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Title: Maritime enterprise 1485-1558
Author: Williamson, James Alexander
Language: English
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MARITIME ENTERPRISE
1485–1558
[Illustration:
WARSHIP, PERIOD 1514–45.
From Cott. MS. Aug. 1. i. 18.
_Frontispiece_
]
MARITIME ENTERPRISE
1485–1558
BY
JAMES A. WILLIAMSON
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1913
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY
HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
PREFACE
The subject of English maritime enterprise during the period 1485–1558
falls naturally into two divisions—discovery and trade. The former has
engaged the attention of numerous historians in the last thirty years,
their works centring mainly on the voyages of the Cabots with subsequent
exploring adventures more or less summarily treated. Commerce, on the
other hand, has been somewhat neglected as a factor in that great
development of the powers of the English nation which made itself
evident in the sixteenth century. The only exhaustive book on the
_maritime_ trade of our country in the period in question is that of G.
Schanz,[1] published in German in 1881, and never translated into
English. This work stops at the year 1547.
The object of the present work is to present a comprehensive picture of
English maritime affairs from the accession of Henry VII to that of
Elizabeth; to trace out such lines of policy as are visible in the
existing records; and to elucidate certain incidents concerning which
disputable ideas, or no ideas at all, are current.
With regard to the Cabot voyages, no new evidence is adduced, but a
scientific criticism and analysis of that already known has been
attempted; leading, in the author’s opinion, to the partial
rehabilitation of the character of Sebastian Cabot. The evidence in
favour of his independent exploration in the North-West seems, when
properly discriminated from other matters with which it has been
unjustly confused, too strong to be neglected.
The later voyages of discovery under Henry VII, and those under Henry
VIII, have been as deeply entered into as the scanty surviving evidence
permits. The debt which our maritime expansion owes to the last-named
monarch is emphasized by the fact that most of the projects of his reign
owed their origin to his initiative, acting in despite of popular
apathy.
With the trading voyages to Brazil, the African coast, and the
North-East the new era of national expansion was entered upon. On these
matters the Record Office possesses numerous documents which supplement
the printed sources of information. The negotiations concerning the
Guinea voyages furnish an illustrative sidelight on the actual influence
exercised by King Philip over the conduct of English affairs.
In the chapters on commerce under Henry VIII and his two successors the
development of the various branches of trade, and their relation to
diplomacy, have been outlined, but many details have been necessarily
omitted. The circumstances attending the fall of the Hansa in England
are here fully stated for the first time.
For purposes of reference a chapter on the naval history of the period
has been added. The connexion between the naval service and the
mercantile marine was perhaps closer in Tudor times than at any
subsequent period. Officers, men, and ships served alternately in the
one and the other; and the navy itself was more of the nature of a
marine militia than of a regular force.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. HENRY VII AND HIS COMMERCIAL POLICY 13
II. MERCANTILE ORGANIZATION 31
III. THE CABOT VOYAGES—JOHN CABOT, 1497 AND 1498 51
IV. THE CABOT VOYAGES—SEBASTIAN CABOT, ? 1499 86
V. AN EARLY COLONIAL PROJECT 104
VI. THE GROWTH OF COMMERCE 120
VII. THE FALL OF THE HANSA 152
VIII. THE ENGLISH IN THE NORTH SEA 183
IX. FRANCE, SPAIN, AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 208
X. VOYAGES AND PROJECTS OF DISCOVERY UNDER HENRY VIII 240
XI. THE AFRICAN VOYAGES 274
XII. THE NORTH-EAST PASSAGE AND THE WHITE SEA 307
XIII. SHIPS AND MEN. ENGLISH PORTS 338
XIV. THE NAVY, 1485–1558 372
ILLUSTRATIONS
Warship, period 1514–45 _Frontispiece_
English Trade Routes at the beginning of the Tudor _To face_ p. 16
Period
The North Atlantic, from the Map of Juan de la ” ” 83
Cosa, 1500
The North Atlantic, from Robert Thorne’s Map, 1527 ” ” 116
Venetian map of the British Isles, North Sea, and ” ” 150
Baltic
Calais in the early Sixteenth Century ” ” 206
An English Warship, _temp._ Henry VIII ” ” 272
Map of Guinea and Benin, 1558 ” ” 288
English Discoveries in the North-East, from ” ” 336
William Borough’s Chart
Warship, _c._ 1485 ” ” 342
Two Merchantmen ” ” 346
Two Carracks ” ” 350
The _Henry Grace à Dieu_ ” ” 358
The _Grand Mistress_ ” ” 384
Plan of Portsmouth, _c._ 1545 ” ” 394
SUMMARY OF ENGLISH MARITIME AND
COMMERCIAL HISTORY, 1485–1558
PAGE
1485 Accession of Henry VII 13
Renewal of privileges of the Hansa in England 41
Navigation Act limiting import of Bordeaux wines to 19
English traders
1488 Concessions to Italian merchants 46
1489 Commercial treaty with Spain 22
1490 Commercial treaty with Denmark 41
1491 Diet at Antwerp to settle differences with the Hansa 42
(1492 Columbus discovers the West Indies)
1493 Rupture of intercourse between England and the 19
Netherlands
Riot against the Easterlings in London 43
(1494 Treaty of Tordesillas)
1496 John Cabot and his sons obtain their first Letters 53
Patent for discovery
The _Magnus Intercursus_ settles the dispute with the 20
Netherlands
1497 John Cabot’s first voyage 71–7
Commercial treaty with the Netherlands 20
Diet at Bruges to discuss disputes with the Hansa 43
1498 John Cabot’s second voyage 79–85
(Vasco da Gama arrives at Calicut)
1499 Sebastian Cabot’s voyage to the North-West (?) 86–103
Commercial treaty with the Netherlands 20
Diet at Bruges to discuss disputes with the Hansa 44
1500–2 Voyages of the brothers Corte Real to Newfoundland, &c. 106,
116
1501 Letters Patent for discovery granted to Bristol 104
merchants and Portuguese explorers
First voyage of the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate 107
1502 Second voyage of the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate 108
New Letters Patent issued reconstituting the syndicate 109
1503 Third Anglo-Portuguese voyage 110
1504 Fourth Anglo-Portuguese voyage 110
1505 Fifth Anglo-Portuguese voyage (?) 110
New Charter granted to the Merchant Adventurers 34
1506 The Archduke Philip (King of Castile) falls into the 20
hands of Henry VII
The _Malus Intercursus_ with the Netherlands 21
1507–8 Commercial negotiations with the Netherlands 21
1509 Death of Henry VII. Accession of Henry VIII 120
1511 Defeat and death of Andrew Barton 374
1512 War with France. Expedition for conquest of Gascony 375
Battle off Brest. Loss of the _Regent_ 376–8
1513 Attack on Brest. Death of Sir Edward Howard 381–3
1514 Raids on English and French coasts. End of the war 384–5
1515 Commercial treaty with Spain 216
1516 Alleged North-West voyage by Sebastian Cabot and Thomas 241–5
Spert (very doubtful)
1517 The Evil May Day 141
Grievances of the Hansa 154
Charter of privileges granted to English merchants in 216
Andalusia by the Duke of Medina Sidonia
1520 Commercial treaty with the Netherlands 185
Diet at Bruges to discuss differences with the Hansa 155
1521 The London Companies invited to finance a voyage of 245–8
discovery. Abandonment of the project
1522–5 Second French War of Henry VIII 386–8
1525 Proposal for a voyage of discovery to be led by Paolo 249
Centurioni. Death of the latter
(1526 Sebastian Cabot’s voyage to the River Plate)
1527 Robert Thorne’s _Declaration of the Indies_ and _Book 250–2
to Dr. Lee_
John Rut’s voyage to the North-West 252–8
1528 Arrest of English merchants in Spain and Flanders 187
1530 The English merchants in Spain constituted a Company by 218
Charter of Henry VIII
Act relating to the decay of Southampton 368
1530–2 Voyages of William Hawkins to Brazil 265–7
1532 Death of Robert Thorne 261
Diet at Bourbourg for settling disputes with the 187
Netherlands
1533 Act forbidding export of food stuffs 147
1534 Act giving power to the king to suspend commercial 124
statutes by proclamation
1535 Temporary arrest of the Hanse merchants 157
1536 Master Hore’s voyage to the North-West 262–4
1538–9 International crisis 125
1539 Proclamation placing foreign merchants on fiscal 126
equality with English for seven years
1539–40 Religious persecution of Englishmen in Spain 220–3
1540 Extensive list of grievances presented by the Hansa 157
Comprehensive Navigation Act 128
1540–2 Commercial and diplomatic struggle with Imperial 130–2
Government
Further voyages to Brazil 267–8
1541 Project for northern exploration 265
1542 Proposed diet with the Hansa at Antwerp 159
1544 War with Scotland and France. Sack of Leith and 388–9
Edinburgh. Capture of Boulogne
1545 Arrest of the Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp 191
Capture of a Spanish treasure-ship by Robert and John 272
Reneger
Arrest of all English merchants in Spain 224
Renewed religious persecution of English in Spain 224
French landing in the Isle of Wight 395
Naval actions at Portsmouth and off Sussex coast 392–8
1546 Peace with France 399
1547 Death of Henry VIII. Accession of Edward VI 144
Suspension of statutes limiting the export of unwrought 145
cloth
1548 Return of Sebastian Cabot to England 308
1551 Thomas Wyndham’s first voyage to the Barbary coast 274
1552 Partial repeal of the Navigation Act of 1489 (1485) 214
Execution of the Duke of Somerset 164
Revocation of the privileges of the Hansa in England 166
Voyage of Roger Bodenham to Chios 235–8
Wyndham’s second voyage to Barbary 275–7
1553 Safe-conduct for trade in Turkey granted to Anthony 238
Jenkinson by the Sultan
First English voyage to Guinea (Wyndham and Pinteado) 277–83
Formation of the Russia Company 311
Departure of Willoughby and Chancellor on the first 317
voyage to the North-East
Death of Edward VI. Accession of Mary 150
Restoration of Hanse privileges 170
Willoughby discovers Novaia Zemlia 319
Chancellor discovers the White Sea and reaches 323
Archangel
1553–4 (winter) Chancellor travels to Moscow and interviews 324
the Czar
1554 Death of Willoughby at Arzina 321
John Locke’s voyage to Guinea 284–7
Return of Chancellor with news of discoveries 326
1555 Partial revocation of Hanse privileges 174
New Charter granted to the Russia Company 326
Chancellor’s second voyage to Archangel 327–9
Prohibition of Guinea voyages by the Privy Council 291
1555–6 William Towerson’s first voyage to Guinea 293–5
1556 Agreement with the Hansa allowing limited privileges 176
Third expedition to Archangel 329
Voyage of Stephen Borough in search of the North-East 330-2
Passage
Wreck of the _Edward Bonaventure_. Death of Chancellor 333
Renewed prohibition of the Guinea trade 295
1556–7 Towerson’s second Guinea voyage. Fighting with the 296–302
Portuguese on the Gold Coast
1557 Complete rupture with the Hansa 178
Banishment of Englishmen from the Hanse towns 178
Arrival in London of a Russian ambassador 334
Fourth expedition to Archangel 336
1558 Fall of Calais 405
Towerson’s third voyage to Guinea 302–6
Death of Queen Mary 406
CHAPTER I
HENRY VII AND HIS COMMERCIAL POLICY
The reign of Henry VII marks the opening of the modern era in the
history of the English nation, the period in which, from being an
agricultural and military people, we have become transformed into a
maritime and commercial community, with interests stretching far beyond
the shores of our immediate neighbours on the continent of Europe.
Throughout the Middle Ages all the strivings and ambitions of England
were concentrated on the conquest, by force of arms, of the surrounding
countries—of the remaining parts of the British Isles at first, and
afterwards of France. With a hardy and independent peasantry and a
fierce and warlike baronage, it could scarcely have been otherwise.
English kings found themselves obliged, for their own preservation, to
put themselves at the head of such movements, and those of them who were
unable or unwilling to do so were continually menaced by the turbulent
elements to which they refused an outlet.
This system of violent expansion, successful in the cases of Ireland and
Wales, and not seriously pursued in that of Scotland, proved to be its
own destruction when applied to France. Although a military conquest
might endure for a time, it was impossible that England could
permanently absorb a nation larger than itself, of different blood,
language, and manners of thought, in the same way that Wales had been
absorbed. When Henry V commenced his wonderful career of conquest the
sentiment of nationality was already too well established; and the long
struggle, which ended forty years later in the expulsion of the English
from France, consolidated that sentiment, and rendered the renewal of
such an attempt for ever impossible of success. But just as France had
developed from a mere geographical area into a nation in the modern
sense of the word, so also had England, although much remained to be
done before her development could proceed on truly national lines. The
Wars of the Roses, protracted, with intervals of peace, for thirty
years, cleared away much of the remaining débris of feudalism; and at
their close Henry VII came forward as the first king of modern England.
The old ideals, the old national instincts, and the old social order had
gone, or were in process of dissolution; and the work of his reign
consisted in forming new ones and giving direction to that universal
awakening of the human mind which now first began to make its influence
felt in the practical affairs of the English nation.
As with all changes of deep-rooted and far-reaching importance, its
results were slow to manifest themselves, and were scarcely apparent to
many of the greatest minds of the time, bred up to the old order, yet
nevertheless working unconsciously in the furtherance of the new. The
king himself, who did more than any other man to usher in the new era,
and whose policy has been followed, with intervals of retrogression,
almost to our own time, may well have been unaware how greatly he
differed from his forerunners, and there is nothing in his recorded
utterances to show that he realized the significance of the change that
was taking place. In fact, as compared with many of the more flamboyant
statesmen who followed him, he must have appeared slow and conservative,
a survival of mediaevalism rather than a man of the Renaissance. Like
the evolution of the natural world, that of imperial Britain has been
largely unconscious, and measures which owed their origin to expediency
and the needs of the moment have frequently hardened into enduring
elements of the national system. Let us then examine, from this point of
view, one aspect of the reign of the first Tudor—his commercial policy;
bearing in mind that, although he himself was concerned only with the
immediate welfare of his family and country, his work was of such a
character as to serve as the foundation for an edifice upon which the
passage of four Centuries has not yet placed the topmost stone.
European commerce, down to the age of the great geographical
discoveries, hinged upon two great trade routes and two great producing
areas, the one of manufactured, and the other of raw, material. To these
four dominant factors all subsidiary avenues and crafts owed their
origin and continued existence. The two primary trade routes were:
first, that connecting, by way of the Levant and the nearer East, the
Italian cities with the vaguely known and fabulously portrayed wealth of
southern Asia; and second, that by which the hardy merchants of the
Hanseatic League conveyed the produce of the Baltic shores, of
Scandinavia, of the wide plains of Muscovy, and through them the
far-fetched wares of Persia and Cathay, to western Europe, which region,
stimulated by amenities whence the indolent mind of Asia drew no profit,
inevitably became the centre of the world’s progress. Nothing for
nothing being a universal law, Europe had to find something of her own
to exchange for the furs of the North and the spices of the East. The
cities of the Rhine delta supplied, in great part, the indispensable
_quid pro quo_, by devoting themselves to a variety of manufactures
amongst which that of cloth assumed a position of paramount importance.
Here, then, arose the first producing area necessary to the balance of
the mediaeval trading system; England constituted the second and equally
indispensable one, for she alone, secured by the sea from the worst
scourges of war, could supply the raw material for the cloth industry.
The generous wool-sacks of England became her title of entry into the
ranks of the progressing nations of the world.
Already, before the dawn of the new era, England had begun to
manufacture a portion of her wool into rough, inferior qualities of
cloth, but, until the awakening under the Tudor dynasty, she cannot be
said to have realized the possibilities of her position. The Hanse
merchants and the Italians were in possession of the bulk of her foreign
commerce, and only a few subsidiary trades were in the hands of
Englishmen, whose education and ability in such matters were inferior to
those of the foreigners.
[Illustration:
TRADE ROUTES
from and to
ENGLAND
at the commencement
of the
Tudor Period.
]
A more detailed consideration of the lines of communication with which
England was immediately concerned reveals four main commercial avenues,
all forming part of the great general system already described: the
trade with Germany and the Baltic, chiefly controlled by the great
Hansa, whose tentacles spread from Riga to the Rhine; the export of
half-made cloth to Flanders, shared between the Hansa, the Flemings, and
the English Merchant Adventurers; the wool export, to Calais by the
English Staple Merchants, and overland to Italy by the Venetians and
Florentines, who maintained business houses for that purpose in London;
and the long sea route for wools, wines, and spices, to and from the
Mediterranean, again monopolized almost exclusively by the Italians. In
addition there were minor, but nevertheless much frequented, trades to
Spain for wines and oils, to Gascony for wines, and to Iceland for
stock-fish. The two last mentioned were more exclusively in the hands of
Englishmen than any of the others.
These mediaeval trade routes, although destined to be profoundly
modified by the great extension of the limits of the world as known to
Europeans, remained of paramount importance for more than a century to
come, and Henry VII set himself to the policy of ousting foreigners from
their control, and of fostering, by every means known to his
statesmanship, the mercantile enterprise of his own people.
One of the shrewdest business men who ever sat upon a throne, he had
no doubt studied and admired the commercial system of Venice. That
state, which existed solely by means of and for the purpose of
trade, maintained her ascendancy by a fiscal policy which combined
rigorous protection with a species of socialism undefiled by any
morbidly altruistic ideas. All the familiar weapons of modern
protection—preferential duties on goods from Venetian dependencies,
navigation laws to encourage Venetian shipping, retaliatory tariffs
against rivals, and reciprocal arrangements with such as were
disposed to be reasonable—were to be found in the armoury of Venice,
and were applied with an unquestioning assurance as to their
efficacy, only possible in an age when the doctrines of free trade
were yet unborn.
In addition there was in Venice an absolutely complete subordination of
the individual to the interests of the State. If the export or import of
a certain article was considered prejudicial to the welfare of the city,
that trade was stopped forthwith; if the clothworkers of Venice were
short of raw material, shipmasters coming from England were ordered to
load with wool and nothing else; if the State galleys for the Flanders
voyage had difficulty in completing their cargoes, those who preferred
to ship their goods in private vessels were forced to pay half or
quarter freights to the official ships as well; since it was desirable
that Venice should possess a large commercial navy, the overland
conveyance of certain wares was forbidden or subjected to paralysing
duties. Such are a few examples of the working of an undemocratic
republic, of a type which may never be seen again, but which was
eminently suited to the needs of its time. And the secrets of the
success of this unparalleled interference by the State with individual
rights? They were two: first, magnificent discipline, ready obedience
enforced by severe penalties; and second, an elasticity of method, an
instant variation of policy to meet varying conditions, which could only
have been carried out by an assembly of level-headed, patriotic
merchant-statesmen, such as filled the benches of the Venetian senate.
Henry VII, then, had before him a pattern of successful mercantile
policy, but he was under no illusions as to his powers of enforcing such
a discipline on England. Although he far exceeded him in subtlety of
mind, he lacked the ferocious mastery of men which his son was
afterwards to display. He had to make up his mind to work slowly and
cautiously, to be content to sow that others might reap, to lay sure
foundations for the greatness of his family and of the country with
which its interests were bound up.
Generally speaking, the policy of the Middle Ages had been, in the
interests of cheapness, to encourage foreign merchants of all kinds to
bring their goods to England, and to establish factories in her ports;
in many cases, even, aliens had been granted privileges exceeding those
of native traders, and consequently the trade of England was largely in
foreign hands. Henry soon gave signs that this policy of cheapness was
to be abandoned. His first Parliament passed an Act[2] prohibiting the
import of Bordeaux wines in other than English vessels, manned by
English crews. To avoid friction, the too sudden application of this law
was mitigated by the frequent granting to foreign merchants of licences
to break it. But these were exceptions; the rule remained, and the
grants of licences gradually diminished.
While determined to advance the general interests of his subjects, he
was always ready to conclude commercial treaties conferring a mutual
exchange of benefits; and he sought, wherever possible, to draw
mercantile advantages from his handling of purely political matters. The
commercial relations of England and the Netherlands form an illustration
in point. In 1493 there was a serious quarrel on account of the support
given to Perkin Warbeck by Margaret, the widowed Duchess of Burgundy and
sister of Richard III. Henry’s retaliation to her vindictive
encouragement of his enemies consisted in ordering the cessation of all
intercourse, and the removal of the Continental head-quarters of the
Merchant Adventurers from Antwerp to Calais. Uninterrupted trade with
England was essential to the prosperity of the Netherlands, where a
large proportion of the craftsmen were employed in dyeing and finishing
the rough English cloth. There was on both sides great distress in
commercial circles, and unemployment due to the loss of trade; but the
inconvenience thus caused, while considerable in England, was
intolerable in the Netherlands, and the result was the negotiation of
the famous _Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496, followed by supplementary
treaties in 1497 and 1499.[3] By these treaties tariffs were reduced,
fishing rights regulated, and many vexatious restrictions abolished; in
addition, Henry secured the political object for which he had undertaken
the struggle. When the English cloth merchants returned to Antwerp they
were received with public demonstrations of joy.
The English king, although willing to make concessions when such were
inevitable, showed himself remorseless in seizing an accidental
advantage. In January 1506 the Archduke Philip, who had succeeded to the
throne of Castile on the death of Queen Isabella in 1504, set out from
Flanders to Spain by sea. In the Channel he encountered a furious storm,
and, after all on board had given themselves up for lost, his fleet
reached the shelter of Weymouth. Contrary to the advice of his captains,
he went on shore. The country people, seeing the arrival of strange
ships and armed men, gathered to resist an enemy, but, finding him to be
a friend, they made him welcome. Sir Thomas Trenchard, a most astute
gentleman of the neighbourhood, offered him entertainment, and sent off
post haste to acquaint King Henry of the prize which fortune had cast on
his shore. Philip now realized his rashness and would have been glad to
depart, but was earnestly entreated by Trenchard and his friends to stay
and speak with the king. Fearing that if he insisted their courtesy
would give place to force, he put a good face on the matter and
professed himself delighted to remain. Henry sent the Earl of Arundel,
with many lords and knights, to bring him to Windsor with his wife
Juana.
He was paraded through London and, as the price of his liberty, had to
agree to a commercial treaty which settled outstanding questions in such
a one-sided way, and admitted English cloth at such a cheap rate to the
Netherlands, that the defrauded Flemings named it the _Malus
Intercursus_.[4] In those times shipwrecked voyagers received scant
compassion, and Henry was only taking the same advantage on a large
scale as his unscrupulous subjects took on a smaller one when they stole
the cargoes from stranded ships. Philip died without ratifying the
treaty of 1506, the details of which were not completed until after he
left the country, and relations became unsatisfactory in consequence.
Margaret proposed to resume trade on the terms of the _Magnus
Intercursus_, but Henry was unwilling to forgo his hard bargain.
Finally, a compromise between the treaties of 1496 and 1506 was agreed
upon, the customs payable by Englishmen in the Netherlands remaining on
the basis of the latter. The question of the legal validity of the
_Malus Intercursus_ remained unsettled, the matter being postponed from
time to time by the issue of provisional ordinances for its maintenance.
As late as 1538 the Netherlanders were still demanding its
abrogation.[5]
An important trade existed between England and Spain and, at the
beginning of Henry’s reign, it was largely in the hands of Spanish
merchants, a number of whom resided in London. The customs duties had
long been in an unsettled state, and were the subject of an arrangement
included in the Treaty of Medina del Campo, 1489.[6] It was provided
that the subjects of either country might travel, reside, and carry on
business in the other without a passport, and should be treated in every
way as native citizens. Customs duties were to be reduced and all
letters of marque (i. e. private reprisal for injuries) revoked. There
were also other clauses intended for the suppression of piracy, a
subject which will be referred to later.
That such treaties were often broken is proved by their frequent
renewal; and indeed, the signing of a treaty was more often the signal
for a commencement of wranglings as to its interpretation, than a token
of settlement. In the case in point it had been agreed that customs were
to be reduced to what they had been thirty years before. The intention
was plain, but Henry discovered that the English duties had been
_higher_ at the date mentioned than at the time of the treaty, and he
promptly increased them, although the Spaniards protested that they had
lowered theirs. The dispute on this point dragged on for many years, and
references to it occur at intervals in diplomatic correspondence until
the marriage of the Prince of Wales and Katherine of Aragon. A curious
fiscal argument occurs in a letter from Henry to the Spanish sovereigns
in 1497.[7] He says that the effect of the high duties is that Spaniards
sell their goods at a high price in England, and so are enabled to
obtain more English cloth with the proceeds than they could otherwise
do. Thus the duties are paid by the English, not the Spaniards. An
excellent sermon—for other people—on the disadvantages of protection!
Although anxious to foster English trade and enterprise to the utmost,
Henry could not afford to neglect his dynastic interests, and the latter
were of paramount importance in his dealings with Spain. His title was
weak and his enemies strong, and, during the first part of his reign, it
seemed quite likely that he would perish in a feudal revolution as four
of his predecessors had done in the space of a century. To remedy the
instability of his throne he was sometimes obliged to make use of
commerce as a weapon or a bribe, as opportunity offered. An instance of
the first was seen in his dealings with the Netherlands; the
negotiations for the Spanish marriage were an example of the second. The
proposals and hagglings with reference to this marriage dragged on for
years. Henry was eager for it. He was, in a sense, a parvenu among the
kings of Europe, and he felt that it was a vital matter for him to
establish his family among them. Ferdinand and Isabella, on the other
hand, had great hesitation in allowing their young daughter to be exiled
among the English, whom the Spaniards regarded as being socially and
morally inferior to themselves. In addition to this personal objection
they had another. They wished to procrastinate until Henry should have
disposed of his pretenders and given proofs of the firmness of his
throne. Hence his extreme eagerness to lay Perkin Warbeck by the heels,
which embroiled him with the Netherlands in 1493. The marriage being the
keystone of his policy, he left no means unused to bring it about, and
so we find commercial relations employed by him as a screw with which to
extort the reluctant acquiescence of Spain. In 1496 he declared that he
would come to an understanding on the question of the duties after the
alliance and marriage should have been concluded. In 1497, in the letter
already quoted, he promised that Spanish traders should have
preferential treatment as against the Italians in celebration of the
happy arrival of the princess in England, an event which was still to be
delayed, as it proved, for more than four years to come. One more
instance of the intimate connexion of politics and trade may be given.
In 1504 the Spanish Government prohibited the export of goods from Spain
in foreign vessels so long as there were any Spanish ships unemployed,
but in consideration of the position of the now widowed Katherine in
England and of their desire to recover her or her dowry, the English
were exempted from the application of this law.[8]
With Venice Henry VII was never on bad terms, although for several years
a brisk tariff war was waged between the two powers. It arose from the
action of Venice in imposing an additional export duty of four ducats
per butt on malmsey wines loaded by aliens at Candia. This was done
under pretext of discouraging the pirates of that region, but in reality
for the purpose of favouring Venetian shipping. Henry retaliated by
making Venetians pay 18_s._ per butt extra duty on importing these wines
into England, and by fixing a maximum selling price of £4 per butt. A
butt of malmsey contained 126 gallons, and a gallon of the wine thus
cost about 7½_d._ in England. The differential duty and the maximum
selling price threatened to squeeze the Venetians out of the market, but
the king went further. He entered into negotiations with the Florentine
Government with a view to the establishment of an English wool-staple at
Pisa.[9] This would have constituted the latter city the distributing
centre for English wool in the Mediterranean, and Venice would have been
deprived at a blow of an important branch of her trade. The proposal
seriously alarmed the Venetians, and they threatened to discontinue the
dispatch of the annual trading fleet to England. It would have been
manifestly impossible for them to bring cargoes of spice to England if
they were debarred from loading wool in return, especially as the export
of specie from England was prohibited. The Pisa project was probably not
seriously intended and was not persisted in, although the appointment in
1494 of two English consuls in that city, with full authority over
English merchants, indicates that considerable business was done
there.[10] In the end, after lengthy but quite dispassionate
negotiations, such as befitted business-like powers, Henry carried his
point and the wine duties were reduced.[11]
The prohibition of the export of money, and also of gold and silver
plate, from the realm was typical of the economic ideas of the time.
Gold was looked upon as wealth in itself rather than as a means of
exchange, and this notion was strengthened as time went on by the
enormous apparent advantages which Spain derived from her American
conquests. It was an error which led Spain to ruin, and would have been
equally fatal to England if she had had the same opportunity to go
astray. Fortunately, Englishmen found themselves excluded from the
gold-bearing regions, and were driven to trade and eventually to
colonization instead.
To be successful as a merchant under the conditions which obtained in
the days when individual effort was beginning to displace the rigid
guild-system of the Middle Ages, a man had need of alert wits, a stout
heart, and capital sufficient to enable him to withstand the violent
fluctuations of fortune. Even in times of peace the risks were great,
although undoubtedly the profits of the successful were proportionate.
Shipwrecks were necessarily frequent on unlighted and practically
uncharted coasts; the trade routes were infested with pirates and
privateers; and commercial treaties were broken almost as soon as made.
The cautious trader, before venturing his goods into a foreign country,
was careful to procure a licence or safe-conduct from the Government,
and even this did not always protect him. If he could obtain the
patronage of a powerful person, he might contrive to avoid the payment
of customs dues. In 1492, when Henry VII imposed the prohibitive duties
on Candia wines, the Venetian merchants in London were advised to
distribute forty or fifty butts of the wine, or their cash equivalent,
as bribes in getting the matter set right. Even State-owned vessels were
not secure from molestation, when sufficiently far from home. In the
same year, 1492, we read that Henry, being at war with France, detained
the Flanders galleys of Venice to act as transports for his troops.[12]
A powerful Government might secure compensation for such an infringement
of its neutrality, but private merchants would have stood little chance
of doing so. Conditions such as these caused success to depend entirely
on individual qualities; and when once they took to the sea Englishmen
were not slow to develop that character for resource and audacity which
stood them in such good stead in the long war with Spain at the end of
the sixteenth century.
An incident which occurred in 1505 shows how little reliance could be
placed upon treaties by the persons whom they were designed to benefit.
On the strength of an undertaking by the Spaniards, already mentioned,
that notwithstanding the navigation law the English might freely export
goods from Spain, a fleet of English merchantmen went to Seville, with
cargoes of cloth, intending to come back with wine and oil. On arriving
there, they were forbidden by the local authorities to export anything,
and returned professing themselves ruined. Their spokesmen petitioned
the king, ‘with much clamour’, for redress. Henry sent for de Puebla,
the Spanish ambassador, whom he suspected of duplicity in the matter,
and subjected him to a storm of furious abuse. De Puebla must have
passed a bad quarter of an hour, but, as he remarked, he did not so much
mind as there was no witness to the interview. He explained that the
treaty, by a mistake, had not been proclaimed in Andalusia. He wrote at
once to King Ferdinand and asked him that right might be done. A few
days later he reported that some members of the Privy Council had
visited him on the same matter and that he had had a most unpleasant
interview with them. He again begged Ferdinand to give satisfaction, as
the English sailors were such savages that he went in fear of being
stoned by them if reparation were not made.[13]
Piracy, as has already been noticed, was of common occurrence, and was a
great hindrance to sea-borne trade. Surprising as it may seem, it was
cheaper to send goods from London to Venice by the overland route, up
the Rhine and across the Alps, than it was to send them by sea. This was
partly owing to the huge expenses incurred for defence against pirates.
One Venetian captain, reporting his safe arrival in London, mentioned
that, fearing to be attacked, he had shipped a hundred extra hands and
twenty-two gunners, and that by their aid he had beaten off the attack
of a Norman pirate. Perhaps the greatest piratical coup of the time was
the capture on August 21, 1485, of the entire fleet of Flanders galleys.
They were assailed off Lisbon by a force of French ships, commanded by
an officer in the service of the French king. After a desperate fight,
lasting twenty hours, in which over four hundred Venetians were killed
and wounded, four large galleys surrendered.[14] An enormous booty was
taken from them, and no one seems to have been punished for the affair.
In fact, the deed was justified on the ground that Venice was under a
papal interdict and therefore outside the law. Pirates were particularly
active in the Channel and, besides roving the high seas, were sometimes
bold enough to enter English harbours in search of prey. In 1495 some
Frenchmen sailed up Southampton Water and raided the Venetian galleys
which were at anchor off the town. They seized, among others, the
commander of the fleet and the Venetian consul in England, and held them
to ransom, exacting 550 ducats for each.
Piracy was the more difficult to suppress because there was often a very
slight distinction between merchant and pirate. Unscrupulous persons
frequently combined the two callings as opportunity offered. To check
the abuse, a clause was inserted in some of the commercial treaties, to
the effect that the owners of vessels, before leaving a foreign port,
were to deposit a sum of money as a guarantee of good behaviour,
sometimes twice the value of the ship and cargo. Another remedy for the
victims of piracy was but an aggravation of the disease. It consisted in
the granting of letters of marque or reprisal to the injured parties,
thus allowing them to take the law into their own hands. Naturally, the
scope allowed them by these letters was very liberally interpreted by
the holders, who seem even to have regarded them as negotiable property.
An extreme instance was the seizure on the Rhine of certain Milanese
merchants, bound for England with their goods, at the instigation of the
Emperor Frederick III. This was done on the ground that letters of
reprisal against Milan had been granted by a former king of England to a
certain merchant, then deceased. His heirs had apparently transferred
their rights to the German sovereign.
The extent to which navigation was dependent on the weather is difficult
to realize in these days. Communication between England and Spain was
almost at a stand-still in the winter. A letter of 1496 mentions that
during the first three months of that year the seas had been so rough
that few vessels had been able to leave Spanish ports. One courier had
been detained two months and another three without any chance of
leaving. The diplomatic correspondence between England and Spain, which
was dispatched almost exclusively by the sea route, was always much
diminished in volume during the winter months, and letters sometimes
took many weeks to reach their destination. When Queen Isabella of
Castile died and the Archduke Philip, her successor, proposed to travel
by sea from Flanders to Spain, he was advised that the voyage could only
be made in safety between May and the middle of August. He chose to
undertake it in the winter, with the consequence already described. In
two months of the year 1498 fifty ships are said to have been wrecked on
the coasts of Portugal and Spain.[15]
When the perils of the sea were so great, the trades of pilot and
chart-maker, often combined by the same individual, were of great
importance. In the absence of official charts of coasts and harbours,
the man with local knowledge, who could safely guide a ship to port, was
much sought after by merchants, and a pilot of good repute could
naturally command good prices for his ‘sea cards’. In regulating these
matters Spain was in advance of England. When voyages became longer and
more frequent, owing to the extension of American discoveries, a proper
system of examining and licensing pilots was established. An office for
the purpose was instituted at Seville, and in 1519 Sebastian Cabot, who
had by that time left the service of England, was put in charge of it
with the title of Pilot-Major. All charts and reports of new discoveries
were sent in to this office, and the information contained in them was
embodied in a standard map, which was thus kept up to date. The Guild of
the Holy Trinity, originating early in the reign of Henry VIII,
represented an attempt to organize the craft of pilotage on similar
lines in England, but it was long before English pilots attained to the
standard of the Spaniards in theoretical knowledge.
-----
Footnote 1:
_Englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters._
Footnote 2:
Extended and made permanent in 1489.
Footnote 3:
_Foedera_, xii, pp. 578–91, 654, 713–20; _Cotton MSS._, Galba C ii.
249: ‘A Brief of so much of the Intercourse of 1499 as concerns
Merchant Adventurers, with their opinions touching the same.’
Footnote 4:
Hall’s _Chronicle_, 1809 ed., p. 500.
Footnote 5:
_Spanish Cal._ vi, part i, pp. 59–60.
Footnote 6:
_Spanish Cal._ i, p. 21.
Footnote 7:
Ibid. i, p. 144.
Footnote 8:
_Spanish Cal._ i, p. 337.
Footnote 9:
_Venetian Cal._ i, pp. 185, 186, 188.
Footnote 10:
_Foedera_, xii, p. 553.
Footnote 11:
_Venetian Cal._ i, _passim_.
Footnote 12:
_Venetian Cal._ i, p. 213.
Footnote 13:
_Spanish Cal._ i, pp. 366, 367, 374.
Footnote 14:
_Venetian Cal._ i, Preface, lxviii.
Footnote 15:
_Venetian Cal._ i, p. 278.
CHAPTER II
MERCANTILE ORGANIZATION
It was the universal tendency of the Middle Ages for trades and
industries to organize themselves, more or less rigidly, for the purpose
of mutual defence and assistance. Such organizations accomplished their
object by successfully defending the interests of the calling when
isolated individuals would have fallen easy victims to tyranny; but the
success was concomitant with a stifling of individuality and a
stereotyping of personal relations, which were the bane of mediaeval
times, and against which the Renaissance was in large measure a revolt.
In England the great London Companies, with their counterparts in other
towns, became the arbiters of internal industry; while the greater part
of such over-sea traffic as was not in foreign hands became grouped into
two combinations of which the members were known as the Merchants of the
Staple and the Merchant Adventurers.
Of these, the Merchants of the Staple were the first established, dating
back to the thirteenth century, a time when raw wool and tin were
practically the only exports of England. At the beginning of the Tudor
period they formed a close corporation, under royal patronage, and had
in their hands the entire business of exporting unmanufactured wool,
wool-fells, and hides to Calais, at which place their dépôt or ‘staple’
had long been fixed. Thither the cloth manufacturers of the Low
Countries resorted for the purchase of their raw material.
A very heavy export duty was imposed on wool, yielding from one-third to
a half of the total receipts from all customs, and serving the
additional purpose of fostering home manufacture by making the raw
material more expensive to the foreigner than to the Englishman. The
entire expense of maintaining the garrison and fortifications of Calais
was defrayed from the wool duty. This political tie between the Crown
and the Staplers caused the interests of the latter to be well looked
after by the king, although their relative importance inevitably
declined as the export of manufactured goods increased. Their monopoly
gave them the entire handling of the wool export for Flanders and the
Rhine, all other persons being forbidden to engage in it. Italian
merchants, however, were allowed to export wool to their own states,
provided that none was sold north of the Alps; and other traders, both
Englishmen and foreigners, were granted licences from time to time to
ship wools to the Mediterranean. The export duties were so adjusted
that, generally speaking, non-Staplers paid double as much as Staplers.
Henry VII's contemplated extension of the Staple system to Pisa, and the
alarm occasioned in Venice thereby, have been referred to in the
previous chapter.
The Wool Staple was a typically mediaeval device, harsh and inelastic,
and its privileges were doomed to be submerged in the rising tide of
manufacturing enterprise. The growth of the latter continued to absorb
the surplus of wool until none was left for export. Political events
assisted the change: the loss of Calais in 1558 was a crushing blow; and
although, by transference to a Flemish town, it was sought to maintain a
foreign dépôt, the conflict between England and Spain at the end of the
century deprived it of a permanent resting-place. The manufactures of
the Netherlands, and consequently their demand for raw material, also
languished on the outbreak of their struggle for independence under
Philip II. The decline of the Staple was quite appreciable even before
the death of Henry VII. The average annual customs paid on wool during
the first five years of his reign amounted to £16,800; for the last five
years the figure fell just short of £10,000.[16] The corresponding
averages on all other wares were £17,500 and £29,000 respectively, a
very convincing testimony to the efficacy of the king’s policy. There is
no evidence that the decreased export of wool was in any way due to a
smaller output. To judge from social writers on the period the tendency
was all the other way; the conversion of arable land into sheep farms
being one of the gravest domestic problems of the time, owing to the
consequent falling off in the demand for agricultural labour. The
unexported wool must, therefore, have been taken up by the native
cloth-makers, and the striking increase in non-Staple trade was the
result.
The Merchant Adventurers were a society organized on similar lines to
the Staple, but perhaps not so strictly disciplined, and including all
traders engaged in the export of cloth to the Netherlands. According to
tradition they dated from the reign of King John,[17] but they received
their first undoubted charter of incorporation from Henry IV in
1407.[18] This charter, renewed by successive kings, remained in force
until 1505, when the society was reconstituted by a grant from Henry
VII. The preamble stated that, owing to injuries sustained abroad by
lack of proper governance, new regulations were necessary. The merchants
were therefore empowered to meet and choose a governor and twenty-four
assistant governors from among ‘the most sadde, discreete and honest
persones’ of their number. The Governor and Assistants were to have full
power of control over the English merchants resorting to the Low
Countries. Thirteen was fixed as the number forming a quorum for the
transaction of business, and any one refusing to take office when
elected was liable to a fine of £20.[19] An additional grant in the next
year gave power to the Governor and Council to fine and commit to prison
those who disobeyed their commands. This constitution worked fairly well
for the next fifty years, although complaints were sometimes made of the
indiscipline of the merchants. Unlike the Staplers at Calais, the
Merchant Adventurers were resident, when abroad, under the jurisdiction
of a foreign prince, which rendered them more difficult of control.
During the restraint of the Flanders trade, prior to the _Magnus
Intercursus_, they were ordered to shift their head-quarters to Calais;
‘notwithstanding, the said Low Countries were by disordered persons so
furnished with the said woollen commodities that very few merchants
repaired to Calais, either to buy the same or to bring foreign
commodities thither to be sold’.[20]
Shortly afterwards an attempt was made by the richer members of the
Company dwelling in London to squeeze out the minor traders by making
them pay heavy sums for admission to membership. But it proved a
failure, being contrary to the general spirit of the age. The prosperity
of the smaller seaports was threatened, and the aggrieved parties
complained to the king. An Act was therefore passed in the Parliament of
1497 by which the fee for a licence was limited to ten marks, on payment
of which sum any Englishman might trade. Thus the Merchant Adventurers
were saved from petrifying into an exclusive band of privileged
monopolists such as the Staple had become. With their freer and more
elastic organization, they moved with the times, and remained in the
forefront of commercial enterprise throughout the Tudor period. The
expansion of their business brought them into conflict with the
Hanseatic League, whose decline, as far as its hold upon England was
concerned, was thenceforward inevitable. The Merchant Adventurers proved
unsparing enemies, never letting slip any chance of discrediting their
rivals, and instigating the Government to annoy them whenever
opportunity offered. The course of the struggle and the final success
which crowned the efforts of the English merchants will be described in
a subsequent chapter.[21]
It is important to emphasize at this point the difference between the
cloth manufacture in England and in the Netherlands. The greater part of
the cloth at this time exported by the Merchant Adventurers was of a
coarse, heavy variety, which had not been subjected to the various
finishing processes of rowing, shearing, dyeing, &c. in which the
Flemish craftsmen were more expert. The Flemish industry was twofold: it
consisted in completing the manufacture of English cloth, and also in
making the lighter and more expensive fabrics such as chamlets, crapes,
and serges, from raw wool purchased at Calais. This ‘light drapery’
manufacture was not introduced into England until late in the sixteenth
century, being greatly assisted by Elizabeth’s wise policy of
encouraging Philip’s revolted subjects to settle in this country,
bringing the secrets of their craft with them.
The export and import duties of this period form an interesting subject.
Broadly speaking, they fall into two main divisions: the ‘subsidies’,
otherwise known as tonnage and poundage; and the ‘customs’. The
subsidies were a set of variable duties, granted to the king for life at
the beginning of his reign, and consisting of tonnage, or import duty
per tun of wine; poundage, a duty per pound sterling value on most other
goods exported or imported; and wool duties, levied on exported wool.
The customs, as distinct from the subsidies, were fixed duties of
ancient origin, primarily levied on the strength of the royal
prerogative, and were continued without much alteration[22] by the
tactful Tudors, who had no wish to raise a discussion on their legality.
It remained for James I to strain the prerogative by arbitrarily
increasing the old customs rates, and thus to precipitate a struggle
which ended in the abolition of the levying of imposts by royal
authority, and established the dependence of all duties on parliamentary
grant.
The principal and original object of the duties was undoubtedly the
raising of revenue during the wars of the Plantagenet kings; but, as
time went on, they came to be used as instruments of protection for
those classes of merchants who were particularly favoured by the Crown.
As will be shown, the royal favour, previous to Tudor times, was not
reserved exclusively for Englishmen. The protective function of the
duties was that which Henry VII sought to develop, in the interests of
English trade; and modifications were introduced in the subsidies
whenever it seemed expedient.
The following table gives the duties levied on some of the principal
classes of merchandise and payable by Englishmen and foreigners
respectively at the beginning of the reign. The subject is a somewhat
obscure one, and authorities are contradictory on certain points. The
customs are taken from Arnold’s _Chronicle_,[26] where they are included
in a list of which the exact date is not given.[27] Since, however, the
customs were practically invariable, the point is not one of great
importance. The subsidies are those granted by the Parliament of
1485.[28] They remained in force during the king’s life, with certain
modifications due to political exigencies.
────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────
_Article._ │ _Englishmen._ │ _Aliens._
────────────────────────┼────────────┬────────────┼────────────┬────────────
│ _Custom._ │ _Subsidy._ │ _Custom._ │ _Subsidy._
────────────────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────┼────────────
Wool,[23] per sack[24] │6_s._ 8_d._ │33_s._ 4_d._│ 10_s._ │66_s._ 8_d._
Woolfells,[23] per 240 │6_s._ 8_d._ │33_s._ 4_d._│ 10_s._ │66_s._ 8_d._
Hides,[23] per last │13_s._ 4_d._│66_s._ 8_d._│ 20_s._ │73_s._ 4_d._
Wine, per tun │ nil │ 3_s._ │ 2_s._ │ 3_s._
Sweet wines, per tun │ nil │ 3_s._ │ 2_s._ │ 6_s._
Tin, per £ value │ nil │ 1_s._ │ 3_d._ │ 2_s._
Other goods,[25] per £ │ nil │ 1_s._ │ 3_d._ │ 1_s._
value │ │ │ │
────────────────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────┴────────────
The wool duties were on exports only and the wine duties on imports
only. The poundage was levied on exports as well as imports. The
following goods were exempted from paying poundage: woollen cloth
exported by Englishmen; wool, woolfells and hides exported (taxed by the
special wool duties); corn, flour, fish, flesh, bestall,[29] and wine
imported; and victuals exported for the garrison of Calais. Goods were
valued for poundage on their original cost, on the oath of the merchant
or his servant, and fraudulent declaration was punished by forfeiture.
The wool duties were by far the heaviest in amount, and, to lighten the
excessive strain on the capital resources of the merchant, it was
provided that half the duty should be paid within six months after
shipment, and the other half within twelve months. If the wool were lost
at sea, by wreck, piracy, or war, a similar quantity might be shipped
duty free.
By the Act of 1485 which granted the subsidies for the reign, the Hanse
merchants, who had hitherto been exempt from paying the wine subsidy,
were specially included as being liable to that duty; but their other
existing privileges, which were considerable, were continued unaffected.
By another Act it was provided that if a foreigner had become a
naturalized Englishman he should nevertheless continue to pay duties as
a foreigner. On the other hand, to foster English shipping it was laid
down that if an Englishman shipped his goods in a ‘carryke or galley’,
that is, in a foreign ship, he must pay duties on the foreign scale. A
study of these duties shows how great a measure of protection was
afforded to English trade.
One of the most important of the colonies of foreign merchants settled
in England was the London branch of the Hanseatic League. This, the
greatest mercantile corporation in history, originated, like its smaller
counterparts in England, in the association of merchants from various
German towns for the purpose of mutual protection and co-operation while
trading to foreign countries. After many vicissitudes, it attained in
the fourteenth century to the status of a sovereign power, maintaining a
formidable fleet and waging wars with the northern nations in defence of
its interests. The London ‘factory’ was one of its largest oversea
branches, and, during the fifteenth century, saw its pre-eminence
threatened by the gradual growth of native mercantile enterprise, as
evidenced by the rise of the Merchant Adventurers. The rivalry thus
engendered was intense, but the Hanse merchants were able to take
advantage of the internal dissensions in England, and a long period of
privateering and reprisal was ended by an agreement which they extorted
from Edward IV. In 1473 and 1474 treaties were signed by which the
rights of the Hansa to trade in England under more advantageous terms
than other foreigners, and even, in certain cases, than Englishmen, were
recognized. Their group of warehouses and dwelling-places in the
Steelyard, ‘commonly called Guildhall Theutonicorum’, was also secured
to them in perpetuity, under the jurisdiction of officers appointed by
themselves.[30]
As manufactured woollen goods formed a principal item of their business,
it is illustrative to give in detail a list of the duties on those and
other articles, in which their privileged position is apparent:[31]
────────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────
_Article._ │_Englishmen._│_Spaniards._ │ _Hansa_ │ _Others_
────────────────┼──────┬──────┼──────┬──────┼──────┬──────┼──────┬──────
│Custom│ Subs│Custom│ Subs│Custom│ Subs│Custom│ Subs
────────────────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────
Cloth, without │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
‘greyn’, per │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
cloth │14_d._│ nil│14_d._│ nil│12_d._│ nil│33_d._│12_d._
Cloth, half │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
‘greyned’ │21_d._│ nil│21_d._│ nil│18_d._│ nil│49_d._│12_d._
Cloth ‘in greyn’│28_d._│ nil│28_d._│ nil│24_d._│ nil│66_d._│12_d._
Single worsted, │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
per piece │ 1_d._│ 1_d._│ 1_d._│ 1_d._│ 1_d._│ 1_d._│1½_d._│12_d._
Double worsted, │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
per piece │ 2_d._│ 1_d._│ 2_d._│ 1_d._│ 2_d._│ 1_d._│ 3_d._│12_d._
Every bed, │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
single worsted│ 5_d._│ 1_d._│ 5_d._│ 1_d._│ 5_d._│ 1_d._│7½_d._│12_d._
Every bed, │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
double worsted│ 9_d._│ 1_d._│ 9_d._│ 1_d._│ 9_d._│ 1_d._│13½_d._│12_d._
Wax, per cwt. │12_d._│ nil│12_d._│ nil│12_d._│ nil│12_d._│12_d._
Wines, per tun │ nil│36_d._│24_d._│36_d._│24_d._│ nil│24_d._│36_d._
────────────────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────
It will be seen that, although the Spaniards received very nearly equal
treatment with Englishmen, the Hansa had in nearly every case more
advantageous terms, and was thus enabled to sell its goods at a lower
price or at a better profit than native merchants. It must be borne in
mind also that the trade in cloth with Spain was comparatively small.
With their position thus strengthened, the members of the Hanseatic
League began to oust English traders from the Baltic, the German ports,
Scandinavia, and even Iceland. The English traffic with the last
mentioned country was further threatened with utter extinction by a
quarrel with the King of Denmark, who forbade Englishmen to resort
thither, although the prohibition was not made entirely effective.
On the accession of Henry VII public opinion demanded that he should
diminish the privileges of the Hansa, wrung, as they had been, from
Edward IV at a time when England was weak from a protracted civil war,
and certain, if unchecked, seriously to hinder the expansion of native
trade. He was unable, however, to denounce the treaty of 1473–4, as he
dared not risk open war with a maritime power which could retaliate by
assisting his numerous enemies to invade his realm. He therefore adopted
a policy which, while ostensibly upholding its legal rights, sought
every opportunity to nullify them in practice in favour of his own
subjects. Accordingly, in the first year of his reign, in spite of
protests, he granted a charter to the Hansa, renewing its privileges as
secured by the treaty.[32] The settlement of the Iceland dispute was
next effected. In 1489 Henry dispatched ambassadors to Denmark who, in
the following year, concluded a treaty with that country, by which peace
was restored, trade was resumed on its former basis, and the prohibition
of English voyages to Iceland was removed.[33]
This was a blow at the Hansa of which it could not legitimately
complain, although it abolished at a stroke its threatened supremacy in
the fish trade, which, in pre-Reformation days, was relatively much more
important than it has since become. It was followed up by a series of
annoyances in the matter of the interpretation of treaties and customs
laws. The Easterlings[34] retaliated with restrictions on English trade
with Prussia. A diet was held to adjust differences at Antwerp in 1491.
A long list of grievances against the English administration was
presented, which may be taken as illustrative of the policy pursued
towards the Hansa at all times when there was no special reason to
desire its goodwill. Ships and goods, it was alleged, were robbed in an
English port; Hanse vessels were arrested for shipping cloth to Antwerp
and for exporting unwrought cloths; the Act of Parliament granting
subsidies was interpreted as overriding the treaty privileges of the
League; the Lord Mayor arbitrarily fixed prices in London, and was
guilty of other unjust practices; the Hansa suffered under the
Navigation Acts prohibiting the import of Bordeaux wine and Toulouse
woad in other than English ships; unlawful customs were exacted on
certain articles, and the import of others was forbidden; the privileged
duty rates were only allowed on goods coming from the Hanse towns, full
duties being exacted on goods from other countries; the customs officers
overestimated the value of Easterlings' goods and, when the duties were
paid, delayed clearance so that English merchants might be first in the
market on the other side; arbitrary charges were made for convoy, the
Easterlings being forced to pay although they had not asked for
protection; and Hanse vessels unlading at Hull were forced to take in
cargoes at the same place, although frequently such cloths as they
wanted were not obtainable there.[35]
The above practices were plainly unjust, but were of such a nature,
proceeding as they did from the universal ill will of all grades of
officials and underlings, that only the strongest and most determined of
governments could have put them down. That of Henry VII had no desire to
exert itself in this direction, and undoubtedly connived at the
oppression. The only outcome of the diet was a formal reaffirmation of
the treaty of 1474, with a mutual promise of better conduct and a
provision for settling damages and stopping piracy.
During the quarrel with Margaret of Burgundy, in 1493, when all trade
with the Low Countries was prohibited, the Steelyard merchants were
forced to deposit £20,000 as security for their observance of the
order.[36] At this time they were so intensely unpopular in London that
it was unsafe for a German to walk in the streets alone. A rumour was
spread that they were continuing to trade with Flemish ports in spite of
the prohibition, and popular hatred rose to boiling-over point. A mob of
the unemployed and discontented gathered with the intention of sacking
the rich warehouses in the Steelyard. The Easterlings defended
themselves bravely, and were partially successful in beating off the
assault, although they afterwards claimed that much damage had been
done. While the issue was still in doubt the Lord Mayor assembled the
magistrates and officers of the city; and, at the approach of the forces
of order, the rioters fled. About eighty apprentices and workmen were
captured and locked up in the Tower. They were all subsequently
released.
Commercial hostilities continued on both sides, and were the subject of
renewed diets at Bruges in 1497 and 1499.[37] The Hansa brought forward
similar grievances to those already enumerated. They complained, in
addition, of being subjected to the oppressive jurisdiction of the
Admiral’s Court, which at that time took cognizance of all marine cases.
They also claimed damages for the riot of 1493 and for various piracies.
The English retaliated by putting in a much larger bill of damages, and
asserted that they had been expelled from the Hanse towns, and that
their house at Danzig had been confiscated. The English had more to gain
than to lose by the continuance of bad relations, for their interests in
the Baltic were not nearly so extensive as those of the Hansa in
England. Henry held firm in his contention that legislation, such as
that affecting the import of Bordeaux wine and Cologne silk and the
export of cloth, was binding on all merchants resorting to England,
special privileges notwithstanding. Further than this he did not care to
go. The English merchants would have been glad to see him expel once and
for all the tenants of the Steelyard, but he never liked to commit
himself to a position from which there was no retreat; and he could not
forget that the Hansa, driven to desperation, would be a formidable
enemy. He had done enough to set English North Sea traffic on its legs;
and the continued prosperity of the Merchant Adventurers is no bad
testimonial to the soundness of his cautious policy.
The Spanish and Italian merchants in London were less unpopular than the
Easterlings, and received considerably better treatment. Their
competition was not so vital to English interests, and there were
political reasons for dealing with them in a more civil manner.
Harshness and insolence could not be displayed towards Spain, since the
matrimonial alliance with that country was the keynote of Henry’s
policy, to which mercantile considerations had necessarily to be
subordinate. However, by careful and persistent pressure, he was able to
place English trade to the south on as satisfactory a basis as that to
the east. He was certainly fortunate in the choice which the Spanish
sovereigns made of a representative in England.
Dr. de Puebla, who filled that office during the greater part of his
reign, was a mean and venal figure, amenable alike to flattery,
bullying, and bribes; and the king was able to read him like a book and
play upon all his weaknesses in turn. His infidelity to his employers
made it easier for Henry to enforce the Navigation Laws, already
referred to, by which the Gascony trade was placed exclusively in
English hands; and to strengthen the position of English merchants in
Spain by getting the better of the bargain in most of the tariff
negotiations. De Puebla was so miserly that he lived in a disorderly
house for the sake of cheapness, and was well known as seizing every
opportunity of getting himself and his servants fed at other people’s
expense. But in spite of his conduct he enjoyed the confidence of
Ferdinand and Isabella, who were certainly not ignorant of his
shortcomings. Their motive in continuing him in his post seems to have
been that, although Henry VII despised the man, he had also a certain
regard for him, and occasionally confided intentions to him to which no
one else was made privy. The Spanish sovereigns even went to the length
of investing him with absolute judicial powers over all the Spanish
merchants in London. The subjects of his jurisdiction hated him, and
complained bitterly that he used his authority to extort bribes. They
asserted further that he could have had the objectionable tariff dues
lowered if he had chosen, but that he had sold their interests to the
English Government.[38] Of the truth of the latter accusation there is
no doubt. In Henry’s Privy Purse accounts there are entries of payments
to de Puebla of £66 15_s._ on two occasions, and of £20 on another, it
being stated that they were ‘in reward’. Henry VII was not the man to
disburse such large sums unless in consideration of value received.
Judging by other entries, however, the bribing of ambassadors seems to
have been a common practice.
To the merchants of the various Italian cities Henry was generally
gracious in his manner. The fierce competition which embittered
relations in the north was absent, for England was not yet ready to take
a preponderating share in Mediterranean trade. On the other hand, the
Italians, and more particularly the Venetians, were in a position to cut
off the supply of certain articles such as malmsey wines, spices, and
other eastern goods, which had almost become necessaries to England, and
which could not be obtained elsewhere. Friendly relations were
established with Milan, and the Milanese merchants were taken under the
king’s especial safe-conduct. In 1488 the Venetians, Genoese,
Florentines, and Luccans petitioned that the export duties on wool and
tin might be diminished. Since there was then little or no shipment of
those articles to Italy in English bottoms, the king granted their
request, and made alterations in the customs and subsidies amounting to
a net reduction of 10_s._ per sack on wool and 12_d._ per £ value on
tin.[39]
The Venetian factory in London was never subjected to the treatment
which the merchants of the Steelyard received. The organization of this
Venetian colony has many points of interest. It consisted of numerous
merchants who were permanently resident in England, and were under the
governance of a consul whose judicial powers were far more extensive
than those of a similar official at the present time. The English law
then took no cognizance of the disputes and crimes of foreigners in
cases in which no Englishman was implicated. Hence the Italians were
left to maintain order among themselves in the same way as the Spaniards
and the Germans; and the Venetian consul represented among his
compatriots the full majesty of their country’s law. He was also
responsible for exacting the numerous fines and dues which, in addition
to the English customs, were constantly imposed and varied by the strict
regulations of the Venetian Senate.
A very firm control was exercised by the home government, and the consul
himself, although he had disciplinary powers over the merchants, was
carefully supervised in his turn. A regular service of couriers,
travelling overland through Europe, maintained touch with the
authorities in Venice, and the captains of the annual fleets of Flanders
galleys were also charged with the duty of reporting on the affairs of
the colony. In 1491, when it was suspected that certain of the merchants
in London were covertly opposed to the policy of the Senate in
maintaining a tariff war with Henry VII, the captain of the Flanders
fleet was instructed to find out who the culprits were, and to report
them in order that the Government might make a notable example of their
presumption.[40] The factory had its corporate responsibilities as well
as its rights: when some prominent Venetians were captured by French
pirates at Southampton, the London factory was commanded to pay their
ransoms, a duty which a state less careful of the welfare of its
citizens would have allowed to fall on their own families. The consuls
were sometimes slack in exacting the payment of dues, such as the
additional 5_d._ in the £ which merchants had to pay when they preferred
to send their goods to Venice overland rather than by sea. To remedy
this, supervisors were appointed to audit the consul’s accounts and
generally to keep him up to the mark.
In all these matters the strict discipline was apparent which permeated
the whole state of Venice. It even extended to the control of the
movements of privately owned merchant ships. A decree of 1497 gives
detailed instructions to the captains of two such ships. They were to
load wool, cloth, and tin in London; the numbers of their crews and the
freights they were to charge were specified; they were to take no
aliens' goods until all the goods of Venetians were shipped; and they
were to sail in close company on the voyage. The masters were enjoined
to obey these instructions under a penalty of 500 ducats and ten years'
suspension of their licences.[41]
The management of the Flanders galleys, which have been so frequently
referred to, vividly illustrates the centralized system of Venice. This
fleet, which sailed annually with fair regularity for more than two
centuries, consisted of large, oared ships which were the property of
the State. When the time came for preparing for the voyage a public
auction was held, at which the cargo space was disposed of to the
highest bidders. The cargoes were thus the property of private
merchants, although the conduct of the voyage was in the hands of the
Government. The latter appointed the captains and gave instructions as
to ports of call, the time to be spent at each, and similar matters.
Each galley was manned by about 180 rowers, 30 archers, and numerous
officers, merchants, servants, musicians, &c. After making calls at
various Mediterranean ports the fleet proceeded to the Channel, where it
divided, part going on to Flanders, and the remainder making for London,
Sandwich, or, latterly, Southampton. Here the cargoes of Levant wines,
silks, spices, and other eastern goods were disposed of, while the crews
dispersed over the country to hawk the petty merchandises of their own
which they were allowed to carry on board. Return freights of wool,
cloth, hides, and tin were shipped; the English portion of the fleet
then awaited the Flanders section, and the voyage home was made in
company. The usual time taken was twelve months or a little longer. The
Flanders galleys first sailed in 1517, and their last voyage was in
1552; towards the end of this period the sailings became very irregular,
owing to wars in Italy and the gradual decline of the old trade
routes.[42]
Before the close of the epoch now under discussion the great
geographical discoveries which ushered in the oceanic era of commerce
began to make their effects evident. In the last decade of the fifteenth
century Columbus discovered the West Indies, Cabot voyaged to North
America, and Vasco da Gama arrived at Calicut after the first passage
round the Cape of Good Hope recorded in modern history. The Spanish
discoveries poured into Europe a stream of the precious metals which
upset the economic arrangements of every country, and, by creating a
period of industrial unrest, broke up the old, stagnant organizations of
the Middle Ages, and released a flood of energy which altered the face
of the world. The Portuguese voyages to India soon proved that the sea
route was far superior to the overland system of trading with the East,
by which the Italian cities had risen to greatness. The western and
northern nations, with free access to the Atlantic, were now the nations
of the future; and the Mediterranean, which had for ages been the centre
of civilization, began to decline. It is one of the ironies of history
that Genoa and Venice owe their decay in large part to the achievements
of their own offspring, Columbus and Cabot.
-----
Footnote 16:
For detailed figures as to customs payments see Schanz, _Englische
Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters_, ii. 37–156.
Footnote 17:
_Harl. MSS._, 597, f. 211.
Footnote 18:
Thomas Gresham, writing to Northumberland in 1553, speaks of sending a
copy of their privileges dated 1296, but the document does not now
exist (_Cal. S. P. Dom._ 1547–80, p. 51).
Footnote 19:
_Cotton MSS._, Tib. D viii, f. 37. Printed by Schanz.
Footnote 20:
_Harl. MSS._, 597, f. 211.
Footnote 21:
Ancient histories of the Merchant Adventurers: _Harl. MSS._, 597, ff.
211–15, a general sketch written in the reign of Elizabeth; _Stowe
MSS._, 303, ff. 99–107, written in the time of Charles II, of very
slight value; _A Treatise of Commerce_ (printed), by John Wheeler,
1601, much fuller and better informed than the other two.
Footnote 22:
Some additions were made by Mary.
Footnote 23:
Staple articles: in their case ‘Englishmen’ means members of the
Staple, and ‘Aliens’ includes such Englishmen as exported cargoes of
wool, &c., to the Mediterranean.
Footnote 24:
A sack of wool contained 14 tods, each of 28 lb. weight, or 392 lb. in
all (_Lansd. MSS._, 152, f. 239).
Footnote 25:
Excluding cloth. Cloth duties are given separately below.
Footnote 26:
1811 ed., pp. 193–6.
Footnote 27:
On internal evidence it is probably slightly before the time of Henry
VII.
Footnote 28:
_Rolls of Parliament_, vi. 269, 270.
Footnote 29:
Live animals.
Footnote 30:
_Foedera_, xi. 793–803.
Footnote 31:
Arnold’s _Chronicle_, pp. 193–6. But compare the details of Hanse
privileges in 1552 (_inf._ p. 167). There is no evidence that any
alteration was made in the duties, and Arnold’s figures must therefore
be received with caution.
Footnote 32:
_Harl. MSS._, 306, f. 82.
Footnote 33:
_Foedera_, xii, pp. 374 and 381.
Footnote 34:
The merchants of the Hansa were commonly called Easterlings in
England, and their London dépôt was known as the Steelyard.
Footnote 35:
_Cologne Archives_, printed in Schanz, ii. 397.
Footnote 36:
Hall’s _Chronicle_, 1809 ed., pp. 467–8.
Footnote 37:
_Cologne Archives, Acta Anglicana_, 1434–1521, ff. 166, 188–9; printed
by Schanz, ii. 409, 419.
Footnote 38:
_Spanish Cal._ i, pp. 161–7.
Footnote 39:
_Foedera_, xii. 335.
Footnote 40:
_Venetian Cal._ i, p. 206.
Footnote 41:
_Venetian Cal._ i, p. 253–4.
Footnote 42:
For details on this subject see _Venetian Calendar_, vol. i and
Preface.
CHAPTER III
THE CABOT VOYAGES—JOHN CABOT, 1497 AND 1498
The subject of the Cabot voyages is one of the most puzzling in history,
ranking indeed with the identity of Shakespeare as a battle-ground for
the exponents of conflicting theories. The trouble arises from the fact
that, while John and Sebastian Cabot actually lived and performed
important discoveries in the dim days of England’s awakening from the
sleep of mediaeval ignorance, few of their contemporaries felt
sufficient interest in their exploits to write down a clear account of
them for the benefit of posterity. Consequently the contemporary records
are vague, ambiguous, and wofully incomplete, leaving (when purged of
all uncertainties) little more of absolute truth than that John Cabot
made two voyages across the Atlantic in 1497 and 1498, discovering some
part of what is now British North America in the course of the first of
them.
The progress of discovery in the sixteenth century produced numerous
historians to narrate its annals. These men, living for the most part in
Spain and Italy, had to turn for their information, in default of access
to State archives, to such survivors of the exploits themselves as they
were able to get into touch with. John Cabot had died soon after his
great discovery, and, since his men were for the most part English, not
one of them came in contact with any of the historians of southern
Europe. The latter had therefore to seek information from Sebastian
Cabot, his second son, who entered the service of Spain in 1512, lived
in that country for five and thirty years, and returned to pass the last
decade of his life in England, dying at a great age in 1557. Sebastian
Cabot, then, not only moulded the foreign version of his story, but also
in England was the sole link between the late fifteenth century, when
men of letters took no interest in ocean voyages, and the mid-sixteenth,
when the country was beginning to realize that her future lay upon the
water. Thus the first ‘expansionist’ writer in England, Richard Eden,
sat at Sebastian’s feet and drank in his stories of ancient discovery,
which in this way secured acceptance as the whole truth and nothing but
the truth until the sceptical nineteenth century began to institute a
more searching inquiry.
Sebastian Cabot was a vain egoist, fond of giving vent to mysterious,
bombastic utterances containing a maximum of self-praise and a minimum
of hard fact. So, when appealed to by the historians for information on
North American explorations, he said nothing of his father’s two voyages
of 1497 and 1498, in which he may have taken part, and the details of
which he must have been familiar with, but described instead a
subsequent expedition, which he had himself commanded, in search of a
north-west passage round America to Asia. The sixteenth-century
histories therefore contain _no mention_ of John Cabot, and the accounts
found therein _have no bearing whatever_ on his two voyages.[43] A
recognition of this fact is essential because it has been very generally
believed that there were only two Cabot voyages, whereas there were
actually three; and that Sebastian, in describing himself as commander
of a north-western expedition, was talking of the original discovery in
1497 or of the following voyage in 1498, and taking the credit of them
to himself. In reality, Sebastian Cabot was telling the truth in
describing his own voyage, and merely suppressing the truth in saying
nothing of his father’s. In other words, he was not so great a liar as
he has been painted.
Turning first to John Cabot’s discovery of North America, by him thought
to be eastern Asia, in 1497, and his second voyage to the same region in
1498, it will be convenient first to state the sources of information,
and afterwards to examine the conclusions to which they lead.
On March 5, 1496, Letters Patent were granted to the Cabot family by
Henry VII, to the following effect:
Permission to John Cabottus and to Ludovicus, Sebastianus, and Sanctus
his sons to take five ships at their own charges, to navigate in any
seas to the east, north, or west, and to occupy and possess any new
found lands hitherto unvisited by Christians. They were to voyage only
from and to the port of Bristol, and were to be exempt from the
payment of customs on goods brought from the new lands. No other
subjects of the king were to trade to the new lands without licence
from the Cabots. In return for these privileges one-fifth of all
profits were to be paid to the king.
News of the project reached the ears of de Puebla, the Spanish
ambassador in England, who transmitted it to his sovereigns. His letter
to them is lost, but their reply, dated March 28, 1496, was as follows:
‘You write that a person like Columbus has come to England for the
purpose of persuading the king to enter into an undertaking similar to
that of the Indies, without prejudice to Spain and Portugal. He is
quite at liberty. But we believe that the undertaking was thrown in
the way of the King of England by the King of France with the
premeditated intention of distracting him from his other business.
Take care that the King of England be not deceived on this or in any
other matter. The French will try as hard as they can to lead him into
such undertakings, but they are very uncertain enterprises, and must
not be gone into at present. Besides, they cannot be executed without
prejudice to us and to the King of Portugal.’[44]
The remainder of 1496 was consumed in preparations or, less probably, an
unsuccessful voyage was made in that year. In any case, John Cabot set
out in 1497, found land on the other side of the ocean, and was back by
the beginning of August. The following letters describe the voyage:
Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers in Venice, August 23, 1497.
'The Venetian, our countryman, who went with a ship from Bristol in
quest of new islands, is returned, and says that 700 leagues hence he
discovered land, the territory of the Grand Cham. He coasted for 300
leagues and landed; saw no human beings, but he has brought hither to
the king certain snares which had been set to catch game, and a needle
for making nets; he also found some felled trees, wherefore he
supposed that there were inhabitants, and returned to his ship in
alarm.
'He was three months on the voyage, and on his return he saw two
islands to starboard, but would not land, time being precious as he
was short of provisions. He says that the tides are slack and do not
flow as they do here. The King of England is much pleased with this
intelligence.
'The King has promised that in the spring our countryman shall have
ten ships, armed to his order, and at his request has conceded him all
the prisoners, except such as are confined for high treason, to man
his fleet. The King has also given him money wherewith to amuse
himself till then, and he is now at Bristol with his wife, who is also
Venetian, and with his sons; his name is Zuan Cabot, and he is styled
the Great Admiral. Vast honour is paid him; he dresses in silk, and
these English run after him like mad people, so that he can enlist as
many of them as he pleases, and a number of our own rogues besides.
'The discoverer of these places planted on his new found land a large
cross, with one flag of England and another of S. Mark, by reason of
his being a Venetian, so that our banner has floated very far afield.
‘London, 23rd August, 1497.’[45]
Raimondo de Soncino to the Duke of Milan, August 24, 1497.
‘... Also some months ago His Majesty sent out a Venetian, who is a
very good mariner, and has good skill in discovering new islands, and
he has returned safe, and has found two very large and fertile new
islands; having likewise discovered the seven cities, four hundred
leagues from England, on a western passage. This next spring, his
majesty means to send him with 15 to 20 ships.’[46]
Raimondo de Soncino to the Duke of Milan, December 18, 1497. From the
State Archives of Milan. Printed for the first time in English in
_Narrative and Critical History of America_, edited by Justin Winsor,
Cambridge, Mass., 1886, vol. iii. The Cabot section is by Charles Deane,
F.S.A.
‘Most illustrious and excellent my lord:
‘Perhaps among your Excellency’s many occupations, it may not
displease you to learn how his Majesty here has won a part of Asia
without a stroke of the sword. There is in this Kingdom a Venetian
fellow, master John Caboto by name, of a fine mind, greatly skilled in
navigation, who seeing that those most serene kings, first he of
Portugal, then the one of Spain, have occupied unknown islands,
determined to make a like acquisition for his Majesty aforesaid. And
having obtained royal grants that he should have the usufruct of all
that he should discover, provided that the ownership of the same is
reserved to the crown, with a small ship and 18 persons he committed
himself to fortune; and having set out from Bristol, a western port of
this kingdom, and passed the western limits of Hibernia, and then
standing to the northward he began to steer eastward (sic), having
(after a few days) the north star on his right hand; and having
wandered about considerably, at last he fell in with terra firma,
where, having planted the royal banner, and taken possession on behalf
of this king, and taken certain tokens, he has returned thence. The
said Master John, as being foreign-born and poor, would not be
believed, if his comrades, who are almost all Englishmen and from
Bristol, did not testify that what he says is true. This Master John
has the description of the world in a chart, and also in a solid globe
which he has made, and he (or the chart and the globe) shows where he
landed, and that going towards the east (sic) he passed considerably
beyond the country of the Tanais. And they say that it is a very good
and temperate country, and they think that Brasil wood and silks grow
there; and they affirm that the sea is covered with fishes, which are
caught not only with the net, but with baskets, a stone being tied in
them in order that the baskets may sink in the water. And this I heard
the said master John relate, and the aforesaid Englishmen his comrades
say they will bring so many fishes that the kingdom will no longer
have need of Iceland, from which country there comes a great store of
fish called stockfish. But Master John has set his mind on something
greater; for he expects to go further on towards the East (Levant),
from that place already occupied, constantly hugging the shore, until
he shall be over against an island, by him called Cipango, situated in
the equinoctial region, where he thinks all the spices of the world,
and also the precious stones, originate; and he says that in former
times he was at Mecca, whither spices are brought by caravans from
distant countries, and that those who brought them, on being asked
where the said spices grow, answered that they do not know, but that
other caravans came to their homes with this merchandise from distant
countries, and these again say that they are brought to them from
other remote regions. And he argues thus—that if the Orientals
affirmed to the southerners that these things came from a distance
from them, and so from hand to hand, presupposing the rotundity of the
earth, it must be that the last ones get them at the north towards the
west, and he said it in such a way that, having nothing to gain or
lose by it, I too believe it, and what is more, the King here, who is
wise and not lavish, likewise puts some faith in him; for since his
return he has made good provision for him, as the same Master John
tells me. And it is said that, in the spring, his Majesty aforenamed
will fit out some ships, and will besides give him all the convicts,
that they will go to that country to make a colony, by means of which
they hope to establish in London a greater storehouse of spices than
there is in Alexandria; and the chief men of the enterprise are of
Bristol, great sailors, who, now that they know where to go, say that
it is not a voyage of more than fifteen days, nor do they ever have
storms after they get away from Hibernia. I have also talked with a
Burgundian, a comrade of Master John’s, who confirms everything, and
wishes to return thither because the Admiral (for so Master John
already entitles himself) has given him an island; and he has given
another one to a barber of his from Castiglione of Genoa, and both of
them regard themselves as counts, nor does my Lord the Admiral esteem
himself anything less than a Prince. I think that with this expedition
there will go several poor Italian monks, who have all been promised
bishoprics. And, as I have become a friend of the Admiral’s, if I
wished to go thither I should get an archbishopric. I humbly commend
myself,
‘Your Excellency’s
‘Very humble servant,
Raimundus.’
The next two letters mainly concern the second voyage, that of 1498:
Pedro de Ayala to Ferdinand and Isabella, July 25, 1498.
‘I think your Majesties have already heard that the King of England
has equipped a fleet in order to discover certain islands and
continents which he was informed some people from Bristol, who manned
a few ships for the same purpose last year, had found. I have seen the
map which the discoverer has made, who is another Genoese like
Columbus, and who has been in Seville and Lisbon asking assistance for
his discoveries. The people of Bristol have, for the last seven years,
sent out every year two, three or four light ships (_caravelas_) in
search of the island of Brasil and the seven cities, according to the
fancy of this Genoese. The King determined to send out ships because,
the year before, they brought certain news that they found land. His
fleet consisted of five vessels, which carried provisions for one
year. It is said that one of them, in which one Friar Buil went, has
returned to Ireland in great distress, the ship being much damaged.
The Genoese has continued his voyage. I have seen, on a chart, the
direction they took and the distance they sailed; and I think that
what they have found, or what they are in search of, is what your
Highnesses already possess. It is expected that they will be back in
the month of September. I write this because the King of England has
often spoken to me on this subject, and he thinks that your Highnesses
will take great interest in it. I think it is not further distant than
400 leagues. I told him that, in my opinion, the land was already in
the possession of your Majesties, but though I gave him my reasons, he
did not like them. I believe that your Highnesses are already informed
of this matter, and I do not now send the chart or _mapa mundi_ which
that man has made, and which, according to my opinion, is false, since
it makes it appear that the land in question was not the said
islands.’[47]
De Puebla to Ferdinand and Isabella, July 25 (?), 1498. Printed in the
Hakluyt Society’s _Journal of Columbus_, 1893.
