Title: Training Infantry
Author: Morrison, John F.
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.


*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Training Infantry" ***


  Transcriber’s Note
  Italic text displayed as: _italic_



  TRAINING
  INFANTRY


  BY

  JOHN F. MORRISON

  Colonel of Infantry


  U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
  Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

  1914



  COPYRIGHT. 1914. BY JOHN F. MORRISON


  Ketcheson Printing Company
  Leavenworth



PREFACE


In my commissioned service of over thirty-three years I have spent
over twenty-two years with my regiment and three years in training
a battalion of college cadets. I have been intimately associated
with the national guard of one state and have had experience with
the guard of four other states. I have seen something of foreign
troops in both peace and war. In these many years I have observed the
methods of training employed by a number of officers.

Our infantry training has improved over what I first knew but there
still exists in places a lack of completeness and system. Of late
years a much greater interest than formerly has been taken in the
tactical instruction and training of our officers and the progress
has been marked. The tactician is, however, but the skilled mechanic;
the tools with which he works are his troops. New recruits are like
the lump of ore, of no use until converted into steel and then forged
into shape. The making of this tool from the raw material is our
principal business during peace.

At the request of officers with whom I have often talked and
corresponded on the subject of training infantry, this little book of
suggestions has been prepared. It is based on my own experience and
observation and what others have told me of their work. It is offered
by an older officer to his younger brothers in the infantry in the
hope that it may be of some service to them.

  J. F. M.



CONTENTS


        PAGE

  PREFACE      3

  INTRODUCTION      7

  CHAPTER

  I THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE                                  9
  KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT

  II GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME                                   19
  WINTER AND SUMMER WORK

  III FIRE SUPERIORITY                                              32
  FIRE DISTRIBUTION, CONTROL AND
  DISCIPLINE, SIGNALS

  IV COMBAT                                                         44
  THE COMPANY, BATTALION, REGIMENT

  V ARTILLERY FIRE                                                  70
  EFFECTIVENESS, FORMATIONS TO MEET
  TEAM PLAY

  VI PATROLS, ADVANCE AND REAR GUARDS, OUTPOSTS                     89

  VII MARCHING                                                     104
  PREPARATIONS, INSTRUCTION, PRACTICE

  VIII THE NATIONAL GUARD                                          113
  ESSENTIAL TRAINING FOR, ARMORY
  WORK AND SUMMER CAMPS

  IX INSPECTIONS                                                   130
  YEARLY, COMPANY AND BATTALION
  EXAMINATIONS

  X TRAINING A NEW REGIMENT                                        134
  PRINCIPLES, SCHEDULE FOR

  XI RECRUITING                                                    161
  NEED FOR A CHANGE, PLAN, REASONS

  XII IN CONCLUSION                                                177
  RELATIVE VALUES, STRENGTH OF THE
  COMPANY, OUR RESPONSIBILITY



INTRODUCTION


[Sidenote: Importance of training infantry]

There is nothing more important to an army than the correct training
of its infantry. The training of all the arms has much in common, but
training infantry, owing to the manner of its use in battle, calls
for much that is not required in the other arms.

The infantry soldier must work more independently than men in the
other branches. He cannot be led or controlled as can men in groups
or close formations; hence he needs to be more thoroughly instructed
in the part he is to play. This instruction cannot be given him on
the field of battle. The man who must steadily advance on an enemy in
position requires not only higher training but higher discipline than
one who does his fighting in close formation, or at long range and
out of sight of the enemy and protected from hostile fire by steel
shields.

The mere mechanical part of the drill of all the arms is not
difficult as regards its execution on the peaceful drillground but
it requires much training to carry out these same things on the
battlefield.

[Sidenote: Importance of infantry training]

It is reported as an incident in the recent Balkan War that a general
of division, whose infantry had been reinforced by the addition of
fifty per cent of recruits who had only received about a month’s
training, prepared for battle by sending all his new men to the rear,
preferring to fight without them. His division was successful but the
other divisions, which retained their new men in ranks during combat,
broke and were routed.

War of today is not a game for amateurs. Infantry to be of any value
has not only to be trained but to be properly and thoroughly trained.
On the part of those in charge of this training there is necessary
an appreciative understanding of the objects sought, earnest effort,
tact, enthusiasm, and a real knowledge of men.



I

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT


[Sidenote: Practise and theory]

To ensure the proper training of our infantry there are needed
competent officers—officers who know what should be taught and how to
teach it. One sometimes hears: “He is a good practical soldier but he
knows nothing of the theory.” Such an expression is an absurdity. A
man may know the theory yet be unable to apply it or make practical
use of it; we have all seen such men. But a man cannot practice what
he does not know. The knowledge of theory required by the junior
commander is not great and the time it takes to learn it is short
compared with the time required to master its practical application
and to instruct properly a command.

[Sidenote: Needs of the unit commander]

The first requisite for a unit commander is a knowledge of the
fundamental principles of the tactics of his arm and its employment
in combination with the other arms, especially with the artillery.
He must have a clear conception of the modern battlefield in order
to understand for what he must train his unit. He must train it for
battle conditions, not peace conditions. A company trained to be
handled exclusively by word of command, as in a close order drill on
the parade ground, lacks the training that fits for battle.

[Sidenote: Needs of the unit commander]

[Sidenote: Essential and desirable instruction]

The more the enlisted men know of the art of war the better. Time
is not available however, to teach them the whole art of war even
if the men in ranks were capable of mastering it. The instructor
must therefore clearly understand what are the things the men _must_
know and what are merely _desirable_ as additions to their training.
Every effort should be spent and all available time devoted to first
perfecting the men in the things they _must_ know; afterwards, if
more time is available, it is well to extend in other directions
their education and training.

[Sidenote: Close order drill]

Under the first heading, _essentials_, the men must be taught their
close order drill. This is necessary for two reasons: it renders
possible the orderly movement of troops and it makes for discipline.
So far as the orderly movement of troops is concerned very little
is necessary but without precision close order drill is of no value
towards discipline. To have a disciplinary value, drill movements
must be carried out with exactitude. Discipline is injured if,
when an officer gives a command at drill, it is only carried out
approximately; the soldier is acquiring the habit of slighting his
work and of doing an approximation, not the precise duty demanded of
him.

It takes but little longer to learn to execute correctly the few
movements prescribed than to learn them incorrectly, but it requires
constant attention on the part of the instructor to maintain
exactness. The attention and effort required on the part of the
instructor are, however, amply compensated by the results.

[Sidenote: Extended order drill]

The men must know perfectly the mechanism of the extended order
drill. A company must be able without confusion or mix-up to form
line of skirmishers in the least possible time from any formation and
facing in any direction. This will necessitate much practice. It does
not take long to learn to form line of skirmishers quietly, from line
or column of squads, facing to the front; but that is not sufficient.

[Sidenote: Other essentials]

The men must know how to estimate distances, how to shoot, how to use
the bayonet; they must understand patrolling and outpost duty, the
construction of hasty intrenchments, the application of first aid,
how to cook the ration and how to care for their arms and equipment.

Especially important is it that the men know how to march and how to
care for themselves in the field. However well instructed a soldier
may be he is of no use if at the time of battle he is back in the
hospital.

[Sidenote: Desirable instruction]

Under the second heading, of things that it is desirable the men
should know, are subjects which are essential for the officers to
know but which are not equally essential for the men. Nevertheless
it is an advantage to have them know as much as possible, provided
the merely desirable instruction does not interfere with the proper
training in essentials. Among these subjects are topography and the
construction of temporary bridges; the list might be extended almost
indefinitely.

[Sidenote: Things to be understood and things to be made fixed habits]

The instructor must further distinguish between the essential things
which the men need merely to know or to understand and those which
need to be practiced until they become habits. Those things the men
will only be required to do off the battlefield, where they will
have time to think and be in condition to use their heads, need only
be known.

Psychology teaches us that under great stress of danger and
excitement a man can be depended upon to do only those things which
have become fixed habits, and further, that under these same trying
conditions, a man who has acquired by practice a habit of doing
something a certain way cannot do that thing differently. Action
contrary to habit requires thought, and mental activity is difficult
if not impossible under the circumstances. Acting according to habit
is merely following the line of least resistance.

It is difficult to conceive of greater stress of danger and
excitement than exists in a modern battle. Certainly there is no
other case in which the knowledge of this psychological truth can be
used to greater advantage than in training for battle.

[Sidenote: Fixed habits in battle]

As far as possible, then, all those things which the men must do
under fire should be practiced until they become fixed habits. It has
been said that if in the heat of battle a man even raises his rifle
to his shoulder, before firing, it shows fair discipline. Not only
must bringing the rifle to the shoulder be made a habit, but correct
aiming and trigger pull whenever the rifle is brought to the shoulder
must be made a habit, and one so strongly developed that these acts
will always be done mechanically and without mental effort.

[Sidenote: Habits of correct aiming and firing]

This desired result cannot be accomplished by two or three weeks
a year of target practice. The training must be continuous for an
extended period. To accomplish it altogether with ball cartridges
would be too costly and often impracticable. The desired results can
be obtained by pointing and aiming drills and gallery practice, if
these are so conducted that the men never pull the trigger without
properly bringing the rifle to the shoulder and looking through the
sights at some target.

A week of continuous work every six months will not accomplish the
results; frequent short drill periods are necessary. A man who starts
in by smoking three strong cigars every Christmas and Fourth of
July but not touching tobacco between times will not be so likely
to acquire the smoking habit as one who starts very moderately
and repeats the act daily. Overdoing any kind of training at one
time, with long intervals between has a tendency to produce dislike
rather than a habit. A few minutes of honest work at least twice
every week, in pointing and aiming drill and gallery practice, will
accomplish the result desired and my experience convinces me that it
also produces much better results on the target range than crowding
even more of this practice into the last month before going on the
range. Certainly it is worth more than the other as a habit-former.

[Sidenote: Estimating the range]

The better a man can shoot when the range is known to him the more
important it is that his sight elevation be correct. A poor shot will
scatter his bullets and may hit something even with a wrong elevation
but the accurate shot will not hit anything; yet the correct range is
valuable even to the poor shot.

On the battlefield we can count only on our estimate of the range;
seldom will it be practicable to determine it otherwise. Thus
estimating distances has to be made a habit for two reasons: since
habits alone count in battle, only by making it a habit can we depend
on its being done; and second, it requires constant practice to
enable men to estimate distances with fair accuracy.

Devoting two or three consecutive days annually to estimating
distances is almost a waste of time; practice should be had every
week. I have seen both methods used and I am certain as to their
relative values. How this instruction should be given will be
mentioned later.

The deployments, advancing the attack, working by signals, taking
advantage of cover, and in fact everything pertaining to combat from
the opening of fire until the end of the battle must be practiced
until it becomes a fixed habit on the part of the men.

[Sidenote: The officer as instructor]

If we are to have good infantry the officers as instructors must
be competent, have an appreciation of relative values, be able to
distinguish between what is essential and what is merely desirable
and make sure of essentials before spending time on the latter. Each
officer must realize fully what has only to be known and what must be
made fixed habit and govern his work accordingly.

[Sidenote: Hints as to instruction work]

Now a few hints as to the instruction work. Never do this work in a
perfunctory manner. Always have in mind what you want to teach and
how you are going to do it. Put your heart in your work.

I have seen a well drilled company go to pieces under an officer who
gave his commands in an indifferent manner and who gave too much
“place rest.” The spirit of indifference is contagious as well as the
spirit of enthusiasm. If you have no keen interest simulate it and
you will find it grow into the real thing. Remember that you are paid
for good work and if you do not give this kind of service you are
obtaining money fraudulently.

But not only have you yourself to keep interested; if the best
results are to be obtained you must keep up the interest of your men.
Nothing kills interest like monotony. There are so many things to be
taught and there is so great an opportunity for variety that there is
no excuse for not keeping the men interestedly busy for four hours a
day.

Make clear to the men in the instruction work, particularly in the
field training, not only the object sought but the why and wherefore.
In maneuvers always explain the problem to them so far as is
necessary to make them understand what the command is trying to do,
where the enemy is supposed to be, and the rest. They will respond
not only by taking more interest but by doing their part much better.

I have seen a flank patrol out at a maneuver the leader of which
knew nothing of the supposed situation and had been given no
instructions, except to act as left flank patrol. What interest could
he be expected to take in the maneuver? How could he be counted on
properly to perform his duty?

[Sidenote: Callisthenic drill]

I believe in carrying out this principle even in the callisthenic
drill. Explain to the men the object of each movement, what muscle is
to be developed by it and its advantage. Doing this makes this work
much more profitable to the men as well as more interesting. It will
also prevent our seeing these movements so executed as to deprive
them of all their intended value.

[Sidenote: Appeal to the intelligence of the men]

In other words, treat the men being instructed as the intelligent men
they are. They will both learn faster and do better work when they
fully understand what is to be done and the reason why. A horse must
be simply made to do certain things in a given way; it is a tedious
process and a horse never does know much. Men trained as soldiers
on the same plan as the horse give results out of all proportion to
the time and effort spent. Why not, therefore, make use of the man’s
intelligence and simply help him train himself?



II

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME


In this country we cannot follow literally any of the systems of
training adopted by the great military powers: our whole military
system is too different. We can, however, profit by their experience
and, if we translate, not the literal text of their regulations but
the spirit, gain much. It is essential that any scheme of instruction
adopted should be suited to our organization, method of recruitment
and the various conditions surrounding our service.

[Sidenote: Requisites of a system of training]

The work must be so planned as to utilize all the available time
of the year and in that time to cover all the absolute essentials
of instruction. In this utilization of the time schools for
non-commissioned officers and officers must be included. There is
much ground to be covered during the year and unless the time be
wisely apportioned it cannot be done.

There is much of the work that can be done indoors; other work can
only be done outside. Our troops are so widely scattered and under
such varying climatic conditions that the distribution of time cannot
profitably be the same for all.

[Sidenote: Winter and summer work]

[Sidenote: Schools]

Each post should make its own schedule. The work in each post must,
however, be uniform. For example, in the northern part of the United
States the year’s training should begin November 1st and end October
31st. All the instruction that can be given during the winter months,
should be given, leaving the rest for the open season. The schools
for both officers and non-commissioned officers are held during the
indoor season; the work done in them should dovetail in with the
general scheme of instruction. Particular care should be exercised
with respect to the non-commissioned officers’ schools; in them the
non-commissioned officers should be taught thoroughly how to play
their part in the varied work in the field and be given the reasons
for things.

Simply repeating the words of a book should be avoided; teach them to
do things. The company commander who is capable and in earnest can do
much in winter toward training his company even in garrisons where
weather conditions are the worst.

[Sidenote: Methods of winter instruction]

Most of the captains of one regiment known to me have been doing good
work during the past two years in teaching the principles of the
conduct of patrols and covering detachments. Some of them made use
of the Stacey Relief Map; others simply built a sand table about ten
feet by five. On this the sand was moulded to form hills and valleys.
Blue strings were laid down for streams, yellow ones for roads.
Miniature bridges were constructed and placed where desired. Small
twigs were used to make forests.

By means of practical examples worked out on these made or improvised
maps the principles were thoroughly taught and more easily than is
possible out of doors; when spring came, only a few exercises on the
ground were necessary to make these companies proficient.

[Sidenote: Entrenching]

Another use made of the sand table was in the teaching of
entrenching. Bull Durham tobacco sacks were converted into sand
bags and the men taught their use in revetting, loop-holing, etc.
Similarly on a miniature scale were taught the preparation of
headlogs, the making of gabions, facines and hurdle revetment. Brush
work thus taught indoors needs only be followed by one outdoor
exercise, in which work is done on the scale actually used in the
field, in order to render the company proficient.

[Sidenote: Gymnasium]

Where the post is so fortunate as to be provided with a gymnasium
full advantage should be taken during the winter season of the
opportunities for physical training which it affords. The physical
development of the men is most important. Where no gymnasium is
available a well-planned course in callisthenics is the best
substitute and should be used. Callisthenics to music or for pure
show should be prohibited.

[Sidenote: First aid Signalling]

The indoor season must be fully utilized to save the full time of
the outdoor season for that training which can only be given then.
Instruction in such subjects as first aid and signalling naturally is
given at this time. A place for gallery practice can always be rigged
up.

[Sidenote: Estimating distances]

The foundation for estimating distances must be laid, and there
should be practice in it every week, during the closed season. In
this work the whole company should be employed together only for the
first one or two exercises when the principles are being explained;
after that a platoon or less at a time. Near each barracks there
should be two stakes one hundred yards apart and so placed that the
men see them every time the company forms. This is their unit of
measure and cannot become too familiar to them.

The captain or someone designated by him selects a couple of
distances to be estimated. Each subdivision of the company then goes
out in turn and upon completing the exercise returns and another goes
out.

The men must be taught to estimate distances both from themselves
to a given point and between two points, both at some distance from
them. The latter is necessary in their patrol work in estimating
lengths of column and frontages occupied. If the estimating be
conducted in this way the weather will make little difference; the
men dress suitably for it and are out only a short time. The work to
be of value must be done under varying conditions of light.

There should be no week in the year in which this exercise is not
conducted. In summer it should be done on the days when the company
is away from the garrison on the weekly practice march; there is
ample time for it during the long halt.

This work can be conducted so as only to take about fifteen minutes
of each man’s time per week. It is well worth it. I have seen the
above plan carried out intelligently in two or three companies and
the results were remarkably good; the ability of the men to estimate
distance was better than that given for musketry school graduates
in foreign services. On the other hand I have seen it indifferently
carried out and, like most indifferent work, it was a waste of time.

[Sidenote: Position and aiming drills, gallery practice]

Position and aiming drills and gallery practice must be a weekly
occurrence and holding them twice a week will be better. If the
detachments are made small enough gallery practice requires but
little time for each man. It is important in conducting this practice
to see that no man ever fires a score in a careless or indifferent
manner; if this is permitted the result obtained will be the opposite
of that desired. I found one very effective means of preventing such
careless work: a man found guilty of careless firing was required
to repeat his score—but not at that time when it would delay the
regular course. He had to remain near the gallery until I, or someone
designated by me, came around to supervise his firing and it was
usually some little time before I got around.

[Sidenote: Bayonet fencing]

Throughout the year careful attention should be given to bayonet
fencing. I do not believe that there is much probability of a bayonet
contest in war but, for psychological reasons, this training is
necessary. Positions are carried by the bayonet, but past experience
shows that in such charges the bayonets seldom crossed and when they
did it was a “rough and tumble.” Our men may go in with the best
intentions in the world to use the bayonet according to rule, yet the
chances are that, in the excitement of the mélee, habit will assert
itself and the gun become a bat.

Nevertheless, troops are very seldom “shot out of a position”; the
imminent threat of the bayonet is necessary; but, as the opposing
bayonets get close, one side or the other weakens.

[Sidenote: Kind of bayonet required]

It would be folly to expect men without bayonets to charge an enemy
with long and sharp ones, or to expect them without bayonets to stand
a charge by an enemy armed with such weapons, even though, if they
had bayonets, they would be likely to club their rifles. The moral
effect of a line of bayonets is great.

Infantry should be armed with the best of bayonets, long and, in war
time, razor sharp. The men must have confidence in their ability to
use them with skill and effect; otherwise they will neither charge
nor stand the enemy’s charge. At that stage of the fight success
largely depends on the confidence of the individual man in his power
to win.

[Sidenote: Amount of bayonet practice]

Bayonet fencing should be continuous throughout the year. At least
one-half-hour weekly should be devoted to it and during the indoor
season extended and careful instruction should be given to groups
not larger than a squad. During the outdoor season this instruction
should be so arranged as not to interfere with the regular drills.

