most costly of all arms, and cannot be replaced
during a campaign; machine guns are the least expensive in
proportion to their fire value, and the easiest to renew; they must
consequently save the cavalry when they can, even if they sacrifice
themselves in doing so.
ESCORT TO ARTILLERY
There is one important duty which machine guns are able to perform
better than any other arm, and that is escorting artillery, but
more especially horse artillery. When cavalry are detailed for
this purpose they not only deprive squadrons of much-needed men,
but can only provide three rifles in action to every four men of
the escort, owing to the necessity of providing horse-holders. In
addition to this drawback, the horses provide a costly fire-trap
for the shells of the enemy’s guns which may go wide of the
battery. For these reasons, where it is possible to spare them,
a section of machine guns should be allotted to each battery of
artillery when an escort is necessary.
They should march in the rear of the battery when on a road, and
on the outer flank when in open country and away from cavalry.
The sole object of the machine guns is to afford protection to
the battery from cavalry, and to prevent rifle fire from being
brought to bear on them from effective range; therefore the section
commander must devote his whole attention to this object, and he is
not justified in opening fire on any target that does not directly
threaten the battery--this especially applies to that stage of the
mounted combat immediately before the collision, when the guns are
firing on the opposing squadrons.
The section commander will be under the immediate orders of the
battery commander, and should be acquainted with his plans and
intentions. He should remain with him until the position for
action has been selected, when he will immediately seek the best
position from which to cover the guns, taking particular care
not to mask or limit their radius of fire nor hinder their line
of advance or retreat. This will necessitate a careful but rapid
survey of the ground in the vicinity of the position, in which
good ground scouts, who have been previously trained in this work,
will materially assist. The most suitable positions will usually
be found well to the front and on the inner flank of the battery
from 200 to 600 yards’ distance. It may be occasionally possible to
place a machine gun on each flank from which a cross fire can be
brought to bear on ground in front of the guns; but such a position
on either side of the battery, unless the ground is particularly
favourable, has the disadvantage of rendering fire control
difficult, and may hamper the fire or movement of the battery.
The principal considerations which should govern the choice of a
position are as follows:
(1) Good field of fire to protect the battery from attack.
(2) Position clear of the fire and movement of the battery.
(3) Immunity from artillery firing on the battery.
(4) Concealment.
(5) Cover from fire.
There should be no dead ground in front or on the flanks of the
battery, and with two machine guns this condition can generally be
satisfied. In cases where one flank remains exposed and cannot be
protected by the fire of the machine guns, or where a portion of
the front or one flank cannot be seen, scouts must be placed well
out in this direction, where they can see anything approaching
and signal timely warning of it, and a position must be selected
beforehand to which to move a machine gun should the warning be
given. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, and
may be repeated here, that machine guns have nothing to fear from
cavalry under any circumstances, and when in a selected position
with ranges accurately known, as they would be in this case, a
single gun properly handled could easily stop a squadron. When
selecting the place for the led horses, it must be remembered that
fire from the enemy’s guns is likely to search the reverse slopes
of the position immediately in rear of the battery.
The machine guns must not be re-horsed until after the battery
has limbered up and moved off, as they are then most vulnerable.
They should endeavour to come into action before the battery
unlimbers--though this will seldom be possible with horse
artillery.
CHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY
The employment of machine guns with infantry seems at first sight
to be obvious, for they fire the same ammunition and have the
same range and kinetic effect. Nevertheless the first machine
gun was used by the French in 1870 as artillery, and its name
“mitrailleuse” indicates “grape shot” rather than rifle bullets.
This initial error in its tactical employment, together with its
crude mechanism, artillery carriage, and short range (about 500
yards), enabled the artillery to silence it early in the battle, so
that it rarely proved of any use.
On the few occasions when it was concealed from the artillery
and used at short range against the infantry, its effect was as
astonishing as it was decisive. At Gravelotte several batteries of
mitrailleuses concealed near St. Hubert’s Farm reserved their fire
until the attacking infantry was on the glacis within close range.
The result was decisive, and the German attack was repulsed with
terrific loss. Again at Mars la Tour, the German official account
describes the repulse of the 38th Prussian Brigade by mitrailleuse
batteries placed on the crest of the hill, as causing them such
losses as to amount almost to annihilation. The brigade lost more
than half its numbers and two-thirds of its officers.
When it is remembered that this mitrailleuse was not automatic, but
had to be operated by hand, that it had 25 barrels and a maximum
effective range of only 500 yards, and that it cheerfully engaged
in the artillery duel at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards,
the only wonder is that, having accomplished so much, the reasons
for its failure were not immediately apparent, and that it has
taken nearly forty years to convince the world that tactics are
as necessary for the effective employment of machine guns as for
infantry. The general principles for their tactical employment have
already been dealt with in Chapter II., but they are so excellently
condensed in Sect. 187 of the German Regulations, that at the risk
of repetition they may be quoted here.
“Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the
maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest possible front.
Machine guns can be employed over any country that is practical
for infantry, and when they are unlimbered they must be able to
surmount considerable obstacles. In action they offer no greater
target than riflemen fighting under like conditions, and they can,
in proportion to their fire value, support far greater losses than
infantry. They can utilise all cover that infantry are able to use.
Cover which is barely sufficient for a section of infantry (60
men) can protect an entire machine-gun detachment (six guns).”
In order to see in more detail how machine guns should be employed
with infantry and the limitations of their tactics, it will be
necessary to follow the sequence of the infantry combat in attack
and defence, and to assume such situations as seem likely to arise.
ADVANCED GUARDS
The action of the infantry of an advanced guard will follow the
same lines whatever the dimensions of the force, and the battalion
is a convenient unit with which to deal. There are four battalions
in a brigade, and three brigades in a Division; consequently the
Divisional General will have six batteries of four guns each, or 24
machine guns, under his command. We will assume that the battalion
we are dealing with forms the advanced guard of its brigade, and
that the Brigadier has given it a battery of four machine guns, two
of which will probably belong to the battalion.
_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, page 79, says: “An advanced
guard is divided into a vanguard and a main guard.... The special
duty of the vanguard is reconnaissance. It will therefore generally
be composed of the advanced guard mounted troops, with or without a
body of infantry as a support. By day, when the country is open and
the advanced guard is strong in mounted troops, infantry will not
as a rule form part of the vanguard.... The main guard comprises
the troops of the advanced guard not allotted to the vanguard.”
We will first take the case of infantry with the vanguard as a
support to the mounted troops, and suppose that two companies are
allotted for this duty and have been given a section of machine
guns. The formation of the infantry of the vanguard will largely
depend on the nature of the country and the proximity of the enemy.
Where the country is open plain they will probably be extended in
a long line of skirmishers, in which case the machine guns should
march close in rear of the centre on the road. Should the country
be close or broken, the vanguard infantry may be confined to the
road--with small parties pushed out to the front and flanks--in
which case the machine guns should march in rear of the advanced
party, and not in rear of the vanguard. It must be remembered
that machine guns are able to come into action and open a heavy
and accurate fire in less time than it would take infantry of
equal fire power to deploy and to open fire from a position; it is
therefore the machine guns of the vanguard that should be the first
to open fire and give the infantry time to deploy and find fire
positions. When the enemy is encountered the object of the vanguard
infantry must be to support the cavalry as quickly as possible, and
enable them to mount and push forward round the flanks.
The section commander must go forward at once with scouts from
each gun, and quickly grasp the situation, consulting the officer
commanding the troops engaged as to the action to be taken; he must
then select the positions for his guns to come into action. The
scouts should take ranges and have everything ready for the guns to
open fire on arrival. The moment the guns open fire, the section
commander should send scouts off to find alternative positions to
the front and flank from which it may appear possible to enfilade
the enemy. Should the target be unsuitable, _e.g._ a line of
well-concealed skirmishers, etc., fire must be _reserved_, and the
guns should take up positions of observation while the section
commander and scouts seek for a position on the flanks from which
to bring an effective fire.
As soon as the vanguard infantry are deployed the section commander
must co-operate with them entirely, and must take his instructions
from the vanguard commander, who should leave him a free hand,
merely telling him his intentions and how the guns may best assist
him.
When the main guard comes up, in the case where the vanguard is
checked, the section commander should take the earliest opportunity
of placing himself under the battery commander, and at this stage
the guns should be used to seize and hold positions of importance,
especially artillery positions. If the advanced-guard action
discloses the fact that the main body of the enemy has been
encountered, and the G.O.C decides to engage, the advanced guard
will be required to seize all positions of tactical value and to
hold off the enemy until the main body has had time to arrive and
deploy. Their action will vary according to whether the G.O.C.
decides to act on the offensive or defensive. The latest German
Regulations say: “On becoming engaged, that side will have the
advantage which gains the start over its opponents in readiness
for action, and thus reaps the benefit of the initiative.” No arm
is better able to assist in this than the machine gun, and every
available battery should be brought up at this stage to take part
in the advanced-guard engagement.
The Germans say: “The advanced guard will fight on a wider front
than that ordinarily allotted to a force of its size, so as to
seriously engage the enemy. It will be disposed in groups more or
less detached, which will occupy those positions the possession of
which will most protect the deployment of the main body. _It will
be assisted by detachments of machine guns, which will be placed
for preference on those positions which it is most necessary to
prevent the enemy from capturing._”[16]
The commander of the machine guns of the advanced guard is
under the immediate orders of the O.C. advanced guard, and must
co-operate with him throughout the engagement. All officers with
machine guns must remember that isolated action is useless, and
that however effective their fire may be locally, unless it
directly furthers the object of the action, it is an unjustifiable
waste of fire power.
The seizure of ground likely to be of use to the main
body--particularly artillery positions--must be the first
consideration of machine guns with the advanced-guard infantry,
once the infantry are in action. That they can hold these
unsupported is certain. “There never has been and cannot be such
a thing as a successful attack on a line of machine guns in a
favourable position in action, until the machine guns have been
well battered by artillery fire,” says Lieutenant Parker in his
book _Tactical Organisation and Uses of Machine Guns in the Field_.
In the cases where the infantry of the advanced guard forms the
main guard, the battery of machine guns should march with the
foremost body of troops and should never march in rear, where they
are useless, and where, if on a road, they can only be moved up
with difficulty. The battery commander should remain with the O.C.
advanced guard until he is fully acquainted with the situation
and his intentions. Should the situation be such as to enable the
advanced guard to brush aside the opposition, the machine guns must
be used vigorously to support the infantry attack, and should be
pushed forward to seize positions before the infantry deploy, and
cover their deployment by fire. In the preliminary stages these
positions will probably be on the immediate front, and the four
guns should be able to occupy a front roughly coinciding with the
first deployment of the infantry. As soon as the infantry come
into action the machine guns may be withdrawn and used on the
flanks to bring a cross fire to bear, and to fire on any closed
bodies, led horses, etc., that may offer a target. At this stage
the guns should work in pairs in mutual support, and may be used on
one or both flanks as the situation requires.
Machine guns should rarely be used in the firing line after the
infantry deploy, as they offer a rather marked target and can be
far more profitably employed in pressing the attack on the flanks.
There are several instances of the successful use of machine guns
with the advanced guard in South Africa in 1900 to support the
mounted vanguard, and on many occasions they were able to brush the
enemy aside without deploying the main guard or delaying the march
of the column.
THE ATTACK
Under cover of the advanced-guard action and the subsequent
artillery duel the infantry will deploy for the attack. The first
advance of the infantry will probably be covered and supported by
the artillery, and they will generally be able to push forward to
within long range of the enemy’s infantry, without the necessity
of covering their advance by rifle fire. From here, however, the
firing line will begin to suffer from rifle fire, and it will be
necessary to reply to this fire in order to cover the further
advance.
“To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from
this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater
power, _its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect
produced_. Moreover, from this point forward movement will as a
rule be contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one
another by neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by
the _covering fire brought to bear on the enemy’s line_ wherever
the ground admits of such action, by supports, reserves, and the
troops specially told off for this purpose. Covering fire should
be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb his aim, and
compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed or in
difficulties. _In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the
first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailants’
progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover._”[17]
No one who has controlled the covering fire of infantry, even
on manœuvres, will dispute the immense difficulty of timing
the opening and ceasing of such a fire, with even a company,
to coincide with the advance of the troops covered; while the
necessity for observation of fire and its concentration on certain
parts of the enemy’s position make it still more difficult
effectively to cover the advance of troops with rifle fire at long
range.
That machine guns will be able to perform this duty far more
effectively and easily than infantry is manifest from the nature
of the fire required, the features being _intensity_, _control_,
and _concentration_, all of which are characteristic of machine
guns. When required to cover the advance of infantry, machine guns
should be used in batteries and must be so placed that they are
able to see the infantry they are covering, and to sweep those
portions of the enemy’s position from which fire can be brought
to bear on the advancing troops. If the enemy’s artillery is not
silenced or at least dominated by that of the attackers, it will
be necessary to conceal the machine guns from view and provide
cover from fire. That machine guns well concealed and provided with
cover (pits) are able to remain in action under artillery fire for
considerable periods, is proved by instances in the Russo-Japanese
War (see Chapter III. p. 28). Major Kuhn, who was with the Japanese
Army in Manchuria, in his report states: “Importance is laid on
concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked
out by the Russian artillery.” Covering fire from the flanks is
more likely to be effective than frontal fire, because it will
enfilade entrenchments, reach men behind natural cover and have a
more disconcerting morale effect than frontal fire. It will not
always be possible to find suitable fire positions on the flanks
for machine guns at this stage of the attack, and it will then be
necessary to place them in rear of the attacking infantry and fire
over their heads. This can be done with perfect safety--indeed,
there is far less danger of accidentally hitting the attacking
infantry with machine guns than with artillery fire. Direct fire
should only be used when it is impossible to use indirect fire on
account of the nature of the ground in the vicinity.
Indirect fire from the reverse slope of a hill has the advantage
of concealing the guns and rendering them immune from artillery
fire. The position must be carefully selected with due regard to
the slope in its relation to fire from the enemy as laid down in
chap. ii. p. 67, of _Training Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The best
position is just below the crest of a steep slope, as observation
of fire is rendered easier and the effect of shrapnel minimised.
The safety of the infantry in front will depend entirely on the
range, height of the guns above the infantry, and the position of
the target (enemy). On level ground the range must not be less
than 800 yards,[18] and the infantry will be perfectly safe at all
distances between 200 yards from the guns and 200 yards from the
enemy. (See table, Appendix A.) The methods of employing indirect
fire have been given at the end of Chapter II., and its success
will depend largely upon the careful observation of fire by the
section commanders, who must concentrate their attention on this
alone--the battery commander giving the signal for opening and
ceasing fire, and the target or direction of fire for each section.
Machine guns used as covering fire have ample time for preparation;
and as ranges can be accurately taken, and great deliberation used
in selecting positions, observing fire, and correcting errors, the
maximum of accuracy should be attained. If the enemy is entrenched
against frontal fire, good results may be expected from accurate
distant fire, owing to the angle of descent of the bullet causing
the low parapet or shallow trench to be no protection.
They were successfully used by the Japanese as covering fire for
infantry in the attack, as the following examples will show: “At
Mukden on March 1st all the machine guns of a whole Japanese
division (12 to 18 guns) were brought into action upon a Russian
_point d’appui_. The Russian fire was silenced, but burst out again
whenever the machine-gun fire slackened. The Japanese infantry used
these pauses in the enemy’s fire to press forward to close range
_under cover of their machine-gun fire_.”[19] On March 2nd the
three machine guns of the 10th Japanese Infantry Regiment acted in
the same way against a Russian fieldwork. This method of employing
machine guns requires the closest co-operation with the infantry
from the commencement of the attack.
Again, during the Japanese attack on Namako Yama the infantry
were greatly assisted by covering fire from their machine guns
directed on the Russian trenches. These guns were used from behind
_screens_, and their success was largely due to their being well
concealed.
It will rarely be advisable for machine guns to follow infantry
into the firing line, where they present a conspicuous target
which attracts fire and renders their withdrawal difficult.
We made this mistake in the South African War more than once. At
Rietfontein the machine-gun detachment of the Gloucester Regiment,
which had followed the battalion into the firing line, was almost
annihilated. At Modder River the Scots Guards Maxim gun accompanied
the firing line, and the detachment was annihilated by pom-pom
fire, and the gun was left on the field alone all day.[20] In the
attack on Cronje’s laager at Paardeberg, machine guns were used in
the firing line on the left bank of the river, and when the attack
failed the machine guns, having suffered severe losses, could not
be withdrawn and had to be abandoned till nightfall.
When the covering fire of machine guns is no longer considered
necessary, they should be withdrawn and concentrated in batteries
in rear of the reserve or in such other convenient position as the
G.O.C. may direct. They should take this opportunity of refilling
belts, replenishing ammunition, water, etc., and if the guns have
fired many thousand rounds, of exchanging barrels.[21] They are
now at the immediate disposal of the G.O.C. and will be used by
him as a mobile reserve. Circumstances vary so in war that it is
impossible to particularize in their use at this stage, but their
great mobility will render them extremely valuable in the following
cases:
1. To assist a turning movement.
2. To reinforce a distant flank.
3. To repel a counter-attack.
4. To hold a captured position.
When the infantry reach close range, the point for the assault will
have been selected and the reserves massed behind this point. When
the reserves have been thrown in, and the fire fight has reached
its height, the moment will have arrived when one side or the other
will obtain superiority of fire. “_The climax of the infantry
attack is the assault which is made possible by superiority of
fire._”[22] To assist in the attainment of this superiority of
fire is the true rôle of machine guns with infantry, and, as their
beaten zone at short ranges is so small, they can safely fire
over the heads of prone infantry, even when the latter are within
a hundred yards of the target. The guns should now be pushed up
to the closest ranges, and fire of the most rapid description
concentrated on the point of assault. When it is remembered that
the machine guns of a single Infantry Division, as at present
organised, can bring a fire of more than ten thousand shots a
minute from close range where its accuracy is assured, at this
crisis, there will be no need to say any more on the tactical
importance of the probable result.
In bringing machine guns into action for this purpose, they will
generally be used in batteries, but may come into action in
sections or even single guns once the objective has been pointed
out. The object being to obtain superiority of fire regardless of
cost, rapidity and concentration of fire must be the principal
points. The guns must therefore press forward to the closest
range, and where it is possible to bring a cross or enfilading
fire to bear, the opportunity must not be neglected. It may be
necessary to fire over the heads of the infantry or even to push
guns into the firing line itself, though this is seldom desirable
if good positions can be found in rear. When any portion of the
line advances to the assault, fire must be concentrated over their
heads on the position assaulted; and when they are so close to
the position as to render such fire impossible, fire must not
cease, but be directed over the position so as to strike the enemy
as they retreat. Fire from machine guns may be kept up from 500
yards’ range over the heads of prone infantry within 100 yards of
the target with perfect safety, and from 800 yards over infantry
advancing to within the same distance. General Nogi, speaking of
the use of machine guns in the attack, says: “Our troops trained
machine guns on the most advanced lines of infantry _to overwhelm
with fire the points at which resistance was greatest_. Sacks of
earth were used to mask them. _They have often enabled the infantry
to advance with success._” M. Ullrich, war correspondent of the
_Gazette de Cologne_, was present in many engagements in which
machine guns were pushed up to support the firing line in the final
stage. He says: “In the offensive the Japanese frequently made
successful use of machine guns. _When the infantry were carrying
out a decisive attack, they were supported by their machine guns,
which concentrated their fire on points arranged beforehand_....
When machine guns have been skilfully employed, their action has
been infinitely more effective than that of field artillery, more
especially when they fire at infantry ranges.” The following is
an example of their actual use in this way. “The Japanese,” says
a Russian eye-witness of the fighting round Mukden, “brought up
during the night dozens of machine guns with hundreds of thousands
of cartridges to their front line of skirmishers, from 400 to 500
yards from our positions, and entrenched them there. _When the
assault commenced, at dawn, the machine guns opened fire with fatal
accuracy on the parapets of our trenches and on our reserves_,
preventing them from coming up. We could do nothing with the enemy,
because when the machine guns showed the least vulnerability, they
were at once protected by shields of bullet-proof steel.”[23]
The machine guns of the enemy will all be in action during the
final stages, but they should not be engaged by the machine guns
of the attack except when exposed. They are very difficult to put
out of action by small-arm fire at any time, and when employed by
the defence are sure to be well concealed and provided with cover.
It is the duty of the artillery to silence machine guns, and this
was so far recognised in the war between Russia and Japan that
the latter brought up mountain guns on more than one occasion to
silence the Russian machine guns.
At Kinsan on June 26th, 1905, when the Japanese were attacking the
position, the Russians brought up two machine guns against the
43rd Regiment and a mountain battery at 3 p.m. The battery at once
silenced the machine guns, and by 5.30 p.m. the hill was in the
hands of the Japanese.[24] Captain Niessel, of the Russian Army,
gives another instance. “It was on August 31st at 7 p.m. that the
Japanese decided to drive the machine guns out of the village of
Goutsiati by _artillery fire_. Knowing that their infantry had been
checked, they posted at the village of Datchaotsiati a battery
which showered on us shrapnel and high explosive shell. Although
the men had taken cover behind a wall of earth, we had many wounded
and could not breathe freely until nightfall, when the enemy
ceased their fire, to which _we could not reply on account of the
distance_. At 9 p.m. I was ordered to evacuate the position.”[25]
The moment the infantry assault is successful, the machine guns
must be pushed forward into the captured position to secure the
ground gained and to repel counter-attacks. As the confusion at
this moment will be considerable, it will seldom be possible for
the machine-gun commander to receive orders from the G.O.C., but
this must not prevent him from immediately directing guns to occupy
and quickly entrench themselves in positions which it may appear
vital to secure, and to order the remainder of the guns not so
required to follow and fire on the enemy wherever he may show signs
of rallying. In order that these two distinct duties may be carried
out instantly and without confusion, it will be advisable to tell
off beforehand those batteries that are to pursue the enemy.
Theoretically every available gun should be launched in the
pursuit, but the recent war between Russia and Japan has shown
how often a position that has been stormed and captured has been
retaken by a rapid counter-attack before the attackers have had
time to rally and prepare to hold what they have taken. Machine
guns can render a position safe from counter-attack so quickly and
effectually that this duty should be the _first_ consideration of a
machine-gun commander with infantry in the assault.
