Title: Narrative of the Fenian invasion of Canada
Author: Somerville, Alexander
Language: English
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INVASION OF CANADA ***



  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  Some punctuation has been changed to be consistent.
  — “St ” changed to “St.”
  — “Lt-Col.” changed to “Lt.-Col.”; “Lt. Col.” changed to “Lt.-Col.”
  — “Lieut-Col.” changed to “Lieut.-Col.”
  — “Col ” changed to “Col.”
  — “13th.” changed to “13th”; “22nd.” to “22nd” (Battalions)
  — Period removed from dates (for example 1st. of June)

  The description of time has been made consistent. Use of a comma
  (for example 4,30 p. m. or 4, a. m.) has been changed to use
  a period or a space (4.30 p. m. or 4 a. m.). Some upper case A. M.
  and P. M. have been changed to lower case.

  The Chapter headings were misnumbered in the original book. There
  is no ‘Chapter V’ and no ‘Chapter VII’; no pages are missing.

  Some other changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.



[Illustration:

  MAP
  OF THE
  FIELD OF COMBAT,
  AT
  LIMESTONE RIDGE,

  PUBLISHED IN THE NARRATIVE OF

  ALEXANDER SOMERVILLE,

  AT

  HAMILTON, CANADA WEST.]



                              NARRATIVE

                                OF THE

                           FENIAN INVASION,

                                  OF

                                CANADA,

                                  BY

                         ALEXANDER SOMERVILLE

                                WITH A

                     MAP OF THE FIELD OF COMBAT,

                                  AT

                           LIMESTONE RIDGE,

                           HAMILTON, C. W.,
  PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR, BY JOSEPH LYGHT, BOOKSELLER & STATIONER.
       PRINTED BY A. LAWSON & CO., WHITE’S BLOCK, KING STREET.

                                 1866



PREFACE


The term Fenian is derived from the Irish word Feine, the genitive
case of Fian (plural Fiana), the designation of a band, or rather
several bands of warriors, whose duty was to defend the coasts of
Ireland from foreign invasion.

The Fians, Fiana, or Fenians flourished in the third century of our
era, and employed their time alternately in war, the chase, and the
cultivation of poetry. As their protecting power extended to part
of Scotland, hence the traditions of them in that country, on which
Macpherson’s celebrated poems of ‘Ossian’ are founded. Their chief was
Fin or Fionn (the Fingal of Macpherson), and their most celebrated
bards were Ossian, or Oisin, and Fergus (sons of Fin), and Daire,
sometimes called Gunire.

James Stephens, who claims to be originator of Fenianism, was born
at Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1827. He was probably familiar with the
agrarian disturbances around Kilkenny in the years 1842-43. While it
falls to me in the year 1866 to write this, “Narrative of the Fenian
Invasion of Canada,” and to deprecate, deplore, denounce it, so it
fell to me in the years 1843 and 1844, when vindicating the rights of
industry against injustice to produce a work, “A Cry from Ireland”
of which the late Daniel O’Connell spoke thus at a public meeting in
Dublin, afterwards, nearly in the same words, in London:

“The impartial, vivid descriptions of the wrongs of Irish industry
and sufferings of the tenantry at Bennet’s Bridge, by Alexander
Somerville, are all the more emphatic that he is neither an Irishman,
a catholic, nor a repealer. To him more than to any individual we owe
the commission of Inquiry into the operation of the Laws of Landlord
and Tenant. This work of Mr. Somerville which I hold in my hand (and
from which he had cited passages) will be read by generations of
Irishmen yet unborn.”

On February 14th, 1844, Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, having
announced that a commission of Inquiry was to be sent to Ireland,
Lord John Russell, leader of the opposition, made a speech of which
this is a passage: “Government have appointed a commission for
farther inquiry into the subject. I doubt whether farther evidence
be necessary seeing how much evidence we already have upon it, and
see statements in the book by Alexander Somerville, ‘_A Cry from
Ireland_’ of a heart rending kind; statements which I would not
venture to refer to unless they were fully ascertained to be true;
statements which show that with the powers of the law, and in name of
the law, some landlords in Ireland, are exercising a fearful and a
dreadful power.”

The Prime Minister said in the same debate: “The noble lord has
referred to a book called _A Cry from Ireland_. Sir, I have read that
work, and I think it is impossible for any man whatever to read it
without being shocked with the manner in which landlords, as there
described, have in many instances perverted their powers for harsh
purposes.”

Extract from the evidence of Patrick Ring, one of seventy and odd
tenant farmers on the Bennet’s Bridge estate near Kilkenny, for some
of whom I obtained justice and re-instatement in the lands from which
they had been evicted. _Commission Blue Books, Reports to both Houses
of Parliament, 1844; Vol. III. p. 363._ [See also “Somerville’s Book
of a Diligent Life in the Service of Public Safety in Britain,”
published by John Lovell, St. Nicholas Street, Montreal].

Patrick Ring, examined before the Royal Commission at Kilkenny, Oct.
8, 1844: “There was a gentleman came over to Ireland of the name
of Somerville. He had heard of my case and how I was persecuted.
He hired a car and went out to Bennet’s Bridge, and got up to the
place and saw my mother out in the ruins with an infant in her arms,
after she had come out from the mother [his wife] striving to mind
the mother and to mind the child. They [family of children] were in
a famishing way; and he saw her and left her [a sum of money was
named but misprinted]. He brought me into Kilkenny and he kept me at
Flude’s Hotel taking down my case two days and a night. I told him
I was going to Dublin and he gave me money and clothes, and then he
took me to Dublin, and he got my case put in the _Morning Chronicle_
in London, and he laid it also before Mr. O’Connell” &c.

Extract of a letter from Patrick Ring written from Bennet’s Bridge,
Kilkenny, 4th Oct. 1844 to Alexander Somerville in London: “My Dear
Sir. I take the liberty of writing to you as I know I am welcome,
hoping to find you and your dear mistress, my best friend on earth,
well, as this leaves me and my family at present. Them all is
recovered from the fever, and you next to God was the means of it,
you and your dear mistress.”

In the famine years I was again sent to Ireland by the proprietors
of the Manchester _Examiner_, and on behalf of benevolent persons
in England, to trace the courses of the pestilence. Some Irish
newspapers and many clergymen catholic and protestant hailed my
presence in the country warmly. On my sending to England reports of
villages or districts which were especially distressed benevolent
persons and societies forwarded money to catholic priests and others
whom I named as persons to be entrusted with funds for the relief of
the perishing people.

In 1848, I was, with an artist, the representative of the
_Illustrated London News_, sent to Ireland to describe the progress
of Smith O’Brien’s insurrection.

These matters are here referred to merely to indicate that, although
a Scotchman, I am familiar with the social condition of Ireland;
that although bred only to the plough with but small education in
schools, almost none, for I was working in the fields at seven years
of age to assist in obtaining, as one of a large and poor family
a scanty subsistence, I yet had the power and the privilege, as a
public writer employed in England, occasionally visiting Ireland, to
give material assistance, and obtain redress for oppressed tenants
in that district, which owns James Stephens as a native, and which
has inspired him with Fenianism. My life has been a battle, and my
battle has been the rights of man. Not to pull down, but to build up.
My writings have been for a space of thirty or more years, directed
to the development of a conservative science, teaching, not alone as
Political Economy in its heartless divorcement from human sympathies,
has taught, how to produce and accumulate insensate matter as public
wealth, but how to diffuse as well as produce in completest abundance
the stores of wealth among the producers; and how, among all the
people of a nation, to dispense the elements of human happiness.

“Ireland for the Irish.” What would have been done with Richard Shea,
the tyrant landlord of Bennet’s Bridge, who in 1841, ’42, ’43, had
247 lawsuits with his tenantry, who by his defiance of justice and
of law, yet by the power of the law, had brought the district into
a condition of agrarian convulsion? He was an Irishman of ancient
lineage, boasted of being descended from the kings of Munster? What
of him, and such as he, in expelling the Saxon and giving Ireland to
the Irish.

But standing on this land of Canada in presence of a Fenian invasion,
recently attempted, again threatened, and possibly to be repeated
before these sheets are dry from the press, the mind which has
with long fidelity pleaded for the rights of Irish industry, for
justice to Irish tenant farmers, revolts against discussion of
such, questions now. The people of this Province, reclaiming the
wilderness, creating property, building up a country, a social
fabric, and desiring to enjoy what they are toiling to establish,
what have they done that Irishmen, in the United States, in name
of the wrongs of seven centuries, should invade them? Most of them
were in their own persons, or in the persons of their fathers, poor,
hard-working laborers in England, Scotland, Ireland, before coming
to Canada to toil. My forefathers lost their land in Scotland by
political revolution as many in Ireland have. Three fourths of all
the Scotch in this Province came here for the same reason that the
Irish came, because they were landless at home, and doomed to lives
of toil at small wages, sometimes to the pressure of famine prices on
food, while, in vain, they

      Begged some brother of the earth
      To give them leave to toil.

And English laborers came to Canada to do battle for fortune and
subdue the wilderness, for the same reasons and with similar objects
in view as the Irish and Scotch. So also the French of an older day,
and the Germans and Dutch.

American Republicans. We are not ignorant of political freedom. As
a people, we in Canada, warmly, earnestly sympathized with you in
your great war of four years, waged to conserve your nationality,
to vindicate legitimate government, and the laws against rebellion,
(see chapter eight of this Narrative). We possess freedom in the
widest amplitude; religious, political, civic, social, industrial. We
venerate what is old in the British Constitution, which being at the
same time youthful, vigorous and easily adapted to new circumstances,
is favorable to stability, public morality, social safety, general
happiness.

And the people here will stand by the political constitution and
laws of Canada and by their allegiance to the British Empire, loving
you not the less, trusting to live side by side with you in all the
harmony of people inheriting and enjoying a kindred freedom; but
resolved before Heaven and in the name of Almighty God to defend this
freedom, and this country.

As I have presumed to comment on persons and occurrences in the
following Narrative, it may be proper to say that in youth I had
considerable experience in a field of war, and as a writer have
often had occasion to advert to the subject of national defences. A
military education of the manhood of Great Britain, was, to my pen a
frequent theme.

Letter from Lord Stanley, M. P., late Secretary of State for the
Colonies; afterwards Secretary of State for India, and now, 1866,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated London, May 12, 1863,
to Alexander Somerville, Hamilton, Canada West, acknowledging receipt
of “Somerville’s Diligent Life in the Service of Public Safety,”
and “Canada a Battle Ground.” (About latter work see chapter eight
of this Narrative). Extract: “Your life and writings have long been
known to me. I remember on the occasion of some military debate, your
name being appealed to. I think it was when the Militia Bill was in
question, and the laudatory reference made to you by Lord Palmerston,
was received with general applause by the House of Commons.”

The late Right Hon. Sidney Herbert, Secretary of State for War, House
of Commons, 1860: “Somerville was a man of great ability. He wrote
remarkably well, and in after life raised himself to a good social
position.”

“If we did know the earnest nature of the man, some of the statements
in this remarkable book might be set down as the figments of a
diseased brain. But truth, unsullied truth, we know to be, as it ever
has been the rule and guide of Alexander Somerville.” G. P. Ure,
_Montreal Family Herald_, 1860.

“I know nothing in our literature which, for graphic narrative
and picturesque description of men and things surpasses some of
the Letters of the Whistler at the Plough, written by Alexander
Somerville.” Richard Cobden, M. P., 1847. (On the question of
national defences Mr. Cobden and I parted company never to meet
again.)

For three years, 1835-38, the Foreign Enlistment Act was suspended
in Britain to permit an auxiliary Legion to serve under the Queen of
Spain. I do not cite this matter as approving of the policy, but to
say that I, with 20,000 more, induced by the cry of constitutional
liberty, and full of young life and enterprise, was there. About
5000 survived the hardships of campaigning in a wooded, mountainous
country and the casualties of seven general engagements (allied with
the Spanish army), and numerous smaller actions such as that at
Limestone Ridge on 2nd of June 1866. We were before an active enemy
always. In that time I learned something, and suffered some, as
bullet wounds and premature disability bear witness now. But it does
not follow that because a man has been in a fight or many fights,
that therefore he is a sound military critic. Every man is not a
hero who is wounded or killed, though a generous courtesy confers on
the killed and wounded that high distinction. I do not profess to be
an infallible authority. But in the matter of the Niagara frontier
campaign, claim to have been careful in research, in collecting and
collating evidence. And no inducement under heaven would lead me to
write what I do not believe to be true. A literary experience of more
than a quarter of a century has made me familiar with many subjects.
I adduce a few extracts from military certificates, relating to
service before the enemy. The first is from General Sir De Lacy
Evans, G. C. B., thirty-four years M. P. for the City of Westminster.
He commanded 2nd Division in the Crimea, 1854-55, and before serving
in Spain, 1835-37, had seen more active and arduous service in India,
Portugal, Spain, France, America than almost any living contemporary.

                         “_Bryanstone Square, London_, Nov. 7th, 1847.

(Extract), “MR. SOMERVILLE—SIR, I should be wanting in every feeling
of justice were I to hesitate, under the circumstances referred to,
in bearing my unqualified testimony to your brave, zealous, useful
and exemplary conduct while serving in the Auxiliary Legion under
my orders in Spain. The position you filled in that service, was no
sinecure. The reports respecting your conduct and character were
uniformly to your credit and honor.

                         (Signed)     “DE LACY EVANS, Lieut.-General.”

No. 2. From Colonel Gilbert Hogg, K. S. F. (Knight of San Fernando)
now, 1866, chief of constabulary county of Stafford, England. “I have
much pleasure in stating that the conduct of color-sergeant Alexander
Somerville, late of 8th Highlanders, British Auxiliary Legion, was
such as to merit my most unqualified approbation. His name was
forwarded by me with others to the General of Division as worthy
the notice of His Excellency the Lieutenant General for gallantry
before the enemy. I might stop here were it not that justice demands
I should state more fully the character of this individual. I
have a perfect recollection of a mutiny at St. Sebastian in the
different Scotch corps [this related to the period of enlistment].
On that occasion as on others the conduct of sergeant Somerville was
conspicuous and deserved the highest praise. He never neglected his
duty, and ever evinced a desire to secure order and good conduct
among the men where his influence was considerable. On the line of
march he was enabled from his powerful bodily strength, to bear the
fatigue with comparative ease; and at the halt his exertions were
unceasing in promoting the comforts and providing for the wants of
the men. His conduct naturally attracted my particular notice and I
have satisfaction in now recording it. Gilbert Hogg, Colonel, late
commanding 8th Highlanders, B. A. L. of Spain.

“Given under my hand and seal this 26th day of February 1841.
Gilestown House, Strokestown, County Roscommon, Ireland.”

The more a soldier knows of service before an enemy, not alone the
service of battle, siege, or skirmish; not so much these, as the
life of rough campaigning, marching hurriedly, eating irregularly,
often long without sustenance, sleeping in the open air on the
ground, doing duty on outlying piquets, penetrating the enemy’s
lines as scouts, escorting stores through perilous obstacles,—the
more a soldier knows of these trials of strength and health, of mind
and body, the more he realizes the cardinal truth, that not alone
are firearms and ammunition guardians of his life. His overcoat and
blanket; his water canteen; his haversack to carry food, kettles
to cook food, are, by many possible chances of fortune his life
preservers rather than his arms and ammunition. But the whole are to
him a unity, inseparable. Without a part of the whole he dies. To
see the Militia Volunteers of Canada after three or more years of
organization, and after nearly twelve months of special training for
active frontier service, going forth upon a campaign with almost none
of the necessary equipments to preserve health, life, efficiency as
they went on the 1st of June 1866, was to me, who had gone through
such mind-killing, body-killing service as is indicated in the two
military certificates, deplorable, astounding. I wrote in the public
journals, fervently, strongly. But that fault, that condition of
alarm, does not now remain. Though not in all respects equipped, the
volunteers are in a condition for service creditable to the military
executive officers.

This is how I came to be the writer of the present Narrative. On
Sunday, 3rd of June, when the citizens of Hamilton arose in the
same condition of feverish disquiet in which they subsided from
the streets for a brief space after midnight—not to sleep, for few
sleepers lay in Hamilton on the night of 2nd of June, an adjourned
meeting from Saturday was held in the Court House. A committee of the
principal ladies and gentlemen of the city was there to arrange for
sending provisions, medicines, surgical appliances, medical gentlemen
and nurses to the front. The character of the previous day’s
occurrences was not known beyond the fact that there had been an
engagement and that the enemy had retreated, yet that the volunteers
who had beaten them in fight had also retreated, and were reported by
Lt.-Col. Booker as “demoralized.”

The Committee requested the City clergymen present to offer prayers
in their churches for the men at the front, and sent me as a fit
person to go to the Niagara and Lake Erie frontier to ascertain and
report fully without fear or favor what was the real condition of the
13th, and the state of the campaign. All agreed that any news, if
true, no matter how calamitous, was better than the horrible suspense
which convulsed and clouded the whole city.

I was to cross the country, some thirty miles with a team of fast
horses and a guide, as no trains were supposed to be on the track, it
being Sunday. But there was in preparation a special train which left
at 1.30 p. m. I waited and went on it.

At Grimsby at 2.10 p. m. intelligence was given of Colonel Booker
having passed on his way to Hamilton. I inferred that excessive zeal
for the good of his battalion, nothing to the contrary in his conduct
or character being known to me, had induced the journey to urge up
provisions and field equipments. Yet the fact of his leaving his
command before the enemy also suggested itself as inexplicable. I
assert with all the emphasis which language admits, that I expected
to have good reports to make of Colonel Booker’s eminent military
services, until dismal specks discolored the floating rumours
that were met about the Welland Railway. At Port Colborne, on the
platform, up the street, along the canal wharf, everywhere that
day and next day statements were pressed on me both by Hamilton
and Toronto volunteers. I hesitated to believe; questioned, cross
questioned, sifted, and still doubted, until many refused to reply
farther, alleging that I seemed not to believe anything they said
implicating Colonel Booker.

This gentleman’s name and conduct fills too much of the Narrative.
But in the mismanagement of the action of June 2nd, in the subsequent
aspersions thrown on the 13th battalion by Lt.-Col. Booker, and in
the prominence through a concatenation of circumstances, given to
the combat at Limestone Ridge, as the crisis of the short, prompt,
decisive campaign, the reputation of the 13th battalion; the
good name of Hamilton city which sent it forth to the fight; the
reputation of the Queen’s Own, of Toronto city which gave them to
the service; of the York and Caledonia Rifles; of the Province of
Canada whose sons they were a sample of—all were injuriously affected
through Lt.-Col. Booker, unless the facts would bear proof that his
misconduct was only personal. I have proved that, beyond farther
cavil, the volunteers engaged at Limestone Ridge were brave alike,
and alike deserving of a historical good name in the present day, and
in time to come. To establish this on incontestable grounds I have
made many journeys, questioned many persons, balanced conflicting
statements, and incurred an unprofitable delay in getting this work
before the public; a delay without financial recompense to me as
an author, but favorable to the main object which I had in view, a
vindication of the Militia Volunteers of Canada.

Animadversions are freely made in the Narrative on the reprehensible
inadequacy of equipments with which the volunteers went upon
service in June. While the body of this work was in the press the
incompleteness continued, so also the remarks of censure; but the
Militia authorities have now, (end of August, first and second weeks
of September) proved that, while they have had difficulties almost
insuperable to overcome, the obstacles are in greater part surmounted.

Almost insuperable? What were the obstacles? A factious opposition
waged against the organization of an efficient defensive force of
Militia, carried on under the delusive cry of economy, from the year
1862, when the Militia organization by Colonel Lysons, Her Majesty’s
military representative, was frustrated until the present season of
Fenian Invasion, 1866.

Intelligence which lately arrived from Britain informs Canada that
the new conservative government, under the Earl of Derby, comprehends
and will act on the knowledge of a just conservative philosophy,
which Canadian political men calling themselves conservative would
have done well to have anticipated during the four years of American
war and since. For they have by themselves and their newspaper
organs, during the four years of horrible civil war, cultivated
international asperities, which are now ripened to a bitter American
hatred of Canada, under which, and only under which, Fenian invasions
of British America became possible.

On 23rd of July, 1866, Lord Stanley, (son of the Earl of Derby), the
new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, being questioned by Mr.
White, a non-official member of the House of Commons, on the Fenian
Invasion of Canada in June, and reminded of the just, honorable,
effectual interference of the United States government to prevent a
more formidable Fenian incursion than that which happened, replied
thus:

“I agree in the opinion which the honorable member has expressed as
to the friendly and honorable feeling that has been shown by the
United States with regard to this Fenian affair. I am very anxious,
if possible, and I can speak for my colleagues as well as myself, to
do anything that is reasonably possible to remove any ill-feeling
of irritation or soreness which may remain in consequence of
circumstances connected with the late war.” Her majesty’s speech at
the prorogation of parliament; and subsequently the Prime Minister’s
speech at a London banquet, expressed similar sentiments.



INVASION OF CANADA.



CHAPTER I.

  _Outlines of Strategy as arranged by General Sweeny, Fenian
  Commander in Chief.—Personality of Colonel O’Neil._


The plan of the invasion of Canada at the end of May, 1866, was given
by the Fenian military commander, General Sweeny, to his followers
somewhat thus:

The advance to be made simultaneously from points along the American
frontier from St. Albans in Vermont, to Chicago in Illinois, on
a sinuous frontage line of fifteen hundred miles. The right wing
was at St. Albans and to the eastward. The centre at Malone, State
of New York, situated at about fifteen miles inland from the St.
Lawrence river, and having railway facilities to concentrate men and
supplies from the wide interior of the States, and to distribute
them to selected positions on the frontier opposite Canada. Malone
was considered available for a landing at Cornwall, the lower outlet
of the Upper Canada section of the St. Lawrence canals. Also for
an attack on Prescott from Ogdensburg. The occupation of Prescott
was to include the severing of the Grand Trunk railway, and to give
possession of the branch line to Ottawa city, seat of the Canadian
Government. Malone was available also for an expedition to Montreal
by way of the Richelieu river. That expedition was also to co-operate
with Spears’ force crossing the Missisquoi frontier line, both
marching with artillery within easy supporting distance of each other.

Murphy and Heffernan were to cut the Lachine and Beauharnois canals;
while Spears destroyed the Grand Trunk at several points, including
Longueil, opposite Montreal, St. Hilaire, and St. Hyacinthe.

Kingston was to be threatened from Cape Vincent and Ogdensburg, both
within easy supporting distance from Malone, by a body of two or
three thousand men, who were merely to keep moving, advancing and
retiring in the vicinity of the St. Lawrence, where it issues from
Lake Ontario, and so occupy the Kingston garrison of British regulars.

O’Neil with 5,000 men was to cross from Buffalo, by the narrows
of Lake Erie, or upper section of the Niagara river, or if
transportation availed, to go to Port Colborne, the Lake Erie
terminus of the Welland canal. In any case to reach that place,
occupying the canal and Welland railway; Buffalo and Lake Huron
railway; and reach the chief depot of the Great Western at Hamilton;
occupy that city and co-operate with forces which would advance
against Toronto, from the south by Lake Ontario and its shores,
from the north and west by Lake Huron and Georgian Bay. The Niagara
peninsula and agricultural country around Hamilton were expected
to furnish horses sufficient to transpose O’Neil’s 5,000 men on
foot into cavalry. Many of these had been in cavalry service in the
American war. O’Neil himself was from Nashville, Tennessee, his men
were from Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio.

At Chicago, General Lynch, with Tevis, Adjutant-general of Sweeny’s
staff, were meanwhile to organize and transport what men and
supplies were ready in Illinois State, co-operate with another force
concentrating at Milwaukee city, State of Wisconsin, both to be
steamed across Lake Michigan, through the straits of Mackinaw, and
Lake Huron, invading Canada at Goderich, the western terminus of the
Buffalo and Lake Huron railroad, and at Collingwood, upper terminus
of the Northern railroad, connecting by eighty miles, the Georgian
Bay and Huron Lake, with Toronto city and Lake Ontario. This force
was called, or was to have been, the left wing of the Fenian army of
invasion.

The State of Michigan, supplemented by the States lying to westward
and south was to furnish the right column of this grand left wing.
This column, or rather division, had assigned to it Detroit and Port
Huron as points of advance, from which to cross the Detroit river,
occupy Windsor, Sandwich, Amherstburg, north shore of Lake Erie,
and, at Windsor, the Great Western railway of Canada, leading toward
Chatham and London. The other part of that Michigan division was to
cross to Sarnia, where the river, a mile wide, issues from Huron
lake; where the north-west branch of the Great Western, connecting
with the main line at London, has its terminus; and where the Grand
Trunk of Canada crosses the frontier, by steam ferry, to Michigan,
and by running fifty miles southerly reaches Detroit city.

All that western army, forming the grand left wing was to have been
supported by artillery.

Next there was to be the Cleveland column, 7,000 strong, occupying
an intermediate place between O’Neil’s column of 5,000 at Buffalo,
and the right of the western wing at Detroit. This, it seems, was to
have been an independent army corps to support the first invaders and
permanently occupy central positions in Upper Canada.

  “All the invaders from the west, having crossed the line, were to
  concentrate at Hamilton, London, Toronto and Kingston, where plenty
  of supplies and large depots of arms for the use of the British
  troops, could have been seized without any hard fighting, from the
  smallness of the forces occupying these places. Thus Canada would
  have been invaded from every available point.”—_Correspondent New
  York World._

  “The Fenian forces advancing from the different western lake
  cities, on Canada West, must necessarily as a measure of safety,
  have drawn all the best troops from Montreal, to cover the exposed
  points, such as London, Hamilton, Toronto, and Kingston. This
  movement of Sweeny’s would certainly have left Montreal uncovered
  to the attacks of Spears and Murphy, who were to co-operate in two
  different columns, marching on left and right of the Richelieu
  river on Montreal.” _The same._

  “The total number of men directly engaged in this Fenian movement
  to the front has been variously estimated, according to the
  feelings or prejudices of those making calculations. Enthusiastic
  Fenians assert that 50,000 to 75,000 men designed for operations
  against Canada were furnished transportation by agents of the
  Fenian directory at New York, and other large cities and by the
  circles of the Fenian Brotherhood throughout the United States,
  during the progress of the movement northward.” _The same._

  “On the other hand, Canadians whom I have conversed with, some
  of them holding high positions in the colonial government, have
  assured me that there were not more than 15,000 or 20,000 Fenians
  congregated at any one time along the frontier with hostile intent
  or purpose. However, from my observation and information, having
  a most favorable opportunity and facility for both, I can safely
  say that over 30,000 men have been forwarded by Fenian authorities
  from all points toward the frontier, and had the United States
  government shut its eyes to the hostile purpose of the movement,
  there can be no reasonable doubt whatever, but that at least fifty
  or sixty thousand hardy and earnest men, four-sixths of whom had
  been inured to war in the contending armies of the North and South
  during the late war, would have precipitated themselves on the
  Canadian people.” _The same._

The foregoing extracts and statements of Fenian plans are here placed
on permanent record for reference, but without admission or denial of
their accuracy.

On 29th of May intelligence from Nashville, Louisville, and
Cincinnati, in the States of Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio
respectively, reached Canada intimating that Fenians were in motion,
and that an extensive raid on Canada was contemplated. From Ohio
large shipments of arms had been ordered northward to Cleveland, on
the south shore of Lake Erie.

Large bodies of men arrived on the same day by railway and on being
questioned as to their destination said, “to California, to the
railroad.” Most of them moved eastward on foot and entered the cars
outside the city, on the railway to Buffalo.

  May 30. A telegram from Buffalo brought intelligence to Canada in
  these terms: “The Fenians from Cleveland arrived here this morning.
  Several fights occurred on the train, and out of three hundred and
  forty-two that started, quite a number were left by the way, badly
  hurt. One at Ashtobula will die. They left the train a mile outside
  Buffalo, separated, and are now scattered through the worst places
  in the city, and are very disorderly. Two are in gaol for shooting
  at a policeman who attempted to arrest them for misconduct. There
  is no possibility of any organized movement to-night, the entire
  police force is on duty. Some think the movement a blind to cover
  an attempt elsewhere.”

  “LATER. About two hundred more Fenians reached the city at 10
  o’clock, and left the train as the others did—some distance out
  of the city. They have just marched into town. A meeting is now
  being held in Townsend Hall, the Fenian head-quarters. The men are
  boarded at various Irish boarding houses. There is only a force
  of fifty regulars at Fort Porter here. Warning has been given,
  however, to the commander of the revenue steamer _Michigan_.”

It was reported that the _Michigan_ had been about to leave Buffalo
several days before on a cruise, but on rumours of an intended Fenian
gathering at Buffalo reaching the United States authorities the
commander had orders to remain. It was the presence of this vessel
which now prevented the Fenians going at once to Port Colborne,
terminus of the Welland canal twenty miles from Buffalo; at least
this has been stated.

During that day, Wednesday May 30, several rumours, not at any time
probable gained currency; of which one was that trains had been
arrested on the Great Western Railway, at Niagara Suspension Bridge.
By whom, or for what purpose, did not in reasonable form appear. But
with an aptitude to accept any reports of offensive operations having
been commenced against the Province, the public mind of Canada, was
equally ready to accept assurances given through the newspapers that
the Executive power of Canada, civil and military, was actively alert
and equal to meet the impending emergency.

A telegram from Philadelphia dated May 31, gave information that a
company of three hundred and fifty men had left that city to join the
Fenian invaders at the northern frontier.

A telegram from Ottawa, seat of Canadian government dated May 31st,
conveyed intelligence that all was tranquil there. In Toronto,
Hamilton, London, Kingston, Montreal, and Quebec, where regular
troops were stationed and at Sarnia, Windsor, and Sandwich which were
guarded by Volunteers, the forces were quietly ordered to be on the
alert.

COLONEL JOHN O’NEIL, of Nashville Tennessee, who was now at Buffalo
and was on 31st of May, about to invade Canada, has been thus
described in New York journals. “He is a young and ardent Fenian, and
is now in his twenty-fifth year. He was formerly connected with the
Sixteenth regiment of regulars, and served in that organization under
Gen. Sweeny. He was well known as a dashing cavalry officer in the
late war, when he was attached to a Western regiment. He was promoted
to a captaincy for gallantry in a severe engagement.”

A newspaper writer who conversed with O’Neil at Buffalo reported as
follows:

  “He is not a graduate of West Point, as has been stated, but
  enlisted as a private in the 2nd U. S. dragoons in 1857, and went
  to Utah. He was subsequently transferred to the 1st dragoons, went
  to California and served until the breaking out of the rebellion.
  He entered the Union ranks and served in the Army of the Potomac
  until McClellan was driven back. After the seven days’ fight the
  regiment to which he belonged was broken up. The officers went
  to Indianapolis on recruiting service, and he was commissioned
  in the 5th Indiana cavalry. He served in Kentucky until after
  Morgan’s raid, and had a severe fight with that famous guerilla at
  Buffington Island, and though the force with which O’Neil opposed
  the rebel was greatly inferior in numbers, compelled him to
  retreat.

  “Colonel O’Neil continued in the service until severe wounds forced
  him to leave it. He further says that the report of his having been
  in the rebel service is wholly untrue. That he was a Union man from
  the first—that he never fought against the Union, and that he never
  could be induced to do so.

  “In reply to a question as to what truth there was in the report
  that he had killed a man unfairly in a duel, he stated that he had
  never fought a duel in his life; that he condemned ‘the code’ as
  against his religion, was opposed to it in _toto_, and would never
  fight a duel under any circumstances.

  “We give these statements as given us by Colonel O’Neil himself,
  and while expressing no doubt of their truth, are not, of course
  prepared to vouch for their authenticity.”

By different persons who saw him at Fort Erie and Lime Ridge, he is
described as about five feet seven or eight inches high, of slim,
active figure, with light colored hair, blue or grey eyes, ruddy face
somewhat freckled; speaking with a soft voice and courteous manner.



CHAPTER II.

  _From 3.30 a. m. 1st of June 1866 to 11 a. m. Canada invaded. Lower
  Ferry. Engineer of International Bridge. He is asked for “chunk”
  and “sugar.” Mrs. Kempson parleys. Dr. Kempson made prisoner.
  Village Council ordered to find breakfast for one thousand Fenians.
  Axes and spades in request. Telegraph posts cut down. Boat escaping
  on the river. The Hotels. Bar-rooms. Landlords serving liquors with
  revolvers at their heads. Carrying sacks of flour with bayonets in
  their rear. Baking, cooking for one thousand Fenians. They eat,
  drink, sleep. Are aroused for the line of march._


During the night of 31st May, the Fenian bands left Buffalo city,
travelling by different outlets; but meeting on Niagara Street and
Black Rock Road, they halted at Black Rock Ferry about five miles
below, and north of Buffalo city; there they embarked in scows,
which, with a steam tug, lay in readiness to receive and tow them
over to the Canada shore, distance about one thousand yards. They
landed at the wharf called Lower Ferry, and marched westward towards
the village of Waterloo. This is a place containing about seven
hundred and fifty inhabitants. By persons living at a distance it
is called Fort Erie from an old fort of historical name situated
two miles south-west on the shore of Lake Erie, and nearly opposite
to Buffalo city, where the outflowing volume of Niagara is three
miles wide. But to the inhabitants of the surrounding country the
village is only known by name of “The Ferry.” The river at this point
has contracted to a width of eight hundred yards, and the traffic
across is conveyed by a steamer which plies every half hour. On the
American side there is first an embankment separating Buffalo mill
race from the main river. On this embankment are several flour mills,
lofty and wide, the most southerly of the group now marked with
Fenian bullets which, on the afternoon of June 2nd, were directed
against the steam tug Robb, a vessel from Dunnville, which gallantly
stemmed the current with about sixty Fenian prisoners on board,
below decks, on passage to Port Colborne, twenty miles westward.
The mill race is spanned by a swing bridge, after which is the Erie
and New York canal, which extends along the foot of the Buffalo and
Black Rock heights, which there rise seventy or eighty feet. On the
Canada shore is a corresponding range of heights, but more rounded
and covered with verdure, and with a level margin between them and
Niagara river, the level varying from three hundred to fifty yards
wide. On this plain lies scattered on three quarters of a mile of
river front the village of Waterloo. It has three small churches,
a school house, which was, for a short while on June 2nd, a prison
for Fenians, before these were taken on board the steamer Robb; and
some hotels, stores, and a few goodly dwelling houses embowered in
orchards, in maple and poplar groves, one of which, occupying a
prominent position, became the prison of certain officers and men of
the Welland Artillery, who, with a portion of the Dunnville Naval
Brigade, had become captives to the Fenians, after placing Fenian
prisoners on board their vessel. This, as will hereafter appear, was
not the result of their own mistakes, but of a turn in the fortunes
of war, which with many other adverse complexities characterized the
different parts of the military drama of the 2nd of June.

A Buffalo journal related how the Fenians obtained transports, thus:
“On Wednesday or Thursday previous to the raid, some persons waited
on Capt. Kingman, of this city, and engaged two tugs and four canal
boats to carry the employees of Pratt’s Iron Works, at the lower
Black Rock, on a pleasure trip to Falconwood. The price of the
trip was arranged for, the money paid and the boats dropped down to
their position on Thursday afternoon. The Fenians seized upon these
transports to invade the ‘sacred soil’ of Canada. The boats, after
use, were quietly returned to the American shore; the owners being
nothing out of pocket thereby.”

On the night of invasion there was a brilliant moon three days past
full. Sunrise was twenty-five minutes past four. The first gleams of
daybreak appeared in the north-east as the invaders landed in Canada
at Lower Ferry, township of Bertie, county of Welland. At this place
there is a shingle factory, a boat-house, a tavern, the residence
of a customs officer, and one or two frame dwellings. It is about
two miles below and north of Waterloo village. The invaders took
possession and left an armed guard on those houses. The main body
then moved hurriedly up the Niagara shore road towards the village.

Near to a bend in the Canada shore, named Bertie Point, half a mile
south of Lower Ferry is the residence of Mr. Molesworth engineer
of the International railway bridge, which was to have been built
this year, but is not yet begun, the delay being caused partly
through financial difficulties, in Britain, and partly through
Fenian disturbances on this frontier. The river between Bertie Point
and Squaw Island on New York shore, where it will terminate in
conjunction with the Atlantic and Great Western Railway is eighteen
hundred feet wide, greatest depth forty-one feet. There will be a
carriage and foot-way as well as railroad track, and it is expected
when the bridge is completed, citizens of Buffalo will erect dwelling
houses on the Canada side. The hotels and boarding houses of Waterloo
were frequented by persons from Buffalo before the Fenian alarm.