[Sidenote: Division into sections for instruction]

The company should be divided into sections that can be handled
conveniently for the instruction work. The success of the indoor work
largely depends on keeping the sections small enough.

This is especially necessary in first aid and sandtable work. If the
sections are too large at estimating distance and gallery practice it
results in too much idle standing around.

[Sidenote: Changing sections]

The sections must be changed from one class of work to another before
the work drags or the men become tired of it. Give them variety.

[Sidenote: Selecting instructors]

The captain must exercise care in selecting the instructors for the
various subjects. The man who will do it the best should be the
instructor in each. Perfunctory or indifferent work should never be
allowed on the part of an instructor or by the man being instructed.

[Sidenote: The captain]

The capable, intelligent and honest captain will utilize the
indoor season to the great benefit of his company and of his
government. He will discover the best ways and means of instructing
his own particular men. The incompetent captain, lacking average
intelligence, will accomplish nothing under any circumstances.

[Sidenote: Initiative in the instruction work]

As much latitude as practicable should be given to subordinate
commanders in carrying out any system of instruction and they should
be held strictly responsible for results. A scheme in which there
is laid down just how each thing is to be taught, and how much time
and what time is to be devoted to it, is radically wrong. We need to
develop our officers as well as our men. The conditions are different
at different posts. The needs of different companies at the same
posts are varied. Each captain should know just how much time he has
and what is absolutely required of him in that time. He should then
be allowed to work out his own solution of the problem.

When every detail is prescribed the officer has no initiative,
his interest is diminished, he thinks less, exercises less
responsibility, and his work is not so good. If that policy be kept
up long enough the subordinate officer will never do anything without
positive instructions. An officer who exercises no judgment is of no
value in war.

[Sidenote: The regiment a team]

But absolute liberty for the subordinate to do as he pleases is
impracticable. The regiment is a team of which his unit is only one
member. There must be team play and every member must know and be
able to do his part. The company must be taught certain things or it
will not fit into the battalion team; the battalion must be fitted
for the regimental team. Each larger unit must have time for training
and has a right to demand that each lower unit which forms a part of
it shall have accomplished its own special work on time and be ready
to play its part in the work of the larger unit.

[Sidenote: The colonel]

The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. He
should allot the time, supervise the work and see that every member
of the team is ready. He is the best judge of the requirements of
his regiment. But the colonel should do this so as to leave all the
liberty practicable to subordinate commanders.

[Sidenote: Orders and restriction]

If all our captains were competent and reliable this work of
the colonel would be very simple. But there are a few captains,
unfortunately, who are far from the best, whose long suit at drill
is “place rest” and having a sergeant drill the company in Butts’
Manual. While more restrictions are necessary for such captains these
restrictions do not hamper the others; they merely prohibit things
the right kind of captain would never think of doing or require what
he would never think of omitting.

[Sidenote: Time to organizations]

Of course most of the instruction time belongs to the companies; it
is in them that most of the work must be done. Four well trained
companies under a competent major can be made into a well trained
battalion in a very few days, and the time required for each higher
unit is less than that for the one next below.

[Sidenote: Time to target practice]

To the company belongs all the indoor season. In dividing the rest
of the year for the northern part of the U. S. I believe that the
available time from April 1st to October 1st should be allotted in
the proportion of 4 days to the company for each 2 to the battalion
and 1 to the regiment. The month of October should be devoted to
maneuvers and to work in higher units. The time spent on the target
range is excluded in computing the available time but no company
should be allowed to devote more than two weeks to target practice
exclusive of field firing; of the latter we can hardly get too much.
It is appreciated that conditions at various posts make different
schedules necessary.

In the past we have seen the training done in a back-handed way: work
in the higher units first, finally down to the company and soldier.
This is so unlikely to occur in future that its evil results are not
worth mentioning.

[Sidenote: Time to close order drill]

Too much time should not be devoted to close order drill, especially
during the outdoor season. An hour a day for the first five or six
drills and thereafter fifteen minutes a day is ample. There should
always be, however, at least ten minutes a day of snappy, precise
close order work; this together with the ceremonies will keep the
companies up to the standard. Too much close order drill becomes
monotonous; when that happens the command fails to improve even if
it does not deteriorate.

[Sidenote: Length of drills]

The drills during the indoor season should be two hours long; for the
rest of the year not less than three and generally from four to six
hours daily.



III

FIRE SUPERIORITY


We are told that in battle we must have fire superiority to win; and
fire control and direction are held as important. I doubt if these
terms are fully understood by all. A hope to aid some of our younger
officers to a better understanding of these terms, and of the vital
importance of fire distribution, is the excuse for this chapter.

[Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle]

A line of men firing with the rifle, if not disturbed or endangered
by the fire of an enemy, can do approximately target practice work.
Now let a heavy fire be opened on them, one that is fairly accurate
and well placed, and their work falls off very greatly; the heavier
the fire they are subjected to the less effective becomes their own
fire.

Careful study and research by competent men of foreign armies leads
to the conclusion that if this line, when not under fire, could make
280 hits in a given time, subjected to a heavy, well placed fire its
effectiveness would fall to 1/40 or 1/70; that is, from 280 hits to 7
or 4.

[Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle]

This looks extreme at first thought; but what captain with a good
company but would know that he could deploy his company at from 800
to 1000 yards from a line of lying down figures and get a hit for at
least every 10 shots. Yet history tells us that it takes from 1200
to 2000 shots in battle to put a man out of action. In the light of
these facts our first figures look very moderate.

With our present infantry arm an advance against a hostile line doing
280 work is impossible. Bring the enemy’s effectiveness down to the
four and keep it there and you can advance and win.

Fire superiority does not mean that you are firing more shots than
the enemy, it does not mean he is firing less than you; it means that
your fire has become so close and effective that he has lost his
nerve and is shooting wildly.

[Sidenote: Fire distribution]

To obtain this fire superiority certain things are necessary. We must
have proper fire distribution. To explain this let us assume that a
hostile line is 200 yards long, that our force is the stronger. We
concentrate our fire on the right half of the hostile line, leaving
the other half untouched. The effectiveness of the fire of half of
this line remains at 280, the other half falls to 2, average 141;
our advance is impossible. We now cover the entire target and its
fire effectiveness falls to 7; our advance is possible.

[Sidenote: Fire distribution]

Fire superiority is possible, then, only if we have fire
distribution. It is not sufficient to fire a certain number of shots
at part of the line, the whole hostile line must be subjected to a
nerve racking fire to reduce the effectiveness of its fire.

Another thing to be considered is that the enemy will conceal himself
as much as possible. On a large part of the hostile line no one will
be seen; men will be hidden by tufts of grass, bushes, etc. But while
this cover conceals the enemy from our view, he sees our location
and his fire is not interrupted. There is a strong tendency to shoot
only at the men that can be seen. This must be overcome; much of
our firing must be aimed at a locality, although unseen the enemy
is nevertheless there and his fire effectiveness must be kept down.
Our fire must be distributed to cover every part of the hostile line
whether the enemy is seen or not.

[Sidenote: Fire control]

To secure this fire distribution we must be able to direct the fire
of our men, to place it where wanted. But direction necessarily
implies control; you can not direct what you cannot control. Thus a
fire control system which will work on the battlefield is a primary
requisite to success.

[Sidenote: Fire discipline]

Another term used is fire discipline. The word fire adds nothing to
its meaning; but discipline is vital to success. No matter what your
system of control, if the men do not respond with prompt obedience it
is worthless. Disciplined men can be counted on to do what is wanted
if they know how, others cannot. There is no fire discipline distinct
from other military discipline.

To sum up: fire superiority is necessary to success, to attain fire
superiority we must properly distribute our fire, to do this we must
be able to control and hence direct it, and this can only be done if
our men are disciplined. An attack with raw troops is possible only
against still poorer ones.

[Sidenote: Method of fire control]

Our fire control and direction needs more explanation. A method
must be had which will work on the battlefield. No one who has seen
a modern battle will think for a moment that it is practicable to
control and direct a firing line by verbal orders. A battalion
commander must be far enough to the rear to observe his entire line.
In the noise of a real battle his voice could not be heard ten yards
by men on the firing line. The same is equally true of company and
platoon commanders. These officers cannot be running up and down the
line giving instructions; if they tried it they would not last long.

[Sidenote: Use of signals]

Our method must therefore be one that can be executed independently
of the voice and with as little exposure of the officers as
practicable. The method by signals given in our I. D. R. answers the
requirements. The text of it can be learned in a few minutes, but to
train a battalion so that it will fully respond under danger requires
hours of practice: it is one thing that must become a habit.

After the mechanism of the drill is learned officers should conduct
their line as in battle by signals only. Do not teach men to expect
you to be running up and down the line personally correcting errors
and giving directions, leading them to expect this to be done in
battle. The effect of a decided change in conduct when danger is
present is apt not to be good. Moreover, the command will not respond
to signals alone on the battlefield if, in instruction work, they
have never been taught to depend on them exclusively. We should do
everything at battle exercises just as nearly as possible as it will
be done in battle.

[Sidenote: Use of signals]

I have seen at battle exercises men stand up in the open and wave
their flags to give the signals. This is absurd. In battle it would
be needlessly dangerous, would give the enemy too much information,
and it is unnecessary. The necessary signals in the battalion can
be given by a man lying on the ground with a handkerchief, or flag
without the staff, and be seen for the short distances separating the
major from his captains or the captain from his platoon commanders.
Practice alone is required to enable this to be done efficiently. It
must be so done in battle and must therefore be drilled that way.

It should be remembered that the new semaphore code recently adopted
does not apply to these signals. The new code requires men to stand;
the old must be used for these battle signals.

[Sidenote: Additional signals]

Additional signals to those given in the I. D. R. may be taught
and used in companies. It is doubtful if they are necessary and if
not necessary they are wrong. The more signals you have, the more
chance of mistakes. Signals for forming squad or platoon columns are
unnecessary. These movements are not executed close to the enemy nor
when your line is firing, hence verbal commands are practicable and
when practicable are desirable, are surer and easier.

[Sidenote: Additional signals]

Signals are necessary when your line has commenced the fire fight but
from there on few commands are necessary; there are so few things
that can be ordered, the time for maneuver and instruction is past.
One or two of those given might be dispensed with and one for fixing
bayonets should be added; possibly there are one or two others that
should be added.

[Sidenote: Observing fire effectiveness]

We have discussed how to obtain fire superiority; how may we
know when we have it, if the volume of the enemy’s fire remains
practically the same? Company and platoon commanders must watch for
the effect of the enemy’s fire, where his bullets are striking. If
the hostile bullets are going wild, some striking far short, others
way high, and very few are effective, you have fire superiority;
that is the time to gain distance to the front. On the other hand,
although you may be suffering no loss, you see that the enemy’s
bullets, well massed, are striking, say 50 yards in your front; you
have no fire superiority; the enemy has simply underestimated the
range and your advance will bring you into the center of his beaten
zone. But this is your opportunity to gain fire superiority. Your men
are suffering little or no loss, should be less affected and should
do better work. If this opportunity is well utilized you will gain
fire superiority.

[Sidenote: Observing fire effectiveness]

When you have fire superiority you must push the advance, take full
advantage of your opportunity; if you temporarily lose it, suspend
the advance until you regain the necessary superiority.

[Sidenote: Distribution of fire]

Fire properly distributed is one essential to gaining fire
superiority. Proper distribution means it is placed _on_ the target
and on all of the target, not just one part. Placing our fire on the
target requires that our men be at least fair shots, have their nerve
and know the range. To cover all the target rather than concentrate
on a part is not easy and to attain practical efficiency in this
requires skill and practice.

In the deployment for battle the division is generally given a
specific mission, the division commander assigns to each brigade its
part of the task, and so on down to the battalion, company, platoon
and even squad.

[Sidenote: Distribution of fire]

There is little involved in the larger units except the tactical
skill to know how to use the larger units to gain the required end;
dividing the terrain is easy. It is difficult with the commanders
of the smaller units; the division of the target generally becomes
harder the smaller the subdivision. The major must divide his target,
say between two companies, and do it so that there can be no mistake
on the part of the captains as to just what part each is to cover.
The company commander must then divide his section among his platoons
and the latter often among the squads.

[Sidenote: The captain’s problems]

The battalion commander has only one difficulty—to find a way to make
each captain clearly understand where is the division of target and
where its extreme limit. The company commander has a shorter line to
divide and has to divide it into more parts. Landmarks are not so
common as he will then desire.

[Sidenote: The captain’s problems]

The captain has another problem in this connection: shall he divide
his target into four parts and assign each platoon a separate part,
or into two parts and give two platoons the same target, i. e., 1st
and 3d the right half, 2d and 4th the left half? The captain has not
only the problem of finding proper dividing points in the target,
but he must divide and allot the target so as to get the best fire
effect. It might happen, as I once saw in a field firing problem,
that the right platoon could not see the corresponding part of the
target, hence was given the other extreme flank and the rest of the
target divided accordingly. It is not the division alone, but what is
the best division and allotment, that must be considered.

[Sidenote: Practice in distributing the target]

This will all be more clearly understood if you will go in the
country and assume a regiment is ordered to attack a certain line
under certain conditions, and then give the colonel’s attack
order, from that take each major’s target and divide it between
the companies and then divide each company target. This should, of
course, always be done at the same distance from the target that you
would have to make the distribution if a real enemy were there. You
should have two or three men with you to act as the subordinates
in each case and to determine whether the division is fully and
perfectly understood. It is easy on a map, but often very difficult
on the ground; distinctive marks are sometimes very scarce.

Each commander should practice this, devising a method for himself
that will work. Officers alone or together in small groups should
practice it as a sort of tactical walk. But primarily it should be
done in each unit: the colonel should take the majors on such a
tactical walk; the majors their captains; the captains their platoon
commanders. Estimating distance should be worked in the same exercise.

For the companies this is good work for the indoor season. There
are days when work can be planned for the company that does not
require the presence of the captain or of most of his officers and
non-commissioned officers; these can then utilize the drill period
as above described. It may be made a real tactical walk with special
stress laid on the division and allotment of the target.

[Sidenote: Assistance of artillery]

It must be borne in mind that in most cases the artillery will play
a large part in the gaining and maintaining of fire superiority.
But this fact does not alter the work of the infantry; we must
still do most of the killing and unnerving of the enemy and this is
true whether the enemy consists of infantry alone or of infantry in
conjunction with artillery.

In this chapter the first part is much like “right line strategy”
mathematics applied to a battlefield where little is subject to such
treatment. But that seemed the easiest and simplest way to make clear
to beginners terms that must be fully understood. It is hoped that
that part of the chapter will be understood as meant, as offering
merely a means of illustration and not as implying that a battle can
be worked out with mathematical precision.



IV

COMBAT


War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of diplomacy.
Diplomacy is not always able to settle international disputes, then
the army must do what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. In our
own history it has been the mass of the people who have forced our
wars, and who, in the case of a strong public sentiment arising, will
involve us again. On account of the state of preparedness of most
great nations and because of the enormous cost of modern war, wars
are shorter than formerly.

[Sidenote: Object of an army]

If this country becomes involved in a war with a military power it
will be impracticable to learn the art of war and train an army after
the outbreak; the war will not last long enough. The object of having
an army is for war not for peace, and the battles alone really decide
the issue; the battles are not numerous but each tends one way or the
other to end the struggle. Great armies exist for many years between
wars and are then trained for these few days of battles which
determine the fate of the nation. The whole aim of an army should be
to be ready for war and the success or failure in war is determined
by a few days of battle. Untrained troops are of no value on the
modern battlefield.

[Sidenote: Training for battle]

Part of our close order drill, the ceremonies and some other things
we teach, are accessories and, if given their proper place, are
of value, but the battlefield is the crucial test; by our fitness
for that must our training be judged. The work of generals and the
general staff is vitally important but the best plan will accomplish
nothing if there are no trained companies to carry out their part.

In this chapter is considered the training necessary for combat. This
is the work executed under the severest strain and under the greatest
difficulties of leadership and control. This training must be
thorough and the things in combat which have to be done must become a
habit.


THE COMPANY

[Sidenote: Extended order practice]

The first essential is that the men must know the mechanism of the
extended order drill, including all signals used. To keep control
of the skirmish line in battle, that is to maintain such order
therein that it can be directed and used as desired, is far from
easy. Excitement and confusion, especially in the last stages of
the combat, are apt to occur. Everything possible must be done to
preserve organization and control.

Much depends upon the start; if there is confusion at the start and
the squads get mixed, success is more than doubtful. In the majority
of cases the deployment will be made quietly at long range, but not
in all. The company must be drilled until able to deploy from all
formations, facing in any direction, in the least time practicable,
and without any confusion or mix-up.

[Sidenote: Calmness in giving orders]

The captain who can give all his orders and commands at the start
of a fight in a calm, unexcited manner has a great advantage over
the one whose voice or manner indicates excitement. This calm manner
should be cultivated during training. As good a way as I know for
such training is to have a few men to represent hostile forces
conceal themselves at various points in a moderately close country;
march the company through this terrain and, as the represented enemy
appears, form skirmish line facing the supposed enemy, give the
range and the commands for opening fire in the least possible time.
The captain himself should not know where the represented enemy will
appear. This is training for the captain and also excellent practice
for the company.

[Sidenote: Restoring order]

Occasionally during an advance points are reached where a company
is sheltered from fire. Advantage should always be taken of such
opportunities to reëstablish perfect order, replace fallen leaders
and thus get a new start. Such an opportunity decidedly increases
your chance of success in battle; real control is reëstablished.
Practice this in your battle training when the opportunity offers,
but never do it when, in a real combat, it would be impracticable.

[Sidenote: Combat exercises]

After the mechanism of the extended order drill is understood all
combat exercises should have a problem or situation. These should
always be simple; elaborate tactical problems for this instruction
work are unnecessary. For a simulated attack as part of a line,
all that is necessary is a statement that the enemy, a regiment of
infantry, is holding the line from —— to ——, our regiment is to
attack it at once, our battalion on the right, we are the right
company, our target or objective the part of the line from —— to ——.
This of course should be varied but need be no more complicated. The
captain should give this to his whole company, let all the men know
what they are supposed to be doing.

[Sidenote: Situation and orders]

[Sidenote: Method of conducting exercises]

The captain should then give his attack order, always carefully
distributing the target. For a company operating alone the following
form will answer every purpose: This company belongs to a division
engaged with a hostile division five miles north of here. This
company was detached to capture that building (pointing) which is
assumed to be important. The defending force occupies the line ——.
The order for the attack then follows. Usually in such a case, a
small support would be held out. Of course the problems will vary
according to what it is desired to teach. Always distribute the
target and let the men understand what you are trying to do. All
combat exercises should be conducted as nearly as possible as though
the enemy were real. Allow nothing to be done that would not be
attempted were it real war, otherwise you do not give instruction
but misinformation. After the mechanism is taught, the captain and
platoon commanders must conduct themselves in combat exercises as
they would under hostile fire, keep close to the ground, use signals
only. After the exercise is over have a critique, point out the
errors made and tell the command how they should be corrected.

You must expect that if mistakes are made at the drill they will be
made in battle; to correct these mistakes you should use only those
means at drill that will be practicable in battle. The captain needs
much practice in thus handling a skirmish line and those under him
need more practice before the company can be well handled in this
manner.

[Sidenote: Means of representing enemy’s fire]

The effectiveness of the enemy’s fire should be indicated that
platoon commanders can practice the control of rushes. The simplest
way to do this that I have found is to have a man at the hostile
position with two little flags. Holding both of these vertically over
his head means the enemy’s fire is wild and nearly harmless. One
flag vertical the other horizontal indicates a moderately effective
fire. Both flags horizontal indicates the maximum effectiveness—that
the enemy has a decided fire superiority. When both flags touch the
ground it indicates no fire.