Fresh ammunition must be brought up, and every endeavour made to
conceal the guns and construct good cover from any material found
in the position.
“During the battle of Mukden, on the evening of March 1st, a
position at Sha-shan was captured by the Japanese. The Russians
had taken up another position some 500 yards in rear, from which
they opened an effective fire upon the Japanese infantry in the
captured position. Another Russian force about 1,000 yards
further to the west threatened their flank. The Japanese, however,
succeeded in bringing up _the machine guns which had taken part in
the attack, and brought them into action under cover of a number of
sandbags abandoned by the Russians_. The effect was decisive: all
counter-attacks failed before the annihilating fire of the machine
guns.”[26]
IN THE DEFENCE
When infantry are acting on the defensive, it is advisable that the
majority of the machine guns should be held in reserve, and used to
check turning movements, to reinforce distant portions of the line
of defence, and to deliver counter-attacks, but their principal
rôle will be the repelling of the assault. Guns allotted for this
purpose must be placed in very carefully selected positions in the
line of defence, from which they can command narrow approaches,
and sweep ground in front of trenches or important works by cross
fire, especially any dead ground likely to afford temporary cover
to the attackers. Concealment is of the first importance, and cover
from fire absolutely necessary, but the combination of the two
requires great skill both in choosing positions and in constructing
an inconspicuous shelter. In certain positions where the country
is flat or undulating and has no abrupt features, pits will be
found the best form of cover; but where the ground presents
marked features, emplacements providing overhead cover will not
only conceal the guns, but render them immune from shrapnel. The
Japanese used these emplacements with great success, the guns often
remaining concealed even when the enemy were within 300 yards.
The positions for machine guns should not be in one and the same
line, and they should be placed at wide intervals. At least two
positions should be provided for each gun, and a second series
of positions in rear, commanding those in front, should also be
provided. The machine guns should be allotted to their positions by
sections, each gun being so placed that its fire crosses that of
the other when possible. Section commanders should be responsible
for having all ranges from their respective positions taken and
written up in each emplacement. They must arrange with the O.C. of
that portion of the position to which they are allotted the time
and signal (if any) for opening fire; the exact moment should be
left to the discretion of the section commander as a rule, the O.C.
merely indicating the stage of the attack up to which fire is to be
reserved, and great care should be taken not to open fire before
this stage has been reached. Every endeavour should be made to
ensure co-operation between the machine-gun units in reserving fire
till the shortest range has been reached by the attack and a really
good target presented. Nothing can justify a machine gun opening
fire from a concealed position until its fire will give the best
results that can be expected from that place, and to ensure this
it is necessary that the target is big and vulnerable, the range
close, and the fire unexpected by the enemy. Captain von Beckmann,
speaking of the Russo-Japanese War, says: “Premature fire upon
unsuitable targets at long range is to be deprecated. The greater
the surprise, and the shorter the time within which heavy loss is
inflicted, the greater the morale effect produced. At the battle
of Hai-kou-tai on January 27th, 1905, a Japanese company attacked
Sha-shan. Four Russian machine guns _opened fire at about 1,100
yards upon the extended firing line, without causing any serious
loss or affecting its advance_. On the other hand, the Japanese
on March 1st had _approached to within 200 or 300 yards_ of the
Russian position at Wang-chia-wo-pang and were beginning the final
assault. Two Russian machine guns _suddenly came into action_, and
the Japanese assault _was repulsed with heavy loss_ owing to the
annihilating fire.”
These two instances well illustrate the right and wrong way of
using machine guns in the defence. Where a battery is allotted to
one section of the defence the guns should be distributed two or
four along the front and one or more on each flank. Single guns
may be used in the defence where a section cannot be spared, as
the assistance of a supporting gun is not essential to its safety
when behind entrenchments. In the first instance guns may be kept
in rear of the position until the direction of the attack has
been ascertained, provided they are able to occupy their positions
unseen.
Machine guns at salients and on the flanks are of great value in
defending a position.
If sufficient machine guns are available, one or two batteries
should be reserved for the counter-attack. They should in this
instance be pushed right into the firing line when necessary and
used with the greatest boldness. It will be their duty to cover the
retirement of the Infantry in the event of a repulse, and for this
purpose positions in rear should have been selected beforehand.
Although the principle of reserving machine guns in the defence
must be strictly adhered to, there may be occasions when the use
of a battery or two well in front of the defensive position will
compel the enemy to deploy prematurely, cause him loss, and delay
his advance. Machine guns so used may also find opportunities for
surprising artillery while unlimbering, and thus render great
service to the defence. They should be withdrawn when their mission
is accomplished, and be reserved for further use as already
indicated. The following are examples from the Russo-Japanese War
of the use of machine guns in the defence of a position.
General Nogi has written: “Our most formidable foes were wire
entanglements placed 100 yards in front of the Russian trenches,
well lit up by search-lights and covered by the murderous fire of
machine guns. The defenders made use of them to flank dead ground
in their front and also had them at other points, kept carefully
in reserve and under good cover, to make use of continuous fire
against the attackers at the moment of the assault.”
“On January 28th, 1905, near Lin-chin-pu at about 7 p.m. the
Japanese attacked the forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near
by, in which were posted two machine guns. _These latter opened
fire at 200 or 300 yards on a Japanese company in line. In one or
two minutes they fired about 1,000 rounds, and the Japanese company
was annihilated._”[27]
“At Mukden on March 1st, the left of a Japanese Division _being
within 300 yards of the enemy’s position_ and about to assault,
the Russians suddenly opened a very heavy machine-gun fire from
cleverly concealed positions, _causing such loss that the Japanese
attack was temporarily suspended_. On August 20th, 1904, the
Japanese captured a lunette near the village of Shin-shi after
severe fighting. _The Russians made a counter-attack with three
machine guns, and drove the Japanese out again with a loss of over
300._ The three machine guns retired from the lunette before the
attackers got home, and, taking up a position behind the open gorge
of the work, showered such a hail of bullets on the victorious
Japanese that they were compelled to retire.”[28]
“On February 27th, 1905, the Russians tried to surprise the
railway bridge over the Sha-ho on a very clear night, when one
could see as far as 500 yards. Four Japanese machine guns opened
fire on a company of the 10th Light Infantry, which was almost
wiped out.”[29]
At the battle of Hei-kow-tai, the Russians at Shen-tan-pu made
no less than five determined attacks against the Japanese
entrenchments, in which was a machine gun, but were repulsed each
time. The machine gun is said to have done great execution, and
_one thousand dead Russians were reported to have been found before
it_.[30]
The 8th Division of the Japanese Army are reported to have made
several fine attacks upon Hei-kow-tai, _but were each time repulsed
mainly by the fire of the Russian machine guns_.[31] The same
report says, “Throughout the campaign in Manchuria the Japanese
have suffered severely in attacking those points of the Russian
front which have been armed with machine guns,” and proceeds to
quote an episode in the operations of the 5th Division at the
battle of Mukden, to show to what lengths the Japanese went in
order to silence these weapons. It appears that the Japanese were
so galled by the fire of four machine guns that the attack was
materially affected. They decided to bring up two mountain guns to
within 500 yards of these machine guns, to try to destroy them.
The mountain guns were brought up behind a wall and fired through
two holes bored for the muzzles. Two machine guns were at once
destroyed, but so well had the others been concealed that they were
able to be withdrawn in safety.
Sufficient has been quoted to show that both the Japanese and
Russians made the greatest use of machine guns in the defence,
and that when employed on sound tactical principles they not only
afforded material assistance, but were often the predominant
factor. On the other hand, when these principles were neglected
or ignored, the machine guns merely wasted ammunition and were
impotent to affect the situation. The lesson to be learned is this:
_that machine guns are only useful when their tactical handling is
thoroughly understood, and then their effect is more decisive than
that of any other arm_.
CHAPTER VI
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY (_contd._)
THE RETREAT
The reply of the British drummer-boy when asked by the great
Napoleon to beat the “Retreat,” is historical, and, following the
traditions of the British infantry, the word will not be found in
the index of _Infantry Training_. Nevertheless, although British
infantry never retreat, they may be called upon to perform that
most difficult operation of war--“a retirement in the face of the
enemy.”
_Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, speaking of the retreat
says: “The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong
force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance,
and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible,
of _a rear guard in support of the mounted troops_, will move as
rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and
there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately _to secure any
bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat_
at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force.
Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest
danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s
mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they
should take precautions _that all ground commanding their line of
retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”
There are three distinct ways of employing machine guns with
infantry to assist in covering the retreat, as will be seen from
the portions of the above quoted in italics, viz. (1) With the rear
guard. (2) To secure vital points on the line of retreat. (3) To
occupy commanding positions on the flanks. The use of machine guns
with the rear guard will be dealt with separately, so we will see
how they should be employed to fulfil the two latter duties.
Let us suppose that the moment has arrived when the commander of
the force decides to break off the engagement and to effect a
retreat. We have already seen how the cavalry and their machine
guns will co-operate, and we may assume that their intervention
will enable the infantry to break off the fight under cover of the
fire of the rear guard and their machine guns. In anticipation
of this, the commander of the machine-gun batteries--other than
those allotted to the rear guard--will assemble them in a central
position and receive from the commander of the force his plan of
action and instructions for the co-operation of the machine guns.
These instructions should definitely state the positions to be
occupied on the line of retreat, and for how long such positions
are to be held (_e.g._ until the infantry are past such-and-such a
place, or to the last possible moment, etc.); but they should leave
all details as to unit of guns, fire positions, opening fire,
etc., to the machine-gun commander, who should be given a free hand
in carrying out his instructions. The machine-gun commander will
then issue his orders to battery commanders, allotting the battery
for the flank and the battery which is to occupy positions on the
line of retreat. In like manner the battery commander will tell off
sections to occupy certain positions, if these have already been
selected, and if not he will direct his battery to a position of
readiness and will gallop off with his section commanders to select
the positions for each section and explain the course of action to
be taken. The position of readiness must be in the vicinity of the
position to be occupied, and section commanders must take steps to
ensure that their sections keep in signalling connection with them
and can be brought up by signal to the position selected.
The choice of the position will depend upon the nature of the
country and the features favourable to delaying the enemy, but it
may be laid down that the machine guns should not be placed in
one line, but should be broken up as much as possible, so that no
two guns are at the same range. In the same way, guns placed in
well-concealed positions on the lower slopes of hills should have
the other guns of their sections higher up, where they can command
a wide extent of country and at the same time cover the retirement
of the guns below. All guns must be so placed that they can be
_retired under cover of the ground immediately they move_. The
guns on the higher ground will open fire at long range, and the
opportunity may be afforded at this stage for using “deliberate”
fire at the most rapid rate possible, in imitation of rifle fire,
for the double purpose of concealing the guns and deceiving
the enemy by causing them to believe that the position is held
by infantry. The guns at the lower position should watch their
opportunity for opening fire on a large and vulnerable target; but
should none be presented, it is possible by reserving fire to catch
the enemy in close formation should they press on when the guns
have ceased fire, thinking the position has been vacated.
It may be possible to surprise the enemy from close range at
bridge-heads or on roads through defiles leading to the line of
retreat, if guns are carefully concealed in positions commanding
such approaches. Indeed, the opportunities for ambushing pursuing
cavalry or infantry will be frequent during the early stages of a
retreat, and no chance must be lost in making the enemy pay dearly
for his temerity during the pursuit. One successful ambush by
machine guns is worth more than the most stubborn stand, for it
imposes caution as nothing else can; and caution in the pursuit
means delay, and delay spells failure. When machine guns get a
really good target at close range, the result is little short of
annihilation, and the morale effect of such a heavy loss, totally
unexpected and inflicted in a few moments, takes the life out of
the pursuit more completely than even a long stand.
The machine guns allotted to the flanks will find positions in
the way already described. These positions must be chosen along
the line of retreat so as to hold all ground from which fire can
be brought to bear on the retreating columns, and from which the
enemy can be successfully repulsed when he attempts to break
through. If there has been time to form infantry flank guards, the
machine guns will assist in strengthening their resistance, and
in covering their withdrawal. When acting alone they should open
fire on suitable targets at the longest ranges, but when supporting
infantry they may be able to reserve fire and surprise the enemy
from close range. Guns working together on a flank must keep in
touch with each other by signal, and guns should work in sections
in mutual support. A battery acting as a flank guard to a force
retreating must be prepared to occupy a front of some two or three
miles, and sections will often be in positions a mile apart in
open ground. Directly the guns have taken up positions the battery
commander should go off with scouts from each gun and select fresh
positions along the line of retreat. He will give the signal for
retirement, and if in action at the time one gun of each section
should move off first under cover of the fire of the others; or
where the situation permits, a flank section may be ordered to move
first. It must sometimes occur that the cavalry on the flanks will
be compelled to retire by a superior force, and when this is the
case machine guns in position may be able to inflict considerable
loss, should the pursuing cavalry follow them too closely while
retiring.
As soon as it is known that the main body has reached the rallying
position and is ready to hold it, the machine guns can be
withdrawn. This will not usually be possible in daylight, and as a
rule it will take place after dark. The dispositions of the machine
guns in the rallying positions will be the same as in the case with
infantry in the defence.
REAR GUARDS
The prime necessity for the machine guns with a rear guard of a
retreating force is mobility, and without this they will be of
little service and become a hindrance rather than a help.
“A rear guard carries out its mission best by compelling the
enemy’s troops to halt and deploy for attack as frequently and at
as great a distance as possible. It can usually effect this by
taking up a succession of defensive positions which the enemy must
attack in turn. When the enemy’s dispositions are nearly complete,
the rear guard moves off by successive retirements, each party as
it falls back covering the retirement of the next by its fire.
This action is repeated on the next favourable ground.... A rear
guard may also effectually check an enemy by attacking his advanced
troops as they emerge from a defile or difficult country.”[32]
Machine guns, by reason of their concentrated fire and shallow
beaten zone, are peculiarly suited for compelling troops to deploy
at long range. They are also suited for quickly taking up a
defensive position, and, when mobile, can instantly cease fire and
move off in a few moments with considerable rapidity.
Their power for suddenly developing an intense fire will enable
them quickly to overwhelm an enemy caught “emerging from a defile
or difficult country.” It would appear therefore that the machine
guns are far more fitted than infantry to perform the duties of a
rear guard as quoted above.
“The first consideration in selecting a position for the artillery
is that it shall be able to open fire on an enemy at long range,
and thus compel his infantry to assume an extended formation at
the greatest possible distance. The second is that it should be
possible to withdraw without difficulty.”[33]
When the infantry arrive within effective rifle range of the
artillery, the latter will be compelled to retire, especially if
the former are supported by cavalry. This will also be the moment
when the infantry will require to retire to a fresh position in
rear. Machine guns that have been well concealed, or which have
taken up fresh positions in good cover in rear of the infantry
line, should be able to unmask and by their fire hold off the enemy
until both guns and infantry have effected their retreat. The
facility with which they can traverse and sweep widely extended
lines, and instantly concentrate fire on any portion of it, make
them of great service in covering a retirement at effective range,
as they can render the hottest fire ineffective and aimed fire
impossible for a short time.
Machine guns with a rear guard must be prepared to work from place
to place with great rapidity, and for this purpose they must
arrange to bring the gun horses close up to their fire position.
Alternative positions are essential, but must be reached under
cover and unobserved by the enemy. Sections will act independently,
using their guns in mutual support; but the retirement of
one section may often afford another the opportunity, from a
well-chosen position on a flank, to surprise the enemy from close
range as they press forward to occupy the abandoned position.
A ruse that may sometimes be successful where guns are really well
concealed is to bring up the gun horses and retire at a gallop
by a pre-arranged signal all along the position, but leaving one
gun of each section still in position but flat on the ground,
where it will be completely concealed even from glasses. This is
almost certain to draw a hot pursuit, especially if the artillery
and infantry have retired previously, and if fire is reserved
till close range a severe check may be administered to the enemy.
“Skilfully laid ambushes will cause the enemy to move with caution
in pursuit.”[34]
Machine guns should never retire for a few hundred yards, except
where absolutely necessary for covering the retirement of those in
front. Once in position, they should only be moved to alternative
positions when discovered, and these will usually be more or less
on the same general alignment. When they retire they should move
to such a distance in rear as to give them time to select, or
if necessary improvise, good cover in the new positions and to
replenish ammunition, etc. “The positions should be sufficiently
far apart to induce the enemy, after seizing one, to re-form column
of route before advancing against the next.”[35]
General Alderson, speaking at the Aldershot Military Society in
1904 and referring to the South African War, said: “I had two
Maxims with tripod mountings on pack-saddles, which belonged to the
1st Battalion Mounted Infantry. These guns had well-trained mounted
detachments, and a pushing officer, with a good eye for ground, in
command. _They were most useful, and more than once saved the flank
of their unit from being turned by galloping up and coming into
action on the flank of the out-flanking Boers_.... I am of opinion
that if the most is to be got out of the guns, the detachments,
_even with infantry_, should be mounted.... With the detachment
mounted ... there is no question about the guns not keeping up, and
they can be sent quickly to any desired position. They can hold on
to any such position as long as required to _cover the advance or
retirement of their infantry_, and then easily catch them up or get
into another position. In fact, if the detachment is mounted the
value of the guns is more than doubled.”
Machine guns with the rear guard will certainly be exposed to
artillery fire, and they will seldom have the time or opportunity
for making sufficient cover to protect themselves. It will be
necessary therefore either to withdraw the gun on coming under
artillery fire or to find shelter from it. If good natural cover
has been obtained, it will only be necessary to lower the gun flat
on the ground behind it, and for the detachment to lie flat close
against it, when they will be practically safe. The artillery will
cease fire as soon as they find there is nothing to fire at, but
the detachment should not move for some time after this, as the
guns, having got the range, will be able to inflict considerable
damage if the detachment exposes itself.
It is always advisable to keep one or two sections in reserve with
a rear guard to be used to protect the flanks or any point where
the pursuit threatens to break through in the manner mentioned by
General Alderson. These sections should remain with the rear-guard
commander and be under his immediate command; they should be in
readiness for instant action.
OUTPOSTS
The duties of the outposts are:
(1) To provide protection against surprise.
(2) In case of attack, to gain time for the commander of the force
to put his plan of action into execution.[36]
The first duty of outposts, which is _reconnaissance_, cannot
be assisted by machine guns; but their second duty, which is
_resistance_, may be materially strengthened and aided by them,
as we have already seen in dealing with the defence. Little can
be said about tactics, and it will be necessary to use the guns
in positions on the line of resistance where their fire power is
most likely to be of value. In order clearly to understand where
and how machine guns should be used with outposts, it will be
necessary first to examine the composition and distribution of
outposts of a force of all arms. _Field Service Regulations_,
Part I., 1909, says: “When there is any possibility of a force
coming in conflict with an enemy, its commander, when halting for
the night, should first decide on his dispositions in case of
attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the
position of the outposts accordingly.... Command, co-operation, and
inter-communication will be facilitated by placing the advanced
troops along well-defined natural features, such as ridges,
streams, the outer edges of woods, etc., or in the vicinity of
roads, but this must not be allowed to outweigh the necessity
for making the best tactical dispositions possible. In enclosed
country, and at night, the movements of troops are generally
confined to the roads and tracks, which should be carefully
watched. If the outpost position is extensive, it may be divided
into sections, each section being numbered from the right. The
extent of a section depends upon the amount of ground which can be
supervised conveniently by one commander. The extent of frontage
to be allotted to each company will depend on the defensive
capabilities of the outpost position, and, where they exist, on
the number of approaches to be guarded. The outpost position will
invariably be strengthened and communications improved where
necessary. Piquets and supports will do this without waiting for
definite orders.... The outposts of a force of all arms consist of
outpost mounted troops, outpost companies, and, where necessary,
the reserve. Machine guns will generally be included and sometimes
artillery.... When stationary, the duty of local protection will
fall almost entirely on the infantry, most of the outposts mounted
troops being withdrawn, their place in this case being with the
reserve, if there be one. In certain cases, however, standing
mounted patrols may be left out at night with advantage....
“Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches,
and to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to
pass or occupy.”[37]
Machine guns must be used on the principles given above, which
naturally fall under two distinct headings, viz. use by day and
use by night. Machine guns with outposts by day will not occupy
their fire positions unless an attack is imminent, but should be
posted with the reserves in their own section of the defence. This
must not prevent emplacements or pits for the guns being made,
ranges carefully taken and written up, and everything being ready
in case of action. These positions and the subsequent action will
correspond so closely with those already suggested for infantry in
the defence in the last chapter, that they need not be repeated. By
night, however, the case is very different, and it is necessary to
select very carefully the position of each gun, so that it commands
a road, a bridge, or other ground which the enemy in advancing may
be compelled to pass or occupy. These places must be selected in
order of importance, and an endeavour made to leave no approach by
which a body of troops might move uncovered by fire. The machine
guns must occupy their positions before dark and be carefully laid
to sweep the area of ground necessary for protecting the position,
the angle of elevation of the gun being taken by clinometer
afterwards in order that it may be relaid if necessary in the dark.
Great care must be taken to conceal these guns from observation
when bringing them into position or withdrawing them, and it is
worth while going to some considerable trouble to do this. One
method of many is suggested to show what is meant. Field guns might
be placed in the positions by day and withdrawn before night, the
machine guns being brought up on the limbers and dropped in the
position behind a screen of brushwood, and withdrawn again in the
morning when the field gun is brought up.
The detachment of each machine gun must find two double sentries
and their reliefs, who will remain at their posts with the gun,
which should have the belt ready in the feed block, but not
actually loaded. These men may either take it in turn to stand to
the gun or both be directed to watch. When there are no infantry
sentries on piquet duty in front of the gun, it will be necessary
to detail two who will be posted in the usual way some little
distance in front of the gun to prevent it being rushed in the
dark. The method of preparing the sights and laying the gun for
night work is given in Chapter VII.
The value of machine guns with the outposts at night is shown
by an incident at the Battle of Mukden, March 6th, 1905. Two
Russian battalions made a night attack against the hill north of
Tung-chia-wen, which was occupied by the 2nd Japanese Regiment.
There was no moon and the night was very dark. Two Japanese machine
guns did great execution at ranges between 50 and 100 yards, and
the Russians were repulsed with a loss of 450 men, the Japanese
casualties being only 48.
CHAPTER VII
EMPLOYMENT IN FORTRESS WARFARE
The siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese and its defence by the
Russians have thrown an entirely new light on Fortress Warfare.
