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Title: An economic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
Author: Beard, Charles A. (Charles Austin)
Language: English
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ***
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
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MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
CHARLES A. BEARD
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1914
_All rights reserved_
COPYRIGHT, 1913,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and electrotyped. Published April, 1913. Reprinted July, 1914.
Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co.—Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
PREFACE
The following pages are frankly fragmentary. They are designed to
suggest new lines of historical research rather than to treat the
subject in an exhaustive fashion. This apology is not intended as an
anticipation of the criticism of reviewers, but as a confession of fact.
No one can appreciate more fully than I do how much of the work here
outlined remains to be done. The records of the Treasury Department at
Washington, now used for the first time in connection with a study of
the formation of the Constitution, furnish a field for many years’
research, to say nothing of the other records, printed and unprinted,
which throw light upon the economic conditions of the United States
between 1783–1787.
If it be asked why such a fragmentary study is printed now, rather than
held for the final word, my explanation is brief. I am unable to give
more than an occasional period to uninterrupted studies, and I cannot
expect, therefore, to complete within a reasonable time the survey which
I have made here. Accordingly, I print it in the hope that a few of this
generation of historical scholars may be encouraged to turn away from
barren “political” history to a study of the real economic forces which
condition great movements in politics.
Students already familiar with the field here surveyed will discover
that I have made full use of the suggestive work already done by
Professor Turner, Drs. Libby, Ambler, and Schaper.
I am indebted to Mr. Merwin of the Treasury Department for his great
courtesy in making available the old records under his jurisdiction; to
Mr. Bishop, of the Library of Congress, for facilitating the examination
of thousands of pamphlets as well as for other favors; and to Mr.
Fitzpatrick, of the Manuscript Division, for keeping his good humor
while bringing out hundreds of manuscripts which seemed to yield results
wholly out of proportion to the labor entailed.
I am under deep obligation to two friends, nameless here, without whose
generous sympathy and encouragement, this volume could not have been
written.
CHARLES A. BEARD.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
February, 1913.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
II. A SURVEY OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 1787 19
III. THE MOVEMENT FOR THE CONSTITUTION 52
IV. PROPERTY SAFEGUARDS IN THE ELECTION OF DELEGATES 64
V. THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION 73
VI. THE CONSTITUTION AS AN ECONOMIC DOCUMENT 152
VII. THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION 189
VIII. THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION 217
IX. THE POPULAR VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION 239
X. THE ECONOMICS OF THE VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION 253
XI. THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT OVER RATIFICATION AS VIEWED BY CONTEMPORARIES 292
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Broadly speaking, three schools of interpretation have dominated
American historical research and generalization. The first of these,
which may be justly associated with the name of Bancroft, explains the
larger achievements in our national life by reference to the peculiar
moral endowments of a people acting under divine guidance; or perhaps it
would be more correct to say, it sees in the course of our development
the working out of a higher will than that of man. There is to be
observed in the history of the struggle for the Constitution, to use
Bancroft’s words, “the movement of the divine power which gives unity to
the universe, and order and connection to events.”[1]
Notwithstanding such statements, scattered through Bancroft’s pages, it
is impossible to describe in a single phrase the ideal that controlled
his principles of historical construction, because he was so often
swayed by his deference to the susceptibilities of the social class from
which he sprang and by the exigencies of the public life in which he
played a by no means inconspicuous part. Even telling the whole truth
did not lie upon his conscience, for, speaking on the question of the
number of Americans who were descendants from transported felons and
indented servants, he said that “Having a hand full, he opened his
little finger.”[2]
Nevertheless, Bancroft constantly recurs in his writings to that “higher
power” which is operating in human affairs, although he avoids citing
specific events which may be attributed to it. It appears to him to be
the whole course of history, rather than any event or set of events,
which justifies his theory. “However great,” he says, “may be the number
of those who persuade themselves that there is in man nothing superior
to himself, history interposes with evidence that tyranny and wrong lead
inevitably to decay; that freedom and right, however hard may be the
struggle, always prove resistless. Through this assurance ancient
nations learn to renew their youth; the rising generation is incited to
take a generous part in the grand drama of time; and old age, staying
itself upon sweet Hope as its companion and cherisher, not bating a jot
of courage, nor seeing cause to argue against the hand or the will of a
higher power, stands waiting in the tranquil conviction that the path of
humanity is still fresh with the dews of morning, that the Redeemer of
the nations liveth.”[3]
The second school of historical interpretation, which in the order of
time followed that of Bancroft, may be called the Teutonic, because it
ascribes the wonderful achievements of the English-speaking peoples to
the peculiar political genius of the Germanic race. Without distinctly
repudiating the doctrine of the “higher power” in history, it finds the
secret to the “free” institutional development of the Anglo-Saxon world
in innate racial qualities.
The thesis of this school is, in brief, as follows. The Teutonic peoples
were originally endowed with singular political talents and aptitudes;
Teutonic tribes invaded England and destroyed the last vestiges of the
older Roman and British culture; they then set an example to the world
in the development of “free” government. Descendants of this specially
gifted race settled America and fashioned their institutions after old
English models. The full fruition of their political genius was reached
in the creation of the Federal Constitution.
For more than a generation the Teutonic theory of our institutions
deeply influenced historical research in the United States; but it was
exhausted in the study of local government rather than of great epochs;
and it produced no monument of erudition comparable to Stubbs’
_Constitutional History of England_. Whatever may be said of this
school, which has its historical explanation and justification,[4] it
served one exceedingly useful purpose: it was scrupulously careful in
the documentation of its preconceptions and thus cultivated a more
critical spirit than that which characterized the older historians.[5]
The third school of historical research is not to be characterized by
any phrase. It is marked rather by an absence of hypotheses. Its
representatives, seeing the many pitfalls which beset the way of earlier
writers, have resolutely turned aside from “interpretation” in the
larger sense, and concerned themselves with critical editions of the
documents and with the “impartial” presentation of related facts. This
tendency in American scholarship has been fruitful in its results, for
it has produced more care in the use of historical sources and has given
us many excellent and accurate surveys of outward events which are
indispensable to the student who would inquire more deeply into
underlying causes.[6]
Such historical writing, however, bears somewhat the same relation to
scientific history which systematic botany bears to ecology; that is, it
classifies and orders phenomena, but does not explain their proximate or
remote causes and relations. The predominance of such a historical ideal
in the United States and elsewhere is not altogether inexplicable; for
interpretative schools seem always to originate in social
antagonisms.[7] The monarchy, in its rise and development, was never
correctly understood as long as it was regarded by all as a mystery
which must not be waded into, as James I put it, by ordinary mortals.
Without the old régime there would have been no Turgot and Voltaire;
Metternich and Joseph de Maistre came after the Revolution.
But the origin of different schools of interpretation in controversies
and the prevalence of many mere preconceptions bolstered with a show of
learning should not lead us to reject without examination any new
hypothesis, such as the theory of economic determinism, on the general
assumption of Pascal “that the will, the imagination, the disorders of
the body, the thousand concealed infirmities of the intelligence
conspire to reduce our discovery of justice and truth to a process of
haphazard, in which we more often miss than hit the mark.” Such a
doctrine of pessimism would make of equal value for the student who
would understand, for instance, such an important matter as the origin
of the state, Mr. Edward Jenk’s severely scientific _History of
Politics_ and Dr. Nathaniel Johnston’s _The Excellency of Monarchical
Government, especially the English Monarchy, wherein is largely treated
of the Several Benefits of Kingly Government and the Inconvenience of
Commonwealths.... Likewise the Duty of Subjects and the Mischief of
Faction, Sedition, and Rebellion_, published in 1686.
It is not without significance, however, that almost the only work in
economic interpretation which has been done in the United States seems
to have been inspired at the University of Wisconsin by Professor
Turner, now of Harvard. Under the direction of this original scholar and
thinker, the influence of the material circumstances of the frontier on
American politics was first clearly pointed out. Under his direction
also the most important single contribution to the interpretation of the
movement for the federal Constitution was made: O. G. Libby’s
_Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the
Federal Constitution_.
In a preface to this work, Professor Turner remarks that the study was
designed to contribute “to an understanding of the relations between the
political history of the United States, and the physiographic, social,
and economic conditions underlying this history.... It is believed that
many phases of our political history have been obscured by the attention
paid to state boundaries and to the sectional lines of North and South.
At the same time the economic interpretation of our history has been
neglected. In the study of the persistence of the struggle for state
particularism in American constitutional history, it was inevitable that
writers should make prominent the state as a political factor. But, from
the point of view of the rise and growth of sectionalism and
nationalism, it is much more important to note the existence of great
social and economic areas, independent of state lines, which have acted
as units in political history, and which have changed their political
attitude as they changed their economic organization and divided into
new groups.”[8]
Although the hypothesis that economic elements are the chief factors in
the development of political institutions has thus been used in one or
two serious works, and has been more or less discussed as a philosophic
theory,[9] it has not been applied to the study of American history at
large—certainly not with that infinite detailed analysis which it
requires. Nor has it received at the hands of professed historians that
attention which its significance warrants. On the contrary, there has
been a tendency to treat it with scant courtesy and to dismiss it with a
sharpness bordering on contempt.[10] Such summary judgment is, of
course, wholly unwarranted and premature; for as Dr. William Cunningham
remarks, the validity of no hypothesis can be determined until it has
been worked to its utmost limits. It is easier to write a bulky volume
from statutes, congressional debates,[11] memoirs, and diplomatic notes
than it is to ascertain the geographical distribution and political
significance of any important group of economic factors. The theory of
economic determinism has not been tried out in American history, and
until it is tried out, it cannot be found wanting.
Sadly as the economic factors have been ignored in historical studies,
the neglect has been all the more pronounced in the field of private and
public law. The reason for this is apparent. The aim of instruction in
these subjects is intensely practical; there are few research
professorships in law; and the “case” system of teaching discourages
attempts at generalization and surveys.[12] Not even the elementary work
has been done. There has been no generous effort to describe the merely
superficial aspects of the development of private law in the United
States. There has been no concerted attempt to bring together and make
available to students the raw materials of such a history. Most of the
current views on the history of our law are derived from occasional
disquisitions of judges which are all too frequently shot through with
curious errors of fact and conception.
Nor has England advanced far beyond us in the critical interpretation of
legal evolution—its explanation in terms of, or in relation to, the
shifting economic processes and methods in which the law is tangled. It
is true that English scholars have produced admirable histories of the
law in its outward aspects, such as the monumental work of Pollock and
Maitland; and they have made marvellous collections of raw materials,
like the publications of the Selden Society. But apart from scattered
and brilliant suggestions thrown off occasionally by Maitland[13] in
passing, no interpretation has been ventured, and no effort has been
made to connect legal phases with economic changes.
In the absence of a critical analysis of legal evolution, all sorts of
vague abstractions dominate most of the thinking that is done in the
field of law. The characteristic view of the subject taken by American
commentators and lawyers immersed in practical affairs is perhaps summed
up as finely by Carter as by any writer. “In free, popular states,” he
says, “the law springs from and is made by the people; and as the
process of building it up consists in applying, from time to time, to
human actions the popular ideal or standard of justice, justice is only
interest consulted in the work.... The law of England and America has
been a pure development proceeding from a constant endeavor to apply to
the civil conduct of men the ever advancing standard of justice.”[14] In
other words, law is made out of some abstract stuff known as “justice.”
What set the standard in the beginning and why does it advance?
The devotion to deductions from “principles” exemplified in particular
cases, which is such a distinguishing sign of American legal thinking,
has the same effect upon correct analysis which the adherence to
abstract terms had upon the advancement of learning—as pointed out by
Bacon. The absence of any consideration of the social and economic
elements determining the thought of the thinkers themselves is all the
more marked when contrasted with the penetration shown by European
savants like Jhering, Menger, and Stammler. Indeed, almost the only
indication of a possible economic interpretation to be found in current
American jurisprudence is implicit in the writings of a few scholars,
like Professor Roscoe Pound and Professor Goodnow,[15] and in occasional
opinions rendered by Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the
United States.[16]
What has here been said about our private law may be more than repeated
about our constitutional history and law. This subject, though it has
long held an honorable position in the American scheme of learning, has
not yet received the analytical study which its intrinsic importance
merits. In the past, it has often been taught in the law schools by
retired judges who treated it as a branch of natural and moral
philosophy or by practical lawyers who took care for the instant need of
things. Our great commentaries, Kent, Story, Miller, are never
penetrating; they are generally confined to statements of fact; and
designed to inculcate the spirit of reverence rather than of
understanding. And of constitutional histories, strictly speaking, we
have none, except the surveys of superficial aspects by Curtis and
Bancroft.
In fact, the juristic theory of the origin and nature of the
Constitution is marked by the same lack of analysis of determining
forces which characterized older historical writing in general. It may
be stated in the following manner: The Constitution proceeds from the
whole people; the people are the original source of all political
authority exercised under it; it is founded on broad general principles
of liberty and government entertained, for some reason, by the whole
people and having no reference to the interest or advantage of any
particular group or class. “By calm meditation and friendly councils,”
says Bancroft, “they [the people] had prepared a Constitution which, in
the union of freedom with strength and order, excelled every one known
before.... In the happy morning of their existence as one of the powers
of the world, they had chosen justice for their guide; and while they
proceeded on their way with a well-founded confidence and joy, all the
friends of mankind invoked success on their endeavor as the only hope
for renovating the life of the civilized world.”[17]
With less exaltation, Chief Justice Marshall states the theory, in his
opinion in the case of McCulloch _v._ Maryland: “The government proceeds
directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the name of
the people; and is declared to be ordained ‘in order to form a more
perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and
secure the blessings of liberty’ to themselves and to their posterity.
The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in
calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people.
But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their
act was final.... The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the
influence of this fact on the case) is emphatically and truly a
government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them, and for their benefit.... It is the government of all; its
powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all.”[18]
In the juristic view, the Constitution is not only the work of the whole
people, but it also bears in it no traces of the party conflict from
which it emerged. Take, for example, any of the traditional legal
definitions of the Constitution; Miller’s will suffice: “A constitution,
in the American sense of the word, is any instrument by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited, and
defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments for their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of
the body politic.... It is not, however, the origin of private rights,
nor the foundation of laws. It is not the cause, but the consequence of
personal and political freedom. It declares those natural and
fundamental rights of individuals, for the security and common enjoyment
of which governments are established.”[19]
Nowhere in the commentaries is there any evidence of the fact that the
rules of our fundamental law are designed to protect any class in its
rights, or secure the property of one group against the assaults of
another. “The Constitution,” declares Bancroft, “establishes nothing
that interferes with equality and individuality. It knows nothing of
differences by descent, or opinions, of favored classes, or legalized
religion, or the political power of property. It leaves the individual
along-side of the individual.... As the sea is made up of drops,
American society is composed of separate, free, and constantly moving
atoms, ever in reciprocal action ... so that the institutions and laws
of the country rise out of the masses of individual thought, which, like
the waters of the ocean, are rolling evermore.”[20]
In turning from the vague phraseology of Bancroft to an economic
interpretation of constitutional history, it is necessary to realize at
the outset that law is not an abstract thing, a printed page, a volume
of statutes, a statement by a judge. So far as it becomes of any
consequence to the observer it must take on a real form; it must govern
actions; it must determine positive relations between men; it must
prescribe processes and juxtapositions.[21] A statute may be on the
books for an age, but unless, under its provisions, a determinate
arrangement of human relations is brought about or maintained, it exists
only in the imagination. Separated from the social and economic fabric
by which it is, in part, conditioned and which, in turn, it helps to
condition, it has no reality.
Now, most of the law (except the elemental law of community defence) is
concerned with the property relations of men, which reduced to their
simple terms mean the processes by which the ownership of concrete forms
of property is determined or passes from one person to another. As
society becomes more settled and industrial in character, mere defence
against violence (a very considerable portion of which originates in
forcible attempts to change the ownership of property) becomes of
relatively less importance; and property relations increase in
complexity and subtlety.
But it may be said that constitutional law is a peculiar branch of the
law; that it is not concerned primarily with property or with property
relations, but with organs of government, the suffrage, administration.
The superficiality of this view becomes apparent at a second glance.
Inasmuch as the primary object of a government, beyond the mere
repression of physical violence, is the making of the rules which
determine the property relations of members of society, the dominant
classes whose rights are thus to be determined must perforce obtain from
the government such rules as are consonant with the larger interests
necessary to the continuance of their economic processes, or they must
themselves control the organs of government. In a stable despotism the
former takes place; under any other system of government, where
political power is shared by any portion of the population, the methods
and nature of this control become the problem of prime importance—in
fact, the fundamental problem in constitutional law. The social
structure by which one type of legislation is secured and another
prevented—that is, the constitution—is a secondary or derivative feature
arising from the nature of the economic groups seeking positive action
and negative restraint.
In what has just been said there is nothing new to scholars who have
given any attention to European writings on jurisprudence. It is based
in the first instance on the doctrine advanced by Jhering that law does
not “grow,” but is, in fact, “made”—adapted to precise interests which
may be objectively determined.[22] It was not original with Jhering.
Long before he worked out the concept in his epoch-making book, _Der
Zweck im Recht_, Lassalle had set it forth in his elaborate _Das System
der erworbenen Rechte_,[23] and long before Lassalle had thought it
through, our own Madison had formulated it, after the most wide-reaching
researches in history and politics.[24]
In fact, the inquiry which follows is based upon the political science
of James Madison, the father of the Constitution and later President of
the Union he had done so much to create. This political science runs
through all of his really serious writings and is formulated in its most
precise fashion in _The Federalist_[25] as follows: “The diversity in
the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is
not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The
protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From
the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of
the respective proprietors, ensues a division of society into different
interests and parties.... The most common and durable source of factions
has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct
interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are
debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and
views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms
the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.”
Here we have a masterly statement of the theory of economic determinism
in politics.[26] Different degrees and kinds of property inevitably
exist in modern society; party doctrines and “principles” originate in
the sentiments and views which the possession of various kinds of
property creates in the minds of the possessors; class and group
divisions based on property lie at the basis of modern government; and
politics and constitutional law are inevitably a reflex of these
contending interests. Those who are inclined to repudiate the hypothesis
of economic determinism as a European importation must, therefore,
revise their views, on learning that one of the earliest, and certainly
one of the clearest, statements of it came from a profound student of
politics who sat in the Convention that framed our fundamental law.
The requirements for an economic interpretation of the formation and
adoption of the Constitution may be stated in a hypothetical proposition
which, although it cannot be verified absolutely from ascertainable
data, will at once illustrate the problem and furnish a guide to
research and generalization.
It will be admitted without controversy that the Constitution was the
creation of a certain number of men, and it was opposed by a certain
number of men. Now, if it were possible to have an economic biography of
all those connected with its framing and adoption,—perhaps about 160,000
men altogether,—the materials for scientific analysis and classification
would be available. Such an economic biography would include a list of
the real and personal property owned by all of these men and their
families: lands and houses, with incumbrances, money at interest,
slaves, capital invested in shipping and manufacturing, and in state and
continental securities.
Suppose it could be shown from the classification of the men who
supported and opposed the Constitution that there was no line of
property division at all; that is, that men owning substantially the
same amounts of the same kinds of property were equally divided on the
matter of adoption or rejection—it would then become apparent that the
Constitution had no ascertainable relation to economic groups or
classes, but was the product of some abstract causes remote from the
chief business of life—gaining a livelihood.
Suppose, on the other hand, that substantially all of the merchants,
money lenders, security holders, manufacturers, shippers, capitalists,
and financiers and their professional associates are to be found on one
side in support of the Constitution and that substantially all or the
major portion of the opposition came from the non-slaveholding farmers
and the debtors—would it not be pretty conclusively demonstrated that
our fundamental law was not the product of an abstraction known as “the
whole people,” but of a group of economic interests which must have
expected beneficial results from its adoption? Obviously all the facts
here desired cannot be discovered, but the data presented in the
following chapters bear out the latter hypothesis, and thus a reasonable
presumption in favor of the theory is created.
Of course, it may be shown (and perhaps can be shown) that the farmers
and debtors who opposed the Constitution were, in fact, benefited by the
general improvement which resulted from its adoption. It may likewise be
shown, to take an extreme case, that the English nation derived immense
advantages from the Norman Conquest and the orderly administrative
processes which were introduced, as it undoubtedly did; nevertheless, it
does not follow that the vague thing known as “the advancement of
general welfare” or some abstraction known as “justice” was the
immediate, guiding purpose of the leaders in either of these great
historic changes. The point is, that the direct, impelling motive in
both cases was the economic advantages which the beneficiaries expected
would accrue to themselves first, from their action. Further than this,
economic interpretation cannot go. It may be that some larger
world-process is working through each series of historical events; but
ultimate causes lie beyond our horizon.
CHAPTER II
A SURVEY OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 1787
The whole theory of the economic interpretation of history rests upon
the concept that social progress in general is the result of contending
interests in society—some favorable, others opposed, to change. On this
hypothesis, we are required to discover at the very outset of the
present study what classes and social groups existed in the United
States just previous to the adoption of the Constitution and which of
them, from the nature of their property, might have expected to benefit
immediately and definitely by the overthrow of the old system and the
establishment of the new. On the other hand, it must be discovered which
of them might have expected more beneficial immediate results, on the
whole, from the maintenance of the existing legal arrangements.
The importance of a survey of the distribution of property in 1787 for
economic as well as political history is so evident that it is strange
that no attempt has been made to undertake it on a large scale. Not even
a beginning has been made. It is, therefore, necessary for us to rely
for the present upon the general statements of historians who have
written more or less at length about the period under consideration; but
in the meanwhile it can do no harm to suggest, by way of a preface, the
outlines of such a survey and some of the chief sources of information.
I. In the first place, there were the broad interests of real property
which constituted, in 1787, a far larger proportion of all wealth than
it does at the present time. The size, value, and ownership of holdings
and their geographical distribution ought to be ascertained. In the
absence of a general census, the preparation of such an economic survey
would entail an enormous labor, and it could never be more than
approximately complete. Neither the census of 1790 nor the assessment
for direct taxes under the law of 1798 covers this topic. The assessment
rolls of the several states for taxation, wherever available, would
yield the data desired, at least in part; but a multitude of local
records would have to be consulted with great scrutiny and critical
care.
II. In order to ascertain the precise force of personalty in the
formation and adoption of the Constitution, it would be necessary to
discover not only the amount and geographical distribution[27] of money
and public securities; but also the exact fields of operation in which
personalty looked for immediate and prospective gains. A complete
analysis of the economic forces in the Constitution-making process would
require the following data:—
1. The geographic distribution of money on hand and loaned and the names
of the holders. It is apparent that much of the material from which
evidence on these points may be obtained has disappeared; but an
intensive study of the tax returns of the states, the records of the
local assessors, wills probated, mortgages recorded, and suits in courts
over loans and mortgages, would no doubt produce an immense amount of
illuminating information.
2. The geographic distribution and ownership of the public securities.
Fortunately the unpublished and unworked records of the Treasury
Department at Washington throw great light on this fundamental problem.
Shortly after the federal government was established the old debt was
converted into a new consolidated, or funded, debt; and holders of
public securities, state and continental, brought their papers to their
local loan office (one for each state) or to the Treasury to have them
recorded and transformed into the stocks of the new government.
The records of this huge transaction (which was the first really great
achievement of nascent capitalism in the United States), if they had
been kept intact, would constitute, perhaps, the most wonderful single
collection on economic history ever possessed by any country. Were they
complete, they would form a veritable Domesday Book of the politics
during the first years of the new government. But unfortunately they are
not complete. The records of Hamilton’s administration at the Treasury
itself seem to have largely disappeared, and the records of the loan
offices in the several states are generally fragmentary, although in one
or two instances they are indeed monumental.
A complete set of these financial documents should show: (1) the owners
of certificates of the old government as issued, during the Revolution
and afterward, to original holders; (2) the transfers of certificates
from original holders to other parties; (3) the names of those who held
certificates in 1787, when the Convention was called to frame the
Constitution; (4) the records of transactions in stocks between the
announcement of the Convention’s work and the adoption of Hamilton’s
funding system; (5) the names of those who brought in securities for
funding into the new debt; (6) the names of those for whom the brokers,
whose names appear on the loan office books, were, in fact, operating.
None of the records preserved at the Treasury Department presents all of
the evidence required for the scientific study of a single state. Nearly
one-third of the operations were at the Treasury and of these only a
meagre fragment seems to have escaped the ravages of time. In the
documents of some of the commonwealths, however, it is possible to
ascertain the names of hundreds of patriots who risked their money in
original certificates or received certificates for services rendered.
The books of a few loan offices are so kept that it can be easily
discovered who brought in securities to be funded into the new debt and
also to whom these securities were originally issued.
In some states the ledgers were carefully preserved and it is possible
to find out the names and addresses of the holders of securities funded
at the local loan office and the amount held by each person. The ledgers
of Connecticut, for example, offer a rich field for the study of the
names and geographical distribution of public creditors, and the tracing
of these interests through their myriad local ramifications would afford
an interesting and profitable undertaking. But unfortunately multitudes
of the most significant operations are forever lost; it is to be
particularly deplored that the “powers of attorney” for the period are
not forthcoming. Unless the Government at Washington follows the example
of enlightened administrations in Europe and establishes a Hall of
Records, the precious volumes which have come down to us will be worked
only with great difficulty, if they do not disintegrate and disappear
altogether.[28]
3. The geographic distribution of small mortgaged farms and their
connection with various schemes for depreciation of the currency and
impairment of the obligation of contract. No doubt work in local records
would yield valuable results in this field.
4. Owners and operators in western lands. Speculation in western lands
was one of the leading activities of capitalists in those days. As is
well known, the soldiers were paid in part in land scrip and this scrip
was bought up at low prices by dealers, often with political
connections. Furthermore, large areas had been bought outright for a few
cents an acre and were being held for a rise in value. The chief
obstacle in the way of the rapid appreciation of these lands was the
weakness of the national government which prevented the complete
subjugation of the Indians, the destruction of old Indian claims, and
the orderly settlement of the frontier. Every leading capitalist of the
time thoroughly understood the relation of a new constitution to the
rise in land values beyond the Alleghanies. This idea was expressed, for
example, by Hugh Williamson, a member of the Convention from North
Carolina and a land speculator in a letter to Madison.[29] The materials
for the study of land operations exist in enormous quantities, largely
in manuscript form in Washington; and a critical scrutiny of the
thousands of names that appear on these records, in their political
relations, would afford results beyond all measure. Here, too, is the
work for a lifetime.
5. The geographic distribution of manufacturing establishments and the
names of owners and investors. On this important topic a mass of printed
and manuscript materials exists, but no attempt has yet been made to
catalogue the thousands of names of persons with a view to establishing
political connections. To produce the materials for this study, searches
must be made in the local records from New Hampshire to Georgia. Wills
probated, transfers of property, law suits, private papers,
advertisements in newspapers, shipping records, Hamilton’s
correspondence in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress,
unclassified Treasury Records and correspondence, and innumerable other
sources must be searched and lists of names and operations made.
Pending the enormous and laborious researches here enumerated, the
following pages are offered merely as an indication of the way in which
the superficial aspects of the subject may be treated.[30] In fact, they
sketch the broad outlines of the study which must be filled in and
corrected by detailed investigations.
THE DISFRANCHISED
In an examination of the structure of American society in 1787, we first
encounter four groups whose economic status had a definite legal
expression: the slaves, the indented servants, the mass of men who could
not qualify for voting under the property tests imposed by the state
constitutions and laws, and women, disfranchised and subjected to the
discriminations of the common law. These groups were, therefore, not
represented in the Convention which drafted the Constitution, except
under the theory that representation has no relation to voting.
How extensive the disfranchisement really was cannot be determined.[31]
In some states, for instance, Pennsylvania and Georgia, propertyless
mechanics in the towns could vote; but in other states the freehold
qualifications certainly excluded a great number of the adult males.
In no state, apparently, had the working-class developed a consciousness
of a separate interest or an organization that commanded the attention
of the politicians of the time. In turning over the hundreds of pages of
writings left by eighteenth-century thinkers one cannot help being
impressed with the fact that the existence and special problems of a
working-class, then already sufficiently numerous to form a considerable
portion of society, were outside the realm of politics, except in so far
as the future power of the proletariat was foreseen and feared.[32]
When the question of the suffrage was before the Convention, Madison
warned his colleagues against the coming industrial masses: “Viewing the
subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the
safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great
majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other
sort of property. These will either combine under the influence of their
common situation; in which case,[33] the rights of property and the
public liberty will not be secure in their hands, or, which is more
probable, they will become the tools of opulence and ambition; in which
case there will be equal danger on another side.”[34]
So far as social policy is concerned, however, the working-class problem
had not made any impression on the statesmen of the time. Hamilton in
his report on manufactures,[35] dismisses the subject with scant notice.
He observes that one of the advantages of the extensive introduction of
machinery will be “the employment of persons who would otherwise be
idle, and in many cases, a burthen on the community, either from bias of
temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other cause, indisposing or
disqualifying them for the toils of the country. It is worthy of remark,
that, in general, women and children are rendered more useful, and the
latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they
would otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton
manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that four-sevenths,
nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest proportion are
children, many of them of a tender age.” Apparently this advantage was,
in Hamilton’s view, to accrue principally to the fathers of families,
for he remarks: “The husbandman himself experiences a new source of
profit and support, from the increased industry of his wife and
daughters, invited and stimulated by the demands of the neighboring
manufactories.”
Passing beyond these groups which were politically nonexistent, except
in so far as those who possessed the ballot and economic power were
compelled to safeguard their rights against assaults from such quarters,
we come to the social groupings within the politically enfranchised
mass. Here we find no legal class distinctions. Social distinctions were
very sharp, it is true, as every student of manners and customs well
knows; but there were no outward legal signs of special class
privileges.
GROUPS OF REAL PROPERTY HOLDERS
Nevertheless, the possessors of property were susceptible of
classification into several rather marked groups, though of course they
shade off into one another by imperceptible gradations. Broadly
speaking, there were the interests of real and personal property. Here,
however, qualifications must be made. There was no such identity of
interest between the large planters and the small inland farmers of the
south as existed in England between the knights and yeomen. The real
property holders may be classified into three general groups: the small
farmers, particularly back from the sea-coast, scattered from New
Hampshire to Georgia, the manorial lords, such as we find along the
banks of the Hudson,[36] and the slaveholding planters of the south.
1. The first of these groups, the small farmers, constituted a
remarkably homogeneous class. The inland section was founded and
recruited by mechanics, the poorer whites, and European (particularly
Scotch-Irish) immigrants. It had peculiar social and political views
arising from the crude nature of its environment, but its active
political doctrines were derived from an antagonism to the seaboard
groups. One source of conflict was connected with the possession of the
land itself. Much of the western country had been taken up by
speculators and the settlers were either squatters or purchasers from
large holders. This is illustrated by the situation in Virginia, where,
as Ambler points out, “liberality in granting her unoccupied lands did
not prove to be good policy. True, large numbers of settlers were early
attracted to the state, where they made permanent homes, but much of the
land fell into the hands of speculators. Companies were formed in Europe
and America to deal in Virginia lands, which were bought up in large
tracts at the trifling cost of two cents per acre. This wholesale
engrossment soon consumed practically all the most desirable lands and
forced the home seeker to purchase from speculators or to settle as a
squatter.”[37] As the settler sought to escape from the speculator by
moving westward, the frontier line of speculation advanced.
In addition to being frequently in debt for their lands, the small
farmers were dependent upon the towns for most of the capital to develop
their resources. They were, in other words, a large debtor class, to
which must be added, of course, the urban dwellers who were in a like
unfortunate condition.
That this debtor class had developed a strong consciousness of identical
interests in the several states is clearly evident in local politics and
legislation.[38] Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, the disturbances in
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and other northern states, the activities
of the paper-money advocates in state legislatures, the innumerable
schemes for the relief of debtors, such as the abolition of
imprisonment, paper money, laws delaying the collection of debts,
propositions requiring debtors to accept land in lieu of specie at a
valuation fixed by a board of arbitration,—these and many other schemes
testify eloquently to the fact that the debtors were conscious of their
status and actively engaged in establishing their interest in the form
of legal provisions. Their philosophy was reflected in the writings of
Luther Martin, delegate to the Convention from Maryland, who disapproved
of the Constitution, partly on the ground that it would put a stop to
agrarian legislation.[39]
2. The second group of landed proprietors, the manorial lords of the
Hudson valley region, constituted a peculiar aristocracy in itself and
was the dominant class in the politics of New York during the period
between the Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution, as it had
been before the War. It was unable or unwilling to block the emission of
paper money, because the burden of that operation fell on the
capitalists rather than itself. It also took advantage of its
predominance to shift the burden of taxation from the land to
imports,[40] and this fact contributed powerfully to its opposition to
the Constitution, because it implied a transference of the weight of
taxation for state purposes to the soil. Its spokesmen indulged in much
high talk of state’s rights, in which Federalist leaders refused to see
more than a hollow sham made to cover the rural gentry’s economic
supremacy.
3. The third group of landed proprietors were the slave-holders of the
south. It seems curious at the first glance that the representatives of
the southern states which sold raw materials and wanted competition in
shipping were willing to join in a union that subjected them to
commercial regulations devised immediately in behalf of northern
interests. An examination of the records shows that they were aware of
this apparent incongruity, but that there were overbalancing
compensations to be secured in a strong federal government.[41]
Money-lending and the holding of public securities were not confined to
the north by any means; although, perhaps, as Calhoun long afterward
remarked,[42] the south was devoid of some of the artifices of commerce
which characterized New England. Neither were attempts at relieving
debtors by legislative enactment restricted to Massachusetts and Rhode
Island. The south had many men who were rich in personalty, other than
slaves, and it was this type, rather than the slaveholding planter as
such, which was represented in the Convention that framed the
Constitution. The majority of the southern delegates at Philadelphia in
1787 were from the towns or combined a wide range of personalty
operations with their planting. On this account there was more identity
of interest among Langdon of Portsmouth, Gerry of Boston, Hamilton of
New York, Dayton of New Jersey, Robert Morris of Philadelphia, McHenry
of Baltimore, Washington on the Potomac, Williamson of North Carolina,
the Pinckneys of Charleston, and Pierce of Savannah than between these
several men and their debt-burdened neighbors at the back door. Thus
nationalism was created by a welding of economic interests that cut
through state boundaries.
The southern planter was also as much concerned in maintaining order
against slave revolts as the creditor in Massachusetts was concerned in
putting down Shays’ “desperate debtors.” And the possibilities of such
servile insurrections were by no means remote. Every slave-owner must
have felt more secure in 1789 when he knew that the governor of his
state could call in the strong arm of the federal administration in case
a domestic disturbance got beyond the local police and militia. The
north might make discriminatory commercial regulations, but they could
be regarded as a sort of insurance against conflagrations that might
bring ruin in their train. It was obviously better to ship products
under adverse legislation than to have no products to ship.
GROUPS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
A second broad group of interests was that of personal property as
contrasted with real property. This embraced, particularly, money
loaned, state and continental securities, stocks of goods, manufacturing
plants, soldiers’ scrip, and shipping. The relative proportion of
personalty to realty in 1787 has not been determined and it is
questionable whether adequate data are available for settling such an
important matter.[43]
PERSONALTY IN MONEY.—Although personalty in the form of money at
interest or capital seeking investment did not constitute in 1787
anything like the same amount, relative to the value of real estate,
which it does to-day, it must not be thought that it was by any means
inconsiderable in any state. The tax returns of New Hampshire for 1793
report the value of all buildings and real estate as £893,327:16:10 and
the amount of money on hand or at interest as £35,985:5:6. The
Massachusetts tax returns of 1792 show £196,698:4:6 at interest and
£95,474:4:5 on hand. The Connecticut returns for 1795 show £63,348: 10:1
at interest.[44]
Money capital was suffering in two ways under the Articles of
Confederation. It was handicapped in seeking profitable outlets by the
absence of protection for manufactures, the lack of security in
investments in western lands, and discriminations against American
shipping by foreign countries. It was also being positively attacked by
the makers of paper money, stay laws, pine barren acts, and other
devices for depreciating the currency or delaying the collection of
debts. In addition there was a widespread derangement of the monetary
system and the coinage due to the absence of uniformity and stability in
the standards.[45]
Creditors, naturally enough, resisted all of these schemes in the state
legislatures, and failing to find relief there at length turned to the
idea of a national government so constructed as to prevent laws
impairing the obligation of contract, emitting paper money, and
otherwise benefiting debtors. It is idle to inquire whether the rapacity
of the creditors or the total depravity of the debtors (a matter much
discussed at the time) was responsible for this deep and bitter
antagonism. It is sufficient for our purposes to discover its existence
and to find its institutional reflex in the Constitution. It was to the
interest of the creditors to see the currency appreciate, to facilitate
the process for securing possession of forfeited mortgaged property, and
to hold the rigor of the law before the debtor who was untrue to his
obligations. Whether the creditors were driven into class consciousness
by the assaults of their debtors or attained it by the exercise of their
wits is, for scientific purposes, immaterial.
PERSONALTY IN PUBLIC SECURITIES.—Even more immediately concerned in the
establishment of a stable national government were the holders of state
and continental securities. The government under the Articles of
Confederation was not paying the interest on its debt and its paper had
depreciated until it was selling at from one-sixth to one-twentieth of
its par value.[46] Grave uncertainties as to the actions of legislatures
kept state paper at a low price, also, even where earnest attempts were
being made to meet the obligations.
The advantage of a strong national government that could discharge this
debt at its face value is obvious; and it was fully understood at the
time. The importance of this element of personalty in forcing on the
revolution that overthrew the Articles of Confederation is all the more
apparent when it is remembered that securities constituted a very large
proportion of the intangible wealth. In Massachusetts, for example, it
is set down in 1792 at a sum greater than all the money at interest and
on hand in the state.[47]
The amount of the public securities of the United States and of the
several states at the establishment of the new government was estimated
by Hamilton, in his first report on credit, as Secretary of the
Treasury.[48] The foreign debt, that is, money borrowed abroad, was
fixed at $10,070,307 and arrears of interest up to December, 1789, were
estimated at $1,640,071.62, making a total of $11,710,378.62. The
domestic continental debt, including the registered debt, army
certificates, etc., amounted to $27,383,917.74, to which was added
arrears of interest to the amount of $13,030,168.20, making a total of
$40,414,085.94. The amount of the state debts was unknown in 1790, but
Hamilton placed it at about $25,000,000, which appears to have been
rather high. The issue, later authorized to cover them, was $21,500,000
and the amount actually paid out was $18,271,786.47.[49]
The enormous total of the national debt after state and national
securities were funded is shown by Hamilton’s report of January 16,
1795:—
Foreign Debt $13,745,379.35
Funded domestic debt 60,789,914.18
Unsubscribed debt 1,561,175.14
────────────────────────────────────
Total unredeemed debt $76,096,468.67
In addition to this sum, there was an amount of $1,400,000 due to the
Bank of the United States on account of the loan from that institution,
but this was more than counterbalanced by the value of the stock.[50]
It is evident from this statement that a vast mass of state and
continental securities was scattered throughout the country in 1787. The
degree of its concentration or distribution cannot be determined until
the Domesday Books of the Treasury Department have been carefully
studied, and their incompleteness makes an absolute statement
impossible. The value of this paper in the hands of the holders in the
spring when the Convention met cannot be ascertained with mathematical
precision, for prices varied from state to state. Furthermore, the
prices obtained by the holders of public paper after Hamilton’s funding
system had gone into effect can only be roughly estimated, for it
depends upon the market in which they were sold. For example, 6 per
cents were bringing 17 shillings in the pound on March 5, 1791, and 22
shillings in the pound on October 3, 1792. On these dates, deferred
sixes were 9/1 and 13/7, respectively, and 3 per cents were 9/1 and
13/1, respectively.[51]
If we leave out of account the foreign debt, it appears that some
$60,000,000 worth of potential paper lay in the hands of American
citizens in the spring of 1787. This paper was changing hands all of the
time at varying prices. The common selling price in good markets before
the movement for the Constitution got under way ranged from one-sixth to
one-tenth its face value; and some of it sold as low as twenty to one.
In fact, many holders regarded continental paper as worthless, as it
might have been had the formation of the Constitution been indefinitely
delayed. It seems safe to hazard a guess, therefore, that at least
$40,000,000 gain came to the holders of securities through the adoption
of the Constitution and the sound financial system which it made
possible. This leaves out of account the large fortunes won by the
manipulation of stocks after the government was established and
particularly after the founding of the New York Stock Exchange in
1792.[52]
It should be pointed out, however, that this was not all gain for the
original holders of public paper, that is, for those who had loaned the
Revolutionary government money or had rendered it services during the
War. Nevertheless, they would have lost all their continental securities
under the prevailing methods of the Congress. As Pitkin points out, “The
interest of the debt was unpaid, public credit was gone, the debt itself
was considered of little value, and was sold at last by many of the
original holders for about one-tenth of its nominal value.”[53] From
this point of view, the appreciation due to the adoption of the new
government was so much clear gain, even to original holders; and in some
states more than one-half of the paper had passed into the hands of
speculators at low figures.
The significance of this huge national debt and of the enormous gain
made in the appreciation of securities can be understood only in
comparison with other forms of wealth at that time. Unfortunately, our
statistics for the period of the formation of the Constitution are
meagre, but under an act of Congress passed in 1798 a valuation of lands
was made for the purposes of direct taxation. The surveys were made
between the years 1798 and 1804. The following table[54] exhibits the
value of lands (not including houses, which amounted to more than
$140,000,000 in addition) in each of the states at the close of the
eighteenth century, and also the amount of money paid out by the loan
offices of the respective states for the year 1795 in discharging the
interest on the public debt and the payment of 2 per cent towards the
reimbursement of the 6 per cent stocks held in the several
commonwealths:—
═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════
│ │ INTEREST, ETC.,
│ VALUE OF LANDS │ DISBURSED[55]
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
New Hampshire │ $19,028,108.03│ $20,000.00
Massachusetts │ 59,445,642.64│ 309,500.00
Rhode Island │ 8,082,355.21│ 31,700.00
Connecticut │ 40,163,955.34│ 79,600.00
Vermont │ 15,165,484.02│
New York │ 74,885,075.69│ 367,600.00
New Jersey │ 27,287,981.89│ 27,350.00
Pennsylvania │ 72,824,852.60│ 86,379.19
Delaware │ 4,053,248.42│ 2,980.00
Maryland │ 21,634,004.57│ 74,000.00
Virginia │ 59,976,860.04│ 62,300.00
North Carolina │ 27,909,479.70│ 3,200.00
South Carolina │ 12,456,720.94│ 109,500.00
Georgia │ 10,263,506.95│ 6,800.00
Kentucky │ 20,268,325.07│
Tennessee │ 5,847,562.00│
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
Total │ $479,293,263.13│ $1,180,909.19
═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════
Footnote 55:
No table showing the capital amount of the loan office books of the
states after the funding was complete was discovered, so that interest
payment is given here.
To the total amount of payments made through the loan offices must be
added the payments made at the Treasury on the securities registered
there, bringing the total annual interest and capital disbursements to
$2,727,959.07.
It seems safe to assume from the table that $400,000,000 would cover the
total taxable value of all the lands in the thirteen states in 1787.[56]
Very probably the estimate should be much lower, but letting the figures
stand at this amount, it will be seen that an advance of $40,000,000 in
securities would have represented one-tenth of the total taxable value
of all the land in the thirteen United States at the time of the
formation of the Constitution.
To put the matter in another way: The amount gained by public security
holders through the adoption of the new system was roughly equivalent to
the value of all the lands as listed for taxation in Connecticut. It was
but little less than the value of the lands in New Hampshire, Vermont,
and Rhode Island. It was about equivalent to one-half the value of the
lands in New York and to two-thirds the value of the lands in
Massachusetts. It amounted to at least ten dollars for every man, woman,
and child in the whole United States from New Hampshire to Georgia.[57]
The significance of the figures showing the annual interest disbursement
also when the debt had been funded becomes evident only by comparison.
Tench Coxe, as commissioner of the revenue, estimated the amount of
goods, wares, and merchandise exported from the United States between
October 1, 1791, and September 30, 1792, at $21,005,568. In other words,
the annual interest on the domestic debt was more than one-tenth the
total value of the goods exported annually. The average imports for each
of the three years ending March 4, 1792, was $19,150,000, so that the
interest on the domestic debt was more than one-tenth of the value of
the goods imported into the United States.[58]
One of the most potent effective forces of these public securities was
the Society of the Cincinnati which was composed of the officers of the
Revolutionary Army organized into local branches in the several states.
Like other soldiers, the members of this order had been paid for their
patriotic services partly in land warrants and depreciated paper; but
unlike the privates, they were usually men of some means and were not
compelled to sacrifice their holdings to speculators at outrageously low
prices. The members of this Society appear in large numbers on the loan
office records of the several states preserved in the Treasury
Department; and many, if not all, of the state branches had funds
derived from this source.
The political influence of the Society was recognized in the Convention.
When the popular election of President was under consideration, Gerry
objected to it. “The ignorance of the people,” he said, “would put it in
the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union and acting
in concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a
Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They were
respectable, United, and influential. They will in fact elect the chief
Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the
people—His respect for the characters composing this Society could not
blind him to the danger and impropriety of throwing such a power into
their hands.”[59] In this view Colonel Mason concurred.[60]
An observant French chargé d’affaires, writing to his home secretary of
state for foreign affairs in June, 1787, calls attention to the weight
of the Order of the Cincinnati in the movement for a new government, but
remarks that their power has been greatly exaggerated. “Les Cincinnati,”
he says, “c’est à dire les officiers de l’ancienne armée américaine,
sont intéressés à l’éstablissement d’un Gouvernement solide, puisqu’ils
sont tous créanciers du public, mais, considérant la foiblesse du
Conseil national et l’impossibilité d’être payés par la présente
administration, ils proposent de jeter tous les États dans une seule
masse et de mettre à leur tête le gai. Washington avec toutes les
prérogatives et les pouvoirs d’une tête couronné.” He also says that
they threaten a revolution by arms in case the Convention fails, but
adds that this project is too extravagant to merit the least
consideration.[61]
This society was, however, compactly organized. Correspondence among the
members was frequent, extensive, and frank. Almost uniformly, they were
in favor of a reconstruction of the national government on a stronger
basis.[62] They were bitter in their denunciation of the popular
movements in the states; particularly Shays’ revolt in Massachusetts.
War had given them a taste for strong measures, and the wretched
provisions which had been made for paying them for their military
services gave them an economic interest in the movement to secure a
government with an adequate taxing power. Moreover, they were
consolidated by the popular hostility to them on account of their
“secret” and “aristocratic” character.
PERSONALTY IN MANUFACTURING AND SHIPPING.—The third group of personalty
interests embraced the manufacturing population, which was not
inconsiderable even at that time. A large amount of capital had been
invested in the several branches of industry and a superficial study of
the extensive natural resources at hand revealed the immense
possibilities of capitalistic enterprise. The industrial revolution was
then getting under way in England and the fame of Arkwright was being
spread abroad in the land. In the survey of the economic interests of
the members of the federal Convention, given below, it is shown that a
few leading men were directly connected with industrial concerns,
although it is not apparent that the protection of industries was their
chief consideration, in spite of the fact that they did undoubtedly
contemplate such a system. But outside of the Convention vehement
appeals were made by pamphleteers for protection, on the score that the
discriminatory measures of Great Britain were disastrous to American
economic independence.
As early as April, 1785, a memorial from prominent merchants and
business men of Philadelphia was laid before the legislature of the
state lamenting that Congress did not have “a full and entire power over
the commerce of the United States,” and praying that the legislature
request Congress to lay a proposal conferring such a power before the
states for their ratification. The memorialists assured the legislature
that there was a “disposition in the mercantile interest of Pennsylvania
favorable thereto.”[63] Among the signers were T. Fitzsimons and George
Clymer, who were destined to sit in the constitutional Convention as
representatives of the state of Pennsylvania and of the mercantile
interest which they had so much at heart.
The supporters of the Constitution were so earnest and so persistent in
their assertion that commerce was languishing and manufactures perishing
for the lack of protection that there must have been some justification
for their claims, although it is impossible to say how widespread the
havoc really was. The exaggeration of danger threatened by a tariff
reduction is not peculiar to our times; it was sharply marked in older
days. That the consumer suffered from the lack of the protection sought
in 1787 by merchants and manufacturers is not apparent. Indeed the
“mechanics and manufacturers of New York” in their humble petition to
Congress for relief in 1789 complain that “their countrymen have been
deluded by an appearance of plenty; by the profusion of foreign articles
which has deluged the country; and thus have mistaken excessive
importation for a flourishing trade. To this deception they [the
petitioners] impute the continuance of that immoderate prepossession in
favor of foreign commodities which has been the principal cause of their
distresses, and the subject of their complaint.”[64]
That innumerable manufacturing, shipping, trading, and commercial
interests did, however, look upon the adoption of the Constitution as
the sure guarantee that protection could be procured against foreign
competition, is fully evidenced in the memorials laid before Congress in
April, May, and June, 1789, asking for the immediate enactment of
discriminatory tariff laws.[65]
The first of these petitions was from Baltimore in particular and
Maryland generally, and was communicated to the House of Representatives
on April 11, 1789, a few days after that body had settled down to
business. The second was laid before the House a week later by a
committee representing the mechanics and manufacturers of New York. On
May 25, 1789, the shipwrights of Philadelphia laid their pleas before
Congress; and on June 5, the tradesmen and manufacturers of Boston put
in their appearance. These petitions for protection from the four great
trading and shipping centres of the country, Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston, which had been most zealous in securing the
establishment of the new government, are in themselves eloquent
documents for the economic interpretation of the Constitution.
The first of these, from Baltimore, bears the names of two members of
the federal Convention from that state, Daniel Carroll and James
McHenry, and the names of two or three hundred other citizens of that
community, the analysis of whose politico-economic connections would
doubtless repay the detailed scrutiny which the painful labor would
entail. The petition cites the sad state of decline in which
manufacturing and trading interests have been since the close of the
Revolution and the ineffectual attempts of the states acting alone to
remedy the evils. “The happy period having now arrived,” the
memorialists exultingly exclaim, “when the United States are placed in a
new situation; when the adoption of the General Government gives one
sovereign Legislature the sole and exclusive power of laying duties upon
imports; your petitioners rejoice at the prospect this affords them,
that America, freed from the commercial shackles which have so long
bound her, will see and pursue her true interest, becoming independent
in fact as well as in name; and they confidently hope that the
encouragement and protection of American manufactures will claim the
earliest attention of the supreme Legislature of the nation.”
The Maryland petitioners are conscious of no narrow motives in asking
for relief at the hands of the government: “the number of her poor
increasing for want of employment; foreign debts accumulating; houses
and lands depreciating in value; trade and manufactures languishing and
expiring”—these are the evidences of need for the expected legislation.
They, therefore, ask for duties on all foreign articles that can be made
in America, which will give “a just and decided preference to their
labors.” And lest Congress might not understand the precise character of
the relief for which they ask, they append a long list of articles,
which are, or can be, manufactured in Maryland, and on which protection
is needed—including ships, hardware, clocks, boots, shoes, saddles,
brushes, food-stuffs, and raw iron, to mention only a few.
The second petition, from the mechanics and manufacturers of New York,
recites how the memorialists had expected great prosperity on the
successful issue of the Revolution and had seen their hopes blasted “by
a system of commercial usurpation, originating in prejudices, and
fostered by a feeble government.” They had struggled in vain against
dire adversity and “wearied by their fruitless exertions, your
petitioners have long looked forward with anxiety to the establishment
of a government which would have the power to check the growing evil,
and extend a protecting hand to the interests of commerce and the arts.