The advance of the attacking force is only practicable by taking
advantage of the times when the fire is ineffective or weak to push
forward, and, when the hostile fire is too strong, shooting to gain
fire superiority. Platoon commanders and men must become accustomed
to seizing these opportunities to advance and suddenly getting down
when there is a burst of effective fire. The flags on the hostile
position may be controlled by an instructor, stationed behind the
company officers, indicating how the flags are to be held.

Remember that the hostile fire becomes more effective in proportion
as ours is less effective. If we have the most men we should gain
fire superiority if our shots are well placed. If the firing line has
not distributed its fire properly the instructor causes both flags to
be held horizontally; no advance is then possible until the company
officers find out the cause of the trouble and correct it. The same
is done whenever a serious error in sight elevation is made. Majors
should frequently conduct such exercises with their companies. The
company officers must become quick in determining why the hostile
fire is more effective than suits existing conditions and learn to
correct the error.

[Sidenote: Judging defects in firing]

You may not be able to reduce the effectiveness of the hostile fire
so that an advance under it is practicable and, in some cases, it may
not be your mission to do so; but in every case where the hostile
fire passes a certain point of effectiveness, depending on relative
numbers, your range, distribution or something is wrong, or else your
men have lost their nerve. Judging the effect of the hostile fire is
something in which company and platoon commanders must be proficient,
but off the battlefield this can only be taught in theory.

[Sidenote: Advance by rushes]

In advancing the attack by rushes the size of the fraction rushing
will be dependent upon the relative proportion of rifles necessary to
hold your fire superiority. If rushes are practicable at all it will
seldom be necessary to rush by smaller units than the platoon. But an
advance will sometimes have to be made by fractions of only a man or
two and sometimes by crawling. All these should be taught.

When the enemy is active the rushes should not be long, if of only 25
or 30 yards the time the men are actually running will be very short,
too short for the average man to pick up the target, raise the rifle
to his shoulder and fire with careful aim. Too much time is taken by
the average man in getting up and down. The men must be practiced in
springing to their feet and getting down again in the shortest time
possible. There is a knack in this not difficult to acquire.

[Sidenote: Reinforcements]

Reinforcing a firing line will generally bring about intermingling
of squads and platoons. To avoid this by closing in on the center by
companies, thus creating gaps for reinforcements, is impracticable on
a battlefield when reinforcing is necessary. In battle in the great
majority of cases reinforcements will go in as they can and fall into
the existing gaps where found. As this will be the rule in battle we
should so drill it.

When the next rush is made, say by squads, where do these
reinforcements go? In one regiment at least, they solved it
satisfactorily. The points of division along the firing line remain
where they were; the new man who joins the firing line always goes
with the man on his right, he belongs to the squad and to the platoon
of the man on his right. This provision should be added in the I. D.
R.

[Sidenote: Mixing on the firing line]

In teaching the mechanism of the extended order, practice should be
had in this by dividing the company into firing line and support and
then feeding in the support and continuing the advance by rushes. If
you expect this to be done in battle it must become a habit. To get
the best practice in this mixing, as well as to train officers and
sergeants to think quickly and to act properly, there should be many
rencontre engagements so planned as to bring about a mixing of units
on the firing line.

[Sidenote: Practice at war strength]

Some practice should be afforded with companies at war strength.
This can be had by combining two or more companies. By this means
it is sought to accustom officers to the fronts and depths of such
a company and also to the greater length of time required to change
formation.

[Sidenote: Redistributing the target]

In combat exercises of the company alone practice must be had in
shifting part of the fire to new targets and redistributing the old.
In large battles this will seldom if ever be required by men in the
firing line, but it will occur in detachment work. The companies
should get practice in this and it can be well coupled with the
instruction in hasty deployments suggested on page 46.

[Sidenote: Work on the defensive]

Some work should be done on the defensive. A few men should be
detailed to represent the enemy; if the man carries one little flag
he represents a squad, if two flags a platoon. These men should be
in charge of a competent man who as nearly as is practicable directs
their advance as such units would really advance under the assumed
conditions. Enveloping movements and surprise attacks can thus be
well simulated, giving the company the opportunity to practice
meeting such movements by the use of the support, redistribution of
targets, etc.

[Sidenote: Company against company]

The instruction against an outlined enemy having been practiced until
the companies are well instructed, the enemy should be represented,
one company should work against another. This gives an opportunity
for reconnaissance work before and during the attack and introduces
the elements of uncertainty as to what the enemy will do.

[Sidenote: Night operations]

In war, night operations are inevitable and we must recognize
this fact and prepare for them. Night marches by large commands,
patrolling by both large and small groups, and outpost work,
including the establishing of the outpost in the dark, will all occur
as well as an occasional night battle. In all this work the principal
difficulty seems to be to avoid confusion and mistakes.

[Sidenote: Orientation]

The men, especially those who are city bred, are unable to orient
themselves in the dark. The darkness when coupled with possible
unseen foes has a demoralizing effect and this effect will be the
greater the more helpless the man feels himself to be in the dark and
the less confidence he has in the ability of the company to act as a
company. Much of this difficulty can be overcome by a little careful
training.

The men should be taken out and taught to orient themselves by the
stars and prominent features that can be distinguished at night.
The effects of different backgrounds on the visibility of objects
should be demonstrated, and especially the prominence of objects on
a skyline. Estimating distance by sound should be practiced. The men
grouped into small patrols should be made to find their way from
place to place and then to operate against other patrols.

[Sidenote: Night drill]

The company should be drilled at night. Forming line from column,
front into line, on right or left into line, and even forming line of
skirmishers, should be practiced and an occasional night march made.
A very few drills each season, held at night instead of in daylight,
will do much toward giving the men that necessary confidence in the
ability of the company to work together in the dark.

It will sometimes happen that a command will have to go into camp
after dark and establish an outpost. This should be practiced at
least once each season after the company has been well instructed in
the work by daylight.

[Sidenote: Night attacks]

Satisfactory training for night attacks is difficult. The first
principle governing night attacks is not to shoot but to get in as
close as possible undiscovered and then rush with the bayonet. It
is impracticable to practice this with a represented enemy; it is
too dangerous. To practice it by allowing the opposing sides to fire
blanks at each other is all wrong because it is teaching the men to
do what they should not do in war.

One method is to place men to represent the enemy behind a suitable
fence, then to make the advance and attack, causing the represented
enemy to open fire as soon as the attack is discovered. An open wire
fence will not prevent the discovery of the attack but will stop the
bayonet rush before anyone is hurt. This is not very satisfactory
work for the company but is more appropriate for the battalion and
regiment. In these latter it is desirable to practice the necessary
formations for such attacks and to give the officers experience in
such troop leading. For this work to be of benefit the officers must
know their night tactics, the proper formations to take and the best
methods of troop leading; this knowledge should first be acquired by
study and then put to the test at night. It is not well to devote too
much time to such work.

[Sidenote: Woods fighting]

In many posts practice can be had in tactical work in the woods. This
opportunity should not be neglected. A good tactician will try to
avoid a thick forest as a battlefield but with long lines of battle
parts of the line will inevitably extend through forests. Hence the
officers must study the principles governing woods fighting and seek
to train the men so that they can play their part. Woods combat has
many of the difficulties of night work.

[Sidenote: Fire problem]

There should be considerable work on fire problems; it is excellent
practice, especially for the officers and non-commissioned officers.
Field firing is not here meant but simulated firing. A simple problem
is given and the officer or sergeant with a platoon or company solves
it practically. By using a few men with flags to represent the enemy
and with a proper critique afterwards for all the company, great
benefit should be derived.

As an example of such a problem: dispose one platoon of the company
under cover near a ridge with a concealed man watching to the front
and stationed about 25 yards from the platoon, the remainder of the
company 400 yards in rear but in sight of the platoon. The following
situation is then given out:

[Sidenote: Fire problem against cavalry]

“This company has been detached from a larger force back at X.
Hostile cavalry is in this neighborhood and is doing much damage.
The orders received when this company was detached stated that other
companies were to go out on other roads and this company on this
one to inflict as much punishment as practicable on this cavalry if
encountered. We have reached this point and just halted for a ten
minutes rest.”

As soon as the situation is fully understood and the men are in their
respective positions, a troop of cavalry, represented by a few men
with yellow flags, comes in view of the sentinel and halts. Either
verbally, or by a signal agreed upon, the captain explains that they
have dismounted for rest. The sentinel and platoon commander now have
their problem.

As another example take the same general situation in such terrain
that a glimpse is caught of the troop moving along a road but
immediately it passes behind cover; several hundred yards beyond, if
it continues on the road, the troop will again come into view and be
exposed for a considerable stretch of road and within rifle range.
What is done now?

After the exercise the captain assembles the company and criticises
the errors made and points out what should have been done. In the
first situation opening fire by a few men would result in the hostile
troop’s mounting and getting away with little damage or else in their
getting their horses back under cover and being prepared to fight on
foot. After the company once opens fire it will have a target but for
a very short time; hence great care must be exercised in estimating
the distance, dividing the target and giving the other necessary
orders so as to produce the greatest effect in the least time. The
captain should carefully study his problem and be prepared to give an
instructive critique.

[Sidenote: Suggestions for fire problems]

A little book called “Fire Problems” by T. D. Pilcher of the British
Army is recommended to our officers; it treats this subject more
fully, gives several problems and shows how the solutions should be
criticized.

The problems must be gotten up, as a matter of course, to fit the
ground you have. A great variety of fire problems is afforded by any
terrain. There should be some problems in which more than one target
is offered. In getting up problems do not let yourself be hampered
by the critics who will tell you that a troop of cavalry would not
have crossed your front without having discovered you or without
having been warned by its patrols: you are teaching fire tactics,
not cavalry tactics, and besides, even cavalry has been known to do
foolish and careless things. Try to make the problem reasonable and
one which might occur in war but do not discard a good fire problem
which teaches a valuable lesson because the situation is one which
ought never to arise in battle. Few problems that are tried out in
maneuvers will ever be duplicated in that exact form in war but the
tactical principles involved will recur often.

[Sidenote: Distribution of fire problem]

There is one field firing problem which, if practiced once each year,
would do a world of good in securing fire distribution. A line of
prone figures is placed to represent the enemy on ground so selected
that, while the figures cannot all be seen by the attackers, yet a
man in the place of each figure could see the ground over which the
advance is made. The defensive line should not be straight; it would
seldom be so in war, it must conform to the ground. There should be
stretches of thirty or forty figures that are concealed, then groups
in plain view; brush, clumps of heavy grass afford the kind of cover
desired. Have the battalion go through the form of attacking this
line, using ball cartridges. Then have the men inspect the targets,
see how plainly they could have been seen by the enemy while the
latter was out of sight and see the effect of cover on the fire drawn
and the faults in distribution. After this carefully explain the
results of a lack of distribution; point out that the long stretches
of the hostile line not under fire would have been doing target
practice work on your advancing line and what the resulting losses
would have been.

It is an effective way of impressing on men’s minds the necessity of
proper distribution and of firing where directed whether they see
anything or not. It also shows the advantage of cover, if only from
view. The men must be taught to take advantage of cover, if only from
view, whenever offered, if it can be done without interfering with
their doing their work.

[Sidenote: Combat against cavalry]

For combat against cavalry the men must be taught in their bayonet
work the proper way to oppose a man on horseback. How to meet a
charge with fire must be largely theoretical but it should be
carefully explained and, if a few mounted men are available to
outline a charging force, some practical work can be had; it is a
fire problem.

[Sidenote: Special company problems]

There are many problems in minor tactics that should form part of
every company’s training, such as forcing a defile or a bridge,
passing through a village as a patrol or as advance party of an
advance guard, passing a woods under the same conditions and, on the
side of the defense, preventing a hostile force from doing these
things. There may be no gorge or pass through hills in your immediate
vicinity but the practice can still be had: two large buildings
near together will answer for a defile; the garrison is a village.
If there be no bridge, with a little imagination you can improvise
something to answer. In this class of problems the captain must know
the tactics of his problem and be able to explain it thoroughly.
Generally in these problems detachments having important missions
have to be made; give their commanders much latitude in carrying
them out and in your critique point out the errors and how the work
should have been done. It is well in all such problems to precede
them by a simple talk to the whole company explaining the tactical
principles governing the work. These problems can be made the most
interesting part of the company’s training.

Instruction must be given the company in meeting artillery fire
and in the work of the various covering detachments but these two
subjects, owing to their importance and length, are reserved for
consideration in separate chapters.

[Sidenote: Hints for company work]

The company commander must get the full help and support of his
platoon and squad leaders, much depends upon them; they are the
real leaders of the men; they require much training and practice,
especially in leading the rushes and in controlling and directing
fire.

The discipline must be strict in these exercises, the men must never
be allowed to slight the work. A certain amount of latitude must be
given but prompt obedience to an order must be insisted upon. Without
such discipline an attack is hopeless; the drill field is the place
to acquire it.

In all this work keep the interest of the men. Occasionally take
them to a shady place and instruct them orally, explain the objects
sought and the reasons for doing things in anything that is part of
their proper training.

Do not keep at one class of work until the men are tired of it; vary
the work. You can keep a company interested for four hours a day if
you will only vary the instruction and put some soul into it. Give
very little place rest; for a rest change the work. Combat exercises
must be frequent. They are entitled to a large share of the time; the
work of the firing line must be a habit.


THE BATTALION

[Sidenote: Hints for battalion training]

The period of company training having been completed that of the
battalion commences. The same general plan should be followed as in
the case of the company. The mechanism of extended order should first
be thoroughly learned, then the attack against an outlined enemy,
then battalion against battalion. The enlisted men have little new to
learn, the work for them is merely practice in what they have learned
in the company training. For the captains it is instruction in team
work and in tactics.

The battalion is the attack unit and as a tactical unit is most
important. An infantry attack is largely a combination of battalion
attacks. Every exercise should be a problem which teaches some lesson
as well as affords practice. The employment of combat patrols of some
size can be made a part of the exercise and their proper use and
leading taught. The use of the local support, how it is handled and
how maneuvered, is a very important part.

In these exercises the major must control his battalion as in battle.
The absurdity of his riding around and giving verbal instructions
to his firing line must not be permitted. A great part of the value
of these combat exercises lies in the practice given in handling a
battalion with the limited means of control possible on the field of
battle and accustoming company commanders to carrying out their part
under the same conditions. Majors thus learn to give their initial
orders so as to insure the carrying out of their plan of action.

The battalion being the attack unit, whether alone or as part of a
long line, its rushes are independent of those of other battalions
although as a whole it keeps the general line. Each company of course
must govern its advance by that of the others in the same battalion.
An advance can only start from one flank or the other of the
battalion and then continue successively to completion. Rushes never
start from both flanks or the center; the reason for this is obvious.

The little flags mentioned under company training can be used in
battalion training to even better advantage. Captains are more on
their own responsibility in a battalion than are platoon commanders
in a company and must act according to assumed existing conditions.
In the battalion the shifting of fire from one target to another is
less frequent than in the company. New unexpected targets are cared
for, as a rule, by the support.

Battalion commanders have more need of reconnaissance and must get
experience in ordering it properly and judging the reports and basing
their action thereon.

When a battalion operates against battalion the colonel should
prepare the problems and act as umpire. If he does not do this the
practice should not be omitted, the majors concerned must get up
their own although this is not so satisfactory.

The battalion commander or colonel should give a critique after each
exercise, pointing out all errors of tactics and of execution. There
should be much more of tactical instruction and less of mechanical
training in battalion work than in the company.

Majors should not be limited to these drill periods to instruct their
officers but be allowed to have tactical walks at other times. A
major should have a good knowledge of tactics, be able to give clear
and concise orders and enter into the spirit of his work. Four good
companies, under a competent major learn with very little practice to
work together as a team and become an efficient battalion.


THE REGIMENT

[Sidenote: Regimental training]

In the period alloted to the regiment the solution of tactical
problems and thereby the gaining of experience in team work and
imparting tactical instruction to the officers are the ends sought.
The same rules as to method of control, giving of orders and critique
apply as in the case of the battalion.

The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. It is
not trained until the three battalions, the band, machine gun platoon
and mounted detachment are trained, each in its special work, and
then the whole is practiced as a team.

The training of the twelve companies, as such and as battalions, has
been discussed.

[Sidenote: Band]

The band forms a large part numerically of the sanitary detachment of
the regiment in battle. It must be trained and made efficient. This
should be done by the officers of the Medical Corps serving with the
regiment. There should be no perfunctory performance of this work;
the colonel should see that it is thoroughly done.

[Sidenote: Machine gun platoon]

The officer in command of the machine gun platoon must not only
instruct his men in the care and working of the guns, but in the
proper care of all his equipment, including the animals. The machine
gun is an emergency weapon; the commander of the machine gun company
must thoroughly understand the tactical use of this weapon and be
able to act as circumstances demand even without instructions.

[Sidenote: Mounted detachment]

The mounted detachment must be trained as scouts.

[Sidenote: Objects sought in regimental training]

The principal objects sought in the regimental period are practice
and experience by the colonel in handling his regiment as a whole,
practice by the regiment in team work, and tactical instruction for
all. A practical knowledge of tactics on the part of the colonel is
essential if these exercises are to be correctly carried out and his
critique of value. Overlooking tactical errors in these exercises
does much harm, younger officers gain wrong ideas and it is hard to
eradicate errors once firmly fixed in the mind.

If the different units of the regiment are separately well trained
it requires few exercises to make a team of them, good regimental
work is largely a question of the tactical skill and ability of the
colonel. If he is competent and the units are separately well trained
the regiment is trained. Placing these well trained units in the
hands of an incompetent regimental commander is but placing a fine
and complicated machine in the hands of an unskilled operator; there
is a fair chance that he will ruin the machine.



V

ARTILLERY FIRE


[Sidenote: Object of study of artillery]

Except in small engagements in detachment warfare the infantry will
have the assistance of friendly artillery and will be opposed not
only by infantry but by artillery fire. Some knowledge of artillery,
its use, the effects it can produce and how best to utilize the aid
afforded by our own and to meet the opposition of the enemy’s, is
therefore necessary for the infantry officer and also for the men in
ranks. While familiarity with the artillery will be far from breeding
contempt, it will enable the infantry to escape much unnecessary loss
and, by correcting the false conception so many have of its power, it
will improve the morale of our men.

This chapter is not intended to teach infantry officers what they
should know about artillery and its use. It is offered merely as a
suggestion as to what our men should be taught and how to train them
to meet certain phases of this fire. The officer should know much
more about the subject and must go to more extended works by more
competent men for the instruction.

Artillery is effective against infantry both physically and morally.
The moral effect is the greater, the less instructed and trained is
the man. Most untrained men have very exaggerated ideas as to the
effectiveness of artillery, they know nothing but guess much. It is
the terror of the unknown.

[Sidenote: Classes of artillery]

There are two general classes of artillery that accompany an
army: light and heavy. The light artillery may be rifles or light
howitzers; the first have a flat trajectory, the others, of greater
caliber, have the advantage of being able to use high angle fire.
Mountain and horse artillery are merely subdivisions of the light
artillery and, except that the mountain artillery is less effective
at long ranges than the others, “all look alike” to the infantry
advancing under their fire.

The heavy field artillery in our service comprises 4.7” and 5” rifles
and 6” and 7” howitzers. Their range is much greater than that of
the pieces of the light field artillery. In a general way we may say
that these heavy pieces will be used only against hostile batteries,
earth works and material objects or against troops caught in some
mass formation. They will generally not be used against an advancing
skirmish line or troops in proper formation to meet light artillery
fire. There is no training to be given infantry except discipline to
hold them to their duty in an earth work under fire by heavy field
artillery, hence in this chapter we may ignore it.