Although the main principles of the attack and defence remain
unchanged and the primary armament of both is still the heavy
artillery, the improvement of small-arms, their great range, and
rapid fire have materially altered the nature of the fighting in
the later stages and during the assault. The result of this has
been to prolong the defence after the fortress has been dismantled
by the bombardment, and to render the storming of a single breach
an operation no longer possible in war. The machine gun is largely
responsible for this; and when high-explosive shells have destroyed
the fortifications and disabled the artillery, the stormers will
be met by rifle fire and that of machine guns concealed among
the ruins of the works. The intensity and accuracy of this fire
will be such as to result frequently in the complete repulse of
the assault, and even when the glacis of a work has been occupied
it may be several weeks before the capture of the work itself is
effected.
Machine guns are particularly suited to the defence of
fortresses during this period, and Sir G. S. Clarke, in his book
_Fortification_, says: “The fire of the Maxim gun, delivering about
700 bullets a minute,[38] can be directed by one man, who need not
show more than his head (easily shielded) above the parapet, the
feed being tended by another man completely under cover. In the
special qualities of the machine gun there is a distinct advantage
to the defence, arising from the fact that _an intense fire over a
particular area can be suddenly developed by a few men occupying
a small space_. This, in the case of night attacks especially,
is a valuable quality. At Port Arthur the Russians in some cases
employed machine guns with good effect, concealing them so that
their fire came as a surprise to the assaulting parties. Their
portability renders them well suited for the defence of positions,
and they will doubtless form an important element in the armament
of fortresses.”
Speaking of the difficulty of “storming” the modern fortress, the
same author says: “The _vive force_ school proposed therefore--on
paper--to shell them heavily and then storm, trusting to incomplete
organisation and general unpreparedness. There is little or nothing
in military history to bear out the views of this school, and
modern experience is entirely against them. Only one such attempt
was made in 1870-1, against the indifferent provisional works of
Belfort, garrisoned mainly by _Gardes Mobiles_--and this failed
completely. The tremendous assaults on the defences of Port Arthur
may have been partially inspired by the German teaching; but the
results were discouraging, although the devoted and sustained
gallantry of the Japanese could not be surpassed and probably would
not be equalled by any European army.”
The machine guns of a fortress should be divided into two
classes--the stationary and the mobile guns. To the former will be
allotted the defence of distinct portions of the permanent works,
and they will be provided with cone and parapet mountings,[39] the
former being fixed and the latter capable of being moved within the
work to which it is allotted.
The mobile guns should be mounted on a light tripod and carried
in a low-wheeled handcart, or they may be mounted on a very light
two-wheeled carriage capable of being drawn by one man and having
wheels of small track, which can move over the narrowest roads
in the fortress. These mobile guns should not be allotted to any
particular work, but to the garrison other than those within the
forts, for use in repelling assaults and making counter-attacks.
We will deal first with the stationary machine guns. It will not be
necessary to provide a machine gun for each cone mounting, as the
guns can be easily carried from one cone to another as required.
Shields should be used with all stationary mountings, but must be
detachable, and should not be placed in position until required, as
they indicate the situation of the gun and are easily destroyed by
artillery.
The positions for machine-gun mountings in a fort must depend on
the size and construction of the work, the nature of the outer
defences, and particularly on the supporting works in the immediate
vicinity. Positions commanding the glacis and the entanglements,
on salients of works and enfilading ditches, and any dead ground
where the enemy may effect a lodgment, are suitable. Counterscarp
galleries at the angles of works flanking the ditch should
invariably have machine-gun positions, with a special loophole,
long and shallow, to enable them to sweep a wide area with fire.
The selection of the positions for machine guns in permanent works
belongs to the art of the engineer, and there is little that can be
said of their tactical employment. Fire should be reserved until
the attack has reached close range, and then only opened when the
target is large and vulnerable. Guns must be concealed by every
possible device and all the loopholes must be blinded. By night
all guns should be mounted and trained to sweep ground by which
the enemy must approach; when search-lights are not in use, the
elevation should be checked by the use of a clinometer and the
amount of traverse may be shown by chalk lines on the parapet, or
white stones placed in two rows. In this way accurate fire may be
brought to bear on the assault on the darkest night, and many night
attacks were repulsed with machine-gun fire by the Russians at Port
Arthur. Sir G. S. Clarke says: “The front faces of the forts were
retrenched in some cases by obstacles and a line of field parapet
across the terre-plein. _These, with the assistance of machine guns
brought up at the last moment_, enabled assaults of the breaches
formed by the mines to be repulsed.” Again, “The Russians used
machine guns with effect, frequently concealing them in light
blindages, so that their positions could not be detected until they
were brought to bear upon an attacking force.”
The war correspondent Mr. F. Villiers, in his book _Three Months
with the Besiegers_, speaking of the storming of West Panlung
Redoubt,[40] says: “The death-dealing machine guns of the Russians
_in the casemates of the fort_ are playing ghastly havoc--such
havoc that only a score or more of Ouchi’s battalions reached the
first ditch of the fence, where they threw themselves panting into
the grateful cover of the pits their own artillery have torn.”
The number of machine guns allotted to the permanent works of Port
Arthur is given as 38 by the United States Official Report, while
Nojine, in _The Truth about Port Arthur_, gives them in detail as
28, the distribution of which is shown in red figures on the map at
the end of Chapter IX. The ten guns unaccounted for were probably
mobile, and used for the defence of the harbour and the various
landing-places in the neighbourhood of the fortress.
The mobile machine guns of the fortress will be used on the
advanced line of defence with the mobile troops, and should be
divided into two--those allotted to the outposts and those allotted
to the local reserve.[41] Those allotted to the outposts must be
placed in carefully selected positions commanding the approaches
to the section of the defence to which they have been posted.
These positions will usually be in minor works such as redoubts,
emplacements, and lunettes, and they will be selected for their
good field of fire, particular attention being paid to their
command of dead ground in front of other works. Great care and
trouble must be taken in concealing the guns and providing them
with good cover, not only from rifle fire, but also from artillery.
An endeavour should be made to command all wire entanglements along
the front with machine guns, and the angles of traverse of each gun
should be carefully laid off and marked in white paint or tape, so
that they may be used in the dark accurately to sweep their area
of ground. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of the
accurate laying and sighting of machine guns by day for use at
night, and it must be remembered that they are the only weapons
which are capable of bringing a rapid and concentrated rifle fire
on a particular spot in the dark, and are therefore invaluable to
the defence during a night attack.
The detachments of guns on outpost duty at night should be told
off into three watches of two men each, whose duty it will be to
remain with the gun in readiness for instant action. The gun should
be loaded and laid, and the men on duty should watch the front.
Where the gun is in an emplacement or other loop-holed work, one
man should watch through the loophole in turns of half an hour
at a time. The strain of peering into the dark and listening for
the sound of an approach at night is so great that no man should
be required to do this duty for more than half an hour at a time,
while the chance of a man dozing during a short spell is much
reduced and the acuteness of the senses has not time to get dulled.
Very strict orders must be given to insure that fire is not opened
prematurely; and where infantry sentries are on duty near the gun,
it may be advisable not to load the gun, but merely to insert the
belt in the feed-block in readiness.
It is always advisable to have the gun ready for any emergency
at night, and the following will be found an effective method of
preparing the sights for aiming in the dark. Cut a piece of white
paper, previously prepared with luminous paint, into the shape
of a triangle, and paste it on the slide of the tangent sight so
that the apex of the triangle touches the bottom of the V of the
sight. Cut also a circular piece of a size that will fit on the
foresight just below the tip, and paste this on the foresight. On
looking over the sights in the dark, when the luminous ball on the
foresight is seen resting on the apex of the luminous triangle on
the tangent sight, the gun will be truly laid for the range for
which the sight is set.
Machine guns with the local reserves must be light and mobile; they
will be used in a similar way to those with infantry, and to assist
in counter-attacks, particularly against the advanced infantry
positions and sap-heads of the besiegers. They may also have
opportunities of enfilading a trench or firing into a work that has
been captured by the enemy. When used for this purpose they must be
brought up by hand under cover and open fire at close range from
a position that commands the interior of the trench or work, and
if possible enfilades it. Great risks are justified in bringing up
machine guns for this purpose, as the results of a successful fire
action will usually be decisive and far-reaching.
The following is an example of their use in this manner during the
siege of Port Arthur:
“On the attack on 203-Metre Hill, machine guns on Akasakayama
flanked the position and enfiladed the attackers. Four hundred
Japanese were sheltered together in a parallel, where they
were completely screened from fire from any part of 203-Metre
Hill. Suddenly two machine guns, _which had been concealed on
Akasakayama, where they could fire directly into the parallel_,
opened fire. Within a few seconds it was turned into a veritable
pandemonium, a seething mass of humanity, where men were wildly
fighting to get away, trampling on the wounded, climbing over
piles of corpses which blocked the entrance, and trying to escape
down the coverless hillside. But the Maxims did their work as
only Maxims can, and within a few moments practically the whole
force was wiped out; a few men were shot dead as they ran down
the hillside, but nearly all the others were killed in the narrow
trench. It took the Japanese days to extricate and carry away the
fearfully intermingled corpses.”[42]
There are so many instances of the successful use of machine guns
in the defence of Port Arthur that it will be impossible to quote
more than a few of the most striking to illustrate the principle on
which they should be employed.
At the third general attack on November 26th, at 2 p.m., a large
force of Japanese assaulted Sung-shu fort, and having crossed the
moat through a bomb-proof passage, they gained the parapet of the
rampart and swarmed over it. “Into this seething mass of humanity
the machine guns of the forts and batteries on An-tzu Shan poured
such a tremendous fire that the attackers were mowed down, crushed,
dispersed, and sent head over heels to the moat again in less than
half a minute, before a single man had reached the interior of the
fort. _The same fate befell a fresh attempt undertaken at five
o’clock._”[43]
Here we see the importance of machine guns being able to command
the parapet of neighbouring works, and the necessity of reserving
fire until the best possible target is presented, even though the
enemy is permitted actually to scale the parapet. The same thing
occurred at the storming of Erh-lung Fort. At midnight on November
26th the Japanese “made a desperate attempt to storm the upper
battery, but the assailants were mown down by machine guns, _as
soon as they appeared on the parapet_.”[44]
This is a good illustration of the use of machine guns at night,
and no doubt these guns had been trained by day to sweep the
parapet in anticipation of an attack after dark. “On January 28th,
1905, near Linchinpan at about 7 p.m. the Japanese attacked the
forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near by in which were posted
two machine guns. These latter opened fire at 200 or 300 yards on a
Japanese company in line. _In one or two minutes they fired about
1,000 rounds and the Japanese company was annihilated._”[45] During
the attack on North Chi-kuan Fort on December 19th, by the 38th
Regiment under General Samayeda, which took place at 5 p.m., the
men were sent over the parapet man by man from different points, to
make it more difficult for the Russian machine gunners. “As soon as
there was a little interval in the rattling of the machine guns, a
man would jump up and run for his life, and seek shelter behind the
débris piled up in the terre-plein after the explosion, or in the
holes which the big howitzer shells had made in the ground. Though
many of the men were shot down in the short race, little by little
a force of about 150 men were assembled in the front part of the
fort, and the commander, Captain Iwamoto, then led them against
the sandbag trenches at the rear.... The fighting was mostly
hand-to-hand, _but the Russian machine guns took an important part
in the defence_, their galling fire making fearful ravages amongst
the attacking party. The Japanese, therefore, got a couple of
mountain guns hauled up on the parapet, and with them succeeded in
silencing the Maxims.”[46]
Speaking of the use of machine guns in the defence of Port Arthur,
Norregaard says: “As an active means of defence the search-light
and _machine guns_ undoubtedly come in the first rank. The Japanese
acknowledge the immense value of machine guns to the defence. The
search-lights are stationary, they say, and the ground round Port
Arthur is broken, so that they can avoid them; but the machine guns
can be moved about anywhere and can easily be shifted from place to
place by a couple of men. It is nearly impossible to detect them
and put them out of action; their effect on the Japanese was most
disastrous and time after time enabled the Russians to beat off
their attacks, inflicting severe losses. Nothing can stand against
them, and it is no wonder that the Japanese fear them and even the
bravest have a chilly feeling creeping down their backs when the
enemy’s machine guns beat their devil’s tattoo. They shoot with
amazing precision even at very long range, and they were splendidly
served.”
The U.S.A. Official Report on the siege of Port Arthur states:
“Machine guns played an important part in the siege, being freely
used by both sides.... The guns were used with telling effect
against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, _being
trained to cover all the approaches with murderous fire_.” These
last words condense into a single sentence their tactics in the
defence of a fortress.
The Russians used the Maxim of ·312 calibre manufactured by
Vickers, Sons & Maxim, of London, while the Japanese used the
Hotchkiss of ·253 calibre made at the Arsenal at Tokyo. The
Japanese had 72 of these weapons at Port Arthur, immediately under
the command of the Divisional General, viz. 24 guns with each
Division.
The use of machine guns in the siege of a fortress will cover a
far wider field than in the defence, and much that has already
been written of their employment both in the attack and defence,
of positions will apply to the attack on a fortress. It cannot be
claimed for machine guns that they are as vital to the success of
the besiegers as they are to the garrison, but that they often
afford material assistance during assaults, in holding sap-heads
and repelling sorties, cannot be denied.
The details of their tactical employment with the besiegers will
differ greatly in accordance with the nature of the operations, and
particularly with the situation of the fortress and the surrounding
country. In the case of Port Arthur the broken and mountainous
nature of the terrain, the deep ravines, and rocky watercourses all
lent themselves to the employment of machine guns, and consequently
the Japanese were able to make greater use of them than would have
been the case under less favourable conditions.
It will be impossible here to do more than briefly indicate how
machine guns may be used to assist in siege operations generally,
and then show how the Japanese used them before Port Arthur.
“When the enemy’s advanced troops have been driven in and the
preliminary reconnaissance has enabled the line of investment to be
fixed, this line will be divided into sections, to which commanders
will be appointed and troops allotted.... Outposts will be
established as closely as possible round the fortress in order to
cut it off from outside communication and to protect the operations
in rear.[47] Machine guns should be allotted to these sections
in proportion to their importance in the line of investment.
The commander of the section should use them according to the
circumstances of the situation, but as a rule a large proportion of
the guns should be distributed to the outposts.... The duties of
outposts in siege operations are even more important and exacting
than they are in the field operations; in the case both of an
investment and of a regular siege the brunt of the work throughout
will fall upon the outposts.... They must therefore have greater
power of resistance than outposts in field warfare in order to
prevent the troops in rear from being disturbed by every skirmish.
The outposts of a section which is maintaining a close investment
should be about one quarter of the total infantry allotted to the
section, together with a proportion of artillery, _machine guns,
and engineers_.”[48]
The positions for the machine guns should be along the _line of
resistance_, which will usually be the piquet line. It will be
necessary to provide bomb-proof emplacements for the machine guns,
and alternative emplacements should be made for each gun. The
temptation to engage in the fire fight must be resisted, and the
machine guns should be solely employed for resisting attacks and
their fire reserved till close range. Once they have been unmasked,
it will be advisable to move them to a fresh position, leaving a
dummy gun in the old position.
In the second phase of the siege the machine guns not required
for the outpost line should be allotted to the local reserves
and the general reserve, and will be used as circumstances
require in assisting attacks on outlying works and in repelling
counter-attacks. In the third phase machine guns must be pushed
up to secure sap-heads and to assist the infantry in the
assault; they will be found specially useful in covering the
advance of assaulting infantry by sweeping parapets with fire
and in securing captured works against counter-attacks. Sandbags
should always be carried with machine guns supporting infantry
in the assault, and the first consideration should be to secure
the guns from fire on reaching a position. It must be remembered
that machine guns in siege operations are always exposed to their
worst enemy--artillery--and that their only hope of success is
by concealment and cover. An example of their use in repulsing a
counter-attack at Port Arthur is given by Nojine in his book _The
Truth about Port Arthur_. Speaking of the attempt by the Russians
to retake Chien-shan, he says: “The 13th Regiment took two-thirds
of it, but could not advance further, as the Japanese threw in
heavy reinforcements _and brought up a number of machine guns_.
On the night of the 5th we had to withdraw and abandon further
attempts to retake the position, as one attack alone had cost us
500 men.”
The following account from the U.S.A. Official Report of the
storming of Fort Erh-lung, one of the principal forts of Port
Arthur, shows how machine guns can be used to assist in the final
assault. “On December 28th the parapet of Fort Erh-lung was blown
up at 10 a.m. by five mines being simultaneously sprung.... When
the smoke cleared sufficiently, the exterior slope at the salient
of the fort was seen to be filled with a dense crowd of Japanese
infantry, who closely hugged the ground.... It appears that the
Russians had occupied the heavy gun line which lies in the interior
of the fort _and with machine guns_ raked the front parapet and
thus made it impossible for the Japanese infantry to leave their
cover on the exterior slope. Meanwhile the Japanese brought up
_three machine guns, and with these replied to the Russian fire
from the heavy line_.... The bombardment kept up without diminution
until about 1 p.m., when it slackened perceptibly on both sides....
About 4 p.m. the Japanese infantry could be seen working along the
flanks of the work on the outside of the parapet. The Russians
retired to the gorge parapet which had been arranged to fire to
the front, and maintained themselves for several hours longer. By
7.30 p.m. the Japanese had fully mastered the position, and the
largest and strongest of the permanent works on the front of attack
fell into their possession.... A large number of field and machine
guns[49] were included in the spoils of Fort Erh-lung. The assault
entailed a loss of about 1,000 men to the Japanese.”
During the attack on Wangtai Fort the Japanese used machine guns
from the high ridge N.E. of the fort, and thus brought a heavy fire
against the Russian interior line.
The Japanese invariably brought up their machine guns with the
assault and lost no time in placing them in position to hold
captured works. This is indeed their true rôle in the assault, as
they will seldom be able to support the actual stormers with fire,
but once a foothold is gained in a work, they may be invaluable for
the purpose of holding it and thus set free the storming party for
another advance.
CHAPTER VIII
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD IN MINOR OPERATIONS
SMALL WARS
Callwell, in his well-known work on this subject, defines the
small war in the following terms: “It comprises the expeditions
against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers,
it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and
guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies
are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open
field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in
their scope and in their conditions.”[50]
The British Empire, “upon which the sun never sets,” is seldom
without its small war in some remote part of the globe, and it is
safe to affirm that there is never a small war in which the machine
gun does not play a prominent part.
Wars against savages or semi-civilised peoples differ fundamentally
in principles and tactics from war against a civilised enemy,
and the tactics adopted will be governed by the object of the
expedition and the tactics and arms of the enemy to be dealt with.
Callwell says: “The tactics of such opponents differ so greatly in
various cases that it is essential that these be taken fully into
consideration. The armament of the enemy is also a point of extreme
importance.”
In dealing with machine-gun tactics in small wars, it is obviously
impossible to treat with all the situations that may be met with or
to attempt to lay down definite rules for their use under all the
varying conditions of country, race, and arms before mentioned. It
will therefore be sufficient for our purpose to show how machine
guns may be used generally in warfare in uncivilised countries,
and then to take a single typical campaign to illustrate their
employment.
“Against an enemy who fights outside stockades, machine guns are
very efficacious; and in any case against all uncivilised people a
sudden burst of fire from these is often most paralysing.”[51]
After speaking of the jamming of non-automatic machine guns at
Ulundi, Abu Klea, Dogali, and Tofreck, Callwell says: “On the
other hand, Maxims, which can be easily handled and moved, have
done excellent service in East Africa, in Matabililand, and in
the campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India. There can be
no doubt that machine guns of an easily portable and thoroughly
trustworthy class may be most valuable in small wars, and they
will probably be freely used in such operations in the future,
especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in mass. In hill
warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not
very well suited for picking off individuals and as it is dangerous
to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which
are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare
also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when
the shooting is at short range the detachment is likely to be put
_hors de combat_, as it offers such a good target; this happened
at Owikokaro. An open field of fire and a well-defined object to
aim at are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery.
On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In
laager, zarebas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always
likely to be of service, and to a certain extent they may take the
place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia
in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small
laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight.
Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the
siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the
fight on the Shangani River in Matabililand after the attempt to
capture the king had failed, the troops, although they were in a
bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply
because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action
during the change of position. Against rushes of Zulus, Ghazis,
or other fanatics the effect of such weapons is tremendous, as
long as the fire is well maintained. In the excitement of the
moment the best infantry may fire unsteadily; but machine guns can
be absolutely trusted to commit destructive havoc in the hostile
throng, provided that their mechanism does not go out of order.”[52]
The above is interesting as showing the wide field for their use in
small arms and yet how narrow the method of tactical employment.
It may be summed up in a few words: a good target, a good field of
fire, constant readiness for action, and sufficient protection to
enable the gun to be handled with confidence.
Machine guns should form an integral part of the arm to which they
are attached, and must be used with them to supplement their fire
power. In attack they must seek positions from which to bring to
bear a concentrated and overwhelming fire on the main body of the
enemy, and against savages this must be from the flanks or rear
to be successful, as the object is to prevent flight and insure
decisive results. Their real value in small wars lies in their
enormous defensive powers, which may be employed in clearing
the way for columns in enclosed country, in stopping a charge
of fanatics whether mounted or on foot, and in preventing small
columns on the march from being overwhelmed by superior numbers.
It will be found that, although it is the invariable rule for the
disciplined force in a small war to assume the initiative and
attack with vigour on every possible occasion, the uncivilised
enemy, by reason of his primitive arms and tactics, generally
avoids the encounter until he is able to make an attack at a time
and on ground of his own choosing. Thus we find the disciplined
force thrown on the defensive in the early stages of the expedition
and the very heavy losses inflicted then often directly lead to a
speedy termination of the campaign. Callwell says: “The tactics
adopted by the Zulus and Mahdists when flushed with confidence
were best met at a halt in close formation, even on ground where
arms of precision could not tell with full effect. In the jungles
of Dahomey the sudden hostile attacks on flanks and rear could be
confronted most satisfactorily by the troops on the spot acting
on the defence until the edge was taken off the hostile appetite
for combat.... Where a small force of regular troops is opposed to
great hostile masses, no matter how ill-armed or how deficient in
morale the masses may be, circumstances render it almost imperative
to act on the defensive.”