Such a government is now established. On the promulgation of the
Constitution just now commencing its operations, your petitioners
discovered in its principles the remedy which they had so long and so
earnestly desired. They embraced it with ardor, and have supported it
with persevering attachment.” Lest Congress might not have the
information necessary for the formulation of a protective tariff on
correct principles, the petitioners subjoined a list of articles
manufactured in the state and susceptible of protection.
The petitioners from Philadelphia, humbly seeking protection for
shipping, lament that the tonnage built at that harbor has fallen to
about one-third the amount constructed before the Revolution, and call
attention to the fact that the British navigation act totally prevents
them from building for English customers. They add that they “have
waited, with anxious expectation, for the sitting of the honourable
Congress under the new Constitution of the United States, firmly relying
that every exertion would be used to reinstate so necessary and useful a
branch of business.” Like the representatives from Baltimore and New
York, they append for the information of Congress a list of suggestions
as to the best method of protecting American shipping interests.
Finally come the manufacturers and ship builders of Boston.
Ship-building with them has also declined since the Revolution, and the
revival of manufacturing in the north depends upon adequate protection
from the federal government. Accordingly they request that “heavy duties
may be laid on such articles as are manufactured by our own citizens,
humbly conceiving that the impost is not solely considered by Congress
as an object of _revenue_, but, in its operation, intended to _exclude_
such importations, and, ultimately, establish these several branches of
manufacture among ourselves.” Rope-makers, hatters, pewterers,
soapboilers, and tallow-chandlers, wool card-makers, ship-carvers,
sailmakers, cabinet-makers, coachmakers, tailors, cordwainers, glue and
starch makers, brass-founders, and coppersmiths are among the
memorialists.
In the processions which celebrated the adoption of the Constitution in
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New York, the several
local manufacturing concerns were extensively represented by floats and
banner-men, which shows that they were not unaware of the gain that had
been made in their favor by the establishment of the new system. But it
must not be supposed that the consolidation of interests in support of
the Constitution was purely local in character. On the contrary it was
nationwide.
Immediately after the Revolution the local groups were being welded into
a national interest by correspondence committees. Before the formation
of the Constitution, Boston merchants were sending out appeals to other
merchants in the several states to join in a national movement for
protection; and before the new government went into effect, they were
active in stirring up united action among the merchants and
manufacturers of the whole country. In 1788, a committee of the
association of Boston merchants and manufacturers sent out a circular to
“their brethren in the several seaports of the union,” asking for
cooperation in this grave juncture.[66] To this Boston appeal are
appended the names of John Gray, Gibbins Sharp, Benjamin Austin, Jr.,
Larson Belcher, William Hawes, and Joshua Witherle—all of whom signed
the petition addressed to Congress the following year asking for
protection.[67]
During the struggle over the reconstruction, the advocates of a
constitution made use of the argument that the consumption of foreign
luxuries, manufactured stuffs, was one of the chief causes of the
economic distress which was said to prevail; and declared that national
legislation was the only source of relief from this heavy importation. A
writer in the _American Museum_ for February, 1787, complains that “the
articles of rum and tea alone, which are drank in this country, would
pay all its taxes. But when we add sugar, coffee, gauzes, silks,
feathers, and the whole list of baubles and trinkets, what an enormous
expense! No wonder you want paper currency. My countrymen are all grown
very tasty. Feathers and jordans must all be imported. Certainly,
gentlemen, the _devil_ is among you. A Hampshireman, who drinks forty
shillings worth of rum in a year and never thinks of the expense, will
raise a mob to reduce the governor’s salary.”[68]
The Connecticut Courant, of November 12, 1787, in an argument for
ratification declares: “In the harbour of New York there are now 60
ships of which 55 are British. The produce of South Carolina was shipped
in 170 ships, of which 150 were British.... Surely there is not any
American who regards the interest of his country but must see the
immediate necessity of an efficient federal government; without it the
Northern states will soon be depopulated and dwindle into poverty, while
the Southern ones will become silk worms to toil and labour for Europe.”
It is worthy of remark, however, that the gloomy view of economic
conditions persistently propagated by the advocates of a new national
system was not entertained by all writers of eminence and authority. One
of the members of the Convention, Franklin, early in 1787, before the
calling of that assembly, declared that the country was, on the whole,
so prosperous that there was every reason for profound thanksgiving.[69]
He mentioned, it is true, that there were some who complained of hard
times, slack trade, and scarcity of money, but he was quick to add that
there never was an age nor a country in which there were not some people
so circumstanced as to find it hard to make a living and that “it is
always in the power of a small number to make a great clamour.” But
taking the several classes in the community as a whole, prosperity,
contended Franklin, was widespread and obvious. Never was the farmer
paid better prices for his products, “as the published prices current
abundantly testify. The lands he possesses are continually rising in
value.” In no part of Europe are the laboring poor so well paid, fed, or
clothed. The fishing trade, he thinks, is in a rather bad way, and
mercantile branches are overcrowded; but he is not distressed by the
extensive importation of English goods, because this is nothing new, and
America has prospered in spite of it.
It may very well be that Franklin’s view of the general social
conditions just previous to the formation of the Constitution is
essentially correct and that the defects in the Articles of
Confederation were not the serious menace to the social fabric which the
loud complaints of advocates of change implied. It may be that “the
critical period” was not such a critical period after all; but a phantom
of the imagination produced by some undoubted evils which could have
been remedied without a political revolution. It does not seem to have
occurred to those historians, who have repeated without examination
Fiske’s picturesque phrase that it is a serious matter to indict a whole
system, an entire epoch, and a whole people. It does not appear that any
one has really inquired just what precise facts must be established to
prove that “the bonds of the social order were dissolving.” Certainly,
the inflamed declarations of the Shaysites are not to be taken as
representing accurately the state of the people, and just as certainly
the alarmist letters and pamphlets of interested persons on the other
side are not to be accepted without discount. When it is remembered that
most of our history has been written by Federalists, it will become
apparent that great care should be taken in accepting, without reserve,
the gloomy pictures of the social conditions prevailing under the
Articles of Confederation. In fact, a very learned, though
controversial, historian, Henry B. Dawson, in an article published more
than forty years ago makes out quite a plausible case (documented by
minute research) for the statement that the “chaos” of which historians
are wont to speak when dealing with the history of the years 1783–87,
was a creation of their fancies.[70]
However this may be, and whether or not Franklin’s view is correct,[71]
it cannot be denied that the interests seeking protection were extensive
and diversified. This is conclusively shown by the petitions addressed
to public bodies, by the number of influential men connected with the
movement, and by the rapidity with which the new government under the
Constitution responded to their demands.
CAPITAL INVESTED IN WESTERN LANDS.—Although companies had been formed to
deal in western lands on a large scale before the Revolution, it was not
until the close of the War that effective steps were taken toward
settlement. At that time, says Professor Haskins, “the number of
emigrants, the cheapness of the lands, and the lack of an established
system of sale in small quantities offered many inducements for the
formation of great land companies whose opportunities for speculation
were increased by the depreciated currency and general ignorance
concerning the West.... ‘All I am now worth was gained by speculations
in land,’ wrote Timothy Pickering [a member of the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention] in the same year [1796]; and many eminent men
could have said the same, often with a later experience quite similar.
Land speculation involved Washington, Franklin, Gallatin, Patrick Henry,
Robert Morris, and James Wilson, as well as many less widely known.”[72]
The situation was this: Congress under the Articles of Confederation
adopted a policy of accepting certificates in part payment for lands;
and it was hoped by some that the entire national debt might be
extinguished in this way. However, the weakness of the Confederation,
the lack of proper military forces, the uncertainty as to the frontiers
kept the values of the large sections held for appreciation at an
abnormally low price. Those who had invested their funds in these lands
or taken stocks in the companies felt the adverse effects of the
prevailing public policy, and foresaw the benefits which might be
expected from a new and stable government. Their view was tersely put by
Williamson, a member of the Convention from North Carolina, in a letter
to Madison on June 2, 1788: “For myself, I conceive that my opinions are
not biassed by private Interests, but having claims to a considerable
Quantity of Land in the Western Country, I am fully persuaded that the
Value of those Lands must be increased by an efficient federal
Government.”[73]
The weight of the several species of property in politics is not
determined by the amount, but rather by the opportunities offered to
each variety for gain and by the degree of necessity for defence against
hostile legislation designed to depreciate values or close opportunities
for increments. When viewed in this light the reason for the special
pressure of personalty in politics in 1787 is apparent. It was receiving
attacks on all hands from the depreciators and it found the way to
profitable operations closed by governmental action or neglect. If we
may judge from the politics of the Congress under the Articles of
Confederation, two related groups were most active: those working for
the establishment of a revenue sufficient to discharge the interest and
principal of the public debt, and those working for commercial
regulations advantageous to personalty operations in shipping and
manufacturing and in western land speculations.[74]
It should be remembered also that personalty is usually more active than
real property. It is centralized in the towns and can draw together for
defence or aggression with greater facility. The expectation of profits
from its manipulation was much larger in 1787 than from real property.
It had a considerable portion of the professional classes attached to
it; its influence over the press was tremendous, not only through
ownership, but also through advertising and other patronage.[75] It was,
in short, the dynamic element in the movement for the new Constitution.
CHAPTER III
THE MOVEMENT FOR THE CONSTITUTION
Did the system of government prevailing in the United States in 1787
affect adversely any of the economic interests enumerated in the
preceding chapter? Furthermore, were the leaders in the movement which
led to the adoption of the Constitution representatives of the interests
so affected?
Fortunately, it is not necessary to devote any considerable attention to
the first of these questions. It is answered in part above, and all of
the standard treatises show conclusively that the legal system
prevailing at the opening of 1787 was unfavorable to the property rights
of four powerful groups above enumerated.[76] That system was, in brief,
as follows. There was a loose union of thirteen sovereign states under
the Articles of Confederation. The national government consisted of a
legislature of one house in which the states had an equal voting power.
There was no executive department and no general judiciary. The central
government had no power to regulate commerce or to tax directly; and in
the absence of these powers all branches of the government were rendered
helpless. Particularly, money could not be secured to pay the holders of
public securities, either their interest or principal. Under this
system, the state legislatures were substantially without restrictions
or judicial control; private rights in property were continually
attacked by stay laws, legal tender laws, and a whole range of measures
framed in behalf of debtors; and in New England open rebellion had
broken out.
That the economic groups in question looked to a new national government
as the one source of relief and advantage, is shown in a hundred
contemporary pamphlets and newspaper articles. It was in fact the topic
of the times.
For example, a letter from Philadelphia, under date of August 29, 1787,
sums up concisely the interests which were turning to the new
Constitution: “The states neglect their roads and canals, till they see
whether those necessary improvements will not become the objects of a
national government. Trading and manufacturing companies suspend their
voyages and manufactures till they see how far their commerce will be
protected and promoted by a national system of commercial regulations.
The lawful usurer locks up or buries his specie till he sees whether the
new frame of government will deliver him from the curse or fear of paper
money and the tender laws.... The public creditor, who, from the
deranged state of finances in every state and their total inability to
support their partial funding systems, has reason to fear that his
certificates will perish in his hands, now places all his hopes of
justice in an enlightened and stable national government. The
embarrassed farmer and the oppressed tenant, who wishes to become
free ... by emigrating to a frontier country, wait to see whether they
shall be protected by a national force from the Indians.”[77]
A final answer to the second question propounded above would require an
exhaustive analysis of the “movement for the Constitution,” in the
following form:—
1. A study of the economic forces in the Revolution and particularly in
the Continental Congress that drafted the Articles of Confederation.
2. An inquiry into the first signs of discontent with the prevailing
system, their geographic distribution, and their economic sources.
3. An examination of the several attempts in the Congress under the
Articles of Confederation to secure the power to regulate commerce and
establish a revenue for discharging the debt.
4. A description of the economic interests of all the members who were
most active in these attempts.
5. A description of the economic forces in the communities whose
representatives in Congress were zealous in securing a revision of the
Articles.
6. A study of the nature and distribution of the several legislative
attacks on private rights in property between 1783 and 1787.
7. A minute study of the personnel of the movement for revision and the
economic interests of the leading spirits in Congress and the state
legislatures and outside of legislative chambers.
Any one superficially acquainted with the sources of American history
will see at once the nature of the work which must be done to secure the
raw materials for such a study. The enormous mass of unprinted papers of
the Continental Congress in the Library at Washington would have to be
thoroughly searched; proceedings in state legislatures during the years
under consideration would have to be scrutinized; local archives and
newspapers would have to be examined.
In the present state of our historical materials, therefore, all that
can be attempted here is a superficial commentary on some of the outward
aspects of the movement for the Constitution which are described in the
conventional works on the subject. Many of the eminent men prominently
identified with the events which led up to the Convention of 1787 were
themselves members of that Assembly, and their economic interests are
considered below in Chapter V. But it is not without significance to
discover that some of the leading men outside of the Convention who
labored for an overthrow of the old system were also directly interested
in the results of their labors.
As early as January, 1781, General Philip Schuyler moved in the senate
of New York “to request the eastern states to join in an early
convention, which should form a perpetual league of incorporation,
subservient, however, to the common interest of all the states; invite
others to accede to it; erect Vermont into a state; devise a fund for
the redemption of the common debts; substitute a permanent and uniform
system for temporary expedients; and invest the confederacy with powers
of coercion.”[78] General Schuyler was a large holder of depreciated
securities.[79]
In February, 1781, Congress recommended to the states that they vest in
the national legislature a power to levy a duty to pay the principal and
interest of the debt. In April, 1783, Congress again appealed to the
states for authority to lay duties for the purpose of supplying a
revenue with which to discharge the debt. Among the leaders in Congress
who favored this increase in power were Gorham, Higginson, Ellsworth,
Dyer, Boudinot, Fitzsimons, Williamson, Izard, Johnson, and King, all of
whom held securities which were daily depreciating under the failure of
the government to meet its just obligations.[80]
In 1785, Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, in his inaugural address
urged the necessity of a stronger union with larger powers, and
recommended a convention to deliberate upon the whole matter.[81]
Governor Bowdoin was a large holder of public securities.[82] The
legislature of the commonwealth, thereupon, resolved that the Articles
of Confederation were inadequate, and directed the representatives in
Congress to take steps looking toward a strengthening of the union; but
they failed to act.
Men less eminent than Bowdoin and Schuyler were being educated in
Federalism by the march of events. In Boston merchants were petitioning
Congress for relief from British discriminations[83]; in the Virginia
legislature the representatives of the commercial interests were
learning their lessons[84]; the demands for positive action were
increasing daily in number. Every failure to find a remedy under the
Articles of Confederation only served to augment the ranks of those who
were ready for a complete reconstruction of the prevailing system.
A few illustrations will serve to show how the demand for reform was
being fostered and also the connection between the leaders in the
agitation and the personnel of the public bodies which later achieved
the great work of framing and ratifying the Constitution. Even before
the war was over and the Articles of Confederation tested in a time of
peace, the inability of the government under it to afford defence to
commerce on the high seas was deplored by merchants whose vessels were
falling prey to the British. In April, 1782, a number of prominent
merchants presented a petition to Congress in which they lamented the
British depredations on American trade and the want of adequate naval
protection at sea.[85] Among the signers of this petition were several
men who were later known as warm supporters of a strong federal
government. One of them, Thomas Fitzsimons, was a member of the
Convention which drafted the Constitution; another, John Barclay, was a
member of the Pennsylvania convention and voted in favor of the
ratification of the new system of government.
Six years before the Convention met in Philadelphia, the disordered
financial system under the Confederation was the subject of protest by
interested parties. In 1781, “divers inhabitants of the state of
Pennsylvania,” were petitioning Congress to take some action designed to
put the credit of the country on a sound basis.[86] Thus runs the
petition: “Humbly sheweth that whereas you thought fit heretofore in the
course of your wisdom to emit bills of credit for good and great
purposes, but the same depreciating to such an amazing degree beyond the
expectation of all living did therefore lay open wide door for the most
monstrous and absurd injustices by fraudulent payments which we conclude
is directly contrary to your good and great purposes in emitting the
same, we therefore, not only firmly relying on the extraordinary
clearness of the circumstances of our agrievances, but likewise on the
uprightness of your understandings, Do therefore presume to pray your
honors would be pleased to recommend to the several states to adopt such
measures as they may think most likely to afford a safe and effectual
redress to all such agrievances....”[86] Among the signers to this
petition are Thomas Bull, John Hannum, and Thomas Cheyney, who six years
later as members of the Pennsylvania convention had the pleasure of
voting for the ratification of an instrument of government that put an
end to the evils against which they had so earnestly protested.
The failure of repeated attempts in Congress to secure an amendment
authorizing the laying of impost duties, the refusal of the states to
pay the requisitions made by Congress, and the obvious impossibility of
gaining their ends through the ordinary channels of ratification by
state legislatures, drove the advocates of these measures to
desperation. Republican government, as it had been tried out, had failed
to secure for personalty that protection and opportunity for advancement
which it enjoyed under monarchy. The despair of the representatives of
the property interests thus jeopardized and their readiness for some
heroic measures were fully manifest in the correspondence of the time.
Washington, who was not given to undue alarms, wrote to John Jay from
Mount Vernon, on August 1, 1786, to the effect that men of leadership
were ready for drastic action: “What astonishing changes,” he said, “a
few years are capable of producing. I am told that even respectable
characters speak of a monarchical form of Government without horror.
From thinking proceeds speaking, thence to acting is often but a single
step. But how irrevocable and tremendous! What a triumph for our enemies
to verify their predictions—what a triumph for the advocates of
despotism to find that we are incapable of governing ourselves, & that
systems founded on the basis of equal liberty are merely ideal &
fallacious! Would to God that wise measures may be taken in time to
avert the consequences we have but too much reason to apprehend.”[87]
Later in that year, General Knox, who was a holder of public securities,
wrote to Washington in the following strain: “The people who are the
insurgents [Shaysites] have never paid any, or but very little taxes—But
they see the weakness of government; They feel at once their own
poverty, compared with the opulent, and their own force, and they are
determined to make use of the latter, in order to remedy the former.
Their creed is ‘That the property of the United States has been
protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint exertions of
all, and therefore ought to be the common property of all. And he that
attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy to equity and justice, and
ought to be swept from off the face of the earth.’ In a word they are
determined to annihilate all debts public and private and have agrarian
Laws, which are easily effected by means of unfunded paper money which
shall be a tender in all cases whatever—
“The numbers of these people may amount in Massachusetts to about one
fifth part of several populous counties, and to them may be collected,
people of similar sentiments, from the states of Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and New Hampshire so as to constitute a body of 12 or 15000
desperate & unprincipled men—They are chiefly of the young and active
part of the community, more easily collected than perhaps kept together
afterwards—But they will probably commit overt acts of treason which
will compel them to embody for their own safety—once embodied they will
be constrained to submit to discipline for the same reason. Having
proceeded to this length for which they are now ripe, we shall have a
formidable rebellion against reason, the principle of all government,
and the very name of liberty. This dreadful situation has alarmed every
man of principle and property in New England. They start as from a
dream, and ask what has been the cause of our delusion? what is to
afford us security against the violence of lawless men? Our government
must be braced, changed, or altered to secure our lives and property. We
imagined that the mildness of our government and _the virtue_ of the
people were so correspondent, that we were not as other nations
requiring brutal force to support the laws—But we find that we are men,
actual men, possessing all the turbulent passions belonging to that
anim[al] and that we must have a government proper and adequate for him.
The people of Massachuse[tts] for instance, are far advanced in this
doctrine, and the men of reflection, & principle, are determined to
endev[or] to establish a government which shall have the power to
protect them in their lawful pursuits, and which will be efficient in
all cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions—They mean that
liberty shall be the basis, a liberty resulting from the equal and firm
administration of the laws. They wish for a general government of unity
as they see the local legislatures must naturally and necessarily tend
to retard and frustrate all general government.”[88]
A few months later, Madison, writing to Edmund Pendleton from New York,
the seat of the government, corroborated the views expressed by
Washington and Knox and set forth what he conceived to be the desperate
state of republican government. His letter, dated February 24, 1787,
three days after Congress had issued the call for a national Convention,
ran as follows: “In general I find men of reflection much less sanguine
as to a new than despondent as to the present System. Indeed the Present
System neither has nor deserves advocates; and if some very strong props
are not applied will quickly tumble to the ground.... If the approaching
Convention should not agree on some remedy, I am persuaded that some
very different arrangement will ensue. The late turbulent scenes in
Massachusetts & infamous ones in Rhode Island, have done inexpressible
injury to the republican character in that part of the U. States; and a
propensity towards Monarchy is said to have been produced by it in some
leading minds. The bulk of the people will probably prefer the lesser
evil of a partition of the Union into three more practicable and
energetic Governments. The latter idea I find after long confinement to
individual speculations & private circles, is beginning to show itself
in the Newspapers.”[89]
A few days after this letter was written by Madison, John Armstrong
wrote to Washington from Carlisle that the suppression of the
insurrection in Massachusetts had not allayed the fears of leading men
in his state. “The alarming flame in Massachusetts,” he says, “seems
nearly extinguished, but if the subsequent measures of that State
respecting the insurgents should be severe, amounting to _death_,
Confiscation, or disfranchisement, the consequence may be bad, as
tending to reinkindle the flame. Shall I tell you in _confidence_, I
have now twice heard, nor from low authority (some principal men of that
State) begin to talk of wishing one general _Head_ to the Union, in the
room of Congress!”[90]
By correspondence such as this just cited, by an increasing recognition
of the desperate straights in which they were placed, a remarkable
fusion of interested forces was effected. The wealth, the influence, and
a major portion of the educated men of the country were drawn together
in a compact group, “informed by a conscious solidarity of interests,”
as President Wilson has so tersely put it.[91]
Having failed to obtain relief through the regular channels of amendment
by Congress ratified by the state legislatures, the leaders struck out
on a new path. Operating through the Virginia legislature, they secured
a resolution inviting the sister commonwealths to send delegates to a
convention at Annapolis to take into consideration the trade and
commercial system of the United States.[92] The convention duly met, but
the attendance was so slim that, as Professor Burgess has put it, “a
coup d’état attempted by so small a body could not but fail.”[93]
Although the Annapolis convention was ostensibly concerned with
commercial regulation primarily, there is no doubt that it was the
creation of the men who had been working in Congress and out for a
general revision of the whole system. There is no doubt also that it was
not regarded as of much significance in itself, but rather as a
preliminary to a national convention which would afford an opportunity
for reconstructing the government. For this view we have a witness of
high authority, James Madison, who in a letter of August 12, 1786, to
Jefferson, written a month before the Annapolis conference, said: “Many
gentlemen, both within and without Congress, wish to make this meeting
subservient to a plenipotentiary Convention for amending the
Confederation. Tho’ my wishes are in favor of such an event, yet I
despair so much of its accomplishment at the present crisis that I do
not extend my views beyond a commercial Reform.”[94]
Under the influence of Hamilton, the conference at Annapolis contented
itself with merely recommending that another convention be called “to
devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to
render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the
exigencies of the Union.” Acting on this modest suggestion, Congress, in
February, 1787, invited the states to send delegates to a Convention at
Philadelphia for “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
of Confederation.”
Certain tentative conclusions emerge at this point.
Large and important groups of economic interests were adversely affected
by the system of government under the Articles of Confederation, namely,
those of public securities, shipping and manufacturing, money at
interest; in short, capital as opposed to land.
The representatives of these important interests attempted through the
regular legal channels to secure amendments to the Articles of
Confederation which would safeguard their rights in the future,
particularly those of the public creditors.
Having failed to realize their great purposes through the regular means,
the leaders in the movement set to work to secure by a circuitous route
the assembling of a Convention to “revise” the Articles of Confederation
with the hope of obtaining, outside of the existing legal framework, the
adoption of a revolutionary programme.
Ostensibly, however, the formal plan of approval by Congress and the
state legislatures was to be preserved.
CHAPTER IV
PROPERTY SAFEGUARDS IN THE ELECTION OF DELEGATES
Under the protection afforded by these outward signs of regularity, the
leaders in the movement for the new Constitution set to work in their
respective legislatures to secure the choice of delegates prepared to
take the heroic measures which the circumstances demanded. The zealous
and dynamic element, of course, was favored by the inertness, ignorance,
and indifference of the masses, and the confidence of the legislatures
in their ability to exercise the ultimate control through the ratifying
power. No special popular elections were called to complicate the
problem of securing the right kind of a Convention and the leaders were
confronted with the comparatively simple task of convincing the
legislatures of the advisability of sending delegates. Naturally the
most strenuous and interested advocates of change came forward as
candidates.
The resolution of the Congress under the Articles of Confederation
calling for the Convention provided that the delegates should be
“appointed by the states.” The actual selection was made in each case by
the legislature, both houses participating, except in Georgia and
Pennsylvania, which had unicameral assemblies. That is, the delegates to
the federal Convention were selected in the same fashion as were United
States Senators under the present Constitution, in all states, previous
to the adoption of the principle of direct election. This fact in itself
removed the choice of delegates one degree from the electorate.
A further safeguard against the injection of too much popular feeling
into the choice of delegates to the Convention was afforded by the
property qualifications generally placed on voters and members of the
legislatures by the state constitutions and laws in force in 1787.[95]
In order to ascertain the precise character of the defence afforded to
property by this barrier to universal manhood suffrage, it is necessary
to inquire in detail into the qualifications then imposed.[96]
The New Hampshire constitution of 1784 was in force when the call for
the election of delegates came. It provided that “no person shall be
capable of being elected a senator who is not of the Protestant
religion, and seized of a freehold estate in his own right of the value
of two hundred pounds.”[97] Members of the lower house were required to
possess an estate “of the value of one hundred pounds, one-half of which
to be a freehold.” The suffrage was widely extended, for freeholders,
tax payers, and even those who paid a poll tax could vote.
Massachusetts conferred the suffrage upon all males possessing a
freehold estate of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of
the value of sixty pounds. A senator was required to be “seized in his
own right of a freehold within this commonwealth, of the value of three
hundred pounds at least, or possessed of a personal estate of the value
of six hundred pounds at least, or of both to the amount of the same
sum.” Every member of the house of representatives was required to be
“seized in his own right of a free hold of the value of one hundred
pounds, within the town he shall be chosen to represent, or any ratable
estate to the value of two hundred pounds; and he shall cease to
represent the said town immediately on his ceasing to be qualified as
aforesaid.”
Like the neighboring state of Rhode Island, which sent no delegates to
Philadelphia, Connecticut had continued after the Revolution under the
old royal charter form of government without taking the trouble to draft
a constitution. Under this old system, the suffrage was restricted to
holders of real or personal property of a certain value. According to
McKinley, “The forty-shilling freehold, translated later into seven
dollars income from land, was retained as one of the alternative
qualifications of the suffrage until the amendment in 1845 of the
constitution of 1818.”[98] The alternative qualification here spoken of
was the ownership of forty pounds’ worth of personal property, which was
established in 1702 and remained until after the Revolution. The
Connecticut Register of the time thus quaintly describes the franchise:
“The qualifications for freemen are that they be at least twenty-one
years of age, possessed of freehold estate to the value of 40s. per ann.
or £40 personal estate in the general list of estates in that year
wherein they desire to be admitted Freemen; or are possessed of estate
as aforesaid and by law excused from putting it into the list; and being
of quiet and peaceable behaviour.”[99]
New York gave a special position to the rights of property in the
senate. Senators were required to be freeholders, and were chosen by
freeholders “possessed of freeholds of the value of one hundred pounds.”
With regard to the voter for members of the lower house, it was
stipulated that “he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold
of the value of twenty pounds within said county, or have rented a
tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated
and actually paid taxes to this state.” An exception to this rule
conferred the suffrage on all who were freemen in Albany, and in New
York City, on or before October 14, 1775.
These qualifications worked an extensive disfranchisement in New York.
“The census of 1790 shows that out of a population of thirty thousand
[in New York City], there were but 1,209 freeholders of £100 valuation
or over; 1,221 of £20, and 2,661 ‘forty-shilling’ freeholders. Property
interests—something like a landed aristocracy—controlled municipal
elections.”[100] Some notion of the extent to which the adult males
would have voted if permitted, is afforded by the elections of 1788, at
which members of the state ratifying convention were chosen under the
universal manhood suffrage rule,[101] and members of the assembly were
chosen under the regular property qualifications. For example, Richard
Harrison received 2677 votes as member of the convention, and 1500 votes
as member of the state assembly.[102] In Albany county the vote for
members of the assembly ran about 1600 under that for members of the
convention.[103] It looks as if one could safely guess that about
one-third more voters would have been active participants in elections
if they had not been shut out by the prevailing property qualifications
in New York.
New Jersey had a legislature of two houses, a council and a general
assembly. Every member of the former had to be a freeholder and “worth
at least one thousand pound proclamation money, or real and personal
estate within the same county;” and every member of the latter body was
required to possess at least half as much in real and personal property.
As for the suffrage, the constitution provided “that all inhabitants of
this colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money
clear estate in the same ... shall be entitled to vote for
Representatives in Council and Assembly.”
The Delaware constitution of 1776 provided that members of both branches
of the legislature should be chosen from among the freeholders of the
county, and that “the right of suffrage in the election of members for
both houses shall remain as exercised by law at present.” The election
law which then governed the suffrage in Delaware was the act of 1734
which enfranchised freeholders owning “fifty acres of land, with twelve
acres cleared and improved, or otherwise worth £40 lawful money.”[104]
The first constitution of Pennsylvania established in 1776 was the work
of a radical party, and it provided for a single chambered legislature
based on a widely extended suffrage. “Every freeman of the full age of
twenty-one years,” runs the instrument, “having resided in this state
for the space of one whole year ... and paid public taxes during that
time, shall enjoy the right of an elector: _Provided_ always that sons
of freeholders of the age of twenty-one years shall be entitled to vote
although they have not paid taxes.”[105]
In Maryland a distinction was made between town and county in the choice
of delegates to the lower house of the state legislature. Generally
every freeman “having a freehold of fifty acres of land,” or “having
property in this state above the value of thirty pounds current money”
could vote in the county in which he resided for members of the house of
delegates. All persons qualified by the charter of Annapolis to vote for
burgesses could vote for delegates from that city; and in Baltimore
persons “having the same qualifications as electors in the county” could
vote for delegates. County delegates in the state legislature were
required to possess “real or personal property above the value of five
hundred pounds current money.” The senators were chosen indirectly by
electors selected by the qualified voters for delegates. These
senatorial electors were to possess the qualifications of delegates, and
senators themselves had to possess “real and personal property above the
value of one thousand pounds current money.”
The Virginia constitution of 1776 stipulated that members of both houses
of the legislature must be “freeholders or duly qualified according to
law;” and added that “the right of suffrage in the election of members
of both houses shall remain as exercised at present.” Under this
provision, persons owning twenty-five acres of improved land or fifty
acres of unimproved land were admitted to the suffrage, “together with
certain artisans residing in Norfolk and Williamsburg.”[106]
At the time of choosing delegates to the Convention, North Carolina was
under the constitution of 1776 which prescribed property qualifications
for members of the legislature and for voters as well. Each member of
the senate was required to possess “not less than three hundred acres of
land in fee,” and each member of the lower house “not less than one
hundred acres of land in fee or for the term of his own life.” A
freehold qualification of fifty acres of land was required of voters for
senators, and the suffrage for voters for members of the lower house was
extended to all freemen who paid “public taxes.” In the towns entitled
to representation the possession of a freehold or the payment of a
public tax qualified for voting in the election of members of the lower
house.
The legislature of South Carolina, that chose the representatives of
that state to the Philadelphia Convention, was elected under the
constitution of 1778 which prescribed high property qualifications.[107]
“No person who resides in the parish for which he is elected shall take
his seat in the senate, unless he possess a settled estate and freehold
in his own right in the said parish or district of the value of two
thousand pounds currency at least, clear of debt.” Non-resident senators
were required to be the holders of such an estate worth at least seven
thousand pounds, clear of debt. The member of the lower house was
required to possess an estate and slaves or realty worth one thousand
pounds,[108] while each non-resident member of that house had to own a
freehold estate worth at least three thousand five hundred pounds, clear
of debt. The suffrage was restricted to persons owning fifty acres, or a
town lot, or paying taxes equivalent to the taxes on fifty acres of
land.
In 1787, the Georgia legislature consisted of one chamber, under the
constitution of 1777, which stipulated that members of the house of
representatives “Shall be of the Protestant religion, and of the age of
twenty-one years, and shall be possessed in their own rights of two
hundred and fifty acres of land or some property to the amount of two
hundred and fifty pounds.” The suffrage was widely extended to every
white male having in his own right property “of ten pounds value and
liable to pay tax” or “being of any mechanic trade.”
From this review it is apparent that a majority of the states placed
direct property qualifications on the voters, and the other states
eliminated practically all who were not taxpayers. Special safeguards
for property were secured in the qualifications imposed on members of
the legislatures in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Further
safeguards were added by the qualifications imposed in the case of
senators in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
While these qualifications operated to exclude a large portion of the
adult males from participating in elections, the wide distribution of
real property created an extensive electorate and in most rural regions
gave the legislatures a broad popular basis.[109] Far from rendering to
personal property that defence which was necessary to the full
realization of its rights, these qualifications for electors admitted to
the suffrage its most dangerous antagonists: the small farmers and many
of the debtors who were the most active in all attempts to depreciate
personalty by legislation. Madison with his usual acumen saw the
inadequacy of such defence and pointed out in the Convention that the
really serious assaults on property (having in mind of course,
personalty) had come from the “freeholders.”[110]
Nevertheless, in the election of delegates to the Convention, the
representatives of personalty in the legislatures were able by the sheer
weight of their combined intelligence and economic power to secure
delegates from the urban centres or allied with their interests. Happily
for them, all the legislatures which they had to convince had not been
elected on the issue of choosing delegates to a national Convention, and
did not come from a populace stirred up on that question.[111] The call
for the Convention went forth on February 21, 1787, from Congress, and
within a few months all the legislatures, except that of Rhode Island,
had responded. Thus the heated popular discussion usually incident to
such a momentous political undertaking was largely avoided, and an
orderly and temperate procedure in the selection of delegates was
rendered possible.
CHAPTER V
THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION
Having shown that four groups of property rights were adversely affected
by the government under the Articles of Confederation, and that economic
motives were behind the movement for a reconstruction of the system, it
is now necessary to inquire whether the members of the Convention which
drafted the Constitution represented in their own property affiliations
any or all of these groups. In other words, did the men who formulated
the fundamental law of the land possess the kinds of property which were
immediately and directly increased in value or made more secure by the
results of their labors at Philadelphia? Did they have money at
interest? Did they own public securities? Did they hold western lands
for appreciation? Were they interested in shipping and manufactures?
The purpose of such an inquiry is not, of course, to show that the
Constitution was made for the personal benefit of the members of the
Convention. Far from it. Neither is it of any moment to discover how
many hundred thousand dollars accrued to them as a result of the
foundation of the new government. The only point here considered is: Did
they represent distinct groups whose economic interests they understood
and felt in concrete, definite form through their own personal
experience with identical property rights, or were they working merely
under the guidance of abstract principles of political science?
Unfortunately, the materials for such a study are very scanty, because
the average biographer usually considers as negligible the processes by
which his hero gained his livelihood. The pages which follow are,
therefore, more an evidence of what ought to be done than a record of
results actually accomplished. They would be meagre, indeed, were it not
for the rich unpublished records of the Treasury Department which are
here used for the first time in this connection; and they would
doubtless have been fuller were it not for the fact that most of the
books showing the central operations of the Treasury Department under
Hamilton have disappeared. The names of the attending members of the
Convention are given in alphabetical order.
Of _Abraham Baldwin’s_ private fortune there is little known. His father
was evidently well-to-do, for he enjoyed the advantage of a classical
education at Yale before he established himself in the practice of law
at Savannah, Georgia. He soon rose to eminence in his profession, and
was reckoned among the ablest and shrewdest lawyers of his adopted
commonwealth. A short sketch of him states that by “his constant habits
of economy and temperance,” he accumulated enough to enable him to
assist many young men in their education and establishment in business.
When his father died, in 1787, he was able to pay the debts of the
insolvent estate, and he educated his six half brothers and sisters “in
a great measure at his own expense.”[112]
Some portion of Baldwin’s fortune was invested in public securities. He
possessed a few thousand dollars worth of the stocks of the new
government at its very inception, which doubtless represented old paper
of the Confederation acquired by original subscription or by purchase.
The ledgers and other principal records of Georgia are apparently
unavailable—at all events a search at the Treasury Department failed to
reveal them; but Baldwin held some paper which is entered on the books
of his native state, Connecticut, in April, 1792: deferred 6 per cents,
funded 6 per cents, and 3 per cents to the amount of about $2500.[113]
At later dates, 1797 and 1804, he appears on the Treasury Records for
several thousand dollars worth of 6 per cents and 3 per cents, but the
sources of these sums are not apparent.[114] It is probable, however,
that these stocks were paper which Baldwin funded at the Treasury
instead of a loan office. He was a member of Congress, and naturally
would have transacted business with the agency nearest at hand. They
may, of course, represent purchases for investment, made after the great
appreciation had taken place.[115]
There is no exhaustive biography of _Richard Bassett_, of Delaware. A
brief sketch of him relates that he “was born in 1745. He was the
adopted son of Mr. Lawson, a lawyer, who married a Miss Inzer. The Inzer
family was Herman’s heir to Bohemia Manor.... Mr. Bassett was educated
and trained for the profession of law by Mr. Lawson, whose heir he
became. By this inheritance he came into possession of six thousand
acres of Bohemia manor, which we are informed, embraced the fairest and
best portion of the Manor.”[116] Through his inheritance and his
accumulations in the practice of law, he became one of the wealthy men
of his state. Another biographer notes that “His fortune was large and
he entertained lavishly at his three homes in Wilmington, Dover, and at
Bohemia Manor.”[117] He was on intimate terms with the leading financial
men of the community; he was very active in securing a charter in
Delaware for the Bank of North America when it was attacked by the
Pennsylvania legislature, and was warmly thanked for his success by
President Willing, in a letter dated February 6, 1786.[118]
Whether any considerable amount of Mr. Bassett’s large fortune was
invested in public securities at the inception of the new government it
is impossible to ascertain, on account of the meagre records of the
state of Delaware preserved in the Treasury Department. In the later
documents of the central office of the Treasury there appears the
remnant of “an old account” to the amount of a few hundred dollars worth
of 3 per cents and 6 per cents under dates of 1796 and 1797.[119] A
reasonable inference from the entry would be that Bassett, like other
members of Congress, carried on his transactions directly with the
Treasury (whose early records are missing), and that these holdings were
based on paper originally funded.
_Gunning Bedford_, of Delaware, was the son of a “substantial land
owner”[120] and a Bedford of that name appears on the tax lists of
Newcastle county for the year 1776 for the amount of sixteen pounds, a
moderate sum for those days.[121] He was a lawyer, but the extent of his
practice is not known. He was of high standing in the community, and was
elected governor of his state a few years after the Convention met. He
took an interest in the financial affairs of the state, and under his
administration as governor the Bank of Delaware was organized. How far
Bedford had an interest in public securities cannot be determined on
account of the fact that only a few scraps of the loan office papers for
Delaware seem to be preserved in the Treasury Department. An old loan
office volume shows a Gunning Bedford down for one $400 certificate of
May, 1779[122] and traces of the financial connections of the member of
the Convention with the government are to be found in the Pennsylvania
loan office records.[123]
_John Blair_, of Virginia, was born in that state about 1731. He
received a collegiate education, prepared for the law, and “in a very
few years rose to the head of his profession.”[124] Pierce, in his notes
on the men of the Convention, says: “Mr. Blair is one of the most
respectable men in Virginia, both on account of his Family as well as
fortune. He is one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and
acknowledged to have a very extensive knowledge of the Laws. Mr. Blair
is however no orator, but his good sense and most excellent principles
compensate for other deficiencies.”[125]
Blair took advantage of the excellent opportunity afforded by the
formation of the new Constitution to profit by the rise of securities.
He appears frequently in the fiscal transactions between the federal
government and the Virginia loan office, of which a few illustrations
need be given here. In March, 1791, he presented £577:16:7 in Virginia
certificates toward the United States loan; and of these securities £249
had been invested by Blair himself in 1782. The remaining amount he had
purchased on his own account.[126] In the same year an agent of Blair
presented two small certificates which had evidently been purchased by
the principal because they were issued to other parties in 1778.[127] In
September of that year, Blair himself turned in nearly $10,000 worth of
paper on the United States loan, of which a part was purchased and a
part original issues to the holder.[128]
_William Blount_, of North Carolina, was the son of Jacob Blount who
died in 1789, “leaving a large estate.”[129] Of the younger Blount’s
property interests in 1787 it is impossible to speak in detail. Very
early after the establishment of the new government he was connected
with land speculations on a large scale.[130] In 1790 he was appointed
by Washington to the post of governor of the Territory South of the Ohio
and it seems that he did not consider the employment of public office
for personal gain as incompatible with the discharge of his
administrative duties. In July, 1797, President Adams sent a message to
Congress asserting that there was a conspiracy in the southwest to wrest
New Orleans and the Floridas from the King of Spain and transfer them to
the English crown, and adding that Blount, who was then a Senator from
Tennessee, was implicated in the plot. The United States Senate
immediately took action, and after inquiry expelled him by a vote of
twenty-five to one on the charge of “high misdemeanor inconsistent with
public trust and duty.” When the sergeant-at-arms went to arrest him and
take him to Philadelphia for trial he refused to go; and in his refusal
he was warmly supported by his friends, of whom he had a legion, for, as
his biographer remarks, “He was a man of commanding presence, courtly
yet simple manners, and having a large salary and large private means,
he entertained lavishly at his house.”[131]
It does not appear that Blount combined dealings in securities with
speculations in land, for the loan office of North Carolina credits him
with only a small holding, and the origin of that is not apparent.[132]
It is true that the records of that state are incomplete, but Blount’s
appointment to the western post at the beginning of Washington’s
administration must have precluded extensive operations in securities.
_David Brearley_, of New Jersey, was the grandson of John Brearley, who
“owned 1600 acres of land near Newton, N. J. ... a hundred acre
plantation on the Delaware ... besides several thousand acres of land
near Lawrenceville.”[133] A brief sketch of him states that he “received
the honors of Princeton at the age of eighteen. On leaving that
celebrated seminary, he commenced the study of law, and in a few years
stood foremost at the bar of his native state.”[134] In 1779 he was
appointed chief justice of New Jersey, a post which he held until 1789
when he resigned to accept a position as judge of the United States
district court of that state.[135]
Brearley died in the summer of 1790 and consequently could not have
established any fiscal relations with the new government. The
incompleteness of the early loan office records for New Jersey,
preserved in the Treasury Department, renders impossible a positive
statement concerning Brearley’s holdings of securities at the time of
the Convention. Only one small entry appears in his name for a few
hundred dollars in a certificate purchased in 1779;[136] his relatives,
however, appear frequently on the loan office books of his state; but
their aggregate holdings were small. Joseph Brearley’s name occurs
several times, for example in July, 1791, for $505.80 worth of 3 per
cents;[137] David Brearley had a son and a brother bearing that
name.[138] Elizabeth Brearley is also among the small holders, and the
Chief Justice’s first and second wife and a daughter bore that
name.[139] The name of Zerujah Brearley—a sister of the member of the
Convention[140]—also appears.
_Jacob Broom_, of Delaware, was born at Wilmington, in 1752. His father
“originally a blacksmith was regarded as one of ‘the gentry’ of the day,
and was ‘a man of considerable substance, in real estate, silver, and
gold,’ although not one of the very wealthiest of his class. ‘Class’
distinctions, arising from birth, education, and worldly possessions
were not wholly ignored at that time by those who came to this land, to
find a home, a sanctuary, and liberty. And so in the transactions of the
period we find James Broom, Jacob’s father, referred to as James Broom,
Gentleman; and Jacob Broom as Surveyor. And both of these men had lands
and houses to rent and sell and gold and silver to loan on good
security. And both of them sold and rented and loaned.”[141]
Broom was a man of diversified financial resources. He was interested in
cotton mills and other enterprises. He was one of the original
stockholders of the Insurance Company of North America organized at
Philadelphia in 1792.[142] He was also one of the organizers and
original stockholders of the Delaware Bank established under Bedford’s
administration.[143] As mentioned above, the fragmentary records of
Delaware in the Treasury Department throw little light on the public
security holders of that state at the time of the formation of the
Constitution; but the ledgers of the central Treasury show that Broom
was a holder of a small amount of 3 per cents in 1797 and that this was
a remnant of an older account.[144] Broom was also willing to serve the
new government in an official capacity, for he applied to Madison in
April, 1789, for an appointment as collector at Wilmington.[145]
_Pierce Butler_, of South Carolina, was a descendant of the Duke of
Ormond and was very vain of his noble birth.[146] William Pierce in his
notes on the members of the Convention records that Butler “is a
gentleman of fortune and takes rank among the first in South
Carolina.”[147] He was a large slave-holder, having thirty-one in his
possession at the time of the first census. He also possessed some
public securities, for he was a stockholder and director of the first
United States Bank, and must have purchased his shares on the same basis
as other stockholders, that is, by the exchange of securities. He does
not appear on the records of South Carolina, however, but his daughter,
Sarah, had in 1792 a small amount of the assumed debt.[148]
_Daniel Carroll_, of Maryland, is recorded by his contemporary, Pierce,
as “a man of large fortune and influence in his state.”[149] His
interests were wide and varied. He was a stockholder in the Potomac
Company;[150] and he favored the adoption of a protective tariff, for he
was among the signers of the petition for such a measure laid before the
first Congress under the new Constitution.[151] He was a holder of
public securities, for his name occurs frequently in the Treasury
records of the period.[152] His chief source of profit out of the new
system was however in the location of the capitol at Washington, on land
which he owned.[153] Incidentally, he was able to facilitate this last
transaction, for he was a member of the Congress of 1789–1791 and was
one of the commissioners appointed to lay out the District of Columbia.
_George Clymer_, of Pennsylvania, was the son of “a wellto-do merchant
and ship builder of Philadelphia” who had augmented his fortunes by
marrying the daughter of a fellow merchant of the same city.[154] On the
early death of his parents he was placed under the guardianship of
William Coleman, one of the first business men of his native city, whose
counting house he entered to learn all the arts of mercantile pursuits
and “the principal part of whose fortune he inherited.”[155] Clymer’s
personal fortune was further enhanced by a happy marriage to Elizabeth
Meredith, the daughter of Reese Meredith, “one of the principal
merchants of Philadelphia.”[156] He was thus a brother-in-law of Mr.
Meredith the first treasurer of the Union, also a man of “large
fortune.”[157] For some time Clymer was associated in business with his
father- and brother-in-law.[158]
Mr. Clymer’s intimate associations were therefore merchantile and
financial, and his large fortune and quick understanding of the needs of
trade and commerce made him one of the first men of his city in the
Revolution and gave him a wide influence during the critical period, the
formation of the Constitution, and the establishment of the new
government, which he served as a member of Congress and later in several
official capacities.
In all financial matters he took a deep interest. He helped to create
the temporary Bank of Pennsylvania in 1780, and subscribed £5000 to its
capital stock. When the Bank of North America was organized he became
one of the directors and later was president of the Philadelphia
Bank.[159]
Clymer turned his extensive financial experience to some account in
handling the securities of the new government which he had been
instrumental in framing, for he is recorded in the Pennsylvania books as
holding, in August, 1791, over $3000 worth of 3 per cent
securities.[160] If he held sixes deferred and funded, as may be
assumed, although the incomplete records apparently do not permit of a
verification or denial of this, he had in all over $10,000 worth of the
government paper.
_Wm. R. Davie_, of North Carolina, was born in England in 1756 and was
brought to America in 1763 by his father, who left him in care of his
maternal uncle, William Richardson, a Presbyterian clergyman, who took
charge of his education and on his death bequeathed to him his
estate.[161] Davie chose the profession of law, and by a lucrative
practice “he quickly accumulated a large estate.”[162] He was of counsel
in the famous case of Bayard _v._ Singleton, and he had the satisfaction
of securing from the court an opinion declaring an act of the state
legislature unconstitutional.[163] He held a fine plantation at Tivoli
and at his death left a considerable estate which was the subject of
litigation as late as 1892 in the Supreme Court of the United States.
His personal property certainly was not small for he was able to pay
$5000 for a thorough-bred colt.[164] His connections with the landed
proprietors of his region were intimate and extensive and he is reported
to have drawn all the wills made during his time in that part of the
state.[165]
_Jonathan Dayton_, of New Jersey, was associated with, and agent for,
John Cleves Symmes, in the purchase of an enormous tract of land in Ohio
in July and October, 1787, the year of the Convention (formally
consummated in 1788), and before the ensealing of the contract Symmes
and his associates had paid into the Treasury $82,198 “one seventh in
military rights and the residue in the public securities of the United
States.” The remainder was to be paid in gold or silver or the
securities of the United States, and part (one seventh) in military
rights. In 1792 Symmes and Dayton complained that on account of the
“advanced price of certificates,” they must have easier terms. It is
apparent from this record,[166] that they were engaged in buying up
military certificates and government securities about the time of the
meeting of the Convention.
Afterward, by collusion with Ludlow, the official surveyor, and the
inadvertence of Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, Symmes, Dayton, and
associates secured “the advantage of paying almost two-sevenths of their
contract and above one-half of their actual payments in military
warrants of one acre for an acre and a half of the supposed million,
instead of one-seventh part of the actual payments” at a loss to the
United States of more than $30,000.[167] In March and April, 1800,
Dayton purchased about 15,000 acres of public lands with military
certificates.[168]
If further evidence were needed that Dayton was speculating vigorously
in government securities and military certificates, it is to be found in
a suit brought by him and his partner, Lawrence, against Childs, a
member of their concern in 1800, which was carried before Chancellor
Livingston and later withdrawn. In this case Childs exhibited sixteen
letters from Dayton, showing that while the latter was Speaker of the
House of Representatives he had been engaged in speculations in public
land warrants. Dayton was not unaware of the improper character of such
transactions, for in a letter of April 17, 1796, he wrote to Childs:
“The contents of this letter are of such a nature as to render it
improper to be seen by any except yourself; burn it therefore, when you
have perused it.”[169]
The conclusive evidence of Dayton’s extensive operations in public
securities during the period of the establishment of the new government
and his term of service as Speaker is afforded by the records of the
Treasury Department. Here he appears so frequently on the books of the
loan offices of several states that some pages of this volume would be
required to present the bare data of his transactions. However, a few
examples of his dealings may be given by way of illustration. He appears
on the loan office books of New York in February and March, 1791, for
the following amounts: $17,060.82, $8530.40, $11,332.93, $7401.31,
$3700.73, and $5100.61, totalling more than $50,000.[170] At another
point he is recorded for more than $15,000;[171] and at another point
for $6000.[172] Although Woods is not celebrated for the painstaking
impartiality of his famous _History of Adams’ Administration_, he is
singularly accurate in one of his characterizations: “Jonathan Dayton,
of New Jersey, the late speaker of Congress, is notorious from Boston to
Georgia. The deeds of other members of Congress were scarcely known
beyond the circle of their respective states, but the speculations of
this man have rung throughout the western world.”[173]
_John Dickinson_, of Delaware, was a member of one of the established
landed families of the south. He was born in 1732, on a plantation in
Talbot County, on the eastern shores of Maryland; and eight years after
his birth, his father, Samuel Dickinson moved from Maryland to Delaware
“where he purchased a large estate in Kent County, near Dover.”[174]
Dickinson was a student of law in the Middle Temple and took up the
practice of his profession in Philadelphia in 1757.[175] Within five
years he had acquired an extensive practice and won a respectable
standing at the bar.