[Sidenote: Light artillery]

With light field artillery it is very different. The light field
artillery is what concerns us most in our training. The extreme
range for which these guns are sighted is 6500 yards, and at all
ranges under 5000 yards they can produce serious losses on infantry
exposed to their fire. They use two classes of projectiles, shell
and shrapnel. The high explosive shell has a much smaller radius of
action than the shrapnel, but is very effective within this area. It
is generally used to batter material objects and with high angle fire
to get at men in trenches or behind cover.

[Sidenote: Shrapnel]

The shrapnel of the 3” rifle contains 252 bullets and on burst these
bullets are scattered over an area, roughly speaking, elliptical
in form, 200 yards in depth by 25 yards in width. The flatter
the trajectory, the deeper becomes the pattern made; the width
practically does not vary. In other words the 252 bullets are
scattered on burst over an area of 5000 square yards.

If these bullets were uniformly distributed there would be _one_
for every 20 square yards or an area of 15 x 12 feet. They are,
however, not evenly distributed, being thicker in a small area near
the front end. This bullet will not penetrate the infantry soldier’s
pack at any range, so that when lying on the ground his pack affords
complete protection to his spine and considerable protection to all
vital parts except his head. The chance then of a man being wounded
by a single shrapnel, even when inside the cone of dispersion, would
only be about 1 in 80 if in the open and very much less with partial
cover, as a trench, log, etc. The shrapnel bullet will not pass
through one man and wound a second as will the infantry bullet.

[Sidenote: Rate of fire]

While artillery can fire very rapidly once the range data is
accurately determined it requires considerable time to get into
position and determine this data. Until then it is harmless.

[Sidenote: Moving target]

An erratically shifting target is hard for artillery to keep on.
The fuze must be so set that the burst is at the proper height and
distance to the front of the target to be effective, both not easy
especially in case of a moving target, and the more erratic the
movement the harder is the task of the artillery-man.

[Sidenote: On the defensive]

On the defense the man’s protection is much better for he will
generally have cover of some kind, but he has also a serious
disadvantage, the line remains fixed, the hostile artillery soon
locates it, gets its exact range and can place its own fire where it
will do the most good. This is a decided offset to the defenders’
diminished vulnerability. The use of high explosive shells by their
moral as well as physical effect weakens any advantage the defense
might have as concerns artillery fire.

[Sidenote: Artillery targets]

To determine the relative vulnerability of different infantry
formations let us apply to them the target made by a bursting
shrapnel. A line of skirmishers at the normal interval extending
across this beaten zone would have 19 or 20 men inside its extreme
limits; if in squad columns there would be 2 squads at least and
generally 3 squads or 24 men and the target, being much deeper, would
give the artillery a better chance as it is easier to get direction
correctly than the point of burst.

In platoon columns there can be but one platoon in the same burst if
fire comes from the front, and platoons are 4 squads strong, but the
whole platoon may be within it. If, however, the direction of the
artillery fire be very oblique, and the platoons are on a line, more
than one platoon may be caught by a single burst but not all of any
one column.

In successive thin lines, if the advance be made by one man from a
squad, and the fuze and direction be just right, there may be 2 men
in the cone of dispersion, which is to say that, in that formation,
the artillery has about one chance in forty of wounding a man. If
the advance be by one man from each platoon the artillery’s chance,
provided range and fuze are correct, is one in two that one man
will be within the cone of dispersion of a given shrapnel and, if
in there, there is one chance in 80 of his being hit; in other
words, the artillery has one chance in 160 of getting one man and no
possibility of getting two. Such a target will hardly draw artillery
fire.

An infantry battalion in column of squads well closed up can nearly
all be covered by the burst of a shrapnel. Such a target would likely
draw many shots as would a company in this formation.

[Sidenote: The advance under artillery fire]

We can only win in the attack if our infantry can advance to the
hostile position. We must get there, and as soon as practicable and
with the least loss of life. We can not afford to lose too many in
the advance or we shall be too weak at the end to drive the enemy
from his position.

The infantry can not open fire until within rifle range of the enemy
and should try to get much closer before doing so. In open country,
however, infantry may be subjected to artillery fire while crossing
the ground from 5000 yards to, say 1200 yards from the hostile
position, with no chance to reply. The problem to be solved by the
infantry commander is how to cross this zone without losing too many
men and too much time.

[Sidenote: In skirmish line]

In skirmish line. The long advance in this formation is tedious
work, and the target offered is sufficiently vulnerable to draw
artillery fire. If no cover is afforded in the terrain the line
is apt to suffer heavy loss and become more or less disorganized
before reaching the point where it will take up the fire fight.
Where the line of advance is crossed by ridges, sunken roads and
other features of that kind affording cover, where the line can
rest and to a certain extent reform, this formation can be used to
advantage, especially if the terrain permits us to approach under
cover from artillery fire to within two or three thousand yards. If
this formation be used in a force of some size, as a war strength
battalion or more, the platoons should not keep on a line but in an
irregular echelon formation.

[Illustration:

  ——             ——
          ——
    ——     ——
                          ——
      ——
                      ——
                             ——

This makes a much more difficult target for the artillery. The
distance from front to rear between any two adjoining platoons should
not be less than 150 yards. The advance in skirmish line has the
advantage of being in the formation that it will be necessary to have
when you open fire and no changes are necessary and, if the enemy is
encountered much sooner than expected, you are prepared.

[Sidenote: The squad column]

The squad column. This formation was devised by our soldiers at
maneuvers at Sparta and in California, where the ground in part was
covered with thick brush. It was found an excellent formation to take
when the skirmish line encountered these patches of thick brush.
Since it was placed in the I. D. R. it has been understood by some as
a good formation for advancing in the _open_ against artillery fire.
This is a mistake. It should never be so used. In this formation
there will always be two squads, and generally three, in the burst of
a single shrapnel, exposing more men to danger than if they were in
skirmish line.

Marching in column of files is not as easy as in line on open ground.
Remember good artillery is pretty accurate in getting direction. Most
shots will be at the head of a column and if at the head of one,
another on each side is included in the burst. Direction is much
easier to get in artillery fire than exact fuze setting in the case
of a moving target; this is another reason against the squad column,
the target is deeper and thus slightly improves the chances of the
artillery. This formation not only has no advantage on open ground,
in an advance under artillery fire, but does have disadvantages.

[Sidenote: Platoon columns]

Platoon columns. In average terrain this formation will be more used
than any other. The distance between these columns is great enough so
that a shrapnel bursting between two may entirely miss both; it also
permits a more or less erratic or zig zag course to be followed.
Each column is lead presumably by a more intelligent and better
instructed man than in the case of the squad.

These columns should never be on the same line but echeloned as
explained for the skirmish line.

In most terrains there are little hills, clumps of trees, buildings
and other cover of the same general kind. Platoon leaders must while
keeping generally within their own zones of advance, rush from one
cover to another where it is offered and, where cover is wanting,
vary the pace and avoid advancing in a straight line.

Properly done this formation is one of the best. No time is lost, the
columns are far enough apart to allow of advantage being taken of all
the cover afforded, and the target is not, on average terrain, too
vulnerable. It is not so good on flat open plains and it should not
be used on such ground if the artillery fire is very oblique to the
line of advance.

This form of advance requires that platoon leaders understand the
theory and also requires much practice on different sites to give
platoon commanders facility in leading and skill in taking advantage
of the cover offered. This is one of the things in which captains
should give instruction during the indoor season with the aid of the
sand table. In addition outdoor practice is most necessary. When this
formation is adopted platoon commanders should know, if possible,
before starting where line of skirmishers is to be formed.

[Sidenote: Successive thin lines]

Successive thin lines. This is by all means the safest formation on
open ground in plain view of the hostile artillery observing station.
The successive lines must be so far apart that no one shrapnel can
reach two; this distance depends on the range but may be taken as 200
yards. With one man from each squad there will be two in the cone of
a single shrapnel that bursts right; if the enemy is so situated that
he can afford to fire at such a target and you do not want to pay the
cost for such an advance, then send one man from each platoon in each
line. Hostile artillery cannot afford to fire at such a target and if
it does it will use up ammunition that will be much needed later and
get small results for the expenditure.

The chief objection to this formation is the time it takes. In
advancing in skirmish line or in platoon columns your firing line
is established as soon as you get your first line up, while, with
successive lines formed from squads, it takes the longer time
required for a line to advance 1400 yards, and if formed from
platoons it takes the time required for a line to advance 6200 yards.

This formation is also safe against oblique fire.

The training of the men for it is simple. Before the line starts the
point where it is to be rebuilt must be carefully designated. That
the line may be rebuilt without confusion or mixing, each man must be
taught to keep his eyes on the next preceding man of his own squad or
platoon to ensure his finding his right place in the new line.

After a few of the successive lines have reached the new position,
they form a dense enough target to draw artillery fire. For this
reason the position of the new line should be one affording cover
from artillery fire if possible; if not, men must get cover by
digging to protect at least their heads from shrapnel. Head cover
and the pack will give them protection from being killed if not from
being wounded.

If the advance in this manner must be for three or four thousand
yards and the enemy has advanced posts or is likely to make an
infantry counter attack, the advance over this whole distance can not
be made at once but must be made by steps, growing shorter as you
approach the enemy’s position.

[Sidenote: Artillery sweeping fire]

The artillery will often sweep with fire an area being crossed by
infantry. This is done by increasing or decreasing the range after
each shot until the entire area is beaten. If this process be
repeated often enough the artillery will get anything within this
area not under cover. But this does not change the average number of
shrapnel required to get a man nor does it render advisable a great
expenditure of ammunition for meager results.

Infantry encountering this kind of fire should, as it approaches, lie
down and get what cover is available and, after the storm has passed,
move on.

The artillery may determine the exact range to some zone which the
advancing infantry has to cross and, as the infantry reaches it, open
a heavy and accurate fire. The infantry must cross this zone in a
formation which decreases its vulnerability as much as practicable,
consistent with other conditions, such as the hostile infantry fire.

The enemy’s guns can get you if they expend enough ammunition at the
task; but can they afford the ammunition? Your own artillery may
interfere with such an expenditure even if the enemy were willing to
make it.

A division deployed with 2500 men on the firing line, crossing
correctly in thin lines a fire-swept zone from 4000 to 1200 yards,
might lose 10% of this number from artillery fire and not have its
advance even checked. With this open formation the loss is so small
that the moral effect of it will be negligible with trained men.
But a loss of 250 men at an expenditure of 160 shrapnel for each
means 40,000 shrapnel. Even half that much would be more than could
generally be afforded.

[Sidenote: Forming skirmish line]

After the skirmish line is formed at the position for opening the
infantry attack, the further advance from there is conducted as
already explained. In skirmish line the hostile infantry is now
by far your most dangerous foe, but the artillery will still be
punishing you: your line must advance under both fires.

Artillery fire will seldom be uniformly distributed along the entire
skirmish line or continuous in its action. There will be blasts
of intense fire, then a lull. The troops must be trained to take
advantage of these lulls to advance and to lie quiet during the
periods of hottest fire. Of course, if for any cause the artillery
fire is not very effective, the advance continues as against the
infantry.

Our infantry must be taught to keep their fire superiority over the
hostile infantry and to this object to devote all their skill and
energy, but to avoid unnecessary heavy loss from artillery whenever
possible. The hostile infantry is their real opponent, their real
danger. As the opposing lines get close the losses from artillery
fire become relatively slight, compared with the losses from infantry
fire.

[Sidenote: How to practice advance under artillery fire]

How are we to get this training in most of our posts where there is
no artillery to afford us the practice?

A man with a red flag indicates the position of a hostile battery,
or, if the battery is concealed, a position that can be seen and
is in the general direction of the battery. When the flag is waved
rapidly it indicates a rafale or violent burst of fire; waved very
slowly, it indicates slow fire by battery. In most exercises no flag
is necessary; the instructor can give verbally the direction from
which the artillery fire is coming in stating the problem; but
in practicing the attack formation, under combined artillery and
infantry fire, the flags should be used to practice platoon leaders
in the rushes under such conditions.

[Sidenote: Infantry as an artillery support]

Infantry is sometimes detailed to support batteries that are somewhat
separated from the rest of the troops and liable to attack by a
rush of infantry or cavalry. Officers on this duty must thoroughly
understand their mission. They must protect the artillery. Artillery
can generally take ample care of itself if the attack comes directly
from the front. The infantry commander must never mask the fire
of the guns. Where he will place his men and what his general
dispositions will be is a problem in tactics and the solution will
vary with each case. These general propositions may be stated: his
position must be such that from it he can effectively meet the
attack; it should not be where he will get too much of the fire
directed on the batteries; the command must be well in hand and the
reconnaissance and observation groups so employed that he will have
timely warning of the hostile approach and be prepared to meet it.
His position will generally be to a flank and probably somewhat to
the rear, never in front of the guns.

An occasional exercise in this work should be carried out as a
maneuver. Something should be placed to represent the guns and a
battalion or company assigned as their protection while another force
is given the mission to capture them. This exercise should always be
carefully umpired to see that the guns get credit for what they could
do if fire is not masked. A problem of this kind is a small part
of the work of infantry in war and when it comes it is a tactical
problem like any other attack or defense. The reason for recommending
it is that it affords excellent practice in security and information
service and in combat when one position must be avoided. Combat
exercises should be as varied as possible, here is another variety.

[Sidenote: Fire superiority]

The importance of fire superiority has already been dwelt upon as
well as how much the effectiveness of hostile fire falls off as the
effectiveness of our own increases. Infantry alone does not gain this
fire superiority but it gains it by the help of our powerful ally and
sister arm, the artillery.

[Sidenote: Artillery fire over infantry]

Battle fronts are too short for the artillery to occupy space in the
line, even if this were a good place for it which it is not; it must
fire over the infantry. All our men must be made to understand the
effect of this artillery fire on the effectiveness of the hostile
infantry, how much more effective this latter would be without the
fire of our artillery, and the importance of having this artillery
fire kept up to the last possible moment. Prove to them how much less
we shall lose by an occasional premature burst than we should lose by
the increased effectiveness of the hostile infantry if our artillery
ceased to fire. The men must be taught that it is the infantry that
does most of the killing and that, especially at the very short
ranges, we want all the help we can get to keep down this killing by
the enemy’s infantry.

It has already been shown why the attacker’s artillery has an
advantage—the target is fixed. If the men are properly taught this
there will be no trouble in getting them to want the artillery to
fire over their heads as long as possible.

[Sidenote: Tactical connection]

The connection that must be kept between the infantry commander
and the commander of the batteries told off to his support is of
the greatest importance, but that will be the function of a higher
ranking man than this book is written for.

[Sidenote: How to instruct]

How part of this instruction is to be given has already been told.
It is believed that the best way to give the theoretical part is in
small doses between exercises in the field—the little talks referred
to before. Care must be taken not to give too much at once and to
continue explaining until the men really grasp it. The theory should
go along with the practical work; some of it can be best given in the
non-commissioned officers’ school and, as before stated, on the sand
table.

How and when you do it is of less importance than _that_ you do it.



VI

PATROLS, ADVANCE AND REAR GUARDS, OUTPOSTS


Patrolling. The great importance of this work calls for the most
careful instruction being given our men in this duty. It is not easy
to teach, there is so little of it that can be done by thumb rule
except in the simpler forms as visiting patrols. The first requisite
is that the instructor know the subject thoroughly. As this work is
in no sense a treatise on tactics that phase of the question will not
be entered into here.

[Sidenote: Teaching patrolling]

In teaching this subject in the company the following course has
been found to give good results. In the winter’s school thoroughly
instruct all the non-commissioned officers and selected privates in
the fundamental principles; for example, the various formations, the
necessity of the leader’s determining his mission and knowing how to
interpret what he sees, how to write a message, and how to decide
many other questions.

[Sidenote: Sand table work]

With this oral instruction there should be work on the relief map or
sand table. This latter is one of the most important aids in teaching
this subject. The instructor with a small group at the table gives
a simple situation and then, turning to one of the men, gives him
an order as patrol leader to make a certain patrol on the ground
represented by the map. Allow a short time for the section to think
it over then question the leader. First get his idea of his mission
and plan of action, question the others as to what they think of it,
then the instructor gives his idea or concurs in that already given
by the men.

Next the leader should be required to tell what he would do up to the
time of moving out, the inspection he would make, what men must have
and what they must not have, all the instructions and information
he would give his patrol. The other members are called on in turn
to point out any errors or omissions, then this part is discussed.
The leader then points out his general route and gives the formation
of his patrol along this route under the supposition that no enemy
is encountered. The others are questioned as to their ideas of the
correctness of the leader’s decision.

The instructor should then take up the march in detail, something as
follows: When you reached this point what would you do? How would
you get from here to there? When you reached the bottom of this
little hill what did you do? And so on, bringing out carefully and
thoroughly how woods, bridges, defiles and villages are traversed,
etc.

At the conclusion the instructor should go back to the start and at
various points along the route have them see various hostile patrols
and bodies of troops, bring out what should be done in each new
situation, what messages sent, whether by one man or more, whether
written or verbal, requiring in every case the reasons. The problem
should be worked out once on the assumption that the patrol is in
hostile territory and once as in friendly territory, the instructor
bringing out clearly the difference in conduct. The mission should
then be changed, as for instance from a patrol seeking information
change the problem, on the same ground so as to give it a mission of
screening.

The various phases of patrolling, in friendly and hostile territory,
with a mission to gain information and then to prevent the enemy’s
gaining it should be worked out carefully on the same ground
with only the necessary changes in the problem to bring out the
differences in their conduct. It seems to impress these differences
on the men the more lastingly, the more closely the problems
resemble each other in other respects and when they are on the same
ground.

After this series is once worked through with the men, other problems
on different ground are taken. It takes considerable work of this
kind to make the men proficient in the principles of patrolling.
As soon as they are deemed proficient they should be taken out for
tactical walks in patrol problems on the ground and there given
problems to solve, the instructor acting as umpire. This is all
work that can be done in most posts in the winter season by taking
advantage of the most favorable weather for the outdoor part.

The instruction in the principles of patrol leading can be given to
better advantage on the relief map or sand table than on the ground
but the latter training can not be dispensed with, some of it must be
given. Later on there should be much opportunity for further practice
in the course of the combat exercises.

[Sidenote: Other kinds of patrolling]

The work of the expeditionary patrol should be taught in the same
manner. The work of the visiting and connecting patrols can be taught
during the exercises in advance guard and outposts. They require very
little effort. The company as a whole should be frequently exercised
as a strong patrol. There is one form of patrol, often very strong,
that is of great importance and yet its proper training is frequently
neglected—the combat patrol. These patrols are always thrown out
when a command deploys for action and upon their proper conduct much
depends. Their mission is always to prevent the firing line from
being unexpectedly fired into from the flank and they fulfill this
mission according to the situation, either by securing the flank by
themselves holding off the enemy, or by observing and giving timely
warning so that the support or reserves can be disposed to meet the
enemy and thus ward off the attack.

It must be thoroughly impressed on all what the mission of the combat
patrol leader really means and that any position or formation of such
a patrol, that allows the firing line to be so attacked is all wrong.

[Sidenote: The combat patrol]

The following must be thoroughly taught:

1. That when the patrol is so situated that it can see no more than
the men on that flank of the firing line it is serving no valuable
purpose.

2. That in practically all cases where it is not in advance of the
firing line it will not gain the necessary information in time to be
of any value.

3. That the enemy must not get within effective rifle range of the
flank of the line.

The strength of the combat patrol must depend on whether it is merely
to observe or to offer real resistance and its conduct must be
governed accordingly.