‘The King of England sent five armed ships with another Genoese like
Columbus to search for the island of Brasil and others near it. They
were victualled for a year. They say that they will be back in
September. By the direction they take, the land they seek must be the
possession of your Highnesses. The King has sometimes spoken to me
about it, and seems to take a very great interest in it. I believe
that the distance from here is not 400 leagues.’
A second charter, granted on February 2, 1498, also bears upon the
second voyage:
Petition of ‘John Kabotto, Venetian,’ for a charter in the following
terms, which was accordingly granted: Authority and power to John
Cabot ‘that he by him, his deputie, or deputies sufficient’ may take
six ships, up to 200 tons burden, and voyage to ‘the lande and isles
of late founde by the seid John’. All subjects of the King to give
every assistance in their power to Cabot for the furtherance of the
enterprise.
The successful return of John Cabot in 1497 has some traces in the
records of official business:
Grant from the Privy Purse of Henry VII, August 10, 1497, ‘To him who
found the New Isle, £10’.[48]
Pension grant of £20 per annum to John Cabot, December 13, 1497.
‘Henry by the grace of God, etc. to John, Cardinal Archbishop of
Canterbury etc., Our Chancellor, greeting. We let you wit that we, for
certain considerations us specially moving, have given and granted
unto our well-beloved John Calbot of the parts of Venice an annuity or
annual rent of £20 sterling, to be had and yearly perceived from the
Feast of the Annunciation of Our Lady last past, during our pleasure,
of our customs and subsidies coming and growing in our port of
Bristol, by the hands of our customers there for the time being, at
Michaelmas and Easter, by even portions. Wherefore we will and charge
you that under our Great Seal ye do make thereupon our letters patent
in good and effectual form. Given under our Privy Seal, at our palace
of Westminster, the 15th day of December, the 13th year of our
Reign.’[49]
Together with this may be taken the authorization for the immediate
payment of the pension, which would seem to have been delayed, dated
February 22, 1498.[50] Both these documents are printed by Mr. C. R.
Beazley in his _John and Sebastian Cabot_ (1898).
Memoranda of loans of £20 to Launcelot Thirkill of London, ‘going
towards the new island’, March 22, 1498; £30 to Thomas Bradley and
Launcelot Thirkill, ‘going to the New Isle’, April 1, 1498; and 40
shillings and five pence to John Carter, ‘going to the new isle’.[51]
Launcelot Thirkill’s name appears again in a document of 1501, which
shows that he returned safely from this voyage (the second), if indeed
he actually performed it.
In this category also falls the important discovery made in 1897 among
the Westminster Chapter Archives,[52] consisting of the accounts of the
Customers of Bristol for the years 1497–8 and 1498–9. These accounts
show that John Cabot’s pension of £20 was paid during the years named.
He is mentioned by name, and the customers deduct the amount of the
pension from the total receipts which they hand over to the Exchequer
officers.
A manuscript chronicle, of unknown authorship, in the British
Museum,[53] contains a reference to the second voyage, ostensibly
written before its return:
'This yere (1498) the Kyng at the besy request and supplicacion of a
straunger Venisian, which by a chart made hymself expert in knowyng of
the world, caused the Kyng to manne a ship w^t. vytaill and other
necessaries for to seche an Iland wheryn the said straunger surmysed
to be grete comodities. W^t which ship by the Kyng’s grace so rygged
went iij or iiij moo owte of Bristowe, the said straunger beyng
conditor of the said fleete, wheryn divers m’chants as well of London
as Bristow aventured goods and sleight m’chandises, which dep’ted from
the west cuntrey in the begynnyng of somer but to this p’sent moneth
came nevir knowledge of their exployt.'
Stow and Hakluyt both quote from a manuscript chronicle, then in the
possession of the former, but now lost. Hakluyt says it was written by
Robert Fabyan. Stow’s version (1615 edition, p. 481), almost identical
with Hakluyt’s except as regards the name of the explorer, runs thus:
'1498, an. reg. 14. This yeere one Sebastian Gabato, a Genoa’s sonne,
borne in Bristow, professing himself to be expert in knowledge of the
circuit of the world and islands of the same, as by his charts and
other reasonable demonstrations he showed, caused the King to man and
victual a ship at Bristow to search for an Iland, which he knew to be
replenished with commodities. In the ship divers merchants of London
adventured small stocks, and in the company of this ship, sayled also
out of Bristow three or foure smal shippes fraught with sleight and
grosse wares, as course cloth, caps, laces, points and such other....
'1502, ann. reg. 18. This yeere were brought unto the King three men
taken in the new found Ilands, by Sebastian Gabato, before named, in
anno 1498. These men were clothed in beasts’ skins, and eate raw
flesh, but spake such a language as no man could understand them, of
the which three men, two of them were seen in ye King’s court at
Westminster two yeares after, clothed like Englishmen, and could not
be discerned from Englishmen.'
Hakluyt’s version adds at the end of the 1498 extract: 'And so departed
from Bristow in the beginning of May, of whom in this Maior’s time
returned no tidings'; and at the end of the 1502 extract: ‘but as for
speach, I heard none of them utter one word’. (The Mayor referred to was
William Purchas, whose term of office expired at the end of October
1498.) Hakluyt printed this extract from the now lost Fabyan chronicle
in his _Divers Voyages_ (1582), and again in his _Principal Navigations_
(1599). The two versions differ in two respects: in _Divers Voyages_ the
name of John Cabot is omitted, he being simply designated ‘a Venetian’;
while the bringing of the savages to England is placed in the eighteenth
year of Henry VII's reign instead of the fourteenth as in _Principal
Navigations_. Stow’s own extract, as has been seen, calls the explorer
Sebastian Gabato. The variations were intentional rather than
accidental, as it was the habit of both editors to amend their material
where they considered it to be in error, without drawing attention to
the fact. The truth probably is that Hakluyt had no warrant for his
alteration of the date of the arrival of the savages, other than his
ignorance of later voyages and consequent assumption that Cabot must
have brought them. It is now known that other expeditions were made in
the early years of the sixteenth century, and that these savages were
most probably kidnapped by one of them, thus having nothing to do with
the Cabots.
The final piece of evidence bearing on John Cabot is that contained in
an inscription on a map of the world published in 1544, and attributed,
with fair certainty, to Sebastian Cabot himself. An example of this map
came to light during the nineteenth century, and is now at Paris. The
inscription relating to the Cabots was translated by Hakluyt from a copy
of the map which was in the possession of Queen Elizabeth at
Westminster. Copies of it were numerous in England in Elizabeth’s time.
‘In the yere of our Lord 1497 [1494 in Paris copy], John Cabot a
Venetian, and his sonne Sebastian (with an English fleet set out from
Bristoll) discovered that land which no man before that time had
attempted, on the 24th of June, about five of the clocke early in the
morning. This land he called Prima Vista, that is to say, First seene,
because as I suppose it was that part whereof they had the first sight
from the sea. That Island which lieth out before the land, he called
the Island of S. John on that occasion, as I thinke, because it was
discovered on the day of John the Baptist. The inhabitants of this
Island use to weare beastes skinnes and have them in as great
estimation as we have our finest garments. In their warres they use
bowes, arrowes, pikes, darts, woodden clubs, and slings. The soile is
barren in some places, and yeeldeth little fruit, but it is full of
white beares, and stagges farre greater then ours. It yeeldeth plenty
of fish, and those very great, as seales, and those which commonly we
call salmons: there are soles also above a yard in length: but
especially there is great abundance of that kinde of fish which the
savages call baccalaos. In the same Island also there breed hauks, but
they are so blacke that they are very like to ravens, as also their
partridges, and egles, which are in like sorte blacke.’
The two Letters Patent granted by Henry VII afford some information as
to the Cabot family and the intentions of the king. Owing to their
length and verbosity they have been merely summarized here, but they
have been frequently printed _in extenso_. In the first of them occurs
the only mention of the name of Sebastian Cabot in strictly contemporary
documents (contemporary, that is, with the voyages). It has been deduced
that, since Sebastian was evidently the second son and at least a year
older than Sanctus, and since the name of a minor would not appear in
such a charter, Sebastian must have been twenty-two years old at least
in 1496. Another point to be noticed is that permission was given to
sail to the east, the west, or the north, but not to the south. Henry
VII was on friendly terms with both Spain and Portugal, and wished to
remain so; he was therefore careful not to allow Cabot to trespass on
their routes, although he was quite aware that the end in view—i.e. the
discovery of a sea-passage to Asia—was identical with theirs. He was not
prepared to risk a quarrel for an unachieved advantage, but was
evidently ready to do so if a lucrative trade were proved to be
possible; otherwise he would not have engaged in the adventure at all.
The second charter is evidently intended to supplement, but not to
supersede, the first. It omits the provisions as to customs, monopoly,
and payments to the king, and confines itself to the details of the
second expedition. It is valuable as proving beyond doubt that John
Cabot commanded on the first voyage, and was successful in finding land.
There is no mention in it of any of his sons, and no other document for
nearly fifty years associates Sebastian with John’s discoveries, the
next joint reference to the pair occurring in the map of 1544. This,
however, is no proof that Sebastian did _not_ sail on these expeditions,
and the point must be regarded as doubtful.
It should be noted that the terms of the first charter are such that it
holds good for an indefinite time, and that no new grant was really
needed for making further voyages. Therefore the fact that no third
charter exists does not preclude the possibility of voyages having taken
place other than those of 1497 and 1498.
The six contemporary letters, all of them unknown until the latter half
of the nineteenth century, are the most valuable authorities remaining
for the deeds of John Cabot. The evidence they afford is of the highest
class, since they are written by observant third parties, and not by the
explorer or his sovereign for the purpose of glorifying their own
achievements. In particular, the letters of Pasqualigo and Soncino,
which give the greatest amount of information on the first voyage,
represent the conclusions formed by intelligent bystanders with no
personal interest in the affair, and writing with the sole object of
giving useful news to the recipients. They are therefore free from the
taint of possible bias and self-interest, which is inherent in the later
statements of Sebastian Cabot, and any misstatements they contain are
the result of ignorance rather than intention.
The Venetian colony in London was rich and numerous, and its members
must naturally have taken a deep interest in the exploit of their
countryman. Pasqualigo was an important member of it, and probably
became personally acquainted with Cabot or some of his followers. His
letter has an air of accuracy, and the details given, although meagre,
are not fanciful, with the exception of the distances, which are
probably loose statements of members of the crew. Considering that Cabot
was only three months on the voyage, it is hardly possible that he could
have coasted for 300 leagues.
There is a great contrast between the two letters of Soncino. The first,
written soon after the arrival of Cabot in London, is evidently based on
hearsay and rumour, and contains no fact of importance. The second
dispatch of Soncino is a news-letter written several months after the
return of the 1497 expedition, and shows that in the interim the writer
has taken great pains to obtain full information on the subject. The
letter is a model of clearness and businesslike arrangement. The writer
gives authorities for his statements; he has talked with Cabot and with
members of his crew; he has listened to the explorer’s demonstrations,
probably in the presence of the king and the court; he gives some idea
of Cabot’s character and personality, and the amount of credence which
should be paid to him; and when he falls back on rumour he is careful to
insert ‘it is said’. He has evidently displayed such an intelligent
interest that Cabot has offered him a place in the next expedition. Full
value may therefore be assigned to the facts in his letter. When Soncino
speaks of sailing to the east, he means of course the west. He had in
mind that the new land was thought to be the Far East although reached
by a western route.
The letter from Ferdinand and Isabella is useful as showing the jealousy
of Spain at the projected enterprise even before it had started. The
same sentiment is again strongly expressed in Pedro de Ayala’s letter
two years later, and, although it does not appear from the available
documents that any official remonstrance was addressed to Henry VII,
Spanish disapproval must, nevertheless, have had its share in causing
the gradual abandonment of American enterprises in the early years of
the sixteenth century.
Ayala’s letter, written after the sailing of the second expedition, is
the only one of the series which contains any positive facts as to that
expedition. It has an unsatisfying air of vagueness and, as regards the
first voyage, is not nearly so precise as Soncino’s long account. This
is partly due to the fact that the details of the matter were already
known to the Spanish sovereigns, and there was thus no need to enter
deeply into them. One point in the letter has been made the basis of a
rather revolutionary theory as to the second expedition, namely, that
John Cabot was in Seville and Lisbon during the winter of 1497–8,
recruiting men for his second voyage. This theory is built upon the
general statement that Cabot had sought assistance in those places. An
interpretation which makes him do so in 1497–8 is hardly allowable. In
the first place we know that he could get plenty of men in England,
where also investors came forward readily and the greatest enthusiasm
prevailed; secondly, it is not likely that he would have trusted himself
in Seville at that time, having regard to the feelings of the Spanish
Government on the subject; and thirdly, a winter voyage to the Peninsula
was a risky undertaking if the traveller were pressed for time. In the
then state of navigation he might easily be detained for weeks and
months by bad weather;[54] and John Cabot could not afford to risk the
postponement of his expedition for a year, with its possible
abandonment, or the appointment of another to command it in his stead.
On the contrary, the natural and probable interpretation of the
statement is that Cabot had sought a hearing for his plans in Spain and
Portugal before coming to England; and even at that, it is quite a ‘by
the way’ remark and lacks corroboration. The same may be said as to the
caravels annually sent out from Bristol; Ayala was not in England during
the period referred to, and was probably repeating a piece of current
gossip.
The few facts he relates of the 1498 voyage rest on surer ground, as
having occurred under the writer’s more immediate attention. The five
ships are mentioned elsewhere, and that number is thus probably correct.
The ‘Friar Buil’ referred to was possibly a Spanish spy: it is singular
that his name alone of all the adventurers is thought worthy of mention
to the Spanish sovereigns. Unless such an obscure man was an agent of
theirs, it is difficult to see what interest they could have had in
hearing of him. The assertion that Cabot’s charts were falsified
entirely lacks confirmation, and there is no ground for believing it.
Ayala was suspicious and prejudiced, and ready to impute dishonest
intentions to England. It is noticeable that in affairs quite separate
from this one he took up a more hostile attitude towards Henry VII than
did his superior, de Puebla. He had a great admiration for Scotland, in
which country he had been ambassador, and this may have engendered a
corresponding hatred of England.
The information, such as it is, afforded by the rewards to John Cabot
and the loans to his associates in the second expedition is, of
necessity, absolutely trustworthy. The documents in question were
written for immediate business purposes, with no idea of their ever
being used to elucidate the story of the discoveries.
The unfinished account of the 1498 voyage, given in the anonymous
British Museum chronicle, has evidently some near relationship to that
contained in the lost Fabyan manuscript copied by Hakluyt and Stowe. It
is probable that Fabyan based his account on the former chronicle,
adding the note on the savages from his own knowledge, but not troubling
to relate the fate of the 1498 voyage. This in itself gives ground for
presuming that the expedition in question returned in safety without
achieving any striking results. If none of the vessels ever came back, a
possibility that has been suggested, Fabyan would hardly have refrained
from commenting on such a sensational occurrence. As it is, he merely
records the fact that they had not returned by the end of October 1498,
and there leaves the matter. Existing editions of Fabyan contain no
reference to the Cabots.
The famous map of 1544, of which the only copy now known to exist is in
the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, is generally agreed to be the work
of Sebastian Cabot, or at least, based on information supplied by him.
The inscriptions upon it, descriptive of various countries, are in Latin
or Spanish, the majority in both. Typographical considerations indicate
that it was not printed in Spain—the printer does not use the Spanish
_tilde_ over the n—and Antwerp has been suggested as the most likely
place of origin. The inscription given above, relating to the Cabot
discovery, was translated by Hakluyt from a similar map which he saw at
Westminster, and Hakluyt’s translation agrees very closely with a modern
translation from the Paris map, showing that they are from one and the
same source. The voyage described is obviously the first one, but the
local colour as to the natives and their habits must have been supplied
from later experiences, as the contemporary letters expressly assert
that John Cabot saw no inhabitants on the first expedition. The date of
the discovery is given on the Paris map as MCCCCXCIIII (1494), but this
may be explained as a careless error for MCCCCXCVII, due to bad writing.
It should be noted that this inscription is the earliest authority for
the statement that land was sighted on June 24 at 5 a.m., and that the
island of St. John was discovered and named on the same day. There seems
to be no good reason why the statements on the map should not be
believed, other than that they proceed from a tainted source. Sebastian
Cabot’s reputation for veracity is certainly under a cloud, even when he
is acquitted of giving false information about his explorations. In
other matters he undoubtedly lied freely and frequently.[55]
The ground being now cleared by a necessary, if tedious, appraisement of
values, it is possible to relate what is known of John Cabot’s voyages.
It had been owing to a mere accident that Christopher Columbus had not
sailed under the English flag on his first epoch-making voyage to the
west. In 1485, after vainly attempting to interest the sovereigns of
Portugal and Spain in his ideas, he had dispatched his brother
Bartholomew to England, to lay his plans before Henry VII. But
Bartholomew Columbus had suffered disaster on his journey. After being
robbed by pirates in the narrow seas, he was further delayed by sickness
and poverty before being able to lay his brother’s case before the king.
When he was at length successful in doing so, Henry listened with
sympathy and promised assistance, but, being preoccupied with other
matters, he postponed the adventure until too late. When he did finally
make up his mind to take the affair in hand, it was only to hear that
Christopher Columbus had already sailed from Palos in the service of
Ferdinand and Isabella.
Henry had missed a great chance, partly through his own fault, and must
have realized his mistake when news began to spread through Europe of
the discovery of rich islands on the western route to Cathay, as all men
supposed the new land to be. It was considered at the English court a
thing ‘more divine than human’ to have reached the Far East by way of
the west, and the anticipations of the advantages of the new discovery
must have exceeded even the reality. Throughout the Middle Ages the
imagination of all who were capable of thought had been stimulated by
glowing accounts of the riches and wonders of the East. The experiences
of Marco Polo and many another wanderer of lesser fame had been spread
broadcast through Europe; such adventures lose nothing in the telling,
and indeed the material civilization of Asia compared not unfavourably
with that of mediaeval Christendom; hence to reach Cathay became the
ambition of many a restless mind. The Venetians and the Genoese were
content to trade with the Asiatic merchants who brought their goods
overland to the ports of the Levant. The Portuguese navigators, excluded
from the Mediterranean, pushed successively further and further down the
coast of Africa in the hope of finding a way round it into the Indian
Ocean. They had not yet succeeded when, in 1495, Columbus returned with
his report of rich islands to the west, and it was universally believed
that he had solved the problem in the simplest possible way.
To the western nations of Europe this news was more especially
important, and so, when John Cabot petitioned Henry VII, three years
later, for permission to make similar discoveries, he obtained a patent
from that king without difficulty. Cabot was of Genoese birth, although
a naturalized citizen of Venice, and he had been for some years settled
at Bristol. He had taken part in the Venetian trade to the Levant, and
had on one occasion travelled as far as Mecca. At that place, a busy
centre of exchange for eastern goods, he questioned the merchants as to
the source of the supply of spices, drugs, perfumes, rare silks, and
precious stones, in which they dealt. They replied that these goods were
transported by successive caravans from a vast distance, and that they
themselves had never visited the countries that produced them. This
suggested to Cabot a similar train of reasoning to that of Columbus: it
was evident that the long land journey and the laborious transport and
exchange from hand to hand must immensely add to the original cost of
the produce which Europe valued so highly; great wealth was therefore in
store for the man and the country which should first find a practicable
sea route to the orient. Cabot, like Columbus, based his plans on the
sphericity of the earth, and came to the conclusion that the shortest
way to the east was by the west. It is unknown whether it was in
consequence of these ideas that he came to England. It may well have
been so, for it was evidently of little use to urge such plans in
Venice. The Italian merchants stood to lose instead of gaining by any
alteration of the trade routes, and, moreover, could be cut off from
access to the Atlantic at the pleasure of the power which could block
the straits of Gibraltar. Whatever his reasons, John Cabot came to
Bristol, bringing his wife and family with him. In after years his son
Sebastian, when it suited him to make himself out an Englishman, claimed
to have been born in Bristol; but as Sebastian cannot have been born
later than 1474, and John was not naturalized as a Venetian till 1476,
it is hardly possible that Sebastian’s statement was true. The year
1476, therefore, is the earliest possible date for John Cabot’s arrival
in Bristol, and the probability is strong that he did not settle there
for several years after that.
Bristol was the largest seaport of the west of England, and, in the
fifteenth century, a most important branch of its trade was with
Iceland, whence the Bristol ships fetched quantities of stockfish. It is
possible that traditions of early Norse voyages to ‘Vineland’ still
lingered in northern regions and were picked up by the Bristol sailors.
There were other legends current of lands to the west: the island of
Brasil, marked on many mediaeval maps; the blissful isle of St. Brandan,
actually supposed to have been visited by a shadowy Irish saint of
antiquity; and the Seven Cities, said to have been founded by Spanish
bishops fleeing from the fury of invading Moors when the Cross fell
before the Crescent on the banks of the Guadalete. Moved either by these
traditions or by the new scientific reasonings of men like Cabot, the
Bristol merchants undoubtedly felt an interest in the possibilities of
the unexplored Atlantic. There are rumours of their having sent out
ships towards the west before 1497, but unfortunately they rest on no
solid basis of proof.
Things were at this stage when, in the winter of 1495–6, Henry VII
visited Bristol, and we may suppose that John Cabot took the opportunity
of petitioning the king for a charter which should place the enterprise
on a more regular footing. On March 5, 1496, the patent was drawn out,
in the terms already described. For reasons unknown, more than a year
elapsed before John Cabot started on his first recorded voyage. He set
out in the early summer of 1497 in a small ship with a crew of eighteen
men, mostly Englishmen of the port of Bristol. In addition to Cabot, and
possibly his sons, there were among the crew two other foreigners, one a
Burgundian, probably a Netherlander, and the other a Genoese. A
document, generally known as the Fust MS., and now destroyed, gave the
name of Cabot’s ship as the _Matthew_, and the dates of the voyage as
May 2 (departure) and August 6 (return). Authorities are at variance as
to the authenticity of the Fust MS. The use of the word ‘America’ in a
record ostensibly written several years before that name was first
invented seems to brand it as an imposture, but it may have been written
up in the form of a year-to-year chronicle several years after the date
contained in it, and still have embodied true information. The dates
given tally approximately with what is known from other evidence.
After leaving Bristol the explorers passed the south of Ireland, and
then steered northwards for an indeterminable time—‘a few days’—Cabot’s
intention apparently being to reach a certain parallel of latitude, and
then to follow it westwards. He knew that the further north he went, the
less would be the distance to be traversed, owing to the decreasing
circumference of the earth and the general lie of the land of eastern
Asia, which was roughly known. When he had made sufficient way to the
north, he turned westwards, and, after considerable wandering, sighted
land. The ‘wandering’ may simply mean that he sailed westwards for a
long time, or that he was diverted to the north or south. In any case
the wording is so vague that the actual course cannot be even
approximately laid down.
In the map of 1544 it is stated that the landfall was in the
neighbourhood of Cape Breton, and that it was made on June 24 at 5 a.m.;
also, that an island near the land was visited on the same day and named
the Island of St. John. The doubts cast on the authenticity of this
inscription have already been considered. On the whole, Cape Breton
seems the likeliest place for the landfall, although the most learned
authorities are hopelessly at variance on the point, some favouring Cape
Breton, others Newfoundland, and others Labrador. With the knowledge at
present available the problem must be pronounced insoluble. The date,
June 24, is a little late, as it allows less than half the total
duration of the voyage for the coasting and return journey; but this is
not impossible if the coasting was restricted and the return was made
with more favourable winds than the outward passage. We know, from an
absolutely trustworthy source, that Cabot was back in London by August
10, and thus probably at Bristol some days earlier.
The land discovered had a temperate climate. In view of Sebastian
Cabot’s accounts, which have sometimes been read as applying to this
voyage, it is important to notice that no mention is made of ice or any
extraordinary length of day, points which would certainly have been
remarked by Pasqualigo or Soncino, if they had been narrated by the
returning crew. An immense quantity of fish was encountered off the
coast.
After planting the flags of England and Venice at the place where he
first landed, John Cabot coasted for some distance. Probably the 300
leagues of Pasqualigo’s letter is a mistake, being incompatible with the
total duration of the voyage. It has been suggested that ‘leagues’
should read ‘miles’. The direction of the coasting, whether northwards
or southwards, is likewise not stated. Cabot saw signs of habitation,
but no actual inhabitants; and doubtless he was not anxious to see any,
for a crew of eighteen all told would not furnish a landing party with
which he could confidently face all comers. This first voyage was merely
for the purpose of reconnoitring and preparing the way for a greater
enterprise. It was a pity that the reconnaissance was not more thorough,
for it might have saved much disappointment afterwards. As it was, Cabot
was firmly convinced that he had reached the north-eastern coast of
Asia, ‘the territory of the Grand Cham’, which the Spaniards were
thought to be on the track of, although they had not yet arrived there.
However, provisions began to run short, and he turned his ship
homewards, passing on the way two islands which he had not time to
explore. He arrived at Bristol in the early days of August.
John Cabot travelled at once to London to lay his report before the
king. He carried with him his charts and a globe with which to
demonstrate his discoveries; and he was so far successful in convincing
the prudent and parsimonious monarch of the value of the new land that
the latter made him an immediate grant of £10 from the Privy Purse (ten
to twelve times as much in modern money), and later allotted him a
pension of £20 a year. The royal sanction, if not a more substantial
aid, was promised for a much larger expedition to sail in the following
year for the purpose, not only of exploring, but also of founding
colonies and trading posts. Cabot and his contemporaries were still
under the impression that he had found the east of Asia. He admitted
that he had only touched the fringe of the golden land, but he asserted
that he had only to sail with a larger and better-found expedition, with
provisions to last for a year’s voyage, and to follow the coast
westwards and southwards to the tropic region, to arrive at the
wonderful island of Cipango,[56] the source of the world’s supply of
spices and precious stones. He had a persuasive tongue, and his
arguments were absolutely convincing to the minds of all who heard them,
from the cool and calculating king to the hard-headed merchants of
London, and still more to hot-blooded adventurers, whose ears already
tingled with wondrous tales of the Spanish Indies. He was everywhere
sought after and fêted. He dressed in silk and assumed the title of
Admiral. In their own imagination he and all his men were princes and
nobles; to the surgeon of the _Matthew_ he gave an island; to a
Burgundian among his crew he gave another.
From London, Cabot went back to Bristol, there to be lionized and to
make preparations for the adventure of the following year. On February
3, 1498, the king issued a second patent, made out this time to John
Cabot alone, without mention of his sons, empowering him to take six
ships and pursue his discoveries on much the same terms as those of the
first patent. It is not evident that the State contributed anything to
this fleet beyond a cheap and convenient permission to take convicts
from the gaols to do the hard work of the proposed colony. Most probably
Henry VII was a shareholder in his private capacity, as he seems to have
been as much convinced as any of his subjects of the profits that were
to accrue.
But soon the king was to receive a significant hint of trouble from a
quarter whence he doubtless expected it. Even before Cabot had obtained
his first patent, in 1496, Spanish jealousy had been aroused at the
prospect of a voyage to the west. De Puebla had evidently reported what
was going forward to his sovereigns, and in their reply to him occurs
the statement that such enterprises ‘cannot be executed without
prejudice to us and to the King of Portugal’. Evidently they were
prepared to take their stand on the Bull of Alexander VI, which divided
between Spain and Portugal all the undiscovered parts of the world, and
which had been confirmed by the Treaty of Tordesillas between those two
nations in 1494. Whether de Puebla communicated this protest to Henry or
not we do not know. Probably he did not, as he always showed himself
extremely anxious to curry favour with that monarch. But in 1498 Pedro
de Ayala, another Spanish agent, was also in London, and to him the king
frequently spoke of the new voyages in order to sound him as to the
opinion of the Spanish court. De Ayala claimed stoutly that the lands
which the English were trying to discover were already in the possession
of Spain, and he gave his reasons, which, he says, the king did not
like. Henry, however, could not afford to quarrel with Spain, and from
this time forward he seemed to become half-hearted in his approval of
western projects.
With regard to John Cabot’s second voyage, only the intentions of the
explorer and the circumstances of his start from Bristol are known. The
former were as follows: Sailing with several ships laden with English
manufactured goods—‘coarse cloth, caps, laces, points, and such
other’—he proposed to return to the land which he had discovered on the
first voyage, and thence to follow the coast which, as he had observed,
trended towards the south-west, until he arrived in the tropical
latitudes. There he expected to find, over against the land, the rich
island of Cipango—the island replenished with great commodities of the
chronicles—and in it to establish, if not a colony in the true sense of
the word, at least a permanent trading post. This is evidenced by the
proposal to take several priests, and also the convicts, who would be
useless on the voyage, but would do the hard work of planting a new
settlement. The programme was naturally very distasteful to the
Spaniards, since the position of Cipango, in John Cabot’s ideas, must
have been in the same latitude as their own discoveries, although lying
further to the west.
Everything in the contemporary letters, and also in the chronicles,
points to the fact that Cabot, in common with every other thinking man
in 1497–8, had no suspicion of the existence of the separate continent
now called America, and that he intended to make for the tropical region
of the coast of eastern Asia. Indeed, it is inconceivable that he, a
much-travelled man, who had experience of tropical climates and their
products, should have sailed northwards to look for spices, unless we
are to assume that he knew that America was not Asia and was
consequently looking for a north-west passage. That assumption a careful
reading of the evidence renders untenable. This matter of the intended
destination of the second voyage is the point at which the commonly
received versions of the Cabot problem go astray, the accepted theory
being that the second expedition was an attempt to force a passage round
the north of the new continent and so into the Pacific. But it cannot be
too strongly emphasized that John Cabot had not the remotest intention
of sailing round the north of what he took to be Asia, since such a
course, if persisted in, would have brought him, according to his
charts, back to the North Sea and the British Isles!
All preparations being complete, he sailed from Bristol in the beginning
of May 1498. He had with him his own ship, manned and victualled, if the
chroniclers are to be believed, at the king’s private expense, and three
or four smaller vessels fitted out by the merchants of London and
Bristol, some of whom had also been financed from the Privy Purse. Pedro
de Ayala states that the fleet numbered five in all, and also reports,
but only as a rumour, that one of them put back to an Irish port in
consequence of damage, sustained presumably in a storm. The ships were
provisioned for a year, and Cabot expected to be home again by
September. In the outcome, however, nothing had been heard of him as
late as the end of October.
Here unfortunately our knowledge of John Cabot leaves the realm of sober
fact, and degenerates into mere theory and speculation. History is
totally silent as to the progress of this voyage, launched with such a
great acclaim; as to its vicissitudes, as to the date, place, and
circumstances of its ending, nothing whatever is known. It is only
through the cumulative effect of side-winds, none of them absolutely
conclusive, that it can be deduced that Cabot’s squadron reached the
American coast, and that he himself, with part at least of his men,
returned in safety.
First, as to his personal survival. This was always considered extremely
doubtful until the discovery of the Bristol Customers' accounts for
1497–9, which prove beyond doubt that, until Michaelmas 1499, annual
pension of £20 was still being paid. It is conceivable of course, that
the pension was being drawn by an accredited agent, his wife for
example, so that there is no positive proof that he was in Bristol
during that year. But it may, as a minimum, be confidently asserted that
he was not known to be dead, since in that case no agent could have
drawn the pension without obtaining fresh official papers. Hence, either
Cabot returned in safety from the 1498 voyage, or else no word had been
heard of his fleet for nearly eighteen months. The balance of
probability is certainly in favour of the former alternative.
One of the persons to whom loans were granted from the Privy Purse was
Launcelot Thirkill, of London, ‘going towards the new island’. A later
document shows this man to have been in England in 1501. Consequently,
if he accompanied the fleet, as he evidently intended, some part of it
must have returned in safety.
[Illustration:
THE NORTH ATLANTIC.
From the map of Juan de la Cosa, 1500. The earliest map showing
English discoveries.
]
A still more probable testimony to the return of Cabot’s expedition, and
to its having coasted extensively on the other side of the Atlantic, is
furnished by the map of the Spanish pilot, Juan de la Cosa, drawn up in
the year 1500. It is a map of the world as known at the time, and
includes a part of the east coast of North America, with flags marking
the places visited by the English. The flags are intended to represent
the English standard, and some of the names, although translated into
Spanish, are such as English explorers might have given; others are
unintelligible. They are as follows, reading from south-west to
north-east:
Mar descubierto por Yngleses, cavo descubierto, C. de S. Jorge,
lagofor, anfor, C. de S. Luzia, requilia, jusquei, S. Luzia, C. de
lisarto, menistre, argair, fonte, rio longo, ilia de la trenidat, S.
Nicolas, Cavo de S. Johan, agron, C. fastanatra, Cavo de Ynglaterra,
S. Grigor, y verde.
The map is so unlike the real coastline that it is impossible to
identify definitely any of the places mentioned. In addition, there are
no lines of latitude or longitude. The most plausible interpretation is
that ‘Cavo de Ynglaterra’, the most northerly point marked on the
mainland, is Cape Race, and that the southernmost flag represents a
point on the coast of Virginia or Carolina, possibly Cape Hatteras.
However, this is mere guesswork, as is shown by the divergent views
taken by equally competent authorities. The only indisputable
information obtainable from the map is the fact that the English did
actually coast along a large part of the North American littoral before
the year 1500. It is practically certain that the map embodies the
geographical knowledge gained in John Cabot’s second voyage, since the
amount of coasting shown is too extensive for the first voyage, the
southernmost English flag being placed more than three-quarters of the
entire distance down from the Cabo de Ynglaterra to the point of
Florida. The only fact which weakens the value of the map’s evidence for
the 1498 voyage is the possibility that it embodies information from
Sebastian Cabot’s expedition, which, as will be shown, probably took
place in 1499. It is possible that la Cosa had seen the charts of the
latter when he drew his map in 1500.
But the most illuminating light is thrown on the voyage of 1498 by a
careful reading of the descriptions of Sebastian Cabot’s adventure given
in the next chapter. These accounts indicate that Sebastian had grasped
the great fact that the transatlantic land was a separate continent,
altogether distinct from Asia. From whence did he derive his
information? Without reasonable doubt, from his father’s voyage of 1498.
It is practically certain, although definite proof is lacking, that John
Cabot acted in accordance with his expressed intentions, and sailed
westwards to his former landfall. Thence he turned to the south-west and
followed the land towards the tropics, exploring the coast, and seeking
eagerly for signs of the wealthy and civilized Asiatics whom he expected
to find there. The islands of Columbus were considered as merely a
half-way house on the route to Asia, and Cabot was confident that his
newly-discovered coast would lead him far to the west of their position,
which the king’s instructions had doubtless enjoined him to avoid. It
may be imagined, then, how his heart sank when day followed day and
brought no sight of oriental shipping on the sea or cities on the land;
and when no inhabitants could be encountered save wandering bands of
savages, who lived by the chase, and had nothing of value to exchange
for the goods in his ships’ holds. The coast, too, trended more and more
to the southwards, taking him in the direction of the Spanish
possessions and rendering illusory the hope of finding Cipango, for
which there was evidently no room between them and it. Gradually Cabot
must have realized that the new land was not a part of Asia, since it
corresponded with none of the known facts about that continent; and,
with the realization, the purpose of his voyage was gone. To find a way
to Asia by the west would necessitate the finding of a passage through
this strange and desolate land, and, until that was effected, all hope
of profitable trade had to be abandoned. Whether an attempt was made to
discover such a passage, or whether the expedition sailed straight back
to England, is unknown. In either case the result, as judged by the
shareholders in the venture, was complete failure.
It is easy to understand how, after this great disappointment, involving
the shattering of a lifetime’s convictions, John Cabot had no heart for
further voyages, but lived quietly at Bristol on the king’s pension
until death overtook him at the close of the fifteenth century.
Such is the theory of the 1498 voyage to which all the ascertained
evidence points. It explains the silence of contemporary chroniclers,
who did not think such a financial failure worthy of mention; it
explains the cessation of the interest of the London commercial world in
transatlantic ventures; and it explains also the motives of Sebastian
Cabot in the voyage which has now to be considered, and the meaning of
his narrations, which have long been considered to be little more than a
collection of impudent falsehoods.
-----
Footnote 43:
An exception must be made of a short extract in Hakluyt.
Footnote 44:
_Spanish Cal._ i, p. 128.
Footnote 45:
_Venetian Cal._ i, p. 262.
Footnote 46:
Ibid., p. 260.
Footnote 47:
_Spanish Cal._ i, pp. 176–7.
Footnote 48:
_Add. MSS._, 7099, f. 41.
Footnote 49:
_R. O., Privy Seals_, Dec. 13, 13 Hen. VII, No. 40.
Footnote 50:
_R. O., Warrants for Issues_, 13 Hen. VII.
Footnote 51:
_Add. MSS._, 7099, f. 45.
Footnote 52:
_Chapter Muniments_, 12243. Printed in facsimile as _The Cabot Roll_,
Bristol, 1897, edited by A. E. Hudd.
Footnote 53:
_Cotton MSS._, Vitell. A. xvi.
Footnote 54:
See Chap. I, pp. 29–30.
Footnote 55:
See Harrisse’s _John and Sebastian Cabot_ (1896) for an account of
Sebastian’s intrigues with Venice, and other discreditable affairs.
Footnote 56:
Evidently Japan. 'Zipangu is an island in the eastern ocean, situated
at the distance of about 1500 miles from the mainland or coast of
Manji. It is of considerable size; its inhabitants have fair
complexions, are well made, and are civilized in their manners....
They have gold in the greatest abundance, its sources being
inexhaustible, but as the king does not allow of its being exported,
few merchants visit the country, nor is it frequented by much shipping
from other parts. To this circumstance we are to attribute the
extraordinary richness of the sovereign’s palace, according to what we
are told by those who have access to the place. The entire roof is
covered by a plating of gold, in the same manner as we cover houses,
or more properly churches, with lead. The ceilings of the halls are of
the same precious metal; many of the apartments have small tables of
pure gold, of considerable thickness; and the windows also have golden
ornaments. So vast indeed are the riches of the palace, that it is
impossible to convey any idea of them. In this island there are pearls
also, of a pink colour, round in shape, and of great size, equal in
value to, or even exceeding in value, the white pearls.' _The Travels
of Marco Polo_, Everyman’s Library, pp. 323–4.
CHAPTER IV
THE CABOT VOYAGES—SEBASTIAN CABOT, ? 1499
The voyage of Sebastian Cabot is described in narratives of which the
details were presumably furnished by himself, in the works of various
historians of the sixteenth century. As in the previous chapter, the
necessary extracts will be given first, followed by a consideration of
the conclusions to which they lead. Many other authors, besides those
quoted, mention Sebastian Cabot; but, since they merely reproduce
earlier accounts without providing any new evidence of their own, it is
unnecessary to refer to them here.
Peter Martyr, in his _Decades of the New World_, of which the first
part, containing the notice of Cabot,[57] was published at Alcala in
1516, says:
‘These North Seas have been searched by one Sebastian Cabot, a
Venetian borne.... Hee therefore furnished two ships in England at his
owne charges, and first with 300 men directed his course so farre
towards the North pole, that even in the moneth of July he found
monstrous heapes of ice swimming in the sea, and in maner continuall
daylight, yet saw he the land in that tract free from ice, which had
been molten by the heat of the Sunne. Thus seeing such heapes of yce
before him, hee was enforced to turne his sailes and follow the West,
so coasting still by the shore, that he was thereby brought so farre
into the South by reason of the land bending so much southwards, that
it was there almost equall in latitude with the sea Fretum Herculeum,
having the North pole elevate in maner in the same degree. He sailed
likewise in this tract so farre towards the West, that hee had the
Island of Cuba on his left hand, in maner in the same degree of
longitude. As hee travailed by the coasts of this great land, (which
he named Baccalaos), he saith that he found the like course of waters
toward the West, but the same to runne more softly and gently then the
swift waters which the Spaniards found in their navigations
Southward.... Sebastian Cabot himselfe named these lands Baccalaos,
because that in the seas thereabout hee found so great multitudes of
certaine bigge fishes much like unto Tunies (which the inhabitants
call Baccalaos) that they sometime stayed his shippes. He found also
the people of those regions covered with beastes’ skinnes, yet not
without the use of reason. He also saith that there is great plentie
of Beares in those regions, which use to eate fish.... Hee declareth
further, that in many places of these regions he saw greate plentie of
Copper among the inhabitants. Cabot is my very friend, whom I use
familiarly, and delight to have him sometimes keepe mee company in
mine owne house. For being called out of England by commandment of the
Catholique King of Castile, after the death of King Henry the seventh
of that name in England, he was made one of our councill and
Assistants, as touching the affaires of the new Indies, looking for
ships dayly to be furnished for him to discover the hid secret of
Nature. Some of the Spaniards deny that Cabot was the first finder of
the land of Baccalaos, and affirm that he went not so far westwards.’
Lopes de Gomara, _Historia General de las Indias_, 1554.[58]
‘Sebastian Cabot was the first that brought any knowledge of this land
for, being in England in the days of King Henry VII, he furnished two
ships at his own charges or, as some say, at the King’s, whom he
persuaded that a passage might be found to Cathay by the North Sea....
He went also to know what manner of land those Indies were to inhabit.
He had with him three hundred men, and directed his course by the
track of Iceland, upon the cape of Labrador, at 58 degrees—though he
himself says much more—affirming that in the month of July there was
such cold and heaps of ice that he durst pass no further; that the
days were very long, and in manner without night, and the nights very
clear. Certain it is that at 60 degrees the longest day is of 18
hours. But considering the cold and the strangeness of the unknown
land, he turned his course from thence to the west, refreshing
themselves at Baccalaos; and following the coast of the land unto the
38th degree, he returned to England.’
Giovanni Battista Ramusio, _Navigations_. Three volumes published at
Venice in 1550, 1559, and 1556 respectively.
(α) In vol. i occurs the following relation by a ‘Mantuan
gentleman’,[59] whose name has never been discovered (Eden falsely
identified him with Galeacius Butrigarius, Papal Legate in Spain),
speaking to a company of Venetians in the house of Hieronimus Fracastor:
‘Finding himself in the city of Seville a few years ago, and desiring
to know about those navigations from the Castillians, he was told that
a distinguished Venetian was there who had knowledge of them, named
Sebastian Caboto, who knew how to make marine charts with his own
hands, and understood the art of navigation better than any one
else.... Caboto said: ... “My father died at the time when the news
came that the Genoese, Christopher Columbus, had discovered the coast
of the Indies, and it was much discussed at the court of King Henry
VII, who then reigned, saying that it was a thing more divine than
human to have found that way never before known to go to the east
where the spices grow. In this way, a great and heartfelt desire arose
in me to achieve some signal enterprise. Knowing by a study of the
sphere that if I should navigate to the west, I should find a shorter
route to the Indies, I quickly made known my thought to his Majesty
the King, who was well content, and fitted out two caravels for me
with everything needful. This was in 1496, in the commencement of the
summer. I began to navigate towards the west, expecting not to find
land until I came to Cathay, whence I could go on to the Indies. But
at the end of some days I discovered that the land trended northwards,
to my great disappointment; so I sailed along the coast to see if I
could find some point where the land turned, until I reached the
height of 56 degrees under our pole, but finding that the land turned
eastward, I despaired of finding an opening. I turned to the right to
examine again to the southward, always with the object of finding a
passage to the Indies, and I came to that part which is now called
Florida. Being in want of victuals, I was obliged to return thence to
England, where I found great popular tumults among the rebels, and a
war with Scotland. So that there was no chance of further navigation
to those parts being considered, and I therefore went to Spain to the
Catholic King and Queen Isabella, who, having heard what I had done,
took me into their service, and provided for me well, sending me on a
voyage of discovery to the coast of Brazil. I found a very wide river,
now called La Plata....”
(β) In the preface to the third volume, Ramusio gives the following note
on Sebastian Cabot. From Hakluyt’s translation.[60]
‘It is not yet thoroughly known whether the lands set in fiftie
degrees of latitude to the north be separated and divided by the sea
as islands, and whether by that way one may goe by sea unto the
country of Cathaia: as many yeeres past it was written unto me by
Sebastian Gabotto, our countrey man a Venetian, a man of great
experience, and very rare in the art of navigation and the knowledge
of cosmographie, who sayled along and beyond the land of New France at
the charges of King Henry the seventh, King of England: and hee
advertised mee that, having sailed a long time West and by North,
beyond those Ilands unto the latitude of 67 degrees and an halfe,
under the North pole, and at the 11 day of June, finding still the
open sea without any manner of impediment, he thought verily by that
way to have passed on still the way to Cathaia, which is in the East,
and would have done it if the mutinie of the ship master and the
mariners had not hindered him and made him returne homewards from that
place.’
André Thevet, _Les Singularités de la France Antarctique_, Antwerp,
1558. Thevet reproduces the outline of previous accounts, and adds that
Cabot landed three hundred men at some undefined place in the north, to
found a colony. They nearly all perished of cold:
‘Vray est qu’il mist bien trois cens hommes en terre, du coste
d’Irelande au Nort, ou le froid fist mourir presque toute sa
compagnie, encores que ce fust au moys de Juillet.’
Jean Ribault,[61] writing in 1562, mentions 1498 as the date of
Sebastian Cabot’s voyage.
Richard Eden, _Decades of the New World_, 1555, preface, leaf C 1.
‘But Cabot touched only in the north corner and most barbarous part
thereof, from whence he was repulsed with ice in the month of July.’
Antonio Galvano, _Discoveries of the World to 1550_, Lisbon, 1563.
Latest edition, Hakluyt Society, 1862. Hakluyt published this
translation in 1601.
‘In the yeere 1496 there was a Venetian in England called John Cabota
[the name is probably an interpolation of Hakluyt’s], who having
knowledge of such a new discoverie as this was, and perceiving by the
globe that the islands before spoken of stood about in the same
latitude with his countrey, and much neerer to England than to
Portugall or to the Castile, he acquainted King Henrie the seventh,
then King of England, with the same, wherewith the saide King was
greatly pleased, and furnished him out with two ships and three
hundred men: which departed and set saile in the spring of the yeare,
and they sailed westward til they came in sight of land, in 45 degrees
of latitude towards the north, and then went straight northwards till
they came into sixty degrees of latitude, where the day is 18 howers
long, and the night is very cleere and bright. There they found the
aire cold, and great islands of ice, but no ground in seventy, eighty
or hundred fathoms sounding, but found much ice, which alarmed them:
and so from thence, putting about, finding the land to turne eastward,
they trended along by it, discovering all the bay and river named
Deseado, to see if it passed on the other side; then they sailed back
again till they came to 38 degrees towards the equinoctial line, and
from thence returned into England. There be others which say that he
went as far as the Cape of Florida, which standeth in 25 degrees.’
Alonzo de Santa Cruz, _Islario General de todas las Islas del Mundo_, a
manuscript first printed by F. R. von Wieser, Innsbruck, 1908. Writing
to Charles V, Santa Cruz says:
‘This land was called Labrador because a labrador (ploughman or
landowner) from the Azores gave information and intelligence of it to
the King of England at the time he sent to explore it by Antonio
Gaboto the English pilot and the father of Sebastian Gaboto, your
Majesty’s present Pilot Major.’
Further on he speaks of the Baccalaos ‘first explored by the English
pilot Antonio Gaboto, by command of the King of England’.[62]
It will be seen that the principal detailed accounts are those of Peter
Martyr, Gomara, Ramusio, and Galvano.
Peter Martyr’s account was the earliest published (1516) and has the
best right to be considered as correctly reproducing Sebastian’s own
claims, since it was written by a man who was personally known to him
and who was in frequent friendly communication with him. Circumstances
of both time and place thus point to Martyr as the most trustworthy
witness of Sebastian Cabot’s statements during the first years of his
residence in Spain. As will be seen from the analysis given below,
practically all the important details common to more than one account
are found in his work, and it may be safely assumed that every serious
historian subsequent to him was acquainted with it, more especially as
it was written in Latin and thus accessible to all men of education.
Gomara, writing a few years after Sebastian Cabot had left Spain,
repeats the main features of Martyr’s account. He may have known
Sebastian personally, but does not expressly say so. His attitude is
critical and somewhat suspicious, and he shows that he is not a mere
blind reproducer of all he is told by his reduction of the northern
limit of the voyage claimed by Sebastian. It should be remarked that the
latitude of 58° N. is Gomara’s own figure and not Cabot’s, because this
has been advanced as proof that Cape Farewell in Greenland was the point
reached. There is no real evidence that Sebastian’s northward wanderings
took him far away from the Labrador coast; and the fact that in early
maps, including that of 1544, Greenland and Labrador are confused with
one another, or rather, represented as continuous, points the other way,
since, if Sebastian had crossed Davis Strait, he would have known that
they were distinct.
Ramusio’s two relations, (α) by the Mantuan gentleman, and (β) in the
preface to volume iii, are not of nearly such high value. In particular,
the Mantuan gentleman’s story is quite untrustworthy. It is a report by
Ramusio of a discourse delivered some years before he wrote it down, and
in which the narrator in his turn was speaking from memory after the
lapse of several years. Ramusio himself admits that his recollection is
confused on the matter, and the consequence is that he makes the Mantuan
gentleman put statements into the mouth of Sebastian Cabot with which
that individual would never have insulted the intelligence of his
hearers. The assertion that Queen Isabella, who died in 1504, helped
Sebastian to fit out the expedition with which he explored the River
Plate in 1526, does not encourage much trust in the remainder of the
account. Two of its implications also contradict one another. Cabot is
first made to say that he believed the new land to be Cathay, and
immediately afterwards he speaks of trying to find a passage through it,
because it trended northwards. But if it trended northwards it must also
have trended southwards if followed in the opposite direction, and,
assuming it to be Cathay, he had only to go that way to arrive at the
coast of India, his goal. Other obvious misstatements, as to the date of
John Cabot’s death, and the reasons for the abandonment of the
enterprise in England, which have caused so much damage to Sebastian’s
reputation for truthfulness, occur in this story. Considering the
third-hand and ‘hearsay’ character of the same, it is hardly fair to put
its inaccuracies down to his account. It evidently suffered by the
carelessness of one or both of the avenues by which it has been
preserved.
Ramusio’s statement in the preface to volume iii has a slightly better
life history, but here again he is quoting from memory, avowedly faulty,
of a letter written several years before, and apparently not preserved
by him. However, the details given are scanty, the only remarkable one
being that Sebastian Cabot could have made the north-west passage, but
was prevented by a mutiny. Such a plausible explanation of failure is
quite consistent with Sebastian’s character. On the whole, Ramusio
exhibits very little critical faculty, and has done Sebastian a great
disservice by reproducing such nonsense as the Mantuan gentleman’s
story.
The brief references in the manuscript of Alonzo de Santa Cruz
effectually clear up one point, namely, the suggestion that Sebastian
tried to deceive his contemporaries in Spain by claiming his father’s
exploits as his own. There could never have been much probability in
such a charge, in view of the number of persons who must have been
living during the period 1512–47 with personal recollections of all the
circumstances; and it is definitely and finally swept away by Santa
Cruz’s allusion, as a matter of common knowledge, to the explorations of
John Cabot.[63]
The remaining account of any length is that of Antonio Galvano,
published in 1563, but written before 1557, the date of his death. It is
not, on any serious point, at variance with Peter Martyr, but includes
some details peculiar to itself. Galvano was a man of grave and sober
character, and moreover, an experienced voyager. His judgement, in any
conflict of evidence, is more likely to be reliable than that of
Ramusio.
A correct view of the statements in all these accounts is best obtained
by summarizing them and placing the results side by side in the
following manner:
Points of Agreement:—
Two ships were employed (Martyr, Gomara, Ramusio α, Galvano).
Three hundred men were carried (Martyr, Gomara, Galvano).
The general direction of the voyage was to the north-west (Martyr,
Gomara, Ramusio α and β, Eden). Galvano says they went westwards to land
in 45°, and then northwards to 60°.
Ice was encountered in July (Martyr, Gomara, Eden). Ice without mention
of date (Galvano).
After making land, the expedition coasted northwards (Martyr, Gomara,
Ramusio α and β, Galvano).
It then turned back and sailed along the coast southwards and westwards
(Martyr, Gomara, Ramusio α, Galvano). Eden appears to deny this, but
probably unintentionally.
Extraordinary length of day was observed (Martyr, Gomara, Galvano).
A passage was being sought _through_ the new land to Cathay (Ramusio α
and β. The other accounts are not explicit on this point.
Points of difference:—
Highest north latitude attained: 58°, ‘he himself says much more’
(Gomara); 56° (Ramusio α); 67½° (Ramusio β); 60° (Galvano).
Lowest south latitude attained: ‘latitude of Gibraltar’, 36° (Martyr);
38° (Gomara); latitude of ‘Florida’—say 25–35° (Ramusio α); 38°, ‘others
say 25°’ (Galvano).
The ships were fitted out at Cabot’s own charges (Martyr); ships fitted
out at the king’s charges (Ramusio α and β, Galvano). Gomara uncertain.
A north-west passage was discovered (Ramusio β); further progress north
was impossible (Gomara, Ramusio α, Galvano).
Date of voyage: 1498 (Ribault); 1496 (Galvano); 1496 (Ramusio α).
Facts inconsistent with what is known with certainty of John Cabot’s
voyages:—
Sebastian Cabot was in command; two ships were employed; the voyage was
into Arctic seas primarily, and only turned southwards when further
progress north was impossible.
Statements obviously incorrect:—
Ferdinand and Isabella jointly dispatched Sebastian on the River Plate
voyage (Ramusio α);[64] date of John Cabot’s death (Ramusio α); date of
Sebastian Cabot’s voyage (Ramusio α and Galvano); the American coast
trends eastwards at 56° N. (Ramusio α).
In considering the accounts thus summarized, we are struck first by the
importance and the inter-corroborative nature of the points on which
unanimity is displayed, and secondly by the relative unimportance (so
far as concerns the general outline of the story) of the points of
difference. It is precisely on such points as latitude and date that
men, writing in good faith, would be liable to err from defect of
memory. The single serious discrepancy is the statement by Ramusio that
a northwest passage was found, while the other writers assert that it
was impossible to find such a passage. But Ramusio, as has been shown,
was not very careful as to his facts, and Sebastian Cabot may well have
been in a boasting mood when he wrote his letter to him. Sebastian was
undoubtedly prone to misstatements on minor points, such as the place of
his birth and his discoveries in the art of navigation, and in this
respect he was neither above nor below the general standard of morality
displayed by the adventurers of his time. With this exception, the above
analysis shows that Ramusio’s ‘Mantuan gentleman’ is responsible for
practically all the demonstrably impossible elements in the story. The
reasons for disregarding him have already been fully entered into.
The conclusion is thus inevitable that the extracts under consideration
present a report of a voyage that did actually take place, and that the
following were the principal details of it: Sebastian Cabot was the
commander; two ships were employed, with large crews; the general
direction was westwards and northwards from England; so much progress
was made into Arctic seas, by coasting northwards along the American
shore, that quantities of ice were encountered in the height of summer;
the object of the expedition was to find a passage through the American
continent to the land of Cathay beyond, and thence to the Indies in the
tropic latitudes; owing to ice, or mutiny, or both, further northern
progress had to be abandoned; and finally, Sebastian Cabot skirted the
whole coast of North America, from the neighbourhood of the Arctic
circle down to Delaware Bay, or even to the southern point of Florida,
and thence returned to England.
It is evident at a glance that this cannot possibly be a description of
John Cabot’s first voyage. Facts are known with absolute certainty
relating to that voyage which are quite incompatible with Sebastian’s
story.
On reference to the very meagre, but yet undoubted, details in existence
with regard to the 1498 voyage, it becomes equally evident that
Sebastian Cabot was not speaking of that either, when he furnished
material to the sixteenth-century historians. From first-class sources
it has been seen that John Cabot sailed in command in 1498; that he
conducted five ships; that he imagined the opposite shore to be that of
Cathay; that he intended to make his former landfall, and then sail to
the south-west, instead of to the north; and that his goal was the Isle
of Cipango in the tropic seas, and not a by-him-undreamed-of passage in
the Arctic.
Undoubtedly, then, Sebastian Cabot’s voyage was not identical with that
of 1497, or with that of 1498. It must have been subsequent to those
expeditions, since its commander was in possession of geographical
knowledge which can only have been gleaned by John Cabot in 1498. Two
considerations point to its having taken place in 1499 or 1500, with the
balance of probability in favour of the former year. On March 19, 1501,
Henry VII granted to a Bristol syndicate a new charter for western
exploration, in which it was distinctly laid down that no foreigner,
under colour of any former grant, should resort to the new-found lands
without the permission of the present patentees. This seems to preclude
with certainty the possibility of any Cabot voyage for several years to
come, for the new company continued its operations until 1505, and
possibly longer.
Another indication, from a Spanish source, points to 1499 as the
probable date. A Spanish adventurer, Alonzo de Hojeda, put to sea on a
voyage of discovery in May 1499. He explored the coast of Venezuela,
steering thence to Hispaniola, and returning to Spain in the spring of
1500. On June 8, 1501, he obtained from the Spanish sovereigns a patent
for a second voyage, empowering him to take ten ships and prosecute
further discoveries on certain conditions, among which appear the
following:[65]
‘That you go and follow that coast which you have discovered, which
extends east and west, as it appears, because it goes towards that
part where it has been reported that the English were making
discoveries; and that you set up marks with the arms of their
Majesties or with other signs that may be understood, such as may seem
good to you, so that it may be known that you have discovered that
land, in order that you may stop the discoveries of the English in
that direction....
‘Likewise their Majesties make gift to you, in the island of
Hispaniola, of six leagues of land ... for what you have accomplished
in discovery, and for the exclusion of the English from the coast of
the mainland, and the said six leagues of land shall be yours for
ever....’
Navarette, writing of Hojeda’s first voyage, says it is certain that the
explorer encountered some Englishmen near Coquibacoa on the coast of
Venezuela;[66] but he gives no authority for the statement, and such
authority has been searched for in vain. Possibly the patent quoted
above was the origin of his assertion. In any case the patent deserves
serious consideration, showing, as it does, that the Spanish Government
was genuinely alarmed at the progress of English exploration on the
mainland of America. If it is to be credited that Hojeda did encounter
an English expedition on his first voyage, that expedition must have
been Sebastian Cabot’s, as the dates do not allow of the possibility
that Hojeda ran across John Cabot in 1497 or 1498. If Hojeda met
Sebastian Cabot, it is most unlikely, in view of the latter’s accounts
of his voyage, that it was on the coast of Venezuela. The most probable
time and place of the intersection of the routes of the two explorers
was in the autumn of 1499 and in the vicinity of the island of
Hispaniola. Hojeda seems to have arrived at that place on September 5,
staying there for a considerable time before resuming his voyage; and it
is quite possible that Sebastian Cabot touched there on his homeward
passage from Florida, although he would naturally not mention the
circumstance in after days when in Spanish service.
But, however interesting these possibilities may be, there is not
sufficient proof for them to be regarded as facts, and their truth or
falsity does not affect the credit due to Sebastian Cabot for his
determination to turn his father’s disillusionment to account. A man of
good education, and of a subtle, reflective mind, he realized, as did
other cosmographers much earlier than is commonly supposed,[67] that the
new-found land was veritably a separate continent, and lay as an
obstacle between Europe and the coveted spices of the East. Hence his
voyage into the Arctic—the first voyage in search of the North-West
Passage, a quest which has formed an integral part of English history
almost to our own time, and of which the first act has been buried under
such an accumulation of misunderstanding and controversy as to pass
almost unrecognized. Whether the voyage took place in 1499 or later;
exactly how far north Sebastian reached; whether he actually entered
Hudson’s Strait; and whether he encountered Hojeda in the West Indies
after giving up the northern quest, are points which cannot be decided
with the evidence at present at disposal. Certain it is, however, that
his was the first attempt to pass from the Atlantic to the Pacific, an
achievement which Magellan was to accomplish by a different route twenty
years later.
Much has been made of Sebastian Cabot’s suppression of his father’s
discoveries. It cannot be denied that he showed a strange want of
generosity on the point, his first recorded reference to them being
found in the map of 1544. But the neglect to mention a fact which is
common knowledge is not so serious a fault as the withholding a secret
generally unknown. From the references to John Cabot made by Alonzo de
Santa Cruz, it would seem that Charles V was perfectly aware that John,
and not Sebastian, was the original discoverer, as indeed any one who
troubled to inquire into the matter could hardly fail to be when so many
contemporaries of the fact were still living. The wretchedly slipshod
and perfunctory methods of the sixteenth-century historians are
certainly as much to blame as Sebastian, who had a financial motive for
taking advantage of the confusion when he claimed, in his old age, the
gratitude of England for the services of his family.
That Sebastian Cabot was nothing but a charlatan and a ‘glib reciter of
other men’s tales’ is highly improbable. If he had been such, he would
surely have appropriated the 1497 and 1498 voyages to his own credit,
and would have made his story agree closely with all the undoubted
details of those exploits, with which he was necessarily familiar. If he
had really intended to represent himself as the sole discoverer of
America, what possible motive could he have had in arousing suspicion by
altering the number of ships from one or five, as the case might be, to
two; in maintaining the deception well knowing that his master, Charles
V, and many others were cognisant of it; and finally in giving his whole
case away and acknowledging himself a liar by publishing the inscription
on the map of 1544? His real fault was his egotistic silence on
achievements which were not his own, a fault which served his turn at
the time, but afterwards brought its own punishment by damaging his
reputation to an even greater extent than he deserved.
Most modern writers[68] have assumed that he claimed to have commanded
one or both of the first two voyages, and they have put forward, as an
explanation of the discrepancies, the suggestion that he named the
Arctic as the scene of his chief efforts in order to please his Spanish
masters. The latter were (on this hypothesis) bound to admit that
England had made some discoveries, but preferred to have them located in
a frigid and comparatively useless region rather than in more temperate
zones. The obvious and fatal objection to this reasoning is that
Sebastian, while asserting that he had been in the Arctic, also claimed
to have coasted down to Virginia or Florida during the very same voyage,
thus giving England just as good a title to those regions by right of
discovery as if his first landfall had been made there.
The conclusion is, therefore, that there were three distinct Cabot
voyages of which evidence has survived; the first two, under John Cabot,
made upon a false conception, and the third, under his son, upon a true
conception, of the nature of the newly discovered continent; and that
the search for the North-West Passage was begun by Sebastian Cabot.
-----
Footnote 57:
Hakluyt, vii. 150. All references to Hakluyt, unless otherwise stated,
are to the edition in twelve volumes printed by Messrs. Maclehose for
the Hakluyt Society in 1903. The above passage was taken by Hakluyt
from Richard Eden’s translation.
Footnote 58:
Hakluyt, vii. 153.
Footnote 59:
Hakluyt, vii. 147.
Footnote 60:
Hakluyt, vii. 149.
Footnote 61:
No French copy of Ribault’s work is known to exist. It was published
in English in 1563, with the title ‘The Whole and true discoverie of
Terra Florida’. Reprinted by Hakluyt in _Divers Voyages_ (Hakluyt
Society’s edition, 1850, pp. 91–115).
Footnote 62:
By ‘Antonio’ Cabot Santa Cruz evidently meant John, as the context
shows. His mistake in the name arose from his copying Ziegler’s
version of Peter Martyr. Jacobus Ziegler (Strasburg, 1532) reproduced
Martyr’s account of the northern voyage, attributing it to ‘Antonio’
Cabot. Apparently Ziegler did not know there were two Cabots.
Footnote 63:
The date of this manuscript is generally given as 1560, but, from
internal evidence, it must be earlier. F. R. von Wieser, in his
preface to the Innsbruck edition (1908), comes to the conclusion that
it was completed in 1541.
Footnote 64:
Isabella died in 1504 and Ferdinand in 1516. Cabot sailed for the
River Plate in 1526.
Footnote 65:
Navarette, _Coleccion de los Viajes_, Madrid, 1825–37; (original
patent printed in full).
Footnote 66:
Navarette, iii. 41: ‘Lo cierto es que Hojeda en su primer viaje halló
á ciertos ingleses por las immediaciones de Coquibacoa.’
Footnote 67:
On this point see Harrisse: _Discovery of North America_ (1892), pp.
102–24.
Footnote 68:
The principal modern works on the Cabots are: S. E. Dawson, _Voyages
of the Cabots_, 1894; H. Harrisse, _Jean et Sébastien Cabot_, 1882,
and _John and Sebastian Cabot_, 1896; G. E. Weare, _Cabot’s Discovery
of North America_, 1897; C. R. Beazley, _John and Sebastian Cabot_,
1898; G. P. Winship, _Cabot Bibliography_, 1900; H. P. Biggar,
_Voyages of the Cabots and Corte Reals_, 1903. Of these authors Mr.
Winship is the only one who takes the view that there were three
voyages, and he inclines to the belief that Sebastian’s voyage took
place in 1508–9.
CHAPTER V
AN EARLY COLONIAL PROJECT
After the Cabot voyages, which were, financially, a failure, nothing
more is heard of American enterprises originating in England until March
19, 1501. On that date Henry VII granted a patent ‘to our beloved
subjects Richard Ward, Thomas Ashehurst, and John Thomas, merchants of
our town of Bristol, and to our beloved João Fernandes, Francisco
Fernandes and João Gonsalves,[69] squires born in the islands of Surrys
(Azores) under the obedience of the King of Portugal’, giving them
authority to explore any regions of the earth for the purpose of
discovering any countries hitherto unknown to Christians. The patentees
were further empowered to set up the king’s standard on all places by
them newly discovered, and to occupy such places as his vassals and
governors, making laws and enforcing the obedience of all who should
resort to those regions. During ten years following the grant of the
patent they were to have a monopoly of trade with their discoveries,
other persons being forbidden to engage in it without obtaining their
licence and that of the king, and then only on condition of paying to
the patentees one-twentieth part of the value of the goods shipped.
Certain exemptions from customs duties on small quantities of goods were
granted to the masters and mariners employed by the patentees, who were
themselves entitled to import one shipload of merchandise duty free at
some time within the first four years after the grant of the patent. If
foreigners persisted in intruding into the dominions of the patentees
the latter were given leave to expel and punish them at their
discretion, even if they were subjects of a friendly power. They were
also granted, jointly and singly, the rank and privileges of Admiral,
with power to exercise the same in the new lands. A significant clause
provided that no foreigner, under colour of any concession formerly
granted under the Great Seal, should resort to the new lands without the
licence of the patentees. Finally, the three Portuguese mentioned in the
patent were to be naturalized and have all the rights and privileges of
Englishmen, except that they were to continue to pay customs duties on
the same scale as foreigners.[70]
A study of the terms of the charter, the original of which is in Latin
and of great length, shows that the foundation of a permanent colony,
and not merely the dispatch of a trading expedition, was contemplated.
The clauses, much elaborated in the original, relative to the rights of
legislation, power to exclude foreigners, and administrative authority
of the patentees, all point to this conclusion, although there is very
little evidence that they were ever carried into effect. The locality is
not mentioned, but it must have been somewhere on the coast of Greenland
or North America between the Arctic Circle and the extremity of the
peninsula of Florida, limits which are sufficiently wide, but which are
necessitated by the extreme vagueness and the contradictory nature of
the indications of the site of the projected settlement. The permission
to expel foreigners by force of arms is interesting as showing that
Henry VII, on paper at least, was in a less conciliatory mood than usual
towards the Spaniards, at whom and the Portuguese the clause was
levelled. The express revocation of any previous grants under the great
seal could only apply to the patents obtained by the Cabots in 1496 and
1498, which were now annulled, most probably on account of the failure
of those navigators to achieve any commercial success by their voyages.
The somewhat incongruous combination of Bristol merchants and Portuguese
adventurers may be accounted for by the assumption that the former
provided the capital and the business management of the affair, while
the latter supplied the navigating skill and experience of similar
enterprises. João Fernandes, at least, possessed such experience. On
October 28, 1499, he had been granted a patent by King Manuel of
Portugal, authorizing him to make voyages to the North-West and giving
him the captaincy of any islands he might discover; and certain
expressions used in another patent obtained by him in 1508 imply that he
had previously made voyages in the same direction.[71] The Portuguese,
in general, thanks to their persistent attempts to find an eastern route
to Cathay, were much more advanced in the art of conducting exploring
expeditions than were the English of that period, and they had very
quickly followed in the track of the Cabots to the coast of North
America itself. The two brothers, Gaspar and Miguel Corte Real, as
important in Portuguese history as the Cabots in our own, perished in
the North-West in 1501 and 1502 respectively; while Portuguese fishermen
flocked to the Baccalaos, or Newfoundland banks, in such numbers that in
1506 an import tax was levied in Portugal on fish from that region.[72]
On the other hand, England was in its infancy as a maritime nation, and
its sailors, using inferior ships, charts, and navigating methods, had
been hitherto accustomed only to coasting voyages and very short
open-sea passages, such as were necessitated by the trade to Iceland and
Spain.
It would appear that a commencement of the American enterprise was made
in 1501, soon after the granting of the patent. It was usual to set out
on such expeditions in the early summer so as to enjoy the maximum of
good weather, and also to take advantage of the longest days when
examining a new coastline. The only positive evidence of a voyage having
been made in 1501 is an entry in Henry VII’s Privy Purse accounts[73] on
January 7, 1502: ‘To men of Bristol that found the Isle, £5.’ Scanty as
it is, this entry may be taken as proving conclusively that a voyage was
made in 1501. It was customary to make such donations on the arrival in
England of the persons concerned: John Cabot had received a similar gift
within a few days of his return from his first voyage in 1497; and the
obvious inference here is that the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate dispatched
an expedition in 1501, news of the safe arrival of which came to England
at the end of that year. It is uncertain whether a colony was planted
and messengers sent back with news to England, or whether the first
voyage was made simply for the purpose of exploring and choosing a
suitable site. It should be noted that the phrase employed does not
necessarily imply that the new land was an island in the usual
acceptation of the word; most newly discovered regions were commonly
referred to as islands until exploration proved their continental
nature.
A series of three documents, all referring to the last week of September
1502, imply the arrival of another ship or fleet from the new land at
that time. A Privy Purse entry of September 23: ‘To a mariner that
brought an eagle, 6_s._ 8_d._’, may or may not relate to the enterprise;
but another of September 30 is more explicit: ‘To the merchants of
Bristol that have been in the Newfound land, £20.’ The third piece of
evidence is the grant, on September 26, 1502, of pensions of £10 each
per annum to Francisco Fernandes and João Gonsalves, ‘in consideration
of the true service which they have done unto us to our singler pleasure
as capitaignes unto the newe found lande’.[74] Here again the
phraseology is tantalizingly vague, and leaves us completely in the dark
as to the real nature of the undertaking. It would apply equally well to
a colony, a trading voyage, or a voyage of exploration. Two facts may,
however, be deduced: first, that something of real importance had been
accomplished, as is shown by the unwonted liberality of the king, whose
habitual parsimony became accentuated in his later years; and, secondly,
that João Fernandes severed his connexion with the enterprise at this
time or earlier, since he is not recorded as obtaining either gratuity
or pension.
Indeed, the next step of which we have evidence is a reconstruction of
the whole syndicate and the grant of a new patent by the king on
December 9, 1502.[75] The number of the patentees was now reduced to
four, namely, Hugh Elyot, Thomas Ashehurst, João Gonsalves, and
Francisco Fernandes. Nothing is known of the causes of this change, by
which three of the original adventurers dropped out and one new one was
introduced; but it may safely be assumed that it was not due to an
entire lack of commercial success, since that would probably have
resulted in the winding-up of the whole concern.
The new patent was very similar in its terms to the old one, with the
following exceptions: In the general licence to conquer and colonize, a
special exception was made of the lands of the King of Portugal and any
other ‘principum, amicorum & confoederatorum nostrorum’; the period
during which the patentees might have a monopoly of trade was extended
to forty years; two shiploads, instead of one, might be imported duty
free; and Gonsalves and Francisco Fernandes were now placed on a
complete equality with Englishmen as regards the payment of customs.
Richard Ward, John Thomas, and João Fernandes were expressly debarred
from exercising privileges granted in the patent of 1501, which was
thus, for practical purposes, cancelled. The clause aiming at the rights
of the Cabots was not repeated.
On the whole, the new patent was more favourable than the old, and the
contrast seems to be intentionally emphasized between the status of the
four new patentees and that of Ward, Thomas and João Fernandes, who were
now excluded. The conduct of the latter had evidently been as
displeasing to the king as that of the former had been satisfactory.
An entry in Stow’s _Chronicle_ with reference to these expeditions has
already been discussed in connexion with the Cabot voyages. It states
that in the year 1502 three men were brought to the king, who had been
taken in the new-found islands. They were clothed in skins, ate raw
flesh, and spoke an unintelligible language. Two of them were to be seen
at Westminster two years later, when they resembled Englishmen in
clothing and appearance. These men must have arrived in the ships which
returned in September 1502.
The new patent granted by Henry VII was followed by a renewal of the
energies of the adventurers, and a Privy Purse entry of November 17,
1503, indicates the arrival in England of ships at that time. Like the
others, it affords very little information, merely recording the
payment: ‘To one that brought hawkes from the Newfoundland Island, £1’.
Another entry, ‘April 8, 1504, to a prest that goeth to the new island,
£2,’ points to a fresh sailing soon after that date, although there is
no information as to the corresponding homeward voyage in the autumn.
The Privy Purse accounts afford only one more piece of evidence, and
that is of doubtful bearing on the subject. On August 25, 1505, we find
entered: ‘To Clays going to Richemount with wylde catts and popyngays of
the Newfound Island, for his costs, 13_s._ 4_d._’, and on the same date,
‘To Portyngales that brought popyngais and catts of the mountaigne with
other stuf to the Kinges Grace, £5.’ The word ‘popinjays’ was generally
used to mean parrots, and no clear instance exists of the word being
applied to any other bird.[76] Parrots are not now to be found in the
northern part of North America, but one species at least existed on the
shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario at the beginning of the nineteenth
century,[77] and it is quite possible that Indians in Newfoundland and
Labrador bartered them to Europeans in the time of Henry VII. Hence the
extract in question need not be absolutely rejected as applying to the
present subject.
The interesting and valuable transcripts of Privy Purse accounts in Add.
MS. 7099 cease at the year 1505. They are continued to the end of the
reign by a manuscript[78] in the Record Office (first entry, October 1,
1505), but there is no further mention of donations to American
adventurers. At this point, therefore, all contemporary information
ceases. The enterprise may have been continued during the succeeding
years, but it was certainly not very long before it was abandoned, as
certain statements of a later date tend to prove.
About the period 1517–19 a play in rhymed verse was printed, entitled
_The New Interlude of the Four Elements_, of which the only known copy
is at present in the British Museum.[79] The page which should bear
information as to its origin is missing, and the date given above is
arrived at on internal evidence. The following lines vaguely refer to
the early transatlantic voyages (spelling modernized):
This sea is called the great Ocean,
So great it is that never man
Could tell it sith the world began,
Till now, within this twenty year,
Westward be found new lands
That we never heard tell of before this
By writing nor other means,
Yet many now have been there;
And that country is so large of room,
Much lenger than all Christendom,
Without fable or guile;
For divers mariners have it tried,
And sailed straight by the coast side
Above five thousand mile!
But what commodities be within
No man can tell nor well imagine,
But yet not long ago
Some men of this country went,
By the King’s noble consent,
It for to search to that intent,
And could not be brought thereto;
But they that were the venturers
Have cause to curse their mariners,
False of promise and dissemblers,
That falsely them betrayed;
Which would take no pain to sail further
Than their own lust and pleasure,
Wherefore that voyage and divers other
Such caitiffs have destroyed.
O what a thing had been then,
If that they that be Englishmen
Might have been the first of all;
That there should have taken possession,
And made first building and habitation,
A memory perpetual;
And also what an honourable thing
Both to the realm and to the King,
To have had his dominion extending
There into so far a ground,
Which the noble King of late memory,
The most wise Prince, the VIIth Harry,
Caused first to be found.
/ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / /
./ / / / ./ / / / .
Now Frenchmen and other have found the trade
That yearly of fish there they lade
Above an hundred sail.
/ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / / ./ / / /
./ / / / ./ / / / .
But these new lands by all cosmography
From the Khan of Cathay’s land cannot lie
Little past a thousand miles.
In common with all the other evidences of these obscure transactions,
the language here employed is vague and disputable, although it does
undoubtedly show that the colony, if it ever existed, no longer did so
at the time of writing. The voyage which failed owing to the cowardice
of the mariners was possibly one undertaken in the early years of Henry
VIII, of which other hints survive.[80] It was entered upon ‘by the
King’s noble consent’, that is, the then king, Henry VIII, and not the
late one, Henry VII, who is spoken of in a different manner further on,
where the original discovery is attributed to him. The author had
seemingly no detailed knowledge of the successive voyages of the period
1501–5. His identity is not revealed; it would be most interesting to
know who he was in view of the imperialistic notions he expressed at
such an early date.