If his personal fortunes, however, had not been sufficient to assure him
a satisfactory position in the business and professional world at
Philadelphia, his marriage into one of the first and wealthiest
commercial families would have more than made up for his deficiencies.
In 1770 he married Mary Norris, and for a time lived at the family
estate, Fairhill, one of the show places of the day: “This house,” says
Simpson,[176] “was in its day a very grand mansion and a place of great
celebrity, with a large front of sixty feet. It was surrounded by forest
and evergreen trees of majestic growth and well-arranged shrubbery. It
commanded a beautiful prospect of the city, with a distant view of the
Delaware.... The mansion was two stories high and most substantially
built, with a very wide hall running through its centre. The library was
papered, but the parlors and hall were wainscotted with oak and red
cedar unpainted, but polished with wax and kept in bright and handsome
order by constant rubbing. The carriage way was finely graduated and
wound through an extensive lawn, from its approach on the Germantown
road which was bordered with shrubbery. The pleasure grounds, lawn,
green house, and gardens, fish-ponds, and walks, embraced a large area
of several acres in extent.” It is true the vast estates bequeathed to
Miss Norris by her father were transferred to collateral male heirs in
order to preserve the family holding and name, but she retained the
“considerable personal property” which her father left to her.[177]
Dickinson was able to make a large gift to Dickinson College, named in
his honor; and he and his wife were widely celebrated for their
extensive benefactions.[178]
The meagreness of the Treasury records for Delaware make it impossible
to determine whether Dickinson was engaged in fiscal operations along
with his intimate friends, Robert Morris, Thomas Willing, George Clymer,
and other prominent Philadelphia men of affairs. It is possible that he
was not largely engaged in the public security transactions,[179] for he
was an extremely cautious man in finances, and had got into serious
discredit with the patriot party during the Revolution, because it was
rumored that he had advised his brother against accepting the payment of
debts in paper which was sure to depreciate. He was also unhappily
involved with Robert Morris to the amount of £7000 at the time of the
latter’s embarrassment, and may not have wished to incur further
risks.[180]
_Oliver Ellsworth_, of Connecticut, was the son of a clever Connecticut
farmer who inherited a hundred pounds and “had the industry and the
shrewdness to accumulate a considerable estate and to win the reputation
of an excellent farmer.”[181] Oliver was educated at Yale and Princeton
and became a lawyer in spite of his father’s determination to force him
into the ministry. Though he was almost briefless during the early days
of his practice, he had the good fortune to wed the daughter of William
Wolcott, of East Windsor, “a gentleman of substance and
distinction.”[182] He is described by his biographer as a man of great
purpose, persistency, and of little imagination, and he rose rapidly to
wealth and power at the bar of his native state. “It is doubtful,” says
Brown, “if in the entire history of the Connecticut bar any other lawyer
has ever in so short a time accumulated so great a practice.... Measured
either by the amount of his business or by his earnings, it was
unrivalled in his own day and unexampled in the history of the colony.
Naturally shrewd, and with nothing of the spendthrift in his nature, he
quickly earned a competence, and by good management he increased it to a
fortune which for the times and the country was quite uncommonly large.
From a few documents still in existence it is clear that he became
something of a capitalist and investor. He bought lands and houses and
loaned out money at interest. He was a stockholder in the Hartford Bank
and one of the original subscribers to the stock of the old Hartford
Broadcloth Mill (1788).”
With that natural shrewdness and economy which his latest biographer
ascribed to him, Ellsworth accumulated a by no means negligible amount
in public securities from which he profited by the rise of credit that
accompanied the establishment of the new government. He was among the
first citizens of Connecticut to have his paper funded into the new
government securities, for he appears in December, 1791, with $1330.50
in deferred sixes, $2660.98 in funded sixes, and $1995.75 in 3 per
cents.[183] His wife, Abigail, and other members of her family, the
Wolcotts, had also invested in securities.[184]
_William Few_, of Georgia, was almost unique among the members of the
Convention in being a representative, in origin and education, of the
small farming class. His father was a Maryland farmer who was led by a
successive failure of crops to try his fortune in North Carolina, where
young Few labored with the ax and plow. Even here the elder Few did not
prosper, and he became so deeply involved in debt that his son had to
take over the management of his property. William, afterward, in 1776,
settled in Georgia, and soon became engaged in politics and the
Revolutionary War.
At the close of the War, he relates, “I possessed not much property nor
had I any expectation that I did not acquire by my own industry. I
therefore determined to commence the practice of law, although I had
never spent one hour in the office of an attorney to prepare for
business, nor did I know anything of the practice.” He adds, however,
that his practice grew in spite of his deficiencies and that his
“pecuniary prospects were very flattering,” by the time he was elected a
member of the Convention. At all events he acquired a plantation in
Columbia County, and after the expiration of his term as Senator in
1793, he retired there and engaged in agricultural pursuits. In 1799 he
left Georgia for New York, where he managed his small fortune in real
and personal property, according to his own estimate, about
$100,000.[185]
Few’s personal interest in the new government was probably rather small,
but the absence of the full records of Georgia from the books of the
Treasury Department renders impossible a categorical statement. He was
connected with the Georgia Union Company, which was involved in the
Yazoo land deals;[186] and he presented for funding a certificate of the
issue of 1779 to the amount of $2170 nominal value, which he had secured
from one Spears.[187] His name appears occasionally on other records for
small amounts, and the index in the office of the Register of the
Treasury cites him as being among the security holders recorded in a
volume not found.[188]
_Thomas Fitzsimons_, of Pennsylvania, was intimately identified with the
mercantile interests of his city. He is described as “an extensive
merchant,” and his family connections were with people engaged in his
own line. He married the daughter of Robert Meade, and established
business relations with his brother-in-law “who was one of the prominent
merchants and shipowners of Philadelphia.”[189] It is recorded of him
that “His influence in the country and especially among merchants was
second to none.... Mr. Fitzsimons was one of those efficient and able
men who laid the foundations of the commercial and financial systems of
the United States.”[190] It is not surprising to find that he was also a
“conspicuous advocate of a protective tariff.”[191]
Like his prominent associates in Philadelphia, Mr. Fitzsimons combined
mercantile and financial operations. He was “for a long time a director
in the Bank of North America and President of the Insurance Company of
North America, in which latter office he continued until his
death.”[192] Indeed he was so extensively involved in the speculations
of Robert Morris that his resources were seriously crippled by the
failure of that gentleman.[193]
His intimate knowledge of finance and his immediate business connections
doubtless invited him to deal in public securities; and Maclay sets him
down among the speculators as follows: “The Speaker gives me this day
his opinion that Mr. Fitzsimons was concerned in this business [of
speculating] as well as Mr. Morris, and that they stayed away (from
Congress) for the double purpose of pursuing their speculation and
remaining unsuspected.”[194] It is probable that Maclay’s version is
correct, for in 1791 Fitzsimon’s agent, Michael Conner, presented for
him certificates of 1778 to the amount of nearly $12,000 nominal value
which he had evidently bought up.[195] He appears also on the records of
the 6 per cents and the threes for small amounts, and his operations
extended beyond his native state.[196]
Fitzsimons was also involved extensively in land speculations with
Robert Morris, for the latter in a letter of October 9, 1795, writes to
James Marshall, their European agent, to the effect that Fitzsimons and
he had put on sale in London “about 360,000 acres of land situated in
Georgia.”[197] But as pointed out above Fitzsimons’ relations with
Morris cost him dearly and snatched away from him all that he had made
in public securities and more besides.
_Benjamin Franklin_, of Pennsylvania, in the midst of his varied
activities as printer, diplomat, statesman, and philosopher, managed
withal by thrift and investments to accumulate a considerable fortune
for his day, about $150,000.[198] At his great age on the assembling of
the Convention, it would hardly have been practicable for him to have
engaged in investments in public securities had he been so inclined; and
he died in 1790, before the funding system went into effect. A short
time before his death, however, he was interested in land
speculations;[199] and in his will he bequeaths “lands near the Ohio”
and three thousand acres granted by the State of Georgia to him.[200] He
does not appear to have held any public paper.
_Nicholas Gilman_, of New Hampshire, was in public life from his youth
until his death. He entered the army at the age of twenty-one, and after
the War he served in Congress and in other public positions. He does not
seem to have been a man of much weight either in private life or the
Convention. A French observer remarks of his election as a member of the
Federal Convention: “Cette circonstance prouve qu’il n’y a pas un grand
choix à faire dans cet Etat, ou que du moins les hommes des plus sensés
et les plus habiles ne sont pas assés riches pour accepter une place
publique.”[201]
In financial matters, there was no doubt of Gilman’s ability. He managed
to accumulate a considerable amount of public securities before the
meeting of the Convention, and apparently added to his holdings later.
In the Nicholas Gilman papers preserved in the Library of Congress there
is a list of certificates of the liquidated debt to the amount of
$5400.67, declared to be the property of Nicholas Gilman, on December 9,
1786. This paper was bought up by Gilman, for the list of original
holders is given. A receipt bearing the date of June 29, 1787, preserved
in the above papers, shows Nicholas Gilman to have received interest on
$6654.79 of the public debt. He and the various members of the Gilman
family of New Hampshire were extensively engaged in transactions in
public securities.[202] One entry in the Treasury books of the new
government shows Nicholas Gilman to have $11,021.95 worth of 6 per cent
Deferred Stock;[203] and he supplemented his purely fiscal operations by
dealing in military certificates (that is, soldier’s paper which could
be bought from necessitous holders at a fraction of its value), and in
public lands.[204]
While Gilman was quick to look after his own interests, his devotion to
his native state made him anxious for her towns to participate in the
general prosperity enjoyed by holders of public securities after the
formation of the Constitution. On September 3, 1787, he had already
discovered the probable effect of the proposed Constitution, not yet
ready to lay before the people, upon the securities of the government.
On that day he wrote to the President of New Hampshire advising the
towns to buy up public securities at the prevailing low price in order
to have paper to transfer to the federal government in lieu of taxes and
other charges. He says: “I find many of the states are making provision
to buy in their quota’s of the final settlements, and I must ardently
wish that the towns in New Hampshire may be so far awake to a sense of
their interest as to part with their property freely in order to
purchase their several quota’s of the public securities now in
circulation, while they are to be had at the present low rate; which is
in this place, at two shillings and six pence on the pound. If they
suffer the present opportunity to pass and we should be so fortunate as
to have an efficient Government, they will be obliged to buy them of
brokers, hawkers, speculators, and jockeys at six or perhaps eight times
their present value.”[205]
_Elbridge Gerry_, of Massachusetts, was born in Marblehead in 1744. His
father was a merchant of good standing and comfortable estate. His
biographer states that after his graduation from Harvard, Elbridge
“turned his attention to that line of life in which his father’s
prosperity seemed to hold out the greatest inducements to a young and
enterprising mind; and he plunged at once into the most active pursuits
of commerce. His fairness, correctness, and assiduity, and the extensive
knowledge of commercial concerns which he acquired from his father’s
experience and his own exertions were crowned with good fortune, and
while yet young in business and in years he acquired a considerable
estate and a very high standing at Marblehead.”[206]
As a merchant, Gerry was closely in touch with the needs of commerce,
and was deeply impressed with the necessity for national resistance to
the discriminations of Great Britain. In April, 1784, he presented a
report to Congress in which he called attention to the fact that Great
Britain had adopted regulations destructive to American commerce in the
West India Islands, and that these measures of discrimination were
growing into a system. “Unless the United States in Congress assembled,”
he urged, “shall be vested with powers competent to the protection of
commerce, they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade; and
without these, our foreign commerce must decline and eventually be
annihilated.” The West Indian trade affected New England particularly,
and Gerry is thus reflecting a local interest in demanding a national
system of commercial protection.[207]
In addition to his mercantile interests, Gerry was concerned in
financial affairs. In the Convention he strongly urged inserting in the
Constitution a clause conferring on the new government not only the
power but also the obligation to provide fully for the holders of public
securities. According to Madison’s notes, “Mr. Gerry considered giving
the power only, without adopting the obligation, as destroying the
security now enjoyed by the public creditors of the United States. He
enlarged on the merit of this class of citizens, and the solemn faith
which had been pledged under the existing Confederation.”[208] Later in
the Convention, when Colonel Mason objected to making the full discharge
of the debt obligatory, Gerry again took exceptions. He said, “that for
himself he had no interest in the question, being not possessed of more
of the securities than would by the interest pay his taxes. He would
observe, however, that as the public had received the value of the
literal amount, they ought to pay that value to somebody. The frauds on
the soldiers ought to have been foreseen. These poor and ignorant people
could not but part with their securities. There are other creditors who
will part with anything rather than be cheated out of the capital of
their advances.... If the public faith would admit, of which he was not
clear, he would not object to a revision of the debt so far as to compel
restitution to the ignorant and distressed who had been defrauded. As to
the Stock-jobbers he saw no reason for the censures thrown on them. They
kept up the value of the paper. Without them there would be no
market.”[209]
Gerry here explains to his colleagues that he is a holder of securities;
but he modestly underestimates the amount, or his taxes were rather
high, for the loan office records of Massachusetts show that the
interest on his securities, issued pursuant to the act of Congress of
April 28, 1784, was about $3500 a year, an amount which, even at the
prevailing rate of depreciation, would have covered the taxes on a
considerable estate.[210] The incompleteness of the records in the
Treasury Department does not permit of an exact estimate of Gerry’s
holdings; but they must have been large, for the following items appear
to his credit: $14,266.89 on the Liquidated Debt Book of the
Massachusetts loan office,[211] $2648.50 worth of sixes and threes in
1790 on the Pennsylvania loan office books,[212] $409.50 in threes on
the Pennsylvania ledger under the date of December 13, 1790,[213] and
£3504:8:10 worth of old paper funded into federal securities in the
Massachusetts loan office, August 24, 1791.[214] There may be of course
some duplication of amounts but there can be no doubt that Gerry’s
interest income from confederate securities in one year shortly before
the meeting of the Convention was about $3500, and also there can be no
doubt that Gerry had bought largely with a view to speculation, for a
very few of his certificates were issued to him originally. He had
therefore more than an academic sympathy with the stockbrokers.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that notwithstanding his large
interests at stake, Gerry for several reasons strongly opposed the
ratification of the Constitution.[215]
However, Gerry during his entire public career seems to have intermixed
his official relations with his private economic affairs. While he was a
member of Congress, before the adoption of the Constitution, he became
interested in the public lands. On March 1, 1785, Timothy
Pickering,[216] one of the leading land operators of the period, wrote
to Gerry: “As you have expressed your wishes to be concerned in the
purchase of lands on the other side of the Alleghany mountains thro’ our
agency, we think it very material to your interest as well as our own
that we be informed, if possible, what plan Congress will probably adopt
in disposing of those lands which lie west of the Ohio. If they mean to
permit adventurers to make a scramble ... it will behove us to engage
seasonably with some enterprising, but confidential character, to
explore the country and make locations.... If there must be a scramble,
we have an equal right with others, and, therefore, the information
desired in the beginning of this letter may be of essential importance.
Your answer to this letter will much oblige your sincere friends who
wish to advance your interest with their own.”[217]
Gerry was then a member of Congress, which had under consideration the
disposal of the western lands. If this land company, of course, could
secure inside information, it would be advantageous to Mr. Gerry who
contemplated speculating in those lands, as well as to Mr. Pickering’s
agency.
Gerry undoubtedly took advantage of the opportunity to invest in western
enterprises, for he was a share-holder in the Ohio Company, proprietors
of lands on the Muskingum River[218]—a concern in which he apparently
became interested while a member of the Congress under the Articles of
Confederation, during the organization of the Company and the procuring
of the public grant.
_Nathaniel Gorham_, of Massachusetts, was a successful merchant at
Charlestown, the place of his birth. He was prominent in the political
life of his community, having served as a member of the legislature and
the constitutional convention of his state.
In addition to his mercantile and political pursuits, Gorham engaged in
land speculation on a large scale. In 1786, Massachusetts, by a
compromise with New York, secured a large area of western country, and
in April, 1788, “sold all this land to Nathaniel Gorham, of Charlestown,
and Oliver Phelps, of Granville, for a million dollars, to be paid in
three annual instalments in the scrip of Massachusetts, known as
consolidated securities, which were then much below par.... Behind
Phelps and Gorham there was a syndicate of persons who desired to
speculate in the lands, but who, in order not to compete with each
other, had united and allowed these two to act for all.”[219]
Robert Morris was one of Gorham’s associates in this venture, and other
prominent men were behind the project; but the projectors were unable to
realize fully on their scheme, because the rise of Massachusetts scrip,
after the adoption of the Constitution, made it impossible for them to
fulfil the original terms of their contract. Consequently, they received
only a portion of the original purchase.
The unhappy outcome of this venture apparently left Gorham without a
very large fortune at his death in 1796. He does not seem to have
combined any considerable transactions in continental securities with
those in state scrip; although he was doubtless a holder in some amount
because his will shows him to have been possessed of twenty shares in
United States Bank stock.[220] Inasmuch as holders of this paper secured
it in exchange for old securities and some specie, it may be surmised
that Gorham must have had some of the continental paper at the time of
the establishment of the Bank, although it may be that he purchased the
stock as an investment. The tangled state of his affairs at his death
makes this latter conclusion improbable at least.
We have now come to the colossal genius of the new system, _Alexander
Hamilton_. It is true, that he had little part in the formation of the
Constitution, but it was his organizing ability that made it a real
instrument bottomed on all the substantial interests of the time. It was
he who saw most keenly the precise character of the social groups which
would have to be rallied to the new government in order to draw support
away from the states and give the federal system a firm foundation. He
perceived that governments were not made out of thin air and abstract
principles. He knew that the Constitution was designed to accomplish
certain definite objects, affecting in its operation certain definite
groups of property rights in society. He saw that these interests were
at first inchoate, in process of organization, and he achieved the task
of completing their consolidation and attaching them to the federal
government.
He saw, in the first place, that the most easily consolidated and
timorous group was composed of the creditors, the financiers, bankers,
and money lenders. He perceived that they were concentrated in the towns
and thus were easily drawn together. He saw that by identifying their
interests with those of the new government, the latter would be secure;
they would not desert the ship in which they were all afloat. It has
been charged that he leaned always on the side of the financial interest
against the public as represented in the government; but it must be
remembered that at the time the new system went into effect, the public
had no credit, and financiers were not willing to forego their gains and
profits for an abstraction. It is charged against him that he did not
buy up government paper in behalf of the public at the most favorable
terms; but to have done so would have diminished the profits of the very
financiers whose good will was necessary to the continuance of the
government.
The second group of interests which Hamilton saw ready for organization
were the merchants and manufacturers who wished protective tariffs. He
would have been blind, indeed, if he had not discovered and interpreted
the widespread movement for protection which was swiftly gathering
headway during the years preceding the formation of the Constitution. He
was not blind. His first report on manufactures show how keenly alive he
was to the extent and diversity of the groups whose financial advantage
lay in a system of protection. Whether this was for the good of the
whole people need not be argued here. Hamilton’s relations were with the
immediate beneficiaries. They were the men who were to throw their
weight on the side of the new government. How persistently Hamilton
sought to inform himself of the precise nature of the interests needing
protection in the separate localities, from New Hampshire to Georgia, is
evidenced by his unpublished correspondence with business men in all the
commercial centres.[221]
The third interest which Hamilton consolidated was composed of the land
speculators and promoters and embraced all the leading men of the
time—Washington, Franklin, Robert Morris, James Wilson, William Blount,
and other men of eminence.[222] This dealing in land was intimately
connected with public securities, for a large portion of the lands were
bought with land warrants purchased from the soldiers, and with other
stocks bought on the open market at low prices. Hamilton saw clearly the
connection of this interest with the new government, and his public land
policies were directed especially to obtaining the support of this type
of operators.[223]
Without the conciliation and positive support of these powerful elements
in American society, the new government could not have been founded or
continued. With keen insight, Hamilton saw this. He made no attempt to
conceal it; for whatever may have been his faults he did not add the
crime of demogogy. It is true that in private he often expressed a
contempt for popular rule which is absent from his public papers; but
his public papers contain a plain statement of his policies, and show
why he considered them necessary to the strength and stability of the
government.
Thousands of small farmers and debtors and laboring mechanics were
opposed to his policies, but they did not have the organization or
consciousness of identity of interests which was necessary to give them
weight in the councils of the new government. They were partly
disfranchised under the existing laws, and they had no leaders worthy of
mention. The road to power and glory did not yet lie in championing
their cause. It required the astute leadership of Jefferson, and the
creation of a federal machine under his direction, to consolidate the
heterogeneous petty interests against the Federalist group.
But during Hamilton’s administration, representatives of these smaller
interests began to attack his policies as inimical to public interest,
_i.e._, their own interests; and out of this attack grew the charge that
Hamilton himself was privately engaged in augmenting his personal
fortune by the methods which he had created for the advantage of public
creditors and financiers generally. Although this charge, even if true,
should not be allowed to obscure the real greatness of Hamilton’s
masterly mind, and has little bearing upon a scientific application of
the economic interpretation to the period, it deserves examination at
length.
Rumors that Hamilton was personally interested in securities were
persistent from the beginning of his career as Secretary of the
Treasury, and in his famous Reynolds pamphlet, published in 1797, he
precisely states the charge against himself: “Merely because I retained
an opinion once common to me and the most influential of those who
opposed me, that the public debt ought to be provided for on the basis
of the contract upon which it was created, I have been wickedly accused
with wantonly increasing the public burthen many millions in order to
promote a stock-jobbing interest of myself and friends.”[224] That this
heavy burden was necessary to secure the support of the financial
interests concerned, and that their support was absolutely indispensable
to the establishment of the new national system on a substantial basis,
was admitted by many of Hamilton’s worst enemies; but this did not
prevent their attacking the Secretary on mere rumors of private
peculations.
It now remains to examine the evidence against Hamilton, and state the
case fairly so far as our existing records will allow. In 1793, Hamilton
was accused of a criminal violation of the laws, and laid under the
suspicion of being a defaulter. The House of Representatives was so
impressed with the charges that it appointed a committee to investigate
the conduct of the Treasury Department, particularly with regard to the
charge that Hamilton had made the public moneys “subservient to loans,
discounts, and accommodations” to himself and friends.
The result of this investigation was a vindication of the Secretary by
the committee on the basis of affidavits from the officers and employees
of the various banks involved, public and private. Hamilton cites the
report of this committee of the House as containing the “materials of a
complete exculpation.”[225] But this investigation does not cover the
dealings which Hamilton might have had with stock brokers and other
persons handling public securities. Evidences of such relations would
not have been contained in the public and private papers available to
the committee. Indeed, on account of his intimate business relations
with all the leaders who were buying and selling public securities, and,
on account of the fact that he could have seen them personally at New
York and Philadelphia, it would not have been necessary for him to make
any written record of such transactions. But of the larger charges
brought against him in Congress we may regard this report as a complete
vindication.
The direct charge, however, that Hamilton had violated the solemn
obligations of his own office by buying up public securities, as
distinct from the charge that he had employed his high authority in the
interests of his friends and his class, first took on a serious form in
1797, when the notorious pamphleteer J. T. Callender, in his _History of
the United States for the Year 1796_ published a series of papers
purporting to show that in 1791 and 1792 Hamilton had been engaged in
speculative ventures with one James Reynolds and Mr. Duer.[226] It
appears that in 1792 a Mr. Clingman, then in jail for a crooked
transaction with the government, got into communication with Speaker
Muhlenburg and hinted that a fellow-prisoner, Reynolds, had been
associated with Hamilton in security operations, and had in his
possession papers that would establish the facts in the case. Muhlenburg
communicated with Monroe and Venable, and the three heard from Reynolds
and his wife grave charges against the Secretary.
On learning of these serious charges, Muhlenburg, Venable, and Monroe
confronted Hamilton with them and the Secretary explained that the whole
charge of speculation was false and that his relations with the Reynolds
grew out of an unhappy amour with Mrs. Reynolds. The three investigators
accepted this explanation, although Monroe prosecuted further inquiries
which resulted in his accumulating additional charges. The papers in the
case, it was agreed by Hamilton and his three investigators,[227] were
to be kept secret and out of the reach of publication. It turned out,
however, that Monroe, angered by the abuse heaped upon him later by the
Federalists, gave the documents out for publication, much to the scandal
of the country. Hamilton promptly replied in a pamphlet in which he
denied any improper financial relations with Reynolds, and explained in
painful detail his affair with Reynolds’ wife.[228]
When all the external and internal evidence is taken in this case, and
the documents connected with it are carefully analyzed, it will be
apparent that a decision will rest upon the answer to this question:
“Shall Hamilton’s testimony as to speculations outweigh that of an
undoubted rascal and his wife?” Mr. F. T. Fox, in a recent study of the
matter, attempts to convict Hamilton on the internal evidence of his
vindication; and apparently does so. But on an examination of Mr. Fox’s
brief against the Secretary, it soon comes out that he has made a
mistake in the crucial dates on which turns his whole case.[229]
Consequently, this particular matter rests just where it did more than a
hundred years ago. Fair-minded men will be inclined to exonerate
Hamilton of the charge brought in the Reynolds indictment.
That Hamilton himself made any money in stocks which he held personally
has never been proved by reference to any authentic evidence. He did
hold a small amount of public securities, for in a letter of June 26,
1792, to William Seton, he says, “All my property in the funds is about
$800, 3 per cents. These at a certain period I should have sold, had I
not been unwilling to give occasion to cavil.”[230] The origin of this
holding is not explained. Even if it was derived from the funding under
the acts of August, 1790, and the 6 per cents, funded and deferred were
added, it would not have made more than a trifling amount.
That Hamilton ever held any considerable sum in securities seems highly
improbable, for he was at no time a rich man, and at his death left a
small estate. Though he lived well, and had a large income apart from
his paltry salary as Secretary, his earnings as an eminent lawyer may
very well account for such sources of revenue as he may have enjoyed.
Certainly, had he seen fit to employ his remarkable talents in private
enterprise, he might have died one of the rich men of his day. However
this may be, the question may be legitimately asked whether Hamilton had
any personal connections with any of the security operations which were
carried on during his administration of the Treasury?
Hamilton’s defenders, in response to such an inquiry, will cite his
famous reply to Henry Lee in 1789, when the latter asked him for his
opinion about the probable rise of public securities: “I am sure you are
sincere when you say that you would not subject me to an impropriety,
nor do I know that there would be any in answering your queries; but you
remember the saying with regard to Cæsar’s wife. I think the spirit of
it applicable to every man concerned in the administration of the
finances of the country. With respect to the conduct of such men,
suspicion is ever eagle-eyed, and the most innocent things may be
misinterpreted.”[231]
On the other hand, Maclay, who, as United States Senator during the
funding operations, had opportunities for first-hand information,
answers the above question in the affirmative. He says, in his record of
the Senate on February 1, 1790: “If I needed proof of the baseness of
Hamilton, I have it in the fullest manner. His price was communicated in
manuscript as far as Philadelphia. Thomas Willing, in a letter to the
speaker of the Representatives, after passing many eulogiums on
Hamilton’s plan, concludes, ‘For I have seen in manuscript his whole
price,’ and it has been used as the basis of the most abandoned system
of speculation ever broached in our country.”[232] What Maclay doubtless
means here is that Hamilton had communicated to one of the leading
financiers of Philadelphia, a partner of Robert Morris and dealer in
securities,[233] his proposed plans for redemption of the public debt in
full, previous to their publication in the first report to the House on
public credit, January 9, 1790. On the question as to how much credence
should be given to the assertions of the querulous Maclay, students of
history will differ, and impartial scholars will seek further evidence.
Far from admitting any truth in Maclay’s allegations, Hamilton’s friends
would indignantly deny that he had any private connections with security
operations in any form. Hamilton’s son, in his _Reminiscences_, states
that “Hamilton requested his father-in-law, General Schuyler, not to
permit his son to speculate in the public securities lest it should be
inferred that their speculations were made upon information furnished by
Hamilton; or were made in part on Hamilton’s account. Schuyler inhibited
any speculations; as Van Rensellaer Schuyler, my uncle, told me,
complaining at the same time that, but for this inhibition, he would
have made a large sum of money.”[234]
The General, however, evidently did not regard this inhibition as
binding upon himself, for he appears upon the records as one of the
large dealers in public paper in New York. Examples of his extensive
financial transactions can be readily found by reference to the old loan
books in the Treasury Department; there appear in March, October, and
November, 1791, the following amounts to his credit: $23,189.21;
$15,594.61, $8036.50, $20,689.21.[235]
Neither did Hamilton deem it necessary to inhibit his brother-in-law,
J.B. Church, from dealing in securities. During Hamilton’s
administration of the Treasury, Church was a large holder of public
securities.[236] One entry credits him with $28,187.91 worth. Moreover,
while Secretary of the Treasury, through his agents, Thomas Willing in
Philadelphia, and Wm. Seton in New York, Hamilton bought and sold for
his brother-in-law. In the Hamilton Mss. in the Library of Congress is
preserved a letter from Thomas Willing bearing the date of February 24,
1790, and addressed to Hamilton, which shows that the former was then
selling stocks under the latter’s orders for Church.[237]
At a later date, Hamilton was engaged in an extended correspondence with
William Seton of the New York Bank, which shows that the latter was
buying United States Bank stocks for Church, under Hamilton’s orders. On
November 21, 1793, Seton writes that he has not been able to make an
investment for Mr. Church on account of the high price of bank
stock.[238] Five days later Seton writes to Hamilton that he thinks it
will be possible in a day or two to purchase stock for Mr. Church “under
your limits;” and adds, after further remarks, “I therefore feel loth to
enter into the market without further orders from you.”[239] Here
follows voluminous correspondence showing Seton’s successful purchases.
Hamilton’s operations for his brother-in-law, Church, also extended to
speculations in public lands; for in the Hamilton Manuscripts there is a
letter bearing the date of August 24, 1792, from William Henderson to
him relative to the purchase of large quantities of land (45,000
acres).[240] It appears that Hamilton, Church, and General Schuyler were
involved in this negotiation, and that Church was the principal.
Hamilton was also personally interested in western land schemes, for he
held five shares of the Ohio Company, proprietors of land on the
Muskingum River.[241] Although this concern was organized before the
formation of the Constitution, Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury was
called upon to pass upon the validity of claims involving thousands of
acres. He felt the delicacy of this situation, for on May 9, 1792, he
wrote to Washington that he regretted that he was required by law to
decide a case in which he was an interested party, and stated that he
had left the matter to be adjusted by the accounting officers of the
Treasury acting under an opinion of the Attorney General.[242]
Although Hamilton showed great hesitancy in passing upon his own land
claims while Secretary, he did not deem it incompatible with his
official duties to communicate occasionally with friends as to the
probable prices of public securities and bank stock.
For the communication to Willing, mentioned above,[243] we have, of
course, only Maclay’s testimony; and if his statement is true Hamilton
transmitted official secrets of the most significant character to a
financier who, however great his integrity, was in a position to take
advantage of them, and was engaged in dealing in securities on his own
account and for Hamilton’s brother-in-law, Church, under Hamilton’s
orders. When we remember that Maclay’s journal was private in its
nature, not intended for publication, and not given to the world until
long after all the men mentioned in it were dead, we are constrained to
give some credence to his straightforward statements like the one in
question, even though he was a bitter enemy of the Federalist leaders.
But we are not constrained to attribute to Hamilton any improper
motives. Those who assume that the Secretary of the Treasury could have
carried out his enormous reorganization of the finances without
conferring with the leading financiers of the time have only an
elementary knowledge of Treasury administration.
As Secretary, he often found it necessary to set rumors at rest. An
instance is afforded in a letter written by Hamilton, on August 17,
1791, to Rufus King, in which he mentioned having given out his opinion
on prices to counteract an undue rise in script on the stock market, and
concluded by giving King his standard of prices on that day, saying “I
give you my standard that you may be able if necessary to contradict
insinuations of an estimation on my part short of that standard for the
purpose of depressing the funds.”[244]
This letter from Hamilton was evidently drawn by one from King bearing
the date of August 15, 1791, in which the latter cautions the former
against giving out any statements which might affect prices, and informs
him that his opinions had been quoted in efforts to depress stocks.[245]
King also adds that Duer had been injured in attempts to raise prices,
but is of the opinion that “his conduct has been as correct as any
buyer’s and seller’s could be.” King had little liking for popular
vagaries in finance, for he tells Hamilton that “the fall of Bank
certificates may have some good effects; it will operate to deter our
industrious citizens from meddling in future with the funds, and teach
them contentment in their proper avocations.”
On the same day that Hamilton replied to King’s letter which had
informed him of Duer’s danger, he wrote to Duer cautioning him against
pushing prices too high and repeating earlier warnings. He says: “I will
honestly own I had serious fears for you—for your purse and for your
reputation; and with an anxiety for both, I wrote you in earnest terms.
You are sanguine, my friend. You ought to be aware of it yourself and to
be on your guard against the propensity.... I do not widely differ from
you about the real value of bank script. I should rather call it about
190, to be within bounds, with hopes of better things, and I sincerely
wish you may be able to support it at what you mention.”[246] There is
of course, little beyond friendly advice in this, although Hamilton’s
enemies may see impropriety in his communicating his own price to a man
deeply engaged in speculation.
There is some evidence, however, which may reasonably be interpreted to
imply that Hamilton might have used his official power in behalf of
Duer. In reply to a letter from Duer (after his disastrous failure)
making some request which is not explained by Mr. Lodge, the Secretary
says: “Your letter of the 11th got to hand this day. I am affected
beyond measure at its contents, especially as it is too late to have any
influence upon the event you were apprehensive of, Mr. Wolcott’s
instructions having gone off yesterday.”[247] Wolcott was Hamilton’s
subordinate in the Treasury Department, and evidently he had issued some
instructions which affected Duer’s fortunes. Wolcott was the auditor of
the Treasury whose duty it was under the act of September 2, 1789, “to
receive all public accounts and after examination to certify the
balance, and transmit the accounts with the vouchers and certificates to
the Comptroller for his decision thereon.” This connection with Duer is
the sole piece of evidence of what might be termed the possible use of
the Secretary’s office in a private matter. The nature of this is not
clear, and the plan was not carried out.
The conclusion to be reached from this evidence is that Hamilton did not
have in 1787 any more than a petty amount of public securities which
might appreciate under a new system; that he did have some western land;
but that an extensive augmentation of his personal fortune was no
consideration with him. The fact that he died a poor man is conclusive
evidence of this fact. That he was swayed throughout the period of the
formation of the Constitution by large policies of government—not by any
of the personal interests so often ascribed to him—must therefore be
admitted. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the additional evidence
given here that it was no mere abstract political science which
dominated his principles of government. He knew at first hand the stuff
of which government is made.
_William C. Houston_, of New Jersey, was of no consequence in the
Convention, and little is known of his economic interests. He was a
Princeton graduate, and was for a time professor of mathematics and
natural philosophy. He entered the practice of law at Trenton, and from
1784 until his death in 1788 he was clerk of the Supreme Court of his
state. On account of ill health he was unable to remain through the
sessions of the Convention. A search among the New Jersey loan office
records in the Treasury Department failed to reveal Houston as a holder
of securities; but the records for that state are incomplete and
Houston’s death in 1788 would have prevented his appearing on the
Treasury Records of the new government. A William Houston is recorded in
the New York books for small amounts of deferred sixes,[248] but,
although William Churchill Houston had a son by that name, the identity
of the son and the public creditor cannot be established.
Houston was, however, interested in the possibilities of western land
speculations, for his biographer relates that he “joined with others in
procuring for John Fitch, the steamboat inventor, the office of Deputy
Surveyor. After the treaty of peace with England, the question of how
the lands northwest of the Ohio should be disposed of was mooted in
Congress. It was thought that they would be sold to pay the debts of the
confederacy. Fitch was a land jobber and supposed that a good operation
might be made by a presurvey of the country, so that when the Land
Offices were opened, warrants might be taken out immediately for choice
tracts. He found no difficulty in forming a company to forward such an
enterprise. It was composed of Dr. John Ewing, Rev. Nathaniel Irwin, Wm.
C. Houston.... These gentlemen put £20 each in a fund to pay
expenses.”[249] How far this venture was carried and whether Houston
acquired lands through it is not related. As a member of the Congress
under the Articles of Confederation, he doubtless learned of the
advantages to be gained in the West.
_William Houstoun_, of Georgia, took some part in the proceedings of the
Convention, but he was of little weight. He was the son of a royal
officer in the government of Georgia; and he received his education in
England and studied law at the Inner Temple. His colleague Pierce
records that “Mr. Houstoun is an Attorney at Law, and has been a member
of Congress for the state of Georgia. He is a gentleman of family, and
was educated in England. As to his legal or political knowledge, he has
little to boast of.”[250] The meagre biographical details available do
not permit a statement of his economic interests; and the paucity of the
records of the Georgia loan office in the Treasury Department makes it
impossible to say whether he was among the beneficiaries through the
appreciation of public securities. An index to a volume of Treasury
Records not found (Vol. XXVI, folio 44) contains the name of William
Houstown, but whether this holder of public debt and the member of the
Convention were identical cannot be determined.
_Jared Ingersoll_, of Pennsylvania, was the son of Jared Ingersoll of
Connecticut, sometime agent of that colony as commissioner in England
and later admiralty judge in Pennsylvania. He graduated at Yale and
studied in the Middle Temple. At the bar in Philadelphia he “soon rose
to first rank. His practice was larger than any others. His opinions
were taken on all important controversies, his services engaged in every
great litigation.”[251] Ingersoll was a man of considerable wealth, but
he does not seem to be involved in the large transactions in public
securities which engaged the attention of his intimate friends in the
Convention.[252] He does not appear on the Pennsylvania books as a
holder of securities. If he held any, his transactions must have been
with the Treasury direct, and this would have been very convenient as it
was located in Philadelphia during the funding process. Ingersoll was a
son-in-law of Charles Pettit, one of the security operators in
Philadelphia.[253]
_Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer_, of Maryland, is reported by Pierce to
have been “a gentleman of fortune” in his state.[254] He was a planter
and a slave-holder; the census of 1790 records his holding twenty slaves
on one plantation under an overseer, but the number on his own
plantation is illegible.[255] It is probable also that he held a small
amount of public securities at the establishment of the new government.
He died in the latter part of the year 1790, but his son,[256] Daniel
Jenifer, Jr., appears on the loan office records as the holder of nearly
six thousand dollars’ worth of paper in December, 1790,[257] which he
disposed of the following year.[258]
_William Samuel Johnson_, of Connecticut, was a son of Samuel Johnson, a
clergyman of Stratford, Connecticut, and a gentleman of some means. He
was a graduate of Yale, and entered the practice of law. He refused to
aid in the Revolutionary cause, because he could not “conscientiously”
take up arms against England, and he lived in retirement until the War
was over. After the establishment of independence he resumed the
prominent position in public life which he had enjoyed before the
struggle; and according to his biographer he took “the highest rank in
his profession and became the renowned and high-minded advocate who was
always crowded with cases and had his clients in New York as well as in
every part of Connecticut.”[259] He added to his own patrimony by
marrying the daughter of a “wealthy gentleman” of Stratford.
Johnson was a member of the first Senate under the new Constitution, and
he was included by Jefferson in the list of men “operating in
securities.”[260] It is highly probable that he did not aid the
Revolutionary cause by investing his money in the original paper; and he
does not appear on the Treasury Books for large amounts of stock,[261]
but there is every reason for believing that he carried on extensive
operations through his son Robert Charles Johnson. The latter was
speculating extensively in New York and Connecticut immediately after
the establishment of the new government, and two entries show a credit
to the father through the son.[262] The loan office books under the date
of December 13, 1791, credit Robert Charles Johnson, of Stratford,
Gentleman, with nearly fifty thousand dollars’ worth of sixes and
threes.[263] Connecticut loan office receipts confirm this evidence of
his extensive holdings. The New York loan office also shows large
transactions in the name of Robert Charles Johnson.[264]
_Rufus King_, of Massachusetts, was born in Scarborough, Maine, then in
the province of Massachusetts, March 24, 1755. His father, in 1740, was
“in prosperous business as a trader and factor for Ebenezer Thornton,
one of the principal merchants in Boston for whom he purchased and
prepared large quantities of timber.” On settling at Scarborough, his
father became “both a farmer and a merchant, and in each capacity was so
successful as to become the owner of three thousand acres of land
divided into several valuable farms and to be the largest exporter of
lumber from Maine.” Rufus was educated at Harvard. When his father died
in 1775 he left a good estate which was divided among several children.
Rufus King was also fortunate in his marriage; his wife was Mary Alsop.
Her father at first sympathized with the movement against Great Britain,
but, “taking umbrage at the manner in which the New York convention had
conveyed their adhesion to the Declaration of Independence to the
Congress, and besides unwilling to close the door of reconciliation with
Great Britain,”—he retired to Middletown, Connecticut, and stayed until
after the War was over, when he returned to New York, resumed business,
and became president of the Chamber of Commerce. According to King
himself, his wife “was the only child of Mr. John Alsop, a very
respectable and eminent merchant in this city [New York]. Mr. Alsop
declined business in 1775 with a very handsome fortune.”[265] King thus
had extensive mercantile and other business interests which were largely
managed for him by others, so that he was able to devote most of his
time to politics.
Nevertheless, he did not neglect matters of private economy. Robert and
Gouverneur Morris were engaged in 1788 in a plan to associate a number
of Americans in a project to purchase up the debt (or portions thereof)
of the United States due to France. Wadsworth, General Knox, Osgood, and
Colonel Duer were involved in it. It was first proposed to send
Gouverneur Morris as minister to Holland to further the scheme. The
originators of the plan finally hit upon the appointment of Rufus King.
King replied to the overture: “I told Col. Duer that I was not
indisposed to a foreign appointment—that the honor and duties of such an
office wd. be my sovereign rule of Cond. and that if in perfect
consistence with the duties and dignity of the office, I cd. promote the
interest of my friends, it wd. be a great satisfaction to me. But that I
desired not to be considered as giving an answer any way at present,
that ... the opinions of Mr. Jay and Col. Hamilton were of consequence
in my mind. That previous to any decision on my part I must be
ascertained of their opinions.”[266]
Whether King engaged in this ambitious project or not, there is evidence
to show that he was a considerable holder of government paper shortly
after its establishment. It may be that a part of his fortune had been
invested originally in public securities, although this is not apparent
from the early loan office books in the Treasury Department. Jefferson
puts King down among the holders of bank stock and public
securities;[267] and he is correct in his statement. King was director
in the first United States bank.[268] He was also a large holder of
government securities—one entry records more than $10,000 worth to his
credit.[269] King thought that speculations should be reserved to the
experienced, and rejoiced in the hope that one of the crashes would
teach the ordinary industrious citizens “contentment in their proper
avocations.”[270]
_John Langdon_, of New Hampshire, was born on the family farm near
Portsmouth in 1740, and “after a mercantile education in the counting
room of Daniel Rindge, he entered upon a sea-faring life, but was driven
from it by the revolutionary troubles.” He must have prospered, however,
before the War blighted his trade, for when the news of the fall of
Ticonderoga reached Exeter, he rose in the legislature of which he was
the speaker and said: “I have a thousand dollars in hard money; I will
pledge my plate for three thousand more. I have seventy hogsheads of
Tobago rum which will be sold for the most they will bring. They are at
the service of the state. If we succeed ... I will be remunerated; if we
do not then the property will be of no value to me.”[271]
After the war, Langdon’s various mercantile and commercial enterprises
took on new life, and there is every evidence that in his worldly
affairs he was uniformly prosperous. A French report to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on the Congress of 1788 speaks of John Langdon as a man
of great wealth and pressing commercial interests: “M. L. a fait une
grande fortune dans le commerce, c’est le Rob. Morris de son Etat,
faisant une grande dépense et s’attachant beaucoup de citoyens par ses
libéralités.”[272]
John Langdon-Elwyn, grandson of John Langdon, in whose family were
preserved the valuable private papers of the elder Langdon, wrote,
sometime in the early part of the nineteenth century, a pamphlet on his
celebrated grandfather. The author of this useful brochure “was nineteen
years of age at the time of his grandfather’s death. A critical observer
of men and affairs, his opportunities as a member of the family of
Governor Langdon give the production of his pamphlet a special
significance.”[273] This writer characterizes John Langdon as “a man
that loved money, at an age when it gets the upper hand, that was prone
to banking and funding, to whom such atmospheres were familiar and
congenial, that knew how to make it and keep it, and felt no envy of
others that did so too.”[274]
That Langdon was deeply concerned in the financial operations connected
with the new government is evidenced in many sources. According to his
grandson, quoted above, “He voted for this bank [the first United States
Bank]; and was we suppose an original subscriber of some account.... We
believe he had been concerned in the Bank of North America: the first
real National Bank: He was an intimate friend of Robert Morris.”[275]
Maclay also adds his testimony to that of Langdon’s grandson. When he
was a Senator, Langdon lodged in New York with a Mr. Hazard who followed
the business of buying up government certificates of public debt which
had been “issued in place of the paper money of the old Congress and
bore interest for their face value,” and had depreciated to even as low
as seven cents on the dollar. Maclay writes, “Mr. Hazard told me he had
made a business of it; it is easy to guess for whom. I told him, ‘You
are then among the happy few who have been let into the secret.’ He
seemed abashed and I checked by my forwardness much more information
which he seemed disposed to give.”[276]
The loan office books of New Hampshire show that Langdon was a large
creditor of the new government, and indeed he was one of the heavy
original contributors who risked their fortunes on the outcome of the
War.[277] One entry in the New Hampshire ledger credits him with more
than $25,000 worth of sixes and threes;[278] and there are other entries
as well. His brother, Woodbury Langdon, was also among the holders of
public paper.
With that patriotism to his state and thrift in her interest that
characterized his colleague, Gilman, Langdon sought to give the
commonwealth some advantage in the various speculations in securities.
On January 7, 1791, he wrote to the President of New Hampshire advising
him of the approaching passage of the National Bank bill and advising
that the state use its continental securities and some cash to buy stock
in the new Bank. He says that the stock “would undoubtedly sell for
specie at par at any time ...; and in all probability it would soon sell
above par, the state would therefore run no risque of looseing.”[279]
_John Lansing_, of New York, was a lawyer at Albany and the mayor of
that city. William Pierce, in his notes on the Convention, speaks of him
in the following language: “His legal knowledge, I am told, is not
extensive nor his education a good one. He is however a man of good
sense, plain in his manners, and sincere in his friendships.”[280]
Lansing was one of the stout opponents of the Constitution and left the
Convention early. He was there long enough however to learn (what was
not a very deep secret) the certain effect of an efficient government on
continental securities; for in January, 1791, immediately after the
establishment of the new financial system, he appeared at the New York
loan office with paper to fund to the amount of over seven thousand
dollars.[281] All the members of the Lansing family in Albany seem to
have taken advantage of the opportunity to augment their fortunes.[282]
_William Livingston_, of New Jersey, was a member of the distinguished
Livingston family which was among the largest proprietors in New York.
He graduated at Yale, and in 1745 married Miss French “whose father had
been a large proprietor of land in New Jersey.” He entered the practice
of law in 1748 “and soon became a prominent member of the bar and
employed in most of the important legal controversies of that day in New
York and New Jersey.” He apparently accumulated a comfortable fortune,
but had lost a portion of it in 1773 by the failure of his debtors, and
the necessity of accepting depreciated continental currency.[283]
Whether Livingston held any of the securities of the confederacy, it is
impossible apparently to determine, for his death in the summer of 1790,
before the funding system went into effect, would have precluded his
appearing on the Ledger records. It is probable, however, that he did
not entertain views in regard to the relation of public and private
affairs different from those of his eminent colleagues. This theory will
seem justified when it is understood that his son and heir, Brockholst
Livingston, a New York lawyer, was among the heaviest security holders
in that city; and in view of the wide-reaching ramifications of his
operations and his connections with Le Roy and Bayard was reckoned among
the princely speculators of his day. One entry in 1791 credits him with
about $70,000 worth; another in the same year, in conjunction with Le
Roy and Bayard, with nearly $30,000.[284] At a slightly later date, 1792
and 1793, his 6 per cents alone amount to more than $100,000,[285] and
he appears frequently in the records of other states. How much of this
was his own paper and how much was for friends who did not wish to
appear among the records cannot be determined.
_James Madison_, of Virginia, was a descendant of one of the old landed
families of Virginia whose wealth consisted principally of plantations
and slaves, and whose personal property was relatively small in amount.
Madison’s father “was a large landed proprietor occupied mainly with the
care and management of his extensive rural concerns.” Madison graduated
at Princeton and studied law, but the practice of his profession did not
appeal to him. His inclinations were all toward politics, for which he
was prepared by long and profound researches in history, law, and
political economy. He was constantly in public life, and seems to have
relied upon the emoluments of office and his father’s generosity as a
source of income. The postponement of his marriage until 1794 enabled
him to devote himself to political pursuits rather than commercial or
economic interests of any kind. He does not appear to have been a holder
of public securities; for the small amounts credited to James Madison on
the books of the Treasury Department[286] seem to have belonged to his
father, also named James Madison.[287]
Having none of the public securities, Madison was able later to take a
more disinterested view of the funding system proposed by Hamilton; and
the scramble of politicians and speculators which accompanied the
establishment of the new government did more than anything else to
disgust him with the administration party and drive him into opposition.
Writing to Jefferson in July, 1791, he said: “The subscriptions [to the
Bank] are consequently a mere scramble for so much public plunder, which
will be engrossed by those already loaded with the spoils of
individuals.... It pretty clearly appears, also, in what proportions the
public debt lies in the Country, what sort of hands hold it, and by whom
the people of the United States are to be governed. Of all the shameful
circumstances of this business, it is among the greatest to see the
members of the legislature who were most active in pushing this job
openly grasping its emoluments. Schuyler is to be put at the head of the
Directors, if the weight of the New York subscribers can effect it.
Nothing new is talked of here. In fact, stock-jobbing drowns every other
subject. The Coffee-House is in an eternal buzz with the gamblers.”[288]
_Alexander Martin_, of North Carolina, was a graduate of Princeton, and
practised law. He was for a time governor of his state. Later he served
in the United States Senate, and supported Adams and the alien and
sedition laws; but was defeated for election in 1799.[289] Martin was
among the well-to-do planters and slave-owners of his state;[290] but
his tastes do not seem to have turned to dealings in public securities,
for the Index to the holders of the public debt preserved in the
Treasury Department does not contain his name, and a search among the
papers of North Carolina fails to reveal any record of his transactions.