A detachment of invaders broke off from the main body in passing
Mr. Molesworth’s house, a brick villa with white columns supporting
a verandah and standing among a thicket of trees, twenty or thirty
yards from the road. They knocked loudly with the butt end of their
rifles. Mr. Molesworth, his wife and family of young children were
asleep. He looked upon the intruders from an upper window and asked
what was wanted. They ordered him down to open the door, else they
would break it in. He again asked who they were and what was wanted?
The reply was that they were the Fenian army landed to liberate
Canada; they wanted chunk; they wanted sugar. Mr. Molesworth not
being acquainted with slang did not know that chunk and sugar meant
money. He asked if they wanted bread. Their reply was “yes; bread,
chunk, sugar.” He went down stairs, collected all the bread and
cheese the house contained, carried it up, and lowered it out of the
window. Still they cried for chunk and sugar. Presently officers
with drawn swords and revolvers in hand drove that portion of the
mob away ordering them to fall into their places on the road. Mr.
Molesworth felt relieved by their absence, but was much puzzled to
think what such a crew could want with sugar. Either these returned
or others came and once more there was the cry, “chunk! sugar!” “I
have given all the bread, everything eatable in the house,” responded
the engineer. “We want money,” rejoined one of the marauders. But
fortunately for that defenceless household, Fenian officers again
called away, or forced off these men.

As they approached Waterloo village, the shore road on which they
marched, crossed the railway track of the Erie and Niagara line, a
track not yet regularly working. A single telegraph wire was on the
posts skirting this line; but on the river side road by which they
had come, were the International telegraph wires. Near to Lower
Ferry, these are bound around a post and carried under water from
shore to shore. When the invaders had reached the Erie and Niagara
track, they passed a church on their right hand, standing within its
small cemetery among trees, on a descending section of the heights
before mentioned which here approach the river. At fifty yards
further south they passed the mouth of a ravine which separates the
church bluff from one on which, within an orchard and a grove of tall
poplars, stands prominently out the residence of Dr. Kempson, reeve
of the village. That house was the first point to which the Fenian
commander O’Neil conducted his force. He ascended a steep carriage
way at a right angle from the river road and railway track, about
two hundred yards, entered the enclosure, placed sentries around the
house, stable and barn, and along the garden and orchard, his main
body being halted outside the garden fence and in an enclosed pasture
field adjoining. At a short distance north from this residence on the
same bluff and within the same orchard, was another house which was
also surrounded by Fenian pickets.

It was now daylight. The range of rounded green knolls, extending
three quarters of a mile southerly and west from this section, on
which the second skirmish of next day was fought, and on which Royal
Artillery, Infantry regulars, and Volunteers were subsequently
encamped, reflected back the first beams of the sun; that sun of
the 1st of June, which brought the light of offended Heaven to bear
witness against an army of strangers whose presence there was a crime
against international law, against innocent Canada, which had done
them no offence, against civilization, against the liberty and safety
of a free people, which America should be ever foremost to vindicate;
against the declared authority of the bishops and priests of the
Roman Catholic Church, to which nearly all the Fenian brotherhood
professed to be attached. By the scheme of invasion of Sweeny and
Roberts attacks had been designed for this or the preceding morning,
at eight or more places along a frontier line of fifteen hundred
miles. By confusion in the councils of the Fenian brotherhood, by
want of confidence in one another, by failure of transport to men and
munitions of war; by a sense of justice or of discreet policy newly
manifested in the executive government of the United States, the hand
of Omnipotence was on that occasion discernible on the side of right,
and of comparative innocence, against crime and unqualified wrong.

O’Neil, the chief of the invaders, has been described. He wore gray
clothes with some badge of green around a military cap. He ascended
the steps to Dr. Kempson’s front door, rapped, and demanded that the
Doctor should come out to speak with him. Mrs. Kempson descended to
the door instead of her husband. She is an intelligent lady seemingly
about twenty-five years of age, and mother of several young children,
who were then in the house. Colonel O’Neil quickly announced himself,
again demanded to see the lady’s husband, in his capacity of reeve
of the village of Waterloo; and intimated that if he did not come at
once force would be used. Mrs. Kempson inquired what they intended
to do? “To do? what do you mean?” “To us—what are you going to do to
us?” “We have come to hold possession of Canada; you are all, for the
present, my prisoners.” “Do you intend to kill us?” “No; not if you
be quiet and do as I require.” “What do you want with us?” “First
of all, where are your axes and spades, I must have them instantly;
and your husband must at once surrender himself to my orders!” The
lady intimated that the tools asked for were in the barn or in
the woodshed. Whereupon O’Neil ordered some men to find them, and
proceed to the railway track and the road in front of the church, cut
down the telegraph posts, sever the wires, lift the rails, and dig
trenches across the track; all of which was speedily done. While Mrs.
Kempson still guarded her doorway, O’Neil said, “Do you suppose my
men will kill you?” She expressed fear that they would. “They will
not hurt you” he replied; “but you must bring Dr. Kempson here at
once.” The Doctor came. O’Neil ordered him out to the road in front
of the garden wicket, placed an armed guard in front and in rear
of him, and said, “Dr. Kempson, you are chief magistrate of this
village, I require you to assemble the principal inhabitants and,
without delay, provide breakfast and other rations for one thousand
men. You march along with me. A picket of officers and men will keep
guard on your house; your wife will give them and also those in the
field such provisions as she may now have.” About fifty men occupied
the garden and searched the lower rooms and cellar. Mrs. Kempson gave
the bread, meat, wine and brandy which the house contained, and with
her servants baked more bread, fried ham, made tea and coffee in
pailfuls, which were carried out to the field beyond the garden gate,
where between one and two hundred men lay on the grass, besides the
fifty who crowded into the house. They in the field were prevented by
sentries from entering at the garden gate.

After the occupation of the reeve’s house, the next incident of
sensation in the village was the discharge of Fenian shots at a small
boat which had crept out from the Canada shore, containing two men,
one of whom was pulling his oars frantically towards middle stream,
the other lying down in the boat. The oarsman was Mr. Leslie the
postmaster, his passenger, Mr. Kerby, a clothier; Fenian bullets
whizzing past their ears, and loud shouts of “come back”, compelled
their return. Like others they were taken prisoners, but liberated on
parole.

As the reeve advanced up the street, half a mile south of his own
house, Mr. Forsyth, a justice of peace and member of the corporation,
Mr. Douglas another member of corporation, Mr. Graham, collector
of customs and two or three more principal men emerged from cover,
and answered O’Neil’s summons to surrender themselves prisoners.
They also were paroled, and commanded to furnish breakfast for one
thousand men on pain of having their houses forcibly entered and
possibly burned. The words “one thousand men,” were frequently used
by O’Neil on that morning. Next day, June 2nd, when he made his
head-quarters in the house and on the farm of Henry F. Angur at
Limestone Ridge, before the fight began, he spoke of his force being
fourteen hundred. After much inquiry I have not been able to trace
the retreat of the latter number of men across Niagara river, though
it is ascertained that many escaped across from Saturday to Sunday
June 2nd and 3rd, besides those intercepted by the U. S. steamer
_Michigan_. By the excess of rifles and ammunition brought from
Buffalo beyond what O’Neil’s force required, and which were destroyed
previous to the Lime-ridge conflict, it is probable that Canadian
Fenians were expected to fall into the invading ranks. But whether
they were to have partaken of the breakfast for “one thousand men,”
or if that was the actual numerical strength brought from Buffalo,
investigation has failed to determine.

Some of the inhabitants were too poor to contribute to the Fenian
breakfast. The operations in the principal hotel, were of this kind:
The three lower sitting rooms were filled by men, who awaited their
turn to pass into the bar-room. Sentries with loaded revolvers stood
in front of the bar; the landlord stood behind it filling his liquors
as long as bottles and jars held out. When these were drained he was
escorted to his cellar by other guards with revolvers loaded and
capped and assisted by willing “helps” to carry his liquid stock to
the floor above. When all was drained, his cellar and bar empty,
he was thoroughly cursed for not having more liquor on hand; and,
at point of bayonet, driven to make haste and “help get breakfast
ready.” All the butcher’s meat and cured hams in the hotel were cut
up and cooked; coffee was made in pails and tubs and carried to a
rising ground west of the village, on which O’Neil and his officers
had posted the main body of their force. All the bread was soon
consumed, and the flour in the hotel had been made into more bread
and that eaten up. The landlord having drained off his liquors and
given his eatables to his voracious visitors thought to rest himself,
as he could do no more. The click of revolvers seconded the command
to go and purchase. His faint reminder that he had drawn no money
wherewith to purchase additional supplies, was stopped by curses,
by pointed bayonets, and the language of menace which informed him
that he had credit at the stores. Thither he went under a dancing,
rollicking escort, and was ordered not to look miserable, but to be
happy, to laugh and join in the hilarious joy now that, “degraded
Canada was liberated, and from that day was a free country!” He
shouldered a sack of flour; and, pricked with bayonets, trotted
under his burden, laughing as best he could; assuring the liberators
of Canada, that he was happy to see them; happy to see that day;
overcome with joy in fact; oh, yes! very happy! hoorah for the Irish
Republic!

“You may as well not publish names,” said one of the villagers who
with me listened to this recital; “when Colonel Peacocke and the army
leaves here, some of those Buffalo men may come over and give us a
licking.”

During the plunder of the bar-room and cellar, the landlady, a
delicate young person, and servants, with Fenian “helps” were
cooking, baking, and boiling. Next day, during the absence of the
Fenians at Limestone Ridge, this landlord, like most other residents
on the Canada shore got the females of the family removed to the
American side for safety.

Other contributories to Friday morning’s breakfast were treated and
employed similarly to the hotel keeper, though not all. Wherever
O’Neil was, his men were moderate, merciful, obedient.

When the invaders had filled themselves, and drank all the liquor in
the village they still demanded more. One hundred and fifty or two
hundred continued about that hotel, singing, and dancing, several
hours. At last O’Neil and other officers with drawn swords came,
supported by armed pickets and drove them away, using such reproaches
as, “you blackguards! do you think we brought you to Canada to get
drunk, and make sport? you came here to fight. The army of red-coats
will soon be on you! are you in a state to meet the red-coats? For
shame! soldiers of the Fenian brotherhood! shame!” And the officers
drove out the plunderers before them.

A man named Canty, who had been suspected of Fenianism disclosed
himself now. He girded on a sword and boldly informed his neighbours
that he was a B, or Major, in the “army of liberation.” Canty was
owner of a house and lot in the village, of which government agents
soon took possession. He was said to have absconded from the States,
two years before, with the money of his creditors, and purchased this
property. He absconded from Canada quite as hurriedly after the fight
at Limestone Ridge, on the reported advance of Colonel Peacocke’s
force. His house was said to be a depository of entrenching tools. It
was said that arms and ammunition had been concealed there, but after
the man’s flight none were found. Some village names were freely
and unfavourably mentioned to me by a person in authority, who was
making an official report to the government at Ottawa through Colonel
Peacocke; but, in conversation, I found that the Fenian invasion had
less to do with the gentleman’s ideas than the discomfiture which he
had suffered at a recent village election. That gentleman’s narrative
of the movements of the steamer Robb, of the Welland Artillery, and
of the manner of capturing Fenian prisoners, as also of the number of
prisoners captured was at variance with facts otherwise ascertained
and unquestionably certified. He might intend to do government a
good service, but his memory seemed not reliable, nor his mind
sufficiently free of a petty political distemper. The Ottawa
authorities should receive with caution any magisterial statement he
may have forwarded reflecting on the loyalty of his neighbours.

A detachment of Fenians, some hundreds strong, but precisely how
strong, I could not ascertain, proceeded to the Buffalo and Lake
Huron Railway depot, a mile south-west of the village. A man named
William Duggan, employed as a track-man on that line, was committed
for trial to Welland prison, on June 21st, accused of having
conducted the marauders to the depot offices and aided them with
crowbars to open lock-fast doors.



CHAPTER III.

  _Dinner ordered for a “thousand,” and provisions run out. Fenian
  army asleep; what, when it should awake? Pickets, sentries and
  passes. Reverend Fenian, Lumsden from “Auld Reekie.” Dimensions
  of Welland Canal. Rideau Canal. St. Lawrence Canals. American
  vessels with-held from Welland Canal. They re-appear after two
  weeks. Horses captured. How bridles were made. New use of telegraph
  wires. Milking the cows at Frenchman’s Creek. O’Neil’s pass. Fenian
  sentry. Sergeant of the picket._

The village corporation of three at Waterloo, and the less timid of
seven hundred and fifty inhabitants, breathed more freely at nine a.
m. than they had done any minute since daybreak. The “breakfast for
one thousand men” had been amply furnished, and heartily eaten. The
armed multitude, fierce and hungry before, were now filled, and lay
stretched in sleep on the green slopes, or under the trees, or kept
watch by the river side, or as railway pickets. But noon was fast
approaching. The thousand men would be hungry again. The corporation
were ordered to prepare dinner. Where was it to come from? Then
supper would be required, and lodgings for the ensuing night. The
food of the village was already eaten up. It was a fearful prospect,
the awakening of that multitude, now lying drowsily in the fields, in
the orchards, in the woods, in the barns, on the door steps in the
passages, on the sofas, or carpeted floors of private dwellings. But
it was no part of O’Neil’s policy to remain inactive in that village,
risking an attack, without having accomplished something more than
levying breakfast for his forces.

They were roused from sleep, collected and admonished that the time
had arrived to march into the interior. O’Neil’s object was, first,
to gain possession of the Welland canal and two railways at Port
Colborne, situated seventeen miles west from where he then was,
and besides, to strike at the aqueduct which feeds the canal, and
the swing bridge which carries the Welland railway over it at Port
Robinson. He left guards upon the Fort Erie terminus of the Grand
Trunk auxiliary, the Buffalo and Lake Huron railway, a mile south of
the village, besides cutting the telegraph wires on that line, as he
had done on Erie and Niagara track, to prevent intelligence of his
movements going west by way of Port Colborne. He also left pickets in
the woods and at the junction of different roads, and at the ferries
on the Niagara river. The inhabitants were only permitted to move
from their houses to any given point by obtaining written passes from
Fenian officers. One who wrote passes during that day signed his name
L. F. Lumsden. On being recognized by a farmer as a Scotchman and
asked where he came from in Scotland, Lumsden replied, “Auld Reekie,”
a familiar term for Edinburgh; and added that he was an Episcopal
clergyman, as his dress in some measure indicated. This person was
one of the prisoners captured next day, taken by the steamer Robb to
Port Colborne, then to Brantford jail, subsequently to Toronto. After
being prisoner he dropped the name Lumsden, written on the passes
which he was pleased to grant, and called himself Farfarden.

The importance of the Welland canal and the railway running near its
side, in the scheme of Fenian strategy lay in this: that the canal
connects the navigation of Erie and Ontario lakes. Erie is united
by Detroit river, Lake St. Clair and River St. Clair, in the west,
with Lakes Huron, Michigan and Superior, besides several smaller
aggregations of navigable water and tributary streams equal to
one-half the fresh water on the globe. Ontario, after interchange of
commerce with Erie by way of the Welland canal, which obviates the
torrents and falls of Niagara, gives birth to the River St. Lawrence,
the rapids on which, occurring occasionally over a space of ninety
miles, are overcome by a series of magnificent works, known as St.
Lawrence canals. Near to Montreal this river of the life of Canada
receives a tributary hardly inferior to itself, the romantic floods
of northern forests, brown-tinged Ottawa.

The Welland Canal is 30 miles long. It has 27 locks, surmounting a
rise of 350 feet; is 564 feet above sea level at Lake Erie, and
about one thousand miles from the sea, by way of Montreal, Quebec
and Gulf of St. Lawrence. The locks admit vessels 142 feet long by
26 feet beam and 10 feet draught. On the several sections of rapids
between Prescott and Montreal the St. Lawrence Canals admit vessels
184 feet long, 44½ feet beam, and nine feet draught. But all craft
passing from Montreal, the head of ocean navigation, nearly 600 miles
from the sea, are limited to the size of the Welland locks.

The Rideau canal, to connect the eastern outflow of Lake Ontario, at
Kingston, at the head of the St. Lawrence, with the River Ottawa,
and the navigation from Montreal, at a point where stands the city
of Ottawa, overcomes 293 feet of rise, and is 126½ miles long. The
locks are 134 by 33 feet, and 60 inches deep, on the sill. This with
some minor sections of canal on the River Ottawa, was intended to
serve a strategical purpose in the defences of Canada. It was begun
in 1826, and finished so far as for a steamer to pass through, in
1832. Its cost, $3,860,000, was defrayed by the Imperial Government.
It is frequently out of repair, and is not now available for the main
object of its construction. The St. Lawrence Canals and the Grand
Trunk Railway running parallel with them, are available for defensive
purposes, yet so openly exposed to hostile incursions, if such should
ever threaten them, as to be elements of strategical weakness as well
as lines of transport for conveyance of troops and munitions of war.
But in the interests of peace they are works of unspeakable benefit
to Canada, as also to the western United States.

For eight or ten days previous to the day of the Fenian invasion,
June 1st, 1866, American vessels had nearly all disappeared from the
Welland canal, the ship-owners, merchants, forwarders and insurers of
Chicago and Milwaukee, the great commercial ports on Lake Michigan;
and of Detroit. Cleveland and other places in the west, declined
to charter vessels or risk freights on passage through the Welland
canal. They knew that its capture and obstruction formed one of
the earliest acts intended against Canada in the scheme of Fenian
invasion. Except an occasional empty vessel, bound up, none bearing a
United States flag passed through the Welland locks, until two weeks
after O’Neil returned to the American side of the Niagara river.
The steamers of the Northern Transportation Company, plying between
Cleveland on Lake Erie, and Rochester, and Oswego on Lake Ontario,
continued to run.

It was not without delay and difficulty that O’Neil and his officers
collected their forces, extended as these were from old Fort Erie
on the lake shore, and from that north by the station of Buffalo
and Lake Huron branch of the Grand Trunk Railway through Waterloo
Village to the Lower Ferry where they had first landed at daybreak,
in all five miles; and from farm-houses several miles inland, where
already desultory bands had penetrated in search of horses and other
plunder. The other plunder consisted of sheep, turkeys, fowls and
such provisions as hams, crocks of butter, cheeses, sacks of flour
and pigs. The live animals intended for food were shot, and slung
over the backs of horses. Frequently two men, and occasionally three
bestrode one horse. These animals having been in most instances
captured in pasture fields, and such bridles and saddles as the
owners possessed having been removed in their hurried flight to
escape the perils of Fenian imprisonment, the marauding horsemen
contrived a new kind of bridles from a material not before used for
that purpose. They had cut telegraph poles to prevent transmission of
intelligence, they now made bridles for the horses, and strung their
plunder together with the wires. As they assembled at the camping
grounds on Frenchman’s creek, three miles north of the village,
half a mile north of Lower Ferry where they had first landed, the
duplicate and triplicate riders went in with their plunder, the
mouths of the horses bleeding; and some animals which, a few hours
before had been proudly defiant, and too bold in spirit to submit
tamely to such loads as oppressed them, were reduced to obedience
by bayonet wounds which crippled one or both of the hind quarters.
A trotting mare of beautiful form and high reputation, was ridden
into the field of bivouac at the creek, hobbling painfully on three
legs, two Fenians shouting and cursing in wild hilarity seated on
her back, one with his feet to the left, the other with his feet to
the right side, bundles of fowls, turkeys and other plunder on their
shoulders, and a wild warrior on foot, who, a few minutes before had
been a third rider, but had fallen off, inflicting bayonet wounds on
the bleeding flanks of the groaning beast, one of whose hind quarters
was pierced by a bayonet through and through. Farmers who had been
compelled to surrender their horses and who were then prisoners stood
witnesses to these scenes of spoliation and of cruelty.

But I feel bound to suggest that such cases must have been
exceptional. If these western Fenians were experienced cavalry men,
as said to have been, they would know the worth of horses too well to
abuse them. It had been part of the tactics of O’Neil to mount his
entire force on horses, provided he had met, in Canada, the friendly
contingents which he expected but did not meet. Yet still there was
wanton spoliation. Farmers saw their sheep shot in the yards, and out
on the pastures. The family of Mr. Thomas Newbigging, whose house
stands on the south side of Frenchman’s creek, and about forty yards
from Niagara shore, and on whose hay field and orchard, on the north
bank of the creek, O’Neil and his main force planted themselves about
eleven o’clock a. m. 1st of June, saw their cows driven into the yard
from a distant pasture, and two or three Fenian warriors around each
cow struggling to have the first privilege of milking. The restive
cows were subdued as the horses were, by hobbling them with telegraph
wires. When the beasts had been teased and milked all the afternoon
and evening, with nothing to eat for the night, and men were heard
talking of killing one or more to roast on some of the many fires
which they had made of fence rails in the orchard field, one of the
sons of Mr. Newbigging asked Colonel O’Neil to give him permission
and a pass to the lines of sentries to drive the cows to the pasture
field. The answer was, “certainly, tell every man who questions, that
it is Colonel O’Neil’s order that none of your cows shall be injured
or molested.” The young man drove the beasts forth. At a gate four
hundred yards in the rear of the house, a sentry demanded to know who
he was, and where he was going with those cattle? The name of Colonel
O’Neil was given, but the sentry responded by bringing his rifle and
bayonet to the charge, and swearing that he would stick the bayonet
through him for the cursed lie, that he was not taking the cattle
to pasture but attempting to escape with them into the wood; and if
he dared go one step farther his “mouth would be filled with a live
bullet.” The sergeant of the picket came and inquired what was the
matter. On being told he called other men to come and assist to make
a gap in the fence and put the cows in the field. When this was done,
he, assisting to replace the rails, and at the same time charging the
men of the picket to see that the cows were not injured, turned to
Mr. Newbigging and said, “This occupation of your premises and farm
by us is, no doubt, very disagreeable, but we have stringent orders
from Colonel O’Neil to injure no one who quietly submits, nor destroy
property, nor to appropriate anything beyond what is required for
subsistence.” That sergeant and his picket being left behind, when
the Fenian main body marched at midnight of Friday June 1st, were
made prisoners next day; but some escaped across the river early on
the morning of Saturday.



CHAPTER IV.

  _Midnight in Fort Erie village. Kerby and Rutherford’s store
  plundered by Buffalo thieves. O’Neil’s letter denouncing theft.
  Young ladies seek safety on the American side. Newbigging’s farm.
  Half a hundred horses collected. Stockdale’s farm plundered of
  provisions. Mr. Penny, and Mrs. McCarty, robbed of money. Fenian
  positions and defences at Frenchman’s creek. Fenian sentry shot by
  his picket. Rifle bullet screens, how made by Fenians. Bridge set
  on fire. O’Neil marches at midnight June 1st. Eighteen thousand
  cartridges afterwards found in the creek. Also rifles and bayonets.
  A night of sensations. “Worst looking blackguard of the whole was a
  Scotchman.” Bivouac at Krafft’s farm. March at daylight, June 2nd.
  Limestone rocks and house on Ridgeway road. Fenian head-quarters.
  O’Neil’s conversation with Henry Angur. Stoneman’s three little
  Boys, they ran to the woods._


It was about 11 a. m. on June 1st, that the Fenian main body were
aroused from slumber, in Waterloo village, and marched to northward,
three miles down Niagara shore road. Their absence relieved the
anxieties of the village corporation as to getting another mess for
one thousand men. But unhappily, a residue, not of military Fenians,
but of Buffalo, and other American city thieves was left. They had
followed the invaders to pursue their professional vocation.

One was a woman. She sought to win confidence, and thereby attain to
friendly familiarity with native Canadians, by weeping for a husband,
who “without intending it, had come from Buffalo with the Fenians,
not knowing what he did, with a drop too much to drink;” that he and
many more were about to desert and return to the American side.

Her assumed sorrow hardly deceived any one; and not at all, after a
Fenian officer came upon her at a house and ordered her off to the
other side on pain of being thrown into the river. He said; “We have
been followed by thieves, who are no part of our force, and this
woman is one of the worst: watch her.”

In the village, near the hour of midnight, the military body of the
Fenians being then at Frenchman’s creek, three miles north, the
landlord of the Forsyth House, was, with his wife, at an open window
inside of the verandah, anxiously observing parties of men who were
seen, by the moonlight to come across Niagara river, land at unusual
places of wharfage and go prowling about the village. Some he saw
come to the store of Kerby and Rutherford clothiers and general
dealers, next door to his house. It was shut, Mr. Rutherford only
being within, and as he afterwards stated, asleep. The men outside
broke open the door with billets of cordwood. Mr. Rutherford, when
aroused by the noise confronted them. He was seized and thrown on his
back across the counter, revolvers pointed to his head, and sternly
admonished to remain quiet. Some cases of champagne had been left
there for sale by a St. Catharines merchant. The plunderers quickly
discovered that part of the stock, and drank freely. A young man who
keeps a grocery store lower down the village was passing. He entered,
calling, “Rutherford, what is the matter?” One of the thieves struck
him with a champagne bottle across the face, cutting him frightfully,
and exclaiming, “That’s what’s the matter!” The grocer ran out
calling “help!” and “murder!” He was overtaken at the hotel door and
again struck. He ran across the street and attempted to get into a
house there. But no one dared open a door. He was followed by one who
threw him down, and with threats of shooting him dead, ordered him to
be quiet. The young man pleaded for life and said he would be quiet.
Then he ran south along the railway track, and obtained entrance to
a house at the south end of the village, where the bleeding gashes
in his face were dressed. The robber returned to his comrades, who
deliberately carried out bales of cloth, ready-made clothing and
other goods, and loaded their boats with which they departed across
the river. American customs officers were on watch and seized the
goods. The plunderers returned to the Canada shore. Two of them were
afterwards found among Fenian prisoners and identified. They are said
to have been known as thieves in the city of Hamilton.

On the subject of plunder the following letter, published in a
Buffalo daily paper, shows the terms in which Colonel O’Neil
disclaimed and denounced theft and thieves. It was dated June 5th,
1866, on board the U. S. steamer _Michigan_:

  “To the Editor,—You will please make known through the news columns
  of your paper, that I have in my possession a gold mourning ring,
  engraved with the following inscriptions: on the outside in black
  ground the words, ‘in memory of,’ on the inside ‘Lucretia Wrigly,
  ob’t 6th Feb., 1829, Act 6,’ and under that, ‘Mary Wrigly, ob’t
  6th Feb., 1830, Act 45,’ besides some other rather indistinct
  characters, that the claimant will have to describe. Also a lady’s
  gold pencil and mounted gold eye-glass, with chain attached made of
  fine beads. These articles were found on the person of one of the
  men in the scow; and I wish to say, to the credit of the men, that
  loud and earnest threats of lynching the fellow were made, such was
  the indignation at an act calculated to throw discredit on all,
  and so contrary to discipline and the wishes of our body. And I
  wish to say farther that were it not for our present circumstances
  and relations, such an act would, as it ever will be by me and
  my associate officers, have been punished with all the rigor of
  army discipline. You will oblige us all by the publication of this
  communication, both to set us right, and that the property may be
  restored to its owner.

                                “(Signed)       JOHN O’NEIL, Colonel.”

When the Fenians arrived at Newbigging’s farm on Frenchman’s creek
about noon June 1st, two sons of the family had just returned from
hurriedly taking their sister and other young ladies to a place of
safety on the American side. O’Neil was then mounted on the cream
colored charger which had been “borrowed” from Mr. James Stivens of
the Ferry, and which he next day rode in the combat at Limestone
Ridge. This horse was returned to its owner on Sunday the 3rd,
considerably jaded.

The Fenian chief alighted at the garden wicket, which opens from the
road skirting Niagara river, walked up to the house, where he was
met at the door by Mrs. Newbigging. This family came from Greenock,
in Scotland some years ago. The Fenian courteously introduced
himself, was sorry to cause alarm; assured the lady that although
the premises, on this side the creek and fields beyond were occupied
by an armed force, no harm would be done, if every one in the house
remained quiet. He had a sick gentlemen whom it was necessary to put
to bed. Soldiers would be placed in the house to attend him, and
protect the family. None else would be permitted within doors. O’Neil
and officers, some of them, not all, had meals in the house; and the
sick person had warm drinks, all of which were prepared by Fenian
hands; Mrs. Newbigging’s offers of assistance being declined. All
remained quiet within doors, but there was uproar outside. Between
forty and fifty horses were collected and brought to the premises
before sunset, upon all of which men wildly mirthful and grotesque in
dress and manners galloped and curvetted about, along the river side
road and over the farm fields. An American reporter said a hundred
horses. Three of Mr. Newbigging’s best were taken. One of brown color
with white hind feet answered the description of a charger shot
under its rider in the combat of next day, and which he supposed was
his; but the three were returned on Sunday, June 3rd, not seriously
injured though much distressed. One of his waggons and a set of
harness were found in the woods a wreck. Several of his sheep were
killed, and at the hurried midnight departure thrown into the creek.

At Mr. Stockdale’s house next farm north, thirteen cured hams,
several crocks of butter and sacks of flour were taken. That
provision had been made for hay and harvest workers. Nine or ten
of the hams rudely slashed with sword cuts, and sacks of flour
were afterwards found in the creek. An old Englishman named Penny,
residing alone, was visited; his money was demanded. He gave a
dollar, all he had. They threatened, he says, to bake him on the
stove if he did not disclose where more money was concealed, but
beyond frightening the poor man, the plunderers only seem to have
taken the dollar. Mrs. McCarty living further down the river side
road, said they tore up her carpets, broke open a bureau and took
twelve dollars in money. Many fowls, turkeys and geese were taken.
Their remains, with feathers, still strewed the bivouac field when I
was there, 19th to 22nd June.

Frenchman’s creek is a deep sluggish stream, sixty to eighty feet
wide, with marshy banks. Its dull water, seemingly motionless mingles
with the clear swift current of the great Niagara, which is here
about a mile wide to Strawberry Island opposite. At the mouth of the
creek, close on the river shore, is a bridge of timber. Newbigging’s
house and farmyard are a hundred yards south of the creek. An apple
orchard, willow and poplar trees skirt it on the north side. A field
of grass lies beyond the orchard and north of that, other fields
which gave a clear rifle range of from five to eight hundred yards,
down the river side, and inland over clear stretches of from eight
hundred yards to a mile. At these distances from the river were
forest thickets, only a few trees intervening on the open pastures.
Here O’Neil, apprehensive that Colonel Peacocke, or other British
commander would bring up a force by Niagara river side, constructed
screens of fence rails across the pasture field, and in the orchard,
from east to west to command the approach from north. The creek
bended on his left flank and round upon his rear to Niagara river
which flanked his right. The position was comparatively strong
except as against artillery. Beyond the creek westward, twelve
hundred yards to forest thickets, and southerly from Newbigging’s
house, pickets were thrown out, and sentries posted: these last all
round and back in the woods. And mounted scouts, furnished from
the locality and from Buffalo, penetrated to the interior of the
country. The creek so frequently mentioned, with a devious course
comes through marshy meadows from south-west. On each side are
gently elevated grounds, well cultivated, and long settled called
the Ridges. A road runs diagonally through the farm lots and squared
township roads from a point two miles below, and north of Frenchman’s
creek, following the bends of a ridge to the south-west ending on
Lake Erie, nine or ten miles west of Waterloo village. This road
follows the Limestone Ridge, and is therefore termed Ridge Way.

From the careful dispositions of his force, and the half circle of
outlying pickets, with sentries along the roads in all directions,
O’Neil evinced apprehension of being attacked there. One of the
sentries posted in the thicket, fourteen hundred yards west of the
bivouac field was shot during the night by another Fenian sentry
who had mistaken him for a Canadian. His comrades stripped him of
clothing except a flannel. Next day when some farmers who went to
bury the body, were tracing the course the bullet had taken, through
right arm, right side, to the heart, a pocket containing $112 in
greenbacks, was discovered. A custom house officer took charge of
the money. The Fenian picket of which this man was a sentinel were
then prisoners, and among them the sergeant before spoken of. They
said their comrade had been shot “accidentally,” they not choosing,
perhaps, to admit that the bullet which killed him had been intended
for a subject of Her Majesty the Queen. The farmers wished the
coroner to hold an inquest, but he declined. The deceased man had a
cross suspended on his breast, and the figure of one with initials
marked on his left arm. He is buried on the edge of the wood where
the body was found.

The split rails of oak, averaging about six inches thick, so well
known as “snake fences” in Canada, “Virginia rails” on the other
side, about fifteen feet long, which are piled in a zigzag form,
alternately overlying each other at the end, and rising to a height
of five, six, or seven feet, were carried from the sides of the
Niagara river road, and from other fields, and piled as rifle bullet
screens. These extended at intervals across the pasturage in front of
Newbigging’s orchard from the river on the right, to the westerly
bend in the creek, distance four or five hundred yards. The screens
were formed thus:

A rail was cut in three pieces; the ends sharpened, and driven
into the ground in form like x. Two of these x’s supported a rail
horizontally set at a height of about three feet. From that two or
more rails slanted downward to the ground, from the position in
which sharpshooters were to be screened. Then a lower roof of rails
was laid longitudinally and horizontally on these, beginning on the
ground, rising to the higher level. Then an upper roof was laid by
pieces placed transversely to the former, and as closely together as
they would lie. This roof sloped from three feet high to the ground
at an angle of about thirty degrees, or less. It was intended that
rifle bullets, hitting it from the direction in which the opposing
force might come, would glance off over the heads of sharpshooters
ensconced behind. Some of these screens were four feet high in
rear, others only two, generally they were elevated three feet. The
different sections of screens were regulated by the length of rails,
and were not placed continuously end to end, but were advanced, like
detached columns twelve or twenty yards before others, and much
scattered. Probably this was done in expectation that, if artillery
fired upon them, all would not be knocked down at once.

A way of escape was intended under cover of the orchard, within which
screens were also placed at intervals, to the bridge over the creek,
close to Niagara shore. The creek is there about seventy feet wide;
the bridge eighty feet long. Piles of fence rails split to be readily
combustible, were laid on the bridge to be set on fire, should the
attack be from north and the Fenians have to retreat behind the
Newbigging farm premises and south by the way on which they had
advanced. The destruction of that bridge, and the rifle shooting
which for a time might have been practised from the farm house and
barns, to give the main body of Fenians time to escape to their scows
and steam tug at Lower Ferry where they first landed, three quarters
of a mile south and round a bend out of sight of their present
position, would have probably delayed an advancing force for a time.
That is, had such force come by the river-side road and that only.
But there were inland roads by which, as O’Neil knew the British
could approach from the direction of the Great Western railway at
Niagara Suspension bridge and from Chippewa. There was also a line
of rails, the Erie and Niagara track which though not regularly open
for traffic, had been recently repaired to be opened; and G. W. R.
trains, it was supposed could pass up the track to Waterloo village.
Information having reached the Fenian colonel at Frenchman’s creek,
sometime between 10 p. m. and midnight, June 1st, that Colonel
Peacocke of Her Majesty’s army, with a force of Royal Artillery,
regular, Infantry and Canada Volunteers, had reached Chippewa, a
village three miles south of Niagara Falls, and about four miles
south of Suspension Bridge, fifteen miles north of his bivouac on
Frenchman’s creek, he decided to leave his position and march into
the interior of the country.

To gain the Welland canal and railway at Port Colborne was now, as
it had from the first been the Fenian object. O’Neil either expected
additional forces unarmed from the American side, or to have had
unarmed Fenians joining him in Canada, most probably the latter. For
at the creek were collected spare arms and ammunition. This was in
boxes of one thousand cartridges each; ten packages of one hundred,
to a box; ten smaller parcels of ten to each package, and twelve
percussion caps with each parcel of ten. Eighteen of the boxes had
been fished up from the bottom of the creek, close by the bridge
previous to 20th of June, containing 18,000 cartridges. Possibly more
had been sunk elsewhere. The boxes had been punctured by bayonets to
admit water to destroy the powder. Each box bore a date, “1865,” and
the name of a United States arsenal, most of them that of “Bridport.”
The arms, rifles and bayonets, were piled on a fire kindled on centre
of the timber bridge, to be destroyed with that structure. They had
been sunk in the creek. Ninety rifles were taken out and accounted
for before 20th of June. How many more were found or still remained
in the water, was uncertain. Rifles had also been broken by striking
the butts against trees. The bark of apple and cherry trees, poplars
and willows along the creek, indicated where the rifle stocks had
been broken; and stock, lock, and barrel thrown into the water.
Remnants of barrels and locks were also found in the ashes of the
numerous cooking fires which had been used along the orchard and
pasture field.