It is believed that the principles governing this work can be best
taught, after a talk in the school, by a form of tactical walk, where
the instructor can devote himself to the handling of this patrol;
later on it is, of course, practiced in all battle exercises.

[Sidenote: Combat patrol tactical walk]

In the conduct of such walks the instructor takes his class out as
such patrol and states his problem, the firing line being represented
by a few men or even entirely imaginary, its progress being announced
from time to time. The instructor then acts as leader, explains
what is to be done and, assuming he has a platoon, takes his first
position. He conceals his platoon and has observers out covering
him and so placed that any enemy approaching will be seen in time,
and that he will be in the best position to meet him. The number of
sentinels out and their distance from the main body of the platoon
depend on the terrain. He then carefully points out his dispositions
to the class and explains why made and assuming in turn that the
enemy is approaching from each of the likely directions, how his
dispositions enable him to meet fully the case. The necessity for
signal communication with the commander is explained and how he has
provided for it.

He then discusses the terrain with reference to the next advance.
As the firing line advances where he should next go, and how get
there. A small patrol advances to the next position selected, finds
it unoccupied and so signals back. The platoon then moves there and
sentinels are sent out as before and possibly small reconnoitering
patrols. The same discussion as before. Also from time to time
hostile patrols are assumed to be seen and what should be done
explained; when fire would be opened on the main hostile line, if at
all. In fact the whole conduct of this patrol until the conclusion
of the fight should be discussed, showing how it jumps from place
to place, always covered by sentinels or small patrols, and how the
firing line is always protected by it from surprise. He should point
out how, in most cases, a mere marching along in a straight line
would utterly fail, and impress upon the men the fact that the leader
must use his head all the time.

Having gone through such an exercise once or more, the instructor
solving the problem himself, he should then prepare the problem and,
having stated it, call on the class to solve it step by step in the
same manner. In all cases of errors in disposition the instructor
assumes an enemy from a certain direction and has the class realize
the error by their inability to meet the situation. The importance
of keeping as many of the patrol as practicable well in hand must be
emphasized.

Any combat patrol that is to offer resistance, from a squad to a
company, is handled in the same way. The work of the smaller combat
patrols whose duty is only to observe are likewise taught in the same
way. The terrain and conditions bringing about their use instead of
the larger ones make the problem easier.

The officers of the battalion should be taken on such walks by the
major or some other officer. The company commander should conduct
them for his lieutenants and non-commissioned officers.

The men should also be practiced in the same way, as the combat
patrol or covering detachment of a defensive line. This work is
simpler, the patrol generally does not move from position to
position. Its mission is the same as in the attack and even more
important. In the defense very much depends on the selecting of the
best position for this patrol and the correct dispositions being
taken.

The case must be also considered of a patrol sent out by the defense
for reconnaissance or screening which in case of attack becomes the
combat patrol.

In a battle line with intervals, as in the case of the enveloping
attack, connecting files must be used. Their object is to keep
the commanders of the subdivision informed as to how the other is
progressing. This can generally be done by forming points in the line
joining the two inner flanks. In some cases this will not serve.
Rules for this can not be given.

[Sidenote: Advance guard training]

Advance Guard. In most commands too much of our limited field
training period is devoted to work of advance and rear guards. It
is important and must be taught, but if the other work which is the
real foundation for this is properly done but little more time is
required outside of the maneuver exercises for training the enlisted
men. Patrolling and combat form most of the work in these exercises
so far as the men are concerned.

There are many tactical problems that come to the officers in this
class of work and they must know how to solve them. This is the work
of the school for officers and should be effectively done.

[Sidenote: Advance guard rencontre]

The point is but a patrol with a special mission. The flanking groups
are reconnoitering and scouting patrols but they involve some new
features. When a rencontre engagement occurs on the march one of the
first things the commander wants to know is the strength of the enemy
and his location; if deployed, where is his line? Where its flank?
If not deployed, what is he doing? As the advance party deploys and
pushes on, these flanking groups have the best opportunity to observe
and by reconnaissance to gain valuable information. They also become,
temporarily at least, combat patrols to the firing line. The men must
be taught to carry out this mission without further orders and to do
it correctly. In case small detachments attempt to delay our march,
these patrols by flanking them can greatly hurry their retreat and
prevent the delay of our column.

[Sidenote: Maneuver work]

The general principle of advance and rear guards should be taught
the company. This work can be done in part at the relief map and
sand table, but the company should be exercised on the ground as the
advance guard of a battalion and as the advance party of a larger
advance guard, the other troops being imaginary. Afterwards two
companies should work against each other, one as rear party of a rear
guard, the other as advance party of an advance guard; also each as
advance party in a rencontre.

If the foundation has been properly laid there is no difficulty in
teaching the application of these principles to covering detachments.
If it has not been so laid and the men do not thoroughly understand
patrolling in its different forms, it will be hard to teach it in
these exercises.

In maneuver exercises problems involving rencontre engagements and
engagements involving a marching column encountering an enemy in
position should be had to train the officers in tactics and to give
the men practice in combat exercises and in the patrolling necessary.

[Sidenote: Outpost training]

Outposts. The general principles of outpost duty, the duties of
sentinels, the general formation of an outpost line with its
subdivisions must be taught the men indoors. The officers have
much to learn in school or from books on this subject. With proper
preparation by all the work outside is simple.

There are a few things that need special mention:

In the instruction work have a definite situation. If the company
is to be exercised as a support take an outpost order giving the
situation and general location of the supports. If any detachment,
including the company, is to march beyond assumed existing covering
detachments, see that it is properly covered by an advance guard.
Judgment must be used in this, the smaller the detachment the weaker
relatively the cover. Bear in mind where the other detachments are
marching and the amount of cover they afford to yours.

When starting out instruct the advance where you are going, then have
it go far enough in advance of that to cover you while you are making
your dispositions after you have reached your destination.

From the company down make the distribution of troops and assignment
of tasks in an orderly manner, much as the guard is divided up for
the post guard; do this while the detachment is still formed.

Full information of the situation should be given the men; the proper
performance of their duty is impossible otherwise. Each subdivision
commander must attend to this. The captain should give as much of
the necessary information as practicable to the whole company, this
saves time for the picket commanders and will probably result in the
situation being better understood.

[Sidenote: Outpost practice on the ground]

Where the outpost line should be located and how it should be
disposed varies with many conditions. It is a tactical problem that
the officers must be able to solve and must learn elsewhere than on
the ground in the few hours devoted to this work in troop training.

A little practice should be held by the regiment as a whole in
forming outpost; one with the regiment as the outpost and one with
the regiment as the whole command, one battalion forming the advance
guard on the march. In the latter, a halt order should be issued and
outpost formed from the advance guard battalion; when completed a
march order should be issued by which the new advance guard passes
through the outpost line. The outpost should then be assembled and
take its place in column.

We do this very easily in map problems; try it on the ground,
especially in rather close country.

[Sidenote: Mounted scouts]

The mounted scouts. While the mounted scouts have been taken from
the infantry regiment there is still with each regiment a mounted
detachment of orderlies. A few mounted scouts well trained are
invaluable to an infantry regiment when operating alone. The
commander of an infantry regiment, if wise, will see that these
orderlies are trained as scouts and then when necessary he can so
use them. Their most important and frequent use will be as the
mounted point and flank patrols for an advance or rear guard and for
patrolling to the front of an outpost line.

To be of any value they must be well instructed in these duties as
described under advance guard. Being mounted they are much more
valuable than a dismounted patrol for gaining information from the
flanks and getting it back to the commander in time to be of some
use. These orderlies can be trained in this work without interfering
materially with their instruction in the care of horses and equipment
and it can be given along with instruction in horsemanship.



VII

MARCHING


Ability to march under war conditions is of primary importance in the
training of infantry. There is much more marching than fighting in
war and, no matter how well a man may be trained otherwise, if he is
unable to reach the field of battle he is of no value as a fighting
man.

[Sidenote: Requisites for marching]

That the infantry soldier may be able to meet the requirements in
this respect he must possess the necessary health and strength he
must be properly shod, know how to care for himself on the march,
especially how to take care of his feet, and his muscles must be
properly developed. It is also necessary that the responsible
officers know how to conduct the march and to care for the men.

That the man has been allowed to enlist presumes the possession of
the necessary health and strength and gives us a man who can be
trained to meet all necessary requirements except when temporarily
sick or disabled.

[Sidenote: Shoes for marching]

The soldier’s shoes must be of proper construction, well fitted to
the man and the leather kept soft and pliable. The shoe now issued to
our army is good and with proper care in fitting leaves little to be
desired. The fitting of the shoes is an important duty of the company
commander and should never be slighted. The rules prescribed for this
should be carefully followed. Every captain of infantry should have
and carefully study the little book “The Soldier’s Foot,” by Lieut.
Colonel Munson, Medical Corps.

No matter how well a shoe may be fitted if it becomes soaked with
water and dries, without proper care, it will become hard and stiff
and sore feet are apt to result. The men’s shoes in campaign should
be kept oiled. Neatsfoot oil should always be carried in every
company’s baggage and officers should see that it is used as needed.
There should also be a supply of talcum or foot powder.

[Sidenote: Socks for marching]

The socks are of nearly as much importance as the shoes. They, too,
must fit. If too large they wrinkle, if too small they are apt to
bend and injure the toes; in both cases the result is sore feet.
Woolen socks are much better for hard marching than cotton, they keep
the feet dryer and afford more of a cushion and consequently better
protection from injury. If the man finds that wool next his skin
produces too great irritation he should wear woolen socks over a pair
of cotton or lisle thread.

[Sidenote: Care of abrasions]

After a day’s march the feet should be washed and any blisters and
abrasions should receive proper attention. Adhesive plaster should be
applied to all such, even to spots that are sore and the skin not yet
broken; properly applied it is a great protection.

Rather than have the men treat their own feet it is much better that,
after the day’s march and camp has been made, a reasonable time be
given the men to wash their feet and prepare for inspection. Captains
should then carefully inspect the feet of all their men and send
every man with the slightest injury to the regimental infirmary at
once and have the injuries properly treated.

Men should be taught to do this for themselves but as it can be so
much more surely and better done as above described the men should
be permitted to do it themselves only in emergencies where sanitary
troops are not available.

[Sidenote: Protection of head and neck]

In marching in very hot weather the men must be instructed in the
importance of protecting the back of the neck from the direct rays of
the sun. It would be well if our men were issued a small piece of
cloth of suitable color with some means of readily attaching it to
the hat to afford this protection. The Japanese soldiers used such an
attachment in Manchuria with good results.

There must be an air space between the top of the hat and the man’s
head. The hat must be ventilated and in very hot weather a wet sponge
or cloth or green leaves should be carried in the hat. The shirt
collar, if not very loose, should be unbuttoned.

[Sidenote: Bathing]

Besides bathing the feet the men should bathe their whole bodies
frequently. Anyone familiar with our “regulars” on the march and who
has seen them break for the water to bathe as soon as possible after
a day’s march knows that it requires no order to get this done. But
sometimes we must camp where there is no water available for bathing.
Men should at least wash the crotch with a wet towel, especially if
there is a tendency to chafe. Talcum powder should be used in such
cases.

[Sidenote: Drinking]

Men should be carefully taught the disabling effects of alcohol if
drunk the night before or during a hard march, especially if the
march be made in hot weather. The men must also be instructed to care
wisely for their diet and to avoid the excessive drinking of water
on the march. Too little water is as bad.

[Sidenote: Personal hygiene]

All this instruction should be carefully given the men by their
company officers under the general supervision of the regimental
surgeon. The surgeon, with the approval of the colonel, should
prepare an outlined scheme for instruction in first aid and in
personal hygiene, having special reference to the soldier’s care of
himself in the field. The surgeon should then instruct such company
officers as have need of the instruction; the company officers then
instruct the men. A part of the examination of the company at the end
of its indoor period should be on these subjects.

[Sidenote: Muscle development]

The muscles must be _properly_ developed. It is not the strongest
man who can best stand the march; it does not require great physical
strength. The man’s muscles must be flexible, he must be trained to
use them and be able to use them without causing physical pain.

Marching as fully equipped infantry in the ranks is a very different
proposition from walking along the road independently, and for the
private in ranks with his load it is different from what it is for
the officer with his.

Many men of great strength are often what is called “muscle bound.”
Others have certain muscles overdeveloped others underdeveloped.
When muscles usually unused are brought into play, or when a man is
forced into a constrained position, if it be kept up continuously for
some time, serious pain and discomfort results and often ends in a
physical break down.

A good course in callisthenics or in gymnasium training is the best
thing for the new man. It loosens him up, brings into play the
different muscles, renders them flexible and gives the man control
of himself. Then practice in marching, carrying his equipment,
strengthens the necessary muscles and accustoms the man to the
necessary constraint.

[Sidenote: March training]

The training of the company for marching consists, then, in getting
the men’s muscles in proper condition by physical drill, in
theoretical instruction as outlined above, and actual practice. Most
of the actual practice is and should be gained at the regular daily
drills and exercises. In these, if they are properly conducted, the
man gets enough preparation.

[Sidenote: Practice marches]

Devoting one day each week to a practice march is believed a mistake.
In many of our posts a command going out on the roads can not leave
them, there is no chance for instruction except very imperfect
instruction in advance and rear guard work and practice in marching.

The physical part, the mere practice in marching can be just as well
gained in the regular exercises, and to devote one-fifth of our field
training period to the other instruction is excessive. It prevents
some of the other necessary training being given and it ignores
relative values.

What are wanted are men physically fit. Four to six hours a day of
correct and rational training will make them as much fit without this
weekly practice march as with it and give more time, all of which is
needed, for necessary work.

[Sidenote: Yearly march]

There should, however, be one march every year of from 200 to 300
miles. This is necessary for instruction in camp expedients, to train
the men to care for themselves on long marches and to give them
experience in field service.

It would be better could it be held late in the season. The command
should march to some point where they could have maneuver work and
training in the larger units and on the ground more unfamiliar than
their home reservation. But the march should be held, if it be only
out and back.

[Sidenote: The officers]

Even with the men well prepared much of the success of the march
depends on the officers. They must understand how to conduct a march
and care for their men and conscientiously perform their duty. They
must try to get the man’s point of view, think of the man’s comfort
and health.

[Sidenote: Marching gait]

[Sidenote: Halts]

Every officer who may be responsible for the uniformity and rate of
march should carefully train himself to take a suitable gait and
strictly maintain it. No one thing is more trying than an unsteady
pace and many good officers are unable properly to lead a column on
on the march for this reason. The halts must be regulated to suit
conditions. In very hot weather or when climbing steep hills they
must be more frequent than once an hour.

Discipline must be strict, no straggling allowed. Running to catch
up, “backing and filling” is productive of a big sick report.

Whenever conditions permit the intervals between units should be
increased, especially when the weather is hot and roads dusty. It
renders a steady, uniform pace easier to maintain, and thus tires the
men less.

The other rules for marches given in our service regulations should
be carefully observed.

[Sidenote: The first few days]

Much of the success of a long march depends on the first two or three
days, until the men get into the swing. Where practicable the first
day’s march should be a little less than average, the second a short
one, after that our trained regulars can keep up the average march
six days a week. On starting out it is the second day’s march that
is the most trying to the men. This should be borne in mind and all
practicable allowances made.

An excessively long march should never be made just for practice. It
does not fit the man for another but the reverse.



VIII

THE NATIONAL GUARD


In training the infantry of the national guard we have a very
different problem from that of the regular regiments.

In these regiments the same proportional attention should be given to
those things that should be habits as in training the regulars and
the necessity for varied instruction in order to keep the interest of
the men is even greater.

[Sidenote: Scope of the instruction]

My observation leads me to believe that the greatest weakness of
many of our national guard captains lies in the narrow scope of the
instruction given and in its monotony. There is a lack of variety at
each meeting. The men lose interest.

When the recruit first joins the guard he generally does it for the
best of reasons and is interested in the work. But after going to
the armory for a few times and drilling in a few movements over and
over again he loses interest, then he cuts drill and possibly ends by
trying to get discharged.

There are many things that should be taught, and you can only hope
for success by varying the work and holding the interest of your men.
Do not put more time than necessary on non-essentials.

[Sidenote: The recruit]

Of course the recruit must first be taught the school of the soldier
and he must have the necessary instruction in close order drill. But
even early in his course there is a chance for variety; early in the
game give him a rifle for part of the time and as soon as he has had
a little drill in the manual of arms teach him sighting and then
pointing and aiming drill. As soon as he is far enough along let him
fire a score at gallery practice each drill. At first devote the most
time to drill without arms but increase the time with arms until all
the drills are with arms and you get him in the company for close
order drill.

The following should be taught as carefully as practicable:

[Sidenote: Essentials for the guard]

1. Target practice on the range. If the gallery practice and pointing
and aiming drill recommended below be well done, comparatively little
of this will answer. But it cannot be omitted, every man should
have some practice. Where possible some of this practice should be
in “field firing.” In many cases there is a tendency to give known
distance firing an exaggerated value to the neglect of other training.

2. The mechanism of the deployments, the advance by rushes even after
the line is mixed, control of fire, and all these directed by signals
only; verbal commands should not be used.

3. Estimating distance must be taught.

4. Pointing and aiming drill and gallery practice, so that the man
will always bring his piece up properly, look through the sights and
pull the trigger only after careful aim, must be practiced until the
necessary habit is formed.

5. There must be frequent close order drill. Knowledge of this is
necessary for the orderly movement of troops and it is our greatest
aid to discipline. But to be an aid to discipline it must be exact,
otherwise it has a reverse effect. It is just as easy to do it
correctly as to do it approximately if you only teach it so at the
beginning and then give the subject attention ever afterward and do
not allow the drill to become sloppy.

6. The use of the bayonet must be taught and practiced.

7. The men must be taught simple intrenching and the various uses of
sand bags.

8. First aid and personal hygiene.

9. Patrolling; especially the combat patrols and those with advance
and rear guards and outposts. As many as possible should know how to
read a map.

10. The company musicians and two or three privates should know the
flag signalling.

But the captain may say: all these are practicable with the regulars
who have all the time needed and daylight in which to work and ground
to work on; but how are we to do these in an armory at night?

[Sidenote: Required equipment]

Every armory should have a place fixed for gallery practice if it is
only a backing for the target against the wall in one of the corners.
And no company should be without a sand table; a relief map is also
very desirable.

With this equipment let us see what we can do.

The ordinary drills of course are on the armory door.

[Sidenote: Estimating distances]

The principles of estimating distance should be taught the company
and the men urged to practice it for themselves. Groups are formed
and go anywhere it is convenient for this purpose. Occasionally,
if found practicable, the company goes out. Officers and
non-commissioned officers in this same way should learn to use the
range finder.

[Sidenote: Patrolling]

Patrolling can be well taught on the sand table or relief map. Pile
up your sand, forming any desired terrain; with yellow strings mark
the roads and with blue ones the streams, little bridges, etc., can
be made with a jackknife, houses represented by blocks, forests with
little pieces of evergreen—you have your outdoors.

A scale must be provided and one end of the table marked as north.

The instructor takes a squad to the table and starts out, for
instance, by stating: “Smith, your regiment has reached this point
(just off the table) moving north in hostile territory. The colonel
sends for you and gives you this order—‘Corporal, I have heard rumors
that there is a force of the enemy in that village northeast of here.
I want to know whether that is true. Take your squad and move along
in the general direction of this main road, find out and report. The
regiment will remain here for several hours. Be back here by 3 P.
M., it is now 10 o’clock.’” The instructor tells Smith to do just
as if he were on the ground. Smith inspects his squad, gives his
instructions to his men and then proceeds. He can tell the instructor
his formation, and what he does from time to time, or each of the
men, provided with a match and a scale, may be required to move his
own match. There are many ways of doing it. The instructor must give
information of the enemy, either orally or at certain points place
lead soldiers or something to represent the enemy.