_Luther Martin_, of Maryland, was a descendant of English ancestors who
had obtained “large grants of land in New Jersey [and] removed their
domestic establishment there when a greater part of the colonial domain
was a dense wilderness.” He was a graduate of Princeton and took up the
practice of law. Being the third of nine children, and having little or
no assistance from his parents, who were in pinched circumstances, he
was thrown upon his own resources. He commenced his career in Virginia
“where he soon acquired a full and lucrative practice, amounting, as he
informs us, to about one thousand pounds per annum; which, however, was
after a period diminished by the disturbance growing out of the American
Revolution.”[291]
Luther Martin’s fortune was never very large, although he had among his
clients men of great wealth and influence, like Robert Morris.[292] The
census of 1790 records his owning only six slaves,[293] and his holdings
of public securities were apparently meagre—a few thousand dollars at
most. One entry of sixes and threes on June 15, 1791, credits him with
$1992.67, and he occasionally appears in other records.[294] He was
always more or less in sympathy with poor debtors, and was unwilling to
preclude altogether the issue of paper money or moderate impairments of
contract. He was accordingly a bitter opponent of the adoption of the
Constitution in his state.[295]
_George Mason_, of Virginia, was born in 1725. He was the son of a rich
slave owning and planting family of Dogue’s Neck, and on account of the
early death of his father he came into his vast estate on attaining his
majority.[296] His family fortunes were augmented by speculations in
western lands. He married the daughter of a Maryland merchant, from whom
a large estate came into his family.[297] He was a member of the Ohio
Company which was organized in 1749, and obtained a grant of “six
hundred thousand acres of land, lying mostly west of the mountains and
south of the Ohio.”[298] In 1754 he also secured a patent for about
fifteen hundred acres of land in Northern Neck.[299] He was constantly
increasing his holdings,[300] and in 1769 “he seems to have come into
possession of two thousand acres of land in the district of
Kentucky.”[301] As a member of the Virginia legislature he drew a bill
“to encourage the making of hemp, woollen, linen, and other
manufactures.”[302]
His property at the time of the establishment of the Constitution was
unquestionably large, for at his death in 1792 “he devised to his sons
alone, some fifteen thousand acres, the greater part of his own
acquisition, of the very best land in the Potomac region. Most of these
estates were well improved, with large and comfortable mansions and all
necessary outbuildings. But he left to be divided among his children
what was solely acquired by himself: sixty thousand of among the finest
acres in Kentucky, some three hundred slaves, more than fifty thousand
dollars’ worth of other personal property, and at least thirty thousand
dollars of debts due on his books, while his own indebtedness was
absolutely nothing.”[303] Very little of this personal property seems to
have been in public securities, for a search in the records of the
Treasury Department shows one small entry of a few hundred dollars’
worth of threes and sixes to his credit.[304]
Mason frankly admitted his personal interest in certain landed property
to be among his many objections to the Constitution—which he refused to
approve and the adoption of which he bitterly opposed. Speaking on the
dangers from the supremacy of the federal courts, in the Virginia
ratifying convention, he said: “I am personally endangered as an
inhabitant of Northern Neck. The people of that part will be obliged, by
the operation of this power, to pay the quit rent of their lands....
Lord Fairfax’s title was clear and undisputed. After the revolution we
taxed his lands as private property. After his death, an act of Assembly
was made, in 1782, to sequester the quit rents due, at his death, in the
hands of his debtors. Next year an act was made restoring them to the
executor of the proprietor. Subsequent to this, the treaty of peace was
made, by which it was agreed that there should be no further
confiscations. But after this an act of Assembly was passed,
confiscating his whole property. As Lord Fairfax’s title was
indisputably good, and as treaties are to be the supreme law of the
land, will not his representatives be able to recover all in the federal
court? How will gentlemen like to pay an additional tax on lands in the
Northern Neck?”[305]
Mason proposed to limit the judicial power in such a manner that it
should “extend to no case where the cause of action shall have
originated before the ratification of this Constitution, except in suits
for debts due the United States, disputes between states about their
territory, and disputes between persons claiming lands under grants of
different states.” He expressed a fear that under the Constitution as it
stood the titles to all the country between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany
Mountains would be upset in the federal courts and that the vast Indiana
purchase would be rendered a subject of dispute.[306]
_James McClurg_, of Virginia, was an accomplished man of letters and
distinguished physician of his native state. He was born there in 1747,
studied at the college of William and Mary, and finished his training in
medicine at Edinburgh and Paris. He established himself in the practice
first at Williamsburg, and about 1783 he settled in Richmond, where he
took first rank as a physician, scholar, and man of the world.[307]
McClurg’s knowledge of government was not academic. He knew the subject
practically, as well as theoretically; for as early as November 23,
1790, he was engaged in operations in federal securities.[308] And on
February 17, 1791, he presented to the local loan office Virginia
certificates to the amount of $26,819, all of which, except a few
hundred pounds originally subscribed by himself, he had evidently bought
for speculation.[309] McClurg was also an investor in stock in the first
United States Bank and one of the directors.[310]
_James McHenry_, of Maryland, received a classical education in Ireland,
the country of his birth, and came to Baltimore in 1771. He studied
medicine with Dr. Benjamin Rush at Philadelphia and became an army
surgeon during the War. He was for a time secretary to Washington and
later to Lafayette, and from 1783 to 1786 he was a member of Congress
from Maryland.[311]
McHenry was the son of Daniel McHenry, a Baltimore merchant, who
achieved “considerable financial success”[312] and was in business with
his son, John, a brother of James, until his death in 1782. John and
James began buying town property, and when the former died in 1790, the
latter inherited the entire estate, as John had never married. The death
of James’ father, says Steiner, left him financially independent.
McHenry’s personal property must have been considerable. A casual letter
of August 4, 1792, shows that one Dickinson owed him an amount secured
by a bond for £5000.[313] He was one of the original stockholders of the
Insurance Company of North America organized in 1792.[314] It is not
apparent that he was among the original holders of federal securities,
but an entry in 1797 records an old account to the amount of $6970.90,
brought forward.[315]
McHenry’s early mercantile interests left a deep impression on him, and
he sympathized with the efforts made in his state to secure an adequate
protective tariff. Indeed, he was among the signers of the memorial from
Baltimore laid before Congress on April 11, 1789, praying for the
protection and encouragement of American manufactures.[316]
_John Francis Mercer_, of Maryland, was born in Virginia and graduated
at William and Mary College in 1775. He served in the army and after the
war studied law with Jefferson. He moved to Maryland in 1786. He seems
to have been a man of some fortune, for he held six slaves,[317] and a
moderate amount of public securities.[318] His sympathies, however, were
with the popular party in Maryland. He joined with Luther Martin in
violent opposition to the adoption of the Constitution. In 1801 he was
elected governor of the state, and as governor he attacked the property
qualifications on voters under the constitution of the commonwealth, at
length securing the repeal of the provisions.
_Thomas Mifflin_, of Pennsylvania, was born in Philadelphia in 1744 and
graduated at the College of Philadelphia, where he distinguished himself
as a student of the classics. His father introduced him to a mercantile
life by placing him in the counting house of William Coleman, one of the
most eminent merchants of his native city. “When he was twenty-one years
of age he visited Europe to improve his knowledge of commercial affairs,
and after his return home he entered into business with his brother, the
connection continuing until after the Revolution.”[319]
Mifflin was deeply interested in the protection of American
manufactures. He was prominently identified with the Philadelphia
Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and Useful Arts, organized
in the summer of 1787. In fact, he presided at the meeting at which it
was established in August of that year, during the sessions of the
Convention.[320]
General Mifflin was a holder of public securities, but it does not
appear that his paper aggregated more than a petty sum. He and Jonathan
Mifflin are down for a few hundred dollars’ worth of continental paper
in 1788;[321] and he held in his own name another small account in
1791.[322] It is, therefore, apparent that General Mifflin appreciated
the position of the powerful class of security holders who looked to the
Convention for relief, and had a more than abstract interest in the
establishment of public credit.
_Gouverneur Morris_, of Pennsylvania, was born in 1752 at the family
manor house at Morrisania. He “belonged by birth to that powerful landed
aristocracy whose rule was known by New York alone among all the
northern colonies.” He graduated at King’s College, entered the practice
of law, and very soon began to take a hand in colonial politics,
attacking with great vehemence the propositions of the paper money
party. “He criticised unsparingly the attitude of a majority of his
fellow-citizens in wishing such a measure of relief, not only for their
short-sighted folly, but also for their criminal and selfish dishonesty
in trying to procure a temporary benefit for themselves at the lasting
expense of the community.”[323]
He was a member of the Continental Congress and was regarded as a
considerable expert in financial affairs. He assisted Robert Morris in
the establishment of the Bank of North America, and seems to have been
able, in the midst of his public engagements, to augment his private
fortunes and to engage in divers economic enterprises. At the time of
the formation of the Constitution, he had accumulated enough to purchase
the family estate from his elder brother, and “he had for some time been
engaged in various successful commercial ventures with his friend Robert
Morris, including an East India voyage on a large scale, shipments of
tobacco to France, and a share in iron works on the Delaware river, and
had become quite a rich man.”[324] He declared in the Convention that he
did not hold any public securities, and the records seem to bear out his
assertion, although his name does appear on an index to a volume of
Treasury Records not found.
Of all the members of the Convention, _Robert Morris_ of Pennsylvania,
had the most widely diversified economic interests. He was born of
humble parents in Liverpool in 1734, and came to America at an early
age. The death of his father, about 1750, left him a small estate of a
few thousand dollars, which stood him in good stead in his relations
with the Willings, whose counting house he had entered to learn
mercantile arts, in which he showed an early proficiency.[325]
In the course of his long career he owned and directed ships trading
with the East and West Indies, engaged in iron and several other
branches of manufacturing, bought and sold thousands of acres of land in
all parts of the country, particularly in the west and south, and
speculated in lots in Washington as soon as he learned of the
establishment of the capital there. He was instrumental in organizing
the Bank of North America in Philadelphia, with Thomas Willing, his
partner, as first President, and Thomas Fitzsimons, an associate in his
land and speculative enterprises, as one of the directors,[326] and was
in short a merchant prince, a captain of industry, a land speculator, a
financier, and a broker combined.[327] Had he been less ambitious he
would have died worth millions instead of in poverty and debt, after
having served a term in a debtor’s cell.
It is impossible to gauge correctly the extent of his land speculations,
for they ran into the millions of acres. Before and after the adoption
of the Constitution, he was busy interesting his colleagues in every
kind of enterprise that promised to be profitable. James Marshall, a
brother of John Marshall, was his chief agent, and carried on operations
for him in the United States and Europe. Marshall was given the power of
attorney by Morris and his wife to sell enormous quantities of lands and
other properties, and received from his principal letters of
introduction to European capitalists and persons of prominence,
including Mr. Pinckney, the representative of the United States in
France.[328]
The exact extent of Morris’ speculations in the securities of the new
government is a matter beyond the scope of the present inquiry, but it
is sufficient for our purposes to know that he held practically every
kind of continental security, that his deals in stocks mounted upward
into the tens of thousands of dollars,[329] and that in the Convention
and in the first Senate under the Constitution, of which he was a
member, he was uniformly strenuous in his support of public credit. No
man of his time had such wide-reaching interests or involved in his
personal affairs so many eminent men, like Hamilton, John Marshall,
Thomas Fitzsimons, Thomas Willing, Gouverneur Morris, John Langdon, and
Robert Clymer, all closely identified with the new system of government.
It may be truly said therefore that Morris was an effective
representative of the speculative land operators, the holders of
securities, the dealers in public paper, and the mercantile groups
seeking protection for manufactures—in short every movable property
interest in the country. It was fortunate for the new government to have
in its support a man whose economic power and personal acquaintanceship
extended from New Hampshire to Georgia. It seems fair to say that no man
contributed more to the establishment of our Constitution and the
stability of our national institutions than Robert Morris, “the Patriot
Financier.”
Washington, therefore, showed his acumen when, as first President of the
United States, he selected Morris for the office of Secretary of the
Treasury; but the latter, on account of the pressing nature of his
private business, was unable to accept the post thus tendered. Indeed,
he wisely concluded that he could be more serviceable to the new
government in his capacity as senator from Pennsylvania; and in this
position he lent his powerful support to the funding system, the new
Bank, and the establishment of a protective tariff. “Morris and Hamilton
together worked out a tariff bill,” says Oberholtzer.[330] “But for the
influence of the Senator from Pennsylvania the measure, important
because it would provide the national government with ample revenues,
and because it had protective features of utility in the development of
the country industries, could not have passed Congress in the form which
would have commended it to the Secretary of the Treasury.... All
witnesses agree that Robert Morris was a stupendous political force in
Washington’s administration, and his influence did not decrease when, in
December, 1790, the capital was removed to Philadelphia, where he
resumed his princely entertainment of public men, surrendering his home
on Market Street to Washington, and becoming the President’s most
intimate friend and closest companion.”
_William Paterson_ was born in the north of Ireland, came to this
country in 1747, graduated at Princeton in 1763, and received his
license to practise law in 1769. His father was a merchant, and he was
himself for a time engaged in the mercantile business.[331] A by no
means extensive search has failed to bring out any of Paterson’s later
economic interests.
_William Pierce_, of Georgia, does not seem to have made any
considerable impression on his age, for the biographical material
relating to him is meagre indeed. His economic interests do not appear
to have been looked into, although it is known that he was “in business
in Savannah as the head of the house of William Pierce and
Company.”[332] His private fortune was probably not large, for he
applied to Madison in 1788 for a position as collector in his
district.[333]
_Charles Cotesworth Pinckney_ was the son of “Chief Justice Pinckney, a
man of great integrity and of considerable eminence under the Provincial
Government.” He received a fine classical and legal education in
England. He began the practice of law in the provincial courts in 1770,
and very soon “began to acquire business and reputation.” After the
Revolutionary war “his business was large and its profits
commensurate—reaching in one year the amount of four thousand guineas, a
considerable sum for that day.” He became “a considerable landholder in
the city of Charleston. He had numerous tenants living on his
property.... His benevolence was of the most enlarged character, and was
experienced not only by the poor and such as were dependent on him, but
in his liberal support of churches, seminaries of learning, and every
object of public utility.”[334] He also held a country estate at
Pinckney Island, and is recorded in the first census as the owner of
forty-five slaves.[335]
Pinckney had a large practice for the merchants of Charleston, and his
knowledge of maritime law must have been extensive.[336] Through this
direct experience, he must have learned the importance of a national
commercial system, not only to merchants and manufacturers, but also to
those having occasion to appear in the courts. In the midst of the local
conflict between the creditors and debtors, he took a firm stand against
any weakening of public and private credit.
The significance and importance of the public credit he understood from
first-hand knowledge, for his holdings of public securities were large
when compared with the average holdings in the South. Shortly after the
establishment of Hamilton’s funding system, Pinckney is credited with
over ten thousand dollars’ worth of sixes and threes on the loan office
books of his state.[337]
_Charles Pinckney_, like his distinguished cousin, was also an eminent
lawyer in Charleston and enjoyed a large practice with the merchants. He
was likewise a land-owner on a considerable scale, for the census of
1790 records the number of his slaves as fifty-two.[338]
Charles Pinckney was also identified with the conservative forces of the
state in their fight against the debtor or paper money party, and he
thoroughly understood the meaning of the sacredness of private and
public obligations. He was a holder of government securities on a large
scale, his transactions early in the history of the new system amounting
to more than fourteen thousand dollars.[339] In common with the men of
his party he naturally feared the effect of popular lawmaking upon the
value of personalty.[340]
_Edmund Randolph_ was a grandson of Sir John Randolph, an English
gentleman of ancient and honorable lineage. Through an uncle he
inherited “three farms ... negroes, and other property;” but this estate
was burdened with debt.[341] As a lawyer, however, he enjoyed a
magnificent practice which furnished him a considerable revenue. When
charged with having defrauded the Treasury of the United States during
his official service as Secretary of State, he advanced as a counter
claim the fact that the condition of his fortune was evidence that he
could not have engrossed any large government funds. He reported on that
occasion (1801) that in money claims he had £14,200 Virginia currency
which he traced “to the best of all resources, the independent labors of
my own hands.”[342] About that time, his other property which had come
to him by way of inheritance amounted to “some seven thousand acres of
land, several houses, and near two hundred negroes. The slaves had long
been an incumbrance on account of his refusal to sell their increase and
his inability while at Philadelphia to hire them properly.”[343]
Indeed, Randolph was apparently never very prosperous. He held ten or
fifteen thousand dollars’ worth of public securities about the time of
the establishment of the new government;[344] but he seems to have been
in debt to Hamilton for a considerable sum that gave him some
embarrassment. On April 23, 1793, he wrote to Hamilton asking an
extension of time on the paper, saying: “I am extremely thankful to you
for your readiness to accommodate me on the subject of the bills.... The
sum which I want to sell is much less than £2600 stg. It is only £1300;
as I prefer waiting for a rise....”[345]
_George Read_, of Delaware, was the grandson of a “wealthy citizen of
Dublin.” His father had migrated to America and established himself as
“a respectable planter” in Delaware. George studied law under John
Moland, a distinguished attorney in Philadelphia, and began business for
himself in Newcastle in 1754 where he soon acquired a lucrative
practice.[346] Although he surrendered all claim to his father’s estate
on the ground that he had received his portion in his education,[347]
Read managed to accumulate a modest competence.
Of his economic position, so far as it was reflected in his style of
living, a descendant writes: “The mansion of Mr. Read commanded an
extensive view of the river Delaware.... It was an old-fashioned brick
structure, looking very comfortable but with no pretensions to
elegance.... Here Mr. Read resided for many years in the style of the
colonial gentry who, when having no more than the moderate income of Mr.
Read, maintained a state and etiquette which have long disappeared....
How could this be, Mr. Read not being affluent? His income would buy
more then than now, and he had a small farm ... and besides he generally
owned his servants.” In addition to his income from official positions
and his practice, Read possessed some capital for investment, because he
appears among the subscribers to the stock of the Bank of North America
issued in 1784.[348]
A small part of his worldly goods he had invested in the securities of
the Continental Congress in 1779, during the dark days of the Revolution
when the chances of ever recovering it were slight indeed. He was among
those who risked their lives and fortunes in the Revolutionary cause,
and has the honor of being one of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence. The loan office of Delaware records that in March and
April, 1779, Read subscribed for $2000 worth of certificates, and that
Mary Read subscribed for $11,500 worth of the same paper.[349] The
incompleteness of the records of Delaware in the Treasury department
prevents the tracing of these securities, but an entry of 1797 shows
Read as holding a small account (old) of threes.[350] At all events,
Read had felt personally the inconveniences of depreciated paper, and
knew the value of a stable government to every owner of personal
property.
_John Rutledge_, of South Carolina, was the son of Dr. John Rutledge, a
native of Ireland who settled in Carolina about 1735. He was educated
under a classical tutor and pursued the study of law in the Temple. He
opened his practice in Charleston in 1761, and a biographer relates that
“instead of rising by degrees to the head of his profession, he burst
forth at once the able lawyer and accomplished scholar. Business flowed
in upon him. He was employed in the most difficult causes and retained
with the largest fees that were usually given.”[351]
Rutledge was elected president of South Carolina, under the first
constitution, and when a new frame of government was made by the
legislature, in some respects more democratic, he vetoed it, preferring
“a compound or mixed government to a simple democracy, or one verging
towards it.”[352] “However unexceptionable democratic power may appear
at first view,” said Rutledge, “its defects have been found arbitrary,
severe, and destructive.”
He resigned because he was unable to prevent the adoption of the new
constitution; but he was soon elected governor under it; and inasmuch as
it provided that no person could be governor unless he held in his own
right, on his election, “a settled plantation or freehold ... of the
value of at least ten thousand pounds currency, clear of debt,” it must
be assumed that Rutledge was the owner of a considerable plantation and
a number of slaves. Indeed, the census of 1790 records the number at
twenty-six, which, though small, was considerable for a man whose
interests were not primarily in planting.[353] Unlike his other
colleagues from South Carolina, John Rutledge does not seem to have
invested in securities, though several members of the Rutledge family
appear on the records.
_Roger Sherman_, the shoemaker of New Milford,[354] Connecticut, was one
of the very few men of the Convention who had risen from poverty to
affluence largely through his own efforts, and had none of the
advantages of education and support which a family patrimony can give.
But as his biographer remarks of him: “In regard to worldly
circumstances, Mr. Sherman was very happily situated. Beginning life
without the aid of patrimonial wealth or powerful connections, with
nothing but his good sense and good principles, he, by his industry and
skilful management, always lived in a comfortable manner, and his
property was gradually increasing.”[355]
In common with other far-seeing business men of his day, Sherman seems
to have invested a portion of his accumulations in public securities,
for shortly after Hamilton’s fiscal system went into effect he funded
nearly eight thousand dollars’ worth of paper at the loan office of his
native state.[356]
_Richard Dobbs Spaight_, of North Carolina, was of respectable origin.
His father had been secretary of the colony under the crown, and his
mother was a sister of Dobbs, a royal governor of the colony. He came
into his father’s estate early; he studied in Ireland, and finished his
education at the University of Glasgow. At the time of the Convention,
he was, according to Pierce, a “worthy man, of some abilities, and
fortune.”[357] He was among the large planters of his state, and is
recorded to have held seventy-one slaves.[358] He seems to have taken no
share in the public security transactions. At least a search in the
incomplete records does not reveal him as an original holder—but an old
account of 3 per cents for the sum of a few dollars, shows that he was
not unaware of the relations of public credit to stable
institutions.[359] It was largely through his influence that Washington
went to North Carolina to aid in the fight for the adoption of the
Constitution by that state.
_Caleb Strong_, of Massachusetts, was the descendant of an old and
honorable family of Northampton, the place of his birth. He was educated
at Harvard and entered the practice of law.[360] He early began a public
career for which he showed remarkable aptitudes, and was rewarded by
election to the convention which drafted the constitution of his state,
to the federal Convention, to the first United States Senate, and later
to the office of governor of the commonwealth. Whether he inherited a
fortune or accumulated considerable wealth in the practice of law is not
recorded by his biographer, Senator Lodge,[361] but he took advantage of
his superior knowledge of public affairs, and bought up £3271:0:6 worth
of certificates of issues up to May, 1787, which he funded into federal
securities in September, 1791.[362]
_Washington_, of Virginia, was probably the richest man in the United
States in his time, and his financial ability was not surpassed among
his countrymen anywhere. He possessed, in addition to his great estate
on the Potomac, a large amount of fluid capital which he judiciously
invested in western lands, from which he could reasonably expect a large
appreciation with the establishment of stable government and the advance
of the frontier.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate his economic interests is to give the
data from the schedule of his property attached to his will, drawn up in
1799. He possessed in Virginia, counting the enormous holdings on the
Ohio, and the Great Kenhawa, more than 35,000 acres, valued at $200,000;
in Maryland, 1119 acres, at $9828; in Pennsylvania, 234 acres, at $1404;
in New York, about 1000 acres, at $6000; in the Northwest Territory,
3051 acres, at $15,255; in Kentucky, 5000 acres, at $10,000; property in
Washington, at $19,132; in Alexandria, at $4000; in Winchester, at $400;
at Bath, $800. He held $6246 worth of United States securities; and of
this holding he said: “These are the sums which are actually funded; and
though no more in the aggregate than 7566 dollars, stand me in at least
ten thousand pounds, Virginia money; being the amount of bonded and
other debts due me and discharged during the war when money had
depreciated in that rate—and was so settled by the public authority.” He
held $10,666 worth of shares in the Potomac Company presented to him by
the state of Virginia (which he left to establish a national
university); $500 worth of James River Company shares; $6800 worth of
stock in the Bank of Columbia, and $1000 worth of stock in the Bank of
Alexandria. His own slaves were to be emancipated on the death of his
wife. His live-stock he estimated at $15,653—making a grand total at a
conservative estimate of $530,000.[363]
Washington was also a considerable money lender and suffered from the
paper money operations of the Virginia legislature. He “had bonds and
mortgages to ‘nigh £10,000’ paid off in depreciated paper currency worth
at times as little as 2/6 in the pound, and when he attended the federal
Convention he was in arrears for two years’ taxes through having been
unable to sell the products of his farms.”[364]
If any one in the country had a just reason for being disgusted with the
imbecilities of the Confederation it was Washington. He had given the
best years of life to the Revolutionary cause, and had refused all
remuneration for his great services. He was paid his personal expenses
to the amount of $64,355.30 in paper that steadily depreciated. M. Otto
writing to Vergennes on February 10, 1787, says of Washington’s losses:
“I have before me a letter of this honored man in which he complains of
being obliged to sell at a rate of twenty for one the certificates which
Congress sent to him in payment for the arrearages due him.”[365]
_Hugh Williamson_, of North Carolina, was the son of “an industrious
tradesman” of Dublin, who settled in America about 1730—five years
before Hugh was born. The latter received a fine education and graduated
at the College of Philadelphia in 1757. About this time his father died,
leaving him sole executor of the estate, the settlement of which
required the greater part of two years.[366] He studied divinity, but
later turned to medicine and went to Edinburgh to pursue his studies in
that subject. He practised for a time in Philadelphia, but afterward
went South to reside.
During the Revolutionary War he engaged in mercantile speculations in
Charleston and later at Edenton, “from which he afterward traded to the
neutral islands in the West Indies.” While continuing his mercantile
connections with his brother, “then also engaged in the West India
trade, he determined to resume the practice of medicine; this he did
with the same success as he had done formerly at Philadelphia.” He was
an opponent of the emission of paper money in North Carolina and
published an essay against fiat currency.
He happily combined a theoretical and practical knowledge of finance,
for he seems to have accumulated a large amount of public securities. He
appears frequently on the records of the Treasury Department; for
example in December, 1791, for $2444.84 worth of sixes and threes.[367]
Furthermore, his correspondence with Hamilton and others shows that he
had “the smallest of two large trunks” full of 6 per cents, threes, and
deferred stock which he had delivered to Hamilton for transfer to the
New York loan office, in 1793.[368]
Williamson also engaged in western land speculations, and was not
unaware of the advantage to that class of property which the new
Constitution afforded. On June 2, 1788, he wrote to Madison from New
York, “For myself, I conceive that my opinions are not biassed by
private interests, but having claims to a considerable quantity of land
in the Western Country, I am fully persuaded that the value of those
lands must be increased by an efficient federal government.”[369] After
his long and assiduous public services, Williamson settled in New York,
where he engaged in historical writing and the management of the
considerable fortune which he had accumulated in the midst of his
pressing public duties.[370]
_James Wilson_, of Pennsylvania, was born in Scotland in 1742 and
received a fine classical education there. He came to America in 1766,
began the study of law with John Dickinson, and was admitted to the bar
in 1767. He developed a lucrative practice at Carlisle, where he first
settled; but in 1778 he removed to Philadelphia where he established a
close connection with the leading merchants and men of affairs including
Robert Morris, George Clymer, and General Mifflin.[371] He was one of
the directors of the Bank of North America on its incorporation in
1781;[372] and he also appears among the original stockholders of the
Insurance Company of North America, organized in 1792.[373]
Wilson’s largest interest seems to have been in public lands, for he was
among the members of the Georgia Land Company, a highly speculative
concern tainted with fraud, to put it mildly, for ten shares, £25,000
cash and 750,000 acres.[374] Haskins says, “James Wilson, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, held shares to the amount of at least one
million acres and it is asserted was influential in securing the
grants.”[375]
Wilson does not appear to have been a large holder of public securities;
for a search in the records of the Pennsylvania loan office preserved in
the Department of the Treasury reveals only a trivial amount of 3 per
cents to his credit, on June 2, 1791.[376] It may be that the extent of
his other operations prevented his taking advantage of the opportunities
offered in this line.
_George Wythe_, of Virginia, was born in 1726 on the shores of the
Chesapeake in the colony of Virginia. “He was descended from a
respectable family and inherited from his father, who was a farmer, an
estate amply sufficient for all the purposes of ease and independence,
although it was seriously impaired by the Revolution.” He studied law,
and “by reason of his extensive learning, correctness of elocution, and
his logical style of argument, he quickly arrived at the head of the
bar.”[377] His second wife “was a lady of a wealthy and respectable
family of Taliafero, residing near Williamsburg.” He was a slave-owner,
but he emancipated his slaves and made provisions to keep them from
want. His public security holding was not large. On March 12, 1791, he
presented Virginia certificates to the amount of £513:2:8 which he had
acquired from their original owners.[378]
_Robert Yates_, of New York, was born in Schenectady, and received a
classical education at New York City. He read law and began the practice
at Albany where he soon built up an extensive business. He was made a
judge of the Supreme Court under the state constitution of 1777, but his
salary was small. “Indeed before the scale of depreciation of
continental money had been settled, he received one year’s salary in
that money at its _nominal_ value, the whole of which was just
sufficient (as he humorously observed) ‘to purchase a pound of green tea
for his wife.’” He refused to enrich himself by speculating in
confiscated estates, a favorite occupation of some of his friends, and
“he died poor.”[379] He opposed the adoption of the Constitution, and
apparently took no part in the transactions in public securities; but
several members of the Yates family, Richard, Adolphus, and Christopher
were large operators.[380]
A survey of the economic interests of the members of the Convention
presents certain conclusions:
A majority of the members were lawyers by profession.
Most of the members came from towns, on or near the coast, that is, from
the regions in which personalty was largely concentrated.
Not one member represented in his immediate personal economic interests
the small farming or mechanic classes.
The overwhelming majority of members, at least five-sixths, were
immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their
labors at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic
beneficiaries from the adoption of the Constitution.
1. Public security interests were extensively represented in the
Convention.[381] Of the fifty-five members who attended no less than
forty appear on the Records of the Treasury Department for sums varying
from a few dollars up to more than one hundred thousand dollars. Among
the minor holders were Bassett, Blount, Brearley, Broom, Butler,
Carroll, Few, Hamilton, L. Martin, Mason, Mercer, Mifflin, Read,
Spaight, Wilson, and Wythe. Among the larger holders (taking the sum of
about $5000 as the criterion) were Baldwin, Blair, Clymer, Dayton,
Ellsworth, Fitzsimons, Gilman, Gerry, Gorham, Jenifer, Johnson, King,
Langdon, Lansing, Livingston,[382] McClurg, R. Morris, C. C. Pinckney,
C. Pinckney, Randolph, Sherman, Strong, Washington, and Williamson.
It is interesting to note that, with the exception of New York, and
possibly Delaware, each state had one or more prominent representatives
in the Convention who held more than a negligible amount of securities,
and who could therefore speak with feeling and authority on the question
of providing in the new Constitution for the full discharge of the
public debt:
Langdon and Gilman, of New Hampshire.
Gerry, Strong, and King, of Massachusetts.
Ellsworth, Sherman, and Johnson, of Connecticut.
Hamilton, of New York. Although he held no large amount personally,
he was the special pleader for the holders of public securities and the
maintenance of public faith.
Dayton, of New Jersey.
Robert Morris, Clymer, and Fitzsimons, of Pennsylvania.
Mercer and Carroll, of Maryland.
Blair, McClurg, and Randolph, of Virginia.
Williamson, of North Carolina.
The two Pinckneys, of South Carolina.
Few and Baldwin, of Georgia.
2. Personalty invested in lands for speculation was represented by at
least fourteen members: Blount, Dayton, Few, Fitzsimons, Franklin,
Gilman, Gerry, Gorham, Hamilton, Mason, R. Morris, Washington,
Williamson, and Wilson.
3. Personalty in the form of money loaned at interest was represented by
at least twenty-four members: Bassett, Broom, Butler, Carroll, Clymer,
Davie, Dickinson, Ellsworth, Few, Fitzsimons, Franklin, Gilman,
Ingersoll, Johnson, King, Langdon, Mason, McHenry, C. C. Pinckney, C.
Pinckney, Randolph, Read, Washington, and Williamson.
4. Personalty in mercantile, manufacturing, and shipping lines was
represented by at least eleven members: Broom, Clymer, Ellsworth,
Fitzsimons, Gerry, King, Langdon, McHenry, Mifflin, G. Morris, and R.
Morris.
5. Personalty in slaves was represented by at least fifteen members:
Butler, Davie, Jenifer, A. Martin, L. Martin, Mason, Mercer, C. C.
Pinckney, C. Pinckney, Randolph, Read, Rutledge, Spaight, Washington,
and Wythe.
It cannot be said, therefore, that the members of the Convention were
“disinterested.” On the contrary, we are forced to accept the profoundly
significant conclusion that they knew through their personal experiences
in economic affairs the precise results which the new government that
they were setting up was designed to attain. As a group of doctrinaires,
like the Frankfort assembly of 1848, they would have failed miserably;
but as practical men they were able to build the new government upon the
only foundations which could be stable: fundamental economic
interests.[383]
CHAPTER VI
THE CONSTITUTION AS AN ECONOMIC DOCUMENT
It is difficult for the superficial student of the Constitution, who has
read only the commentaries of the legists, to conceive of that
instrument as an economic document. It places no property qualifications
on voters or officers; it gives no outward recognition of any economic
groups in society; it mentions no special privileges to be conferred
upon any class. It betrays no feeling, such as vibrates through the
French constitution of 1791; its language is cold, formal, and severe.
The true inwardness of the Constitution is not revealed by an
examination of its provisions as simple propositions of law; but by a
long and careful study of the voluminous correspondence of the
period,[384] contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, the records of the
debates in the Convention at Philadelphia and in the several state
conventions, and particularly, _The Federalist_, which was widely
circulated during the struggle over ratification. The correspondence
shows the exact character of the evils which the Constitution was
intended to remedy; the records of the proceedings in the Philadelphia
Convention reveal the successive steps in the building of the framework
of the government under the pressure of economic interests; the
pamphlets and newspapers disclose the ideas of the contestants over the
ratification; and _The Federalist_ presents the political science of the
new system as conceived by three of the profoundest thinkers of the
period, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.
Doubtless, the most illuminating of these sources on the economic
character of the Constitution are the records of the debates in the
Convention, which have come down to us in fragmentary form; and a
thorough treatment of material forces reflected in the several clauses
of the instrument of government created by the grave assembly at
Philadelphia would require a rewriting of the history of the proceedings
in the light of the great interests represented there.[385] But an
entire volume would scarcely suffice to present the results of such a
survey, and an undertaking of this character is accordingly impossible
here.
_The Federalist_, on the other hand, presents in a relatively brief and
systematic form an economic interpretation of the Constitution by the
men best fitted, through an intimate knowledge of the ideals of the
framers, to expound the political science of the new government. This
wonderful piece of argumentation by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay is in
fact the finest study in the economic interpretation of politics which
exists in any language; and whoever would understand the Constitution as
an economic document need hardly go beyond it. It is true that the tone
of the writers is somewhat modified on account of the fact that they are
appealing to the voters to ratify the Constitution, but at the same time
they are, by the force of circumstances, compelled to convince large
economic groups that safety and strength lie in the adoption of the new
system.
Indeed, every fundamental appeal in it is to some material and
substantial interest. Sometimes it is to the people at large in the name
of protection against invading armies and European coalitions. Sometimes
it is to the commercial classes whose business is represented as
prostrate before the follies of the Confederation. Now it is to
creditors seeking relief against paper money and the assaults of the
agrarians in general; now it is to the holders of federal securities
which are depreciating toward the vanishing point. But above all, it is
to the owners of personalty anxious to find a foil against the attacks
of levelling democracy, that the authors of _The Federalist_ address
their most cogent arguments in favor of ratification. It is true there
is much discussion of the details of the new framework of government, to
which even some friends of reform took exceptions; but Madison and
Hamilton both knew that these were incidental matters when compared with
the sound basis upon which the superstructure rested.
In reading the pages of this remarkable work as a study in political
economy, it is important to bear in mind that the system, which the
authors are describing, consisted of two fundamental parts—one positive,
the other negative:
I. A government endowed with certain positive powers, but so constructed
as to break the force of majority rule and prevent invasions of the
property rights of minorities.
II. Restrictions on the state legislatures which had been so vigorous in
their attacks on capital.
Under some circumstances, action is the immediate interest of the
dominant party; and whenever it desires to make an economic gain through
governmental functioning, it must have, of course, a system endowed with
the requisite powers.
Examples of this are to be found in protective tariffs, in ship
subsidies, in railway land grants, in river and harbor improvements, and
so on through the catalogue of so-called “paternalistic” legislation. Of
course it may be shown that the “general good” is the ostensible object
of any particular act; but the general good is a passive force, and
unless we know who are the several individuals that benefit in its name,
it has no meaning. When it is so analyzed, immediate and remote
beneficiaries are discovered; and the former are usually found to have
been the dynamic element in securing the legislation. Take for example,
the economic interests of the advocates who appear in tariff hearings at
Washington.
On the obverse side, dominant interests quite as often benefit from the
prevention of governmental action as from positive assistance. They are
able to take care of themselves if let alone within the circle of
protection created by the law. Indeed, most owners of property have as
much to fear from positive governmental action as from their inability
to secure advantageous legislation. Particularly is this true where the
field of private property is already extended to cover practically every
form of tangible and intangible wealth. This was clearly set forth by
Hamilton: “It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws
includes that of preventing good ones.... But this objection will have
little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that
inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish
in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every
institution calculated to restrain the excess of lawmaking, and to keep
things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period,
as more likely to do good than harm.... The injury which may possibly be
done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the
advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”[386]
THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION[387]
Before taking up the economic implications of the structure of the
federal government, it is important to ascertain what, in the opinion of
_The Federalist_, is the basis of all government. The most philosophical
examination of the foundations of political science is made by Madison
in the tenth number. Here he lays down, in no uncertain language, the
principle that the first and elemental concern of every government is
economic.
1. “The first object of government,” he declares, is the protection of
“the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originate.” The chief business of government, from which,
perforce, its essential nature must be derived, consists in the control
and adjustment of conflicting economic interests. After enumerating the
various forms of propertied interests which spring up inevitably in
modern society, he adds: “The regulation of these various and
interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation,
and involves the spirit of party and faction in the ordinary operations
of the government.”[388]
2. What are the chief causes of these conflicting political forces with
which the government must concern itself? Madison answers. Of course
fanciful and frivolous distinctions have sometimes been the cause of
violent conflicts; “but the most common and durable source of factions
has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct
interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are
debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and
views.”
3. The theories of government which men entertain are emotional
reactions to their property interests. “From the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different
degrees and kinds of property immediately results; _and from the
influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors, ensues a division of society into different interests and
parties_.” Legislatures reflect these interests. “What,” he asks, “are
the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the
causes which they determine.” There is no help for it. “The causes of
faction cannot be removed,” and “we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control.”
4. Unequal distribution of property is inevitable, and from it
contending factions will rise in the state. The government will reflect
them, for they will have their separate principles and “sentiments”; but
the supreme danger will arise from the fusion of certain interests into
an overbearing majority, which Madison, in another place, prophesied
would be the landless proletariat,[389]—an overbearing majority which
will make its “rights” paramount, and sacrifice the “rights” of the
minority. “To secure the public good,” he declares, “and private rights
against the danger of such a faction and at the same time preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government is then the great object to
which our inquiries are directed.”
5. How is this to be done? Since the contending classes cannot be
eliminated and their interests are bound to be reflected in politics,
the only way out lies in making it difficult for enough contending
interests to fuse into a majority, and in balancing one over against
another. The machinery for doing this is created by the new Constitution
and by the Union. (_a_) Public views are to be refined and enlarged “by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.” (_b_) The
very size of the Union will enable the inclusion of more interests so
that the danger of an overbearing majority is not so great. “The smaller
the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party....
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such
a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their strength and to act in unison with each other.”
Q. E. D., “in the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore,
we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
republican government.”[390]
I. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OR THE BALANCE OF POWERS
The fundamental theory of political economy thus stated by Madison was
the basis of the original American conception of the balance of powers
which is formulated at length in four numbers of _The Federalist_ and
consists of the following elements:
1. No mere parchment separation of departments of government will be
effective. “The legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
The founders of our republic ... seem never for a moment to have turned
their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and
all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and
fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They
seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations,
which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same
tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.”[391]
2. Some sure mode of checking usurpations in the government must be
provided, other than frequent appeals to the people. “There appear to be
insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people as
a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power
within their constitutional limits.”[392] In a contest between the
legislature and the other branches of the government, the former would
doubtless be victorious on account of the ability of the legislators to
plead their cause with the people.
3. What then can be depended upon to keep the government in close rein?
“The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied by so
contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places.... It is of great importance
in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of
its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice
of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different
classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the
rights of the minority will be insecure.”[393] There are two ways of
obviating this danger: one is by establishing a monarch independent of
popular will, and the other is by reflecting these contending interests
(so far as their representatives may be enfranchised) in the very
structure of the government itself so that a majority cannot dominate
the minority—which minority is of course composed of those who possess
property that may be attacked. “Society itself will be broken into so
many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from
interested combinations of the majority.”[394]
4. The structure of the government as devised at Philadelphia reflects
these several interests and makes improbable any danger to the minority
from the majority. “The House of Representatives being to be elected
immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the
President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would
be little probability of a common interest to cement these different
branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.”[395]
5. All of these diverse interests appear in the amending process but
they are further reinforced against majorities. An amendment must
receive a two-thirds vote in each of the two houses so constituted and
the approval of three-fourths of the states.
6. The economic corollary of this system is as follows: Property
interests may, through their superior weight in power and intelligence,
secure advantageous legislation whenever necessary, and they may at the
same time obtain immunity from control by parliamentary majorities.
If we examine carefully the delicate instrument by which the framers
sought to check certain kinds of positive action that might be advocated
to the detriment of established and acquired rights, we cannot help
marvelling at their skill. Their leading idea was to break up the
attacking forces at the starting point: the source of political
authority for the several branches of the government. This
disintegration of positive action at the source was further facilitated
by the differentiation in the terms given to the respective departments
of the government. And the crowning counterweight to “an interested and
overbearing majority,” as Madison phrased it, was secured in the
peculiar position assigned to the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity
and mystery of the law as a foil to democratic attacks.
It will be seen on examination that no two of the leading branches of
the government are derived from the same source. The House of
Representatives springs from the mass of the people whom the states may
see fit to enfranchise. The Senate is elected by the legislatures of the
states, which were, in 1787, almost uniformly based on property
qualifications, sometimes with a differentiation between the sources of
the upper and lower houses. The President is to be chosen by electors
selected as the legislatures of the states may determine—at all events
by an authority one degree removed from the voters at large. The
judiciary is to be chosen by the President and the Senate, both removed
from direct popular control and holding for longer terms than the House.
A sharp differentiation is made in the terms of the several authorities,
so that a complete renewal of the government at one stroke is
impossible. The House of Representatives is chosen for two years; the
Senators for six, but not at one election, for one-third go out every
two years. The President is chosen for four years. The judges of the
Supreme Court hold for life. Thus “popular distempers,” as eighteenth
century publicists called them, are not only restrained from working
their havoc through direct elections, but they are further checked by
the requirement that they must last six years in order to make their
effects felt in the political department of the government, providing
they can break through the barriers imposed by the indirect election of
the Senate and the President. Finally, there is the check of judicial
control that can be overcome only through the manipulation of the
appointing power which requires time, or through the operation of a
cumbersome amending system.
The keystone of the whole structure is, in fact, the system provided for
judicial control—the most unique contribution to the science of
government which has been made by American political genius. It is
claimed by some recent writers that it was not the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to confer upon the Supreme Court the power
of passing upon the constitutionality of statutes enacted by Congress;
but in view of the evidence on the other side, it is incumbent upon
those who make this assertion to bring forward positive evidence to the
effect that judicial control was not a part of the Philadelphia
programme.[396] Certainly, the authors of _The Federalist_ entertained
no doubts on the point, and they conceived it to be such an excellent
principle that they were careful to explain it to the electors to whom
they addressed their arguments.
After elaborating fully the principle of judicial control over
legislation under the Constitution, Hamilton enumerates the advantages
to be derived from it. Speaking on the point of tenure during good
behavior, he says: “In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the
despotism of the prince; in a republic it is no less an excellent
barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body.... If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments,
this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent
tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as
this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to
the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.... But it is not with a
view to infractions of the Constitution only that the independence of
the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther
than to the injury of private rights of particular classes of citizens,
by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial
magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and
confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the
immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates
as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving
that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected
from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very
motives of injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a
circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our
governments than but few may be aware of.”[397]
Nevertheless, it may be asked why, if the protection of property rights
lay at the basis of the new system, there is in the Constitution no
provision for property qualifications for voters or for elected
officials and representatives. This is, indeed, peculiar when it is
recalled that the constitutional history of England is in a large part a
record of conflict over the weight in the government to be enjoyed by
definite economic groups, and over the removal of the property
qualifications early imposed on members of the House of Commons and on
the voters at large. But the explanation of the absence of property
qualifications from the Constitution is not difficult.
The members of the Convention were, in general, not opposed to property
qualifications as such, either for officers or voters. “Several
propositions,” says Mr. S. H. Miller, “were made in the federal
Convention in regard to property qualifications. A motion was carried
instructing the committee to fix upon such qualifications for members of
Congress. The committee could not agree upon the amount and reported in
favor of leaving the matter to the legislature. Charles Pinckney
objected to this plan as giving too much power to the first
legislature.... Ellsworth objected to a property qualification on
account of the difficulty of fixing the amount. If it was made high
enough for the South, it would not be applicable to the Eastern States.
Franklin was the only speaker who opposed the proposition to require
property on principle, saying that ‘some of the greatest rogues he was
ever acquainted with were the richest rogues.’ A resolution was also
carried to require a property qualification for the Presidency. Hence it
was evident that the lack of all property requirements for office in the
United States Constitution was not owing to any opposition of the
convention to such qualifications per se.”[398]
Propositions to establish property restrictions were defeated, not
because they were believed to be inherently opposed to the genius of
American government, but for economic reasons—strange as it may seem.
These economic reasons were clearly set forth by Madison in the debate
over landed qualifications for legislators in July, when he showed,
first, that slight property qualifications would not keep out the small
farmers whose paper money schemes had been so disastrous to personalty;
and, secondly, that landed property qualifications would exclude from
Congress the representatives of “those classes of citizens who were not
landholders,” _i.e._ the personalty interests. This was true, he
thought, because the mercantile and manufacturing classes would hardly
be willing to turn their personalty into sufficient quantities of landed
property to make them eligible for a seat in Congress.[399]
The other members also knew that they had most to fear from the very
electors who would be enfranchised under a slight freehold
restriction,[400] for the paper money party was everywhere bottomed on
the small farming class. As Gorham remarked, the elections at
Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, “where the merchants and mechanics
vote, are at least as good as those made by freeholders only.”[401] The
fact emerges, therefore, that the personalty interests reflected in the
Convention could, in truth, see no safeguard at all in a freehold
qualification against the assaults on vested personalty rights which had
been made by the agrarians in every state. And it was obviously
impossible to establish a personalty test, had they so desired, for
there would have been no chance of securing a ratification of the
Constitution at the hands of legislatures chosen by freeholders, or at
the hands of conventions selected by them.
A very neat example of this antagonism between realty and personalty in
the Convention came out on July 26, when Mason made, and Charles
Pinckney supported, a motion imposing landed qualifications on members
of Congress and excluding from that body “persons having unsettled
accounts with or being indebted to the United States.” In bringing up
this motion Mason “observed that persons of the latter descriptions had
frequently got into the state legislatures in order to promote laws that
might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into
Congress if report was to be regarded.”[402]
Gouverneur Morris was on his feet in an instant. If qualifications were
to be imposed, they should be laid on electors, not elected persons. The
disqualification would fall upon creditors of the United States, for
there were but few who owed the government anything. He knew that under
this rule very few members of the Convention could get into the new
government which they were establishing. “As to persons having unsettled
accounts, he believed them to be pretty many. He thought, however, that
such a discrimination would be both odious and useless and in many
instances unjust and cruel. The delay of settlement had been more the
fault of the public than of individuals. What will be done with those
patriotic Citizens who have lent money or services or property to their
country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their
claims? Are they to be excluded?” On thinking it over, Morris added to
his remarks on the subject, saying, “It was a precept of great antiquity
as well as of high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch.
He thought we ought to be equally on our guard against being wise
overmuch.... The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Colonel Mason
had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed
against the monied interest.”[403]
Gerry thought that the inconvenience of excluding some worthy creditors
and debtors was of less importance than the advantages offered by the
resolution, but, after some reflection, he added that “if property be
one object of government, provisions for securing it cannot be
improper.” King sagely remarked that there might be a great danger in
imposing a landed qualification, because “it would exclude the monied
interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the
public safety.”
Madison had no confidence in the effectiveness of the landed
qualification and moved to strike it out, adding, “Landed possessions
were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great
extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust laws of
the states had proceeded more from this class of men than any others. It
had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit
got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection
against their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land
should be made the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it
would exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens
who were not landholders.” For these and other reasons he opposed the
landed qualifications and suggested that property qualifications on the
voters would be better.[404]
The motion to strike out the “landed” qualification for legislators was
carried by a vote of ten to one; the proposition to strike out the
disqualification of persons having unsettled accounts with the United
States was carried by a vote of nine to two. Finally the proposition to
exclude persons who were indebted to the United States was likewise
defeated by a vote of nine to two, after Pinckney had called attention
to the fact that “it would exclude persons who had purchased confiscated
property or should purchase Western territory of the public and might be
some obstacle to the sale of the latter.”
Indeed, there was little risk to personalty in thus allowing the
Constitution to go to the states for approval without any property
qualifications on voters other than those which the state might see fit
to impose. Only one branch of new government, the House of
Representatives, was required to be elected by popular vote; and, in
case popular choice of presidential electors might be established, a
safeguard was secured by the indirect process. Two controlling bodies,
the Senate and Supreme Court, were removed altogether from the
possibility of popular election except by constitutional amendment.
Finally, the conservative members of the Convention were doubly
fortified in the fact that nearly all of the state constitutions then in
force provided real or personal property qualifications for voters
anyway, and radical democratic changes did not seem perilously
near.[405]
II. THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
1. The powers for positive action conferred upon the new government were
few, but they were adequate to the purposes of the framers. They
included, first, the power to lay and collect taxes; but here the rural
interests were conciliated by the provision that direct taxes must be
apportioned among the states according to population, counting
three-fifths of the slaves. This, in the opinion of contemporaries
eminently qualified to speak, was designed to prevent the populations of
the manufacturing states from shifting the burdens of taxation to the
sparsely settled agricultural regions.[406]
In a letter to the governor of their state, three delegates from North
Carolina, Blount, Spaight, and Williamson, explained the advantage of
this safeguard on taxation to the southern planters and farmers: “We had
many things to hope from a National Government and the chief thing we
had to fear from such a Government was the risque of unequal or heavy
Taxation, but we hope you will believe as we do that the Southern states
in general and North Carolina in particular are well secured on that
head by the proposed system. It is provided in the 9th section of
article the first that no Capitation or direct Tax shall be laid except
in proportion to the number of inhabitants, in which number five blacks
are only counted as three. If a land tax is laid, we are to pay the same
rate; for example, fifty citizens of North Carolina can be taxed no more
for all their Lands than fifty Citizens in one of the Eastern States.
This must be greatly in our favour, for as most of their farms are small
and many of them live in Towns we certainly have, one with another, land
of twice the value that they possess. When it is also considered that
five Negroes are only to be charged the same Poll Tax as three whites,
the advantage must be considerably increased under the proposed Form of
Government. The Southern states have also a better security for the
return of slaves who might endeavour to escape than they had under the
original Confederation.”[407]
The taxing power was the basis of all other positive powers, and it
afforded the revenues that were to discharge the public debt in full.
Provision was made for this discharge in Article VI to the effect that
“All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption
of this Constitution shall be valid against the United States under this
Constitution as under the Confederation.”