Robert Thorne, a member of an important family of Bristol merchants,
writing in the year 1527, refers to his father, also named Robert
Thorne, ‘which, with another merchant of Bristowe, named Hugh Eliot,
were the discoverers of the newe found lands, of the which there is no
doubt, as now plainly appeareth, if the mariners would then have been
ruled, and followed their pilot’s mind, the lands of the west Indies,
from whence all the gold commeth, had been ours. For all is one coaste,
as by the carde appeareth, and is aforesaide.’ Robert Thorne, the
younger, was a strong advocate of the possibility of a northern passage
over the pole to Asia, but, in this instance, he is evidently referring
to a voyage down the North American coast in the direction of Florida
and Mexico ‘whence all the gold commeth’, and which his own map,
accompanying his book, shows to be ‘all one coast’ with the
north-western lands. It is impossible to say which voyage it was which
thus failed on account of mutiny; perhaps the last Privy Purse entry,
with regard to popinjays and wild cats, had some connexion with it. It
is worthy of remark that three separate authorities give stories of
early voyages which came to nothing on account of the insubordination of
the crews; namely, Sebastian Cabot as reported by Ramusio, the _New
Interlude_, and Robert Thorne; but it is not necessary to refer all
these stories to the same source and make them all apply to the same
voyage. The excuse was obviously a convenient one to make, and must
certainly have occurred to many a disappointed adventurer whose own lack
of constancy had been perhaps as much to blame as that of his men.
A confirmation of the association of the elder Thorne with the American
adventurers is furnished by a Record Office paper showing that on
January 7, 1502, Robert and William Thorne and Hugh Elyot, of Bristol,
were granted a bounty of £20 by the king in consideration of their
having bought a French ship of 120 tons.[81]
A consideration of Robert Thorne’s map leads to the question of the
locality to which the Bristol syndicates made their mysterious
expeditions. The map shows the whole of the Old World together with
South America and the eastern coast-line of North America. It is the
last-mentioned part which concerns the present subject. In the latitude
of the coast of Portugal, and extending to about the same length,
appears a peninsula corresponding, in shape and relative position, to
Nova Scotia together with Cape Breton. To the north of it is a long and
important indentation, which evidently represents the Gulf of St.
Lawrence. Above this the coast extends northwards for about 8° until
another gulf is reached of even larger size. Newfoundland is not
indicated as a separate island, but is massed with the land to the north
of the St. Lawrence. The second or northern gulf is puzzling, and two
explanations of it may be given. One is that it represents Davis Strait,
separating Labrador and Greenland, and that therefore the land to the
north of it is Greenland, wrongly drawn as forming part of the American
continent. The other is that it is intended for Hamilton Inlet, a gulf
occurring in the Labrador coast in the latitude of 54°. The latter is
the more satisfactory explanation of the two, more especially as a land
resembling Greenland is shown separately on the map, although much too
far to the east. Huge discrepancies in longitude, however, are
characteristic of all maps of the period. The size of the gulf, as
drawn, gives no help, since it is too small for Davis Strait and too
large for Hamilton Inlet. In latitude it corresponds more nearly with
the latter. We may take it then that Robert Thorne was not confusing
Greenland with America, and that the northern part of his map represents
the coast of Labrador. On this land is inscribed ‘Nova Terra laboratorum
dicta’, and along the coast, ‘Terra hec ab Anglis primum fuit
inventa’.[82]
Here is a conclusive solution concerning the destination of the voyages,
if only we may assume that Robert Thorne was fully acquainted with the
doings of his father and his fellow adventurers.[83] In all probability
he was, but, failing definite proof on the point, we must look for other
evidence.
[Illustration:
THE NORTH ATLANTIC.
From the map of Robert Thorne, 1527.
]
Two considerations point to the fact that the English territory was not
Newfoundland or Nova Scotia: firstly, that Thorne’s map does not
recognize the existence of Newfoundland as separate from the mainland;
and, secondly, that the patent of 1502 expressly forbade the grantees to
intrude into the lands of the King of Portugal. In the years 1500, 1501,
and 1502, the brothers Corte Real, as has been mentioned, made voyages
to North America, and explored the coasts of Virginia (taken in its
widest sense), Newfoundland, and southern Greenland. On the Cantino map,
which was drawn up for the purpose of recording their discoveries,
Newfoundland is denominated ‘Terra del Rey de Portugall’, and an
inscription on the map asserts that the explorers did not land in
Greenland, contenting themselves with viewing the coast from a distance.
Now, the coast of Virginia was generally agreed to be outside the
Portuguese half of the globe as defined by the Bull of Alexander VI and
the Treaty of Tordesillas. Consequently, Portuguese energies were
concentrated on Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, which lay in more easterly
longitude, the actual difference also being greatly exaggerated in their
maps.[84] These two regions, therefore, must be taken to be the ‘lands
of the King of Portugal’ which the patentees were to respect.
The brief notice, already quoted, in Stow’s _Chronicle_, as to the
savages brought home by one of these expeditions, may also be used in
support of a more northerly site. It is not stated that they were brown
or red men, but on the contrary, that after two years’ residence in
England they resembled Englishmen in appearance. The word Eskimo means
an eater of raw flesh,[85] and this is precisely one of the
characteristics that observers noticed about them. Both Indians and
Eskimos are found in Labrador, but Eskimos do not live in any countries
further south. Thus it may be concluded that the ships returning in 1502
came from Labrador or some other northern region. There is no evidence
that the English discoveries were anywhere to the south of Newfoundland.
No maps can be found which give support to the idea, and the voyages
which alarmed the Spanish Government at the time of Hojeda’s early
expeditions have been shown to have been those of the Cabots. The voyage
in which Robert Thorne’s father failed to penetrate to the West Indies
was thus probably an isolated venture, failing for the reason he gives,
and not repeated.
It was quite possible for a fairly lucrative trade to have been carried
on in the southern part of Labrador. As far north as 54° the timber is
plentiful and well suited for ship-building purposes. In Dawson’s work
on Labrador, already cited, it is stated that ‘Dr. Grenfell reports
trees at the head of Sandwich Bay from which 60 feet spars might be
made’, and such trees were not obtainable in western Europe. Although no
agriculture is possible, the country swarms with game and the rivers
with fish, so that, given friendly relations with the natives, a trading
post would have been able to support life during the long winter. In
addition to timber, furs, then so much in demand in Europe, might have
been exported. The fishery on the coast is still very important at the
present day, and that of Newfoundland was certainly worked soon after
the first discovery by the Cabots. The English traders may have acted as
middlemen, buying from the fishermen and selling in England, as they did
afterwards in Elizabeth’s time. The coast of Labrador is rugged and
forbidding, but at the heads of the deep inlets the climate is milder
and the conditions more suitable for Europeans. Two of these inlets
suggest themselves as likely sites for a settlement—Sandwich Bay and
Hamilton Inlet. The former is in latitude 53½°; it is 25 miles long and
6 miles wide, and contains several good harbours. The latter is in
latitude 54° and reaches 150 miles inland, with an average width of 14
miles, narrowing in one place to one-third of a mile.
The only alternative to Labrador is Greenland, with which the scanty
evidence in some respects agrees. But for what possible reason could
four or five voyages in successive years have been made to Greenland
except for purely explorative purposes? It must be borne in mind that,
although a passage to Asia was no doubt the ultimate goal of the
adventurers, the expeditions nevertheless had to pay expenses or the
enterprise would have come to an abrupt end. The Cabot experiences had
sickened King Henry of financing explorers, who came home with nothing
but geographical knowledge in their ships’ holds. Greenland provided
none of the produce which could be found in southern Labrador, and must
on that account be ruled out. The evidence of Thorne’s map, as already
interpreted, also militates against Greenland. We are therefore driven
to the conclusion that the balance of evidence places the English sphere
of influence on the coast of Labrador. Whether or not a colony was
established is unknown; all that can be said is that the patents
contemplated the formation of one. Some sort of merchandise must have
been obtained, but the trade was not sufficiently lucrative to warrant a
continuation of the business after a few years’ experience; for the
liability to losses by accident in these northern seas was no doubt
considerable.
The mainspring of the whole affair was undoubtedly the persistent belief
in the existence of a practicable channel leading to Cathay and India,
the discovery of which would have given England the possession of the
shortest route and an immense advantage over all rivals. And here is
most likely the clue to the colonizing ideas set forth in the patents;
for such a passage, when discovered, would need to be fortified if its
use was to be monopolized by the English.
After preliminary investigations, which held out strong hopes of
success, if we may judge from Henry’s liberality to the Portuguese and
the Bristol men in 1502, insuperable obstacles were encountered, and no
clear evidence survives of anything being done later than 1504 or, at
latest, 1505. The enterprise had, unfortunately, no chronicler, and the
details of its audacities and its heroisms have fallen into complete,
though undeserved, oblivion.
-----
Footnote 69:
One of these three Portuguese is in all probability the ‘labrador’
mentioned by Santa Cruz as having taken intelligence of discoveries to
Henry VII.
Footnote 70:
Patent printed in full in introduction to Hakluyt Society’s _Divers
Voyages_, ed. by J. W. Jones.
Footnote 71:
H. Harrisse, _Évolution Cartographique de Terre-Neuve_, p. 41.
Footnote 72:
Harrisse, _Discovery of North America_, p. 174.
Footnote 73:
_Add. MSS._, 7099, a manuscript copy of the original accounts, which
are not now available.
Footnote 74:
First printed by Harrisse in _John and Sebastian Cabot_ (1896). The
actual document is an appropriation for the pension and bears date
December 6, 1503, but contains a reference to the first grant on the
date given above.
Footnote 75:
_Foedera_, xiii. 37.
Footnote 76:
See _New English Dictionary_.
Footnote 77:
_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 11th ed., art. ‘Parrots’.
Footnote 78:
_R. O., T. R. Misc._ Book 214.
Footnote 79:
Reprinted by the Percy Society, 1848, ed. J. O. Halliwell.
Footnote 80:
The evidence that the voyage in question really took place is
extremely doubtful. See Chap. X.
Footnote 81:
M. Oppenheim, _Administration of the Royal Navy_, p. 38.
Footnote 82:
The inscription alone is insufficient to identify the country with
modern Labrador, for it is certain that some early cartographers
applied the name to Greenland.
Footnote 83:
Robert Thorne the elder did not die until some time between 1519 and
1526, so that his son, writing in 1527, had had every opportunity of
hearing his story from his own lips.
Footnote 84:
A fine facsimile of the Cantino map is exhibited in the British
Museum.
Footnote 85:
Stanford’s _Compendium_, 1897: ‘Labrador’, by S. E. Dawson.
CHAPTER VI
THE GROWTH OF COMMERCE
The death of Henry VII and the accession, in April 1509, of his son,
then in his eighteenth year, inevitably caused great changes in nearly
all departments of the state. The new king was a typical child of the
Renaissance in its most exuberant aspect. Young and enthusiastic, he
bubbled with energy both of body and mind, and was at once the champion
of the tiltyard and an earnest worshipper at the shrine of the new
learning. He was surrounded by nobles whose natures were as fiery as his
own and who were impatient of the restraints of a sober and prosaic
régime. Thus circumstanced, like a generous rider bestriding a mettled
steed, it was natural that he should seize the first opportunity of
playing a part in the shifting and treacherous politics of Europe, from
which his father had ever remained watchfully aloof.
The old dream of Continental conquest, which seemed to have been finally
abandoned by Henry VII, was again revived; and the country was soon
resounding with the noise and rumour of warlike preparations. England,
Spain, the Emperor, and the Pope united in an alliance to which the
sanctity of the spiritual partner gave the name of the Holy League.
Henry was eager to do his share. In 1512 he dispatched the Marquis of
Dorset to the Biscayan coast of Spain with an English force which was to
join hands with the Spaniards and, advancing east and north, to achieve
the reconquest of Guienne. The outcome was disastrous. Deserted by its
Spanish allies, the English army fell a prey to its own indiscipline and
lack of experience, and returned without having had one serious
encounter with the enemy. Next year Henry himself took the field,
invaded the north of France, routed the French at the Battle of the
Spurs, and received the surrender of Tournay and Terouenne. But in the
meantime the other members of the Holy League had achieved their own
objects by expelling the French from Italy. Having done so, they
unhesitatingly made peace, leaving Henry in the rôle of confiding dupe
to pursue unaided his conquest of France—a task for which his resources
were manifestly inadequate. It was his first practical experience of the
faithless diplomacy of the time, and the romantic strain noticeable in
his earlier character received a permanent check when he realized how he
had been used as a tool by such a veteran pair of schemers as Ferdinand
of Aragon and Maximilian the Emperor.
Accordingly, peace was made with France in 1514, and for seven years
Europe enjoyed an uneasy tranquillity which was but the prelude to
fiercer storms. During the war Thomas Wolsey had climbed to a position
of supreme authority under the king, which he was able to retain for
close on fifteen years. Until 1528 the policy of Wolsey was the policy
of England. In the main he was mediaeval in his outlook, as befitted the
last English representative of a type which was so essentially a product
of the Middle Ages, the statesman-ecclesiastic. Although advanced in his
appreciation of the balance of power, his ideas were centred rather on
royal marriages and intrigues at Rome than on colonies and maritime
expansion. His outlook was that of a man oblivious of the marvellous
opening-up of the world which was going on around him and of the part
which his country might play therein. Until quite the end of his
ascendancy there is no authenticated voyage of discovery or attempt to
penetrate new markets with the produce of industry. In the long run this
was not disadvantageous. An enduring empire was only to be built upon a
basis of consolidated experience and battleworthiness which England had
yet to acquire, and which the reign of Henry VIII was in large part to
supply. In spite of initial mistakes, Wolsey and his master steadily
increased the prestige of the nation. They trained up a new generation
of diplomatists, able to fathom and cope with the designs of the
continental masters of the craft; they increased the navy and encouraged
the practice of warlike exercises by the people; they strengthened the
executive until treason counted the cost before it showed its head, and
legitimate adventures became the only outlet permissible to turbulent
spirits.
Meanwhile commerce, no longer the prime object of governmental care, was
allowed to pursue its course practically without the assistance or
hindrance of diplomacy, along the lines which Henry VII had laid down.
The North Sea, the Bay of Biscay, and the Mediterranean afforded for the
time an ample field for the training of Englishmen in the arts of trade
and seamanship. They saw the world, and rubbed shoulders with the
nations of Europe; acquiring in the process a pride in themselves and a
talent for dealing with their fellow men, which have been incalculable
but nevertheless important factors in their subsequent development. The
sixteenth century is the first of the great tradition-building periods
of English history. The tradition which it produced, and which
flourishes in a tarnished form to the present day, was that Englishmen
were unsurpassed as fighters, explorers, traders, and money-getters by
every means, fair or foul, upon the sea. And this tradition rests, not
only upon the deeds of the great names which History records in her most
lurid passages, but also upon the accumulated exploits of the infinite
number of small men, but for whom the Drakes and the Hawkinses, the
masters of the sea, would never have been. Hence the activities of the
numerous undistinguished units producing such notable results would,
taken in the mass, appear worthy of study. During the years immediately
under consideration, the commercial side of the story predominates over
the exploring and fighting side.
For thirty years the policy of protection—the efficacy of which no sane
person dreamed of doubting—was maintained. In the first Parliament of
the reign a subsidy Act was passed, granting tonnage, poundage, and wool
duties for the king’s life. The provisions were practically identical
with those of the corresponding Act under Henry VII. The customs, as
distinguished from the subsidy, were continued unchanged. Henry VII’s
fiscal system thus passed on intact to his successor. It is significant
that the usual clause was again inserted providing for the maintenance
of the privileges of the Hansa. There was as yet no thought of the
abolition of the greatest obstacle to England’s commercial advancement.
No modification of the imposts occurred until 1539, although laws were
made at various times for the regulation of trade. The Government of
Henry VIII, if at times unjust, was seldom corrupt, and generally sought
to strike a fair balance between the interests of the manufacturer, the
consumer, and the trader. Hence we find Acts for such purposes as
forbidding the import of foreign-made hats and caps and fixing the
prices of the home-produced article, for forbidding the export of
foodstuffs, and for ensuring that the more expensive kinds of cloth
should not be exported unless fully manufactured. The practice of
granting bounties for the construction of new shipping was continued. In
1509 a licence was granted to a merchant to carry a cargo to Bordeaux
and bring another home, duty free, in consideration of his having built
a vessel of 120 tons, and for the encouragement of others to do
likewise. Highly detailed legislation, of which the above are examples,
although crude and irritating to modern ideas, shows at least that the
Government was taking an interest in the welfare of the classes of its
subjects who were affected. No doubt the initiative came usually from
the Commons, and the countenance given to it by the king made them more
disposed to support him in other matters.
Broadly speaking, English commerce was in the happy condition of having
no history until some years had elapsed after the fall of Wolsey. In the
year 1534 an innovation of the utmost importance to its constitutional
status was appended to an Act relating to the import of French
wines.[86] It consisted of a clause stating that the Act in question,
together with others relating to export and import, might be contrary to
certain treaties; and that the king might therefore repeal such Acts by
proclamation, and revive them from time to time as he thought fit. This
conferred upon the Crown a power which, if wisely used, might be of
great advantage to England’s interests, but which was also capable of
abuse by a government actuated by corrupt motives. In any case such
facility for suddenly changing the conditions of trade was undesirable,
as tending to increase the insecurity which was the bane of the time.
The constitutional import of the Act was far-reaching: it implied that a
treaty was of superior validity to an Act of Parliament, and
consequently gave to the executive, which makes treaties, a power of
legislation which it had never possessed since Magna Charta. This Act is
not to be confused with the better-known one of 1539 which gave to all
the king’s proclamations the force of law, and which was repealed by the
first Parliament of Edward VI.
The first experiment on a large scale in the use of the power thus
acquired was not altogether happy in its results. At the opening of the
year 1539 the country was in an extremely critical position. Revolution
within and invasion from without were threatening to overturn the Tudor
throne. Large sections of the community were enraged at the dissolution
of the monasteries, and still more at the desecration of venerated
objects like the shrine of St. Thomas at Canterbury, or the numerous
wonder-working roods and madonnas which had pandered to the emotions of
the superstitious. Open rebellion, it is true, had met with a terrible
retribution at the hands of Thomas Cromwell, who now filled Wolsey’s
place; but it had been crushed by fraud rather than force, and was ready
to burst into fresh flame at the hint of foreign assistance. And seldom
had the time seemed more auspicious for the conquest of our island by a
foreign coalition. In June 1558 Charles V and Francis I had made a peace
having every aspect of solidity; and six months later they entered into
an agreement which was tantamount to a joint rupture of diplomatic
relations with England. Scotland would be certain to join such a
promising enterprise, while treason at home was to be stirred up by
Cardinal Pole, who, armed with the thunders of a papal bull, was moving
heaven and earth to procure the ruin of the sacrilegious king and to
avenge the slaughter of his own friends and relatives, a large batch of
whom had been executed at the end of 1538.
Henry saw that some sacrifice must be made to avert the storm. Besides
fortifying the coasts, drilling troops, and terrifying the seditious by
an exhibition of the utmost savagery of the law, he determined on a
concession which should render peace with England more profitable than
an attempt to crush her. On February 26, 1539, proclamation was made
that, for the space of seven years from April following, foreign
merchants were free to trade with England on payment of such customs and
subsidy only as were paid by the king’s own subjects.[87] The only
branch of trade excepted from the concession was the export of wool, on
which the old duties were maintained. Here was free trade at a single
stroke, or what practically amounted to it, since the duties paid by
natives were very low. Heavy as the sacrifice was, it was justified by
the occasion and by the result. Before the lapse of many weeks the
international tension was relieved, and the country was able to breathe
freely once more. The principal effect of the move was to buy off the
hostility of Charles V, whose Flemish subjects were the chief gainers by
it. It must be remembered that the change applied to exports as well as
imports. The result was that the Flemish cloth dealers were enabled to
ship their supplies from England on the same terms as the Merchant
Adventurers, whose mart at Antwerp was thus in danger of being
superseded by a similar centre for Flemish buyers in London. In addition
to conciliating the emperor, it is also probable that the new policy
caused some alleviation of the internal situation in England. The lower
total sum paid in duties and the increased freedom of competition among
importers must have caused a fall in the prices of foreign products. But
the effect produced in this direction may easily be exaggerated, since
England was then, in the matter of necessaries, practically
self-supporting.
It soon became evident that the inauguration of a free-trade policy was
intended as a merely temporary expedient to tide over a difficult
situation.[88] The prosperity of England’s rising commerce was
threatened, and with it the fulfilment of her destiny among the nations.
Protection was essential to her merchants if they were to elbow their
way to a foremost place amid the jostling crowd of Flemings,
Easterlings, Bretons, Spaniards, and Italians who thronged the marts of
Europe. The serious effects of the change were immediately evident in
the falling-off of the number of ships engaged in the cloth export.
Flemish buyers in London used Flemish bottoms in preference to English.
Yet a healthy mercantile marine was vitally necessary to national
security at a period when the regular navy had to be largely
supplemented by merchant vessels in time of war. Accordingly, it was not
long before Henry looked round for a convenient pretext for the evasion
of his pledge. He was now no longer the chivalrous youth of the Holy
League. Hard experience had taught him many a lesson in the game of
statecraft as played by the rulers of the Renaissance, and he counted it
folly to sacrifice his country’s commerce when the need for sacrifice
had passed. In fact, to one who reads the history of the sixteenth
century, it seems matter for surprise that the great powers should ever
have been at pains to make commercial treaties or pledges, their
infringement being of almost daily occurrence.
The virtual revocation of the free trade edict of 1539 was effected in
the summer of 1540. In the Parliament which sat from April to July of
that year—Thomas Cromwell’s last Parliament—an Act[89] was passed which
had a more important bearing on English shipping than any since the
Navigation Acts of Henry VII. Those Acts were cited and re-enacted. In
addition, it was provided that, in view of ‘the no little detriment and
decay that hath and is likely to ensue to the navy’ by reason of the
late concession, all foreigners who might wish to avail themselves of
its advantages must in future ship their goods in English bottoms. This
astute move placed the commercial rivals of England on the horns of a
dilemma; for, if they persisted in trading on equal terms with the
Merchant Adventurers, the measure of their success would be also the
measure of the growth of a new carrying trade which would be of enormous
advantage to our naval resources. The English merchants would also
receive some compensation for the loss of their privileged position,
since they were themselves the owners of most of the ships which carried
their wares, and would thus participate in the new monopoly. The day of
the shipowner as a distinct class, with interests opposed to those of
the manufacturer, had not yet arrived.
Lest extortionate profits should be exacted by owners of shipping, the
Act further proceeded to fix maximum rates of freight from London to the
principal ports of Europe, varying for different commodities. From the
details given it is evident that, apart from the Staplers’ trade of
wool, woolfells and hides, the only article of export of any importance
was cloth. Cloth, in a partly or completely manufactured state, was sent
to Flanders for distribution throughout western Germany, to Denmark,
France, the Peninsula, and the Mediterranean.[90] The control of the
cloth export to eastern Germany and the Baltic was vigorously contested
between the English and the Easterlings. In spite of oft-renewed efforts
of the former, their position at Danzig and the neighbouring ports was
very precarious, and the Hansa held the bulk of the trade. The imports
were more varied: from Flanders came velvet, chamlet, fustian, Cologne
hemp or thread, madder, nails, hardware, hops, together with
Mediterranean or ocean-borne produce such as sugar, almonds, currants,
prunes, dates, and pepper; Denmark sent wheat and rye, flax, canvas,
pitch and tar, ‘compters,’ ‘osmonds’,[91] bowstaves, iron, wax,
feathers, and fish; wines and woad (used in dyeing cloth) were obtained
from Bordeaux; wines, raisins, figs, oil, and salted meats, from Spain;
and sweet wines, spices, carpets, rare textiles, gems, and other eastern
goods, from the Mediterranean. When it is remembered that any large
transference of cash was forbidden by the laws of almost all nations, it
will be realized that the output of cloth and wool must have been
enormous to balance such a long list of costly imports. To return to the
Navigation Act, one more provision of which is of interest: it was laid
down that shipowners were to post a notice in Lombard Street giving, for
the information of shippers, the dates of sailing and ports of
destination of their vessels.
Loud-voiced indignation abroad was the immediate consequence of the
passage of this great measure. The Flemings were the hardest hit, more
especially as the Easterlings, rivals of theirs as well as of the
English, were exempt from its operation, being enjoined to use English
ships only when none of their own were available. Chapuys, the imperial
ambassador, wrote bitterly: ‘Two years ago, when in fear of war and
stoppage of trade, the King issued an edict placing foreign merchants on
the same terms as English for customs, etc. Now, seeing no more danger
of war, and wishing to increase his own shipping, he has issued an
ordinance forbidding merchants to ship goods in other than English
bottoms. It concerns most the people of Antwerp.’[92]
A prolonged diplomatic conflict was inevitable, for Henry was not
disposed to withdraw from his position unless circumstances should
compel him to do so. The threatened internal conflagration had been
smothered; also, the good relations between Charles V and Francis I
showed signs of giving place once more to the usual state of hostility
habitual to those sovereigns. The financial disadvantages of the free
trade policy were illustrated by a document drawn up in September
1540.[93] It showed that the loss to the revenue, consequent on the
reduction of foreigners’ payments, was £15,450 in the space of eighteen
months. Of this total London was responsible for £14,000, it being thus
evident that the great bulk of foreigners’ traffic passed through the
capital.
Reprisals were immediately resorted to by the Imperial Government. In
the Netherlands an edict was promulgated forbidding the lading of
English ships when any others were available. England retorted by
prohibiting the employment of Flemish ships by Englishmen in any
circumstances whatever. Chapuys repeatedly urged his master to revive
the old Spanish laws against the import of ‘untrue’ cloths and the
freighting of foreigners’ ships in Spanish ports, but it would seem that
this was only partially, if at all, carried out. Henry had a yet
stronger card to play, and, early in 1541, he forbade by proclamation
the export of wool and undressed cloth, thus starving the Flemish
craftsmen of raw material, and reviving the evils of the suspension
which preceded the _Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496. The dispute dragged on
until the summer of 1542, when the attitude of France rendered
imperative a political agreement between England and the Empire. Charles
could not face the prospect of a new war with France with England
hostile; on the other hand, the Queen of Hungary, Regent of the
Netherlands, began to talk of reopening the whole question of commercial
relations between England and her subjects, which relations still rested
on the basis of the hated _Malus Intercursus_ of 1506.
Neither side had now anything to gain by being obdurate. Accordingly,
Chapuys and Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, two of the ablest
diplomatists of the time, were employed to settle the commercial
question as a preliminary to a closer union between the two enemies of
France. It was agreed that the objectionable edicts on either side
should be revoked, and that the emperor’s subjects, both in Spain and
the Netherlands, should be exempt from the operation of the Navigation
Act.[94] This was certainly a surrender of the main point at issue by
the English Government; it must be remembered, however, that the
original free trade concession was not perpetual, but would expire
automatically in 1546. When that date arrived, as a matter of fact, it
was not renewed. The Flemings were still inclined to cavil at details of
the settlement, but commercial interests had now to bow to politics, and
ere long Henry and Charles were making war in person on the soil of
France. So unbrilliantly ended the fiscal struggle caused by the first
departure from the commercial policy of Henry VII.
Apart from the above incident, the record of commerce under Henry VIII
shows a steady progress along familiar lines rather than the
introduction of any startling innovations. Many factors contributed to
this result. Owing to rivalry with France, the country, on the whole,
maintained the traditional alliance with the House of Burgundy, of which
the emperor was now the heir and the representative. Since he was also
King of Spain, the maintenance of amity with him forbade any widespread
oceanic enterprises. With the Hansa, too, Henry was unwilling to
quarrel, although the extension of the cloth export was certain to bring
on trouble with them sooner or later. There were good reasons for
deferring the evil day as long as possible: the Hanse community in
London was rich and law-abiding, and could be unconstitutionally taxed
without making effective protest—towards one forced contribution alone
they paid £1,000;[95] also they could supply naval stores, the rigging
for ships, and even ships themselves in time of need. Thus the English
merchants had to be content with a share only of the North Sea trade,
together with an increasing interest in the Peninsula and the
Mediterranean. The mediaeval commercial system had not, in fact, been
developed to the fullest extent of its possibilities. Until that had
been done extensions elsewhere were not worth fighting for.
But expansion, although containing no novel elements, was nevertheless
extremely rapid within the prescribed limits. The increase of culture
and social intercourse with foreign countries raised the standard of
living among the well-to-do, and demanded a full share of the luxuries
rendered accessible by the progress of discovery. The court of Henry
VIII was incomparably more splendid than that of his father, or of any
previous king. Many of his courtiers were newly promoted men without
sufficient inherited wealth to support their position, and greedy to
employ any means of augmenting their incomes. Hence the steady
conversion of agricultural land into sheep farms producing England’s
most valuable raw material. The temporary effect of the change was
famine, unemployment, rise of prices, and discontent; but in the long
run the gain was superior to the loss. Labour, cast adrift from the
fields, employed itself in the cloth industry, and the very increase of
the foreign-bought luxuries of the rich is witness of the growth of the
manufactures which were bartered for them. The true significance of the
time is observable from the standpoint of the present day. A nation of
Boeotians, of ploughmen, country squires, and great feudal magnates,
could never have founded a colonial empire beyond the seas; it failed
permanently to hold a military empire close at hand in France. A nation,
on the other hand, which had transformed some of its ploughmen into
craftsmen and mariners, its squires into merchant venturers, and its
nobles into fighting admirals and projectors of plantations, was fit to
seize and possess the waste places of the earth, and to build a
world-enveloping power on the proceeds of a world-wide commerce. Of this
process the reign of Henry VII was the seed-time; his son’s saw the
first pushing of the young plant above the mediaeval clay.
One aspect of the commercial life of the time is particularly
striking—the ubiquitous tyranny of officialism. Every transaction, from
the greatest down to the most trivial, was the subject of endless
regulation and supervision. The making and selling of cloth, the packing
of wool, the times and seasons for shearing and winding, the date and
place of vending, the qualifications of persons competent to buy and
sell, the sailing of merchant ships, the lading and unlading of the
same, were constantly interfered with by king, Parliament, Privy
Council, and hordes of officials. For the adjustment of such matters
statute was piled upon statute, and ordinance upon ordinance. In the
period 1485–1558 at least a dozen Acts were passed ‘for the true making
of woollen cloth’. When made, it had to be sent to London and sold only
at Blackwell Hall after passing a theoretically searching scrutiny for
quality or ‘trueness’. Nevertheless, the very iteration of the statutes
shows that they failed largely of their effect. Corruption was rampant
in the civil service, and pessimists were always to be found lamenting
the steady deterioration of the produce of English craftsmen. Cloths
above a certain value might only be exported fully wrought, in order
that English dyers, fullers, and shearmen might not suffer unduly from
foreign competition; but changes in the currency and the continuous rise
of all prices rendered laws on this subject obsolete very soon after
they had been passed, and necessitated frequent amendments. In the same
way the sale of wool by the farmers was stringently regulated so that
the Staplers might have an advantage over other Englishmen, and they in
their turn over foreigners. Maximum selling prices were decreed for
wines and other foreign produce: when some Portuguese ships brought
cargoes of sugar to the Thames, a paternal Government sent to Antwerp to
inquire the retail price of the luxury prevailing there, and, on the
strength of this information, fixed it at 7_d._ per pound in London.
Clearing a cargo from an English port was a complicated process. When
the goods were brought down to the wharf they were taken over by the
packer and his underlings, whose duty it was to pack them and enter them
at the custom-house, giving a true inventory of the contents of the
bales. The merchant having paid the duties to the customers, the latter
sent ‘cocketts’ or tallies for the same to the searcher, who searched
the ship to see if they were true. If the searcher detected the presence
on board of any goods not accounted for in the cocketts, the goods in
question were forfeit, the official himself taking half their value and
the State the other half. It was the searcher’s duty also to see that
the victuals provided were sufficient for the voyage. He next mustered
the passengers, being empowered to take 4_d._ per head for all such as
were aliens. Everything being satisfactory, he gave a bill of discharge
to the purser of the ship, and charged a fee for his services—2_s._
4_d._ for a Flemish ship, 3_s._ 4_d._ for a Hamburger, and 5_s._ 4_d._
for a Spaniard or Portuguese.[96] Each kind of merchandise—wools, wines,
cloth, &c.—had its special weighers, packers, gaugers, collectors, and
overseers necessitated by the wide range of duties, embracing
practically every article of outward and inward trade.
The laws relating to the export of wool and woolfells limited the trade
to the merchants of the Staple and to Italians exporting direct to the
Mediterranean. Other persons wishing to take wool out of the country had
to obtain licences from the Crown, and to pay heavily for the privilege.
Such licences were freely granted, particularly for the south of Europe,
and formed a lucrative source of revenue. For example, in 1514 the sum
of £800 was paid for a licence to ship 1,000 sacks of wool. Other
licences were granted for the entire or partial evasion of duties:
£1,200 was paid for the right to ship 6000 broadcloths at a reduced
rate; and two Florentine capitalists secured freedom from customs on all
their merchandise for five years by paying £1,000 down at a time when
the king was pressed for money.
This over-regulation of trade was in accordance with the ideas of the
time. The science of administration was in an early stage of
development, and it was a prevalent delusion that a theoretically
perfect system was the thing to aim at, without much regard being paid
to the practical possibility of working it. Thus the administrative
machine staggered under a load of complications which would have taxed
the resources of the most ideally honest and industrious officials, and
the result was that jobbery and corruption flourished on an extensive
scale. To the men of the sixteenth century all this seemed perfectly
natural. They cheerfully submitted to inquisitorial tyrannies which
would be revolting to moderns with their hypersensitive ideas of
personal liberty. There was no demand for real freedom of trade (in the
non-fiscal sense), and no realization of the enormous waste caused by
the existing system. From its very extravagance, the red-tapeism of the
sixteenth century failed to produce the effects on national character
which are so justly feared from a similar cause at the present day. On
the contrary, the principal characteristic of the subjects of the Tudors
was a very healthy spirit of initiative, paying scant respect to the
undoubted terrors of the law, and only held in check on English soil by
the most ruthless of governments, while it rendered the sea a happy
hunting ground for unscrupulous adventurers.
The twin evils of the time, as far as legitimate trading was concerned,
were piracy and the arbitrary behaviour of practically all governments
towards the merchants trading in their ports. Both were largely due to
the constant wars between France and the Empire, in which struggles
England occasionally took a share. As the sixteenth century progressed,
religious strife also played its part in stirring up international
animosity and providing a pretext for evil-doing on the sea. A period of
nearly fifty years elapsed between the accession of Henry VIII and that
of Elizabeth. During twenty-five of those years either England, France,
Spain, or the Empire, and at times all four, were at war. Moreover, the
wars were so distributed as to leave comparatively short intervals of
peace between them, so that there was not time for international order
to be fully re-established before the next contest began. In addition to
the rivalries of the greater powers, there were struggles between
England and Scotland; between the Hanseatic League and the north-eastern
nations; and between the advancing wave of Mohammedan conquest and the
Christian powers in the Mediterranean. The insecurity arising from the
above causes constituted an enormous impediment to maritime commerce.
The operations of regular warships were supplemented by the devastations
of privateers. Letters of marque were freely issued, and merchantmen
perforce went armed, becoming belligerents themselves on the slightest
provocation. Very early in the century we find that it was customary for
English vessels trading to Aquitaine to be equipped with artillery.
Embargoes and restraints of trade, unjust taxes and extortions of all
kinds, were everyday occurrences. The most harmless merchandise was
regarded as contraband of war, so that a neutral ship became a fair
prize if suspected to contain so much as an ounce of goods belonging to
a merchant of a hostile nation. When once a vessel had been seized, even
on the most flimsy pretext, it became a tedious and almost hopeless task
to secure its release.
As a consequence, the tendency towards individualism, characteristic of
the Renaissance, was largely checked in the sphere of international
commerce, and incorporated trading in European waters secured a fresh
lease of life. The merchantmen, on all frequented routes, sailed in
large fleets for mutual protection, this custom extending even to the
short voyages of the Merchant Adventurers to Antwerp and of the Staplers
to Calais, although in their cases there were additional reasons for the
practice. But although the great organizations maintained their sway,
and a new one—that of the English merchants in Spain—was formed, the
principle began to show signs of disintegration. In the reign of Edward
VI the Government found it necessary to issue an order prohibiting from
the Flanders trade all who were not members of the Merchant Adventurers’
Company. Later, the aid of the Privy Council had to be invoked to put
down a schism in the Company itself, caused by the impatience of central
control displayed by the younger members.[97] The same period saw the
virtual ruin of the Steelyard, the head-quarters of the Hansa in
England. Its privileges were revoked in 1552 and were never permanently
restored. The trade of Bristol and the now rising western seaports had
always been more or less free. And finally, the fall of Calais in 1558
sealed the doom of the Staplers, whose monopoly failed to take root when
transferred to a Flemish town. The great corporations of the future were
for oceanic, not European, trade; they were rendered necessary by the
same causes as their more local prototypes, and, like them, decayed or
disappeared when they had played their parts as pioneers, and the
conditions were ripe for individuals to take their place.
Merchants as a class advanced greatly in power and consideration under
Tudor rule. It became a common thing for them to be admitted to the
honour of knighthood, and to be employed in political and diplomatic
positions of trust. The records of such families as the Thornes, the
Gonsons, the Hawkinses, and the Greshams show that the career open to
talents was a well-established possibility of sixteenth-century life.
Naturally, the representatives of the old order were jealous of the
advance of the new. The old nobility hated the upstarts at court and
council whom the Crown delighted to favour in order to dissipate the
last remnants of feudal power. Even Thomas Cromwell, himself of the
merchant class, recognized the force of this feeling when at the height
of his power. In his ‘Remembrances’ for the year 1535 occurs an entry:
‘That an act be made that merchants employ their goods continually in
trade, and not in buying land. That craftsmen shall use their crafts in
towns, and not take farms in the country. That no merchant shall
purchase more than £40 worth of land a year.’ Another entry shows that
the same idea was running in his mind in 1539, and throws an
illuminating side-light on the state of political science when the
cleverest politician of his time thought it possible to change the
current of a vast social tendency by means of an Act of Parliament. In
1554 a worthy conservative, basking in the genial warmth of Mary’s rule,
wrote of the Merchant Adventurers: ‘To such a pride are those kind of
men become by reason of the disorder of Princes, as all seemeth to them
reason that necessity maketh to be sought for at their hands; so as,
contrary to nature and all God’s forbode, the merchant is now become the
prince, and who needeth aid at their hands shall so pass therein, as he
shall feel the tyranny they have....’ He seemed indignant and surprised
at the change in the balance of social forces, yet, almost at the same
time, a Venetian observer remarked that there were among the Merchant
Adventurers and the Staplers many individuals worth from fifty to sixty
thousand pounds sterling.[98]
In spite of increasing intercourse, hatred of foreigners lurked always
in the English mind. Early in the reign of Henry VIII a petition begged
the king that the swarms of aliens—‘Frensshemen, Galymen, Pycardis,
Flemyngis, Keteryckis, Spanyars, Scottis, Lumbardis, and dyvers hother
nacions’, a truly terrifying list—be restrained from trading with
England; and in 1517 the same sentiment blazed into action with even
greater fierceness than on the occasion of the assault on the Steelyard
in 1493. Inflamed by the sermons of a popular preacher, the London mob
attacked the foreign quarters of the city on the night of April 30.
Although forewarned, the Government failed to prevent the outbreak, and
considerable damage was done to the French and Flemish colonies. The
Italians, having taken measures for their own defence, suffered little
harm. The rioting was finally put down by the Lord Admiral and his
father, the Duke of Norfolk, who gathered troops outside the city,
forced the gates which the rioters had locked, and scoured the streets,
taking numerous prisoners. According to one account, some sixty persons
were hanged for their share in this affair. A Portuguese ambassador,
arriving in London in the midst of the tumult, narrowly escaped with his
life. The severity of Henry VIII on this occasion, which was known as
the Evil May Day, is in striking contrast with the clemency of his
father in 1493.
The commercial and maritime sections of the community did not escape the
far-reaching effects which the Reformation exercised on all phases of
the national life. In fact, those effects were developed in a more
striking manner among the seafaring class than perhaps in any other. The
constant intercourse with the Low Countries, and, through the medium of
the Hansa, with Germany, caused an importation of the new ideas into the
south-eastern districts of England long before any suspicion had fallen
upon the orthodoxy of the king. Indeed, throughout the reign of Henry
VIII, the revolution in the religious ideas of the above-mentioned
classes constantly outran that in the official views. At the outset a
champion of the Pope, Henry never departed very far from the old beliefs
so far as ritual and clerical practice were concerned. He had no love
for the spiritual motives of the Reformation, and merely desired, for
secular reasons, to substitute his own authority for that of the
successor of Peter, while maintaining everything else as little changed
as possible. If there had been no contemporary reformation on the
Continent, Henry VIII would scarcely have been reckoned by history as
more uncatholic than Henry II of England or Louis XIV of France.
Circumstances, however, caused him to tolerate Protestant teachings at
times, and before his death the new doctrines, superposed on the still
surviving remnants of Lollardism, had gained a firm hold on the country.
As long as Wolsey retained his supremacy there was no indication of
change from above. On May 12, 1521, there was a great burning of
Lutheran books by the hangman in St. Paul’s Churchyard. The king and the
principal dignitaries of the Church were present, and the popular mind
was so impressed that some years elapsed before open advocation of
reform was heard. The spread of Protestantism was specially to be looked
for in London and the other ports trading across the North Sea, and the
Steelyard was early a centre for its propagation. In February 1526
Wolsey instituted an inquiry into the spiritual condition of that
establishment. Various German merchants were examined. Among other
questions the suspect was asked whether he had ever read or possessed
any books by Martin Luther, and, if so, what he thought of them; whether
he believed the Pope to be head of the Church; whether he had eaten
flesh on prohibited days; and why a certain mass was no longer
celebrated in the Steelyard.[99]
By his long and obstinate struggle with Rome Henry alienated the
feelings of the Catholic nations, and was insensibly drawn into sympathy
with the Lutherans. The results were out of all proportion to the cause.
Rigorous Spanish orthodoxy began a persecution of Englishmen in Spain.
Merchants were imprisoned, tortured, and fined for asserting the royal
supremacy. The centuries-old alliance with the Netherlands and Spain was
gradually undermined, and the seeds were planted of that bitter hatred
between Englishman and ‘Dago’ which ultimately emboldened the former to
challenge the claim of Spain and Portugal to the monopoly of Asia and
the New World. The more immediate results of the cleavage were to be
seen in the threatened invasion of 1538–9 and in a generally increasing
ill will in international relations, augmented by the audacity of
English sea-rovers. Gone were the suave correspondence and fawning
ambassadors of Henry VII and Ferdinand; in their place were tariff wars,
wilful misunderstandings, and carping, querulous diplomatists like
Chapuys, leading by natural development to the assassination plots of
Alva and Mendoza. That affairs might have followed such a course without
the intervention of the Reformation is probably true; but this was not
evident to contemporary thinkers, and at least it may be said that
religious hate embittered the struggle and rendered it more desperate in
its character. The extent of the feeling against the reactionary power
of the Hapsburgs may be gauged by the intensity of the indignation
against Mary’s Spanish marriage.
In another aspect the Reformation produced effects on the future
expansion of England. It undoubtedly modified for the better certain
national characteristics. When information became current in England as
to the nature of the Spanish administration in America, the cruelty with
which the natives were treated was emphasized and possibly exaggerated.
The barbarities of the Spaniards provided a moral sanction for the
privateering adventures of the English, and, to mark their abhorrence of
the practices of their enemies, it became a point of honour with the
better sort of Englishmen to be just and humane in their dealings with
native races. This effect, however, was scarcely evident during the
period now under consideration, and belongs more properly to the age of
Elizabeth.
Before his death Henry VIII made certain arrangements for the carrying
on of the government during his son’s minority. He wished that his own
policy, intermediate between Catholicism and Protestantism, and averse
from any violent breach with past traditions, should be maintained; and
his will provided for the establishment of a council of regency in which
adherents of both parties should find a place. No sooner was the breath
out of his body, however, than the Protestants asserted their ascendancy
and, under the leadership of the Earl of Hertford, uncle of the new
king, proceeded to achieve the Reformation with the utmost violence and
lack of foresight. Hertford assumed the titles of Duke of Somerset and
Lord Protector of the Realm, an office the creation of which Henry,
mindful of sinister precedent, had been desirous to avoid.
Somerset, although bold and ambitious, was essentially a weak ruler.
After the first glamour of a military triumph over Scotland, which
brought in its train a political defeat, his true character began to
appear. He had no power of control over his unscrupulous subordinates,
and his best personal quality, a natural kindliness and reluctance to
punish, enhanced the evils of his rule. Authority was everywhere
weakened; industrial and religious discontent were stirred up by the
greed of the new nobility, who plundered the Church and enclosed common
lands to the detriment of the poor. In commercial life corruption began
to increase. The new Government, unlike that of the late king, was
accessible to the demands of the various ‘interests’, irrespective of
damage to the common weal, and the need of money made it particularly
partial to the views of the Merchant Adventurers.
On November 9, 1547, the Council decided to suspend the statutes
relating to the export of unwrought cloths above a certain price, and to
permit the free export of all cloths by Englishmen, and also, for a
limited period, by the Hansa. The effect was, of course, to benefit the
trader at the expense of the craftsman. That this was not part of a
settled policy, but merely the prompting of expediency, is shown by
another decision to repeal the Navigation Acts of Henry VII with regard
to the importation of Bordeaux wine and woad. Owing to the high price of
those commodities it was decreed that the trade should be open to aliens
between February and October of each year. The Merchant Adventurers were
not interested in the Bordeaux trade, and the inference is obvious that
they brought pressure to bear on the Government to secure a privileged
position for themselves, while the western shipowners, having no
incorporation and no collective power of bribing the Council, saw their
interests go to the wall. Both these changes were injurious to the
general welfare of the country. It was particularly injudicious at a
time of economic stress to remove any measure of protection to native
industry; and the same may be said of the weakening of the mercantile
marine by the reversal of a policy which had been successfully
maintained for over half a century. The proverbial spice of good,
however, was intermingled with the evil, and the way was prepared, by
the same means, for the overthrow of the Hanseatic monopoly, again at
the instance of the Merchant Adventurers. This was done, not by
Somerset, who shrank from such a far-reaching stroke, but by his
successor, Northumberland, the friend and patron of Thomas Gresham, now
rising to the leadership of the forward party in the English mercantile
world.
One of the worst effects of the corruption of the administration was the
steady depreciation of the coinage throughout the reign of Edward VI. It
placed Englishmen at a disadvantage abroad, and, by lowering the rate of
exchange, involved the Government in the very financial difficulties for
which it was intended to be the remedy. One of its consequences was a
rapid rise of prices, that of wool increasing threefold in the space of
six years.[100] In spite of tardy reforms the tendency could not be
checked. The price of wool was a governing factor of that of cloth and,
indirectly, of all other commodities. The result was that cloth was
‘falsified’ to a greater extent than ever before, a new Act to the
contrary notwithstanding, and foreign competition began seriously to
affect the prosperity of English industry. We read that trade with
Flanders decayed, that much cloth was now made in other countries of
Spanish wool, and that crowds of workmen were thrown out of employment.
One remedy proposed was the holding of free marts in England on the
lines of those in the Flemish and German cities. Southampton and Hull
were suggested as suitable places, also London and Calais; but nothing
was done before the death of Edward, and the idea was then allowed to
drop.
The keynote of the reign of Edward VI is unrest and chaos, religious,
political, and economic. In the latter connexion it should be noted that
the country was now with difficulty finding sufficient supplies of food.
As early as 1533 it had been necessary to pass an Act forbidding the
export of corn, cattle, pigs, sheep, &c., unless for the garrison of
Calais or by special licence. The extension of the wool and cloth trade
was thus being paid for by some loss of economic independence. Already a
large part of the food supply consisted of fish brought by the Iceland
fishing fleet and the ships of various foreign nations; and by the end
of Henry’s reign England was importing corn with fair regularity from
the German and Baltic ports. In 1550 a scheme to obtain 40,000 quarters
of wheat from Danzig alone is mentioned in Edward’s diary. At the same
time it would seem that the Peninsula was more in need of foodstuffs
than was England. In spite of the Act of 1533 a considerable illicit
export of grain went on from Bristol. A letter from Cadiz in 1538
mentioned that much victual was received there from the west of England
and that the price of wheat was 20_s._ a quarter—certainly a much higher
figure than the average price in England at the time. To remedy this
leakage a new Act was passed in 1542–3 with the special intention of
regularizing the Bristol export, followed by another in 1554–5 of more
general application. By the latter it was enacted that corn might be
exported without special licence only when the price of wheat did not
exceed 6_s._ 8_d._ per quarter, rye 4_s._, and barley 3_s._ It is
probable that actual prices were seldom as low as these.
One symptom of the great commercial changes which the sixteenth century
was unfolding in its progress was the gradual falling-off in the once
active intercourse between England and the Mediterranean. That sea
itself, once the most distant goal of English ambition, was beginning to
lose its pre-eminence as the centre of the world’s activities. Two
causes accounted for its decline. The more obvious was the extension of
Turkish power, which destroyed the trading posts of Venice, and slowly
but surely closed the old trade routes through Egypt, Syria, and the
Black Sea. The Turks as a nation had no genius nor appreciation for
commerce, and, although certain contemptuous exceptions were made, their
general attitude was that of non-intercourse with Christian nations. The
power of Venice was thus cut off at its source; that of Genoa had
already fallen at the hands of the Adriatic city, and Italian traders
came less and less frequently to northern seas. The less immediate, but
in the long run more effective, cause of the decay of the Mediterranean
was the increasing volume of the Portuguese traffic to Asia round the
Cape of Good Hope. Once this route was established—and it became
regularly frequented very soon after its discovery—its superiority was
evident, and the track of the most important commerce in the world was
permanently changed. Antwerp, whither the Portuguese forwarded their
cargoes, became the entrepôt of the north, to be succeeded in its turn
by London when the fires of religious fury had devastated its wharves
and warehouses.
During the early years of Henry VIII the Flanders galleys visited
England with fair regularity. In 1522 they were arrested at Southampton,
partly in consequence of complications arising out of the war with
France. Complaints were made that the galleys now came to England empty,
owing to the scarcity of spices in late years, that the merchants would
not pay ready money for wools, and that their wine measures were smaller
than formerly. Henry required the Signory to give an undertaking to send
the fleet annually, and the Venetians professed willingness to
comply.[101] But the truth was that their commerce was languishing. The
great galleys could no longer find cargoes. A futile effort was made to
revive their old importance, and then, after 1532, they are heard of no
more. Privately owned Venetian ships occasionally found their way to
England after that date, and English vessels still continued to voyage
through the ‘Straits of Marrok’ until the beginning of Elizabeth’s
reign. The sea-borne trade then died away for a generation, to be
precariously renewed towards the close of the century.
The remnants of Anglo-Venetian commerce were mainly conducted by the
overland route. The Venetian colony in London was principally occupied
in dispatching wool this way, paying the enormous duties exacted from
foreigners rather than buy from the Staplers at Calais. The latter
practice was contrary to the policy of the Senate; in 1532 they severely
censured some citizens who were guilty of it.[102] The influence which
the Merchant Adventurers and the Staplers were able to exert on the
Government during the period following the death of Henry VIII seriously
affected the Italian merchants in London. In 1557 Giovanni Michiel, the
Venetian ambassador, reported that they were in a fair way to being
forced to quit England altogether, owing to the prohibition of the
export of wools through Flanders. A similar matter had in the previous
year elicited a complaint from the whole of the Italians resident in
London. They had been in the habit of exporting, via Antwerp, a
considerable quantity of cloths and kerseys for the Levant. The
Government, in the interests of the Merchant Adventurers, had ordered
them to desert Antwerp and make Bergen their entrepôt. The English
shipowners, indeed, contended that they ought not to trade overland at
all, but to ship through the Straits of Gibraltar. Finally a grudging
permission was given for a certain amount of cloth to be sent through
Antwerp, provided that none of it was sold this side of Italy.[103]
[Illustration:
MAP OF BRITISH ISLES, NORTH SEA, AND BALTIC.
Venetian, c. 1489. From Egerton MS. 73, f. 36.
]
The accession of Mary, in 1553, followed by the execution of
Northumberland, produced no permanent changes in commercial policy. The
tonnage, poundage, and wool duties granted for the reign by the first
Parliament differed scarcely at all from those of Edward VI and his two
predecessors. The Hansa recovered its privileges for a short time, only
to be again deprived of them before the end of the reign. Relations with
the Netherlands, strained during the Protestant régime, improved after
the marriage of the queen with Philip of Spain. But these affairs are of
little interest compared with the projects for more extended enterprise
which now began to be seriously entertained for the first time. The
really significant events of the period are the voyages of Sir Hugh
Willoughby and his successors in search of a North-East Passage to
Cathay, the opening up of an important trade with Russia, and the
expeditions of English merchants to the Gold and Ivory Coasts in search
of a more lucrative traffic than home waters could offer them. In fact,
the old pelagic system of commerce was now developed as fully as foreign
competition would admit; and the sky was white with the dawn of the
oceanic era, with the progress of which the greatness of the Anglo-Saxon
race has marched hand in hand.
-----
Footnote 86:
26 Hen. VIII, c. 10.
Footnote 87:
_Letters and Papers_, xiv, part i, No. 373.
Footnote 88:
Cromwell has been credited with the intention of ‘stapling’ the cloth
trade in London, i.e. with deliberately supplanting the Merchant
Adventurers’ mart at Antwerp by an emporium in London. It is hardly
likely that he would have adopted such a suicidal policy otherwise
than on compulsion. The more probable explanation seems to be as here
stated. Chapuys’s letter quoted below (p. 130) appears conclusive.
Footnote 89:
32 Hen. VIII, c. 14.
Footnote 90:
Some particulars here given are taken from other sources than the Act
of 1540. See Hakluyt, v. 62; _Letters and Papers_, xvi, No. 1126.
Footnote 91:
Iron in pigs and bars ready for manufacture.
Footnote 92:
_Letters and Papers_, xvi, No. 13.
Footnote 93:
Ibid., No. 90.
Footnote 94:
_Letters and Papers_, xvii, No. 440.
Footnote 95:
_Letters and Papers_, iii, No. 2483.
Footnote 96:
_Cotton MSS._, Galba B x, ff. 246, 251.
Footnote 97:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, iv. 279, 280. This affair, obviously
relating to the Merchant Adventurers, is referred to in the preface as
concerning the Steelyard owing to a mistaken interpretation of the
word ‘Hanze’, here used in its generic sense of a corporation or union
of merchants.
Footnote 98:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, p. 1045.
Footnote 99:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 1962.
Footnote 100:
_Cal. Dom. S. P., Addenda, 1547–65_, p. 420.
Footnote 101:
_Venetian Cal._ iii, Nos. 440, 441, 608, 877.
Footnote 102:
_Venetian Cal._ iv, No. 751.
Footnote 103:
_Lansdowne MSS._, 170, f. 131 et seq.
CHAPTER VII
THE FALL OF THE HANSA
During the reign of Henry VIII the Hanseatic League enjoyed its last
days of prosperity in England. Its ancient privileges, confirmed and
regularized by treaty with Edward IV, and precariously maintained in
face of the unsparing encroachments of Henry VII, continued to be
enjoyed in practically undiminished form throughout the life of the
second Tudor; being, in fact, justified in the king’s estimation by the
services, and still more by the potential disservices, which their
possessors had it in their power to render to the English State.
In the first Parliament of the reign, therefore, a short Act was passed
for the maintenance _in statu quo_ of the rights of the Steelyard; and
similar Acts were repeated at intervals by succeeding Parliaments. In
practice, however, the general privilege thus conferred was not held to
be immune from modification by the operation of statutes dealing with
particular branches of trade. Of this order were the laws governing the
manufacture and export of cloth, which were to the following effect: In
the session of 1511–12 the old Acts[104] forbidding the export of any
but fully-wrought cloth were resuscitated, with the proviso that they
should not apply to the cheaper qualities below the value of four marks
per piece. Two years later the law was amended by a new Act, of which
the preamble set forth the interests of the various parties concerned:
the weavers, scattered over the face of the country, and producing in
their cottages the raw, undressed fabric; the dyers, fullers, shearmen,
and other craftsmen who, as the names of their callings imply, completed
by their several processes the manufacture of the finished article, and
in whose interest the prohibition of the export of unwrought cloth had
been made; and the exporters, merchants who stood to lose by the
restrictions imposed. But let the statute-book speak for itself and
throw light on the most ancient of our manufactures as practised four
centuries ago:
‘Which act, [that of 1511–12, fixing the limit of cheap cloths at 4
marks] put in execution, shall not only turn to the abatement of the
King’s customs, but also grow to the utter undoing of his subjects the
clothmakers and merchants conveyers of the said cloths, forasmuch as
wool is risen of a far greater price than it was at the making of the
said act; for where a cloth was then commonly sold for 4 marks, it is
now sold for 5 marks; and also, by the said act, the merchants should
be bound to dress every white cloth above the value of 4 marks on this
side the sea after they have bought them; which white cloths so
dressed when they be brought into the parts beyond the sea and there
by the buyers of them dyed and put in colours, then they must be newly
dressed, barbed, shorn and rowed; and so they shall be less in
substance by themself, and the worse to the sale, and sold for less
price by 10 or 12 shillings apiece beyond the sea, than if they were
at first undressed.’
Accordingly it was now enacted that every white cloth under the price of
five marks might be exported undressed, but that all of greater value
must undergo complete manufacture at the hands of English craftsmen. The
continuous increase in the bulk of the precious metals in circulation,
and the consequent rise in prices, rendered a new alteration necessary
in 1535. An Act of that year repeated the above preamble almost word for
word, but fixed the price limits of ‘cheap cloths’ at £4 for white
cloths and £3 for coloured.[105]
The Easterling merchants, in common with other exporters, were included
in the scope of these Acts. That they considered them as an infraction
of their liberties is proved by a complaint on the subject addressed to
King Henry from Lubeck in 1517.[106] But it was idle for them to expect
exceptional redress in a matter which affected English merchants as
hardly as themselves. Economic change was producing terrible problems of
beggary and unemployment, and it was essential to maintain a certain
amount of protection for English industry.
Of more importance was another grievance exposed in the same complaint.
This was that the Easterlings were only permitted to import, at their
privileged rates of duty, the merchandise of their own cities. The
dispute arose from the ambiguity of a phrase in a Latin treaty which
gave the Hanse merchants the right to import _suae merces_. The English
contention was that the words applied only to articles actually produced
in the Hanse towns; the Hansa, on the other hand, claimed that the
phrase covered all goods, however acquired. The matter was of some
moment and considerable sums were involved, since barter, rather than
manufacture, was the essence of the existence of the League. Its cities
were rich and powerful, not because they gave shelter to thousands of
skilful artisans, but because they formed the European extremity of a
trade route which passed through Poland into Russia, and thence tapped
the products of the Near and Middle East. But the time was unfavourable
for the League to commence a serious controversy with England. A period
of European peace had succeeded the war of the Holy League, and bade
fair to continue indefinitely. Henry VIII was thus in no pressing need
of ships or naval stores, and was disposed to be obdurate rather than
compliant. German merchants were imprisoned in connexion with marine
depredations dating back as far as 1511. On renewed protests by the
Magistrates of Stralsund, backed by some neighbouring potentate, Wolsey
said to their ambassador in the presence of many notable persons: ‘Your
reverence has presented to us the letters of an unknown prince. He may
be most Christian and powerful, as you say, but he is unknown to us, and
we do not wish to have anything to do with him.’[107]
The Easterlings, however, were stubborn men, and were not prepared to
submit tamely to such arrogant treatment. They were determined to
maintain their privileges, which, as they said, they had bought with
their money and blood. The dispute dragged on until 1520, when a diet
was appointed to meet at Bruges to negotiate for a settlement. One of
the English commissioners was Thomas More; another was John Hewster,
Governor of the Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp. In September the diet
met, but the representatives of the League offered excuses for being
unready to begin business. Discussion of their privileges was not what
they desired, since any modification would almost certainly be to their
prejudice; what they asked was a sweeping reaffirmation of all their
claims, however obsolete. Such was not the intention of the English
commissioners, who took the initiative, presented extensive claims for
injuries inflicted, and pressed the Easterlings to state exactly the
names of the towns belonging to the League when the privileges were
first granted. The latter demand touched the Hansa in its weakest spot.
It was basing its claims on grants of privileges of very ancient date;
yet it was undeniable that the scope of the League had been vastly
extended since that date, and therefore that the whole of its relations
with England ought in justice to be reconsidered. Its representatives at
the diet had no answer to make; they could only profess themselves much
shocked at the League’s integrity being doubted, and declare that such a
suggestion had never been raised before. With such irreconcilable
motives on either side a final settlement was impossible. The same
questions continue to recur at intervals throughout the remainder of the
history of the Hansa in England. Some minor concessions were agreed upon
and the acerbity of the dispute was smoothed down.[108] A new European
war was by this time looming on the horizon, a fact which rendered free
access to the naval resources of the Baltic essential to England. The
commercial question was of secondary importance, and could wait.
As may have been seen, the relations between Henry VIII and the Hansa
depended, broadly speaking, on the fluctuations of foreign politics.
When the prospect was peaceful and the country seemed secure, he was
inimical to the Easterlings and openly favoured Englishmen at their
expense; when danger threatened, he had to conciliate them on account of
their strength in ships and seamen. There was at that time little
structural difference between warships and merchantmen, and it was a
simple matter to convert the one into the other. Hence on military
grounds alone the enmity of the League was not to be despised.
Thus, with alternations of calm and storm, the denizens of the Steelyard
pushed their fortunes, ever ready to seize an advantage and, if we are
to believe jealous English accounts, steadily increasing their business
and pressing hard on the younger and more tender commerce of England. As
time went on, it is evident that the shackles on their activities,
feeble as they were, were nevertheless gradually tightened. An Act of
1523 forbade the sale of white cloth to aliens except under certain
conditions. In 1526 the Easterlings resident in London were proceeded
against for heresy; and, in times of peace, all the oppressive laws in
the statute-book were sharply enforced against them. Towards the end of
1535 they were subjected to a temporary restraint and sequestration of
property, by reason, as Chapuys says, of the seizure of some English
ships by the Swedes. After a few weeks, however, the matter was arranged
and trade was resumed.[109] In 1540 the Council of Lubeck forwarded an
extensive list of grievances to Henry, of which the following were the
most important:[110]
1. Contrary to ancient grants they are now forbidden to load undressed
cloth.
2. Whereas they were formerly free to export to England whatever they
pleased (wines excepted), special licences are now demanded.
3. They are held responsible for losses sustained by English subjects
within their princes’ territories.
4. Contrary to the treaty of 1474, they are subjected to the
jurisdiction of the Admiral’s Court.
5. Unjust and dishonest conduct of customs officials.
As was usual in time of peace, the English exporters had the ear of
Henry and his Council, and strained relations continued for some time
longer. In September 1540 it was rumoured that the entire privileges of
the Easterlings were to be revoked and that they were on the point of
leaving the country.[111] But the time was not ripe for such a step, and
Henry held his hand. In the great Act ‘For the maintainance of the
Navy’, passed in the summer of the same year, wherein it was laid down
that foreigners wishing to trade on payment of reduced customs must ship
in English bottoms, it was expressly provided that nothing in the Act
should be construed to the prejudice of the Hanse merchants. In their
case it was merely enjoined that they should lade in English ships when
none of their own were available. Whatever benefits the Act conferred on
English merchants were also shared by the Easterlings, for, while
leaving their own privileges intact, it curtailed those of other
foreigners, thus leaving them in a relatively better position. In spite
of this, charges and countercharges continued for some time to pass
between England and the League. In 1542 some Englishmen complained to
the Privy Council of injuries sustained at the hands of the inhabitants
of Danzig. Representatives of the London Easterlings were summoned to
answer the complaint, and alleged, first, that the charges were untrue,
and secondly, that there were no Danzig men in their company. But
corporate privileges were naturally held to entail corporate
responsibility; and it was pointed out to them that, even though there
might be no Danzig men in the London Hansa, as members of the same
company they were liable, and must induce the Danzig authorities to make
restitution.[112] Although this system of corporate responsibility bore
hardly on individuals, it was the only available check on arbitrary
proceedings, and maritime trade would have been an impossibility without
it.
By this time there was on both sides a sufficient accumulation of
grievances to warrant the holding of another diet to clear the air. It
was fixed to take place at Antwerp in 1542. But the League made the
customary excuses when it came to the point. What they feared most was
a searching discussion of their whole position. They were conscious
that, whatever a parchment signed and sealed seventy years before
might say, their privileges were an absurdity in the light of common
sense, and that any modification could only be in one direction.
Accordingly the Consuls and Senators of Lubeck wrote to Henry thanking
him for appointing a day for the diet, but begging to be excused from
sending representatives as the wars rendered Antwerp an unsafe
meeting-place.[113] This persistent evasion of discussion shows the
weakness of their position. The morale of the attack was with the
English merchants and, even in an age when morality went for very
little in public matters, their sense of injustice rendered the
reduction of the preposterous advantages enjoyed by a company of
aliens only a matter of time. For the moment, however, the inevitable
conclusion was again postponed. A new war was in progress with
Scotland and in prospect with France, and, as usual, naval and
military necessities rendered peace with the Hansa indispensable.
The fact that the League’s naval power was never used against Henry VIII
must not be allowed to obscure the fact that it could have been so used,
and that, if it had been, the consequences to him would have been most
serious. As it was, in this last French war of his, the navies on either
side of the Channel were practically equal; the French, indeed, were
superior in material strength. Thus the king simply could not afford to
quarrel with the League, and, instead of pressing the matter of the
diet, he appears to have made extensive concessions. Such is the
implication to be derived from a letter from Lubeck dated April 6, 1543,
in which it is stated that the Hanse towns are greatly indebted to Henry
and will never do anything to his prejudice.[114] Two years later
several Hanse vessels served in his fleet against the French.
So ended the last passage of arms between the League and Henry VIII.
Friendly alliance persisted thenceforward to the end of the reign. In
1544 a large consignment of ships, rigging, and stores was received from
Danzig for the use of the Navy.[115] Henry was treacherously treated by
the emperor, who made an unexpected peace with France in 1544. The
hostile relations which resulted between England and the Imperial
Government placed the Merchant Adventurers in difficulties in the
Netherlands. Oppressive taxes were imposed on them and, for a time, they
and their goods were under arrest.[116] From these troubles the Hansa
made its profit, and was soon absorbing an ever-increasing share of the
cloth export to Antwerp, a trade which the Merchant Adventurers had
always regarded as peculiarly their own. When Henry died the prosperity
of the London Hansa was at its highest point, and formed a striking
contrast to the ruin which overtook it a few years later. Broadly
considered, it seems surprising that such an undoubted anachronism
should have survived so far into the noon-day of Tudor rule. The
explanation, as has been shown, is to be found in the wars of Henry VIII
and the relative weakness of his navy as compared with the demands he
made upon it. His personal position was so elevated and commanding that
he seldom needed to stoop to ignoble truckling with factions, as did the
rulers who immediately succeeded him. From his lofty standpoint he
viewed the interests of the nation as a whole, and placed its safety
above the more sectional desire of the merchants to score off their
foreign rivals. Consequently he seems to have been over-generous in his
treatment of the Hanseatic League, to have failed to realize that it
must be crushed before England could take a leading place among the
maritime nations. But it is doubtful if precipitate action would better
have advanced the interests of English commerce than did the policy
actually pursued. When the time was ripe the inevitable happened, and
our trade was free to expand without the drag of privileged competition
within our gates.
The accession to power of the Duke of Somerset did not produce any
immediate change in the position of the Hansa, although doubtless the
Merchant Adventurers were quick to see that their chance had come with
the troublous times of a minority. The Act granting tonnage and poundage
for the reign contained a clause in favour of the ancient privileges of
the Steelyard, but with a proviso for their maintenance during the
existing Parliament only. For the time being the prospect of trouble
with Scotland and France forced Somerset to hold his hand, if indeed he
had any intention of yielding to the demands of the League’s enemies.
The Protestant sympathies of the new Government tended rather towards
alliance with the German powers. Within two months of Henry’s death a
proposal was on foot to lend 50,000 crowns to the Duke of Saxony and the
Free Towns, to be repaid by the latter in cables, masts, anchors, pitch,
and other naval stores;[117] and in the same year the suspension of the
statutes limiting the export of unwrought cloth, and the permission of
the free export of the same by Englishmen, was extended to the Hansa
also for a limited period. This favourable treatment continued even
after the deposition of Somerset, during the two years from the autumn
of 1549 to autumn of 1551, in which Warwick was consolidating his power.
Thus, when the Hanse establishment at Hull was being oppressively used
by the civic authorities, letters were addressed to the Mayor and Jurats
enjoining them to cease their aggressions and to refrain from imposing
new imposts.[118] Hitherto the only measure suggestive of hostility to
the Hansa had been an Act passed in 1548 to suppress ‘colouring’. This
was a method of defrauding the customs and consisted in the passing of
the property of others through the custom-house as their own by those
who paid reduced duties, as did the Easterlings. The offence was
extensively charged against them, probably with good reason.
Apparently, therefore, the death of Henry had made no difference to the
position of the Hansa; and their privileges, which even he had never
seriously challenged, seemed more strongly rooted than ever. During
these years their business, by all accounts, increased to an enormous
extent. It is to be hoped that they made some sacrifice to Nemesis, in
the shape of insurance against the evil times that followed. The very
weakness of the Government, which seemed their best guarantee, was in
the end to be the cause of their ruin. By the year 1551 the
administration was in serious financial difficulties, and was resorting
to such desperate measures as the wholesale debasement of the coinage.
English credit diminished abroad, and the rate of exchange at Antwerp
fell alarmingly. Thomas Gresham, a protégé of Warwick’s, was sent to the
Low Countries to exercise his business genius in remedying matters;[119]
at the same time the Merchant Adventurers were called upon for extensive
loans, and, backed by Gresham, they were clamorous for the revocation,
in return, of the privileges of the Hansa. That momentous step was
accordingly resolved upon by Warwick, not as the culminating act in a
piece of patriotic diplomacy, but as a stake thrown on the table by an
irresponsible gambler, risking what is not his own. That the
consequences were not immediately disastrous may be admitted, but the
country was scarcely in a strong enough position for such a risk to be
taken, as the feebleness of the fleet in subsequent actions was to
demonstrate. The suppression of the Hanse privileges was necessary and
desirable; but it should have been deferred to a time when the English
navy was strong enough to maintain unaided the command of the narrow
seas. Such undoubtedly would have been the policy of Henry VIII.
Warwick was now on the point of consummating his triumph over the rival
faction of Somerset, crippled, though not destroyed, two years before.
In October 1551 he was created Duke of Northumberland by the pliant
young king. The second and final arrest of Somerset followed, and his
trial on fabricated charges began on December 1. On January 22, 1552,
Somerset’s head fell on the scaffold and Northumberland was henceforth,
in fact though not in name, supreme ruler of England.
Meanwhile the tragedy of the London Hansa was proceeding concomitantly
with that of the great protector. The first hint of its impending fate
was contained in an order sent on December 12 to the Clerk of Chancery
to search for the last letters patent granted by the king to the
Steelyard men, ‘about January was twelvemonth’, and to send a copy of
the same for immediate consideration.[120] As compared with the
prolonged diplomatic struggles which the Hansa had already survived, its
suppression was accomplished with surprising rapidity. On the 29th the
alderman and some of the merchants of the Steelyard were summoned before
the Council.[121] The information laid against them by the Merchant
Adventurers was recited and a copy delivered to them in writing.
Briefly, the charges were as follows: That there was no definition of
the exact extent of the League, and that thus it was enabled to admit
whom it liked to its liberties, to the detriment of the revenue and of
the trade of the English merchants; that the Steelyard men ‘coloured’
foreigners’ goods extensively; that their export of English cloth to the
Low Countries and elsewhere, and the import of goods from neutral
countries, constituted an infraction of their original privileges, which
provided only that they should deal in _suae merces_, a phrase
interpreted by the English as meaning the produce solely of their own
territories; and that the treaty of 1474, providing that Englishmen
should enjoy similar privileges in German ports, had not been adhered
to.[122]
It is probable that, although they had been living under the shadow of
some such crisis for over half a century, the blow fell unexpectedly at
last. No preliminary warning of a categorical nature is discoverable in
the surviving evidence, and it is natural to suppose that
Northumberland, Gresham, and the governing clique of the Merchant
Adventurers concerted their measures in secrecy. The whole process of
trial and judgement certainly reads like a foregone conclusion. The
Easterlings took nearly three weeks to consider their reply, which they
presented on January 18, 1552. The Solicitor-General and three other
lawyers were appointed to deal with it, and the matter was before the
Council on January 25 and February 9. The advocates of the rival
corporations argued their several cases, the Hansa showing ‘divers
writings and charters’, which, however, were not thought to be of
sufficient force. The hearing was adjourned to the 18th, when the
Merchant Adventurers made their retort to the defence and nothing
remained but for judgement to be pronounced.[123] Judgement was not slow
to follow, since the case had been decided before ever it was opened,
and it was desirable to make an end before the arrival of ambassadors
known to be on their way from the Baltic towns. These latter must, in
bare courtesy, be listened to, and their eloquence would but delay the
inevitable result.
Accordingly, on February 24, 1552, the decision was promulgated in a
document which still rests among the Public Records, endorsed in Cecil’s
hand as ‘The Decree against the Styllyard’. The _Calendar of Foreign
State Papers_ gives the pith of it as follows:
1. The pretended privileges are void because the merchants have no
sufficient corporation to receive the same.
2. These privileges extend to no certain persons or towns, but they
admit to be free with them whom they list, to the annual loss to the
customs of nearly £20,000.
3. Even were such privileges good according to the law of the land,
which they are not, they had only been granted on condition that the
merchants should not avow or colour any foreign goods or merchandise;
a condition which the merchants have not observed.
4. For more than a hundred years after these alleged privileges were
granted, the Hanse merchants exported no goods except to their own
countries, nor imported any but the produce of the same; whereas now
they do so to the Low Countries, Flanders, and elsewhere, contrary to
the terms of a recognisance made in the time of Henry VIII.
5. These privileges, which were at first beneficial to the merchants,
without any notable injury to the realm, have now by their exceeding
of the same grown so prejudicial to the state that they may no longer
without great hurt thereof be endured.
6. The treaty of reciprocity, made after the forfeiture of the alleged
privileges by war, in the time of Edward IV, whereby the English
should have similar liberties in Prussia and other places of the
Hansa, has been daily broken, especially in Danzig, by the prohibition
of Englishmen to buy and sell there: and though divers requests for
redress of such wrongs have been made, no reformation has ensued.
Wherefore, until the merchants can prove better and more sufficient
matter for their claim, all their liberties and franchises are seized
and returned into the king’s hands; reserving to the merchants the
ordinary privilege of trading, common to those of other nations.[124]
The privileges thus lost were considerable, arising principally from the
adjustment of the duties. On all foreign wares coming into the country,
wines excepted, the Easterlings paid only 3_d._ in the £ as subsidy or
poundage, while Englishmen paid 12_d._ and other foreigners 20_d._ For
the export of cloth Englishmen paid no subsidy, the Easterlings paid
12_d._ _per piece_, and other foreigners as much as 6_s._ 4_d._[125]
Here the English exporters had a slight advantage, but insufficient to
neutralize the discrimination of 9_d._ in the £ on imports. The 12_d._
per cloth paid by the Hansa was not very ruinous when compared with the
value of the goods—the average price of a piece of cloth for export
being about £5. To the other foreigners the cloth duties proved almost
prohibitive, with the result that in one year the Hansa shipped 44,000
cloths out of England as against 1,100 shipped by all other aliens.[126]
The great offence of the Easterlings was undoubtedly this successful
competition of theirs with the Merchant Adventurers in the cloth export
to the Low Countries. It would seem that, although they had practised it
to some extent as far back as the time of Henry VII, they had enormously
increased their operations during the last years of Henry VIII and
throughout the reign of his son, a period in which the English had been
in bad odour with the Imperial Government. But the Merchant Adventurers
claimed a monopoly in this direction quite as ancient as that of their
rivals—dating back, in fact, to the reign of Edward I, if we are to
believe Thomas Gresham—and they can hardly be blamed for striking hard
when the turn of political intrigue put it into their power to do so.
The numerous lists of grievances against the Easterlings all emphasize
the unprecedented increase of this branch of their business, and when,
under Mary, their liberties were partially restored, it was with special
safeguards against their selling cloth in Antwerp. If they had been
prepared to recognize that their day of power was past, and peaceably to
forgo this traffic, they might long have continued unmolested in London,
dealing on favourable terms in the special products of Germany and the
Baltic. But their obstinate insistence on a treaty close on a century
old, and embodying privileges more ancient still, granted when social,
economic, and national conditions had all been widely different, was
certain not to pass unchallenged in the new age of national awakening.
The new edict was rapidly put into execution. On February 27 the Council
sent letters to the customers of London and Hull ordering them to exact
from the Easterlings the ordinary customs as paid by other aliens. No
trace can be found of similar instructions being sent to Lynn, from
which it would appear that the Hanse dépôt at one time existing in that
place had already been abolished. On the following day the expected
ambassadors arrived from Hamburg and Lubeck to plead their cause, the
task of dealing with them being committed to the Lord Chancellor and a
committee of nine. On May 1 an answer was delivered which confirmed the
former judgement in all points. The Government was determined to stop
the Hanse export of cloth, and strict injunctions were issued to prevent
any one else from ‘colouring’ their goods. Later, after renewed
representations from the ambassadors, or ‘orators’ as they were styled,
they relented so far as to allow the export at the old rates of a
certain quantity of cloths, not exceeding 2,000 in number, which had
been purchased before the restraint.[127] An entry in the king’s journal
noting the above concession, concludes with the following words, which
seem to signify that the Government was still disposed to negotiate:
‘... in all other points the old decree to stand, till by a further
communication the matter should be ended and concluded.’ Again, in
October, it was resolved by the Council, ‘that the matter (of the Hansa)
shall be more fully heard in the Exchequer’. Second thoughts were
evidently giving rise to misgivings as to the possible disadvantages of
open war with the League.