For this reason alone machine guns form the most valuable arm in
encounters of this nature, and their tremendous effect cannot be
better illustrated than at Omdurman, where they literally mowed
down the attacking masses in great swathes.
The first consideration when employing machine guns in a small war
is the method of carrying the gun and its ammunition, which must
be suited to the country in which the operations are to take place.
In the majority of cases it will be found that the usual transport
of the country is the most suitable, and a tripod-mounted gun can
be adapted to almost any form of carriage. In mountainous open
country such as the North-West Frontier of India mules or ponies
are suitable; in the desert the camel has been used; while in the
forests of East Africa machine guns have been carried by porters on
their heads, strapped on their backs, or slung beneath a pole by
two men. Whatever method is adopted, it is essential that the gun
can be brought into action easily and quickly, and that it is at
least as mobile as the troops it accompanies.
The operations in Somaliland in 1901-4 are an excellent example of
one of our typical small wars, and will serve to illustrate the use
of machine guns against a savage enemy in a bush country.
The camel is the transport animal of the country and riding camels
were used to carry the machine guns with the infantry of the force.
In the first expedition, under Lieut.-Colonel Swayne, there were
three Maxim guns--two of which were ·450 bore and one a ·303. On
June 2nd, 1901, Captain McNeil, who was left in zareba at Smala
to guard the live stock, was attacked by about 3,000 Somalis, who
increased to about 5,000 on the 3rd. His force consisted of three
British officers and 500 native troops, many of whom were native
levies and only 370 of whom were armed with rifles. There were
about 3,500 camels, 100 horses, and some cattle and goats in a
separate zareba from the men who were above and able to command it.
The Maxim, under Lieutenant Younghusband and served by Somalis,
was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men’s zareba and
commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground was fairly
open all round, and clear of bushes for about 150 yards from the
zareba. Before the camels could be driven in, the enemy’s horsemen
appeared and threatened to capture a large head of camels, to
prevent which a section under a Jemada was sent out to try to
keep off the enemy until these camels could be driven in. Captain
McNeil says: “I supported him by turning the Maxim on the nearest
horseman.... Some of the horsemen had got round by now a good way
out, but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range
volleys from the Punjabis, we did much to check them.”[53]
On June 3rd at about 9 a.m. a very large force of footmen attacked
in one long line several ranks deep and enveloped the south and
west sides of both zarebas. They came on at a steady pace and
opened fire at about 400 yards. Fire was reserved until the enemy
were at about 500 yards range, when heavy fire was opened by both
rifles and Maxim, with the result that no one got within 150 yards
of the zareba, though they advanced most pluckily. 180 dead were
found around the zareba, and the enemy’s loss was estimated at 500.
The danger of rushing machine guns up to the front while still
mounted is shown in an incident that occurred on June 17th during
a successful attack on the Mullah’s villages near Feriddin. During
the reconnaissance the mounted corps became somewhat heavily
engaged, and Colonel Swayne sent forward the reserve company and
the Maxims to bring fire to bear from a commanding spur about two
miles to the front. On reaching the spur they came under a heavy
fire, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. The
Somalis, however, were able to disentangle the Maxims from the dead
camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.[54] Colonel
Swayne, in his official report, said: “Mekometers were badly wanted
for the Maxims.... The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical
moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been
due to the belts.”
When the Maxim gun jams without a breakage of the mechanism, the
fault is usually want of experience on the part of the gunner.
During the third expedition the machine guns were increased to
eleven and were carried by porters with the infantry.
The disaster to Colonel Plunkett’s force at Gumburu on April 17th
was due to ammunition running short. The force, consisting of about
200 men with two machine guns, was attacked by a large force of
horse and foot. They at once formed square, and took up a position
in an open spot surrounded by dense bush at from 300 to 600 yards’
distance. For some two hours they were able to hold off the enemy,
but on the ammunition being exhausted they were overwhelmed.
On April 22nd, 1903, Major Gough’s force of about 200 men with one
machine gun was attacked in thick bush by a large force under very
similar conditions to Colonel Plunkett. The attack began at 10.30
a.m. from all sides, and was continued with great determination
until 2 p.m. Square was formed, and fire opened at very close
range (20 to 50 yards), owing to the dense bush. “The Maxim, under
Sergeant Gibb, was moved from place to place as occasion arose, the
enemy always giving way when it opened fire.”[55]
In the fourth expedition, under General Egerton, the ammunition per
machine gun was 30,200 rounds in garrison, 10,400 rounds with the
brigade, and 2,200 rounds in second-line transport; 6,000 rounds
with each gun was carried ready in belts.
During the action at Jidbali on January 10th, 1904, the force
engaged, which consisted of about 2,500, including native levies,
the infantry, about 1,299 strong, formed the usual hollow square
round the transport. The enemy consisted of the pick of the
Mullah’s fighting Dervishes, and were about 6,000 to 8,000 strong.
The Dervishes advanced in regular skirmishing order, rushing from
cover to cover, and lying down. A few got within 400 yards of the
square, _but were unable to face the heavy rifle and Maxim fire
that met them_, and this attack failed. Then two determined rushes
were made on the front and right flank of the square, _but they
were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and Maxims that the
charging enemy could not face it_. At 10 a.m. the whole mass of
the enemy broke and fled, followed by fire till it was masked by
the pursuing mounted troops. Six hundred and sixty-eight dead were
counted round the position two days later.[56]
“_Much execution was done by the Maxim worked in the right corner
of the square by Sergeant Gibbs, 1st Bn. King’s African Rifles, on
the groups of Dervishes taking cover behind the scattered clumps
of bushes surrounding the square. One entire group of nine men was
wiped out in a moment by this Maxim._”[57]
It will be seen that machine guns are a very useful auxiliary in
bush warfare, especially in holding posts and defending squares
from the rush of fanatics. They must always march with the main
body of the arm to which they are attached, and be used as
circumstances require. A high state of efficiency in working the
gun, a thorough knowledge of its mechanism, and ability to bring
it into action with great rapidity are of more importance in bush
warfare than tactical handling, which is usually of the simplest
description.
MOUNTAIN WARFARE
“The principle of always having bodies of men in rear or on the
flanks, covering by their fire the advance or retirement of the
troops nearest the enemy, is specially important in hill fighting.
On nearly every ridge and spur positions will be found where this
can be done, and advantage can also often be taken of parallel
features, from which covering and cross fire may be used with
effect.”[58]
It will seldom be possible to make much use of machine guns with
the advanced guards, as mountaineers usually oppose the advance
by bands of skirmishers who fire from the cover of rocks and
scattered sangars, and while affording a bad target to the machine
gun, can quickly put it out of action by concentrating their fire
upon it. They are also unsuitable for piqueting the heights, on
account of the difficulty of getting them into position and of
rapidly withdrawing them again. They are, however, very useful to
strengthen small fortified posts on the lines of communications,
and for the defence of camps by night, being trained by day and the
sights prepared as suggested in Chapter VII., page 150. Callwell
says: “It is a good plan, if night attacks are at all probable,
to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the
enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be
anticipated. _This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with
excellent results._”
Machine guns are invaluable to the rear guard of a force retiring,
which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking in mountain warfare,
because hillmen invariably await this opportunity to swoop down
and make a vigorous attack. The very nature of the operations
necessitates frequent retirements. Callwell says: “Columns have
to visit outlying valleys for punitive purposes, and must then
rejoin the main body; and even when penetrating into the heart of
a hostile mountain district, the rear of the army, as it passes
successively the homes of different tribes and clans, draws these
down upon it, and, as a result of the general direction of its
march, retires before them.”
_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, speaking of rear guards in
mountain warfare, says: “Mountain artillery should usually form
part of a rear guard, _and machine guns may be usefully employed_.
The withdrawal of the artillery is usually an encouragement to the
enemy to press on, and on such occasions machine guns will often
find scope for action....” “If the rear-guard commander considers
it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will generally be
advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most
favourable position for defence.” Here, again, machine guns will
be most useful in defending the bivouac after dark if trained by
daylight to sweep approaches, while the morale effect of its
accurate fire in the dark will be considerable. There are many
instances from our wars on the North-West Frontier where machine
guns might have been used profitably in covering the retreat; but
to be successfully employed in such cases, they must be far more
mobile and better trained for rapid-fire practice than they have
been in the past. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton’s retreat from the Iseri
Kandeo Pass is typical of such operations. “A brigade had been sent
on detached duty into the Warais Valley, and after completing its
work there was rejoining the rest of the army in Maidan. In doing
so the brigade had to cross the Iseri Kandeo Pass over the hills
which separate the two valleys. As the force quitted its bivouacs
the Ghurkas were left as rear guard, while the 15th Sikhs were told
off to hold the Kotal, which was about half-way. The main body and
baggage moved off early, and the latter reached the maidan almost
unnoticed. The Ghurkas, however, were pressed from the commencement
of the retirement right up to the top of the Kotal; then they
marched on, leaving the 15th Sikhs to cover the retirement. As the
Sikhs began to draw in their piquets from the heights above the
pass, the Afridis, as was their wont, grew bolder and bolder, and,
taking advantage of the cover of a wood hard by, they crept down
close to the rear guard. One company as it withdrew was suddenly
charged by a crowd of swordsmen.... But those who participated in
this rush paid dearly for their temerity, the Sikh company meeting
them with steady musketry and being most opportunely reinforced
by another company. The carrying off of the wounded was, however,
becoming a matter of serious difficulty, so reinforcements were
asked for. These arrived in the shape of two companies of Dorsets
and of several companies of the 36th Sikhs under Lieut.-Colonel
Haughton, who assumed command, and who withdrew his force down the
hill without much loss.”[59] It is easy to imagine how machine
guns might have been used here, and how their presence might even
have rendered the reinforcements unnecessary; but unless they are
capable of coming into action and opening fire in thirty seconds,
and of packing up and moving off again after ceasing fire in the
same time, the rear guard in mountain warfare is no place for them
and they had best march with the baggage.
During the expedition to Tibet some trouble arose with the machine
guns owing to the extreme cold, which not only froze the water in
the barrel-casing of the Maxims, but froze the lubricating oil in
the lock and recoiling parts and thus rendered the gun useless.
When very low temperatures are encountered in high latitudes,
alcohol or spirit should be added to the water to prevent it
freezing; and as potable spirit is liable to “evaporate,” a little
paraffin oil should be added. Glycerine may be substituted for
lubricating oil in temperatures where even Russian petroleum will
freeze.
CONVOYS
Callwell defines a convoy as “a column of non-combatants guarded by
a comparatively speaking small escort.” The object of this escort
is to hold off all hostile parties and to get the convoy to its
destination in safety. Escorts will generally have to be reduced
to the smallest possible size in order not to deprive the fighting
force of men. They will therefore always act on the defensive,
while endeavouring to keep moving with the convoy, which will only
be halted when compelled to do so for its own safety. When the
escort consists of the three arms, machine guns may be used to
reduce the number of infantry required very considerably, while
adding to the defensive power of those necessary.
In minor operations where every available rifle is required with
the fighting force, machine guns will be found invaluable to
replace infantry. Their exact position with the convoy must depend
upon its composition and length and the number of guns available.
The principle of having a machine gun, or where possible a section,
at the head and another at the rear end of the line of wagons or
pack animals is sound, as these are the vital points, and an attack
on the centre can be met by a cross fire from these positions. If
the convoy is unduly long, another gun or section may be placed in
the centre. Should it be necessary to form laager, the machine guns
in the front and rear enable this to be done under their converging
fire. Where wagons or carts are used and the enemy is unprovided
with arms of precision, machine guns may be mounted on the tops
of wagons, so that they can open fire instantly and fire while
moving forward with the convoy; this position not only provides
them with a good field of fire, but also affords protection to the
detachments from a sudden charge home of savages from an ambush.
“The success of an attack upon a convoy usually depends upon the
defeat of the protecting troops. This will involve a combat, which
will be governed by the principles already laid down in this
manual.... If fighting is inevitable, the enemy should be engaged
as far from the convoy as possible.”[60]
For this reason machine guns should open fire on any body of the
enemy presenting a good target, even at long range, if they are
moving to attack the convoy. The presence of machine guns with a
convoy will free the infantry to move out wide on the flanks in
open country, and to push ahead to piquet hills, clear bush, and
occupy heights on the line of march, without exposing the convoy to
danger during their absence.
BLOCKHOUSES
Blockhouses have been much used in warfare in uncivilised
countries ever since the introduction of firearms, to enable small
detachments on a frontier or on the lines of communication to
maintain themselves in the midst of the enemy when unsupported by
other troops, and also to form a chain of posts across an enemy’s
country for the capture or suppression of guerilla bands.
Looking back to the South African War, it appears inexplicable
that little or no use was made of machine guns to hold the long
blockhouse lines which stretched for so many hundreds of miles in
every direction during the latter stages of the war. Time after
time the Boers succeeded in breaking through this line, even in
places where the blockhouses were within effective range of each
other and the intervening space guarded by elaborate barbed-wire
entanglements. The reason for this is not difficult to discover.
Screened by the darkness, the fire of the small garrisons of these
blockhouses was neither sufficiently powerful nor accurate to
stop the majority of the enemy from breaking through, even though
stopped by the entanglements and compelled to use a single gap. The
annihilating and concentrated fire of machine guns which had been
laid by day to sweep the entanglements should render the forcing of
a similar blockhouse line impossible in the future. Machine guns in
detached blockhouses should be sited as low as is compatible with a
good field of fire, and should have long narrow loopholes prepared
for them for at least two positions on every face. Constant change
of position within the blockhouse after firing will prevent the
enemy from being able to “snipe” the gunners through the loopholes.
The great variety of conditions and circumstances under which minor
operations take place renders it impossible to do more than show
how they may be used in certain selected instances. The machine
gunner must be prepared to modify and adapt his tactics to suit the
special circumstances of the expedition with which he is employed,
and he cannot do better than study Callwell’s _Small Wars, their
Principles and Practice_, which has been so freely quoted in this
chapter.
ENCLOSED COUNTRY
This chapter would not be complete without some reference to the
use of machine guns in enclosed country such as is found in the
United Kingdom. Clery, in his _Minor Tactics_, p. 118, says that
cultivated country is the most favourable to the attack, while in
defence the country to the front cannot be too open. “In the first,
infantry gains a succession of covered positions by means of which
it comes on more equal terms with the defence. In the second, the
infantry of the defence has a clear field to destroy the assailants
as they approach.”
Apart from civil war, the only possible occasion for the use of
machine guns in the British Isles is against an invader, and it
is well known to students of modern war that the prospects of a
successful invasion do not depend upon the strength or weakness of
our fleet, but on that of our army for home defence. The duty of a
fleet in time of war is to go to sea and destroy the enemy’s ships,
and while it is absent on this mission an opportunity for invasion
may occur, the success of which will wholly depend upon the force
the invader will meet on landing.
The Japanese recently landed in Manchuria in spite of Russia’s
superior naval strength; but because it was the case of an island
invading a continent, we do not apply the lesson to ourselves, and
are content to believe that a continent cannot invade an island.
It is obvious to the military student that no invasion will be
attempted unless its success is reasonably certain, and the
presence of four divisions of regular troops at home renders such
an enterprise extremely difficult, if not impossible, without
permanent command of the sea. But these four divisions are not
the Home Defence Force, and form that part of our Expeditionary
Army for service outside the United Kingdom. We may, therefore,
rest assured that as long as we retain command of the sea, no
invasion can take place until we are involved in an over-seas war
which requires a more or less large portion of our Expeditionary
Force--an event which has happened almost every decade.
It will be safe, therefore, to assume that in the event of an
invasion we shall have to rely on our Territorial Army to meet the
enemy, and it will be doing this force no injustice to assume that
they will be compelled to act on the defensive in the face of a
highly trained and disciplined Continental Army. Indeed, it is
difficult for a soldier to realise how a Volunteer force, trained
for fourteen days in the year and unacquainted with military
discipline, can hope to meet on equal terms, even if superior by
three to one in numbers, the pick of Continental manhood trained
under an iron discipline for the minimum of two years.
Be that as it may, it is necessary to realise the difficulties to
be faced, not the least of which is the question of _training_,
for, as already pointed out, it is absolutely essential to the
successful use of machine guns that the personnel should be very
highly trained, and this applies to their use in enclosed country
even more than elsewhere.
Although as a general principle enclosed country benefits the
attacker and is disadvantageous to the defender, this is not
always the case with machine guns, and provided the golden rule
of “concealment, cover, and surprise” is intelligently applied,
enclosed country is particularly suited for the use of machine guns
in the defence.
For this purpose machine guns should be trained to work in pairs in
mutual support. They must be so mounted that they can be carried by
hand for considerable distances into position, and must be capable
of firing from a low siting when they must be inconspicuous. If
mounted, as at present, on a wheeled carriage, a light tripod may
be carried on the carriage, which will render the gun far more
inconspicuous and useful.
While all the principles for the tactical handling of machine guns
with infantry hold good, there are several points of importance
to be noted in using them in the defence in enclosed country. The
advance of any formed bodies of the enemy will be confined to the
roads; consequently machine guns must endeavour to command all
roads leading from the enemy, especially where they become defiles.
The hedgerows, standing crops, woods, and lanes must be used to
afford concealment in advancing or retiring from position to
position, and scouts must be specially trained in finding the
easiest _concealed_ way from field to field by gates, gaps, or
through stiles. The way from the road or lane to the selected
position must be always marked by sticks or broken branches which
are placed to indicate the direction of gates or gaps, or where
a turning has to be made. The usual procedure will be for the
scouts to work across country on one or both sides of the road. The
section commander, who should be mounted, will select the position
for the guns, and scouts from each gun will be sent out to guide
them to the positions. The carriages and ammunition cart must
move up the road to the nearest point to the position, and scouts
should select and mark the easiest way to the carriages. Careful
co-operation between the guns and carriages will often enable the
latter to greatly facilitate movement, by pushing up by-lanes or
across fields to a position near the guns. Ammunition will usually
have to be carried to the guns by hand, so that great pains must
be taken to get the cart as near the position as possible. The
selection of the position will be governed by the facilities it
presents for surprising the enemy in close formation at effective
range. The range must be accurately found, and fire must only be
opened by order of the section commander. In selecting a position
care must be taken that it offers perfect concealment from view,
and that the guns can retire under cover to their carriages. The
neighbourhood of conspicuous objects, such as single trees, a gap
in a fence, etc., must be carefully avoided, and care must be taken
to secure a good field of fire for as great a distance as possible
to the front, while the flanks and any cover within effective range
which the enemy might occupy must be watched by scouts. It is in
this matter of careful reconnaissance, of selecting ground and
occupying or watching all neighbouring cover, that the successful
use of machine guns in enclosed country mainly depends. The enemy
is obliged by the nature of the country to move in close formation
to pass defiles, roads, gaps, or to avoid crops, woods, and
villages, and it is the intelligent anticipation of where this will
occur that gives the machine gun its chance for decisive action.
The hedges, orchards, lanes and woods, and other features will
afford endless opportunities for bringing _flanking_ fire to bear
on the enemy. Nothing is so effective, and the morale effect on an
enemy who is enfiladed at close range renders it usually decisive.
Cover will generally be provided by the spade, and ditches require
little work to turn them into excellent pits, the only thing
necessary as a rule being to excavate a hole in rear for the back
leg of the tripod. Where there is a ditch with a hedge in front of
it, the ditch should be improved so as to provide a pit for the gun
to fire through the hedge about six inches above ground level. If
the hedge is too thick to fire through, it should not be cut down,
but a hole should be cut in the growth for the muzzle of the gun
sufficiently large to aim through. If it is necessary to cut a gap
in the hedge, the growth should be cut through close to the ground,
but _without removing it_ until the moment for opening fire.
Alternative positions in the same hedgerow should be avoided, as it
is certain to be discovered immediately, and the range is probably
already known.
The edge of the wood, if it commands suitable ground, is an
excellent position for machine guns; but if the carriages remain in
the wood they must be provided with cover. When time and material
are available, a good field of fire may be obtained by erecting
a platform ten to twelve feet above the ground in the trees, and
placing a machine gun on this; not only is the field of fire much
increased, but the gun will be almost impossible to discover. This
was done on one occasion in the Spanish-American War, when it met
with considerable success.
When machine guns are used for the defence of villages or farms,
they should be placed outside the village or farm buildings well
clear of the walls. The salient angle will usually be the most
suitable place, a good field of fire being the chief object. The
guns should be placed so as to flank one side of the village, and
must be most carefully concealed, a pit being usually the best
form of cover. Walls should as a rule be avoided, as they are very
easily destroyed by artillery fire and always afford a conspicuous
target.
When time permits the pits should be deepened and hollowed out
in front to afford the firers protection from artillery fire.
Similar protection may be provided for the rest of the detachment
by making a narrow and deep trench connected with each side of the
gun pit. Should it be necessary to defend the village to the last,
a second position should be provided in the centre of the village,
commanding the main avenues, and the church tower, or roof, may
afford a suitable site, provided artillery is not present.
Although machine guns have never been used in England, they
were employed by the French in 1871 during General Chanzy’s
retreat from the Loire to Le Mans with great success, and this
campaign is particularly interesting to us because the country
greatly resembles England. Dr. Miller Maguire, in his lecture
given at the Royal Artillery Institute on this campaign, quotes
the German official account as follows: “The entire country is
covered with the densest cultivation of long-standing growth,
with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens.... Owing to the
extensive subdivision of land customary in this country, every
property is surrounded by hedges, ditches, and walls. There are,
consequently, numerous positions and isolated points at which
even moderate troops could defend themselves behind good cover.
Although the superior effect of the chassepot here ceased to
avail, _the mitrailleuses were in their true element_, and became
a dangerous weapon in the narrow passes.” Dr. Maguire remarks: “I
do not know how far you will be inclined to apply those remarks to
the circumstances of your own country in the event of invasion.
It might be a good lesson to try; for the several arms could
be handled between Dover and London step by step.” Later on he
quotes from a British officer, who says: “In fact, Kent and Surrey
combined, with vineyards instead of hop gardens, would be an exact
picture of the country through which the Germans were pushing on.”
There are numerous instances in this campaign where the
mitrailleuse caused great loss to the Germans, and enabled the
French to delay their advance and hold on to villages and positions
with greatly inferior forces.