But the cautious student of public economy, remembering the difficulties
which Congress encountered under the Articles of Confederation in its
attempts to raise the money to meet the interest on the debt, may ask
how the framers of the Constitution could expect to overcome the hostile
economic forces which had hitherto blocked the payment of the
requisitions. The answer is short. Under the Articles, Congress had no
power to lay and collect taxes immediately; it could only make
requisitions on the state legislatures. Inasmuch as most of the states
relied largely on direct taxes for their revenues, the demands of
Congress were keenly felt and stoutly resisted. Under the new system,
however, Congress is authorized to lay taxes on its own account, but it
is evident that the framers contemplated placing practically all of the
national burden on the consumer. The provision requiring the
apportionment of direct taxes on a basis of population obviously implied
that such taxes were to be viewed as a last resort when indirect taxes
failed to provide the required revenue.
With his usual acumen, Hamilton conciliates the freeholders and property
owners in general by pointing out that they will not be called upon to
support the national government by payments proportioned to their
wealth.[408] Experience has demonstrated that it is impracticable to
raise any considerable sums by direct taxation. Even where the
government is strong, as in Great Britain, resort must be had chiefly to
indirect taxation. The pockets of the farmers “will reluctantly yield
but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their
houses and lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible
a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible
agency of taxes on consumption.” Real and personal property are thus
assured a generous immunity from such burdens as Congress had attempted
to impose under the Articles; taxes under the new system will,
therefore, be less troublesome than under the old.
2. Congress was given, in the second place, plenary power to raise and
support military and naval forces, for the defence of the country
against foreign and domestic foes. These forces were to be at the
disposal of the President in the execution of national laws; and to
guard the states against renewed attempts of “desperate debtors” like
Shays, the United States guaranteed to every commonwealth a republican
form of government and promised to aid in quelling internal disorder on
call of the proper authorities.
The army and navy are considered by the authors of _The Federalist_ as
genuine economic instrumentalities. As will be pointed out below, they
regarded trade and commerce as the fundamental cause of wars between
nations; and the source of domestic insurrection they traced to class
conflicts within society. “Nations in general,” says Jay, “will make war
whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it”;[409] and it is
obvious that the United States dissevered and discordant will be the
easy prey to the commercial ambitions of their neighbors and rivals.
The material gains to be made by other nations at the expense of the
United States are so apparent that the former cannot restrain themselves
from aggression. France and Great Britain feel the pressure of our
rivalry in the fisheries; they and other European nations are our
competitors in navigation and the carrying trade; our independent
voyages to China interfere with the monopolies enjoyed by other
countries there; Spain would like to shut the Mississippi against us on
one side and Great Britain fain would close the St. Lawrence on the
other. The cheapness and excellence of our productions will excite their
jealousy, and the enterprise and address of our merchants will not be
consistent with the wishes or policy of the sovereigns of Europe. But,
adds the commentator, by way of clinching the argument, “if they see
that our national government is efficient and well administered, our
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit
re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be
much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our
resentment.”[410]
All the powers of Europe could not prevail against us. “Under a vigorous
national government the natural strength and resources of the country,
directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of
European jealousy to restrain our growth.... An active commerce, an
extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the
offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts
of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and
unchangeable course of nature.”[411] In the present state of disunion
the profits of trade are snatched from us; our commerce languishes; and
poverty threatens to overspread a country which might outrival the world
in riches.
The army and navy are to be not only instruments of defence in
protecting the United States against the commercial and territorial
ambitions of other countries; but they may be used also in forcing open
foreign markets. What discriminatory tariffs and navigation laws may not
accomplish the sword may achieve. The authors of _The Federalist_ do not
contemplate that policy of mild and innocuous isolation which was later
made famous by Washington’s farewell address.[412] On the contrary—they
do not expect the United States to change human nature and make our
commercial classes less ambitious than those of other countries to
extend their spheres of trade. A strong navy will command the respect of
European states. “There can be no doubt that the continuance of the
Union under an efficient government would put it within our power, at a
period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie
with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of
respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending
parties.... A few ships of the line sent opportunely to the
reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the
fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the
usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military
operations in the West Indies, it will be readily perceived that a
situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage
for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our
friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union,
we may hope, ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and
to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part
of the world as our interest may dictate.”[413]
As to dangers from class wars within particular states, the authors of
_The Federalist_ did not deem it necessary to make extended remarks: the
recent events in New England were only too vividly impressed upon the
public mind. “The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has
scarcely emerged,” says Hamilton, “evinces that dangers of this kind are
not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue
of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Cæsar
or by a Cromwell.”[414] The strong arm of the Union must be available in
such crises.
In considering the importance of defence against domestic insurrection,
the authors of _The Federalist_ do not overlook an appeal to the
slave-holders’ instinctive fear of a servile revolt. Naturally, it is
Madison whose interest catches this point and drives it home, by
appearing to discount it. In dealing with the dangers of insurrection,
he says: “I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding
in some of the states who, during the calm of regular government are
sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil
violence, may emerge into human character and give a superiority of
strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.”[415]
3. In addition to the power to lay and collect taxes and raise and
maintain armed forces on land and sea, the Constitution vests in
Congress plenary control over foreign and interstate commerce, and thus
authorizes it to institute protective and discriminatory laws in favor
of American interests,[416] and to create a wide sweep for free trade
throughout the whole American empire. A single clause thus reflects the
strong impulse of economic forces in the towns and young manufacturing
centres. In a few simple words the mercantile and manufacturing
interests wrote their _Zweck im Recht_; and they paid for their victory
by large concessions to the slave-owning planters of the south.[417]
While dealing with commerce in _The Federalist_[418] Hamilton does not
neglect the subject of interstate traffic and intercourse. He shows how
free trade over a wide range will be to reciprocal advantage, will give
great diversity to commercial enterprise, and will render stagnation
less liable by offering more distant markets when local demands fall
off. “The speculative trader,” he concludes, “will at once perceive the
force of these observations and will acknowledge that the aggregate
balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much
more favorable than that of the thirteen states without union or with
partial unions.”
4. Another great economic antagonism found its expression in the clause
conferring upon Congress the power to dispose of the territories and
make rules and regulations for their government and admission to the
Union. In this contest, the interests of the states which held
territories came prominently to the front; and the ambiguity of the
language used in the Constitution on this point may be attributed to the
inability of the contestants to reach precise conclusions.[419] The
leaders were willing to risk the proper management of the land problem
after the new government was safely launched; and they were correct in
their estimate of their future political prowess.
These are the great powers conferred on the new government: taxation,
war, commercial control, and disposition of western lands. Through them
public creditors may be paid in full, domestic peace maintained,
advantages obtained in dealing with foreign nations, manufactures
protected, and the development of the territories go forward with full
swing. The remaining powers are minor and need not be examined here.
What implied powers lay in the minds of the framers likewise need not be
inquired into; they have long been the subject of juridical speculation.
None of the powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress permits a
direct attack on property. The federal government is given no general
authority to define property. It may tax, but indirect taxes must be
uniform, and these are to fall upon consumers. Direct taxes may be laid,
but resort to this form of taxation is rendered practically impossible,
save on extraordinary occasions, by the provision that they must be
apportioned according to population—so that numbers cannot transfer the
burden to accumulated wealth. The slave trade may be destroyed, it is
true, after the lapse of a few years; but slavery as a domestic
institution is better safeguarded than before.
Even the destruction of the slave trade had an economic basis, although
much was said at the time about the ethics of the clause. In the North
where slavery, though widespread, was of little economic consequence,
sympathy with the unfortunate negroes could readily prevail. Maryland
and Virginia, already overstocked with slaves beyond the limits of land
and capital, had prohibited the foreign trade in negroes, because the
slave-holders, who predominated in the legislatures, were not willing to
see the value of their chattels reduced to a vanishing point by
excessive importations. South Carolina and Georgia, where the death rate
in the rice swamps and the opening of adjoining territories made a
strong demand for the increase of slave property, on the other hand,
demanded an open door for slave-dealers.
South Carolina was particularly determined,[420] and gave northern
representatives to understand that if they wished to secure their
commercial privileges, they must make concessions to the slave trade.
And they were met half way. Ellsworth said: “As slaves multiply so fast
in Virginia and Maryland that it is cheaper to raise than import them,
whilst in the sickly rice swamps foreign supplies are necessary, if we
go no farther than is urged, we shall be unjust towards South Carolina
and Georgia. Let us not intermeddle. As population increases; poor
laborers will be so plenty as to render slaves useless.”[421]
General Pinckney taunted the Virginia representatives in the Convention,
some of whom were against slavery as well as importation, with
disingenuous interestedness. “South Carolina and Georgia cannot do
without slaves. As to Virginia she will gain by stopping the
importations. Her slaves will rise in value and she has more than she
wants. It would be unequal to require South Carolina and Georgia to
confederate on such unequal terms.”
III. RESTRICTIONS LAID UPON STATE LEGISLATURES
Equally important to personalty as the positive powers conferred upon
Congress to tax, support armies, and regulate commerce were the
restrictions imposed on the states.[422] Indeed, we have the high
authority of Madison for the statement that of the forces which created
the Constitution, those property interests seeking protection against
omnipotent legislatures were the most active.
In a letter to Jefferson, written in October, 1787, Madison elaborates
the principle of federal judicial control over state legislation, and
explains the importance of this new institution in connection with the
restrictions laid down in the Constitution on laws affecting private
rights. “The mutability of the laws of the States,” he says, “is found
to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so
flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am
persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these
sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the
Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than
those which accrued to our national character and interest from the
inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform,
therefore, which does not make provision for private rights must be
materially defective.”[423]
Two small clauses embody the chief demands of personalty against
agrarianism: the emission of paper money is prohibited and the states
are forbidden to impair the obligation of contract. The first of these
means a return to a specie basis—when coupled with the requirement that
the gold and silver coin of the United States shall be the legal tender.
The Shays and their paper money legions, who assaulted the vested rights
of personalty by the process of legislative depreciation, are now
subdued forever, and money lenders and security holders may be sure of
their operations. Contracts are to be safe, and whoever engages in a
financial operation, public or private, may know that state legislatures
cannot destroy overnight the rules by which the game is played.
A principle of deep significance is written in these two brief
sentences. The economic history of the states between the Revolution and
the adoption of the Constitution is compressed in them. They appealed to
every money lender, to every holder of public paper, to every man who
had any personalty at stake. The intensity of the economic interests
reflected in these two prohibitions can only be felt by one who has
spent months in the study of American agrarianism after the Revolution.
In them personalty won a significant battle in the conflict of
1787–1788.
The authors of _The Federalist_ advance in support of these two clauses
very substantial arguments which bear out the view here expressed. “The
loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilential
effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man,
on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and
morals of the people, and on the character of republican government,
constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this
unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an
accumulation of guilt which can be expiated no otherwise than by a
voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice of the power which has been
the instrument of it.” Speaking on the contract clause—that “additional
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights”—Madison is
sure that the “sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating
policy which has directed the public councils,” and will welcome a
reform that will “inspire a general prudence and industry and give a
regular course to the business of society.”[424]
Hamilton on several occasions laid great stress on the contract clause
as one of the features of the Constitution which had warmly commended it
to its supporters. In a communication to Washington, dated May 29, 1790,
he wrote: “This, to the more enlightened part of the community, was not
one of the least recommendations of that Constitution. The too frequent
intermeddlings of the state legislatures in relation to private
contracts were extensively felt and seriously lamented; and a
Constitution which promised a preventative was, by those who felt and
thought in that manner, eagerly embraced.”[425]
There was not a little discussion of the obligation of contract clause
in the contemporary press during the period of ratification, and there
can be no doubt that it was favorably viewed by the supporters of the
Constitution as an added safeguard against paper money and stay laws. A
writer in the New Hampshire Spy, on November 3, 1787, in commending the
new frame of government to his fellow citizens, calls particular
attention to this provision: “It also expressly prohibits those
destructive laws in the several states which alter or impair the
obligation of contracts; so that in future anyone may be certain of an
exact fulfilment of any contract that may be entered into or the penalty
that may be stipulated for in case of failure.”
Another writer of the period approves the same principle with more
vigor. “My countrymen, the devil is among you. Make paper as much as you
please. Make it a tender in all _future_ contracts, or let it rest on
its own credit—but remember that _past_ contracts are sacred things—and
that legislatures have no right to interfere with them—they have no
right to say, a debt shall be paid at a discount, or in any manner which
the parties never intended.... To pay _bona fide_ contracts for cash, in
paper of little value, or in old horses, would be a dishonest attempt in
an individual: but for legislatures to frame laws to support and
encourage such detestable villainy, is like a judge who should inscribe
the arms of a rogue over the seat of justice.”[426]
The full import of the obligation of contract clause was doubtless
better understood by Chief Justice Marshall than by any man of that
generation. He had taken an active part in the adoption of the
Constitution in his state, and he had studied long and arduously the
history of the period for his classic defence of Federalism, _The Life
of Washington_. In more than one decision he applied the clause with
great effect, and voiced the views of his Federalist contemporaries on
this point, explaining the deep-seated social antagonism which is
reflected in it.[427] And when at length, in his declining years, he saw
it attacked in the legislatures by Jacksonian democracy, and beheld the
Supreme Court itself surrendering the position which he had earlier
taken, he spread on record in a dissenting opinion a warning and a
protest which for cogency and vigor equals any of his great
dissertations delivered in the name of the Court.
In the case of Ogden _v._ Saunders, decided in the January term of 1827,
the Supreme Court was compelled to pass upon the issue: “Does a bankrupt
law which applies to contracts made _after_ its passage impair the
obligation of those contracts?” The newer school on the bench,
Washington, Johnson, Trimble, and Thompson were of opinion that such a
law did not impair the obligation of contract and was valid. Marshall,
Duvall, and Story dissented. The Chief Justice took the high ground that
the obligation of a contract inhered in the contract itself, and could
not be changed by any external legislation whatever. Therefore,
obviously, legislation affecting adversely the obligation of future
contracts was just as unconstitutional as legislation attacking
contracts already made. In other words, Marshall, who ought to have
known what the framers of the Constitution intended better than any man
on the supreme bench, believed that it was designed to bring under the
ban substantially all legislation which affected personalty adversely—in
other words that it was similar in character to the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking on the contract clause he said with great solemnity: “We cannot
look back to the history of the times when the august spectacle was
exhibited of the assemblage of the whole people by their representatives
in convention, in order to unite thirteen independent sovereignties
under one government, so far as might be necessary for the purposes of
union, without being sensible of the great importance attached to the
tenth section of the first article. The power of changing the relative
situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power
which comes home to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls
the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes to be
proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess
by the state legislatures as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse
of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The mischief
had become so great, so alarming as not only to impair commercial
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals
of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard
against the continuance of the evil was an object of deep interest with
all the truly wise, as well as virtuous, of this great community, and
was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of the
government.”[428]
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The authors of _The Federalist_ carry over into the field of
international politics the concept of economic antagonisms which lie at
the basis of their system of domestic politics. Modern wars spring
primarily out of commercial rivalry, although the ambitions of princes
have often been a source of international conflict. “Has commerce
hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war?” asks
Hamilton. “Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a
passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of
territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one
and for the other?”[429] Let history answer. Carthage, a commercial
republic, was an aggressor in a war that ended in her destruction. The
furious contests of Holland and England were over the dominion of the
sea. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of England, and
she has been constantly engaged in wars. Even the Hapsburg-Bourbon wars
have in a large measure grown out of commercial considerations.
In this world-wide and age-long conflict of nations for commercial
advantages, the United States cannot expect to become a non-resistant,
an idle spectator. Even were pacific ideals to dominate American policy,
she could not overcome the scruples of her ambitious rivals. In union,
therefore, is strength against aggression and in support of offensive
operations. Moreover, the Union will be better able to settle disputes
amicably because of the greater show of power which it can make.
“Acknowledgements, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as
satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as
unsatisfactory if offered by a state or a confederacy of little
consideration or power.”[430]
Turning from the material causes of foreign wars the authors of _The
Federalist_ examine the possible sources of danger from domestic discord
among the states, regarded as independent sovereignties. And how may
such domestic discord arise? The North will probably grow strong and
formidable and be tempted to despoil the South: nor “does it appear to
be a rash conjecture,” says Jay, “that its young swarms might often be
tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of
their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.”[431]
Then the apple of discord may be thrown among the states by foreign
countries if several confederacies take the place of union. And what is
this apple of discord? Each of the proposed confederacies, says Jay,
“would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct
treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and
proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially
different.” Treaties are subject to the law of greatest economic
pressure. “Different commercial concerns,” he continues, “must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.”[432] The
degrees of political attachment also follow the law of greatest economic
pressure; and if foreign nations come to blows among themselves, their
allies in America are likely to be drawn into the conflict. Thus
domestic discord may arise among the states indirectly through their
material connections with other countries.
But internecine warfare will more probably arise from causes operating
within the states; and what may be the real sources of such conflict?
asks Hamilton.[433] They are numerous: lust for power and dominion, the
desire for equality and safety, the ambitions of leaders. Has it not
invariably been found, he adds, “that momentary passions, and immediate
interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct
than general and remote considerations of policy, utility, or
justice?... Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the
objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as
many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the
prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity
of territory or dominion?”
Of course such acute observers as the authors of _The Federalist_ do not
omit to remark that the personal ambitions of monarchs have been a cause
of wars, and the passions of men for leadership have been a source of
domestic insurrections. But they are quick to add that the
aggrandizement and support of their particular families are among the
motives that have led monarchs to undertake wars of conquest;[434] and
as to personal element in domestic insurrections, Hamilton expresses a
doubt whether Massachusetts would recently have been plunged into civil
war “if Shays had not been a _desperate debtor_.”[435]
Turning from the question as to the extent of the economic motive in the
personal element, Hamilton makes an inquiry into the more probable
sources of wars among the states in case a firmer union, endowed with
adequate powers, is not established. These he enumerates:[436]
1. “Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most
fertile sources of hostility among nations.” The several states have an
interest in the Western Territories, and “to reason from the past to the
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend that the sword would
sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences.”
2. “The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention.” Each state will pursue a policy conducive to its own
advantage, and “the spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the
commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself
unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would
pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular
states might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own
citizens.” The economic motive will thus probably override all
considerations of interstate comity and all considerations of
international law. But that is not all; says Hamilton, in italics, “_We
should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in
reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a
distinct interest._” Commerce will have little respect for the right of
other peoples to protect their interests, and it will stigmatize as an
“injury” anything which blocks its enterprise.
3. “The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate states or confederacies.” Some states would oppose
paying the debt. Why? Because they are “less impressed with the
importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if
any, immediate interest in the question.” But other states, “a numerous
body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond the proportion
of the state in the total amount of the national debt, would be
strenuous for some equitable and effective provision.” In other words,
citizens who had nothing at stake would be indifferent, and those who
had something to lose would clamor. Foreign powers also might intervene,
and the “double contingency of external invasion and internal
contention” would be hazarded.
4. “Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to
aggressions on the rights of those states whose citizens are injured by
them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility.” Had
there not been plenty of evidence to show that state legislatures, if
unrestrained by some higher authority, would attack private rights in
property? And had there not been a spirit of retaliation also? “We
reasonably infer that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a
war, not of _parchment_, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice.”
These, then, are the four leading sources of probable conflict among the
states if not united into a firm union: territory, commerce, the
national debt, and violations of contractual rights in property—all as
severely economic as could well be imagined.
To carry the theory of the economic interpretation of the Constitution
out into its ultimate details would require a monumental commentary,
such as lies completely beyond the scope of this volume. But enough has
been said to show that the concept of the Constitution as a piece of
abstract legislation reflecting no group interests and recognizing no
economic antagonisms is entirely false. It was an economic document
drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately
at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to identical
interests in the country at large.
CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION
Having examined the economic implications of the Constitution in the
light of the greatest of all commentaries, _The Federalist_, it is now
interesting to inquire whether the members of the Convention at large
entertained substantially identical views as to the political science of
the system. There are several difficulties in the way of such an
investigation. Not all of the delegates, indeed not all of the most
influential, were speech makers or writers or philosophers. As intensely
practical men they were concerned with tangible results, not with the
manner in which political scientists might view the details of their
operations. There is, accordingly, a considerable danger of attempting
too much in making generalizations, and to obviate this as far as
possible, the method of taking the members in alphabetical order is
adopted, and the evidence of the views entertained by each is fully
documented.[437]
The leaders in politics and political philosophy in the eighteenth
century were not far removed from that frank recognition of class rights
which characterized English society, and they were not under the
necessity of obscuring—at least to the same extent as modern partisan
writers—the essential economic antagonisms featuring in law and
constitution making. Their clarity of thought was greatly facilitated by
the disfranchisement of the propertyless, which made it unnecessary for
political writers to address themselves to the proletariat and to
explain dominant group interests in such a manner as to make them appear
in the garb of “public policy.”
There does not appear, of course, in the writings of American political
scientists in the eighteenth century, that sharp recognition of class
rights which characterizes the feudal legists, because within the
propertied interests politically represented in the government, there
were divisions which had to be glossed over; and there were also
mutterings of unrest on the part of the disfranchised which later broke
out in the storm that swept away the property qualifications on voters
and introduced political equalitarianism. Under these circumstances the
supporters of the Constitution had to be somewhat circumspect in the
expression of their views; but, happily for science, the proceedings at
Philadelphia during the drafting of the Constitution were secret, and
they were able to discuss with utmost frankness the actual
politico-economic results which they desired to reach. Fortunately,
also, fragmentary reports of these proceedings have come down to us, and
have been put in a definitive form by Professor Farrand.
_Abraham Baldwin_, of Georgia, did not indulge in any lengthy
disquisitions on government in the Convention, and his literary remains
are apparently very meagre. However, his view that the Senate of the
United States ought to represent property came out in the debate on June
29, over a motion by Ellsworth to the effect that the “rule of suffrage
in the second branch be the same as that established by the Articles of
Confederation.” Baldwin immediately opposed the proposition, saying, “He
thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property,
and that in forming it therefore some reference ought to be had to the
relative wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which
the senate of Massachusetts was constituted.”[438] At the time the
senate of that commonwealth rested upon special freehold and personalty
qualifications,[439] and the members were apportioned among the several
districts on the basis of the amount of taxes paid by each. It is thus
apparent that Baldwin wished the Senate of the new government to be
based frankly upon property.
_Gunning Bedford_, of Delaware, did not participate extensively in the
debates of the Convention, but it seems from the character of the few
remarks that he made that he favored a more democratic form than was
finally adopted, although he signed the Constitution. This inference is
drawn from a brief notice of his objection to the establishment of a
council of revision composed of the executive and a certain number of
the judiciary to exercise a sort of censorship over the acts of
Congress. Madison records as follows: “Mr. Bedford was opposed to every
check on the Legislative, even the Council of Revision first proposed.
He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the
boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the
requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The
Representatives of the People were the best judges of what was for their
interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever. The two
branches would produce a sufficient controul within the Legislature
itself.”[440]
_Jacob Broom_ was among those who wished to “lessen the dependence of
the general government on the people,” to use Jefferson’s phrase, by
lengthening the terms of public officers. He seconded Read’s motion to
increase the term of Senators to nine years;[441] he opposed the
election of the executive by popular vote, and supported Luther Martin’s
resolution in favor of election by electors appointed by the
legislatures of the several states;[442] he wished to give life tenure
to the executive, that is, during good behavior,[443] and he favored the
suggestion that Congress should be given a negative over state
legislatures.[444] Broom seldom spoke in the Convention, but there is no
doubt that he believed in a restricted and well “balanced” democracy.
_Pierce Butler_, of South Carolina, on more than one occasion urged
the desirability of making property at least one of the elements in
the distribution of representation. On June 6, when Charles Pinckney
moved that the lower house of the national legislature should be
chosen by the state legislatures and not by the people, Butler said:
“I am against determining the mode of election until the ratio of
representation is fixed—if that proceeds on a principle favorable to
wealth as well as numbers of free inhabitants, I am content to unite
with Delaware (Mr. Read) in abolishing the state legislatures and
becoming one nation instead of a confederation of republics.”[445] In
connection with a discussion of the Senate, “he urged that the second
branch ought to represent the states according to their
property.”[446] Later in the sessions of the Convention he again
“warmly urged the justice and necessity of regarding wealth in the
apportionment of representation.”[447] He was also particularly
solicitous about slave property, and he declared that “the security
which the southern states want is that their negroes may not be taken
from them.”[448]
_Daniel Carroll_ favored the popular election of the executive, but he
advocated a three-fourths vote in Congress to overcome the executive
veto. Speaking on this point, “He remarked that as a majority was now to
be the quorum, seventeen in the larger and eight in the smaller house
might carry points. The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to
call for greater impediments to improper laws.”[449] Carroll did not
indulge in any philosophic reflections in the Convention so that his
“political science,” if he had worked out any definite system, is not
apparent in the records.
_George Clymer_ entertained the notions of government which were
common to the Federalists of his time. He held that “a representative
of the people is appointed to think _for_ and not _with_ his
constituents”;[450] and invariably, during the course of his career,
he “showed a total disregard to the opinions of his constituents when
opposed to the matured decisions of his own mind.” It was on these
principles that he “warmly opposed the proposition introducing a
clause in the Constitution which conferred upon the people the
unalienable right of instructing their representatives.”[451]
_W. R. Davie_, although he is reputed to have been an accomplished
orator and profound student, does not figure extensively in Madison’s
meagre records. At no point does he expound any philosophy of
government. His views were always practical. On the proposition to count
slaves in apportioning representation, he threw down the gauntlet to the
Convention, and declared that if the rate was not at least three-fifths,
North Carolina would not federate.[452] As to the basis of government
Davie “seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be represented
in the second branch; and numbers in the first branch.”[453]
Davie fully understood the significance of the obligation of contract
clause which was designed as a check on the propensities of popular
legislatures to assault private rights in property, particularly
personalty. Speaking in the convention of North Carolina on this clause,
he said: “That section is the best in the Constitution. It is founded on
the strongest principles of justice. It is a section, in short, which I
thought would have endeared the Constitution to this country.”[454]
Davie undoubtedly understood and approved the doctrines of balanced
classes in the government, as expounded in Adams’ _Defence of American
Constitutions_.[455]
At no time does Davie appear to have courted popular favor in his native
state, for a writer speaking of his candidacy for the legislature in
1798 says: “The ‘true Whigs,’ as they styled themselves, dined together
under the oaks and toasted Mr. Jefferson. The other party, who were
called ‘aristocrats,’ ate and drank in the house on entirely different
principles. General Davie dined in the house with the ‘aristocrats.’ The
‘true Whigs’ took offence at this and resolved to oppose his selection,
and it was only with much address that they were kept quiet.... If any
person had had the impudence to dispute the election, General Davie
would certainly not have been returned. The rabble, which in all places
is the majority, would have voted against him.”[456]
_John Dickinson_, of Delaware, frankly joined that minority which was
outspoken in its belief in a monarchy—an action that comported with his
refusal to sign the Declaration of Independence and his reluctance to
embark upon the stormy sea of Revolution. At the very opening of the
Convention, on June 2, he expressed his preference for a regal
government, although he admitted that the existing state of affairs
would not permit its establishment in America. Madison records him as
saying: “A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments
in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable
from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet
been derived from any of the republican form. A limited monarchy,
however, was out of the question.”[457]
Dickinson was also among the members of the Convention who wished to
establish a property qualification for voters because he thought no
other foundation for government would be secure. In the debate on this
subject on August 7, according to Madison’s notes: “Mr. Dickinson had a
very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in
the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians
of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary
defence agst. the dangerous influence of those multitudes without
property & without principle, with which our Country like all others,
will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in
his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at
this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.”[458]
According to King’s notes: “Dickinson—It is said yr. restraining by ye
Constitution the rights of Election to Freeholders, is a step towards
aristocracy—is this true, No.—we are safe by trusting the owners of the
soil—the Owners of the Country—it will not be unpopular—because the
Freeholders are the most numerous at this Time—The Danger to Free
Governments has not been from Freeholders, but those who are not
Freeholders—there is no Danger—because our Laws favor the Division of
property—The Freehold will be parcelled among all the worthy men in the
State—The Merchants & Mechanicks are safe—They may become Freeholders
besides they are represented in ye State Legislatures, which elect the
Senate of the U.S.”[459]
No member of the Convention distrusted anything savoring of “levelling
democracy” more than _Oliver Ellsworth_. Later as Chief Justice he
denounced from the bench Jefferson and the French party as “the apostles
of anarchy, bloodshed, and atheism.”[460] In the Convention, he opposed
the popular election of the President[461] and favored associating the
judges with the executive in the exercise of a veto power over acts of
Congress.[462] He believed in the restriction of the suffrage to those
who paid taxes.[463] He was a warm advocate of judicial control, in
general, and thoroughly understood the political significance of the
system.[464]
_Thomas Fitzsimons_, the wealthy merchant and stockbroker from
Pennsylvania, was, after his kind, not a loquacious man, but rather a
man of action—a practical man; and the records of the Convention contain
no lengthy speech by him. When Gouverneur Morris, on August 7, proposed
to restrain the right to vote to freeholders, Fitzsimons seconded the
motion, apparently without saying anything on the point.[465] While he
thus sympathized with the movement to set the Constitution frankly on a
property basis, Fitzsimons was naturally more interested in such matters
as protection to manufactures and harbor improvements.[466]
_Benjamin Franklin_, who at the time of the Convention was so advanced
in years as to be of little real weight in the formation of the
Constitution, seems to have entertained a more hopeful view of democracy
than any other member of that famous group. He favored a single
chambered legislature,[467] opposed an absolute veto in the
executive,[468] and resisted the attempt to place property
qualifications on the suffrage.[469] He signed the Constitution when it
was finished, but he was accounted by his contemporaries among the
doubters, and was put forward by the opponents of ratification in
Pennsylvania as a candidate for the state convention, but was
defeated.[470]
_Elbridge Gerry_, of Massachusetts, participated extensively in the
debates of the Convention, but his general view of government was
doubtless stated in his speech on May 31, when he expressed himself as
not liking the election of members of the lower house by popular vote.
He said on this point: “The evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy. The people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended
patriots. In Massts. it has been fully confirmed by experience that they
are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the
false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot
can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for
those employed in the administration of Governnt. It would seem to be a
maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the
popular clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack
made on that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had, he said, been too republican heretofore: he
was still, however, republican, but had been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.”[471]
When the proposition that Senators should be elected by the state
legislatures was up for consideration, “Mr. Gerry insisted that the
commercial and monied interest wd. be more secure in hands of the State
Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more sense of
character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are
for paper money when the Legislatures are agst. it. In Massts. the
County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that wd.
sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the
Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There wd. therefore
be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice.”[472]
_Nicholas Gilman_ was by temper and interest a man of affairs, more
concerned with the stability of public securities and the development of
western land schemes than with political theorizing. From Madison’s
record he does not appear to have said anything in the Convention.
_Nathaniel Gorham_ was opposed to property qualifications on the
suffrage in the federal Constitution and the association of the
judiciary with the executive in the exercise of the veto power.[473]
Speaking on the latter point, however, he said, “All agree that a check
on the legislature is necessary. But there are two objections against
admitting the judges to share in it which no observations on the other
side seem to obviate. The 1st is that the judges ought to carry into the
exposition of the laws no prepossessions with regard to them; 2d that as
the judges will outnumber the executive, the revisionary check would be
thrown entirely out of the executive hands, and instead of enabling him
to defend himself would enable the judges to sacrifice him.”
_Alexander Hamilton_ had a profound admiration for the British
constitution. “The House of Lords,” he said in the Convention, “is a
noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change and a
sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the
national interest, they form a permanent barrier against every
pernicious innovation whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of
the Commons.”[474] Doubtless his maturely considered system of
government was summed up in the following words: “All communities divide
themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well
born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been
said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent
and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to
the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will
check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any
advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good
government. Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass
of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing
but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy.... It is
admitted that you cannot have a good executive upon a democratic
plan.”[475] In consonance with these principles Hamilton outlined his
scheme of government which included an assembly to consist of persons
elected for three years by popular vote, a senate chosen for life or
during good behavior by electors chosen by the voters, and a president
also elected for life or during good behavior by electors chosen by the
voters. The Convention failed to adopt his programme, and he entertained
a rather uncertain view of the Constitution as it was finally drafted,
doubting its stability and permanency.
_William Houstoun_, of Georgia, seems to have spoken only once or twice;
but he gave an indication of his political science in a remark which he
made to the effect that the Georgia constitution “was a very bad one,
and he hoped it would be revised and amended.”[476] The constitution to
which he alludes was the radical instrument made in 1777, which provided
for a legislature with a single chamber and an unusually wide extension
of the suffrage.[477]
_Jared Ingersoll_, in spite of his great abilities as a student and
lawyer, seems to have taken no part at all in the debates of the
Convention. Such at least is the view to which Madison’s records lead.
Something is known, however, of the political principles which he
entertained. Though he became intimately associated with President Reed
on his migration to Philadelphia in 1778, he never accepted the extreme
democratic principles embodied in the constitution of that state in
1776.[478] His biographer, after making an exception of Ingersoll’s
services in the Convention, says: “I am not aware that he held or sought
a position in any popular or representative body whatever. He was what
is called conservative in politics; that is to say, he was not by
constitutional temper a rebuilder or reconstructor of anything that had
been once reasonably well built; nor was his favorite order of political
architecture, the democratic. After the great subversion in 1801 he was
found as rarely as anybody in Pennsylvania on the side of the majority.
He was known to be inclined to the contrary, so far that with or without
his consent he was selected in that state, in the year 1812, as the
opposition or anti-Madisonian candidate for the office of Vice-President
of the United States.”[479]
_Rufus King_ correctly understood the idea of a balanced government
independent of “popular whims” and endowed with plenty of strength. He
favored a long term for the President, and speaking on the executive
department in the Convention he “expressed his apprehensions that an
extreme caution in favor of liberty might enervate the government we
were forming. He wished the house to recur to the primitive axiom that
the three great departments of governments should be separate and
independent: that the executive and the judiciary should be so, as well
as the legislative: that the executive should be equally so with the
judiciary.... He [the executive] ought not to be impeachable unless he
hold his office during good behavior, a tenure which would be most
agreeable to him; provided an independent and effectual forum could be
devised. But under no circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the
legislature. This would be destructive of his independence and of the
principles of the constitution. He relied on the vigor of the executive
as a great security for the public liberties.”[480] King also believed
in the principle of judicial control—that most effective check on the
popular attacks on property through legislatures.[481]
It was largely on King’s initiative that the prohibition against
interference with contracts was placed in the Constitution.[482]
_William Livingston_ took a middle ground between the “high-toned”
system of John Adams and the simple democracy of such writers as
“Centinel” of Pennsylvania.[483] _The Defence of the Constitutions_ he
impatiently characterized as “rubbage”; and a “Humiliating and
mortifying acknowledgement that man is incapable of governing himself.”
But for the opposite party that would set up a simple democratic
government through legislative majorities, Livingston had just as little
patience. “The security of the liberties of a people or state depends
wholly on a proper delegation of power. The several component powers of
government should be so distributed that no one man, or body of men,
should possess a larger share thereof than what is absolutely necessary
for the administration of government.... The people ever have been and
ever will be unfit to retain the exercise of power in their own hands;
they must of necessity delegate it somewhere.... But it has been found
from experience that a government by representation, consisting of a
single house of representatives, is in some degree liable to the same
inconveniences which attend a pure democracy; a few leading men
influence the majority to pass laws calculated not for the public good,
but to promote some sinister views of their own. To prevent this,
another representative branch is added: these two separate houses form
mutual checks upon each other; but this expedient has not been found to
be altogether effectual. If the legislative power, even tho’ vested in
two distinct houses is left without any controul, they will inevitably
encroach upon the executive and judicial.... But further, as prejudices
always prevail, more or less, in all popular governments, it is
necessary that a check be placed somewhere in the hands of a power not
immediately dependent upon the breath of the people, in order to stem
the torrent, and prevent the mischiefs which blind passions and
rancorous prejudices might otherwise occasion. The executive and
judicial powers should of course then be vested with this check or
controul on the legislature; and that they may be enabled fully to
effect this beneficial purpose, they should be rendered as independent
as possible.... Tho’ it is so short a time since our governments have
been put in motion, yet examples have not been wanting of the prevalence
of this dangerous thirst after more power in some of our legislatures; a
negative therefore lodged in the hands of the executive and judicial
powers, is absolutely necessary in order that they may be able to defend
themselves from the encroachments of the legislature.”[484] Livingston
thought that there were some grave defects in the Constitution as
drafted at Philadelphia and proposed some emendations. He believed that
the President should enjoy the appointing power without any control by
the Senate; he thought the Chief Justice should hold office during good
behavior and be empowered to appoint his colleagues; and he further held
that the President, the Chief Justice, and a Superintendent of Finance
should be organized into a council of revision to pass upon the acts of
Congress.
_James McClurg_, of Virginia, left the Convention during the early part
of August, and was silent on most of the questions before that body. On
July 17th, he proposed that the term of the executive should be changed
from seven years to “good behavior”;[485] and he was particularly
anxious to have the executive independent of the legislature. He said
that he “was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to be
unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to republican government as not
to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been and may be exercised under
that form. It was an essential object with him to make the executive
independent of the legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it,
after the vote destroying his ineligibility the second time, was to
appoint him during good behavior.”[486] That McClurg had small respect
for legislatures in general is shown by a letter which he wrote to
Madison from Virginia on August 7, 1787, in which he said: “The
necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly by a
negative, seems now to be admitted by the most zealous Republicans—they
only differ about the mode of constituting such a power. B. Randolph
seems to think that a magistrate annually elected by the people might
exercise such a controul as independently as the King of G. B. I hope
that our representative, Marshall, will be a powerful aid to Mason in
the next Assembly. He has observ’d the continual depravation of Mens
manners, under the corrupting influence of our Legislature; & is
convinc’d that nothing but the adoption of some efficient plan from the
Convention can prevent Anarchy first, & civil convulsions
afterwards.”[487]
_James McHenry_ belonged to the conservative party of his state and
opposed “radical alterations” in the constitution of that commonwealth
as it stood in November, 1791.[488]
Writing in February, 1787, on the property qualifications placed on
voters and representatives in Maryland, McHenry explained that
“These disabilities, exclusions, and qualifications have for their
object an upright legislature, endowed with faculties to judge of
the things most proper to promote the public good.” He was warmly
opposed to the doctrine that the people had a right to instruct
their representatives.[489] Democracy was, in his opinion,
synonymous with “confusion and licentiousness.”[490]
_James Madison_ was the systematic philosopher of the Convention and set
forth his views with such cogency and consistency on so many different
topics that no short quotations will suffice to state his doctrines. His
general scheme of political science was, however, embodied in the tenth
number of _The Federalist_ which has been discussed above and need not
be reconsidered here.[491]
_Alexander Martin_ was among the silent members of the Convention, for
Madison records only an occasional and incidental participation by him
in the proceedings.
_Luther Martin_ was the champion of the extreme states’ rights’ view,
and entertained rather democratic notions for his time, although, in
arguing against the clause prohibiting Congress to issue paper money, he
held that, “considering the administration of the government would be
principally in the hands of the wealthy,” there could be little danger
from an abuse of this power. Martin was in fact a champion of paper
money in his state, and he opposed that part of the Constitution which
prohibited the emission of bills of credit. As a representative of the
more radical section of his community, he was against the clauses
restricting the states to the use of the gold and silver coin of the
United States, and was opposed to the clause forbidding the impairment
of the obligation of contract. Speaking on the latter point he said:
“There might be times of such great public calamities and distress, and
of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should render it the duty of a
government for the preservation of even the most valuable part of its
citizens in some measure to interfere in their favor, by passing laws
totally or partially stopping the courts of justice, or authorizing the
debtor to pay by installments, or by delivering up his property to his
creditors at a reasonable and honest valuation. The times have been such
as to render regulations of this kind necessary in most or all of the
states, to prevent the wealthy creditor and the moneyed man from totally
destroying the poor, though even industrious debtor. Such times may
again arrive.... I apprehend, Sir, the principal cause of complaint
among the people at large, is the public and private debt with which
they are oppressed, and which in the present scarcity of cash threatens
them with destruction, unless they can obtain so much indulgence in
point of time that by industry and frugality they may extricate
themselves.”[492]
As might have been expected, a man entertaining such radical notions
about the power and duty of a government to interfere with the rights of
personalty in behalf of the debtor could not have accepted the
instrument framed at Philadelphia. In fact, Martin refused to sign the
Constitution; he wrote a vehement protest against it to the legislature
of his state; he worked assiduously against its ratification; and as a
member of the state convention, he voted against its approval by his
commonwealth—but in vain.
_George Mason_ thoroughly understood the doctrine of a balanced
government. Speaking in the Convention on the function of the upper
house, he said: “One important object in constituting the senate was to
secure the rights of property. To give them weight and firmness for this
purpose a considerable duration in office was thought necessary. But a
longer term than six years would be of no avail in this respect, if
needy persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety
of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this
would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale
for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.”[493] On
another occasion, he presented a motion requiring “certain
qualifications of landed property, in members of the legislature.”[494]
Although Mason refused to sign the Constitution, his reasons were based
on personal economic interests, not on any objections to its checks on
democratic legislatures.[495]
_J. F. Mercer_, of Maryland, who opposed the Constitution in its final
form and became the belligerent anti-federalist leader in that state,
does not appear to have been so warmly devoted to the “people’s cause,”
behind the closed doors of the Convention, for he took exceptions to the
proposition that the determination of the qualifications of voters
should be left to the several states. But his particular objection was
“to the mode of election by the people. The people cannot know and judge
of the characters of candidates. The worst possible choice will be
made.”[496]
_Thomas Mifflin_ took no part worthy of mention in the proceedings of
the Convention, and expounded no views of government during the debates.
_Gouverneur Morris_, of Pennsylvania, was the leader of those who wanted
to base the new system upon a freehold suffrage qualification; and, on
August 7, he made a motion to this effect. In the course of the
discussion which followed, Morris said: “He had long learned not to be
the dupe of words. The sound of Aristocracy, therefore, had no effect on
him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of
his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is
that it threatens this Country with an Aristocracy. The Aristocracy will
grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who
have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able
to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment.
The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics &
manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will
such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the
impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was as little duped by the
association of the words, ‘taxation & Representation’—The man who does
not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates
the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because
they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as
little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the
difficulty of defining ‘freeholders’ to be insuperable. Still less that
the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present
freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merchts.
&c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not
they don’t deserve it.”[497]
In all the proceedings of the Convention, Morris took a deep interest
and expressed his views freely, always showing his thorough distrust of
democratic institutions. As his biographer, Mr. Roosevelt puts it, “He
throughout appears as the _advocatus diaboli_; he puts the lowest
interpretation upon every act, and frankly avows his disbelief in all
generous and unselfish motives. His continual allusions to the
overpowering influence of the baser passions, and to their mastery of
the human race at all times, drew from Madison, although the two men
generally acted together, a protest against his ‘forever inculcating the
utter political depravity of men, and the necessity of opposing one vice
and interest as the only possible check to another vice and
interest.’”[498] This protest from Madison, however, betrays
inconsistency, for on more than one occasion in the Convention he
expounded principles substantially identical with those which he
reprobated in Morris.[499] Indeed, what appeared to be cynical
eccentricity on the part of the latter was nothing more than unusual
bluntness in setting forth Federalist doctrines.
_Robert Morris_, the merchant prince and speculator of Pennsylvania,
seems to have broken his rule of absolute silence only two or three
times in the Convention, and he apparently made no speech at all. He
nominated Washington as president of the assembly, and seconded Read’s
motion that Senators should hold office during good behavior.[500] There
is no doubt that Morris appreciated the relative weight of speeches and
private negotiations.[501]
In the proceedings of the Convention, _William Paterson_ was chiefly
concerned with protecting the rights of small states; but he signed the
Constitution, and after its adoption became an ardent Federalist,
serving as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. On the bench he
was one of the most scholarly and eminent supporters of the doctrine of
judicial control over legislation.[502]
_William Pierce_ took little part in the proceedings of the Convention.
On the question of states’ rights he held a broad view, saying, “state
distinctions must be sacrificed so far as the general government shall
render it necessary—without, however, destroying them altogether.
Although I am here as a representative from a small state, I consider
myself as a citizen of the United States, whose general interest I will
always support.”[503] On no occasion, apparently, did Pierce indulge in
any general reflections on the basis of all government. He did not sign
the Constitution, but he explained this fact by saying, “I was absent in
New York on a piece of business so necessary that it became unavoidable.
I approve of its principles and would have signed it with all my heart
had I been present. To say, however, that I consider it as perfect would
be to make an acknowledgement immediately opposed to my judgment.”[504]
_Charles Pinckney_ was among the members of the Convention who thought
that it was desirable to fix the property qualifications of members of
the national legislature firmly in the Constitution. Speaking on the
subject of property and government he said: “The Committee as he had
conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of
property for the members of the Natl. Legislature; instead of which they
have referred the task to the Natl. Legislature itself. Should it be
left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any
particular qualifications of property; and if it should happen to
consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too
favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run
into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic
influence in the Constitution, but he thought it essential that the
members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges—should be
possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable.
It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the
tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful
administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put
into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence
on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen &
Citizen but also where foreigners were concerned. They will even be the
Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between
one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should
be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand
dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and
in like proportion for the members of the Natl. Legislature. He would
however leave the sum blank. His motion was that the President of the U.
S., the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to
swear that they were respectively possessed of a clear unincumbered
Estate to the amount of —— in the case of the President, &c &c—”[505]
Pinckney, in fact, had no confidence in popular government, for on March
28, 1788, he wrote to Madison: “Are you not ... abundantly impressed
that the theoretical nonsense of an election of Congress by the people
in the first instance is clearly and practically wrong, that it will in
the end be the means of bringing our councils into contempt.”[506]
_General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney_ entertained views with regard to
the special position that should be enjoyed by property, which were
substantially identical with those held by his cousin. He proposed that
no salary should be paid to members of the Senate. As this branch, he
said, “was meant to represent the wealth of the country, it ought to be
composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made the
wealthy alone would undertake the service.”[507] General Pinckney also
wished to extend property qualifications not only to members of the
legislature, but also to the executive and judicial departments.[508]
_Edmund Randolph_ was not only fully aware of the distress to which
property had been put under the Articles of Confederation, but he also
understood the elements of a “balanced” government. Speaking on the
subject of the structure of the Senate, he said: “If he was to give an
opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it
ought to be much smaller than that of the first, so small as to be
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are
liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for
the evils under which the U. S. Laboured; that in tracing these evils to
their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this
tendency of our governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely
to answer the purpose.... Mr. Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The
Democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity
of a firm Senate. The object of this 2d. branch is to controul the
democratic branch of the Natl. Legislature. If it be not a firm body,
the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the
people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like
principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No
mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and
in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A
firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch,
as it ought to guard the Constitution agst. encroachments of the
Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of
the popular branch.”[509]
_George Read_ was most outspoken in his desire to see the Articles of
Confederation completely discarded. He said that “he was against
patching up the old federal system: he hoped the idea would be
dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The
Confederation was founded on temporary principles. It cannot last; it
cannot be amended.”[510] He favored vesting an absolute veto power in
the executive;[511] and he proposed that Senators should hold office
during good behavior.[512]
_John Rutledge_ held that the apportionment of representatives should be
on a basis of wealth and population.[513] He favored a property
qualification for the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments;[514] and he thought that Senators should not be paid.[515]
In fact, he was one of the most ardent champions of the rights of
property in government in the Convention. He was strictly opposed to the
introduction of sentimental considerations in politics, for, speaking on
an aspect of slavery and the Constitution, he said: “Religion & humanity
had nothing to do with this question—Interest alone is the governing
principle with Nations—The true question at present is whether the
Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the Union. If the
Northern States consult their interests they will not oppose the
increase of Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they
will become the carriers.”[516]
_Roger Sherman_ believed in reducing the popular influence in the new
government to the minimum. When it was proposed that the members of the
first branch of the national legislature should be elected, Sherman said
that he was “opposed to the election by the people, insisting that it
ought to be by the state legislatures. The people, he said, immediately
should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want
information and are constantly liable to be misled.”[517]
_Richard Dobbs Spaight_ does not seem to have made any very lengthy
speeches in the Convention, but his occasional motions show that he was
not among those who believed in “frequent recurrence to the people.” On
September 6, he moved that the length of the President’s term be
increased to seven years, and finding this lost he attempted to
substitute six years for four.[518] Spaight was the one member of the
Convention, however, who came out clearly and denounced judicial
control;[519] but he nevertheless proved a stout champion of the
Constitution in North Carolina—defending it warmly against charges to
the effect that it was aristocratic in character.[520]
_Caleb Strong_ carried into the Convention the old Massachusetts
tradition in favor of frequent elections. He favored a one year term for
representatives,[521] voted against a seven year term for
President,[522] and also opposed a seven year term for Senators.[523] He
supported the Constitution, however, in his native state, and was a
member of the convention that ratified it.
_George Washington’s_ part in the proceedings of the Convention was
almost negligible, and it does not appear that in public document or
private letter he ever set forth any coherent theory of government. When
he had occasion to dwell upon the nature of the new system he indulged
in the general language of the bench rather than that of the penetrating
observer. For example, in his Farewell Address, which was written
largely by Hamilton, he spoke of the government’s being “the offspring
of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full
investigation, and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with
energy.”[524] He feared, however, the type of politics represented by
the Democratic Societies which sprang up during his administration, and
looked upon criticism of the government as akin to sedition.[525] Like
Jefferson, he also viewed with apprehension the growth of an urban
population, for in a letter to La Fayette at the time of the French
Revolution, he said, “The tumultuous populace of large cities are ever
to be dreaded. Their indiscriminate violence prostrates for the time all
public authority.”[526]
_Hugh Williamson_ was against placing property qualifications on voters
for members of Congress;[527] and he was opposed to the association of
the judges with the executive in the exercise of the veto power.[528] He
preferred to insert a provision requiring a two-thirds vote for every
“effective act of the legislature.”[529] He was, however, an opponent of
the paper money party in North Carolina[530] and in the Convention he
supported a proposition forbidding the states to pass ex post facto
laws, on the ground that “the judges can take hold of it.”[531]
_James Wilson_ was among the philosophers of the period who had
seriously pondered on politics in its historical and practical aspects.
In the Convention he took a democratic view on several matters. He
favored the annual election of representatives by the people,[532] he
advocated the popular election of United States Senators,[533] and he
believed also in the popular election of the President.[534] He
furthermore opposed the proposition to place property qualifications on
voters.[535] His check on popular legislation was to be found in
judicial control, at first in the association of the judges with the
executive in its exercise, and later in its simple, direct form.[536] In
fact, Wilson shared the apprehensions of his colleagues as to the
dangers of democratic legislatures, though he did not frankly advocate
direct property checks.[537] He doubtless believed that judicial control
would be sufficient.
_George Wythe_ was a representative of the old school of lawyers in
Virginia, and he was a profound student of historical jurisprudence,
although he apparently made no attempt to apply his learning to any of
the general political questions before the Convention. He was a warm
advocate of the doctrine of judicial control and gave practical effect
to principles while on the bench in Virginia.[538]
The conclusion seems warranted that the authors of _The Federalist_
generalized the political doctrines of the members of the Convention
with a high degree of precision, in spite of the great diversity of
opinion which prevailed on many matters.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION
On the 17th day of September, 1787, the Convention at Philadelphia
finished its work and transmitted the new Constitution to Congress, with
the suggestion that “it should afterwards be submitted to a convention
of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the
recommendation of its legislature for their assent and ratification; and
that each convention assenting to and ratifying the same should give
notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.” The
Philadelphia Convention further proposed that when nine states had
ratified the new instrument, it should go into effect as between the
states ratifying the same. Eleven days later, on September 28, the
Congress, then sitting in New York, resolved to accept the advice of the
Convention, and sent the Constitution to the state legislatures to be
transmitted by them to conventions chosen by the voters of the
respective commonwealths.