The Hansa, in fact, never accepted defeat nor relaxed their efforts to
secure a reversal of the decree. On September 7, 1552, Sigismund
Augustus, King of Poland, wrote to Edward VI on behalf of the citizens
of Danzig, setting forth the intolerable burdens to which they were
subjected and desiring the restoration of their ancient liberties.[128]
But on the main point the Government held firm. No agreement was arrived
at, and the ‘restraint’ continued until after the death of Edward, which
event took place in July 1553.
With the opening of Mary’s reign the prospects of the Hansa brightened
for a short time, only to be extinguished again before its close. The
queen was naturally not prejudiced in favour of any policy of
Northumberland’s, and she found good reasons for treating the
Easterlings more leniently. Gresham, as a strong adherent of the duke’s
party, fell under a cloud, from which he only emerged when found to be
indispensable to the new Government. He was not reinstated in his
position at Antwerp until the middle of November.[129] The emperor, with
whose son Mary was already contemplating marriage, was opposed to the
infliction of extreme penalties on those who were theoretically his
subjects. His Flemings also were afraid that if the Merchant Adventurers
were freed from all competition they would raise their prices at
Antwerp. Influence was accordingly brought to bear upon the queen, with
the result that orders were given for the restraint to be removed in
September 1553, after a duration of nineteen months.[130] In spite of
this the usual Act granting tonnage, poundage, &c., for the reign,
passed in October, made no mention of the restoration of the Hanse
privileges, and the customers of London continued to exact from them the
usual duties payable by aliens. On complaint being made to the queen,
she issued definite instructions that the Easterlings were to pay no
more than in the time before the restraint. She further ruled that they
should be allowed to export unwrought cloths up to the value of £6 per
piece, the suspension of the statutes on this matter, which took place
in 1547, having lapsed.[131]
The Hansa was now better off than it had been for many years, but the
improvement was destined to be fleeting. The Merchant Adventurers did
not accept the reversal of their good fortune without a struggle. They
accumulated evidence of the malpractices of their enemies and clamoured
their discontent with a vigour and pertinacity which showed that the
Easterlings would never again enjoy an unchallenged supremacy in the
North Sea trade. In December 1554 an indictment was drawn up, setting
forth in detail the injuries suffered by the Crown and the merchants of
England by reason of ‘the usurped trade and traffic which the
Easterlings many years have used and yet do use’. It is typical of
numerous complaints current at the time, and contains most of the stock
charges and arguments against the Hansa, amongst which the question of
the cloth export holds a preponderating place. Some of the details must
be accepted with reserve: party statements, even in our own moral age,
are not apt to be over-scrupulous in the handling of figures:
Beginning with a specification of the reduced duties restored since the
lifting of the restraint, it went on to deplore the ‘decay’ of English
shipping and mariners caused by the carrying trade of the Easterlings:
where, in former times, thirty or forty large English ships would have
been freighted at once, now only three or four small crayers were
required. Next, the decay of the cloth manufacture, the diminishing
sales at Blackwell Hall, the rise of prices of all commodities, the fall
of the rate of exchange on Antwerp Bourse, and, in fact, all the
commercial evils of the time, were ascribed to the same ‘usurped’ trade.
The English merchants trading to the Low Countries were, in common with
everything else in this gloomy screed, ‘much decayed’, and likely within
few years to be utterly undone. The resident Germans being, by the rules
of the Steelyard, bachelors, and the Englishmen having wife and children
to support, the latter were again at a disadvantage. Their grievances
beyond the seas were still more bitter. The Hansa, paying lower import
duty, could afford to undersell them everywhere. Severe laws and
exactions had driven out those Englishmen who formerly had warehouses in
various German and Baltic ports. Not content with that, the Easterlings
had followed them into the Low Countries, and had made great sales of
English and foreign wares there. At Hamburg they had established a rival
mart for English cloth which they caused to be dressed in that city,
thus throwing English craftsmen out of work. The Hamburg mart, being
nearer than Antwerp to the interior of Germany, was threatening to do
away with most of the English trade to Antwerp.
Figures were then given in support of the foregoing and other charges.
Thirty-one Hanse merchants had between them shipped 11,200 cloths to
Antwerp in eleven months of the year 1554; thirty-four had in the same
period sent 23,250 cloths to Hamburg, Lubeck, and other German towns.
Twenty-seven persons, being only ‘shippers (skippers) and mariners’, had
brought cargoes to England, but had taken no merchandise away in return;
they must, therefore, have taken money out of the realm. Thirty-eight
Dutchmen, not members of the Hansa, were mentioned, who had exported
largely from England during the restraint, but who had not since shipped
a single cloth; from which it was deduced that the Easterlings must now
be colouring their goods. The charge of colouring was further supported
by a tabulation of exports and imports showing that the Hansa had sent
out of the country in eleven months goods to the value of £154,366 more
than those they had brought in; since it was certain that they had not
brought specie to anything like that amount, it was concluded that they
must have coloured cloths for the Flemings and other heavily taxed
aliens. But for this, the same cloth would have been purchased from the
Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp. To cap the whole indictment, it was
urged that the Easterlings studiously avoided chartering English
shipping: during the period named they had freighted about forty
vessels, not one of them English.[132]
The complaint was backed by a petition from the Merchant Adventurers to
the Council, deploring the falling-off of their trade and asking for the
following remedies: that the Hansa be forced to define precisely its own
extent; that it be allowed to export to its own cities, only coloured
cloths, ‘dyed, rowed, barbed, shorn, and fully dressed unto the proof’;
and that its trade in English goods to the Low Countries be
prohibited.[133] The petitioners pointed out that it was not sufficient
merely to restrain the traffic to Antwerp, but also that in white cloth
to the North German ports. The finishing of such cloth was becoming a
rising industry in that region, while English and Flemish craftsmen were
losing work. The inclusion of the Flemings in the argument was possibly
a bid for the favour of King Philip, who, however, consistently
supported the Hansa. But Philip had by no means an overwhelming
influence in the conduct of English affairs. The queen, no doubt,
usually gave way to him, but the Council, while rendering unlimited
lip-homage, generally contrived to thwart his desires when they ran
counter to their own; and, as time went on, their independence
increased. Such at least was the case with regard to maritime and
commercial matters.
The efforts of the Merchant Adventurers were crowned with success. On
March 25, 1555, the Council issued orders that, pending the holding of a
diet, the Hansa should export no cloth whatever to Antwerp, and to other
places only one white cloth for every three coloured ones.[134] If they
wished to make any shipments in excess of the above limits they were to
pay the ordinary aliens’ customs rates. With regard to imports, they
might import £1 worth of ‘foreign’ goods for every £3 of the produce of
their own countries. This order was to continue in force until a diet
should otherwise determine the matter.[135]
Thus, after eighteen months’ unrestricted enjoyment of their old
privileges, the Easterlings found them once more virtually suppressed by
an edict almost as severe as that of 1552. There could be no mistake as
to the intention of the proposal for a diet. Its only result would be to
tear up the treaty upon which their position was based, and to
regularize their reduction to the status of ordinary aliens. They
therefore refused to have anything to do with it. Yet they did not
despair of securing a modification of the latest sentence and, twelve
months later, an embassy arrived in London with proposals for a
settlement. The ambassadors pointed out that their own cities produced
little or nothing which could be sold in England, most of their
merchandise being brought, by the travail of their merchants and
sailors, from the remotest regions of the North and East. Accordingly
they asked that the term ‘foreign goods’ (_exoticae merces_) might be
interpreted to mean the goods of France, Spain, and Italy, and that they
might be free to import other merchandise without restriction. With
regard to the export of cloth from England, they declared that the
distinction between white and coloured cloth was intolerable and, if
persisted in, would exclude the majority of Easterlings from commerce
with this country. They asked therefore for the restoration of their
ancient liberty of exporting to their own cities any cloths, white or
coloured, and, if under the value of £6, unwrought. The emphasis laid
upon this demand makes it evident that cloth finishing was indeed a
growing industry in North Germany, as the Merchant Adventurers had
alleged, and that a supply of the rough fabric, obtainable only in
England, was indispensable. In return for the above concessions the
Hansa was willing to undertake to abstain altogether from selling
English cloth in the Low Countries, merely reserving the right to export
via Antwerp to its own cities without opening the packages in transit.
The letter to Sir William Petre, in which the above proposals were
enclosed, ends with a half-threatening recommendation that moderation
and friendship would prove the better course, and that the English would
do well not to make themselves unpopular on the Continent.[136]
The Hanse demands were countenanced by King Philip[137], who, as Regent
of the Netherlands, was by no means satisfied that his subjects’
interests were identical with those of the English. In deference to her
husband, Mary determined to make a show of concession, although it would
seem that she had by this time been entirely won over to the Merchant
Adventurers’ point of view. An answer was returned to the following
effect: That Their Majesties were mindful of the ancient friendship
between England and the Hansa, and were desirous to increase the same,
but that the rights claimed had not in former times been generally
admitted. As long as they had been used in moderation it was not a
matter of much importance, but of late they had been excessively used,
to the great prejudice of the revenue and merchants of England, and
could no longer be tolerated. Therefore Their Majesties’ proposal was
that a diet should be held in London within one year, for the settlement
of all questions in a manner useful to both parties. In the meanwhile
the absolute prohibition of the export of white cloth should be removed,
the liberty of exporting one white cloth for every two coloured ones
being substituted.[138] Nothing is here said about Antwerp, but it is
evident from other sources that the Hansa was held to its offer to
abstain from trading there.[139]
An agreement was concluded on the above lines on March 25, 1556, exactly
a year after the second revocation of the privileges. It was to endure
for one year only, or until the conclusion of the diet if held sooner.
At the same time the Easterlings of the London establishment were
granted relief from certain oppressive proceedings of the Lord Mayor,
and were given the right to buy cloth in warehouses adjoining the
Steelyard instead of at Blackwell Hall.[140]
In spite of all losses and interruptions the trade of the Hansa showed a
wonderful vitality. By the end of 1556 they were shipping cloth through
Antwerp in such quantities that their enemies could not help suspecting
that they meant to ‘utter’ some of it there. The Council threatened to
bind them over in the sum of £20,000, but they begged off and escaped
with a strict admonition to do nothing fraudulent.[141] The drawback to
all such agreements as that under which they were working was that the
resources of the administration were insufficient for the supervision of
intricate mercantile processes. Consequently it was as easy to evade—or
be suspected of evading—a commercial treaty, as it became in later days
to smuggle goods without paying duty. The fires of hatred and suspicion
were now thoroughly kindled, and it was not long before England and the
League were again at variance.
As always, the Hansa was strongly averse to the proposed diet for a
final settlement, and the allotted year in which it was to be held
slipped by without any steps being taken. Conscious that the diet was a
trap which would mutilate still further their diminished privileges,
they postponed the evil day as long as possible, trusting doubtless that
international complications would arise to save them, as had happened so
often on previous occasions. The year elapsed and no delegates appeared.
Nevertheless, on April 12, 1557, the Council resolved that,
notwithstanding the expiry of the last settlement, judgement should be
suspended for five weeks longer, during which period they might export
2,000 cloths, on the understanding that the diet should commence without
delay.[142] This produced yet another embassy. It arrived before the end
of the same month, and we read that Sir James Tregonwell was appointed
to conduct the negotiations. They were hopeless from the first; the
points of view of the two parties were irreconcilable, and in less than
a month the ambassadors were taking their departure, leaving the
business on the same footing as before.[143] Again, in October, the
queen was corresponding direct with Lubeck, still pressing the question
of the diet. The concessions of March 1556 had long expired, but the
Easterlings were still carrying on a languishing trade on the same terms
as other aliens. It was a situation their pride could not submit to, and
by the end of the year all intercourse was at an end between England and
the League.
The first hostilities emanated from the latter. During the summer all
English ships arriving at Danzig were arrested, compelled to land their
cargoes, and to pay extortionate duties on the same, forbidden to load
anything in return, and only allowed to depart on the merchants taking
oath that they would go home in ballast without purchasing grain
anywhere else. It was alleged that fifty-five English vessels were
served in this way. At Hamburg also the English were molested. Finally,
on August 24, a decree of the Council of the Hansa at Lubeck proclaimed
the banishment of all English ships, men, and goods from the Hanse
towns.[144] Negotiations were still continued by letter, but the
expulsion was enforced, as is shown by a missive from the Duke of
Schleswig to the queen. Writing on January 1, 1558, he suggested that
several places in his dominions might be found suitable for the trade of
English merchants, in consequence of the suspension of intercourse
between England and the Hansa.
The quarrel threatened to entail serious consequences to England and
Spain in their war with France. A shortage of corn in England emphasized
the closing of the Baltic marts and increased popular discontent against
the Government. Serious fears were entertained[145] of a maritime league
between the Hansa, Denmark, and the French; and King Philip was
unceasing in his recommendations of peace. But he had shown only too
thoroughly his utter callousness towards English interests, and no
attention was paid to his advice. Another embassy from the Hansa
appeared in March 1558, but failed as the others had done. No permanent
agreement was to be expected before the conclusion of a general European
pacification, in which all the international questions which had been
ripening for half a century might receive consideration. England and
Spain had for the past two years been fighting France. As far as England
was concerned, the war represented the last chapter in the history of
the great Burgundian alliance, which, after enduring for a century and a
half and bringing numerous benefits, was now ending in shame and ruin.
France had indeed been worsted on the Flemish frontier, but England had
sustained the disastrous loss of Calais. On all sides there was a
genuine weariness of strife.
The peace congress opened at Arras and concluded its labours at Câteau
Cambrésis, from which place the treaty took its name. To the conferences
the Hansa sent representatives,[146] and the English envoys received
instructions to conclude a peace with them if terms could possibly be
arranged.[147] But still both sides remained obstinate. The larger
questions were settled or in process of settlement, while the commercial
matter seemed insoluble. At this juncture the death of Mary introduced
fresh factors into the problem, which proved not to be auspicious to the
Hansa. One of the promoters of the original revocation of the Hanse
privileges, Sir William Cecil, was called to a prominent position in the
counsels of the new queen. Acting doubtless on his advice, Elizabeth
maintained a firm attitude, resolving to secure once and for all the
equitable treatment of English commerce in the North Sea.
In the ‘considerations’ delivered to the Parliament of 1559 it is
recommended that ‘the Queen’s Highness in no wise restore to the
Steelyard their liberties; for they not only intercepted much of the
English merchants’ trade but, by concealment of strangers’ goods, robbed
the Queen of customs 10,000 marks a year at least, which was so sweet to
them that, as some of them confess, they gained in Queen Mary’s time
among solicitors above £10,000 in bribes’.[148] Elizabeth pursued the
line of policy here indicated. On July 2, 1559, she wrote to the Council
of Lubeck saying that she had consulted the councillors of Queen Mary,
who had informed her that, during the reign of Edward VI, the privileges
had been withdrawn by the Crown in consequence of abuse. Although Queen
Mary, out of regard for them, had introduced certain just modifications,
they had neglected to observe them, and had behaved with great cruelty
to England, publicly forbidding intercourse. The late queen might have
retaliated, but did not, satisfying herself with imposing certain
reasonable conditions on the intercourse of the Hanse towns with
England. These regulations had again been violated, and the former acts
of ingratitude and inhumanity repeated. She (Elizabeth) would not
proceed to interdict all intercourse, but would continue things as Queen
Mary left them. If they had reasons against this they were to declare
them.[149]
Here was obviously an invitation to the Hansa to come to terms, although
the terms must be those formulated by England. Accordingly, after
further delay, the long struggle was finally settled in 1560. The
Easterlings were given the liberty of exporting cloth to their own
states at the same duty as paid by Englishmen, provided that they sent
none to the Low Countries or Italy. Goods imported by them into England
from other than their own states were to pay 1_d._ less in the £ than
those imported by other foreigners; while cloths exported by them to
other than their own states were to pay 12_d._ per cloth less.
Counter-balancing privileges were secured for Englishmen in the Hanse
towns.[150] Thus the two great questions of the cloth export and the
carrying trade were settled substantially in favour of England, an
auspicious opening to a reign which was to witness a hitherto
unprecedented expansion of her maritime interests. Shorn of a great part
of their ancient privileges, and with their pride humbled by defeat in a
long-contested struggle, the tenants of the Steelyard lived peaceably in
London for nearly half a century more, until their final expulsion in
1598. By that time England had become so relatively great and the Hansa
so small that the eviction of the Easterlings was accomplished with no
more stir than would have accompanied the seizure by the bailiffs of a
private debtor’s house.
-----
Footnote 104:
Of 7 Ed. IV and 3 Hen. VII.
Footnote 105:
A mark = 13_s._ 4_d._
Footnote 106:
_Letters and Papers_, ii, No. 3435.
Footnote 107:
_Letters and Papers_, iii, No. 1082.
Footnote 108:
_Foedera_, xiii, p. 722; _Letters and Papers_, iii, part i, Nos. 974,
979.
Footnote 109:
_Spanish Cal._ v, pp. 550, 563, &c.
Footnote 110:
_Letters and Papers_, xvi, No. 392.
Footnote 111:
_Letters and Papers_, xvi, No. 12.
Footnote 112:
_Proceedings of the Privy Council_, vii, 301, 308–9.
Footnote 113:
_Letters and Papers_, xvii, No. 736.
Footnote 114:
_Letters and Papers_, xviii, part i, No. 376.
Footnote 115:
_Cal. Cecil MSS._, i. 44.
Footnote 116:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, No. 164.
Footnote 117:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, ii. 61.
Footnote 118:
In June 1548, and June and September 1551.
Footnote 119:
_Dict. Nat. Biog._
Footnote 120:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, iii. 441.
Footnote 121:
Ibid. 453.
Footnote 122:
_R. O., State Papers Dom., Ed. VI_, vol. xiv, No. 10, and other R. O.
MSS.
Footnote 123:
_Journal of Edward VI_, pp. 59, 61; _A. P. C._, iii. 460, 475.
Footnote 124:
This document is assigned in the Calendar to the year 1553, but it
obviously belongs to the sequence of events of 1551–2. At the end of
the original (_R. O., S. P. For. Ed. VI_, vol. xi, ff. 147–9) occur
the words: ‘This decree was made and given at Westmr. the xxiiii of
February in the sixt year of the reign.’ The sixth year of Edward VI
extended from January 29, 1552, to January 28, 1553. See also the
_Journal of Edward VI_ and _A. P. C._, iii. 487–9.
Footnote 125:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. iv, No. 36.
Footnote 126:
_Edward VI’s Journal_, p. 61.
Footnote 127:
For this embassy see _Edward VI’s Journal_, pp. 61, 62, 66, 73; and
_Acts of the Privy Council_, iv. 32, 43, 93, 98, 141.
Footnote 128:
_Cal. For. S. P., Ed. VI_, p. 220.
Footnote 129:
_Dict. Nat. Biog._
Footnote 130:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. v, No. 5.
Footnote 131:
_Foedera_, xv. 364.
Footnote 132:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. iv, No. 36.
Footnote 133:
Ibid., vol. v, No. 5.
Footnote 134:
Other evidence points to a total prohibition of the export of white
cloth (see p. 176). The point is doubtful.
Footnote 135:
_Lansdowne MSS._, 170, f. 155.
Footnote 136:
_R. O., S. P. For., Mary_, vol. viii, No. 481.
Footnote 137:
_Cotton MSS._, Titus B ii. 129b. Letter from Philip to Mary in support
of a Hanse petition (Dec. 1555).
Footnote 138:
_R. O., S. P. For., Mary_, vol. viii, No. 491; _Lansdowne MSS._, 170,
f. 156.
Footnote 139:
Report of Paget and Petre to King Philip, _R. O., S. P. For., Mary_,
vol. viii, No. 492; and _A. P. C._, vi. 33, 34.
Footnote 140:
_A. P. C._, v. 252–7.
Footnote 141:
Ibid., vi. 33, 34.
Footnote 142:
_A. P. C._, vi. 73.
Footnote 143:
_Lansdowne MSS._, 170, f. 156 b.
Footnote 144:
Ibid., ff. 200, 217 b.
Footnote 145:
Kervyn de Lettenhove, _Relations Politiques des Pays-Bas et de
l’Angleterre_, Brussels, 1882, i. 128, 144, 161, 184, &c.
Footnote 146:
_Foreign Cal._, 1553–8, pp. 393–4.
Footnote 147:
Ibid., p. 396.
Footnote 148:
_Cal. of Cecil MSS._, i, 164.
Footnote 149:
_Foreign Cal._, 1558–9, No. 922.
Footnote 150:
_Cotton MSS._, Claud E vii. 240, f. 250.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ENGLISH IN THE NORTH SEA
The first half of the reign of Henry VIII was undoubtedly the palmiest
time in the history of the Merchant Adventurers. Under Henry VII their
position in the North Sea had been firmly established by the series of
treaties which that monarch had concluded with the Netherlands and by
his unbending attitude towards the Hansa. Their constitution had also
been settled on a permanent basis by the failure of the attempt of the
ring of London capitalists to form a small and exclusive society and by
the new charter of incorporation granted in 1505. Thus at the outset of
the new period which commenced in 1509 they had only to push on their
expansion along lines already laid down, and to gather strength for the
culminating struggle with the Hanseatic League which has been described
in the previous chapter.
The earlier wars and politics of Henry VIII had little, if any,
prejudicial effect on the North Sea merchants. French sea-power did not
often manifest itself east of the Straits of Dover, while that of
Scotland was so vastly inferior to the forces it had to face that it
constituted little hindrance to English trade. It is true that the
piracies of Andrew Barton and his associates created a great stir at the
time; but it is probable that the actual damage done was small in
proportion, and English warships were able to make the occupation of the
rovers much more risky than was that of their quarry. The cardinal point
of Henry’s policy, previous to the Reformation, was friendship with the
Empire. As long, therefore, as this state of affairs endured, Englishmen
enjoyed comparatively favourable treatment in the Netherlands. The ties
of self-interest united the two countries; England requiring a market
for her surplus produce of cloth and wool, and the Flemings needing raw
or semi-manufactured material for the refined products of their
craftsmen, who supplied the wealthy of the whole of northern Europe with
delicate garments, velvets, tapestries and metal ware. The cargoes
shipped into England from the Low Countries were now also beginning to
include the spices, drugs, sugar, and other oriental luxuries[151] which
had hitherto been brought by the carracks and galleys of the Italian
merchant states.
The warlike preparations consequent on Henry’s entry into the Holy
League were largely furthered by supplies drawn from the Netherlands.
The craft of gunfounding was in its infancy in England, and most of the
heavier weapons were obtained from the foundries of Mechlin. Hans
Popenruyter of that town supplied forty-eight heavy guns in 1512, the
largest weighing nearly two tons.[152] At this time the ships of the
Merchant Adventurers sailed as usual, proceeding in company for greater
safety, and being convoyed or ‘wafted’ by warships detailed for the
purpose.
When peace was restored the good relations between England and the
Netherlands continued until 1515, when a dispute with reference to the
interpretation of treaties arose. The intercourse between the two
countries was still based on the great treaty of 1496, supplemented by
later ones, and more especially that of 1506, which was so unpopular
with the Flemings. The young Prince Charles, afterwards the Emperor
Charles V, who succeeded Margaret of Savoy as Regent of the Netherlands
in 1515, determined to better the position of his subjects, and
denounced the validity of the treaties on the ground that they
terminated with the death of the contracting parties. New duties were
imposed and English merchants complained that they were worse treated in
the Low Countries than in Spain and Portugal. Charles, or rather his
guardians and councillors, attempted artificially to revive the decaying
prosperity of Bruges by so arranging tolls and dues as to compel the
English to resort only to that place. However, the English, as had been
abundantly shown in the reign of Henry VII, had in the last resort the
whip-hand, and rumours of a new cessation of intercourse brought about
an agreement in July to postpone the whole matter for six years until
Prince Charles should come of age, and in the meantime to maintain the
operation of the original treaties. In spite of this, the unfriendly
treatment of the English continued, and a complaint of 1516 mentions
that tolls were exacted at different places on the same goods, damage
was done by customs officers in examining goods, and that Englishmen
were hindered in buying and generally obstructed by officials. Some of
the disputes were settled in 1517, and others were provided for in an
agreement between the English merchants and the town of Antwerp, signed
on June 1, 1518. In 1520 a general commercial treaty, to endure for five
years, was signed between England and the emperor. It provided, in the
main, that intercourse and duties should continue on the former basis.
The vexed question of the _Malus Intercursus_ of 1506 was again left
unsettled.[153]
The inconveniences of trade above described were normal to the time and,
in spite of them, the relations between England and the Netherlands
during the first part of Henry’s reign may be described as good. In
1525, however, owing to the overwhelming success of Charles in his war
with Francis I, culminating in the capture of that monarch at Pavia on
February 24, the balance of Europe was in danger of being upset, and a
change of policy was initiated in England which entailed far-reaching
consequences. Wolsey’s new plan was an alliance with France, to be
sealed if possible by a royal marriage. The idea of a divorce from
Katherine of Aragon was taken up eagerly by Henry, but received in his
mind a direction totally unforeseen by Wolsey. Henry was soon intent,
not on a marriage with a French princess, but on a union with Anne
Boleyn, a lady of his own court. When it is remembered that Charles V
was a nephew of the king’s existing wife, it will be seen that the
divorce proposals could not fail to have a bad effect on the relations
between England and the Imperial dominions.
Moreover, owing to the course which affairs took, the whole question of
the religious position of England was opened up, to the detriment of the
papal power. Charles was committed to the pope’s side in religious
affairs in Germany, while Spain, also under his rule, was fanatically
Catholic. Hence a fresh cause of strife appeared between him and
England. The divorce case began in the middle of 1527, and, from the
first mention of it, the emperor showed himself violently hostile. A
hint of the possibilities of retaliation on the English side to any
imposition of commercial disabilities was contained in a proclamation by
the mayor of Calais on July 13. It was announced that English and
foreign merchants might trade at Calais on the same terms as at Antwerp,
and that the governor and Fellowship of the Merchant Adventurers should
have the same jurisdiction at Calais as formerly at Antwerp.[154] This
could not fail to recall to the Flemings their sufferings during the
restraint of 1493 when a similar transference had taken place. The
prospects, however, became worse instead of better, and in March 1528 a
panic was caused by reports of the detention of all English merchants in
Spain and Flanders. There was a general paralysis of trade, workmen were
discharged, and large stocks of cloth remained unsold at Blackwell Hall.
It required all the skill of the Government to ‘quench the bruit’ and
restore confidence.[155] The crisis slowly passed away and the Merchant
Adventurers returned to Antwerp. A diet for settling grievances was held
at Bourbourg, near Dunkirk, in 1532. Another similar period of
depression and fear of war with the emperor occurred in 1535. The worst
crisis of all, that of 1538–9, has already been considered in a previous
chapter.
The organization of the Merchant Adventurers was of political as well as
commercial importance. Their colony at Antwerp, with its governor and
council of twenty-four, constituted an English outpost in the Low
Countries almost if not quite as valuable as Calais, and without the
disadvantage of requiring a large military outlay for its maintenance.
Just as the possession of Calais enabled English wool to be sold at a
vast profit to the Crown, so, until the competition of the Hansa became
severe, the produce of English craftsmen was disposed of at Antwerp on
more favourable terms than could have been obtained by a less
centralized organization. The merchants themselves were an intelligent
and respected class, and their governor was usually selected for the
possession of such qualities in the highest degree. Consequently it is
frequently found that there was the closest understanding between him
and the home Government, to which he was able to make himself useful in
many ways. Valuable information was sometimes acquired by the merchants
and transmitted before it reached the ears of the regular diplomatic
representative. They were also especially well placed for keeping a
watch on the movements of political exiles and traitors of all kinds. In
1533 John Coke, the Secretary of the Merchant Adventurers, was in
constant correspondence with Cromwell, sending him information as to
disloyal books and speeches about the king’s marriage with Anne Boleyn.
A few years later John Hutton, the governor, acted as Cromwell’s
political agent at Antwerp, while in the troubled times of Edward VI and
Mary the tie became closer, and financial aid was commonly rendered by
the one party, to be paid for by official attacks upon its rivals by the
other.
The circumstances of the time required the maintenance of strict
discipline in the Company, and for this purpose the governor was by the
charter of 1505 endued with full powers. In 1536 a merchant was
condemned to pay a fine of £150 for ‘misshipping’ cloths; and in the
following year William Castlyn, one of the most prominent members of the
Company, was fined 100 marks for shipping certain kerseys to Flanders in
ships other than those appointed to be used.[156] Here it may be
remarked that it was usual for the merchants to accumulate their stocks
of cloth in London until the date of the mart at Antwerp was at hand,
and then to ship all their cargoes at the same time in certain ships
specified for the purpose. As many as sixty vessels sometimes composed
one fleet, although they seldom exceeded 100 tons in burden. This
dispatching of merchantmen in large fleets was a characteristic of all
branches of maritime trade and afforded a convenient means of protection
and supervision.
In spite of the powers to fine and imprison enjoyed by the governor,
discipline was not easy to maintain, and the misfortunes due to the
growing hostility between Henry and the emperor did not conduce to the
better conduct of the English in the Netherlands. In 1542 a letter from
the deputy governor complained of the growing decay of good order and
the violation of their privileges, showing that internal dissension went
hand in hand with attacks from without. The office of governor was
vacant, and there was a difference in opinion between the merchants at
Antwerp and those in London as to the filling of the post. Two
successive appointments made by the Antwerp section were annulled by the
London head-quarters, who finally called in the aid of the Privy
Council. The latter addressed a strongly-worded letter to the refractory
brethren at Antwerp. The London party were described as ‘ancient, grave
and substantial men’ to whose choice the young and inexperienced at
Antwerp ought to submit. The latter were further upbraided for wishing
to have as their governor ‘one most unfit’ (John Knotting), who had been
living as a naturalized citizen of Antwerp and abjuring his own
nationality. The letter concluded by charging them to accept William
Castlyn, the London candidate, without demur, in default of which John
Knotting and the secretary were to repair to London for an investigation
of the case.[157] The chief leader of the older or London party in this
affair was Sir Richard Gresham, father of Thomas Gresham, the future
founder of the Royal Exchange. The division of the Company into two
factions, here indicated, became more or less chronic, and it was
perhaps inevitable that such should be the case. In a period of change
the interests of the older men, whose fortunes were made, lay rather in
keeping things as they were and resisting any alteration of the rules of
the game, while the young members, impatient to be rich, must frequently
have been guilty of actions offensive to their more conservative
seniors.
As will be remembered, the critical state of international politics in
the years 1538–9 caused Henry VIII to proclaim that for the space of
five years foreigners might trade with England on payment of the same
duties as were exacted from native merchants. This edict was modified in
1540 by an Act of Parliament which stated that foreigners availing
themselves of the privilege must ship their goods in English bottoms.
The resulting quarrel with the Imperial Government prejudiced the
position of the Merchant Adventurers, more especially as, in the end,
Henry was obliged to exempt the Flemings from the operation of the Act.
Scarcely was this dispute settled than another arose owing to the
imposition by the Regent of the Netherlands of a new duty of 1 per cent.
on the value of all exports, payable in addition to existing duties. The
new tax—called the _centième_—was for the purpose of defraying the
expenses of the war against France, and at first the English Government
was not inclined to cavil at it. The merchants, however, viewed the
matter differently and made strenuous protests. Finally, since an
alliance was in process of formation between England and the Empire, the
matter was compromised by the Merchant Adventurers paying a benevolence
of £1,000 and being excused from the duty on goods sent into
England.[158] The new alliance was not of long duration; in 1544 Charles
made a separate peace with France, leaving Henry to continue the war
alone. The English were furious at the trick played on them, and English
warships and privateers exercised little discrimination in making prizes
of any vessels suspected of carrying an ounce of French goods. The
Flemings complained of the damage thus done to their shipping and, in
retaliation, all the Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp were placed under
arrest on January 6, 1545.[159] The arrest lasted for some time, and the
Easterlings improved their opportunity by obtaining a firm grasp on the
cloth export, from which it was afterwards found so difficult to
dislodge them. It is true, of course, that they had exported cloth to
the Low Countries before, but it was during these years of hostility
between Henry and Charles V that their competition, coupled with the
disadvantages under which the English merchants laboured, threatened in
the end to extinguish altogether the trade of the latter. As early as
August 1538 a letter from Antwerp complained that, although money was
plentiful and good sales had been made, the Easterlings had been
beforehand with cloth shipments, ‘which hath skatched us in our sales
more than two thousand pound’.[160] In any case English cloth, by
whomsoever sold, was able to hold its own against anything of the same
sort which the Netherlands could produce, because it could be sold ready
finished at Antwerp for less price than the Flemings had to pay for a
proportionate amount of the raw wool at Calais.
The arrest of the Merchant Adventurers in 1545 seems to have done more
harm than good to the Flemings. An English emissary, writing to the
Council from Antwerp,[161] describes the consternation produced, all the
merchants remaining ‘in a marvellous stay, the Bourse unhaunted, their
hearts damped and made cold with fear that they had never to recover
again such things as were taken upon the seas. All the inhabitants of
this town shrunk at it, fearing the utter decay of their traffic. Great
numbers of fullers, shearmen, dyers, and others thought their livings
were utterly bereaved from them, so that if it had continued a little
longer it would have brought a wonderful alteration of things here. This
little arrest hath made many to confess to me that it were better for
this country to have twenty years’ war with France than one with
England, in so great fear were they of it’. The arrest was over and
cloth was again being dispatched to Flanders by the middle of May.
The course of events and the financial necessities of the Government in
the reigns of Edward and Mary threw considerable political power into
the hands of the Merchant Adventurers. The way in which they availed
themselves of it to secure the downfall of the Hansa has been described
in the previous chapter.
The strife of factions among the Adventurers at this time became
accentuated. On account of a dispute with the city of Antwerp they were
ordered in 1547 and 1548 not to resort to that town, but to make
Bergen-op-Zoom their temporary head-quarters. Some of them disregarded
the injunction and even talked of electing a new Governor and Secretary,
a sharp reprimand from the Privy Council being necessary to bring them
to order.[162] A letter from Thomas Chamberlain, the Governor, in this
connexion, is worth quoting:
‘And thus it is to be seen that the very folly and rashness of our
merchants is our disturbance, who do daily bring over clothes to
Bruges by stealth, notwithstanding my lord’s grace’ (Somerset)
prohibition and stay of their ships; and also do buy at Antwerp
contrary to their own statute and ordinance, whereby they have
forfeited large sums, of the which the King’s Majesty ought to have
his third part; and till his highness do take the same and make them
smart, they will never keep order, but for their own private lucre
undo, if they might, the common weal; for their fashion is even when
they make their statutes and swear to observe the same, even forthwith
by collusion and colour to break the same, generally saying, that
every man transgressing shall cause a general pardon among them, and
thus they mock with God and the world and are perjured daily, that it
is pity to think thereon, and that any such should have to do with
them....’[163]
In 1553 the quarrel broke out afresh, and representatives of the two
factions, called respectively the ‘Old Hanze’ and the ‘New Hanze’,[164]
were before the Council, which sided, on Thomas Gresham’s
recommendation, with the former.[165] The New Hanze were convicted of
behaving in a disorderly manner, trying to subvert the government of the
Fellowship, and endangering its privileges. They were commanded to make
humble submission to the Governor and the ringleaders to receive
punishment.[166] Gresham, although himself a member of the Company, was
acting primarily in the financial interests of the Government. For that
purpose his principal object was to raise the rate of exchange,
expressive of the state of English credit, on the Antwerp Bourse. To
attain it he sought to handicap the foreign capitalists, his
adversaries, by manipulating the cloth export, restraining or permitting
it as occasion demanded. Hence he was all in favour of maintaining
strict discipline among the Adventurers. In a letter to Northumberland
in 1553 he deplored their lack of experience and suggested a rigid
insistence on an eight years’ apprenticeship. He himself, he continued,
had been made to serve that time by his father’s wisdom, although he
might have evaded it.[167] Gresham’s character had much of the masterful
audacity typical of Tudor statesmanship, and he used his authority with
a high hand when the unruliness of the merchants threatened danger to
his plans. He succeeded in raising the exchange for the £ sterling from
16 to 22 shillings Flemish, and at the latter figure liquidated debts
contracted at the former.[168]
Although the Merchant Adventurers had succeeded in ousting their rivals
of the Steelyard from the Low Countries, their own position was by no
means secure during the reign of Edward VI. There was continual friction
with the Imperial Government, whose conduct became so irritating at one
time that Sir Thomas Chamberlain, English agent at Brussels and a former
Governor of the Company, advised that the merchants should be withdrawn
altogether from the country, ‘for truly these people will never know
what they have of us until they lack us,’ although he remarked elsewhere
that the English misfortunes were chiefly due to their own insatiable
greed and disorder. The anti-Protestant policy which Charles V
instituted in 1548, and the severe measures by which he enforced it in
the Netherlands, formed another disturbing factor in his relations with
England.[169] In 1550 a rupture was thought to be imminent on this
account, and the merchants were advised to withdraw their goods little
by little from the country. With the accession of Mary, however, the
danger temporarily passed away, although it was destined ultimately to
cause a profound modification of England’s industry and of the direction
of her maritime expansion. The merchants themselves were not very deeply
imbued with Protestantism; or, if they were, means were found of
converting them, since a report of 1556 mentions that all those then at
Antwerp were Catholics with the exception of four, against whom
proceedings were to be taken.[170]
The marts of the Low Countries had for long provided a sufficient outlet
for England’s surplus products, but circumstances were presently to
arise which should drive English enterprise farther afield. The civil
troubles in the Netherlands, which began soon after the death of Mary
and the overthrow of the Catholic régime in England, and became ever
more acute until they exploded into a war of eighty years’ duration, did
much to blight the commerce and industry of the southern provinces. The
northern or Dutch states which rose to pre-eminence in their place with
such astonishing rapidity were not a manufacturing community, and had
very little need of English cloth and wool. At the same time the German
ports and the Baltic became more accessible owing to the decay of the
Hanseatic League and the opening up of relations with Russia by
Chancellor and Jenkinson. Thus the death of Mary, though not of itself
of immediate importance, may be conveniently regarded as synchronizing
with the relative decline of the old Flanders trade. That trade, while
still extensive for many years, was no longer of primary importance. The
capital and energies of the bolder mercantile adventurers were
henceforth to be employed in penetrating the farther limits of the North
Sea, and still more in oceanic enterprises to the West and the tropic
East.
Long before the opening up of communications with Russia—in fact,
throughout the period now under discussion—a regular trade was
maintained with Sweden, Denmark, and Danzig, and also at intervals with
the north German ports. This traffic was free to all English merchants
and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Company of Merchant
Adventurers. The latter, it is true, sometimes exerted their influence
to induce the Government to secure better treatment for the English at
Danzig, but only because certain individuals of their Company were
trading in their private capacity to that place.
The principal article of English export to the above-named regions was
cloth. In return many articles of absolute necessity to an increasingly
maritime nation—canvas, hemp, ropes, pitch, and spars—were obtained,
together with supplies of grain and fish, for which there was a growing
demand as food prices steadily rose in England.
At all times the traders encountered hostility from the Hansa, which, as
they were not effectively incorporated, they were less able to cope with
than were the merchants in the Low Countries. On the other hand, they
suffered less from arbitrary exactions and oppressive restraints imposed
for political reasons, since England, until the end of Mary’s reign,
took practically no interest in the international dealings of the
northern powers. The English dépôt at Danzig was always of considerable
importance, as is evidenced by the trouble they took to maintain it in
the reign of Henry VII. The damage mutually suffered by the reprisals
which then took place convinced both parties that tranquillity was more
profitable to them, and peace was maintained for nearly fifty years.
Danzig was the principal source of the supply of naval stores, and
furnished on occasion not only materials but ships ready built. One such
consignment was received during the war of 1544.[171] Again in 1556 a
large quantity of naval stores was procured at that place. A letter from
the Council to the English merchants on this occasion is interesting as
showing the extent of their operations. Whereas, it pointed out, they
had bought up all the hemp and cable yarn in that city, and had also
secured the promise of the rope-makers to work exclusively for them
during the next six months, they were commanded to desist from such
practices until such time as William Watson, who was coming to buy for
the navy, should be furnished with what he required.[172] The
possibilities opened up by the employment of capital in large masses
were evidently well realized, as indeed other instances prove.
During the cessation of intercourse with the Hansa in 1557–60 the Duke
of Schleswig wrote to the queen to point out the suitability of various
places in his dominions for English trade. Some communication with North
Germany was essential owing to the scarcity of grain in England, and a
deputation of merchants went to Schleswig in the summer of 1558 to
inspect the ports and make arrangements for commerce.
The reopening of the communications with the Hanse towns early in
Elizabeth’s reign placed the North Sea and Baltic trade on a far more
favourable footing than had ever before been the case. For the first
time the English could do business in the northern ports on something
like equitable terms and with some assurance of security; a steady
increase of the volume of traffic was the result.
An important source of food supply was the Iceland fishery, which in the
sixteenth century was regularly frequented by English vessels, mainly
from the east coast ports. Bristol, which in the Middle Ages had had a
foremost share in the traffic, seems to have dropped out altogether in
Tudor times. The Bristol fishermen, like those of Normandy and Brittany,
preferred the Newfoundland banks—the Baccalaos of the Cabots—which,
although more distant, produced more plentiful supplies of fish. No
mention of Bristol ships going to Iceland is to be met with under Henry
VIII or his two successors.
It was customary for the fishing fleet to rendezvous at some point on
the east coast before the end of April and to proceed in company past
the Scottish coast, and thence through the Pentland Firth or between the
Orkney and Shetland Islands. The ships were laden with food to last the
crews for the summer, supplies of salt for the preservation of the
intended cargoes, and possibly also with cloth and other manufactured
articles for trade with the natives. In time of war with Scotland it was
necessary for the fleet to be wafted or convoyed until clear of the
coasts of the northern kingdom, and even then stragglers were frequently
snapped up. On arrival at the destination fishing for cod and ling was
carried on throughout the summer or until the holds were full, and the
return voyage was made before the end of September with the same
precautions as before.
The English had by no means a monopoly of the fishery, and the various
nations of the North Sea which sent out competing squadrons found them
troublesome neighbours on the coast. In 1532 an extensive affray
occurred between the English and the Hamburgers, and, in this or other
affairs of the same kind, forty or fifty Englishmen were slain. On
remonstrances being made to Frederick of Denmark, who, as sovereign of
Iceland, was apparently expected by Henry VIII to preserve order on the
coast, he replied by charging the English with being the authors of all
the trouble. They claimed a fishing-place which had never been theirs;
they reduced the people to bondage; they refused to pay tribute, and
stole fish.[173]
Olaus Magnus, in his _History of the Goths and Swedes_, has a paragraph
on the same subject:
‘Of the mutual slaughter of the merchants for the Harbours of Iceland.
‘It is a miserable spectacle of factors that fall foul one upon the
other, either at home or abroad, and kill one another for gain, or put
all their merchandise in danger to be lost, or to revenge their
Kindred.... Amongst these the chief, as it is supposed, are the
Bremers, or the cities of the Vandals, the Rostochians, Vismarians,
and Lubeckers. And lastly the merchants of England and Scotland, who
so stifly contend for the primacy and privilege of the Iceland ports
to ride in, as if they fought a fight at sea; and so wound one another
for gain, that whether one or the other gets the Victory, yet there is
always ready one of the officers of the Treasury, who knows how to
correct them both sufficiently, both in their moneys and bodies,
either by ordinary or extraordinary Exaction.’[174]
The Scots, too, had need to look to their defences when the fleet was
passing along their coast; for the fishermen, as James V complained in
1535, were in the habit of plundering the islands and catching the
unfortunate inhabitants on the way north, to serve as slaves during the
fishing season, and be landed again on the homeward voyage in the
autumn.[175] The suggestion of slave-hunting is supported by an existing
indenture of apprenticeship to an east-coast mariner of a boy, nine
years old, brought from ‘Lowsybaye’ in Iceland. It was a rough trade
with more than the usual maritime hardships of those times. In 1542,
Norfolk, writing to the Council on some proposal to utilize the returned
Iceland fleet for Government service, remarked that when the cargoes
were discharged the vessels stank so horribly that no man not used to
the same could endure it.
An interesting letter is preserved from the commissioners at York to the
Council during the Scottish war of 1542. A design was on foot for a raid
on the Orkneys and Shetlands, an idea which the commissioners wrote to
discourage. Touching the isles of ‘Shotland and Orkeney’, they said,
they were informed that Shotland was so distant that Englishmen who went
yearly to Iceland dared not tarry on those coasts after St. James’s
tide. They must pass through the Pentley Firth, the most dangerous place
in Christendom, and Scottishmen who knew it best dared not venture to
pass it at this season (October). Orkney was also very dangerous and
full of rocks; the people lived by fishing and had little to devastate
save oats and a few beasts, which were so wild that they could only be
taken by dogs. The enterprise would not quit a tenth part of its cost,
besides the danger of losing the ships.[176]
An accurate estimate of the extent of the Iceland trade is obtainable
from certain lists which still exist of ships engaged. In 1528, 149
ships sailed for Iceland, exclusively from east-coast ports, which
contributed as follows:[177] London, 8 ships; Harwich, Ipswich,
Manningtree, Dedham, Sudbury, and Colchester, 14 ships; Woodbridge, 3;
Aldborough, Sysewell, and Thorpe, 6; Dunwich, Walderswick, Southwold,
Easton, and Covehythe, 32; Lowestoft, 6; Yarmouth, 30; Claye, Blakeney,
and Cromer, 30; Wells, 6; Lynn, 10; and Boston, 4. Another list[178]
shows that, in 1533, 85 ships returned from Iceland, belonging to the
same ports, of which the southernmost was London, and the most
northerly, Boston. These vessels were all small, ranging from 30 to 150
tons, although the latter figure was exceptional, 100 tons being the
usual limit. In July 1557, owing to the naval activities of the French,
it was necessary to furnish a squadron to protect the homeward-bound
Iceland fleet. In addition to nine queen’s ships, twenty private vessels
were demanded from ports on the east and south coasts as far westward as
Dartmouth and Plymouth.[179] A force of this strength, in the then
debilitated state of the national defences, would only have been
employed to protect a convoy of the highest value.
On the other hand we find, in the lugubrious times of Edward VI, a
complaint of the decay of the fishing industry. Whereas, it runs, in the
twentieth year of Henry VIII (1528) 140 ships went to Iceland, now only
43 go, and a proportionate decrease is indicated in the fishing in the
North Sea itself.[180] The causes assigned are non-observance of fish
days owing to the progress of Protestantism, lack of enterprise on the
part of the fishermen, and burdensome regulations as to sales. The
Catholic reaction under Mary caused a revival of the trade, which
special legislation in the next reign attempted to maintain by enjoining
the eating of fish on certain days, although the religious incentive no
longer existed.
As has been indicated, the Bristol mariners preferred to do their
fishing on the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador, and desisted from
the Iceland voyage after the opening up of the new regions. There is no
categorical authority for this view, but it may be deduced from the
non-appearance of Bristol in the documents quoted above and from the
undoubted presence of English craft on the American coast quite early in
the sixteenth century. The obscure operations of the Bristol adventurers
subsequent to the Cabot discoveries have already been considered. The
_New Interlude_, of approximately the date 1519, also refers to the
Newfoundland fishery, while John Rut, in 1527, although he found only
foreigners fishing there on his arrival, spoke of fishing as a matter of
course and no novelty to the English. The first statutory mention of an
English fishery in Newfoundland is contained in an Act of 1541–2 for the
prohibition of the practice of buying fish at sea instead of catching
it, which was alleged to be deleterious to the common weal. This Act was
not to extend to the buying of fish in Iceland or ‘Newland’. In a map
drawn up for Henry VIII, in 1542,[181] Newfoundland is inscribed: ‘The
new fonde londe quhar men goeth a fisching.’ Again, in an Act of 1548,
there occurs a reference to fishing by Englishmen in Newefoundelande’.
Thenceforward the traffic was well established, and has given to the
Newfoundland and Labrador coasts the claim to be the oldest of English
settlements beyond the seas. From the beginning, however, the French,
Spaniards, and Portuguese were keen competitors. In 1542 a French fleet
of from 80 to 100 small vessels, returning from the fishery, were nearly
all taken by the Spaniards; and to the present day St. Malo and other
western ports of France send out every year wooden sailing craft which
fish all the summer on the Newfoundland banks and return to divide the
spoil in the autumn, the men being paid according to the profits of the
trip.
A few notes are necessary with reference to the affairs of the Staplers.
During the reign of Henry VIII the Staple continued to conduct its
business in the time-honoured manner. All wool for the consumption of
the north of Europe was exported to Calais from London and other ports,
while that intended for the Mediterranean was sent, at double duties, by
the Italian merchants of London into the Low Countries, and thence via
the Rhine to Italy. Occasionally English subjects, not belonging to the
Staple, obtained licences to export wool ‘beyond the Straits of Marrok’,
the duty payable being usually the subject of special arrangement with
the Crown.
It would seem that, in 1544, an attempt was made by some of the Staplers
to export wool to Italy themselves, probably by the overland route, and
that this was stopped by the Company. This at least is the most probable
inference to be drawn from a curious letter written at Venice by one
Henry Bostoke to John Johnson, merchant of the Staple of Calais.[182]
The writer refers to the success of the voyage, ‘having long since made
wholesale of our goods to an honest reckoning as the occasion required;
not perceiving but that we should have made better reckoning hereafter
if the laudable ordinance of our Company had permitted the continuance
of this said voyage, whereof the impeachment, I beseech Jesus, may not
in process of time be more prejudicial to the whole generality than now
disprofit to our masters in particularity’. The letter is very vague,
the writer refraining from stating the nature of his commodities and the
route by which they had reached Venice; but the reference to ‘our’
Company addressed to a merchant of the Staple is fairly conclusive, and
indeed there was no other company which could have exercised
jurisdiction over Englishmen in Venice. The Merchant Adventurers
concerned themselves only with the Low Countries and did not interfere
with the doings of their members elsewhere, while the Englishmen who
traded in general cargoes to the Mediterranean were free-lances without
any incorporation.
The keystone of the whole system of the Staple was the retention of
Calais, so conveniently placed for buyers from France, the Netherlands,
and Germany. An Act of 1515 provided that the Mayor and Fellowship of
the Company should retain the customs and subsidies on all wools from
England, paying the king £10,000 yearly in lieu of the same. The Company
were to defray the expenses of the Staple, the town, and the
fortifications, while the king was to pay the wages of the garrison.
This Act, which was to endure for twenty years, superseded one of
similar import passed by Henry VII. At its expiry another was passed in
1535–6, the preamble of which shows that the defences of the town had
fallen into great decay and weakness. Corruption was rife, and the
merchants were inevitably niggardly in their expenditure on them, for
they trusted that in case of danger the whole power of the country would
be put forth to save them. The system of farming the duties was
continued, but in course of time the bargain ceased to be profitable to
the Staplers, owing to the decrease in the shipments of wool. In 1551 a
petition on the subject complained of the great burdens imposed on the
merchants and of the increasing competition of wool sent from Spain to
the Netherlands.[183] The payments due to the king, it was represented,
amounted to more than the receipts from the customs. The remedy
suggested for Spanish competition was to allow only low-priced wools to
be shipped to Calais, to prohibit absolutely any export to other places,
and to be content with a reduced custom, so that the clothmakers who had
been draping Spanish wool might get ‘as good pennyworth’ at Calais as
they had been getting from the Spaniards.[184] The customs were not
reduced, but the suggested restriction of non-staple export was carried
out, and in the reign of Mary the Italian merchants were on the point of
quitting London in despair of obtaining leave to buy wools.
[Illustration:
CALAIS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
From Cott. MS. Aug. I. ii. 70.
]
The monopoly which had endured for so long was gradually breaking up
under the stress of changing conditions; and the loss of Calais in 1558
dealt it a blow from which it never recovered. The amount of wool
exported was in any case bound to decrease with the growth of home
manufactures,[185] so that the decay of the Staplers’ business must not
be regarded as a commercial loss to England: it was simply a diversion
of the channels of wealth into a new direction. Long-rooted
organizations die hard, and the Staplers survived precariously for many
decades after the fall of Calais, holding their marts at various places
in the Low Countries; but in course of time England, far from continuing
to export wool, became a wool-importing country, the native output being
insufficient to keep pace with the growth of manufacture. The completion
of the change is marked by an Act of 1660, prohibiting all export of
wool, and containing no mention whatever of the once mighty Staple.
-----
Footnote 151:
The Portuguese shipped a considerable quantity of their East Indian
merchandise to Antwerp, which formed the distributing centre for
northern Europe.
Footnote 152:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 464.
Footnote 153:
_Letters and Papers_, ii, Nos. 540, 649, 723, 724, 2738, 3647, 3649,
4210; _Cotton MSS._, Galba B ix. 69; _Foedera_, xiii. 714.
Footnote 154:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 3262.
Footnote 155:
Ibid., No. 4044.
Footnote 156:
_Letters and Papers_, xii, part i, No. 415.
Footnote 157:
_Letters and Papers_, xvii, No. 1055, also Nos. 990 and 1062.
Footnote 158:
_Letters and Papers_, xviii, part i, Nos. 196, 259, 331, 773; _Cal. of
Cecil MSS._, i, No. 38.
Footnote 159:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, No. 32.
Footnote 160:
_Cotton MSS._, Galba B x. 82.
Footnote 161:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, No. 65.
Footnote 162:
_A. P. C._, ii. 545, 556.
Footnote 163:
_Cotton MSS._, Galba B xii, f. 28.
Footnote 164:
See _Transactions of the Royal Historical Society_, vol. xvi (1902),
pp. 19–67. In an article by W. E. Lingelbach on the organization of
the Merchant Adventurers the suggestion is put forward that the Old
Hanze and the New Hanze were two separate grades of merchants with
differing privileges. Certain not very precise indications point to
such an arrangement, but, on the other hand, there is no hint of any
such thing in the Charter of Incorporation of 1505 or in any other
document of the same type.
Footnote 165:
In the previous autumn the Council, on receiving a loan of £30,000
from the Company, had promised to suppress disorders (_R. O., S. P.
Dom., Edw. VI_, vol. xv, No. 13).
Footnote 166:
_A. P. C._, iv. 279, 280.
Footnote 167:
_Foreign Cal._, 1547–53, No. 655.
Footnote 168:
_Dict. Nat. Biog._
Footnote 169:
John Wheeler, however, in his _Treatise of Commerce_ (1601), states
that the Emperor refrained from establishing the Inquisition at
Antwerp in 1550, for fear it should drive the English out of the city.
Footnote 170:
_Domestic Cal._, 1547–80, p. 87.
Footnote 171:
_Cal. Cecil MSS._, i. 44.
Footnote 172:
_A. P. C._, v. 236.
Footnote 173:
_Letters and Papers_, v, Nos. 1417 and 1633.
Footnote 174:
English translation, 1658, p. 127.
Footnote 175:
_Letters and Papers_, viii, No. 1153.
Footnote 176:
Ibid. xvii, No. 893.
Footnote 177:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 5101.
Footnote 178:
Ibid., vi, No. 1380.
Footnote 179:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. xi, No. 38.
Footnote 180:
_Domestic Cal._, Addenda, 1547–65, p. 426.
Footnote 181:
_Royal MSS._, 20 E ix.
Footnote 182:
_R. O., S. P., Henry VIII_, § 195, f. 176; digest in _Letters and
Papers_, xix, part i, No. 85.
Footnote 183:
The Spaniards established a wool dépôt at Bruges: Kervyn de
Lettenhove, i, p. 152.
Footnote 184:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Edw. VI_, vol. xiii, No. 81.
Footnote 185:
Under Henry VIII the wool export decreased by 50 per cent. as
estimated on the average number of sacks exported in the first five
and last five years of the reign.
CHAPTER IX
FRANCE, SPAIN, AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
The trade between England and France during the first half of the
sixteenth century falls into two divisions: the local cross-channel
traffic between Normandy and Brittany and the southern ports of England,
and the wine trade with Bordeaux. There was at that time no regular
commerce between England and the Mediterranean coast of France. Of the
two sections above mentioned the second was by far the more important,
since Bordeaux was the outlet for the merchandise of southern France,
which could not be obtained elsewhere, while the northern seaboard of
that country, similar in climate to the south of England, differed
little from it in agricultural products, and had, if the weaving of
sail-cloth in Brittany be excepted, no surplus manufactures to dispose
of. Hence the elements of an important commerce with it were wanting.
The Bordeaux trade was one of the oldest channels of English enterprise
beyond the seas. The town itself, coming under the authority of English
kings with the accession of Henry II, in 1154, had survived all the
vicissitudes of war until 1453, when the defeat of Talbot at Chatillon
involved its permanent transference to the Crown of France. During the
three centuries of English rule continual commerce was maintained with
Bristol, London, and the intervening ports on the English coast, and the
taste for Bordeaux wines became a national habit. As the cloth
manufacture increased in England, another valuable commodity, used in
dyeing and known as Toulouse woad, was also in demand, and was obtained
exclusively from Bordeaux. The loss of the town at the disastrous close
of the Hundred Years’ War did not, like that of Calais in 1558, involve
any diversion of trade, since it did not coincide with any industrial or
economic changes such as those which exterminated the wool export. The
Bordeaux trade, therefore, was continued, but seems largely to have
passed out of English hands during the Wars of the Roses, which, or the
rumours of which, recurred sporadically from 1455 until the accession of
Henry VII.
It was natural that in a period of unrest and anarchy commercial
interests should be neglected by governments engaged in a struggle for
bare existence; and thus we find the preamble of Henry VII’s Navigation
Act of 1489 lamenting the great decay of English shipping engaged in the
wine trade. It has been said that preambles to Acts of Parliament
invariably exaggerate the grievances which they design to amend, but
this one at least must have had some foundation in fact, as is evidenced
by the diminished volume of Bristol trade at the beginning of Henry’s
reign and the rapid recovery of English shipping which resulted from his
policy. The Act itself, which extended and rendered permanent a
temporary measure of 1485, provided that Gascony wines and Toulouse woad
should only be imported into England in English, Irish, or Welsh bottoms
manned by crews of the same nationalities. Its importance cannot be
over-estimated. It remained in full operation for more than sixty years,
and, besides producing a mercantile revival, it provided a
training-ground for the seamen and navigators whose services were so
essential to the defence of the realm in the stormy times of the
sixteenth century. It must be remembered that, in the days when the
Mediterranean trade was in its infancy, the voyages to Bordeaux and
Spain were the only ones habitually made by the English outside the
North Sea, and that they demanded the use of larger ships than were
commonly employed by traders from east-coast ports. In addition, such a
policy had its moral significance; it was a blow to foreigners, and it
gave Englishmen a sense of privilege which was gratifying to their
pride; it supplied at once a cause and a testimony of the relations of
enthusiastic admiration which undoubtedly existed between the Tudor
sovereigns and their seafaring subjects.
The traffic thus re-established flourished continuously under Henry VII
and his son. The French wars of the latter produced interruptions, but
their actual duration was not of great extent, and the merchants on
either side were only too eager to resume business as soon as politics
allowed. Every autumn, as soon as the vintage was complete, the wine
ships set out from all English ports between London and Bristol,
together with a few from Wales and Ireland, and, uniting into fleets for
protection from the voracious rovers who infested the havens of the
French coast, sailed across the tempestuous Bay to the mouth of the
Gironde. There they were obliged to anchor and send ashore the chambers
of their cannon so that no surprise attempt might be made on the richest
port of France, some of whose citizens looked back with regret on the
golden days of English rule, when business was brisk and taxes few. The
last stage of the journey then commenced with the toilsome seventy
miles’ struggle with the swift yellow stream before anchor could be
dropped in front of the embattled walls of the wine city.
In a busy year, when the whole wine fleet had arrived, there were as
many as seven or eight thousand Englishmen in the town at one
time—merchants, factors, clerks, and seamen—and no doubt they made the
place exceedingly lively; it must have been a depressing winter for the
Bordelais when war prevented their coming. After two or three months
spent in completing cargoes by the leisurely business methods of the
time, the homeward voyage was begun in January or February.[186] The
sailor of early Tudor times probably differed little from the type
described by Chaucer a century before:
A schipman was ther, woning fer by weste:
For ought I woot, he was of Dertemouthe.
He rood upon a rouncy as he couthe,
In a gowne of faldyng to the kne.
A dagger hanging on a laas hadde he
Aboute his nekke under his arm adoun.
The hoote somer had maad his hew al broun;
And certainly he was a good felawe.
Ful many a draught of wyn had he y-drawe
From Burdeuxward, while that the chapman sleep.
Of nyce conscience took he no keep.
If that he foughte, and hadde the heigher hand,
By water he sente hem hoom to every land.
But of his craft to reckon well his tydes,
His stremes, and his dangers him besides,
His herbergh, and his mone, his lodemenage,
Ther was non such from Hulle to Cartage.
Hardy he was and wys to undertake;
With many a tempest hadde his berd ben shake.
He knew wel al the havenes, as they were,
From Scotland to the Cape of Fynestere,
And every cryk in Bretayne and in Spayne;
His barge y-clepud was the _Maudelayne_.
It had been in accordance with Henry VII’s indirect methods of taxation
to grant licences to foreigners to infringe the navigation laws, for
which licences they were obliged to pay sums of ready money. The
expenses of the first war with France, coupled with the temporary
restraint of English trade to Bordeaux which it involved, tempted his
successor to do the same to such an extent that serious discontent was
aroused among the mercantile community, and a discontinuance of the
practice was demanded. Accordingly, Parliament passed an Act in 1515
revoking all licences granted to foreigners to import French wines and
woad in foreign ships. Thenceforward the grant of such licences became
much less frequent, and the English monopoly was more firmly
established. It is indicative of the inertness with regard to commercial
matters which prevailed in France that such an arrangement should have
continued so long unchallenged. For French merchants were included in
the scope of the law; they could not send their own wines to England
save in English ships. They were also subjected, in common with other
foreigners, to irritating restrictions in England, of which the most
irksome was the prohibition of taking more than ten crowns in money out
of the realm. In pursuance of this law, they complained, they were
searched to their shirts on departure.
In 1531 the Navigation Act of Henry VII was amended by a new Act
providing that all existing regulations should be maintained, and with
the addition that no wine was to be imported from France between
Michaelmas and Candlemas (February 2). The reason for this was
apparently to discourage navigation at the dangerous season of the year
by preventing the too early return of keenly competing merchants. The
French took offence at the interference with trade, and detained several
English ships by way of reprisal. Henry VIII explained that his action
was due to the numerous losses of ships on the voyage, but promised to
remove the offending regulation, as he was empowered to do by a later
Act of 1534.[187] An international crisis due to religious changes was
impending, and he was obliged to conciliate the French. He even spoke of
abrogating the Navigation Act altogether, although it is not likely that
he really intended to do anything of the kind. There is evidence,
however, that the administration of the laws was relaxed and infractions
connived at. The new Navigation Act of 1540 expressly referred to those
of 1489 and 1531 and stated that, although they had been neglected, they
were now to be fully confirmed and regulations as to prices and freights
enforced. For every tun of wine from Bordeaux the freight was fixed at
18_s._, and no one was allowed to retail French wine in England at more
than 8_d._ per gallon. A tun contained 252 gallons and might thus be
sold for more than £8, so that the freight was not excessive as compared
with the value of the goods. The import duty, or tonnage, was also
comparatively slight, being but 3_s._ per tun.
In September 1542 the third French war of Henry VIII was in sight, and
was heralded by acts of commercial hostility. The French, who had
hitherto not protested against the last Navigation Act, suddenly
discovered that they were injured by it, and a proclamation was issued
that no goods were to be brought from England to France except in French
ships.[188] This was copying English methods with a vengeance. The
French proclamation, if enforced, would have involved the stoppage of
the wine fleet, as, Englishmen being forbidden to export money, they
could not pay for French wines if they were not allowed to do so with
English goods. Nevertheless, the situation became more easy for a time,
and the wine fleet sailed as usual. On their return in January 1543
sixteen of the laden vessels were taken by four Scottish privateers who
waited for them in the neighbourhood of Brest. Orders were sent for
those which had not yet left the Gironde to wait until an escort could
be provided.[189] In April 1543 war with France had become a certainty,
and Henry refused to allow twenty French ships with wine and woad to
proceed up the Channel to the Netherlands, as it would put such a large
sum of money into the enemy’s pockets. The Netherlands Government had
requested a safe-conduct for the wine, as it was for the use of the army
which was to act against France, but the king maintained that he
personally would rather drink beer, or even water, than permit his own
subjects to have wine from the French, to say nothing of allowing it to
pass to oblige foreigners.[190]
In 1551–2 the first breach in the Tudor navigation policy was made by
the selfish and improvident Council-government of which Northumberland
was becoming the moving spirit. An Act of that year effected a partial
repeal of previous laws by allowing the importation of wine and woad in
the ships of any friendly nation between February 1 and October 1. Of
course the English still had the privilege of selling, without
competition, the first cargoes of the season which were brought home in
December and January, but it was nevertheless very injudicious to remove
any measure of protection from English shipping at a time when the naval
defences of the country were being allowed to deteriorate. The reason
alleged for taking this step was the dearness of wine and woad; the
probable explanation being that the London retailers brought pressure or
bribery to bear upon the Council, while the seamen and merchants engaged
in the Bordeaux trade had no such corporation to stand up for their
interests as had those who did business with the Low Countries. An Act
of 1563 restored the full navigation law of Henry VII, and thenceforward
there is no record of any subsequent legislation with regard to this
traffic, from which it would appear that the English monopoly was
allowed gradually to die out. As other liquors obtained a greater hold
upon public favour, French wines lost their relatively important
position; while changes in the methods of dyeing rendered obsolete the
use of Toulouse woad in the cloth industry.
The commercial intercourse between England and Spain, of ancient origin
and the subject of careful negotiations on the part of Henry VII,
continued to expand under his successor until religious cleavage arising
between the two nations threatened it with extinction. It was
advantageous to both countries, although the Spaniards complained that
all the gold which changed hands went from Spain to England and nothing
but cloth came in return. The reign of Henry VIII opened with the
Anglo-Spanish Alliance against France, in which the sea power of both
England and Spain was utilized to blockade the French coast. Although
Henry was bitterly mortified at his desertion by his ally in 1514, he
smothered his resentment so far as to conclude a commercial treaty in
the following year, which repeated the agreement made by his father in
1489. Commerce in each country was to be free, without necessity for
licence or safe-conduct.[191] ‘Freedom’ of trade meant, of course, not
the abolition of duties, but a guarantee of fair treatment.
Casual and isolated traders visited the northern ports of Spain, more
especially during the period of the English expedition to the north-east
corner of that country in 1512, but internal communication in the
Peninsula was so bad that the products of the south were only accessible
to ships reaching the ports of Andalusia. Accordingly, the majority of
English merchantmen sailed to Cadiz, to San Lucar at the mouth of the
Guadalquivir, and to Seville higher up the same river. The hereditary
lords of San Lucar were the Dukes of Medina Sidonia, who, before the
centralization of government had been effected, exercised an almost
regal authority. English trade became sufficiently important to justify
the merchants in asking for extensive privileges, which were granted by
the then duke, Don Alonzo Perez de Guzman, on March 14, 1517. The
charter set forth that, in accordance with the petition of the English
trading to his town of San Lucar de Barrameda, the duke granted them a
piece of ground on which to build a Church of St. George; protection
from the customs officials of Seville, Cadiz, and Xerez, who oppressed
them because they preferred to land goods at San Lucar; restriction of
the duties to amounts agreed upon in previous privileges; a promise to
enforce payment of debts by Spaniards to Englishmen, the latter having
suffered losses through the partiality of the law courts; protection to
the English so that they might not be killed or molested, nor their
goods sequestered; permission to the English to carry weapons by night
and day; and several other minor concessions.[192] Some expressions in
the document indicate that the English had already a governor and
council, although the original charter of incorporation, if one ever
existed, is not to be traced. Henceforward, San Lucar became the English
head-quarters in Spain, being suitably situated for tapping the wealth
of the southern part of the country, for the collection of merchandise
from the Canaries and the West Indies, and for the transhipment of
Mediterranean produce to English bottoms.
Matters proceeded smoothly until the divorce of Henry from Katherine of
Aragon and the political reformation in England sounded the death-knell
of the old friendship between the two countries. During this period
Englishmen made fortunes in the Spanish trade, as may be judged from the
example of Robert Thorne, who left £17,000, although he died
comparatively young. Some of them even maintained factors in the
jealously guarded Spanish colonies in the west. But ere long religious
hatred was permanently to affect their position in the country. As early
as 1528 a rupture was thought to be imminent between England and Spain,
and the English were advised to withdraw their goods.[193] The expected
struggle was avoided, but the merchants took steps to strengthen their
position by a closer union among themselves and by obtaining renewed
promises from the Spanish Government. On September 1, 1530, Henry VIII
granted a licence to his subjects trading in Spain and Andalusia, who
desired to associate for mutual relief and redress of grievances, to
assemble once a year, or oftener if need were, and to elect one or more
councillors with twelve ‘ancient and expert persons’ to be their
assistants. The meeting might be held at Seville, Cadiz, or San Lucar,
and the merchants of London, Bristol, and Southampton were to be
represented. The councillor or governor (only one was actually elected
at a time) was to be paid for his services and to be removable at the
pleasure of his constituents. He and the twelve assistants were
empowered to levy imposts and make ordinances for the welfare of the
Company.[194] It will be seen that, in its general outlines, the
constitution of the Spanish Company resembled that of the Merchant
Adventurers. There was no hint of monopoly; any Englishman might engage
in the trade so long as he paid the prescribed fees to the governor.
Confirmation of the above licence was obtained from Charles V, and the
next step was to demand a renewal of the Duke of Medina Sidonia’s
privileges of 1517, which had apparently not been maintained. On October
15, 1530, Richard Cooper, the newly-elected governor of the English,
appeared before the justice of San Lucar and demanded fulfilment of the
grant, which the judge ordered to be publicly proclaimed on two
successive days.[195] The Church of St. George had already been built.
In the years following the incorporation of the Company the position of
the English in Spain was not a happy one. They became unpopular with the
people and still more with the Church. According to Spanish complaints
the quality of English cloth fell off considerably, while an English
letter of 1538 confesses that, owing to the use of many devices to
defraud the customs, English credit was not so good as it had formerly
been. Reference has been made, in the chapter devoted to Henry VII’s
commercial policy, to a Spanish Navigation Act prohibiting the lading of
foreign ships while native ones were lying idle in Spanish ports.
Originally, the English were exempted from the operation of this law,
but their privilege seems to have lapsed after the death of Henry VII.
The law was not continuously enforced, but was revived from time to time
after lying dormant, much to the hindrance of English trade. Another
law, the enforcement of which was continuously held as a threat over
English heads, forbade the import of ‘false’ cloths into Spain. The
Spaniards frequently asserted that all the English cloth of this period
was ‘false’ in the sense of the statute. It was not to the interest of
Spain to put either of these laws into constant operation, but they
served nevertheless as excellent pretexts for a sudden embargo on
English trade. Such stoppages became increasingly frequent as time went
on.
In spite of all disadvantages the volume of traffic was considerable.
The Andalusian trade resembled that to Bordeaux, in that the bulk of the
English vessels made their outward voyage in the autumn, arriving about
the middle of October. The trading season was determined by the nature
of the commodities obtained, the chief of which were wines, raisins,
figs, oil, and salted meats. In one month sixty English ships were
expected to arrive on the Andalusian coast.[196]
On April 24, 1539, the merchants at San Lucar assembled in the Church of
St. George and confirmed the election of William Ostrigge or Ostrich,
chosen as governor in the previous December. In accordance with the
charter of Henry VIII they invested him with full powers of
administration, and fixed a scale of dues to be paid to the Company by
all English and Irish traders.[197] It was not long before Ostrich, who
proved himself a capable governor, had matters of the utmost importance
to deal with. Already, as early as 1534, Englishmen in Spain had been
troubled by the Inquisition. In 1539 and 1540, the former of which years
had been a time of the utmost tension between England and the Empire,
there was a regular epidemic of persecution. Henry VIII had now finally
repudiated the authority of the Pope, had abolished the smaller
monasteries, had put down the Catholic rising known as the Pilgrimage of
Grace with the utmost barbarity, and was in process of exterminating the
remaining religious houses. His minister, Thomas Cromwell, was a known
supporter of the Protestants, and was negotiating a matrimonial alliance
intended to link England with the cause of the Protestant princes of
Germany. Spanish bigotry had therefore every incentive to a savage
persecution of such Englishmen as it could lay hands upon; and Charles
V, who alone had the power to prevent it, held his hand and allowed
matters to take their course.
In March 1539 it was reported, although the story lacks confirmation,
that three English merchants were burnt in Spain, and that the Pope had
granted remission of sins to any one who should kill an English
heretic.[198] A letter from Henry VIII to Wyatt, who had been sent as
ambassador to Spain in 1537,[199] explained that Flemish and Spanish
ships had been arrested in England because ‘in sundry parts of the sea
coast of Spain, English subjects are much molested at the instigation of
slanderous preachers suborned thereto by the Bishop of Rome’s
adherents’.[200] Relations were temporarily ameliorated by the
inauguration, in April 1539, of the free trade policy by which foreign
merchants had their duties reduced to the same amounts as those paid by
Englishmen. But in January of the next year Wyatt wrote from Spain that
the king should warn all English merchants that they traded to Spain at
their own risk, for that there was a power there which depended upon
their adversary the Pope. The Emperor refused to modify the action of
the Inquisition.[201] Wyatt went so far as to threaten that if the
Inquisition did not cease from troubling Englishmen commerce with Spain
must cease.
The usual method of entrapping an Englishman was to engage him in
conversation with regard to the Pope’s authority over Christendom. If he
admitted it he was infringing the Act of Supremacy, which declared Henry
to be the supreme head of the Church in England; if he denied it he was
haled before the inquisitors, a heretic confessed. It speaks much for
the loyalty and patriotism of Englishmen that they held firm on what was
to most of them a purely political quibble, even when the shores of
England were far away, and the dungeons of the Holy Office gaped close
at hand.
The case of Thomas Pery furnishes a good illustration of inquisitorial
methods. Writing from a Spanish prison to one of Cromwell’s servants, he
describes how a priest got him into argument as to whether the king were
a good Christian or no. On his maintaining that he was, he was arrested
and taken to the Castle of Triana in Seville. He underwent numerous
examinations, with and without torture, on the matter of the king’s
orthodoxy, and was also pressed to say whether he thought the
suppression of the monasteries was good or bad. Finally he, with four
other Englishmen whom the Holy Office had seized for the same cause,
were forced to do public penance, and sentenced to six months’
imprisonment with forfeiture of all their goods. At the time of writing,
he says, he was in prison without a blanket or garment to his back.[202]
Ultimately, however, he was released, and came home to England to lay
his complaint before the Council. The latter communicated with the
Emperor, but it does not appear that any compensation was ever
recovered.
William Ostrich convened a meeting of the merchants at San Lucar to
protest against the treatment they were receiving, and a detailed
complaint was transmitted to England. Thomas Pery and his companions had
by this time been released, and had related their sufferings in person
at San Lucar:
‘The said Thomas doth allege and say that by force of torment he was
compelled to declare and say as the judge would he should say....
Divers merchants of England, prisoners with the said Thomas, have
declared before divers of us that they were present when the said
Thomas was so tormented.... Furthermore it shall please you to
understand here, that of long time past and unto this day, all we that
hereunder have firmed our names have lived and do live in great peril
and fear of our persons and goods, and not only we but all others of
our nation trading these parts of Andalusia, for fear of the extreme
punishment and cruel intreating of the fathers of the Inquisition and
their deputies, which be in all places where our trade doth lie.’[203]
Matters were not improved by the passing of the English Navigation Act
of 1540, limiting the free trade privilege granted to foreigners in the
previous year to those who shipped in English vessels. However, after a
prolonged diplomatic struggle, in which either side fired off all its
heavy guns, consisting of embargoes, restrictions, and revivals of
obsolete statutes, Henry agreed to exempt both Spaniards and Flemings
from the Act. A new alliance against France was shortly afterwards
concluded between England and the Empire, and the Inquisition relaxed
its activities against the heretic islanders. This early persecution in
Spain was undoubtedly the germ of much that bore great fruit in the next
generation. The sons of the men of 1540 were the sailors and merchant
adventurers of Elizabeth’s reign; and their contemptuous hatred of the
Spaniard did not arise exclusively from the events of their own day. The
seafarers also became, on the whole, the most staunchly Protestant
section of the community, which may be accounted for, on the principle
of contrariety, by the torments inflicted on those who, while not
themselves Protestants, denied the Pope’s supremacy. It cannot be
pretended that any man in Henry’s reign experienced any religious
fervour in asserting that his king was supreme head of the Church.
Thomas Pery and his friends upheld the royal supremacy because they were
loyal Englishmen who were commanded so to do; but their sufferings at
the hands of the Papists engendered a hatred of the Catholic form of
priestcraft, and inclined them to a corresponding sympathy with
Protestantism.
The new alliance between Henry and the emperor was not of long duration.