The thing aimed at is to find out how Smith and the other men would
act under various conditions, point out their errors and show them
how to correct these, and give the reasons. An infinite number of
such problems can be devised.

This sand table is especially good for teaching the work of a
combat patrol. Form your field of battle and along one flank have a
varied terrain with houses, clumps of trees, little hills, etc. The
instructor moves a light rod along to represent the firing line and
the patrol leader solves his problem. Whenever any error is made the
movement stops until the mistake is pointed out and explained.

[Sidenote: Security]

In the same way are treated advance and rear guards of the strength
of a company and a company as advance or rear party. Outposts are
established, the sentinels being represented, and routes of the
patrols selected.

[Sidenote: Entrenching]

Entrenching can be taught by constructing trenches to scale on the
sand table terrain. I have seen elaborate field works with bomb
proofs constructed in this way by the men of one company, but this is
not recommended for any but the officers; it is better to limit this
work to the simpler trenches. With a round piece of stove wood for
a log and with a good jack knife, or better a hatchet, you can make
your loop holes for the head log. With a lot of small Bull Durham
tobacco sacks, filled with sand, you have your sand bags, the varied
uses of which should be taught.

The officers should have a war game map for their patrol problems and
for war games.

[Sidenote: Bayonet fencing]

Bayonet fencing should be practiced if you have the necessary
equipment. If not, and a place is available for it, suspend by a rope
something to represent a man, a sack full of straw will do, so that
it can be made to swing through a small angle back and forth and to
right and left. Let the men practice the thrusts, lunges, cuts, etc.,
against this, another man giving the dummy a motion. This should come
after training in the bayonet exercise.

I would propose a system something like the following for your
company drills:

Recruits by themselves until they can be put in the company; their
work has already been discussed.

[Sidenote: Essentials at every drill]

After the company is formed give 15 or 20 minutes of snappy, precise
close order drill then a little manual of arms. Then have the company
deploy, two or three times at least, from different formations. Then
go through an attack formation the best you can, all the company in
the line, no support, an advance of 40 yards being represented by one
of five, etc. Then try it holding out a support and putting it in so
as to mix squads and advance as before. Remember, no verbal commands,
all this to be done by signals.

Have little posters on one wall of your armory at the proper height;
have a few minutes pointing and aiming drill, impressing on the men
the importance of always taking careful aim.

[Sidenote: Group work]

Then divide your company into small groups. One group at the sand
table, one receiving first aid instruction, another bayonet work,
another gallery practice, etc. The group at the sand table may be
larger than the others and may stay there for the rest of the
evening, the others should change every 15 or 20 minutes. The sand
table group should change each drill and once during the night if
practicable, that is, if there is time for one group to finish its
problem and give another a chance that same evening, it should be
done. Nearly all the company should fire a score at the gallery every
night.

If there are a few men in the company who are poor at the manual of
arms they can be put in one group and be given one of their turns in
drill in the manual.

One group may have to be taught how to make the pack. Instruction
in guard duty may be necessary for another. Verbal instruction can
be given in several subjects with great advantage where a good
instructor is available; in that case all except the group at the
sand table can be assembled.

The whole course cannot be covered at one drill. The captain should
so arrange his groups that all in turn get instruction in the whole
course, that all get a variety each night, that where men have a
special deficiency it receives attention, that the first part, the
essentials for the whole company, be never slighted, and that as many
as practicable of the company get gallery practice at every drill—one
score will answer fully.

Owing to the time it takes to complete a problem or task on the sand
table, often but one group can use it in an evening. The size of the
group working should not, however, be increased. Only small parties
can be advantageously instructed. For this reason the sand table must
be worked to the limit and because of this and the number of things
to be taught on it and because some officers are not very expert in
forming suitable terrain on the sand table, it is an advantage to
have the relief map also. The latter can then be used for patrolling
and work of covering detachments and the sand table for the field
engineering.

[Sidenote: Brush work]

At most stations small twigs can be collected and used to make hurdle
revetments, fascines and gabions for use on the sand table. They
can be constructed to the reduced scale and this brush work learned
nearly as well as outside with normally sized faggots.

Have the officer or non-commissioned officer best qualified give
the instruction in each class. The instructor has much to do with
success; some are specially good at one thing but poor at another.

With such a course of instruction well given throughout the year and
with a week or ten days of good camp work annually, and suitable
school work for the officers, there is no reason why the national
guard should not possess the efficiency required of it to be a
valuable military asset.

[Sidenote: No callisthenic drill]

Sufficient of the callisthenic or setting up exercises for the proper
development of the soldier should be shown the recruit and the latter
told of the advantages of practicing them for a few minutes every
morning or evening, or both. Tell him what it will do for his health
and appearance and urge him to get busy. There is no use drilling
these exercises in the armory. A few minutes once a week or less
often will do no good and wastes drill time of which the guard has
none to spare.

The detailed sergeants should help in all drill work but especially
should be valuable in teaching camp expedients, care of equipment,
etc.

[Sidenote: Use of schools for N. C. O.]

I believe that in nearly every state the officers pursue
a theoretical course each winter and generally there is a
non-commissioned officers’ school as well. In the latter school there
should be thoroughly taught, giving importance and precedence in the
order stated:

  Infantry Drill Regulations,

  Manual of Guard Duty,

  Small Arms Firing Regulations, and parts of Field Engineering.

Parts of the Field Service Regulations should be read carefully in
connection with the study of the same subject in Infantry Drill
Regulations. If more time is available map reading should be taught,
and, if time remains, then applied minor tactics on the map. Attempt
no more than you can _thoroughly_ do in the time available and make
the course progressive.

[Sidenote: Schools for officers]

The school for officers should first cover thoroughly the above
course but take more of Field Service Regulations and include the
Manual of Courts Martial. Map reading should be thoroughly learned
by all and the remaining time put on tactics. Beginning with minor
tactics study some good problems with their solutions, then solve
others to be criticised by some competent person. I have found it
satisfactory to use problems in this way in connection with the drill
regulations. Study a subject, for example an advance guard, then read
a few tactical problems on the same subject, then try solving one,
and so on.

As you progress use larger and larger forces. But do not attempt the
brigade until you can handle the regiment correctly. Do not cover
too much ground in one season and acquire only confusion. Each term
get something positively fixed in your mind so that you can use it;
there will be more winters.

Much attention should be given to acquiring facility in giving
correct verbal orders.

Studying tactical problems correctly solved and solving others
for yourself is the best way to learn tactics after you know the
principles laid down in your manuals. Beware of “normal form”
solutions, they are misleading and apt to be wrong. Apply general
principles with common sense. Advantage should be taken of the
officers detailed as inspector-instructors to plan and conduct
this work as well as to help in the instruction of the men. Only
those thoroughly competent for this instruction work should ever be
detailed with the national guard.

There should be a camp of instruction each year. If properly
conducted this is very valuable.

[Sidenote: Camps of instruction]

Nearly all national guard infantry needs training for individual men
and officers and work in the company, battalion and regiment. When
formed in divisions or larger forces for maneuver campaigns the men
in ranks and junior officers get but little instruction. Except a
little camp experience, it is chiefly walking, the object of which
they know nothing, and most of the officers are not yet ready for
this class of work. It is a camp of instruction, not a campaign, they
need. They must apply on the ground what they have learned in the
armory.

I believe the best results can be obtained from camps of not more
than three regiments. The special needs of each regiment should be
considered in forming the program. The work should be planned so as
to give instruction to each in the most important things in which it
is deficient. Special consideration should be given to what can not
be learned in the armory and must be done out of doors.

Most of the program should be made up of practical drills and
exercises in which all get instruction from private to colonel, and
where their interest can be held and the best instruction given.
Small maneuvers of company, battalion and regiment are what are
needed.

Tactical walks for officers and non-commissioned officers are an
excellent means of instruction—these supplement the other exercises.

The big maneuvers are very largely for general officers and very
little for regimental officers. We need the foundation before we
build the superstructure.

As much ground should be covered during the camp as is consistent
with efficient instruction. No attempt should be made to cover the
whole art of war in a week as it only results in confusion of ideas
and gives little or no benefit.

[Sidenote: Service with regular companies]

If the law would permit a few national guardsmen to serve for short
periods in the regular army it would help greatly towards uniformity
of training and improve the non-commissioned personnel of the guard.
These men should be allowed to so serve for three months during the
company’s field training period or for one month during the indoor
season; not more than five should be assigned to any one company.
They should receive the regular’s pay and rations and, if joining for
the three months period, one complete service uniform; the one-month
men should bring their uniforms with them.

This privilege should be granted only to men who have still one
year more to serve in their enlistment in the guard and who are
recommended by their captains. They should be excused from post
guard and all fatigue duty and in place of that receive additional
instruction work each day. In order to obtain the most benefit, these
men should be attached to those companies whose training is the best;
in an indifferently trained company they would get some benefit but
it would be little in comparison with what they would receive in the
other class.

This recommendation is made from having recently seen the results
of having a few men of the national guard join an excellent regular
company for a short period. These men came without pay and themselves
paid their board while with the company.

There would probably be no large number who would so serve, but there
are some and we are in no condition in this country to overlook even
small helps that will contribute towards fitting us for war.

[Sidenote: Value in war]

Owing to the small peace strength of most of these regiments and the
large number of recruits they must take in on the outbreak of war,
their value will depend on the time they will require to be fit for
the field at war strength. They have the organization in working
shape. Their officers will, in the majority of regiments, be men who
have had considerable training. If they will follow a logical and
systematic course of training in peace, the officers will be familiar
with it and will be experienced instructors, and all their old men
will have the instruction to a certain degree so that they can help
drag up the recruits. All this will help to shorten the time required
to fit them for the field and every day thus cut off adds greatly to
their value.

Without such training their value is small, for no regiment should
be accepted except at war strength and a national guard regiment so
filled up, without experienced instructors who know the course, will
take nearly as long to become efficient as would a new regiment.



IX

INSPECTIONS


Much can be done to improve the training of our infantry by the
inspections. Most officers greatly dislike to have an adverse report
made by an inspector on their commands. Fear of such a report
sometimes works to the detriment of sound training and sometimes to
its improvement.

[Sidenote: Influence of inspections]

A captain once asked why he put so much time on exercises of
obviously little consequence and so little time on others more
important, replied: “Blank will inspect this year. He always pays
great attention to such and such an exercise and never examines the
company in the others. I want a clean record on this inspection.”

We have all been influenced as was this captain. Even if we do not
care personally, loyalty to our colonel or to the post commander
leads us to consider what the inspector will require.

The author has no intention of criticizing adversely the Inspector
General’s Department; its inspections have steadily improved
in recent years and become more rational and consequently more
beneficial. His aim is rather to point out the place of the
inspections in the year’s training and to suggest how, in connection
with the methods of training proposed, they may be made both
searching and helpful toward real proficiency.

[Sidenote: The annual inspection]

In the annual inspection it is evident that in the time available
the inspector cannot examine an organization in everything it should
know; he must choose certain things and judge from those of the
training of the company or regiment.

In making this choice the relative importance of the subjects must be
kept in mind. Of course every company must be tried out in the combat
exercises and in all the things that should be made fixed habits.
It is of equal importance that no stress be laid on non-essentials.
For the rest, he should select certain important things which every
company should know and inspect it thoroughly as to its proficiency
in those, examining the various companies at a post in different
subjects so that a captain would feel that anything in the whole
course might fall to his lot from properly making the pack to
establishing an outpost at night.

The inspector should make free use of the war game map, tactical
walks and every other recognized means of instruction to find out how
well the officers and men of the regiment are instructed and what
class of work each organization is doing.

In order to be fair to the organizations inspected the annual
inspection should be made late in the season. It should never be made
before the officers have had a fair show to instruct their commands.

[Sidenote: Company examination]

[Sidenote: Battalion examination]

The above inspection by an officer of the Inspector General’s
Department should not, however, be the only one. At the close of
each period of training there should be an examination of the
organizations on the work they are supposed to have done. The last
of March or first of April the field officers of the regiment, as a
board, should examine the companies on the results of their winter’s
work; a similar examination should be made at the close of the
period of company field training. When the battalions have finished
their period of field training the colonel and lieutenant colonel
should form the board to examine them. If the brigade commander be
thoroughly posted on all matters pertaining to infantry training
his presence at the examinations and careful supervision of the
work cannot fail to be very beneficial. His supervision should not,
however, lead to restriction of the proper latitude which should
be allowed subordinates; his mission should be to see that the
instruction given is correct and that the whole course has been
satisfactorily covered.

[Sidenote: National guard inspection]

The same general principles apply to the inspection of national guard
organizations. If anything is found wrong with them the inspector
should not keep silent at the time and content himself with rendering
later an adverse written report; he should tell the officer being
inspected what is wrong and take pains to show him how to correct the
error. A helping hand, offered in the right spirit, will always be
appreciated.



X

TRAINING A NEW REGIMENT


[Sidenote: Need for quick training]

In this country we are liable to have the necessity forced upon us of
turning out troops in the shortest possible time. We shall have to
use troops not fully trained; we shall have to employ them as soon as
they can be used at all. Of course this system will be frightfully
costly in blood and money. In war imperfectly trained troops must pay
with their lives for all mistakes. The better trained they are, the
fewer mistakes, the more skill they possess the more cheaply can any
desired result be obtained.

It is the duty of all officers who may be charged with the
responsibility of preparing this mass of untrained men for war
service to give the subject careful thought, to study the question
carefully and to be prepared on short notice to take charge of such
work and produce the best results possible in the shortest time.

Success in this hurried training can only be secured if the man
in charge thoroughly appreciates his task and follows out a well
prepared and systematic course.

There are three phases of the problem: Our regular regiments must be
raised from a strength of about 65 men per company to nearly 150.
The national guard regiments, less well prepared, will have, as a
rule, to stand a still greater increase of new men, and there will be
hundreds of entirely new regiments to be raised.

[Sidenote: The commander]

In outlining or suggesting a possible course to be pursued in
such cases let us take the new regiment. The regiment must first
be enlisted, organized and equipped. This first step will not be
considered further than to say that in its organization it is
absolutely necessary that its commander be an active, competent
officer, one who can train it and prepare it for its work. In no
other way can the regiment be prepared to do anything within a
reasonable time.

To appoint an incompetent commander to such a regiment would cost
many lives, would be a crime closely resembling murder in the second
degree.

An effort should be made in every new regiment to have a reasonable
number of subordinates competent to act as instructors.

[Sidenote: General principles of training]

Under modern conditions there is a minimum amount of training that is
absolutely necessary before an organization can be put in the field.
The number of men lost to an organization from disease depends on how
well the men are trained in caring for themselves and how well the
officers do their part.

Time is the all important element; we must have these organizations
in such shape that they can be used as quickly as possible and be as
nearly good as possible. Of course they will constantly improve in
the field and become excellent, but they will have to be used before
that state is reached. The occasion for organizing such regiments
will only arise in case of great national danger, when the utmost
can be demanded of all. Hours of work should then be all that can be
profitably employed. Most of the recruits will be men accustomed to
at least eight hours work a day.

All that has been said previously as to variety in the work, keeping
up the men’s interest, explaining and giving the reasons for things
done, applies even more to a new volunteer regiment than to our
regular companies. Essentials only must be taught at first, bearing
in mind that discipline is most essential and the use that can be
made of close order drill in obtaining it. Those things that should
be a habit must be drilled carefully and frequently. Other essentials
may be hurried through for the first time, to give the men the best
general idea possible in the shortest time, and then repeated and
perfected as time and opportunity offer.

As a rule our men will be intelligent and quick to learn. Every
little taught them, if they have understood the reason for it, will
help them to do what is required even if their instruction is not
complete. With such volunteers much instruction should be given not
as a drill but as a sort of lecture or talk. The average American
works better when he knows the why and the wherefore. Remember
how different are his new life and surroundings from what he is
accustomed to and how very little the average American knows of an
army and how much of that little is not so.

In submitting a proposed schedule of training it is fully appreciated
that conditions will vary greatly and any schedule must be suited to
conditions as they exist; it is doubtful if the one here proposed
would ever exactly fit. It is only offered as a possible help.

It is assumed that the colonel is thoroughly competent and that there
are several men in the command with some military training, such as
ex-regulars and national guardsmen and those who have had training
in a college battalion. This latter assumption is a safe one in this
country.

[Sidenote: Company Cooks]

It is very probable that every company will have a cook that enlisted
as such and knows something of the art. But handling the ration and
army cooking have features that are different from what he is used
to unless he has been trained in the army. The company kitchen must
be correctly run or training will be difficult. Discontent and a big
sick report are fatal to success.

The first thing, then, is to instruct the cooks and mess sergeants.
Some one must be found competent to do this and he must look after
the kitchens, correct mistakes and give instruction until they are
all running properly. The new captains must learn how to look after
this work properly if they do not already know. If the colonel can
find nobody else to do it he must do it himself. It must be done. It
is a very important part of the foundation upon which success must be
built.

[Sidenote: Paper work]

The necessary records and papers should be properly kept and made,
both at regimental headquarters and in the orderly room. This is
important but not so much so as the kitchens. The mistakes in paper
work only cause annoyance and confusion off the battlefield and
possibly will lose somebody some money; but the other causes loss of
life and prevents efficiency. This work should be properly taught.
Some competent non-commissioned officers or officer should be given
the task of instructing the clerks and first sergeants. It is not
difficult, at least the essential parts, and it should be promptly
attended to upon organization but so as in no way to interfere with
training. An ex-regular sergeant major, first sergeant or clerk
would be very valuable here. So far as possible such a man should
be made adjutant of every new regiment of volunteers. His value as
an instructor in many things would be great and he would save the
colonel much trouble and annoyance.

[Sidenote: Band]

From the first day of training the band should be turned over to
the surgeons for thorough instruction as auxiliary sanitary troops.
At least two hours a day should be devoted to this work until they
become proficient, after which, an hour or two a week, to keep them
so.

The band must also receive the necessary drill so that it can be
maneuvered as such. Callisthenic drill, practice in marching, care of
themselves in the field, individual cooking, and tent pitching must
be taught. Three hours daily should be devoted to this instruction
until satisfactory results are obtained, after which only occasional
drills are necessary. This may interfere somewhat with their music,
but that can wait.

[Sidenote: Surgeon]

The regimental surgeon must also carefully train his detachment. His
officers must not only be doctors but medical officers; his men must
be trained for field service as well as for hospital attendants.

[Sidenote: Machine gun company]

[Sidenote: Mounted detachment]

The training of the machine gun company and mounted detachment must
begin from the start and follow generally the lines proposed below
for the companies. More attention must be paid to their tactical
instruction than even to that of company commanders. They must know
their function and how to do their part. The instruction of these
men as to field service, care of themselves, callisthenics, cooking,
etc., must be the same as in the company. They must be taught how to
care for the animals and in the case of orderlies how to ride and to
scout.

[Sidenote: Musicians]

The company musicians will receive the following instruction with
their companies: callisthenics, first aid and personal hygiene,
individual cooking, tent pitching and rifle firing. They make
all practice marches with their companies. They will be grouped
by battalion and given at least one hour a day of instruction in
signalling, and the musicians of the regiment assembled under the
drum major for instruction in the necessary marching and maneuvering
and practice with their instruments. They should work about the same
number of hours per day as the other men.

Those armed with a revolver must be instructed in its mechanism and
care, and firing practice frequently held.