This whole process was a departure from the provisions of the then
fundamental law of the land—the Articles of Confederation—which provided
that all alterations and amendments should be made by Congress and
receive the approval of the legislature of every state. If to-day the
Congress of the United States should call a national convention to
“revise” the Constitution, and such a convention should throw away the
existing instrument of government entirely and submit a new frame of
government to a popular referendum, disregarding altogether the process
of amendment now provided, we should have something analogous to the
great political transformation of 1787–89. The revolutionary nature of
the work of the Philadelphia Convention is correctly characterized by
Professor John W. Burgess when he states that had such acts been
performed by Julius or Napoleon, they would have been pronounced _coups
d’état_.[539]
This revolutionary plan of procedure was foreshadowed in the Virginia
proposals at the opening of the Convention, and was, therefore,
contemplated by some of the leaders from the beginning. When it was
under consideration on June 5, Sherman, of Connecticut, opposed it on
the ground that it was unnecessary and that regular provisions were
already made in the Articles for amendments. Madison wanted to establish
the Constitution on some foundation other than mere legislative
approval. Gerry “observed that in the Eastern states the Confederation
had been sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of
referring the new system to them. The people in that quarter have, at
this time, the wildest ideas of government in the world. They were for
abolishing the senate in Massachusetts.” King thought that “a convention
being a single house, the adoption may be more easily carried through it
than through the legislatures where there are several branches. The
legislatures also being to lose power will be most likely to raise
objections.”[540]
On July 23 the resolution regarding ratification came before the
Convention again for discussion,[541] when it was moved that the
Constitution be referred to the state legislatures. One of the principal
objections urged against this plan was the possibility of a later
legislature’s repealing the ratification by a preceding body of the same
authority; but the chief problem was whether there was more likelihood
of securing a confirmation by legislatures or by conventions. “Whose
opposition will be most likely to be excited against the system?” asked
Randolph. “That of the local demagogues who will be degraded by it from
the importance they now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that
progress in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of
the plan.... It is of great importance, therefore, that the
consideration of this subject should be transferred from the
legislatures where this class of men have their full influence to a
field in which their efforts can be less mischievous. It is, moreover,
worthy of consideration that some of the states are averse to any change
in their constitution, and will not take the requisite steps unless
expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.”
Mr. Gorham, of Massachusetts, was of the same opinion. He “was against
referring the plan to the legislatures. 1. Men chosen by the people for
the particular purpose will discuss the subject more candidly than
members of the legislature who are to lose the power which is to be
given up to the general government. 2. Some of the legislatures are
composed of several branches. It will consequently be more difficult in
these cases to get the plan through the legislatures than through a
convention. 3. In the states many of the ablest men are excluded from
the legislatures, but may be elected into a convention. Among these may
be ranked many of the clergy who are generally friends to good
government.... 4. The legislatures will be interrupted with a variety of
little business; by artfully pressing which, designing men will find
means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether, the
national system. 5. If the last article of the Confederation is to be
pursued the unanimous concurrence of the states will be necessary.”
In the Convention, Ellsworth preferred to trust the legislatures rather
than popularly elected conventions. “He thought more was to be expected
from the legislatures than from the people. The prevailing wish of the
people in the eastern states is to get rid of the public debt; and the
idea of strengthening the national government carries with it that of
strengthening the public debt.” After the plan of ratification by
conventions was carried in spite of Ellsworth’s objections, he defended
it in his appeal to the populace by saying: “It proves the honesty and
patriotism of the gentlemen who composed the general Convention, that
they chose to submit their system to the people rather than to the
legislatures, whose decisions are often influenced by men in the higher
departments of government, who have provided well for themselves and
dread any change least they should be injured by its operation. I would
not wish to exclude from a state convention those gentlemen who compose
the higher branches of the assemblies in the several states, but choose
to see them stand on an even floor with their brethren, where the
artifice of a small number cannot negative a vast majority of the
people. This danger was foreseen by the federal convention and they have
wisely avoided it by appealing directly to the people.”[542]
A study of the opinions of the members of the Convention shows that four
leading reasons led to the agreement on ratification by state
conventions. It permitted the disregard of the principle of unanimous
approval by the states. A firmer foundation would be laid for the
Constitution if it had the sanction of special conventions rather than
temporary legislatures. One of the first objects of the Constitution was
to restrict the authority of state legislatures, and it could hardly be
expected that they would voluntarily commit suicide. Another leading
purpose of the Convention was to pay the public debt at par, and the
members had learned from the repeated appeals to the state legislatures
for funds to meet this national obligation that no relief was to be
expected from this source. There was a better chance of getting the
right kind of citizens elected to a convention than to a legislature. By
separating the election of delegates to state conventions from the
election of members to the state legislatures, the supporters of the
Constitution were better able to concentrate their campaign of
education. As for the provision of the Articles of Confederation
requiring the approval of every state for any amendment in the Articles,
the urgent necessities of the advocates of the new system could not
permit such a mere technicality to stand in their way.
The question of their legal right to cast aside their instructions and
draft a totally new instrument was more or less troublesome for those
who entertained a strict regard for the observance of the outward signs
of propriety. No doubt the instructions of the delegations from the
several states limited them to the “revision” of the Articles of
Confederation, and it is highly improbable that in the state of public
temper then prevailing a Convention would have assembled at all if its
revolutionary purposes had been understood. During the debates behind
closed doors Mr. Paterson declared that the delegates were bound by
their instructions, but Randolph replied that “he was not scrupulous on
the point of power”; and Hamilton agreed with this view saying, “We owed
it to our country to do on this emergency whatever we should deem
essential to its happiness. The states sent us here to provide for the
exigencies of the union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to
these exigencies merely because it was not clearly within our powers
would be to sacrifice the means to the end.”[543]
Outside the halls of the Convention it also became necessary to defend
this revolutionary departure from their instructions. Madison took up
the cause in _The Federalist_[544] and made out an unanswerable case for
his side, frankly pleading the justification of revolution if the legal
arguments which he advanced were deemed insufficient.
At the outset he is unwilling to admit that the Convention had broken
with its instructions and performed a revolutionary act. He,
accordingly, puts forward a legal and moral justification first, based
upon an analysis of the instructions of the delegates. They were bound,
he shows, to make such revisions in the Articles as would render them
adequate to the exigencies of the union; but an adequate government, he
pleads, could not be made by revising the Articles, and the Convention
was either compelled to sacrifice the greater for the less by strictly
obeying its instructions or to do its whole duty by sacrificing the
letter of the law. Then he clinches the argument: “Let them declare
whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of
America that the Articles of Confederation should be disregarded and an
adequate government be provided and the Union preserved; or that an
adequate government should be omitted and the Articles of Confederation
preserved.”
But Madison, after having paid his respects to Legality, hastens to add
that in all great changes in government “forms ought to give way to
substance.” A rigid adherence to mere technicalities “would render
nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people
‘to abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their safety and happiness.’” That is, the right of revolution
is, at bottom, the justification for all great political changes. If it
is argued that this right of revolution should not be exercised by a
small group of men, such as the Convention of fifty-odd delegates at
Philadelphia, Madison replies that it is impossible for the whole people
to move forward in concert, and “it is therefore essential that such
changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions
made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens.”
This was the manner in which the recent revolt against England was
carried out; and in the present case the people had the right to pass
upon the work of the Philadelphia assembly.
The opponents of the Constitution were able to see the significance of
that clause of the Constitution which cast aside the legal system under
which they were living and provided that the new instrument should go
into effect when ratified by nine states—as between those states.
“Cornelius,” in Massachusetts, exhibited great anxiety on this point,
and in his letters of December 11 and 18, 1787, he asked concerning this
departure: “Will not the adoption of this constitution in the manner
here prescribed be justly considered as a perfidious violation of that
fundamental and solemn compact by which the United States hold an
existence and claim to be a people? If a nation may so easily discharge
itself from obligations to abide by its most solemn and fundamental
compacts, may it not with still greater ease do the same in matters of
less importance? And if nations may set the example, may not particular
states, citizens, and subjects follow? What then will become of public
and private faith? Where is the ground of allegiance that is due to
government? Are not the bonds of civil society dissolved? Or is
allegiance founded only in power? Has moral obligation no place in civil
government? In mutual compacts can one party be bound while the other is
free? Or, can one party disannul such compact, without the consent of
the other? If so, constitutions and national compacts are, I conceive,
of no avail; and oaths of allegiance must be preposterous things.”[545]
On all hands the “unconstitutional” procedure of the Convention was
attacked by the Anti-Federalists. “A system of consolidation,” says
another writer, “has been formed with the most profound secrecy and
without the least authority: And has been suddenly and without any
previous notice transmitted by the federal convention for
ratification—Congress not disposed to give any opinion on the plan, have
transmitted it to the legislatures—The legislatures have followed the
example and sent it to the people. The people of this state, unassisted
by Congress or their legislature, have not had time to investigate the
subject, have referred to the newspapers for information, have been
divided by contending writers, and under such circumstances have elected
members for the state convention—and these members are to consider
whether they will accept the plan of the federal convention, with all
its imperfections, and bind the people by a system of government, of the
nature and principles of which they have not at present a clearer idea
than they have of the Copernican system.”[546]
Whatever was thought of the merits of the controversy over the proposed
plan of ratification, it was accepted by the state legislatures which
were invited by Congress to transmit the Constitution to special
conventions. It remains to inquire, therefore, what methods were
employed in calling these conventions and setting the seal of approval
on the new and revolutionary proposals of the Philadelphia assembly.
The resolution calling the convention in New Hampshire to pass upon the
federal Constitution was adopted by the legislature on December 14,
1787. The time for holding the elections was left to the selectmen of
the several towns, who were instructed to warn the duly qualified voters
of the event. The date for the meeting of the convention was fixed on
the second Wednesday of February, 1788.[547] Four hundred copies of the
Constitution were ordered to be printed for distribution.
The elections seem to have been held about mid-January, for the New
Hampshire Spy, for January 25, 1788, contains a long list of delegates
already chosen, and adds that “several of the towns not mentioned in the
above list were to have had their meetings this week.”
A majority of the members of the state convention so chosen, writes a
student, who has inquired into the personnel of that body, “were
undoubtedly opposed to the Constitution.... The talent of the convention
was decidedly on the side of the Federalists and a majority of the
ablest members were in favor of ratification.... For a time the friends
of the Constitution had hopes of securing its ratification without a
recess of the convention. Although the greater number of the members
from the upper part of the state came down rather opposed to its
adoption, yet on the final question it was hoped that a majority would
be found to favor it. But these hopes proved delusive. While some of the
members who came to the convention instructed to vote against the
Constitution had been led by the discussions to a change of opinion and
now favored it, they still felt bound by their instructions, and frankly
said that if a final vote was to be taken before they had an opportunity
to consult their constituents their vote would be adverse to
ratification.”[548] Under these circumstances the Federalists adjourned
the convention and set to work to convert the enemy. When the convention
reassembled a few months later, they were able to carry the day by the
uncomfortably small margin of 57 to 47.[549]
In Massachusetts the Federalists lost no time in moving for a
convention. As early as October 20, 1787, they carried a favorable
resolution in the senate of the state, and secured the concurrence of
the house four days later. This resolve provided that the delegates
should be chosen by those inhabitants “qualified by law to vote in the
election of representatives,” and the elections should take place “as
soon as may be” in the several towns and districts. The date for the
meeting of the delegates was fixed as the second Wednesday in January
next. On January 9, 1788, the Convention met at Boston; and a real
battle of wits ensued.
As in New Hampshire, the delegates, when they came together fresh from
their constituents, appeared to be opposed to adopting the new
instrument of government. A careful scholar, who has studied the period
intensively, takes this view: “Had a vote been taken on the adoption of
the Constitution as soon as the convention assembled, there can be no
question but that it would have been overwhelmingly against the proposed
plan.”[550]
Even after powerful influences had been brought to bear, the margin for
the Federalists was uncomfortably close—187 to 168. Harding remarks:
“The majority in favor of ratification, it will be seen was only
nineteen. The nine delegates whose names were returned to the
convention, but who were not present when the vote was taken, might
almost have turned the scale in the other direction. Bearing in mind
that it was mainly the Antifederalist towns that were unrepresented, it
may be safely asserted that out of the forty-six delinquent corporations
there were enough which were Antifederalist to have procured the
rejection of the constitution. This calculation, however, is based on
the assumption that a corresponding increase did not take place in the
Federalist representation. Had all the towns entitled to send
representatives done so, and had all the delegates been present to cast
their votes, it is probable that the final result would not have been
changed, though the Federalist majority would have been cut down to
scarcely more than a bare half-dozen.”[551]
After turning over the debates in the Massachusetts convention, one can
scarcely escape the conclusion that the victory in eloquence, logic, and
pure argumentation lay on the side of the Federalists; and it would not
be worth while to consider at all the charges that improper influence
was brought to bear on the delegates, were it not for the fact that they
were made at the time and have lasted in the literature on the
ratification in Massachusetts. We have “the sober assertion of a
reputable historical writer within the last thirty years” to the effect
“that enough members of the Massachusetts convention were bought with
money from New York to secure the ratification of the new system by
Massachusetts.”[552] Harding, after making an examination of the
charges, dismissed them as “baseless”; and quite properly, for whoever
would convict men of such high standing in the community as King,
Gorham, and Strong of being associated with such a reprehensible
transaction should produce more than mere unsubstantiated evidence.
The legislature of Connecticut, determined not to be behindhand in
setting the approval of the state on the new instrument, called a
convention on October 11, 1787.[553] A month was given to the electors
to deliberate over the choice of delegates who were to decide the
momentous issue. The election was held on November 12; the convention
assembled on January 3, 1788; and after a few days’ discussion gave its
assent on January 9, 1788, by a vote of 128 to 40.[554]
In New York the voters were given more time than in Connecticut to
consider the new Constitution before they were called upon to settle the
question of ratification at the polls by choosing delegates to the state
convention. It was not until February 1, 1788, that the legislature of
that commonwealth issued the call for the special election to be held on
the last Tuesday of the following April.[555]
The contest in New York was hot from the start. Governor Clinton, in his
message to the legislature in January, 1788, did not mention the
Constitution—an omission which gave the Federalists some hope as they
had feared an executive attack. The resolution calling the state
convention passed the lower house by a narrow margin; and in the senate
a motion to postpone the matter was almost carried, receiving nine out
of nineteen votes.[556]
When, at length, the convention assembled, at least two-thirds of the
sixty-four members were found to be against ratification. Such is the
view of Bancroft, and the contemporary press bears out his
conclusion.[557] Nevertheless, by much eloquence and no little
manœuvring, the Federalist champions were able to obtain a majority of
30 to 27. The assent of the requisite number of opponents was secured
only after an agreement that a circular should be issued recommending
the call of another national convention at once to revise the
Constitution as adopted.
In pursuance of this agreement, the legislature at its next session, on
February 5, 1789, called upon Congress to summon another convention to
revise the new instrument of government at once. The address of the
legislature stated that the Constitution had been ratified “in the
fullest confidence of obtaining a revision of the said Constitution by a
general convention, and in confidence that certain powers in and by the
said Constitution granted would not be exercised until a convention
should have been called and convened for proposing amendments to the
said Constitution.” The legislature went on to say that it complied with
the unanimous sense of the state convention, “who all united in opinion
that such a revision was necessary to recommend the said Constitution to
the approbation and support of a numerous body of their constituents,
and a majority of the members of which conceived several articles of the
Constitution so exceptionable, that nothing but such confidence and an
invincible reluctance to separate from our sister states could have
prevailed upon a sufficient number to assent to it without stipulating
for previous amendments.”[558]
The commonwealth of New Jersey made haste to ratify the new Constitution
as soon as possible after its transmission by Congress. On November 1,
1787, the legislature issued the call for the convention, ordering the
inhabitants who were “entitled to vote for representatives in General
Assembly,” to elect delegates on the fourth Tuesday in the following
November, i.e., November 27. The date for the meeting of the convention
was fixed as the second Tuesday in December, the 11th, and on the 18th
day of that month, the members, “Having maturely deliberated on and
considered the aforesaid proposed Constitution,” unanimously agreed to
its adoption.[559]
The legislature of Delaware, influenced by “the sense and desire of
great numbers of the people of the state, signified in petitions to
their general assembly,” adopted a resolution on November 10, 1787,
calling for the election of delegates within a few days—that is on
November 26—for the state convention to pass upon the Constitution. The
convention met at Dover on December 3; and after four days’ deliberation
on the matter adopted the Constitution by unanimous vote on December 6,
1787.[560]
In Pennsylvania the proceedings connected with the ratification were
precipitous and narrowly escaped being irregular. Before it was known
that Congress would even transmit the Constitution to the states for
their consideration, George Clymer,[561] who had been a member of the
national Convention and was then serving in the Pennsylvania
legislature, “rose in his place and moved that a state convention of
deputies be called, that they meet at Philadelphia, and that they be
chosen in the same manner and on the same day as the members of the next
general assembly.”[562] In vain did the opponents urge that this was
irregular, that it was not known whether Congress would act favorably,
and that deliberation rather than haste should characterize such a
weighty procedure. The legislature, nevertheless, resolved to call the
convention, and adjourned until the afternoon, leaving the date of the
convention and manner of selecting delegates to be settled later. The
opposition thereupon decided to secure delay by staying away and
preventing the transaction of business for want of a quorum.
Meanwhile the news reached Philadelphia that Congress had sent the
Constitution to the states for their consideration. The Federalists in
the legislature, now having secured the sanction of regularity,
determined not to brook further delay, so they sent officers after some
of the recalcitrants, who thought “filibustering” justifiable in view of
the importance of securing more deliberation before acting. These
officers, ably assisted by a Federalist mob “broke into their lodgings,
seized them, dragged them through the streets to the State house, and
thrust them into the assembly room, with clothes torn and faces white
with rage. The quorum was now complete.”[563] The legislature (September
29) fixed the election of delegates to the state convention at a date
five weeks distant, November 6, 1787. Thus the people of the state were
given a little over a month to deliberate on this momentous issue before
selecting their agents to voice their will. Some Federalists, like Tench
Coxe, expressed regret at the necessity of adopting these high-handed
methods; but the stress was so great that it did not admit of delay.
After the convention assembled, the Federalists continued their
irregular practices, although from the vote on the Constitution in the
convention this latter manipulation seems to have been a work of
supererogation. Everything was done that could be done to keep the
public out of the affair. “Thomas Lloyd applied to the convention for
the place of assistant clerk. Lloyd was a shorthand writer of
considerable note, and when the convention refused his request,
determined to report the debates and print them on his own account. His
advertisement promised that the debates should be accurately taken in
shorthand and published in one volume octavo at the rate of one dollar
the hundred pages. These fine promises, however, were never fulfilled.
Only one thin volume ever came out, and that contains merely the
speeches of Wilson and a few of those of Thomas M’Kean. The reason is
not far to seek. He was bought up by the Federalists, and in order to
satisfy the public was suffered to publish one volume containing nothing
but speeches made by the two federal leaders.”[564] The Federalists
appear to have suppressed other attempts at issuing the debates, and
they “withdrew their subscriptions from every publication that warmly
supported the Antifederal cause.”[565] The Constitution was ratified by
a vote of 46 to 23.
Against these precipitous actions on the part of the Federalists in
carrying the ratification of the Constitution, a minority of the state
convention, twenty-one members, protested in an address to the people
after the day had been lost. The protestants told how the federal
Convention had been called by Congress, and then recited the facts as
they viewed them: “So hastily and eagerly did the states comply [with
the call of Congress for the Convention] that their legislatures,
without the slightest authority, without ever stopping to consult the
people, appointed delegates, and the conclave met at Philadelphia. To it
came a few men of character, some more noted for cunning than
patriotism, and some who had always been enemies to the independence of
America. The doors were shut, secrecy was enjoined, and what then took
place no man could tell. But it was well known that the sittings were
far from harmonious. Some left the dark conclave before the instrument
was framed. Some had the firmness to withhold their hands when it was
framed. But it came forth in spite of them, and was not many hours old
when the meaner tools of despotism were carrying petitions about for the
people to sign praying the legislature to call a convention to consider
it. The convention was called by a legislature made up in part of
members who had been dragged to their seats and kept there against their
wills, and so early a day was set for the election of delegates that
many a voter did not know of it until it was passed. Others kept away
from the polls because they were ignorant of the new plan; some because
they disliked it, and some because they did not think the convention
legally called. Of the seventy thousand freemen entitled to vote but
thirteen thousand voted.”[566] For a long time the war of the dissenters
against the Constitution went on in Pennsylvania, breaking out in
occasional riots, and finally in the Whiskey Rebellion in Washington’s
administration; but they were at length beaten, outgeneralled, and
outclassed in all the arts of political management.
In November, 1787, the Maryland legislature, after hearing Luther
Martin’s masterly indictment of the Constitution and McHenry’s effective
reply, “unanimously ordered a convention of the people of the state; it
copied the example set by Virginia of leaving the door open for
amendments; and by a majority of one the day for the choice and the day
for the meeting of its convention were postponed till the next
April.”[567] Several months were thus given for deliberation, in marked
contrast to the speedy despatch of the business in Delaware, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. The elections were duly
held on the first Monday in April, 1788; and the convention assembled on
April 21. The opponents of the Constitution, Chase, Mercer, and Martin,
hurled themselves against it with all their might; but, it is related,
“the friends to the federal government ‘remained inflexibly
silent.’”[568] After a week’s sessions, “the malcontents having tired
themselves out,” the convention ratified the Constitution by a vote of
sixty-three against eleven on the afternoon of Saturday, April 26. The
instrument was formally sealed on the 28th.
The legislature of Virginia, by a resolution passed on October 25, 1787,
and a law enacted on December 12th, called a convention to be elected in
March, 1788, and to assemble on June 2, 1788.[569] In no state were the
forces for and against the Constitution more ably marshalled and led. In
no state was there higher order of debate in the convention than took
place in Virginia, the birthplace of the Constitution. It was a
magnificent battle of talents that was waged during those June days,
from the 2nd until the 25th. Then “the roll was called; and from the
cities of Richmond and Williamsburg, from the counties near the ocean,
from the northern neck, and from the counties between the Blue Ridge and
the Alleghanies, eighty-nine delegates voted for the Constitution. From
the other central and southern border counties of Kentucky, seventy-nine
cried No.” The margin of victory was small, but it was safe.
North Carolina was recalcitrant. The call for the convention was issued
by the legislature on December 6, 1787;[570] the election was held on
the last Friday and Saturday of March, 1788; and the convention
assembled on July 21, 1788. In this body “the Antifederalists obtained a
large majority. They permitted the whole subject to be debated until the
2d of August; still it had been manifested from the first that they
would not allow of an unconditional ratification.” On that day the
convention deferred the ratification of the Constitution by a vote of
184 to 84,[571] and adjourned _sine die_. The new federal government was
inaugurated without North Carolina; but the economic pressure which it
brought to bear on that state, combined with the influence of eminent
Federalists (including Washington), and the introduction of
constitutional amendments in Congress, brought her into the union on
November 21, 1789.[572]
South Carolina was one of the most deliberative of all the states, for
it was not until January 18, 1788, that the legislature by unanimous
resolution called a convention which was elected in April, and organized
in Charleston, on May 13 of that year. The discussion there was
evidently of a high order. Those who participated in it took first rank
in the commonwealth, and the defenders of the new system put forth
efforts worthy of the distinguished forensic leaders of the Charleston
bar. The opponents exhausted the armory of their arguments, and seeing
the tide running against them, they sought an adjournment of five months
for further deliberation; but a motion to this effect was lost by a vote
of 89 to 135. Finally at five o’clock on the tenth day of the sessions,
May 23, the Constitution was carried by a large majority—149 to 73.[573]
The legislature of Georgia, on October 26, 1787, called for a state
convention to be chosen “in the same manner as representatives are
elected,” at the next General Election, held on the first Tuesday in
December, _i.e._, December 4, 1787. The convention was duly chosen, and
met at Augusta on December 25; and after “having taken into serious
consideration the said constitution” for four or five days, solemnly
ratified the instrument on January 2, 1788.[574]
Rhode Island was the last of the thirteen states to accept the
Constitution. She had refused to send delegates to the federal
Convention; and the triumphant paper money party there would have none
of the efficiency promised by the new system. It was not until May 29,
1790, that Rhode Island ratified the Constitution, and this action was
brought about by the immediate prospect of coercion on the part of the
government of the United States,[575] combined with the threat of the
city of Providence to join with the other towns which were Federalist in
opinion, in a movement to secede from the state and seek the protection
of the federal government.[576] Without these material considerations
pressing upon them, the agrarians of that commonwealth would have
delayed ratification indefinitely; but they could not contend against a
great nation and a domestic insurrection.
A survey of the facts here presented yields several important
generalizations:
Two states, Rhode Island and North Carolina refused to ratify the
Constitution until after the establishment of the new government which
set in train powerful economic forces against them in their isolation.
In three states, New Hampshire, New York, and Massachusetts, the popular
vote as measured by the election of delegates to the conventions was
adverse to the Constitution; and ratification was secured by the
conversion of opponents and often the repudiation of their tacit (and in
some cases express) instructions.
In Virginia the popular vote was doubtful.
In the four states which ratified the constitution with facility,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, and Delaware, only four or five weeks
were allowed to elapse before the legislatures acted, and four or five
weeks more before the elections to the conventions were called; and
about an equal period between the elections and the meeting of the
conventions. This facility of action may have been due to the general
sentiment in favor of the Constitution; or the rapidity of action may
account for the slight development of the opposition.
In two commonwealths, Maryland and South Carolina, deliberation and
delays in the election and the assembling of the conventions resulted in
an undoubted majority in favor of the new instrument; but for the latter
state the popular vote has never been figured out.[577]
In one of the states, Pennsylvania, the proceedings connected with the
ratification of the Constitution were conducted with unseemly haste.
CHAPTER IX
THE POPULAR VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION
In the adoption of the Constitution, says James Wilson, we have the
gratifying spectacle of “a whole people exercising its first and
greatest power—performing an act of sovereignty original and
unlimited.”[578] Without questioning the statement that for juristic
purposes the Constitution may be viewed as an expression of the will of
the whole people, a historical view of the matter requires an analysis
of “the people” into its constituent elements. In other words, how many
of “the people” favored the adoption of the Constitution, and how many
opposed it?
At the very outset, it is necessary to recall that the question whether
a constitutional Convention should be held was not submitted to popular
vote, and that it was not specially passed upon by the electors in
choosing the members of the legislatures which selected the
delegates.[579]
In the second place, the Constitution was not submitted to popular
ratification. The referendum was not unknown at that time, but it was
not a fixed principle of American politics.[580] At all events, such a
procedure does not seem to have crossed the minds of the members of the
Convention, and long afterward, Marshall stated that ratification by
state conventions was the only mode conceivable.[581] In view of the
fact that there was no direct popular vote taken on the Constitution, it
is therefore impossible to ascertain the exact number of “the people”
who favored its adoption.
The voters, who took part in the selection of delegates to the ratifying
conventions in the states, may be considered as having been divided into
four elements: those who were consciously in favor of the Constitution,
those who were just as consciously against it, those who were willing to
leave the matter to the discretion of their elected representatives, and
those who voted blindly.
The proportions which these four groups bear to one another cannot be
determined, but certain facts may be brought out which will throw light
on the great question: How many of the people favored the adoption of
the Constitution?
The first fact to be noted in this examination is that a considerable
proportion of the adult white male population was debarred from
participating in the elections of delegates to the ratifying state
conventions by the prevailing property qualifications on the suffrage.
The determination of these suffrage qualifications was left to the state
legislatures; and in general they adopted the property restrictions
already imposed on voters for members of the lower branch of the state
legislatures.
In New Hampshire the duly qualified voters for members of the lower
house were authorized to vote for members of the convention, and those
Tories and sympathizers with Great Britain who were excluded by law were
also admitted for this special election.[582] In Massachusetts the
voters were those “qualified by law to vote in the election of
representatives.”[583] In Connecticut, those “qualified by law to vote
in town meetings” were enfranchised.[584] In New Jersey, those who were
“entitled to vote for representatives in general assembly;”[585] and in
Delaware, those “qualified by law to vote for Representatives to the
General Assembly”[586] were empowered to vote for delegates to their
respective conventions. In Pennsylvania, voters for members of the
assembly selected the delegates to the convention.[587] In Maryland,
voters for members of the lower house;[588] in Virginia, those
possessing the “qualifications now established by law;”[589] in North
Carolina, those entitled to vote for members of the House of
Commons;[590] in South Carolina, those voting for members of the lower
house; and in Georgia, those voting for members of the legislature (one
branch) were admitted to participation in the election of delegates to
their respective state conventions.[591]
In New York alone was the straight principle of manhood suffrage adopted
in the election of delegates to the ratifying convention. Libby seems
inclined to hold that this exception was made by the landed aristocracy
in the state legislature because it was opposed to the Constitution and
wished to use its semi-servile tenants in the elections; but this
problem has not yet been worked out, and any final conclusion as to the
“politics” of this move is at present mere guesswork.[592]
It is impossible to say just what proportion of the adult males
twenty-one years of age was disfranchised by these qualifications. When
it is remembered that only about 3 per cent of the population dwelt in
towns of over 8000 inhabitants in 1790, and that freeholds were widely
distributed, especially in New England, it will become apparent that
nothing like the same proportion was disfranchised as would be to-day
under similar qualifications. Dr. Jameson estimates that probably
one-fifth of the adult males were shut out in Massachusetts,[593] and it
would probably be safe to say that nowhere were more than one-third of
the adult males disfranchised by the property qualifications.
Far more were disfranchised through apathy and lack of understanding of
the significance of politics. It is a noteworthy fact that only a small
proportion of the population entitled to vote took the trouble to go to
the polls until the hot political contests of the Jeffersonian era.
Where voting was _viva voce_ at the town hall or the county seat, the
journey to the polls and the delays at elections were very troublesome.
At an election in Connecticut in 1775, only 3477 voters took part, out
of a population of nearly 200,000, of whom 40,797 were males over twenty
years of age. How many were disfranchised by the property qualifications
and how many stayed away through indifference cannot be shown.[594]
Dr. Jameson, by most ingenious calculations, reaches the conclusion that
in Massachusetts about 55,000 men in round numbers or about 16 or 17 per
cent of the population were entitled to vote under the law. Assuming
that 16 per cent were entitled to vote, he inquires into the number who
actually exercised the franchise in the years from 1780 to 1790 in
elections for governor; and his inquiry yields some remarkable results.
To give his conclusions in his own words: “Something like three per cent
[of the population, or about one-fifth or one-sixth of those entitled to
vote] took part in the first election in the autumn of 1780. During the
next six years the figures remain at about two per cent only. In 1784,
only 7631 votes were cast in the whole state; in the spring of 1786 only
a little over eight thousand. Then came Shays’ Rebellion and the
political excitement of that winter brings up the votes in the spring
election of ‘87 to a figure nearly three times as high as in ’86, and
amounting to something between five and six per cent of the population.
The political discussions of the next two winters respecting the new
federal government keep the figure up to five per cent. Then it drops to
something between three and four and there it remains until 1794.”[595]
For the purposes of a fine analysis of the economic forces in the
ratifying process, it would be of the highest value to have the vote on
delegates to the state conventions in each town and county throughout
the whole country; but unfortunately no such figures are compiled and
much of the original materials upon which the statistical tables could
be based have doubtless disappeared.[596] Even such tables would be
unsatisfactory because in several instances there were no contests and
the issue of adoption or rejection of the Constitution was not squarely
put before the voters.
In a few instances, however, the number of voters participating in the
election of delegates to the state conventions has come down to us. In
Boston, for example, where the fight was rather warm, and some 2700 men
were entitled to vote, only 760 electors turned out to pass upon the
momentous issue of the national Constitution—about half as many as voted
in the next gubernatorial election.[597]
The treatises on the Constitution do not give any figures on the popular
vote for delegates to the state convention in New York, but the
following partial list taken from contemporary papers shows that in some
of the counties the vote ran to almost 10 per cent of the population,
while in others the percentage of the electorate participating (even
under the universal manhood suffrage provision) was about that in
Massachusetts, namely, 5 per cent. It will be noted also that the
distribution of representation in the convention was grossly unequal and
decidedly unfavorable to the Anti-Federalists. The classification into
Federalist and Anti-Federalist is based upon the election returns as
reported in the contemporary press, not on the vote in the state
ratifying convention.
FEDERALIST
═══════════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════
│ │ │ │ │ RATIO OF
│ │ HIGHEST │ HIGHEST │DELEGATES │DELEGATES
│POPULATION│FEDERALIST│ANTI-FEDERALIST│ IN │ TO
│ 1790 │ VOTE │ VOTE │CONVENTION[598]│POPULATION
───────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┬────┴─────
New York County│ 33,131│ 2735[599]│ 134│ 9│ 3,681
Westchester │ 23,941│ 694[600]│ 399│ 6│ 3,990
Queens[601] │ 16,014│ │ │ 4│ 4,003
Kings │ 4,495│ │ │ 2│ 2,247
Richmond │ 3,835│ │ │ 2│ 1,917
───────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
│ │ │ │ 23│
═══════════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════
Footnote 598:
Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. II, p. 206.
Footnote 599:
Daily Advertiser, May 30, 1788.
Footnote 600:
_Ibid._, June 3.
Footnote 601:
Queens vote was divided in the Convention.
ANTI-FEDERALIST
═══════════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════
│ │ │ │ │ RATIO OF
│ │ HIGHEST │ HIGHEST │DELEGATES │DELEGATES
│POPULATION│FEDERALIST│ANTI-FEDERALIST│ IN │ TO
│ 1790 │ VOTE │ VOTE │CONVENTION│POPULATION
───────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
Albany │ 75,921│ 2627[602]│ 4681│ 7│ 10,845
Ulster │ 29,397│ 68[603]│ 1372│ 6│ 4,899
Dutchess │ 45,266│ 892[604]│ 1765│ 7│ 6,466
Orange │ 18,478│ │ 340[605]│ 4│ 4,619
Columbia │ 27,732│ 1498[606]│ 1863│ 3│ 9,244
Montgomery │ 28,839│ 811[607]│ 1209│ 6│ 4,806
Suffolk │ 16,440│ │ │ 5│ 3,288
Washington[608]│ 15,647│ │ │ 4│ 3,911
───────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────
│ │ │ │ 41│
═══════════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════╧══════════
Footnote 602:
Daily Advertiser, June 4.
Footnote 603:
_Ibid._, June 4.
Footnote 604:
_Ibid._, June 6.
Footnote 605:
_Ibid._, June 14.
Footnote 606:
New York Journal, June 5, 1788.
Footnote 607:
_Ibid._, June 5.
Several conclusions are obvious from this table. Measured by the popular
vote, New York was overwhelmingly against the ratification of the
Constitution. With the apportionment of representation against them, the
Anti-Federalists elected nearly twice as many delegates as the
Federalists. The popular vote in favor of ratification was largely
confined to the urban centres of New York City and Albany City, thus
correcting assumptions based on the convention vote alone.
But with this decided popular vote against them the Federalists were
able to carry through their program by a narrow margin of thirty to
twenty-seven. Why did so many Anti-Federalists whose popular mandate was
clear and unmistakable, for there was a definite fight at the polls on
the issue, go over to their enemies? Three Anti-Federalist members, who
did go over and carry the day for the Federalists, John DeWitt, John
Smith, and Melancton Smith, later appeared as holders of public
securities;[609] but this does not explain the event.[610]
In Pennsylvania, the vote on the election of delegates to ratify the
Constitution was apparently very slight. The dissenting minority in
their famous manifesto declared: “The election for members of the
convention was held at so early a period and the want of information was
so great that some of us did not know of it until after it was over....
We apprehend that no change can take place that will affect the internal
government or constitution of this commonwealth unless a majority of the
people should evidence a wish for such a change; but on examining the
number of votes given for members of the present State convention, we
find that of upwards of seventy thousand freemen who are entitled to
vote in Pennsylvania, the whole convention has been elected by about
thirteen thousand voters, and though two-thirds of the members of the
convention have thought proper to ratify the proposed Constitution, yet
those two-thirds were elected by the votes of only six thousand and
eight hundred freemen.”[611] Though the partisan source of these figures
might lead one to question their accuracy, nevertheless it is hardly
probable that they would have greatly exaggerated figures that were open
to all.
Philadelphia was the scene of perhaps the hottest contest over the
election of delegates that occurred anywhere. The city had at that time
a population of about 28,000 inhabitants. At the election, the candidate
who stood the highest at the polls, George Latimer, received 1215 votes
while his leading opponent received only 235 votes.[612] Thus a total of
1450 votes was cast in the election—about 5 per cent of the population.
The total population of the state in 1790 was 434,373, and allowing for
the difficulty of journeying to the polls in the rural districts, it
seems that the estimate of the dissenters was probably not far from
correct.
It appears that in Baltimore 1347 voters participated in the election of
representatives from that city. McHenry at the head of the poll received
962 votes and it was known that he favored unconditional ratification of
the Constitution. His leading opponent received 385 votes.[613] This
vote was taken after a considerable demonstration, for a newspaper
report says that “On the same day, the ship builders, the tradesmen
concerned in navigation, the merchants, the manufacturers and several
thousand inhabitants walked in procession through the different streets
of the town.” Baltimore had at that time a population of 13,000 so that
a very large proportion of the adult males took part in the election.
Further light is thrown on the vote in Maryland by an opponent of
ratification in a long paper printed in the Maryland Journal of May 16,
1788, signed “Republican.” The author, says Steiner, “asserts that the
‘common class’ of people knew little of the Constitution. The two
thousand copies of that document printed by order of the Assembly were
too few to go far. The Annapolis paper is of small circulation, and the
two Baltimore ones are never seen on the Eastern Shore, while the severe
weather during the past winter prevented any newspapers from being sent
over thither. Of the 25,000 voters in the state, only 6000 voted at the
election and 4,000 of these votes were cast in Baltimore town and seven
of the counties. The rich and wealthy worked for the Constitution to
prevent the loss of their debts, and in some counties the opposition had
named no candidates.”[614]
In South Carolina, the distribution of representation in the convention
was such as to give a decided preponderance to the personalty districts
along the seaboard. The convention of 1788 was composed of approximately
twice the number of the house of representatives in 1794 and the
apportionment was similar in character. In the latter year, R. G.
Harper, under the pen-name of “Appius” pointed out the great disparity
in the weight of the upper and lower districts in the legislature: “The
lower country, including the three districts of Charleston, Beaufort,
and Georgetown [which were strongly in favor of ratification of the
Constitution], contains 28,694 white inhabitants, and it elects seventy
representatives and twenty senators. Divide 149,596, the whole number in
the state, by 28,694, those of the lower country, and the result will be
more than five, from whence it appears, that a large majority of both
branches of the legislature is elected by less than one-fifth of the
people.”[615] The upper district [largely Anti-Federal], on the other
hand, contained 120,902 white inhabitants, and sent only fifty-four
members to the house of representatives. On this basis, the
seventy-three votes cast in the convention against ratification may in
fact have represented a majority of the white inhabitants and voters in
the state.[616]
While one hesitates to generalize about the vote cast in favor of the
Constitution on the basis of the fragmentary evidence available, it
seems worth while, nevertheless, to put together several related facts
bearing on the matter.
In addition to the conclusion, brought out by Dr. Jameson, that about 5
per cent of the population voted in Massachusetts in the period under
consideration, we have other valuable data. Dr. Paullin has shown that
the electoral vote in the presidential election of 1788 in New Hampshire
was 2.8 per cent of the free population; that the vote in Madison’s
electoral district in Virginia in the same election was 2.7 per cent of
the white population; that the vote in the first congressional election
in Maryland was 3.6 per cent of the white population and that the vote
in the same congressional election in Massachusetts was 3 per cent.[617]
Speaking of the exercise of the franchise as a whole in the period, Dr.
Paullin says, “The voting was done chiefly by a small minority of
interested property holders, a disproportionate share of whom in the
northern states resided in the towns, and the wealthier and more
talented of whom like a closed corporation controlled politics.”
In view of these figures, in view of the data given above on the
election of delegates (to the ratifying conventions) in the cities of
Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, in view of the fact that the
percentage participating in the country was smaller than in the towns,
and in view of the fact that only 3 per cent of the population resided
in cities of over 8000, it seems a safe guess to say that not more than
5 per cent of the population in general, or in round numbers, 160,000
voters, expressed an opinion one way or another on the Constitution. In
other words, it is highly probable that not more than one-fourth or
one-fifth of the adult white males took part in the election of
delegates to the state conventions. If anything, this estimate is high.
Now in four of the states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, and
Virginia, the conventions at the time of their election were either
opposed to the ratification of the Constitution or so closely divided
that it was hard to tell which way the final vote would go. These four
states, with Rhode Island and North Carolina,[618] which were at first
against ratification, possessed about three-fifths of the population—in
round numbers 1,900,000 out of 3,200,000 free persons. Of the 1,900,000
population in these states we may, with justice it seems, set off at
least 900,000, that is, 45,000 voters as representing the opposition.
Add to these the voters in Pennsylvania who opposed the ratification of
the Constitution, approximately 6000, and we have 51,000 dissenting
voters, against ratification. Adding the dissenters in Maryland, South
Carolina,[619] and Connecticut, and taking the other states as
unanimous, we may reasonably conjecture that of the estimated 160,000
who voted in the election of delegates, not more than 100,000 men
favored the adoption of the Constitution at the time it was put into
effect—about one in six of the adult males.
Admitting that these figures are rough guesses, it appears,
nevertheless, that the Constitution was not “an expression of the clear
and deliberate will of the whole people,” nor of a majority of the adult
males, nor at the outside of one-fifth of them.
Indeed, it may very well be that a majority of those who voted were
against the adoption of the Constitution as it then stood. Such a
conjecture can be based on the frank statement of no less an authority
than the great Chief Justice Marshall who took a prominent part in the
movement which led to the formation and ratification of the new
instrument of government.[620]
At all events, the disfranchisement of the masses through property
qualifications and ignorance and apathy contributed largely to the
facility with which the personalty-interest representatives carried the
day. The latter were alert everywhere, for they knew, not as a matter of
theory, but as a practical matter of dollars and cents, the value of the
new Constitution. They were well informed. They were conscious of the
identity of their interests. They were well organized. They knew for
weeks in advance, even before the Constitution was sent to the states
for ratification, what the real nature of the contest was. They resided
for the most part in the towns, or the more thickly populated areas, and
they could marshall their forces quickly and effectively. They had also
the advantage of appealing to all discontented persons who exist in
large numbers in every society and are ever anxious for betterment
through some change in political machinery.
Talent, wealth, and professional abilities were, generally speaking, on
the side of the Constitutionalists. The money to be spent in the
campaign of education was on their side also; and it was spent in
considerable sums for pamphleteering, organizing parades and
demonstrations, and engaging the interest of the press. A small
percentage of the enormous gain to come through the appreciation of
securities alone would have financed no mean campaign for those days.
The opposition on the other hand suffered from the difficulties
connected with getting a backwoods vote out to the town and county
elections. This involved sometimes long journeys in bad weather, for it
will be remembered that the elections were held in the late fall and
winter. There were no such immediate personal gains to be made through
the defeat of the Constitution, as were to be made by the security
holders on the other side. It was true the debtors knew that they would
probably have to settle their accounts in full and the small farmers
were aware that taxes would have to be paid to discharge the national
debt if the Constitution was adopted; and the debtors everywhere waged
war against the Constitution—of this there is plenty of evidence.[621]
But they had no money to carry on their campaign; they were poor and
uninfluential—the strongest battalions were not on their side. The
wonder is that they came so near defeating the Constitution at the
polls.
CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMICS OF THE VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION
As in natural science no organism is pretended to be understood as long
as its merely superficial aspects are described, so in history no
movement by a mass of people can be correctly comprehended until that
mass is resolved into its component parts. To apply this concept to the
problem before us: no mathematically exact conclusion can be reached
concerning the material interests reflected in the Constitution until
“the people” who favored its adoption and “the people” who opposed it
are individualized and studied as economic beings dependent upon
definite modes and processes of gaining a livelihood. A really fine
analytical treatment of this problem would, therefore, require a study
of the natural history of the (approximately) 160,000 men involved in
the formation and adoption of the Constitution; but for the present we
must rely on rougher generalizations, drawn from incomplete sources.
It would be fortunate if we had a description of each of the state
conventions similar to that made of the Philadelphia Convention;[622]
but such a description would require a study of the private economy of
several hundred men, with considerable scrutiny. And the results of such
a search would be on the whole less fruitful than those secured by the
study of the Philadelphia Convention, because so many members of the
state ratifying bodies were obscure persons of whom biography records
nothing and whose property holdings do not appear in any of the
documents that have come down to us. In a few instances, as in the case
of Pennsylvania, a portion of this work has been done in a fragmentary
way—as regards economic matters; and it may be hoped that a penetrating
analysis of the public security holdings and other property interests of
the members of all state conventions may sometime be made—as far as the
sources will allow. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study,
certain general truths concerning the conflict over the ratification of
the Constitution in the several states have already been established by
scholars like Libby, Harding, Ambler.
The first of these authors, Dr. Libby, has made a painstaking study of
the _Geographical Distribution of the Vote on the Constitution_, in
which he sets forth the economic characteristics of the areas for and
against the adoption of the Constitution. These conclusions are all
utilized in this chapter; but they are supplemented by reference to the
later researches of Harding[623] and Ambler,[624] and by a large amount
of new illustrative materials here presented for the first time. The
method followed is to exhibit, in general, the conflict of economic
interests in each of the several states over the adoption of the
Constitution.
_New Hampshire._—There were three rather sharply marked economic
districts in New Hampshire which found political expression in the
convention that ratified the Constitution. Two of the three were the
sea-coast area and the interior or middle region. “The former,” says
Libby, “the coast area, represented the commercial and urban interests;
here were to be found most of the professional men, leaders of thought,
men of wealth and influence. The second section, the interior, was
composed of those representing the small farmers; a population cut off
from the outside world by lack of good roads, and which raised little
for market except to exchange for the few things that could not be
produced at home. The former class, progressive and liberal and familiar
with the practical details of government, as a rule voted for the
Constitution. The latter, conservative by environment and having little
knowledge of what went on outside the narrow bounds of the home village
or township, quite as generally voted against the Constitution.”[625]
The third region in New Hampshire (whose representatives favored
ratification) was “the Connecticut valley or border district” whose
interests were akin to those of the sea towns because it had commercial
connection with the outside world through the Connecticut River. It was
to this region particularly that Oliver Ellsworth must have appealed in
his open letter to the citizens of New Hampshire in which he said: “New
York, the trading towns on the Connecticut River, and Boston are the
sources from which a great part of your foreign supplies will be
obtained, and where your produce will be exposed for market. In all
these places an import is collected, of which, as consumers, you pay a
share without deriving any public benefit. You cannot expect any
alteration in the private systems of these states unless effected by the
proposed government.”[626]
Several economic facts of prime significance in the ratification of the
Constitution in New Hampshire are afforded by the tax returns of 1793.
These show that of the £61,711:9:5 “total value of stock in trade” in
the state in that year (Vermont being then cut off) no less than
£42,512:0:5 or over two-thirds was in Rockingham county, the seat of the
commercial town of Portsmouth, whose citizens were the leading agitators
for the new system, and whose delegates in the state convention were
overwhelmingly in favor of ratification. Moreover, of the total amount
of the “money on hand or at interest” in the state, £35,985:5:6, about
two-thirds, £22,770:9:4 was in Rockingham county. It is of further
significance that of the £893,327:16:10 worth of real estate and
buildings in the state, less than one-half, £317,970:7:2, was in that
county.[627] Thus the stronghold of Federalism possessed about
two-thirds of all the personalty and only about one-half of the realty
values in the commonwealth.
All personalty was not equally interested in ratifying the Constitution,
as pointed out above; holders of public paper multiplied their values
from six to twenty times in securing the establishment of the new
system. Further interesting data would be revealed, therefore, if we
could discover the proportion of public securities to other personalty
and their geographic distribution.[628] The weight of the securities in
New Hampshire is shown by the fact that the tax list for 1793 gives only
£35,985 as the total amount of money on hand or at interest (including
public securities)[629] in the state, while the accounts of the Treasury
department show that $20,000 in interest on the public debt went to the
loan office of that state to discharge that annual federal
obligation.[630] It is highly probable that the tax list is very low,
but even at that the public securities constituted a considerable mass
of the capital of the commonwealth. The leading supporters of the
Constitution in New Hampshire were large holders of public paper,[631]
and there is no doubt that as personalty was the dynamic element in the
movement for the Constitution, so securities were the dynamic element in
the personalty.
_Massachusetts._—The vote in Massachusetts on the Constitution was
clearly along class or group lines: those sections in which were to be
found the commerce, money, securities—in a word, personalty—were in
favor of the ratification of the new instrument of government; and those
sections which were predominantly rural and possessed little personalty
were against it. Libby classifies the sections on the basis of the vote
as follows:—
Eastern section Yeas, 73 per cent Nays, 27 per cent
Middle section Yeas, 14 per cent Nays, 86 per cent
Western section Yeas, 42 per cent Nays, 58 per cent
Speaking of this table he says: “Such striking differences as these
indicate clearly that there is something fundamental lying back of the
vote. Each of these sections is an economic and social unit, the first
representing the coast region, the second the interior, and the third
the Connecticut valley and border districts of the state. In the eastern
section the interests were commercial; there was the wealth, the
influence, the urban population of the state.... The middle section of
Massachusetts represented the interior agricultural interests of the
state—the small farmers. From this section came a large part of the
Shays faction in 1786. The Connecticut valley or western district may be
subdivided into the northern, most interior, and predominantly
Antifederal section, and the southern section, nearest the coast and
predominantly Federal, with the trading towns of the Connecticut River
in its southeastern part.”[632]
Harding, after an independent study of the opposition to the
Constitution in Massachusetts, comes to substantially the same
conclusion. Among the weighty elements in the struggle he places “the
conflict of interest, partly real and partly fancied, between the
agricultural and the commercial sections of the state.” Underlying the
whole opposition, he continues, “was the pronounced antagonism between
the aristocratic and the democratic elements of society in
Massachusetts.... Massachusetts was not alone in this experience; in
most, if not all, of the states a similar contest had arisen since the
war. The men who at Philadelphia had put their names to the new
Constitution were, it seems quite safe to affirm, at that time
identified with the aristocratic interest.... There can be no question
that this feeling [of antagonism between democracy and aristocracy]
underlay most of the opposition in the Massachusetts convention.”[633]
Of course this second element of opposition—aristocracy _versus_
democracy—introduced by Harding is really nothing but the first under
another guise; for the aristocratic party was the party of wealth with
its professional dependents; and the democratic party was the agrarian
element which, by the nature of economic circumstances, could have no
large body of professional adherents. This economic foundation of the
class division was fully understood by Adams and set forth with
unmistakable clearness in his _Defence of the American Constitutions_.
Hamilton, Madison, and all thinkers among the Federalists understood it
also. To speak of a democratic interest apart from its economic sources
is therefore a work of supererogation; and it does not add, in fact, to
an exposition of the real forces at work. Harding himself recognizes
this and explains it in a luminous fashion in his introductory chapter.