After making war in concert with the English in 1544, and failing to
achieve any very decisive results, the emperor unexpectedly made peace
with France at Crespi on September 18. England was left to carry on the
struggle alone. In 1545 and 1546 the war was largely naval, the
privateers of both countries ravaging the Channel and the Atlantic
coasts of Europe, to the great annoyance of neutrals. Relations with
Spain again became bad, particularly after the capture by an English
privateer of an enormously rich Spanish ship from the West Indies, an
act which, although justified by specious excuses, was nothing but rank
piracy. As a result, orders were given in March 1545 for the arrest of
all English merchants and ships in Spain. The arrest was of long
duration, extending over more than eighteen months; in fact the affair
was not satisfactorily cleared up before Henry’s death. The Inquisition
again began to arrest Englishmen, who were refused a hearing in the
civil courts on the ground that they were heretics. In June an
Englishman was sentenced to be burnt at Seville, and a ship’s captain
who was driven by stress of weather into San Sebastian was promptly
seized by the Holy Office.[204]
When Henry VIII died the Council, under the control of the Protector
Somerset, effected a settlement of the quarrel with Spain, and trade was
resumed. The English at San Lucar obtained a restoration of their
privileges after lodging a complaint in 1548 to the effect that the
functions of their governor had been usurped by a Spaniard, who was
collecting the dues rightfully belonging to their Company.[205] The
troubles with France during the reigns of Edward VI and Mary rendered
the Spanish voyage very unsafe. In 1552 the Council ordered that the
ships should return from Spain in companies of not less than ten or
twelve at a time.[206] Privateering, once set on foot by the French war
of 1544–6, was not stamped out until the close of the century; and the
privateers never hesitated to become pirates if the stakes were
sufficiently large.
Under Mary and a restored Catholic régime in England there was naturally
a period of better relations; and, surprising as it may seem, throughout
the long period of veiled hostilities prior to the dispatch of the
Armada, English merchantmen continued to resort to Spanish ports. John
Hawkins, in 1568, actually put into Vigo to refit on his return from his
disastrous third voyage, when his fleet was scattered by the Spaniards
at St. Juan de Ulloa. In spite of the war to the death which was carried
on in American waters, trade was maintained in Europe until 1585, when a
treacherous attempt to seize English ships at Bilbao at length
precipitated an official declaration of war.
Some light is thrown on the conditions of English residence in Spain and
the Indies by a relation in Hakluyt of the adventures of one Robert
Tomson, a merchant who went to Seville in the year 1553. He was
possessed with a desire to wander and see the world, but first
determined to make himself master of the Spanish tongue. For this
purpose he resided for a year at the house of John Field, an Englishman,
who had lived at Seville for close on twenty years, and who had a wife
and family in that city. Seeing the ships arrive with rich cargoes from
the Indies, Tomson determined to make his way thither, and persuaded
Field to share in the enterprise. Field purchased a licence for himself,
his family, and his friend to sail in the next fleet for New Spain. They
made all preparations for departure, providing their own victuals and
necessaries for the voyage. Before sailing, however, the fleet was
stayed by the king’s command, and the two Englishmen, unwilling to wait,
shipped themselves in February 1555 in a caravel going from San Lucar to
the Canaries, where they knew the Indies fleet would touch for water.
At Grand Canary they found some Englishmen, factors of Anthony Hickman
and Edward Castlyn, merchants of London, who gave them good
entertainment. After they had waited nearly eight months the Indies
fleet at last appeared. Tomson and Field went aboard a ship of Cadiz,
belonging to an Englishman named John Sweeting, residing in that city,
and commanded by another Englishman, Leonard Chilton, son-in-law of
Sweeting. One of the other passengers in the same ship was also an
English merchant. The fleet touched at San Domingo and then proceeded to
San Juan de Ulloa, the principal port of Mexico. Before reaching that
place, however, the ship in which the Englishmen had taken passage
sprang a leak and foundered in a gale at sea, all her people being
rescued by one of her consorts.
On April 16, 1556, Tomson and his friends landed in Mexico, much
distressed by the loss of all their goods in the shipwreck. They were
very generously treated by a Spaniard, an old friend of John Field’s,
who lent them clothes, horses, and money for their journey to the city
of Mexico. Disaster still dogged their footsteps. On the road Tomson
fell sick with an ague, from which he did not recover for six months;
while John Field and three of his family died of the same disease soon
after reaching the capital. On his recovery Tomson fell in with a
Scotsman, Thomas Blake, more than twenty years resident in the country,
and by his assistance obtained employment with a rich Spaniard, who had
been one of Cortes’s original _conquistadores_. After twelve months’
prosperity Tomson was foolish enough to give vent at a dinner-table to
some Protestant opinions. An ill-wisher reported his words to the Bishop
of Mexico. He was arrested and kept seven months in prison, and then,
together with an Italian also charged with heresy, was forced to do open
penance in the great church at Mexico. The Italian was sentenced to
imprisonment for life, and Tomson for three years. They were sent down
to the coast and put aboard a ship bound for Spain, but the Italian
contrived to escape at one of the islands of the Azores by swimming
ashore. He ultimately made his way to England and died in London. Tomson
served his sentence in the Inquisition at Seville, and, on his release,
was fortunate enough to marry the heiress of a rich Spaniard who had
died on the homeward voyage from Mexico. He says: ‘The marriage was
worth to me 2500 pounds in bars of gold and silver, besides jewels of
great price. This I thought good to speak of, to shew the goodness of
God to all that put their trust in him, that I ... should be provided at
God’s hand in one moment, of more than in all my life before I could
attain unto by mine own labour.’ And here, to the chink of the precious
metal, his story ends.
What is particularly striking in this account is the number of
Englishmen encountered by this one traveller in the Spanish seas and
colonies. When the Indies were first discovered Castilians alone were
permitted to resort to them. After the death of Isabella they were
thrown open to all Spaniards; and it would appear that in later days
Englishmen had little difficulty in making their way unobtrusively
wherever they wished so long as they sailed under the Spanish flag, and
were sound on religious matters. Other Englishmen, known to have been
early voyagers to Spanish America, will be referred to in the next
chapter.
Throughout the Middle Ages Englishmen had intermittently engaged in
mercantile adventures to the Mediterranean, although it was not until
the end of the fifteenth century that any regularly frequented trade was
begun.[207] The stirrings of the Renaissance in England and the
accompanying social changes developed a growth of the demand for
luxuries such as only the East could supply. Prior to 1498, the year of
Vasco da Gama’s epoch-making voyage to Calicut, the only avenue of
approach to the marts of eastern merchandise lay through the Straits of
Gibraltar. The discovery of the sea voyage to Asia was destined to
revolutionize utterly the conditions of the trade, but the change was
slow to accomplish itself, and for half a century to come the
Mediterranean route was able to hold its place in competition with the
long, dangerous navigation round half the circumference of the globe.
Consequently it seemed well worth while to contemporary Englishmen in
the days of the early Tudors, ignorant as they were of the vast
significance of the discoveries of their time, to make strong efforts to
capture a share of the traffic of the Levant.
Hitherto the galleys of Venice and the carracks of Genoa had supplied
practically all the eastern goods which England could pay for with
surplus wools and cloth, but early in the reign of Henry VII we find
evidence, in his tariff dispute with Venice, of a regular voyage of
English ships to Candia, Chios, and possibly other Venetian
dependencies, to load cargoes of the sweet malmsey wines which were
becoming popular in England. The proposal, at the same period, to
establish an English wool staple at Pisa has already been described. If
carried out, it would have caused an immense disturbance to trade and
would probably have ruined the whole Italian colony in London, with
diplomatic consequences which Henry must have had little desire to face;
but the project was no chimaera, and was sufficiently within the scope
of practicabilities to cause intense alarm to the Venetian Government,
who concluded the quarrel with Henry on his own terms.
Once established and diplomatically supported, English commerce throve
exceedingly in the Levant. Many of the most prominent commercial
families—the Gonsons, the Lockes, and the Greshams—took part in it.
Hakluyt, speaking on the authority of the old ledgers of the merchants
concerned, relates that, as early as 1511, ‘divers tall ships of London
... with certain other ships of Southampton and Bristol, had an ordinary
and usual trade to Sicily, Candia, Chios, and somewhiles to Cyprus, as
also to Tripoli and Beyrout in Syria’. The goods which they took out
with them were hides and various kinds of cloth, while the homeward
cargoes consisted of silks, chamlets, rhubarb, malmseys, muscadels and
other wines, sweet oils, cotton wool, Turkey carpets, galls, pepper,
cinnamon and other spices, everything in fact which advancing material
civilization, spurred on by the quickened imagination of the time, could
demand.[208] An extensive use was also made of local Mediterranean
shipping, which seems to imply the presence of numerous resident English
merchants or their factors in those regions.[209]
Concomitantly with the advance of English trade in the Mediterranean,
the mercantile marine of Venice declined under stress of wars with the
Turk and the Italian powers who were jealous of her success. The
Flanders galleys came less and less frequently to England, ceasing
altogether before the end of the reign of Henry VIII. The commerce of
Genoa had already fallen before the attacks of her great rival, and the
trend of events rendered impossible any revival of Italian seaborne
trade. Consequently the English vessels not only bore the goods of their
own merchants, but also developed a carrying traffic on behalf of the
Italian factors and agents in London, who had to forward in some way the
wools and rough fabrics which provided employment for the population of
the great cities, indispensable now that their commerce was deserting
them.[210] When the Mediterranean trade became well established, consuls
were appointed at Chios and Candia with full authority over English
merchants while in port,[211] but otherwise the trade was absolutely
free, and there was never anything resembling an incorporation of the
merchants interested until the granting of a Charter to the Turkey
Company by Queen Elizabeth in 1581. By that date the conditions had
entirely changed; the trade had languished and had then been revived,
while the hostility of Spain and the necessity of negotiating with the
Turks had rendered co-operative working and mutual support with capital
and armed force essential to success.
In the first half of the century, on the other hand, Turkish sea power
was not yet at its height in the Mediterranean, while the length of the
voyage and the diversity of the places visited made it difficult for the
merchantmen to sail in fleets. At that period the ships generally
proceeded alone or, at most, in pairs, and the immense risks were no
doubt compensated by corresponding profits. The freedom of trade did
not, of course, extend to raw wool and the other articles constituting
the Staplers’ monopoly, for which special licences had to be obtained.
So lucrative was the trade that these licences were sought after by the
most prominent men in the land, and maritime adventure must have
received a great stimulus from their participation. In 1510 a syndicate
composed of Sir Edward Howard, son of the Earl of Surrey, Sir Thomas
Knyvet, Charles Brandon (afterwards Duke of Suffolk and brother-in-law
of the king), and Sir Edward Guldeford obtained permission to export
wool, leather, lead, tin, &c., for three years in a ship called the
_Mary and John_ of London.[212] Sir Edward Howard was killed in the
attack on Brest in 1513, but we find his brother, Thomas Howard, Lord
Admiral and Duke of Norfolk, engaging in the same trade about 1540, when
he had a factor at Chios.
Voyages such as these, which occupied on an average a full year from
departure to return, necessitated the use of larger ships than were
customary in the older and more local trades. It was obviously more
economical to employ one well-armed and capacious vessel with a large
crew than to send two or three smaller ones which would be liable to
part company on a long trip, and would be much more open to peril from
storms and pirates. The same considerations had caused the Venetians to
build merchantmen of 1,000 tons burden, and they undoubtedly assisted in
the development of naval architecture in England which was so remarkable
between the accession of Henry VII and the defeat of the Armada. There
was more essential difference between the unwieldy basin-shaped ‘cog’ of
the fifteenth century and the vessels with which Drake outmanœuvred the
Spaniards, than there was between Drake’s ships and those of Nelson at
Trafalgar.
In times of peace the ships of the navy, heavily armed and stoutly
built, were sometimes employed on Mediterranean voyages. The _Regent_,
afterwards lost in the fight off Brest in 1512, was sent with wool to
Italy in 1510; and as late as 1552 two king’s ships, the _Jesus of
Lubeck_, of 800 tons, and the _Mary Gonson_, of 600, were chartered by
merchants for £1,000 for a voyage to ‘Levants-end’.[213] In 1515 the
_Christ_, a ship which had served against the French in the war just
concluded, made a most unfortunate voyage to the Mediterranean. She was
chartered by three London merchants and laden with wools and other
merchandise for Italy. After leaving London she was driven by a storm on
the coast of Zealand, arrested for tolls by the authorities, and
released after much delay on security being given. Proceeding on the
voyage, she was captured by the Moors off the Barbary coast. The ship
and cargo were of course hopelessly lost, and the crew were held to
ransom, for the payment of which a certain John Hopton received a
licence to gather alms for three years in England.[214]
This begging to raise the ransom of captive friends was a common custom.
In 1510 two Provençal merchants were licensed to ask alms for the ransom
of nineteen of their comrades who still survived out of twenty-eight
taken by the Turks two years previously; and indulgences were granted by
the Pope to all who should aid them. Another instance was that of
Isabella Lascarina, ‘a gentlewoman of Greece’ who was trying to raise
1,300 ducats for the ransom of her four children, taken by the Turks ten
years before. As long as the Turkish power flourished in the
Mediterranean the aid of the charitable continued to be invoked for such
cases.
Hakluyt, writing at the end of the century, was able to get into touch
with a veteran survivor of these early voyages, and obtained from him
many interesting particulars.[215] This man, John Williamson by name,
was living in 1592 in the parish of St. Dunstan’s in the East, and had
sailed as cooper in one of Gonson’s ships. In 1534, he says, a voyage to
Candia and Chios was made by two ships named the _Holy Cross_, of 160
tons, and the _Matthew Gonson_, of 300 tons. The latter was commanded by
Richard Gonson, a son of William Gonson, the paymaster of Henry VIII’s
navy. Richard Gonson died at Chios in the course of this, his first
voyage. The two vessels brought home cargoes consisting of the usual
Levant goods, together with some ‘very excellent muscatels and red
malmesey, the like whereof was seldom seen before in England’. The
double journey occupied a full year, and was the last made by the _Holy
Cross_, ‘which was so shaken in this voyage, and so weakened, that she
was laid up in dock, and never made voyage after’. In 1535 the _Matthew
Gonson_ made another voyage alone, commanded this time by Captain
Richard Gray, who afterwards died in Russia. William Holstocke, who in
later days rose to be Controller of Elizabeth’s navy, sailed as purser,
having been the captain’s page in the previous voyage. The ship was
evidently well armed, for the crew numbered 100 and included six
gunners. There were also four trumpeters who all deserted at Messina,
‘and gat them into the galleys that lay near unto us, and in them went
to Rome’. The voyage was finished in eleven months, and in that time
only one man died of sickness. The _Matthew Gonson_ was still trading to
the Mediterranean in 1553.
Another narration,[216] that of Roger Bodenham, captain of the _Barke
Aucher_, goes more into detail, and gives a vivid picture of the perils
of Mediterranean trading. Leaving Tilbury on January 6, 1551, after long
delay by reason of contrary winds, they proceeded in charge of a pilot
to Dover, whither Sir Anthony Aucher, the owner, had journeyed to bid
them farewell. On the 11th they arrived at Plymouth, whence they
departed two days later and sighted Cape Finisterre on the 16th. On
January 30 they entered the harbour of Cadiz, discharged part of their
cargo, and took in fresh goods, not leaving that port until February 20.
After being delayed five days by contrary winds among the Balearic
Islands, they passed in sight of Sardinia and arrived at Messina on
March 5, discharging ‘much goods’ there. Thenceforward the dangerous
part of the voyage was entered upon as ‘there was no going into Levant,
especially to Chios, without a safe-conduct from the Turk’. The
principal owner of the cargo, a foreigner named Anselm Salvago, had
promised to obtain such a safe-conduct and have it ready for the ship at
Messina, but it was not forthcoming, and Bodenham was obliged to go on
to Candia without one. There he was assured he would find a safe-conduct
to continue the voyage to Chios, the destination of most of the
merchandise. Reaching Candia without mishap he was again disappointed,
and on sending a messenger to Chios to ask for a safe-conduct, received
answer that the Turks would give none. As a fleet of Turkish galleys was
then at sea he announced his determination not to proceed any further,
in spite of the urging of the merchants who owned the cargo.
Certain small Turkish vessels which were in the port made sail that day
for Turkey, carrying the news that a rich English ship was in Candia and
intended to remain there. Perceiving that this might afford a chance of
slipping through to Chios, Bodenham changed his plan and made sail the
same evening, trusting that the Turks would not be on the look-out for
him. He had some trouble to induce the crew to set out on such a risky
enterprise, but finally won them all over except three, whom he sent
ashore. At the last moment they also begged so hard to be received on
board again that he was constrained to take them with him. When in the
midst of the Archipelago the wind failed and he was obliged to anchor
for ten or twelve days at an island called Micone, where he picked up a
Greek pilot who undertook to bring the ship to Chios. The voyage was
resumed, and Chios was sighted in the afternoon, but Bodenham decided to
stand off for the night as he preferred to enter the port in the
morning. A number of small Greek vessels, however, which had accompanied
him from Chios, decided to make for the harbour that night. Shortly
after they had parted company three ‘foysts’ full of Turks were seen
preparing to attack them. The Greek pilot, who had a son in one of them,
entreated Bodenham to go to the rescue. This he did, and the pirates
were driven off by a single effective shot from one of his guns.
Next morning the _Barke Aucher_ was lying off the mole of Chios, and
Bodenham sent in his boat with word to the merchants that if they wanted
their goods they must come out and fetch them, as otherwise he would
take them back to Candia. Finally he allowed himself to be persuaded,
and entered the harbour on receiving a bond from the city for 12,000
ducats as a guarantee of his safety for twenty days. He was making haste
to get his business done, fearing the approach of the Turkish fleet,
when some of the citizens informed him privately that he was in great
danger, and that they had no means nor intention to defend him, living
as they did entirely at the mercy of the Turk. Bodenham, realizing the
condition of affairs, determined to make off at once, but the merchants,
who had not completed their cargoes, tried to prevent him by instigating
the crew to demand payment of their wages and an opportunity to spend
the same ashore. The men, who had before been so backward in face of
danger, were now in a reckless mood, and there was fresh trouble before
the ship could depart.
To continue in the captain’s own words:
‘But God provided so for me, that I paid them their money that night,
and then charged them, that if they would not set the ship forth, I
would make them to answer the same in England, with danger of their
heads. Many were married in England and had somewhat to lose, those
did stick to me. I had twelve gunners: the master gunner, who was a
mad-brained fellow, and the owner’s servant had a parliament between
themselves, and he upon the same came up to me with his sword drawn,
swearing that he had promised the owner, Sir Anthony Aucher, to live
and die in the said ship against all who should offer any harm to the
ship, and that he would fight with the whole army of the Turks and
never yield. With this fellow I had much to do, but at the last I made
him confess his fault and follow mine advice. Thus with much labour I
got out of the mole of Chios into the sea by warping forth, with the
help of Genoese boats and a French boat that was in the Mole; and
being out, God sent me a special gale of wind to go my way. Then I
caused a piece to be shot off for some of my men that were in the
town, and with much ado they came aboard, and then I set sail a little
before one of the clock.’
He was only just in time, for, not two hours afterwards, seven Turkish
galleys arrived to capture the ship, and next day a hundred more. A
great fleet in fact, consisting of 250 sail, was at sea with the
intention of proceeding against Malta. Three days afterwards Bodenham
got into Candia, which proved to be a safe refuge. The Turkish fleet
sailed past in sight of the town, but the inhabitants had made good
preparations for defence, and they were left undisturbed. After loading
with wines and other goods the _Barke Aucher_ set sail for Messina,
rescuing by the way some Venetian vessels which were being attacked by
Turkish galleys. From Messina she sailed in safety through the Straits
to Cadiz and thence home to London. Richard Chancellor, afterwards the
first Englishman to reach Moscow, was one of the crew, as was also
Matthew Baker, who became chief shipwright to Queen Elizabeth.
Anthony Jenkinson, another pioneer of Russian and Asiatic travel, was
also engaged in the Mediterranean trade in his earlier years. In 1553 he
obtained a patent from the Sultan Solyman, granting him full liberty to
travel and trade throughout the Turkish dominions, with protection for
his factors and goods. But, notwithstanding the Sultan’s goodwill, from
this time onwards the traffic declined, probably owing to the lawless
state of the Levant waters; and Hakluyt relates that it was ‘utterly
discontinued, and in manner quite forgotten, as if it had never been,
for the space of twenty years and more’. But about the year 1575 some
London merchants sent two representatives overland through Poland to
Constantinople to obtain a fresh safe-conduct, whereupon trade was
resumed and the Turkey Company received its letters of incorporation
from the queen in 1581.
-----
Footnote 186:
_Add. MSS._, 11716 (_Letters and Papers_, ii, No. 3521) contains a
contrast between the treatment of merchants in France and in England,
embodying many of the above details.
Footnote 187:
Various references in _Letters and Papers_, ix and x.
Footnote 188:
_Letters and Papers_, xvii, No. 555.
Footnote 189:
Ibid., xviii, part i, No. 33.
Footnote 190:
_Letters and Papers_, xviii, part i, No. 416.
Footnote 191:
_Foedera_, xiii. 520.
Footnote 192:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, part iii, No. 6686.
Footnote 193:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, App. 78.
Footnote 194:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, part iii, No. 6654.
Footnote 195:
Ibid., No. 6686.
Footnote 196:
_Letters and Papers_, xvi, No. 1126.
Footnote 197:
_Harl. MSS._, 297, f. 249. There is in the Record Office (_S. P.
Misc._, No. 107) a manuscript volume containing transcripts of the
proceedings on April 24, 1539, the Letters Patent of Henry VIII in
1530, the privileges granted by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the
complaint of the merchants on March 15, 1548, and of certain
negotiations with Spain at the end of Elizabeth’s reign.
Footnote 198:
_Letters and Papers_, xiv, part i, No. 466.
Footnote 199:
G. F. Nott, _Works of Howard and Wyatt_, ii, p. xxxiv.
Footnote 200:
_Letters and Papers_, xiv, part i, No. 487.
Footnote 201:
Ibid, xv, No. 38.
Footnote 202:
_Letters and Papers_, xv, No. 281.
Footnote 203:
_R. O., S. P. Hen. VIII_, § 161, ff. 76–82.
Footnote 204:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, Nos. 459, 494, 981, 1003; part ii,
No. 874; xxi, part ii, Nos. 371, 509.
Footnote 205:
_Cotton MSS._, Vesp. C viii, f. 56.
Footnote 206:
_A. P. C._, iv, p. 138.
Footnote 207:
In the Parliament of 1514–15 an amendment was passed to an Act of
Richard III which rendered it obligatory on all merchants bringing
goods from the Mediterranean to import therewith a proportionate
number of bowstaves. Certain Englishmen had been proceeded against for
failing to comply with this law, and the amendment made it plain that
it was henceforth only to apply to aliens. This seems to indicate that
in the time of Richard III there were few or no Englishmen engaged in
the Mediterranean trade, since no discrimination was thought necessary
in the original Act. If Richard III’s Act had been intended to apply
to both Englishmen and aliens it would most probably have been
expressly so stated.
Footnote 208:
Hakluyt, vol. v, p. 62.
Footnote 209:
In Hakluyt’s pages some of these factors are mentioned by name:
William Heith, factor of John Gresham at Candia; John Ratcliffe,
factor of the same in Portugal; William Eyms, factor of Sir William
Bowyer, the Duke of Norfolk and others at Chios; Robert Bye and Oliver
Lesson, also factors at Chios.
Footnote 210:
Various references to this trade: _Letters and Papers_, i, pp. 46 and
120; xiv, part i, No. 538, &c.
Footnote 211:
_Foedera_, xiii, 353; xiv. 424, 703.
Footnote 212:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 186.
Footnote 213:
_Journal of Edward VI_, p. 61. The tonnage is given as there stated,
but is probably exaggerated.
Footnote 214:
_Letters and Papers_, ii, Nos. 738, 811.
Footnote 215:
Hakluyt, v. 67–8.
Footnote 216:
Hakluyt, v. 71.
CHAPTER X
VOYAGES AND PROJECTS OF DISCOVERY UNDER HENRY VIII
During the reign of Henry VIII, although English prestige increased and
commerce became firmly established, it must be confessed that
commensurate progress was not made in discovery and oceanic enterprise.
The king himself was intermittently anxious to promote such
undertakings, but the preoccupations arising from Continental politics
proved too strong for him. His hostility to France involved the
maintenance of the old alliance with the Netherlands and Spain; and
while that alliance endured England was barred from all the more
profitable parts of the New World.
Also, there was as yet no real public interest in discovery; England was
not _awake_ to matters that were common knowledge and subjects of eager
discussion in the Peninsula, in France, Italy, and even in inland
Germany. Although diligent chroniclers and accomplished men of letters
existed in Henry’s England, we look in vain for a Hakluyt, or even a
Richard Eden, to record for us the details of such minor adventures as
were actually attempted. Hakluyt himself in after years lamented ‘the
great negligence of the writers of those times, who should have used
more care in preserving of the memories of the worthy acts of our
nation’. Closely connected, either as cause or result, with this
indifference was a deplorable want of the knowledge necessary to
success. As seamen the Englishmen of the time were unsurpassed, but with
a few honourable exceptions, such as Robert Thorne and William Hawkins,
they took no interest in the advance of navigation and cosmography.
Thorne is the only Englishman in the reigns of the first two Tudors who
is known to have written on such matters. Consequently the lack of an
enthusiastic, well-informed leader was even more detrimental to the
accomplishment of important discoveries than was the want of public
support. The adventures of the reign of Henry VIII illustrate the truth
that expansion must be national and spontaneous if it is to produce
permanent results; the early attempts of the Cabots and their Bristol
contemporaries had been allowed to die of neglect, and it was not until
the revival of oceanic enterprise, first by William Hawkins and
afterwards by the merchant companies who sent fleets to West Africa and
the White Sea, that world-wide interests became a regular factor in
English life and history.
The first recorded project of the reign is an alleged voyage to the
North-West by Sebastian Cabot and Sir Thomas Pert or Spert in 1516. Its
actual occurrence is doubtful, and rests primarily on the authority of
Richard Eden, who, in the dedication to his _Treatise of the Newe
India_, published in 1553,[217] says: ‘Our Sovereign Lord King Henry
VIII, about the same year of his reign (i. e. 1516 or 1517), furnished
and sent forth certain ships under the governance of Sebastian Cabot,
yet living, and one Sir Thomas Perte, whose faint heart was the cause
that voyage took none effect.’ This is the sole definite and express
statement that such a voyage took place. Purchas, it is true, refers to
it, but he evidently copied Eden and had no independent knowledge. It
has been suggested that Ramusio’s note in the preface to his third
volume (see Chap. IV, pp. 89–90), and also the lines in the _New
Interlude_ (Chap. V, pp. 111–13), refer to this expedition, but it must
be allowed that they apply equally well to other voyages. The doubt as
to their intention thus destroys any value they might have as evidence
of the occurrence of a voyage in 1516.[218] In favour of Eden’s
statement it must be remembered that Sebastian Cabot was in England in
1553 and was personally known to the author, who probably derived his
information from him direct. But Cabot, as is evidenced by other
incidents in his career, had no scruple in distorting the truth when it
suited his purpose, and it was certainly to his interest to magnify his
services to England at a time when he was living on the bounty of the
English Crown, and was engaged in promoting fresh northern explorations.
The ascertained record of the doings of Cabot throws little light on the
matter. He was in England in May 1512, when he was paid twenty shillings
for making a map of Gascony and Guienne for the use of the expedition
sent to Biscay under the Marquis of Dorset for the invasion of those
provinces. This is his first reappearance in history after the voyages
at the end of the fifteenth century. Whether or not he had lived in
England during the interval is unknown. He accompanied Dorset’s
expedition to Spain, and transferred himself to the service of King
Ferdinand, by whom, on October 20, 1512, he was appointed a naval
captain. He then took up his abode at Seville. His residence in Spain
can be continuously traced until November 13, 1515, after which date no
further mention of him occurs until February 5, 1518, when he was
appointed Pilot Major of Spain by the Government of Charles V, Ferdinand
having died in January 1516. He is thus quite unaccounted for during the
years 1516 and 1517. It is possible that, thinking his prospects in
Spain unpromising, he returned to England on the death of
Ferdinand.[219]
The movements and employments of Thomas Spert can be much more
satisfactorily traced. As a mariner in the service of Henry VII he had
carried dispatches between England and Spain.[220] He served, evidently
with credit, in the navy during the war of 1512–14. In 1512–13 he was
master of the _Mary Rose_, one of the most important fighting ships in
the fleet. On the approaching completion, towards the end of the latter
year, of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_, the largest vessel then constructed
in England, he was transferred to her as master. On November 10, 1514,
he was granted an annuity of £20, which was confirmed in January
1516.[221] Again, on July 10, 1517, he was granted the office of
ballasting ships in the Thames, which office he was to hold during
pleasure at a rent of £10 a year.[222] This militates strongly against
one part of Eden’s story, namely, that it was Spert’s misconduct which
spoiled the success of the voyage of discovery. The office was evidently
one of profit, and would hardly have been granted to one who had
recently disgraced himself. But indeed the whole theory of Spert’s
connexion with a voyage of discovery at this time is effectively killed
by a document in the Record Office which has not hitherto been quoted in
this connexion. It is a manuscript book[223] showing the issues of
various stores to the masters of the king’s ships, and it proves beyond
doubt that between 1515 and 1521 Thomas Spert never vacated his post as
master of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_. There are entries showing his
presence in that ship on April 7 and July 3, 1516, and on April 28 and
September 17, 1517, which, together with the grant on July 10 of the
last-mentioned year, are conclusive evidence that he could not have made
a voyage to America at the period in question.
What is known of the remainder of Spert’s career shows that he continued
in high favour. He served in the war of 1522–5 and was consulted by the
admiral as to the best way of cutting out some Scottish privateers in
Boulogne harbour. He remained master of the _Great Harry_ until 1530.
His next promotion was to be ‘Clerk Controller’ of the king’s ships. By
the year 1533 he had been knighted.[224] In 1542 he was granted lands in
Essex, and he is last heard of in 1544 as the owner of a ship called the
_Mary Spert_, which was serving with the fleet against the French.[225]
It is probable that he died soon afterwards; it may be deduced from
Eden’s remarks that he was not living in 1553.
On the whole this voyage of 1516 must be ranked as of extremely doubtful
authenticity. Spert certainly had nothing to do with it, but there is
nothing in the known evidence to render it impossible that Sebastian
Cabot had. On the other hand, it has left no contemporary record in
official papers, and the chroniclers of the reign are absolutely silent
with regard to it. The most feasible conclusion is that the story was
the combined product of the credulity of Richard Eden and the senile
romantic tendencies of Sebastian Cabot.
Whatever may have happened in 1516, there is no doubt that Henry’s mind
was running on schemes of western discovery; and in 1521 a new design
was mooted whose details rest upon much surer authority.[226] Early in
that year two members of the Privy Council, Sir Robert Wingfield and Sir
Wolston Brown, were deputed to lay the king’s proposals before the
Livery Companies of London. The plan was as follows: the Companies were
to furnish five ships of not more than 120 tons each for a voyage to
‘the Newefound Iland’, and to be responsible for the victualling and
wages; the king was to find the tackle and ordnance and ‘bear the
adventure of the said ships’, whatever that may mean; the City of London
should have control of the whole enterprise, although other towns might
participate—Bristol had already promised two ships; ten years’ exclusive
monopoly of the new trade was offered, with exemption from customs for
the first thirty months. As will be seen from what follows, the
expedition was evidently to be placed under the command of Sebastian
Cabot, although his surname is nowhere mentioned.
The germ of the enterprise was most probably the departure in 1519 of
Magellan’s squadron for the discovery of a south-west passage into the
Pacific. The actual existence of that passage was not yet known, for
Magellan’s _Victoria_ did not return until 1522 with the news of the
discovery of the Strait of Todos Sanctos and the circumnavigation of the
globe. All that Henry knew was that the Spaniards were challenging the
Portuguese monopoly of trade with eastern Asia; and he doubtless felt at
liberty to do the same if he could find a north-west passage past the
new-found lands which English enterprise had explored in his father’s
reign. Most probably King Henry knew of Sebastian Cabot’s former attempt
in this direction—we may fairly assume that a man of his learning would
be acquainted with Peter Martyr’s _Decades of the New World_, published
in 1516, even if he had as yet no personal knowledge of Cabot
himself—and it was natural that he should wish to entrust the command of
the new expedition to a man with previous experience of the task.
The cautious merchants of the Livery Companies, however, showed little
eagerness to adventure their ships and money in a scheme which had
already proved financially unsound within the memory of many of them.
Moreover, any success which might be obtained would inevitably be more
to the profit of Bristol than of London. The seamen and merchants of the
former port were more accustomed to distant enterprises, and their
geographical position would give them as much advantage in a
north-western trade as it did in the traffic with Bordeaux and Spain.
Accordingly, the Companies hung back and advanced objections. The
wardens of the Drapers said that they had no authority to bind their
fellowship to any outlay; also that there were in their Company ‘but few
adventurers, saving only into Flanders, whereunto requireth no great
ships’. If the king would supply the vessels they would do their best to
find a cargo, but they feared trouble with Spain, which would entail
perilous consequences to their legitimate trade.
The Drapers seem to have taken the lead in opposing the design. In a
communication to the Mercers they suggested that it would be advisable
to have more information from English mariners with respect to the route
proposed, ‘although it be further hence than few English mariners can
tell. And we think it be too sore adventure to jeopard five ships with
men and goods unto the said Island upon the singular trust of one man
called, as we understand, Sebastian, which Sebastian, as we hear say,
was never in that land himself, all if he makes report of many things as
he hath heard his father and other men speak in times past.’[227] Also,
they continued, even if Sebastian had been there, and were the most
cunning navigator imaginable, it would be a great risk to venture five
ships in the event of his death or of a separation of the fleet, in
which case four ships at least would be in peril by lacking a pilot.
They concluded by objecting that it was impossible to victual the ships
for a whole year. The other eleven Companies gave a partial and grudging
acquiescence. They were willing to find two ships and ‘they supposed to
furnish the third’, but they desired a longer respite. The king and the
Cardinal, however, would be content with no half measures. The Lord
Mayor was sent for to speak with the king. ‘His Grace would have no nay
therein, but spake sharply to the Mayor to see it put in execution to
the best of his power.’ But passive hostility triumphed; a few niggardly
subscriptions were collected and then the whole matter was allowed to
drop. As far as is known, not a single vessel put to sea.
It is plain that the ‘Sebastian’ of the Drapers’ protest was Sebastian
Cabot. The reference to his father is sufficiently conclusive, and the
contention is borne out by two other circumstances. In 1524 Sir Thomas
Lovell died, and among the debts paid after his death occurs the
following item: ‘18 Feb. (year not stated), to John Goderyk, of Foly,
Cornwall, draper, for conducting Sebastian Cabot, master of the pilots
in Spain, to London, at our testator’s request, 43_s._ 4_d._’[228] This
of course might possibly relate to the dubious voyage of 1516,
especially as, in that event, his coming to England in February would
tally very well with the death of King Ferdinand on January 23. But the
supposition is rather far-fetched, and is further vitiated by the fact
that Cabot was not Pilot Major until 1518. It seems more likely that
Cabot’s visit to England was in connexion with the 1521 project. Again,
when he was plotting to betray his geographical secrets to the Venetian
Government, Cabot made the following statement to their envoy Contarini
at Valladolid in December 1522: ‘Now it so happened that when in England
three years ago, if I mistake not, Cardinal Wolsey offered me high terms
if I would sail with an armada of his on a voyage of discovery. The
vessels were almost ready, and they had got together 30,000 ducats for
their outfit. I answered him that, being in the service of the King of
Spain, I could not go without his leave, but if free permission were
granted me from hence, I would serve him.’[229] Allowing for Sebastian’s
constitutional inaccuracy in the matter of dates, which in this case
expands twenty-one months to ‘about three years’, there is here fairly
trustworthy evidence on the question. We are not, of course, obliged to
believe that Sebastian failed to take the command from the motive of
high principle which he describes. Henceforward he had no further
concern with English enterprises until his final reappearance in England
in 1548.
In 1525 Henry was in treaty with another foreign navigator, Paolo
Centurioni the Genoese, to whom he promised the leadership of an
expedition for the discovery of new countries. Centurioni came to
London, but died there before the plan took practical shape; and the
affair was again in abeyance for lack of a skilled leader.[230]
Centurioni’s idea was apparently to open up communication with Asia by
way of Muscovy and the North-East—a foreshadowing of Willoughby’s
expedition of 1553.
The idea of a northern passage to the Pacific was again revived in 1527.
In that year Robert Thorne, a Bristol merchant then residing at Seville,
addressed to King Henry a _Declaration of the Indies_,[231] in which he
exhorted him again to take in hand the promotion of northern
exploration, not only because the Spaniards and the Portuguese had
already monopolized the western and eastern routes, but also ‘because
the situation of this your realm is thereunto nearest and aptest of all
other: and also for that you have already taken it in hand ... though
heretofore Your Grace hath made thereof a proof and found not the
commodity thereby as you trusted, at this time it shall be no
impediment. For there may be now provided remedies for things then
lacked, and the inconveniences and lets removed that then were cause
Your Grace’s desire took no full effect, which is, the courses to be
changed, and followed the foresaid new courses.’ Thorne appealed to the
honour of the king and the nation not to be left behind in the race. He
minimized the danger of Arctic voyages, and enlarged on the advantages
to mariners of the perpetual daylight of the Arctic summer. He argued
that the Arctic seas were everywhere navigable, and suggested a route to
eastern lands right over the Pole itself. ‘For they, being past this
little way which they named so dangerous, which may be two or three
leagues before they come to the pole, and as much more after they pass
the pole, it is clear that from thenceforth the seas and lands are as
temperate as in these parts.’ After passing over the Pole, he continued,
three routes lay open to navigators: they might turn towards eastern
Asia, reaching Tartary, China, Cathay, the Moluccas, and so home by the
Cape of Good Hope; or they might decline to the west and go down by ‘the
back side of the new found land, which of late was discovered by Your
Grace’s subjects, until they come to the back side and south seas of the
Indies occidentals’, and then through the Straits of Magellan to
England; but if they should take a middle course between these two, ‘and
then decline towards the lands and Islands situated between the Tropics
and under the Equinoctial, without doubt they shall find the richest
lands and islands of the world of gold, precious stones, balms, spices,
and other things that we here esteem most, which come out of strange
countries; and may return the same way. By this it appeareth Your Grace
hath not only a great advantage of the riches, but also your subjects
shall not travel half of the way that other do, which go round about as
aforesaid.’
Thorne also expressed his ideas in greater detail to Doctor Lee, Henry’s
ambassador at that time in Spain.[232] He enclosed a map, which Hakluyt
has preserved, and entered into elaborate calculations to show that the
northern route to the Pacific was much shorter than those used by either
the Spaniards or the Portuguese. He referred to the Spanish expedition
which had sailed from Seville in the previous year for the Spice
Islands, and mentioned that he and his partner had invested 1,400 ducats
so as to have an excuse for sending two Englishmen to accompany it and
report on those regions.[233] He claimed that his father and Hugh Elyot
were the original discoverers of Newfoundland, and that they would have
reached the Indies but for a mutiny.
That the book to Dr. Lee was written in the first quarter of 1527 is
evidenced by a reference to Cabot’s squadron of 1526 as having sailed
‘in April last past’, but there is no clue to the month of the letter to
the king. Hence it cannot be stated with certainty that the expedition
which we have next to consider was a consequence of that letter.
Whether it was or not, the fact remains that two ships were commissioned
in 1527 and placed under the command of John Rut, a master mariner who,
like Spert, had served in the navy during the French wars. Grafton’s
_Chronicle_ has a brief entry relative to their departure: ‘This same
month (May, 1527) the king sent two fair ships, well manned and
victualled, having in them divers cunning men, to seek strange regions;
and so forth they set out of the Thames the 20th day of May; if they
sped well you shall hear at their return.’ In spite of which promise,
the _Chronicle_ makes no further mention of them. Hakluyt attempted to
glean some further information about this voyage, with very little
success. Martin Frobisher and Richard Allen told him that one of the
ships was called the _Dominus Vobiscum_, and that a canon of St. Paul’s,
whose name they did not know, but who was a great mathematician, was a
promoter of the enterprise and went with it in person: and that,
‘sailing very far north westward, one of the ships was cast away as it
entered into a dangerous gulf, about the great opening between the north
parts of Newfoundland and the country lately called by Her Majesty Meta
Incognita. Whereupon the other ship, shaping her course towards Cape
Breton and the coasts of Arambec, and oftentimes putting their men on
land to search the state of those unknown regions, returned home about
the beginning of October of the year aforesaid.’
Although Hakluyt was ignorant of the fact, however, two letters from
members of the expedition were in existence, and Purchas printed one of
them in his _Pilgrims_.[234] This, the first letter on record from
America to England, is worth quoting in full for the quaintness of its
style and the unconscious picture which it affords of the mind of an
early Tudor seaman. Purchas remarks: ‘John Rut writ this letter to King
Henry in bad English and worse writing, Over it was this superscription:
“Master Grube’s two ships departed from Plymouth the 10 day of June,
and arrived in the Newfoundland in a good harbour, called Cape de Bas,
the 21 day of July: and after we had left the sight of Selle (Scilly),
we had never sight of any land, till we had sight of Cape de Bas.”’
The letter itself runs thus:
‘Pleasing your honourable Grace to hear of your servant John Rut, with
all his company here, in good health, thanks be to God, and your
Grace’s ship the _Mary Gilford_, with all her ... thanks be to God:
And if it please your honourable Grace, we ran in our course to the
northward, till we came into 53 degrees, and there we found many great
islands of ice and deep water, we found no sounding, and then we durst
not go further to the northward for fear of more ice; and then we cast
about to the southward, and within four days after we had one hundred
and sixty fathom, and then we came into 52 degrees and fell with the
mainland. We met with a great island of ice, and came hard by her, for
it was standing in deep water; and so went with Cape de Bas, a good
harbour and many small islands, and a great fresh river going far up
into the main land, and the main land all wilderness and mountains and
woods, and no natural ground but all moss, and no inhabitation nor no
people in these parts: and in the woods we found footing of divers
great beasts, but we saw none, not in ten leagues. And please your
Grace, the _Samson_ and we kept company all the way till within two
days before we met with all the islands of ice, that was the first day
of July at night, and there rose a great and a marvellous great storm,
and much foul weather; I trust in Almighty Jesu to hear good news of
her. And please your Grace, we were considering and a writing of all
our order, how we would wash us and what course we would draw, and
when God do send foul weather, that with the Cape de Sper she should
go, and he that came first should tarry the space of six weeks one for
another, and watered at Cape de Bas ten days, ordering of your Grace’s
ship and fishing, and so departed toward the southward to seek our
fellow: the third day of August we entered into a good haven, called
St. John, and there we found eleven sail of Normans, and one
Brittaine, and two Portugall barks, and all a fishing, and so we are
ready to depart toward Cape de Bas, and that is twenty five leagues,
as shortly as we have fished, and so along the coast till we may meet
with our fellow, and so with all diligence that lies in me toward
parts to that islands that we are commanded by the Grace of God, as we
were commanded at our departing: And thus Jesu save and keep your
honourable Grace, and all your honourable Rever(ences), in the Haven
of Saint John, the third day of August, written in haste, 1527.
‘By your servant John Rut to his uttermost of his power.’
Purchas continues: ‘I have by me also Albert de Prato’s original letter,
in Latin style, almost as harsh as the former English, and bearing the
same date, and was indorsed: Reverend. in Christo Patri Domino Domino
Cardinali & Domino Legato Angliae: and began Reverendissime in Christo
Pater salutem. Reverendissime Pater, placeat Reverendissimae paternitati
Vestrae scire, Deo favente postquam exivimus a Plemut quae fuit x Junii,
&c. (the substance is the same with the former and therefore omitted).
Datum apud le Baya Saint Johan in Terris Novis, die x Augusti, 1527.
Rever. Patr. vest. humilis servus, Albertus de Prato. (The name written
in the lowest corner of the sheet.)’
How were these letters dispatched to England? Probably by one of the
fishing vessels which was on the point of returning to Europe. It was
evident that Rut had no immediate intention of turning back. The ‘Master
Grube’ of the endorsement must certainly be a perversion of Rut’s name.
It is impossible that there should have been two independent pairs of
ships both departing from Plymouth on the same day and both making the
same landfall in Newfoundland at the same time. Unfortunately Purchas’s
editing was very careless, as witness his remark that Rut’s and de
Prato’s letters were of the same date; and, in spite of his assurance of
their identity in substance, one cannot help suspecting that important
details may have been contained in de Prato’s letter.
From quite a different source we hear of the further adventures of Rut
and his vessel. Herrera in his _Historia General_,[235] under the
erroneous date of 1519, says that a Spanish caravel encountered an
English ship off the island of Porto Rico—a ship of three masts and
about 250 tons. Gines Navarro, the Spanish captain, thinking it was a
Spanish ship, was going aboard when he was met by a pinnace with
twenty-five armed men and two guns. They said they were English, and had
set sail with another large ship to find the land of the Grand Cham, and
that a storm had separated them. They had been in a high latitude and
had encountered great icebergs, and turning further south they had come
into a hot sea, and lest it should melt their pitch they had made for
the Baccalaos, where they found fifty ships fishing—Spanish, French, and
Portuguese. They landed there to make inquiries of the Indians, who
killed the pilot, a Piedmontese. Navarro asked them what they were doing
in those islands, to which they replied that they wished to make a
report to their king, and to trade. They asked him to show them the
course for San Domingo. When they arrived at that island they were fired
upon, and so did not land. They went back to Porto Rico and traded with
the inhabitants, and then disappeared. The ship had sixty men with
plenty of guns and merchandise. Oviedo’s _Historia General das Indias_
gives a corroborating account under the correct date, 1527, and adds
that, as nothing more was heard of this ship, she was supposed to have
been lost.[236]
Such, however, was not the case, for, in the autumn of 1528, John Rut,
still in the _Mary Gilford_, was engaged in bringing wine from Bordeaux
to England.[237] There is no further trace of the _Samson_, and it is
probable that she was lost, although Frobisher’s story that she
foundered in Hudson’s Strait does not agree with John Rut’s northernmost
latitude of 53°.[238] Before setting out on his voyage John Rut
received, on May 24, 1527, a grant of an annuity of £10.[239] This is
two days later than the sailing date from London given in the
_Chronicles_, but the discrepancy is not serious, for England was not
finally lost sight of until June 10.
In reviewing the evidence above set out, it is evident at once that here
was another quest of the North-West Passage. John Rut’s letter,
describing the attempt to force a way northwards through the icebergs of
Davis Strait, and its reference to the islands which he had received
instructions to make for—evidently not the islands of the new-found
land, but far beyond them—point to that conclusion; and the story told
to the Spanish captain, as to seeking the land of the Grand Cham, is
conclusive. We may therefore set this down as the third authenticated
English expedition for the discovery of the northern route to Asia,
those of Sebastian Cabot and the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate being the
first and second.
On closely comparing the above accounts with Robert Thorne’s letter to
the king, it is evident that the voyage of John Rut was _not_ an attempt
to put Thorne’s theories into practice, but rather a revival of
Sebastian Cabot’s old plan of finding a passage by closely hugging the
supposed northern shore of America. Thorne, on the other hand, wished to
send his expedition over the Pole itself, and such a course would have
taken it well to the east of Iceland and Greenland, and would, in fact,
have lain almost at right angles to that actually followed by Rut. Hence
it becomes certain, either that Thorne’s ideas were modified by the
king’s advisers in London, possibly by Albert de Prato, who seems to
have been a man of learning, or that Thorne’s letter was written after
the unsuccessful return of the surviving vessel. It must be remembered
that, although the _Book to Dr. Lee_ is dated by internal evidence early
in 1527, there is no such clue to the date of the letter to the king.
Also, certain expressions quoted from the letter as to the advisability
of following new courses, if literally construed, are consonant with the
recent return of an expedition which had failed on the old course. On
the whole, then, it must be left in doubt whether Thorne may claim the
honour of being the author of the voyage of 1527.
Yet another mystery is the identity of the Italian pilot who, according
to the Spanish captain’s account, was killed by Indians. There is
absolutely no confirmatory evidence that such a man accompanied the
expedition. It is more probable that, apart from Rut, there was no pilot
in the ordinary sense of the word as then used, and that Albert de Prato
was the man referred to. There is no proof of his return from the
voyage, and it is quite possible that, in the conversation between the
English and the Spaniards, with an imperfect command of each other’s
languages, a man with a knowledge of geography and astronomy might have
been described as a ‘pilot’.
A brief account of the Thorne family may be of interest, especially as
an incomplete article on them appears in a recent authority on the
subject, the _Dictionary of National Biography_. The father of the
Robert Thorne who wrote the treatises above considered was another
Robert Thorne, who, at the opening of the sixteenth century, was a
prosperous merchant of Bristol. According to his son he accompanied Hugh
Elyot on a voyage of discovery to the North-West about the year 1502,
although his name does not appear in the charters granted for that
purpose by Henry VII. In 1510 he was one of a group of Bristol men who
were appointed to act as commissioners for the office of admiral in
their town.[240] In 1514 he was mayor of Bristol,[241] and in 1523 was
returned as Member of Parliament for that city,[242] dying in London
shortly afterwards. He was evidently dead at the time his son was
writing, in 1527. A Bristol historian, however, states that he died in
1519, in which case the M.P. of 1523 must have been Robert Thorne the
younger (J. Latimer, _Sixteenth Century Bristol_, 1908; authorities not
given). He was buried in London in the Temple Church, and his epitaph
runs as follows:
Epitaphium M. Roberti Thorni, sepulti in Ecclesia Templariorum
Londini.
Robertus jacet hîc Thorne, quem Bristolia quondam
Praetoris merito legit ad officium.
Huic etenim semper magnae Respublica curae
Charior & cunctis patria divitiis.
Ferre inopi auxilium, tristes componere lites
Dulce huic consilio quosque juvare fuit.
Qui pius exaudis miserorum vota precesque
Christe huic coeli des regione locum.[243]
Barrett, writing in 1789, speaks of this epitaph as still existing in
his time.
Robert Thorne the younger was born in 1492[244] and was four years
senior to his brother Nicholas Thorne.[245] They were both merchants,
and carried on their father’s business, which seems to have been
principally with the ports of Andalusia. Robert had a house in Seville
and resided there for some years. The Thornes and other English
merchants traded with the Canary Islands and even with the West Indies,
sending their goods by way of Spain. Hakluyt, who was in possession of
some of their ledger books and letters, mentions that in 1526 they
dispatched two English agents in a Spanish ship to Santa Cruz in
Teneriffe with a cargo of cloth and soap, with instructions to sell the
goods in the Canaries.[246] From the same source we learn that an
Englishman named Thomas Tison acted as a kind of secret factor for them
in one of the West Indian islands, and distributed the goods which they
shipped in Spanish vessels. Tison, the first recorded Englishman to
reside in the West Indies, was a Bristol man who served as a mariner
against the French in 1514. He is mentioned in Robert Thorne’s will, and
returned in safety from the Indies, as we find him doing business at
Cadiz in 1534.[247]
Robert Thorne the younger was held in great estimation in Seville. Dr.
Lee, writing to Wolsey in 1526, mentions that the emperor had spoken to
‘a right toward young man as any lightly belongeth to England, called
Thorne’. His geographical writings show him to have been a man of
learning and originality of mind, while his distant enterprises, and
especially his investment of a large sum in Cabot’s fleet of 1526 so
that Englishmen might accompany it, indicate a breadth of view and a
generous willingness to take risks for great results, in keeping with
the best traditions of English commercial enterprise. In 1532 he was
again in England, and, with his brother and others, set about the
founding and endowing of a grammar school in Bristol. Before the
completion of this purpose, however, he died unmarried on Whit-Sunday of
the same year. The inventory of his goods, drawn up by his brother
Nicholas, shows that his fortune amounted to nearly £17,000, a large sum
for those days.[248] In his will,[249] made shortly before his death, he
made numerous bequests to his sisters, his business friends and
servants, and his brother. He left £400 towards ‘the making of a free
school of St. Bartholomew in Bristol’. A reference to ‘Pawle Withipole,
my master’ suggests that he belonged to the Company of Merchant
Adventurers, of which body Withipole was then a prominent member.
Barrett (p. 650) says that Thorne was buried in the Church of St.
Christopher, London, with the following epitaph, for which he does not
mention his authority:
Robertus cubat hic Thornus, mercator honestus,
Qui sibi legitimas arte paravit opes:
Huic vitam dederat puero Bristollia quondam,
Londinum hoc tumulo clauserat atque diem,
Ornavit studiis patriam, virtutibus auxit,
Gymnasium erexit sumptibus ipse suis.
Lector quisquis ades requiem cineri precor optes,
Supplex et precibus numina flecte tuis.
Obiit 1532, aetatis vero suae anno 40.[250]
Nicholas Thorne outlived his brother several years, taking a prominent
part in the affairs of his native city. He was a friend of Thomas
Cromwell’s, and engaged in business transactions on his behalf. In
1536–7 he built a merchant vessel for Cromwell, which was named the
_Saviour_ and made her first voyage to Andalusia.[251] He was evidently
of the Catholic party in Bristol, to judge from some very insulting and
disparaging references to him in a Protestant letter of 1539.[252] In
1544 he became mayor of Bristol, and in the following year we find him
appealing on behalf of some English merchants who had suffered
ill-treatment at San Sebastian.[253] He died in 1546 at the age of
fifty,[254] leaving two sons, of whom one was named Nicholas.
One other voyage to the North-West remains to be chronicled under Henry
VIII. In the year 1536 a certain Master Hore of London, a man learned in
cosmography, and apparently of good position and fortune, was possessed
with the desire to make a voyage to North America. He was joined by
others of the same mind, including Armigil Wade or Ward, who afterwards
held an official position under Henry VIII and Edward VI. With the
king’s consent and good will two ships, the _Trinity_ and the _Minion_,
were fitted out, and 120 persons embarked, of whom 30 were gentlemen,
many of them being lawyers of London. They departed from Gravesend at
the end of April 1536.
Hakluyt,[255] the authority for this voyage, received a personal
relation of it from Thomas Butts, one of the participators, who survived
until his time; and the editor’s cousin, also named Richard Hakluyt,
furnished him with an account he had personally received from Oliver
Dawbeny, another survivor. After leaving Gravesend the explorers were
more than two months at sea before reaching Cape Breton. Thence they
coasted north-eastwards along the Newfoundland shore, visiting an island
which they called the Island of Penguins, on account of the numbers of
birds they saw there. Black and white bears were also encountered. They
failed to get into touch with the natives, who fled at their approach,
and soon their stock of food became exhausted. As time went on the
agonies of famine became so acute that, when scattered over the country
in search of food, some of the members of the party were killed by
others and their flesh cooked and eaten. Hore did his best to stop these
excesses, gathering the whole company and exhorting them to perish
rather than ‘be condemned everlastingly both body and soul to the
unquenchable fire of hell’. Nevertheless, they were again on the point
of casting lots to see who should be killed when a French ship arrived
in the bay, well stocked with food. She was attacked and captured by the
starving Englishmen, who victualled themselves and set sail immediately
for home. Meeting with much ice on the way, they arrived at St. Ives at
the end of October. Butts, as he told Hakluyt, who made a journey of 200
miles to obtain his narrative, was so changed by hunger and misery that
his parents failed to recognize him.
Some months afterwards the Frenchmen who had been relieved of their
victuals arrived in England and complained to King Henry; but he, after
inquiring into the matter, ‘was so moved with pity that he punished not
his subjects, but of his own purse made full and royal recompense unto
the French’.
This expedition can hardly claim to rank as a serious voyage of
discovery; it was rather of the nature of a tourist’s cruise under very
incompetent guidance. It was not promoted by sailors but by landsmen,
who, whatever their book-knowledge, had very little practical experience
of voyaging. The necessity for cannibalism in a country swarming with
game and a sea teeming with fish could hardly have arisen in an
expedition organized by other than amateurs. There is no mention of any
purpose of trading or searching for a passage to the North-West. Hore’s
associates, as Hakluyt says, were mainly ‘gentlemen of the Inns of Court
and of the Chancery, and divers others of good worship, desirous to see
the strange things of the world’. It was not from such a party that any
useful results could be expected, lacking, as it did, the essentials of
success: clearly defined purpose, strong leadership, and knowledge
tempered by experience.
As far as is now known, no other English ship set out to solve the
problem of the north until 1553, the date of Willoughby’s departure in
search of Cathay by the north-east. That the matter was not entirely
forgotten we are reminded by a passage in Chapuys’s correspondence with
the Queen of Hungary. Writing on May 26, 1541, he says:
‘About two months ago there was a deliberation in the Privy Council as
to the expediency of sending two ships to the northern seas for the
purpose of discovering a passage between Iceland and Engronland
(Greenland) for the northern regions, where it was thought that, owing
to the extreme cold, English woollen cloths would be very acceptable
and sell for a good price. To this end the King has retained here for
some time a pilot from Seville well versed in the affairs of the sea,
though in the end the undertaking has been abandoned, all owing to the
King not choosing to agree to the pilot’s terms, so that for the
present at least, the city of Antwerp is sure of not losing the
commerce of woollen cloth of English manufacture.’[256]
There is no reason to suppose that the pilot of Seville was Sebastian
Cabot, as has been suggested. The professional training which the
Spanish pilots received before being granted their certificates produced
numerous competent navigators, many of whom would have been superior in
theoretical knowledge to the master mariners of England, and therefore
able to render good service in Arctic exploration.
The majority of the North Atlantic voyages already considered were for
discovery with an ultimate view to trade; but towards the end of Henry
VIII’s reign certain adventurers undertook purely trading expeditions to
regions already explored and partially occupied by the Portuguese.
Hakluyt relates that William Hawkins, of Plymouth, father of Admiral Sir
John Hawkins, and one of the principal sea captains of the west of
England, made three voyages to the coast of Brazil in 1530 and the years
following.[257] Details are given of only two of the voyages, which were
made in a vessel of 250 tons called the _Paul_, of Plymouth. Of the
first, no information is forthcoming, unless it was on this occasion
that Hawkins touched at the coast of Guinea on his way out, buying ivory
and the other produce of the country. This circumstance is so vaguely
described as to be applicable to any or all of the expeditions. On the
second occasion such good relations were established with the natives of
Brazil that they consented to allow Hawkins to take one of their chiefs
to England, leaving as a hostage one of the crew, Martin Cockeram by
name. This is the man whom Kingsley introduces in _Westward Ho!_ as
conversing, in extreme old age, with the captains assembled on Plymouth
Hoe when news was brought of the approach of the Armada. There was
nothing impossible in such a situation, since Hakluyt, writing in 1599,
says: ‘Martin Cockeram, by the witness of Sir John Hawkins, being an
officer of the town of Plymouth, was living within these few years.’
The Brazilian chief was brought to England and presented to Henry VIII
at Whitehall. The whole court was astonished at his appearance, ‘for in
his cheeks were small holes made according to their savage manner, and
therein small bones were planted, standing an inch out from the said
holes, which in his own country was reputed for a great bravery. He had
also another hole in his nether lip, wherein was set a precious stone
about the bigness of a pease. All his apparel, behaviour and gesture
were very strange to the beholders.’ After nearly a year in England,
Hawkins, according to his promise, set sail to Brazil once more to take
him back. But he was destined never to see his native shores again, for,
‘by change of air and alteration of diet’, he died at sea. Nevertheless
the natives were so impressed with the honourable dealings of the
English that they accepted their explanations without demur and restored
the hostage unharmed.
From his third voyage Hawkins returned with his ship freighted with the
commodities of the country, which are not further specified. The exact
locality, also, to which his journeys were made, is unknown. Hakluyt
tells no more of William Hawkins, but he has brief notices of other
adventurers to Brazil at about the same period. He was informed that
‘this commodious and gainful voyage’ was frequently made by numerous
Southampton merchants, and, in particular, by Robert Reneger and Thomas
Borey in 1540; also that one Pudsey, of Southampton, made a voyage to
Baya de Todos Santos in 1542, and built a fort not far from it.
The details of another Brazil voyage have recently come to light among
the Admiralty papers at the Record Office.[258] On March 7, 1540, the
_Barbara_ of London set sail from Portsmouth under the command of John
Phillips. She captured a Spanish bark off Cape St. Vincent, and later on
a caravel also. Arriving at the coast of Brazil on May 3, Phillips first
traded and afterwards fought with the natives, losing many of his crew.
After this unsatisfactory experience he sailed homewards by way of the
West Indies. At San Domingo he fought with two Spanish vessels, one of
which he captured. On his return to Dartmouth, in August of the same
year, he and the surviving members of his company were arrested for
piracy at the instance of Chapuys. The result of their trial is unknown.
Fuller evidence on these transactions is believed to exist in Spain, and
it is to be hoped that it will soon be made public.
With regard to Hawkins’s further operations, a letter exists from him to
Thomas Cromwell in 1536, to the following effect:
‘Most honourable and my singular good lord: so it is that I durst not
put myself in press to sue unto your good lordship for any help or
succour to be obtained at your hands in my poor affairs, until such
time (as) I had first put my ship and goods in adventure to search for
the commodities of unknown countries, and seen the return thereof in
safety; as, I thank God, hath metely well happened unto me, albeit by
four parts not so well as I suppose it should if one of my pilots had
not miscarried by the way. Wherefore, my singular good lord, I now,
being somewhat bold by the reason aforesaid, but chiefly for the great
hope and trust I have in your accustomed goodness, I most humbly
beseech your good lordship to be mean for me to the King’s highness,
to have of His Grace’s love four pieces of brass ordnance and a last
of powder, upon good sureties to restore the same at a day. And
furthermore, that it may please His Grace, upon the surety of an
hundred pound lands, to lend me £2000 for the space of seven years
towards the setting forth of three or four ships. And I doubt me not
but in the mean time to do such feats of merchandise that it shall be
to the King’s great advantage in His Grace’s custom, and to your good
lordship’s honour for your help and furtherance herein....
Your most bounden orator,
William Hawkyns of Plymouth.’[259]
If the above refers to trading voyages to Guinea and Brazil, as seems
reasonably probable, it would appear that Hawkins had given up going in
person with a single ship, and was acting as manager of a fleet of
vessels which were sent out under employed captains in the manner of a
modern shipping company. The trade was evidently thought worthy of
cultivation.
Another sidelight on the Brazil trade is thrown by a letter of Chapuys
to Charles V.[260] Writing on January 2, 1541, he says that to obviate
piracy he will try to get it enacted that no armed ship shall sail from
the ports of England for Brazil and such countries without giving
security not to attack the emperor’s ships. This supports the theory of
the regular traffic which Hakluyt described as being carried on from
Southampton at the time. It is significant also of the growing interest
in strange lands that in 1541 a request was made by the Privy Council
that Englishmen might be allowed to accompany the next Portuguese
navigation to Calicut to buy spices for English consumption. Needless to
say, it was not granted. During this period French adventurers were also
making voyages to Brazil. Francis I forbade the enterprise to his
subjects in December 1538, but withdrew his prohibition in 1540. Early
in the next year the English envoy in France reported that the
Portuguese ambassadors were daily suing for the stay of the ships that
were being permitted to sail to Brazil. If they persisted in going, he
added, they were likely to suffer, as the Portuguese had sent many armed
vessels thither. It is strange that we have no record of similar
protests being made in England, especially as a Portuguese ambassador
was in the country at the time. Whether they were or not, it would seem
that the Brazil voyages were discontinued during the ‘forties’ of the
sixteenth century. The reason was probably to be found in the renewal of
war with France and the unsettled state of the narrow seas quite as much
as in Portuguese remonstrances or warships. On the outbreak of war the
large vessels suitable for transatlantic voyages would be requisitioned
for the fleet; and thenceforward for many years Hawkins and the others
found piracy, thinly disguised under letters of marque, more profitable
than trade.
A few facts relating to Hawkins and Reneger may be of interest. The
former was a supporter of Cromwell, and acted as one of his numberless
correspondents—to use no harsher word—on the affairs of his part of the
country. There was a bitter feud, for reasons now unknown, between
Hawkins and a faction headed by Thomas Bolle, who was mayor of Plymouth
in 1537. In the previous year the parties had been summoned before Sir
Piers Edgecumbe, and had agreed to waive their differences and live
together in peace according to the old customs of the town. Bolle,
however, wrote to Cromwell, in 1537, protesting against Hawkins’s
conduct and accusing him and his friends of disturbing the peace of the
place. He further asked that the Hawkins faction might be expelled from
the town council. Hawkins evidently triumphed in this affair, for he was
chosen mayor in 1538–9, at which time he and his friend James Horswell,
who had previously been banished, were engaged in taking over Church
property for the Government.
The war of 1544 brought him to the front in a new capacity. In September
of that year a commission was made out for Hawkins, Horswell, and John
Elyot, empowering them to proceed to sea and annoy the French with four,
six, or eight barks at their own charges, and also to impress such
mariners, gunners, victuals, and artillery as they needed. In May 1545
Hawkins was denounced by a Spaniard for ‘colouring’ French goods. He was
also charged, jointly with Thomas Wyndham, with capturing a ship
belonging to the Spaniards. He apparently paid little attention to the
charge, for, two months later, he was committed to prison by the Council
for selling the Spaniards’ goods. Next year another privateer of which
he was part owner—the _Mary Figge_—took some goods illegally. The owners
of the _Mary Figge_ were slow to disgorge, and the personal authority of
the king had to be called in to coerce them. Henry, in spite of his
tigerish fierceness towards any others who withstood him, could always
find a soft place in his heart for his sailors who erred from
over-boldness; and he ordered that they should be given another chance
to make amends before being punished. As Hakluyt relates, Hawkins was
‘for his wisdom, valour, experience and skill in sea causes, much
esteemed and beloved of King Henry’. He gradually attained a kind of
official position, being entrusted with the construction of a fort at
Plymouth and with the supply of victuals for the fleet. He was Member of
Parliament for his town in 1539, 1547, and 1553. He died at the end of
the latter year or at the beginning of 1554. Energetic, versatile, able
to turn his hand to politics, trade, discovery, or war, headstrong and
quarrelsome, defiant of the law in an age of dreadful penalties, and yet
withal patriotic and humane to the weak, it is a pity that our knowledge
is so scanty of a career which was so typical of the new, progressive
Englishmen of the Renaissance.
Robert Reneger at Southampton was something of a counterpart to William
Hawkins of Plymouth. Like him, he was not content with petty coasting
voyages and European trade hampered by the surviving shackles of
mediaevalism. Like him also, he abandoned the lucrative Brazil trade for
still more lucrative privateering when the renewal of the wars rendered
the western seas of Europe a treasure-ground for the brave. In 1543 he
obtained letters of marque against the French, after entering into a
recognisance not to attack the Emperor’s subjects. Nevertheless, in
March 1545, he and his son John Reneger, with four ships and a pinnace,
captured off Cape St. Vincent a Spanish treasure-ship homeward bound
from Hispaniola with gold, pearls, and sugar, and worth the dazzling sum
of 29,315 ducats. Such a prize, foreshadowing the exploits of the
Elizabethans, must have furnished an object-lesson on the wealth of the
Spanish Indies which was never forgotten by the seamen of the southern
shores of England.
[Illustration:
ENGLISH WARSHIP, TEMP. HEN. VIII.
From Cott. MS. Aug. I. ii. 70.
]
The immediate consequence was almost a war with Spain. All English
merchants and ships in that country were arrested and were not released
for many months. Reneger asserted that he had only made just reprisal
for the confiscation of a prize of his in Spain; and the Spaniards
complained that he, although a known pirate, was swaggering at court as
though he had done a meritorious deed. No doubt his merit consisted in a
judicious distribution of shares of the plunder, after the manner of
Drake in later times. Henry, who loved success and the man that gained
it, and who was angry at the conduct of the Emperor in other matters,
did not make any real attempt at enforcing reparation. It was only after
his death that the Council compelled a partial restitution, and the
affair was patched up. The richness of the prize may be gauged from the
fact that the bribe of bullion offered to the king alone was worth at
least £5,000 in modern currency. It was this sum (13 lb. 3 oz. of gold
and 131 lb. 5 oz. of silver) which the Council ordered Reneger to
restore. He is last heard of as Controller of the Port of Southampton in
1556.[261]
-----
Footnote 217:
Reprinted, 1885, by Dr. E. Arber, p. 6.
Footnote 218:
To make Ramusio, iii, Preface, apply to 1516, it is further necessary
to assume a misprint in his work, as he distinctly says that the
voyage he describes took place under Henry VII.
Footnote 219:
For Sebastian Cabot’s career in Spain see Harrisse, _John and
Sebastian Cabot_ (1896), which contains a syllabus of documents
relating to him.
Footnote 220:
_R. O., Book of King’s Payments_ (_T. R. Misc._, Bk. 214): ‘Ann. 21
Hen. VII Aug. 7th. Item to Thoms Perte maryner in rewarde that come
from the king of Castill, x sh.’
Footnote 221:
_Letters and Papers_, ii, No. 1462, and p. 875.
Footnote 222:
Ibid., No. 3459.
Footnote 223:
_Exchequer T. R. Misc. Bks._, vol. x. The entries relating to Spert
all resemble the following: ‘The herry gce diew. Delyv’de the xxvij
daye of September anno dicto [7th year of Henry VIII] to thoms spte
for the herry gce diew iiij cabulls....’
‘The herry gce diew, the katryn fortune and the gabryell riall.
Delyv’de to thoms spte [and the other two masters] the vijth. daye of
ap’ll anno dicto [7th year of the reign] vj barells tarre.’ In no case
is any other person but Spert designated as the master of the _Henry
Grace à Dieu_.
Footnote 224:
His knighthood has been disputed, but two official documents speak of
him as Sir Thomas Spert (_Letters and Papers_, vi, No. 196. xvii, No.
1258).
Footnote 225:
_Letters and Papers_, many references.
Footnote 226:
_Wardens’ Manuscript Accounts of the Drapers’ Company_, vol. vii,
86–7. Printed _in extenso_ in Harrisse, _Discovery of North America_,
iii. 747.
Footnote 227:
This passage has been regarded as fatal to the connexion of Sebastian
Cabot with a voyage in 1516, and even to his claims to have made
discoveries under Henry VII. As regards the former, it is quite
compatible with an expedition which returned without discovering land,
which is precisely what Eden hints at. On the latter point it is to be
remarked that the third Cabot voyage (that of Sebastian in search of
the North-West Passage) ended in failure and obscurity and was
overshadowed by the expeditions of the Bristol syndicates; thus it is
not surprising that the London Drapers were able to profess a very
convenient ignorance of it. They could hardly do the same about John
Cabot in view of the notoriety of his discovery in 1497, and the
brilliance of his reception in London in that year.
Footnote 228:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, part i, p. 154.
Footnote 229:
_Venetian Cal._, iii, No. 607.
Footnote 230:
Agostino Giustiniani, _Castigatissimi Annali_, Genova, 1537, lib. vi,
f. cclxxviii. Quoted by Harrisse in _John and Sebastian Cabot_ (1896),
pp. 337–8.
Footnote 231:
Hakluyt, ii. 159–63.
Footnote 232:
_The Book made by Master Robert Thorne_, Hakluyt, ii. 164–81.
Footnote 233:
This was Sebastian Cabot’s expedition, which never passed the Straits
of Magellan, but turned instead into the River Plate. The two
Englishmen were Roger Barlow and Henry Latimer. There is no record of
their personal adventures, although the details of the voyage are well
known. See Harrisse, _John and Sebastian Cabot_ (1896).
Footnote 234:
Maclehose edition, 1905, xiv. 304.
Footnote 235:
_Historia General_, Madrid, 1601, Dec. II, lib. v, cap. iii, pp.
144–5.
Footnote 236:
1852 ed., Bk. 19, chap. xiii, p. 611.
Footnote 237:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 5082.
Footnote 238:
The author of an article in the _English Historical Review_ (vol. xx,
p. 115) suggests that it was the _Samson_ and not the _Mary Gilford_
which visited the West Indies, but there seems to be no satisfactory
proof of this. The balance of evidence certainly points to the loss of
the _Samson_ in the North-West.
Footnote 239:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 3213 (20).
Footnote 240:
_Letters and Papers_, i, No. 1050.
Footnote 241:
See his epitaph and Barrett, _Antiquities of Bristol_ (1789), p. 683.
Footnote 242:
Archives of Bristol, quoted by Fox Bourne, _English Merchant_ (London,
1866), i. 155.
Footnote 243:
Hakluyt, ii. 181.
Footnote 244:
See his epitaph, p. 261.
Footnote 245:
Barrett, p. 483.
Footnote 246:
Hakluyt, vi. 124.
Footnote 247:
_Letters and Papers_, i, No. 5026; vii, No. 938.
Footnote 248:
Ibid., iv, No. 2814.
Footnote 249:
Robert Thorne’s will is copied in an Elizabethan hand on the back of
folio 209 of _Cotton MS._, Vitellius A xvi, a city chronicle which was
printed by C. L. Kingsford in 1905. The will is not included in the
printed edition.
Footnote 250:
_The Dictionary of National Biography_ states: (1) that Nicholas
Thorne was the father of Robert, and the participator in Hugh Elyot’s
voyage; and (2) that Robert Thorne junior died in 1527 at Seville. The
latter statement is evidently due to the fact that the inventory of
Thorne’s goods, drawn up by his brother, is calendared in the _Letters
and Papers_ under the date 1527. There is nothing in the document
itself (_R. O., S. P. Hen. VIII_, § 40, f. 219) to indicate its date.
On the other hand, the will (Vitellius A xvi, f. 209b) distinctly
says, ‘Anno 1532 on whitsonday dyed Robart Thorn’. The grant in
connexion with the Grammar School on March 2, 1532 (_Letters and
Papers_, v, No. 909), shows that Robert Thorne junior was living at
that date, and also speaks of Robert Thorne deceased. The possibility
that the Robert Thorne of Seville and the Robert Thorne who died in
1532 were two different men is negatived by a comparison of the
inventory with a signed letter (_R. O., S. P. Hen. VIII_, § 81, f.
151) by Nicholas Thorne. The handwriting of both is identical, showing
that the inventory was written by Nicholas, and therefore that it
referred to the goods of his brother who, as the will shows, died in
1532.
Footnote 251:
_Letters and Papers_, vi, No. 1696; xii, No. 233; xiv, part ii, No.
172.
Footnote 252:
Ibid., xiv, part i, No. 184.
Footnote 253:
Ibid., xx, part ii, No. 874.
Footnote 254:
Barrett, p. 483.
Footnote 255:
Hakluyt, viii. 3.
Footnote 256:
_Spanish Cal._ vi, No. 163.
Footnote 257:
Hakluyt, xi. 23.
Footnote 258:
See the _English Historical Review_, xxiv. 96, article by R. G.
Marsden.
Footnote 259:
_R. O., S. P. Hen. VIII_, § 113, f. 180.
Footnote 260:
_Spanish Cal._ vi, part i, No. 148.
Footnote 261:
The above notes on Hawkins and Reneger are drawn from numerous
references in the later volumes of _Letters and Papers_, and from the
_Acts of the Privy Council_.
CHAPTER XI
THE AFRICAN VOYAGES
In the days of Queen Elizabeth, when Michael Locke and Martin Frobisher
were contemplating the revival of the search for the North-West Passage,
a certain James Alday wrote to the former, asking to be employed in the
project.[262] As a recommendation he put forward the claim to have
‘invented’ the trade to the coast of Barbary in the reign of Edward VI.
Sir John Lutterell and other merchants, he said, appointed him to
command the first expedition to that land in the year 1551. But a great
epidemic of the sweating sickness broke out; most of the promoters of
the voyage died, and Alday himself was struck down. The ship, called the
_Lion_ of London, a vessel of 150 tons, was then at Portsmouth. Thomas
Wyndham assumed the command and, leaving Alday behind, took her out to
the Atlantic coast of Morocco to a port named Santa Cruz. There he
traded, presumably with success, and returned, bringing with him two
Moors of noble blood to England. Such is all that is now known of the
opening voyage of the African trade, which assumed great importance in
the decade which followed.
Thomas Wyndham was the son of a Norfolk knight who had served at sea
against the French, and who became a councillor and vice-admiral under
Henry VIII. He himself also served in the navy, taking part in the
fighting against the French and Scots in 1544–5, and filling spare
moments with piracy as did William Hawkins and others of Henry’s
officers. In 1547 he was vice-admiral in the fleet which accompanied
Somerset’s army up the east coast to the Battle of Pinkie. His next
exploit was the Barbary voyage above described. By all accounts he was a
fierce, masterful man, making more enemies than friends among his
equals, but always able to command the loyalty of his crews; just the
type of character of which the service and personality of King Henry
bred such numerous examples, and whose traditions were handed on to the
golden age of Elizabeth’s sea captains.