[Sidenote: Callisthenic drill]

In the proposed schedule given below for the companies an effort is
made to provide for the necessary muscular development referred to
before. The amount of this drill is not as great as desirable but
as the men progress bayonet exercise and pointing and aiming drill
answer fairly well to supplement this work. Some will object to any
callisthenic drill, under the assumed conditions, as a waste of
time. They are wrong—it will save time in the end, keep down the sick
report and give better results.

[Sidenote: Instructors and drill masters]

The colonel should carefully inventory his command for instructors
and drill masters. In the early stages when divided into small groups
many are required; fortunately but little military training is
necessary for this preliminary work.

Owing to shortage of good drill masters groups for this preliminary
work will have to be larger than is customary in peace time in the
regular service, not less than eight men to a group from the start,
and these should be combined into groups of two squads each then into
platoons, as soon as their work permits. The best instructors should
be kept as drill masters after each consolidation.

For the callisthenic drills from the very start the men can be
combined into large groups and instructors found who are already
competent to drill their squads in the school of the soldier. The
other squad commanders who are imperfectly prepared must be assembled
at this time for drill and instruction under the best officers and
non-commissioned officers in the regiment. They will be carefully
taught the next movements to be given to the men and how to teach
them to their squads.

As these squad leaders are selected as far as possible from those
having had some military training and the others from the brightest
and most intelligent men, it is believed possible for them to keep
ahead of their squads. It becomes easier as the groups grow larger
and fewer instructors are required.

The drill will be given to the officers who do not know it. The
officers being formed into a squad by themselves.

All trained officers must be on the drill ground during all these
drills by squad, supervise the work, correct mistakes and help out
the poorer instructors. The other officers not acting as instructors
should be required to attend about half to learn from seeing it done,
the other half of this time they should be required to be drilled
themselves and to study the drill regulations. There should be no
hesitation in having lieutenants drill squads during this period
provided they are better at it than some of the enlisted men and are
not needed to supervise the work of several squads.

[Sidenote: Officers’ school]

There should be an officers’ school every evening except Saturdays
and Sundays. This should be conducted by the colonel himself. The
first subject taken up being the drill regulations. Lessons should be
short as well as the sessions of the class and the work thoroughly
done. The student officer must learn the text and the instructor
fully explain it where necessary. Much explanation will be required
in Part II.

The class must keep well ahead of the outdoor work.

Besides the Infantry Drill Regulations, in this school must be taught
early in the course, parts of the Guard Manual and Small Arms Firing
Manual. The essential parts of the Field Engineering will be taught,
and, those not proficient therein, how to read military maps. Lastly
take up the Manual of Courts Martial.

The more important parts of Army Regulations should be included in
the above course. Better results will be obtained if the lesson each
day includes two or three selected paragraphs from this book than by
taking it up as a whole and by itself. In its use this is largely a
book of reference. In this proposed way the officers become familiar
with it and how to use it and the relatively few paragraphs they must
positively know are learned.

[Sidenote: N.C.O. schools]

If, beside the colonel, the regiment has three or more thoroughly
competent officers, the colonel will not require the others to attend
officers’ school but will order schools for non-commissioned officers
with these others as instructors. The classes should not be larger
than one composed of all the non-commissioned officers of a battalion
and, if instructors are available, those of only two or three
companies should form a class.

The work of this class will be largely confined to Infantry Drill
Regulations. First the drill then combat and covering detachments
must be fully explained and the principles of patrolling taught. If
time is available these schools will also take up other subjects
taught in our regular indoor course. Care must be taken not to give
the men more in one lesson than they can learn.

If there be one, and less than three, competent instructors for these
non-commissioned officers, a class will be formed in each battalion
and only two sessions held weekly for each, the instructor taking
them in turn. Lessons in this case may be longer but the work cannot
be so well done.

If there be no one available except the colonel, each captain will be
required to have a school in his company at the most convenient hour
and try to transmit to the men what he has learned in the officers’
school.

The following instruction should be given by demonstration or by
talks given to the men assembled and sitting.

[Sidenote: Talks and demonstrations]

Part of it will be given by battalion, part by company, 2 and 4
should be given by squad or platoon, the leaders having first been
instructed. In the schedule this instruction is designated by the
word “verbal”. Its value will depend on the instructor.

List of subjects for instruction by talks and demonstrations:

  1. General duties of a soldier. His relation to his officers.
  System of discipline. Military courtesy. Customs of service as they
  relate to him. An outline of organization. Encourage the class to
  ask questions on the subject in hand and kindred subjects and then
  answer them.

  2. The rifle, its mechanism and care and how to clean it.

  3. Care of the other equipment, especially that of leather.

  4. How to make the pack and adjust it.

  5. Duties of a sentinel on the interior guard. Sentinels’ orders.

  6. The most essential parts of the course in personal hygiene and
  first aid.

  7. Importance and necessity of fire control and distribution.

  8. Instruction as to artillery with a view to diminish unreasonable
  fear of its fire.

  9. Principles of patrolling.

  10. Objects of advance and rear guards and outposts.

  11. Duties of a sentinel on outpost and conduct of visiting patrols.

  12. If time is available give more instruction under 6.

Most of this is only preliminary to explanations and instruction the
men will get in their drills. It is a start, and at the beginning of
his training will help to arouse interest and gives some variety at
the time when, in the regular drills, but little variety is possible
and the drills are least interesting. A good instructor will make
this pay.

It is assumed in this schedule that the season is between May and
October. Work beginning on a Monday.

Reveille at 6 A. M. Breakfast immediately after. Necessary police
between that and 7 A. M. No drill Saturday afternoon except one hour
for instructors; none on Sunday.


PROPOSED SCHEDULE

  1st, 2d and 3d Days.

  [Sidenote: 1st week]

      A. M.
  6-30 to 7-45          Drill for instructors and officers only.
  7 to 7-30             Callisthenics.
  8 to 8-45             School of the soldier without arms.
  9 to 9-45             Same.
  10 to 10-30           Callisthenics.
  10 to 10-45           Drill for officers and instructors.
  11 to 11-45           Verbal.

  P. M.

  1 to 1-45             School of the soldier without arms.
  2 to 2-45             Same.
  3 to 3-45             Same.
  4 to 4-30             Callisthenics.
  4 to 5-00             Drill for officers and instructors.
  7                     School to last from ½ to ¾
                        of an hour at first, later the time to be
                        extended.

4th and 5th Days and Morning of the 6th Day.

The same as above except that the drill from 9 to 9-45 A. M. and 2 to
2-45 P. M. will be in the manual of arms.

Some camp guards will probably be necessary. This should be done by
platoon and this time on guard used to the utmost to teach this duty.

[Sidenote: 2d week]

2d Week.—During this week drills will be in the school of the soldier
without and with arms, the proportion with arms steadily increasing.

Commencing Thursday one-half hour each half-day will be pointing and
aiming drill.


A. M.

   6-30 to  7-45 Drill for officers and instructors.
   7-00 to  7-30 Callisthenics.
   8-00 to  9-15 Drill—school of the soldier.
   9-30 to 10-15 Verbal.
  10-30 to 11-45 Drill.


P. M.

  1-00 to 2-00 Drill for officers and instructors.
  1-30 to 2-00 Callisthenics.
  2-15 to 3-45 Drill
  4-00 to 4-30 Callisthenics.
  4-00 to 5-00 Drill for officers and instructors.
  7-00         School.

[Sidenote: 3d week]

3d Week.—Squads combined in pairs.

Drill will be with arms. Part of each drill will be pointing and
aiming drill and extended order, close order work being continued.
Beginning Thursday an aggregate of half an hour daily will be given
to bayonet exercise. The drill must be varied, change made every 15
or 20 minutes.


A. M.

   7-00 to  7-30 Callisthenics.
   6-30 to  7-45 Drill for officers.
   8-00 to 10-45 Drill.
  11-00 to 11-45 Verbal.


P. M.

  1-00 to 3-45 Drill.
  4-00 to 5-00 Monday and Wednesday—estimating distance.
               Tuesday and Thursday—intrenching, using the small tools.
               Friday—Instruction in guard duty by company.
  7-00         School.

[Sidenote: 4th week]

4th Week.—Squads are combined into full platoons. Five or six men
are selected from each company to form the signal detachment of the
company. These men are required to do at least one hour’s work a day
at this from now on until thoroughly proficient, and excused from a
corresponding amount of other work, preferably police and close order
in the afternoon.

   A. M.   Each drill to be divided approximately
  7 to 11  as to time as follows:
   DRILL   30 minutes pointing and aiming drill.

           20 minutes bayonet exercise.
           1 hour close order drill.
           Remainder of time extended order drill.

  11 to 12 All non-commissioned officers
           have gallery practice and instruction
           in use of range finder.

  P. M.    The best officers of the company
  1 to 4   for the work take one-half
  DRILL    the non-commissioned officers
           of the company for work in patrolling.
           The two sections alternate
           as to days. Remainder of
           company will be divided into
           groups. All must have gallery
           practice at least 5 shots per man
  P. M.   daily. Only one group at target
  1 to 4  at a time.
  DRILL   Each group to have estimating
          distance twice during week. Each
          group to have individual cooking
          twice.

          Each group to have one hour’s instruction
          during week in first aid
          and care of feet on a march.

          All to be taught to form for and
          pitch shelter tent camp.

          If the necessary masks and plastrons
          are available practice in bayonet
          fencing at least three times
          during week for each group. If no
          fencing rifles are available, poles
          the length of the rifle and bayonet,
          with a good pad fastened on the
          end, answer the purpose. If
          masks are not available bayonet
          exercise and close order drill will
          fill up the rest of the time.

          In arranging this work the best
          man for it should be put in charge
          of each class of work.

  4 to — Company formed with full kit,
          except rations and ammunition,
          and marched first day about
                        twenty minutes, lengthening the time
                        each day by 10 minutes.

  7 P. M.      School.


  5th Week.

  [Sidenote: 5th week]

  A. M.
  7 to 11               Drill same as last week.

  11 to 12              Same as last week.

                        Gallery practice same as last week.

                        Patrolling same as last week.

                        First aid, same as last week.

                        Estimating distance, once during
                        week.

                        Bayonet fencing or exercise for at
                        least one hour during the week.

  P. M.
  1 to 4                Each platoon to be posted as a
                        picket of an imaginary outpost
                        line and men instructed twice
                        during week.

  11 to 12              Each squad as above once as a
                        sentry squad.

                        A wall prepared and men given instruction
                        in scaling it.

                        Any time left over to be used as
                        thought best.

  4 to 5                March with pack as before, giving
                        instruction in advance and
                        rear guard.

  7                     School.


  6th Week—Company.

  [Sidenote: 6th week
  Company]

  A. M.    One hour close order, remainder
  7 to 11           extended order drill.
  DRILL    Much practice in attack as explained
                    in Chapter IV.
  11 to 12          Same as last week.
  P. M.    Gallery practice as last week,
  1 to 4            except on Friday.

                    Friday whole company as support
                    of an outpost, sentinels and patrols
                    carefully instructed.

                    Each non-commissioned officer,
                    twice during week, to conduct a
                    patrol, instructing privates.

                    Bayonet fencing and wall scaling
                    as last week.

                    Estimating distance as last week.
                    Remainder of time teaching men
                    brush work, hurdle revetment,
                    fascines, etc.
  4 to 5            Same as last week.
  7                 School.
                    Saturday, formal inspection by
                    company.


  7th Week—The Company.

  [Sidenote: 7th week
  Company]

  A. M.    As last week except that time
  7 to 11           given to close order may be reduced
  DRILL    to 15 minutes daily.

  7 to 11            At least two days must be given
  DRILL     to maneuver of company against
                     company.

                     All the men must fire 20 shots during
                     the week at gallery practice at
                     such times as found practicable
                     without interfering with the prescribed
                     program.
  P. M.     Monday. Outpost, company as a
  1 to 5             support.

                     Friday. Practice march with instruction
                     in patrolling, advance
                     and rear guard, and attack and
                     defense, either one company to
                     work against another or enemy
                     to be outlined.

                     Estimating distance drill while
                     out. Men must not march more
                     than 10 miles nor less than 6.
                     Packs will be carried.

                     Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

  1 to 3-30          Patrolling at least once during
                     week by each non-commissioned
                     officer as leader.

                     Remainder of time to brush work,
                     filling and piling sand bags, making
                     loopholes and intrenching.

  P. M.      Drill in dark as training for night
  9 to 10             work.

                      School as last week.

                      Saturday, formal inspection by
                      company.


  8th Week—Battalion.

  [Sidenote: 8th week
  Battalion]

  A. M.      Drill by Battalion. Not more
  7 to 11             than one hour of this time per day
                      should be devoted to close order.
                      Gallery practice, same as last
                      week.

  P. M.      Tuesday and Thursday.

  1 to 5              March and instruction by battalion
                      similar to that by company
                      last week. Distance marched
                      about 10 miles.

                      Monday.

  1 to 5              Tent pitching and making camp,
                      including the large tents.

                      Wednesday and Friday.

  1 to 3-30           Field engineering.

                      Work same as last week.

  9 to 10             Night drill.

  6                   Monday, Wednesday, Friday,
                      battalion dress parade. Each battalion
                      once during week. School
                      as usual.

                      Saturday morning, battalion review
                      and inspection.

  [Sidenote: 9th week
  target
  practice]

  9th Week.         Target practice on the range
                    with ball cartridges.

If the pits are not large enough so that each company can have three
targets, only part of the companies should go at a time so as to give
that number of targets. It should be completed by end of 9th week and
may have had to come earlier for some companies.

If the range is right at the instruction camp it would be much better
to have the companies shoot only a couple of hours a day beginning
with 7th week and reduce the other instruction by that much, but so
that at the end of the 9th week the work accomplished is the same.


  10th Week.

  [Sidenote: 10th week]

  A. M.
  7 to 11           Battalion drill all but 15 minutes
                    daily, extended order work. Battalion
                    against battalion at least twice.
  P. M.    Monday, battalion outpost instruction.
  1 to 5
                    Wednesday, march by battalion
                    with packs. Instruction as before.
          Tuesday and Thursday from 1 to
          5 and Friday from 1 to 3 instruction
          by company. Gallery practice,
          pointing and aiming and
          estimating distance, each once.
          Bayonet work for one hour. Wall
          scaling once. Two patrol problems
          for each non-commissioned
          officer. Balance of time field engineering
          work as before.

          Friday 9 to 10 P. M. Night drill
          by battalion.

          Battalions in turn have battalion
          dress parade on Monday, Tuesday
          and Thursday.

          Saturday morning battalion review
          and inspection.

          School, 7 P. M.


11th Week.

[Sidenote: 11th week]

Regimental work. Colonel uses it to best advantage.

One afternoon practice march. Regimental dress parade 4 evenings.
School, 7 P. M. as before.

Saturday, regimental review and inspection.


12th Week.

[Sidenote: 12th week practice march]

A seven days’ practice march under war conditions with as much
instruction as possible in field service, care of men, especially the
feet, and of course in loading wagons, making and breaking camp.

Marches, especially the first two or three, must not be long.


13th Week.

[Sidenote: 13th week]

Work each forenoon from 7 to 11-30 in what, by careful observation,
the colonel finds is most needed.

No work in the afternoon except as follows:

Each man to have gallery practice once, ten shots. Each man to
estimate distance once. Companies to have bayonet work for at least
two half-hour periods each week and pointing and aiming drill once
for some length of time.

Dress parade by regiment three times during week.

Regimental review and inspection Saturday.

School as usual.

[Sidenote: Results of training]

This regiment can be used at the end of this three months. It will
not be completely nor even well trained but it is believed to be the
best that can be done in that time.

Can we have even this much time without great sacrifice and loss?
It is very doubtful, and yet it is not believed practicable to use
volunteers with less training except in fortifications.

The work has been very strenuous for all; the weaklings will have
been eliminated. Any one fit for a soldier in war could have stood
the strain, and the others had better be eliminated before taking the
field.

If at the end of our 13th week we find we have more time, the work
for the week following should be reduced to three hours per day and
the schools, after that we may resume the long days of work.



XI

RECRUITING


The method of recruiting has a decided influence on effective
training. It is much harder to train a company whose recruits dribble
in a few at a time than one, all of whose recruits for the year come
in at once.

[Sidenote: When recruits should join]

The best results can be obtained if these recruits can all be had in
the fall. As stated before, the course of instruction should run from
November 1st to October 31st. In the indoor season all that part of
the instruction course that can be given, should be. It should be
preparatory to the outdoor work. The foundation of sound training
should be laid during this season; the recruit can then be given
his elementary instruction and be ready to begin the outdoor work
with the company. The outdoor season is none too long in which to
go through properly the whole course of work that should be taught
outside.

If recruits are received late in the spring or summer they are not
prepared to do the work with the company, they get only part of it
and that in a way that does not give good results. It is like trying
to teach Algebra first, then Arithmetic. Another drawback to this
method is that it results in the captain’s not having all his company
for this outdoor work. Our present peace strength is so low that
correct training in parts is difficult and when much below this the
training is very imperfect.

[Sidenote: Recruit depots]

Most, if not all, good captains very much prefer to have their
recruits directly on enlistment to having them go to a depot for
several weeks. The training they receive in these depots, in value,
is out of all proportion to the time spent. In their companies, from
the very start, while learning the recruit drill they are learning
much else of value. The recruit is better off and more contented. In
his company there is a personal feeling for him and interest in him
not found at the depot.

The instruction and ways of doing things first learned are those of
his company, not always the case at the depot. The few movements
taught at the recruit depots must be taught exactly right if precise
close order drill is to be had, it is harder to change a recruit’s
ways of doing anything than to teach him the right way from the
start. It has been suggested that if the depots are kept up, all
drill thereat except callisthenics be prohibited.

Recruits dribbling in, waste effort. It is as much bother to a
company to train and get one recruit into the company as a squad of
eight. The large number of men held at these recruit depots would
give a very desirable increase in strength to our companies if we
could have them. The vaccinations that are attended to at the depots
could just as well be done at the posts.

[Sidenote: Plan of recruiting]

The following is offered as a plan of recruiting that it is believed,
would improve that branch of the service and greatly improve the
training of our infantry:

All recruiting stations and recruit depots in time of peace to be
abolished.

Each regiment in the U. S. to be assigned a permanent district
within which its recruits are to be found. The regiment may never be
stationed inside this district but its recruits are all to come from
there.

Early in November of each year, each regimental commander to select a
few recruiting parties composed of an officer and three or four men
from his regiment to beat up this district for recruits. They should
visit the small towns as well as have stations in the larger ones.
Before enlistment the recruits to be physically examined by a doctor,
either of the Medical Corps or one hired in the district.

These recruits are to be sent directly to their regiments in
detachments as enlisted and their training commenced.

As there are many young men who will not enlist for service in the U.
S., but do want to go on foreign service, each home regiment will, in
addition to getting its own recruits, be given the task of getting
a certain number for the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, the number
being allotted by the War Department. Men reënlisting should be sent,
as far as practicable, to foreign service. These latter will be sent
to designated posts and held long enough to be properly equipped,
vaccinated, etc., and then be sent to their regiments.

Large cities like New York and Chicago should not be assigned to a
single regiment but three or four regiments to have stations there
and part of the outlying districts to be theirs to beat up.

These recruiting parties to remain out until they have completed
their quotas then to return to their stations, but never later than
February 1st.

[Sidenote: Advantages of plan]

This plan offers several advantages and some disadvantages, but is
believed to be an improvement.

Its advantages are:

All the recruits of the company come in at one season and that the
best one.

They come directly to the company on enlistment.

Companies can be larger without increasing strength of army.

The officer enlisting them belongs to the regiment as does his
recruiting party and will exercise more care to get only suitable men.

The recruiting will be more widely distributed and as the men go back
to their homes knowledge of the service, and trained men in case of
war, will be generally distributed.