The Fenian Chief’s object in burning the bridge, on his removal
north, from Frenchman’s creek at midnight of June 1st, was to prevent
pursuit in his rear, in the event of a British force having reached
Waterloo village (commonly called Fort Erie) by an inland road. To
cover his movement he left his outlying pickets on their posts,
southerly and west of the creek and Newbigging’s house. Some men
of these pickets escaped across Niagara, when at daylight, June
2nd, they discovered that the main body had left; others remained,
refusing to believe that any British force was approaching. Certain
of the farmers, acting with Mr. Murray a customs officer, took them
prisoners, as also other stragglers, and during the forenoon, of
June 2nd, delivered them to a party of the Welland Artillery, who
placed them on board the steamer Robb. They formed part of a batch of
sixty-five prisoners taken to Brantford jail, afterwards to Toronto.

The Newbigging family passed a night of keen sensations. They did
not know that O’Neil and his force had left, having been ordered,
when he and officers took supper at 11 p. m., in their house, to stay
strictly within doors. They dreaded that, if the Fenians remained
until the expected advance of British troops in the morning, they
would, on retreating burn the premises; or, if giving battle, that
the creek, bridge, dwelling-house and barns would be the central
theatre of fiery conflict, or, if the British did not come soon, that
their cows, sheep, everything consumable would be taken for Fenian
food, and the premises perhaps, burned at last.

The “worst looking blackguard of the whole” according to the judgment
of the lady of the house, was a small sized Scotchman, who had been
pugilistically engaged and had then a disfigured face. He was asked
what induced him to be a Fenian? and replied that he had been a
soldier, in the American army, was discharged, wanted something to
do, and so joined the army of General Sweeny.

A youthful volunteer of the 13th left wounded on the field of
Limestone Ridge next day, relates that he narrowly escaped murder
after being a prisoner, and was saved by intervention of a Fenian
Scotchman. If that was the same person he had a good side as well as
a bad and an ill-favored face.

After leaving Frenchman’s creek the invaders marched five miles
north, to the town lines of Bertie and Willoughby; then west to Lot
16, 8th concession of Bertie, the property of Louis Krafft. There
they bivouacked till daylight; having as at the Newbigging farm,
erected bullet screens of rails, posted pickets and made a show of
entrenching and defending a position on Black creek.

At sunrise they marched south, and struck the road called Ridgeway,
and then south-west on that road until they reached the property of
Henry F. Angur, Lot 4. 10th concession of Bertie. About a hundred
yards distant from the road, skirting it on the south, the limestone
rock has a vertical face, the farm fields above the precipice sloping
upward and south two or three hundred yards to a pine thicket; the
country to north of the road being nearly level, and stretching half
a mile to the skirts of a thicket of maple and oak where also is a
marsh and a stream, which is a feeder of Black creek. Henry Angur’s
house is on the wayside, not many yards from the vertical rocks.
There, O’Neil halted to reconnoitre, and, as events came out made
his head-quarters during the combat which derives its name from that
locality. It was now 5 a. m. June 2nd.

On the previous day messengers came along this road and warned the
inhabitants that the Fenians were to march that way to Port Colborne
and to Port Robinson to capture the Welland canal. The farmers,
whose houses are nearly all on the wayside, if their land touch it,
removed their families and the best of their horses and cattle that
day. Henry Angur, aged 73, afflicted with gout and moving only on
crutches chose to remain. He is an intelligent veteran from the war
of 1812, and the rebellion of 1837-38. He said his family wanted him
to go in the waggon, but, “he had been in two wars and would risk
a third.” O’Neil had been well informed of the inhabitants lining
in that district, of the horses they possessed, with the number and
names of their sons. On entering this house he looked the old man in
the face and said: “Your name is Henry Angur?” “Yes, sir, Henry F.
Angur; what may your name be, if you please?” “My name is O’Neil. I
am chief in command of fourteen hundred men, (Mr. Angur feels sure he
gave that number), now in possession of your premises, your farm and
country from the ferry to Ridgeway; where are your sons?” “I have no
sons at home, sir,” “No sons at home? nonsense! where is Jim?” “Well,
sir, I don’t know where Jim have gone.” “When did you last see him?”
“Last see him? well sir, Jim went yesterday to the mill with a grist,
and I suppose he heard ill news and so have not come home.” “What ill
news do you think he heard?” “The same as we heard here, I suppose.”
“What was that?” “It was that the Fenians had landed, and to begin
with had killed Dr. Kempson of the Ferry.” “But Dr. Kempson is not
killed, nor injured, don’t you know that no harm has happened him or
any one else, from us?” “I have heard since that he was not killed;
but what, sir, are you going to do with us?” “Tell me first Mr.
Angur, have you any Johnny Bulls around here?” “Johnny Bulls, sir?
I don’t exactly comprehend.” “Yes, you comprehend quite well; have
you seen any red-coats here about? any of Queen Victoria’s soldiers?
or of Canadian Volunteers? any armed men? any cavalry? artillery?
infantry?” “No, sir, I have not; I have not indeed, sir.” “Very well,
that will do for the present. Captain” (to an officer of the staff)
“you and a guard remain in charge of this house and this old man.
Make every person prisoner you find.” O’Neil, after that conversation
proceeded in the direction of the railway station at Ridgeway, but
did not go farther, it is supposed, than about Hoffman’s tavern, the
“Smuggler’s Home,” a mile in advance of Henry Angur’s house and about
two miles short of the station.

A nephew of the old man, a youth of sixteen remained beside his horse
in sight of the conflict in the woods 800 yards north of the road.
Another young man lay concealed in the roof of a barn. He said he
counted over twelve hundred Fenians pass the barn. All else had left
the previous day. At the farm house of Mr. Stoneman, half way between
Henry Angur’s and J. N. Angur’s (that name being German is pronounced
Anker) I spoke to three small boys a few days after the fight, the
hottest of which had been in their orchard, and in fields adjoining.
They were aged about eleven, nine, and seven. “Where were you little
boys, the time of the battle?” “Back in the woods, over yonder.”
(pointing north). “How far?” “Back ever so far—six mile” “Did you go
soon in the morning?” “No, day before.” “How did you know the day
before that Fenians were coming this way?” “A man came along from the
Ferry, telling all around here to clear.” “Did you carry provisions
with you?” “Some, not much.” “Where did you stay all Friday night?”
“Slept in the woods?” “Were you frightened?” “Yes, I think so; you’d
have been frightened too.” “You have fancy pigeons in that cage;
did you take them to the woods?” “No, they hung just there all the
time.” “And the Fenians did not take them?” “They took fowls, and
then throwed fowls away; pigeons were no use to them, but they were
near being shot; you can see where bullets went through boards of
the house—up there, and here, and there again, and the trees in the
orchard are scored all over with bullets.”

Up to this point the narrative has followed the track of the Fenians.
Let us now turn to the prompt mustering of forces, the patriotic, the
impassioned attitude of defiance, the gallant rush to the frontier,
to repulse from Canadian soil, this unrighteous army of intruders,
who by no law recognized on earth or in heaven was justified in its
invasion of Canada.



CHAPTER VI.

  _Words of warning in 1862, and 1863, from Colonel Lysons,
  Quarter-master General of Her Majesty’s Forces in Canada. Olden
  signals of War. The alarm on June 1st, 1866. The quick response.
  Give us arms, lead on. Conflicting telegrams on 1st of June. The
  cry is still they come. Sons of Canada, come home to fight for
  mothers and mother land. Americans at Oil Springs enrol for defence
  of Canada. Home Guards organized. The cry is still they come.
  Volunteers for the field. How are they equipped? The Queen’s Own.
  Tenth Royals. York and Caledonia Rifles. Hamilton Field Battery.
  Welland Field Battery. Hamilton Thirteenth. All defective in
  equipments. “Authorities” in a lethargy. Enemy “thundering at the
  door.” Courage of the people. Little else ready._


  “It will be too late to speak of organizing and equipping your
  Militia when the enemy is thundering at your doors” [Valedictory
  letter of Lieut.-Colonel Lysons, C. B. Royal Artillery, to the
  people of Canada, 1862, on his leaving the Province after an effort
  rendered fruitless through Canadian parliamentary factions to
  organize and equip a Provincial Defensive force.]

  “What the Province is doing is worse than nothing, as yet.
  Her Majesty’s Government have furnished arms for an effective
  Provincial Militia, and what do we see? The arms after six months
  are still lying in boxes kicking about at railway depots, rusting
  and going to destruction. No armories provided.” [Extract of a
  letter from Lieut.-Colonel Lysons, C. B. Royal Artillery, after
  returning to Canada as Acting Quarter-master General of H. M.
  Forces, June 1863, addressed to Alexander Somerville, then Editor
  of the CANADIAN ILLUSTRATED NEWS, writer of CANADA A BATTLE GROUND,
  published May, 1862].

An enemy within the frontier line! Canada trodden by the foot of
hostile forces vowing to be avenged on the peaceful, industrious
people of British America, for the grievances of Ireland,
accumulating through the long historic ranges of seven centuries.
The land we live in invaded. Whatever may be the incentives to war
growing out of the traditions of seven hundred years, there is no
questionable sentiment, within the living community which hears
the tread of the armed stranger within its borders. That is the
aggression of to-day.

What is the note of alarm? What is the signal? Who are the messengers
to carry along the lake and river shores a thousand miles east
and west, and north into the far interior, to citizens, artizans,
husbandmen, and lumbermen, the intelligence, “Stand to your arms,
an enemy is within the frontier; he has broken in on upper Niagara;
he threatens to come in on lake and river shore, and all along the
faintly defined line of Lower Canada!” Who is to carry this message,
and diffuse it, proclaim it, be eloquent to enforce it?

Electricity, secret, instant, is the messenger. But the matter of
the message itself is electric, even when carried by men on foot.
It thrills through body and soul, limb and life, of all the people;
youngest, oldest; citizens of all professions, rural husbandmen,
forest lumberers, lake and river raftsmen, sailors; sons and
daughters of every national parentage, dwelling in these Provinces.
No prompting of eloquence, no invocation of patriotism is needed.
The enemy armed and hostile, supposed to be in league with some
among ourselves; how many none can tell; some among ourselves but
not very many. That possibility of an enemy in our own city, or
street, or house, inspires to prompt action. In all ages of mankind,
among all races, in all lands, the alarm of—“the enemy within your
borders!” was diffused by the agency of light and fire and sound;
and messengers swift of foot. Read Jeremiah, chapter VI. verse I.
“O ye children of Benjamin, blow the trumpet in Takoa and set up a
_sign of fire_ in Beth-haccerem!” Read the extract from an act of the
Scottish parliament of the year 1455, C. 48, and find, that Scotland
fought the invaders in the day of their evil visitation, not waiting
for Scottish posterity to be avenged on English posterity, and other
inoffensive posterities, in another land, living in fellowship under
a system of happiest liberty, four thousand miles away, seven, or
five, or three, or one hundred years after the evil occurrences.
It was directed that one bale fire of faggots on crag, or hill, or
mountain summit, should be warning of the approach of the “English
in any manner.” That two bale-fires of faggots should be the alarm
that, “the English are _coming indeed_.” That four bale-fires should
be decisive intelligence that, “the English are within the borders in
great force.”

Indians in America, Kaffres, Hottentots and Bosjesmens in Africa,
light their war-fires, some adding on elevated ground signs of an
extended hand with club, two extended hands with clubs, a blanket,
a skin, or several skins; in the whole a species of telegraphing
which was not much improved until the semaphore was invented in
France in 1794, introduced to England about the same time, by which
intelligence was carried long distances and secretly, by signs,
numerals, and letters.

The oldest Fenian tradition, a dim glimmer of uncertain light seen
through a tunnel more than two thousand years long, by way of
ancient Greece, and Phoenecia, leads the idea to war-fires lighted
in Ireland to warn the owners of the soil, cultivators and herdsmen,
of those remote centuries that Phoenician invaders were within the
Irish coasts. Other dim lights shew the Fenian descendants of Irish
Phoenicians burning war-fires of alarm to announce the approach of
Danes, Normans, and Norman English, as the Scotch did. The feudal
system oppressed and paralyzed the industrial arm of Scotland,
Ireland, England, France and all Europe. But it was indeed grievous
in Ireland.

      “Man’s inhumanity to man—
        Makes countless thousand’s mourn.”

The Fenians were, in Ireland conquerors of the land from an older
proprietory. The colonists of Massachusetts, and of the American
Atlantic coast invoked in 1757-58-59, the aid of their mother
country, Great Britain, to capture the castle of Louisburg on
Cape Breton, Quebec in Canada, Fort du Quesne, now Pittsburg in
Pennsylvania, to repress or expel the French in North America, for
the sake of the ocean fisheries and the fur trade. Thus it was that
English, Irish, and Scottish colonists, came to occupy the Provinces,
now claimed by Fenians and by such of the Americans as sympathize
with Fenianism on the ground that Britain was not justified in
subduing the French to gratify the colonies of New England, New York,
New Jersey, Virginia and the Carolinas, in 1757, 1758, 1759. Contrary
to the prayer of Massachusetts and the conjoint colonies, Great
Britain did not seek to expel the French from Canada, nor to suppress
their language by legal enactment, as the United States subsequently
did in Louisiana and region of the Mississippi; but gave the French
co-equal rights political and religious with English, Irish, Scotch
and German or any other colonizing race in British America.

And thus it was, that enjoying equal rights, laws, and privileges,
with a freedom of speech and of publication, as generous and
universal, as summer sunshine and fertilizing rain, the people of
Canada, French, British, Irish,—all, except perhaps some thinly
scattered adherents of delusion led away from better judgment under
the fascination of secrecy and hope of future adventures—leapt to
their arms, demanding to be led to the frontier, demanding to be
armed and placed under responsible leadership.

And not alone these, but native Americans now resident in Canada who
under other influences might think annexation of the two countries
desirable. At Oil Springs, township of Enniskillen, Lambton County,
Canada West, situated twenty miles from Sarnia, a strong Volunteer
Company was enrolled in a few hours to aid in repelling the invaders
of which a third were Pennsylvania oilmen and other Americans. Mr.
Read a lawyer; Mr. Robert Mathison printer and editor, both graduates
of the Canada military schools, were chosen captain and lieutenant.
Mr. Perry, a merchant, was ensign. On remote tributaries of the
Upper Ottawa, lumbermen, raftsmen, heard the news through the fleet
hurrying of messengers and faster paddling of canoes, and thronged
down the streams to the river and upon the river to the cities of
Ottawa and Montreal, offering their services, their lives—gifts to
the Province. Sons of Canada resident in the United States left
employment and social ties, and hastened to their own land to defend
it, to assert that British America will remain British. A goodly
number of these came from Chicago to Toronto, five hundred miles.
Many more would have quickly followed if wanted.

Who is she, that elderly woman on the railway platform, looking
eagerly to the cars, into the circles of friends, crowding around
the men as they alight? She is looking if her son has come. “Yes!”
she exclaims, embracing the youth, loyal to his mother, loyal to his
native land, “I knew you would come to fight for Canada and for me.”

At Hamilton the Mayor issued this proclamation: “I hereby request
all able bodied men who are willing to turn out in defence of their
country to meet this evening at 7 o’clock in their respective wards
for the purpose of enrollment and forming a Home Guard.” They met,
they enrolled, they formed the Home Guard; were armed and for some
months exercised in the use of rifles and bayonets, and nightly
perambulated the city in squads. These were merchants, store
keepers, artizans, professional men, clerks. In other cities, towns,
villages similar associations were formed. At Toronto, said the
newspapers; “Without exaggeration we may say we have never seen the
city so intensely moved as it was last night (June 1.) when the news
indicated a probable battle on the line of the Niagara river. The
streets were crowded with thousands of men and women eager to obtain
the latest scrap of intelligence from the front and every extra was
perused with feverish anxiety. It is to be hoped to-day’s news will
relieve the deep suspense which may be said to have rested on the
city last night.”

All reports were not true, but they occupied official time; and
complicated military plans. The following reached Toronto by way of
Buffalo. “It has been reported that Port Sarnia and Windsor have been
captured by the Fenians. It is also reported that they have taken
possession of the Welland canal.” [Not true]. Buffalo, 12 o’clock
noon, June 1. “The Fenians at Fort Erie have opened a recruiting
office, and are now enrolling volunteers. They have seized the
Newbigging Farm and made it their head-quarters. When opposition is
offered by people of the town, the Fenians at once set fire to their
houses.” (Not wholly true.)

That was from the American side. The following came from St.
Catharines a town on Welland canal, Welland railway and Great
Western, in Canada, twelve miles inland from Niagara bridge. “A
portion of four companies from Grimsby and Beamsville arrived here
this morning at eight o’clock. Col. Currie is in temporary command.
Forty or fifty more will arrive in a few hours.” “Col. McGiverin has
procured one thousand stand of arms, to be sent from Hamilton, to arm
the citizens, and also ammunition. The home guard under Col. McDonald
is called out. There is no ammunition for the Spencer rifles.”

The following dated Buffalo June 1, 1.30 p. m. was circulated
in Toronto and all Canada in the afternoon. Exaggeration in the
estimates of Fenian numbers had not then been corrected by better
information. Military plans of defence were formed on the highest
estimate, not the lowest.

  “I have just returned from Lower Black Rock, 4 or 5 miles from the
  city, and had a view of the Fenians encamped on the opposite bank;
  some say to the number of 2000 or 3000. A tug boat carried over
  a large number, and cheers for the new arrivals were distinctly
  heard on this side. The ferry-boat is now stopped, but the Fenians
  appear to have full liberty to ply in tug boats as often as they
  please. A man on a white horse appeared to be very active, he
  being distinctly seen on the bank of the river riding amongst
  his men. About half past six the host of the Fenian army proper
  went over in canal boats and took with them twenty wagon loads of
  munitions of war. They have sentinels posted for miles around their
  encampment, and are enjoying their favorite occupation of stealing
  all the horses in the locality. The stars and stripes float from a
  flag-pole at Erie, opposite Black Rock, but the general impression
  here is that if the Canadians have the least spark of that
  spirit they are supposed to possess, the Fenians will soon have
  to skedaddle. It is said that they intend going on to Chippewa
  forthwith. The steamer Michigan has steam up to prevent the Fenians
  coming back.

  “All kinds of rumors are afloat here—_one_ that Windsor has been
  burnt down. Another that a force was advancing from Albany. They
  had tickets for Rome, and probably were destined for the St.
  Lawrence region. They had no arms. The Fenian leaders in this city
  are very active and more men will leave to-night for the Canadian
  frontier.”

More news arrived from the States and flew on wings of a free
press through the Province. The people not dismayed one shade of
countenance, but on the contrary fired with newer, bolder energy
to muster, march, give battle and conquer. This was circulated at
Toronto, after noon. Cincinnati, June 1. The _Commercial’s_ Columbus,
Ohio, despatch says that 450,000 rounds of ammunition were shipped
from that place to New York, and 150,000 to Chicago, and 30,000
muskets to Buffalo, within a few days, which it is reported were
intended for the Fenians.

Also came information from Boston telling of Fenian forces forwarded
from there and in the same paragraphs of United States forces sent to
the frontier to intercept them. Canadians were ready to believe the
Fenian items true; slow to rest confidently on what U. S. authorities
would do; for, said same reports; “Fenians and U. S. regulars are
fraternising.” Boston June 1. “Two companies United States regulars
left Fort Warren this morning for St. Albans, under the command of
Col. Livingstone. An additional detachment of about 100 Fenians also
left, it is supposed for the Canada border. Fifteen hundred men is
the alleged Fenian quota of Massachusetts for the present enterprise.
The newly raised Fenian Cavalry regiment, under the command of Col.
Icartoi, late of Moseby’s guerillas, is a part of the expedition
from this city. The Fenians say that Gen. Fitzhugh Lee will command
the cavalry wing of their army of invasion. They further say that
the blow will be struck early next week probably on Monday.” And
again, BOSTON, June 1.—12, noon.—“In addition to the Fenian cavalry
regiment, the third Fenian Infantry, Col. Connor, 1,200 strong,
has left this city for the Canada border. Transportation for the
cavalry regiment was paid through to St. Albans by a citizen of
Boston. Detachments of United States troops from Forts Warren and
Independence, and also from Fort Preble, are under orders to leave
for the northern frontier.”

A despatch from Port Stanley [north shore of Lake Erie, terminus of
a railway from London C. W.,] said that forty schooner’s had been
in sight from one o’clock; their conduct very mysterious all the
morning. At London C. W., the volunteers were immediately ordered
under arms and preparations made in the garrison of Royal Artillery
and 60th Rifles of H. M. regular army, to move in any direction.
Colonel Hawley the commandant called in the detachment of the
60th from Komoka. The city council met to form a Home Guard. At
Port Hope and Cobourg, and all down the shore of Ontario lake the
organized volunteers mustered under arms. Intelligence arrived that
a suspicious steamer was moving on the mouth of Niagara river. At
Kingston the 14th battalion of militia, and the garrison of regulars
mustered; the militia on Garden island. At Ottawa, at Montreal
and throughout Lower Canada the same spirit of promptitude became
an instant thing of life, of action. Let the preceding items of
defensive preparation be multiplied by hundreds, with all the names
of towns, townships, cities, counties attached; and add that the
thoughts of the people had but one bent, defend the frontier, repel
the invader, pray to high Heaven, but remember that Heaven helps
those who help themselves.

And now stands out the question prominent above all thoughts of that
day—in the minds of some—What had the Canadian Government done to
equip the Volunteer Militia for this emergency?

At the beginning of this chapter two quotations are cited, which
though brief, afford a glimpse of what was the opinion of the
Quarter-Master General of H. M. forces as held by him in 1862 and
1863. After 1863, some change for the better was made in militia
organization. In all, about thirty thousand men had been enrolled,
armed, and less or more efficiently educated in military evolutions.
That portion of their equipment which is most conspicuous to the
eye—uniform and ornamental clothing—was perfect. Rifles, bayonets,
cross-belts and cartridge pouches, were also correct according to
army pattern. But equipments, equal in importance for the life and
efficiency of the soldier on active service, to his rifle, ball
cartridge, percussion cap, and bayonet, and greatly more important
to his life and efficiency than the make or material or color of
his clothing, were awanting, had not it seemed, by the event, been
thought of by persons called for want of a more distinct name, the
Authorities.

The political Authorities had given out from time to time, and up
to the day of invasion, when, as Colonel Lysons had said, the enemy
would be “thundering at their doors” that they were ready for any
emergency; but they were not ready. Not much was ready but the mercy
of heaven and the courage of the people.

The Volunteer Militia had been frequently inspected in Canada West by
Major-General Napier, Assistant Adjutant-General Durie, and by other
army officers. Their complimentary addresses, or at least newspaper
paragraphs purporting to be echoes of their addresses, led the public
to believe that the volunteers were organized, exercised, educated,
equipped for any emergency.

The Rifles of Toronto known as the “Queen’s Own,” were despatched
from that city on 1st of June, with a speech from General Napier
to the effect that they might be engaged with the enemy within
twelve hours, yet all save one company went without ammunition, and
without the equipments enumerated on another page as wanting by the
Thirteenth from Hamilton. The Tenth Royals from Toronto, were in like
manner deficient. Observe the result in the military fortunes of next
day. Referring to his bivouac at Chippewa, night and morning of 1st
and 2nd June, Colonel Peacocke, commanding on Niagara frontier, in
his official despatch, when relating the events of the 2nd, and 3rd
says, “_The Volunteers being unprovided with the means of carrying
provisions and of cooking them had not been able to comply with
an order I had sent the previous evening that they were to bring
provisions in their haversacks. I saw that the absolute necessity of
furnishing them with some would cause delay and I telegraphed to Port
Colborne that I should be one hour later in starting. We marched at
7, o’clock._” In the previous sentence he had named the Toronto “10th
Royals under Major Boxall,” 415 in numerical strength, and no doubt
referred to them, but the remark of having no haversacks to carry
provisions, no cooking apparatus, no provisions to be cooked, applied
to other volunteers besides the 10th Royals. That delay was more than
an hour. Had there been haversacks and provisions, the Queens Own,
Thirteenth, York and Caledonia men need not have been confronted
with the Fenians at Limestone Ridge alone. So small a matter as a
haversack to a volunteer, and a single atom of common sense to an
“Authority,” might have changed the history of that day.

The County of Lincoln sent forth a squadron of Cavalry, good men and
true, with faultless horses, but without Cavalry equipments. The
York and Caledonia rifles like the Toronto Queen’s Own went without
ammunition. The Hamilton Field Battery of artillery, comprised a
body of men equal to any that ever assumed the name of soldiers but
their harness was decayed, had been condemned over two years, and
government had not replaced it. It was unfit for field exercise.
The battery could not go to battle. And yet the local newspapers,
reporting Colonel Peacocke’s inspection of that battery on 8th
March, 1866, published to the Province that he had said, “The
Hamilton battery was in a state of highest efficiency, ready for any
emergency.” Had it been ready for service it might have been on the
field of Limestone Ridge on 2nd of June: and thus, again, the history
of that day might have read differently from what it does.—The
Welland Field battery was at Port Colborne on the morning of 1st of
June, and would have been on Limestone Ridge, but its officers and
men had no cannon. Their guns had been removed to Hamilton where
there was no harness. They embarked on the steamer Robb and went to
Fort Erie. There we shall meet them in due time, in combat with the
Fenians on the afternoon of 2nd of June.

If the volunteers engaged with the enemy on 2nd of June are brought
under the readers eye in this narrative more frequently than others
equally worthy of popular record, it is the circumstance of their
having been mortally engaged that brings them now prominently out for
comment. The soul of the old soldier when he looked upon the 13th,
mustering for frontier service on that morning, bounded with joy to
behold the olden youthfulness, buoyancy, and confidence of the race
reproduced in this newer country, newer generation. But, because he
was an old soldier and knew the exigencies of active war in a wooded
country his heart sunk within him at seeing those gallant youths go
forth carrying, in the negligence of governmental authorities their
death with them. Addressing the public immediately after the events
of the 2nd, the writer said: “I assert that had the 13th been exposed
day and night for one or two weeks in such work as that of June 2nd,
half would have perished of diseases induced by thirst, bad water, no
water, hunger, fatigue, and through exposure to marsh malaria without
overcoats.” The coats having been lost for want of, with each man, a
pair of straps to fasten them when folded on the back. They had no
pioneers, no spades, axes, nor other entrenching tools. The Fenians,
as was seen in chapter II. looked for spades and axes first thing on
touching Canada. They had not been taught how to fold their overcoats
so as to carry them on their backs without impeding the action of
loading, capping, aiming, and firing. From the American Bull Run of
1862, they had profited nothing in the matter of advancing upon an
enemy in a wooded country, carrying no water, no food, nothing but
bold confidence, which in war is something but not everything. For
want of their coats they mounted guards at night exposed to rain, to
swamp fogs, chills from the lake and the canal, wearing only their
red tunics and shirts, and all because they had not each a pair of
shoulder belts, to carry that first of a soldier’s life preservers,
the overcoat. Was no superior answerable for this neglect?

They were sent out without canteens to carry water when on the line
of march or on the battle-field. On the field of action and on the
retreat they drank from swampy ditches, lifting the water in their
shakos and caps and shoes; many were in consequence sick—their
intolerable thirst having been aggravated by the ambrosial breakfast
of a red-herring which the military genius of their commander,
administered to them at 4.30 a. m., preparatory to a long march
without water and the hazards of a battle.

It has since been ascertained that he had beef-steak for breakfast.
They had no knapsacks in which to carry changes of underclothing, or
the usual military necessaries. They had no mess tins in which to
divide food, and carry it when not all at once consumed. They had no
haversack to carry bread and small articles indispensable to personal
cleanliness and health, and not second to these, indispensable in
keeping the rifle in working order. They had not a wrench in the
battalion to unscrew locks, nor a worm screw, of which every man
should have one wherewith to draw charges from rifles. The nipples of
some were, after the action, plugged with dirt and could not be fired
off. There was no battalion armourer. They had no oil for springs,
or to protect burnished steel from rust. They had no portable camp
kettles, to cook food which should have been supplied by a Government
commissary. There were commissary agents who had no stores. The
Government were said to be ready for any emergency. The 1st and 2nd
of June proved that they had made no adequate preparation. And the
question remains for the time of present writing, month of August.
Has any better provision, or equipments for a campaign yet been made?

With all those wants the 13th carried with them their colors to the
woodlands. No commanders of practical experience permit colors to
be carried into forests, where the war from nature of the enemy and
contour of the country is likely to prove desultory. General Sir De
Lacy Evans, in Spain, than whom no soldier of riper and more varied
experience has lived in this century, never permitted his troops to
carry colors before the enemy in that country of woods, orchards,
rivers, and ravines.

I come now to the Toronto Volunteers, The “Queen’s Own” were thus
described in a local journal, the _Leader_. The first call to arms
referred to was when companies of Volunteers were sent to the
frontier to prevent raids into the United States by American refugee
rebels, or desperadoes calling themselves such, during the great, the
calamitous civil war. (See further on this subject, ensuing chapter.)

  The second call to arms of the volunteers has been responded to
  with even more enthusiasm than the first. The order for mustering
  the “Queen’s Own” only reached here late on the afternoon on
  Thursday, and at the appointed hour (four o’clock yesterday
  morning) over five hundred men assembled in the drill-shed ready
  to receive orders to proceed to the point where the Fenians were
  congregating. At that hour the fire bells rang out as a signal for
  the men to assemble, and in less than an hour the number we have
  mentioned were under arms. Under the command of Colonel Dennis,
  Brigade Major 5th military district, the men were marched from the
  drill-shed to the Yonge street wharf, where they were embarked
  on board the steamer City of Toronto, at half past six o’clock,
  for Port Dalhousie, where they were to take the Welland railway
  to Port Colborne. The men were in the highest spirits, and one
  and all expressed the hope that the Fenians who have been so long
  threatening would at length give the volunteers an opportunity
  of meeting them in open conflict. Notwithstanding the early hour
  at which the steamer left, the wharf was crowded with people who
  lustily cheered the brave fellows as they took their departure.
  About 120 men of the battalion had been left behind, some of whom
  had not been notified of the arrangements that had been made, and
  others who had not heard the alarm of the fire bells and had slept
  too long. The boat left half an hour earlier than was stated,
  and many of the men had reached the wharf just as the steamer
  was moving out. It was therefore deemed advisable that the men
  so left behind should assemble at drill about noon and be ready
  to proceed by special train to join their comrades. The men were
  punctually at their post, and after being inspected by Major Smith
  and their names called over, they were marched, under the command
  of Capt. Gardner, of the Highland company, to the Union Station,
  followed by an immense concourse of people. Nothing could exceed
  the delight which evidently filled the breast of every man of
  them. Upon arriving at the station it was ascertained that they
  were not to go by railway, but to take the City of Toronto upon
  her return from Port Dalhousie at two o’clock. They were then
  marched back to the drill-shed, and there awaited the hour of
  embarkment. When the order to again “fall in” had been given, they
  formed into two companies marched to the Yonge street wharf and
  immediately proceeded on board the steamer which was lying at the
  wharf ready to receive them. Besides the officer in command—Captain
  Gardner—they were accompanied by Lieut. Bevan, Lieut. Campbell,
  and Ensign Davis. At this juncture the crowd of people and the
  excitement among them, along the way between the drill-shed and
  the wharf, were tremendous. Previous to the volunteers going
  on board many were the warm greetings that they received from
  relatives and friends. Many a kind word of encouragement, and many
  a heartfelt wish for their success and their safe return were
  expressed. While bales of blankets and canvass for tents were being
  placed on board, the men were engaged in singing songs, and as
  the steamer was leaving her moorings, they were lustily cheered
  again and again by the crowds of people on the wharf and as warmly
  returned by the volunteers.

When the Queen’s Own arrived at Port Dalhousie, Mr. McGrath, manager
of the Welland railway, was there with a special train to convey them
to Port Colborne. “Gentlemen,” said he, to some of the officers,
“where is all that luggage going?” This consisted of trunks, hat
boxes, and usual accompaniments of railway travellers when on long
journeys. “We are going to Port Colborne,” one replied. “That
luggage,” rejoined the manager, “will require a van for itself;
what is the meaning of it for this military train?” “We expect to
remain in garrison at Port Colborne.” “Remain there! It is likely
you will be engaged with the Fenians before you pass Port Robinson,
or somewhere between that and Port Colborne.” To which the officer
commanding said, “Good God! you don’t say that?” Someone observed
that General Napier had told them at Toronto they might soon be
engaged with the enemy. “Did he?” said the commander, “if he thought
so, why are we sent from Toronto and landed here without ammunition?”

Mr. McGrath had reason to suppose that the enemy might attack
this train. He warned Colonel Dennis that it was hazardous to run
the train into Port Colborne without first sending skirmishers to
feel the way; the enemy might be in the woods on either side. This
suggestion went unheeded. The battalion was disembarked at the
platform, scattering at once through the village, along the canal,
over the bridges, no guard mounted, no pickets, no sentries posted;
but all easy victims to any military enemy, had such been there.

When Mr. McGrath was giving car room for conveyance of the unmilitary
luggage, he asked to be informed of the space to be filled with their
provisions. The reply was that, “no provisions had been brought,
sufficient would be found at Colborne.” “That,” he rejoined, “is a
poor place for provisions. It is but a small village; other volunteer
forces will be there; you should take stores from St. Catherines.”
That town was on the way, but there was no commissariat arrangements
for purchasing, or obtaining stores by requisition. No cooking
utensils to dress food. They came as destitute of field equipments
from Toronto, as the 13th did from Hamilton, and in the vital article
of ammunition worse; only one company of the Queen’s Own had ball
cartridges; they were thirty rounds each with No. 5 company for
repeating rifles, which as the event proved were expended in a very
brief time and to small purpose.

Brave young men, full of hope, full of confidence, they went to the
front without suspicion that any requisite for an active campaign had
been neglected.

Let us return to Toronto for the volunteer 10th Royals, and
detachments of regulars. Newspapers of next day reported that:

  The 10th Royals, in obedience to orders, mustered in the drill-shed
  at twelve o’clock, and after having been inspected by Major Boxall,
  who, in the absence of Lieut.-Col. Brunel, had assumed command of
  the battalion, were ordered to be in readiness to proceed to St.
  Catharines, by the Great Western railway, at four o’clock. Col.
  Brunel, who was in Montreal, was telegraphed for to return to this
  city immediately. At the appointed hour the 10th Royals assembled
  at the shed. The excitement about this time became intense. All
  kinds of rumors were afloat, some of which were that the volunteers
  who had left at early morn, and some of the 16th regiment, were in
  actual engagement with the Fenians, and had been repulsed. This
  story made the men of the 10th still more eager for the fray. After
  having been formed into companies and then four deep, the order to
  march was given, and the battalion proceeded to the Queen’s wharf,
  headed by their band. The whole consisting of eight companies,
  under the command of Major Boxall. They were met by about two
  hundred men of the 47th regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Villiers. Three
  companies of that gallant regiment, under command of Major Lodder,
  and the G battery of the Royal Artillery left at 12.40 o’clock by
  the Great Western railway for Port Colborne. The two companies of
  the forty-seventh and the tenth royals were marched to the cars,
  which were in waiting to convey them to St. Catharines. The bridge
  which spans the railway track at the Queen’s wharf and the hill
  tops which surround the Great Western railway workshops, were
  crowded with spectators. The greatest enthusiasm possible prevailed
  among the troops—the men of the 47th and 10th Royals singing with
  heart and voice, “Rule Britannia,” the “Red White and Blue,” and
  other loyal songs.