Remembering that the mitrailleuse of 1870 was a clumsy and
primitive weapon, worked by hand and mounted on a field carriage,
there is every reason to suppose that the modern automatic machine
gun, on its light and mobile tripod, will be still more valuable in
fighting in enclosed country.
CHAPTER IX
MACHINE GUNS IN THE ARMIES OF THE WORLD
AMERICA (UNITED STATES)
GUN.--At present there are three machine guns in use in the United
States, viz.:
(_a_) The Gatling.
(_b_) The Maxim Automatic.
(_c_) The Colt Automatic.
(_a_) _The Gatling._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service rifle
bullet. It has 10 barrels, and is fed by a rotating cylinder. The
gun is mounted on a shielded carriage with limber. The rate of fire
is about 600 rounds per minute.
(_b_) _The Maxim Automatic._--This is similar to the one in use in
our own service, and takes the ·3 in. U.S. service ammunition.
_Mounting._--For infantry and cavalry, a tripod mounting. For use
in fortified works, a two-wheeled shielded carriage.
The transport is by means of pack-animals. A complete outfit
consists of five packs, _e.g._ the gun and tripod form one pack,
and the remaining four packs carry 1,500 rounds of ammunition
and accessories for the gun, including water for filling the
water-jacket.
For firing blank it is fitted with an attachment called the “drill
and blank-fire attachment.”
(_c_) _The Colt Automatic._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service
rifle bullet. The gun is fed by means of a cartridge belt, and
fires 400 rounds a minute.
The weight is 40 lb., and the gun is mounted either on a tripod
mounting or a wheeled carriage.
A “silencer” for the Maxim was tested in March, 1909, and the
results compared with those obtained from the gun without the
silencer. As regards accuracy of fire there was nothing to choose
between the two. The silencer, however, reduced the noise to that
of a ·22 in. long cartridge, and when used at night the flash was
entirely obliterated.
ORGANISATION.--_Infantry._--One battalion in each regiment has a
machine-gun platoon consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 18
privates, and 2 guns.
_Cavalry._--In a regiment of 3 squadrons, 1 squadron has a
machine-gun platoon of 3 corporals and 18 privates.
AUSTRIA
GUN.--In 1907 after prolonged trial the Austrians definitely
adopted the Schwarzlose. It is a very simple weapon and very
reliable, firing 375 rounds per minute from a tripod mounting.
ORGANISATION.--A section of machine guns is attached to each
regiment of cavalry and infantry; there are also mountain companies
of machine guns.
With infantry the section consists of 2 guns; 10,000 rounds are
carried per machine gun. The detachment consists of 14 men per gun,
7 for actually working the gun and 7 to lead the horses. There are
7 horses to each gun, of which 1 carries the gun and 500 rounds, 5
carry from 1,500 to 2,000 rounds each, and 1 carries the shields.
There is also a spare horse. For hand transport one man carries 2
belts of 250 cartridges, another the gun and 1 belt, a third the
mounting and 1 belt, a fourth 2 belts, a fifth the water-jacket,
etc. The shields are left on the horse. It will be seen that when
the machine gun is taken forward in this way it has ready for
immediate use 1,500 rounds.
With cavalry the section consists of 4 guns without shields. On
account of the great independence of cavalry, the machine guns have
with them 15,000 rounds each, of which 5,000 are on pack-animals
and 10,000 in wagons. These wagons usually march in rear of the
column. The detachment, which is all mounted, consists of 9 men per
gun with 4 pack-horses (1 for the gun and 3 for ammunition). Hand
transport is provided for as with the infantry machine guns.
The mountain machine-gun company consists of 3 officers and 64
other ranks. There are 4 guns carried on pack-horses, with 2
pack-horses per gun for ammunition (4,000 rounds per gun).
TACTICAL (taken from a précis of the Austrian Regulations, 1908;
published in _Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift_, April,
1908).--(_a_) _With Infantry._--During the advance it is well to
give some machine guns to the principal units of the covering
force, for they add to their resisting power, and in the many
phases of the preparatory fight they are sure to have opportunities
of effecting surprise. The place for the section leader is then
near the O.C. detachment. When the machine guns leave the column it
is always advisable to detail a few cavalry to cover them.
To take up a position it is necessary to observe the following:
(1) To manœuvre out of sight of the enemy. This will often
necessitate unloading and carrying forward the _matériel_ by hand.
(2) Not to keep the guns too close together, which may cause
additional losses. The “position of observation” will play an
important part in the machine-gun fight.
The narrow effective zone of the machine guns allows them to fire
over the heads of other troops. Such fire will be advantageously
employed when machine guns occupy high positions. But it is only
allowed at ranges greater than 1,000 yards, and when the troops
over whom they are firing are at least 400 yards from the guns.
Under these circumstances the use of searching fire is forbidden.
Both in attack and defence it is necessary to remember that
machine guns are not suitable for a continuous fight of long
duration. If during the preparatory fight the machine guns have
found opportunities of opening fire, they ought, when the general
engagement has begun, to be withdrawn from the firing line and held
ready to act again under certain circumstances of importance.
These circumstances are:
In attack: to act on the enemy’s flank to facilitate the infantry
advance; to open fire on the decisive point, whether flank or
front, from a dominating position, either over the heads of the
infantry or by carrying the machine guns up into the firing line.
In defence: to reinforce threatened points; to stop enveloping
movements; to repulse an assault; to take part in a counter-attack.
In most cases these tasks will necessitate the machine guns being
at once carried into the firing line to fight side by side with the
infantry.
(_b_) _With Cavalry._--The rôle of machine guns with cavalry is
thus determined:
(1) To take part in dismounted action: if pushed forward, they
allow the number of men dismounted to be limited; if kept in
reserve or pushed against a flank, they facilitate the success of
the frontal attack.
(2) To add considerably to the offensive and defensive power of
patrols by replacing the battalions of chasseurs which used to be
attached to the cavalry.
(3) Finally, to take part in the cavalry fight; for this they
should be judiciously divided among the troops of the advanced
guard, and should make use of their mobility. This will allow
them to open fire from well-chosen positions before the moment of
contact, and help to obtain the desired result.
The place for the machine-gun commander is near the General. If the
machine guns have been well placed in the column, they will--thanks
to their mobility, which is equal to that of any cavalry
detachment--be able to make use of the considerable time required
by a large force of cavalry to get into battle formation.
Whereas with infantry the surprise of the enemy is always effected
by making use of the features of the ground, the best method for
cavalry guns is to utilise their rapidity of motion and their
resemblance to other cavalry units, for which at a distance they
are easily mistaken.
The widest power of initiative is left to the commander for the
grouping of his units in the fight. Very often he will only bring
up near the firing line the horse carrying the gun and one carrying
ammunition, in order to be able to escape rapidly. At other times
all the horses will be brought up close under cover. At others the
whole section will dash up to their position at full speed; the
guns will be unloaded at once, and the horses will disappear to the
rear. The one important thing is to open fire as a surprise.
To sum up: the Austrian Regulations only confirm the rules already
laid down by very competent writers who have published works
on the subject. They enunciate in a clear and concise form the
principles which should govern the employment of machine guns in
various circumstances, laying particular stress on the necessity
for constant readiness for action in a position of observation.
In _Les Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_ Lieutenant M. quotes certain
Austrian officers who, writing before the publication of the
Regulations of 1908, considered that the value of machine guns
lay chiefly in their use as a reserve of fire. Lieut.-Colonel
Berndt says: “In offence, as in defence, machine guns must be held
back as a reserve of fire to be used at the moment when the rapid
development of heavy fire is required.” Lieutenant Binder is of the
same opinion, and also recommends their being used in the closest
co-operation with the infantry. Lieutenant Hayeck-Liprandi, a
cavalry officer, fully realises the importance of machine-guns, as
relieving cavalry to a large degree of the necessity for dismounted
action. He also advocates the attachment of machine-gun sections to
regiments at the disposal of the regimental commanding officer.[61]
CHINA
GUN.--The Chinese have bought numbers of Maxims for attachment to
their infantry. With cavalry they have adopted the Madsen.
Their organisation is at present in process of evolution, and no
official views on their tactical employment have been published
hitherto.
DENMARK
GUN.--In 1904 Major-General Madsen, the Danish War Minister,
invented the Rekyl (recoil) machine gun. The gun weighs only 13½
lb., is not much longer than the service rifle, and in case of need
can be served by one man. It has a rate of fire of 750 rounds per
minute with a muzzle velocity of 2,350 ft. per second.
ORGANISATION.--Every Hussar Squadron in the Danish Army is to have
a section of three guns attached. The gun is carried on a horse
together with 300 rounds of ammunition, and with each gun there is
a led horse with reserve ammunition.
TACTICS.--The gun detachment can easily and rapidly follow all
the movements of the body of horse to which they are attached,
even through woods. It is therefore argued that the possession of
this weapon will do away with the necessity for dismounted cavalry
action.
FRANCE
GUN.--France has adopted both the Puteaux and Hotchkiss patterns
of machine gun without shields. With cavalry the question of
mounting has not yet been definitely settled, but experiments have
been carried out with wheeled carriages drawn by four horses. The
infantry sections have been provided with a tripod mounting (70
lb.), which can be adjusted to two heights, either 1 ft. 6 in. or 2
ft. 6 in. above the ground.
ORGANISATION.--At present (1909) every brigade, both of cavalry
and of infantry, has a two-gun section attached. It is intended to
provide every regiment with a section as soon as possible.
With cavalry the detachment for each gun consists of 24 men, who
are all mounted. The carriage carries 16,500 rounds of ammunition
in addition to the gun.
The infantry section is commanded by a lieutenant, who has under
him one N.C.O. and 23 men, armed with rifles. There are two gun
horses, which each carry a gun, tripod, and one box of ammunition;
and eight ammunition horses, which each carry seven boxes, three on
each side and one on top. A box contains 150 rounds, so that each
section has 8,700 rounds. The “Souchier” telemeter is carried.
TACTICAL.--The French Regulations are at present under
consideration, and the tendency seems to be to follow the
principles laid down by the Germans.
M. le Commandant Niessel, in his preface to _Les Mitrailleuses à
l’Etranger_, by Lieutenant M., says: “There is one principle which
should dominate the whole subject and never be lost to view. It
is that machine guns are condensed infantry, and that therefore
it is as infantry that they should be used in battle. Together
with accuracy and power of fire, the characteristic which should
especially distinguish infantry in battle is their utilisation
of every feature of the ground. Machine guns, then, to exert to
the full their powers of effecting surprise and developing great
intensity of fire, should reach effective and, if possible, close
range without being observed.
“Machine guns ought, then, in battle to be carried forward by
hand by the detachment, in order to take up positions as much
under cover as possible; this does not in any degree lessen their
opportunities of offensive action, for there can be no hope of
decisive success for the infantry whom they are supporting except
in a vigorous offensive.”
GERMANY
GUN.--Germany has adopted the Maxim gun. The guns are mounted on
sleighs which are themselves mounted on limbered gun-carriages,
being clamped into grooves. They can either be fired from the
carriage or be dismounted and fired from the sleigh. The gun on
the sleigh can be adjusted to fire from a height of 1 ft. 6 in., 2
ft. 6 in. or 3 ft. 6 in. above the ground by a simple lattice-work
arrangement. The gun can easily be dragged to almost any position
where men can go, and can be fired by men lying down under cover.
ORGANISATION.--Machine guns have been organised into 16 batteries
(called Sections), which are independent, and 216 companies, which
are attached to infantry regiments.
The battery consists of six machine guns, drawn by four horses and
divided into three sections (called Divisions). There are three
ammunition wagons and one battery wagon (1st line). There are three
2nd-line wagons. The detachment consists of:
1 captain (in command); 3 lieutenants; 1 sergeant-major; 12
N.C.O.’s; 36 gunners; 28 drivers; 1 armourer; 1 trumpeter; 1
apothecary (dresser); 70 horses (20 saddle and 50 draught).
The men wear a special greyish-green uniform, and are armed with
carbine and bayonet; the carbines are carried in the limbers.
87,300 rounds are carried with each battery.
Each company consists of six guns drawn by two horses, three
wagons, and one cart. The detachment consists of:
1 lieutenant (in command); 3 second lieutenants; 9 N.C.O.’s; 74
men; 28 horses (7 saddle, 18 draught, and 3 spare).
All the officers and 3 warrant officers are mounted. The men are
armed with automatic pistols. 72,000 rounds are carried with each
company, as follows:
With the guns 18,000
With the wagons 42,000
With the reserve cart 12,000
------
Total 72,000
======
On going into action each gun is made up to 5,000 rounds. The
infantry pattern range-finder is used.
TACTICAL.--_Regulations for Machine-Gun Detachments in the German
Army._
_Para. 187._--Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed
points the maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest
possible front. Machine guns can be employed in any country which
is practicable for infantry, and when once they are unlimbered
they must be able to surmount considerable obstacles. In action
they offer no greater target than riflemen, fighting under like
conditions, and they can in proportion to their fire value support
far greater losses than infantry.
When movements over the battlefield are contemplated, and the
machine guns (unlimbered as soon as hostile fire is expected)
are pulled or carried forward, they can utilise all cover which
infantry is able to use. Cover that is barely sufficient for a
section of infantry can protect an entire machine-gun detachment.
The construction of the carriage on which guns, ammunition, and men
can be conveyed, and the capabilities of the team, enable machine
guns to keep up with mounted troops on the march.
_Para. 188._--The range and striking effect of the machine gun is
identical with that of the infantry rifle. The rapid succession
of shots and the narrow concentration of the cone of dispersion,
together with the possibilities of uniting several guns on a
limited front, render it feasible for machine guns to obtain
rapidly a decisive success in certain positions, and even at long
ranges to inflict heavy losses in a short time on large and deep
targets. Machine guns, however, are of small use to a commander
fighting a protracted rifle-fire engagement.
_Para. 189._--An engagement with a thin line of skirmishers under
good cover should be avoided. It demands a heavy expenditure of
ammunition which is not commensurate with the result obtained.
During a lengthy rifle-fire action the detachments with their guns
should be withdrawn temporarily from their position, so as to save
their effect for a decisive moment.
_Para. 190._--The engagement of hostile machine guns that offer
a difficult target is by no means the chief duty of machine-gun
detachments; in most cases it will be more profitable to leave this
to other arms. When engaging hostile machine guns the most accurate
information should be sought regarding the enemy’s position.
_Para. 191._--Machine-gun detachments can at all times and under
all conditions confidently await the attacks of hostile cavalry.
To meet these any formation can be adopted which allows of a
well-directed and calmly delivered fire being poured into the
advancing cavalry. Both when firing from the carriage and from the
gun dismounted the fire must be distributed all along the advancing
line of cavalry; special attention must be paid to the supporting
lines, to one’s own flanks, and to the defence of the carriages
when the guns are separated from them. Machine-gun detachments
are able to advance in the open fields without any fear of the
enemy’s cavalry, provided the latter is not supported by artillery
or infantry, or is not in such force as to be able to attack
simultaneously from different sides in several lines.
_Para. 192._--In action against artillery it should be remembered
that at long ranges the superiority of fire will always remain with
this branch. If machine guns are to engage artillery, the sleighs
must be brought as near as possible to it. The rapidity of movement
of machine guns due to their being horsed will enable them to start
the action from a flank, and thus produce a sensible increase of
effect. Scattering the fire from all the machine guns along the
entire line of a battery is as useless as it is purposeless.
_Para. 193._--Machine-gun detachments should generally be employed
undivided; on special occasions separate sections may be made to
act independently. The detachment commander will decide as to the
distribution of the ammunition train to the individual sections.
The employment of single machine-gun detachments will be seldom
advisable. In such cases the senior detachment leader will command
the entire force of machine guns.
_Para. 194._--In view of the uses to which machine-gun
detachments may be applied, and with the object of increasing
their independence of action, it is desirable that a few mounted
men should be attached to them for reconnaissance. Otherwise
the readiness of machine guns is such that it is only in very
obstructed and overgrown country that they require special
protection. Here it may be necessary, in order to secure the
threatened flanks and rear, and to protect the carriages left
behind, to detail small parties of cavalry or infantry. An
application for such from a machine-gun commander should be
complied with by any infantry or cavalry commander in the vicinity.
_Para. 196._--Machine guns can never replace artillery.
_Para. 197._--Machine guns will always find their chief work to
be at the place where their powerful fire effect, together with
their mobility (on the march) and the advantage of being able to
get across country when separated from their carriage, can best be
utilised.
_Para. 198._--For the correct manœuvring of machine guns it is
necessary to possess a clear knowledge of the general situation,
of the aims of the commander, and of the state of the action. The
disposal of the machine-gun detachments rests with the superior
command. By attaching machine-gun detachments to stated bodies of
troops, the full value of the former in action can only be realised
in exceptional cases.
_Para. 199._--All commanders must quickly make their dispositions
to suit the situation, and must always realise that neglect and
delay are a more serious hindrance to success than an error in the
choice of means.
_Para. 200._--At the commencement of an action the commander will
proceed to the O.C. troops, or to the commander of the force to
which his detachment is detailed, and receive the necessary orders
for the impending action. It is his duty, in case of emergency, to
act on his own initiative. During the progress of the action he
will remain in constant communication with that commanding officer,
in order to keep him constantly informed of what he is doing, and
in turn to be posted in the progress of the fight.
_Para. 201._--In choosing a position the first condition to fulfil
is to obtain the best possible fire effect for the task in hand;
then secondly one may think of cover.
_Para. 202._--The choice of every position must be preceded by
special reconnoitring, the opportune and skilful performance of
which is essential to success. This includes ascertaining what
the targets are, where there are suitable fire positions, and the
facilities for approach, the nature of the ground to be crossed,
and lastly what security is offered against surprises.
_Para. 203._--In the advance and in defensive positions the
commander reconnoitres himself. During retirements the commander
remains with the detachment so long as it is within effective range
of the enemy, but sends back for reconnoitring purposes a senior
officer. Before occupying a position the commander, if possible,
must have examined it himself.
_Para. 205._--The attention of the enemy must not be previously
directed to the position selected. A personal inspection is often
to be carried out only on foot, leaving all escort behind.
_Para. 206._--The following points guide the choice of position:
an open field of fire; a front lying as far as possible at right
angles to the line of fire; plenty of space; possibility of
sweeping all the ground right up to the closest range; concealment,
and facilities for communication along and behind the line of fire.
_Para. 207._--Positions close to or on a level with a point to
which the enemy has ranged are to be avoided as much as possible.
Similarly it is not advisable to take up a position in close
proximity to prominent objects, still less straight in front of
them, as they facilitate the enemy’s ranging. On the other hand, a
position in front of a dark background or in a place covered with
vegetation hinders the enemy from picking up the target.
Every kind of concealment, even of an artificial nature, offers
advantages, because the observation of the enemy is thereby impeded.
_Para. 208._--During the advance and in moving into position
security should not be overlooked. On threatened flanks special
scouts must be sent out by the officer who is bringing up the
troops, especially in close country. These should not ride far
ahead, but should bear in mind to keep in touch with the troops.
During the advance roads should be used as long as possible.
_Para. 210._--The pace of the advance and the moment of unlimbering
depend on the object of the commander, the state of the action,
the nature of the country and the state of the ground.
_Para. 211._--The dispositions for taking up a position must be
made in time to avoid any delay in opening fire. Every effort
must be made to take up a position unobserved, and to open fire
by surprise. Both of these are, however, only possible if special
attention is paid to the utilisation of cover during the advance to
the position, thus keeping the enemy in ignorance of the locality
which it is intended to occupy. In the absence of cover, or when
immediate entry into action is required, the surprise of the enemy
must be effected by rapidity in occupying a position.
_Para. 213._--The most favourable position must be sought for each
individual weapon with regard to fire effect and cover. As a rule
there is an interval of 20 paces between guns, but the direction
and regularity of the intervals in the detachment are not to be
insisted upon. It must be considered, however, that the losses
caused by the enemy’s fire will be heavier in proportion as the
machine guns are posted closer together. Care must be taken that
the individual guns do not interfere with one another’s fire.
Placing single guns in echelon may offer advantages where the
flanks are threatened.
When the nature of the ground or of the target renders a more
careful choice necessary for each gun, it is recommended that this
be carried out by the No. 1 of the gun.
_Para. 214._--The decision to open fire must not be made too
hastily. It is to be borne in mind that the fire can only have a
decisive effect when it is directed against troops situated within
effective range. The arm to which they belong has little to do
with the question; the decisive point in choice of target is first
and foremost the momentary tactical importance of that target.
Afterwards fire must be turned on to those targets which, owing to
their height, depth, breadth, and density, render a high percentage
of hits probable.
_Para. 215._--Good results from indirect fire can only be achieved
if the range and position of the target are known, or if the fall
or the effect of the shots can be observed from a point close to
the detachment.
_Para. 216._--Firing over one’s own troops is only permissible when
the nature of the ground renders possible the deployment of several
firing lines one above the other.
_Para. 217._--Firing by night can only promise success if the
guns can be trained by daylight on to points where the enemy is
expected, or if well-lit objects are taken as targets, such as
bivouacs or camps.
_Para. 218._--From the very beginning of an action it must be
remembered that the number of cartridges carried is limited, and
that the consumption of ammunition implies an expenditure of power
which should only be made when it will meet with success. Should
the decision be taken, however, to fire on a given target, the
ammunition necessary to attain the object of the action must be
expended. Fire with an insufficient effect weakens the morale of
the troops, whilst it encourages the enemy.
_Para. 219._--The losses inflicted on the enemy will affect him
more if he incurs them in a short space of time, than if they are
distributed over a long period; it is advisable therefore in most
cases, even in the face of a weaker enemy, to open fire with the
whole detachment rather than with one or two sections only.
The expenditure of ammunition necessary for the silencing of the
enemy will in both cases be about the same, but in the former case
one’s own loss will be appreciably smaller.
_Para. 220._--A change of objective should not be made until the
result aimed at against the first target has been fully realised. A
frequent change of objective weakens the fire, and should therefore
be avoided.
_Para. 221._--A distribution of fire over several objectives cannot
be avoided under all circumstances, but it must not resolve itself
into an aimless scattering of fire.
_Para. 222._--In every case coolness, marksmanship, and strict fire
discipline are necessary to get full value in fire effect. In an
engagement, should the majority of those in command be put out of
action, fire discipline must still be preserved. With well-trained
and well-disciplined troops, the presence of mind of the individual
soldier, and the example of stout-hearted and cool-headed men will
ensure a successful conclusion to an engagement fought against an
enemy in a similar plight.