A second voyage to the Barbary coast was set forth in 1552, on a larger
scale, and its history was written by Hakluyt[263] from the relation of
James Thomas, Wyndham’s page on the expedition. Three vessels, the
_Lion_, 150 tons, the _Botolph_, 80 tons, and a Portuguese caravel of 60
tons purchased at Newport in Wales, the whole fleet manned by 120
persons, sailed from Bristol at the beginning of May 1552 with Wyndham
in chief command. Sir John Yorke, Sir William Gerard, Sir Thomas Wroth,
Francis Lambert, and other London merchants, were the promoters or
‘adventurers’, as the investors were then called. After a prosperous
passage, which occupied only a fortnight, the fleet arrived at Zafia on
the coast of Barbary, in 32° latitude. Some goods were there set on
shore to be conveyed to the city of Morocco, and they then proceeded to
Santa Cruz, where the _Lion_ had been in the previous year. A French
ship was already in the port on their arrival, and hastened to take
refuge under the walls of the town, a precaution which was not
unjustifiable in view of the reputation for piracy which the English had
by this time established at sea. The townspeople, mistaking their
intentions, at first fired on them, but on recognizing them as having
been there before, received them amicably. Three months were spent at
this place before cargoes were completed, consisting of sugar, dates,
almonds, and molasses.
On the return voyage the ships stood well out into the ocean in order to
get a west wind for England. The _Lion_ sprang a leak, and it was
decided to make for Lancerota in the Canary Islands to effect repairs.
Part of the _Lion’s_ cargo was unloaded on the island, some of the men
being set to guard it. The inhabitants took note of these proceedings
and, seeing that the caravel was not of English build and supposing that
she had been unlawfully acquired, made a sudden attack on the shore
party. Some of the latter were captured and seventy chests of sugar were
carried off. Seeing this, Wyndham sent three boats full of men to the
rescue and put the Spaniards to flight, killing many and making prisoner
the governor of the island, an old gentleman of seventy. After this,
both sides having suffered losses, a parley ensued and a mutual
restoration of prisoners was agreed upon. In addition, the Spaniards
gave an acknowledgement of the damage inflicted which, it was decided,
was to be recovered from the Spanish merchants residing in London.
The leak being mended the voyage was resumed. As the English were
leaving the roadstead a Portuguese armed fleet sailed in, but did not
give chase. The Portuguese had already taken great offence at the
English trading on the African coast, and threatened to treat as
belligerents any Englishmen found there. When it came to fighting,
however, they were generally very faint-hearted, and they never
succeeded in capturing an English ship.
After seven or eight weeks’ sailing Wyndham and his fleet reached
Plymouth, and thence proceeded to London, arriving at the end of October
1552.
The experience gained in these voyages emboldened those interested to
attempt a much more distant adventure, having for its object the
acquisition of cargoes more valuable than dates and sugar. There was in
London at that time a Portuguese refugee named Antonio Anes Pinteado. He
is described as a skilled pilot and captain, who had formerly served on
the coasts of Brazil and Guinea, and who was therefore well acquainted
with the intricacies of the navigation in the latter region. The cause
of his quarrel with his own country is not known, but he was so much in
dread of his compatriots that he would not venture unaccompanied into
their society even in London; neither was he to be deceived by the fair
promises made him by the Portuguese Government, which doubtless was
eager to stop the mouth of one who knew so much. This man placed his
services at the disposal of the African adventurers, and was engaged by
them to guide an expedition to the coasts of Guinea and Benin, where
gold, ivory, and other rare commodities were obtainable. With him went
Thomas Wyndham, who assumed the chief command. It does not plainly
appear whether Pinteado was intended to have any share of the control of
the expedition beyond what his duty as pilot entitled him to; if such
was the intention of the promoters it was soon overruled by Wyndham, who
kept the Portuguese in a strictly subordinate position.
The sole existing account of the voyage is not very satisfactory. It was
written by Richard Eden and published by him in his _Decades of the New
World_ in 1555.[264] It is marred by the deep prejudice against Wyndham
and a corresponding bias in favour of Pinteado displayed by the writer.
Eden, although he did his contemporaries good service by arousing their
interest in travel and geography, was one of those unhappy people who
can discover nothing good in their own country and have nothing but
censure for the acts of their own countrymen. His temperament can best
be illustrated by a quotation of his own words. In the preface to the
work above mentioned, after a general eulogy of the Spaniards and King
Philip and a severe condemnation of those Englishmen who resented that
monarch’s intrusion into the affairs of England, he proceeds: ‘Stoop,
England, stoop, and learn to know thy lord and master, as horses and
other brute beasts are taught to do. Be not indocible like tigers and
dragons, and such other monsters noyous to mankind.... But oh,
unthankfull England and void of honest shame! Who hath given the face of
a whore and the tongue of a serpent without shame to speak venomous
words in secret against the anointed of God ...’, with a great deal more
to the same effect. To such a man Wyndham, asserting his authority, was
an insane tyrant, ‘a terrible Hydra, with virtues few or none adorned’;
while Pinteado, a renegade and traitor to his own country, selling that
country’s most cherished secrets to its rivals, was ‘a wise, discreet
and sober man, ... a man worthy to serve any prince, and most vilely
used’. A realization of Eden’s infirmity is necessary to a just
appreciation of his account of the voyage.
On August 12, 1553, not quite a month after Mary’s accession, the little
squadron consisting of two ships and a pinnace set sail from Portsmouth.
The ships were the _Lion_, which had made the two Barbary voyages, and
of which Wyndham was part owner, and the _Primrose_, the pinnace being
named the _Moon_. The two last-mentioned belonged to the navy and were
lent for the expedition.[265] The three vessels were manned by 140 men,
including several of the merchants who had ‘adventured’ the voyage. Most
of them were destined never to return. They touched first at Madeira,
where wines were bought and duly paid for. Here they encountered a great
Portuguese galleon, full of men and guns, expressly sent to prohibit
their voyage; but, on a closer view, she refrained from interfering with
them, and they proceeded unmolested. At this point the disagreements
between Wyndham and Pinteado began. Eden implies that hitherto they had
had equal authority, the fleet ‘having two captains’, an improbable
arrangement. However that may have been, Wyndham was henceforth supreme,
and was evidently backed by the officers and crews, while the merchants,
if we are to believe Eden, sided with Pinteado. Voyaging in leisurely
fashion so as not to arrive on the coast before the end of the hot
season, and touching at various islands on the way, they at length
reached the River of Sestos in the westernmost part of Guinea, known as
the Grain Coast (the modern Liberia). They did not tarry to load the
‘grains’ of the district, although cargoes of them were frequently
brought to Europe by the Portuguese;[266] but, ‘by the persuasion or
rather inforcement of this tragical captain’, they pushed on to the Gold
Coast, and there traded on either side of the Castle of Mina, the
head-quarters of the Portuguese.
The position of the latter on the Guinea coast at this time somewhat
resembled that of the English and French on the coast of Coromandel at
the opening of Clive’s career, with the exception, of course, that the
Portuguese officials were the servants of the Government and not of a
trading company. There was no effective occupation of the hinterland or
even of the entire coast, but at various places along the latter were
Portuguese forts and trading stations, of which Mina, not far from the
modern Cape Coast Castle, was the chief. Other places on the coast were
ruled over by native chiefs in a state of vassallage to the Portuguese,
whose hold over them was not sufficiently rigorous to prevent them from
trading with the English and French. Thus there was no colony in the
sense in which the word was applied to the Spanish settlements in
America, but merely a chain of commercial ‘factories’. Liberty of trade
among the Portuguese themselves was restricted to those who had the
royal licence for that purpose, a fact which redoubled their annoyance
at the invasion of their preserves by others.
Wyndham did not touch at Mina itself, but exchanged his wares with the
native chiefs, obtaining in all about 150 lb. weight of gold, a sum
which in itself would have cleared all the expenses of the expedition
and have paid a handsome profit besides. Eden asserts that it was
Wyndham’s unbalanced brain which then caused him to leave this lucrative
trade and push on to Benin to seek pepper. But, judging from the
accounts of later voyages, it is probable that no more gold was then
forthcoming, or that the demand for English goods had slackened. Only
one other expedition of which we have particulars secured more than 150
lb. of gold, the supply being limited; and the natives were always very
grasping and prone to take offence. The record of Wyndham’s career
certainly gives no ground for the supposition that he would forsake the
certainty of gold for the possibility of pepper.
The decision to make for Benin was the prelude to a series of disasters.
Pinteado opposed it owing to the lateness of the season, and a violent
scene was the result. ‘Wyndham ... fell into a sudden rage, reviling the
said Pinteado, calling him Jew, with other opprobrious words, saying:
This whoreson Jew hath promised to bring us to such places as are not,
or as he cannot bring us unto: but if he do not, I will cut off his ears
and nail them to the mast.’ Pinteado submitted, and piloted the fleet to
the river of Benin,[267] up which he himself with Nicholas Lambert and
other merchants proceeded for some sixty leagues in the pinnace. Having
completed this distance, they left the pinnace and travelled thirty
miles inland to the town of a native king, by whom they were civilly
received. The king could speak Portuguese, and promised to buy all their
merchandise in exchange for pepper. In the course of a month eighty tons
of pepper were collected, and the merchants were assured that more would
be obtained until the fleet should be fully laden.
In the meantime the inaction and the climate were producing dire effects
on the crews left at the mouth of the river. The men ate without
moderation of the tropical fruits, and drank the liquor exuding from the
trunks of palm trees, ‘and in such extreme heat running continually into
the water, ... than which nothing is more dangerous, were thereby
brought into swellings and agues’, so that they sickened and died at a
terrible rate, sometimes four or five in a day. This could not go on for
long without entailing utter extermination to an expedition which
numbered only 140 men to begin with. Therefore, a month having elapsed,
Wyndham sent word to Pinteado and the others to return immediately,
contenting themselves with such cargo as the pinnace could bring down.
But they failed to comply, and wrote instead, telling of the quantity of
pepper which they hoped to secure. Wyndham replied with a peremptory
order to come back at once, under threat of being left behind; then, in
desperation at their callous disregard of the sufferings of the crews,
he lost control of himself and ‘all raging, brake up Pinteado’s cabin,
brake open his chests, spoiled such provision of cold stilled waters and
suckets as he had provided for his health, and left him nothing, neither
of his instruments to sail by, nor yet of his apparel; and in the
meantime falling sick, himself died also.’
On receipt of the second summons Pinteado had started for the coast to
expostulate, the other merchants still remaining up the river. Before
his arrival Wyndham was dead. The surviving officers and men were
thoroughly exasperated, and gave him a very bad time with copious abuse
and threats of violence. In vain he asked to be allowed to fetch his
companions from the interior. They would stay for nothing, and refused
even to let him remain behind with the ship’s boat and an old sail, with
which he promised to bring Lambert and the others back to England.
Eden’s account is very confused, and there is no mention of the pinnace
having come down the river again, the messages having evidently been
conveyed by smaller boats, possibly by natives. If the merchants still
had the pinnace their case would not be altogether desperate. There is
no information as to their ultimate fate.
Before commencing the homeward voyage one of the ships was abandoned and
sunk for lack of men.[268] A week afterwards Pinteado, who had been
degraded to a menial position, fell sick and died ‘from very pensiveness
and thought, that struck him to the heart’; and when the remaining
vessel at length reached Plymouth scarcely forty men were left of all
those who had set forth.
The lessons enforced by the disasters of this voyage were taken well to
heart by subsequent adventurers. The succeeding expeditions confined
themselves to the Guinea coasts, and left Benin severely alone. They
were also careful not to remain on the coast after the beginning of the
season of extreme heat, and, as they probably took greater personal
precautions against disease, we hear of very little mortality
thenceforward. The importance of the information supplied by Pinteado
cannot be overestimated. The arrival without a hitch on the Grain Coast,
the successful trading in the neighbourhood of Mina, the finding of the
native town 150 miles up the Benin river which none of the English had
ever seen before, all point to the fact that the expedition was availing
itself of the experience that the Portuguese had taken a century to
gather. It is no wonder that Pinteado, lending himself to such a
purpose, went in fear of his life, as his admirer tells us, from his own
countrymen. No provocation can justify a man in betraying his country’s
interests, and we cannot feel much commiseration for his melancholy end;
he was a traitor receiving a traitor’s wages. Eden’s denunciations of
Wyndham’s character as a commander are largely discounted by the fact
that he was in command at all. He was a tried man, and his record was
known; no company of merchants would have entrusted him with their lives
and goods if he had been the irresponsible maniac whom Eden depicts. No
doubt he was jealous of his authority, and rightly so, for a hazardous
adventure cannot be conducted on republican lines. In the days when
success at sea depended primarily on the captain’s personal powers of
discipline, harshness was often the only justifiable course, as Drake
and many another were to prove.
Terrible as had been the personal sufferings in Wyndham’s last voyage,
the commercial possibilities of the Guinea coast had been proved to be
most encouraging. A strong syndicate was therefore formed to send out
another expedition in 1554, including among others the names of Sir
George Barnes, Sir John Yorke, Thomas Locke, Anthony Hickman, and Edward
Castlyn. Five vessels were prepared—the _Trinity_, 140 tons, the _John
Evangelist_, 140, the _Bartholomew_, 90, and two pinnaces, one of which
foundered before getting clear of the English coast—the whole being
placed under the command of John Locke. Locke was a merchant rather than
a sailor, and the arrangement was thus analogous to that which obtained
then and long afterwards in the navy, when the captain of a ship was
commonly a soldier, the master being responsible for the handling of the
vessel. This was the same John Locke who had made a pilgrimage to
Jerusalem in the previous year, of which Hakluyt prints a very
entertaining account. Eden again supplies the story of this voyage and,
having no quarrel with any individual concerned, gives a much more
intelligible description of what occurred.[269]
The squadron sailed from the Thames on October 11, 1554, was detained
for a fortnight at Dover by adverse winds, and again for three or four
days at Rye. After touching once more at Dartmouth the English coast was
finally lost sight of on the night of November 1. Thence a fair passage
was made to Guinea, the first point of which, Cape Mensurado, was
sighted on December 21. Next day they entered the River of Sestos, the
principal haven on the Grain Coast, and remained there for a week,
trading for grains. Five more days were spent at the mouth of another
stream, the Rio Dulce, 75 miles to the south-eastward, and altogether
630 butts of grains were obtained. On January 3, 1555, the expedition
made sail along the coast to the eastward, passing Cape Palmas which
marks the division between the Grain Coast and the Ivory Coast.
Apparently no stay was made at the latter on the outward passage, for by
the 11th they had reached Cape Tres Puntas, which similarly divides the
Ivory Coast from the Gold Coast. Fifteen miles to the west of Cape Tres
Puntas there was a Portuguese fort named Arra. Their head-quarters, the
Castle of El Mina, lay about 90 miles to the eastward of the same cape,
and well in the middle of the Gold Coast.
Very successful trading was done at the native settlements on either
side of El Mina, and altogether 400 lb. of gold was secured—the greatest
haul recorded by any single expedition. In particular, they were well
received at a town called Cape Corea (probably Cape Corso, the present
Cape Coast Castle), where a native chief named Don John maintained his
independence against the Portuguese. At another place, called Samma,
however, the negroes were in possession of two or three cannon, with
which they fired at the English after taking a hostage. The hostage was
detained, and the ships had to go on without him. During this time the
_Trinity_ had proceeded still further east to the limits of the Gold
Coast, and, the others having overtaken her, the homeward voyage was
begun from Perecow Grande, otherwise called Egrand, the easternmost port
of all. Although it is not specifically mentioned, considerable trading
must have been done on the Ivory Coast while the ships were slowly
beating westwards against wind and current; for Eden relates that there
were 250 tusks among the cargo brought home, and there was no time for
these to have been obtained on the outward passage. Also, at some town
not named, Robert Gainsh, master of the _John Evangelist_, kidnapped
five natives, who were brought home as slaves.[270] This had an
unfavourable effect on the attitude of the natives towards succeeding
expeditions.
Up to this point Eden follows closely the log of the pilot who gave him
the account of the voyage, but here he diverges into a dissertation on
elephants, and gives only very meagre details of the homeward passage.
Although the latter was begun in the middle of February, it was April 22
before the latitude of 9° was reached, but this was a common experience.
Wind and current made it extremely difficult for ships rigged in the
fashion of the time to get away from the Guinea coast, and even when
that had been accomplished, the course had to be laid well out into the
ocean, and contrary winds were met with until the Azores were passed.
The expedition arrived in England at some time in July or August 1555.
Eden does not give the date, but says the passage took twenty weeks and
that twenty-four men died on the way home. Financially, it must have
been a dazzling success; the value of the grains and ivory is difficult
to estimate, but the gold alone was easily worth £20,000 in the currency
of the time, and none of the large ships had been lost.
When these transactions became known in Portugal intense indignation was
aroused; already, before the return of John Locke, a protest had been
lodged, and on July 18, 1555, the Privy Council sent instructions to the
authorities of London and Bristol to stop all voyages to Guinea until
further orders.[271] This did not mean that the Portuguese view was
already accepted, but simply that no decision on the matter had yet been
arrived at. The chief factors in the situation were these: King Philip,
still remaining in England since his marriage in the previous year, was
a supporter of the Portuguese monopoly, based as it was on the papal
bull which divided all extra-European lands between Spain and Portugal;
it was clear to him that if English merchants carried their point in
this affair, a challenge of his own monopoly in the west was certain,
sooner or later, to arise. The Council, next in importance so far as
effective influence went, were naturally desirous of encouraging the
efforts of their fellow countrymen, but at the same time stood in
considerable awe of Philip and would not go to the length of defying his
clearly expressed commands. Finally, the queen, priest-ridden, harassed,
and miserable, but yet at bottom a patriot, was torn between reverence
to the decree of Rodrigo Borgia and a consciousness that, in obeying
that decree, she was betraying the nation whose crown she wore. While
the decision was still in suspense Philip sailed, early in September,
for the Netherlands, whence he still continued to exercise his authority
over the affairs of England. The Portuguese ambassador, Lopez de Sousa,
continued to urge his suit, and the queen committed the negotiations to
the Council, which had arrived at no conclusion as late as October
21.[272] A week later they transmitted a copy of his allegations to
Philip, together with their own opinion thereupon.[273]
The Portuguese statement was to the following effect:[274] News had been
received that in January of this same year, 1555, three large English
merchant ships (evidently John Locke’s squadron) had visited the coasts
of Guinea, which were either in the possession of the King of Portugal
or under his protection, and had forcibly exchanged their merchandise
with the natives for huge quantities of gold and ivory, of which
commodities they had wellnigh stripped the whole country; in which
process they had stirred up the resentment of the natives against the
Portuguese. This trade was only permitted under restrictions to the King
of Portugal’s own subjects, those who infringed the regulations being
severely punished. The ambassador was therefore to demand the punishment
of the Englishmen concerned, the handing over of any Portuguese who
should have assisted them, the restitution of the treasure, and a
proclamation forbidding such enterprises in future under the severest
penalties.
[Illustration:
MAP OF GUINEA AND BENIN, 1558.
From Add. MS. 5415. A. 7.
]
Such was the position, based on the world-dividing bull of Alexander VI,
taken up by the two nations of the Peninsula, and now for the first time
flaunted in all its arrogance in the face of an English Government. The
Government, already discredited in the eyes of the country, and
entangled in the net of the Counter-Reformation, lacked the insight and
the courage to take up the challenge. For many a year to come it was to
be left to private men, with the fear of the gallows before them, to
assert the right of Englishmen to sail all seas and do business in all
lands, the prohibitions of popes and emperors notwithstanding. The reply
of the merchants opens with words which might serve as the title-deed of
a commercial empire.
‘First we say we be merchants who, by common usage of the world, do
use traffique in all places of the world, as well Asia and Africa and
Europa, and have never been restrained from resort to any places....
And following this our accustomed usage we have of late resorted to
sundry places both towards the south and north parts of the world, in
both which we find the governors and the people of the places well
willing to receive us friendly and gently. Amongst other places, our
factors did about two years past resort to sundry places where we
found several princes or governors, and with them traffiqued,
exchanging merchandises for merchandises, and from them returned
quietly, thinking that without any offence we might use there (where
we found no resistance) the same liberty that we use and do find in
all other places of the world.’
After their return, they continued, they prepared to set forth another
expedition to the same place, but were stayed by the Council and
commanded not to enter any dominion of the King of Portugal or any other
prince without his permission; which command their factors punctually
obeyed, not landing in any place where the said king had a town,
fortress, or officers or other persons that forbade them. Their factors
did not land in any force, but awaited in their ships the resort of the
people to them, and even then did not trade with them until the people
assured them that they were no subjects of the King of Portugal. The
inhabitants offered them ground to build upon if they wished to land and
fortify the country, and the assistance of slaves in the work without
any charge.[275] Their factors were also with a king of those parts, ‘a
prince of power’, whom they call the King of Bynne, in whose country
they traded after obtaining his licence; and they left behind them there
three English merchants to further view the country, bringing with them
also certain men of that country to England, and promising to return in
a short time.[276] Accordingly, they made preparations for another
voyage at the beginning of this last summer, but were again stayed by
command of the king and queen, the King of Portugal saying that his
subjects were wronged by these navigations, and promising to show proofs
in six weeks or two months at latest. They obeyed this second command,
and in the meantime had heard that three ships had sailed from France to
those countries, and that two others were preparing to sail. Upon which
they continued their preparations, and, if the voyage were now stayed,
they would be ruined. They concluded by begging to be allowed to
continue the voyage, and offered to bind themselves not to visit or do
violence to any of the possessions or merchants of the Portuguese, nor
to trade with any country without its ruler’s consent.[277]
The Council, as has been said, forwarded to King Philip a copy of the
ambassador’s statement, and put before him at the same time their own
advice as to the course to be pursued, namely, that the merchants were
within their rights in making these voyages, and ought not to be
debarred from the same, especially as they were also being made by the
French. Their opinion was, then, that the merchants should be allowed to
proceed at their own risk, after giving the sureties which they
themselves had offered for their good behaviour.
The intercession of the Council, and also that of the queen, was
unavailing: Philip, seeing the great principle involved, was obdurate,
and commanded that the voyage should be stayed. In a later communication
(December 17, 1555),[278] he expressed a wish to have the merchants
compensated, but took no active steps to secure that end. A memorandum
of the Council’s affairs, however, suggests that the queen herself paid
them the costs of the goods which they had provided for the trade.[279]
On December 30 Edward Castlyn, Jeffrey Allen, Rowland Fox, and Richard
Stockbridge were summoned before the Council to hear its reluctant
decision. By the queen’s command they and all other merchants concerned
were to bring their ships to such places as were convenient, and there
to discharge all the wares they had provided for the Guinea trade, such
as were not vendible in any other place; receipts should be given and
compensation paid. As to their other expenses, the matter of
compensation should be considered.[280]
The queen at the same time wrote a letter to the King of Portugal
acquainting him with the above decision.[281] The Venetian envoy, in a
dispatch to his Government, states that the queen interceded with the
ambassador of Portugal to consent to the Guinea voyage being made ‘this
once only’, but that he would not agree. He adds that two or three ships
had nevertheless gone secretly.[282]
The official prohibition of the Guinea trade was more ostensible than
real. The Council had no intention of stopping it—possibly some of its
members were financially interested—and was not prepared to go further
than a purely paper submission to the demands of Philip and the
Portuguese. Even the steps taken to prevent the individual voyage of
Castlyn and his associates were not effectual; for although metal basins
and sham jewellery formed part of the cargoes taken to Guinea, there was
also generally a considerable quantity of cloth, which would not come
under the description of goods not vendible elsewhere, and which would
therefore not be surrendered. Such being the attitude of the Council,
that of the customers and port authorities throughout the country may
well be imagined. When large armed vessels were being manned and
provisioned for long voyages and laden with goods which would find a
market in no European port, they shut their eyes, or looked another way.
And so, besides the three remaining Guinea expeditions of Mary’s reign
of which Hakluyt has preserved the particulars, there are traces of
several others, doubtless quite as successful, which King Philip, with
all his influence over the queen, was quite unable to prevent.
While the official decision had been still under consideration, and
while the ships of the syndicate already mentioned had been under a
provisional arrest pending a final prohibition, another expedition had
slipped off to Guinea on September 30, 1555, sailing from Newport in the
Isle of Wight. It was under the command of William Towerson, a merchant
of London, and was probably unconnected with the venture of Castlyn and
his friends, of whom no mention is made. Towerson, who is himself the
narrator of the voyage,[283] refers to the presence of other merchants
in the ships, but it is very likely that he himself was the principal
adventurer. This time there were only two ships, the _Hart_, of 60 tons,
commanded by John Ralph, who had sailed with Locke in the previous year,
and the _Hind_, commanded by William Carter, and probably not much
larger, since Towerson himself sailed in the _Hart_. After finally
clearing from Dartmouth on October 20 they made a fair run down to the
Canary Islands, which were sighted on November 6. Thence standing in to
the main land they fished in 14 fathoms and caught a quantity of sea
bream. A day or two later they saw six Portuguese caravels fishing in
the neighbourhood of the Rio del Oro in the present Spanish territory to
the south of Morocco, and overhauling one of them they took various
stores out of her which they liberally paid for.
On December 12 they sighted the Guinea coast, and on the 15th entered
the River St. Vincent, eight leagues to the eastward of the River of
Sestos. They found it impossible to beat back to the latter river on
account of the winds and currents which set always to the eastward. In
the River St. Vincent they obtained a small quantity of grains and
ivory, but found the inhabitants very greedy and no profitable trading
to be done. After coming very nearly to blows they departed and sailed
on towards the Ivory Coast, doubling Cape Palmas on the 23rd. During the
ensuing week they bought ivory in a river lying about 40 miles to the
east of the cape, and on January 3, 1556, they sighted Cape Tres Puntas,
the westernmost boundary of the Gold Coast. Arriving at the town of
Samma, where last year a man had been kidnapped and the ships fired
upon, they went in cautiously and were able to do little trading at
first, but afterwards obtained a fair quantity of gold there. They next
proceeded to Don John’s town, beyond the Mina, and after some bartering
the sons of that chief attempted to betray them to the Portuguese. Some
of the _Hart’s_ men narrowly escaped an ambush, whereupon cannon were
mounted in the ships’ boats, which sailed in close to the shore and
engaged in an artillery duel with the Portuguese upon a hill. The
English suffered no damage. At another place they found the negroes
distrustful because some of them had been carried off by the master of
the _John Evangelist_ in the previous voyage.
From January 14 to February 4, however, they did excellent business on
the more easterly portion of the coast, taking several pounds of gold
daily. On the latter date, having taken stock of the provisions, and
finding them running low, and finding also that the beer, without which
no sailor at that time considered himself properly fed, was turning
sour, they decided to begin the return voyage. One entry in Towerson’s
log is significant as pointing to the existence of other clandestine
expeditions at this time: ‘The fifth day we continued sailing and
thought to have met with some English ships, but found none.’ He had
evidently received information of their presence on the coast.
Towerson made a better homeward passage than did his predecessors. By
February 13 he was clear of Cape Palmas, having passed the whole of the
Gold and Ivory Coasts in nine days. He had found by experience, he says,
that from two hours after midnight until eight in the morning the wind
blew off the shore from the north-north-east, although all the rest of
the time it was at south-west. On March 22 he had reached the latitude
of Cape Verde, and a month later that of the Azores. On May 14, 1556,
both his vessels dropped anchor at Bristol after a most prosperous
voyage. Apparently not one man died in either crew. He does not give the
total amount of the treasure secured, but a reckoning up of the various
daily takings mentioned shows a total of about fifty tusks and 130 lb.
of gold. Considering the small size of the two ships employed, and
consequently of the general working expenses, this must have yielded an
excellent return on the outlay.
The successful return of the _Hart_ and the _Hind_ was the signal for
renewed preparations for further Guinea adventures, and for a fresh
outburst of activity on the part of the Council, ostensibly intended to
frustrate the same. On July 7, 1556, orders were sent to all customers,
&c., not to permit any one to ship goods for ‘Mina, Guynye, Bynney or
any other place thereabouts within the King of Portingales dominions’;
and on the 28th the command was repeated with instructions for warning
to be given to all merchants. Again on August 8 the Council addressed a
letter to Anthony Hussey, Governor of the Merchant Adventurers in the
Low Countries, to the effect that they had heard that Miles Mordeyne, a
London merchant, had prepared a cargo in Flanders to be sent to Bristol
and thence to Guinea. Hussey was to make search for the wares and
sequester them until further orders, sending particulars as to their
condition and value. On the same date they also sent word to the Mayor
and Customers of Bristol to arrest and unload two ships which certain
merchants contemplated setting forth for Guinea. The cargoes had been
secretly conveyed to the Welsh coast to be loaded. Miles Mordeyne, who
was apparently at Bristol, was to be sent before the Council. On
September 22 Giles White and Thomas Chester were held to bail in £500 as
a guarantee of their appearance when called upon in the matter of
sending two ships from Bristol to Guinea.[284]
These measures give the impression that the Council was actually in
earnest; but the fact remains that, in spite of them, Towerson and
others were able to sail once more for Guinea in this same autumn. If
there had been any genuine desire to put a stop to these enterprises
nothing would have been easier than to imprison the adventurers on their
return and to confiscate their spoils. The fact that this was never done
leads to the conclusion that the Council was merely making a show of
zeal to deprecate Philip’s anger.
Towerson, on his second expedition,[285] had to use more precaution than
formerly in order to get safely away. The _Tiger_, of 120 tons, his
principal ship, was equipped at Harwich, and sailed from thence to
Scilly on September 14, 1556. At Scilly he was to meet the _Hart_ and a
pinnace of 16 tons which had been prepared at Bristol. These may have
been the two vessels which the Council professed itself so anxious to
arrest. The _Hart_ and the pinnace failed to appear at the rendezvous,
at which the _Tiger_ arrived on the 28th. After waiting for some time
Towerson in the _Tiger_ put back to Plymouth, being joined there by his
consorts shortly before the middle of November, and on the 15th of that
month the whole squadron set sail for Africa nearly two months after the
intended time of departure. The nature of the intrigue which finally set
them at liberty can only be imagined, as no clue has survived, but it is
difficult to suppose that they departed otherwise than with the
knowledge and connivance of the Council.
As was usual, a fairly quick outward passage was made, the Guinea coast
being sighted on December 30. The inaccuracy of the prevailing methods
of calculating longitude is illustrated by the fact that the River of
Sestos, the intended landfall, was overshot by some 150 miles. Shortly
after reaching the coast the sails of three ships and two pinnaces were
seen to windward. The English prepared for action, manœuvred to recover
the wind, and then gave chase. The strangers likewise cleared for action
and, when ready, offered battle ‘very finely appointed with their
streamers and pendants and ensigns, and the noise of trumpets very
bravely’. When within hailing distance, however, it was discovered that
the opposing fleet was manned, not by Portuguese, but by Frenchmen,
bound upon the same errand as the English; and, instead of fighting, an
alliance was struck up, both sides agreeing to trade without cutting
prices and to support each other against the Portuguese. The French
ships were from Havre, Rouen, and Honfleur, under the chief command of
Denis Blondel. He informed Towerson that they had been six weeks upon
the Grain Coast with very little result, apparently fearing to push on
to the Gold Coast on account of reports of a Portuguese armed fleet at
Mina. They had fallen upon a single Portuguese vessel of 200 tons in the
River of Sestos, and had burned her, only three or four of the crew
being saved. Blondel seemed extremely glad of the presence of the
English, and offered to share his victuals with them and act under their
orders in all things.
For the first fortnight of January 1557 they all proceeded slowly along
the Ivory Coast, arriving at Cape Tres Puntas on the 14th. A small
quantity of ivory was picked up on the way, but for the most part the
negroes were shy of trading. At one point they attempted elephant
hunting on their own account, without success. Their methods certainly
read as if they were designed rather for the assault of a city than of
an elephant: thirty men were landed, ‘all well armed with harquebusses,
pikes, long-bows, cross-bows, partizans, long swords, and swords and
bucklers: we found two elephants, which we stroke divers times with
harquebusses and long-bows, but they went away from us and hurt one of
our men’.
At a native town where they were well received the negroes told them
that they had witnessed a fight of two ships against one a month before;
and further on they received definite intelligence of the presence of
another English ship on the coast, which had brought back one of the
negroes kidnapped by Robert Gainsh two years previously. The Frenchmen
also asserted that they knew of five other French vessels making the
same voyage.
The combined squadrons were now past Cape Tres Puntas and doing daily
business with the inhabitants of the Gold Coast, who seem at this time
to have been in a state of hostility towards the Portuguese. On January
25, while they were anchored off Samma with most of the ships’ boats and
merchants ashore, five Portuguese ships suddenly appeared. Guns were
fired, the crews hastily embarked, and anchors were weighed; but by this
time night had fallen and nothing could be done but prepare for action
on the following day. In the morning it was seen that the Portuguese had
anchored near the shore; the English and French did likewise, ‘within
demiculverin shot of them’. It was not for them, in their rôle of
peaceful traders, to commence hostilities, but the challenge was
sufficiently obvious. Night again came on without further developments
taking place.
Next day both sides made sail, but the allies gained the wind of the
Portuguese and gradually bored them in towards the shore until they were
forced to tack and make for them. The allies tacked also and stood out
to sea ahead of the enemy; then, when they had sufficient room to fight,
they took in their topsails and waited. The Portuguese came up one by
one, the first being a small bark well armed and very fast, which
exchanged broadsides and then passed on ahead. Next came a caravel,
which did some damage to the French admiral’s ship. After her came the
Portuguese admiral in a large ship, whose fire was ineffective owing to
the guns being carried too high, followed by two caravels more. Towerson
says that the _Tiger_ ‘was so weak in the side, that she laid all her
ordinance in the sea’, which seems to mean that the wind laid her over
so much that sufficient elevation could not be given to the guns. The
Portuguese, being to leeward, were just as badly off, since they could
only fire over their enemies’ heads. Accordingly the _Tiger_ and the
_Espoir_, Denis Blondel’s ship, made an attempt to board the Portuguese
admiral. The _Espoir_ missed her and fell astern, missing also the two
caravels which followed. The other two Frenchmen stood aloof, and the
_Hart_ was far behind. Nevertheless, the Portuguese made no offer to
stop and fight Towerson, but stood on out to sea. He chased them for two
hours, and they then turned shorewards again, hoping to catch the French
admiral, who for some unexplained reason was close to the land. He was
caught under the lee of the whole Portuguese squadron, received all
their broadsides, and would have been boarded but that the _Tiger_ stood
in to his assistance. The _Hart_ and the other two French ships
meanwhile looked on and did nothing. The French admiral was still full
of fight and, with the _Tiger_, regained the wind of the enemy and
chased them till nightfall.
Next day the whole fleet reunited, with the exception of one Frenchman
who had fled. The master of the _Hart_ excused himself, saying that his
ship ‘would neither rear nor steer’. The French admiral had half his
crew sick or dead, and the other Frenchmen said they could do no more
fighting. The English pinnace had to be burnt owing to her bad state of
repair. However, the Portuguese had likewise had enough of it, and
troubled them no more.
Trade was now resumed, and the allies sailed slowly down to the eastern
part of the Gold Coast, where the natives were more amenable and the
greater part of the profits of the voyage were obtained. Business went
on throughout the month of February, entirely undisturbed by the
Portuguese. The English kept to the leeward or eastward of the French,
doubtless skimming the cream off the trade; and when one of the
Frenchmen attempted to push on ahead of them he was fired on and reduced
to obedience. After this incident Towerson makes no further mention of
the French, and it is evident that the allies parted company here or
soon afterwards. At the end of February a native chief called King Abaan
sent friendly messages, inviting them to make a settlement and build a
fort. His town was said to be as large in circuit as London, and with
1,000 ricks of corn outside the walls. After doing business at this
place they began to retrace their course along the coast, passing a fort
where they saw the five Portuguese ships at anchor. Next day they were
surprised at anchor by a new fleet just out from Portugal, consisting of
a ship of 500 tons, another of 200, and a pinnace; but they were able to
escape without fighting. The _Hart_ was badly handled, and her captain
was reproved by Towerson.
The new arrivals brought the enemy up to a strength of seven fighting
ships against the English two, and it was folly to expect that any more
undisturbed trading could be done. Towerson therefore sailed for England
on March 4. On the 18th the _Hart_ parted company, intentionally as was
thought, her master having taken offence at his reproof. The _Tiger’s_
perils were not yet past; on April 23, when nearing English waters, they
were set upon by a Frenchman of 90 tons, who, judging them weak from a
long voyage, laid them aboard and commanded them to strike sail.
‘Whereupon’, to quote Towerson’s words, ‘we sent them some of our stuff,
crossbars and chain shot and arrows, so thick that it made the upper
work of their ship to fly about their ears, and we spoiled him with all
his men, and tore his ship miserably with our great ordinance, and then
he began to fall astern of us, and to pack on his sails and get away:
and we, seeing that, gave him four or five good pieces more for his
farewell; and thus we were rid of this Frenchman who did us no harm at
all.’ On April 29, 1557, having failed to double the Land’s End for
Bristol, they arrived instead at Plymouth after an exceptionally quick
passage. The daily takings of gold on the coast for this voyage amounted
to 76 lb., but the figures for some of the trading are not given, so the
total must have been actually greater.
There is no record of any official notice being taken of Towerson’s
return, nor of further proclamations being issued against African
voyages. The Government was preoccupied with other things; a war was
beginning with France (formal declaration, June 7), and Philip’s
influence and pretensions were becoming more and more unpopular in the
country. It was therefore not a fitting time to punish Englishmen for
distant trading adventures. The difficulty in obtaining large ships,
caused by the war, may have been the reason that Towerson did not begin
his third voyage until January 30, 1558[286], instead of setting out in
the autumn as was usual. In the winter most of the vessels of the fleet
were put out of commission, a piece of economy which resulted in the
loss of Calais; and Towerson sailed for Guinea with the _Minion_, the
_Christopher_, the _Tiger_, and the _Unicorn_, a pinnace. The Count of
Feria, Philip’s representative in England, wrote to his master that two
of the above were queen’s ships and among the best she had, and that
they sailed with the knowledge and approval of William Howard, the Lord
Admiral. He added that the adventurers gave out that they were going to
Barbary, and distributed 3,000 ducats in bribes, being in reality bound
for Guinea.[287]
The day after leaving England they fell in with two Danzig ships coming
from Bordeaux with wines. They examined them strictly on suspicion of
carrying French-owned cargo, and, in spite of denials, convicted them.
But considering the lateness of the season they did not think well to
take them back as prizes to an English port, and, having despoiled them
of such goods as they needed, including eight guns, they let them go. On
February 12 they entered the roadstead of Grand Canary to repair the
pinnace, which had broken her rudder. While they were there a Spanish
fleet of nineteen sail, bound for the Indies, came in. Compliments were
exchanged, but afterwards a misunderstanding arose owing to the English
refusing to strike their flag. The Spaniards fired upon them, but the
Admiral apologized, declaring that it had been done without his orders.
On March 10 they arrived at Rio das Palmas on the Grain Coast. Going on
from thence to the River of Sestos they heard news of six French ships
on the coast, and decided at once to make for the Mina region lest the
French should spoil their trade. Picking up some ivory on the way, they
reached Hanta on the Gold Coast on March 31. Next day five Portuguese
ships were sighted, but no action took place till after dark, each side
cautiously manœuvring to get to windward of the other. In the night
Towerson in the _Minion_, having got the wind of the Portuguese admiral,
fought with him for about two hours, shooting him several times through
the hull, while the Portuguese were only able to fire into the
_Minion’s_ rigging. After this the Portuguese sheered off and attacked
the _Christopher_ without doing much damage. Next morning the enemy were
nowhere to be seen; it was decided to seek for and fight them before
continuing to trade, but after two days’ fruitless search the plan was
given up and the squadron returned to the coast.
Here they heard that some French ships were in the vicinity, and,
England and France being now at war, decided to attack them. On April 5
they saw three Frenchmen and gave chase. They were successful in
capturing one of 120 tons, the _Mulet de Batuille_, and in her 50 lb. 5
oz. of gold. Arriving at Egrand, the easternmost place on the Gold
Coast, they found the French prize to be leaky, and were obliged to
spoil and sink her. Towerson now proposed to go on to Benin, but the
majority of the company refused. The fleet then separated to trade at
various places on the coast, agreeing to rally on the _Minion_ if
attacked. At this time the men began to be sickly, and six died. Having
sold all her cloth at Egrand the _Minion_ sailed westwards on May 10,
picking up the _Christopher_ and the _Tiger_ on the way. Both reported
little trade, and the negroes in general seemed hostile and suspicious.
For another six weeks they continued on the coast, trading at some
places and being repulsed at others, until victuals began to run short.
The crews of the _Tiger_ and the _Christopher_ were willing to attack
the Portuguese ships at Mina and so supply themselves, but the
_Minion’s_ men would not consent for fear of hanging when they should
reach home. At Samma the natives refused to supply either gold or food,
having made an agreement with the Portuguese, and the English therefore
burned the town. Next day, June 25, they set sail for England.
Great difficulty was experienced in getting away from the coast. Six
days after sailing they again sighted land and found themselves 18
leagues to leeward of the place they had started from, owing to the
extraordinary strength of the current. It was now decided to head
southwards as far as the equator before attempting to beat to the
westwards, and on July 7 they arrived at the Island of St. Thomé. A stay
of nearly a month was made at this island before, on August 3, a fresh
start was made and the homeward passage was begun in earnest. The
shortage of victuals became more serious, and on the advice of a Scot,
taken prisoner in the French ship, they called at the Isle of Salt, one
of the Cape Verde group. They obtained a few goats and a quantity of
fish and sea-birds. The Scot went ashore on the island and was not seen
again: it was supposed that the inhabitants found him asleep and carried
him off. On August 24 the master of the _Tiger_ reported his ship leaky
and his men too weak to keep her afloat. There were now only thirty
sound men in the whole fleet. A fortnight later the _Tiger_ had to be
abandoned in mid-ocean, in latitude 25° N. Still the long voyage was
protracted, and the latitude of Cape St. Vincent was not reached until
October 6. The _Christopher_ being now very weak, it was agreed to put
into Vigo and send for more men from England. But a fair wind sprang up,
and Towerson decided to make one more effort to reach home, fearing
that, once in Vigo, the treasure would never be allowed to go out again.
Two guns were fired to warn the _Christopher_, and the _Minion_ sailed
on. The _Christopher_ appeared to be following, but, the next morning
being foggy, they lost sight of her. Towerson mentions that he concluded
at the time that she had either outsailed them or gone back to Vigo, but
he strangely omits to state which supposition turned out to be correct,
and we are left quite in the dark as to the _Christopher’s_ fate. At the
time they parted company there were only twelve men in health in the two
ships. After losing most of her sails in a great south-westerly gale,
the men being too weak to handle them, the _Minion_ arrived at the Isle
of Wight on October 20, 1558.
The total amount of gold and ivory obtained on this voyage cannot be
stated owing to want of clearness in the account, but it would appear
that it was not nearly such a successful venture as the previous ones,
although more capital was involved. The truth was that, between the
French and the English, the Guinea trade had been somewhat overdone, and
the huge profits of the first adventurers could not be expected to
continue. The Portuguese had hitherto restricted their own trade on the
coast for this very reason, but now the negroes were becoming spoiled
and inclined to play off one competitor against the other. One new thing
was certainly revealed by these voyages, and that was that the
Portuguese were impotent to make good their boasted monopoly. A simple
process of reasoning led Englishmen to ask if the Spaniards were in the
same case; and it was not long before an affirmative answer was to be
supplied by Hawkins and Drake.
-----
Footnote 262:
Hakluyt, vi. 136.
Footnote 263:
vi. 138.
Footnote 264:
Reprinted in Hakluyt, vi. 141–52.
Footnote 265:
Strype, _Memorials_, ii. 504. Strype says the two ships were lent to
Wyndham and his associates in 1552, and were intended for the voyage
in search of the North-East Passage.
Footnote 266:
Stanford’s _Compendium_ (1907) says that the ‘grains’ of this coast
were pepper. Eden, although he describes them as ‘a very hot fruit’,
speaks of pepper as a distinct article further on.
Footnote 267:
Probably the Niger.
Footnote 268:
Eden speaks of having seen the _Primrose_ after her return, hence it
must have been the _Lion_ which was abandoned.
Footnote 269:
Reprinted by Hakluyt, vi. 154–77.
Footnote 270:
See Towerson’s first voyage, and marginal note to Eden’s account of
the present voyage.
Footnote 271:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, v. 162.
Footnote 272:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, No. 251.
Footnote 273:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. xiv, Nos. 4 and 5 (erroneously
calendared under date 1558).
Footnote 274:
_R. O., S. P. For., Mary_, vol. vii, No. 448.
Footnote 275:
This evidently refers to John Locke’s voyage, and tallies with Eden’s
account, except that the latter does not mention the offer of land for
a settlement.
Footnote 276:
This would seem to relate to Wyndham’s visit to Benin. No other
place-name is mentioned in any of the voyages which bears any
resemblance to ‘Bynne’. If such is the case, it throws a fresh
complexion on Eden’s story of the abandonment of the merchants.
Footnote 277:
_R. O., S. P. For., Mary_, vii, No. 449.
Footnote 278:
_Cal. For. S. P., Mary_, p. 198.
Footnote 279:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vi, No. 83.
Footnote 280:
_A. P. C._, v, p. 214.
Footnote 281:
_R. O., S. P. For., Mary_, vii, No. 450.
Footnote 282:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, No. 327.
Footnote 283:
Hakluyt, vi. 177–211.
Footnote 284:
_A. P. C._, v. 305, 315, 322, 358, 384.
Footnote 285:
Hakluyt, vi. 212–31.
Footnote 286:
The date of this voyage is given, by a misprint, in the 1598–9
editions of Hakluyt as 1577. Modern reprints have perpetuated the
mistake. The date is correctly given in the 1589 Hakluyt as 1557, that
is 1558 by our present style of beginning the year on January 1.
Footnote 287:
Kervyn de Lettenhove, _Les Pays-Bas et l’Angleterre_, i. 152: ‘Los
navios ... eran dos de la Reyna y los mejores que Su Majestad tenian.’
CHAPTER XII
THE NORTH-EAST PASSAGE AND THE WHITE SEA
Shortly after the death of Henry VIII there reappeared in England that
mysterious and elusive figure which has so often flitted across the page
of this history—Sebastian Cabot. Although he had passed thirty-five
years in the service of Spain, had received high pay and honour, had
been appointed to the command of an important expedition, and had been
forgiven for his mistakes and incapacity on his return, he was never
really content, and was for ever ready to plot and intrigue that he
might skip from the service of one master to that of another. But
Sebastian Cabot was not the subtle and calculating villain that he has
often been painted. The key to his unending restlessness was nothing
more nor less than an egregious vanity, a never-satisfied desire to be
praised, looked up to, consulted, a morbid fear that he was falling in
the esteem of his fellows. Hence his offers to betray secrets which he
never possessed, his boasts of exclusive knowledge in astronomy and
navigation which he never revealed, and his tacit acquiescence in the
attribution to him by contemporary historians of the honour of being the
original discoverer of North America. Yet with all his hollowness he was
a useful man: he probably knew as much of the scientific side of
navigation and geography as any man living, although he professed to
know much more; and in the course of his long career he could not have
failed to acquire a very perfect knowledge of the details of Spanish
methods of exploration and discovery.
For some ten years at least he had been contemplating the
re-transference of his services to England. In November 1538 he
approached Sir Thomas Wyatt, Henry VIII’s envoy in Spain, with a request
to be recommended to the king. Wyatt’s memorandum runs: ‘To remember
Sebastian Cabote. He hath here but 300 ducats a year, and he is
desirous, if he might not serve the King, at least to see him, as his
old master.’ This touching manifestation of affection failed of its
effect. Henry showed no inclination to outbid the emperor for Cabot’s
expensive talents, and no more is heard of the intrigue until 1547. On
October 9 of that year, some eight months after the accession of Edward
VI, the Council made out a warrant for £100 ‘for transporting one Shabot
a pilot to come out of Hispain to serve and inhabit in England’.[288]
The sum was far too large for the expense of the journey alone; possibly
some bribery was needed to get Cabot out of the country. The affair was
still not cleared up nearly two years later when an entry occurs
relative to this same sum of £100, the warrant for which was to be
‘taken up by exchange’ by Henry Ostrich, a member of a business house
which had dealings in Spain.
The date of Cabot’s flight can only be approximately stated. It almost
certainly took place in the summer or autumn of 1548. On the 6th of
January of the following year King Edward, or rather the Protector
Somerset, granted him an annual pension of £166 13_s._ 4_d._, payable
quarterly, the first instalment to date from Michaelmas, 1548; which
date was doubtless near the commencement of his service in England.[289]
Cabot had probably given out that he had travelled to England on private
business. He certainly made no resignation of his office of Pilot Major
of Spain. Consequently more than a year elapsed before the emperor
troubled to ask for his return. In November 1549 Sir Philip Hoby wrote
from Brussels that the emperor had expressed a desire for Cabot to be
sent back. Five months later the Council replied that they were not
detaining him in England, but that he refused of his own accord to
leave; and that as he was an English subject they could not compel him.
With this the matter dropped. Cabot was frequently described by writers
of the latter half of the sixteenth century as an Englishman by birth,
although there is little doubt that he first saw the light in Venice. He
himself lied freely on the point as occasion demanded, and at this
period it was obviously to his interest to pose as an Englishman.
His position and occupations in England at this time are obscure.
Hakluyt states that he was ‘Grand Pilot’ of England, but there is no
other evidence that such an office then officially existed. The
adventurers of the Council doubtless entertained schemes of diverting
some of the wealth of the new worlds into the coffers of their own
State. The long stagnation of the English mind on such subjects was at
last breaking up, as many contemporary events indicate; and mid-century
England was virgin ground for the boastings and mystifications of the
old intriguer, who revelled in the impression he produced on the
unsophisticated islanders. The esteem in which he was held is proved by
several passages in Eden and Hakluyt. But the only project, prior to
that of the north-east voyage to Cathay, of which even a hint survives,
is that referred to in a letter from Cabot to Charles V, informing him
of a design of the Duke of Northumberland to fit out an expedition to
Peru in co-operation with the French.[290] Needless to say, the scheme
was never put into execution. Cabot was simply amusing his credulous
hosts while at the same time ingratiating himself with the emperor by
betraying them. It almost looks as if he had in view at this time yet
another change of employers. His one real achievement during his
declining years did not take shape until the last year of Edward’s
reign.
The general progress of discovery and the growth of English manufactures
led to the project of finding a passage to Cathay by the north-east.
Theoretically there were four ways of reaching from Europe the shores of
eastern Asia, which were still regarded as the most desirable mercantile
goal in the world. The most practicable route, via the Cape of Good
Hope, had been discovered and monopolized by the Portuguese, and no ship
of any other nationality had yet traversed it. The Spaniards had opened
up the corresponding western voyage through the Straits of Magellan or
South-West Passage, although they did not use it to anything like the
same extent, preferring to reach the Pacific by transhipment across the
isthmus of Panama. Frequent attempts, English for the most part, had
ended in nothing but discouragement for those who dreamed of a
North-West Passage through the ice-strewn gate of Davis Straits. The
fourth method only then, through ‘the north east frostie seas’, remained
to be tried. Few practical men could at this stage have put any trust in
the facile theory of Robert Thorne that it was possible to sail due
north over the Pole itself. But the coast-line of northern Russia and
Siberia was entirely unexplored, and, on the principle of _omne ignotum
pro magnifico_, it seemed to offer a glorious solution of the great
problem. Some expansion of the field of England’s commerce was
imperatively needed, for the old European markets were now being
exploited to the fullest possible extent, and the increasing luxury of
living, coupled with the industrial unrest due to the transformation of
the land system, rendered an extension of oversea trade essential to the
salvation of the country. The new England of the Renaissance, seething
with restless energies which waited to take shape and direction, was
incapable of living in a state of economic isolation from the rest of
the world.
In the months preceding the spring of 1553 a strong combination of
capitalists, courtiers, and merchants was formed for the prosecution of
the Cathay enterprise. It included the Marquis of Winchester, the Earls
of Arundel, Bedford, and Pembroke, Lord William Howard, Sir William
Cecil, Sir John Gresham, Thomas Gresham, Sir George Barnes, and about
two hundred others.[291] None of the documents relating to the Company
prior to the first voyage are now known to exist with the exception of
Sebastian Cabot’s ordinances for the guidance of the commanders. From a
reference in the latter, however, it is evident that a charter of
incorporation was granted by Edward VI, and that the government of the
Company was regularly constituted. Article 20 of the ordinances,
relating to the disposal of merchandise, provides that an inventory
shall be ‘presented to the Governor, Consuls and Assistants in London,
in good order, to the intent the King’s Majesty may be truly answered of
that which to his Grace by his grant of incorporation is limited’. It
would appear by this that in return for granting a monopoly the king was
to have a share of the profits. Sebastian Cabot acted as chief expert
adviser to the new company, and, in consideration of his services, he
was appointed its first Governor, in which position he was confirmed by
the subsequent charter granted by Philip and Mary in 1555. His dimly
reported adventures in search of the North-West Passage under Henry VII
were no doubt supposed to give weight to his opinions on the North-East,
although in reality he was as ignorant as was every one else on the
subject. The Company raised, for the setting out of the first voyage, a
capital of £6,000 divided into £25 shares. The subscribing of a single
share entitled an investor to membership.
It is important to emphasize the fact that this new company of
‘Merchants Adventurers of England for the discovery of lands,
territories, isles, dominions and seignories unknown’ was an
organization quite distinct from and independent of the old Merchant
Adventurers who exported cloth to the Low Countries. The term ‘merchant
adventurers’ was of general and not particular application, although,
during the time when there was only one such society in London, it had
naturally tended to be used as a proper noun. The fact that by force of
circumstances the name of the new combination was soon changed, and that
it came to be called the Russia or Muscovy Company, has perpetuated the
error as to its origin, from which serious misconceptions have arisen.
One of these is the story that Sebastian Cabot was Governor of the Low
Countries Merchant Adventurers, and that, in that capacity, he took a
leading part in the struggle with the Hansa which ended in the abolition
of that society’s privileged position in England. This supposition,
first advanced in Campbell’s _Lives of the British Admirals_, and
repeated by subsequent writers, is unsupported by any contemporary
evidence, and is manifestly absurd. The Governor of the Low Countries
Merchants had to reside at Antwerp, their head-quarters. Antwerp being
Imperial territory, Cabot would not have dared to set foot in it after
1548. Moreover, the names of the Governors of the old Merchant
Adventurers during Cabot’s presidency of the new company are traceable
in the State papers of the time: from 1548 to 1558 Thomas Chamberlain,
William Dansell, and Anthony Hussey successively filled that office.
They were London merchants, intimately acquainted with the cloth trade,
and exercising administrative control over the business of their fellows
in Antwerp. It is obvious that Cabot lacked the qualifications for such
a duty. The whole legend falls to the ground when it is realized that
there were now two companies of Merchant Adventurers.
From a crowd of eager applicants Sir Hugh Willoughby was selected to be
Captain-General of the first expedition, mainly on account of his good
record of war service and his commanding appearance. Richard Chancellor,
a protégé of Sir Henry Sidney, was appointed chief pilot and second in
command. Little is known of Willoughby’s previous career, except that he
had served on land in the Scottish wars. Chancellor was a professional
seaman who had been with Roger Bodenham in the adventurous voyage of the
_Bark Aucher_ to the Mediterranean in 1551. At the same meeting at which
these appointments were made it was decided that the voyage must begin
before the end of May in case the way should be barred by ice before the
passage had been effected. It is evident that both the length of the
Arctic winter and the distance to be traversed before the eastern flank
of Asia should be turned were grossly underestimated; otherwise the
voyage would certainly have been postponed till the next year. But none
of the geographical factors of the project were known, and, after a vain
attempt to extort information from the dense stupidity of two Tartar
stableboys who had somehow found their way to London, and who were
interrogated before the assembled adventurers, the issue had to be left
to the fates.
The fleet consisted of the _Bona Esperanza_, 120 tons, the _Edward
Bonaventure_, 160 tons, and the _Bona Confidentia_, of 90 tons. Each
ship was accompanied by a pinnace and a boat. Willoughby sailed in the
_Esperanza_, having with him six merchants, including his kinsman
Gabriel Willoughby, and a crew of thirty-one, of whom three were
discharged at Harwich before clearing from the English coast. Chancellor
was captain of the _Edward Bonaventure_, with Stephen Borough as master
and John Buckland mate. His crew numbered thirty-seven, among whom were
William Borough and Arthur Pet, both in the forecastle. He had also with
him ten landsmen—merchants, gentlemen adventurers, and a chaplain. The
_Confidentia_ was commanded by Cornelius Durforth, with three merchants
and twenty-four officers and men. The pinnaces were manned by drafts
from the ships to which they were attached.
Cabot’s ordinances[292] contain many interesting details. They embody
the experience gained in more than half a century of Spanish
exploration, with modifications suitable for the special circumstances
of the voyage. Loyalty and goodwill in executing orders are prominently
insisted upon. The Admiral is to submit all important matters to the
decision of a Council of Twelve in which he is allowed a double vote.
The fleet is to be careful to keep together and the commanders are to go
on board the Admiral’s ship as often as he shall require. Logs are to be
kept by every person capable of writing and to be compiled into a common
ledger to be preserved for record. The Admiral and Council have power to
reduce in rank inefficient officers and to set delinquents on shore in
any English port. Morning and evening prayers are to be read daily, and
no blasphemy, swearing, lewd talk, dicing, card-playing, or other
devilish games to be permitted. The merchants are only to trade with the
consent of the captains, councillors, and head merchants, or a committee
of four of them. Petty merchants must show their accounts to the head
merchants, and all goods must be carefully packed and not opened until
the end of the voyage. No person may engage in private trade until the
Company’s interests are first satisfied. In dealing with strangers all
must be careful not to enter into any discussion about religion. Persons
may be enticed aboard the ships to give useful information, but no
violence must be used, although it is recommended to make them drunk if
possible. Strangers must not be offended by arrogance or ridicule. If
invited to festivities the landing party should go in force and well
armed. News is to be sent home whenever possible, especially in the
event of the passage being found. The last article contains an
impressive warning against ‘conspiracies, partakings, factions, false
tales, and untrue reports’, and an exhortation to behave always as loyal
and honourable men, ‘with daily remembrance of the great importance of
the voyage, the honour, glory, praise, and benefit that depend ... upon
the same, toward the common wealth of this noble realm, the advancement
of you the travailers therein, your wives and children’.
The twelve councillors were Sir Hugh Willoughby, Richard Chancellor,
George Burton, head merchant, Richard Stafford, minister, Thomas
Langlie, merchant, James Dalabere, gentleman, and the masters and mates
of the three ships.
No better planned and equipped expedition had ever before left an
English port on a voyage of discovery. The commander was a man of rank
and good repute, while the chief navigator was a practical seaman and no
mere book-learned amateur. The crews were of the best that could be
found, and acted up to the spirit of their instructions; there is no
hint of insubordination in any accounts of the voyage, although the
bitterest hardships were encountered. In addition to Chancellor there
were in the _Bonaventure_ alone three men who afterwards rose to
eminence in their profession and commanded important expeditions. The
ships were the largest that could conveniently be used, for, although
greater tonnage was common in the navy, big vessels were not yet a
success for trade and exploration, being too unhandy for navigation on
uncharted coasts. The Admiral was furnished with letters of friendship
and recommendation from Edward VI to all princes and potentates
inhabiting the north-east parts of the world as far as the empire of
Cathay. For reasons obvious enough now, the attempt to force a passage
to Asia was foredoomed to inevitable failure, but that failure was due
to no fault in the promotion or execution of the voyage. It resulted
from a want of the knowledge which was only to be obtained from actual
trial and experience.
All preparations being complete, the fleet departed from Ratcliff on May
10, 1553. The next day, towing down the river, they passed Greenwich
with great pomp, the mariners all attired in their uniform of sky-blue
cloth, kept for such occasions, and the ships discharging their ordnance
in a salute to the king, who was then lying sick in the palace. The
Privy Councillors looked out from the windows, ‘the courtiers came
running out, and the common people flocked together, standing very thick
upon the shore ... but, alas, the good King Edward, in respect of whom
principally all this was prepared, he only by reason of his sickness was
absent from this show, and not very long after the departure of these
ships the lamentable and most sorrowful accident of his death followed’.
Proceeding in leisurely fashion out of the estuary and along the East
Anglian coast, it was not until the 23rd of June that the voyage fairly
commenced with a final clearance from Orford Ness. After getting well
away from the land, a course was steered due north until the 27th. Then,
westerly winds preventing them from touching at Shetland, after much
‘traversing and tracing the seas by reason of sundry and manifold
contrary winds’, they came to the southern end of the Lofoten
Archipelago on the coast of Norway. Touching at various points they
arrived on August 2 at the island of Senjen in latitude 69½°. A skiff
put off from the land and informed them of their whereabouts, promising
also that a pilot should be furnished next day to conduct them round the
North Cape to Vardo, the Danish stronghold which marked the furthest
outpost of European civilization in the North-East. Beyond Vardo all was
unknown.
Before the promised pilot could come aboard a sudden and violent storm
arose and scattered the fleet far out to sea. The night came on and the
wind so increased that Willoughby was forced to heave to. In the morning
he was rejoined by the _Confidentia_, but the _Edward Bonaventure_,
Chancellor’s ship, was nowhere to be seen. At this point the story of
the expedition forks into two, for Chancellor and Willoughby never met
again. It will be convenient first to follow to their conclusion the
fortunes of the latter.
As it had been agreed that in case of a separation Vardo should be the
rendezvous, Willoughby, with the _Esperanza_ and the _Confidentia_, set
about finding his way thither. The gale abating on August 4, he sailed
north-east by north, but soon found that he was quite out of his
reckoning and that his charts were incorrect. With frequent changes of
direction owing to varying winds, but all the time making headway
eastwards, he sailed on until August 14, when land was discovered in
latitude 72°. His course cannot with any certainty be laid down; on some
days the distance traversed is not stated in the log, the eccentricities
of the compass in northern latitudes render untrustworthy the bearings
given, there was then no accurate method of calculating longitude, while
such factors as currents and leeway caused serious errors in an attempt
to estimate the distance by dead reckoning. The one certain datum is the
fact that the land discovered lay in 72°. Latitude was then usually
ascertainable within a degree of correctitude; William Borough’s chart
of these regions, drawn up a few years later, contains no error greater
than ¾°, and only one in any way approaching that. Therefore it is
evident that Willoughby, on August 14, 1553, discovered Novaia Zemlia,
probably in the neighbourhood of Moller Bay.[293] Between it and
Greenland there is no other land in latitude 72°. Willoughby’s error in
longitude may be judged from the fact that he thought it to be 480 miles
east by north from the island of Senjen on the coast of Norway; actually
it is about 700 miles. The prospect was desolate in the extreme: ‘Early
in the morning we descried land,’ he says, ‘which land we bare with all,
hoising out our boat to discover what land it might be: but the boat
could not come to land, the water was so shoal, where was very much ice
also, but there was no similitude of habitation.... Then we plyed to the
northward the 15, 16 and 17 day.’ There was no occasion here for the use
of the king’s friendly letters to princes and potentates, but the
explorers did not lose heart. The last quoted phrase seems to imply that
Willoughby took this land to be a promontory of the continent and that
he was seeking to find the passage round it to the northward, having by
this time given up the idea of meeting Chancellor at Vardo. However,
after three days’ ‘plying’ or beating to windward, the _Confidentia_ was
found to be leaking, and, putting about, they ran 70 leagues before the
wind to the south-south-east to seek a harbour for her repair.
From hence onwards the actual course is altogether conjectural; the
daily distances are seldom given, and no more latitudes are mentioned.
But the general direction was now westwards, and it is evident that the
quest for the passage had been given up for that year. The object was
now to return to some safe wintering place on the coast of Norway. On
August 23 land was sighted on a west-south-westerly course, low-lying
and deserted, and running west-south-west and east-north-east. This was
probably the coast to the west of Cape Ruskoi and the Petchora River.
After coasting westwards for some distance they drew off into the sea,
and seem next to have sailed south-westwards into Cheska Gulf. Land was
again seen on the 28th, barren as before and running north-eastwards to
a point, after which it turned to the west. This can only be identified
with Kaninska Island, the eastern arm of the entrance to the White Sea.
The explorers landed in a neighbouring bay and saw signs of human
habitation, although no one appeared. On September 4 they lost touch
with the coast by reason of contrary winds, but regained it on the 8th.
It was probably during this interval that the entrance to the White Sea,
where Chancellor had already found safety, was passed and missed. From
September 8 to the 17th they coasted north-westwards along the dreary
shore of Lapland, and finally, turning back for a short distance, they
entered on the 18th a haven known as the River Arzina, which they had
noted a day or two before. It was some six miles long by one and a half
wide, and was full of seals and large fish, while on the land were seen
bears, deer, foxes, and other beasts, but no sign of man. After spending
a week in this place they decided to winter there as the weather had
become too bad to admit of further exploration. Groups of men were sent
out in three directions to search for inhabitants, but all alike
returned ‘without finding of people or any similitude of habitation’.
With these words closes the log of Sir Hugh Willoughby, written by his
own hand, and found a year later by Russian fishermen in the cabin of
the _Bona Esperanza_.
The details of the sufferings and death of the sixty-three men who
formed the crews of the _Esperanza_ and the _Confidentia_ are
unrecorded: not one of them survived the long Arctic winter. The only
other document besides the log of which we have any record was a will
made in January 1554 by Gabriel Willoughby, from which it was evident
that Sir Hugh and most of his crew were still alive in that month. The
will came into the possession of Samuel Purchas, by whom it was kept as
a relic, but it has long since disappeared. They certainly did not die
of starvation, for, when the ships were visited in 1555 by agents of the
Company, a considerable quantity of provisions was recovered. Henry
Lane, writing from Russia many years afterwards, ascribed their fate to
‘want of experience to have made caves and stoves’. At that we must
leave it. A wildly imaginative description by Giovanni Michiel, the
Venetian agent in London, forwarded to his Government in 1555, says:
‘The mariners now returned from the second voyage narrate strange things
about the mode in which they (i.e. Willoughby and his men) were frozen,
having found some of them seated in the act of writing, pen still in
hand, and the paper before them; others at table, platter in hand, and
spoon in mouth; others opening a locker, and others in various postures,
like statues, as if they had been adjusted and placed in those
attitudes. They say that some dogs on board the ships displayed the same
phenomena.’ Other statements in the same letter are demonstrably false,
and it need only be said that the above account is extremely unlikely to
be true.
Chancellor, in the _Edward Bonaventure_, had better fortune. After
losing sight of Willoughby in the storm of August 2, he steered for
Vardo as had been pre-arranged. Reaching that place without difficulty
he waited a week for the other two ships and then decided to proceed on
the voyage without them. The pluck and loyalty of Chancellor and his
crew are altogether admirable. If they had not exhibited those qualities
in the highest degree the whole project would have ended in complete
failure, and a disastrous check would have been sustained by the
exponents of the new movement of maritime expansion just when, for the
first time, there was some sign of national interest aroused. After the
separation from the rest of the fleet Chancellor’s company became,
according to Clement Adams, ‘very pensive, heavy and sorrowful’, and an
incident which took place at Vardo was not calculated to raise their
spirits. They encountered there certain Scotsmen who, hearing of their
intention to seek the North-East Passage, did their best to dissuade
them, magnifying the dangers of the northern seas and omitting no
arguments to divert them from their purpose. The Scotsmen, if they had
been resident for any length of time at Vardo, must have spoken with
good reason, and what they said was believed by the English to be
inspired by pure good will and without envious intent. Chancellor stood
firm, however, and ‘holding nothing so ignominious and reproachful as
inconstancy and levity of mind, and persuading himself that a man of
valour could not commit a more dishonourable part than, for fear of
danger, to avoid and shun great attempts, he was nothing at all changed
or discouraged with the speeches and words of the Scots, remaining
stedfast and immutable in his first resolution: determining either to
bring that to pass which was first intended, or else to die the death’.
His men rose to his own height of resolution, and the most hearty good
will prevailed between captain and crew. Accordingly, about the middle
of August they set forward once more, arriving at length at the entrance
of the White Sea. It does not appear whether or not he believed this to
be the mouth of the passage. In any case, ignorant as he was of the
shape and extent of the northern coast of Asia, it was his duty to
explore it, especially as it ran southwards at first and then curved to
the east in the Bay of Mezen. Having penetrated far into this great gulf
the explorers sighted a boat full of fishermen, the first men seen since
leaving Vardo. They fled in terror at the sight of the strange English
ship, of a size and loftiness hitherto undreamed of by their simple
minds. Chancellor manned his boat and overtook them, finding them ‘in
great fear as men half dead’. He reassured them by his gentleness and
courtesy, the report of which was spread abroad and caused ‘the
barbarous Russes’ to flock round the ship with offers of food and
welcome. At this point the English learned, somewhat to their surprise,
that they had discovered the dominions of the Czar. There is no hint in
Sebastian Cabot’s instructions of any such result being contemplated. A
marginal note to a later account of Russian adventures in Hakluyt says
that they arrived first at the village of Newnox (Nenoksa), twenty-five
miles west of St. Nicholas and somewhat further from St. Michael
(Archangel).[294]
News of their coming was at once sent to the Czar Ivan, not yet called
the Terrible, whose authority was so respected, even in those remote
regions, that the natives dared not buy the Englishmen’s goods without
his permission. In the meantime Chancellor, who at once realized the
commercial possibilities of his discovery, was eager to set out for
Moscow to deliver in person to the Czar his king’s letters of
recommendation. The local authorities were still awaiting instructions,
pending the arrival of which they made excuses to defer the journey. At
length they yielded on Chancellor’s threat to depart forthwith by the
way he had come. They provided him with sledges and post-horses with
which he and a few companions set forward over the snow-covered plains
to the south. On the way he encountered the messenger returning from the
Czar with a letter couched in cordial terms and injunctions to the
inhabitants to defray all the expenses of the journey. Such was the
weight of Ivan’s word that the Russians quarrelled and fought for the
honour of supplying horses to the travellers.
Twelve days after arriving at Moscow Chancellor was summoned before the
Czar. He was conducted through an outer room, wherein sat a hundred
courtiers in cloth of gold, into the presence chamber filled with a
hundred and fifty more. Ivan sat on a lofty throne, with crown and
sceptre and a most regal countenance. Nothing abashed, the sailor strode
up to him and saluted after the English fashion, and then presented the
letters of Edward VI. The emperor, having read the letters, conversed a
little with him and commanded him and his companions to dinner. The meal
was served in high state, with impressive ceremonies and massive vessels
of gold; but the English were quick to detect barbarian squalor beneath
barbaric display. They were greatly impressed, however, by the hardiness
of the people, and by the iron discipline which prevailed throughout the
land; also by the military power of the Czar, concerning which they gave
credit to exaggerated reports.
Chancellor made good use of his opportunities. His account of Russia and
that of Clement Adams (based entirely on reports of this first voyage)
are full of useful and generally correct information on the cities,
government, laws, religion, and products of the country, to an extent
that is wonderful when one considers that at the outset he was utterly
ignorant of its language and almost of its very existence. In his
bearing toward the Czar and his ministers he remembered always that he
was the representative of England, and that his conduct would mainly
determine the attitude which they would take up towards his country. His
combined modesty and dignity caused him to be favourably treated from
the first, and secured valuable privileges for the Company.
After a stay in Moscow of unknown duration, Chancellor and his comrades
returned to the Bay of St. Nicholas, where his ship had been laid up for
the winter. He was the bearer of a letter from Ivan to the English
sovereign, dated February 1554, in which a cordial invitation was
extended to Englishmen who should wish to trade with Russia. The Czar
promised them his protection and complete freedom to buy and sell in any
part of his dominions. As soon as navigation became possible the _Edward
Bonaventure_ set sail for England, arriving in the summer of 1554, after
having been robbed on the way by Flemish pirates.
Chancellor’s return with tidings of a promising new outlet for English
trade created a great stir in commercial circles. The quest of the
North-East Passage was for the moment forgotten, and a second expedition
to the White Sea was prepared for 1555. In February of that year the
Company obtained a fresh charter of incorporation from Philip and Mary,
in supersession of that granted by Edward VI. Sebastian Cabot, as having
been ‘the chiefest setter forth of this journey or voyage’, was
confirmed in the office of Governor. Four consuls and twenty-four
assistants to the Governor were to be elected yearly by the
shareholders, meeting in London or elsewhere. The first list of
appointments to these offices was stated in the charter. Among the four
consuls were Anthony Hussey, Governor of the Low Countries Merchant
Adventurers, and Sir George Barnes, whom we have already seen as an
adventurer in the African voyages. Sir John Gresham was one of the
assistants, as were also Sir Andrew Judde, Miles Mordeyne, and others
who took an active part in the Guinea trade. The Governor, consuls, and
assistants were to have full administrative powers over the merchants of
the Company. It is interesting to note how naturally the English
tradition of representative government took its place in the affairs of
these mercantile societies. The constitutions of the old Merchant
Adventurers, of the Staplers, and of the various provincial merchant
guilds, were very similar to the one now under consideration. The habits
of thought which they kept alive were undoubtedly a factor in preventing
England from becoming an absolute monarchy after the example of her
Continental neighbours. The charter proceeded to grant power to the
Company to acquire real estate in England, to plead in the courts, to
make statutes for its own governance, to impose penalties for the
enforcement of the same, to proceed with the discovery of new lands and
to conquer them in the name of the English Crown, and finally, to enjoy
a monopoly of the newly instituted trade with Russia, in which all other
persons were forbidden to engage.
The 1555 expedition consisted of two ships, the _Edward Bonaventure_ and
the _Philip and Mary_.[295] They sailed from London at the end of May.
The instructions were for the former to go to the White Sea while the
latter stopped at Vardo, there to collect a cargo of fish and train oil.
Richard Chancellor was in chief command, sailing in the _Edward_. With
him were Richard Gray and George Killingworth, appointed to be agents
for the Company in Russia. John Brooke was to fulfil a similar duty at
Vardo. Killingworth must have been a man of striking appearance: Henry
Lane records that on one occasion, when dining with the Czar, ‘The
prince called them to his table to receive each one a cup from his hand
to drink, and took into his hand Master George Killingworth’s beard,
which reached over the table, and pleasantly delivered it to the
Metropolitan, who, seeming to bless it, said in Russe: This is God’s
gift. As indeed at that time it was not only thick, broad and yellow
coloured, but in length five foot and two inches of a size.’ The agents
were ordered to go with Chancellor to the Czar, to present the queen’s
letters, and to obtain from him a grant of privileges. They were also to
set up warehouses in Moscow or other towns and sell their goods to the
best advantage. They were to use all diligence in inquiring about the
route from Russia to Cathay, and in obtaining news as to Willoughby’s
fate, of which nothing was yet known in England.
All this was duly carried out. The _Edward’s_ cargo was unladen at St.
Nicholas, and the goods transported up the Dwina to Colmogro
(Kholmogori), and thence to Vologda, where they were warehoused. Vologda
was about half-way between St. Nicholas and Moscow. At the end of
September Chancellor, with four others, set out for the capital to
perform their errand to the Czar. They were as well received as on the
previous occasion, and it was agreed that they should establish
factories at Colmogro and Vologda, the one fifty and the other five
hundred miles up the Dwina. The Czar made a formal grant of privileges,
including freedom from tolls and customs, freedom from arrest, and
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Chief Agent of the Company over
all Englishmen in Russia.
After the departure of Chancellor in the previous year the bodies of
Willoughby and his men had been discovered in their ships at Arzina by
Russian fishermen. The vessels were still lying at the same anchorage,
and were now visited by some of Killingworth’s men, a considerable
quantity of the cargoes being recovered. It is possible that
Willoughby’s body was sent home. His ships, for lack of sufficient
seamen, had to be left for another year.[296] Richard Chancellor, with
the agents, remained in Russia for the winter, but the _Edward
Bonaventure_ was sent home before the navigation closed. She picked up
the _Philip and Mary_ at Vardo, and they arrived together in the Thames
at the beginning of November.[297]
Next year (1556) the _Edward_ and the _Philip and Mary_ were again sent
out, in company with a pinnace called the _Serchthrift_ under the
command of Stephen Borough. The latter was not intended to trade, but to
pursue the north-eastern discovery towards the River Obi. The two large
ships had surplus crews for the manning of Willoughby’s vessels, the
_Bona Esperanza_ and the _Bona Confidentia_, found in the previous year.
They left Ratcliff on April 23. Soon afterwards occurred one of the last
recorded incidents in the life of Sebastian Cabot:
‘The 27th, being Monday, the right worshipful
Sebastian Cabota came aboard our pinnace at Gravesend,
accompanied with divers gentlemen and gentlewomen
who, after they had viewed our pinnace and tasted of
such cheer as we could make them aboard, they went
on shore, giving to our mariners right liberal rewards:
and the good old gentleman Master Cabota gave to the
poor most liberal alms, wishing them to pray for the
good fortune and prosperous success of the _Serchthrift_
our pinnace. And then at the sign of the Christopher,
he and his friends banqueted, and made me (Stephen
Borough) and those that were in the company, great
cheer: and for very joy that he had to see the towardness
of our intended discovery, he entered into the dance
himself amongst the rest of the young and lusty company:
which being ended, he and his friends departed
most gently, commending us to the governance of
almighty God.’
This was his last personal appearance on the page of history. All that
remains thereafter is a document or two relative to his pension, and a
reference to his death by his friend Richard Eden. The latter event
almost certainly took place towards the end of 1557, when he must have
been at least eighty-two years of age.