Reverting to the departure of regulars and volunteers from Hamilton
on 1st of June. On the previous day about 4 p. m. the 16th of H.
M. army, the head-quarters, right wing, at Hamilton under Colonel
George Peacocke, was kept within barracks. Intelligence had then
arrived from the General commanding in chief that a Fenian invasion
was expected. During the same day a sergeant of the volunteer 13th
went to the dwellings of the members warning them to assemble at
the drill-shed at 6 a. m. next morning. They came; most of them
without breakfast. They were told, says Lieut.-Col. Booker, to get
breakfast for they were going to meet the enemy and he did not know
when they would return. [Statement to Court of Inquiry]. Some went to
breakfast; others did not. A few, about one-fifth of the whole—the
parade state of that morning being 265 of all ranks, had haversacks.
They were chiefly men who had been on previous frontier service.
Therefore the need of their having that article had long been known
to the commanding officer. He also knew they were without knapsacks.
He addressed the battalion in the drill-shed, when about to march,
in these terms: “Men of the Thirteenth, you are once more called out
for duty. You will now, as you did before, _follow me_. You have no
knapsacks, but I can promise that if you do not behave yourselves
before the enemy as soldiers should do, you will get plenty of
‘knapsack drill’.” [_Written statement laid before me by men of the
13th, who offered to attest it_]. There was nothing contrary to
good military rule in these words. But in memory of the fact that a
portion of the battalion had been five months on frontier service at
Windsor not under his command, but under an officer from another city
equally vigilant if less pretentious, and had not one defaulter all
the time, the taunt of knapsack drill, that is, punishment drill,
was not then in the line of discretion. The words _follow me_, were
afterwards remembered. This address on the morning of June 1, is
noted here, however, principally to show that Colonel Booker, for
several years Militia Commandant of the city as well as Lieut.-Col.
of the 13th, was familiar with the deficiency of field equipments.

This battalion, small in numbers, several men and officers having
been then absent from the city who afterwards overtook it on the
frontier, marched to the railway depot accompanied by many citizens
who heartily prayed for blessings on it. The Great Western cars were
ready. The train left at 10 a. m. going west to Paris, a two hours
journey; then on the Buffalo and Lake Huron track to travel eastward
to Port Colborne.

H. M. 16th, (right wing) went on board a train about 12 noon,
but remained at the depot two hours, many citizens crowded on
the platform. Again, the spirits of old soldiers who had known
campaigns in earnest, and who now looked on, were depressed to see
infantry—nothing yet but infantry, bound for the front. These were
not going without all necessary equipments, as the volunteer militia
had gone, but they were without canteens to carry water. Those
articles, indispensable to men on a campaign, had been reserved in
some army store, not at Hamilton. Thus in addition to the delay
caused at Chippewa, on the morrow, to give the 10th Royals breakfast,
they having come from Toronto without provisions, without haversacks,
“contrary to my orders” (_Colonel Peacocke’s report_,) the 16th
regulars marched without water canteens; “the day was very hot.”
(_same report._) And the men of the regulars, like the volunteers
were thirsty, exhausted, and did not reach the vicinity of the enemy
so soon by some hours as otherwise they might.

But strangest want of all; though there is in the Province a
Quarter-master General’s Department, whose special business is, with
other things special, to provide commanding officers with maps of
the country, and though county maps abounded in the Canada common
schools, and Normal School at Toronto, Colonel Peacocke, in command
of the forces in the Niagara District went out without a map showing
the roads upon which he would have to move the troops. He had a small
chart of the Niagara peninsula, but it did not show the Welland
roads. This want of a good map from which to question his advisers;
with want of breakfast for 10th Royals, want of water canteens for
both regulars and volunteers, delayed the advance of the main force
from Chippewa. Colonel Booker had no map of any kind, nor paper of
his own on which to write a message, which want became an event next
day.

But O’Neil in command of the Fenians had a map of the roads. And also
writing paper for his messages.

The narrative and narrator were at the Hamilton depot a minute ago.
The absence of such a common-place element in field equipment as the
best map which the Province could afford the commanders not then
known; yet the apparent absence of artillery, causing a tremulous
apprehension that the volunteers who had gone hours before, and the
regular infantry now on board to go, were to be exposed to the hazard
of——

No; not this branch of the army of the front. Here came the Royal
Artillery from Toronto; the Armstrong guns on platform cars; horses
in vans; men guarding guns, sentries guarding horses; detachment of
47th regulars. Hurrah! Loud was the shouting on the Hamilton depot
platform. Cheerful the military responses.

The time was 2.30 p. m. June 1st. The Toronto train with two engines
went ahead. Hamilton train followed. After a delay at St. Catherines
the two trains reached Suspension Bridge, Niagara river, about 6 p. m.

Another view of this large subject, public safety of Canada, lies in
the pathway of this narrative which cannot be here avoided. Let us
look it in the face.



CHAPTER VIII.

  _American newspapers had a “grim satisfaction” at seeing Canada
  “scared.” Assertion that Canadians, as a people, during the
  American civil war sympathised warmly with the legitimate
  government and loyal citizens of the United States. Extracts from
  “Canada a Battle Ground,” published 1862. And, “Where is Canada
  Drifting?” 1863._


Though this chapter may seem to interrupt the story of Canadian
operations of defence, its matter forms an integral part of the
larger field of circumstances which gave character to those
operations. The Fenian invasion only became possible by sufferance of
American popular opinion; and that was widely, deeply distempered, as
regarded the British American Provinces and Great Britain, A full,
true account of the Fenian invasion, cannot be given without the
writer adverting to that distemper, speaking, as he believes he is
about to do, for five-sixths of the whole people of Canada, and for
the true national opinion of the British Islands.

The two following paragraphs are from a journal of New York called
the _Citizen_. The first purports to be the conclusion of a statement
made by an officer of the United States army.

  “The mistake of the Fenians was, that they allowed too much talking
  and writing about their contemplated movements. They should have
  collected all their men and material along the frontier—their
  equipments were plentiful and good—without allowing one word to
  leak out of what they were doing. This, taught by experience,
  they promise to do next Fall; and if so their success cannot be
  doubtful.”

The next is the comment of the Editor of the _Citizen_, who is styled
General Halpine, reprinted in Canadian papers, August 3rd, 1866, with
the italics as given here.

  “The foregoing remarks we commend to the attention of all American
  citizens who are not enamored with the course of England and Canada
  toward the United States during the late rebellion. Here was an
  opportunity to have avenged the wrongs of the British pirate
  vessels without costing the American Government one dollar. Here
  the Canadians might have been allowed to realize the scoundrelism
  of their conduct in sheltering the raiders of St. Albans, and the
  yellow fever and assassination conspirators. What Mr. Seward may
  think about it, we do not know; but _are well satisfied a majority
  of the American people regret that the Fenian flag is not to-day
  floating over the steeples of a captured Montreal_.”

The next two paragraph’s are reprinted from the Buffalo _Courier_ of
June 1st, but written on the previous day. Both of them are texts:

  “It will be seen by reference to an advertisement, that the
  collector of this port has issued instructions, forbidding any
  vessel to clear between the hours of 9 a. m. and 4 p. m., without
  inspection of her cargo by officers of the custom house, and
  peremptorily interdicting the departure of vessels at all between
  the hours of 4 p. m. and 9 a. m., until instructions have been
  received from the Secretary of the Treasury. It is more than
  probable that the Fenians are endeavoring to obtain transportation
  to some point, audit is quite certain that they will be very
  closely watched, and find it very difficult to leave without
  discovery.

  “Our neighbours over the border may be pardoned for indulging in
  a little excitement under the circumstances; but they claim to be
  prepared for the worst, and ready to welcome the invaders. There
  will be no violation of the neutrality laws if our authorities can
  prevent it; but, looking back two or three years, to the time when
  Buffalonians were in hourly expectation of Confederate soldiers
  from Canada, we can ‘phancy the phelinks’ of Victoria’s loyal
  subjects. We don’t wish them any ill; but a little healthy scaring
  won’t do them any harm. So soon does time make all things even.”

I permit the last paragraph to be reprinted to remark, that it
was in the month of the invasion, but one of hundreds, published
in the United States expressing, what the writers termed a “grim
satisfaction” that Canadians were now experiencing a return of the
evil wishes they gave American citizens during the war of 1861-65.
This allegation, was not true. It was the opposite of truth. The
widest circulated journals in both the Canadas, and a largely
predominating majority of the male adult population of Canada West,
who held any political opinions, were throughout the war sympathizers
with the legitimate national government of the United States, and
were by rational opinion and natural instinct, abhorrent of the
Southern insurgents, who, though enjoying co-equal rights with their
fellow citizens of the North, and enjoying the privilege of a free
press and freedom of speech to discuss public questions, had plunged
the great American nation into the horrible calamities of civil war.
And added to this numerical majority of political male adults, were
the non-political, and all the women and children of the Province,
who were guiltless of evil thoughts towards Americans, yet whose
risk of life, alarm, terror and plundered homesteads, while fleeing
to the woods, the wilderness, to escape the Fenians, were a “grim
satisfaction” to some portion of the American newspaper mind.

But this is not all the denial. It is not true that any inhabitants
of Canada, political or non-political, sympathizers with the national
integrity and lawful authority of the United States or with the
rebellion of the slave-owners, were parties to Confederate warfare
based in Canada against the Federal States. The Canadian government
and people at much cost and inconvenience in 1864 and 1865, posted
forces of Militia Volunteers along the frontier to prevent American
rebel refugees, resident in Canada, from making raids across the
boundary line.

I might be more explicit and elaborate on this matter, which so
intimately affects the two great nationalities who in common speak
the English language in North America, but for the present refer to
a book entitled “CANADA A BATTLE GROUND, by Alexander Somerville”
(present writer) published early in 1862. In that publication the
sympathy of Canadians, for the lawful government of the United
States was asserted, and the estrangement which painfully occurred,
foreshadowed. Mr. Seward, in reference to Canada being annexed to the
States, writing in 1856, before he was Secretary of State had said
“All Southern stars must set though many times they rise again with
diminished lustre. But those which illuminate the pole remain for
ever shining, for ever increasing in splendour.” To which the author
of “Canada a Battle Ground” rejoined in 1862, page 24.

  “Remark. It is belief in that bright destiny of Northern free
  nations which binds Britain, Canada, and other Colonies together.
  They will not separate. For Britain to willfully pluck her Empire
  in pieces to set up new nations in conformity to some theory of
  magnanimity, is an offence to the simplest principles of political
  philosophy. Were Canada to demand separation, and obtain it; or
  were she cut adrift, the inevitable fate of absorption, by her
  more powerful neighbour, and extinction of political existence,
  would follow. The integrity and perennial vigour of the British
  empire should be the lofty political faith of all Conservatives and
  rational Reformers whether at home or in the colonies. And they who
  desire the permanence of British stability, or deserve the personal
  safety and freedom guaranteed by imperial laws, and by institutions
  at once venerable, and youthfully elastic in their adaptability to
  new circumstances, must by a logical necessity—if they hold any
  settled conservative principle—cherish a sympathy for other free
  nations, and hold in abhorrence a rebellious appeal to arms to
  overturn constitutional government.

       *       *       *       *       *

  “New complications may occur between Britain and France, as well as
  between Canada and America. A recurrence of excitement about French
  invasion may any day arise with still deeper perplexities than at
  any time before. The Legislative Chamber at Paris has just been
  told by a noble member, a legitimist, not a Napoleonist, and so
  much the worse, that the thirteen hundred millions of francs, spent
  on the Crimean war would have carried the French army to London.
  The British uneasiness of 1858 ripened public sentiment in favour
  of an auxiliary army of volunteers. Other ‘tyrannicide’ pamphlets,
  as atrocious as that of 1858, may issue from London and inflame
  France. Again, the ‘French Colonels’ may demand permission of the
  Emperor, as in that year, to ‘hunt conspirators in their London
  dens.’

  “In that hypothesis of complex difficulties, the Engineers and
  Guards, the Royal Artillery and regiments of the British Line,
  grandly efficient in quality, but inadequate in number even now,
  may be recalled to save the venerated soil of Britain from the
  track of invasion. But should they remain, as pray Heaven they
  may have no cause to go away nor any employment here; a mass levy
  of the male population will be an instant necessity in the event
  of war. The mass levy will be only a mob, yet indispensable, as a
  source from whence to draft selected levies, and to form working
  brigades to construct defences; to build Forts, for instance,
  beyond Toronto on the Yorkville side, and on the heights near
  Hamilton city, should Huron Lake and Georgian Bay be occupied by
  gun-boats and floating batteries from the arsenals at Chicago, and
  Green Bay; and Erie Lake, from docks and arsenals at Toledo and
  Buffalo. The sooner those Forts are raised after the enemy is at
  Georgian Bay, at Suspension Bridge, at Port Dover, Port Colborne
  and Port Dalhousie, the sounder may Toronto and Hamilton sleep in
  bed, if they can sleep at all.

  “Concentrated on one point, or distributed to distant places in
  obedience to the exigencies of strategy, the rural aggregations of
  the mass levy, and the rural regiments of militia, while defending
  towns and cities from hostile occupation and ravage, may be told
  of their own undefended homesteads laid in ashes; barns plundered
  and pastures cleared of cattle; women and children fleeing to the
  wilderness distracted, or dying on the cinders of the homes, in
  which they live happily this day, believing that none dare make
  them afraid.

       *       *       *       *       *

  “And those aggregations of militia and volunteers, and the mass
  levy, _in this newspaper-made war_, may be told of such atrocities,
  when absent on the frontier service, or may see them after the
  occurrence. If they do, the fiercest spirits in Canada, not few in
  number, will volunteer with all the vehemence of revenge; or they
  may, in desperate frenzy, form expeditions on their own account,
  to make reprisal on the towns and country opposite. Offended
  humanity there, which is now as innocent of political feuds or evil
  intention to Canada, as any non-political farmer and his wife and
  baby on this side, will in turn cry for a reciprocity of vengeance.
  Patriotism on that side will be crime on this: the patriotism
  of Canada will be crime beyond the frontier. They who are least
  successful in devastation and in victory, will on their Fast days,
  pray to have a due sense of sin, and better success. The side which
  enjoys the highest satisfaction for defeats avoided, and battles
  won, will proclaim a day for thanksgiving and sky-rockets. And what
  wonder if Eternal Justice should leave them all to the consummation
  of their own wrath? The only warrant for hope, that they may not be
  utterly forsaken of merciful Heaven, rests on this; that they who
  are exposed the most to suffer such calamities are the least guilty
  in provoking war.

  “On the frontier homes of Canada, two thousand miles of war-track.
  One thousand miles open to attack on the frontier of the States.
  On the one side and the other, three thousand miles of war, among
  cities, towns, hamlets, homesteads; tracks of plunder in the
  mansions of the wealthy; houses of the poor; iron safes of the
  merchants; strong vaults of the banks. Tracks of battle and of
  marching armies on fields of summer greenness; on harvests of ripe
  wheat. Tracks of blood on three thousand miles of death-bed snow.

  “War-tracks of wreck, vessels and canals all a wreck, on lake,
  river and canal navigation. Mutual destruction along the frontier
  lines of railway, American and Canadian—populated Canada nearly all
  a frontier as yet.

  “Locomotive engines, offspring of genius more godlike than human,
  now carrying civilization through the primeval forests, dispensing
  the elements of social happiness as they go, these, compelled to be
  their own executioners.

  “The wheels of Human Progress are reversed. Viaducts broken
  down on this side the frontier and on that. Flying bridges
  of international amity now spanning the torrent at Niagara;
  or leviathans of the ferries, breasting the rivers in calm or
  storm or floods of crashing ice, at Sarnia, Windsor, Erie Ferry,
  Kingston, Prescott, and other passages of friendly traffic and
  social courtesies—all a wreck. And noblest victory of science, the
  monumental bridge at Montreal, each of its four-and-twenty pillars
  a monument, that overthrown; or besieged and defended as a bulwark
  of the fair city which with good reason, dreads to be captured.

  “Barrenness on the fields; emptiness in the granaries of Canada;
  much of the soil untilled, little sown; husbandmen in the war;
  wives and families scattered; and a pitiful harvest to reap.
  The peopled country being nearly all frontier, in Upper Canada,
  the farmers in those days, or months, for years, happily all a
  hypothesis as yet, are defending not ploughing.—They march to the
  battle which was expected yesterday; or counter-march to that
  which is expected to-day; or they are harassed by sleepless nights
  on picket and forced marches to meet a fresh invasion expected
  next week, or next month, yet which may come this night. Canada
  _clems_ with hunger while her enemy is abundantly supplied from the
  interior of the Union and the prolific North-western States.

  “Granaries which supplemented deficient harvests in Britain and
  France are now devastated or blockaded on the seaboard. Britain
  is in peril of domestic convulsion by insufficiency of food and
  material for manufactures and external commerce. Continental Europe
  sharing the disorder. _Austria, weakened by revolted provinces
  is strength to France. France, stronger, is nearer danger to
  the English coast, and that is new weakness and greater peril
  to Canada._ Our regular troops, as already said, may be called
  suddenly home. The gun-boats expected may never come. France scorns
  neutrality and blockades, most probably. Her steam rams-of-war
  make grim fraternity with the iron rams of America, possibly.
  The commerce of two oceans and of all the seas and gulfs is
  plundered, burned or sunk by privateers. Electric telegraphs, ‘our
  own correspondents’ and unofficial army reports, by facilitating
  wreck and ruin, and keeping enemies well informed, are curses,
  no longer utilities. The fire-brand or revolutionary section of
  the Canada press, _happily a very small and misguided minority of
  the whole_, which in mockery of common sense retains the name of
  ‘conservative,’ or ‘moderate,’ yet has outraged moderation, and
  put rational conservatism to shame by spreading along and across
  the peaceful frontier the elements of discord and convulsion—takes
  its turn of ‘sentry go’ on dark and stormy nights, in sleet, or
  snow, or rain, or sultry summer heat; the provost-martial keeping
  the office, types and ink. And ‘special correspondents,’ sent from
  England are considerably abridged of the liberty which they used
  so indiscreetly in the United States, while lawful authority there
  struggled in all the majesty of national conservatism to suppress
  a rebellion less excusable than any ever known in the history of
  the world. And so the war of invasion, which in the incongruities
  of party servitude the ‘moderate’ newspapers of Canada have done
  so much to realize as a fact of horrible proportions, goes on; the
  roar of ocean storms deafened by the roar of naval battles; Great
  Britain with hands full, yet grand even in that day of extremity,
  while Canada sweeps up the ashes of her homesteads and wipes her
  widowed eyes.

  “Such may that war be which political lunacy, less or more apparent
  on both sides the boundary line, is now hastening to a hideous
  birth. Why are two nations of kindred race and language preparing
  for the world this great agony? The event advances to its fullness
  of time primarily and chiefly, because they are of kindred race and
  language.

  “To describe the cities, towns, hamlets, and happy homesteads
  on both sides of the boundary line; the social and commercial
  intercourse of the two countries. To depict, as far as an
  uninspired pen may, their measureless resources of natural
  wealth—all pleading for peace. To foreshadow as far as a
  non-prophetic writer may presume, the nature of the differences
  from which they may drift into a conflict of mutual devastation.
  To illustrate the practical elements of military discipline
  and strength by reference to changed circumstances of social
  and political life in new communities. To relate incidents of
  British campaigns, victories, defeats, retreats, army panics,
  and the difficulties of the greatest generals in all wars, as
  a study indispensable in Canada, where the new militia of this
  year, 1862—fifty thousand undisciplined men not yet obtained, are
  proposed to do what fifty thousand veteran troops continuously in
  the field, might fail to do—defend Canada against an army of the
  United States, now trained or being trained, to arms, should it
  be directed at once against all accessible landing places on her
  vastly extended frontier.

  “To ask by the logic of political affinities, that all loyal
  subjects who can appreciate the freedom and stability of Britain,
  should extend a lively sympathy to the United States, now
  struggling in the majesty of a grand conservatism to consolidate
  civil and religious liberty with an enduring nationality; a
  result, which only Britain, of all other nations in the world,
  has practically achieved. To treat of those things; to contribute
  to the safety of Canada, and like a drop added to the mighty
  St. Lawrence, river of the life of North America, to contribute
  my driblet to the well-being of the British empire, and to the
  happiness of peaceful nations. That is the object of the work now
  in the reader’s hand.”

BATTLE OF BULL’S RUN. That was still a topic of popular conversation
when “Canada a Battle Ground” was written. Of that, it was remarked;
p. 59,

  “It would have been to the advantage of international amity if Mr.
  Russell of the _Times_ had seen and described the actual battle of
  Manassas _alias_ Bull’s Run, which, while it lasted, was a valiant
  conflict, carried on by troops, on the Government side, _famishing
  for want of water and food, and unsupported by the necessary
  adjuncts of a campaign, all difficulties caused by a too early
  advance without the means of transport, and all aggravated by the
  battle occurring in a thickly wooded country_. Killed and wounded
  at Bull Run, 18 per cent of all engaged, in five hours. Killed and
  wounded at Waterloo, in the year 1815, 24 per cent of all engaged
  of British and Allies, in twelve hours. The defeated veterans ran
  six times farther from Waterloo, than the defeated troops at Bull
  Run.”

  “TRUTHS ABOUT BATTLES—WELLINGTON AND WATERLOO. Even Generals in
  command can only make a guess at the incidents of battle. Civilian
  correspondents, viewing the smoke from afar, can tell nothing
  but by hearsay. Nor do Generals find it desirable to publish all
  occurrences in their dispatches. A historian having applied to
  Wellington for a full account of Waterloo, that he might exactly
  describe it, the great General replied as follows:—“You cannot
  write a true history of the battle without including the faults and
  misbehavior of part of those who were engaged, _and whose faults
  and misbehaviour were the cause of material losses. Believe me,
  that every man you see in a military uniform is not a hero_; and
  that although in the account given of a general action, such as
  that of Waterloo, many instances of individual heroism must be
  passed over unrelated, it is better for the general interests to
  leave those parts of the story untold than to tell the whole truth.

                                                          WELLINGTON.”

  “Victory is not always a certainty even with the ablest Generals
  in command of the best troops. Many unreflective admirers of
  Wellington, military men as well as civilians, have asserted that
  he never engaged in battle but with the certainty of success. He
  has himself affirmed the contrary, and what he said should be
  treasured as words of caution to over confident officers in command
  of armies or detachments. Writing to Sir Charles Stuart, British
  Envoy at Lisbon, in March, 1811, previous to a new campaign, he
  said:—“I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a
  sufficient number of battles _to know that the result of any one
  of them was not certain_, even with the best arrangements, I am
  anxious that the Government should adopt preparatory arrangements
  and take out of the enemy’s way those persons and their families
  who would suffer if they were to fall into the enemy’s hands.”

WHERE WAS CANADA DRIFTING IN 1863?—The following passage from the
CANADIAN ILLUSTRATED NEWS of May, 16, 1863, was widely reprinted
in British newspapers, its sentiments meeting the popular British
opinion of that time, as it expressed the opinions of the press and
people of Canada with but few exceptions. It is given here that
Americans who peruse this Book of the Fenian invasion, may see that
sympathy for the people who were loyal to the legitimate authority
in the United States was in Canada a fact in the years of the war,
not an after-thought in this year of the Fenian trouble, 1866,
as some of them now allege. One of the exceptions just noted, a
Brantford paper, had jeered at the American army then on the Potomac;
and spoke lightly of a rupture which it said, “might occur between
England and the Federal States at any time.” A rejoinder of rebuke by
the present writer, which accorded with the popular voice of Canada,
was in these terms, necessarily now abbreviated:

  “‘May lead at any time to an open rupture.’ And what might that be
  to Brantford? Read the selections from the report of the committee
  of Congress on page 4 of this journal. ‘An open rupture’ means the
  probable sequences of war; the stoppage of all through traffic
  on the Buffalo and Lake Huron railroad, whose central works are
  at Brantford. It means the enemy’s occupation or bombardment of
  Goderich town from Lake Huron. It means the approach of an army
  of invasion from Buffalo and Port Dover, and all the ports on the
  north shore of Lake Erie towards Brantford and Hamilton; and a
  battle perhaps the bloodiest in the annals of time, the Thermopylæ
  of Canada fought on the banks of the Grand River near the village
  of Caledonia, or between that village and the lake shore, but
  more probably in and around Brantford town. Then will every brick
  of that place be battered to rubbish heaps, in the battle which
  decides which army shall hold the key-ground of Canada West. The
  key-ground of Canada West extends from the Grand River below
  Caledonia, by way of Brantford to Paris, and northerly to Guelph;
  from thence to Toronto eastward, and to London westward. The three
  railways, Buffalo and Lake Huron, Great Western, and Grand Trunk,
  will be kept open to the last extremity, for though we may be
  terribly tried, Canada will submit willingly,—never.

  “I will not describe in these columns the probable disposition of
  forces. I direct the reader’s eye through the curtain of the future
  to take that one glimpse, because of the fervency of a terrible
  apprehension that the wilful negligence of the Government of Canada
  to organize, or provide means for organizing a defensive force, may
  leave the Province to the appalling hazard of seeing a time of war
  with insufficiency of means to resist the invasion at the beginning.

  “What, to Great Britain, are the aspects of the contingency of
  an ‘open rupture’ or Roebuck’s ‘declaration of war?’ War with
  the United States, the Southern blockade broken, and secession
  achieved, involves either the defence of Canada by all the might
  of the Mother country or abandonment. Abandonment means, the
  confiscation of every man’s estate, every child’s heritage.

       *       *       *       *       *

  “Then we may see Alabamas playing havoc on the wrong side. The
  sordid traitors to their Queen and country who, in 1862 and 1863,
  have built them on the Mersey and the Clyde, in breach of British
  neutrality, standing accursed in the presence of the British
  Empire immersed in the three-fold baptism of convulsion famine and
  pestilence, weird offspring of havoc and of war.

  “Such, Mr. Roebuck, of Sheffield, would be the probable result of
  your crazy counsels. Such, Mr. Laird, of Birkenhead, will possibly
  be the early convulsion of nations in which your sordid iniquity is
  preparing to plunge the British Empire.

  “And you, the suicidal section of the newspaper press of Canada,
  happily a minority of the whole, mocking common sense by retaining
  the otherwise respectable name of ‘conservative,’ outraging all
  moderation in blindly, prodigally goading to implacable anger our
  next-door national neighbour, struggling as that great nation
  has been during the last two years, in the noblest efforts that
  could engage the sympathy of conservatives—the conservation of
  nationality, the repression of internal rebellion—what of you in
  that day which I have depicted; in that conflagration which you
  will have contributed to kindle? you will stand, not as Cassandra
  stood, in frantic joy at the havoc of your torch, but you will
  be whiffed out, extinguished in the dread convulsion of this
  distracted Province, your types and presses in the custody of the
  provost-martial. That is where Canada is drifting to.”—ALEXANDER
  SOMERVILLE, ‘Whistler at the Plough.’

American journalists—orators—statesmen. Such were the sentiments of
Canadians towards the United States, with only the small exceptions
indicated in the years of the war. Some of you now enjoy, what you
term a “grim satisfaction” at the thought of the women and children
of Canada being exposed to ravage, plunder, murder, who in no way
offended you. And the large majority of men who felt your cause to be
theirs—the cause of constitutional freedom, national stability, true
conservatism, you are grimly satisfied because they are now, or but
lately were, exposed to the contingencies of invasion. History will
judge that you cruelly wrong this Province. And Almighty God whom you
worship, is witness, that the people of Canada, as a people never did
you wrong, never spoke of you but in friendliness.

  NOTE FOR TO-DAY—While this sheet is passing through the press
  intelligence from Britain informs Canada that the new conservative
  government comprehends and will act on a just conception of
  conservative philosophy towards the United States. In society
  the first characteristic of a gentleman is courtesy towards
  his neighbors. In international policy the first duty of true
  conservatism is promotion of friendship with other nations. August,
  1866.



CHAPTER IX.

  _Colonel Peacocke’s advance to Chippewa on June 1st. His march next
  day. And the day after. Lieut.-Colonels Booker and Dennis. Night of
  June 1st, and morning of the 2nd._


We are now arrived at the morning of June 2nd. In the Niagara
District the first act of the Fenian Invasion being in progress
Colonel Peacocke is looked to as the leading actor in the operations.
Around him the main forces for defence and repulsion of the enemy
have gathered. On him expectation rests. A senior officer Colonel
Lowry of the 47th will presently appear, but not yet. Colonel
Peacocke’s official report as written in his own terms is demanded by
the pretentions of this narrative to fulness, and fidelity to truth.
A chapter describing his advance and halts from Suspension Bridge to
Fort Erie to be followed by that report, and the report by comments
on his movements and strategy would occupy too many of these pages.
It is convenient therefore to introduce his official statement first.
This is it:

  COLONEL PEACOCKE’S REPORT; _To Major-General G. Napier, C. B.
  Commanding 1st Military District, Toronto, C. W._

                                            FORT ERIE, 4th June, 1866.

  SIR.—I have the honor to make the following Report of my operations
  in the field since the 1st inst. In compliance with a telegram
  received from you, I joined at 2 o’clock, at Hamilton, with 200
  men of my own battalion, the force proceeding from Toronto to St.
  Catherines, consisting of one battery of Royal Artillery, under
  the Command of Lieut.-Col. Hoste, C. B., and 200 men of the 47th
  Regt, under the command of Major Lodder. You had also placed under
  my command, for the defence of the frontier, 7 companies of the
  volunteer force stationed at St. Catherines, under the command
  of Lieut.-Col. Currie, the Queen’s Own regiment of volunteers at
  Port Colborne, and the 13th Battalion volunteer militia, commanded
  by Lieut.-Col. Booker, at Dunnville; and you had informed me
  that I should be reinforced at St. Catherines by 800 men. Your
  instructions were that I was to make St. Catherines my base, to
  act according to my own discretion, to advance on Clifton or
  elsewhere, and to attack the enemy as soon as I could do so with a
  force sufficient to ensure success. On arriving at St. Catherines,
  I received telegrams to the effect that the Fenians, about 800
  strong, were marching on the Suspension Bridge and were actually
  two or three miles from Chippewa. I pushed on immediately to the
  Bridge, leaving orders for all troops arriving at St. Catherines
  to follow me as soon as possible. On reaching the Bridge, I heard
  that the enemy had not yet reached Chippewa, and being anxious
  to save the bridge over the creek, I pressed on with the 400
  infantry, preceded by a pilot engine—the battery marching by road
  in consequence of the reported want of platform accommodation at
  the Chippewa station. (1.) It was dark when we arrived at Chippewa.

  We bivouacked there that night. I there received numerous reports
  from scouts sent out by Mr. Kirkpatrick, the reeve. They agreed
  generally in the statement that the Fenians had entrenched
  themselves roughly a little below Fort Erie, at Frenchman’s Creek,
  and had sent on a party towards Chippewa. Their strength was
  variously estimated from 800 to 1,500. I resolved on effecting a
  junction with the force at Port Colborne, to which place I had
  already ordered the battalion from Dunnville. With this object in
  view, I selected Stevensville as the point of junction, and having
  explained to Captain Akers, of the Royal Engineers, who accompanied
  the force from Toronto, what my object was, and that this point
  was chosen, because judging from information received we could
  not be anticipated at it by the evening. (2.) I despatched that
  officer at 12 o’clock, to communicate with the officer commanding
  at Port Colborne, to make him conversant with my views and to meet
  me at Stevensville between ten and eleven o’clock next morning,
  informing him that I should start at six o’clock. I continued to
  send out scouts during the night, and to receive reports which made
  me believe that my information was correct, and that the enemy had
  not left their camp. At about two o’clock, I received a telegram
  from Colonel Booker, despatched before he was joined by Captain
  Akers, informing me that he had given orders to attack the enemy
  at Fort Erie. (3.) At about half past three I received another one
  from Captain Akers, despatched after he had reached Port Colborne,
  saying the enemy was at French Creek, and proposing that Lt.-Col.
  Booker’s force should advance on Fort Erie and join us at
  Frenchman’s Creek.

  At about 4.30 o’clock, I was joined by the eleven companies of
  volunteers from St. Catharines, formed into a battalion 350 strong,
  under Lt.-Col. Currie, and by the expected reinforcement under
  Lt.-Col. Villiers, of the 47th Regiment, which consisted of 150
  men of the 47th, and of the 10th Royals, 415 strong, under Major
  Boxall. The volunteers, being unprovided with the means of carrying
  provisions and of cooking them had not been able to comply with
  an order I had sent the previous evening, that they were to bring
  provisions in their haversacks. I saw that the absolute necessity
  of furnishing them with some would cause delay, and I telegraphed
  to Port Colborne that I should be one hour later in starting. (5).
  We marched at 7 o’clock, leaving the Garrison Volunteer Battery,
  from St. Catharines, under Capt Stoker, to hold Chippewa. The day
  was oppressively hot, and our guide took us by a road much longer
  than necessary. (6). When about three miles from Stevensville, at
  about 11 o’clock, I received a few words from Lieut.-Col. Booker,
  written at 7.30 o’clock, to the effect that he had just received
  my telegram, but that he was attacked in force by the enemy at a
  place three miles south of Stevensville, (7). At the same time, I
  received information that he had retired from Ridgway. I encamped
  a mile further on, at a small place called New Germany, across a
  road leading due south to Stevensville. At about 4 o’clock, having
  gathered information that the enemy was falling back on Fort
  Erie, I left everything behind which would encumber the men and
  started to follow them. At the moment of starting, we received an
  important accession to strength by the arrival of the Cavalry Body
  Guard of His Excellency the Governor-General, 55 strong, under
  Major Denison. (8.) We marched until dark, and halted two and a
  half miles from Fort Erie, the men sleeping on their arms, due
  precautions being observed. During the night, I sent out scouts to
  collect information. It appeared that the Fenians, on retiring,
  had posted themselves at once near the old Fort. Some said they
  had been reinforced, some that they were attempting to re-cross
  into the United States. I also heard that three companies of the
  60th Rifles had arrived at our vacated camp at New Germany and
  that a force had reached Black Creek; also that 10 more companies
  of volunteer militia had arrived at Port Colborne. The Volunteer
  Garrison Battery, which I had left at Chippewa, joined me during
  the night.

  Anxious to prevent the escape of the Fenians, I sent word to the
  officers commanding at those places that I was going to attack
  Fort Erie, and asked when they would be able to co-operate.
  Subsequently, fresh reports of attempts of the Fenians to escape
  having reached me, I determined to advance at once. We were about
  to move when Lt.-Col. the Hon. John Hillyard Cameron came into camp
  and informed me that the Fenians had escaped. The intelligence
  caused great mortification in my little force. I desired Major
  Denison to scour the country and enter the town. He sent me a
  message that he was informed that there was still a body of
  Fenians about the old Fort. We at once marched in that direction,
  skirmishing through the woods. Major Denison soon informed us that
  they really had escaped. As many scouts and farm people assured
  us they had not escaped, we took a long sweep through the woods.
  On our right on Lake Erie, a few stragglers were seen, and four
  were reported shot. On entering the old fort, traces were found
  of its having been recently occupied. During the short operation
  which extended only over forty hours, the troops under my command
  underwent very great fatigue, and bore it with great cheerfulness.
  I received all possible support and co-operation from officers of
  all ranks. The conduct of the men was excellent. A great number
  of private individuals rendered me service in many ways, and the
  inhabitants generally exhibited a good and loyal feeling. Mr.
  Swinyard, Manager of the Great Western Railroad, gave me the
  benefit of his services in person. He placed at my disposal the
  resources of the railway; and the officials on the line exerted
  themselves to render these available. I have the honor to enclose a
  report of Lieut.-Col. Booker, of his operations on the 2nd inst.

                                          GEO. PEACOCKE,
                                          Col. and Lt.-Col. 16th Regt.

NOTES TO COLONEL PEACOCKE’S REPORT. 1. “The reported want of platform
accommodation.” Since the time and the events, persons have spoken
largely as to how quickly they would have provided platforms had
they been consulted. The Colonel could not consult persons of
whose existence he was uninformed. He acted according to the best
information.

2. and 3. I had written a criticism on the extraordinary, the
unmilitary procedure of Captain Akers, Lieut.-Colonels Dennis and
Booker, in taking upon themselves to alter the plans of their
superior, Colonel Peacocke, who alone was responsible in the
campaign, and from whom they were bound to take instructions; but a
statement of Major Denison having been published as these sheets are
passing to the press, some portions of it are here cited.