_Para. 223._--The officer commanding the troops announces the
object of the action, and also the objective in a general way.
_Para. 224._--The machine-gun detachment commander selects the
positions, determines the range, names the targets in detail
together with the nature of attack on them, and orders the opening
of fire.
_Para. 225._--The section commander passes on the orders. He
decides the place for each gun, also the portion of the objective
to be fired at, and the range for each individual weapon. He
observes the service of the guns, and is especially responsible
that the correct target is fired at and for the fire action of his
section.
_Para. 226._--The No. 1 of the gun selects the spot to place his
gun, and the most suitable height for it to stand above ground,
follows in detail all orders, and ensures (using in case of
necessity independent measures) that the centre of the cone of
dispersion falls on the target. He is responsible for the service
of the gun in detail, and attentively watches the weapon so as to
remedy any defects which might interfere with its fire effect.
_Para. 227._--By a correct utilisation of the degree of
independence allotted to each individual commander, by a rapid
and accurate ascertaining of ranges, by a correct judgment of the
influence of the weather on the cone of dispersion, it is possible
to avoid an interruption of the fire of the whole detachment for an
alteration of the sights. Any such interruption must be especially
avoided when it is obvious from the nature of the objective that
it will only be in view a short time. Again, when firing at such
objectives, no time must be lost by giving a long and detailed
description of the target.
A well-trained detachment should be able to get quickly on to the
target, and to distribute its fire advantageously on receiving
brief words of command. If one part of the enemy is silenced or has
vanished, the fire must at once be independently directed on the
still visible and active part of the objective.
_Para. 228._--The position of the commander is of importance for
issuing commands and controlling the fire. In peace exercises
all commanders must issue their orders from the same positions
and in the same attitude they would adopt in actual warfare. The
commander may allow himself to depart from this rule, and order the
subordinate commanders to do the same, in so far as such a step is
necessary for instructional purposes. Moreover, it must be strongly
insisted upon that no man should expose himself more than is
absolutely necessary for the observation of the general situation,
the service of the guns, the conveyance of ammunition, and the
taking of ranges.
* * * * *
_Para. 242._--In an action of two forces meeting, the advanced
guard must secure time and space for the main body to deploy. As
the accomplishment of this duty depends essentially on the rapid
occupation of favourable points on the ground, the allotment of
machine guns to the advanced guard will be highly advantageous. On
the arrival of the infantry the machine guns must be withdrawn from
the firing line, and kept in readiness for further employment.
_Para. 243._--In an attack on a fully developed and defended front,
the machine guns will as a rule be kept back. They constitute a
highly mobile reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C., which may
be used for the speedy reinforcement of threatened points, for
acting against the flanks of an enemy, and for the preparation of
an attempt to break his line. The attack in view has a chance of
success only when superiority of fire is established. For this
purpose machine guns possess ample mobility to enable them to
follow infantry advancing to the attack. That they should join in
the rushes of the firing line is no more required of them than that
they should join in the charge.
Under skilful and judicious leadership they will nevertheless be
able to come so close to the enemy as to take part in the decisive
fire engagement; the temporary increase of distance from the
carriages need not be considered.
It is of exceptional advantage to direct the fire against the point
of the enemy’s line selected for the attack from a commanding
position, or from a flank, since under these circumstances it
is not necessary to cease fire when the infantry continue their
advance, and prepare for the final rush. Should such a position be
reached at a range which admits of the maximum fire effect (800
yards or under) any further forward movement of the machine guns is
wrong; it interrupts the fire effect and entails fresh laying and
ranging.
_Para. 244._--In the event of a successful issue of the action, the
machine guns must co-operate with the first pursuit by a lavish use
of their fire power. As soon as the victory is assured they will be
hurried forward into the captured position to support the infantry
in their occupation of the same, and to crush the last powers of
resistance of the enemy.
_Para. 245._--Should the attack fail, the machine guns must support
the retiring troops.
_Para. 246._--In using machine guns in defence, one must consider
that the guns are not suitable for conducting a protracted action
for any space of time, and that the advantage of the machine
guns’ mobility cannot be utilised if a fixed part of the position
is handed over to them for defence at the outset. It is to be
recommended generally, and particularly in the defence, to keep the
guns at first with the reserve, and to utilise them as the need
arises--to strengthen the defending line at threatened points,
to hinder outflanking, and to repel an attempt at storming the
position, or for offensive movements. This does not always exclude
machine guns from entering into action at the commencement of an
engagement, _e.g._ if it is necessary to command certain important
approaches. Also, if a covered retreat for the machine guns is
assured, it will be possible to place them to the front or to the
side of the main line of defence, so that they can sweep with their
fire the country which the enemy will presumably occupy with his
artillery.
At times a flanking machine-gun fire can be used to sweep dead
ground in front of the line of battle.
_Para. 247._--In all cases where machine guns are placed in
positions selected beforehand, cover must be constructed. If the
time is not sufficient for this, an attempt must at least be made
to arrange some artificial concealment, to improve the field of
fire, and to determine ranges.
_Para. 248._--After a successful action machine-gun detachments
must be utilised in the boldest fashion, to turn the victory
to account during the pursuit. They are highly suitable for
this purpose, as they unite great power of fire with rapidity
of movement. The pursuit must be continued as long as strength
permits. The machine guns will approach to within effective range
of the enemy, and hinder every attempt of the adversary to re-form
and take up a position. Flanking fire is especially effective. A
liberal supply of ammunition must be pushed forward, this being
necessary for the energetic maintenance of fire in pursuit.
_Para. 249._--When breaking off an action in the event of
an unsuccessful issue, the machine-gun detachment can render
considerable service by opposing the enemy, regardless of the
possible loss of the guns, and by pouring a vigorous fire into
him. For keeping the enemy in check, positions behind defiles with
covered lines of retreat are especially suitable.
Special importance must be attached to the provision of sufficient
ammunition, to the thorough reconnaissance of the lines of retreat,
and to the correct estimation of the moment for beginning to
retire, especially when the movement is to be carried out in
echelon. To avoid obstruction the ammunition wagons must be moved
away at the right moment. Increased attention must be paid to the
flanks, since it is from these that danger most threatens during
a retreat. If suitable positions can be occupied on the flanks,
increased facilities for conducting the retreat will be obtained by
utilising them.
_Para. 250._--Machine guns attached to independent cavalry might
be used to increase the power of cavalry, mounted and dismounted,
and on the offensive and defensive. The duties that will fall
on machine guns in this service demand great mobility and the
strictest fire discipline.
_Para. 251._--The commander of the independent cavalry will
make all decisions regarding the employment of machine guns. He
communicates all his plans of action to the machine gun commander,
and provides him further with special orders concerning the first
entry into action of the machine guns. If the machine guns are
not to be used, it is advisable to leave them behind in a suitable
covering position.
_Para. 252._--On reconnaissance duty with the cavalry, machine guns
will be most frequently employed in breaking down the resistance of
the enemy at small posts or defiles which they have occupied, or
vice versa--to stiffen the opposition made by the cavalry at such
points. On such an occasion even the assistance of a single section
with its ammunition will be of use to the cavalry detachment.
_Para. 253._--In the advance of cavalry against cavalry the
machine-gun detachments must take up their positions as soon as
possible, so as to support first the deployment, and then the
attack of the cavalry. The most advantageous position will be well
to the front and to a flank of the advancing cavalry, since from
there a continuation of the fire is rendered possible up to the
moment almost of the charge, and at the same time an outflanking
movement of the enemy is prevented on that side. A position secure
against direct attack is to be desired, yet a consideration of
the effect gained by the position described above precedes all
thought of cover. A change of position is almost always out of the
question, owing to the rapid development of a mounted action.
_Para. 254._--A wide separation of the sections is not advisable,
since several lines of fire hamper the movements of cavalry.
_Para. 255._--In a forward movement of the machine guns when
limbered up, decreasing the intervals to less than 10 paces must be
avoided, since smaller spaces render difficult the passage of the
limbers to the rear.
_Para. 256._--During the fight the detachment commander will have
to act on his own responsibility, according to the state of the
action. He must not wait for orders, and must always watch the
cavalry engagement; he must use every opportunity to join in the
issue at stake and make preparation for decisive action in case of
either a successful or an unsuccessful termination of the struggle.
Under certain conditions it may be advantageous to await events
with his guns ready to march.
_Para. 257._--In the event of a favourable issue of the action, it
will be his duty to follow the beaten enemy with his fire and to
prevent him from offering further resistance.
_Para. 258._--The nature of a cavalry engagement will often render
it necessary to keep the carriages close to the guns or to shoot
from the wheeled carriages. Since the massing of several carriages
in rear of the detachment offers the enemy a favourable opportunity
for attack and impedes firing towards the rear, the question will
arise whether the ammunition wagons should be kept back in a secure
place.
_Para. 260._--The machine-gun detachments attached to the cavalry
divisions remain with them in action. They will find occasion
to prove of service in the varied duties of cavalry during and
especially after action.
_Para. 261._--Also for protecting batteries in position, machine
guns can be profitably employed, if infantry are not forthcoming
for this duty.
_Extract from “Field Service Regulations, 1908”_
“The fire effect of machine guns is influenced primarily by correct
sighting, possibility of observation, size and density of target,
and methods of fire.”
“It is further affected by the suddenness with which fire is
opened, by the number of machine guns firing at the same target,
and by the enemy’s fire. The high rate of fire concentration of the
bullet-sheaf, and the possibility of bringing several machine guns
into action on a narrow front, enable great effect to be produced
in a short time even at long ranges. When the front of the target
is broken and irregular, the effect is reduced. A wrong sighting
elevation or an imperfect observation of fire may render the fire
completely ineffective.”
“Dense lines of skirmishers standing suffer heavy losses at ranges
of 1,650 yards and under. At lines of skirmishers lying, good
effect is to be expected at 1,100 yards and under, provided that
the observation of fire is good. Against artillery in action the
fire is similar to that of infantry. Owing to the mobility of
machine-gun batteries they are especially adapted for securing the
increased fire effect due to _oblique_ fire.”
“At short ranges under hostile fire machine guns can only be
brought up and withdrawn under cover.”
* * * * *
The German _Cavalry Drill Book_ of 1909 has some interesting
paragraphs on the employment of machine guns, which are here given:
_Para. 497._--Horse artillery and machine guns, by reason of their
fire, enhance the offensive and defensive powers of cavalry. In
defence and against unexpected opening of fire they form the most
effective portion of the force.
_Para. 498._--Horse-artillery fire will often be the first thing to
make the enemy disclose his dispositions, and thus is useful for
reconnaissance. In conjunction with machine guns it can break down
the enemy’s resistance in defiles, and thus save the cavalry the
necessity of dismounted action.
_Para. 498._--Artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry, ...
especially by fire effect upon their flanks, to distract hostile
columns from their line of march.
_Para. 500._--Detached forces of the Division may be allotted
artillery and machine guns to increase their powers of offensive
action.... The employment of single machine guns is forbidden.
_Para. 501._--The commanders of artillery and machine guns must
be kept informed of the situation and of the cavalry commander’s
intentions. They remain with him until the employment of their
commands has been arranged for; and, if necessary, it is their
duty to bring this question of employment to his notice. At later
stages they must keep in constant communication with him. Guns and
machine guns come into action for the first time by order of the
leader.
_Para. 502._--As a general principle, fire is to be opened on those
portions of the enemy the defeat of which is likely to influence
the decision of the fight. Under anything like equal conditions, a
duel with the hostile artillery cannot lead to rapid results. But
should the hostile artillery expose itself, the opportunity must be
seized with rapidity and energy. It may be also necessary to engage
hostile artillery in order to draw their fire from the cavalry.
_Para. 503._--Fire control is facilitated by keeping the batteries
together, nor is any great dispersion of the machine-gun sections,
as a rule, to be recommended. Many lines of fire cramp the
movements of cavalry during the mounted combat. The conditions
of the fight, however, or the configuration of the ground, may
necessitate dispersions and separate positions.... Machine guns
only require an escort when the field of view is very restricted.
_Para. 507._--In the _mounted cavalry combat_ guns and machine
guns must be brought into action so as to support, firstly, the
deployment; secondly, the attack. Positions for the machine guns,
to a flank and in front of the advancing cavalry, all on rising
ground, will allow fire to be maintained until immediately before
the collision, and will make it difficult for the enemy to
envelop a flank. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that any
large flank movement takes time, and sometimes so much time that
the decisive moment may pass while it is being carried out, and
the guns may arrive too late.... It is desirable that artillery
positions should be secured from direct attack by the nature of
the ground. But if circumstances demand it, artillery and machine
guns must come into action on the spot, without regard for cover or
other advantages.
_Para. 509._--Unless fresh bodies of cavalry offer a tempting
target, fire will be turned on to the hostile batteries and machine
guns immediately after the collision of the cavalry masses.
_Para. 510._--During the fight the leaders of artillery and machine
guns will for the most part have to act on their own initiative.
They must seek every opportunity for intervention, and, according
to the course of the fight, must make preparations for action under
favourable or unfavourable conditions. On occasions it may be
necessary to remain limbered up and ready to move.
_Para. 511._--After a successful attack artillery and machine
guns advance rapidly to follow up the beaten enemy with fire, and
to prevent his rallying for renewed opposition. If the result be
unfavourable, artillery and machine-gun leaders must come to a
timely decision whether the circumstances call for a retirement to
a covering position, or whether they should not hold on to their
fire position even at the risk of losing the guns.
_Para. 512._--Owing to the character of the cavalry encounter, it
is often advisable to keep the limbers with the guns. And it may
sometimes be well to leave a portion of the second-line wagons
and the carts of the machine-gun detachments behind in a place of
security, and to order the light-ammunition column to march at
the head of the second-line transport. Yet another question may
arise for the machine-gun detachments; whether to take the wheeled
carriage or only the sleigh mountings into the firing line.
_Para. 513._--If the assault succeeds, guns and machine guns hurry
to the captured position to take part in the pursuit.
Should their own attack fail, or should that of the enemy succeed,
artillery and machine guns must endeavour to cover the retirement,
and, disregarding the hostile artillery, must turn their fire into
pursuing riflemen.
* * * * *
In a recent article in the _Jahrbücher für die Deutschen Armeen und
Marine_ Captain von Beckmann gives the following summary of the
tactical use of machine guns:--
1. Machine guns must take up the smallest possible space, and be
capable of quickly coming into action (at rifle ranges). They must
be capable of accompanying infantry and cavalry wherever these arms
can go.
2. They can never take the place of artillery, though capable,
especially at short ranges, of affording effective support to the
latter.
3. The fire of one machine gun is approximately equivalent to that
of 80 infantrymen. The dispersion of fire is considerably less;
therefore while the effect is greater with an accurate sight, it is
less if the range is not accurately known.
4. The most suitable targets are those of some size and
depth--_e.g._ infantry columns, cavalry in all formations, and
artillery when limbered up. At medium ranges, extended firing lines
may be fired upon, but little effect can be produced upon men lying
down, even at the shortest ranges--though the morale effect may be
considerable.
5. Short bursts of heavy fire are especially effective. On the
other hand, long-continued fire is unsuitable, owing to the
expenditure of ammunition and the heating of the barrel.
6. Artillery in position provided with shields can only be
effectively damaged by enfilade or oblique fire.
7. Machine guns may either be employed directly under the orders
of the G.O.C. or be attached to certain units. In the first case
they will usually act in complete machine-gun units. In the second
case they will generally do so only at suitable targets at long
and medium ranges. In the later stages they will mostly be used in
sections. The use of single machine guns is to be avoided.
8. The intervals between machine guns in action must depend on
circumstances. They should not be too small if the guns are to
hold their ground for any length of time. When a section (2 guns)
is acting alone, the guns must be able to afford effective mutual
support in all directions.
9. Ammunition must be carefully husbanded, especially at the longer
ranges, while a good supply of ammunition is essential. Even
at long ranges, this ammunition will have to be carried by men
specially equipped for the purpose.
10. When the enemy is unexpectedly met with while on the march,
machine guns will be of special value to the advance guard in
rapidly seizing points in order to hold the enemy at a distance.
The occupation of such points at wide intervals will often
effectively deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force.
Machine guns thus employed will be withdrawn as soon as the
infantry come up and deploy, so as to be available for other work.
11. The wide extensions of modern armies will often make it
impossible for any but mounted troops to be concentrated
at decisive points--either to make the most of favourable
opportunities, or to ward off an unexpected danger. Mounted
machine-gun detachments will be very valuable for such purposes.
12. In the attack of a defensive position deliberately occupied,
part of the machine guns will at first be held in reserve, but,
according to the latest opinions formed from the lessons of the
Russo-Japanese War, the majority of the machine guns will support
the advance of the infantry. They are especially effective in
keeping down the defenders’ fire during the last stage of the
attack when the artillery is no longer able to fire over the heads
of the infantry.
13. On the defensive it is advisable that a considerable number of
machine guns should be held in reserve, especially with a view to
preventing any unexpected turning movements, repelling assaults,
delivering counter-attacks, and in case of such reinforcing any
threatened points in the line of defence. In fortified positions
machine guns may be usefully employed in front of the position to
force the enemy to deploy prematurely. His artillery as it comes
into action will frequently offer very suitable targets. The
majority of machine guns, however, will be placed in the line of
defence (or at least immediately in rear of the sections to which
they are allotted) as soon as the direction of the enemy’s attack
has been ascertained. This presence in the front line will make it
possible to reduce the number of men actually in that line and will
thus economise troops.
14. In the pursuit machine guns will be especially effective
against the flanks and rear of the retiring enemy. Again, in
covering a retirement and checking the enemy’s pursuit, machine
guns with cavalry and artillery will delay the enemy’s advance and
enable their own infantry to break away. In this case the first
duty will be to protect their own artillery.
15. With the Independent Cavalry machine guns form a very valuable
addition to the effective strength both for defence and offence.
Even in reconnaissance work they will be able to break down the
enemy’s resistance at certain points (villages) and to increase
the tenacity of their own forces in the defence of similar points.
Light machine guns carried on the saddle would be of the greatest
assistance to smaller bodies of cavalry in such circumstances.
Machine guns are also valuable in purely cavalry engagements,
especially when it is possible for them to take the enemy in flank.
If this be impossible, they can effectively follow up a success, or
cover the retirement of their own cavalry. If some of the machine
guns act as escort to the artillery, the cavalry escort can be
dispensed with. This will increase the effective strength of the
cavalry and also give the artillery a wide choice of position and
great security, thus increasing its efficiency. Even if at the
beginning the cavalry commander himself directs the working of the
machine guns, the officer commanding the latter will have to act
on his own initiative later on, in accordance with the tactical
situation of the moment.
GREAT BRITAIN
ORGANISATION.--Great Britain was one of the earliest countries to
adopt machine guns, and the Maxim has been in use for the last
twenty years. Machine guns are organised in sections of two guns,
and a section forms part of each regiment of cavalry and battalion
of infantry, who provide and train the personnel.
The organisation is as follows:--
A SECTION WITH A CAVALRY REGIMENT
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Lieutenant 1 | 3 | --
Sergeant 1 | 1 | --
Corporal 1 | 1 | --
Privates 12 | 12 | --
Drivers 8 | -- | 16
Bâtman 2 | -- | --
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
25 (1 officer) | 17 | 16
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--6 pack-saddles (the two lead horses of each wagon are
provided with pack saddlery); 4 G.S. limbered wagons (2 for guns
and 2 for ammunition); 2 machine guns with tripods and pack-saddles
on limbered G.S. wagons, each drawn by 4 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 16,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with
divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Subaltern 1 | 1 | --
Sergeant 1 | -- | --
Corporal 1 | -- | --
Privates 12 | -- | --
Drivers | |
(1st-line | |
transport) 2 | -- | 4
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 4
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
FRONT VIEW.
_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._]
[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
VIEW FROM REAR.
_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._]
_Equipment._--2 machine guns with tripods on 1 limbered G.S. wagon
drawn by 2 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 8,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with
divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
TERRITORIAL FORCE: SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Subaltern 1 | 1 | --
Sergeant 1 | -- | --
Rank and | |
File 15 | -- | 2
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
| |
Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 2
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--2 machine guns on field carriages each drawn by 1
horse.
_Ammunition._--4,000 with the guns; 6,000 with regimental reserve;
10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
SECTION WITH A YEOMANRY REGIMENT
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Personnel. | Riding horses. | Draught horses.
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Subaltern 1 | 2 | --
Sergeant 1 | 1 | --
Corporal 1 | 1 | --
Privates 12 | 12 | --
Drivers 4 | -- | 8
Bâtman 2 | -- | --
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Total 21 | 16 | 8
----------------------+------------------+----------------
_Equipment._--2 carts for guns, tripods, and 2 sets of
pack-saddlery; and 2 carts for machine-gun ammunition.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 6,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
MOUNTING.--There are five English patterns of tripods in use and
one Indian. Marks I. and II. English pattern and the Indian pattern
are exceedingly clumsy, and have been largely replaced by Marks
III., III.A, and IV. Mark III. weighs 49 lb., and consists of a
crosshead and pivot mounted on three legs with a saddle for firer,
and has elevating and traversing gears. A traverse of 25 degrees
can be obtained. The two front legs of the tripod are pivoted in
sockets and secured by wing nuts, and can be splayed to lower the
gun, and fold up for transport. The legs are fitted with shoes
to steady the mounting by gripping the ground. When firing, the
ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the gun.
On the pack-saddle the gun and tripod are carried on either side
of the saddle on hooks and secured by straps. The tool box is
carried on the top of the saddle. With this mounting 4,000 rounds
of ammunition are carried in eight boxes, four on each side of the
ammunition pack-saddle on a second animal.
Mark III.A tripod weighs 56 lb., and differs from Mark III. as
follows:
1. The pivot has a bearing surface to support the rear end of
crosshead arm.
2. The hand nut of elevating gear is formed with four small radial
holes.
3. The rear leg is telescopic, and consists of an inner and outer
tube. The inner tube has a shoe, and the rear end of the outer tube
has a bracket for the saddle and a handle to clamp the inner to the
outer tube.
The Mark IV. tripod weighs 48 lb., and the mounting consists of
a crosshead, elevating gear, and socket mounted on three legs.
It has 13 degrees elevation and 25 degrees depression, but by
arranging the position of legs 43 degrees and 55 degrees can be
had. It has an all-round traverse. The elevating gear is actuated
by a hand-wheel, which consists of an inner and an outer screw.