Fewer men from the slums of the big cities and more from small towns
and rural districts.

The men of a regiment coming from one locality, year after year,
a friendly feeling for the regiment should be built up and future
recruiting assisted and, in case of a great war, every section will
have its nucleus of trained men.

Discipline will be improved and desertion diminished. The men will
realize that their comrades are from their home section and people at
home will know of their misdeeds. Besides it is pleasanter for the
men to serve with those they have known before.

It cannot be asserted without a trial that this method will be
cheaper than the present one but the author believes it will be.

To send out these recruiting parties will be a considerable expense
but to offset this there is the cost of the present recruiting
stations for rent, the difference in the cost of commutation paid
and actual cost at posts, the travelling expenses incurred sending
recruits to depots, often in an opposite direction from that to their
future posts, the costs of keeping up these depots, a large amount,
the loss of the service of all the recruiting personnel for any other
valuable purpose during the year as well as the cost for the time
lost in training of all the recruits.

The recruiting parties sent out by the regiments are taken from
trained men at the season when they can be best spared and probably
they would be absent but for a relatively short time.

If this plan be adopted the method will work better each year.
The men who have gone back, and even those in the ranks, can and
will help in the recruiting, and as the number of these increase
recruiting will be more easily and quickly done. Each village will
know that the party will visit it at a certain season and many will
be ready at once.

It will be more expensive the first year or two than afterwards. The
saving on deserters should be large after the first two or three
years.

[Sidenote: Discussion of objections]

There are two apparent objections. That there will be no large
number of recruits in hand to be sent to particular regiments in an
emergency. This is of small consequence. Where the regiment is wanted
for a sudden emergency, the adding of a large number of raw recruits
is of no immediate advantage.

Suspending recruiting February 1st may result at first in some
regiments not being filled up but this is doubtful. Most of our
original enlistments at present are made in winter, and this would be
offset, if it does occur, by the other advantages enumerated.

Convenience of administration and keeping records should have no
weight as against efficient training for action, the only reason for
our army’s existence.

[Sidenote: Possible modification]

If the infantry cannot have the above system the following
modification would improve matters.

Each company to receive recruits but once during the year, each in
its turn and regiments as nearly at one time as practicable. The
recruits to be sent out within one week of their receipt at the
depots except those for foreign service. If the peace strength of
the companies be kept at 65, when the company is assigned recruits
it should be filled to a strength of 80 it will then average about
65 for the year possibly a few more. It is not believed the total
enlisted strength of the army would be increased at all. It would
amount to having the men with companies instead of in recruit depots.

The above will enable the captains to do much better training and
greater efficiency will result.

Of course those who receive their recruits in October or November
would have a great advantage over the others but all could do better
work.

Recruits enlisted in summer could be held much longer than others and
then, about September 1st, sent to the regiments stationed in the
tropics. It is more comfortable for the recruits if they can reach
those stations in the fall and get their first hard drills and become
acclimated while weather conditions are most favorable. This would
give the regiments at home their recruits at a favorable season if
not the best for all of them.

[Sidenote: Need for a change of system]

Either of the above changes can be made by a change in regulations
and orders.

With our great population and military needs and very small army it
is folly not to use what army we have so as to be as well prepared
for war as conditions permit.

In the preceding chapter it has been shown how important it is that
we have some trained men for every new regiment. We must have trained
men to fill the regular army which must bear the brunt of the first
attack.

The present law does not provide this. The enlistment law should
be radically changed to get the best results for training, general
efficiency and preparedness for war.

[Sidenote: Enlistment law]

All men should enlist for 5 years. At the end of one year’s honest
and faithful service, except when serving beyond the limits of the
U. S., the man should, on his application, be granted a furlough for
the remaining four years; if war breaks out, or becomes so imminent
as to call for mobilization, these furloughs to cease and the men to
rejoin. The men to have the privilege of remaining on in the service
if they so desire and of taking their furloughs at the end of any
completed year of service. Discharges not to be given the men until
the end of their full five years. Hence these men can not reënlist in
another organization while on furlough, and there can be no doubt of
their status and liability for punishment as deserters if they fail
to rejoin when called.

[Sidenote: Men on furlough]

For the present, men should not be _required_ to take the furlough
and reënlistment should not be prohibited, but remaining in service
with the colors over two years in time of peace should not be
encouraged; later, if found practicable to get sufficient recruits,
reënlistment for all, except non-commissioned officers and certain
mechanics who first enlist after that date, should be prohibited.
Men who have enlisted with the understanding that they can remain in
service until retired, provided they behave themselves properly and
are physically fit, should be honestly treated; they have an implied
contract at the least.

Time on furlough not to count for retirement or increase of pay, and
men on such furlough not to be counted in strength of company.

Recruits on foreign service should have the privilege of the furlough
only after two years service, and men with regiments in the U. S. who
wish to remain in the service, after one year’s service should be
encouraged or required to transfer to foreign service for the next
two years.

Men whose service in their first year has not been satisfactory and
who are not fairly trained should be required to serve two years
before being granted a furlough. The law should also provide that
men, whose conduct is found unsatisfactory by a board of officers and
the finding is approved by the colonel, may be furloughed at any time
after two years service whether the man desires it or not.

It is believed the plan would work if no pay were given men on
furlough, but if each be paid ten dollars each six months on
reporting his address by mail to the adjutant of the post it would
help in finding him when wanted and might be an inducement to some to
enlist.

An effort should be made to get young men as recruits. Boys of
eighteen or over if physically strong should be encouraged to
enlist. Young men are easier to train and for a longer time
afterwards are available for service.

We need a reserve but no men should be enlisted directly for it. The
reserve for the regular service should be our men on furlough. Men
too long out of service and advanced in years are not what is needed
for the regular service which must be ready at short notice to face
serious war.

[Sidenote: Reasons for enlistment plan]

The reasons for the foregoing recommendations as they appear to the
author are:

1. Five years is as long as the average man is willing to pledge
his future for military service unless he means to make it a life
occupation. The latter class is not the best for the government.
Young men are the best for the ranks in time of war. Men who serve
only long enough to be trained for the work are to be desired. It
results in a much greater number of trained men being available in
time of war and is much cheaper, for it reduces current pay and the
retired list.

2. The great importance of having as many trained men as possible and
having them dispersed through the country to help in the formation of
the new regiments at the outbreak of war is apparent to any one who
thinks on this subject.

3. If recruits be received during the winter months only, the
organizations can follow a prescribed course of instruction and
complete it annually. If recruits dribble in throughout the year a
proper course of instruction cannot be satisfactorily given in that
time.

4. At the outbreak of war, it is of vital importance that we have as
strong a force as possible of men fully ready trained and equipped.
The losses at first in this force will be heavy. If green recruits,
enough to fill the regular organizations to war strength and to make
good the early losses, be poured in on them they will cease to be
trained organizations. A reserve is a necessity. This will provide it
at small cost.

5. Many excellent and patriotic young men are willing to serve a
short time in the army for the experience and training. Four years,
however, is longer than they are willing to postpone settling down
to their real life’s work. These are the men it is most desirable to
get into the army, not as professional soldiers, but as a trained
reserve for war. For the first years they are a reserve for the
regular companies, then they become available for officers or
non-commissioned officers of volunteers. This class of young men
will enlist much more freely when they can do so and lose only one
year from civil pursuits.

6. Enlisting men as young as they are physically fit interferes less
with their civil careers, hence will get us more desirable recruits.
The physical and mental discipline a boy thus gets will help him
in his future work and the younger he gets it, so long as it does
not interfere with his schooling, the more it will be worth to him.
Taking the recruit young, the five years while his military service
is with the regulars are the five best for that purpose. Later when
older, more developed mentally and matured in judgment he is best in
higher rank than private with the volunteers. If he enters at 18 he
is available at 23 for the volunteers or national guard and has at
least seven years left in which he can be considered at his best.

7. The provision for letting men out at the end of one year, provided
their conduct has been good and they are fairly instructed, will be
a great aid to discipline and a preventative of desertion. A good
many young men enter the service thoughtlessly and find after a few
weeks that the life is different from what they expected. They look
ahead to over three years more of it and the weak ones desert.
They are not vicious nor criminal as a rule but this step injures
them seriously; they become prisoners or fugitives, and either will
decrease the man’s moral stamina and self respect. This provision
will greatly reduce this. The man will see that he has only to behave
himself for the rest of the year to return to civil life with a clean
record. The great expense resulting from desertion will be largely
eliminated. The men will be more contented, they will feel they can
leave in a short time if they wish, which will tend to decrease the
desire to quit. This does not prevent those staying in the service
who wish to do so. A few old soldiers are desirable.

Less than one year’s training is not sufficient in which to cover
properly the course the infantry soldier should have. Two years is
necessary to make a good job of it. But we need more men who can be
used in war. With some thoroughly trained men in the ranks it is
believed better to have 100 others of one year’s training than fifty
of two or more.

[Sidenote: Enlistments for the national guard]

The national guard should have the same period of five years for
enlistment with a provision for inactive service, except in war,
after two years of service, unless the man has had service in some
other organization, as a college battalion. Less than two years is
not enough training to be of value where so little time per year is
devoted to it.

While it has nothing to do with training, there is another provision
that should be in the enlistment law; that is, that every man who
enlists for five years, and is in service when war breaks out, shall
be liable for service for at least one year thereafter no matter
when his term expires. At the outbreak of a great war is no time to
discharge trained men.



XII

IN CONCLUSION


[Sidenote: Relative values]

Time is wasted at most posts on some things that are of little value
compared with the time spent on them.

“Butt’s Manual” is fine callisthenic drill and at proper times should
be practiced. It would be just as valuable and even more so if,
instead of having the men learn to go through it all without command,
an instructor gave the movements and the men executed them purely for
physical drill. The cadence amounts to little, but executing them so
as to exercise properly the desired muscles is important.

Many captains spend a great deal of time practicing this so that
their companies can go through the whole series without command and
to music. It is pretty, and for the chorus in a musical comedy act
might be a success, but for soldiers it is a waste of valuable drill
time that could and should be put to better use.

Our inspectors have had something to do with this, and county fairs
and similar shows, more. The narrow scope of instruction followed in
some companies, and the seeking for the easiest way to kill the drill
hour by a few, has helped to give this its prominence in our training.

[Sidenote: Target practice]

Our target practice is open to criticism in some respects. Its
importance can not be overestimated and it must not be slighted, but
rational methods should be followed. It is necessary to appreciate
fully what is required and wanted.

The individual man must be a fairly good marksman for two reasons:
so that he can place his shots in a designated locality, and to give
him confidence in himself. The better the men can shoot, other things
being equal, the more confidence they have in themselves and in each
other. For practical results on the battlefield an expert rifleman is
of little if any more value than a marksman. Good, fair shooting by
every man in the company is what is desired.

On the battlefield much depends on the confirmed habit, this
habit-forming can not be done on the target range, but throughout the
year’s work. Not to exceed two weeks a year should be allowed to any
company for known distance practice on the range. If its work during
the rest of the year has been properly done, this is sufficient. The
rest of the time is needed for other work. But the time put on field
firing, where done in the solution of correct tactical problems,
cannot well be excessive. The more of this the better.

[Sidenote: Extra pay]

The law granting extra pay to expert shots, sharpshooters and
marksmen is not believed good in its effect; it gives undue
importance to range firing. An expert rifleman without other training
and discipline is of but little value on the battlefield, while even
a second class shot, well trained and disciplined, is infinitely his
superior as a soldier. This law should be amended so as to divide
the men into two classes: the best men in each company to be rated
as 1st class. To be so rated the man must be thoroughly well trained
in _all_ his duties, of excellent character and 1st classmen or
better in target shooting. The extra pay for 1st classmen to be so
alloted as to cost the government no more than is now paid for higher
classifications. Men have drawn this extra pay for qualification as
shots who were of but little account as soldiers.

[Sidenote: Rifle firing competitions]

Rifle firing among young men in civil life should be encouraged.
It is a necessary _part_ of a soldier’s training and is that much
accomplished toward making efficient soldiers of them if the occasion
arises.

Our rifle competitions take too much time and are allowed to
interfere too much with regular training. Officers should not be
allowed to compete. Their work during this season is with their
companies; they should be learning the duties of an officer not that
of the private in the ranks. It is undoubted that a man can not make
much of a success teaching what he does not know. The officer must
know how to shoot well enough to be an instructor, he must know the
theory and have the knack of instructing. He does not need to neglect
his regular work for weeks at a time several summers to acquire this
at competitions.

The best company instructor in rifle firing the author ever saw on a
target range was a first sergeant who himself never made better than
marksman. The company was very short on sharpshooters and experts but
was still shorter on 3d class men. The poorest instructor he ever
saw was an officer whose breast on state occasions was covered with
big medals for shooting. He had to spare his own eyes so as to make
phenomenal scores; the instruction of the new men in the company was
of little importance compared with the former.

[Sidenote: Proper garrisoning]

The proper garrisoning of the army, to avoid so much necessary labor
and afford better opportunities for training, has been given great
attention by the War Department. May it soon meet with success.
But much can be done even under present conditions to help in this
matter. This beautiful parking perfectly kept is pretty, but it takes
ground needed for other purposes and requires an immense amount of
“fatigue” labor. This labor could be reduced: the parks would not be
so pretty but military efficiency would be greater. For which does
the government spend its money?

[Sidenote: Strength of the company]

Our companies should be increased in size to 100 men in peace, in
war to 150. Our companies are now too small for good training; it
requires too many new men to raise them to war strength, and the
present strength is wasteful of money and effort.

With the companies at a fixed peace strength of 65 it means much of
the time still less. There are not enough men to drill in the regular
platoon formations. In our extended order work the captain is
reduced to the capacity of a platoon commander and platoon commanders
are out of a job. These men do not get practice in the handling of
their proper units and it can not fail to diminish their interest and
enthusiasm and result in poorer work as well as in incomplete work.

In the case of war we shall need our regular organizations very
promptly and as efficient as possible. At the same time these
organizations are certain to lose many officers taken for other
duties. The addition of much more than one man to each two then in
ranks, even if they have been previously trained, is a serious blow
to efficiency. The new men must either be untrained or men from a
reserve. If from a reserve they are rusty on many points and are apt
to be strange to the officers who change in a company so frequently.
Adding 50 reservists to a company of 100 men will do no harm; adding
85 to a company of 65 will be very different and, if the men added in
the second case be untrained recruits, we shall not have a trained
unit but a school of instruction.

A great objection to our present strength is the fact that it is so
wasteful of money and effort.

The object of the army is to have a trained force ready for action
and to help train the great mass of men that will be called out in
case of war. We want as many trained men as possible, both for the
ranks and to help prepare others. Since we cannot have a large army
we should do all we are able with what we have.

We have in the regular army an expensive plant; the interest on cost
and overhead charges form a large part of the annual cost, the cost
for privates is relatively small. There is a demand and need for the
output, trained soldiers; yet we produce less than half of what we
could for the same cost, except pay of privates. With no increase in
interest on plant and pay of officers and senior non-commissioned
officers and administration, we could more than double our output
of trained men and more than double our efficiency for war, and the
training would be much better.

A private corporation doing business this way would probably go into
bankruptcy.

[Sidenote: New organization in war]

One thing should be made a fixed policy and made positive law now so
that in case of a real war it will be carried out. All organizations
received into the service for the war must be at full strength.

We shall require in such a war a very large army which means the
utilizing of all the organizations we now have and forming many
new ones. By filling all existing organizations to war strength
we reduce the number of new ones to be formed and utilize their
training capacity to the best advantage; they can not be taken at
their existing strength and state of training and have much value in
battle. We shall need so many men that must be trained that we must
use what means of training we have to its utmost.

By reducing the number of new organizations, more and better officers
can be used for their training; there will be more chance of getting
the necessary instructors for them. A few of the right kind of men
can fit for service a full strength regiment as well as one of half
strength and better officers and non-commissioned officers can be
found for it, for there will be fewer required and the average can be
higher.

Besides the difference in cost, administration, road space on the
march, and the tactical handling when massed in great numbers, are of
great importance and are much better done with fewer organizations.

[Sidenote: The army’s responsibility]

Upon the army today rests a great responsibility. With our small
numbers and many faults in organization and stations we must be as
nearly ready for a great war as possible; not only personally ready
but do what we can to make the organization of a great and efficient
army, if it ever becomes necessary, a possibility.

This means we must study and know our profession thoroughly, give a
helping hand to the national guard when and where we can and to any
other organization that does something toward the military training
of men who may make up this great army if it has to be raised. We
must remember that there are many things to be taught a man before he
is an efficient soldier; all he learns before he joins a volunteer
regiment is that much of a help.

But our chief duty, after personal qualification, is to make the best
soldiers possible out of the men under us. This is what we are paid
for and this is worth much more to our country than anything else we
can do in peace. We should make the best we can of the conditions
as they exist at our post, they may not be favorable for getting
the best results but that is no reason for our not getting the best
possible.

The quitter, the man who does as little as possible, who always wants
to be away from troops because things are not as he thinks they
should be, or who does nothing because he cannot do it exactly as
laid down, is a curse to the army; he should leave the service and
sell ribbons.

Rational, systematic training besides producing the greatest military
efficiency will keep the men interested in their work and will occupy
more of their time; the men will be more contented. Interested and
contented men will furnish a smaller sick report and fewer deserters.
There will be less dissipation hence less punishment.

Discontent, ennui, a constant grouch, injure digestion and bring
on other physical ills. This is another responsibility resting on
officers—that for the men under them. With young men we have a great
influence on their characters and future careers. We make men better
fit for life’s work or turn them back worse than we found them.

To the credit of the army it can be said that in most cases an
enlistment served therein is a benefit to the majority who so serve.
The men are physically and mentally better for a short service and I
believe morally. There is certainly less excessive drinking among
our soldiers in nearly all regiments than in a corresponding number
of civilians in the same vicinity, and the same is true as to other
vices. In personal cleanliness, decency and politeness they are far
ahead of the average man of the same social standing as that from
which they come. Many employers have recognized this, and are giving
preference to discharged soldiers in employment. The uniform makes
the man conspicuous and one drunken soldier in a thousand will call
for more attention than ten drunken civilians out of five hundred.

The duty of trying to improve the men morally is a military as well
as a moral duty. It is in line with what has been said before: the
better the man, the more valuable the soldier, the more he can be
taught, the more he can help to train others, and the more likely is
he to remain in physical condition to be fit for service in the field.

“We have a profession not a trade.” Let us take it seriously,
appreciate our responsibility, make the best of conditions as we find
them, improving them where we can, and train ourselves and those
under us to be THE BEST INFANTRY.



  Transcriber’s Notes

  pg 21 Changed: Minature bridges were constructed
             to: Miniature bridges were constructed

  pg 41 Changed:  take each major’s target and divided
             to:  take each major’s target and divide

  pg 62 Changed: with fire must be largely theorectical
             to: with fire must be largely theoretical

  pg 72 Changed: The high explosive shel
             to: The high explosive shell

  pg 77 Changed: if the enemy is enountered
             to: if the enemy is encountered

  pg 94 Changed: it will not gain the necesary
             to: it will not gain the necessary

  pg 96 Changed: Having gone through such an exercies
             to: Having gone through such an exercise

  pg 98 Changed: When a recontre engagement occurs
             to: When a rencontre engagement occurs

  pg 107 Changed: very loose, should be unbottoned
              to: very loose, should be unbuttoned

  pg 110 Changed: The command should march to come point
              to: The command should march to some point

  pg 173 Changed: for officers or non-commisioned
              to: for officers or non-commissioned



*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Training Infantry" ***


Copyright 2023 LibraryBlog. All rights reserved.