Major Denison’s account of the campaign is lucid, and soldier-like.
But he has committed errors in his description of the combat at
Limestone Ridge. They are serious errors. He is not known to have
consulted any officer of the 13th, at Hamilton, as to matters of
fact affecting that battalion, but has followed stories floating
about Toronto, among certain of the “Queen’s Own,” that are not
true. He expresses acknowledgments for information to Lieut.-Col.
Booker, which is about enough to declare against the fidelity of his
narrative. That person was not at any time in a position to know much
of what was done in the front. In matters within his own knowledge
he has not told the whole truth. Major Denison having had close
intercourse on the advance to Fort Erie with Colonel Peacocke, his
remarks may be accepted as interpreting the mind of that officer.
They also accord with what the Colonel related to me at Fort Erie
village soon after the incidents occurred. Says Major Denison,
referring to June 1, at Chippewa:

  HISTORY OF THE FENIAN RAID, p. 30. “Colonel Peacocke then made
  arrangements for the junction of his forces with Lieut.-Colonel
  Booker’s. At the time he decided upon the hour of meeting, the
  greater portion of his force was yet to arrive, and not knowing
  what hour in the morning or in the night they might come, he was
  unable to name an earlier hour to start than 6 a. m. which would
  make the hour of his arrival at Stevensville between 10 and 11
  a. m. Not having a map showing the roads about Port Colborne and
  between there and Stevensville, and being unable in Chippewa to
  obtain accurate information as to the roads, or the condition
  of them, and having received at the same time very conflicting
  information as to the movements of the enemy, he found it was
  impossible for him to lay down the route Lieut.-Col. Booker should
  take, or the hour at which he should start, in order to meet him
  at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a. m. Under these circumstances
  he thought it desirable to send an officer across to Lieut.-Col.
  Booker who should be thoroughly acquainted with his plan, and would
  be able in case of doubt or difficulty, to consult with Lieut.-Col.
  Booker and see that the spirit of the plan was carried out even if
  the details were varied.

  “Acting upon this idea, Colonel Peacocke chose Capt. Akers R. E.
  for this service and explained his plan and the reasons which
  induced him to adopt it; but with reference to the roads he left
  it entirely optional with Lieut.-Col. Booker and Capt. Akers to
  choose a road after making thorough inquiries as to the most
  available route, _and the route most remote from the position of
  the enemy_—going even so far as to tell Capt. Akers that they
  might go along the Welland railway, northerly to a point opposite
  Stevensville and then march due east to that place; or take the
  Grand Trunk railway for some miles, and then cut across the country
  in a diagonal direction to the point of junction. _Ridgeway was
  never mentioned as a point to leave the railway_; and there is
  little doubt that with a correct map, Colonel Peacocke would have
  positively forbidden it—Ridgeway being nearer Fort Erie than
  Stevensville, and the further march being consequently brought
  nearer to the enemy’s position than the occasion called for. From
  information received since, there is no doubt that the shortest
  and safest route lay from Sherk’s crossing across the country to
  Stevensville.”

Yes, that was the route. But Lieut.-Col. Booker had no map; not even
the poor pretence of one which the officer in chief had. Lieut.-Col.
Dennis may have known the roads but his head seems to have been
deluded with the idea of independent command. Booker in his official
report contradicts the chief direct. He says: “In accordance with
instructions received from Colonel Peacocke, through Captain Akers
I proceeded by a train at 5 a. m. to Ridgeway station.” “Ridgeway
station,” says Major Denison “was never mentioned as a point to leave
the railway.”

In his statement to the Court of Inquiry Lieut.-Col. Booker again
names Ridgeway as the place to which he went, but went with
hesitation. His hesitation, however, did not grow out of a doubt
whether his superior intended him to go there, but whether he and
Dennis and Akers should not go off on an expedition of their own to
French Creek, leaving Colonel Peacocke to his own fortunes. Says
Lieut.-Col. Booker [Court of Inquiry]. “On arrival of Captain Akers,
it appeared that Lieut.-Col. Dennis and myself were in possession
of later and more reliable information of the position of the enemy
than Colonel Peacocke seemed to have had when Capt. Akers left him at
midnight. It then seemed necessary to enquire whether the original
plan for a junction at Stevensville to attack the enemy supposed to
be encamped near Black Creek should be adhered to, when it appeared
they were encamped much higher up the river and nearer to Fort Erie.”

Had they followed their “later and more reliable information,” they
would have reached Frenchman’s creek eight hours after the Fenians
left it. Colonel Peacocke did not know precisely which route his
enemy might pursue inland towards the Welland canal, but strategical
prescience led him to provide against the Fenian advance in that
direction, and he planned accordingly. The event proved that he had
judged correctly.

A strange predicament was that of Colonel Peacocke. At Chippewa his
advisers and scouts gave contradictory information. His subordinates
dividing the command of a distant detachment, set themselves up as
superior to him. Major Denison tells the story, thus:

  “We must go back a little and give an account of what happened
  at Port Colborne until the arrival of Capt. Akers. It will be
  remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis was sent there on the morning of
  Friday with 400 men of the Queen’s Own, and directed to occupy and,
  if necessary, entrench a position there and wait for further orders
  before an attack was made. He arrived at Port Colborne about noon
  and hearing that the enemy were not very near the village, billeted
  the men to enable them to get their dinners, and sent out scouts
  during the afternoon to discover the position of the Fenians. The
  day and evening was occupied in this way. In the evening about 11
  p. m. Lieut.-Col. Booker arrived with his battalion, the 13th from
  Hamilton, and being the senior officer took command of the whole
  force.

  “At 10 p. m. Mr. Graham, the collector of customs at Fort Erie,
  arrived with information of the exact position of the Fenian camp.
  This was at Frenchman’s creek a mile below the Lower Ferry, on
  Mr. Newbigging’s farm. He had been in their camp at 6 o’clock
  that evening, and was of opinion there was not more than 700
  men, and that as they had been drinking hard during the day they
  would certainly fall an easy prey to any force that might attack
  them. Lieut.-Col. Dennis’s _orders were positive not to attack
  until further orders; the same orders were binding on Lieut.-Col.
  Booker_, and consequently they could not move to the attack which
  Mr. Graham urged them on to make, and which he stated would
  certainly be successful. In order to induce them to move at once
  to the attack, he suggested that, probably, Colonel Peacocke _was
  endeavoring to keep the volunteers back in order that the regulars
  should have all the credit of capturing the Fenians_.”

Mr. Graham spoke only as nine civilians out of ten would have
done, in the same position of time and circumstances. Since then
the complaint of the nine out of ten has been that this force of
volunteers was precipitated by General Napier and Colonel Peacocke
into a position of peril, where they had to prematurely encounter
the enemy in mortal combat, unsupported by artillery, unaided by
cavalry. Yet they would have been in a worse predicament, by far, had
they, equally without artillery and cavalry, been precipitated upon
the Fenian field breast-works at Frenchman’s creek. It was Colonel
Peacocke’s negative to that mad project which avoided that peril,
and its probable disaster. Adherence to his orders to find the best
and safest roads, where the Fenians were least likely to be met, in
moving from Colborne to Stevensville to join him, would have avoided
the premature conflict at Limestone Ridge.

But in this remark I write as they may do whose beloved sons,
brothers, friends fell there, slain and wounded. In the larger aspect
of a military event the conflict at Limestone Ridge is not to be
mourned. On the contrary it has exalted the character of the Province.

  “Whether any of the three” says Major Denison, that is, Akers,
  Dennis, or Booker, “had reflected on the propriety of moving a
  large force by rail through a wooded country at night, and through
  a section not properly reconnoitred, and in close proximity to an
  active enemy, does not appear in the official reports.”

Whether the three had an overflow of courage at Colborne before the
hour of trial, or were only in their normal condition of heroes, held
back and impatient of restraint, may never be known. But though each
became separated from the other two in the operations of next day,
each earned the distinction of avoiding, in a conspicuous hurry, the
risk of captivity with the Fenians. Colonel Dennis when attacked at
the village, ran down Niagara side, reached the house of Mr. Thomas,
shaved off his beard, and changed his clothes and so escaped capture.
Capt. Akers, by his own account, made tracks through the woods
towards Port Colborne in a buggy, at the same time as Colonel Dennis
shaved himself, that is about 2 p. m. Lieut.-Col. Booker had then
reached Colborne from the battle of Limestone Ridge thirteen miles,
much flurried.

The other marked passages in Colonel Peacocke’s report refer to the
delay caused by want of haversacks with the volunteers, and the time
at which he got a message from Lieut.-Col. Booker through Detective
Armstrong. This last falls to be noticed in next chapter but one.
Major Denison says, referring to Chippewa, morning of June 2:

  “Colonel Peacocke’s reinforcements were to join him sometime in
  the morning, and being anxious that there should be no delay in
  starting, he telegraphed back to Hamilton and St. Catharines
  directing that the reinforcements should bring with them a supply
  of cooked provisions, so that no delay should be occasioned by
  waiting to get breakfast for the men after they arrived. At about
  4.30 a. m. the expected reinforcements came up and after being
  unloaded, Colonel Peacocke mentioned to the officers commanding
  that he should march at six o’clock, it being then nearly five.
  _They at once objected on account of their men not having had any
  breakfast, and very little to eat the whole of the previous day_,
  and they were unable to bring anything with them, _as they were
  unprovided with haversacks in which to carry it_.”

Severe animadversions have been directed against this commander for
his having delayed on that morning to give his own regiment and
other regulars breakfast, while the Hamilton, and Toronto Volunteers
had marched to battle while fasting. It was the volunteers, newly
arrived at Chippewa, not the regulars, for whom breakfast and
delay were requisite. Whatever the degree of misfortune may have
been, arising from that circumstance, it was directly traceable to
the misjudged economy of the Provincial executive in not having
provided equipments for volunteers suitable for the field and to the
negligence of commanding officers, who preferred scrupulous attention
to the inferior trifles of parade show, well enough in their way,
but not vital to the soldier’s efficiency in fight, existence under
privation. Two more passages are here materially important.

  “Being unwilling to set out upon a very severe march, to finish
  probably with a severe battle, and through a country where it would
  be difficult to get food, Col. Peacocke decided it would be better
  to wait an hour to enable the men to get breakfast, and immediately
  telegraphed to Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march an hour. This
  message, did not reach him until he was engaged with the enemy.
  _Had he started at the proper time he would have received the
  message before he left_, for even to have reached Stevensville at
  9.30 it was not necessary for him to leave Port Colborne until six.
  He was at the battle ground, three miles from Stevensville at 7.30;
  and if not interrupted would have reached Stevensville at 8.30,
  about an hour earlier than Capt. Akers mentioned, and two hours
  before Colonel Peacocke’s time of junction. This mistake of one
  hour led to his not receiving the message to delay, and therefore
  caused him to be really three hours too soon.

  “It must not be forgotten that at the time Colonel Peacocke decided
  to wait that there was no reason for him to fear any ill result
  from the delay. At that time he expected that a heavy battle would
  take place, before the Fenians would be driven out, and that
  instead of the object being to prevent them getting out of the
  country, the opinion of every one was, that the great difficulty
  would be to drive them out, and that he was right in proceeding
  cautiously with that object in view. At any rate he anticipated
  that the steamer (for which he had given orders to be employed)
  would have prevented their escape.”

In another passage the writer speaks thus, of the plans of Dennis,
Booker and Akers, at Colborne in contravention of their chief at
Chippewa;

  “There was the commanding officer’s plan changed by his
  subordinates almost at the moment of execution. The three
  officers whom he had charged with the execution of his orders,
  even including the staff officer who carried them, coolly forming
  themselves into a mimic council of war, aided by a customs officer,
  and unitedly deciding upon a plan which has been previously shown
  to be absurd, a plan for cutting off the Fenian retreat to the
  east, but leaving the whole country open to them to the west, as
  well as uncovering the canal they were sent to protect.

  “Again Lieut.-Col. Dennis’s instructions were to wait further
  orders before any attack was made; and yet Capt Akers says, he
  was anxious to move with the volunteers at once without arranging
  a junction with Colonel Peacocke. Capt. Akers was sent to go
  with Lieut.-Col. Booker, and consult and advise with him on Col.
  Peacocke’s plan, and assist him in carrying it out. Col. Dennis was
  sent to command the ‘Queen’s Own,’ and yet before receiving any
  answer from Col. Peacocke, both these officers, in disobedience to
  orders, went off in the tug to carry out their own plan.

  “The only way in which their conduct can be accounted for is,
  that they were so confident that Col. Peacocke would at once fall
  in with their plan of operation in lieu of his own, that they
  never, for one moment, calculated that his answer would be in the
  negative. Being imbued with this idea it can readily be imagined
  that Capt. Akers would not be very particular in going into details
  and explaining minutely to Lieut.-Col. Booker the plan which
  they had both looked upon as virtually abandoned. It can also be
  conceived, even if Capt. Akers did enter minutely into the details
  of the plan laid down by Col. Peacocke, that Lieut.-Col. Booker
  believing that it was a useless precaution, would not give so
  close attention to it, or be able so clearly to remember it, as
  if he felt when he heard it he was about setting out to put it in
  execution.

  “It also so happened, unfortunately, that Captain Akers, fearing
  the delays which often occur in the movements of a large number
  of men, as a matter of precaution directed them to start an
  hour earlier than they should, and to be an hour earlier at
  Stevensville, thinking that in all probability at least an hour
  would be lost in setting off, or on the march, and that if they
  were before the time they might be kept back a little on the way.
  If he had staid with them to have kept them back, it would have
  been all right, but unfortunately he was away when he was wanted.

  “Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers as stated in the report,
  without receiving any answer from Col. Peacocke, left Port Colborne
  about 4 a. m. in the tug ‘Robb’ which had at that time arrived
  taking with them the Welland garrison battery (but without cannon,
  these having been removed to Hamilton, and not then returned) under
  command of Capt. Richard F. King, and a few men of the Dunnville
  naval company under command of Capt. McCallum.

  “After they had left Colborne Lieut.-Col. Booker received a
  telegram from Col. Peacocke directing him to adhere strictly to the
  first plan, the particulars of which had been carried to him by
  Capt. Akers.”

This telegram was in these words, “Chippewa 3.45 a. m. Have received
your message of 3 a. m. I do not approve of it. Follow original
plan. Acknowledge receipt of this. GEORGE PEACOCKE.” Major Denison
continues:

  “Lieut.-Col. Booker, therefore had set out upon his march without
  the assistance he should have received from Capt. Akers, and
  without the opportunity of referring to him for enlightenment on
  those parts of his instructions which he did not clearly understand.

  “Having his men all ready in the cars to start, and having heard
  that the railway was clear as far as Fort Erie, he decided to go
  by train as far as Ridgeway, and to keep his men in the cars, or
  at least under arms for the short time he would have to delay
  before starting. Having his men thus all ready there occurred none
  of that delay which Capt. Akers had anticipated, and to provide
  against which he had named an earlier hour for starting. Being in
  the cars ready, and only waiting for a particular hour to arrive,
  it can readily be believed that he would be likely to start a
  little before the time rather than after it. However this may be,
  there is no doubt Lieut.-Col. Booker started at least as early
  as 5 a. m., an hour or more earlier than necessary. Immediately
  after the force had left a telegraph arrived from Col. Peacocke
  directing Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march for one hour, which
  would make his time of arrival at Stevensville between 11 and 12,
  cautiously feeling his way in the direction of the rendezvous, Mr.
  Stovin of the Welland railway seeing the importance of the message
  took a hand car and followed Lieut.-Col. Booker as fast as he
  could.”

The more exact fact is that Capt. McGrath, general manager of the
Welland line, seeing the importance of the message took the hand
car, Mr. Stovin with him, and proceeded about half way, five miles,
when they saw the train returning from Ridgeway after debarking the
troops. Capt. McGrath stopped it by signal, and having a pressure
of business on his own line returned with the train to Colborne.
He directed Mr. Stovin to be exact in noting the time at which the
telegram was delivered to Col. Booker, as he already foresaw through
the various nature of the orders with an apparent desire to disobey
them, that trouble would arise. The message was delivered at 7.30,
when the action was just begun at the Ridge and not at 9.30 as stated
by Lieut.-Col. Booker, “when the troops had been under a hot fire
an hour and a half.” This telegram was addressed “to the officer
commanding,” and said; “Be careful in feeling your way for fear
obstacles should prevent a junction; if possible open communications
with me. I will do the same. G. Peacocke.”



CHAPTER X.

  _Nineteenth Volunteer Battalion. Statement of occurrences which
  does not correspond with the official report of Colonel Peacocke,
  and historical narrative of Major Denison._


The nineteenth battalion of volunteers comprises the St. Catharines
and Thorold companies. It is commanded by Lieut.-Col. the Hon. J. C.
Currie, member of the legislative council. St. Catharines is situated
about twelve miles from Clifton Suspension Bridge, both on G. W.
Railway. Chippewa is five miles higher on Niagara shore with railway
connection, the Erie and Ontario line. Col. Peacocke says, (official
reports)

  “On arriving at St. Catharines (about 4 p. m.) I received telegrams
  to the effect that the Fenians about 800 strong, were marching on
  Suspension Bridge and were two or three miles from Chippewa.”

I am informed, for the object of this full and true account of
the Fenian Invasion, and enabled on authority the most reliable,
to remark on Major Denison’s history, that he says nothing about
the fact that until about 8 p. m., Friday, June 1, the village of
Chippewa and important bridges were entirely unprotected. At 10 a.
m. on Friday, ten hours sooner, the St. Catharines 19th volunteers,
under Lieut.-Col. Currie, could have easily been there 450 strong.
It is now asked, why were they not sent there instead of the men
kicking their heels on the street until half past 9 p. m.? The 19th
at that hour, a day wasted, left St. Catharines with the detachment
of 47th and 10th Royals, for Clifton (Suspension Bridge) and could
have reached Chippewa that night at half past 11 o’clock. But instead
of that being done they remained at Clifton in the cars until 4 a.
m. next day. “Had they been allowed to go up the night before, the
whole force under Colonel Peacocke could have left Chippewa at 3 or 4
a. m. on Saturday, and by going the direct road, would have reached
Stevensville by 7 a. m. with ease.” [Letter from the 19th.]

As to the delay at Chippewa to enable the volunteers to breakfast
[see Col. P.’s Rep. and extracts just given from Major Denison], it
is stated on behalf of the 19th, that they did not take breakfast
until they reached New Germany. There they partook of their own
supplies, and shared them with both the royals and regulars.

At noon they reached New Germany and there _remained until after 6 p.
m._ Col. Peacocke says he left this place at 4 p. m. Major Denison
says Col. Peacocke at about 4 p. m. had positive intelligence, of the
Fenians falling back on Fort Erie. “He immediately made arrangements
to move in pursuit. _It was about half past 5_, when he started from
New Germany.” And then says Major D. “Had this delay not occurred the
Fenians in all probability could not have escaped.” Which delay? does
he mean the time that elapsed between noon and 4 p. m.? or the time
lost after 4 p. m.? He says: “it was particularly unfortunate that
Col. Peacocke had not decided to move on Fort Erie three hours or so
sooner.” On behalf of the Volunteer 19th it is said, the whole force
remained at New Germany until after 6 p. m. “I cannot understand why
we delayed unless Col. P. waited for reinforcements (see Lowry’s
report.)” Looking to Col. Lowry’s report it does appear that Col.
P. had telegraphed for assistance, and additional force arrived at
New Germany after he had left. The superintendent of G. W. Railway
told Col. L. at Hamilton, that Col. P. had twice telegraphed for
reinforcements.

It may be reasonably suggested on behalf of Col. Peacocke, that at
New Germany he neither knew the force of the Fenians, nor where they
were, nor whether they had been augmented in strength by artillery.
As it was, they had on that morning, though unknown to any British
commander, from forty to fifty horses. They had cavalry men also, but
no cavalry accoutrements. The critics of Col. Peacocke are writing
after the time and the occurrences when all is known. It is easy in
that case to say what should have been done. But this suggestion
only covers the time from 12 noon to 4 p. m. Why the loss of ninety
minutes (Denison) or over two hours (authority of 19th) before
starting when the locality of the Fenians became known at 4 p. m.

But the other question raised by the letter from the 19th battalion
is more serious. Why were the forces, (they were all night in the
cars at Clifton only five miles off,) not at Chippewa to advance to
Stevensville at 3 or 4 a. m.? The delay for breakfast was meant well,
but no breakfast rewarded the delay, at least for the 19th. None of
these authorities tell why. Let me. The delay was for breakfast;
the marching to New Germany without breakfast was from want of camp
kettles to cook it. These were not up in time. The government was at
fault. The St. Catharines authority says:

  At pp. 52, 53, Major Denison gives the cause of our halt when
  within two and a half miles of Fort Erie. I have undeniable
  authority for saying that there were really no Fenians in the woods
  there referred to, nor had there been any for twenty-four hours
  before.

These woods were on Lots 8 and 9, R. and W. Bowens, fifth concession
of Bertie. The Fenians had been on Newbigging’s farm less than two
miles distant until the midnight preceding and entrenched there as
related in this work. Col. Peacocke not knowing their number and
resources was right in being cautious now that night had come. Yet,
again, Why so late in getting there? The writer continues: “I do not
deny that he and his troop (Denison) saw some men. But they were
people of our own, who accompanied us to see the expected fight. This
halt was most unfortunate. Then, as to the positions of the troops at
page 54, he commits other errors.

“The 19th were the only men in line on the left of the road; but were
covered by a company of the 16th, regulars, and by No. 7 of the 19th,
as advanced skirmishers.” The statement of Major Denison is: “The
19th battalion, Lieut.-Col. Currie took up a similar position [in
line] on the left of the road; in the rear of the 16th.”

There was a small creek close in front, and at a mile farther,
Frenchman’s creek; both crossing Col. P’s line of march. “At this
time,” says Major Denison, p. 54. “While I was close beside Col.
Peacocke, a voice in the dark, said, ‘you can’t go down that way,
sir.’ On looking closely we saw that it was a farmer living about
a quarter of a mile back, who had given us some information as we
passed. Col. Peacocke asked him; ‘Why not?’ He answered, ‘The bridge
is broken.’ The Colonel questioned him closely and he adhered to it
positively that we could not get through. This information, together
with the inability for the skirmishers to make their way through
the woods (these were tangled bush and logs, the ground marshy and
wet, p. 53). This decided Colonel Peacocke. With that report of a
broken bridge; with darkness of night set in; with uncertainty of his
enemy’s place and strength; with the possibility of an ambush in the
woods, or at the broken bridge, he was fully justified in remaining
as he did until daylight.”

The reader will keep in mind that the blame laid on this commander
for that halt implies that he thereby permitted the Fenians to
escape. This is no light charge. But the graver charge of his not
advancing from Chippewa at 3 or 4 a. m. so as to reach Stevensville
at 7 remains as the gentleman of the 19th has put it.

In Major Denison’s account of the line of march taken, and as Col.
Peacocke related to me personally when in conversation at Fort Erie,
there arose several circumstances of hinderance. There was the bad
and devious road taken by the river side instead of the better and
shorter direct way, through his relying on advisers and informants
who seem to have led him up the river side to Black Creek, around
windings and out of the way in order to drive the Fenians from
their properties, or prevent their coming upon them. Mr. Tupper, a
government constable resident at Fort Erie, has since told me that
he was sent to inform Col. Peacocke and conduct him from Chippewa,
but that his service was not accepted. Tupper says that Mr. Street M.
P. P. told the Col. that he was an official person and reliable. But
after seeing him at Fort Erie that officer had no recollection of him
at Chippewa. Major Denison remarking on the unreliability of persons
offering to be guides, relates that one bustling person, talking on
Friday night at Chippewa told what he could accomplish in taking a
message to Port Colborne if he had a horse. He was furnished with
a horse, and the message committed to his care; what did he do? He
rode to the Fenians, gave them the message and the horse too; himself
also, perhaps, for he never again turned up.

We are now sufficiently informed on the aspect which the campaign
presented on the morning of 2nd June; at Chippewa, where delay was
caused because volunteer militia had come without haversacks without
food; at Ridgeway, where Col, Booker had arrived an hour before the
time he should have been leaving Colborne; at Henry Angur’s farm,
where the Fenian commander O’Neil had halted his force, while he sent
scouts forward to see if British and Canadian troops were approaching
in his direction.—With this sufficiency of information let us catch
up to the gallant eight hundred sons of Toronto and Hamilton, cities;
Caledonia and York villages, and march in their footsteps to the
field of conflict.



CHAPTER XI.

  _Combat on Limestone Ridge._


Lieut.-Col. Booker produced the following as having been written
by him at Colborne after the arrival of Capt. Akers: “_Mem._
leave not later than 5.30, at 5 if bread be ready. Move to depot
at Erie and wait till 7. If not communicated with by 7, move to
Frenchman’s Creek. If NO by telegraph, disembark at Ridgeway, and
move to Stevensville at 9.30. Send pilot engine to communicate with
Lieut.-Col. Denison at Erie and with telegrams.”

About that bread. The reeve of Colborne offered to provide rations
for the 13th if presented with a requisition. Booker said; “No;
I think the least the municipality can do is to provide us with
rations.” He did not then give a requisition. But bread and cheese
for supper were procured. About three in the morning an officer went
to him at the house of Mr. Pring, customs collector, and spoke of
breakfast being requisite for the men before starting on the march.
Lieut.-Col. Booker was then seated with a dish of hot beef-steak
before him. He replied to the officer: “I am very tired. Go see what
you can get from the reeve or any one in the village.” The officer,
accompanied by the Quarter-master of the Toronto Rifles, went to the
reeve’s house; knocked at the door; saw a window raised, and heard
an angry reply to their request, “You got all the bread I had hours
ago.” Then the reeve shut down his window, and they went elsewhere.
That was the bread, the supply of which, Capt. Akers had made a
condition in the time of marching. What bread? None. The Lieut.-Col.
who had his hot beef-steak as a foundation for the fatigues of the
day, had presented no requisition, else the baker, being also reeve,
would have readily complied with it. Booker says (Statement to Court
of Inquiry)

  “During the night at my request Major Skinner endeavoured to secure
  a bread ration for the men. Some biscuits and bread were obtained,
  and that officer reported to me that the baker would prepare a
  batch of bread to be ready at 3 a. m. of the 2nd.”

This is not true. It is of minor importance to other mis-statements
of this gentleman, and is only noticed here, as showing that his
story laid before the Court of Inquiry was unreliable, even where he
had no motive for erratic obliquity. He did not concern himself about
the men’s rations further than to murmur over his own substantial
breakfast that he was very tired, and request some one else to do
informally, what he should have done officially. The irregularities
of the day had commenced. Applications were made to several owners
of stores and crackers and red herrings were obtained, but in small
quantity. Some men got half a herring; others a whole one; some
had crackers; some had none. They who ate no herring were the most
fortunate; for that June day became hot, and they had no canteens in
which to carry water.

“Move not later than 5.30, at five if bread be ready.” He knew he had
made no requisition on the baker. Officers of the “Queen’s Own” were
running hither and thither in search of food. Meeting Mr. McGrath of
the Welland railway they implored him for something to eat. He gave
them crackers for which they were thankful. As there was no bread to
wait for, Booker left Colborne at 5-8 a. m. Twenty minutes afterwards
the telegram arrived from Col. Peacocke ordering him not to move
until 7.

The train arrived at Ridgeway about 6, having proceeded over the
intervening ten miles slowly and with due caution, so far as the
engine driver had command. The Fenians instead of being at French
creek were halted on the Ridge road, three miles distant and had sent
forward scouts to watch military arrivals at this station. No sooner
did the small volunteer army alight than emissaries of the enemy
numbered them and went off with information.

The combined force of Q. O. Rifles from Toronto, 480; of York and
Caledonia companies, together 95, and 13th from Hamilton 265;
numbered, 840 of all ranks. Only one company of Q. O. had ammunition.
Why they had come from Toronto without it, and been scattered
through Colborne village without pickets, or guards, or sentries,
can only be accounted for on the supposition that Col. Dennis, who
came in command of them and leaving them to Major Gilmore, started
off on an enterprise of his own devising at 4 a. m., had an imperfect
conception of the military art, though holding the office of Brigade
Major of the 5th military district. Why the Q. O. were sent from
Toronto without ammunition, Major-General Napier knowing that fact,
and telling them they were likely to be engaged with the enemy within
twenty-four hours, (his first speech), or within twelve hours his
second version of first speech, the powers of common sense fails to
comprehend.

Quartermaster-sergeant Stoneman of the 13th supplied ammunition to
the Toronto, York, and Caledonia Rifles at Ridgeway. The percussion
caps ran short. Some of the York and Caledonia getting only 40 caps
to 60 cartridges. There was a large surplus of cartridges left, but
no caps. With difficulty and delay, Q. M. S. Stoneman pressed a
farmer’s waggon into service and followed after the column which by
that time had marched out of sight. No guard was placed by Lt.-Col.
Booker over the ammunition. Dr. Ryal junr. of the 13th had been
supplied at his father’s expense with some surgical necessaries. But
there were no hospital ambulance.

Arrived at this point, with mind depressed by fault-finding, by
recital of official negligences, by wants not supplied among the rank
and file, the follower of this little army enters within a fresher,
higher, moral atmosphere. The mind is now carried to a height from
whence it beholds heroes. They may not be all developed. He is not
the best soldier who distinguishes himself even in some very notable
performance of gallantry. The true and good soldier is he who keeps
his place in the ranks, goes where he is ordered to go, does what
he is ordered to do. The men of the column now before us may have
no demand made on them this day, to display the qualities commonly
called heroic. The nervous and unsteady will sometimes rush upon an
enemy with a vehemence which the world applauds. That is not heroism.
The popular idea of high courage displayed in battle, is the charge,
the shout, the rush with bayonet on the enemy’s line. That charge
of bayonets has on occasions been effective, but it neither evinces
high courage, nor is it often a safe movement. There is no man
breathing who approaches the verge where the enemy’s fire may open,
or who being within it hears the whiz of mortal missiles of death,
but fears to be a victim. Courage is not a condition of mind which
has no fear; courage is the conquest of fear. Without fear there
is no courage. Of all the forms of danger from an enemy in battle
the most trying to the manhood of the soldier, is bullet firing from
forest thickets, from orchards, from behind curtains of concealment,
out of houses, over garden walls, under covert of field fences; from
behind trees. In such places the enemy is not seen or is but dimly
discernable. In the greater fields of carnage where columns are
undergoing rapid evolutions, and moving through massive formations
exposed to quickly repeated vollies of artillery, men do not feel
so acutely apprehensive, and sensitive. The reasons why not are
various. The sight of blood maddens some. The magnitude of sanguinary
havoc deadens the more delicate senses. Combativeness is inflamed.
The desire to destroy obtains ascendancy. In the more intellectual
natures the thought of death and the hereafter have been committed to
the mercy of Almighty God. It has been done silently, and military
duty, proceeds as if there had been no praying. The individual
reckons on being killed. Unless he be fool as well as sinner he has
not deferred repentance and prayer to that supreme hour. If he finds
himself alive, and unhurt where many have fallen, he accepts the
renewed term of life calmly, but inwardly gives Heaven his gratitude,
feeling that he has yet some good service to perform for himself,
kindred, country.

If these columns of subdivisions now marching from Ridgeway station
up the Ridge road, have some quality that the hypercritical must find
fault with, it is a disposition towards too much levity. These young
volunteers are rather too sure that a fight with the Fenians will do
them no harm. But this condition of gaiety has another meaning. It
is young life in the morning of promise. That lightness of laugh,
aptness of jest, gaiety of remark, that general vivacity is the
sparkling of a native born, self-reliant spirit. Underneath lies
manly fortitude.

“With ball cartridge, load!” These words of command at Ridgeway
Station fell upon youthful ears with more meaning than any other
words of command, at any time previously. Yet their full import may
not have been comprehended. The Toronto men, clothed in dark green,
ten small companies, had the lead, right in front. To Trinity College
company of that battalion, only about twenty strong, the York Rifles
were added, also in green. Next was the 13th, six companies, in
scarlet. The Caledonia men wearing green, formed a rear guard. The
Toronto field officers left their horses at Colborne, because said
they, with some prudent ideas of difficulties to come, horses would
be of no use in forest thickets; because said they afterwards,
horses could not have been safely landed from the cars at Ridgeway.
Major Skinner of the 13th took his horse, and lent it to Lt.-Col.
Booker.

The road from Ridgeway station is skirted on each side with the
ancient forest, but occasionally with cleared patches on which are
dwellings and gardens, until you reach up about as far as the houses
near to the letters B B on the map. There the cleared land widens on
either hand. Towards the left the woods are seen forming a waving
line, five, six, and seven hundred yards back to north-west, several
farm fields with zigzag rail fences intervening. On the right hand is
a space of pasturage unenclosed, broken on the front near the Ridge
road with shallow quarries of limestone, lime-kilns now disused; much
debris of broken stone; occasional trees dotted on the surface; the
extent upward over a gentle elevation, three or four hundred yards.
This is a section of Limestone Ridge. Its first boundary is that
marked garrison road, and school house. The bugler sounds. The column
halts. What is the matter? One on horseback comes to Lt.-Col. Booker
and informs him that the Fenians occupy the road, and positions on
the ridge within the fields and orchards, about three quarters of a
mile further along to north-east. This is Squire Learn a justice of
peace. He has been considerably beyond Hoffman’s tavern, and says
he had come within sight of Fenian outposts on the road near to the
place of letter C on the map where subsequently the square to receive
Cavalry was formed. The Squire was fired upon. He had, he says, been
commissioned by government to assist the commanding officer with
information, and is now fulfilling this service. Little more of him
was seen. The Colonel might reasonably doubt every man’s fidelity.
Possibly he doubted this gentleman. Possibly he doubted none. But
there were somewhere around him, persons professing to be friends who
were not trustworthy.

Something in motion by the edge of the wood down on the left, drew
the Colonel’s attention. He consulted with Adjutant Henery of the
13th and other officers. They and he differed in opinion. By aid of
his field glass, he saw, so he affirmed, at least 200 Fenians in the
wood, some mounted. They said there were only some cows and a man on
horseback driving them. This matter did not involve any important
issue. It was only a farmer, one of the Angurs, “running his cows
off.” Yet the Colonel acted prudently, with the concurrence of Major
Gilmore, in sending skirmishers across the fields to discover if the
enemy occupied the woods on the left. No opposition was met in that
direction.

Let us look at the ground before taking up the story of the fight.

We have arrived at the crossing of Ridge road, and Garrison road;
the latter leading to Fort Erie, distant seven miles, eastward to
the right hand. At our left is a tavern, a white house and red barn,
called the Smuggler’s Home, but which on the map bears the occupier’s
name, Hoffman. This was afterwards used as a temporary hospital; so
also the next two houses near the bend of the road, now in rear of us
towards Ridgeway. On the Garrison road which, with a gentle ascent,
crosses over the stoney ridge, and penetrates the forest thickets, is
a school house.

Crossing a rail fence from the Garrison road, a person tracing the
movements of the combatants, enters a field, which in June bore a
crop of young wheat. Let this fence be named 1. The wheat field is
about 200 yards wide. At fence 2 many bullet marks are seen. Cross
it; the field lying before you, 350 yards wide, bears a crop; half
spring wheat, half grass. Near fence 3 is a large maple, at 20
yards from the junction with the cross fence—that which runs nearly
parallel with the front of the wood on your right hand. Here is a
small enclosure of a quarter acre. Within this lay a Fenian picket
at the commencement of the conflict. Behind this small enclosure,
on ground stoney and slightly rising, are thirteen scoriated trees,
leafless and of dismal aspect. The field beyond fence 3, has a crop
of rye. The rye field merges with an orchard. The Fenian right flank,
advance, occupied this orchard at the first. At the head of this
orchard towards the right is a copse of thick brushwood, and on its
higher edge a low stone wall running parallel with the upper woods,
and about 150 yards from their front. Getting through the orchard
and this copse and across another patch of open land about 100 yards
wide, you reach a concession road. Its distance from the Garrison
road is about 800 yards. This concession way crosses the Ridge road.
You see in the corner a brick house—that is J. N. Angur’s house. The
fences on each side of this road are, in the present reckoning, 5
and 6. The Fenian main body occupied that road, where the map shows
black. They took the rails of fence 6, and laid them slanting on
fence 5, with a face for a screen against bullets towards the south,
from which direction the Canada volunteers were to advance. At bottom
of that orchard on the Ridge road are two barns and a dwelling-house,
a few hundred yards south of J. N. Angur’s brick house, which you see
in the corner.