And what were the economic and social antecedents of the opponents of
the Constitution in the Massachusetts convention? Harding, with his
customary directness, meets the inquiry: “A half-dozen obscure men, it
must be answered, whose names are utterly unknown, even to most students
of this period.” He continues: “William Widgery (or Wedgery) of New
Gloucester, Maine, was one of these.[634] A poor, friendless, uneducated
boy, he had emigrated from England before the Revolution, had served as
a lieutenant on board a privateer in that contest, had then settled in
Maine, had acquired some property, and by 1788 had served one term in
the Massachusetts legislature.... Samuel Thompson, of Topsham, Maine,
was another of the anti-federalist leaders. A self-made man, he had the
obstinacy of opinion which such men often show.... He was wealthy for
the times, but inclined to be niggardly.... Another determined opponent
of the proposed Constitution was Samuel Nasson (or Nason) of Sanford,
Maine. Born in New Hampshire and a saddler by trade, he became a store
keeper in Maine, served awhile in the War ... and finally settled down
as a trader at Sanford.... In 1787 he served a term in the General
Court, but declined a reelection because he felt ‘the want of a proper
education.’... From Massachusetts proper, Dr. John Taylor, of Douglas,
Worcester County, was the most prominent opponent of the new
Constitution.... But the slightest information, it seems, can now be
gathered as to his history and personality. He had been one of the
popular majority in the legislature of 1787 where he had taken an active
part in procuring the extension of the Tender Law.... Another delegate
from this part of the state who was prominent in the opposition was
Captain Phanuel Bishop, of Rehoboth, Bristol County. In him the Rhode
Island virus may be seen at work.... He was a native of Massachusetts
and had received a public school education. When or why he had been
dubbed Captain is not now apparent. Belknap styles him ‘a noted
insurgent’; and he had evidently ridden into office on the crest of the
Shaysite wave. His first legislative experience had been in the Senate
of 1787 where he had championed the debtor’s cause.”[635]
This completes the list of leaders who fought bitterly against the
Constitution to the end in Massachusetts, according to a careful student
of the ratification in that state: three self-made men from the Maine
regions and two representatives of the debtor’s cause. Nothing could be
more eloquent than this description of the alignment.
Neither Harding nor Libby has, however, made analysis of the facts
disclosed by the tax lists of Massachusetts or the records in the
Treasury Department at Washington, which show unquestionably that the
live and persistent economic force which organized and carried through
the ratification was the personalty interests and particularly the
public security interests. As has been pointed out, these had the most
to gain immediately from the Constitution. Continental paper bought at
two and three shillings in the pound was bound to rise rapidly with the
establishment of the federal government. No one knew this better than
the members of the federal Convention from Massachusetts and their
immediate friends and adherents in Boston.
Of the total amount of funded 6 per cents in the state, £113,821, more
than one-half, £65,730, was concentrated in the two counties, Essex and
Suffolk, of which Boston was the urban centre—the two counties whose
delegates in the state convention were almost unanimous in supporting
the Constitution. Of the total amount of 3 per cents, £73,100, more than
one-half, £43,857, was in these two counties. Of the deferred stock,
amounting to £59,872, more than one-half, £32,973, was in these two
counties. Of the total amount of all other securities of the state or
the United States in the commonwealth, £94,893, less than one-third or
£30,329, was in these counties. Of the total amount of money at interest
in the state, £196,698, only about one-third, £63,056, was in these two
counties, which supports the above conjecture that public securities
were the active element.[636]
Further confirmation for this conjecture seems to be afforded by the
following tables, showing the distribution of the vote and of public
securities.[637] The first group shows the votes of the delegates from
Essex and Suffolk counties—the Federalist strongholds—on the
ratification, and also the amount of public securities in each as
revealed by the tax lists of 1792:
ESSEX
For the Constitution 38 votes Against 6 votes
SUFFOLK
For the Constitution 34 votes Against 5 votes
Table of public securities listed for taxation in each of these
counties:
═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════
│ SUFFOLK │ ESSEX
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
Funded, sixes │ £29,228│ £36,502
Funded, threes │ 17,096│ 26,761
Funded, not on interest│ 14,854│ 18,119
Other securities │ 14,056│ 16,273
Money at Interest │ 29,941│ 33,115
═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════
Now let us take the vote in the convention, and the property in two
counties which were heavily against the Constitution.[638] The vote is
as follows:
WORCESTER
For the Constitution 7 votes Against 43 votes
BERKSHIRE
For the Constitution 7 votes Against 15 votes
The tables of public securities and money in these counties follow:
═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════
│ WORCESTER │ BERKSHIRE
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
Funded, sixes │ £12,924│ £981
Funded, threes │ 8,184│ 665
Funded, not on interest│ 5,736│ 384
Other securities │ 10,903│ 602
Money at interest │ 25,594│ 6298
═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════
Now if we take the securities in these two counties which went heavily
against the Constitution several economic facts are worthy of notice. Of
the total amount of 6 per cents in the state, only £13,905, or about
one-eighth is to be found in them. Of the 3 per cents, we find £8,849,
or about one-eighth of the total amount in the commonwealth. But if we
take money at interest, we find £31,892, or about one-sixth of the total
amount in the state. This is not surprising, for Worcester was the
centre of the Shays rebellion in behalf of debtors, and a large portion
of their creditors were presumably in the neighborhood.[639]
“The courts were burdened with suits for ordinary debts by means of
which creditors sought to put in more lasting form the obligations which
their debtors could not at that time meet. In Worcester county alone,
with a population of less than 50,000, more than 2000 actions were
entered in 1784, and during the next year 1700 more were put on the
list.”[640]
These figures, like all other statistics, should be used with care, and
it would require a far closer analysis than can be made here to work out
all of their political implications. We should have a thorough
examination of such details as the distribution of the public securities
among towns and individual holders; and such a work is altogether worthy
of a Quetelet.
Meanwhile, it may be said with safety that the communities in which
personalty was relatively more powerful favored the ratification of the
Constitution, and that in these communities large quantities of public
securities were held. Moreover, there was undoubtedly a vital connection
between the movement in support of the Constitution and public security
holding, or to speak concretely, among the leading men in Massachusetts
who labored to bring about the ratification was a large number of public
creditors.
For example, Boston had twelve representatives in the state ratifying
convention, all of whom voted in favor of the Constitution. Of these
twelve men the following were holders of public securities:[641]
Samuel Adams
James Bowdoin, Sr.
Thomas Dawes, Jr.
Christopher Gore
John Coffin Jones
William Phillips
Thomas Russell
John Winthrop
In other words, at least eight out of the twelve men representing the
chief financial centre of the state were personally interested in the
fate of the new Constitution. How deeply, it is impossible to say, for
the Ledgers seem to have disappeared from the Treasury Department and
only the Index to the funded debt remains. Supplementary records,
however, show some of them to have been extensively engaged in dealing
in paper. The four men who, apparently, were not security holders were
John Hancock, Caleb Davis, Charles Jarvis, and Rev. Samuel
Stillman.[642]
The towns surrounding Boston in Suffolk county also returned a number of
men who were holders of securities:[643]
Fisher Ames, Dedham
John Baxter, Medfield
James Bowdoin, Jr., Dorchester
Richard Cranch, Braintree
J. Fisher, Franklin
William Heath, Roxbury
Thomas Jones, Hull
Benj. Lincoln, Hingham
Rev. Daniel Shute, Hingham
Increase Sumner, Roxbury
Cotton Tufts, Weymouth
Ebenezer Wales, Dorchester
Ebenezer Warren, Foxboro
Rev. Anthony Wibird, Braintree
In other words, twenty-two of the thirty-four men from Boston and
Suffolk county who voted in favor of the ratification of the
Constitution in the Massachusetts convention were holders of public
securities, and all of the twenty-two except two (Wales and Warren)
probably benefited from the appreciation of the funds which resulted
from the ratification.[644]
[Illustration: Massachusetts]
To recapitulate. There were thirty-nine members of the Massachusetts
convention from Suffolk county, which includes Boston. Of these,
thirty-four voted for the ratification of the Constitution, and of the
thirty-four who so voted, two-thirds, or twenty-two to be exact, were
holders of public paper.
That other supporters of the Constitution from other Massachusetts
counties held paper so extensively is not to be expected, and a casual
glance through the records shows that this surmise is probably true.
Boston was the centre of the Federalist agitation, and it supplied the
sinews of war for the campaign which finally secured the adoption of the
new system of government.
_Connecticut._—The vote on the Constitution in Connecticut was so
largely in favor of ratification that no very clear lines of cleavage
are apparent on the surface.[645] The opposition, as measured by the
vote of the delegates in the Convention, was “scattered and unimportant.
Its two chief centres were in New Haven county on the coast, and in five
or six towns on the Connecticut river at the northern boundary,
connecting with a group of opposition towns in Massachusetts.”[646] It
is worthy of note that the considerable towns for the time, Windsor,
Norwalk, Stamford, Litchfield, Hartford, and New Haven were for the
Constitution, while much of the opposition came from small inland towns
like Cornwall, Norfolk, and Sharon.[647]
The map facing this page shows that the Federalist towns were the
financial centres of the time in Connecticut. The representatives of the
“shaded” towns in the state convention voted against the Constitution;
those from the partially “shaded” towns were divided; and those from the
plain white towns voted for the Constitution.[648] Each black dot
represents a holder of one 6 per cent assumed debt bond.[649] It is
apparent at a glance that there must have been some relation between
security holding and the “sentiments,” to use Madison’s term,[650] of
the respective proprietors. Hartford alone had almost as many security
holders as all of the Anti-Federalist towns combined. It would be
interesting to have a map showing the distribution of all other forms of
wealth as well as the assumed debt.
What a more searching study would produce were we able to carry the
contest back into the town meetings that chose the delegates cannot be
conjectured. But the local evidence—even that which was recorded—has
largely disappeared or would require years of search to unearth.
Moreover, the tax system in Connecticut at the time was not such as to
yield the data most needed for such an inquiry, for “loans to the state
and the United States were exempt from assessment.”[651] Whether this
grew out of a public policy or the fact that the chief politicians of
the day were large holders of securities—evidenced by the records in the
Treasury Department at Washington—is also a matter for conjecture. No
documents, no history.
Nevertheless, as in Massachusetts, the public securities formed a
dynamic element in the movement for ratification. One hundred and
twenty-eight members of the Connecticut convention voted in favor of the
new system. Of these men at least sixty-five held public paper in some
amount (ranging from a few dollars to tens of thousands) previous to or
about the time of the adoption of the Constitution. They are given here
in alphabetical order with the names of the towns which they
represented.
Nehemiah Beardsley, New Fairfield
Philip B. Bradley, Ridgefield
Hezekiah Brainerd, Haddam
Daniel Brinsmade, Washington
Gideon Buckingham, Milford
Thaddeus Burr, Fairfield
Charles Burrall, Canaan
Samuel Canfield, New Milford
Samuel Carver, Bolton
Jabez Chapman, East Haddam
Moses Cleaveland, Canterbury
Wheeler Coit, Preston
Seth Crocker, Willington
James Davenport, Stamford
John Davenport, Stamford
Benjamin Dow, Voluntown
Joshua Dunlop, Plainfield
Eliphalet Dyer, Windham
Pierpont Edwards, New Haven
Oliver Ellsworth, Winsor
Jabez Fitch, Greenwich
Daniel Foot, Colchester
Isaac Foot, Stafford
Mathew Griswold, Lyme (President of the Convention)
Nathan Hale, Canaan
Asaph Hall, Goshen
Jeremiah Halsey, Preston
William Hart, Saybrook
Cornelius Higgins, Haddam
Benjamin Hinman, Southbury
Caleb Holt, Willington
Jedediah Huntington, Norwich
Samuel Huntington, Norwich
Eli Hyde, Franklin
Wm. Samuel Johnson, Stratford
Richard Law, New London
Andrew Lee, Lisbon
Isaac Lee, Berlin
Elisha Mills, Stratford
Stephen Mitchel, Wethersfield
Josiah Mosely, Glastonbury
Roger Newberry, Winsor
Wm. Noyes, Lyme
Samuel H. Parsons, Middletown
Charles Phelps, Stonington
John Phelps, Stafford
Joshua Porter, Salisbury
Jeremiah Ripley, Coventry
Ephraim Root, Coventry
Jesse Root, Hartford
Lemuel Sanford, Reading
Epaphras Sheldon, Torrington
Roger Sherman, New Haven
Simeon Smith, Ashford
Jonathan Sturges, Fairfield
Dyar Throop, East Haddam
John Treadwell, Farmington
Jeremiah Wadsworth, Hartford
Ichabod Warner, Bolton
John Watson, East Winsor
Jeremiah West, Tolland
Ebenezer White, Chatham
William Williams, Lebanon
Joseph Woodbridge, Groton
Erastus Wolcott, East Winsor
Oliver Wolcott, Litchfield[652]
It must not be thought that the ramifications of economic interest ends
with these names.[653] A large number of men who do not appear on the
records as holding securities personally, belonged to families having
such holdings. For example, John Chester, of Wethersfield, is apparently
not on the books, but he was a colonel in the war and doubtless received
the soldiers’ certificates or other paper at some period. Thomas Chester
and Sarah Chester of Wethersfield appear on the records. Whether there
were family connections might be ascertained by a study of local
history. It is evident what infinite pains would be required to trace
out all of these genealogical data.
_New York._—There can be no question about the predominance of
personalty in the contest over the ratification in New York. That state,
says Libby, “presents the problem in its simplest form. The entire mass
of interior counties ... were solidly Antifederal, comprising the
agricultural portion of the state, the last settled and the most thinly
populated. There were however in this region two Federal cities (not
represented in the convention [as such]), Albany in Albany county and
Hudson in Columbia county.... The Federal area centred about New York
city and county: to the southwest lay Richmond county (Staten Island);
to the southeast Kings county, and to the northeast Westchester county;
while still further extending this area, at the northeast lay the
divided county of Dutchess, with a vote in the convention of 4 to 2 in
favor of the Constitution, and at the southeast were the divided
counties of Queens and Suffolk.... These radiating strips of territory
with New York city as a centre form a unit, in general favorable to the
new Constitution; and it is significant of this unity that Dutchess,
Queens, and Suffolk counties broke away from the anti-Federal phalanx
and joined the Federalists, securing thereby the adoption of the
Constitution.”[654]
Unfortunately the exact distribution of personalty in New York and
particularly in the wavering districts which went over to the Federalist
party cannot be ascertained, for the system of taxation in vogue in New
York at the period of the adoption of the Constitution did not require a
state record of property.[655] The data which proved so fruitful in
Massachusetts are not forthcoming, therefore, in the case of New York;
but it seems hardly necessary to demonstrate the fact that New York City
was the centre of personalty for the state and stood next to
Philadelphia as the great centre of operations in public stock.
This somewhat obvious conclusion is reinforced by the evidence relative
to the vote on the legal tender bill which the paper money party pushed
through in 1786. Libby’s analysis of this vote shows that “No vote was
cast against the bill by members of counties north of the county of New
York. In the city and county of New York and in Long Island and Staten
Island, the combined vote was 9 to 5 against the measure. Comparing this
vote with the vote on the ratification in 1788, it will be seen that of
the Federal counties 3 voted against paper money and 1 for it; of the
divided counties 1 (Suffolk) voted against paper money and 2 (Queens and
Dutchess) voted for it. Of the anti-Federal counties none had members
voting against paper money. The merchants as a body were opposed to the
issue of paper money and the Chamber of Commerce adopted a memorial
against the issue.”[656]
Public security interests were identified with the sound money party.
There were thirty members of the New York constitutional convention who
voted in favor of the ratification of the Constitution and of these no
less than sixteen were holders of public securities:[657]
James Duane, New York (C 6)
John DeWitt, Dutchess (N.Y. 3)
Alexander Hamilton,[658] New York
Richard Harrison, New York (C 6)
Jonathan Havens, Suffolk (C 6 as Trustee for a religious society).
John Jay, New York (C 6)
Samuel Jones, Queens (C 6)
Philip Livingston, Westchester (C 6)
Robert R. Livingston, New York (N.Y. 3)
Nicholas Low, New York (C 6)
Richard Morris.[659] New York (C 6)
Isaac Roosevelt, New York (R)
Gozen Ryerss, Richmond (N.Y. 3)
John Smith, Suffolk (C 6)
Melancton Smith, Dutchess (Conn.)
Philip Van Cortland, Westchester (C 6)
Jesse Woodhull, Orange (C 6)
_New Jersey._—New Jersey was among the states which pushed through the
ratification of the Constitution without giving the agrarian party time
to organize its forces; and, from the records, the vote in the state
convention was unanimous. This unanimity is rather startling in view of
the fact that the year before a paper money party had been able to force
through an emission bill by a narrow margin. Either there was a violent
reaction against inflation, or the Federalist campaign had been highly
organized. What little opposition appears to have been raised in that
state seems to have been by the debtor and paper money class.[660]
It must be admitted, however, that no detailed study of the ratification
in New Jersey has ever been made. Libby passes it over briefly; and the
older writers like Bancroft and Curtis dismiss it with their usual
lightness of touch. Unfortunately for such a study, the records of the
convention in that state are no more than bare minutes; and the
materials in the Treasury Department from the New Jersey loan office are
extremely fragmentary. Until extended search in local and state history
is made on the points here raised, New Jersey must be dismissed
cursorily.
There were thirteen counties in the state represented in the Convention,
and each of nine counties had one or more representatives who had
learned the elementary lessons in public finance through holding at
least some small amounts of public securities—often certificates of only
trivial value. The meagre character of the records of that state do not
permit of a satisfactory statement. There were three delegates from
Bergen county; of these John Fell appears on the Register of Land Office
Certificates; there is no record of Peter Zabriskie either as a
subscriber to original funds or as owner of securities; but a Jacob
Zabriskie appears on a later Ledger. From Essex county, John Chetwood
and David Crane appear among the holders; from Middlesex, John Beatty,
John Neilson, and Benjamin Manning—the entire delegation; from Somerset,
Fred. Frelinghuysen; from Gloucester, Andw. Hunter; from Salem, Edmund
Wetherby; from Hunterdon, David Brearley and Joshua Corshon; from
Morris, John Jacob Faesch; and from Sussex, Robert Ogden and Thomas
Anderson, and even the Secretary, Saml. W. Stockton, was a considerable
holder. Thus every county except Cumberland, Cape-of-May, Burlington,
and Monmouth had its spokesmen for public creditors.[661]
_Delaware._—Although there had been a strong paper money party in
Delaware it does not seem to have manifested any considerable influence
in the ratification of the Constitution, for that commonwealth was the
first to set its seal on the new instrument, and it did so with apparent
unanimity. No detailed scrutiny of the local contests over the election
of delegates has ever been made; and the records of the loan office of
that state preserved in the Treasury Department are defective. The
records for taxation are also of little help. The absence of any contest
of course contributes to obscuring the economic forces which may have
been at work.[662]
_Pennsylvania._—In strong contrast to the uniformity in Delaware is the
sharp division which existed in Pennsylvania. There, says Libby, “the
opposition to the Constitution came from those counties belonging to the
great interior highland of the state, extending from the head waters of
the Schuylkill to the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers, with only
Huntingdon county (one vote—Federal) interrupting the continuity from
east to west.... The Federal area contained ... York, Lancaster,
Chester, Montgomery, Philadelphia, Bucks, Luzerne, and Northampton, and
the largest population, most of the men of wealth and influence and the
commercial classes of the state. Pittsburg with 400 inhabitants was
Federal in an Anti-Federal county.”[663]
Each of the eastern counties of Pennsylvania was represented in the
state convention by one or more members who held public securities.[664]
From Philadelphia city and county, five of the ten members, all of whom
favored ratification, were interested in stocks, George Latimer, James
Wilson, Thomas M’Kean, Samuel Ashmead, and Enoch Edwards. From Bucks
came John Barclay, a large dealer, to whose credit $17,056.56 is set
down in one entry. Two of the six members from Chester, John Hannum and
Thomas Bull, were security holders. James Morris, of Montgomery county,
John Black and David Grier, from York, Timothy Pickering, from Luzerne,
Stephen Balliet, David Deshler, and Joseph Horsfield of Northampton
(three of the four from that county) were interested. From Lancaster
came Jasper Yeates, a large holder (one entry $11,986.65), Robert
Coleman, Sebastian Graff, and John Hubley (four of the six delegates),
who had a first-hand knowledge of the relation of a new and stable
government to public paper.
In other words at least nineteen out of the forty-six men who voted for
the Constitution in the Pennsylvania convention were interested in
public paper at or about the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Their names follow with the references to each,[665] but it is not to be
supposed that this list is complete, for the records of Pennsylvania are
not full, and a great many of the transactions in that state were not
with the local loan office, but directly with the Treasury, a part of
whose early records were probably burned in one of the fires at the
Treasury Building:
Samuel Ashmead (I)
Stephen Balliet (LT)
John Barclay (JA)
John Black (M)
Thomas Bull (I)
Robert Coleman (R)
David Deshler (M)
Enoch Edwards (JA)
Sebastian Graff (I)
David Grier (I)
John Hannum (3 C)
Joseph Horsfield (M)
John Hubley (77)
George Latimer (JB)
Thomas M’Kean (M)
James Morris (I)
Timothy Pickering (I)
James Wilson (I)
Jasper Yeates (JA)
Fortunately, also other data are easily available for the study of the
economic interests of the members of the Pennsylvania convention.
McMaster and Stone[666] have appended to their work on the ratification
of the Constitution in that state brief biographical sketches of the
members of the convention, in which many clues are given to their
respective economic interests. The following table is prepared from
these biographies, and every effort is made to state in the language of
the authors the exact occupation and interests of the delegates. These
details are given so that the student may draw his conclusions
independently.
MEMBERS WHO VOTED IN FAVOR OF RATIFICATION
John Allison “received a thorough English and classical education;”
laid out the town of Greencastle in 1781; in the War, rank of Colonel.
John Arndt. Father a mill owner on the Bushkill; for a time a
commissary of supplies during the War; “advanced large sums of money
to the government, most of which was refunded to him;” devoted the
latter years of his life to “mercantile pursuits.”
Samuel Ashmead. “Little is known of his early history, save that he
received a good education and was brought up to mercantile pursuits.”
[Securities.]
Hilary Baker “received a good classical education, entered mercantile
life, became an iron merchant, which business he carried on for some
years.”
Stephen Balliet, “acquired a very limited education and was brought up
to mercantile life under his father;” an agent for forfeited estates
in Northampton county. Held many offices. Colonel in War.
[Securities.]
John Barclay “was a son of Alexander Barclay, an officer of the Crown
under the proprietary government, and received a classical education.”
Captain in the War and member of the Cincinnati. Sometime president of
the Bank of the Northern Liberties. [Securities.]
John Black was a graduate of Nassau Hall. Was an eminent Presbyterian
clergyman in his time. [Securities.]
John Boyd. Little known of early life and education. In the War.
Member of the Cincinnati. After the War “entered into merchandising at
the town of Northumberland” and was interested in a mill.
Thomas Bull. “Meagre education” and “learned the trade of a
stone-mason. Prior to the Revolution he was the manager of Warwick
Furnace.” Resumed this place after service in the War. [Securities.]
Thomas Campbell “was a farmer by occupation.” Captain in the War and
member of the Cincinnati.
Stephen Chambers. A lawyer. Captain in the War and member of the
Cincinnati.
Thomas Cheyney, “An intelligent and progressive farmer.” Grandfather
bequeathed to his father half of a large tract of land in Thornbury.
Robert Coleman. “By his energy and indomitable perseverance became the
most enterprising and successful iron-master in Pennsylvania.”
[Securities.]
David Deshler was a shopkeeper and afterwards operated grist and saw
mills. He “advanced money out of his private means at a time when not
only the United States treasury but also that of Pennsylvania was
empty.” [Securities.]
Richard Downing operated “a fulling, grist, and saw mill.”
Enoch Edwards “received a classical education, studied medicine, and
was in practice when he went into the War serving as a surgeon.”
[Securities.]
Benjamin Elliott “settled in the town of Huntingdon prior to the
Revolution.” Held many local offices. Regular occupation, if any, not
given.
William Gibbons resided for a time in Philadelphia and later moved to
“a fine farm left him by his parents”. Later held local offices.
Lieutenant Colonel.
Sebastian Graff. Son of a Lancaster “shopkeeper”, and was in “active
business when the War broke out.” [Securities.]
George Gray. “The fifth of that name in the line of descent from
George Gray, a wealthy member of the Society of Friends.”
Office-holder; in the War; apparently a gentleman of means.
David Grier. Classical education. Lawyer. Served in the War, rank of
Colonel. [Securities.]
John Hannum. Settled on a large farm. Local office-holder. In the War,
rank of Colonel. [Securities.]
Thomas Hartley. Classical education. Lawyer. In the War, rank of
Colonel; member of the Cincinnati. Purchased a tract of one thousand
acres of land during the Revolution.
Joseph Horsfield. Man of good education. Local postmaster under
Washington. [Securities.]
John Hubley was a lawyer by profession. [Securities.]
John Hunn was a captain in the merchant marine service at the outbreak
of the War. Engaged in privateering during the war and saw service in
the field also.
George Latimer was a merchant, bank director, and wealthy capitalist.
[Securities.]
Thomas M’Kean received a classical education. Was a lawyer. Extensive
office-holder. In the War, and a member of the Cincinnati. Capitalist
of some quality. [Securities.]
William MacPherson was the son of a noted “privateersman in the French
and Spanish wars.” Educated at the College of New Jersey. Officer in
the British Army; but joined the American cause. Major and member of
the Cincinnati. Man of some means.
James Morris possessed “a house and gristmill and ninety-four acres of
land” which his father had given him. [Securities.]
F. A. Muhlenberg. Studied at the University of Halle. Clergyman, but
entered into the politics of the Revolutionary War. Extensive
office-holder.
John Neville. Soldier and large landholder. Office-holder and member
of the Cincinnati.
Benjamin Pedan. Farmer and office-holder.
Timothy Pickering. Harvard graduate. In the War, rank of
Adjutant-general; member of the Cincinnati. Lawyer and office-holder
and land speculator. [Securities.]
John Richards owned a fine estate. He was “a progressive farmer, a
store-keeper, and iron-master.”
Jonathan Roberts was brought up as a farmer. Office-holder.
Benjamin Rush, graduate of the College of New Jersey and distinguished
physician in Philadelphia.
Thomas Scott settled in Western Pennsylvania as a farmer. Became local
office-holder and later (1791) entered the practice of law.
Henry Slagle was a provincial magistrate. Joined the Revolutionary
cause and held a number of political offices and was connected with
the loan office.
Abraham Stout seems to have been “an influential farmer.”
Anthony Wayne was the son of a farmer and surveyor. Soldier, and a
member of the Cincinnati.
James Wilson. Lawyer. Member of the constitutional Convention of 1787.
Wealthy land speculator. [Securities.]
William Wilson. Officer in the War. Office-holder. In mercantile
business and millowner.
Henry Wynkoop. Collegiate education. Major in the War and
office-holder.
Thomas Yardley, farmer owning a large tract of land.
Jasper Yeates, educated at the College of Philadelphia, lawyer, judge,
and man of large means for his time. [Securities.]
OPPONENTS OF RATIFICATION
John Baird “took up land” and “appears to have been a man of mark west
of the Alleghanies.” Held local offices.
Richard Bard was a farmer and proprietor of a mill.
John Bishop “was brought up as a farmer, an occupation he was engaged
in all his life.... He had extensive business connections, and became
an iron-master. He was a large landholder.” Advanced large sums of
money to the Revolutionary cause.
Nathaniel Breading received a classical education, taught school, was
in the War, and held local offices. “In deference to his constituents
he did not sign the ratification.”
William Brown descendant of a farmer; was a frontiersman; in the War.
James Edgar was born on a farm and died on a farm.
William Findley received a fair English education and “towards the
close of the war he removed with his family to Western Pennsylvania
and took up a tract of land ... on which he resided until his death.”
John Andre Hanna received a good classical education; admitted to the
bar and was a successful lawyer at Harrisburg.
John Harris was a farmer and laid out Mifflintown.
Joseph Hiester acquired the rudiments of a good education, and “until
near age he worked upon his father’s farm when he went to Reading and
learned merchandising.” Was in the War.
Jonathan Hoge. Nothing known.
Abraham Lincoln was brought up on a farm and died on a farm. Local
office-holder.
John Ludwig was a substantial farmer. Was in the War. Local
office-holder.
Nicholas Lotz was a millwright by occupation and established a mill
near Reading. Was in the War.
James Marshel “moved to the western country some three years prior to
the Revolution, and settled in what is now Cross Creek Township.”
Frontiersman and local officer.
James Martin was born in the Cumberland valley and resided in what was
then (1772) Colerain township. Was in the War.
Adam Orth was “brought up amid the dangers and struggles of
Pennsylvania pioneer life. He received the limited education of the
‘back settlements.’... He was one of the pioneers in the manufacture
of iron in Lebanon county.”
John Reynolds.
Joseph Powell.
John Smilie. His father settled in Lancaster county and evidently was
a farmer. In 1781 John Smilie “removed with his family to then
Westmoreland county,” which meant that he went to the frontier.
Office-holder.
William Todd went to Western Pennsylvania about 1765 and later
“removed to Westmoreland county where he settled upon land
subsequently warranted to him.”
John Whitehill, “son of an Irish immigrant who settled on Pequea Creek
in 1723.” Received a good education. Local office-holder. At his death
he left “a large landed estate”.
Robert Whitehill, brother of the above Whitehill. “In the spring of
1771 he removed to Cumberland county, locating on a farm two miles
west of Harrisburg.” Extensive public career. “Died at his residence
in Cumberland county two miles west of the Susquehanna.” Evidently
dependent largely upon agriculture, but farmer of some means.
Obviously such a table is more or less superficial so far as economic
aspects are concerned, for the forms of wealth possessed by each member
and the numerical proportions of the several forms at the time of the
Pennsylvania state convention are not apparent. More than the ordinary
margin must therefore be allowed for error on both sides. Evidently also
it is difficult to classify these men from the meagre data given; but
the following table may be taken to be roughly correct as to the men
about whom we have some economic facts.
═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════╤═══════════════════════
│ FOR THE CONSTITUTION │ AGAINST
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
Merchants │ 4│ 1
Lawyers │ 8│ 1
Doctors │ 2│
Clergymen │ 2│
Farmers │ 10│ 13
Capitalists │ 12│ 3
───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┼───────────────────────
Total classifiable │ 38│ 18
═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════╧═══════════════════════
Of the thirty-eight in favor of the Constitution, who may be reasonably
classified, ten, or one-fourth, represented agricultural interests
primarily. Of the eighteen, opposed to the Constitution, who may be
satisfactorily classified, thirteen or more than two-thirds were
primarily identified with agricultural interests. Of the forty-six
favorable, twenty were capitalists and lawyers; of the twenty-three
opposed, four were in these categories. When all allowance for error is
made, the result is highly significant and bears out the general
conclusion that the Constitution was a reflex of personalty rather than
realty interests.
_Maryland._—In Maryland the mercantile interests of the towns were all
on the side of the Constitution; and as the urban centres were the seats
of operations in public securities these too must be thrown into the
balance. The opposition came from the rural districts and particularly
from the paper money constituencies. Libby discovered there, “a
correspondence between the friends of paper money and debt laws and the
Anti-Federal party of 1788, both as to leaders and to the rank and file
of the respective parties.”[667]
But it should be noted that we are now leaving the regions of small
farms and of estates tilled by free labor and are coming into the
districts where slavery and the plantation system dominate rural
economy. Indeed, the slaveholding plantations were so extensive and the
small farming class so restricted that the paper money party would have
been seriously weakened had it not been for the fact that their ranks
were recruited from other sources. A contemporary, speaking of the
election of delegates to the convention, says: “Baltimore and Hartford
counties alone are clearly anti-Federal, in which are many powerful and
popular men who have speculated deeply in British confiscated property
and for that reason are alarmed at shutting the door against state paper
money. The same men, their relations and particular friends are more
violently anti-Federal because they paid considerable sums into the
treasury in depreciated continental currency and are scared at the
sweeping clause ... which may bring about a due execution of the treaty
between Great Britain and America to their loss.[668]
_Virginia._—Fortunately, for Virginia we have a somewhat detailed study
of the economic forces in the politics of that commonwealth by Dr.
Charles H. Ambler. By way of preparation he examines the geographical
distribution of economic characteristics, and takes up first the
Tidewater region. Of this portion of the state, he says, “The
industrial, social and political life of the Tidewater centered in the
large estate.... The society which developed in the Tidewater ...
resembled that of the mother country. It consisted of several strata
separated by no clearly marked lines. Along the large rivers there were
the great landowners who lived in a style of luxury and extravagance
beyond the means of other inhabitants. Immediately below them were the
half-breeds, persons descended from the younger sons and daughters of
the landed proprietors. They had all the pride and social tastes of the
upper class but not its wealth. Then came the ‘pretenders,’ men of
industry and enterprise but not of established families.... Below these
classes were the ‘yeomen,’ most of whom were very poor. The system of
entail and primogeniture operated to preserve these strata intact.”[669]
The Tidewater region was almost solid in favor of ratifying the
Constitution.
The second geographical division of Virginia, according to Dr. Ambler,
was the Piedmont region, which resembled in many respects the Tidewater
but had some decided characteristics of its own. “Although one and
two-thirds times as large as the Tidewater, the Piedmont, in 1790
contained a much smaller negro slave population. Immigrants from the
northern colonies, who, as will be shown, had pushed into the Valley,
came into the Piedmont from the rear. For the most part they were
conscientiously opposed to slaveholding and consequently did not become
tobacco-growers. On the other hand the poorer whites of the Tidewater
had been pushed by the gradual advance of the plantation into the less
desirable lands of the Piedmont. Lack of ability and the presence of
conscientious scruples prevented them from becoming large planters.
These elements constituted a large and influential democratic and
non-slaveholding population in the Piedmont.”[670] This region was
largely against ratifying the Constitution.
Beyond the Piedmont lay the Valley which was largely settled by
Scotch-Irish and Germans, and the economic basis was the small farm with
all that it implies. Here the political theories, says Ambler “differed
widely from those entertained in the east. The Germans and the
Scotch-Irish brought to the Valley the sacred traditions of the years of
religious wars which taught hatred to an established church, antipathy
to a government by the privileged, and a love for civic and personal
liberty. To the Scotch-Irish, the political leaders, civil liberty meant
freedom of person, the right of fee-simple possession, and an open door
to civic honors.”[671] The markets for this region were at Baltimore and
Philadelphia. This fact, coupled with several peculiar social
characteristics may partially account for the heavy vote for the
Constitution; but the sentiment in favor of the new government in this
region has not yet been traced to economic reasons.
To the far West lay the Kentucky region whose frontier economic
characteristics need no description. There the sentiment was almost
solid against the ratification of the Constitution.
At the time of the movement for the adoption of a new national
Constitution, the self-sufficient western regions of Virginia were
practically indifferent; and the eastern section was the part of the
state in which there was a conscious determination to bring about a
change. At this time, says Ambler, “The towns of the Tidewater chafed
under the British restrictions upon trade and desired better commercial
relations between the states. Of the numerous petitions to the assembly
on these subjects, that from Norfolk was, perhaps, the most significant.
It claimed that the restrictions on the West India trade and the foreign
commercial monopolies were producing injury to Virginia, and asked for
restriction on British trade and better commercial relations between the
states.... Petitions of a similar tone came from Fredericksburg,
Falmouth, Alexandria, and Port Royal.”[672]
Against the indifference and opposition of the western districts, the
east prevailed in the contest over the proposition to send delegates to
the federal Convention; and Washington, Madison, Mason, Henry, Randolph,
Wythe, and Blair were named—“all residents of the Tidewater, except
Henry and Madison.”[673] This result was partly due to the fact that the
Tidewater region was over-represented in the state legislature according
to population, and partly to the superior cohesion of the interests
affected.[674]
The same economic antagonism that was manifested in the selection of
delegates to the federal Convention was again manifested in the state
convention called to ratify the Constitution. “The democratic leaders of
the interior,” says Ambler, “declared that it [the Constitution]
sacrificed the state’s sovereignty. Accordingly they made a desperate
fight to secure the election of delegates pledged to vote against
ratification. When the canvass was ended it was not known which side
would be successful, so evenly were the friends and enemies of the new
plan of federal government matched. From the Tidewater came a strong
delegation favorable to ratification. It numbered among its members the
most prominent characters of the Virginia bar, former sympathizers with
Great Britain, and representatives of interests essentially commercial.
The other delegates favorable to ratification came from the Valley and
the northwestern part of the state. Most of them had seen service in the
Revolutionary armies and were largely under the influence of Washington.
The Kentucky country and the Piedmont sent delegates opposed to
ratification.... The vote on the ratification was: ayes 89, nays 79 ...
practically all the lower Tidewater [being] in favor of ratification.
Only two delegates from Shenandoah valley and that part of the
Trans-Alleghany north of the Great Kanawha voted nay. The democratic
Piedmont and the Kentucky country was almost unanimous in opposition to
the Constitution.”[675]
These conclusions reached by Ambler closely support Libby’s survey. In
speaking of the distribution of the vote on the Constitution in
Virginia, he says: “Four well-marked sections are to be noted.... The
first, the eastern, comprised all the counties in tidewater Virginia.
Its vote on the Constitution stood 80 per cent for and 20 per cent
against ratification. This was the region of the large towns, and where
commercial interests were predominant. The middle district, lying
farther west to the Blue Ridge mountains, represented the interior
farming interests of the state; the class of small farmers made up the
principal part of its population. Its vote on the Constitution stood 26
per cent for and 74 per cent against adoption. The third, the West
Virginia district is really double, composed of the Shenandoah Valley,
in which lay the bulk of the population and the sparsely settled
Trans-Alleghany region. This, also, was an agricultural section with a
population chiefly Scotch-Irish and Germans from Pennsylvania. Its vote
stood 97 per cent for and 3 per cent against the Constitution....[676]
The fourth, or Kentucky district comprised all that territory west of
the great Kanawha to the Cumberland River. Its vote stood 10 per cent
for and 90 per cent against.... The question of the opening of the
Mississippi river was the decisive one in determining the vote of this
section.”[677]
That public securities also carried some weight in the Virginia counties
which were strongly favorable to the Constitution is shown by the
following table of the delegates (all, except Thomas Read, favorable to
the Constitution) to the state convention from the towns and the
seaboard or tidewater regions. Those italicised were holders of paper to
some amount and appear on the _Index to Virginia Funds_ in the Mss. of
the Treasury Department. Those not italicised were not discovered on the
books.
Fairfax County—_David Stuart_ and _Charles Simms_.
King George—Burdet Ashton and William Thornton.
Westmoreland—_Henry Lee_ and _Bushrod Washington_.
Northumberland—Walter Jones and Thomas Gaskins.
Richmond County—_Walker Tomlin_ (as Executor) and _William Peachy_ (as
Executor).
Lancaster—James Gordon and Henry Towles.
Gloucester—_Warner Lewis_ and Thomas Smith.
York—_John Blair_ and _George Wyeth_.
Princess Anne—Anthony Walke and Thomas Walke.
Norfolk—James Webb and _James Taylor_. (Portsmouth.)
Henrico—(Richmond City)—_Edmund Randolph_ and _John Marshall_.
James City—_Nathl. Burwell_ and _Robert Andrews_.
Elizabeth City—Miles King and Worlich Westwood.
Charlotte—_Paul Carrington_ and Thomas Read.[678]
_North Carolina._—North Carolina was at first overwhelmingly
Anti-Federal. It had peculiar economic characteristics. Though in the
south, it had a large body of small farmers; and the great slave-tilled
plantation was not such a marked feature of its economy as it was of
South Carolina. It had small mercantile interests as compared with
Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina,
with their considerable seaport towns. And perhaps most significant of
all was the fact that a very large proportion of the public securities
in that state were bought up by speculators from northern cities[679]
and therefore not held by native inhabitants in the centres of
influence. This must have had a very deadening effect on the spirit of
the movement for ratification.
Owing to these peculiarities, it is impossible to lay out North Carolina
into such sharply differentiated economic regions as some of the other
commonwealths. Nevertheless, certain lines are marked out by Libby in
his survey of the vote in 1789 when the Constitution was finally
ratified. “The counties around Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds constituted
the bulk of the federal area.... This region was the earliest settled,
the most densely populated, and represented most of the mercantile and
commercial interests of the state.” With this region went some
additional inland districts when the swing to the Federalists carried
the state for ratification. The second region was in the centre of the
state where the “interests were wholly agricultural;” this region was
strongly Anti-Federal. To it was added the Tennessee region, also
Anti-Federal, for the same reasons that carried western Virginia against
the Constitution.[680]
_South Carolina._—South Carolina presents the economic elements in the
ratification with the utmost simplicity. There we find two rather
sharply marked districts in antagonism over the Constitution. “The rival
sections,” says Libby, “were the coast or lower district and the upper,
or more properly, the middle and upper country. The coast region was the
first settled and contained a larger portion of the wealth of the state;
its mercantile and commercial interests were important; its church was
the Episcopal, supported by the state.” This region, it is scarcely
necessary to remark, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Constitution.
The upper area, against the Constitution, “was a frontier section, the
last to receive settlement; its lands were fertile and its mixed
population were largely small farmers.... There was no established
church, each community supported its own church and there was a great
variety in the district.”[681]
A contemporary writer, R. G. Harper, calls attention to the fact that
the lower country, Charleston, Beaufort, and Georgetown, which had
28,694 white inhabitants, and about seven-twelfths of the representation
in the state convention, paid £28,081:5:10 taxes in 1794, while the
upper country, with 120,902 inhabitants, and five-twelfths of the
representation in the convention, paid only £8390:13:3 taxes.[682] The
lower districts in favor of the Constitution therefore possessed the
wealth of the state and a disproportionate share in the convention—on
the basis of the popular distribution of representation.[683]
These divisions of economic interest are indicated by the abstracts of
the tax returns for the state in 1794 which show that of £127,337 worth
of stock in trade, faculties, etc. listed for taxation in the state,
£109,800 worth was in Charleston, city and county—the stronghold of
Federalism. Of the valuation of lots in towns and villages to the amount
of £656,272 in the state, £549,909 was located in that city and
county.[684]
The records of the South Carolina loan office preserved in the Treasury
Department at Washington show that the public securities of that state
were more largely in the hands of inhabitants than was the case in North
Carolina. They also show a heavy concentration in the Charleston
district.
At least fourteen of the thirty-one members of the state ratifying
convention from the parishes of St. Philip and Saint Michael, Charleston
(all of whom favored ratification) held over $75,000 worth of public
securities, which amount was distributed unevenly among the following
men:
John Blake
Danl. Cannon
Edw. Darrell
John F. Grimke
Wm. Johnson
Thomas Jones
Lewis Morris
Isaac Motte
C. C. Pinckney
John Pringle
David Ramsay
Nathaniel Russel
Josiah Smith
Danl. de Soussure[685]
_Georgia._—Georgia was one of the states that gave a speedy and
unanimous consent to the adoption of the Constitution. If there was any
considerable contest there, no record of it appears on the surface; and
no thorough research has ever been made into the local unprinted
records.[686] Libby dismisses the state with the suggestion that the
pressing dangers from the Indians on the frontiers, which were
formidable and threatening in the summer and autumn of 1787, were
largely responsible for the swift and favorable action of the state in
ratifying the new instrument of government that promised protection
under national arms.[687]
Three conclusions seem warranted by the data presented in this chapter:
Inasmuch as the movement for the ratification of the Constitution
centred particularly in the regions in which mercantile, manufacturing,
security, and personalty interests generally had their greatest
strength, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that holders of
personalty saw in the new government a strength and defence to their
advantage.
Inasmuch as so many leaders in the movement for ratification were large
security holders, and inasmuch as securities constituted such a large
proportion of personalty, this economic interest must have formed a very
considerable dynamic element, if not the preponderating element, in
bringing about the adoption of the new system.
The state conventions do not seem to have been more “disinterested” than
the Philadelphia convention; but in fact the leading champions of the
new government appear to have been, for the most part, men of the same
practical type, with actual economic advantages at stake.
The opposition to the Constitution almost uniformly came from the
agricultural regions, and from the areas in which debtors had been
formulating paper money and other depreciatory schemes.[688]
CHAPTER XI
THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT OVER RATIFICATION AS VIEWED BY CONTEMPORARIES
Having discovered the nature of the social conflict connected with the
formation and adoption of the Constitution, and having shown the
probable proportion of the people who participated in the conflict and
the several group interests into which they fell, it is interesting,
though not fundamentally important, to inquire whether the leading
thinkers of the time observed the nature of the antagonisms present in
the process. A full statement of the results of such an inquiry would
require far more space than is at command in this volume; and
consequently only a few illustrative and representative opinions can be
given.
No one can pore for weeks over the letters, newspapers, and pamphlets of
the years 1787–1789 without coming to the conclusion that there was a
deep-seated conflict between a popular party based on paper money and
agrarian interests, and a conservative party centred in the towns and
resting on financial, mercantile, and personal property interests
generally. It is true that much of the fulmination in pamphlets was
concerned with controversies over various features of the Constitution;
but those writers who went to the bottom of matters, such as the authors
of _The Federalist_, and the more serious Anti-Federalists, gave careful
attention to the basic elements in the struggle as well as to the
incidental controversial details.
The superficiality of many of the ostensible reasons put forth by the
opponents of the Constitution was penetrated by Madison. Writing to
Jefferson, in October, 1788, he says: “The little pamphlet herewith
inclosed will give you a collective view of the alterations which have
been proposed by the State Conventions for the new Constitution. Various
and numerous as they appear, they certainly omit many of the true
grounds of opposition. The articles relating to Treaties, to paper
money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all the errors in the
system, positive and negative, put together.”[689]
Naturally the more circumspect of the pamphleteers who lent their
support to the new system were careful about a too precise alignment of
forces, for their strength often lay in the conciliation of opponents
rather than in exciting a more deep-seated antagonism. But even in such
conciliatory publications the material advantages to be expected from
the adoption of the Constitution are constantly put forward.
Take, for example, this extract from a mollifying “Address to the
Freemen of America” issued while the Convention was in the midst of its
deliberations: “Let the public creditor, who lent his money to his
country, and the soldier and citizen who yielded their services, come
forward next and contribute their aid to establish an effective federal
government. It is from the united power and resources of America only
that they can expect permanent and substantial justice.... Let the
citizens of America who inhabit the western counties of our states fly
to a federal power for protection [against the Indians].... Let the
farmer who groans beneath the weight of direct taxation seek relief from
a government whose extensive jurisdiction will enable it to extract the
resources of our country by means of imposts and customs. Let the
merchant, who complains of the restrictions and exclusions imposed upon
his vessels by foreign nations, unite his influence in establishing a
power that shall retaliate those injuries and insure him success in his
honest pursuits by a general system of commercial regulations. Let the
manufacturer and mechanic, who are everywhere languishing for want of
employment, direct their eyes to an assembly of the states. It will be
in their power only to encourage such arts and manufactures as are
essential to the prosperity of our country.”[690]
It is in the literature of the contest in the states where the battle
over ratification was hottest that we find the most frank recognition of
the fact that one class of property interests was in conflict with
another. This recognition appears not so much in attacks on opponents as
in appeals to the groups which have the most at stake in the outcome of
the struggle, although virulent abuse of debtors and paper money
advocates is quite common. Merchants, money lenders, public creditors
are constantly urged to support the Constitution on the ground that
their economic security depends upon the establishment of the new
national government.
Perhaps the spirit of the battle over ratification is best reflected in
the creed ironically attributed to each of the contending parties by its
opponents. The recipe for an Anti-Federalist essay which indicates in a
very concise way the class-bias that actuated the opponents of the
Constitution, ran in this manner: “Wellborn, nine times—Aristocracy,
eighteen times—Liberty of the Press, thirteen times repeated—Liberty of
Conscience, once—Negro slavery, once mentioned—Trial by jury, seven
times—Great Men, six times repeated—Mr. Wilson, forty times....—put them
altogether and dish them up at pleasure.”[691]
To this sarcastic statement of their doctrines, the Anti-Federalists
replied by formulating the “Political Creed of Every Federalist” as
follows: “I believe in the infallibility, all-sufficient wisdom, and
infinite goodness of the late convention; or in other words, I believe
that some men are of so perfect a nature that it is absolutely
impossible for them to commit errors or design villainy. I believe that
the great body of the people are incapable of judging in their nearest
concerns, and that, therefore, they ought to be guided by the opinions
of their superiors.... I believe that aristocracy is the best form of
government.... I believe that trial by jury and the freedom of the press
ought to be exploded from every wise government.... I believe that the
new constitution will prove the bulwark of liberty—the balm of
misery—the essence of justice—and the astonishment of all mankind. In
short, I believe that it is the best form of government which has ever
been offered to the world. I believe that to speak, write, read, think,
or hear any thing against the proposed government is damnable heresy,
execrable rebellion, and high treason against the sovereign majesty of
the convention—And lastly I believe that every person who differs from
me in belief is an infernal villain. AMEN.”[692]
MARSHALL’S ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
It must not be thought that this antagonism of economic interests which,
in the language of controversy, frequently took on the form of a war
between “aristocracy” and “democracy” was observed only by partisans
whose views were distorted by the heat of battle. On the contrary, it
was understood by the keenest thinkers—in fact, one may say that the
more profound the wisdom of the observer, the clearer was his
comprehension of the issues at stake. Next to Madison, whose concept of
the Constitution-making process has already been fully discussed,[693]
John Marshall probably understood best the nature of the new instrument,
the social forces which produced it, and the great objects it was
designed to accomplish. In speaking from the bench, as Chief Justice, he
used, of course, the language of jurisprudence and spoke of the
Constitution as a creation of the whole people.[694] But as a historian
of great acumen, in which capacity he was not hampered by the
traditional language of the bench and bar, Marshall sketched with
unerring hand the economic conflict which led to the adoption of the
Constitution, and impressed itself upon the nature of that instrument.
In his masterly _Life of Washington_, he sets forth this conflict in
unmistakable terms:
1. In the first place, the mercantile interest was sorely tried under
the Articles of Confederation. There “was a general discontent with the
course of trade. It had commenced with the native merchants of the north
who found themselves incapable of contending in their own ports with
foreigners; and was soon communicated to others. The gazettes of Boston
contained some very animated and angry addresses which produced
resolutions for the government of the citizens of that town,
applications to their state legislature, a petition to congress, and a
circular letter to the merchants of the several sea ports throughout the
United States.... The merchants of the city of Philadelphia presented a
memorial to the legislature of that state, in which, after lamenting it
as a fundamental defect in the constitution that full and entire power
over the commerce of the United States had not been originally vested in
Congress ... they prayed that the legislature would endeavour to procure
from Congress a recommendation to the several states to vest in that
body the necessary powers over the commerce of the United States.”[695]
2. The public creditors had lost faith in the old government. “That the
debt of the United States should have greatly depreciated will excite no
surprise when it is recollected that the government of the Union
possessed no funds, and without the assent of jealous and independent
sovereigns could acquire none to pay the accruing interest; but the
depreciation of the debt due from those states, which made an annual and
adequate provision for the interest, can be ascribed only to a want of
confidence in the governments which were controlled by no fixed
principles; and it is therefore not entirely unworthy of attention. In
many of those states which had repelled every attempt to introduce into
circulation a depreciated medium of commerce or to defeat the annual
provision of funds for the payment of the interest, the debt sunk in
value to ten, five, and even less than four shillings in the pound.