The _Serchthrift_ and the two large vessels made a prosperous voyage to
the north. In the mouth of the White Sea Stephen Borough with the
_Serchthrift_ parted company to go on his own business, whilst the
others proceeded to St. Nicholas. Borough’s little vessel was
excellently suited for exploring the shallow waters and sandy coasts
lying to the north-east of the White Sea. Her tonnage is not stated, but
she was able to float in five feet of water. Yet her cabin was
sufficiently large to admit of the entertainment of several people at
once. She was fully rigged with three masts, and carried a skiff upon
her deck. Probably she approximated to the type which in Latin countries
was called a caravel. Her crew numbered ten, including Stephen’s brother
William.[298]
Although he bade farewell to the _Edward Bonaventure_ on May 31, it was
not until June 22 that Borough’s voyage was fairly begun. In the
interval he explored the southern shore of the Bay of Mezen and anchored
in the Kola River. A fleet of Russian ‘lodias’ or fishing-boats
collected in the estuary, bound for the summer fishing off the Petchora.
They were undecked, fitted with oars and sails, and were of even lighter
draught than the _Serchthrift_, although they carried twenty-four men
each. The skipper of one of them, Gabriel by name, was very friendly and
rendered useful services to the English. On June 22 all sailed in
company, rounding Cape St. John, the northern arm of the bay. Two days
later the _Serchthrift_ was in peril of being wrecked on a lee shore.
Gabriel, whose craft had reached shelter, came out in a skiff to render
aid. He lent them his own anchor and another which he had borrowed,
their own being too heavy, and, these anchors being taken seawards and
dropped by the skiff, they were able to warp off the shore.
On July 9 they rounded the cape called Kanin Nos and proceeded to
Morgoviets, thence pushing on to the mouth of the Petchora, which was
reached on the 15th. At this point Borough observed the variation of the
compass to be 3½° W. Five days were spent in the Petchora. On July 21,
the day after leaving, the _Serchthrift_ was in great peril from ice,
being hemmed in by a monstrous floe only half an hour after first
sighting it. After six anxious hours she got clear. An easterly course
was followed a little to the north of the seventieth parallel until the
25th, on which date the small islands which lie to the south of Novaia
Zemlia were discovered. Borough named them St. James’s Islands. The
variation was here 7½° W. A Russian vessel passing by gave them some
information as to the River Obi, the intended goal of the voyage, and
they plied eastwards against a head wind until July 31. On that date
they arrived at the Island of Vaigats, the most easterly point they were
destined to reach. In its neighbourhood they remained for more than
three weeks, experiencing very bad weather, storms, rain, and fog. They
encountered some Samoyedes who lived in deer-skin tents and worshipped
idols; and Richard Johnson, one of the crew, wrote a graphic description
of their wizardry and ‘devilish rites’. He was left behind among these
savages for the winter, but the manner of his return to civilization
does not appear.
At length, on August 22, Stephen Borough determined to give up the hope
of further progress for that year. The winds were continuously
unfavourable, the ice was increasing, and the nights were becoming dark.
He turned his sails westwards therefore, doubling Kanin Nos on August
30, and reaching Colmogro, where he wintered, on September 11. He
intended to pursue his discoveries further in the following year, but
was sent instead to look for traces of the ill-fated vessels lost on the
Norwegian coast in the autumn of 1556, as will be described below.
Nothing further was done towards the solution of the north-eastern
problem until the abortive expedition of Pet and Jackman in 1580.
In the meantime the two trading vessels sent out in 1556 had reached St.
Nicholas and there discharged their cargoes. The extra hands were sent
to take possession of Willoughby’s derelict ships, and brought them also
into the bay to be loaded for England. When all were ready to sail for
home Richard Chancellor came down to St. Nicholas, bringing with him a
Russian ambassador for England, Osep Nepea, Governor of Vologda. Both
took passage in the _Edward Bonaventure_, which carried also sixteen
other Russian passengers and £20,000 worth of goods. The _Bona
Esperanza_ had a cargo worth £6,000 and ten more members of the
ambassador’s suite. The ladings of the _Bona Confidentia_ and the
_Philip and Mary_ are not specified. The homeward voyage was disastrous.
Violent storms drove the fleet on to the Norwegian coast: the _Philip
and Mary_ struggled into Trondheim and passed the winter there, not
arriving in the Thames until April 18, 1557; the _Bona Confidentia_ was
seen to split on a rock at the entrance to the same port, and perished
with all hands; while the _Bona Esperanza_ was never heard of again. The
_Edward Bonaventure_ alone continued the voyage, only to meet her fate
on the Scottish coast. On November 10, 1556, after a four months’
passage, she was driven on a lee shore at Pitsligo in Aberdeenshire in
the darkness of a winter’s night. Chancellor, intent on saving the
ambassador, took to the boat, placing him in it with seven of his
compatriots. But it was swamped before reaching the shore; the
ambassador was saved, but the other seven Russians perished, together
with Chancellor and several of the crew. It would appear that those who
stuck by the ship saved their lives; for the remaining nine of the
ambassador’s suite survived, as also did John Buckland, the master of
the vessel. The hungry Scots of the coast plundered the wreck, not £500
worth of goods being ever recovered.
The death of Richard Chancellor was a great loss to his country. He had
been successful as seaman, explorer, and diplomatist. His courage in
face of misfortune on the first voyage and his admirable conduct at the
court of the Czar had alone made the success of the new company
possible, and entitle him to take a worthy place among the great
Englishmen of his age.
As soon as the news of the wreck reached London the Company obtained
letters from the queen to the Regent of Scotland, and dispatched Dr.
Lawrence Hussey to conduct the ambassador to England and to recover the
ship’s cargo. Mary of Guise, the Regent, did her best to obtain
restitution of the stolen goods, but her efforts were for the most part
unavailing; a few small packages of wax were given up by the poorer sort
of Scots, ‘but the jewels, rich apparel, presents, gold, silver, costly
furs, and such like, were conveyed away, concealed and utterly
embezzled’. Finding the business hopeless, Hussey set out with the
ambassador, crossing the Border on February 18, 1557, and drawing near
London on the 27th. The Czar’s representative was accorded a most
magnificent reception, entering London like a conquering king. Twelve
miles out of the city he was met by eighty merchants in costly apparel
and chains of gold, who conducted him to a house in the suburbs. Next
day the members of the Russia Company, as it may now be called, to the
number of 140, led him into the city. At the gates he was met by Lord
Montague with 300 mounted men, representing the queen, and by the Lord
Mayor and all the aldermen, who took him through crowded streets to his
lodging in Fenchurch Street. At various points on the route he was the
recipient of costly presents. Business was not immediately proceeded
with, as it was necessary to await the arrival of King Philip from the
Netherlands.
At length, on March 25, Osep Nepea had his first formal audience of
their Majesties, and the negotiations for a treaty were commenced. It
appears from a Venetian report—a source, however, which we have seen to
be very untrustworthy in this connexion—that, besides discussing
commercial matters, the ambassador requested a loan of artillery and
ammunition for the Czar, and that the Swedish ambassador protested
strongly, threatening war.[299] No trace of any military question
appears in any other evidence as to the negotiations. Among the Cecil
papers are some memoranda for a treaty with Russia.[300] The concessions
proposed for the Muscovites were very similar to those granted by Ivan
to the English; but, in fact, the treaty was rather ornamental than
useful. There was no necessity for it, for the simple reason that no
subjects of the Czar were likely to resort to London for many a year to
come. Russia’s sole outlets to the ocean were at that time the shores of
Lapland and the White Sea; her sailors were nothing more than fishermen,
and their craft were quite unsuited for a voyage to England, being for
the most part undecked rowing-boats; while her merchants were landsmen
and not seamen, accustomed to carry their goods for immense distances
over the rivers and plains, but having none of the knowledge or
inclination requisite for a sea-borne commerce. Hence the intercourse
between the two countries was necessarily very one-sided, and the
privileges already granted by the Czar were all that was needed in the
shape of diplomatic regulation. The real utility of Osep Nepea’s visit
was to learn something of the power and civilization of England, and to
open up an interchange of civilities between the two courts.
An interesting glimpse of the Muscovite at Mary’s court is afforded by a
letter from Josse de Courteville, one of Philip’s Flemings, to the
President Viglius:
‘Je tiens que vous aves esté adverty de l’arrivée du Moscovitte en ce
royaulme, que l’on dict estre passé par la Mer Froide et que l’on
tenoit innavigable. La royne l’a faict icy tarder jusques a l’arrivée
du roy; et aujourd’huy a-t-il esté mené vers Leurs Majestés, au droict
costel de l’evesque de Londres, accompagné de plusieurs chevaliers de
l’ordre et autres, accoustré, assez à la turquesque, d’ung habillement
long jusqu’en terre, de velour pourfillé d’or, et sur la teste force
pierreryes.... Il y marchoit quatre de ses serviteurs devant luy,
accoustrés à l’advenant d’une mesme fachon, et deulx derrière, qui
portiont chascun ung fardeau que aucuns disiont estre sables, aultres
aultre chose, pour en faire présent à Leurs Majestés. Et, comme je me
voulus enquérir du surplus, j’eus nouvelles du partement de ce
courier, qui ne me sembloit se debvoir oublier; et par ainsy je suis
forcé vous laisser le compte à demy.‘[301]
The Company had prepared four ships for the Russian voyage in the spring
of 1557, three of which had already been used in the voyages to the
Guinea coast. They were the _Primrose_, the _John Evangelist_, the
_Anne_, and the _Trinity_. In the first-named went as admiral Anthony
Jenkinson, who was henceforward to take a foremost place in the
exploration of Russia and Central Asia. Osep Nepea also took passage in
the _Primrose_, bearing a letter from Philip and Mary to the Czar,
together with numerous costly presents for himself and his master. Their
Majesties’ letter gave a summary of the commercial treaty which the
ambassador had concluded, and expressed the customary hopes of amity and
good will between the two nations. The Russian merchants—if any should
ever come to England—should have liberty to come and go, and carry on
their business in all parts of the kingdom, selling their goods
wholesale or retail without impediment. While in England they should be
under the special protection of the queen, and should be free from the
payment of the taxes and dues which all other foreigners had to pay.
They might set up warehouses in London and other cities. For their
greater security the Lord Chancellor should be assigned as their judge
and legal adviser, and should decide impartially all disputes. The
letter concluded by giving a testimonial to the conduct and ability of
Osep Nepea, who would be able to describe at greater length the matters
referred to.[302]
[Illustration:
THE ENGLISH DISCOVERIES IN THE NORTH-EAST.
From William Borough’s Chart of Northern Navigation,
Royal MS. 18 D. iii. 124.
]
With the departure of the ambassador and the arrival in Russia of
Anthony Jenkinson, the story of the Russia Company enters on a new
phase. The business of the Company, in spite of the maritime disasters
of its early years, was now firmly established. It had three principal
factories, at Colmogro, Vologda, and Moscow; and a third agent, Henry
Lane, was sent out in 1557 to assist the two already appointed. Numerous
subordinate merchants and apprentices were employed, and craftsmen of
various kinds—rope-makers, coopers, skinners—were set to work at the
establishments in Russia so that freight might be saved by exporting
manufactured goods instead of raw material. A regular service of letters
through Poland and Danzig was established.
After Stephen Borough’s voyage in 1556 the search for the sea passage to
Cathay was for a time discontinued, but the marvellous journeys of
Anthony Jenkinson by land more than maintained the reputation of the
Company for the promotion of discovery. His adventures, however, and the
further history of the Company, fall mainly in the reign of Queen
Elizabeth and outside the scope of this work. One point deserves to be
emphasized: King Philip, by giving his full countenance and support to
the north-eastern discoveries, had tacitly admitted that the papal
division of the globe was not by him considered as extending to the
Arctic regions. Once the literal interpretation of the great bull was
broken down, it was impossible to say where the line should be drawn,
and the way was prepared for the retreat of Spain from an untenable
position to the more reasonable one of maintaining her monopoly in the
lands already colonized by her.
-----
Footnote 288:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, ii. 137.
Footnote 289:
Hakluyt, vii. 156–7. Some confusion has arisen as to the year of this
patent, but it is perfectly clear. ‘The sixt day of Januarie, in the
second yeere of his raigne. The yeere of our Lord 1548’ is January 6,
1549, by the present style. Edward VI succeeded to the throne on
January 28, 1547.
Footnote 290:
Navarette, _Colección de Documentos inéditos para la historia de la
España_, iii. 512. The letter is here dated November 15, 1554, but was
probably written at least two years earlier. Northumberland was
executed on August 22, 1553.
Footnote 291:
Charter of Philip and Mary, February 6, 1555, and _Cal. S. P. Dom.
Addenda, Mary_, p. 439. The latter is a list of the members in May
1555. It includes the names of three women among the adventurers.
Footnote 292:
The authorities for these voyages are to be found, unless otherwise
indicated, in Hakluyt (Maclehose ed., 1903), vol. ii.
Footnote 293:
Purchas, xiii. 6, thinks that Spitzbergen was the land found. The
lowest point of Spitzbergen is in 76½°. It is impossible that
Willoughby could have committed such a serious error in latitude.
Moreover, Spitzbergen is due north of Senjen.
Footnote 294:
Hakluyt, iii. 74, 331.
Footnote 295:
The Venetian agent (_Venetian Cal._ vi, No. 89) says three. The error
arose from the name of the _Philip and Mary_, which the Italian
doubtless took to be two vessels. The instructions for the voyage
leave no doubt that only two ships were sent. See also Henry Lane’s
letter (Hakluyt, iii. 332).
Footnote 296:
The Venetian envoy wrongly states that they were brought home in 1555.
Footnote 297:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, No. 269.
Footnote 298:
These details are scattered here and there in Borough’s account of the
voyage.
Footnote 299:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, No. 852.
Footnote 300:
_Cal. Cecil MSS._, i, p. 146.
Footnote 301:
_Brussels Archives_, Kervyn de Lettenhove, i, p. 61.
Footnote 302:
_Cotton MSS._, Nero, B viii, 3.
CHAPTER XIII
SHIPS AND MEN. ENGLISH PORTS
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed great developments in
English shipbuilding. In the former the feeble, untrustworthy vessels of
the Middle Ages were improved and strengthened until they were
sufficiently sound for regular voyages to all the waters of Europe, the
Mediterranean included; and in the latter an ocean-going type was
evolved, capable of keeping the sea for weeks and months at a stretch,
and of making such voyages as those of Drake and Cavendish, which
constituted an astonishing advance on anything that had previously been
possible.
At the commencement of this improvement in shipping England lagged far
behind her competitors. The Venetians were regularly voyaging to the
North Sea for at least two centuries before there was any established
English trade to the Mediterranean. The Portuguese had commercial posts
on the Guinea coast a hundred years before Wyndham sailed the first
English vessel there; and their successive advances on the route to
India, spread over a long period of years and culminating in Vasco da
Gama’s arrival at Calicut in 1498, gave them a long start in the
acquisition of the experience necessary to the advance of shipbuilding.
Yet by the end of the sixteenth century the positions were reversed, and
English ships were excelled by none in durability and handiness and
general efficiency for the purposes for which they were designed.
It would seem that this rapid advance in excellence was largely due to
the interest in the navy displayed by Tudor governments. The development
of the warship preceded in most respects that of the merchantman; and,
owing to the peculiar conditions of the time, every merchantman which
was to be of use for anything beyond mere coasting had to be provided
with some fighting gear. For distant voyages in fact, such as those to
the Mediterranean, merchants preferred to charter a man-of-war from the
State whenever one was available. Throughout the period in question
England was exposed to constant wars or threatenings of war with France
or Spain, with the result that the improvement of fighting-ships was
vigorously pressed. The fleet became a leading care of the State to an
extent never before dreamed of; and the mercantile marine, fostered by a
system of bounties, shared in the general enlightenment, and steadily
extended the scope of its activities to the accompaniment of an
unprecedented advance in the construction of ships and the study of all
things pertaining to shipping.
Mediaeval vessels fall largely into two classes: the long, low and
narrow galley; and the short, broad, almost basin-shaped sailing-ship,
propelled usually by a single square sail. In northern waters the
galley, common until the twelfth century, gradually gave place to the
sailing-ship, on which all progress was concentrated, so that by the
close of the Middle Ages the oared vessel was practically extinct
outside the Mediterranean. In that sea, however, natural conditions were
more favourable to the galley, which survived side by side with the
sailing-vessel and which, although costing more in working expenses, was
preferred for its swiftness and reliability.
In England the first great improvement of the mediaeval sailing-ship
consisted in fitting two or more masts in place of the one which had
hitherto been considered sufficient. The exact date of this advance is
unknown, but it probably occurred before the beginning of the fifteenth
century, when the increasing frequency of voyages to Bordeaux and
Iceland began to demand more navigable vessels for their safe
accomplishment. A natural concomitant of this change was an increase of
length and a modification of the extreme basin-shape of the
single-masted cogs, which were only suited for short, fair-wind trips
across the narrow seas to France or Flanders. At some time also in the
same century occurred the introduction of the lateen sail in place of
the square sail on the aftermost mast of the ship. This device doubtless
came from the Mediterranean, where small craft were fitted exclusively
with such sails.
A modification in the shape of the hull, which was destined to be of
long enduring influence, was due to the needs of warfare. In early
vessels there was no raised poop or forecastle, but the deck ran in
unbroken sweep from prow to stern, at which extremities the timbers of
the side curved upwards to a point. For fighting purposes it became
customary to fit such ships with raised platforms or castles, built on
temporarily at either end, and occupied by archers, slingers, and
stone-throwing engines. The latter, from such a high vantage-point,
could do great execution on an enemy’s decks and could, moreover, assist
in repelling boarders from the waist of their own vessel. The efficacy
of the new departure was speedily proved, and it became permanently
incorporated into the design. Ships were now built with a strong square
forecastle and ‘summercastle’, as the after-edifice was named, as
integral parts of the structure. The additional weight thus placed at
either end necessitated an increase of length to avoid excessive
pitching. The pitching motion was nevertheless very severe, as was
proved when a full-sized model of Columbus’s caravel, the _Santa Maria_,
was sailed across the Atlantic in 1893.[303]
In a late fifteenth-century manuscript in the British Museum,[304] the
author of which died in 1491, there are numerous illustrations of ships
which may be taken as representing the state of marine construction at
the opening of the Tudor period. On folio 5 is a drawing of a
sailing-ship, probably the type of vessel with which the longer voyages,
such as those to Bordeaux or Spain, were made. She has a platform-shaped
forecastle, not of excessive height, and a long poop sloping upwards
towards the stern. The masts are three in number, the foremast being
very short and the mainmast twice its height. Each of these is intended
to carry one square sail, although the mainsail only is shown. The
mizen-mast is short and carries one lateen sail. There is a bowsprit but
no sprit-sail such as was afterwards used. None of the drawings in this
manuscript shows any signs of a sprit-sail yard on the bowsprit; and it
is possible that they had not been introduced at that date, although
they were in use before the close of the century. The same may be said
of top-sails and topmasts; they occur nowhere in these drawings, but
they were certainly fitted to warships built for Henry VII not long
after his accession. The drawing on f. 5 has been frequently reproduced,
but generally so badly as to make it appear that the ship has only two
masts instead of three.
On f. 25 of the same manuscript is a very clear drawing showing a large
ship in harbour with sails furled. This vessel has a short, high
forecastle and a long poop rising in two tiers. The bowsprit and
foremast are short. The mainmast is high and very thick, while there are
two mizen-masts each with a yard for a lateen sail. When two mizen-masts
were fitted to a ship the foremost was called the main mizen and the
aftermost the bonaventure mizen. This is the earliest drawing showing a
four-masted ship which has been met with. On the other side of the sheet
(f. 25b) the same vessel is shown in a storm at sea. There are guns on
deck in the waist and a row of oval openings in the poop and forecastle
which are evidently intended for ports for smaller pieces. On f. 18b is
a representation of a sea fight, one ship engaging two others at close
quarters. Long-bows, cross-bows, spears, and stones are the principal
weapons used; and marksmen are placed in the tops to sweep the enemy’s
decks. The mainmasts, and occasionally the other masts, of ships of the
time were fitted with circular tops for fighting and look-out purposes,
and large enough for two or three men to stand in. At a later period
small guns were mounted in them. All the vessels in this manuscript show
an immense advance on the old mediaeval cog, and indicate the great
improvements which had been going on during the fifteenth century.
[Illustration:
WARSHIP, _c._ 1485.
From Cott. MS. Jul. E. iv. 6, f. 25.
]
As was natural during a period of more extended voyages, the size of
merchant ships tended to increase. Nine vessels trading between England
and Spain in the time of Henry VII, of which the tonnage is mentioned in
the State papers, show an average of 142 tons, the largest being 220
tons. The Italians generally built their ships larger than this, and,
although we read that in 1488 there was no ship of 1,000 tons in Venice,
the reference seems to imply that ships of that size were by no means
unknown. The statements as to tonnage must, however, be taken as of very
loose application, the same ship being sometimes given as 50 per cent.
or more larger than at others. The _Henry Grace à Dieu_, for example,
Henry VIII’s great warship, varies between 1,000 and 1,500 tons, and the
_Mary Rose_, which was of 400 tons when built, is described as of 600
three years later. In English ships the unit of measurement was the tun
of Bordeaux wine, which contained 252 gallons and occupied about 60
cubic feet of space.[305] When there was a question of hiring
merchantmen for war purposes, for which payment was made by the ton, the
owner’s estimate was apt to differ considerably from that of the
government. In the French war of 1512–13 the navy lists contain numbers
of merchantmen whose tonnage varies so astonishingly as to suggest that
their hulls were capable of inflation and deflation like balloons.
The cost of building ships was very low in comparison with modern
figures, although it rose rapidly with the influx of gold from America
in the sixteenth century. Two small warships, the _Mary Fortune_ and the
_Sweepstake_, were built for Henry VII at a cost of £110 and £120
respectively.[306] At the opening of Henry VIII’s reign the _Mary Rose_,
400 tons, and the _Peter Pomegranate_, 300, together cost £1,016 fully
equipped for sea;[307] while the _Henry Grace à Dieu_, the largest ship
of her time, cost £8,708 in 1514.[308] Privately owned ships were
chartered by the State at 3_d._ per ton per week.
A French manuscript of 1519[309] affords some information as to the
shipping of that date. It is a translation in French of Caesar’s wars,
to illustrate which a large map of France is provided as a frontispiece.
Following the contemporary custom, the cartographer has inserted
drawings of ships in the surrounding seas. One of these, placed near the
mouth of the Garonne, represents a large merchantman. She has a curved
stem and rounded, swelling bows, shaped like a bellying sail and
surmounted by a flat, platform-shaped forecastle which overhangs the
water. The waist has greater freeboard than that of a warship, and the
poop is small and square. No guns are visible, and the hull is evidently
designed for stability and carrying capacity rather than speed and
fighting convenience. There are three pole masts, each with a round top
and one square sail. There are no topmasts and no bowsprit. Three other
sailing-ships are shown on the same map. Their hulls are of the same
type as the one already described, but they have only one mast each. As
this was a work dealing with ancient history it is probable that the
artist purposely drew the oldest-fashioned craft he was acquainted with.
He had some archaeological instinct, as is evident from the semi-Roman
costumes which appear in other illustrations; and he recognized that it
would be inappropriate to place guns in the ships, not one of which
possesses them. If this view is correct the manuscript is interesting as
providing one of the many lost connecting links between the mediaeval
and modern types of sailing-ship.
Robert Thorne’s map of 1527, appended to his book to Dr. Lee, bears a
spirited drawing of a sailing-vessel approximating more to the
man-of-war type. She has a square, overhanging forecastle, a low waist,
and a high, narrow poop. The fore and main masts are lofty, and are each
provided with top-sails, while the short mizen has one lateen sail. It
is not apparent whether this was intended to represent an English or
Spanish vessel. Thorne was an Englishman, but the drawing was made at
Seville and is placed in a part of the ocean to which no English ship
had then penetrated.
One more example of the none too numerous drawings of merchantmen may be
quoted. In a _Book of Hydrography_ designed in 1542 by a Frenchman, John
Rotz, for Henry VIII,[310] occur numerous beautifully painted maps
embracing all parts of the world. On one, representing the North
Atlantic, a merchant vessel is seen near the coast of Portugal. The
hull, evidently built for carrying capacity, is on very full lines, and
the fore and after castles are small in proportion. The mainmast carries
two sails, but the fore and mizen masts have only one each, that on the
latter being a lateen. There is a bowsprit but no sprit-sail. This may
possibly represent a Portuguese carrack of the type with which they
voyaged to the East Indies. Such vessels were subsequently developed to
(for that time) an enormous size. One captured by the English in 1592,
named the _Madre de Dios_, was of 1,600 tons burden.
The facts considered above serve to indicate that, although little is
known with exactitude about the merchant vessels of early Tudor times,
it is at least certain that they were by no means identical in design
with the warships. The latter, as will be seen, mounted large numbers of
guns—over 100 in many cases—and this fact influenced their design to an
extent quite unnecessary in trading craft, which were far less heavily
armed. The principal features in the development of the latter from
their mediaeval prototypes were: increasing length, relatively small
size of the ‘castles’, and an increasing number of sails and spars,
together with the introduction of topmasts.
The ship’s boats were usually three in number, the ‘great boat’, the
long-boat, and the skiff or jolly-boat. They were probably carried on
deck in the waist, and must have been hoisted by tackles from the
yard-arms, since davits were not then used for the purpose. The great
boat was often towed. Hakluyt gives an account of a voyage to the
Mediterranean by the _Matthew Gonson_ in 1535, as narrated by one of the
crew. He says that they towed their great boat all the way from Chios to
the Straits of Gibraltar, implying that she was then hoisted aboard. As
this boat was big enough to carry ten tuns of water it is difficult to
imagine how it was done.
[Illustration: 1]
[Illustration:
2
TWO MERCHANTMEN.
1. From Robert Thorne’s map, 1527. 2. From
Harl. MS. 6205, date 1519.
]
Although, as we have seen, four-masted ships were known long before the
end of the fifteenth century, the merchantman of Tudor times was usually
equipped with three. In short vessels the masts were rigged in a
fan-shape, the foremast inclining forwards, the mainmast upright, and
the mizen raking towards the rear so as to give greater distance between
the sails. The latter tended to increase in number, the use of top-sails
and sprit-sails beneath the bowsprit becoming common in the reign of
Henry VII. An additional spar, projecting from the stern of the ship in
the same manner as the bowsprit from the bow, and named the ‘outligger’,
was fitted to receive the sheet of the lateen sail on the mizenmast.
With top-sails, topmasts were introduced, but the latter were fixtures
in the sixteenth century and not strikeable at sea. To diminish rolling
in heavy weather it was customary to lower the main- and fore-yards down
to the deck, as is depicted in various drawings. Top-gallant-masts and
sails were fitted to warships—the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ had them on three
of her four masts—but it does not appear that any merchant ship had them
until a much later date. Although there is some evidence that reefing
was known in very early times, it was not extensively practised at the
period in question. The purpose of reefing is to reduce the sail area in
high winds, but among Tudor seamen a contrary device was favoured. The
sails were cut smaller than the maximum size possible, and were
lengthened in light winds by lacing to their lower borders additional
pieces called bonnets. As many as three bonnets were sometimes supplied
for one sail,[311] but two was the more usual number. They were applied
to the main- and fore-sails and also to top-sails.[312] Jibs and
stay-sails, and fore-and-aft rigging generally, were entirely unknown at
this time, the nearest approach to any such thing being the lateen. In
consequence it was much harder than at present to make headway against
contrary winds, as an example of which the difficulty invariably
experienced by English traders in getting away from the Guinea coast may
be cited. The shape of the hulls was such as to offer great resistance
to the wind, and the leeway must have been excessive. Towards the middle
of the century, when the size of the forecastle had somewhat diminished,
it would seem that it was possible to heave the ship to without showing
any sail at all: Sir Hugh Willoughby’s journal, describing the gale
encountered off the Norwegian coast, says, ‘... the wind increasing so
sore that we were not able to bear any sail, but took them in, and lay a
drift, to the end to let the storm over pass’.
More distant voyages demanded a long-overdue improvement in the science
of navigation. The finding of latitude was rendered a comparatively
simple matter by the successive inventions of the astrolabe, the
cross-staff, and the quadrant.[313] The astrolabe, which came into use
prior to the age of the great discoveries, remained in favour throughout
the sixteenth century, being described by Martin Cortes in his _Breve
Compendio de la Sphera_ in 1556. An astrolabe which was used by Sir
Francis Drake is preserved in the museum at Greenwich. Cortes’s
astrolabe consisted of a metal ring, of which 90 degrees were graduated,
and a metal pointer turning on a pin in the centre. The pointer had
aperture sights at either end, and when moved until the sun could be
seen through both apertures it indicated his elevation above the horizon
in degrees on the graduated part of the ring.[314] The cross-staff was
invented early in the sixteenth century, but never entirely superseded
the astrolabe until both were rendered obsolete by the quadrant, an
invention of John Davis at the end of the same century. With these
instruments latitude was ascertainable with fair accuracy; in skilful
hands the error was usually less than one degree. The same could not be
said about longitude, in which huge errors were unavoidable by any
method then known. Longitude remained then and long afterwards an
insoluble problem, and many charts of the time made no effort to
indicate it.
Of contemporary foreign vessels the most interesting is the caravel, as
being the type with which Columbus made his great voyages across the
Atlantic, and which had a considerable influence on the design of the
Tudor man-of-war. The caravel, which the Spaniards found most suitable
for their early ocean navigations, had little in common with the short,
broad merchantmen of the narrow seas. It was built with a high, tapering
poop, a low waist, and a high, overhanging forecastle, rectangular in
plan, and serving to break the force of a head sea. The high castles and
general handiness of design rendered it an efficient fighting vessel,
and it was probable, as Mr. Oppenheim has pointed out, that it was for
this reason that Henry VII was eager to employ such craft in preference
to English-built ships on the rare occasions when he needed to mobilize
a naval force.[315] But the caravel, probably as lacking sufficient
cargo capacity, did not find favour with English shipbuilders, and as
late as 1552 was still distinctively a foreign type. In that year the
London merchants who sent out Thomas Wyndham on a trading voyage to
Barbary bought a Portuguese caravel of 60 tons to form part of his
squadron. The inhabitants of the Canary Isles, recognizing from a
distance that she was not an English ship, made an attack on the
expedition as they concluded that she had been wrongfully acquired.
The carrack, unlike the caravel, is not an easily identifiable type, and
the word seems to have been applied to any large and bulky vessel. In
one navy list the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ appears as the ‘Imperyall (or
Gret) Carrick’,[316] but this is exceptional, and the term was generally
used only of foreign ships. In its particular application, if it can be
said to have had one, it signified first the trading-ships of
Genoa,[317] which ceased to come to England after the fifteenth century,
and afterwards the great East Indiamen of the Portuguese. The act
granting tonnage and poundage in 1485 provides that if an Englishman
ship his goods in a ‘carryke or galley’ he shall pay the same duties as
a foreigner. The carracks in this case meant Genoese, and the galleys
Venetian, vessels.
[Illustration:
1 & 2
TWO CARRACKS.
1. From Royal MS. 20. E. ix. 2. From
Add. MS. 5415. A. 7.
]
Another non-English ship was the hulk, the large, clumsy merchantman of
the Hanse towns. William Towerson, sailing for Guinea in January 1558,
captured two ‘hulks of Dantzick’ in the Bay of Biscay. They made no
attempt at resistance against his three vessels, and were released as
not worth keeping by reason of their poor sailing qualities: ‘they
sailed so ill that, having all their sails abroad, we kept them company
only with our foresails, and without any topsails abroad, so that in
every two days sailing they would have hindered us more than one’—which
seems to argue that the Germans built their ships solely with an eye to
capacity. Henry VIII hired several hulks from the Hansa for use against
the French in 1545. His fighting instructions for an anticipated action
in that year directed that they should be placed in the front line and
used to break up the order of the enemy before the onset of the
men-of-war in the second line.[318]
Turning to warships, we find ourselves on much surer ground. Detailed
inventories exist of several of the crack ships of Henry VII and Henry
VIII, and carefully executed drawings of the same period are
numerous.[319] In the evolution of the warship the paramount factor was
the rapid development of artillery. The guns mounted in ships were at
first small and of little penetrative power. Consequently it was
essential to place them where they could do the greatest execution on an
enemy’s decks and against his rigging. The tactical idea in the use of
the gun was mainly to employ it in the same way as the long-bow and the
cross-bow; to kill the enemy’s crew rather than to sink his ship. Hence
we find in the warships of Henry VII large numbers of ‘serpentines’,
small guns weighing about three hundredweight and throwing a half-pound
ball, grouped in the castles of the ship, which were built very high to
accommodate them in two or three tiers. At the same time a few heavier
guns, throwing stone balls, were placed in the waist. These were too low
down to reach the greater part of the hostile deck at close quarters,
and must therefore have been fired at the hull. The collective weight of
all these guns was very great and, to secure stability and structural
strength, the ship’s sides had to be sloped inwards from the water-line
so that the weight should be more centrally carried. This ‘tumblehome’
in high-built ships was so great that the width of the deck on poop and
forecastle was often less than half the width at the water-line. It
served another purpose in rendering boarding more difficult, for, even
if two vessels were touching at the water-line, their decks were
necessarily several feet apart. The most easily accessible part was the
waist, which was defended by nettings and by guns placed in the castles
on purpose to sweep it with ‘hail shot’, the forerunner of grape and
canister.
The armament of the _Sovereign_, built in 1488, was as follows:[320] In
the forecastle, above deck, 16 serpentines, and below deck, 24; in the
poop, 20 serpentines; in the ‘somercastle’ (apparently a quarter-deck,
one stage lower than the poop), above deck, 25 serpentines, below deck,
21 together with 11 stone guns; in the waist, 20 stone guns; in the
stern, over the rudder, 4 serpentines. Total, 110 serpentines and 31
stone guns. The _Regent_, built about the same time, was most likely a
larger vessel, as she carried 225 guns. In her case their distribution
is not known.
Although Henry VII had these two first-class warships built, he did not
maintain a large navy, and at his death there were apparently only seven
royal ships.[321] His successor, bent on a more adventurous foreign
policy, began to strengthen the fleet from the very commencement of his
reign. The _Mary Rose_ and the _Peter Pomegranate_ were built in 1510,
and the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ was laid down at the end of 1512 to replace
the _Regent_, burnt in action off Brest earlier in that year.
An incident which took place in April 1513 probably had a great effect
on the armament of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_. The English fleet was
blockading the French in Brest and seeking in vain for some means of
bringing the enemy to action. As a reinforcement a squadron of six
French galleys was ordered round from the Mediterranean under the
command of a brave and able officer named Prégent de Bidoux. Three of
these galleys, according to contemporary letters, were armed with one
heavy gun each, obtained from the Venetians, and of such a size as had
never before been seen in France. It was asserted that a single shot
from such a gun would be sufficient to send any ship to the bottom. The
boast was soon, to a great extent, substantiated. Arriving off Brest on
April 22, Prégent made a bold dash through the blockading fleet and
succeeding in getting into Blanc Sablons Bay. In the process his
formidable guns sank one English ship outright and crippled another,
striking her through in seven places so that there was great difficulty
in keeping her afloat. This was a minimum estimate of the damage, as
admitted by the English themselves; a neutral account stated that two
ships were sunk, and Prégent himself claimed to have destroyed four
large ships and two transports, which was certainly a gross
exaggeration.[322]
The construction of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ could not at this date have
been at a very advanced stage, since she was not ready for sea until
June 1514; and it is fair to assume that the demonstration of the
effectiveness of a few heavy guns provided by the above action was
responsible for the mounting of several such in the _Henry_. Be that as
it may, the tendency was henceforward to reduce the number of light
pieces carried in the upper works of a ship and to transfer the weight
of armament to a hard-hitting battery placed on the level of the waist
and in a fighting deck below the waist. The _Henry Grace à Dieu_ is the
first ship known to have been provided with a tier of guns below the
main deck. She was armed in 1514 with 136 small guns, and the following
heavier pieces, the exact dimensions of some of which are not
ascertainable: stone guns, 4; ‘great pieces of iron of one making and
bigness,’ 12; ‘great iron guns of one sort that come out of Flanders,’
4; ‘great Spanish pieces of iron of one sort,’ 2; stone guns on wheels,
18; miscellaneous large guns, 4; great brass culverins, 2; a great brass
bombard on four wheels; and a great brass curtall on four wheels: total,
48 heavy guns.[323] It is doubtful whether the stone guns should be
ranked as heavy weapons. They were evidently larger than serpentines, to
judge from their position in the _Sovereign’s_ armament already
described; but it is unlikely that they were identical with the ‘canon
petro’ of the latter half of the century, which fired a 26 lb. shot.
They were probably in 1514 medium-sized pieces, and if we deduct them
from the above total, the undoubtedly heavy guns of the _Henry_ numbered
26. The culverin was of 5½ inches calibre, and threw an 18 lb. ball;
according to a paper of 1513 the weight of the shot fired by the curtall
was 60 lb., while the missile of the bombard was of 260 lb. and required
a charge of 80 lb. of powder.[324] It is somewhat hard to believe that
the _Henry_ ever used such a gun at sea; and in another list of almost
the same date the bombard is omitted.[325] By the end of the reign the
_Henry_ had been re-armed, her heavy guns then numbering 19, and
consisting of 4 cannon, 3 demi-cannon, 4 culverins, 2 demi-culverins, 2
cannon-petro, and 4 sakers.[326] The weight of shot ranged from 60 lb.
for the cannon down to 6 lb. for the saker.
The same policy of reducing the number of guns, increasing their weight,
and carrying them lower, was pursued in the case of other ships built
during the reign, with the consequence that the excessive height of the
castles was no longer necessary; and after 1540 several vessels were
built practically flush-decked. These ships, which varied from 150 to
300 tons, were described as galleys, but the word was not intended in
its usual sense. They were fully-rigged sailing-ships and, although they
may have been occasionally assisted by the use of sweeps, it was not
their principal means of propulsion. They probably owed the name to
their speed and handiness as compared with the high-built,
older-fashioned vessels. An illustration[327] of one of them, the
_Tiger_, built in 1546, appears as the frontispiece of Oppenheim’s
_Administration of the Royal Navy_. She carries about twenty large guns,
of which fourteen are placed on the broadsides below the main deck. The
king himself was greatly interested in the efforts made to improve
warships. The following extract from a letter of Chapuys, an eminently
reliable authority, demonstrates his responsibility for the innovation
just described:
‘The King has sent to Italy for three shipwrights experienced in the
art of constructing galleys, but I fancy he will not make much use of
their science, as for some time back he has been building ships with
oars according to a model of which he himself is the inventor.’[328]
The smaller examples of this class were known as ‘rowbarges’. They did
good service against the French galleys in the war of 1544–6, and were
used for policing the Channel in times of peace. They are thus described
by Martin du Bellay, a contemporary French writer:
‘Il y a une espèce de navires particulières dont usoyent noz ennemis,
en forme plus longue que ronde, et plus estroitte beaucoup que les
gallères, pour mieux se régir et commander aux courantes, qui sont
ordinaires en ceste mer; à quoy les hommes sont si duits, qu’avec ces
vaisseaux ils contendent de vitesse avec les gallères, et les nomment
remberges.’
In the larger ships the type of hull gradually developed into that
familiar in numerous pictures of the Armada period: low forecastle, very
little higher than the waist, and moderately high poop, the guns being
mounted on the main deck and in one or more fighting decks below it.
This build, although increased in size, remained substantially unaltered
in its main proportions until the middle of the eighteenth century.
Although the hulls of ships were undergoing great modifications, the
style of rigging warships remained practically unchanged during the
period under review. The _Sovereign_ of 1488 had four masts, the fore
and main having topmasts and top-sails, and the mizen and bonaventure
mizen being rigged with one lateen sail each. A sprit-sail was carried
under the bowsprit. The _Sovereign_ was in all respects an excellent
ship, and probably in advance of the general standard of her time. As
late as 1525, when her timbers were old and rotten, the authorities were
recommended to have her rebuilt because ‘the form of this ship is so
marvellous goodly that great pity it were she should die’.[329]
Apparently the advice was not carried out, for she disappears from view
about this time. The _Henry Grace à Dieu_ carried topmasts and
topgallantmasts and three sails on the fore-, main-, and mizen-masts,
and a topmast and two sails on the bonaventure mizen; also a sprit-sail
under the bowsprit, which, for practical purposes, was a fifth
mast.[330] But the _Henry_ was exceptional in most respects, and the
rigging of the _Sovereign_ became the standard type for
sixteenth-century warships.
The great picture at Hampton Court depicting the embarkation of Henry
VIII at Dover in 1520 shows the _Henry_ and several warships of the
time, but the technical accuracy of the artist is open to great doubt.
Five ships appear on a large scale, and their hulls are all so
suspiciously alike that they suggest the idea that they were all drawn
from the same original. The only differences are in a few minor details
of carving and colouring. Two of the ships carry four masts and the
remainder three; and it is noticeable that not a single lateen sail is
shown in the whole fleet, the mizen-masts having square sails like the
fore and main. This is almost certainly incorrect.[331] Such guns as can
be seen are arranged in precisely the same way in every case, and the
whole picture gives the impression that the artist was drawing
conventional ships without much study of the real thing, and was
concentrating his care on the numerous gorgeously dressed individuals
who are seen on the decks and in the foreground.
[Illustration:
THE _HENRY GRACE À DIEU_.
From a MS. at Magdalene College, Cambridge.
]
The fighting record of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ is not particularly
brilliant. She was completed just too late to take part in the war of
1512–14. In 1522 war was again declared against France, and she was sent
to sea in the fleet commanded by Sir William Fitz-William. He reported
that she sailed as well and rather better than any ship in the fleet,
weathering them all save the _Mary Rose_; and, although it was only the
beginning of June, he went on to talk about laying her up for the
winter. She was evidently something of a nuisance, and the admiral was
anxious to be rid of her. There had been so much boasting about this
marvellous ship that the French were certain to make her the especial
object of their attacks, and the king would have been furious if she had
been lost. On June 8 she lost her bowsprit, foremast, and maintopmast in
a gale in the Downs, and a week later was brought round to Portsmouth to
be laid up. Special precautions were to be taken against a French raid;
two barks were kept scouting round the Isle of Wight, assisted by an
elaborate system of beacons, sentinels, &c. Later on 1,000 marks were
spent on a dock and fortifications for the _Henry_ at Portsmouth, and it
does not appear that she went to sea in 1523, after which year the war
was virtually over.[332] In 1526, when laid up at Northfleet, it was
reported that she was costing £200 a year in wages alone, and more than
that in cables, hawsers, and other stores, and that a dock would have to
be built at a cost of £600.[333] The next war was that of 1544–6. In the
former year the naval operations were unimportant, and the _Henry_ took
no part in them; but in 1545 an immense French fleet was collected in
the Channel, and for a time England lost the command of the sea. The
English fleet was concentrated at Portsmouth, the _Henry Grace à Dieu_
being the flagship. The king was dining on board when, on July 19, the
approach of the French was signalled. Indecisive fighting at long range
took place, and the French then withdrew. Another cannonade, with the
like result, took place off the Sussex coast on August 15, and with this
the war services of the _Henry_ concluded. She was accidentally burnt at
Deptford in 1553. Her career was typical of those of most of the large
fighting ships of the time. All of them, both English and French, were
considered too valuable to be committed to a decisive action, or to be
sent to sea in any but the finest weather; and such exploits as were
performed went to the credit of lighter and more easily handled craft.
In the wars of this period the French galleys on more than one occasion
proved exceedingly useful to their side; but all attempts to popularize
this type of vessel in England were failures. As has been explained, the
numerous craft so described in the navy lists were for the most part not
true galleys, but light sailing ships. In 1544, however, a galley was
constructed on Mediterranean lines and named the _Galley Subtile_ or
_Row Galley_. She was of 200 tons, carried a crew of 250, and mounted 31
guns.[334] A drawing in the British Museum shows her fitted with a
pointed beak or ram, and one mast with a huge lateen sail. She served on
the Scottish coast in 1544, when Edinburgh was sacked, and in the
actions against the French in the following year.
Artillery in the sixteenth century was in a state of transition.
Originally, after first rudimentary experiments with wood, ropes, and
leather, guns were built up by binding longitudinal strips of metal into
cylindrical form with numerous metal rings, on the principle of the
construction of a cask. Guns made in this way were mounted in Henry
VII’s warships, and the system continued in vogue until the latter half
of the century. At the same time cast-brass and cast-iron guns were
beginning to be made abroad; many of them were imported into England,
and they were used in forts and ships side by side with the built-up
guns.
Practically all the larger pieces for sea use were loaded at the breach.
The method consisted in having a detachable section, from one to two
feet long, called the chamber, which was taken off the remainder of the
barrel to be loaded. When charged with powder the chamber was replaced
at the rear end of the barrel and fixed in position by a wooden wedge
hammered in between it and a projection on the carriage of the gun, the
shot having been previously placed in the barrel itself. The gun was
then fired by means of a linstock and priming powder scattered over the
touch hole. Three chambers were supplied with each gun in the time of
Henry VII, but the number was afterwards reduced to two. The indistinct
accounts of naval encounters give the impression that the rate of fire
was not nearly so rapid as might have been expected, and the
breech-loading system was rapidly displaced by muzzle-loaders towards
the end of the sixteenth century. A large built-up breech-loader,
recovered by divers in 1836 from the wreck of the _Mary Rose_ (1545), is
to be seen at the United Services Museum in Whitehall.
Guns of cast brass were said by ancient authorities not to have been
made in England until 1521, nor cast iron until 1543, but these dates
are probably much too late. In 1516 payment of £33 6_s._ 8_d._ was made
to John Rutter of London ‘for hurts and damages by him sustained in a
tenement to him belonging, wherein the King’s great gun called the
Basiliscus was cast’.[335] If a great gun could be cast in England in
1516 it is reasonable to suppose that some experience had first been
gained in casting smaller ones. The wrought guns of this period were
embedded in solid elm carriages and fastened down by iron rings; but
several cast metal examples exist which were fitted with trunnions in
the modern fashion.
During the war of 1512–14 the Government purchased large numbers of guns
at home and abroad. Humphrey Walker, an English gun-maker, supplied
fifty pieces in 1512. The principal foreign place of manufacture was
Mechlin, where Hans Popenruyter turned out heavy weapons in great
quantities. He delivered twenty-four curtalls weighing about 1¼ tons
each in 1512, also twenty-four serpentines averaging about ½ ton. The
individual guns were all of slightly different weights and were all
named with such appellations as The Sun Arising, Virago, Mermaid, Rat,
Snake, Dragon, &c.[336] The heavier weapons were for land service, and
assisted at the sieges of Tournay and Terouenne in 1513.
A paper of 1513[337] gives some interesting information about the
various classes of guns in use: A minion fired an 8 lb. shot; a lizard,
a 12 lb. ditto, with 14 lb. of powder; culverins, ‘novemburghs’, and
apostles were 20-pounders; while a curtall fired a 60 lb. and a bombard
a 260 lb. missile. The latter could only be fired five times a day,
presumably on account of over-heating. The rates of fire of the others
were very slow, none of them exceeding forty times a day. The powder was
largely purchased abroad, although some was made in England; it cost
3½_d._ or 4_d._ a pound, and was of very poor quality. A Venetian
description of England in 1557 mentions that there were then 600 iron
and 250 brass guns in the Tower.[338] Since the private ownership of
cannon was not encouraged, this fact goes far to explain the non-success
of all rebellions against the Tudor throne.
The crews both of warships and merchantmen were much more numerous in
proportion to the size of the ship than they have since become. Many
improvements tending to greater manageability were then unthought of. On
long voyages also, allowance had to be made for serious sickness and
mortality, which was almost invariably experienced. The _Matthew Gonson_
of 300 tons, which voyaged to the Levant in 1535, carried 100 men, and
it was recorded as remarkable that only one died. On tropical voyages,
such as those to Guinea in the reign of Mary, it sometimes happened that
more than half the crew never returned. Overcrowding and poorness of the
victuals were partly responsible. The food supplied in English warships
consisted only of biscuit, beef, fish, and beer, and it is unlikely that
merchantmen were better found. A French victualling list, however, is
somewhat more varied, including biscuit, fresh bread, flour, cider,
beer, wine, salt and fresh flesh, mutton, bacon, butter, peas, fish, and
verjuice.[339] The wages in 1512 were as follows: Admiral, 10_s._ per
day; captain, 18_d._ per day; lodesman (pilot), 20_s._ per month;
sailors, 5_s._ per month and 5_s._ worth of victuals.[340] The
subordinate officers were paid the same as the sailors and, in addition,
divided among themselves a number of ‘deadshares’ proportionate to the
size of the ship. In merchant vessels private trading by all members of
the crew, at any rate on long voyages, was a recognized custom, and they
were allowed a certain amount of space in the hold for their goods. It
is referred to in the charter granted by Henry VII to the Bristol
syndicate in 1501, in the accounts of the Guinea voyages, and in the
instructions to Sir Hugh Willoughby in 1553.
A large trading-ship was commanded by a captain, appointed by the
merchants owning the cargo, and having general control over the conduct
of the voyage, the ports of call, dates of sailing, &c, and by the
master, who navigated the ship and controlled the crew. The captain was
not necessarily a professional seaman, as the master, of course,
invariably was. The composition of the crews in a well-found merchant
fleet is illustrated by Hakluyt’s account of Willoughby’s expedition. In
addition to the officers above mentioned, the _Edward Bonaventure_, the
largest ship, carried a master’s mate, a minister, a master gunner and
his mate, two gunners, a surgeon, a boatswain and his mate, four
quartermasters, a steward and his mate, a cook, a cooper and a
carpenter, together with twenty-one sailors. Most merchantmen also
carried a purser. The _Matthew Gonson_, in the voyage already referred
to, had six gunners and four trumpeters. The officers of the Tudor
merchant service were recruited from the more educated seamen, or from
boys who went to sea as ‘gromals’ or pages, the equivalent of the modern
apprentice. Sebastian Cabot’s instructions for the North-East voyage
enjoin that the boys are ‘to be brought up according to the laudable
order and use of the sea, as well in learning of navigation, as in
exercising of that which to them appertaineth’. The seamen were by no
means the most illiterate class of men in the community. Several
distinguished men, such as William Borough, rose from the forecastle;
and the numerous relations in Hakluyt by persons in inferior positions
indicate a comparatively high standard of education among seafaring men.
There were no official certificates or examinations, and a man had to
depend for advancement on the reputation he acquired among his fellows.
Consequently it was easier for able men to come by their own than in the
days of paper qualifications. The level of theoretical knowledge was
not, however, very high; and in this respect England was inferior to
foreign nations, which largely accounts for her comparative failure in
exploration during the first half of the sixteenth century.
The subject of discipline in merchantmen is somewhat puzzling. The
master of a ship had apparently no statutory control over his crew; his
powers of discipline must have been largely those inherent in the
cunning of his own right hand. Certain customary punishments, such as
putting in irons, seem to have been recognized; one of Willoughby’s men
was ‘for pickerie ducked at the yard’s arm and so discharged’ before the
expedition cleared the English coast. But insubordination was common on
long voyages, and often forced the captain and master to change their
plans and forgo occasions of profit. Even in the navy things were
sometimes no better. William Knight, writing in 1512 of the expedition
to Spain, complains of ‘the ungodly manners’ of the seamen, who robbed
the king’s victual while the soldiers were sea-sick.[341] The loss of
the _Mary Rose_ in 1545 was undoubtedly due to the state of anarchy
prevailing on board. Her captain, when told of the danger arising from
the open ports on the lee side, remarked that he had a set of rascals he
could not rule; the ports were left open, and the sea poured in and sank
the ship.
Piracy, the bane of European waters, flourished exceedingly during this
period of constant struggle among the western powers. After the peace
between England and France in 1514, a joint attempt was made by the two
countries to put a stop to it. In 1517 it was arranged that a commission
of three or four suitable persons should sit at Calais to hear French
complaints, and that a similar court should hear English grievances at
Boulogne. Judgement was to go against all persons who should neglect to
appear when summoned.[342] Some attempt was made to put the above into
practice, but anything short of an international arrangement was
foredoomed to failure, for, when hard pressed, the freebooters changed
their flag—French pirates pretended to be Scots, and vice versa—and it
was impossible to obtain any redress. The general state of public
opinion also rendered it improbable that port officials would be very
eager to do justice on their own countrymen in behalf of foreigners.
In England piracies were judged by the Admiralty Court, the tribunal
consisting of the Lord High Admiral or his representative, the Master of
the Rolls, and another judge, proceedings being opened at the place
nearest to that at which the offence took place.[343] An Act of 1536
strengthened the hands of the court, permitting it to pass sentence of
death, and depriving pirates of benefit of clergy.
The evil increased as time went on, and during the war of 1544–6 assumed
gigantic proportions. Privateers, under pretext of cruising against the
enemy, snapped up any neutral vessels of value, and the signing of peace
did very little to repress their activities. The weakness of the
Government in the next reign encouraged them to greater audacity, and
the Lord Admiral Seymour was accused of abetting them. The Act of
Attainder by which he was condemned to death[344] stated that he had
‘maintained, aided, and comforted sundry pirates, and taken to his own
use the goods pyratuslye taken against the laws’. It was not until long
afterwards that the Narrow Seas became reasonably safe, for the French
wars of religion, the revolt of the Netherlands, and the Anglo-Spanish
war continued to produce hordes of privateers throughout the remainder
of the sixteenth century.
During the period 1485–1558 the principal seaports after London were
Southampton and Bristol. The customs receipts at Newcastle and Boston
were both in excess of those at Bristol, but, as they were mainly
derived from the extortionate duties on wool, none of which product was
exported by the western city, they over-represent the true volume of
traffic at those ports. Throughout the whole of this period the tendency
was for London to increase its business at the expense of the other
ports, many of which steadily decayed in importance although the volume
of the country’s total trade was increasing. Since the duties continued
practically unchanged, the sums paid at the various ports afford, when
certain allowances have been made, a fair means of estimating their
trade.
The growth of London as a port is illustrated by the following figures:
during the first five years of Henry VII the average annual customs
payments, exclusive of wool duties, amounted to £7,274; during the last
five years of the same reign, £12,359; and during the years 1533–8, the
last such period in which, for various reasons,[345] a just comparison
can be made, £17,962. In half a century, then, the general trade of
London was considerably more than doubled. The wool duties show a steady
decline, due, not to a smaller output, but to the increase of the home
manufacture of cloth which left less raw material available for export.
The wool averages for the same three periods were £10,515, £7,206, and
£4,217.[346]
Southampton suffered great misfortunes owing to changing conditions.
During the latter part of the fifteenth century the town enjoyed great
prosperity as the sole English port to be visited by the Flanders
galleys of Venice and the great carracks of Genoa, bringing valuable
cargoes of eastern goods, and departing with their holds full of English
wool. As time went on this traffic almost entirely ceased, and
Southampton, unlike London, failed to benefit by the growth of the North
Sea trade. Consequently, after enjoying a maximum period of prosperity
in the closing years of Henry VII, during which time she bade fair to
rival London, the southern seaport experienced a steady and
irretrievable decay under his successor. The average receipts at
Southampton for 1485–90 were £5,449; for 1504–9, £10,341; and for
1533–8, £3,232. The quantity of wool exported by the Staple from
Southampton was very small, and does not appreciably affect the above
figures.
So serious had the distress of Southampton become that in 1530 an Act of
Parliament[347] was obtained for the purpose of releasing the town from
certain dues to the Crown which it found itself unable to continue
paying. The preamble sets forth the cause of its decline, attributing it
to the cessation of the ‘petie custom of merchandise which of old time
was accustomed to be levied of the goods of strangers repairing thither
in carreckis of Jeane (Genoa), laden with Jean woade; and in gallies of
Florence and Venyse laden with spicis; and now by the time of many years
past since that Tolowes (Toulouse) woade hath been usually brought into
this realm, and that the King of Portugal took the trade of spices from
the Venyzians at Calacowte, few or no such carreckis, galeis ne other
shippis have repaired unto our said town with woad or spices, nor be
like to repair hereafter’. The trade of Southampton, it was stated, had
also suffered from the wars with France. Many persons of substance had
forsaken the town, and others were preparing to follow. The melancholy
state of affairs here described is borne out by the figures and may be
taken as correct; unlike the majority of such preambles, which were very
prone to wail about ‘change and decay’, and must be received with
caution.
Although the great state galleys came no more to England, occasional
Venetian merchantmen still continued to make the voyage through the
Straits of Gibraltar, more especially after the restriction of the wool
export by the overland route in the reign of Mary. In order to help
Southampton as much as possible it was ordered that they were to
discharge cargoes exclusively at that town. This was opposed by the
London merchants, but the privilege of Southampton was successfully
upheld. In 1558 the Council further commanded that all malmseys brought
to England were to be unloaded there, under penalty of 20_s._ per
butt.[348]
Bristol, whose trade lay principally in the direction of Bordeaux and
the Peninsula, missed a great opportunity in not persevering with the
explorations of the Cabots and their obscure successors in the time of
Henry VII. Unlike many lost chances, it presented itself once again, and
the days of the town’s greatest prosperity came when trade with America
was opened up in the following century. During the early Tudor period
Bristol fairly maintained its position without experiencing any such
fluctuations of fortune as those which assailed Southampton. The average
customs receipts for the first and last five years of Henry VII and for
the period 1533–8 were respectively £1,175, £1,051, and £1,306. At the
commencement of this time Bristol exported considerable quantities of
corn to Spain, but as sheep-farming developed the price of food in
England increased, and the export had to be restricted. An Act of 1543
permitted it only under certain conditions.[349]
In the Middle Ages a Staple had existed at Bristol; but, although it
continued to elect mayors and officials, it had become entirely
unimportant by the middle of the fifteenth century.[350] The trade of
Bristol, in fact, became free to all individuals, notwithstanding
various attempts to form a close corporation to the exclusion of
outsiders. In 1500 one such company was formed with Hugh Elyot, the
Newfoundland pioneer, as one of its members, but it failed to prosper.
Again, in 1552, a charter was obtained incorporating a Bristol Society
of Merchant Venturers, to the exclusion of non-members from the use of
the port. Being unaccompanied by penalties it proved useless. In 1566
confirmation was obtained, and the monopoly was backed up by an Act of
Parliament; but owing to great opposition the scheme was dropped in
1571.[351] On many occasions Bristol displayed a progressive spirit; it
was natural, therefore, that an attempt to impose mediaeval restrictions
on its enterprise should be successfully resisted.
Of the other seaports, Exeter and Dartmouth, closely approaching Bristol
in importance, and Plymouth and Fowey, with about half its volume of
trade, remained fairly steady in their returns. Poole, sharing to some
extent the misfortunes of Southampton, declined. Hull, Ipswich,
Newcastle, and Boston, all of which depended mainly for their revenues
on the dwindling export of wool, show a more or less serious falling-off
in their customs receipts, although, since the cloth export was on the
increase, it is probable that their total bulk of shipping was
undiminished. It must be remembered that the duties on exported cloth
were nothing like so heavy as those on raw wool. It is certain, however,
that the enormous increase of London’s business was partially at the
expense of the prosperity of the smaller ports. As merchant vessels grew
in tonnage and draught they naturally resorted more and more to the
safer harbours, and many of the minor havens dwindled to the status of
mere fishing villages. An Elizabethan document[352] gives a list of all
the seaports of the country by counties; seventeen are enumerated in
Sussex alone, where it would be difficult at the present day to find
more than half a dozen. The same tendency has extinguished numerous east
coast seaports.
-----
Footnote 303:
See _Ancient and Modern Ships_, by Sir G. C. V. Holmes, for an account
of this model.
Footnote 304:
_Cotton MSS._, Jul., E iv. 6.
Footnote 305:
Oppenheim, _Administration of the Navy_, p. 30.
Footnote 306:
Ibid., _Naval Accounts and Inventories_, Introd., p. xxvii.
Footnote 307:
_R. O., Warrants for Issues_, 1 Hen. VIII, No. 121.
Footnote 308:
Oppenheim, _Administration of Royal Navy_, p. 53.
Footnote 309:
_Harl. MSS._, 6205.
Footnote 310:
_Royal MSS._, 20 E ix.
Footnote 311:
Inventory of the _Sovereign_: Oppenheim, _Naval Accounts and
Inventories_, p. 210.
Footnote 312:
Robert Thorne’s drawing, 1527, shows a bonnet on main-topsail.
Footnote 313:
For information on this subject see Laird Clowes, _History of the
Navy_, i, chap. xiii.
Footnote 314:
For detailed description of method of making and using an astrolabe,
see Cortes, _Breve Compendio de la Sphera y de la Arte de Navegar_,
chap. viii.
Footnote 315:
_Naval Accounts and Inventories_, Introductions, p. xxi.
Footnote 316:
_Letters and Papers_, i, No. 3591.
Footnote 317:
In Laird Clowes’s _History of the Navy_, i. 413, there is an
illustration of a Genoese carrack from a drawing said to have been
made in 1452; but it has every appearance of being at least a century
later in date.
Footnote 318:
_Cal. of Le Fleming MSS._, p. 8.
Footnote 319:
See Oppenheim’s _Naval Accounts and Inventories of Henry VII_;
inventory of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ in the same author’s
_Administration of the Navy_; drawings of warships in _Add. MSS._,
22047; _Archaeologia_, vi. 208; Volpe’s picture at Hampton Court, &c.
Footnote 320:
_Naval Accounts and Inventories_, pp. 216–17. The armament here given
is that mounted in 1497 when the ship was chartered for a voyage to
the Levant by some merchants of London.
Footnote 321:
_Administration of the Royal Navy_, p. 35.
Footnote 322:
A. Spont, _Letters and Papers relating to the French War_, 1512–13,
pp. 51, 52, 133, 140, 146. This work is a collection from all sources
of original documents concerning the war.
As far as can be traced, this is the first occasion on which a ship is
recorded to have been sunk by gun fire.
Footnote 323:
Chapter House Book xiii, printed in _Administration of the Royal
Navy_, pp. 372–81.
Footnote 324:
_Letters and Papers_, i, No. 5108.
Footnote 325:
Ibid., No. 4968.
Footnote 326:
Pepysian MS. printed in _Archaeologia_, vi. 216.
Footnote 327:
From _Add. MSS._, 22047.
Footnote 328:
_Spanish Cal._ vi, part i, p. 342. July 1541.
Footnote 329:
_Letters and Papers_, iv, No. 1714.
Footnote 330:
Inventory.
Footnote 331:
A careful reading of the available inventories supports the idea that
square sails were not at this period carried on the mizen-masts. The
sails on fore and main are described as fitted with two sheets, while
those on the mizen had but one.
Footnote 332:
_Letters and Papers_, iii, Nos. 2302, 2308, 2320, 2355. &c.
Footnote 333:
Ibid., iv, No. 2635.
Footnote 334:
Laird Clowes, _Royal Navy_, i. 421.
Footnote 335:
_Letters and Papers_, ii. 1472.
Footnote 336:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 464.
Footnote 337:
Ibid., p. 716.
Footnote 338:
_Venetian Cal._ vi, App. No. 171.
Footnote 339:
Spont, p. 179.
Footnote 340:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 344.
Footnote 341:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 362.
Footnote 342:
Ibid., ii, No. 3520.
Footnote 343:
R. G. Marsden, _Select Pleas in Court of Admiralty_, Introd., p. lvi.
The Admiralty Court had other duties: ‘All contracts made abroad,
bills of exchange (which at this period were for the most part drawn
or payable abroad), commercial agencies abroad, charter parties,
insurance, average, freight, non-delivery of or damage to cargo,
negligent navigation by masters, mariners or pilots, breach of
warranty of seaworthiness, and other provisions contained in charter
parties; in short, every kind of shipping business was dealt with by
the Admiralty Court’ (Ibid., p. lxvii).
Footnote 344:
2 and 3 Ed. VI, c. 18.
Footnote 345:
The free trade policy of 1539–46, the troubles with the Hansa under
Edward VI and Mary, and the rapid rise of prices during the same two
reigns.
Footnote 346:
The customs returns for the period are given _in extenso_ in Schanz,
_Englische Handelspolitik_, ii. 37–156.
Footnote 347:
22 Hen. VIII, c. 20.
Footnote 348:
_Acts of the Privy Council_, vi. 39 and 325; _Venetian Cal._ vi, No.
554.
Footnote 349:
34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 9.
Footnote 350:
J. Latimer, _History of the Merchant Venturers’ Society of Bristol_,
p. 15.
Footnote 351:
_Bristol Charters_ (1909), by the same author, pp. 142–7.
Footnote 352:
_Lansdowne MSS._, 170, f. 281.
CHAPTER XIV
THE NAVY, 1485–1558
Henry VII raised himself to the throne at the close of a period of naval
decadence which corresponded with that of English commerce and prestige,
and which, in common with the last mentioned, was a result of the feudal
anarchy characterizing the expiry of the Middle Ages. The rulers of the
country during the minority of Henry VI—and for practical purposes his
minority lasted until his deposition—sold off the powerful fleet which
his father had established, and relied upon hiring vessels for the very
modest naval undertakings of the reign. The Yorkist kings never enjoyed
sufficient breathing-space from internal disorders to do much for the
re-establishment of the nation in its proper place in the councils of
Europe, but their intentions undoubtedly outran their accomplishments,
and they took some steps towards the acquisition of a royal fleet.
Between 1461 and 1485 eleven ships were purchased by the Crown, and one,
the _Grace Dieu_, was built. They were mostly of small size and
indistinguishable in design from merchantmen, in which capacity the
purchased vessels began their careers. They were probably adapted for
naval service by the mounting of guns and strengthening of the upper
works.
Of these vessels Henry VII acquired six with the crown, the others
having disappeared from the navy list before his accession. His own
reign is not remarkable for important naval operations, and his
additions to the fleet, although of unprecedented quality, were not
numerous. He built two first-rate ships of large size and heavy
armament, the _Regent_ and the _Sovereign_, and also two smaller craft,
the _Sweepstake_ and the _Mary Fortune_, which were provided with
numerous oars in addition to a full equipment of masts and sails. They
were probably intended for the policing of the Narrow Seas and the
extermination of the enemies of commerce. By purchase or capture, Henry
VII also acquired three other ships of minor importance.[353]
A short war against the Scots in 1490, in which the enemy captured
several hired merchantmen from the English and lost one warship to them;
an expedition under Sir Edward Poynings two years later against a nest
of pirates which had terrorized traders and used the town of Sluys as a
base; and a demonstration against the Scottish coast from Berwick to
Edinburgh in support of an invading army which penetrated no farther
than eight miles from Berwick in 1497, represent the only naval events
of the reign. Of the fighting in 1490 no details are known beyond the
general result above stated. Poynings’ expedition against Sluys was
entirely successful, the place falling to the combined attack of the
English by sea and the Elector of Saxony, acting in the interest of the
Archduke Maximilian, on land. In the Scottish campaign of 1497 the
_Regent_ and other new ships, besides hired merchantmen, were employed
under the command of Lord Willoughby; but for political reasons the
commanders on both sides were unwilling to close, and there is no record
of any fighting at sea. On land the only result was the destruction of a
few border strongholds.
The reign of Henry VIII was destined to be of greater naval importance
than any previous one in English history; and from the date of his
accession he set vigorously about building or buying ships in
preparation for the reconquest of France which was the dream of his
earlier years. Before the end of 1512 eight vessels, large and small,
had been laid down, and nine others bought. These, added to the fine
ships left by Henry VII, formed a powerful fleet, which was steadily
increased in force to the very end of the reign. On the day of Henry’s
death, the Royal Navy consisted of more than fifty ships averaging over
200 tons in burden.
The first war against France and Scotland was preluded by the celebrated
action between Sir Andrew Barton, the Scottish rover, and the brothers
Edward and Thomas Howard, sons of the Earl of Surrey. Barton with two
ships, the _Lion_ and the _Jennet Purwyn_, haunted the trade routes
leading to the Flemish ports, and robbed, according to English
allegations, all merchants who fell into his hands, although his own
profession was that he was simply making reprisals against the
Portuguese for injuries inflicted on his father many years before. He
was undoubtedly a pirate under very thin disguise. In June 1511, Henry
commissioned the Howards to bring Barton to justice, and they put to sea
with two ships, of which the names and strength are unknown, for that
purpose. There is no strictly contemporary description of the fight
which ensued; the most probable account is that furnished by Hall’s
_Chronicle_,[354] copied by Holinshed and later writers. An Elizabethan
ballad, although erroneous in many details, preserves the spirit of the
encounter amid a mass of legendary embroidery.
Hall states that the Howards sailed in separate vessels and were parted
by chance of weather. Lord Thomas Howard fell in with Barton in the
Downs, and chased him until he brought him to action. Barton, in the
_Lion_, defended himself bravely, blowing his whistle to encourage his
men; but at length the English boarded, and the Scots made their last
stand on the hatches. Barton was taken prisoner, so sorely wounded that
he died soon after, and the remnant of his crew surrendered. In the
meantime Sir Edward Howard had chased and taken the _Jennet Purwyn_,
which surrendered after an equally desperate resistance. The two prizes
were brought to Blackwall on August 2, 1511, and were both added to the
navy. The prisoners were released on acknowledging their piracy. James
IV was ‘wonderfull wrothe’ on hearing of this action, and it was one of
the causes which determined him to make war on England two years later.
On the eve of Flodden, Lord Thomas Howard, who was then serving with the
army, sent him a message to the effect that he had come to render him an
account of the death of Andrew Barton.
In January 1512, king and Parliament decided on war with France, and
preparations for equipping a fleet were at once entered upon. Its first
duty was to keep the sea passage open for the transit of the land army
to the north-east of Spain, whence it was intended to launch an invasion
of Aquitaine. By an arrangement with Ferdinand of Spain it was agreed
that the English Navy should hold the sea from Calais to Brest, while
that of Spain should blockade the remainder of the western coast of
France down to the Pyrenees. Sir Edward Howard, the younger of the two
brothers who had accounted for Andrew Barton, was appointed admiral, his
command to consist of 18 ships and 3,700 men.[355] He was under
twenty-four years of age and endowed with dauntless spirit and energy,
marred, however, by a lack of patience and ability to play the waiting
game which circumstances were eventually to demand of him. His
subordinate captains were his equals in courage, but, as was inevitable
in a hastily improvised force, they did not at all times work in
concert; although the latter defect was not apparently due to any lack
of goodwill.
Before the fleet put to sea, the king made a banquet to all the
captains, who took oath to perform their duty faithfully.[356] The
French were not yet ready, and the first cruise was an unopposed parade
through the Channel, resulting in the capture of fishing-boats and
merchantmen. In June the army left for Spain under the Marquis of
Dorset, Howard proceeding to the neighbourhood of Brest to beat down any
attempt at interception. Far from any such intention, the French were
unable to preserve their own coast from insult, the English landing and
marauding on three successive days. When the army had completed its
passage to San Sebastian the fleet returned once more to Portsmouth at
the end of July.
By this time the French had made some progress with their preparations,
and early in August had concentrated a fleet of twenty-two sail at
Brest. Howard sailed again to look for them, and a general action, the
only one of the war, took place on August 10, 1512, in Bertheaume Bay.
The largest French ships were the _Louise_, in which was the admiral,
René de Clermont, and the _Cordelière_, commanded by a Breton gentleman,
Hervé de Porzmoguer. On the English side were the _Regent_, commanded by
Sir Thomas Knyvet, with Sir John Carew as his chief subordinate; the
_Mary Rose_, in which Howard sailed in person; and twenty-three others.
After a preliminary cannonade René de Clermont and the majority of his
captains turned tail and fled back to Brest, only the _Cordelière_ and
another vessel called the _Nef de Dieppe_ remaining to retrieve the
honour of their flag. The latter vessel retired after fighting for seven
hours; but the _Cordelière_, grappled by the _Mary James_, the
_Sovereign_, and the _Regent_, fought to a finish. The unequal combat
was drawing to its inevitable close when by some means, which
eye-witnesses are not agreed upon, the _Cordelière_ took fire. The
_Regent_, closely locked with her foe, shared the same disaster, and the
two mightiest ships of England and France were destroyed together.
Porzmoguer, Knyvet, and Carew all perished, together with the majority
of their men. Of the 700 in the _Regent_, 180 were saved; of the
Frenchman’s crew, probably superior in numbers, only six survived.
Perhaps the most intelligible and—from the circumstances of author and
recipient—most trustworthy account of the affair is that written by
Wolsey to the Bishop of Worcester on August 26:
‘And to ascertain you of the lamentable and sorrowful tidings and
chance which hath fortuned by the sea, our folks, on Tuesday was
fortnight, met with 21 great ships of France, the best with sail and
furnished with artillery and men that ever was seen. And after
innumerable shooting of guns and long chasing one another, at the last
the _Regent_ most valiantly boarded the great carrack of Brest,
wherein were four lords, 300 gentlemen, 800 soldiers and mariners, 400
crossbowmen, 100 gunners (these figures are undoubtedly exaggerated),
200 tuns of wine, 100 pipes of beef, 60 barrels of gunpowder, and 15
great brazen curtaulds with a marvellous number of shot and other guns
of every sort. Our men so valiantly acquitted themselves that within
one hour’s fight they had utterly vanquished with shot of guns and
arrows the said carrack, and slain most part of the men within the
same. And suddenly as they were yielding themselves, the carrack was
(at) once a flaming fire,[357] and likewise the _Regent_ within the
turning of a hand. She was so anchored and fastened to the carrack
that by no means possible she might for her safeguard depart from the
same, and so both in fight within three hours were burnt, and most
part of the men in them. Sir Thomas Knyvett, which most valiantly
acquit himself that day, was slain with a gun. Sir John Carew, with
divers others whose names be not yet known, be likewise slain.... Sir
Edward hath made his vow to God that he will never see the King in the
face till he hath revenged the death of the noble and valiant knight
Sir Thomas Knyvett.’[358]
There was no pursuit of the remainder of the French, but, although the
English had suffered as much material loss as their foes, their command
of the sea was assured, and the fruits of victory thus remained with
them. After ravaging the environs of Brest and scouring the Channel for
prizes, the English fleet returned to port at the end of August, and was
for the most part demobilized for the winter. In the late autumn
Dorset’s expedition, having achieved nothing, returned from Spain, again
without molestation. Its failure was due to bad organization, lack of
discipline, and the failure of Ferdinand to fulfil the lavish promises
which he had made at the commencement of the undertaking.
During the winter some of the minor ships were kept cruising in the
Channel, while the dockyards were busy in repairing the remainder and
constructing new vessels, one of which was the famous _Henry Grace à
Dieu_. The latter was not finished in time to take part in this war. The
French also made efforts to strengthen their Channel fleet. At some time
in the autumn of 1512 a squadron of galleys arrived at Brest from the
Mediterranean, under the command of Prégent de Bidoux. After completing
his crews Prégent set out for a raid on the English coast, but was
driven by various misfortunes to give up the design and put into St.
Malo. While he was still there, Sir Edward Howard put to sea (April 10,
1513) and speedily drove the French sailing fleet into Brest, thus
separating it from the galleys.
A strict blockade of Brest was now instituted under circumstances of
great difficulty and danger for the English. The fleet was very poorly
supplied with food, and the sailing of the victuallers with
replenishments was unreasonably delayed. In addition the French were
riding securely in the harbour and refused to come out and fight, while
reinforcements from other ports, together with Prégent’s galleys, were
daily expected. Thus at any time the blockaders might find themselves in
decisively inferior force. More important still, a strong westerly gale
would entail the ruin of the fleet, driving under the guns of Brest such
vessels as might escape destruction on the coast. Howard’s letters,
while exposing to the full the disadvantages under which he laboured,
breathe a spirit of confidence and assurance of victory. Hall states,
although the story lacks documentary corroboration, that when the French
were securely bottled up in Brest, the Admiral wrote to King Henry, ‘to
come thither in person, and to have the honour of so high an enterprise:
which writing the King’s council nothing allowed, for putting the King
in jeopardy upon the chance of the sea. Wherefore the King wrote sharply
to him to accomplish that which appertained to his duty.’[359] True or
false, the story is quite characteristic of Howard’s temperament. He
treated war as the field for the display of the fantastic
knight-errantry of the mediaeval romances rather than as the struggle
between two nations for material advantages.
As time went on it became apparent that, unless the English could get at
their enemy, the unfavourable conditions described above would force
them to relinquish the blockade. An attempt was made to sail into the
harbour and engage the French even under the guns of the forts; but one
ship was lost by striking a submerged rock, and the others drew back.
The captain of the wrecked vessel, Arthur Plantagenet, an illegitimate
son of Edward IV, called upon our Lady of Walsingham when in danger of
drowning, and made a vow that if he escaped he would eat neither fish
nor flesh till he had seen her. As he must have subsisted exclusively on
bread and beer if he had remained with the fleet, Howard made him the
bearer of dispatches to the king, and thus put him in the way of
fulfilling his vow.[360]
The next incident was the sudden appearance of Prégent de Bidoux with
his six galleys and four smaller craft. In spite of instructions given
in anticipation of the event, he forced the blockade and made his way,
not into Brest itself, but into Blancs Sablons Bay, after sinking one
English ship and disabling another. It is evident that the fighting
powers of the galleys had been under-estimated. Prégent anchored his
galleys in a narrow cove with rocks on either hand. Batteries were
mounted on the rocks, and the water was so shallow that only rowing
boats could approach. Two plans for capturing this position suggested
themselves. The first was the landing of a large force on an unprotected
part of the coast, which force should march overland ‘and so come unto
the backside of the galleys’. Orders had actually been given for this
enterprise when a long-expected fleet of victuallers was seen
approaching, and the captains, probably because they had no choice in
the matter, immediately set their starving men to work in transferring
the supplies. For some reason unknown, Howard did not return to his
original intention, but decided instead to make a frontal attack on the
galleys by dashing into the narrow bay with all the small craft and
ships’ boats at his disposal. Once in, he relied upon his luck and his
leadership to expel the enemy from their ships, to get the latter under
way, and to bring them out in the teeth of the cross-fire from the
batteries. Without a full knowledge of all the conditions it is unjust
to condemn him for rashly giving away his life and those of his men.