Crossing that concession road at about 300 yards east of J. N.
Angur’s brick house, you are well up on the crown of the ridge. To
your left is Stoneman’s orchard; and at the bottom of that orchard
on the Ridge road is Stoneman’s house, and Reinhard’s house. Beyond
Stoneman’s orchard, on the Ridge road, at the letter A. is Henry F.
Angur’s house, where O’Neil made his head-quarters. Keeping near
the crown of the ridge, where the concession road was crossed, you
follow the track on which the Fenians fell back. You cross fence 7,
and fence 8, and observe that they join at an angle. Also it is to be
noticed that a portion of each is thrown down. From much treading,
the grass shows here that a crowd had left a beaten track. This track
was made by the Fenians hastening to another position in their rear.
They having got through fences 7 and 8, had a thick pine wood on
their left front; the fence 9, beyond a narrow wheat field crossing
before them, and a maple grove of grand old trees, standing on their
right, within which they buried some of their dead. You can see the
grave of four. It was when they were driven back over fences 7 and
8, and out of Stoneman’s orchard by a concentrated fire from fences
5 and 6, concession road, that Booker’s bugles three times sounded
_retire_. The Fenians then encouraged to a fresh attack counter
marched round by the higher woods, and did execution on the retiring
volunteers; the deadliest of it on those nearest the upper woods, the
University Rifle company as we shall presently see.

Observe that all the open ground lying to the left of the Ridge road
and down to a marshy rivulet on the edge of the forest, is farm land.
It is intersected by many rail fences, all of zigzag form. The York
Rifle, and Trinity College companies got along the lower edges of
those fields, and on the concession road, formed the left of the
advanced skirmishers.

The Toronto Rifles had the lead assigned them, Major Denison says
because they were the senior corps. Coming up from Ridgway No. 5
company, under Captain Edwards, were sent forward as an advanced
guard. They were armed with Spencer rifles. On arriving near, perhaps
a little beyond, that part of the road marked B. B. intimation of the
enemy having then been given by Mr. Peter Learn J. P. No. 5 extended
from its centre. The troops were marching in a column at quarter
distance. No. 1 moved forward and extended on the left, and No. 2 on
the right of No. 5. As supports No. 3 formed the centre; No’s 4 and 6
the left and right.

In this formation one does not recognize an adherence to any ordinary
battalion movement. Indeed throughout, the Q. O. seem to have acted
as independent companies. After moving on in this way for some
distance, according to Major D’s report, but precisely how far I
have failed to ascertain, No. 7 was sent out as a flanking party to
the left towards the woods on that side, supported by No. 8, Trinity
College company. This last was but a section, about twenty in number.
Subsequently, the University, and Highland Companies No. 9 and 10
went on the right; but for the present they formed a reserve. The
York company went with the Trinity college youths as an additional
support on the left.

The advance was steady. They with the Spencer rifles had only thirty
rounds of cartridges per man, and these they fired rapidly away. They
fell back, some reports say in seven, others in ten minutes from the
time they began to fire. Rapid firing, with repeating rifles had in
that instance the disadvantage of too quickly expending an imperfect
supply of ammunition; but it produced noise, and had a formidable
appearance. It assisted materially to drive back the foremost Fenian
pickets. In crossing into the first field from the garrison road an
officer of No. 5 was killed.

At this time, seven to ten minutes after the first firing of the
Fenian pickets on the advance of the Queen’s Own, the Hamilton 13th
moved over the stoney ground on right of Ridge road, distant from
Garrison road, about a hundred yards. Companies No’s 1, 2, and 3,
then advanced and extended as skirmishers; their supports being No’s
4, 5, and 6, Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery accompanied the front
line. “They advanced,” says Adjutant Henery, who is an experienced
Sergeant from Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards, “as steadily, evenly,
as ever did soldiers on a field day.” Said Sergeant-Major Rosconnell,
an old British soldier, “their advance over the fences and across
those fields was as regular and steady as could be desired.” This
was strictly a battalion movement. The Queen’s Own also advanced as
companies, regularly, steadily, but not as a battalion. Let us here
observe them from the high ground beyond concession road, as the
Fenian chief O’Neil saw them. This is how they looked to their enemy:

The _Nashville Press_ of July 9, 1866, reported a statement made
the day before by O’Neil, on the occasion of a public reception.
“Tell us,” cried a voice in the crowd, “about the ‘Queen’s Own.’”
He responded: “I desire to rectify a mistake about those troops. It
has been said that they acted in a cowardly manner. Not so. _When
they advanced in line of battle in their red uniforms they presented
a beautiful appearance. It was one of the prettiest sights I ever
witnessed. The line was well formed and their advance was brave._”

Words similar to these had been used by General O’Neil at Buffalo.
The present writer did not at first attach importance to this matter,
until he observed that the Nashville statement was so well accepted
at Toronto by some who have with an unsoldier-like spirit underrated
the 13th, to exalt the Queen’s Own, that they reprinted the paragraph
omitting the distinctive mark of the 13th, “their red uniforms.” It
was known that not only on the American side, but generally about
Ridgeway and Fort Erie, Canadian residents spoke of the volunteers
collectively, who had been engaged, on June 2nd, as the “Queen’s
Own.” For the accuracy of history, in face of this perversion in
Toronto newspapers, a writer whose constant aim is historical
accuracy and fair play to all persons irrespective of frowns or
favours, addressed, General O’Neil, as to which of the reports was
the true one. He replied thus: (The letters in full will be seen on
another page);—Nashville, Tennessee, July 31st 1866.

  “In answer to your inquiries I beg leave to state that on account
  of the prominence given to the ‘Queen’s Own’ by the American and
  Canadian newspapers, I had been led to believe that they were the
  principal troops opposed to me on the 2nd of June last. And as the
  red uniform appeared to me the most conspicuous on the field, I had
  taken up the idea, without making any inquiry on the subject, that
  the ‘Queen’s Own’ were dressed in red. In my speech at this place
  I did not intend to distinguish the troops dressed in ‘red’ from
  those dressed in ‘green’. I intended to speak of the whole when I
  stated that they fought well.”

Thus, from the enemy’s point of view on those heights above
concession road, it is seen that while nothing was observed
detracting from the steady, soldier-like gallantry of the Toronto
and York and Caledonia Rifles, who wore green uniforms, the equally
soldier-like gallantry of the Hamilton 13th is vindicated. The enemy,
against whom a force advances in mortal conflict is the best judge
of the effect which it produces. Prisoners taken, and other Fenian
informants, concur in stating that while the men in dark green (Q.
O.) had driven in the advanced Fenian pickets, it was the additional
line, the line of red which decided them to abandon the concession
road. About the same time, the University Rifle Company supported
by Capt. Gardener’s Highlanders (Denison’s Hist.) advanced on the
extreme right. “There,” says a writer in Toronto _Leader_ “they bore
the brunt of the battle.” The University youths like all else on the
field were brave, and bravely did their duty, but it was not while
advancing on the enemy’s position that their casualties occurred, nor
while keeping that post on the right under cover of the wood on the
upper ridge. They suffered severely, but not yet, and not there.

From the accounts so plentifully written by members of the Q. O. in
various newspapers the writers seem to have exhausted their soldierly
qualities on the field of fight. It is not soldierly, when the fight
is over to take pens in hand for the detraction of another portion
of the force equally engaged with themselves. The 13th continued to
advance and co-operate, all its companies as a battalion; its three
companies of skirmishers, and its three companies of supports. It
had not been ordered, it was not its duty to take the place of Q. O.
companies that they might fall to the rear. Its duty was to do what
it did, advance as closely as practicable upon the enemy, and make
the best use of its arms and the position. The ultimate position was
in the orchards north and east of the concession road.

The Q. O. companies interchanged and relieved each other, or without
being in each case, relieved, fell back, making a column of reserve.
The order in which this was done cannot be distinctly traced, as few
of the Q. O., officers or men, agree in giving the same statement.
Captain Gardener, (Court of Inquiry,) speaks of having been twice
with his Highlanders sent to the front. Major Gilmore says (Court
of Inquiry,) Gardener did not retire from the front until the last.
Capt. Adam is represented as saying that he and No. 6, Q. O. drove
the Fenians out of J. N. Angur’s brick house, which is situated in
the corner at the crossing of Ridge road with concession road; while
again Lieut. McLean (Court of Inquiry) relates that his company on
the concession road, should have been relieved by one of the 13th,
which did not advance so far, and that on its default to relieve him
he said to his men “peg away”, and they pegged away accordingly. Mr.
McLean’s story in other respects is equally marvelous. The 13th were
in the front. They had nobody to relieve. The duty of all was to
fight, not to fall back.

Three companies of the 13th had advanced upon the brick house and
to right and left of it. No. 1, Capt. Grant, Lieut. Gibson, Ensign
McKenzie, took a position extending up the concession road, where
Fenian breast-work of rails had been. No. 2, Capt. Watson, and Lieut.
Sewell, [Ensign Baker of that company being with the regimental
colours at the reserve], occupied a space of the road on each side
of the brick house, within and in front of it. No. 3 company, Lieut.
Ferguson, [his Capt. absent, and Mr. Armstrong, his Ensign, with
the 13th’s colours at the reserve], advanced upon concession road
to the left of J. N. Angur’s brick house. Finding here that his men
could not fire at anything but a thicket of orchard trees, where
no enemy was visible, Mr. Ferguson advanced his company across the
road towards the letter B of the map, half wheeled to the right and
obtained a range of fire towards a Fenian position beyond Stoneman’s
orchard. No other company was so far advanced towards the enemy. Mr.
McLean says he and a subdivision of No. 6, Q. O. were there; others
say no. Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery with portions of the 13th
took possession of the brick house and the garden in front. The
front garden gate and house doors were all fast until they forced
an entrance, and took up a fighting position. Fenians were not
driven out by the Q. O.; they had not been in. But that house was
then in the range of Fenian bullets. Nor did the 13th find the Q.
O. in possession of the premises, nor see them in front, except a
very few, some half dozen men, on the road, their companies having
scattered and gone back as part of the reserve, so these men said. At
the corner of Angur’s barn an officer of the Q. O. was industriously
firing the rifles which two or more men behind the barn loaded for
him. This was probably Capt. Adam; because, Major Denison says p. 43,
“For some reason the company of the 13th which was to have relieved
No. 6 Q. O. Capt. Adam, marched up to the brick house, where No. 6,
after driving out the enemy with great gallantry had established
itself; and both companies remained in that position fighting
together.”

The meaning of this is obscure. A tone of doubt is not here assumed
as to the gallantry of the Q. O. but as to the exactness of their
recollections, or of the description of their motions. I heard
this brick house incident freely spoken of at Toronto before Major
Denison’s book came out, and have therefore been more particular in
examining the recollections of the 13th. The skirmishers of that
battalion, extended on both sides and in front of Angur’s brick
house, have a vivid recollection of Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery
going along their line, speaking words of cheerful encouragement,
patting some of the youngsters on the shoulder, accompanied with
remarks, such as, “good boys; take steady aim; do not throw away your
fire; do not expose yourselves needlessly”.

There is a large single tree on the Ridge road side, fifty yards or
so, to north of Angur’s brick house, and near to that tree a land
roller. In the hinder part of the frame of the roller is a bullet
hole made by a shot which came from the direction of the barn 200
yards behind Angur’s house. Adjutant Henery and some men were firing
from behind the roller using it and the tree as cover, when that
bullet struck close to his head, he kneeling and taking aim. This was
a circumstance to make him look around and notice who was shooting
in that direction. Nobody was then visible except men in scarlet,
none of whom could have fired that shot, and eight or nine Q. O.
men, who said their company had retired to the reserves, but that
they had remained. This incident is only named as a marking place of
memory. Major Skinner who commanded the three companies in front is
equally clear that men in scarlet uniforms were the sole occupants
of those premises and of the concession road adjoining, as of the
orchard across concession road, when he advanced and held possession
of it. From the nature of the ground which undulated, and from
frequency of wooded thickets, and orchards interrupting the view,
the Q. O. companies which went earliest to the front, especially
those on the extreme right, became concealed to those behind. And
the 13th when they soon after advanced still further to the front,
were in like manner indistinctly seen by the Q. O. who fell back.
When the right wing of the 13th had advanced in even skirmish line
about 400 yards, from garrison road, the left wing under Major
Cattley advancing compactly, as supports, at an interval of 150 or
200 yards, the coolness, caution, precision of eye and soldier-like
watchfulness of the officers were happily exemplified. Major Skinner
having passed along the skirmish line to confer with the adjutant
and observe what was in the front, and on the right flank noticed
objects which some of the 13th were about to fire at. These objects
from their apparently stealthy motions in the bush were supposed by
some to be Fenians. The Major perceived they were not. And Captain
Grant also reported to him that men in dark clothing were creeping
about under cover and occasionally visible in the higher wood, on the
ridge, easterly; that he had difficulty in restraining his company
from firing on them as Fenians; but that he did not think they were
Fenians. Major Skinner said they were not the enemy, and went along
the extended files of No. 1, as also did the officers of the company
giving the men caution that the heads indistinctly seen in that bush,
up to their right, were not heads of the enemy. It is probable they
were the University Rifle Company, perhaps also Captain Gardener’s
Highlanders.

Soon after this the supporting companies of the 13th occupied the
orchard, which is about 200 yards south and in rear of the skirmish
line on concession road. These were No. 4, Lieut. Routh (Capt. John
Brown absent with leave) and Ensign J. B. Young. No. 5, Capt. Askin
and Lieut. Ritchie. Captain Askin is assistant engineer on the Great
Western Railway. I, and the battalion, and the public, are indebted
to him for the map of Limestone Ridge, published herewith. He had
been absent at Windsor when the alarm to assemble, fall in, march,
was given at Hamilton. A telegram told he was wanted. Taking the
earliest train east, he heard at Paris that the 13th had gone by B.
and L. H. Line to Dunnville. He overtook them at Port Colborne, just
as they were marching for Ridgeway. The other company in support,
occupying that orchard, was No. 6, Ensign Roy. Captain Irving of this
Company was absent from Hamilton when they left, and thinking to
reach the battalion by a shorter route followed Colonel Peacocke’s
force, by which he was prevented from reaching the field of fight in
time, much to his mortification.

At a point of the Ridge road about 400 yards north of Angur’s brick
house, a reserve of the Q. O. was halted. The two colours of the
13th, carried by Ensigns Armstrong and Baker were here, in their
proper place. Also the men guarding the colours, and some orderlies.
Major Gilmore (Court. of In.) mentioned this reserve as comprising
green and scarlet uniforms. Those just indicated were the only
officers and men of the 13th there at that time. The only companies
of men in green not in the reserve on the road, when the hottest fire
was being delivered in front by the skirmishers, were the University
and Highlander companies then engaged on the extreme right; Trinity
College and York companies on the left, not then exposed to Fenian
fire. The Caledonias forming a rear guard; and desultory portions of
several Q. O. companies on the concession road, or under the trees
or about the barns. It being said by Major Denison that No. 6, Capt.
Adam, was there, that must also be admitted, but if so, that company
was considerably scattered towards the rear.

All these in the front delivered a steady, well sustained fire,
forward, and into copse woods, and places of covert where the Fenian
smoke and rattle indicated the enemy to be. At no place, in front
of concession road, could more than 200 yards of clear range be
seen. Very few casualties had then occurred, the Fenian bullets
going high. Both Q. O. and 13th men were struck in rear of the
line of skirmishers by bullets flying over the heads of the front
line. Besides the enemy were retiring before the steady, brave,
soldier-like advances of the Q. O. front companies and 13th The
Fenian chief says the men in red were the more conspicuous; but both
his testimony, and that of others competent to judge give the Q. O.
and York Rifles credit in largest measure, highest degree, as well
as the gallant 13th in red. Had there been any generalship then, the
fight was won. Major Denison says p. 44:

  “Our troops had been in this position for some time when it seems
  that the Fenian leaders decided to charge again, to drive our men
  back from the line they had carried.”

Charge again, means that they had charged before. Nobody saw them
charge either before or then. Their tactics were exclusively
movements under cover. They crept from bush to bush. They were
retiring to get round to concession road to retreat to Fort Erie.
They could not have come round the right flank, on crown of the ridge
without being seen by the U. R. and Gardener’s companies posted
there, and by Grant’s of the 13th. Major Cattley of 13th who was
attached to the three companies of supports was at the upper end of
the orchard, at a copse where the low stone wall, before mentioned,
ran parallel with the ridge, 100 yards from the wood on the ridge,
and he saw persons, supposed at the time to have been Fenians the
same as were seen from the Q. O. reserve and Capt. Grant’s company of
13th. If these had been the enemy no better place than that low stone
wall could have been found to shelter troops to keep the position and
drive the Fenians back. Major Cattley made his apprehensions known.
But the brigadier, Lt.-Col. Booker, made no disposition of force in
that direction, nor in any other. These men in the upper wood, and
near to it, were the U. R. and Highlander companies of Q. O.

Two Fenian officers had been at different times seen on horseback.
One was unhorsed, the animal galloping away to eastward with empty
saddle, itself wounded. It was found dead at the top of H. F. Angur’s
field, near the wood of the Fenian graves.

If cavalry had been seen in that direction which it was not, it could
not have charged either upon skirmish lines, or supports, or reserve.
There were several high zigzag fences, impassable by cavalry, had
there been any, on the right, on the left, and in front, except only
in front of the reserve when it stood on the Ridge road. And there
also it was flanked with fences, proof against cavalry. Major Denison
says p. 44.

  “The skirmishers seeing the mounted men coming towards them,
  thought a body of cavalry was going to charge; and raising a cry
  that cavalry were coming began to run back, calling out to the
  reserve ‘look out for cavalry’. The reserves were on the road and
  there mounted men were also seen upon it. Lieut.-Col. Booker, from
  the position in front of the reserves, could not possibly see
  for himself whether the report was true or false; but hearing it
  reiterated, he called to Major Gilmore to ‘look out for cavalry.’
  Major Gilmore therefore ordered his battalion to form square. This
  was done. The bugles sounded to ‘prepare for cavalry!’ and the
  companies on the flanks ran in—some forming in rear of the square,
  others forming rallying squares in the fields, and afterwards
  falling back on the main body.”

How or why Major Denison could have written this story can only
be accounted for, by his saying in his book that for information
received, he tenders his thanks to Lt.-Col. Booker.

To the facts as they were; not as the story was afterwards concocted
and imagined. The facts were these. Between the place of the reserve
on ridge road, letter C on the map, and J. N. Angur’s brick house,
there are two houses on the left of the road, and a barn on the
right of it. From undulations of the ground, bending of the road,
and orchard trees, Booker and those near him, behind that house next
to the reserve, could not see along the road. He had been screening
himself from imaginary bullets. He knew nothing of what was going on
at the front, or to the right of the skirmish line. He was not in a
place to see. He was not in a condition of mind to understand. But of
that presently. The Q. O. men and officers who were scattered behind
the other houses and barn—[not improperly, shelter was legitimate to
all who could obtain it where duty required them to be]—they could
not see farther to the front along ridge road than 100, 200, to 300
yards. But Major Skinner and part of the 13th were in possession of
the brick house and orchard opposite. They could see farther along to
north-east, and saw no horsemen in that direction, nor heard any cry
of cavalry. Adjutant Henery of the 13th, and some men were advanced
still farther, out on the open of Ridge road, they heard no alarm of
cavalry. Capt. Ferguson and his company of 13th, were still farther
advanced, by the side of the orchard on left of the Ridge road, near
Stoneman’s house, at letter B of the map, they heard no alarm of
cavalry. All these ultimately retreated; but when they reached the
place where the reserve had been, where the square had been, where
the cry of cavalry had been,—all had vanished. The cry of cavalry
did not come from the front. Those who were fighting in front,
and came in, when they discovered that their supports were gone,
saw no reserves, no square. They were afterwards told that such
formations had been. Nor did these men, with their company officers,
and the battalion officers, Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery, see
Lieut.-Col. Booker. None of the 13th had seen him after commencement
of the action, except the few with the colours and the orderlies, and
they had been in action one hour. Several persons had noted the time.

The retreat, the confusion, did not originate in the cry of cavalry.

The fight was a soldier’s battle, not that of a general. No coherent
words of command had been given by Lt.-Col. Booker. The fight was won.

The Fenians were retreating. With waggons and stores they were
getting away to Niagara river Ferry from Henry F. Angur’s house,
O’Neil’s head-quarters. They were throwing food out of the waggons
to make room for the wounded and hurrying around to be off. Captain
Mahony came into Henry F. Augur’s house, hurriedly put off his
uniform and assumed the clothes of a labouring man to disguise
himself. They were destroying arms and ammunition, which they could
not carry with them. Unused rifles and bayonets in quantities they
were plunging into a marsh to be hidden. On the upper woods they
were retreating on the run to reach round to the concession road and
so on to Fort Erie village. They had lost the battle. What stopped
them? O’Neil and his officers heard Booker’s bugle sounding _retire_,
that stopped them. A second time it sounded _retire_. A third time
_retire_, and the call to _double_.

At first the Fenians thought this was a trick of tactics to draw
them on in pursuit, and into ambush. They were cautious, but at last
discovered that the force which had advanced upon them so gallantly,
steadily, beautifully, was actually retreating, and in confusion.
They then raised a shout. They followed up. The U. R. Company had
been nighest to them, nearly concealed in the upper wood. It did not
hear the _retire_ and lingered. When the increase of Fenian firing,
with shouting, and the decrease of firing on their own skirmish line,
led them to examine their position, the U. R. retired. And then came
their casualties. They were now at short range and shot down; so also
the Highland Company, but in less degree.

Let us examine that bugle call, _retire_. Sergeant Gibbons of the
13th, (an experienced soldier of H. M. 71st), says: “It was that
bugle call, _retire_, that began the confusion. The first call was
for the skirmishers to come in, and also the second, and they were
retiring, in proper order; but the third was given with the _double_;
and then men came running, and leaping, over fences, and stumbling.”
Capt. Grant, who was with Lieut. Gibson, beside No. 1 Company of the
13th, highest up concession road, except U. R. and Highlanders, heard
the bugle call _retire_. He knowing the enemy had been retreating,
and Fenian fire declining, remarked; “what is meant by that _retire_?
Why is it sounding?” On its second call they retired upon their
supports at head of the orchard. Others fell back in obedience to
that call, and formed on the supports. Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery
and the force nearest their position at the brick house, and in
the orchard beyond the house, over concession road, remained, the
bugle sound not having reached them through the noise of firing, and
impediments of trees.

O’Neil does not admit that he was beaten. Perhaps he did not feel
that he was. But in his Nashville speech he admits that he felt the
necessity of retreating, having a formidable force in his front, and
knowing that, “two or three other small armies were pressing forward
to overwhelm his small and inadequate force.” He was retreating,
pressed by the gallant 13th, and Q. O. with York and Caledonia
Rifles, and would have yielded the field to their advance, had not
the unaccountable retreat of his assailants recalled him to action.

They of the skirmish line who heard the first and second calls
retired. The supports retained their places in the orchard until the
third call and double were sounded. Then they also retired across the
orchard, fields, and fences towards the Q. O. reserve. Then arose the
panic; the cry of, _look out for cavalry_. Perhaps O’Neil and his
mounted officers may have been seen at this crisis riding to their
front to ascertain what was the matter. Perhaps some of the portions
of companies and officers of the Q. O. who were near Lt.-Col. Booker,
beside the barn where he had taken his station, with its walls in
front of him, the orchard on his right hand, nothing visible to him
but the reserve in his rear and the persons around,—it may have been
some of these who cried “look out for cavalry” if he did not himself
imagine its presence. Booker did not know where his front skirmish
line was, did not know that some were beyond hearing the recall of
the bugle from his place of retirement, did not know the enemy had
retreated. The bugler bears testimony that Booker gave the commands
to sound. He seemed to have decided, so far as, in a condition of
imbecility and nervous prostration, he could decide anything, to
retreat from the field of action.

It had been his custom on field days, and Hamilton holidays, to
follow the call of _skirmishers retire_, with _form square_; _prepare
to receive cavalry_. My old note-books written when looking on,
bear that record, so do the memories of his men. Perhaps, in this
hour of his mental prostration he reverted to the old rotation of
movements learned from a book, and gave the order to the bugler _form
square_. Charity would rather believe that he made that mistake in
forgetfulness, than that his vision of cavalry, crossing a variety
of fences, five and six feet high, in pursuit of the retiring
skirmishers, whom he had called in, led to the formation of a square.

An hour and a half earlier, the action about to begin, but no shots
fired, he mistook a farmer “running off his cows” for a Fenian force
of two hundred men, some of them mounted. In his narrative to the
court of inquiry, concocted after the events, and in contradiction to
animadversions on his conduct published two or three days after the
2nd of June, he said: “I observed loose horses moving about in the
woods to our left, but saw no men.”

Officers of the 13th who were then beside him, would make affidavit
were it required, that he said to them his field glass enabled him to
see, distinctly two hundred men, some of them mounted. But these are
gentlemen of honor. They have passed their word to this statement,
their word is sufficient. Thus we have it that Lt.-Col. Booker,
entered on the field seeing cavalry where none were.

It was shortly after this, at 7.30 a. m. that Mr. Stovin of the
Welland railway delivered the telegram from Col. Peacocke, to
Lt.-Col. Booker who expressed, in words of vehemence, anxiety for a
messenger to go to Col. Peacocke. Detective Armstrong was at hand and
offered to go. “Tell him,” said Col. Booker, “how I am situated,”
“you must write it,” rejoined Mr. Armstrong. “I have no paper!”
Booker fumbled about his person and finding no paper said: “tell him
that”—Armstrong repeated that he must have a written message. “Well
then, don’t go at all,” Mr. Lawson of Port Colborne who was present
offered paper. Mr. Armstrong gave paper and pencil. Lt.-Col. Booker
enquired the time and was told by Lawson, by Stovin, by Armstrong and
others 7.30. He wrote 7.30 the only portion of his despatch which was
legible. Mr. Armstrong says it was written on paper given by him.
Booker says to the court of inquiry that now 9.30; “I turned to
Detective Armstrong and wrote on the telegram which I had received
that the enemy had attacked us at 7.30.” Mr. Stovin says: “It seemed
a strange thing to me that he sent away the telegram he had received;
and still more so that after Armstrong was gone, he inquired of me
where that telegram came from. He had not read Chippewa.” Squire
Learn said of Booker, then: “If they have not got a fool for a
commander, he is something worse.”

The time of 7.30, put in the past tense, was an after-thought for
the Court of Inquiry. Mr. Armstrong, rode out two horses in seeking
Col. Peacock, and delivered that paper, he will swear if required,
near Black Creek by 8.30. He is positive it was delivered within the
hour from the time of his getting it. From whom Booker got paper is
in itself immaterial. He went to the field in command of a brigade,
without a map, without a pencil, without a scrap of paper. Says Major
Denison, apologetically, p. 39:

  “Lt.-Col. Booker was on this eventful morning, for the first time
  in his life in command of a brigade.... During his whole military
  career he had never commanded a brigade of infantry, even at a
  review, and was sent to the front merely as a commanding officer of
  his regiment, the 13th and not in any other capacity. Chance threw
  him into the position of a brigadier-general on the morning of a
  battle, without any mounted staff, without any mounted orderlies,
  without any artillery, or cavalry, and without a mounted officer
  in the field but himself. Such was the position in which he found
  himself when forming up his command at the village of Ridgeway
  after taking them off the cars.”

Chance may have made that the morning of battle, but chance did not
find him in command of the brigade. On the cars all the way from
Hamilton he had boasted of his seniority to every other Lt.-Col. of
Volunteers likely to come in rivalry with him, and told in grand
tones that within a few days he expected to command a force of at
least 3,000 men. “And,” say the companions of his journey, “he talked
as if he were competent to command fifty thousand men.”

“Without a mounted officer in the field but himself!” By what chance,
since chance ruled the day, was he himself mounted? At Hamilton
before starting, an officer inquired “Are you not to be mounted
colonel? Why don’t you take your horse?” His reply was to poke the
officer in the side with his fingers, and say: “Skinner! there is
Skinner with his horse; I’ll dismount him.” So, that had Lt.-Col.
Booker supplied himself with a charger for the field, he would
have had at least one mounted officer besides himself. He says to
the Court of Inquiry, and Major Denison says; that finding himself
in command of the brigade, he handed over the command of the 13th
battalion to Major Skinner. Not true. He arranged that Major Gilmore
should handle the Q. O. and York Rifles, and that he would take the
rest. The only words approaching to an order given to Major Skinner
on that day were, to proceed to the front with the right wing of the
battalion, Major Cattley having charge of the left wing as supports.
Had Major Skinner been placed in command of the battalion, Major
Cattley would have gone with the right wing.

“In command of a brigade for the first time in his life.” The force
on Limestone Ridge was not at any time formed or moved as a brigade,
except on the line of march from Ridgeway to the place of first
deployance. He neither commanded his own battalion as such nor the
whole brigade as such. Yet the 13th did operate as a battalion The
Q. O. operated as a series of independent companies, some advancing,
some falling back, pretty much at their own will and option;
or dividing, some portions of a company remaining in position,
another portion falling back upon the reserve; no one in particular
controlling their motions.

Questions by Lt.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore, Court of Inquiry:

  “What did they,(the Highland Company) report on their return?” ANS.
  “I do not recollect their return. I believe them to be the last to
  leave the field.” Ques. “Did you see that we were outflanked on the
  right?” ANS. “No.” By the Court. “On what do you ground your belief
  that they were not outflanked on the right?” ANS. “Principally on
  the statements of the officers and men who were out skirmishing on
  the right.”

Following this Major Gilmore was asked by the Court, whose members
seem from first and to the end, to have had a very imperfect
knowledge of what occurred on the field, and small wonder, as they
shut themselves up against information, refusing to permit any one
who could have directed their inquiries to hear what was said by
others, except Lt.-Col. Booker, and peremptorily stopping explanatory
observations of witnesses, when they attempted to lead the Court into
a clear channel of information; Major Gilmore was asked: “When three
companies of the 13th were sent out to relieve the Queen’s Own, had
the movement been executed before the retreat was sounded?” ANS. “No;
so far as my knowledge extends. Both lines of skirmishers, Rifles
and 13th came in together.” The 13th had been out and their movement
executed nearly, if not quite one hour. Their movement was to drive
back the enemy. With the skirmishers of the Q. O. who remained in
front they did it.

Major Gilmore could not see from his position at letter C on the map,
where the right wing of the 13th were. He may have seen the rear of
the left wing, in the orchard before him.

“Did you notice,” asked Lt.-Col. Booker, “men coming down the hill to
our front at a double in front of the reserves crying, ‘cavalry’?”
ANS. “No.”

Previous to this Court of Inquiry, the story had been that the cry
of cavalry came along the Ridge road from direction of the brick
house.—That story being given up it was tried, on Booker’s behalf, to
fix the cry as coming down the hill from what he calls “our front,”
but which was his right flank, for he had never changed front, at
least his troops had not. That company was No. 1 of the 13th, coming
in at a run in obedience to the _retire_ and _double_. They had heard
no cry of cavalry.

No. 6 Company of the 13th being of the supports, the one nearest the
Q. O. reserve, got over the rails, not in time for the square, but to
form in rear of it. No other men in scarlet had reached that square
then, except they with the colours and the orderlies of the 13th. But
just as the Q. O. were being re-formed into column from the square,
which had been imperfectly formed and but momentary, (for, says Major
Gilmore, a sharp fire was then directed on it from the enemy’s front
and left,) No. 1 Company reached the ground. They hurrying over the
railings into the road, were about to form in rear of that reserve,
now half square half column, when it broke. It broke through No. 6 of
the 13th, and through No. 1. Capt. Grant was violently thrust against
the fence rails on a heap of stones. He saw some of his men trodden
down. Ensign Roy of No. 6 and some of his men were trodden down. And
in that moment of emergency Lt.-Col. Booker called the orderly who
held the horse, Major Skinner’s horse, and quickly vaulting into
the saddle rode off rapidly to the rear. All this has been denied
on behalf of Lt.-Col. Booker. Capt. Grant is a gentleman whose word
is not to be doubted. He saw the act of riding away. Others saw
the same. The companies of the 13th, which had been coming into the
road at the call of _form square_, on seeing the reserve broken and
hurriedly retreating continued their line of retreat across the
fields towards garrison road. The companies at the front which had
not heard the bugle call to retire, observed their supports gone, and
retreated along the ridge road. When arrived where the reserve had
been there was no reserve, no square, no column, no Queen’s Own.

Bugler Clarke says Booker ordered and he obeyed to sound the halt.—It
was sounded, but most say who heard it, rather faintly, bugler
and colonel being both in a hurry. The Court of Inquiry makes one
witness, Mr. Urquart assistant editor of the Hamilton _Spectator_,
and who was in the ranks of the 13th to say:

  “Several attempts by officers of the 13th and the Rifles were made
  to rally or re-form the men. I noticed Colonel Booker and Adjutant
  Henery do this, and Ensign Armstrong who carried the colours.”

Mr. Urquart did not say this. The Court made several answers into
one; thereby placing Booker where he was not. Adjutant Henery was
not where Booker was. Mr. Armstrong was with the colours, but Booker
was not there. Mr. Urquart was in No. 4 Company, which under Lieut.
Routh was one of the supports at the head of the orchard to the right
front of the square C. “What made your Company retreat?” asked the
Court. “We retreated because the bugle sounded retreat; and we were
also ordered to retreat by Lieut. Routh the officer in command of our
Company, who afterwards said it must have been a mistake as it should
have been the advance, and ordered us to halt and front—and we halted
and fronted accordingly.” Then, as the skirmishers came in rapidly in
obedience to the call of _double_, they all retreated. There was no
reserve to go to, it had melted away. No. 4 Company and No. 5 under
Captain Askin again halted and formed at the corner of garrison and
Ridge roads. By that time also Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery and
they who had been in the most advanced front got up; all tried their
utmost to re-organize a force to withstand the enemy now steadily
though cautiously coming in pursuit. Lieut. Gibson of No. 4 saw
Adjutant Henery near the log house (see map) at a tree, assembling
men around him; also Major Skinner near the same spot endeavoring to
arrest and re-form the retreating current, which was then a mixture
of green and red uniforms. He saw Captain Davis of the York rifles
making efforts to organize a force near Mrs. Ryerson’s house. Major
Skinner had partially succeeded in forming a red line across the
road with fixed bayonets directed against the retreat. But his men
were overborne by a rush from behind. Lieut. Routh was there shot
through the body and carried into one of the houses. The University
and Highland companies were then streaming along, having left several
dead and wounded on the track of their retreat. Brave spirits all.
Youths of fair promise cut down in the morning of life, who an hour
before had, with the rest, driven the invading strangers before them,
now destroyed on a retreat which should never have occurred, for
which there was no cause, the culpable author of which was away on
horseback to the front, among the leaders of the panic.

He denies, and loud denials have been made on his behalf that he went
away on horseback. Captain Grant saw him ride off, when the square
and the column dissolved. The Revd. Mr. Inglis who, as a minister
of religion accompanied the 13th from Hamilton, and witnessed as
much of the action as lay between Garrison road and concession road,
and was now on the ammunition waggon with Q. S. Stoneman, says; “I
saw Colonel Booker on the horse (Major Skinner’s) coming towards
Ridgeway.” “Oh no,” said Colonel Booker to the Revd. gentleman when
before the Court of Inquiry, “I was on foot, not on horseback.” But
Mr. Inglis was not mistaken, and he is a witness not to be overborne
by such questionable obliquity of an inculpated party. Lieut.
McKinnon, Caledonia company, said “Col. Booker was on horseback when
he came to Ridgeway.”