The legs are of tubular steel, the lower ends being fitted with
shoes to steady the mountings, and the upper ends have a joint
with serrations; the rear leg has a joint pin with nut and jamming
handle. Joint studs with disc springs and jamming handles are fixed
to the front legs, by which the legs are securely clamped in the
required position. Numbers are stamped on the legs to show the
relative position of the legs to their normal position. The legs
are secured by a leather strap for transport. When firing, the
ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the
gun. The gun can be fired at heights varying from 14½ inches to 30
inches above the ground.
TACTICAL.--Directions for the use of machine guns are found in the
various textbooks issued for each arm. Training is dealt with in
the _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, 1907, and in the _Training
Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The following directions for their
employment in the field are from the latter, ch. vi. pp. 157-63:
_Para. 2._--Surprise is a powerful factor in the effective
employment of the machine gun; every effort must therefore be
made to avoid the enemy’s observations both when advancing to a
position and when in action. The machine gun possesses the power of
delivering, from a very narrow front, a practically uninterrupted
volume of closely concentrated rifle fire, which can be directed
against any desired object with the least possible delay. The
delivery of such fire cannot, however, be long sustained, because
of the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved and the difficulty
of replacing it.
It is necessary, therefore, for its effective use, that its
movements and fire action should be so regulated as to enable it
to open fire rapidly whenever a favourable target presents itself,
for the losses inflicted on an enemy will affect him in proportion
to the suddenness and rapidity with which they are experienced.
As the rôle of machine guns is to assist the particular body of
troops to which they belong, the machine-gun commander should be
fully acquainted with the orders issued to such troops. He should
also carefully watch and conform to their movements, and assist
them by every means in his power. As a rule the guns belonging to a
unit will be employed singly in order to obviate the concentration
of hostile fire against them, the most favourable position being
sought for each weapon with regard to fire effect and cover; this,
however, should not prevent the guns being used together when the
circumstances of the moment demand the adoption of such a course.
The massing of guns should be rarely resorted to. When it is
desired to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on any locality, it
should be accomplished by the concentration of fire from dispersed
guns. The selection of a fire position should be preceded by
careful reconnaissance on the part of the machine-gun commander.
The following points should be looked for:
(_a_) A good field of fire.
(_b_) Concealment.
(_c_) Cover from the hostile fire.
(_d_) Possibilities for advancing to the position unobserved, and
facilities for ammunition supply.
(_e_) Security against a covered hostile approach.
If a position affording concealment is not available, one should
be selected which from the nature of its background will be
difficult for the enemy to locate. As the opportunities for the
effective action of machine guns will often be very brief, and as
the guns will usually be employed singly, the non-commissioned
officer in charge of each gun will, as a rule, have to act on
his own initiative in choosing the objective, judging the range,
and in deciding when to open fire. As a general rule, machine
guns are best adapted for action at effective ranges; at these it
is usually possible to distinguish the target, to ascertain its
range, and to observe the effects of the fire. When, however,
concealment and protection from fire exist, it may sometimes be
advisable to bring machine guns into action at decisive range. If
a sufficiently large target be offered and the range be known, the
concentration and rapidity of their fire will enable guns to be
employed, with considerable effect, at long ranges. Machine guns
should seldom engage artillery at long rifle range, for in such
circumstances superiority of fire will always rest with the latter
if the machines are located. Within effective range, however,
machine guns, if concealed, should inflict considerable loss on
hostile artillery. Engagements with their lines of skirmishers
should be avoided, for the risk of disclosing the position of the
guns and the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved will rarely
be justified by results. Since the gun is not well adapted for
keeping up protracted fire, it may be often expedient to withdraw
it from action, move it elsewhere, or hold it in reserve for a more
favourable opportunity.
The selection of a target upon which to fire should be governed
by (_a_) its tactical importance; (_b_) its dimensions and
vulnerability. It is essential that due regard to economy of
ammunition should be observed. When, however, it is decided to
open fire, the ammunition necessary to secure the results sought
must be expended without hesitation. “Deliberate fire” will rarely
be resorted to. In cases where a favourable target is offered,
prolonged “rapid fire” may be employed, but the most suitable
description of fire will usually be “rapid” in series of from 25 to
30 rounds.
The range should be taken by a range-finder or ascertained from
neighbouring infantry or artillery. Ranging by observation of
fire should be employed only when the nature of the soil is very
favourable and when no other method is practicable. When a reserve
ammunition cart is provided for the machine guns it will be under
the orders of the machine-gun commander, who will arrange that
it is placed where it can most conveniently supply the guns with
ammunition; it should be screened from view, and if possible
sheltered from fire. All belts shall be refilled as soon as
possible after they are emptied. Should the machine-gun commander
consider an escort necessary, he will at once bring the fact to the
notice of his commanding officer.
_With Infantry in the Attack_
_Para. 3._--The machine guns will cover the advance of the firing
line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it.
In ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push them
into the firing line, where they would offer a conspicuous target
to the enemy; but in a broken or enclosed country, where the guns
can be brought up under cover, occasions may arise when they can
be usefully employed in a forward position. When the ground is
favourable the gun may with advantage accompany that portion
of reserves told off to cover the advance of the remainder by
long-range fire. Machine guns will co-operate with the attacking
infantry in the decisive fire action in endeavouring to obtain
a superiority of fire. Positions on the flank of the attacking
battalions or on commanding ground, if available, should be
selected, as they admit of the guns remaining in action whilst
the firing line is pushing forward. A position on the flank of
the attacking infantry has the further advantages that oblique or
flanking fire, which from machine guns is particularly effective,
can be brought to bear against the enemy, whilst guns so placed are
less likely to draw fire upon the attacking infantry. A change of
position during the decisive fire action interrupts the fire and
entails fresh laying and ranging, and therefore should be seldom
resorted to unless an increased fire effect is to be obtained. At
the decisive stage of the attack, fire of the greatest intensity
should be continued as long as is compatible with the safety of
the advancing firing line. In the event of the attack succeeding,
the guns should be pushed forward at once in order to pursue the
retreating enemy with their fire. In the event of failure, every
effort should be made to cover the retirement of the firing line.
They will assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing
line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the
flanks against cavalry or counterstroke. They may be employed to
give effect to holding attacks or feints, by rapid fire directed
against successive portions of the enemy’s line; also to make good
positions secured in the course of an action.
_In the Defence_
_Para. 4._--It is more important to shield machine guns from
artillery fire than to obtain a long range for them. Their
position, therefore, should be always concealed, and cover from
fire should be provided. They are best utilised to sweep with
their fire spaces which are particularly exposed, but which the
enemy is compelled to cross; to flank salients, cover obstacles,
deny the passage of roads and defiles, or to guard the flanks of
the position. It will be at times expedient to retain the guns in
reserve until the enemy reaches effective ranges. In such cases,
emplacements should be prepared previously and covered approaches
provided. Machine guns may also be held as a reserve of fire to
check the advance of hostile reinforcements, to meet turning
movements, or to prepare and cover the counter-attack. When their
retirement is not likely to be compromised, machine guns may be
utilised in positions in front of the main line to delay the
enemy’s advance.
_In Pursuit and Retreat_
_Para. 5._--In pursuit machine-gun commanders should act with great
boldness, and it should be their endeavour to come into action
against the enemy’s flanks at decisive range. In retirements they
should avoid close engagements, and should take up successive fire
positions, from which to delay the enemy’s advance and protect the
flanks of the rear guard.
_With Advanced and Rear Guards and with Outposts_
_Para. 6._--With an advanced guard machine guns may often be
pushed forward to assist in dispersing small bodies of the enemy
who might delay the advance; they may also be employed in opposing
the enemy’s advance and in preventing the occupation of important
positions until the arrival of the main body. With the outposts
they may be used to sweep the approaches, and to dominate certain
points which an enemy, in advancing, is likely to pass or to occupy.
_With Cavalry_
_Para. 7._--As a general principle machine guns should be employed
to supplement the fire action of cavalry. During the cavalry
combat they may be suitably employed in protecting the flanks or
in directing an oblique fire against the hostile cavalry. When
the charge is successful they should press forward and engage the
hostile cavalry at close range. In event of defeat they should form
rallying points and endeavour to check the enemy’s pursuit. In
reconnaissance, or other detached duties, the machine guns should
be retained by the commander of the unit as a reserve, ready to
move to any point where their presence may be required. They may
be utilised for such purposes as to induce the enemy to expose his
position; to drive in hostile patrols; to check the pursuit of
victorious cavalry; to delay the enemy’s infantry, etc. When their
fire has achieved its object they should be withdrawn temporarily.
In other circumstances their action should be guided by the
principles set forth in the case of infantry.
_From_ “FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS,” _Part I., Operations_, 1909
The machine gun possesses the power of delivering a volume of
concentrated rifle fire which can be rapidly directed against
any desired object. Rapid fire cannot be long sustained, owing
to the expenditure of ammunition involved, and it is therefore
necessary that the movements and fire action of the weapons should
be regulated so as to enable them to open fire immediately a
favourable opportunity arises. Surprise is an important factor in
the employment of machine guns, which should be concealed, and
whenever possible provided with cover from fire. The massing of
machine guns is likely to attract hostile artillery fire. For this
reason it is usually better to employ them in pairs in support
of the particular body of troops to which they belong. When an
overwhelming fire on a particular point is required it can be
provided by concentrating the fire of dispersed pairs of guns. The
guns of two or more units may, if required, be placed under the
command of a specially selected officer and employed as a special
reserve of fire in the hands of a brigade commander. Machine guns
are best adapted for use at effective infantry ranges, but when
good cover from view and fire exists they may be usefully employed
at close infantry ranges.[62]
_With Outposts_
Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, and
to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to
pass or occupy.[63]
_During the Battle_
Machine guns will be especially valuable in bringing a sudden fire
to bear from such positions, both in order to cover a further
advance and to assist in defeating counter-attacks. Machine guns
can normally support an attack most efficiently from well-concealed
positions provided with good cover, and within effective infantry
range of the enemy. Occasionally, when good opportunities for a
concealed advance present themselves, they may be established
within close infantry range of the objective.[64]
_From_ “CAVALRY TRAINING,” 1907
Machine guns afford a means of developing fire without dismounting
men from the squadrons. During the cavalry fight they will usually
be massed under one commander, but may be employed in pairs when
necessary. They will co-operate with the horse artillery, the
great volume of fire which they are able to bring to bear from a
narrow front being particularly effective. Their presence with the
artillery will often admit of the latter dispensing with any other
escort.[65]
_Position of Machine Guns_
During the approach march the machine guns will usually accompany
the artillery, to whom they may act as escort when necessary.[66]
_From_ “INFANTRY TRAINING, 1908” (AMENDMENT, AUGUST, 1909)
_General Characteristics_
1. The machine gun possesses the power of delivering rapidly from
a narrow front a volume of closely concentrated fire which can be
controlled easily, be turned readily in any desired direction, or
be distributed by traversing.
2. The effective range of machine guns is the same as that of the
rifle; they are therefore not suited for employment in place of
artillery. On the other hand, the effect of machine-gun fire at
effective infantry and close infantry ranges is very great, and
at close infantry ranges it may, with favourable conditions, be
annihilating. Machine guns are very suitable for the development of
covering fire within the limits of effective rifle range. They can
accompany the troops to which they may be attached over any country.
3. The action of the mechanism is liable to temporary interruption
by jams. Machine guns should not therefore be used singly under
normal conditions. They are organised in sections of two guns,
which should rarely be broken up.
4. Machine guns are essentially weapons of opportunity. The
expenditure of ammunition involved and the nature of the mechanism
make long periods of rapid fire unsuitable. The power of the gun is
best used to develop unexpected bursts of fire.
_The Organisation and Training of Infantry Machine-Gun Sections_
1. The strength and composition of a machine-gun section are shown
in War Establishments. An infantry machine-gun section is an
integral portion of an infantry battalion, but two or more sections
may be brought together by the brigade commander and used under the
command of a brigade machine-gun officer.
The two non-commissioned officers and twelve privates shown in the
establishment will be trained as first-class machine gunners.
Two non-commissioned officers and twelve men will be trained, as
opportunity offers, as second-class machine gunners to replace
casualties among first-class machine gunners.
2. A subaltern officer, other than the assistant adjutant, will be
selected in each battalion to command and train the machine-gun
section, under the orders of the commanding officer. Should a
brigade commander desire to train the machine guns of his brigade
to act together when massed, an officer, who is not the machine-gun
officer of one of the battalions of the brigade, may be selected to
supervise the firing practice and to conduct the brigade training
of machine-gun sections.
3. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men detailed for
machine-gun training should be changed as little as possible; the
two non-commissioned officers and twelve men trained as first-class
machine gunners will fire the practices prescribed in the Musketry
Regulations with one of the companies of the battalion,[67] but
will at other times be at the disposal of the machine-gun officer
for instruction.
4. Details as to the mechanism of the gun, and the drill of
machine-gun sections are contained in the handbook of the gun.
Instructions as to the course of firing are contained in the
Musketry Regulations.
5. The preliminary training, which may be carried out in the
neighbourhood of barracks, will consist in instruction in the
mechanism of the gun; in the drill and methods of laying, ranging,
and firing; in packing and unpacking with limbered wagons.
6. As soon as the men of a section are thoroughly conversant with
the mechanism, are able to recognise without delay the cause of
any failure and to remedy it at once, and can drill and handle the
gun with precision, their further training will be carried out in
open country away from barracks. During this training the sections
should be practised in bringing the gun into action; in fire
discipline; in fire control; in laying and ranging in every variety
of country; in utilising natural cover when advancing into action;
and in constructing cover from both view and fire. The men should
also be trained in range-finding, judging distance, and in the use
of field-glasses.
7. When the section is proficient in these branches of training,
the commanding officer will arrange for it to be trained with one
or more companies which have reached the more advanced stages of
company training, in order that it may be practised in co-operating
with other troops and in dealing with such situations as would
confront it in war. The periods of preliminary training should
be arranged so that the section may be ready for this training,
without hurrying through the more elementary work. To enable this
to be done it will usually be necessary to begin the preliminary
training during the winter training season.
_General Principles of the Employment of Infantry Machine Guns_
1. The normal duty of the infantry machine gun in war is to
assist infantry in every way by its fire, but it may be given an
independent rôle at any time, if the tactical situation makes it
advisable to do so.
2. The effective use of a machine gun depends largely upon the
skill with which it has been brought into action. Surprise and
concealment are very important factors in its employment; for the
effect of the gun is much increased by sudden bursts of fire from
concealed positions. The tripod mounting makes it possible to take
advantage of small features of the ground to obtain cover and to
escape an enemy’s observation. In order to develop the power of the
gun to the utmost the fullest use should be made of natural and
artificial cover.
3. The depth of the beaten zone of the machine gun is small as
compared with that of collective rifle fire. This makes the effect
of small errors in sighting for elevation proportionately greater.
A section of machine guns cannot therefore be relied upon to make
its fire effective when first opening fire, at distances beyond
about 1,000 yards. If observation of fire is possible, elevation
may be rapidly corrected, and the fire of the two guns may in
that case be very effective up to 2,000 yards, or up to the limit
of observation. If there is no observation it will be necessary to
employ several guns and expend a large quantity of ammunition in
order to obtain adequate assurance of effect beyond about 1,000
yards.
4. By massing the machine guns of a brigade the assurance of fire
effect at ranges beyond 1,000 yards is increased, and it is easier
to control and direct fire. At shorter ranges massed machine guns
may form a conspicuous target, and the control of more than two
guns then becomes difficult. Occasions will, however, often arise
when the massed guns of a brigade can be brought into action in a
well-concealed position within the limits of effective rifle range.
Under such circumstances massed guns may produce great effect both
in attack and defence.
5. The general considerations which govern the selection of a
target for machine guns are--its tactical importance, its range,
and its vulnerability.
Machine guns should seldom engage artillery with direct fire beyond
effective rifle range, for in such circumstances superiority of
fire will always rest with the artillery if the machine guns are
located. Within effective range machine guns, if concealed, should
inflict considerable loss on artillery, while oblique fire may be
usefully employed up to the limits of long rifle range.
Engagements with thin lines of skirmishers should be avoided
unless the range is accurately known, as the risk of disclosing the
position of the gun and the expenditure of ammunition involved will
rarely be justified by results.
6. It is very important that fire should not be opened until
there is a reasonable probability of obtaining the desired
result. A section commander must have a thorough knowledge of
the capabilities of his guns to enable him to decide when he is
justified in opening fire.
7. Machine guns should as a rule only open fire upon targets which
are sufficiently large and dense to promise an adequate return
for the ammunition expended. Special circumstances may, however,
warrant the opening of fire upon less favourable targets. When a
machine-gun commander has decided to open fire, the ammunition
necessary to secure the results sought should be expended without
hesitation.
8. If there is no satisfactory indication of effect, and no special
justification for firing at long range exists, it will usually
be better to withdraw from action and to await opportunities for
effective intervention.
9. A machine-gun commander should be given definite orders as
to his action, but should be allowed full liberty, within the
limits assigned to the commander of the body of troops with whom
he is co-operating, in carrying out his orders. He should be kept
informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may
affect his action. Initiative and enterprise are essential to the
effective handling of machine guns.
10. Machine guns will usually be sufficiently protected by the
dispositions of the troops with whom they are acting. Should a
machine-gun commander find himself in an exposed position, he
should consult the nearest infantry commander, who is responsible
for providing a suitable escort, if in his opinion one is necessary.
11. When a machine gun is in action only those numbers required to
work the gun should be with it. Spare numbers, when not employed as
range-finders, ground scouts, ammunition-carriers, or on similar
duties, should be in covered positions in the vicinity. Groups of
men close to machine guns do not facilitate the working of the gun,
and make a vulnerable target.
The limbered wagons will be unloaded in positions where they are
screened from the enemy’s fire and observation.
The commander of the machine-gun section will select a covered
position for his small-arm ammunition cart, as close to his guns as
possible. (see Section 174).
_Choice of Fire Positions_
1. Reconnaissance is of special importance in the handling of
machine guns. Before bringing his guns into action the brigade
machine-gun officer if the machine guns are brigaded, or the
battalion machine-gun officer if the sections are working
independently, accompanied by range-takers and orderlies, should
usually be well in advance of his guns, where he can observe the
action of the body of infantry with which he is co-operating. He
should carefully reconnoitre suitable fire positions and make all
preparations for bringing his guns rapidly into action. During
this reconnaissance the machine guns should normally be placed
in concealed positions. In any case they should not follow the
machine-gun commander so closely as to expose their movements.
Alternative positions to which the guns may be moved to meet
changes in the situation or to avoid artillery fire should always
be prepared.
2. The choice of a fire position must depend upon the tactical
requirements of the situation, and upon the object in view; for
example, it must depend upon whether it is desired to use covering
enfilade or flanking fire, or to act by surprise.
A commanding position is favourable for the development of covering
fire, while for other purposes the gun should be sited as low as is
compatible with obtaining the necessary field of fire.
3. A clear field of fire, facilities for observation, a covered
approach, concealment and cover for the guns and their detachments,
and facilities for ammunition supply are advantages to be looked
for in a good fire position, but one position will rarely unite
them all. In arranging for the concealment of the guns it is
important to consider the background. The neighbourhood of
landmarks and the tops of prominent features should be avoided.
4. Their power of all-round traversing and their great effect
against deep targets make machine guns specially suitable for
position on a flank, whence they can bring enfilade fire to bear. A
position in the firing line is rarely suitable, as the fire of the
guns may be masked and the enemy’s fire drawn on the firing line.
5. The interval between guns in action should be as large as is
compatible with effective control, but the front occupied by the
massed guns of a brigade should rarely exceed 150 yards.
_Machine Guns in Attack_
1. Since machine guns are unsuited for maintaining a continuous
fire, they will usually best assist the infantry by withholding
their fire during the earlier stages of the battle, so as to be
able to intervene at more critical periods. Machine guns allotted
to a protective detachment will, however, always be employed so as
best to assist the detachment in its special duties (_Field Service
Regulations_, Part I., Chap. V.).
2. It will depend upon the general situation whether the machine
guns should be placed under the control of the brigade machine-gun
officer or left with the battalions to which they belong. When
the facilities for concealment and control at effective range are
good, and the brigade is engaged in a decisive attack, the best
results will usually be obtained by unity of command. By a timely
concentration of fire machine guns may thus be the deciding factor
in the struggle for superiority of fire.
When control is difficult, or when the brigade is extended over
a wide front, it will usually be better to leave guns with their
units.
3. It will often be advisable to employ both methods and to leave
their machine guns with the battalions which are first extended,
while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of
the brigade machine-gun officer.
4. Although machine guns can move with deployed infantry under
fire, they should rarely attempt to keep pace with attacking
infantry. When they have gained a position from which they can
effectively support their infantry in the struggle for fire
superiority and in the assault, they should only be moved for
good and sufficient reasons. The difficulties of ranging and
of concealment on the move usually outweigh the advantages of
decreasing the range.
5. Machine guns will usually find opportunities for employment
in the attack in assisting the advance of their infantry by
means of covering fire; in protecting attacking infantry against
counter-attack or against cavalry; in assisting the infantry in the
fire fight, and in preparing for the assault by sudden bursts of
converging fire against the objective of the attack. They will also
be of value in securing localities which have been seized during
the advance, and can assist local reserves in acting as points of
support to the attack.
_Machine Guns in Defence_
1. In defence, as in attack, the fire of machine guns should
usually be withheld until the more critical stages of the battle.
Premature opening of fire is liable to expose the position of the
machine guns to the enemy’s artillery.
2. Machine guns may either be dispersed to command approaches,
defiles, exits from woods, etc., by which the enemy may advance,
to occupy advanced posts, and to bring enfilade fire to bear
upon salients and upon the ground in front of weak parts of the
position, or they may be massed and employed under the orders of
commanders of sections.
3. When the guns are massed the alternative positions, Sec.
167 (D) 1, should be such that the firing line can be assisted
during the crisis of the fight, and the advance of local and
decisive counter-attacks can be covered and prepared. When covered
approaches can be provided, massed machine guns should usually be
withdrawn, after they have achieved their immediate object, and
should await another favourable opportunity for action.