Much more impossible-sounding things have been done by English sailors,
achievements which have owed their success to their very audacity, but
it must be admitted that in Howard’s case there is ground for suspicion
that pique rather than sober judgement actuated him. An English captain
tried to dissuade him, while a Spaniard, Alfonso Charran, urged him on;
and one can imagine that Howard’s fiery temper may have been stung by an
insinuation that the English dared not do what Spaniards had the courage
for.
On Sunday, April 25, the attack was made, the large ships in the
meantime continuing the blockade of Brest. Howard himself went in a
rowbarge with Charran and eighty men. Other boats were commanded by Lord
Ferrers, Sir John Wallop, Sir Henry Sherburne, Thomas Cheyne, and Sir
William Sidney. At four o’clock in the afternoon they pulled in,
Howard’s boat leading by a considerable distance. In spite of a storm of
arrows and shot from the batteries he reached Prégent’s galley and
climbed aboard. His men threw an anchor into the galley and so held on,
but before more than sixteen persons had had time to follow the Admiral,
the cable parted and the boat drifted away. Those who had boarded were
killed or jumped overboard, and Howard was seen alone on the galley’s
deck, waving his arm and crying: ‘Come aboard again! Come aboard again!’
Then seeing that there was no hope he took his whistle from about his
neck and hurled it into the sea; and immediately afterwards the pikes
thrust him against the rail and so overboard. The Spaniard Charran, his
evil councillor, shared his fate. The men in the first boat, dismayed by
what had occurred, made no further effort. The remaining boats arrived
after Howard’s death, which, in the smoke and confusion, they had not
perceived. They made a gallant though ill-combined attack, and lost many
men. Sir Henry Sherburne and Sir William Sidney boarded Prégent’s
galley, but were driven off. Then, seeing the Admiral’s boat retiring,
and supposing him to have abandoned the attack, they drew off likewise,
and only on reassembling outside did they discover their loss. Next day
some of the captains went ashore with a flag of truce and parleyed with
Prégent: what he told them destroyed the hope that the Admiral was taken
prisoner, and rendered his death indisputable.[361]
The words of Sir Edward Echyngham, one of his officers, constitute his
best epitaph: ‘Sir, when the whole army knew that my lord Admiral was
slain, I trow there was never men more full of sorrow than all we were;
for there was never noble man so ill lost as he was, that was of so
great courage and had so many virtues, and that ruled so great an army
so well as he did, and kept so good order and true justice.’
Lord Ferrers succeeded temporarily to the command, and led the fleet
back to Plymouth before a week had passed. The retirement would have
been inevitable even had Howard lived, for the shortage of provisions
had now become unendurable, and sickness had also broken out.
Discipline, never very strong in an irregular force, went utterly to
pieces; for, after the Admiral, there was no other officer combining
rank and character in a sufficient degree to exercise real command. The
king was very angry at the failure, and wrote a severe letter to the
captains. He appointed Lord Thomas Howard Admiral in succession to his
brother, and ordered him to return at once to the Breton coast. Lord
Thomas reported that his men were in great fear of the galleys and ‘had
as lief go to Purgatory as to the Trade (Brest water)’. However, he
promised to lead them there if victuals were forthcoming. After a
month’s delay it was decided not to return to Brest, but to keep a
select force in the Narrow Seas for the preservation of the
communications of Henry’s army invading the north of France. In spite of
their misfortunes, the English had demonstrated their superiority to the
French at sea, and it would have been folly to have wasted more ships
and men in continuing to blockade Brest without a chance of bringing the
enemy to action. After the loss of the _Cordelière_ the French sailing
fleet never showed the least inclination to leave the shelter of its
ports and contest the command of the Channel.
There was a promise of some revival of naval interest in the war in the
latter half of 1513, when, after Henry had commenced his Continental
campaign, James IV of Scotland declared war and allied himself with
France. The small Scottish fleet was sent southwards and joined that of
France, but their combined operations were ineffectual, and most of the
Scottish ships returned to their own country after a few weeks had
expired. The small naval force which England had kept afloat for the
guarding of the Straits of Dover was deemed sufficient to deal with the
allies; and the Lord Admiral did not think it necessary to go to sea,
fighting instead on land at Flodden.
[Illustration:
THE _GRAND MISTRESS_, BUILT 1545.
From Add. MS. 22047.
]
In the spring of 1514 Prégent de Bidoux raided the Sussex coast with his
galleys. Landing by night he burnt Brighton, which the chronicler calls
‘a poor village’, but which a contemporary drawing[362] shows to have
been something more. The drawing in question was thought by the editor
of the _Letters and Papers of the Reign of Henry VIII_[363] to represent
Prégent’s raid, although it is inscribed with the date 1545 in a
sixteenth-century hand. It represents the town of Brighton in the form
of a hollow square, with a green in the middle and houses on three sides
of it, the shore forming the fourth. To the west is the village of Hove,
separated by an intervening stream. The French galleys are thrust ashore
on the open beach, where also the fishing-boats of the natives are seen
in flames. Numerous French warships are cruising near the coast,
doubtless to cover the landing of the galleys. The town is partly on
fire, but reinforcements appear marching down a high road from the
interior, summoned by the smoke of the beacon blazing in the ‘towne fyre
cage’. The whole is beautifully drawn and coloured, and seems to be the
work of a sailor. The details of the ships are minutely correct, and the
artist does not commit the error, almost invariably made by the
landsman-limner of the period, of making the wind blow two ways at once.
Holinshed says that Prégent was finally driven off by a force of
archers, losing one of his eyes as the result of an arrow wound.
Although, apart from the above manuscript, there is no contemporary
description of the burning of Brighton, it undoubtedly took place, since
there is a reference to avenging it in a letter of June 5, 1514. The
revenge consisted in a similar raid by Sir John Wallop on the coast of
Normandy, in the course of which, with a force of only 800 men, he burnt
twenty-one towns and villages and numerous ships.
This was the last act of the war, peace being signed shortly afterwards.
On the whole the English had no reason to be ashamed of the deeds of
their youthful navy. The right spirit was in the officers and men,
although inexperience had betrayed them into many errors, and the
business organization, in spite of Wolsey’s talent, had been lamentably
weak. Prégent’s galleys had certainly borne off the palm for general
efficiency and enterprise. The secret of their success was to be found,
not in any advantages which might be possessed by the galley itself, but
in the exceptional ability of their commander. On later occasions
galleys failed to come up to the expectations which had been formed of
them on the experience of this campaign. As to the behaviour of the
French sailing-ships, it had been, with one or two brilliant exceptions,
beneath contempt.
For the ensuing eight years, Wolsey’s policy was supreme in the State,
and peace reigned between France and England. During this time the navy
was strengthened by the completion of the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ and other
first-class vessels.[364] In 1522 Henry, in spite of his gorgeous
conference with Francis II at the Field of the Cloth of Gold, entered
into an alliance with the new Emperor Charles V. On May 29, while
Charles was in England, war was again declared on France; and soon
afterwards the Emperor, secure in the knowledge that the English fleet
would ensure him a safe passage, set sail for Spain. Ford Thomas Howard,
now Earl of Surrey, and later, by the death of his father, Duke of
Norfolk, still filled the office of Admiral, although a great part of
the operations of the fleet were conducted by the Vice-Admiral, Sir
William FitzWilliam. The fact that Surrey was invested with the supreme
command of the Imperial fleet as well as of that of England testifies to
the prestige the navy had gained in the previous struggle with France.
The war of 1522–5 produced no such stirring incidents as had that of
1512–14. The English fleet, coupled with the marine forces of the
empire, was so immeasurably superior to that of its enemies that the
latter did all in their power to avoid an engagement. Large numbers of
French and Scottish merchantmen were captured or burnt, and a very
imperfect blockade of the northern ports of France was maintained. It
was fortunate for the allies that the Government of Francis I had
allowed the French navy to fall into decay, for on the English side,
although the country had never before possessed so many powerful
fighting ships, there was the utmost slackness and inefficiency in the
civil administration of the fleet. Although the war had been reckoned as
a certainty for quite a year before it actually broke out, the naval
preparations were hopelessly inadequate. Not only was there a deficiency
of accumulated provisions, but also of such essentials as casks and
rigging, without which no fleet could remain at sea for more than a few
days at a time.[365] All food, both solid and liquid, had to be carried
in casks, of which an enormous number was required. Yet such was the
confusion in the administration that some time after war had been
declared Surrey was complaining that he could not move, as some of his
ships had victuals for only eight days, and the majority for not more
than a fortnight.
The French, however, missed their opportunity, and did nothing in the
Channel. In July 1522 Surrey got to sea, and sacked Morlaix. In August
he landed at Calais and ravaged the Boulogne district to the
accompaniment of horrible atrocities. Every farm, village, church, and
castle in the Boulonnais was destroyed.[366] But for Francis the main
interest in the war was elsewhere, and there was practically no
opposition. In spite of this Surrey was unable to capture Boulogne
itself. By the middle of October the raid was over, and he was back at
Calais.
In 1523 the fleet was better able to keep the sea, and in the autumn
another feeble invasion of Picardy was attempted, this time under the
king’s brother-in-law, the Duke of Suffolk. After a perfectly futile
march into the interior, ending in the capture of an unimportant town,
which could not be permanently held, Suffolk returned as Surrey had done
in the previous year. Scarcely ever has the military art descended so
low in England as during this war of 1522–5. Meanwhile Henry and Wolsey
had been experiencing the greatest difficulty at home in raising money
for the inefficient army. After 1523 the war, as far as England was
concerned, perished of sheer inanition. The one side was supreme at sea,
but weak on land, the other was able to fight on land, but powerless at
sea; and neither possessed the means of bringing its strength to bear
upon the other. In 1524 nothing was done; and in 1525 peace was signed
with France, bringing to a close the most purposeless war in English
history.[367]
The third and final maritime war of Henry’s reign opened with
hostilities against Scotland in 1543. In the latter half of that year
naval actions occurred in the North Sea involving the capture of several
merchantmen. War with France was also imminent. In April Henry refused
licence for twenty shiploads of wine to pass from Bordeaux to the
Netherlands; but serious fighting did not take place until 1544. In May
of that year a great English fleet under Lord Lisle, with land forces
commanded by Hertford, appeared in the Forth. It took and burnt Leith
and disembarked the army, which thereupon captured and partially
destroyed the city of Edinburgh, although the castle held out. Scotland
being thus for some time to come put out of action, Henry himself
crossed to France with a large army. Assisted by Lisle’s fleet, he laid
siege to Boulogne, which surrendered in September. Desultory naval
operations continued in the Channel almost to the end of the year.
But the English were not to hold undisputed the command of the sea. For
the first time in modern history, France made a supreme effort and, by
the summer of 1545, had concentrated in the Channel a fleet which was
indubitably stronger in material than that of her enemy. All the
fighting ships, both royal and private, of the northern and western
coasts of France were collected in the Seine ports, and a strong
squadron of twenty-five galleys was ordered round from the
Mediterranean. The admiral of the whole fleet was Claude d’Annebaut,
Baron de Retz, the galleys being commanded by Polain, Baron de la Garde,
and Strozzi, Prior of Capua. England was certainly in a critical
position, for Charles V, who had been her ally in the previous year, had
made a separate peace with France at about the same time as Boulogne
fell, and was now, owing to the irrepressible activity of the English
privateers, distinctly hostile in his attitude. In retaliation for
depredations suffered by his subjects at sea he had ordered the arrest
of all English merchants and ships in his dominions.
The French plan was to sweep the Channel by superior force, to occupy
the Isle of Wight, and use it as an advanced base for the blockade and
destruction of Portsmouth and with it the English fleet. In the meantime
Francis I himself with the land forces of France was to retake Boulogne,
cut off in this manner from all hope of succour from England. If
Boulogne fell, there appeared to be nothing to prevent a similar
reduction of Calais and the enforcement of a humiliating peace upon
England. The destination of the great armament was kept secret: Henry
could not guess whether it was intended for Scotland, the Thames,
Portsmouth, or any intermediate point on his coast. Consequently he was
obliged to disperse his forces over the whole country and postpone
concentration until the blow actually fell. With regard to Scotland he
was particularly uneasy, more especially as a strong body of French
troops had already been sent to that country to operate upon the
northern border of England. It has been calculated that the land troops
under arms in England during the summer of 1545 numbered more than
120,000 men.[368]
The weather during the early summer was rough and stormy and unsuited
for the use of the great ‘high-charged’ battleships which formed the
principal hope of England’s defence. Indeed, until the French should put
to sea, there was no service upon which they could be wisely employed;
for the casualties inevitable in a sustained blockade of the Seine would
but increase their original inferiority in numbers, and such a blockade
would not have prevented the great French fleet from leaving harbour
when ready. Accordingly, the king’s ships were concentrated at
Portsmouth, while the lighter and more seaworthy privateers of the
western ports ranged the Channel and the Bay of Biscay down to the
coasts of Spain itself. Their commissions empowered them to ‘annoy the
enemy’, which they did very effectively, almost contriving in the
process to convert the neutral Spaniards and Netherlanders into allies
of the French. Only one enterprise was undertaken by the regular navy
against the fleet in the Seine, and that—an attempt to damage it by
means of fireships—failed owing to misadventures and change of
weather.[369]
At length the French armada was complete. It set sail from Havre on July
16, after losing one of its greatest ships, the _Caraquon_, by an
accidental fire.[370] Martin du Bellay, a contemporary observer, says it
consisted of 150 ‘gros vaisseaux ronds’, 60 auxiliary craft, and the 25
Mediterranean galleys. In addition to the normal ships’ companies, there
were a number of soldiers for the occupation of the Isle of Wight, and
of siege troops presumably for use against Portsmouth.
In England the fleet had been made ready with the greatest energy,
although the unexpected defection of the emperor in the previous year
had left it to face a foe conscious of superiority and certain of
victory. A list of ships drawn up in April 1545 shows that there were
then available twenty-nine king’s ships, five prizes taken in the Narrow
Seas, two ships belonging to Lord Lisle and one to Sir Thomas Seymour,
and twenty hired merchantmen, of which three were supplied by the
Reneger family of Southampton.[371] This total of fifty-seven sail had
been increased by the middle of July to about eighty. The imperial
minister, writing on July 24, says there were that number at Portsmouth,
forty of them being ‘large and beautiful’.[372] Thus the French
armament, exclusive of the galleys, was quite double as strong as that
of England; and in certain circumstances, as the event was to prove, the
galleys were capable of hitting very hard.
At the time the French set sail the weather fell very calm and hot, and
so continued for several days. On the evening of the 18th they were seen
sailing round the eastern end of the Isle of Wight, the galleys in
advance and the sailing-ships behind. Four of the galleys were sent
forward to reconnoitre, but were driven back by a force of small craft
sent out from Portsmouth. The French then anchored for the night, most
probably in the neighbourhood of Ryde. The position occupied by the
English is somewhat difficult to determine. There are two detailed
accounts of the battle of the following day; one, written from the
French side, by Du Bellay, and the other from the English, by Van der
Delft, the imperial ambassador. In addition there is an engraving in the
British Museum from a contemporary painting, now destroyed, giving a
panoramic representation of the scene.[373] From these sources it would
appear that the English fleet was at anchor outside the inner harbour of
Portsmouth, in a position covered on the left by forts and batteries on
the shore towards Southsea, and on the right by shoals. The only
approach was from the front by a narrow channel.
On the morning of July 19 there was no wind, and the French galleys were
sent forward to cannonade the anchored English fleet. Some of them
entered the outer harbour and for more than an hour kept up a hot fire,
doing considerable damage. Du Bellay claimed that the _Mary Rose_ was
sunk by their fire, and that the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ was so knocked
about as to be kept afloat with difficulty. Neither of these statements
was correct. The _Mary Rose_ was sunk by accident, and the _Henry_ was
at sea shortly afterwards none the worse for the fight. But undoubtedly
the situation, if prolonged, would have been most serious for the
English. Their ships were becalmed at anchor, while the galleys, with
free power of movement, were extremely difficult to hit. The method of
mounting the big guns of the time allowed for very little lateral
adjustment, and no elevation or depression, so that unless the ship
could be manœuvred the enemy might take up a position in which it would
be impossible to bring guns to bear on him. Fortunately a land breeze
sprang up and the lighter English sailing craft immediately dashed out
upon the galleys. The latter had outstayed their welcome, and just
missed suffering severely for it. The English row-barges were among them
before they could get clear of the harbour. Once a sailing craft could
range alongside a galley, that galley was doomed, for her oars would be
smashed without the least damage to her opponent. Accordingly, there was
nothing for it but instant flight. Since the galleys carried no guns
pointing astern, they were at a great disadvantage, and the French
sailing fleet had to advance to their rescue.
Lord Lisle now saw the chance of fighting a battle on his own terms, in
which his smaller fleet would be assisted by the fire of the land
batteries. His heavy ships immediately moved out to join action with the
French. In the process occurred one of the famous disasters of the
English Navy. The _Mary Rose_, the vice-admiral, having discharged her
guns on one side, went about to fire the other broadside, and, the ports
on the discharged side not having been closed, as apparently they should
have been, their lower edges dipped below the water as the ship heeled.
In a moment the catastrophe happened; the sea poured in and heeled the
ship still further until she capsized and sank so rapidly that only some
thirty of a crew of five hundred were saved. Sir George Carew, the
captain, was among the lost. A trustworthy authority states that the
need for closing the lee ports was well known, but that owing to
indiscipline no one thought proper to attend to it.
Undismayed by this disaster, the English presented a bold front to the
enemy, and showed perfect willingness to continue the action. But
d’Annebaut was not prepared to fight both fleet and forts at the same
time, and, having rescued the galleys, the French retired to their
former anchorage off the Isle of Wight.[374] The action was renewed at
long range on the following day, but neither side would surrender the
advantage of position and consequently there was no decisive result.
[Illustration:
PLAN OF PORTSMOUTH, c. 1545.
From Cott. MS. Aug. I. ii. 15.
]
There was now no doubt as to the intentions of the French, and every
nerve was strained to concentrate decisive forces at the point of
danger. The king and the Privy Council had already moved down to the
neighbourhood of Portsmouth before the French had arrived, and the king
was aboard the _Henry Grace à Dieu_ when their approach was first
signalled. On July 20 orders were sent to the western privateers to make
all speed to Portsmouth.[375] Some sixty sail of small but active
fighting ships would thus be added to the English strength. At the same
time the officials at the Tower were instructed to send down all the
large ordnance and ammunition in that fortress.[376] The levies of the
southern shires were also set in motion, but, as the event fell out,
their services were not needed, and before long they were met by orders
to disband, as the danger had passed away.
Time was now in favour of England. If a week were allowed to elapse in
inaction on the part of the French, Portsmouth would be safe and the
invasion would have failed. On the French side other factors pointed to
the same conclusion. Disease in its most terrible forms had broken out
in their crowded ships, and the maintenance of a blockade long enough to
allow of the capture of Boulogne was an impossibility. Already the great
ship _Maitresse_, strained by the seas and shaken by the discharge of
her own guns, had been beached and abandoned to save her from the fate
of the _Mary Rose_. D’Annebaut was not the man to hold on in face of
difficulty as Howard had done at Brest in 1513. He seems to have
realized that prompt action was the only alternative to eventual
failure, and, after vainly seeking to draw the English into the open by
landing and burning villages in the Isle of Wight, he proposed the
desperate plan of sailing his whole fleet into Portsmouth harbour and
attempting to carry the town by a _coup de main_. His pilots represented
to him that the thing was an impossibility, that his ships, passing the
narrow entrance in single file, would be smashed by the fire of the
batteries on their flank, and that tides and shoals would prevent any
retreat. After sending in a boat party to assure himself of the truth of
these arguments, he submitted to the inevitable and began to think of
withdrawal.[377]
Meanwhile there had been sharp skirmishing in the Isle of Wight. The
smoke of the burning villages could be seen from Portsmouth, but the
French were by no means unopposed. Small bands of native archers,
perfectly acquainted with the country, ambushed them in the woods.
Reinforcements were sent across, apparently by favour of the negligence
of the French fleet, until 8,000 English troops were in the island, and
a large force would have been necessary for its conquest.
D’Annebaut’s next move was to leave the Isle of Wight on July 21 and
anchor his fleet along the western shore of Selsey Bill. His reasons for
this move are not clear. It would seem that his original position was
more advantageous until he should be forced by necessity to retire to
France. He has been criticized for not permanently garrisoning the Isle
of Wight, since he had a large number of supernumerary troops on board
his fleet. But he was probably justified in not doing so. With no
strong, well-provisioned fortress in which to hold out, the most
powerful force imaginable would have been driven to surrender in course
of time when deprived of the support of the fleet. With the imperfect
firearms of that day improvised earthworks were not a sufficient
defence, especially within a few miles of such an arsenal as Portsmouth.
Lord Lisle detected the weakness of the French anchorage off Selsey Bill
and made plans to attack when the first south-westerly wind should place
the enemy on a lee shore.[378] But he was preoccupied with attempts to
refloat the _Mary Rose_, and, before the plan could be put into
execution, the French received warning and slipped off in time to escape
annihilation. D’Annebaut sailed for Boulogne, and landed his troops to
assist in the siege, which was making very poor progress.
The great plan had now definitely failed, and its failure was
undoubtedly due in the first place to the terrible mortality from
plague, typhus, and kindred scourges, which afflicted the French crews,
packed to suffocation as they were in their narrow quarters in sultry
weather, and most probably badly fed. In a lesser degree the failure was
ascribable to admirable leadership on the English side, although this
would not have availed to save Boulogne if the French had been in a
state to maintain a blockade for the necessary time. The Fabian conduct
of the English fleet was exactly suited to the occasion; and the credit
for it is due rather to Henry VIII himself than to his Admiral, who did
nothing of his own initiative if he could by any possibility obtain
instructions from the king.
D’Annebaut, after landing his sick and provisioning his fleet, was soon
at sea once more. But by this time the West of England ships had come
in,[379] and Lisle was at the head of a fleet strong enough to go in
search of the French. On August 11 he received orders to put to sea, the
French being reported to be off Rye to the number of 200 sail. The two
fleets sighted each other on the 15th off Shoreham. As before, the
galleys formed the advanced guard of the French, and were engaged by the
lighter English sailing craft. The English fleet was drawn up—if a set
of fighting instructions dated a few days earlier was followed—in the
manner of a land army of the period: the first-class ships in the
centre, preceded by a line of armed merchantmen, and guarded on either
flank by the auxiliaries. The merchantmen thus answered to the cannon in
a land battle, breaking the enemy’s ranks in preparation for the advance
of the main body—the infantry on land—behind. The light craft on the
wings played the part of cavalry, guarding the flanks of their own fleet
and taking advantage of confusion among the enemy. The plan was very
pretty on paper, but it is doubtful if it would have stood the test of
practice by a fleet untrained to manœuvre in concert, and a much simpler
procedure was actually adopted in the Armada fights in 1588.[380] In the
present instance, the battle was never fairly joined. The galleys
maintained a brisk cannonade against the row-barges and privateers,
getting, on the whole, the worst of the encounter. The French ‘great
ships’ held off, hoping that the galleys would do all the work. Towards
evening the weather became worse and the galleys were much knocked
about. Both fleets anchored for the night within a league of one
another; and next morning at dawn Lisle saw his enemies’ topsails
disappearing beneath the horizon. Finding the galleys useless in
anything but a calm, they had decided to give up the enterprise and
retire to Havre.[381]
The English made sail to the Narrow Seas, and a few days later Lisle,
apprehending no further danger for the moment, quitted the fleet. He was
present in person at a meeting of the Council at Woking on August 24. In
September he raided the Normandy coast, burning the town of Tréport and
thirty ships, and retiring without molestation. Thus the French, for all
their superiority of force, had again surrendered the command of the
Channel. But the victory had not been attained without great sacrifice.
The fishermen of all the southern shires had been impressed into the
service, and were now dying by hundreds from the same epidemics which
had scourged the French. Their wives and daughters were obliged to take
the boats out in search of a living; and it was a common occurrence for
a boat ‘manned’ by a dozen women and a boy to be chased into port by a
French privateer. The mortality in the fleet was so great that, as soon
as it was ascertained that the French acknowledged defeat, haste was
made to discharge the majority of the crews. The privateers compensated
by their energy for the timid tactics of the great ships. They scoured
the Channel and the neighbouring seas and were seldom scrupulous as to
the ownership of the property they took. Privateering as a lifelong
profession dates from this war. It was never thoroughly put down until
the following century.
In 1546 naval operations were renewed, centring principally round the
siege and relief of Boulogne; but the French were relatively much weaker
than in the previous year, and the captured fortress remained in English
hands. The war terminated in June with a French acknowledgement of
powerlessness to do anything further.
On a general view it is evident that Henry VIII’s naval policy was
justified by success. If it was his object to create a fleet
sufficiently powerful to render England immune from invasion and to
secure respect for her sea-borne commerce, it must be admitted that that
object was gained. Although the Continental powers were very much more
formidable than they had been at the opening of his reign, he was
generally able to take the offensive and to fight on the enemy’s ground.
Scotland, too, was rendered easier to deal with by the vulnerability of
Edinburgh to a stroke from the sea; and the oft-dreaded Franco-Scottish
combination was seldom effective owing to the interposition of an
English fleet between the allies. Henry died in January 1547, and a
list[382] made a year later shows that there were then in the navy 6
ships of 500 tons and over, 19 between 200 and 500 tons, 4 between 100
and 200, and 24 of less than 100. The total tonnage of the 53 vessels
was 11,268, and they carried between them 7,780 men and 2,087 guns. If
the total of guns seems disproportionately large, it must be remembered
that many of them were small weapons such as swivels and hailshot
pieces, which might almost be reckoned as small arms.
During the eleven years covered by the reigns of Edward VI and Mary, the
history of the navy shows a steady decline, not so much in strength of
ships and guns as in leadership, administration, and the moral qualities
making for success. On paper, especially under Edward VI, this decline
is not evident; indeed, a list of 1552 shows that only five of Henry
VIII’s ships had dropped out, while others had been acquired in their
places. But a formidable roll of battleships was of little value if the
ships themselves were allowed to rot untended in docks and harbours, or
were chartered by merchants for twelve-months’ voyages to the Levant or
the African coast. This charge of improvidence against the
administration is fully borne out by its inability, increasing as time
went on, to send large fleets of first-class ships to sea as Henry VIII
had done. Details of deterioration are wanting, and it can only be
deduced from its results; but it is certain that in the last eighteen
months of Edward’s reign, three large fighting ships were sent on
distant commercial ventures, and it is probable that other transactions
of the same kind took place, of which the evidence has perished. The
three ships referred to were the _Jesus of Lubeck_ (700–800 tons) and
the _Mary Gonson_ (600), chartered for a Levant voyage in February
1552[383]; and the _Primrose_, which, together with the _Moon_
(pinnace), was lent to Thomas Wyndham and his co-adventurers for their
Guinea expedition in 1553.[384]
To the credit of Edward’s guardians, on the other hand, must be placed
the establishment of the rudiments of a naval base in the Medway,
afterwards Chatham dockyard, and the inauguration of a special
department for victualling the ships of the fleet.[385]
At the outset of Edward’s reign, the Protector Somerset[386] determined
on a fresh invasion of Scotland for the purpose of securing the consent
of the Scots to a marriage between their infant queen and the young king
of England. The expedition was on a more ambitious scale than that of
1544, consisting of a fleet under Lord Clinton keeping pace with a
marching army under the Protector. The latter routed the Scots at Pinkie
(September 10, 1547) and again took Leith and Edinburgh; while the fleet
ravaged the coast and destroyed all the Scottish shipping it could find.
But the political result of the invasion was failure, for the young
queen was sent off to France by way of the Irish Sea in the following
summer, and her escort succeeded in eluding the English who were keeping
strict watch in the North Sea and the Channel.
During these events France, in a state of scarcely veiled hostility, had
maintained a fleet of galleys under Strozzi in her northern waters. The
war became regularized when the French began to raid the Sussex coast
and to concentrate troops in the neighbourhood of Boulogne in 1549. In
consequence of the former operations instructions were given to Thomas
Cotton, in May 1549, to patrol the Channel. With the commission of
Vice-Admiral he was to take six small craft of the row-barge type and
one shallop, and with them to drive the enemy from the Sussex coast, to
‘traverse the seas’ between the Isle of Wight, Portland, and the Channel
Islands, to supply the latter with munitions of war, and to keep watch
on Brest, where great preparations were said to be in progress. He was
particularly enjoined not to molest neutral shipping.[387] Early in
August a sharp action was fought in the neighbourhood of the Channel
Islands, but whether by Cotton’s squadron or not is not clear. It is
vouched for by Fox the Martyrologist and by the writers of chronicles of
the time, but has left no trace in official documents, either English or
French. The substance of the accounts is that a fleet of French galleys
was sent to reduce the Islands and that it was beaten back by an English
squadron with the loss of 1,000 men.[388] Boulogne was able to hold out
until the spring of 1550. By that time the English Government, hampered
by lack of money and by anarchy at home, had come to the conclusion that
its retention was not worth the efforts involved. In March they agreed
to surrender the fortress for a large money payment, and peace was
restored between England and France for the next seven years.
A feature of the naval history of this period was the series of changes
in the chief command of the fleet. During Edward’s reign the office of
Lord Admiral was successively held by Warwick (formerly Lord Lisle);
Seymour, brother of the Protector Somerset (executed March 1549);
Warwick again, and Clinton. Mary on her accession appointed Lord William
Howard, who held office until 1558, when he was superseded by Clinton.
One of the charges against Seymour was his connivance at piracy. In this
connexion a letter addressed to him in September 1548, by John
Graynfyld, a privateer captain, is of some interest. At the date
mentioned war had not been declared with France, and the man was legally
a pirate. He describes how his bark and three others had sailed from the
Cornish coast to that of Brittany, and had there separated ‘each to seek
their adventure, as the manner is of venturers’. Graynfyld himself,
being alone within half a league of Pointe de Penmarch, sighted
twenty-seven sail of Normans and Bretons. Nothing dismayed by the odds,
he gained the wind of them, waited until twelve of them had passed, and
then set on the thirteenth, which was armed with six pieces of ordnance.
She only escaped him by going ashore in Audierne Bay. He served two
others in the same way. While thus engaged, another of the enemy, of 95
tons and with a crew of twenty-six men, got to windward of him. But
Graynfyld rose to the occasion, boarded the French ship and took her,
after slaying her captain in the fight.[389] A more convincing testimony
to the reckless audacity of the sixteenth-century privateers would be
hard to find.
Under Mary the navy sensibly decreased in strength and efficiency, and
it may safely be said that it had never since the beginning of the Tudor
period passed through such a period of discouragement as that of the
years 1557–8. Even the paper strength of the fleet was not maintained.
The _Henry Grace à Dieu_ was accidentally burned at Woolwich on August
25, 1553. The _Primrose_ was sold in 1555, together with nine smaller
craft, some of them fetching such ridiculous prices as £8 and £10
apiece,[390] showing the utter state of decay into which they had been
allowed to fall. Other ships disappeared also in the reign with the net
result that, although six new craft were acquired, there were at Mary’s
death only twenty-six royal ships with a total tonnage of 7,110, a
decrease of 36 per cent. from Henry VIII’s total. Mr. Oppenheim does not
agree with censures on Mary’s naval administration. He points out that
thirteen of the ships left by Henry VIII were row-barges of 20 tons, and
that it was mainly this class of vessel which was disposed of. But the
fact remains that England lost command of the sea in the winter of
1557–8, at a time when the French had no overwhelming force afloat, and
that the failure to relieve Calais was due to the fact that not one of
the ‘great ships’ officially borne on the strength of the fleet was in
condition to put to sea at the time of need.
War with France opened in the summer of 1557. In that year Lord William
Howard cruised in the Channel with a fleet including six ships of 200
tons and over, the largest being the _Jesus of Lubeck_, described as of
700 tons.[391] His proceedings were uneventful, and all the large
vessels were laid up at the beginning of winter. At the end of the year
disquieting news began to arrive with startling suddenness in England.
On December 22 Lord Grey of Wilton reported from Guisnes that French
preparations were on foot, although their object was not ascertainable.
On the 26th Lord Wentworth, the commander at Calais, wrote that five
French warships, with forty other sail and large numbers of troops, were
gathering at Boulogne and Abbeville. On the last day of 1557 Calais,
with its garrison of 800, was invested by 30,000 men.
The Government had taken the alarm by the 29th of December and, if the
Narrow Seas had been held by such a force as Henry VIII had been
accustomed to keep there in the winter, would have been in time to
relieve Calais, which held out until January 8. But such force was
lacking: a paper of December 29 shows that the ‘Ships and Barks already
in the Narrow Seas’ were five in number, their combined crews numbering
only 400 men.[392] It is true that instructions were given for the
immediate preparation of eight other vessels with crews amounting to
1,000 men,[393] but it was too late. The unready ships could not be
rigged and manned in time, and their commander, Sir William Woodhouse,
only received his final sailing orders on the very day the French
entered Calais.[394] In the meantime the Earl of Rutland had collected a
few hoys and fishing boats at Dover, and in them had attempted to
transport reinforcements to the beleaguered town. But the French
covering fleet beat them off, and he was obliged to leave Calais to its
fate.[396]
Calais had been lost by default of those responsible for the naval and
military administration of the country. A fortnight after its fall the
queen sent orders to Lord Howard to put the navy into an effective
state, equipping the regular ships and forcibly borrowing the services
of as many merchantmen as he should require. Howard was superseded by
Clinton early in 1558, and by mid-summer the latter was at sea. He made
the usual raid on the Brittany coast in July, burning Le Conquêt and
effecting nothing against Brest. At the beginning of August he was back
at Portsmouth. On July 13 a squadron detached from his fleet had
interfered with decisive effect in a battle fought on the shore at
Gravelines between the French and some of Philip’s Netherland troops.
The ships stood in and played with their heavy guns upon the French
until the latter gave way. But this was the only event to lighten the
gloom of the close of Mary’s reign, and was a trifling exploit as
compared with the fall of Calais. Fortunately the depression of English
affairs proved to be only temporary, and with a new sovereign and a
wiser government misfortunes were retrieved, and the nation was able in
the years to come to make triumphant progress along the path mapped out
for it by the first two Tudors.
-----
Footnote 353:
For full details of naval administration under Henry VII, see M.
Oppenheim, _History of the Administration of the Royal Navy_, and
_Naval Accounts and Inventories_.
Footnote 354:
1809 edition, p. 525.
Footnote 355:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 344.
Footnote 356:
Hall, p. 534.
Footnote 357:
Another account says that a gunner of the _Cordelière_, desperate at
the approaching surrender, fired the magazine. If the figures as to
survivors are correct they give support to the idea that the French
ship blew up while the _Regent_ burned.
Footnote 358:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 409.
Footnote 359:
Hall, p. 536.
Footnote 360:
_Letters and Papers_, i, p. 538.
Footnote 361:
Echyngham’s account. Prégent’s own description of the fight tallies
with the above. The English loss was about 120 killed, number of
wounded unknown.
Footnote 362:
_Cotton MSS._, Aug. I. i. 18.
Footnote 363:
Vol. xx, Preface.
Footnote 364:
The _Great Elizabeth_, 900 tons, bought 1514; the _Katherine
Pleasance_, 100, built 1518; the _Mary Gloria_, 300, bought 1517; the
_Mary and John_, bought 1521; the _Mary Imperial_, 120, built 1515;
the _Trinity Henry_, 250, built 1519.
Footnote 365:
_Letters and Papers_, iii, Preface, p. ccxvi.
Footnote 366:
Ibid., p. ccxix.
Footnote 367:
_Political History of England_, vol. v, pp. 250–1.
Footnote 368:
Froude, _History of England_, iv. 419.
Footnote 369:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, Nos. 987, 1023, 1101.
Footnote 370:
Martin du Bellay, _Mémoires_, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, 1838, p. 553.
Footnote 371:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, No. 543.
Footnote 372:
Du Bellay says the English had only sixty ships on July 18.
Footnote 373:
Brit. Mus. Maps, 3, Tab. 24, No. 2. The original painting was at
Cowdray House, Midhurst, and was burnt with that building at the end
of the eighteenth century.
Footnote 374:
Froude, iv. 425–6; Van der Delft to Charles V, _Spanish Cal._ viii,
No. 101; Du Bellay, p. 554. Froude’s account is based mainly on Du
Bellay; Van der Delft’s letter was unknown at the time he wrote.
Footnote 375:
_A. P. C._, i. 212.
Footnote 376:
Ibid., p. 215.
Footnote 377:
Du Bellay, pp. 555–6.
Footnote 378:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, part i, No. 1237.
Footnote 379:
_Letters and Papers_, xx, App. No. 27.
Footnote 380:
See J. S. Corbett, _Drake and the Tudor Navy_, for tactical formations
employed in the sixteenth century.
Footnote 381:
Froude, iv. 435–6; Du Bellay, p. 559.
Footnote 382:
_Archaeologia_, vi. 218.
Footnote 383:
_Journal of Edward VI_, p. 61.
Footnote 384:
Strype, _Memorials_, ii. 504.
Footnote 385:
Oppenheim, _Administration of the Royal Navy_, p. 101.
Footnote 386:
The Lord Hertford who had commanded the land forces at Leith and
Edinburgh in 1544.
Footnote 387:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Ed. VI_, vol. vii, Nos. 9 and 12.
Footnote 388:
Fox, _Acts and Monuments_ (ed. G. Townsend, 1846), v. 741; Holinshed,
iii. 1055.
Footnote 389:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Ed. VI_, vol. v, No. 3.
Footnote 390:
Oppenheim, p. 109.
Footnote 391:
_R. O., S. P. Dom., Mary_, vol. x, No. 67. This paper is small and
mutilated, but does not look as if any large portion were missing. It
may or may not represent a complete list of the ships employed.
Footnote 392:
Ibid., vol. xi, No. 65.
Footnote 393:
Ibid.
Footnote 394:
Ibid., vol. xii, No. 12.
Footnote 396:
Froude, vi. 500.
INDEX
Abaan, King of Guinea, 301.
Adams, Clement, writer, 322, 325.
Admiralty Court, the, 44, 366 and note.
Alday, James, originator of the Barbary trade, 274.
Alexander VI, Bull of, 79, 116, 287, 289, 337.
Alexandria, wealth of, 57.
Allen, Jeffrey, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 291–2.
Andalusia, English trade with. _See_ Spain.
Anglo-Portuguese Syndicate, 104–19;
first letters patent to, 1501, 104–6;
second letters patent, 1502, 109–10;
first voyage of, 1501, 107–8;
second voyage, 1502, 108;
third voyage, 1503, 110;
fourth voyage, 1504, 110;
fifth voyage (?), 1505, 110–11;
general considerations, 111–19.
Annebaut, Claude d’, French admiral, 389–98.
Antwerp, English trade with, 19, 20, 185, 189, 193, 195 note.
Antwerp, importance of, 149.
Artillery, import of, 184;
development of, 351–2, 353, 354–5, 360–2.
Arundel, Earl of, member of Russia Company, 311.
Ashehurst, Thomas, merchant of Bristol, 104, 109.
Asia, trade with, 15.
Aucher, Sir Anthony, shipowner, 235.
Ayala, Pedro de, Spanish ambassador, 69, 79;
letter from, describing Cabot’s voyage, 58–9, 67–9, 79.
Baccalaos. _See_ Newfoundland Fishery.
Baker, Matthew, 238.
Baltic, trade with the, 15, 16, 44, 129, 179, 196–8. _See also_ Danzig.
Barbary, English voyages to, 274–7;
commodities obtained from, 276.
Barnes, Sir George, merchant, investor in Guinea expedition, 284;
member of Russia Company, 311;
consul of same, 326.
Barton, Andrew, pirate, defeated and killed by the Howards, 1511,
374–5.
Bedford, Earl of, member of Russia Company, 311.
Bellay, Martin du, 356, 391.
Benin, Wyndham at, 1553, 281–3, 290.
Blondel, Denis, French captain trading to Guinea, 297–301.
Bodenham, Roger, voyage of, to the Mediterranean, 1551, 235–8.
Bordeaux, trade with, 19, 129, 145–6, 208–15.
Borey, Thomas, merchant of Southampton, makes voyages to Brazil, _c._
1540, 267.
Borough, Stephen, master of the _Edward Bonaventure_, 1553–4, 314;
commands the _Serchthrift_ in search of a North-East Passage, 1556,
329–32;
in 1557, 332.
Borough, William, seaman and navigator, 314, 319, 330, 364.
Bostoke, Henry, merchant, letter from, 204–5.
Boston, port of, 367, 371.
Boulogne, capture of, 1544, 389;
siege of, by the French, 1545–6:, 399;
renewed by the French, 1549–50, 402–3;
surrender, 403.
Bounties to shipowners, 114, 124.
Bourbourg, Diet at, 1532, 187.
Bradley, Thomas, adventurer in 1498 voyage, 61.
Brandan, Saint, island of, 74.
Brandon, Charles, Duke of Suffolk, engaged in Mediterranean trade, 232;
commands against the French, 1523, 388.
Brasil, island of, 58, 59, 74.
Brazil, English voyages to, 265–70;
French, 269.
Brest, battle off, 1512, 376–8;
blockade of, 1513, 379–83.
Brighton, burnt by the French, 1514, 384–5.
Bristol, 73–4, 139, 148, 199, 203;
visit of Henry VII to, 74;
John Cabot sails from, 1497, 56, 74;
1498, 81;
Anglo-Portuguese voyages from, 1501–5, 104–19;
other expeditions from, 58, 68, 74;
promises ships for 1521 project, 245;
Act relating to, 1543, 148, 370;
mercantile corporations at, 370–1;
status of as a port, 367, 369–70.
Brooke, John, agent of Russia Company at Vardo, 327.
Bruges, English trade with, 185.
Buckland, John, seaman, 314, 334.
Buil, Friar, 58, 68–9.
Butts, Thomas, participator in 1536 expedition, 263–4.
Cabot, John, 51–85, 91–2, 91 (erroneously for Sebastian Cabot);
at Mecca, 57, 72–3;
at Seville and Lisbon, 58, 67–8;
obtains letters patent from Henry VII, 53, 72, 74, 78, 105, 106, 109;
1497 voyage, 54–8, 60, 63–4, 65–7, 70, 74–7;
his landfall, 1497, 63–4, 75–6;
gratuity to, 60, 77;
pension granted to, 60, 61, 77, 82;
1498 voyage, 58–60, 60–3, 68–9, 69–70, 78–85, 98;
date of his death, 82, 85, 88, 94;
his wife, 55, 73;
his ship, 75, 81;
his crew, 1497, 56, 57–8, 74, 78;
chart made by, 56, 59, 69, 77;
his theory of geography, 57, 73, 75, 77, 77–8, 80–1, 84;
his nationality, 72, 73.
Cabot, Ludovicus, 53.
Cabot, Sanctus, 53, 64.
Cabot, Sebastian, 52–3, 62 (erroneously for John Cabot), 63 64 65 84 85
86–103, 114 241–5, 246–9, 265 307–13, 315 323 326 329–30;
first voyage of discovery, 1499 (?), 86–103;
summary of accounts of, 95–7;
question of date of, 99–100, 101, 103 note;
alleged North-West voyage in 1516–17, 241–5;
his career in Spain, 242–3, 307–8;
proposal for him to command an English expedition, 1521, 246, 247–8,
248;
his visit to England, _c._ 1521, 248–9;
his voyage to the River Plate, 1526, 89, 93, 96, 251 note;
Wyatt’s memorandum on, 308;
arrangements for his transfer to England, 1547, 308;
his flight to England, 1548, 308–9;
pension granted by Edward VI, 1549, 308–9, 309 note;
his return demanded by Charles V, 309;
his position in England, 309–10, 312–13;
his letter to Charles V
betraying a project of Northumberland’s, _c._ 1552, 310;
draws up ordinances for Willoughby’s voyage, 1553, 311–12, 315–16;
made Governor of Russia Company, 312, 326;
visits Stephen Borough on board the _Serchthrift_, 1556, 329;
death, 1557 (?), 330;
character, 52, 53, 70–1, 94, 101–3, 307–8;
geographical knowledge of, 98–9, 101, 307–8;
map attributed to, 63, 70;
age of, 64, 330;
his birthplace, 73, 309.
Cabots, the, works on, 102 note.
Calais, head-quarters of Merchant Adventurers, 1493–6, 19;
head-quarters of Staplers, _see_ Staple;
fall of, 1558, 405–6.
Canary Islands, English trade with, 226, 260.
Candia, English trade with, 24–25, 229, 230, 231, 235–6, 238;
English factor at, 230 note;
English consul at, 231.
Cantino map, the, 116–17.
Carew, Sir George, captain of the _Mary Rose_, 1545, 394.
Carew, Sir John, killed at Brest, 1512, 377–8.
Carter, John, adventurer in 1498 voyage, 61.
Carter, William, captain in Guinea expeditions, 293.
Castlyn, Edward, merchant, factors of, at Grand Canary, 226;
investor in Guinea expedition, 284;
forbidden to trade with Guinea, 291–2.
Castlyn, William, member of Merchant Adventurers, 188;
Governor, 1542, 190.
Câteau Cambrésis, Treaty of, 180.
Cathay, search for route to, 71–3, 77, 84–5, 86–103, 106, 118–19, 328,
337.
_See also_ North-East Passage, North-West Passage, and Russia
Company.
Cavo de Ynglaterra, 83.
Cecil, Sir William, 180;
member of Russia Company, 311.
_Centième_, the, tax in the Low Countries, 190–1.
Centurioni, Paolo, Genoese navigator, project for a voyage of
discovery, 1525, 249.
Chamberlain, Sir Thomas, Governor of Merchant Adventurers, 193, 195.
Chancellor, Richard, 238, 313–333;
sails with Willoughby, 1553, 317;
captain of the _Edward Bonaventure_, 314;
separated from Willoughby, 318;
reaches Vardo, 322;
discovers Archangel, 323–4;
visits Moscow, 324–5;
returns to England, 1554, 326;
second voyage to White Sea, 1555, 327–9;
second visit to the Czar, 328;
obtains grant of privileges, 328;
remains in Russia, 1555–6, 329;
sails for England, 1556, 332;
wrecked and drowned, 333.
Channel Islands, naval action near, 1549, 402.
Chapuys, Eustace, Imperial ambassador, 131, 132, 143, 268;
letters from, 130, 265, 269.
Charles V, Emperor, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132, 170, 185, 186, 187, 191,
195, 220, 224, 389;
diplomatic struggle with, 130–2, 223;
in England, 1522, 386.
Charran, Alfonso, Spanish captain, 381–2.
Chaucer’s Shipman, 211.
Chester, Thomas, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 296.
Chilton, Leonard, English captain trading with Mexico, 226.
Chios, English trade with, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235–8;
English factors at, 230 note;
English consul at, 231.
Chronicle, anonymous (Cotton MSS. Vit. A. xvi), 61, 69–70.
Cipango (Japan), 57, 77–8, 80, 84.
Clermont, René de, French admiral, 376–7.
Clinton, Lord, Lord Admiral, 401, 403, 406.
Cloth export, 33–6, 40, 42, 126–7, 129–30, 135, 145, 147, 171–3, 192;
laws relating to, 152–4, 157;
suspension of laws, 145, 162, 170–1.
_See also_ Merchant Adventurers.
Cloth manufacture, English, 16, 36, 134–5, 147, 152–3;
Netherland, 20, 32, 33, 36.
Cockeram, Martin, mariner, 266.
Coinage, debasement of, 163.
Coke, John, Secretary of Merchant Adventurers, 188.
Columbus, Bartholomew, 71.
Columbus, Christopher, 71, 73.
Commerce, general development of, 13–50, 120–51;
Acts relating to, 124, 124–5, 134–5.
Cooper, Richard, Governor of English merchants in Spain, 218.
_Cordelière_, French warship, burning of, 376–8.
Corte Real, Gaspar and Miguel, Portuguese explorers, 106, 116.
Cortes, Martin, writer on navigation, 348.
Cosa, Juan de la, map of, 82–3.
Cotton, Thomas, vice-admiral, 402.
Crespi, treaty of, 224.
Crisis, international, 1538–9, 125–6.
Cromwell, Thomas, 125, 128, 262, 268;
policy of, 127 note, 140.
Customs duties, tonnage and poundage, subsidies, wool duties, 22, 33,
36–40, 46–7, 123, 136;
schedules of, 37, 40;
Acts relating to, 38, 123, 150–1, 161;
proclamation relating to, 1539, 126–7, 128, 130–2;
frauds on, 162;
receipts, 131, 367–71.
Danzig, English merchants at, 44, 129, 158, 178, 197–8.
Dawbeny, Oliver, participator in 1536 expedition, 263.
Denmark, trade with, 41, 129, 197.
Dorset, Marquis of, 120–1, 378–9.
Dudley, John, Viscount Lisle, Earl of Warwick, Duke of Northumberland,
146, 162, 164, 403;
commands fleet against French and Scots, 1544–6, 389–99;
sacks Leith and Edinburgh, 1544, 389;
action at Portsmouth, 1545, 392–7;
action off Shoreham, 1545, 397–8;
raids French coast, 398–9;
policy of, 162, 163, 165;
project for a voyage to Peru, _c._ 1552, 310.
Durforth, Cornelius, master of the _Bona Confidentia_, 314.
Easterlings. _See_ Hansa.
Eden, Richard, historian, 52, 90, 241–2, 245, 278, 279, 283, 284, 285.
Edward VI, general character of his reign, 146–7;
naval administration under, 400–1;
death of, 170.
Elephant-hunting, 298.
Elizabeth, Queen, letter from, to the Council of Lubeck, 180–1.
Elyot, Hugh, merchant and explorer, 109, 113, 114, 370.
Evil May Day, the, 1517, 141.
Exeter and Dartmouth, port of, 371.
Fabyan, Robert, chronicler, 62, 69–70.
Ferdinand, King of Spain, 23, 27, 121;
letters from, 53–4, 67;
letters to, 22–3, 58–9, 59;
death, 1516, 243.
Feria, Count of, Spanish ambassador, 303.
Fernandes, Francisco, Portuguese explorer, 104, 109;
pension granted to, 108.
Fernandes, João, Portuguese explorer, 104, 106, 108, 109.
Ferrers, Lord, naval captain, 1513, 382, 383.
Field, John, English merchant in Spain, 226, 227.
FitzWilliam, Sir William, vice-admiral, 1522, 358, 386.
Flanders galleys, the. _See_ Venice.
Flanders, trade with. _See_ Netherlands.
Foodstuffs, supply of, 147;
export of, forbidden, 147–8;
import of, 147.
Fox, Rowland, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 291–2.
France, trade with, 17, 208–15.
_See also_ Bordeaux.
France, wars with, 1512–14, 120–1, 375–86;
1522–3, 386–8;
1544–6, 159–60, 388–99;
1549–1550, 402–3;
1557–9, 179, 404–6.
Francis I, King of France, 125, 130.
_Fust MS._, the, 75.
Gabriel, Russian skipper, 330–1.
Galvano, Antonio, explorer and historian, 91, 95;
quotation from, 91.
Gardiner, Stephen, Bishop of Winchester, 132.
Gerard, Sir William, merchant, investor in Barbary voyage, 275.
Gold, amounts of, obtained by Guinea expeditions, 280, 281, 285, 287,
294–5, 302, 304, 306.
Gold Coast. _See_ Guinea.
Gomara, Lopes de, historian, 87, 92–3;
quotation from, 87–8.
Gonsalves, João, Portuguese explorer, 104, 109;
pension granted to, 108.
Gonson, Richard, 234.
Gonson, William, merchant, 234.
Grain Coast. _See_ Guinea.
Grand Cham, the, 54, 77, 256, 257.
Gravelines, battle of, 1558, 406.
Gray, Richard, in the Mediterranean, 234;
agent of Russia Company, 327.
Graynfyld, John, privateer, exploit of, 403–4.
Greenland, in early maps, 115, 116;
confused with Labrador, 93, 116 note.
Gresham, Sir John, 230 note;
member of Russia Company, 311, 326.
Gresham, Sir Richard, 190.
Gresham, Sir Thomas, 146, 163, 165, 170, 194;
financial services to Government, 194–5;
member of Russia Company, 311.
Guinea, English voyages to, 277–306;
commodities obtained from, 277, 279, 285–6, 287;
voyages prohibited by the Privy Council, 287, 291–3, 295–6, 297;
defence of the English merchants, 289–91;
Wyndham’s voyage, 1553, 277–84, 290 note;
Locke’s voyage, 1554–5, 284–7, 288, 290 note;
Towerson’s first voyage, 1555–6, 293–5;
Towerson’s second voyage, 1556–7, 296–302;
Towerson’s third voyage, 1558, 302–6;
other English expeditions, 295, 298–9;
French voyages, 297–301, 303, 304;
the Portuguese in Guinea, 280.
Guldeford, Sir Edward, 232.
Hakluyt, Richard, 62, 63, 264.
Hamburg, cloth mart at, 172, 173, 175.
Hansa, Hanseatic League, 15, 16, 35, 39–44, 129, 133, 152–82;
policy of Henry VII towards, 41–4;
of Henry VIII, 132–3, 152, 155, 156–7, 158, 159, 160, 161;
of Somerset, 161–2;
of Northumberland, 162;
of Mary, 170–1, 176, 178;
of King Philip, 173–4, 176, 179;
of Elizabeth, 180–1;
privileges of, 38, 39–40, 123, 152, 161, 167, 170, 172, 178;
first revocation of privileges, 1552, 139, 163–9;
restoration, 1553, 151, 170;
second revocation, 1555, 174, 176;
treaties with England, 39, 176, 181;
grievances of, 42–4, 154–6, 157–8, 159;
diets with, 1491, 42;
1497, 43;
1499, 44;
1520, 155–6;
1542 (proposed), 159;
1555–7 (proposed), 174, 176, 177–8;
negotiations with, 1558–1560, 180–1;
charges against, 162, 164–5, 166, 171–3, 177, 180;
embassies from, 165, 168–9, 174–6, 178, 179;
proclaims cessation of intercourse with England, 1557, 178–9;
banishes Englishmen, 178, 181;
final expulsion from England, 1598, 182;
suspected of heresy, 1526, 143;
temporary restraint of, 1535, 157;
furnishes ships for the English fleet, 160;
trade with Antwerp, 160, 167–8, 172–7;
threatened coalition of, with Denmark and France against England,
1557–8, 179;
dépôt of at Hull, 162, 168;
two Hanse ships captured by Towerson, 303, 350;
the Steelyard, 39;
attack on, 1493, 43.
Hawkins, Sir John, 225.
Hawkins, William, 241;
makes voyages to Brazil, 1530, 265–7;
commercial enterprises, 268–9;
letter from, to Cromwell, 268;
privateering exploits, 271;
further career, 270–1.
Henry VII, 54, 55, 57, 59, 78;
and Columbus, 71;
visits Bristol, 74;
grants letters patent to the Cabots, 53, 56, 59–60, 64–5, 74, 78;
to the Bristol syndicates, 104, 109;
policy of, 14, 17, 19, 20–7, 37, 41–7, 54, 65, 79, 106;
naval administration of, 372–4.
Henry VIII, character of, 120, 121, 128;
court of, 133;
policy of, 120, 121, 123–4, 126–8, 130–3, 142, 144, 161, 183–4, 186,
214;
his interest in discovery, 240, 245–8, 249;
exhorted by Robert Thorne, 250–1;
anecdote of, 264;
and William Hawkins, 271;
naval policy, 374, 399–400;
conduct of war, 1545, 397.
Hewster, John, Governor of Merchant Adventurers, 155.
Hickman, Anthony, merchant, factors of at Grand Canary, 226;
investor in Guinea expedition, 284.
Hojeda, Alonzo de, explorer, 99–100;
encounters English explorers (?), 1499, 100, 101.
Holstocke, William, Controller of the Navy, 234.
Holy League, the, 120–1.
Hore, Master, voyage of to Newfoundland, 1536, 262–4.
Howard, Sir Edward, Lord Admiral, engaged in Mediterranean trade, 232;
action with Barton, 1511, 374–5;
commands fleet against French, 1512–13, 376;
battle off Brest, 1512, 376–8;
blockades Brest, 379–83;
killed, 1513, 381–3;
character, 376, 378, 380, 383.
Howard, Thomas, Lord Admiral and Duke of Norfolk, 141;
engaged in Mediterranean trade, 232;
action with Andrew Barton, 1511, 374–5;
succeeds his brother as Admiral, 383–4;
commands in 1522–3, 386, 387–8.
Howard, Lord William, Lord Admiral, 403, 404–5, 406;
assists Guinea adventurers, 303;
member of Russia Company, 311.
Hull, port of, 371.
Hussey, Anthony, Governor of Merchant Adventurers, 296;
Consul of Russia Company, 326.
Hussey, Dr. Lawrence, 333–4.
Hutton, John, Governor of Merchant Adventurers, 188.
Iceland, fishery at and trade with, 41, 74, 199–203;
fighting in, 199–200;
conduct of the English in, 200–1;
number of ships going to, 201–2;
decline of the fishery, 202–3.
Ipswich, port of, 371.
Isabella, Queen of Castile, 20, 23.
Italy, trade with, overland, 16, 28, 29, 32, 150, 229;
by sea, 17, 28, 32, 48, 149, 230–1.
Ivan the Terrible, Czar, 324–6;
letter from to Edward VI, 325–326;
anecdote of, 327–8;
grants privileges to the English, 328;
letter to from Philip and Mary, 336.
Ivory Coast. _See_ Guinea.
James IV of Scotland, 375.
Jenkinson, Anthony, in the Mediterranean, 238;
goes to Russia, 1557, 336;
his explorations, 337.
John, Don, native chief in Guinea, 286, 294.
Johnson, John, merchant of the Staple, 204.
Johnson, Richard, description of the Samoyedes, 331–2.
Judde, Sir Andrew, merchant, member of Russia Company, 326.
Katherine of Aragon, 22, 23, 24;
divorce of, 186–7.
Killingworth, George, agent of Russia Company, 327–8.
Knotting, John, election of as Governor of Merchant Adventurers
annulled, 189–90.
Knyvet, Sir Thomas, 232;
killed at Brest, 1512, 377–8.
Labrador, 88, 91, 93, 115–16, 117–19, 203–4;
origin of name, 91–2, 104 note;
confused with Greenland, 93, 116 note.
Lambert, Francis, merchant, investor in Barbary voyage, 275.
Lambert, Nicholas, merchant, 281;
abandoned in Benin, 282–3.
Lancerota, fight between Wyndham and Spaniards at, 276.
Lane, Henry, agent of Russia Company, 321, 327, 337.
Lee, Dr., English ambassador in Spain, 251, 260.
Letters of Marque. _See_ Privateering.
Levant, trade with. _See_ Mediterranean.
Lisle, Lord. _See_ Dudley.
Livery Companies, the, invited to set forth a voyage of discovery,
1521, 245–8.
Locke, John, merchant, commands Guinea expedition, 1554, 284–7, 288.
Locke, Thomas, merchant, 284.
London, port of, 131;
growth of, 367–8, 371.
Low Countries. _See_ Netherlands.
Lutterell, Sir John, merchant, 274.
Magellan, Ferdinand, voyage round the world, 1519–21, 246.
‘Mantuan Gentleman,’ relation of the, 88–9, 93–4, 97.
Marco Polo, 72;
quotation from, 77 note.
Margaret, Duchess of Burgundy, 19, 21.
Martyr, Peter, historian, 86, 92;
quotation from, 86–7.
Mary, Queen, policy of, 150–1, 170–1, 176, 288, 291, 292, 303;
letter from to the Czar, 1557, 336;
naval administration of, 404.
Medina del Campo, treaty of, 22.
Medina Sidonia, Duke of, 216;
grants privileges to English merchants, 216–17, 218.
Mediterranean, commodities obtained from, 230;
English trade with, 15, 17, 46, 129–30, 228–39;
Acts relating to, 228 note;
decay of, 148–9, 238–9.
Merchant Adventurers, the, 16, 19, 31, 33–6, 127, 138, 140, 145, 146,
161, 163, 168, 183–96;
constitution of, 34, 35, 187, 194 note;
Act relating to, 35;
head-quarters transferred to Calais, 1493, 19;
treatment of, in the Netherlands, 184–6, 195;
threatened transference of head-quarters to Calais, 1527, 187;
threatened arrest of, in Netherlands, 1527, 187;
relations with English Government, 187–8, 194 note;
pay a benevolence in lieu of taxes, 191;
arrest of at Antwerp, 1545, 191–2;
suffer from Hanse competition, 191–2;
loans to Government, 163, 194 note;
attack privileges of the Hansa, 163, 164–5, 171–4;
petition the Council, 1554, 173;
disputes among, 35, 139, 189–190, 193–4;
indiscipline of, 189, 193, 195;
wealth of, 140–1;
members fined, 188–9, 194;
religion of, 195–6;
relative decline of, 196.
Merchant Adventurers for the discovery of new lands, &c. _See_ Russia
Company.
Merchants, social position of. _See_ Social Changes.
Merchants, foreign, in England;
Flemish, 127, 141;
French, 141, 212;
German, _see_ Hansa;
Italian, 26, 44, 46–8, 141, 150;
Spanish, 44–6.
Merchants of the Staple. _See_ Staple.
Merchant Venturers of Bristol, 370–1.
Michiel, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador, 150, 321, 327 note, 329 note.
Milan, Duke of, 55.
Mina, or El Mina, Portuguese head-quarters in Guinea, 280, 285.
Mordeyne, Miles, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 296;
member of Russia Company, 326.
More, Sir Thomas, 155.
Muscovy Company. _See_ Russia Company.
Navigation Acts, 1485 and 1489, 19, 45, 128, 209–10, 212–13;
repeal of, 145–6, 214–15;
1540, 128–30, 158, 213, 223;
licences to infringe, 19, 212;
Spanish Acts, 24, 27, 131, 219.
Navigation, Science of. _See_ Ships.
Netherlands, trade with, 19, 20, 129, 130, 131–2, 147, 184–7, 190–2,
196.
Newcastle, port of, 367, 371.
Newfoundland, in Thorne’s map, 115, 116;
Hore’s voyage to, 1536, 262–4;
fishery at, 56, 64, 87, 106–7, 118, 203–4;
Acts relating to, 203.
_New Interlude of the Four Elements, The_, 111, 114;
quotation from, 111–13.
Norfolk, Duke of. _See_ Howard.
North-East Passage, search for, 310–32, 337;
causes leading to, 310–11;
voyage of Willoughby, 1553–4, 314–22;
of Chancellor, 1553–4, 322–4;
of Stephen Borough, 1556, 329–32.
_See also_ Russia Company.
North-West Passage, search for, 88, 89–90, 91, 94, 96, 98, 101, 103,
118, 119;
alleged voyage, 1516–17, 241–5;
projected voyage, 1521, 245–8;
Rut’s voyage, 1527, 252–8;
Hore’s voyage, 1536, 262–4;
projected voyage, 1541, 265.
Northumberland, Duke of. _See_ Dudley.
Novaia Zemlia, discovered by Sir Hugh Willoughby, 318–19.
Olaus Magnus, historian, quotation from, 200.
Orkneys and Shetlands, proposed raid on, 1542, 201.
Osep Nepea, Russian ambassador, sails with Chancellor, 1556, 332–3;
reception in London, 334;
negotiates a treaty, 334–5;
description of, 335–6;
departure, 336.
Ostrich, Henry, merchant, 308.
Ostrich, William, Governor of English merchants in Spain, 220, 222.
Packer, the, duties of, 135.
Paris Map, the. _See_ Sebastian Cabot.
Pasqualigo, Lorenzo, letter from, describing Cabot’s voyage, 54–55, 66.
Pembroke, Earl of, member of Russia Company, 311.
Pery, Thomas, imprisoned and tortured in Spain, 222–3, 224.
Pet, Arthur, 314, 332.
Petre, Sir William, 175.
Philip, Archduke and King of Castile, 20–1, 30.
Philip, King, consort of Mary, influence of in England, 174, 287–8;
policy of towards Hansa, 173–4, 176;
towards Guinea adventurers, 287–8, 291–3, 295–296, 302;
towards Russia Company, 337.
Phillips, John, voyage of to Brazil and West Indies, 1540, 267–8.
Pilotage, 30.
Pinteado, Antonio Anes, Portuguese pilot and renegade, 277–84.
Piracy, 28–9, 365–7;
Act concerning, 1536, 366.
Pisa, proposed wool-staple at, 25, 229.
Plantagenet, Arthur, son of Edward IV, 380.
Plymouth and Fowey, port of, 371.
Pole, Cardinal, 126.
Poole, port of, 371.
Popenruyter, Hans, gunfounder, 184, 361–2.
Portsmouth, fighting at, 1545, 392–7.
Portuguese, discoveries of the, 49–50, 72;
in America, 106–7, 116–17;
offence taken by at English voyages to Africa, 276–277, 279, 287;
negotiations with, 287–93;
fighting with on Gold Coast, 294, 299–300, 304.
Porzmoguer, Hervé de, French captain, 377–8.
Poynings, Sir Edward, 373.
Prato, Albert de, Canon of St. Paul’s and explorer, 252, 255, 258;
letter from to Wolsey, 255;
death of (?), 256.
Prégent de Bidoux, French captain, commands squadron of galleys,
1512–14, 379;
forces blockade of Brest, 353, 380–1;
beats off English attack, 381–3;
burns Brighton, 384–5.
Prices, rise of, 135, 146–7;
of sugar, 135;
of wines, 24, 213;
of wool, 146–7;
of corn, 148.
Prima Vista, land named, 64.
Privateering, 29, 138, 214, 224, 225, 270–1, 272, 367, 390–1, 403–4.
Proclamation abolishing protection for seven years, 1539, 126–127, 130,
132.
Prussia, trade with, 42.
_See also_ Danzig.
Pudsey, —, merchant of Southampton, voyage of to Brazil, 1542, 267.
Puebla, Dr. Ruy Gonsales de, Spanish ambassador, 27;
character, 45–6;
letter to, 53–4;
letter from, describing Cabot’s voyage, 59, 79.
Purchas, Samuel, historian, 253, 255, 321.
Purchas, William, Lord Mayor, 62.
Ralph, John, captain in Guinea expeditions, 293.
Ramusio, Giovanni Battista, historian, 88, 93–4, 97, 114;
quotations from, 88–9, 89–90.
Ransoms, raising of, for prisoners of the Turks, 233–4.
Reformation, effects of, on maritime expansion, 141–4.
Reneger, John, son of Robert Reneger, 272.
Reneger, Robert, merchant of Southampton, makes voyages to Brazil, _c._
1540, 267;
career of, 272–3;
captures Spanish treasure-ship, 1545, 272;
lends ships to the king, 1545, 391.
Ribault, Jean, French explorer, 90.
Rotz, John, his _Book of Hydrography_, 345.
Russia Company, 311–37;
formation of, 1552–3, 311;
incorporated by Edward VI, 312;
Sebastian Cabot Governor of, 312, 326;
capital of, 312;
distinguished from Merchant Adventurers, 312–13;
first expedition, 1553–4, 314–26;
obtains fresh charter, 1555, 326–7;
second expedition, 1555, 327–9;
obtains privileges from the Czar, 328;
third expedition, 1556, 329–33;
disasters at sea, 332–3;
fourth expedition, 1557, 336;
factories in Russia, 337.
Rut, John, commander of North-West voyage, 1527, 252–8;
letter from to Henry VIII, 253–4;
in the West Indies, 255–6, 257 note.
Rutter, John, gunmaker, 361.
Salt, Isle of, Towerson at, 305.
San Lucar, English merchants at, 216–17, 218, 220, 222, 225.
Santa Cruz, Alonzo de, geographer, 91, 94;
quotations from, 91–2.
Savages brought from America, 1502, 62, 63, 110, 117.
Scandinavia, trade with, 15.
Schleswig, Duke of, letter from to Queen Mary, 179, 198.
Scotland, wars with, 1490, 373;
1497, 373–4;
1513, 384;
1522–4, 387;
1543–5, 388–9, 390;
1547–8, 401–2.
Searcher, duties of the, 135–6.
Senjen, island of, Willoughby at, 318.
Seven Cities, the, 58, 74.
Seymour, Thomas, Lord Admiral, 366, 391, 403.
Ships: development of ship-building, 232, 338–41, 346;
the mediaeval round ship, 339;
the galley, 339, 359–60, 380–1, 386, 393, 397–8;
English sailing ships called galleys, 355–6;
the carrack, 345, 350;
the caravel, 349–50;
the hulk, 350–1;
row-barges, 356, 393;
English ships, late fifteenth century, 341–2;
a merchantman of 1519, 344;
of 1527, 345;
warships, development of, 340–1, 351–2, 355, 356–7;
size of ships, 342–3, 345, 400;
cost of ships, 343–4;
sails and rigging, 346–8, 356–7;
ships’ boats, 346;
navigation, improvement of, 30, 240–1, 348–9;
seamen, health of, 362–3, 397, 399;
wages, 363;
victualling, 363;
private trading, 363;
officers, 363–4;
discipline, 364–5.
Ships: English (those marked * belonged to the Navy), the _Anne_, 336;
_Barbara_, 267–8;
_Barke Aucher_, 235–8;
_Bartholomew_, 284;
_Bona Confidentia_, 314–22, 328, 332;
_Bona Esperanza_, 314–22, 328, 332–3;
_Botolph_, 275;
_Christ_,* 233;
_Christopher_, 302–6;
_Edward Bonaventure_, 314–18, 322–6, 327–9, 329–30, 332–3, 363;
_Galley Subtile_,* 360;
_Grace Dieu_,* 372;
_Great Elizabeth_,* 386 note;
_Hart_, 293–5, 297–301;
_Henry Grace à Dieu_,* 243, 244, 343, 344, 347, 350, 353, 354–5,
357–9, 379, 393, 394, 404;
_Hind_, 293–5;
_Holy Cross_, 234;
_Jennet Purwyn_,* 374–5;
_Jesus of Lubeck_,* 233, 405;
_John Evangelist_, 284, 286, 336;
_Katherine Pleasance_,* 386 note;
_Lion_, 274, 275–7, 279, 283 note;
_Lion_ * (captured from Barton), 374–5;
_Mary and John_,* 232, 386 note;
_Mary Figge_, 271;
_Mary Fortune_,* 343, 373;
_Mary Gilford_,* 253, 256, 257 note;
_Mary Gloria_,* 386 note;
_Mary Gonson_,* 233;
_Mary Imperial_,* 386 note;
_Mary James_,* 377;
_Mary Rose_,* 243, 343, 353, 358, 361, 365, 377, 393, 394;
_Mary Spert_, 245;
_Matthew_, 75;
_Matthew Gonson_, 234, 255, 346, 362, 364;
_Minion_, 302–6;
_Moon_,* 279;
_Paul_, 266;
_Peter Pomegranate_,* 343, 353;
_Philip and Mary_, 327–9, 329–30, 332;
_Primrose_,* 279, 283 note, 336, 404;
_Regent_,* 233, 352, 353, 373, 377–8;
_Samson_, 254, 256, 257 note;
_Saviour_, 262;
_Serchthrift_, 329–32;
_Sovereign_,* 352, 357, 373, 377;
_Sweepstake_,* 343, 373;
_Tiger_, 297–302, 302–305;
_Tiger_,* 355;
_Trinity_, 284, 286, 336;
_Trinity Henry_,* 386 note;
_Unicorn_, 302.
Sigismund Augustus, King of Poland, letter from, 169.
Sluys, expedition against, 1492, 373.
Social changes, 133–4, 139–41.
Somerset, Duke of, 145;
sacks Leith and Edinburgh, 1544, 389;
invades Scotland, 1547, 401;
policy of, 161–2;
execution of, 164.
Soncino, Raimondo de, letters from, describing Cabot’s voyage, 55,
56–8, 66–7.
Sousa, Lopez de, Portuguese ambassador, 288.
Southampton, 367;
voyages to Brazil from, _c._ 1540, 267–8;
decay of, 368–9;
Act relating to, 1530, 368;
privileges of, 369.
Spain, trade with, 17, 22–4, 27, 129, 139, 215–28;
Company of English merchants in, 217;
incorporated, 1530, 218;
complaint of, 1548, 225;
persecution of English in, 143, 220–4;
arrest of English merchants, 1545, 224–5;
rise of enmity between Spain and England, 143–4.
Spert, Sir Thomas, alleged voyage of, 1516–17, 241–5;
career of, 243–5.
St. John, island of, 64, 70, 75.
St. Thomé, Towerson at, 305.
Staple, Merchants of the, 16, 31–33, 135, 136, 138, 139, 204–7;
wealth of, 141;
decline of, 206–207;
Acts concerning Calais, 205–6;
licences to infringe Staple monopoly, 231–2.
Steelyard. _See_ Hansa.
Stockbridge, Richard, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 291–2.
Stow, John, historian, 62–3.
Tanais, country of, 56.
Thevet, André, historian, 90.
Thirkill, Launcelot, companion of John Cabot, 60, 61, 82.
Thomas, James, relation of Barbary voyage by, 275–7.
Thomas, John, merchant of Bristol, 104, 109.
Thorne, Nicholas, son of Robert Thorne the elder, 260, 262, 261 note.
Thorne, Robert, the elder, voyage of to America, 113–14, 117, 252;
royal grant to, 114;
date of death, 116 note, 259;
career of, 258–9.
Thorne, Robert, the younger, 113, 114;
map made by, 114–116;
_Declaration of the Indies_, 250–1;
_Book made by_, 251–2;
sends agents to South America, 251 and note;
connexion between his projects and Rut’s voyage, 257–8;
career of, 260–261, 261 note.
Thorne, William, 114.
Tison, Thomas, first English merchant in West Indies, 260.
Tomson, Robert, voyage of to Mexico, 1555, 225–8.
Tonnage and Poundage. _See_ Customs.
Tordesillas, Treaty of, 79, 116.
Towerson, William, merchant, first voyage of to Guinea, 1555–6, 293–5;
second voyage, 1556–7, 296–302;
fights a Portuguese squadron, 299–300;
fights a French pirate, 301–2;
third voyage, 1558, 302–6;
captures a French ship, 304.
Trade, mediaeval, 15–16, 19, 31, 49–50.
Trade routes, 15, 16–17, 148–9, 154–5;
effect of discoveries on, 49–50, 149.
Treaties, commercial, with Denmark, 41;
with the Hansa, 39, 176, 181;
with the Netherlands, 1496, 20, 21, 185;
1497, 20;
1499, 20;
1506, 21, 131, 185–6;
1520, 185–6;
1542, 132;
with Spain, 1489, 22;
1515, 216.
Tregonwell, Sir James, 178.
Trenchard, Sir Thomas, 20.
Trinity, Guild of the Holy, 30.
Turkey Company, the, 231, 239.
Vardo, 318;
Chancellor at, 322–323;
trading post of the Russia Company, 327, 329.
Venice, commerce and policy of, 17–18, 47–8, 148–50;
Flanders galleys of, 18, 26, 28, 48–9, 149;
English trade with, 24–5;
decline of, 148–9.
Vineland, 74.
Wade, or Ward, Armigil, explorer, 263.
Walker, Humphrey, gunmaker, 361.
Wallop, Sir John, naval commander, 382, 385.
Ward, Richard, merchant of Bristol, 104, 109.
Warwick, Earl of. _See_ Dudley.
West Indies, English trade with, 217, 228, 260.
White, Giles, merchant, forbidden to trade with Guinea, 296.
Williamson, John, relation by, 234.
Willoughby, Gabriel, 314, 321.
Willoughby, Sir Hugh, Captain-General of the North-East Expedition,
1553, 313–22;
preparations, 314–17;
voyage, 317–322;
discovers Novaia Zemlia, 318–19;
death, 321–22;
bodies discovered, 328.
Willoughby, Lord, commander against the Scots, 1497, 373–4.
Winchester, Marquis of, member of Russia Company, 311.
Wines, import of. _See_ Bordeaux, Spain, Levant, &c.
Withipole, Paul, merchant, 261.
Woad, Toulouse, import of, 209, 215.
Wolsey, Cardinal, 142–3, 155;
policy of, 121–2, 186;
negotiations with Sebastian Cabot, 1521, 249;
letter from, 377–8.
Woodhouse, Sir William, vice-admiral, 405–6.
Wool, export of. _See_ Staple.
Wroth, Sir Thomas, merchant, investor in Barbary voyage, 275.
Wyatt, Sir Thomas, ambassador in Spain, 221, 308.
Wyndham, Thomas, 274–284;
voyages to Barbary, 1551–2, 274, 275–7;
to Guinea and Benin, 1553, 277–84, 290 note;
career of, 274–5;
death, 282.
Yorke, Sir John, merchant, investor in Barbary and Guinea expeditions,
275, 284.
Oxford: Horace Hart M.A., Printer to the University
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
136.23 the right to ship 6000[,] broadcloths Removed.
319.32 such a serious error in latitude[.] Added.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Maritime enterprise 1485-1558" ***
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