But, “Colonel Booker may have hastened to the front of the retreat
to intercept it.” Did he? What in this supposition comes of the want
of evidence of his trying to stem the panic which he had made? What
comes of facts to the contrary, showing that he not only hurried
away himself but prevented others from arresting the retreat? Here
are facts which would have been given in evidence to the Court of
Inquiry, which sat at Hamilton in July, had its members summoned
witnesses whose names were furnished to them, but whom they did not
call. A volunteer officer who commanded a company in the action wrote
to Hamilton for the information of the officers of the 13th. He said;
“Have Lieut. Davis of York Rifles, and Capt. Jackson of Caledonia
Rifles summoned, witnesses as to the language and action of Col.
Booker upon the 2nd ult. I will give you a resume of what they will
swear. Mr. Davis stopped the Colonel (Booker) and begged him to
halt, and rally the men as they knew him. The reply he got was: ‘We
must go to the lake shore.’ Some distance farther on he came up to
Captain Jackson’s company which was the rear guard. He asked, ‘what
company, and who commands?’ and received the reply as above (that
it was rear guard, Caledonia company, commanded by Capt. Jackson).
Then Colonel Booker said: ‘Save yourselves men, the Fenians are after
you!’ The company broke at once, until stopped by their Captain.”

The writer continued: “I have not the slightest ill-feeling, or
wish, for Col. Booker. On the contrary I feel heartily sorry for the
man; but I do not think it fair that the good name and fame of the
officers and men of a good regiment should be impugned, much less
sacrificed, to shield the incompetence of any man. I think I am only
doing my duty as a man who loves his country, and as a volunteer who
knows the stuff there is in the force, if I can throw any light upon
the cause of the disaster of the 2nd of June.”

The gentlemen indicated by this officer were not called, though their
names, on behalf of the slandered 13th, were furnished to the Court
of Inquiry. As was also the name of Captain McGrath, Manager of the
Welland Railway, whose important statement will be read presently. At
the end of August while these pages are preparing for the press, I am
in receipt of a letter; from which the following extract is made in
reference to the passages just quoted: “Had Lieut. Davis been called
before the court he would have given his evidence without any malice,
fear, or favour.”

“Must go to the lake shore.” Could not halt then. The lake shore,
from the point where this fugitive speech was made, Mrs. Ryerson’s
house or thereabout, was eight, or ten, or more miles away according
to the road he might take. By the road he took it was twelve miles
away.

Major Gilmore says (C. of In.) he could have at any time halted and
gathered around him a few hundreds of men, but deemed the effort of
no use. He saw officers at different points of the road “exciting
themselves frantically” to arrest the retreat. Such were his words,
but he was more cool and allowed things to happen as fate and
confusion without a commander would have it. Lieut. Arthur of the
Q. O. has been reported as grandly stemming the tide of retreat,
in its very front, at Ridgeway. He may have been one of those who
“frantically excited themselves.” A more practical question, is;
how did Lieut. Arthur get there so soon? Mr. Arthur a civilian gave
evidence to the Court of Inquiry somewhat exculpatory of Booker. But
it is not forgotten at Hamilton that this same Mr. Arthur returned
from the field of action, where he had been a non-combatant, on the
evening of 2nd of June, and at the railway depot was the first to
give intimation that Booker had broken down as commander and made a
fool of himself.

Men of the 13th called to mind on the line of retreat, that when
Booker was largely pompous at the Hamilton drill-shed on the previous
morning he said, “I know you will follow me.” They followed, but only
a few could get sight of him.

Captains Grant, Askin, Ferguson, Lieut. Gibson, and other officers of
the 13th got sight of him half a mile past Ridgeway. A considerable
force was then halted on the road. They expected that a stand would
be made, the ground being advantageous for resistance, and fighting.
Booker was heard calling for somebody to show the road to Port
Colborne. To a farmer looking on, he trotted up, then returning to
the imperfect column cried “Fours right, quick march!” And so the
return to Colborne was continued in that disorder which incompetency
had initiated, and aggravated. Sometimes he was seen riding, again
walking, and trotting on foot in the semblance of a man crazed in the
head. At Sherkston, five miles west of Ridgeway, they got a railway
train to Colborne. It took them at two trips.

At some point on the road Booker turned to observe the dislocated
column and accosted Sergeant Gibbons whom I have named as affirming
with others that the bugle calls of _retire_ and _double_ gave origin
to the retreat. This general of brigade, who had been so grand
yesterday, that “he looked and talked as if able to command fifty
thousand men,” and who at Port Colborne had asserted his seniority
and displaced the officer who came in command from Toronto, now
murmured in whining tone, and broken speech; “Sergeant, I suppose
this is not your first engagement with an enemy? It is mine.” He gave
the horse to carry a sick man, and on this his apologists form a
claim for magnanimity. It would have been the attitude of a General
to remain mounted, especially on the retreat, that his person might
be observed, his place known, his command heard. A true soldier,
while modest, mild, keenly perceptive that necessary equipments were
present with his force, while days were pleasant and peaceful, would
have now risen with the crisis, firm in his saddle, firm in mind,
lofty with the great emergency, to retrieve order out of confusion.

But Brigadier-General Booker straddled on foot a little while, then
got on the horse a little while, got down again, and again ambled on
foot, seeking sociality with the bugler, the groom, the sergeant,
abjectly mumbling that he had never previously been in battle; then
getting hold of a Lieutenant’s arm said; “I am a failure; I have
failed; I acknowledge my failure.” And to a Captain uttering words
to the same effect. And at Port Colborne continuing his abject
confession to others.

Generous minds might have forgiven him after his miserable
confessions however much they deplored the unhappy consequences of
his incompetency, triumph to the enemy, derision of the Province by
Americans; wild invention of calumnies against the 13th battalion,
because he, its Lt.-Col., had involved the Q. O. Rifles in discredit.
In face of all this his subordinate officers and battalion might
have pitied the man while they deplored his military failure. But
with a feeling of safety to his own person, he began to retract
his confessions of incapacity, and to give currency to accusations
of blame on his troops, and proclaim himself a martyr. At Colborne
a report of the morning’s work was written for the authorities,
imperfect, and untrue. He did not seek the assistance of any officer
of the 13th all of whom could have informed him of as much of the
action as they engaged in the front could know. He did not employ
his own orderly room clerk to write for him. He got a person of the
Q. O. to write, in order to satisfy Major Gilmore; and even then the
Major gave only a general assent to the report. “Yes, its general
tenor was correct, and I assented to it.” But Major Gilmore was not
quite exact about it himself according to his own statement. The
report said the telegram arrived at 9.30 after an hour and a half
of hot fighting. That was not true. It spoke of driving the enemy
from their rifle pits. There were no rifle pits. It said we were in
a cul de sac. There was no cul de sac. All was open to the front
except intervening woods. The enemy had retreated through the woods.
The report said nothing of the 13th having as a battalion advanced
from garrison road across fields and fences half a mile, the enemy
retiring before their beautiful red line, and then across concession
road; they engaged in fight one hour, except the supports lying
within 150 yards of the skirmish line, which however were actually
advancing to the relief of their right wing when the retire stopped
them; while most of that _one hour_ the Q. O. were in reserve, two
companies on the right front, and one on the extreme left front
only excepted. On the contrary Lt.-Col. Booker caused a telegram
to be sent to his superiors reporting the 13th as demoralized, and
unfit for duty. It has been denied by himself and friends that he
did so. But it is known on the highest railway authority that such
messages with his name appended, went over the wires. A Hamilton
newspaper gave currency to that phrase, demoralization. Two days
after, Lieut.-Colonel Booker visited the reporter, and besought him
to retract the imputation, saying “You know it was not I who said
demoralized; it was that —— rascal Gilmore.”

THE SQUARE. _Ques._, by Lieut.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore. “Were
you satisfied with my conduct on the field?” _Ans._ “Col. Booker
asked me the same question in Port Colborne, and I now give him the
same answer that I did then, which was that I could see nothing in
his conduct to disapprove of except with regard to the formation of
the square, which I thought at that time was a mistake and I think so
still.”

_Ques._ By Court. “Who gave the order to form square?” _Ans._
“Lieut.-Col. Booker gave the caution to look out for Cavalry, and I
gave the command to form square.”

AMMUNITION OF Q. O. The paragraph beginning on page 77, and ending
on page 78, in this chapter is inaccurate as respects the alleged
non-supply of ammunition; but not as regards the omission to post
sentries on the arrival of the Q. O. at Colborne. The misstatement
made on authority which I trusted was unfortunate, yet the ammunition
served at Toronto was inadequate to go into a locality near the
presence of an enemy. The following evidence touches this highly
important question:

_Ques._ To Alex Muir, Q. O. “How many rounds of ammunition had
been issued to you?” _Ans._ “I received 5 rounds at Toronto before
leaving; and 30 rounds at Port Colborne. I had 35 rounds.”

To _Ques._ of the Court to Major Gilmore; _Ans._ “No. 5 company were
armed, about forty of them, with Spencer rifles, and for those rifles
they had under thirty rounds each man; the remainder of the company
were armed with long Enfields. The whole regiment had on average
forty rounds of ammunition per man.” _Q._ by the court: “How long
were they under fire when the right wing of the 13th were advanced
to their relief?” _Ans._ “I could not form any idea as to the time.”
Major Skinner, Adj. Henery, Capts. Askin, Grant, Watson, Ferguson,
Lieut. Gibson, Private Urquart, Editor of Spectator, all say that the
13th were engaged about one hour.

DRILL OF THE Q. O. In reply to questions from the Court, Major
Gilmore said;

  “They were as a rule partially drilled, some men undrilled.
  Recruits are joining every week. All the available men, drilled
  and undrilled, were in the field. With the exception of one or two
  days in May when the whole battalion was out skirmishing, I am
  satisfied that half of the battalion had never fired a shot,” (with
  blank cartridge). _Ques._ “What proportion had not fired with ball
  cartridge?” _Ans._ “The proportion was about the same; one half.”
  _Ques._ “What proportion of the regiment was composed of lads
  under 20 years of age?” _Ans._ “I should say more than half the
  regiment.” _Ques._ “Did you observe any difference in the demeanour
  of the lads and the older soldiers going into action?” _Ans._
  “No. Each were equally cool. I may state here that this was the
  first occasion in which the whole regiment had the opportunity to
  skirmish as a battalion. I also wish to state that I saw the right
  wing of the 13th extend and advance in skirmishing order, and that
  nothing could exceed the steadiness and regularity with which they
  advanced.”


LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.


TORONTO Q. O. RIFLES.

  KILLED.—Ensign Malcolm McEachern, No. 5 Company, Sergeant H.
  Matheson, No. 1, Private Christopher Alderson, No. 7, Private M.
  Defries, No. 3, Private W. F. Tempest, No. 9, Private William
  Smith, No. 2, Private J. H. Mewburn, No. 9, Private M. McKenzie,
  No. 9, Corporal F. Lackie, No. 2.

  WOUNDED.—Captain J. B. Boustead, No. 3 Company, Lieut. J. H.
  Beaven, No. 3, Lieut. W. C. Campbell, No. 6, Ensign Fahey, No. 1,
  Color Sergeant Forbes McHardy, No. 10, Private C. F. Bell, No. 5,
  Private W. Vandersmissen, No. 9, Private Kingsford, No. 9, Private
  John White, No. 10, Private Paul Robbins, No. 6, Private Thomas
  Oulster, No. 1, Private William Thompson, No. 2, Private Charles
  Winter, No. 3, Private Colin Forsyth, No. 10, Private Edward Copp,
  No. 5, Private J. H. Rutherford, No. 6, Private E. J. Patterson,
  No. 9, Private Joseph Lugsden, No. 4, Private Alexander Muir, No.
  10, Private E. T. Paul, No. 9, Sergeant William Foster, No. 7,
  Color-Sergeant John Tuck, York Rifles. Private Robert Cranston,
  ditto.


HAMILTON 13TH—WOUNDED.

  Private Edwin Hilders, No. 1 Company, Private S. Dallas, No.
  3, Private J. G. Powell, No. 3, Private James Stewart, No. 3,
  Lieut. Routh, No. 4, Private John Donnely, No. 5, Private Richard
  Pentecost, No. 3, Private McKenzie, No. 4.

  Private Morrison died of fatigue. Several suffered from sun stroke.

  Welland Field Battery, at Fort Erie Village. Wounded: Capt. King,
  leg amputated. Sergeant Bradley, and several others very severely.

FENIANS KILLED.—Nine bodies found on Limestone Ridge, one at French
Creek. Several said to have been found dead near Fort Erie, and some
bodies carried to Buffalo. Most of the wounded were carried away; two
were brought prisoners to Colborne Hospital.



LIEUT.-COL. BOOKER’S REPORT OF THE COMBAT AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.

                                          PORT COLBORNE, June 2, 1866.

  SIR,—I have the honour to report that, in accordance with
  instructions received from Colonel Peacocke, through Capt. Akers,
  I proceeded by train at 5 a. m. to-day to Ridgway station on the
  Buffalo and Lake Huron R. R., with the Queen’s Own, of Toronto,
  Major Gilmore, say 480 men of all ranks; the York Rifles, Capt.
  Davis; the Caledonia Rifles, Capt. Jackson; and the 13th Battalion
  of Hamilton—together about 360 men—total of all ranks, say 840 men,
  in order to form a junction with Col. Peacocke, at Stevensville, at
  9 to 9.30 a. m. On arriving at Ridgway, I sent the Great Western
  Railway train away; and as I could not obtain a horse or waggon
  in the place for the conveyance of the force, I was compelled to
  leave without the stores, and sent them back to Port Colborne at a
  little before 8 a. m. We were feeling our way on the Stevensville
  road, and were about three miles from that village, when our
  advanced guard felt the enemy—Major Gilmore extended the Queen’s
  Own in skirmishing order, in admirable style—the men advancing in
  good spirits. They were supported and relieved, as required, by
  the 13th Battalion of Hamilton and the Rifle companies from York
  and Caledonia. After Major Gilmore had expended much ammunition,
  he reported to me that his ammunition was failing. At 9.30, after
  being engaged under a hot fire for an hour and a half, I observed
  the enemy throwing back his right and reinforcing his left flank.
  I immediately ordered up two companies in support, to counteract
  the movement. At this moment I received a telegram by the hands
  of Mr. Stovin, Welland Railway, on the field, informing me that
  Col. Peacocke could not leave Chippewa before 7 o’clock, instead
  of 5 a. m., the hour named by Capt. Akers on his behalf. The enemy
  was strongly posted in the woods on the west of the garrison
  road, the road forming the entrance as it were to a _cul de sac_.
  We outflanked him, when he brought up his centre reserves and
  outflanked us. We drove them, in the first place, over a mile, and
  held possession of the rifle pits. A cry of cavalry from the front,
  and the retreat of a number of men in our centre on the reserves,
  caused me to form a square and prepare for cavalry. This mistake
  originated from relieved skirmishers doubling back. I immediately
  re-formed column, and endeavoured to deploy to the right. A panic
  here seized our men, and I could not bring them again to the front.
  I regret to say we have lost several valuable officers and men. I
  estimate the strength of the enemy as greater than ours; and, from
  the rapid firing, they were evidently armed with repeating rifles.

                                     I have, &c.,
                                 (Signed)     A. BOOKER,
                                        Lieut.-Col. Com. Vol. Militia.



CHAPTER XII.

  _Lt.-Col. Dennis; Capt. Akers of Royal Engineers. Welland Field
  Battery. Capt. McCallum, Lieut. Robb, Steam tug Robb and Dunnville
  Naval Brigade on 2nd of June. Capt. Harbottle and Hamilton Naval
  Brigade. Toronto Naval Brigade._

Let us return to Lt.-Col. Dennis who came to Colborne on June 1st
commanding the Toronto Q. O. Rifles. He made reconnoisances during
the afternoon in various directions; on B. and L. H. Railway twelve
miles east from Colborne, to a point five miles from Fort Erie,
where the Fenians had burned a railway bridge at 7 a. m. that day.
Lt.-Col. Booker having, as senior officer, taken command, Dennis and
Capt. Akers of the Royal Engineers, who arrived at midnight from Col.
Peacocke to advise and assist went on board the tug steamer Robb at 4
a. m. June 2nd. They took with them the Welland Artillery, with only
small arms (their heavy guns being at Hamilton), 3 officers, Capt.
King, Lieuts. Scholefield and Nimmo, and 50 men. Lachlan McCallum
Esq., owner of the tug, and captain of Dunnville Naval Brigade, with
Lieut. Robb, sailing master of the boat and 25 men were present.

Whatever may be said of the indiscretion of attempting to alter the
plans of Col. Peacocke who commanded in chief, it must be accorded
to the officers of this expedition that they evinced enterprise and
courage in seeking to find the enemy at the earliest moment, and
confront him in mortal combat when found. The same credit is due
to Lt.-Col. Booker. That he is not covered with honorable renown,
and known this day as Sir Alfred Booker, Knt. is due to his want
of perspicuity of judgment, allied with firmness in the crisis
of action, not to a want of preliminary boldness to advance and
encounter the enemy. Supported as he was by officers whose souls
were in the service, and whose souls were honour, and by men every
one of them worthy of such officers; and with an enemy before him
well armed and equipped and accustomed to arms and to field strategy
the most difficult to cope with, but a strategy affording the more
honour to him who circumvents and vanquishes it, namely: the wary,
hiding, creeping, advancing, retiring, slippery tactics of desultory
bush-fighting, Lt.-Col. Booker had that day a life-long renown within
his reach; but he did not grasp the glory flitting before him.

On passing down the river between Buffalo and Fort Erie, a patrol
boat of the U. S. steamer Michigan challenged the Robb, and after
explanations, permitted its passage, giving information that the
Fenians had quitted their entrenchments on French Creek during the
night. The Robb went down the river as far as Black Creek, nine miles
below Fort Erie village, eight miles above Chippewa. There they were
informed that the Fenians had turned westward, passing near New
Germany. Says Lieut. Col. Dennis in his report: “A message was at
once sent off to Col. Peacocke, we presumed then under previously
concerted arrangement to be near there moving up, and we returned
with the tug in accordance with that arrangement, to meet Col. Booker
and the Port Colborne force at the upper railroad depot at Fort Erie.
On our arrival there we could see or hear nothing of them.”

No. Had they come there, the Fenians would have slipped through
between both forces, Booker’s and Peacocke’s; done what damage they
chose to the Welland Canal, and have been, possibly, afloat on Lake
Erie before evening, in shipping seized at Colborne or Dunnville. Or,
still possibly, though not probably, they, daring much to obtain a
temporary success, might have arrived at the city of Hamilton. What
then, imagination declines to suggest.

The Robb then returned to Fort Erie village, where the Welland men
were landed. They were divided in two wings; the right with Lieut.
Scholefield; the left Lieut. Nimmo, the whole under Capt. King.
One wing took the lake shore road, the other the railway line, and
scoured the district northerly, collecting prisoners which the
farmers and customs officers and villagers had previously captured.
They were occasionally accompanied by Lt.-Col. Dennis and Capt.
Akers. During the afternoon intelligence reached the village that
the Fenians had been engaged and were defeated. Capt. King expecting
them to retreat towards the Niagara, put his men on board the Robb,
and the prisoners under hatches, and was preparing to defend the
vessel by breast-works of cordwood on deck; the vessel to patrol the
river and prevent the enemy’s escape. But on Lt.-Col. Dennis who had
been for a time absent, returning and assuming command, the Welland
company were ordered on shore; for, says Dennis: “concluding that
the action which was known to have taken place had resulted in the
capture of the enemy, I,” &c. The enemy not having been captured,
made a sudden appearance, coming down the street from south, and
over the heights, only 100 to 200 yards distant from west. They
opened rifle fire on the Welland men at once, which was as promptly
returned. Capt. King was shot in the leg; several men were also
severely hurt. Dennis, at a run led them to northward, down the river
side. Most of the men, and Lieuts. Scholefield and Nimmo occupied
Mr. Leslie’s house, the post office, and for a time returned a sharp
rifle fire. Ultimately they capitulated as prisoners, being but as
one to twelve of their assailants. Windows and doors were riddled
with Fenian shot. Lt.-Col. Dennis continued his retreat a half mile
further. He entered the house of a friend, Mr. Thomas, changed his
clothes, shaved his beard, took a pipe and came out to the door
smoking, as if a resident of the house. The Fenians who came in
pursuit were told that no one else was there, and returned to the
village, not suspecting the man before them to be Lt.-Col. Dennis.

I heard language of severest censure used against Dennis by the
Welland company. Since then Capt. King has accused him of cowardice
and he has in turn demanded a court of inquiry on his conduct.

The Robb with 65 Fenian prisoners on board and only a portion of
the naval brigade fell down the river but afterwards steamed up,
exposed to a rifle fire from the shore. The Fenians knew their people
were captives on board, and therefore aimed to shoot the steersman.
Lieut. Robb stood by the helm, several bullets hitting near him. He
proceeded to Colborne and delivered the prisoners. They were carried
by railway to Brantford jail. From there to Toronto.

The prisoners whom the Fenians held were detained in the post office,
and in Dr. Kempson’s house, Fenian guards over them in the early
part of the night. At daybreak they saw no guards. After a time
some ventured out. Then all were informed that they were no longer
prisoners.

About the time when the Fenians arrived near the village on Saturday
afternoon, from Ridgeway, Capt. Akers was near the Fort Erie railway
station. He discovered his danger, and having a wheeled conveyance
drove away westward, and reached Colborne about seven in the evening.
In his report he speaks of finding the garrison there in disorder.
The Q. O. exhausted from the battle, and other newly arrived
volunteers, being billeted through the village, there was no doubt a
semblance of confusion. But Capt. Akers did not see the 13th. They
were quartered all in one building, the school house, outside the
village, and remained there in as good order as troops usually are
in after coming from a long march. I saw them next day and affirm
that they were orderly, soldierly, diligent in restoring their
accoutrements and clothes to cleanliness. Nothing unusual to the
best military regulations issued from their lips, except a unanimous
outpouring of scorn against Lt.-Col. Booker.

The Dunnville naval brigade under Capt. McCallum, and the steamer
Robb his property, under Lieut. Robb, continued their good service
to government and for public interests. They complained of being
overlooked in official thanks; and some newspapers intimated that
Capt. McCallum, offended at ill-treatment was about to sell his
property at Dunnville and leave the Province. They who said so,
little understand the patriotism of Lauchlin McCallum; or of his
Lieutenant. Their zeal for Canada, the new country adopted, and for
old country laws brought to consolidate amplest political freedom
with social stability in Canada, is too earnest, to be converted to
antagonism, by any temporary oversight, or neglect, or even rebuffs
of government.

Captain Harbottle at Hamilton organized a naval company in 1862.
He and his officers have twice supplied them with naval uniforms
to the number of about seventy; besides paying drill instructors.
During the crisis of June and July 1866, when the regular troops were
removed from Hamilton to the frontier, this volunteer naval brigade,
numbering then 55 men present, some of its members being as sailors
absent with their vessels, did all the garrison duty, and did it
well. They mounted guards on the stores, magazine, military hospital,
and drill-shed armory. They watched the bay. The Captain performed
the duty of commandant of Hamilton city in all its departments. He
and his men gave the citizens confidence in union with the Volunteer
Artillery, and Home Guard. Their services have been appreciated by
the people, yet not well rewarded. The uniform of the company instead
of coming from government has been provided solely at the expense of
the captain and his officers.

In Toronto a naval company was organized, with Mr. McMaster, a
merchant, acting as captain. They went to Lake Erie on service in the
steamer Rescue in June, which vessel was afterwards manned by British
man-of-war’s men from the Aurora frigate. The Toronto company is
dissolved. The reason why I have failed to ascertain.



CHAPTER XIII.

  _At Port Colborne. Officers of Volunteers from St. Catharines and
  London urge Capt. Akers R. E. to obtain orders to remove Booker
  from command. The midnight alarm. Morning of 3rd June. Capt
  McGrath’s Statement. Booker at Hamilton. Returns to Colborne. His
  telegrams to Col. Lowry commanding Niagara force. Col. L. refuses
  to restore him to command of the 13th Battalion. Court of Inquiry.
  Suppression of truth. Perversion of facts._


Capt. Akers stated in his report, after relating what he knew of
occurrences at Fort Erie: “I arrived at Colborne between 6 and 7
o’clock in the evening. The troops that had been engaged in the
morning were considerably exhausted from want of rest and food. Col.
Booker appeared quite overcome with fatigue and anxiety. He begged
me to undertake all necessary arrangements, and later in the evening
requested me to take the command out of his hands. _Finding this was
the wish of other volunteer officers of rank superior to myself_, I
telegraphed for instructions, and was desired by Col. Lowry to take
the command.”

The troops which had arrived at Colborne since the morning were seven
volunteer companies of Prince Arthur’s Own, from London C. W. Four of
the 22nd Oxford, with the Drumbo company attached, and two companies
of Home Guards from St. Catharines.

Added to these were now the Q. O. and 13th battalions, York and
Caledonia companies, in all about 1,400. Brigadier-General Booker
who last night asserted his seniority and took command, was now in
a condition of maudlin imbecility. He should have taken command of
this force of 1,400. There it was, for aught that any mortal could
tell, exposed on one of the most important strategical points of
Canada to a reinforced enemy from Fort Erie; and to invasion by
water from southern ports of Lake Erie. Nobody in command. That man,
whom a court of inquiry subsequently pronounced to have behaved
as a soldier, now going about in a condition of idiotcy. Had he
surrendered to his next in command in the 13th measures of precaution
would have been taken. But Major Skinner knew nothing of Booker’s
resignation. The garrison was without a responsible head. Lt.-Col.
McGiverin, M. P. P., arrived at 5 p. m. and assisted.

About midnight an alarm was sounded. The troops who lay accoutred
rose, fell in, stood to arms, threw out patrols, and strengthened
piquets. Booker was lying among the men in the school house, weary no
doubt, as all were. He was shaken, rolled over, and violently pulled
in efforts to arouse him (men’s statement). Then he arose staring
wildly, calling, “Where are they? Where are they? What shall I do?
What can I do?”


CAPT. McGRATH’S STATEMENT.

At one o’clock, a. m., Sunday morning, 3rd of June, 1866, sixteen
hours after the combat with the Fenians, at Limestone Ridge, Capt.
McGrath, General Manager of the Welland Railway, received at St.
Catharines the following telegram from Port Colborne.

“Men at Station, Hurry up. A new attack expected here.” This was
signed by Dr. Mack, of St. Catharines, who was then at Colborne. The
meaning of the message was obscure. But a train was placed upon the
track without delay, and certain companies of Volunteers carried from
St. Catharines to Colborne, Mr. McGrath accompanying the train. While
backing to clear the crossing of the Buffalo and Lake Huron line,
and while it was yet barely daylight, a person came on the Welland
line platform, at a running pace, carrying a cloak, and a sword
and belt loose in his arms. This was Colonel Booker. In manner and
language, excited and incoherent, he cried; “For God’s sake send back
this train to St. Catharines. I want to go—to go now. We are attacked
in the woods a mile back, the alarm has just sounded, I want to go to
St. Catharines at once, send this train special!”

Capt. McGrath replied that the train could not go then, the wounded
and sick were to be carried in it and he must wait for them. To which
Colonel Booker rejoined, “Hold my cloak! what shall we do? we are
attacked, hold my cloak.” “I cannot hold your cloak, sir, I have
other business to attend to, some of these men about the platform can
hold it.” That was the response of the General Manager. Then said
Colonel Booker, “Take my sword, hold my sword”. On which Mr. McGrath
responded, “Really, Sir, I have no time to hold your sword, I am
busy”. Colonel Booker again murmured incoherently, something about
the Fenians being in the wood, and that he wanted to go a passenger
to St. Catharines by the train.

His words, action and look, suggested that he was in a condition of
violent mental aberration.

An alarm had just then, or shortly before, been sounded by the
bugles, and the 13th battalion of which Booker was Lieutenant
Colonel, as well as the other volunteers which with the 13th he had
commanded as General of brigade on the previous day, had turned out
and were standing under arms.

An attack was expected. He had left them to their fate.

Either Colonel Booker was in a condition of temporary insanity in
relation to his duty, on one hand, and in relation to his personal
danger on the other, or he was sane, and wanted to escape the
supposed danger of another Fenian fight. Which of these conditions do
his friends elect to judge him by.

The foregoing statement was first published when the Court of Inquiry
was about to meet at Hamilton. In August it was again submitted to
Capt. McGrath to know if lapse of time, or newer information had
led him to modify his first impressions. He said this was true, and
various other occurrences of that morning and of the evening before,
not related in that statement, confirmed the opinion that Booker was
on those days wholly unfitted, physically and mentally, for military
command.

One of these officers of volunteers whom Capt. Akers alludes to as of
superior rank to himself and who advised that Booker, for the safety
of all, should be removed from command of any, was on Sunday morning
witness of his frantic imbecility in clutching hold of Mr. McGrath at
the railway depot.

Lt.-Col. Booker went to Hamilton on Sunday 3rd June. Telegrams
published there on the 4th gave him information that the Fenians were
vanquished: had retreated across the Niagara river, after a fight
with the Welland field battery and Dunnville naval brigade on the
2nd and were intercepted by the U. S. steamer Michigan, which held
them prisoners for breach of the neutrality laws. On the evening
of Monday the 4th Booker re-appeared at Colborne. He telegraphed
to Col. Lowry as if nothing had occurred to interrupt his command,
“I am here awaiting your orders.” This was not replied to. But on
next day Col. Lowry, in a telegram to Lt.-Col. Villiers of the 47th
regulars who was there, inquired; “What does Booker mean? He says
he awaits my orders. He resigned his command on Saturday; it was
accepted; he cannot be re-instated.” On being informed of this Booker
telegraphed again that he had only resigned command of the brigade,
not of the 13th battalion. Col. Lowry did not answer, but sent to
Lt.-Col. Villiers saying: “Major Skinner commands the 13th battalion;
render him all the assistance he may require. If Col. Booker is not
satisfied he may apply to Major-General Napier.”

Booker on next day returned to Hamilton, went to Toronto, and
induced General Napier to telegraph to Lt.-Col. Villiers to assemble
the officers of the 13th, and submit a proposal that they should
sign a letter of solicitation, asking to have Lt.-Col. Booker
restored to the 13th battalion. The officers refused to sign any
such application. They unequivocally made known to the military
authorities, then and afterwards, that if Booker were restored to the
command of the battalion they would not serve under him. By him their
honor had been impugned; by him the battalion was maligned, and all
to cover his own unsoldierly, scandalous misconduct. Not alone on the
field, but by his desertion of them and misrepresentation at Port
Colborne.

He applied for a Court of Inquiry. It was granted. Three volunteer
colonels assembled at Hamilton on 3rd of July. Col. Denison of
Toronto, President; Colonels Chisholm of Oakville, and Shanly of
London C. W., members. The officers of the 13th were not permitted
to be present at the Inquiry neither in their own persons, nor by a
legal representative to examine witnesses, and keep them to lines of
truth, and to lead them to a development of truth, beyond the points
at which it suited Booker to interrupt them. And yet he, with the
assistance of a lawyer out of doors, had his choice of persons and
questions, and style of putting questions at his discretion. And the
Court acquiesced in that mockery of Inquiry. Witnesses who would have
given inculpatory evidence had they told truth, as they tell it out
of doors, were not called.

But the Court pronounced: “That so far as the courage and character
of Lt.-Col. Booker, with reference to his command of the force
engaged with the enemy at Lime Ridge, on Saturday the 2nd of June,
are affected, _there is not the slightest foundation for the
unfavorable imputations cast upon him_ in the public prints, and most
improperly circulated through that channel and otherwise.”

       *       *       *       *       *

“And the Court lastly find that the whole of the wounded and sick
were brought with the retreating column.”

The wounded and killed were left on the field except in the cases of
slight hurts.

On 11th of August the official _Gazette_ announced that the command
of the 13th, battalion, resigned by Lt.-Col. Booker on 8th of May
had been accepted and that Major James Skinner was appointed to
the Lieut.-Colonelcy. Colonel Lowry as chief in Niagara District
had refused to re-instate Col. Booker on the 5th of June when he
begged to be re-appointed, he having been superseded on the 2nd.
Who re-instated him so that he should be gazetted out of command on
the 11th of August? But he remains commandant of Hamilton, of the
volunteer forces, the 13th included, naval brigade, and artillery. He
is a gentleman of good address, and looks well on holidays.

THE WOUNDED.—Lieut. Routh, of the 13th, has stated that when he and
other wounded volunteers were left in the house, (log house on the
map) Colonel O’Neil entered, and after enquiring about their wounds,
expressed hope that the Lieut. would recover. “Does your sword-belt
hurt you?” said the Fenian chief. “Take it off,” replied Mr. Routh;
“I am your prisoner; I suppose the sword is, by right of war,
yours.” O’Neil removed it, handling the wounded officer tenderly;
then said: “No, I will not take it, it’s possession may be a solace
to you; I will leave it by your side.” “Thank you,” rejoined Mr.
Routh, “but some one less kind may come and take it.” Said O’Neil
“Let me conceal it under the bedding.” And he placed the sword under
the mattress, where it might not be seen by any less honorable
visitors, and in mild accents said farewell. Mr. Routh has recovered,
but no one then thought him likely to recover.

Mr. Lawson of Colborne, who was present near the fight and remained
among the wounded, relates that O’Neil or some other Fenian officer
gave him a written protection to go over the field and collect the
wounded into the houses. Major Denison on this, pp. 69, 70, says:

  “Before closing this chapter I must mention that from all accounts
  the Fenians, except in so far as they were wrong in invading a
  peaceful country, in carrying on an unjustifiable war, behaved
  remarkably well to the inhabitants, I spent three weeks in Fort
  Erie and conversed with dozens of the people of the place, and
  was astonished at the universal testimony borne by them to the
  unvarying good conduct of this rabble while among them. They
  claimed food and horses, but they can hardly be blamed for that
  as an act of war, but can only be blamed because the war itself,
  which alone could give them the right to take these things was
  unjustifiable and wicked. They have been called plunderers, robbers
  and marauders, yet, no matter how unwilling we may be to admit it,
  the positive fact remains, that they stole but few valuables, that
  they destroyed, comparatively speaking, little or nothing and that
  they committed no outrages on the inhabitants but treated every one
  with unvarying courtesy.

  “On taking a number of the Welland Battery and the Naval Company
  prisoners they treated them with the greatest kindness, putting the
  officers under their parole and returning them their side-arms,
  taking them down to the wharf on their departure and releasing
  them, bidding them adieu with expressions of good will.”

But the treatment of the University rifleman, the youthful student,
J. H. Mewburn, was by evidence of surviving associates, not tender
nor chivalrous.

  “John Herman Mewburn, who fell at Lime-ridge, a member of the
  University College Rifles, was a student of three years standing,
  and had distinguished himself very highly at Upper Canada College,
  and also at the University of Toronto where he carried off four
  scholarships, and although in ill health from hard study, and unfit
  for service, he hesitated not a moment at the call of duty to join
  his brave comrades. In the retreat he fell, struck by a rifle
  bullet on the temple, which fractured the inner plate, and produced
  delirium and convulsions. He was made prisoner by the enemy,
  robbed, and very roughly if not cruelly used by them. His hands
  were bound behind him and he was thrown on his face, but at the
  earnest request of a wounded comrade, Mr. Rupert Kingsford, he was
  turned on his back, and his hands unbound half an hour before he
  died. Loved and esteemed by all who knew him, and deeply regretted
  in death, the inhabitants of his native township honored him with
  the highest honors it was in their power to bestow, viz: a public
  funeral. The deceased was a grandson of the late Dr. Mewburn of
  Danby House, Stamford, County of Welland, and had just attained his
  twenty-first year.

PRISONERS OF WAR.—When two parties come into mortal combat, and each
holds prisoners taken from the other, a law of expediency arises out
of present circumstances, over-riding all other laws. The United
States, during the war of 1861-65, held rebel prisoners who by the
national laws had forfeited their lives. Yet in view of the fact
that the rebels held prisoners taken from the army of legitimate
authority, that authority was by expediency forced to treat its
captives as prisoners of war. To have hanged them as traitors would
have led to the rebel power hanging prisoners in retaliation.

By the laws of civilized communities the Fenian invaders of
Canada are pirates and liable to the penalties for repression and
punishment of piracy. Humanity may plead for them on one hand.
Indignant vengeance may denounce humanity and demand execution of
the laws against piracy on the other. But while passion and abstract
principles are thus at issue, expediency arises and presents the
subject of contention in another aspect, this is the practical
aspect. The time is 4 p. m. June 2nd. Lt.-Col. Dennis, Capt. Akers,
Capt. King, Lieut. Scholefield, Lieut. Nimmo and seventy-five men
had, at their mercy, fifty-nine piratical prisoners an hour ago. The
fifty-nine are under hatches on board the steamer Robb. By the laws
against piracy they have forfeited their lives. But now, through
the fortunes of war, in one hour, Capt. King, Lieuts. Scholefield,
Nimmo and fifty out of the seventy-five are captives to Fenians. Had
the seventy-five Canadians slain the fifty-nine Fenians when first
captured, might not the fellow Fenians of the fifty-nine slay the
disarmed fifty now? For the present there is no power to prevent
them. But happily the fifty-nine were uninjured after surrendering to
the seventy-five. The fifty being captives in their turn are unhurt.
The higher law, the law of expediency, which is in this case the law
of humanity, has interposed.