ITALY
GUN.--The Perino machine gun has been adopted. The barrel is
surrounded by a cooling tube containing water, and the gun fires
the same cartridge as the infantry rifle. It is regulated to fire
425 rounds a minute, and has a maximum rate of 500 rounds. It can
be fired continuously with the automatic action, or intermittently.
It is loaded by a ridged metal clip containing 25 cartridges, 10
of which clips are formed into a magazine. It is claimed that this
clip is superior to the belt on account of the ease with which
it can be recharged. The gun weighs 27 kilograms, which will be
reduced to 23 in future manufacture. It is mounted on a provisional
tripod, which is of a good pattern, but is said to be too heavy,
and the weight is to be reduced to 20 kilograms.
The gun can be fired from any height above the ground by moving the
legs of the tripod.
The mechanism is strong and simple, the range is the same as the
rifle, and it is very accurate at all ranges.
The Perino machine gun was adopted on the recommendation of a
Commission, who tested it against the Maxim and reported it to be
more efficient.
They recommended the following organisation:
ORGANISATION.--Four machine guns are attached to each regiment of
cavalry and infantry, and two guns to each Alpine battalion. The
detachments recommended are:
For cavalry: 1 N.C.O., 5 men, 7 horses, per gun.
For infantry: 1 N.C.O., 4 men, 2 mules, per gun.
_Ammunition._--No details have been settled as to the amount or
method of carrying.
TACTICAL.--No official instructions for the tactical handling of
machine guns have yet been issued.
JAPAN
GUN.--The Japanese have adopted the Hotchkiss,[68] the barrel of
which is air-cooled, having seven radiating gills on the breech to
absorb the heat. The bore is ·256, being the same as the rifle;
the weight is 70 lb. It is regulated to fire at a maximum rate of
600 rounds a minute. It is loaded by brass clips containing 30
cartridges inserted into the left side of the gun. The empties are
ejected on the right side. The gun is sighted up to 2,187 yards,
with a tangent sight, and is mounted on a tripod weighing 40 lb.,
which has an all-round traverse, and can be adjusted to fire from
two heights. Shields were used in the late war, but were discarded
on account of the weight. It is probable that detachable shields,
large enough to cover the detachment, will in future be issued with
machine guns for use as the situation requires.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM VI
_Diagram of Japanese Machine Gun--Tripod Mount._
_a-b Front and Rear Sights._
_A Piston rod._
_m Gas Vent._
_e Gas chamber._
_d Regulating nut._
_e Strong spiral spring._
_s Feed Slot._
_R Radiator._]
The Japanese machine gun is of home design and manufacture, and
belongs to that class in which the mechanism is actuated by the
action of gas pressure operating upon a plunger or piston and not
by the direct force of recoil as in the Maxim. It uses the same
ammunition as the infantry rifle (murata calibre ·256), and is
rated as firing 600 rounds a minute. Two forms of mountings are
employed, the tripod and the wheeled; the former for fortress use,
and the latter for mobile troops. Referring to the plate, a gas
vent _m_ communicates with a gas chamber _c_ attached laterally to
the barrel. The pressure in the gas chamber is regulated, within
limits, by the nut _d_, which varies the capacity of the chamber.
The piston-rod _A_ is acted upon by the gas pressure at its forward
end, and is driven to the rear against a strong spiral spring _o_,
which moves the piston end forward after the gas pressure has
ceased to act. The reciprocating motion of the piston-rod actuates
the mechanism, which is entirely enclosed in the housing, and
performs the various operations of feeding, firing, and ejecting
through a suitable train of gearing. Cooling is effected by the
radiator _R_, a circumferentially grooved mass of metal attached to
the barrel. The cartridges are mounted on a strip of sheet brass
from which clips are punched and bent round the cartridges to hold
them in position. A series of holes along the edges of the brass
strip engage the teeth of pinions which feed the strip forward as
the piston _A_ moves backward and forward. The cartridges are fired
from their clips by fingers, and drop into position when the bolt
is withdrawn. Thirty cartridges are mounted on one strip, which
is fed into the slot _s_, from the left side. The trigger must
be kept down by pressure all the time, otherwise the spring _o_
cannot operate to return the block forward. The gun is provided
with a shoulder piece and gunner’s seat, as shown. The gun alone
weighs about 73 lb., and with tripod 115 lb. It is sighted to 2,000
metres. The gun is stated to work very satisfactorily, and, owing
to the positive motions, jamming does not occur easily.
ORGANISATION.--At the close of the war each of the two cavalry
brigades was equipped with 6 machine guns and each infantry
regiment with 3 guns, and it was contemplated to increase the
allowance to 6 guns for each regiment, infantry or cavalry. The
guns are served by infantrymen who are extra-regimental and
selected from men having mechanical knowledge.
Guns are organised as follows:
_Infantry._--Batteries of 6 guns, each subdivided into 3 sections;
each infantry regiment has one battery attached to it.
The personnel of the battery consists of 1 captain (or lieutenant),
1 W.O., 1 bugler.
Each gun has 1 commander (sergeant or corporal), 1 firer, 1 loader,
3 ammunition carriers.
TACTICAL.--Tactically, the guns are used primarily for defence,
and reserve their fire for short ranges up to 600 or 800 metres.
On the defensive line of the Third Army after the battle of Mukden
many machine-gun emplacements were noted. These consisted mainly of
blinded casemates, 8 ft. wide, 10 ft. deep, and 3 ft. 6 in. high,
and from 18 to 24 in. of overhead cover. Importance is attached to
concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked
out by Russian artillery. In the cavalry brigades the machine guns
were organised into sections of 2 guns under an officer, so that
sections could be detached with squadrons.
In the First Cavalry Brigade, General Akiyama, 4,000 rounds per
gun per day was the greatest rate of fire attained. Machine guns
were popular in the Japanese army, and were highly spoken of by the
officers.[69]
_Cavalry._--Each cavalry brigade has an 8-gun battery, which
is divided into half batteries of 4 guns each. The personnel
of the battery consists of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 W.O.
(sergeant-major), 2 N.C.O.’s, 2 trumpeters. The gun detachments are
the same as for infantry, with 3 mounted men per gun in addition.
TRANSPORT. _Infantry._--30 horses, 6 of which carry guns and
tripods, and 24 carry the ammunition. One ammunition horse follows
each gun, and the remaining 18 under the W.O. form the battery
ammunition column. Each ammunition horse with the guns carries
15,000 rounds in two boxes, and each horse with the ammunition
column 2,160 rounds in four boxes.
_Cavalry._--Guns and tripods are carried on horses with 32
ammunition horses, each carrying 2,400 rounds.
Total establishment: 3 officers; 87 rank and file.
NOTE.--The organisation during the war was as follows:
Each cavalry brigade had a battery of 6 guns (Hotchkiss pattern
made in Japan). These were mounted on a heavy limbered carriage
with pole draught and 4 horses; these carriages were clumsy, heavy,
and conspicuous, and weighed 15 hundredweight. There was a fixed
shield on each carriage and a rough tripod was also carried.
_Tactical_
The Japanese have issued a well-illustrated drill book for the
use of machine-gun batteries, with cavalry and with infantry
respectively, with a view to enable them to manœuvre accurately and
easily in all situations. Their tactics are at present (1909) under
revision, and it is understood that there are likely to be many
changes introduced owing to the lessons of the late war.
The following is the most recent summary of the principles of their
tactics:
Machine guns are used as batteries, but may be broken up into
sections or even single guns. It is thought wrong to employ
“slow” fire, and 800 yards is considered the most useful range.
Well-hidden lines of skirmishers and other machine guns are
unsuitable targets, and they are never to be used to replace
artillery or to fire at artillery at long range, though they may do
so at close range or from the flanks or rear. Concealed positions
are recommended, and the use of alternative positions advocated,
and change of position should be made on the initiative of the
commander. Wide intervals between the guns should be used, but the
battery front should not exceed 110 yards. The guns should be used
on the flanks or rear of the enemy when possible. All ranges should
be measured.
Machine guns should be used in the attack just before the final
assault, and in the defence when repelling the assault or to
reinforce a threatened flank. In both attack and defence they are
to be held back, and fire reserved for the crisis of the action.
Use with the advance guard is not desirable as a rule. It is
strongly advocated with a rear guard, owing to their intense fire,
rapidity in ceasing fire (breaking off action), and mobility.
The officer commanding machine guns must be accurately acquainted
with the plans of the G.O.C., but must act on his own initiative
in forwarding the general scheme according to the situation.
Communication with the G.O.C. is considered vital. The guns are
considered especially valuable in covering the retreat of infantry.
Concealment from the enemy while manœuvring and surprise by sudden
fire are considered essential to their success.
_Regulations with the Infantry, 1907_
_Art. 67._--In the offensive the battery is at first kept in
reserve; but when its intervention becomes necessary during the
general engagement, to prepare the assault on a point in the
enemy’s position, they will be given orders to come into action.
The employment of machine guns is especially advantageous to
prepare an infantry attack. They can co-operate with this attack
even under heavy fire, without, however, being obliged to follow
the infantry. The battery ought often to change its position,
at the discretion of its commander, to lend its support to the
infantry. The battery will, if possible, take up a dominating
position or will establish itself on a flank in order to open fire
on the selected point of attack, in such a way as not to be marked
by its own infantry.
_Art. 69._--In the offensive in case of success: The machine guns
will rapidly and boldly move to a favourable position to pursue
the enemy with their fire and to make their infantry powerless to
attempt a counter-attack. The energetic action of the machine guns
after the position has been carried will force the enemy to scatter.
_Art. 70._--In the offensive in case of failures: The machine guns
will sacrifice themselves, if necessary, to cover their infantry.
They will break down the morale of hostile troops by riddling
them with fire without care for their own losses, and will thus
facilitate the retreat of their own infantry.[70]
_Machine Guns in the late War_
All officers are enthusiastic about machine guns. All agree that
their chief rôle is defence, even at night, and they are extremely
useful in attack. During the battle of Mukden machine guns were
used very much in the attack by the Japanese, but it seems that the
casualties of the machine-gun detachments were very heavy indeed;
one commander thought them especially useful in pursuit.[71]
_Remarks by Lt.-Gen. Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B._
The value of machine guns is fully recognised. I had a long
conversation with the brigade machine-gun officer. He has six
machine guns formed as a separate detachment, extra-regimental,
and attached to the brigade. Two guns under an officer form the
subdivision of his command, and can be detached at will, but no
machine gun is ever employed singly. The guns are usually kept
at the disposal of the brigadier, and have been used more in
defence than attack; they seldom open at long ranges unless on an
exceptionally good target. It is rather the rule to reserve the
machine-gun fire for decisive ranges. In many actions which cavalry
officers described to me, the practice has been to allow the enemy
to come within 600 yards before opening fire, and then suddenly
to overwhelm him. The principle with such well-trained troops is
sound, for the morale “knock-out” of a 10-per-cent. loss suffered
in a few minutes is far greater than a similar loss spread over the
advance from 1,000 to 600 yards, and the expenditure of ammunition
is less. Concealment is an essential feature of the Japanese
machine-gun tactics, and the officer told me he had not a single
gun put out of action by opposing artillery. The guns have shields;
the manipulators of the machine guns are very expert, and there is
now seldom a jam. Like a good _chauffeur_, the Japanese machine
gunner knows all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires, and can
almost tell by instinct when anything is going wrong. Four thousand
rounds is the most that has been fired in a day by three machine
guns of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the number is now increased to
six. Throughout the Japanese Army the machine guns introduced
during the war are very popular, and instead of three per regiment,
six per regiment are being provided.
_Report by U.S.A. Officers on Russo-Japanese War_
These guns were highly thought of in the Japanese Army, and the
propriety of attaching them to the infantry was never questioned.
Four or six guns per battery and one battery per regiment were
usually suggested, although good arguments have been heard for
eight guns in a battery, and the wish for twelve was sometimes
expressed.... On the outbreak of war the Japanese expected
largely to limit the use of the machine gun to the defensive,
but experience soon taught them to widen its field, and later it
was used to great advantage on the offensive. Their rapid fire
frequently silenced the fire of the Russian infantry, and caused
the latter to crouch down in their trenches. When the guns stopped
firing the Russians could be seen again popping their heads above
the parapet. If the flanks of a line be weak, these weapons can be
used advantageously to strengthen them. Six guns were generally
recommended for a battery, thus permitting an assignment of two
per battalion. One officer of high rank, however, who was heard
to discuss this question ably, said he preferred eight guns, and
that he would divide these into two equal sections and assign
each section to a battalion, thus leaving the third battalion
without any. His idea was to use these guns both on the offensive
and defensive. On the offensive he would send them forward among
the first lines of the battalion to which they were attached,
or reinforce these lines by the guns at an early stage of the
action. In this way he would use them as a substitute for infantry
reinforcements. This system will enable the regimental commander to
hold the third battalion much longer intact for a decisive effort
when an opportunity offers. Officers who have had experience with
machine guns were opposed to using them singly, saying that never
less than two should be at any position not only to obtain volume
of fire, but also because a gun can so easily be put out of action.
In order to reduce the losses among the men from shrapnel fire to
a minimum, they recommend that the guns in a platoon be separated
by 20 metres and the platoons by 100 to 200 metres. Artillery
fire is looked upon as the most dangerous foe of the machine gun,
and in fact the most effective use of the latter on the offensive
presupposes the enemy’s artillery has been silenced, or at least
that its attention is well occupied by friendly batteries. The
machine gun is believed to be especially useful in mountainous
districts, where the elevated ground often discloses the close
formation of the enemy. The Japanese frequently fired it from an
elevated position over the heads of their infantry, and in this
way, as their battalions advanced, they at times kept down the fire
from the Russian trenches.
An officer who commanded one of these batteries at the battle of
Mukden, and who later was detailed to lecture to the attachés with
the First Army, said that on one occasion there he continued this
fire until the advancing infantry had arrived within 30 metres
of the enemy’s position. It is claimed the fire should almost
invariably be directed against the opposing infantry. The gun is
comparatively heavy, and when in action the battery is advancing
with the infantry it is sometimes difficult to keep up with the
latter, and moreover the men carrying the gun offer a good target;
and for these reasons the guns should frequently remain in position
as the echelons make their rushes, provided cover is provided
and a free field of fire secured. It is not essential that they
should be at all times immediately on the line occupied by the
infantry, although when the latter, after a considerable advance,
meets with determined opposition, some guns should be brought up.
This will give a feeling of confidence, and if need be help to
check a counter-attack. When advancing under fire, it is often a
good plan to move one gun at a time. Battery commanders report
good results when firing at long ranges--that is, between 1,200
and 1,800 metres. One thousand five hundred shots per gun is the
greatest number I heard of being fired in one hour. These guns were
sometimes attached to outposts. The loss among men serving machine
guns is usually great, and this requires that a large number be
trained in each regiment to use them. One officer of experience
with these weapons thought all officers and men selected to work
with them should be trained at division headquarters, or at some
other central point, in order to secure uniformity of instruction
and service.
On a previous occasion I reported that the shield was not generally
desired. I wish to modify this statement, as further investigation
showed that while different views were entertained on this subject,
the consensus of opinion was favourable to the retention of the
shield. The objections to it are that it offers a good target
and is more or less difficult to handle on the offensive. Some
officers were in favour of using it on the defensive, but not on
the offensive. In general, however, it was thought that both on the
offensive and defensive it gives material cover and adds confidence
and composure. The guns were almost invariably transported on
pack-ponies, except, of course, when effecting changes of position
under heavy fire, when they were carried by hand. It is understood
wheels were occasionally used in some parts of the army, but I
never saw the guns transported that way....
Machine guns were also added to the cavalry after the outbreak of
the war, there being six to each brigade, divided into sections of
two guns under one officer. Sections may be attached to squadrons
as required. The guns are used primarily for defence, and their
fire reserved for short and mid ranges....
Machine guns played an important part in the siege of Port
Arthur, being freely used by both sides. The Japanese gun was a
single-barrelled gun of home manufacture, while the Russians used
mainly the Maxim automatic. The Russian guns were used with telling
effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, being
trained to cover all the approaches with a murderous fire.
PORTUGAL
On mobilisation machine-gun foot batteries are formed, the
personnel being provided from the division to which the batteries
are subsequently attached. Each battery consists of 6 guns, and is
commanded by a captain. It is subdivided into 3 sections of 2 guns
each, commanded by a subaltern.
The gun is provided with a shield and has a tripod mounting, the
whole being carried on a wheeled carriage on the march. When coming
into action the gun and tripod are taken out of the carriage and
carried into position by 4 men.
The weight of the gun, tripod, and shield, amounting to about 175
lb., is unevenly distributed and renders rapid marching impossible,
as it must be carried as one piece owing to the complicated
attachment of gun and tripod.
The tripod is heavy and rather high, making the gun conspicuous in
action, and on steep slopes the mounting is unstable.
The elevating and traversing gear do not give sufficient scope.
The cartridge belt contains 250 rounds. Each section (2 guns) has
an ammunition wagon carrying 14,000 rounds for each gun.
RUSSIA
GUNS.--Rexar and Maxim, but the former are being discarded and
Maxims alone will be used in future. They are sighted up to 2,000
yards.
ORGANISATION.--Each regiment (4 battalions) has 4 machine guns, and
it is intended to increase this to 8 in the future.
The detail of the personnel to each battery of 4 guns is as
follows: 2 officers, 50 N.C.O.’s and men, and 35 horses if the guns
are on wheeled carriages (36 horses if the guns are carried on
pack-horses).
The detachment is armed with the carbine.
For each gun 13 belts of ammunition are carried, each belt
containing 450 rounds.
The weight of the gun is 68 lb., and of the tripod 45 lb.; the
total weight carried by the pack-horse being 198 lb.
SPAIN
has 6 groups of Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, which have been recently
subdivided into 2 sections. Two new sections were raised in
September 1908.
The 14 sections are attached to the infantry brigades.
Pack transport has been adopted.
SWITZERLAND
There are 4 companies, each having 8 guns, which are subdivided
into sections of 2 guns each.
The detachments are mounted and the guns are allotted to the
cavalry.
The Maxim is the gun adopted by the Swiss Army, and in the
Regulations three kinds of machine-gun fire are recognised, viz.:
(1) _Salvoes, for range-finding._--The 2 guns of a section fire
short salvoes of 20 to 25 rounds alternately to get the right range.
(2) _Quick fire._--This is the normal method, and consists in
firing about 100 rounds at a time.
(3) _Rapid fire by individual guns._--Each gun fires as rapidly
as possible; used only as a last resort, or against a specially
favourable target.
The section (2 guns) is regarded as the unit, and the spirit of the
Regulations is that the machine guns are particularly for use with
cavalry, and must possess to the full the mobility and dash of that
arm.
Dismounted action for the cavalry is not favourably regarded, and
the machine guns are expected to relieve the cavalry of this duty.
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
[Illustration: A MAP SHEWING
the approximate allotment of Machine Guns for the
DEFENCE OF PORT ARTHUR]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Lieutenant A. E. Phillips, in the _Journal U.S.A. Cavalry
Association_, July 1909.
[2] The Germans consider its fire value equal to 120 rifles.
[3] Balck’s _Modern European Tactics_.
[4] These are still in use in the Territorial Army.
[5] _Journal of U.S.A. Cavalry Association_, July 1909.
[6] United States Official Report of Russo-Japanese War.
[7] See pages 12 and 13.
[8] See Chap. VII., “Cavalry Training.”
[9] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 226.
[10] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I.
[11] _Cavalry Training_, 1907.
[12] _France Militaire_, April 15th, 1905.
[13] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 218.
[14] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. chap. vii. p. 133.
[15] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, chap. vii. p. 229.
[16] Captain F. Culmann in _R.U.S.I. Journal_, August, 1909.
[17] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 116.
[18] The Austrian regulations say 1,000 yards.
[19] Captain von Beckmann.
[20] _Times History of the War in South Africa._
[21] A Japanese machine gun fired 25,000 rounds in one day in
Manchuria.--AUTHOR.
[22] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. p. 119.
[23] _Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_, par Lieut. M.
[24] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[25] Captain Niessel in _Enseignements techniques de la guerre
Russo-Japonaise_.
[26] Captain von Beckmann.
[27] Von Ullrich.
[28] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[29] Von Ullrich, War Correspondent of _Gazette de Cologne_.
[30] British Officer’s Report, Russo-Japanese War.
[31] _Ibid._
[32] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[33] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[34] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 85.
[35] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 84.
[36] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 86.
[37] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, pp. 87-9.
[38] Between 400 and 500 is the usual rate of fire.--AUTHOR.
[39] See _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, pp. 88-9.
[40] See map; the Japanese name for this work is Ban-ru-san Nishi
Hodai.
[41] See _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 153.
[42] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[43] _Ibid._
[44] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[45] Von Ullrich.
[46] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[47] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 140.
[48] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., p. 141.
[49] A great many machine guns were added to the forts from the
fleet early in June.--AUTHOR.
[50] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice._
[51] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909.
[52] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_, p. 441.
[53] Official Report.
[54] Official History of operations in Somaliland.
[55] Major Gough’s Official Report.
[56] Official History of the operations in Somaliland.
[57] From Staff Diary of 1st Brigade.
[58] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 173.
[59] Callwell’s _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_.
[60] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, Sect. 157.
[61] This system was adopted; see paragraph _re_ Organisation, p.
189.
[62] Section 7.
[63] Section 77, Para. 4.
[64] Section 150, Para. 5.
[65] Section 150, Para. (iv).
[66] Section 149, Para. (v).
[67] They should fire with their own companies if it can be
arranged that they complete the various parts of the range practice
on approximately the same date.
[68] The Hotchkiss loses accuracy after 600 rounds, and becomes
red-hot after 14,000 rounds.
[69] U.S.A. Official Reports on Russo-Japanese War.
[70] _Revue d’Infanterie_, March, 1908.
[71] Officer’s report, U.S.A., Russo-Japanese War.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 57: ‘moral action’ replaced by ‘morale action’.
Pg 70: ‘should aways’ replaced by ‘should always’.
Pg 114: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 119: ‘M. Ulrich’ replaced by ‘M. Ullrich’.
Pg 125: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 133: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 152: ‘same fate befel’ replaced by ‘same fate befell’.
Pg 173: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 183: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 220: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 222: ‘he held in’ replaced by ‘be held in’.
Pg 258: ‘the moral “knock-out”’ replaced by ‘the morale “knock-out”’.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Machine-Gun Tactics" ***
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