And the circumstances of one day may be the chances of war on another
day. Heaven forbid that day should come.

I write on this subject with a military experience as to prisoners
of war not acquired by many now alive, and known to but few in
Canada. When I served as a soldier on the side of Queen Isabella and
constitutional government in Spain, 1835 to 1838, our enemy in the
field fought under the banner of the Durango Decree of Don Carlos
which was, “Death to every prisoner taken in arms.”

All prisoners taken from the British Legion were without mercy
executed, and in some cases tortured before execution. That decree
was carried into effect. But did it deter, as its diabolical authors
intended it should, the British Legion, (English, Irish, Scotch,
twenty thousand of them,) from engaging in the hazards of such a
conflict? No; the Durango Decree of, “Death to every prisoner,”
transformed ordinary men into extraordinary devils. And I was one of
them. Of a mild type, yet one of them.



CHAPTER XIV.

  _Camp at Thorold in August and September, 1866. Meeting of the 13th
  and Queen’s Own, first time after the action of 2nd June. Speech of
  Adjutant General McDougal. Corrections. Additions. Varieties._


Fenian demonstrations on the U. S. frontier under name of picnic
festivals, with sham fights caricaturing the Limestone Ridge
affair—one near Buffalo on the 21st of August; together with openly
avowed, widely announced determination of Fenian leaders to invade
Canada soon, secretly, and with augmented numbers; and in addition to
those circumstances of threatened aggression, a sense of propriety
in Canada, of promoting the military education of the Volunteers
by service in the field, it was resolved that a camp should be
established at Thorold. The ground selected was on the high level
overlooking the town of St. Catharines, G. Western Railway, and
Welland Canal locks, to the westward of Thorold village. The first
troops posted were volunteers, 10th from Toronto, 7th from London;
a portion of the 16th regulars, and of Royal Artillery; also Major
Denison’s Toronto Troop of Volunteer Cavalry. They assembled on the
18th of August. On the 26th the Volunteers were relieved by Q. O.
from Toronto; the 13th, Hamilton; and 22nd Oxford Rifles, the latter
from Woodstock, Drumbo, and other places in Oxford County. On
arrival of the 13th and Q. O. on the ground the first under Lt.-Col.
Skinner, the latter under their Limestone Ridge commander Major
Gilmore; the Adjutant General brought them together in column, and
in the spirit of a soldier, and military philosopher, thus addressed
them:

  “I am glad that I happened to be here to welcome to camp the two
  battalions who fought at Lime-ridge. I know that foolish people
  have done their best to create a feeling of jealousy between the
  corps, by praising the performance of one at the expense of the
  other. I say that all honor is due to both; and that there is not
  the smallest foundation for the statement that one battalion was,
  in any respect, behind the other in gallantry on that occasion. Up
  to the moment when the unfortunate alarm of cavalry was given, I
  say, and I declare I speak it without exaggeration, that no troops
  of any army or nation could have behaved better than did the two
  battalions of inexperienced volunteers who, at Lime-ridge, attacked
  an enemy posted in a strong position of his own choosing, without
  the support of a single regular officer or soldier. And what I said
  at the time I repeat now—that the manner in which the volunteers
  alone sought out the enemy and attacked him like bull dogs, before
  he had been twenty-four hours on Canadian soil, produced both a
  moral and physical effect which disconcerted his whole general plan
  of operations. He had landed at a remote corner of our territory,
  counting securely on being left unmolested for at least forty-eight
  hours, during which period the attacks on other points were to be
  matured; but thanks to the men I see before me, and to the York and
  Caledonia Rifles, that time was not allowed him.

  “The equal share taken by the Hamilton 13th in that day’s work was
  not undervalued by the Governor-General; neither was it in any
  manner the fault of the Queen’s Own, for that regiment is composed
  of brave men, and brave men never depreciate the gallantry of
  their comrades in the field. I have been told that the feeling
  which exists between the two battalions is such that it would be
  dangerous to bring them to this camp at the same time. I will not
  believe that such is the case, and I have purposely brought them
  here together to prove that such an apprehension is groundless
  and that the only rivalry existing between them is the honorable
  rivalry as to which regiment shall do the best service to the
  country. I appeal to you all earnestly to show by your brotherly
  demeanor while in camp that I have judged correctly. If it were
  possible that by unseemly quarrels you should prove me mistaken, I
  shall of course be severely blamed for my misplaced confidence.

  “A few words now on another matter. Both newspapers and individuals
  have asserted that the government has been and is neglecting its
  duty in the matter of proper equipment for the volunteers. That
  statement is untrue. There is no foundation for it whatever. I
  would ask who is it that is responsible for the faulty equipment,
  who is responsible for the starving of the militia expenditure
  up to the last meeting of parliament? Why the people of Canada
  through their representatives; and I declare positively that
  from the moment of the passing of the last militia estimates, no
  government could have done more than the present government has
  done to render the volunteer force efficient. It is natural that
  the people of Canada should be impatient in this matter, but they
  should consider that the labor to be performed is enormous and
  that the completion of it must take time. When it is considered
  that new clothing had to be issued to the greater part of the old
  existing force; that knapsacks, haversacks and water canteens had
  to be provided; that the field batteries required new harness as
  well as guns and stores, and that the cavalry required saddlery
  and firearms, at the same time that about 150 new companies were
  to be equipped throughout, it must be evident that the work could
  not be done with that rapidity which all must so earnestly desire.
  Even before the militia estimates were passed an urgent request
  was forwarded to England that a complete equipment in knapsacks,
  haversacks, tent equipage, &c., for 35,000 volunteers should be
  sent to Canada, as well as for the necessary harness and armament
  of four field batteries and for a supply of heavy guns for the
  instruction of the garrison artillery. The Imperial stores in
  Canada have been drawn upon to their utmost capacity for our
  pressing wants, and to make up deficiencies contracts have been
  entered into in Canada for haversacks, water canteens and boots,
  and as a substitute for knapsacks, which can only be obtained from
  England, great coat straps have been made or are making in Canada
  sufficient to supply every man of the force. New rifles have been
  sent to London, Hamilton and Toronto for the purpose of exchanging
  damaged or unserviceable arms. I have entered into this explanation
  in order that the country may know that the militia department is
  doing its utmost to enable the volunteer force to take the field,
  if required, with that full and proper equipment which its merits
  so well deserve.”

CORRECTION.—On page 112, the name of Lt.-Col. Villiers is used where
it should be brigade Major Villiers. The name of the Lt.-Col. was
also associated with the subject. The passage relating to Booker’s
resignation at Colborne on 2nd June, and his telegrams to Col.
Lowry commanding in chief, soliciting to be re-instated in the 13th
Battalion should read thus: Lt.-Col. Booker on returning to Colborne,
from Hamilton, evening of June 4th, telegraphed to Col. Lowry saying,
“I am waiting for orders.” Brigade Major Villiers telegraphed on
his behalf to the same effect. Col. Lowry replied to the Brigade
Major: “What does Booker mean? He was relieved of his command at his
own request, and will not be re-instated by me; Major Skinner is in
command.” Booker then telegraphed to Col. Lowry: “I only asked to be
relieved of the command of the Brigade, not of the 13th Battalion.”
Col. Lowry replied referring him to Maj.-Gen. Napier. Booker then
telegraphed to Napier and remained in Colborne until Wednesday, June
6th. Lt.-Col. Villiers had not then arrived at Colborne, nor until
some time after, the date I cannot ascertain. This correction is
made to obviate the mistake of introducing that officer’s name in
that stage of the electric correspondence. But the main fact stands
as before, which is, that Lt.-Col. Booker, left the 13th battalion
early on the morning of Sunday, 3rd of June, without announcing his
departure to Major Skinner, next in seniority in the battalion. The
officers mentioned by Capt. Akers of “superior in rank to himself,”
who had, on the evening of the 2nd, urged Booker’s removal from
command, by reason of his manifest incompetence, saw him on morning
of the 3rd when the force was about to be led towards the supposed
position of the enemy; bear witness to his exhibition of imbecility,
or whatever his malady may have been, at the railway station, as
related by Mr. McGrath, manager of the Welland Railway, when he
pleaded to be sent away, in his flight from Colborne, by a special
train.

I have not in the proper place named it so explicitly as the
circumstance demands, that Booker had reported that the 13th
were demoralized, that is in a military sense unfit for duty,
untrustworthy before an enemy. That is the military signification of
a battalion being demoralized. The troops then at Colborne, June 3rd,
4 a. m., were about to march towards the scene of yesterday’s action;
and the 13th, whether because of Booker’s slanderous report or not,
yet with it resting on them, were left behind, in Colborne. There
lay the stigma from which the officers on their own behalf and that
of the gallant fellows of yesterday’s combat sought to be absolved
before the public, through Booker’s Court of Inquiry, which, however,
refused them a status in it as parties, or a place within its doors
as listeners to what others said involving their interests. True, it
has since been officially stated that the 13th was left there to do
garrison duty. But the invidious distinction was not removed by that
explanation, of the Toronto Q. O., Caledonia and York companies being
taken to the scene of yesterday’s fight where an enemy was expected
on the 3rd, and the 13th left out, apparently as unworthy. And there
was this other set of aggravations. The Q. O. notwithstanding what
Adj.-Gen. McDougal has so handsomely said at Thorold camp, (see
another page), that brave men never calumniate their fellow soldiers,
did set afloat stories at their new quarters in Fort Erie village,
and in their letter-writing to Toronto, slandering the 13th. The St.
Catharines Journal had a reporter at Fort Erie camp, and his ear was
filled, his paper supplied in turn, with calumnious lies about the
13th and unqualified praises of the Q. O. Other volunteer companies
such as Barrie and Scarboro took the story from the Q. O. and when
they came to do garrison duty at Colborne along side of the 13th,
about June 12th, were insolent almost beyond endurance. “If _we_ had
been in the fight,” said they, “_we_ would not have heeded Booker’s
bugle calls to retire; _we_ would have gone on with the battle, _we_
would.” That is each man would have taken the command upon himself.

It was about the 11th or 12th of June that Lt.-Col. Villiers met the
officers of the 13th at Colborne and stated that it was the desire
of Maj. Gen. Napier that Lt.-Col. Booker should resume command of
the battalion. He urged that “bygones should be bygones,” but they
all without exception said Lt.-Col. Booker could never command
the battalion again, while they remained its officers. They were
not, it seems, asked to write a letter of solicitation to have him
re-instated. At Colborne, I was informed that such a request had been
made. And so gave it in the Narrative written from my Notes.

The names of certain witnesses presented to Booker’s Court of Inquiry
may have been considered by the Court as withdrawn. The officers of
the 13th decided to have nothing to do with it when Major Skinner was
refused the privilege of being present as a party to the proceedings.

I have only briefly, for want of space, referred to the evidence
of the Rev. Mr. Inglis. It should have been added that when Booker
contradicted him about the horse, saying “No, not on horseback, I
returned to Ridgeway on foot,” or words to that effect; Mr. Inglis
addressing the Court said; “Well, gentlemen, if I were on my oath I
would only repeat what I have just said.”

The passage on page 110, second paragraph: “Had he surrendered to his
next in command of the 13th,, measures of precaution would have been
taken,” may be misunderstood. It means that Major Skinner would have
taken command of the 13th and posted its guards and night piquets.
There were superior officers present. See paragraph beginning ST.
CATHARINES HOME GUARD.

THAT FLAG. It was reported that but for the Q. O. the 13th would have
lost their colours. The colours were never out of the keeping of
Ensigns Armstrong and Baker and the guard told off to attend them.
When the whole of the 13th went into action, right wing in front,
left wing supporting, the colours took post with the reserve of the
brigade consisting entirely of the unengaged companies of Q. O. When
that reserve led the retreat the Ensigns of the 13th retreated with
it. The story which Toronto papers first started reached New York.
There the pictorial journalists added to the Toronto fiction, and
made pictures of a flag of the “Queen’s Own” captured by Fenians. The
Q. O. had no flag. And here, I repeat, that commanders of experience
will not take flags into a wooded country upon a desultory campaign
of bush-fighting. But an order to that effect should emanate from the
Commander-in-chief.

Page 98. “Major Skinner had partially succeeded in forming a red line
across the road with fixed bayonets directed against the retreat.”
The Major did not state this to me and he is too conscientious to
accept a statement made by others, which it seems is not strictly
correct. At that point, [near log house on the map] Major Skinner and
Lieut. Routh were together and endeavoured to form a party. Two lads
in red, with fixed bayonets had faced round as ordered, and others
seemed willing to stand by the officers, when a rush of men in green
uniforms [Highlanders or U. R.’s retreating from the extreme right]
pushed over them, trampling one of the lads, Parker by name, under
foot. He was found by the Fenians insensible and carried into an
adjoining house. In a few moments after that Major Skinner was told
that Lieut. Routh was killed. The wound however, was not mortal. The
Major like others who came last out of the field, expected that a
re-formation of the force would be made at Ridgeway; but on arriving
there he and they saw nothing of Lt.-Col. Booker, or Major Gilmore,
or of any one attempting to restore order. Under these circumstances
Major Skinner, and officers with him lent assistance to support some
disabled men along; they could do no more at that time.

  O’NEIL AT NASHVILLE.—On pages 83, 84 a letter from the Fenian
  General O’Neil is quoted. It was asked for in the following terms:
  “Hamilton Canada West, July 23rd, 1866. Sir. I am a correspondent
  of British newspapers resident in this city, and author of a small
  work soon to be published bearing some such title as ‘Somerville’s
  Narrative of the Fenian Invasion of Canada, June 1866.’ As such
  I take the liberty of writing this note and soliciting a reply
  to questions which to me as a truthful journalist and current
  historian are important.

  “Before stating the questions permit me to remark that while I as
  a British subject deprecate and deplore your invasion of Canada,
  I am constrained by force of truth to acknowledge, and will in
  my forthcoming Narrative place the acknowledgement on permanent
  record that you individually, as also some of your officers and men
  performed acts of kindness to some of our wounded; and that you and
  also some of your officers interfered with persons in your force to
  prevent outrages on property and persons.

  “It has been reported in American newspapers but the report varying
  in its terms that in conversation at Buffalo and subsequently in a
  public speech at Nashville, you paid a military compliment, which
  coming from one in your position was a generous tribute to your
  enemy, those Canada Volunteers who were in conflict with you on the
  2nd of June at Limestone Ridge.

  “You are reported to have called them the ‘Queen’s Own’ and to have
  spoken of them as wearing red uniform. Some newspapers reprinting
  the report in Canada have omitted the words red uniform. The only
  troops in red which were in conflict with you, or in your sight
  on June 2nd were the 13th battalion of Volunteer Militia from
  Hamilton. The ‘Queen’s Own’ from Toronto wore dark green uniform;
  as also two detached companies from Caledonia and York villages.
  Did you speak of the whole force opposed to you as the ‘Queen’s
  Own’? Did you speak of a part of the force before you as wearing
  red uniform? Did you in your speech distinguish, which I presume
  expressed any distinction observed by you on the field of action,
  between that portion of the Canadian force wearing dark green and
  that wearing red uniforms?

  “If it be agreeable to you to repeat in writing any statement
  which you made in Buffalo or at Nashville about the Canadian force
  opposed to you on the 2nd of June 1866, your courtesy will be duly
  appreciated.

                              “I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
                                                Alexander Somerville.”

  “General John O’Neil, Nashville, Tennessee.”

The portion of the reply relating to red uniforms and affecting the
13th battalion is printed on page 84.

I quote a passage from O’Neil’s Nashville speech in which he
disclaims that the plunderers who followed him to Canada were
Fenians. It is small comfort to Canadians to be told that American
thieves coming over the line under cover of a Fenian invasion are not
of the brotherhood. He said “I wish to correct another false report,
that ninety of our men were taken prisoners by the enemy. Only a few
who did not remain with their command, and a few who were wounded and
could not be removed were captured. _The other prisoners were camp
followers who accompanied the expedition for plunder_, and some who
went out of curiosity. These robbers I hope will get a halter yet.
Had I known them I would have strung them up myself.”

In another passage O’Neil said of the action of the American
Government: “The reinforcement that would certainly have reached us
that night, and have enabled us to hold our ground, was stopped by
the vigilance and promptness of the United States government on the
way to us.”

The retreat of O’Neil’s army over the Niagara on June 3rd was in a
considerable part intercepted by the U. S. gun-boat Michigan. About
600 were detained as U. S. prisoners on a charge of a breach of the
neutrality treaty and law of nations, of whom were 18 officers. The
latter after proceedings in the N. Y. State courts, were held to
bail, but in August discharged. The rank and file of the Fenians were
set free at once. And some thousands were provided with conveyance to
their homes by the American government.

ST. CATHARINES.—Limited space compels to an apparent oversight and
injustice to the many gallant volunteers called out in all parts
of the country, and who hardly waited to be called in the fervor
of their patriotism, but I cannot omit the St. Catharine’s Home
Guard inasmuch as Lt.-Col. McGiverin, M. P. P., who took it to Port
Colborne, on 2nd June, was for a time the superior in command at
that strategically important place. This gentleman is Member of the
Legislative Assembly for the County of Lincoln, and has places of
business both in St. Catharines and Hamilton. Receiving intelligence
of the Fenian landing on Fort Erie shore, through Brigade Major
Villiers, he, with that officer, Colonel Peacocke, and Mr. Swinyard
of the G. W. Railway, proceeded to the station at Hamilton where
arrangements were made to transport the volunteers from Hamilton,
Paris, Brantford, Grimsby, Beamsville and St. Catharines to meet the
enemy.

On the morning of the 2nd of June, Lt.-Col. McGiverin procured 200
stand of arms, which were conveyed to St. Catharines. And there
he organized a Home Guard to aid in the defence of that town. The
greatest enthusiasm was manifested by all classes of persons in St.
Catharines. Young and old of the male population pressed forward,
praying to be admitted to the honor and privilege and duty of
defending the country. Ladies offered assistance in whatever manner
help could be available. And it became available in various ways, for
volunteers at the front, and for the sick and wounded brought from
the front to St. Catharines town hall, converted on the emergency
into a general military hospital.

On Saturday, June 2, about noon, intelligence was received of
the fight at Limestone Ridge, and the subsequent retreat of the
volunteers who had first defeated the enemy, to Port Colborne. Col.
McGiverin called for men of the Home Guard to volunteer to Colborne.
In less than an hour about one hundred and forty offered, were
accepted, and were on passage up the Welland railway to aid their
countrymen in driving the invaders out of the peaceful land they had
dishonored by their presence.

On arrival at Colborne Lt.-Col. Booker was met. He appeared
exhausted. Col. McGiverin offered him every assistance in his power.
A portion of the volunteers who had been in the fight being without
provisions, their wants were supplied from temporary stores brought
up from St. Catharines.

About 5 p. m. the steam tug Robb, under command of Capt. McCallum,
arrived in port from Niagara river with 59 prisoners. These were
placed under charge of Col. McGiverin, with instructions to have them
conveyed to Welland County prison. But from alarming rumors that a
Fenian army reinforced since morning, was marching on the Welland
canal, the Colonel judged that it would be unsafe to have them in a
position so much exposed. He therefore sent them to Brantford, under
a guard of thirty-five of his men, commanded by Capt. Rykert, having
previously telegraphed the Sheriff of Brantford to receive them.

Col. McGiverin believing it possible that the enemy might attack
Colborne during Saturday night felt it prudent to order the hotels
and drinking saloons to be closed, which was promptly and cheerfully
done. Finding a large portion of the force then in Colborne without
ammunition he telegraphed to Maj.-Gen. Napier for supplies. To that
requisition there was a prompt response. A large quantity arrived in
charge of an officer of the commissariat department at 3.30 a. m.,
Sunday 3rd June. The troops were immediately paraded and ammunition
served out. All expressed an impatient desire to advance upon the
enemy. The main body soon after left, and by a circuitous route of 22
miles reached Fort Erie before breakfast.

The noble manner in which the Militia of Lincoln (without uniforms
and without expectation of receiving pay), behaved on that occasion
is deserving of the highest praise. As evidence of the gallant spirit
which inspired all, youthful and aged, to seek the enemy, it may be
related that two veterans of the war of 1812 were present; Lewis
Clement a man of 80 years, who had been wounded at the battle of
Chippewa in that war, and Capt. John Gibson, aged 75. They made the
whole march over rough roads, rifles on shoulder, from Colborne to
Erie Village.

The 13th battalion as already stated were retained at Colborne on
that morning to do garrison duty. Farther evidence is not requisite
as to their efficiency, their earnest desire to share in the expected
combat with the enemy, and their well grounded mortification at being
left behind, in consequence of the misrepresentation of Lt.-Col.
Booker. But Col. McGiverin bears testimony that the 13th were in
every respect soldier-like and fit for any duty on that occasion.
Of the manner in which Col. Booker left them, left Colborne, that
morning and hurried to Hamilton, enough has been said in these pages.



CHAPTER XV.

  _Invasion of the frontier of Eastern Townships, Lower Canada.
  Freligsburg. Pigeon Hill. Losses by Fenian invasion. Compensation
  paid. Another invasion threatened._


The Fenian plans of invasion, as sketched in the first chapter,
embraced the river St. Lawrence and the Eastern Townships frontier
of Lower Canada. The intervention of the United States authorities
to enforce the laws of neutrality and intercept the incursion of the
Fenians into Canada has been lightly esteemed, after the event, by
some in this country from whom a wiser policy might be expected. I
am not of their number, but prefer to say, as Her Majesty’s speech
at the prorogation of the imperial parliament said; as the Prime
Minister, head of the great conservative party of Britain, said; as
his son, Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said,
that the friendly action of the American government was just and
honorable and entitled to the thanks of this Province and of the
Empire. On the 8th of June President Johnson issued a proclamation
directed in strong terms against such citizens of the United States
as had taken part in or been accessory to the Fenian raid upon
Canada. It was late, but the government had intervened to arrest
the passage of Fenians to the frontier, before the proclamation was
issued. Its true value is to be estimated by a calculation of what
was likely to have occurred had no hindrance to the invaders been
opposed by the American authorities; or by the measure of disquietude
now, month of September, prevailing in apprehension that the
President and his cabinet have ceased to enforce neutrality, as they
enforced it in June.

The portion of the Narrative which falls to this concluding chapter
comprises a mingled sketch of Fenians pressing to the frontier, and
intercepted by United States troops; or crossing the boundary line
in Lower Canada, committing depredations and escaping from before
Provincial forces directed against them.

Under date of New York, June 5th, it was reported that quantities
of ammunition and arms had been seized at O’Day’s, in Buffalo, the
day before and confiscated. But that on the other hand that Fenians
were moving upon Canada from Malone and were said to have artillery.
A Montreal despatch to New York said that all was quiet on the 4th
at Plattsburg, Lake Champlain and in that vicinity. That there was
a large number of Fenian spies in the city. That the Mayor had
compelled the police to take the oath of allegiance, but that a
number had refused, (last not true). And it was thought the Fenians
would cross and make a stand near Cornwall.

A Rutland, Vermont, despatch of same date, June 5th, said that the
main body of Fenians at Fairfield met smaller columns at Swanton
and Fairfax about 12 miles from the Canada lines. And that they had
in large force crossed the border and were marching toward the St.
Lawrence, the border there being only a geographical line. And in the
night of June 4th, a force was said to have come up by the Vermont
Central railroad, 2000 strong.

Same date specials from St. Albans, Vermont, said 31 cases of Fenian
arms had been seized at Rouse’s Point. And the St. Albans Fenian camp
under Colonel Spears had moved towards the Canada line. And special
messages from General Sweeney had reached Spears. Something important
was expected to be immediately done.

Ogdensburg specials intimated that Canada had about 2,000 regulars
and volunteers assembled at Prescott, the scene of the fight at
Windmill point in the rebellion days of 1837, where United States
adventurers committed the mistake, the crime of crossing into this
Province.

Other specials of the same date, June 5, received in New York, were
as follows: One from Potsdam said, the Beauharnois canal [in the St.
Lawrence group] was cut by Fenians from Coteau du Lac to the river;
also, that Gen. Murphy was to cross at St. Regis and Cornwall with
4,500 infantry, and another column was to cross at Beauharnois or
Laprairie, and cut the Lachine canal. Gen. Spears, with 3,000 men was
to move from St. Albans via Philipsburg, cutting the railroad at St.
John’s Junction and the Grand Trunk at St. Hilaire and St. Hyacinthe.

WATERTOWN, N. Y., June 5.—The Fenian train was come up with at
Richville by a company of U. S. troops, who took the arms, ammunition
and men in charge. CINCINNATI. O., June 5.—$3,000 were subscribed for
the Fenian cause at a meeting on the previous night. It was stated
that 3,000 Fenians had left for the frontier.

BOSTON, June 5.—It was estimated that 600 Fenians left Boston
yesterday afternoon for St. Albans and northern New York. About 300
belonging to the 3rd regiment left by the Lowell road. About the same
number took the Fitchburg R. R.

A Montreal special said the authorities had reliable information that
the Fenians were marching from Fairfield on St. Armand.

TORONTO, June 5.—A Toronto special said the Volunteers and Regulars
had been recalled from the front, and would concentrate at Toronto.

BOSTON, June 5.—That day special despatches from St. Albans said
the main column of the Fenians commenced moving from Fairfield at 4
o’clock p. m. yesterday. The column headed towards Canada. Seven car
loads of Fenians arrived from Massachusetts this morning bound for
the front.

NEW YORK, June 5.—Colonel James Kerrigan, late member of Congress,
left on Saturday in command of a full brigade, the officers were
taken from various volunteer regiments in the late rebellion.

NEW YORK, June 5.—The _Tribune’s_ telegram, dated Hamilton, C. W.
said 2000 men were concentrated along the line of the Detroit and St.
Clair rivers. The main concentration of troops was about Prescott,
that being considered the real point of attack. Few troops from the
west had been sent to that point, it being guarded by the regulars
and volunteers from Montreal. The west was quiet all the troops being
at the front.

The reports telegraphed on the 6th, 7th and 8th were but repetitions
of the foregoing, with additions to the effect that Spears had
crossed near St. Albans; and Heffernan at a point farther west. Then
came detailed accounts of the marching of Volunteers and regulars
from Montreal and elsewhere in the east to confront the invaders in
the counties of Missisquoi and Huntingdon. A Montreal correspondent
wrote of the volunteers thus:

  “Frelighsburg, 11th June.—I learned on Sunday afternoon that troops
  were to be sent to St. Johns by special train; and managed to
  procure permission to come out with them. This was so far towards
  the front, and I might either by a team, or another train with
  troops for the front reach the Missisquoi frontier. The troops sent
  forward were, a part of the force recently garrisoning Cornwall—a
  portion of the 25th Regt, under Col. Fane, and the Argenteuil
  Rangers under Lieut.-Col. the Hon. J. J. C. Abbott. The 25th men,
  Montrealers know. The Argenteuil Rangers—the Gentiles (corruption
  of Ar-genteuil) as they are called by their fellow soldiers of
  the line. They are a splendid body of men, fine, strapping,
  yeomanry—lacking something of the nattiness of dress, and precision
  of drill, of their companions in arms; but seeming in every way,
  fit for hard fighting when called upon. Some of them were strapping
  fellows from 6 to 6½ feet high.

  “Altogether, the two corps filled eighteen cars, which were drawn
  by two or three engines. Regulars and Volunteers vied with each
  other in alacrity to reach the front, and eagerness to meet the
  robbers. This campaigning, however, falls with great severity on
  those farmers from Argenteuil—many of them having left without
  having put in all their crops, and fearing now lest they may reach
  home too late to put them in, so as to secure a good crop this
  season. The barracks at St. Johns were full of troops—the Artillery
  under Col. Pipon, the provisional battalion of Montreal Volunteers
  under Capt. Bond, detachments of the R. C. Rifles, and other corps
  under Lieut.-Col. Hibbert, and the Chasseurs under Lieut.-Col.
  Coursol being all here, and a part of the troops already under
  canvass. The 25th and Rangers were compelled therefore to encamp
  upon ground somewhat damp after the heavy recent rains, and their
  officers could procure no straw for them at the late hour of their
  arrival. They had, however, a very fine night, and did not suffer
  such discomforts as some of the Volunteers on the Huntingdon
  frontier in the midst of rain, &c. I found our Montreal boys
  indignant that they had not had a chance at the front.”

To follow the operations on the Missisquoi frontier and elsewhere in
Lower Canada would lead to a narrative for which the present sheets
cannot be prolonged.

The Fenians who had invaded and posted themselves on Pigeon Hill were
driven out of the land; but many who were on the border ready to
come in stayed their advance in obedience to the injunctions of U.
S. General Meade acting on the proclamation of the President of the
United States.

The Villages of Freligsburg, parish of St. Armand East, and of Pigeon
Hill, St. Armand West, District of Bedford, Canada East, were the
centre of invasion by the force under Spears, the days of occupation
being the 7th, 8th and 9th of June. A return of the damage done by
plunderers was made to the Provincial Government, with the report of
Joshua Chamberlin, Esq., Commissioner. These copious documents were
not printed though laid before the legislature. I have, however,
to-day, Sept. 10, received a written copy of them, but not in time
to be used in this Upper Canada section of the Narrative. For these
I return thanks to the officers of Government who sent them. The
claimants for compensation were in number 102. Each gave a detailed
statement of losses. The total amount claimed being $18,232.80.
Allowed $15,463.83.

It is noticeable that damage to bureaus, and safes, and to axes
broken in breaking safes, are items of account. Also, in Freligsburg
very considerable quantities of high wines, old rye, and other
liquors are named. The losses on the Fort Erie frontier were about
$6,000.

As this page closes rumors of another invasion, more secretly
planned, and on a wider scale than that of June, and the military
preparations to meet it occupy the minds of the people of Canada.
Some public personages who assume to be leaders of opinion, and
who, whether with good intention or evil design, resisted for
several years a full organization of a defensive Militia, are, in
this supreme crisis, engaged in reviling public men who happen to
be in possession of power, and who have practically evinced the
capacities of statesmen. Though the men in power may have made
political mistakes, and I think the conservative section of them did
grievously err in not conciliating the American national mind in the
years of civil war (see chapter eight), it is now the duty of all
good citizens to be of courage, of one mind, loyal to the ruling
authorities.

                                         ALEXANDER SOMERVILLE.
                                         The “Whistler at the Plough.”



  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
  when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
  and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

  Pg iii: ‘M’Pherson’s celebrated’ replaced by ‘Macpherson’s celebrated’.
  Pg vi: ‘conduct and and’ replaced by ‘conduct and’.
  Pg vii: ‘City elergymen’ replaced by ‘City clergymen’.
  Pg vii: ‘was in preperation’ replaced by ‘was in preparation’.
  Pg viii: ‘on incontestible grounds’ replaced by ‘on incontestable grounds’.
  Pg viii: ‘inadequecy of’ replaced by ‘inadequacy of’.
  Pg 12: ‘States of Tennesee’ replaced by ‘States of Tennessee’.
  Pg 19: ‘also were parolled’ replaced by ‘also were paroled’.
  Pg 22: ‘any magesterial’ replaced by ‘any magisterial’.
  Pg 23: ‘which, occuring’ replaced by ‘which, occurring’.
  Pg 25: ‘too welll to’ replaced by ‘too well to’.
  Pg 30: ‘with eathers’ replaced by ‘with feathers’.
  Pg 34: ‘an il-favored face’ replaced by ‘an ill-favored face’.
  Pg 39: ‘Phenecia’ replaced by ‘Phoenecia’ (three times).
  Pg 39: ‘indeed grievious’ replaced by ‘indeed grievous’.
  Pg 39: ‘secresy and hope’ replaced by ‘secrecy and hope’.
  Pg 40: ‘with thousands af’ replaced by ‘with thousands of’.
  Pg 41: ‘inland front Niagara’ replaced by ‘inland from Niagara’.
  Pg 41: ‘to possesss the’ replaced by ‘to possess the’.
  Pg 42: ‘noon. Cincinnatti’ replaced by ‘noon. Cincinnati’.
  Pg 43: ‘a Home Gnard’ replaced by ‘a Home Guard’.
  Pg 46: ‘indispensible to’ replaced by ‘indispensable to’.
  Pg 46: ‘to prove disultory’ replaced by ‘to prove desultory’.
  Pg 49: ‘Rule Brittania’ replaced by ‘Rule Britannia’.
  Pg 55: ‘perrenial vigour’ replaced by ‘perennial vigour’.
  Pg 57: ‘or leviathens of’ replaced by ‘or leviathans of’.
  Pg 57: ‘are harrassed by’ replaced by ‘are harassed by’.
  Pg 58: ‘forshadow as far’ replaced by ‘foreshadow as far’.
  Pg 58: ‘indispensible in’ replaced by ‘indispensable in’.
  Pg 58: ‘battle of Manasses’ replaced by ‘battle of Manassas’.
  Pg 61: ‘the noblest efiorts’ replaced by ‘the noblest efforts’.
  Pg 63: ‘in consquence of’ replaced by ‘in consequence of’.
  Pg 63: ‘platform accomodation’ replaced by ‘platform accommodation’.
  Pg 64: ‘Lient.-Col, Booker’ replaced by ‘Lieut.-Col. Booker’.
  Pg 65: ‘platform accomodation’ replaced by ‘platform accommodation’.
  Pg 65: ‘Lient. Colonels’ replaced by ‘Lieut.-Colonels’.
  Pg 67: ‘billetted the men’ replaced by ‘billeted the men’.
  Pg 73: ‘The superintendant of’ replaced by ‘The superintendent of’.
  Pg 74: ‘and the occurrances’ replaced by ‘and the occurrences’.
  Pg 74: ‘they all night in’ replaced by ‘they were all night in’.
  Pg 74: ‘At p. p. 52, 53’ replaced by ‘At pp. 52, 53’.
  Pg 76: ‘York vilages’ replaced by ‘York villages’.
  Pg 77: ‘bteakfast that he’ replaced by ‘breakfast that he’.
  Pg 78: ‘in eommand of’ replaced by ‘in command of’.
  Pg 79: ‘repeated vollies of’ replaced by ‘repeated volleys of’.
  Pg 79: ‘gaiety of of remark’ replaced by ‘gaiety of remark’.
  Pg 83: ‘a statemant made’ replaced by ‘a statement made’.
  Pg 84: ‘their casualities’ replaced by ‘their casualties’.
  Pg 86: ‘fighting postion’ replaced by ‘fighting position’.
  Pg 88: ‘disultory portions’ replaced by ‘desultory portions’.
  Pg 88: ‘few casualities’ replaced by ‘few casualities’.
  Pg 94: ‘a brigade. * * During’ replaced by ‘a brigade.... During’.
  Pg 96: ‘over the railngs’ replaced by ‘over the railings’.
  Pg 96: ‘half columm’ replaced by ‘half column’.
  Pg 103: ‘Did you abserve’ replaced by ‘Did you observe’.
  Pg 104: ‘Capt. Jckson’ replaced by ‘Capt. Jackson’.
  Pg 106: ‘tactics of disultory’ replaced by ‘tactics of desultory’.
  Pg 106: ‘they were informnd’ replaced by ‘they were informed’.
  Pg 114: ‘four scholarshps’ replaced by ‘four scholarships’.
  Pg 118: ‘of the malitia’ replaced by ‘of the militia’.
  Pg 121: ‘disultory campaign’ replaced by ‘desultory campaign’.
  Pg 121: ‘as a Brit-sh’ replaced by ‘as a British’.
  Pg 123: ‘Beamsville und’ replaced by ‘Beamsville and’.
  Pg 124: ‘Col. M’Givern’ replaced by ‘Col. McGiverin’ (twice).
  Pg 127: ‘the Artilery under’ replaced by ‘the Artillery under’.
  Pg 128: ‘It is noticable’ replaced by ‘It is noticeable’.




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