However unexceptionable might be the conduct of the existing
legislature, the hazard from those which were to follow was too great to
be encountered without an immense premium.”
3. A profound division ensued throughout the United States based on
different views of the rights of property. “At length,” continues
Marshall, “two great parties were formed in every state which were
distinctly marked and which pursued distinct objects with systematic
arrangement. The one struggled with unabated zeal for the exact
observance of public and private engagements. By those belonging to it,
the faith of a nation or of a private man was deemed a sacred pledge,
the violation of which was equally forbidden by the principles of moral
justice and of sound policy. The distresses of individuals were, they
thought, to be alleviated only by industry and frugality, not by a
relaxation of the laws or by a sacrifice of the rights of others. They
were consequently the uniform friends of a regular administration of
justice, and of a vigorous course of taxation which would enable the
state to comply with its engagements. By a natural association of ideas,
they were also, with very few exceptions, in favor of enlarging the
powers of the federal government....
“The other party marked out for themselves a more indulgent course.
Viewing with extreme tenderness the case of the debtor, their efforts
were unceasingly directed to his relief. To exact a faithful compliance
with contracts was, in their opinion, a harsh measure which the people
would not bear. They were uniformly in favor of relaxing the
administration of justice, of affording facilities for the payment of
debts, or of suspending their collection, and of remitting taxes. The
same course of opinion led them to resist every attempt to transfer from
their own hands into those of congress powers which by others were
deemed essential to the preservation of the union. In many of these
states, the party last mentioned constituted a decided majority of the
people, and in all of them it was very powerful. The emission of paper
money, the delay of legal proceedings, and the suspension of the
collection of taxes were the fruits of their rule wherever they were
completely predominant.... Throughout the union, a contest between these
parties was periodically revived; and the public mind was perpetually
agitated with hopes and fears on subjects which essentially affected the
fortunes of a considerable proportion of society.”
4. Finally, so sharp was this division into two parties on the lines of
divergent views of property rights, that the Constitution, far from
proceeding from “the whole people,” barely escaped defeat altogether. So
positive is this statement by the great Chief Justice and so decidedly
does it contradict his juristic theory of the nature of the supreme law
that the two should be studied together. For this reason, the two views
enunciated by Marshall are printed in parallel columns:
“So balanced were the parties in “The government [of the United
some of them [the states] that States] proceeds directly from
even after the subject had been the people; it is ‘ordained and
discussed for a considerable time, established’ in the name of the
the fate of the constitution people; and it is declared to be
could scarcely be conjectured; ordained ‘in order to form a more
and so small in many instances, perfect union, establish justice,
was the majority in its favor, insure domestic tranquillity, and
as to afford strong ground secure the blessings of liberty’
for the opinion that, had the to themselves and to their
influence of character been posterity.... The government of
removed, the intrinsic merits of the Union then (whatever may be
the instrument would not have the influence of this fact on the
secured its adoption. Indeed it case) is, emphatically and truly,
is scarcely to be doubted that a government of the people. In
in some of the adopting states a form and substance it emanates
majority of the people were in from them. Its powers are granted
the opposition. In all of them, by them and are to be exercised
the numerous amendments which directly on them and for their
were proposed demonstrate the benefit.... It is the government
reluctance with which the new of all; its powers are delegated
government was accepted; and that by all; it represents all, and
a dread of dismemberment, not an acts for all.” Marshall, in
approbation of the particular McCulloch _vs._ Maryland (4
system under consideration, had Wheaton, 316), in 1819.
induced an acquiescence in it....
North Carolina and Rhode Island
did not at first accept the
constitution, and New York was
apparently dragged into it by a
repugnance to being excluded from
the confederacy.” Marshall, in his
_Life of Washington_, written
in 1804–07.
THE CONFLICT IN THE STATES
Turning aside from these more general observations on the nature of the
conflict over the ratification of the Constitution, let us now take up
the struggle in the several states and examine the views entertained by
some of the representative participants in it.
_New Hampshire._—That New Hampshire was rather sharply divided into an
“aristocratic” and a “country” party at the period of the adoption of
the Constitution was remarked by an observing Frenchman;[696] and the
New Hampshire Spy, published at Portsmouth, in the issue of October 27,
1787; aligns the mercantile and mechanical interest on the side of the
new Constitution; adding that the “honest farmer” can have no
objections, either. “The _honest man_,” runs the plea, “can have no
objection to a federal government, for while it obliges him to pay a
sacred regard to past contracts, it will eventually secure him in his
person and his property. The _mercantile interest_ have suffered enough
_to induce_ them to wish for, and espouse a federal reform.... The
_mechanical interest_ can have no aversion to it, when they are informed
that an efficient government will protect and encourage commerce, which
is the very soul of mechanism.... Nor can the _honest farmer_ have any
objection; the increase of commerce will naturally increase the demand
for such articles as he may have for sale; he will be enabled to pay his
taxes and, if economy shakes hands with industry, increase his farm and
live independent of troublesome creditors. Since then no one respectable
order of citizens can have any just reason to reject the new
Constitution, we may venture to conclude that none but _fools_,
_blockheads_, and _mad men_ will dare oppose it.”
_Massachusetts._—The contest over the Constitution in Massachusetts was
a sharp conflict between the personalty interests on the one hand and
the small farmers and debtors on the other, and this fact seems to have
been recognized by every thoughtful leader on both sides. This view of
the social struggle was set forth on so many occasions and by so many
eminent observers that it is difficult to select from the mass of
material the most typical statement of the situation. Perhaps that by
General Knox is not excelled for its clarity and conciseness. Writing to
Washington, January 14, 1788, a few days after the state convention had
begun its labors, he describes the alignment over ratification as
follows:
“There are three parties existing in that state [Massachusetts] at
present, differing in their numbers and greatly differing in their
wealth and talents.
“The 1st. is the commercial part of the state to which are added all the
men of considerable property, the clergy, the lawyers—including all the
judges of all the courts, and all the officers of the late army, and
also the neighborhood of all the great towns—its numbers may include
3/7ths of the state. This party are for vigorous government, perhaps
many of them would have been still more pleased with the new
Constitution had it been more analogous to the British Constitution.
“The 2d party are the eastern part of the state lying beyond New
Hampshire formerly the province of Main—This party are chiefly looking
towards the erection of a new state and the majority of them will adopt
or reject the new Constitution as it may facilitate or retard their
designs—this party 2/7ths.
“The 3d party are the Insurgents or their favorers, the great majority
of whom are for an annihilation of debts, public and private, and
therefore they will not approve the new Constitution—this party
2/7ths.”[697]
Several months before Knox had formulated this view of the conflict,
indeed, early in the struggle over ratification, the Federalist
agitators were busy with appeals to practical economic interests. The
Massachusetts Gazette of October 26, 1787, for example, contains a
letter signed by “Marcus” in which the groups likely to be affected
advantageously by the new Constitution are enumerated and an argument
directed to each of them: “It is the interest of the merchants to
encourage the new constitution, because commerce may then be a national
object, and nations will form treaties with us. It is the interest of
the mechanicks to join the mercantile interest, because it is not their
interest to quarrel with their bread and butter. It is the interest of
the farmer because the prosperity of commerce gives vent to his produce,
raises the value of his lands, and commercial duties will alleviate the
burden of his taxes. It is the interest of the landholder, because
thousands in Europe, with moderate fortunes will migrate to this country
if an efficient government gives them a prospect of tranquillity. It is
the interest of all gentlemen and men of property, because they will see
many low demagogues reduced to their tools, whose upstart dominion
insults their feelings, and whose passions for popularity will dictate
laws, which ruin the minority of creditors and please the majority of
debtors. It is the interest of the American soldier as the military
profession will then be respectable and Florida may be conquered in a
campaign. The spoils of the West Indies and South America may enrich the
next generation of Cincinnati. It is the interest of the lawyers who
have ability and genius, because the dignities in the Supreme Court will
interest professional ambition and create emulation which is not now
felt.... It is the interest of the clergy, as civil tumults excite every
passion—the soul is neglected and the clergy starve. It is the interest
of all men whose education has been liberal and extensive because there
will be a theatre for the display of talents.”
In fact, from the very beginning of the movement, the most eminent
advocates of a new system were aware of the real nature of the struggle
which lay before them. They knew that there was a deep-seated antagonism
between the “natural aristocracy” and the “turbulent democracy” which
was giving the government of Massachusetts trouble. Such an analysis of
the difficulty is set forth by Stephen Higginson, a leading Federalist
of Boston, in March, 1787: “The people of the interior parts of these
states [New England] have by far too much political knowledge and too
strong a relish for unrestrained freedom, to be governed by our feeble
system, and too little acquaintance with real sound policy or rational
freedom and too little virtue to govern themselves. They have become too
well acquainted with their own weight in the political scale under such
governments as ours and have too high a taste for luxury and dissipation
to sit down contented in their proper line, when they see others
possessed of much more property than themselves. With these feelings and
sentiments they will not be quiet while such distinctions exist as to
rank and property; and sensible of their own force, they will not rest
easy till they possess the reins of Government and have divided property
with their betters, or they shall be compelled by force to submit to
their proper stations and mode of living.”[698]
Discerning opponents of the Constitution, as well as its advocates, were
aware of the alignment of forces in the battle. Rufus King explained to
Madison in January, 1788, that the opposition was grounded on antagonism
to property rather than to the outward aspects of the new system.
“Apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger,” he said,
“and a distrust of men of property or education have a more powerful
effect upon the minds of our opponents than any specific objections
against the Constitution.... The opposition complains that the lawyers,
judges, clergymen, merchants, and men of education are all in favor of
the Constitution—and for that reason they appear to be able to make the
worse appear the better cause.”[699]
The correctness of King’s observation is sustained by a vigorous writer
in the Boston Gazette and Country Journal of November 26, 1787, who
charges the supporters of the Constitution with attempting to obscure
the real nature of the instrument, and enumerates the interests
advocating its adoption. “At length,” says the writer, “the luminary of
intelligence begins to beam its effulgent rays upon this important
production; the deceptive mists cast before the eyes of the people by
the delusive machinations of its INTERESTED advocates begins to
dissipate, as darkness flies before the burning taper.... Those furious
zealots who are for cramming it down the throats of the people without
allowing them either time or opportunity to scan or weigh it in the
balance of their intelligences, bear the same marks in their features as
those who have been long wishing to erect an aristocracy in THIS
COMMONWEALTH—their menacing cry is for a RIGID government, it matters
little to them of what kind, provided it answers THAT description....
They incessantly declare that none can discover any defect in the system
but bankrupts who wish no government and officers of the present
government who fear to lose a part of their power.... It may not be
improper to scan the characters of its most strenuous advocates: it will
first be allowed that many undesigning citizens may wish its adoption
from the best motives, but these are modest and silent, when compared to
the greater number, who endeavor to suppress all attempts for
investigations; these violent partisans are for having the people gulp
down the gilded pill blindfolded, whole, and without any qualification
whatever, these consist generally, of the NOBLE order of C—s, holders of
public securities, men of great wealth and expectations of public
office, B—k—s and L—y—s: these with their train of dependents from
[form] the aristocratick combination.”
Probably the most reasoned statement of the antagonism of realty and
personalty in its relation to the adoption of the Constitution in
Massachusetts was made in the letters of “Cornelius” on December 11 and
18, 1787: “I wish,” he said, “there never might be any competition
between the landed and the mercantile interests, nor between any
different classes of men whatever. Such competition will, however,
exist, so long as occasion and opportunity for it is given, and while
human nature remains the same that it has ever been. The citizens in the
seaport towns are numerous; they live compact; their interests are one;
there is a constant connection and intercourse between them; they can,
on any occasion, centre their votes where they please. This is not the
case with those who are in the landed interest; they are scattered far
and wide; they have but little intercourse and connection with each
other.... I conceive a foundation is laid for throwing the whole power
of the federal government into the hands of those who are in the
mercantile interest; and for the landed, which is the great interest of
this country, to lie unrepresented, forlorn, and without hope. It
grieves me to suggest an idea of this kind: But I believe it to be
important and not the mere phantom of imagination, or the result of an
uneasy and restless disposition.”[700]
_Connecticut._—There was no such spirited battle of wits over
ratification in Connecticut as occurred in Massachusetts. Nevertheless,
Ellsworth, in that state, produced a remarkable series of essays in
support of the new Constitution which were widely circulated and read.
In these papers there is revealed a positive antagonism between
agrarianism and personalty, but an attempt is made at conciliation by
subtly blending the two interests. Ellsworth opens: “The writer of the
following passed the first part of his life in mercantile employments,
and by industry and economy acquired a sufficient sum on retiring from
trade to purchase and stock a decent plantation, on which he now lives
in the state of a farmer. By his present employment he is interested in
the prosperity of agriculture and those who derive a support from
cultivating the earth. An acquaintance with business has freed him from
many prejudices and jealousies which he sees in his neighbors who have
not intermingled with mankind nor learned by experience the method of
managing an extensive circulating property. Conscious of an honest
intention he wishes to address his brethren on some political subjects
which now engage the public attention and will in the sequel greatly
influence the value of landed property.”[701]
The fact that the essential implications of this statement about his
primary economic interests being those of a farmer are untrue does not
affect the point here raised: Ellsworth recognised that the opposition
was agrarian in character, and he simulated the guise of a farmer to
conciliate it. Later on Ellsworth classifies the opposition. In the
first rank he puts the Tories as leading in resisting the adoption of
the Constitution because it would embarrass Great Britain. In the second
class, Ellsworth puts those who owe money. “Debtors in desperate
circumstances,” he says, “who have not resolution to be either honest or
industrious will be the next men to take alarm. They have long been
upheld by the property of their creditors and the mercy of the public,
and daily destroy a thousand honest men who are unsuspicious. Paper
money and tender acts is the only atmosphere in which they can breathe
and live. This is now so generally known that by being a friend to such
measures, a man effectually advertises himself as a bankrupt.... There
is another kind of people who will be found in the opposition: Men of
much self-importance and supposed skill in politics who are not of
sufficient consequence to obtain public employment, but can spread
jealousies in the little districts of country where they are placed.
These are always jealous of men in place and of public measures, and aim
at making themselves consequential by distrusting everyone in the higher
offices of society.... But in the present case men who have lucrative
and influential state offices, if they act from principles of self
interest will be tempted to oppose an alteration which would doubtless
be beneficial to the people. To sink from a controulment of finance or
any other great departments of the state, thro’ want of ability or
opportunity to act a part in the federal system must be a terrifying
consideration.”[702]
Leaving aside the Tories and office-holders, it is apparent that the
element which Ellsworth considers the most weighty in the opposition is
the agrarian party. The correctness of his analysis is supported by
collateral pieces of evidence. Sharon, one of the leading paper money
towns which opposed the ratification of the Constitution in Connecticut
had voted to assist Shays and had repeatedly attempted to secure paper
emission legislation.[703] In a few letters and speeches against the
Constitution the plaintive note of the agrarian is discernible.
The opponents of the Constitution in Connecticut found no skilled
champions such as led the fight in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts; and
no such spirited discussion took place. The debates in the state
ratifying convention were not recorded (save for a few fragments); but
the contest in the legislature over the proposition to send delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention showed that the resistance came from the
smaller agrarian interests similar to those in Rhode Island and
Massachusetts which had stood against the whole movement.
Mr. Granger from Suffield was opposed to the proposition to send
delegates to Philadelphia because “he conceived it would be disagreeable
to his constituents; he thought the liberties of the people would be
endangered by it; ... and concluded by saying that he imagined these
things would have a tendency to produce a regal government in this
country.” Mr. Humphrey from the inland town of Norfolk sided with Mr.
Granger and “concluded by saying that he approved the wisdom and policy
of Rhode Island in refusing to send delegates to the convention and that
the conduct of that state in this particular, was worthy of imitation.”
Mr. Perkins of Enfield “was opposed to the measure and said that the
state would send men that had been delicately bred and who were in
affluent circumstances, that could not feel for the people in this day
of distress.”[704]
_New York._—When it is remembered that the greatest piece of
argumentation produced by the contest over ratification, _The
Federalist_, was directed particularly to the electorate in New York,
although widely circulated elsewhere, it will appear a work of
supererogation to inquire whether the leaders in that commonwealth
understood the precise nature of the social conflict which was being
waged.[705] Nevertheless, it may be worth while to present Hamilton’s
analysis of it. On the side of the Constitution, he placed the “very
great weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in
the universal popularity of General Washington—the good will of the
commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its
efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating,
protecting, and extending the commerce of the Union—the good will of
most men of property in the several states who wish a government of the
Union able to protect them against domestic violence and the
depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on
property ...—a strong belief in the people at large of the insufficiency
of the present confederation to preserve the existence of the Union.”
Over against these forces in favor of the Constitution, Hamilton places
the antagonism of some inconsiderable men in office under state
governments, the influence of some considerable men playing the part of
the demagogue for their own aggrandizement;—“and add to these causes the
democratical jealousy of the people which may be alarmed at the
appearance of institutions that may seem calculated to place the power
of the community in a few hands and raise a few individuals to stations
of great preeminence.”[706]
_New Jersey_ and _Delaware_.—The speedy ratification of the Constitution
in these states gave no time for the development of a sharp antagonism,
even had there been an economic basis for it. In the absence of this
actual conflict over the Constitution we can hardly expect to find any
consideration of the subject by contemporary writers of note.[707]
_Pennsylvania._—The opposition between town and country, between
personalty and realty in other words, was so marked in this commonwealth
during the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution that it
was patent to all observers and was the subject of frequent and
extensive comment by leaders on both sides. On September 28, 1787, Tench
Coxe wrote to Madison describing the disturbance over the resolution in
the state legislature calling the ratifying convention, and after
reciting the events of the day he added, “It appears from these facts
that the Western people [i.e. the agrarians] have a good deal of
jealousy about the new Constitution and it is very clear that the men
who have been used to lead the Constitutional [or radical party][708]
are against it decidedly.”[709] A month later Coxe again writes to
Madison: “The opposition here has become more open. It is by those
leaders of the constitutional [local radical] interest who have acted in
concert with the Western interest. The people of the party in the city
are chiefly federal, tho’ not so I fear in the Counties.”[710]
Writing about the same time from Philadelphia to Washington, Gouverneur
Morris said: “With respect to this state, I am far from being decided in
my opinion that they will consent. It is true that the City and its
Neighborhood was enthusiastic in the cause; but I dread the cold and
sower temper of the back counties and still more the wicked industry of
those who have long habituated themselves to live on the public, and
cannot bear the idea of being removed from power and profit of state
government which has been and still is the means of supporting
themselves, their families, and their dependents.”[711] Such comments on
the nature of the alignment of forces might be multiplied from the
writings of other Federalist leaders in Pennsylvania, but it appears to
be unnecessary to say more.
The leaders on the other side were constantly discanting upon the
opposition between town and country. The recalcitrant members of the
legislature in their protest to the people against the hasty calling of
the state convention declared, “We lamented at the time [of the
selection of delegates to the national Convention] that a majority of
our legislature appointed men to represent this state who were all
citizens of Philadelphia, none of them calculated to represent the
landed interests of Pennsylvania, and almost all of them of one
political party, men who have been uniformly opposed to that [state]
constitution for which you have on every occasion manifested your
attachment.”[712]
The author of the famous “Centinel” letters saw in the movement
favorable to the new Constitution a design of “the wealthy and ambitious
who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their
fellow creatures.”[713] In fact the most philosophic argument against
the adoption of the new system on account of its intrinsic nature was
made by the author of these letters.
At the opening of his series, Centinel inveighs against the precipitancy
which characterized the movements of the Federalists, and then attacks
the Constitution as the work of an active minority. “The late
revolution,” he says, “having effaced in a great measure all former
habits and the present institutions are so recent that there exists not
that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities
and which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot
foresee the full operation of material changes on civil polity.... The
wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to
lord it over their fellow creatures have availed themselves very
successfully of this favorable disposition; for the people thus
unsettled in their sentiments have been prepared to accede to any
extreme of government. All the distresses and difficulties they
experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the
impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to
expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of
government; and in the other event immediately ruin and annihilation as
a nation.”[714]
After warning his countrymen against being lulled into false security by
the use of the great names of Washington and Franklin in support of the
Constitution, Centinel takes up the fundamental element in the new
system: the balance of powers as expounded in Adams’ _Defence of the
Constitutions_; and shows the inherent antagonism between “democracy”
and the Federalist concept of government in a manner that would do honor
to the warmest advocate of the initiative and referendum in our time.
“Mr. Adams’ _sine qua non_ of good government is three balancing powers;
whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests and
thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that
the administrators of every government will ever be actuated by views of
private interest and ambition to the prejudice of the public good; that
therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people
and promote their welfare is to create an opposition of interests
between the members of two distinct bodies in the exercise of the powers
of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis
supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three
co-equal orders in government and a corresponding weight in the
community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts
and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a
coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr.
Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of
government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has
not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he
indeed says the British constitution is such in theory, but this is
rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be
reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable
how long would it continue? Not a day—for there is so great a disparity
in the talents, wisdom, and industry of mankind, that the scale would
presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every
accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly
extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such
a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a powerful
hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but
even there, for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction
of interests in the three orders of government, they exist but in name;
the only operative and efficient check upon the conduct of
administration is the sense of the people at large.... If the
administrators of every government are actuated by views of private
interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community
to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?”[715]
In opposition to the Adams-Madison theory of balanced economic interests
and innocuous legislatures, which was the essence of the Federalist
doctrine, Centinel expounded his reasons for believing that distinct
property groups should not be set against one another in the government,
and that trust in the political capacity of the broad undifferentiated
mass of the community should be the basis of the Constitution; but it
should be noted that his undifferentiated mass was composed largely of
property holders. “I believe,” he says “that it will be found that the
form of government which holds those entrusted with power in the
greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for
freemen. A republican or free government can only exist where the body
of the people are virtuous and _where property is pretty equally
divided_. In such a government the people are sovereign and their sense
or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this
ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed and an
aristocracy, monarchy, or despotism will rise on its ruins. The highest
responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure of government,
for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations
of government, and for the want of due information are liable to be
imposed upon. If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people
will be perplexed and divided in their sentiment about the sources of
abuses or misconduct; some will impute it to the senate, others to the
house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the
people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if
imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative
power in one body of men (separating the executive and the judicial),
elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from
permanency and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed
on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility; for
then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the
authors and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding
them at the next election.”[716]
It is evident that a considerable number of the voters in Pennsylvania
clearly understood the significance of the division of powers created by
the Constitution. In a petition circulated and extensively signed by
Philadelphia citizens immediately after the completion of the labors of
the Convention and directed to the state ratifying convention, the
memorialists expressed their approval of the Constitution, and added:
“The division of the power of the United States into three branches
gives the sincerest satisfaction to a great majority of our citizens,
who have long suffered many inconveniences from being governed by a
single legislature. All single governments are tyrannies—whether they be
lodged in one man—a few men—or a large body of the people.”[717]
_Maryland._—The contest in Maryland over the ratification was keen and
spirited and every side of the question was threshed out in newspaper
articles and pamphlets.[718] Through all the controversy ran the
recognition of the fact that it was a struggle between debtors and
creditors, between people of substance and the agrarians. Alexander
Hanson in his considerable tract in favor of the ratification, dedicated
to Washington, treats the charge that the Constitution was an instrument
of property as worthy of a dignified answer. “You have been told,” he
says, “that the proposed plan was calculated peculiarly for the rich. In
all governments, not merely despotic, the wealthy must, in most things,
find an advantage from the possession of that which is too much the end
and aim of mankind. In the proposed plan there is nothing like a
discrimination in their favor.... Is it a just cause of reproach that
the Constitution effectually secures property? Or would the objectors
introduce a general scramble?”[719]
Recognizing the importance of the interests at stake, another Federalist
writer, “Civis,” in the Maryland Journal of February 1, 1788, appeals to
the voters for delegates to the coming state convention to be
circumspect in order to procure the ratification of the Constitution. He
laments that “men of property, character, and abilities have too much
retired from public employment since the conclusion of the war,” but
expresses the hope “that, in this all important crisis, they will again
step forth, with a true patriotic ardour, and snatch their dear country
from the dreadful and devouring jaws of anarchy and ruin.” He cautions
the citizens against voting for undesirable persons: “The characters
whom I would especially point out as your particular aversion, in the
present critical conjuncture, are all those in desperate or embarrassed
circumstances, who may have been advocates for paper money, the
truck-bill, or insolvent act; and who may expect to escape in the
general ruin of the country.”
On the other hand many opponents of the Constitution in Maryland
definitely declared the contest to be one between property and the
people of little substance. Such was practically the view of Luther
Martin[720] in basing his resistance on the ground that the new system
prevented the states from interfering with property rights. The spirit
of this opposition was also well reflected in a reply to the letter of
“Civis,” mentioned above, which took the form of an ironical appeal to
the voters to support only men of property and standing for the coming
state convention. “Choose no man in debt,” it runs, “because being in
debt proves that he wanted understanding to take care of his own
affairs.... A man in debt can scarcely be honest.... Vote for no man who
was in favor of paper money, for no _honest_ man was for that measure.
None but _debtors_ and desperate wretches advocated the diabolical
scheme.... Elect no man who supported the law allowing insolvent debtors
to discharge their persons from perpetual imprisonment, by _honestly_
delivering up _all_ their property to the use of their creditors. The
legislature _have_ no right to interfere with _private_ contracts, and
debtors might safely trust to the humanity and clemency of their
creditors who will not keep them in gaol all their lives, unless they
deserve it.... Men of great property are deeply interested in the
welfare of the state; and they are the most competent judges of the form
of government, best calculated to preserve their property, and such
liberties as it is proper for the common and inferior class of people to
enjoy. Men of wealth possess natural and acquired understanding, as they
manifest by amassing riches, or by keeping and increasing those they
derive from their ancestors, and they are best acquainted with the
wants, the wishes, and desires of the people, and they are always ready
to relieve them in their private and public stations.”[721]
_Virginia._—Madison remarked that he found in his state “men of
intelligence, patriotism, property, and independent circumstances”[722]
divided over the ratification of the Constitution although in some other
commonwealths men of this stamp were “zealously attached” to the new
government. This general reflection is not borne out however by some of
his contemporaries. Marshall, as we have noted above,[723] regarded the
conflict as being between two rather sharply divided parties, those who
favored maintaining public and private rights in their full integrity
and those who proposed to attack them through legislation.[724] In fact,
Madison himself at a later date declared that “the superiority of
abilities” was on the side of the Constitution.[725] Charles Lee claimed
that “except a few characters, the members [of the Virginia convention]
with the most knowledge and abilities and personal influence are also in
favor of the Constitution.”[726]
In the opposition Patrick Henry put the whole mass of small farmers. “I
believe it to be a fact,” he declared in the Virginia convention, “that
the great body of yeomanry are in decided opposition to it. I may say
with confidence that, for nineteen counties adjacent to each other,
nine-tenths of the people are conscientiously opposed to it. I may be
mistaken but I give you it as my opinion; and my opinion is founded on
personal knowledge in some measure, and other good authority.... You
have not solid reality—the hearts and hands of the men who are to be
governed.”[727]
_North Carolina._—It would have been strange if the leaders for and
against the Constitution in this commonwealth had not taken cognizance
of the nature of the conflict they were waging. The popular paper money
and debtor party had been powerful and active and had aroused the
solicitude of all men of substance; and the representatives of the
latter, as practical men, knew what they were doing in supporting an
overthrow of the old system. “It is essential to the interests of
agriculture and commerce,” exclaimed Davie, in the state ratifying
convention, “that the hands of the states should be bound from making
paper money, instalment laws, and pine barren acts. By such iniquitous
laws the merchant or farmer may be defrauded of a considerable part of
his just claims. But in the federal court, real money will be recovered
with that speed which is necessary to accommodate the circumstances of
individuals.”[728] Speaking on the same theme, paper money, Governor
Johnston said: “Every man of property—every man of considerable
transactions, whether a merchant, planter, mechanic, or of any other
condition—must have felt the baneful influence of that currency.”[729]
The recognition of the nature of the clash of interests is manifest in
scattered correspondence, as well as in speeches. For example, in a
letter to Iredell, January 15, 1788, Maclaine says: “In New Hanover
county the people if left to themselves are in favor of the change. Some
demagogues, a few persons who are in debt, and every public officer,
except the clerk of the county court, are decidedly against any change;
at least against any that will answer the purpose. Our friend Huske is
the loudest man in Wilmington against the new constitution. Whether
ambition, or avarice, or a compound of both actuates him I leave you to
judge.... I expect in a few weeks _The Federalist_ in a volume. He is
certainly a judicious and ingenious writer, though not well calculated
for the common people.... Your old friend Huske and Col. Read have
joined all the low scoundrels in the County [_i.e._ the country party]
and by every underhand means are prejudicing the common people against
the new constitution. The former is a candidate for the county.”[730]
This conflict between the town and country is explained by Iredell’s
biographer: “Soon after the [Revolutionary] War commenced a feud between
the town of Wilmington and the county of New Hanover. The leading men
‘upon ’Change’ were either Tories or those whose lukewarmness had
provoked suspicion: the agrestic population could but illy brook their
prosperity. From that day to the present [1857] the politics of the
burgess have been antagonistical to those of the former. The merchants
have ever been the predominant class in the borough: daily intercourse
has enabled them with facility to form combinations that have given them
the control of the moneyed institutions while their patronage has added
a potent influence with the press.”[731]
_South Carolina._—The materials bearing on the ratification of the
Constitution in South Carolina which are available to the northern
student are relatively scanty.[732] Nevertheless, in view of the marked
conflict between the agrarian back-country and the commercial seaboard,
it may easily be imagined that it was not unobserved by the leaders in
the contest over ratification who championed the respective regions.
This antagonism came out in a pamphlet war over the amendment of the
state constitution which was being waged about the time of the adoption
of the new federal system. In this war, “Appius,” the spokesman for the
reform party is reported to have declared that “wealth ought not to be
represented; that a rich citizen ought to have fewer votes than his poor
neighbor; that wealth should be stripped of as many advantages as
possible and it will then have more than enough; and finally, that in
giving property the power of protecting itself, government becomes an
aristocracy.”[733]
“Appius,” after this general statement of his theory, then explains
wherein the distribution of economic interests engendered antagonism in
politics in that state. “The upper and lower countries, have opposite
habits and views in almost every particular. One is accustomed to
expense, the other to frugality. One will be inclined to numerous
offices, large salaries, and an expensive government; the other, from
the moderate fortunes of the inhabitants, and their simple way of life
will prefer low taxes, small salaries, and a very frugal civil
establishment. One imports almost every article of consumption and pays
for it in produce; the other is far removed from navigation, has very
little to export, and must therefore supply its own wants. Consequently
one will favor commerce, the other manufactures; one wishes slaves, the
other will be better without them.”[734] In view of this opposition of
interests, “Appius” holds that there should be a redistribution of
representatives which will give the back-country its proper proportion
and enable the majority to rule.
To this argument Ford replies in the language of Federalism. The rights
of property are anterior to constitutions; the state constitution
recognizes and guarantees these rights; the substantial interests of the
minority must be forever immune from attacks by majorities. Otherwise
“the weaker party in society,” he declares, “would literally have no
right whatever: neither life, liberty, or property would be guaranteed
to them by the social compact, seeing the majority are not bound by it,
but might destroy the whole and by the same rule any part of it at
pleasure.... Virtue and vice would lose their distinction; the most
vicious views would be sanctified if pursued by the greater number, and
the most virtuous resistance punishable in the less. If the principles
of justice are derived from a higher source than human institutions (and
who will deny it?) I contend that the majority have no right to infringe
them.”[735] Hence, any change in the system which deprives the seaboard
minority of their preponderance in the state government cannot be too
severely reprobated.
It can hardly be supposed that an economic antagonism in the state that
was so clearly recognized by publicists in 1794, and that manifested
itself in the vote on the ratification of the Federal Constitution six
years before, was overlooked in the earlier contest.
Indeed, evidence that it was not appears in a pamphlet written in
defence of the Constitution by Dr. David Ramsay, who was afterward a
member of the ratifying convention in South Carolina. He particularly
warns his fellow-citizens against the debtor element. “Be on your
guard,” he says, “against the misrepresentations of men who are involved
in debt; such may wish to see the Constitution rejected because of the
following clause, ‘no state shall emit bills of credit, make anything
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.’ This will
doubtless bear hard on debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but
it will be real service to the honest part of the community. Examine
well the characters and circumstances of men who are averse to the new
constitution. Perhaps you will find that the above clause is the real
ground of the opposition of some of them, though they may artfully cover
it with a splendid profession of zeal for state privileges and general
liberty.”[736]
_Georgia._—The speedy and unanimous ratification of the Constitution in
Georgia seems to have prevented any very vigorous pamphleteering on the
question. Indeed, the energies of the state were being strained to the
limit in preparing for defence against the Indians, and there was little
time for theorizing. Foreign invasion generally silences domestic
discord.
CONCLUSIONS
At the close of this long and arid survey—partaking of the nature of
catalogue—it seems worth while to bring together the important
conclusions for political science which the data presented appear to
warrant.
The movement for the Constitution of the United States was originated
and carried through principally by four groups of personalty interests
which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation:
money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping.
The first firm steps toward the formation of the Constitution were taken
by a small and active group of men immediately interested through their
personal possessions in the outcome of their labors.
No popular vote was taken directly or indirectly on the proposition to
call the Convention which drafted the Constitution.
A large propertyless mass was, under the prevailing suffrage
qualifications, excluded at the outset from participation (through
representatives) in the work of framing the Constitution.
The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the
Constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, directly, and
personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from, the
establishment of the new system.
The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the
concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to
government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.
The major portion of the members of the Convention are on record as
recognizing the claim of property to a special and defensive position in
the Constitution.
In the ratification of the Constitution, about three-fourths of the
adult males failed to vote on the question, having abstained from the
elections at which delegates to the state conventions were chosen,
either on account of their indifference or their disfranchisement by
property qualifications.
The Constitution was ratified by a vote of probably not more than
one-sixth of the adult males.
It is questionable whether a majority of the voters participating in the
elections for the state conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina, actually approved the
ratification of the Constitution.
The leaders who supported the Constitution in the ratifying conventions
represented the same economic groups as the members of the Philadelphia
Convention; and in a large number of instances they were also directly
and personally interested in the outcome of their efforts.
In the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage for
and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty
interests on the one hand and the small farming and debtor interests on
the other.
The Constitution was not created by “the whole people” as the jurists
have said; neither was it created by “the states” as Southern nullifiers
long contended; but it was the work of a consolidated group whose
interests knew no state boundaries and were truly national in their
scope.
INDEX
Adams, John, theories attacked, 313.
Annapolis convention, 62.
Army, place in government, 171 ff.
Articles of Confederation, conditions under, 47, 58;
system of government, 52.
Baldwin, Abraham, economic interests of, 74;
political philosophy of, 190.
Baltimore, petitions for protection, 42;
popular vote in, 247.
Bancroft, interpretation of history, 1.
Bassett, Richard, economic interests of, 75.
Bedford, Gunning, economic interests of, 76;
political philosophy of, 191.
Blair, John, economic interests of, 77.
Blount, William, economic interests of, 78.
Boston, petitions for protection, 44;
property interests in, 261 ff.;
vote in, 244.
Bowdoin, Governor, demands stronger union, 55.
Brearley, David, economic interests of, 79.
Broom, Jacob, economic interests of, 80;
political philosophy of, 191.
Burgess, Professor, cited, 62.
Butler, Pierce, economic interests of, 81;
political philosophy of, 192.
Capital, attacks on, 31 ff.;
invested in lands, 49;
_see_ Money and Securities.
Carroll, Daniel, economic interests of, 82.
“Centinel,” essays of, 312.
Checks and balances, 159 ff.
Cincinnati, Society of the, 38 ff.
Cities, populace feared, 215.
Clymer, George, 41;
economic interests of, 82;
political philosophy of, 193.
Commerce, demands for protection of, 40 ff.;
influence in politics, 172, 183 ff.
Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, 52;
calls the Convention at Philadelphia, 63.
Connecticut tax returns, in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 66;
elections to state convention, 228;
vote on the Constitution, 228;
voters for members of convention, 240;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 265 ff.;
public securities in, 265;
conflict over ratification, 306 ff.
Constitution, U. S., juristic theory of, 10 ff., 299;
economic forces in creation and adoption, 16 ff.;
movement for, 52 ff.;
nature of, 152 ff.
Constitutional law, interpretation of, 13 ff.
Contracts, provision for safeguarding, 179 ff.
Convention, at Philadelphia, called, 63;
movement for, 52 ff.;
method of electing delegates, 64; 73 ff.
Creditors, consolidation of, 32.
Currency, depreciation of, 31.
Davie, William R., economic interests of, 84;
political philosophy of, 193.
Dayton, Jonathan, economic interests of, 85.
Debt, Public, _see_ Securities.
Debtors, political schemes, 28;
war on creditors, 31 ff.;
in revolt in New England, 59.
Delaware, suffrage qualification, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
ratification of the Constitution, 272.
Depreciation, of securities, 32.
Dickinson, John, economic interests of, 87;
political philosophy of, 194.
Disfranchised, the, 24 ff.
Economic interests, appealed to, in behalf of the Constitution, 53.
Economic interpretation of history, 5 ff.;
of law, 7 ff.;
of constitutional law, 13;
Madison’s, 14 ff.; 156 ff.
Elections, popular, feared, 214;
annual, 216;
popular vote on the Constitution, 239 ff.;
to state conventions, 226 ff.;
number voting in, 242 ff.;
_see_ Suffrage.
Ellsworth, Oliver, economic interests of, 88;
political philosophy of, 196;
on ratification, 220.
Executive, veto power, 213; 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
203, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216.
Farms, mortgaged, 22;
small, 27.
_Federalist, The_, on the Constitution, 152 ff.
Few, William, economic interests of, 90.
Fitzsimons, Thomas, 41;
economic interests of, 91;
political philosophy of, 196.
Franklin, Benjamin, on conditions of the country in 1787, 47;
and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 92;
political philosophy of, 197.
Freeholders, dangers from, 71;
best guardians of liberty, 195; 189–216 _passim_;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.
Georgia, suffrage qualifications, 70;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
reasons for speedy ratification, 290.
Gerry, Elbridge, views on the Cincinnati, 38;
economic interests of, 95;
political philosophy of, 197;
on property qualifications, 167.
Gilman, Nicholas, economic interests of, 93.
Gorham, Nathaniel, economic interests of, 99;
political philosophy of, 198;
on ratification, 219.
Hamilton, Alexander, views on the working-class, 25;
estimate of debt, 33;
economic interests of, 100;
political philosophy of, 199;
on ratification, 222.
Henry, Patrick, and land speculation, 49.
History, interpretation of, 1 ff.
Holmes, Justice, economic views cited, 9 n.
Houston, W. C., economic interests of, 114.
Houstoun, William, economic interests of, 115;
political philosophy of, 200.
Ingersoll, Jared, economic interests of, 116;
political philosophy of, 200.
Jenifer, Daniel, 116.
Jhering, work cited, 14 n.
Johnson, W. S., economic interests of, 117.
Judicial control, nature of, 162, 196;
Spaight against, 214; 216.
King, Rufus, economic interests of, 118;
political philosophy of, 201;
on ratification, 218.
Knox, General, believes the Confederation is in ruins, 58; 301.
Land, policy, 27;
western, speculation in, 23, 49;
members of the Convention, interests in, 151.
Langdon, John, economic interests of, 120.
Lansing, John, economic interests of, 123.
Lassalle, cited, 14 n.
Law, interpretation in the United States, 7 ff.;
England, 7.
Libby, O. G., work on the Constitution, 5.
Livingston, William, economic interests of, 123;
political philosophy of, 201.
Madison, James, interpretation of history and politics, 14 ff.;
on universal suffrage, 25;
on the dissolution of the Confederation, 60;
on the Annapolis convention, 62;
economic interests of, 125;
political philosophy of, 156;
on property qualifications, 165, 167;
on ratification, 222;
view as to causes of opposition to Constitution, 293.
Maitland, and economic interpretation, 8 n.
Majority rule, devices for checking, 156 ff.
Manufacturing, 23;
demands for protection, 41 ff.; 175.
Marshall, opinion as to nature of the Constitution cited, 10;
on the obligation of contracts, 181 f.; 287;
analysis of the conflict over the Constitution, 295 ff.
Martin, Alexander, economic interests of, 126.
Martin, Luther, and debtors, 28;
economic interests of, 126;
political philosophy of, 205.
Maryland, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 234;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of convention, 241;
vote on Constitution in, 247;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 281;
conflict over ratification, 316 ff.
Mason, George, economic interests of, 127;
political philosophy of, 205.
Massachusetts, tax returns in, 31;
rebellion in, 59;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 226;
vote on the Constitution, 227;
voters for members of convention, 240;
elections in, 242;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 257 ff.;
public securities in, 261;
conflict over ratification, 301 ff.
McClurg, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 203.
McHenry, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 204;
elected to the Maryland convention, 247.
Mercer, J. F., economic interests of, 131;
political philosophy of, 207.
Merchants, petition for adequate naval protection, 56.
Mifflin, Thomas, economic interests of, 132.
Minority, rights of the, 156 ff.; 322.
Monarchy, favored by Dickinson, 195.
Money, distribution of, 31;
paper, 28 ff.;
forbidden in the Constitution, 179; 281.
Money-lending, 28.
Monroe, on the Annapolis convention, 62.
Morley, on Macaulay, 4 n.
Morris, Gouverneur, economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 207;
on property qualifications, 166;
view of conflict in Pennsylvania, 311.
Morris, Robert, and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 209.
Navy, _see_ Army.
New England, rebellion in, 59.
New Hampshire, tax returns in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 225;
vote on the Constitution, 226;
voters for members of state convention, 240;
economic interests and the Constitution, 254;
conflict over ratification, 300.
New Jersey, suffrage qualifications in, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 271 f.;
public securities in, 271.
New York, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 67;
number of voters in, 67;
elections to state convention, 229;
vote on the Constitution, 229;
demand for a second national Convention, 229;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 244;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 268 ff.;
public securities in, 270;
conflict over ratification, 309.
North Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
ratification of Constitution deferred, 235;
ratification, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 287 f.;
conflict over ratification, 319.
Paper money, 28 ff.
Paterson, William, 136, 209, 222.
Pennsylvania, suffrage qualifications, 68;
elections to state convention, 231;
vote on the Constitution, 233;
conflict over ratification, 231 ff.;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 246;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 273 ff.;
public securities in, 274;
conflict over ratification, 310 ff.
Personal property, distribution of, in the United States, 19 ff.
Philadelphia, petitions for protection, 40, 44;
residents seek relief from financial disorders, 57;
popular vote in, 247.
Pierce, William, economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 209.
Pinckney, Charles, economic interests of, 138;
political philosophy of, 210.
Pinckney, C. C., economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 211.
Pound, Professor, writings cited, 9.
Powers, balance of, 159 ff.
President, _see_ Executive.
Property, rights of, 156 ff.;
qualifications on voters and officers, 164 ff.;
position under the Constitution, 176;
qualifications for officers, 213;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.
Protection, for manufacturing, demanded, 40;
for trade, 175.
Public securities, records of, at Treasury Department, 20.
Randolph, Edmund, economic interests of, 139;
political philosophy of, 212;
on ratification, 219.
Ratification, _see_ separate states;
plan suggested by the Convention, 217;
accepted by Congress, 217;
criticism and defence of, 218 ff.;
accepted by the states, 225.
Read, George, economic interests of, 140;
political philosophy of, 213.
Real property, groups of interests, 26 ff.
Referendum, 239.
Representatives, House of, 160, 162, 191, 192, 197, 199, 207, 210, 212.
Rhode Island, ratification of the Constitution, 237.
Rutledge, John, economic interests of, 141;
political philosophy of, 213.
Schuyler, Philip, demands a national convention, 55, 108.
Securities, Public, amount of, 32 f.;
depreciation of, 32;
gain in appreciation of, 34 ff.;
members of the Convention holding, 149 f.;
in Massachusetts, 261 ff.;
in Connecticut, 266 f.;
in New York, 270;
in New Jersey, 271;
in Pennsylvania, 273;
in Virginia, 286;
in North Carolina, 287;
in South Carolina, 289.
Senate, 161, 162;
and property, 190, 192, 199, 206, 211, 212, 213;
_see_ Senators.
Senators, life term proposed, 213;
term of, 214;
popular election, 216.
Shays’ Rebellion, 39.
Sherman, Roger, economic interests of, 142;
political philosophy of, 213;
view of plan of ratification, 218.
Slave-holders, interest in the Constitution, 29.
Slaves, members of the Convention holding, 151;
danger of revolt, 174;
trade in, discussed in the Convention, 176;
Rutledge’s view of, 213.
Smith, Melancton, 246.
South Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 70;
popular vote on the Constitution, 248;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 288 f.;
public securities in, 289;
conflict over ratification, 321.
Spaight, R. D., economic interests of, 143;
political philosophy of, 214.
States, restrictions on, 178 ff.;
causes of conflict among, 186 ff.
Stock Exchange, founding of, 35.
Strong, Caleb, economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 214.
Suffrage, qualifications on, in 1787, 64 ff.;
discussed in the Convention, 164 ff., 190 ff.;
manhood in New York, 241;
for electors voting on the Constitution, 240 f.;
number disfranchised, 242.
Taxation, absence of power under the Confederation, 52;
power conferred by the Constitution, 169;
interpretation of the system, 170;
Hamilton on, 171.
Territories, provisions for, in the Constitution, 175.
Teutonic school, interpretation of history, 2.
Tories, 240.
Turner, Professor, historical interpretation, 5.
Veto, absolute, proposed, 213.
Veto power, 215.
Virginia, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 282 ff.;
public securities in, 286;
conflict over ratification, 318.
Vote, popular, _see_ Elections.
Washington, George, and the Cincinnati, 39;
and land speculation, 49;
fears for the safety of the country, 58;
economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 215.
Williamson, Hugh, and land speculation, 23, 50;
economic interests of, 146;
political philosophy of, 215.
Wilson, James, economic interests of, 147;
political philosophy of, 215.
Wilson, Woodrow, description of the movement for the Constitution, 61.
Women, legal position of, 24.
Working-class, and politics, 25.
Wythe, George, economic interests of, 148;
political philosophy of, 216.
-----
Footnote 1:
_The History of the Constitution of the United States_ (1882 ed.),
Vol. II, p. 284.
Footnote 2:
American Historical Review, Vol. II, p. 13.
Footnote 3:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 6.
Footnote 4:
It has been left to a Russian to explain to Englishmen the origin of
Teutonism in historical writing. See the introduction to Vinogradoff,
_Villainage in England_. W. J. Ashley, in his preface to the
translation of Fustel de Coulanges, _Origin of Property in Land_,
throws some light on the problem, but does not attempt a systematic
study.
Footnote 5:
Note the painstaking documentation for the first chapters in Stubbs’
great work.
Footnote 6:
What Morley has said of Macaulay is true of many eminent American
historical writers: “A popular author must, in a thoroughgoing way,
take the accepted maxims for granted. He must suppress any whimsical
fancy for applying the Socratic elenchus; or any other engine of
criticism, scepticism, or verification to those sentiments or current
precepts or morals which may in truth be very equivocal and may be
much neglected in practice, but which the public opinion of his time
requires to be treated in theory and in literature as if they had been
cherished and held _semper, ubique, et ab omnibus_.” _Miscellanies_,
Vol. I, p. 272.
Footnote 7:
For instance, intimate connections can be shown between the vogue of
Darwinism and the competitive ideals of the mid-Victorian middle-class
in England. Darwin got one of his leading ideas, the struggle for
existence, from Malthus, who originated it as a club to destroy the
social reformers, Godwin, Condorcet, and others, and then gave it a
serious scientific guise as an afterthought.
Footnote 8:
See also the valuable and suggestive writings on American history by
Professor W. E. Dodd, of Chicago University; W. A. Schaper,
“Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical Association
Report_ (1900), Vol. I; A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_; C. H.
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_. There are three works by socialist
writers that deserve study: Simons, _Social Forces in American
History_; Gustavus Myers, _History of Great American Fortunes and
History of the Supreme Court_.
Footnote 9:
See Seligman, _The Economic Interpretation of History_.
Footnote 10:
Vincent, in his treatise on _Historical Research_ (1911), dismisses
the economic theory without critical examination.
Footnote 11:
The _Congressional Record_ requires more care in use than any other
great source of information on American politics.
Footnote 12:
Attention should be drawn, however, to the good work which is being
done in the translation of several European legal studies, the “Modern
Legal Philosophy Series,” under the editorial direction of the
Association of American Law Schools. Perhaps the most hopeful sign of
the times is the growth of interest in comparative jurisprudence. See
Borchard, “Jurisprudence in Germany,” Columbia Law Review, April,
1912.
Footnote 13:
For examples of Maitland’s suggestiveness, see the English Historical
Review, Vol. IX, p. 439, for a side light on the effect of money
economy on the manor and consequently on feudal law. See also the
closing pages of his _Constitutional History of England_, where he
makes constitutional law in large part the history of the law of real
property. “If we are to learn anything about the constitution, it is
necessary first and foremost that we should learn a good deal about
the land law. We can make no progress whatever in the history of
parliament without speaking of tenure; indeed our whole constitutional
law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real property”
(p. 538). Maitland’s entire marvellous chapter on “The Definition of
Constitutional Law” deserves the most careful study and reflection. He
was entirely emancipated from bondage to systematists (p. 539).
Footnote 14:
J. C. Carter, _The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law_ (1884),
pp. 6–8.
Footnote 15:
Of the newer literature on law, see the following articles by
Professor Roscoe Pound: “Do we need a Philosophy of Law?” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. V, p. 339; “Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence,” Green
Bag, Vol. XIX, p. 607; “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. VIII, p. 605; “Law in Books and Law in Action,” American
Law Review, Vol. XLIV, p. 12; Professor Munroe Smith, “Jurisprudence”
(in the Columbia University Lectures in Arts and Sciences); Goodnow,
_Social Reform and the Constitution_.
Footnote 16:
Consider, for example, the following remarks by this eminent Justice
in his dissenting opinion in the New York Bakery case: “This case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s _Social Statics_.... General propositions do not decide
concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.” 198 U. S. 75.
Footnote 17:
_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 367.
Footnote 18:
4 Wheaton, p. 316. No doubt the learned Justice was here more
concerned with discrediting the doctrine of state’s rights than with
establishing the popular basis of our government.
Footnote 19:
S. F. Miller, _Lectures on the Constitution_ (1891), p. 71.
Footnote 20:
_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 324.
Footnote 21:
See A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_.
Footnote 22:
In the preface to his first edition, Jhering says: “Die Schrift, von
der ich hiermit die erste Hälfte der Öffentlichkeit übergebe, ist eine
Ausläuferin von meinem Werk über den Geist des römischen Rechts. Der
letzte Band desselben ... schloss ab mit einer Grundlegung der Theorie
der Rechte im subjektiven Sinn, in der ich eine von der herrschenden
abweichende Begriffsbestimmung des Rechts im subjektiven Sinn gab,
indem ich an Stelle des Willens, auf den jene den Begriff desselben
gründete, das Interesse setze. Dem folgenden Bande war die weitere
Rechtfertigung und Verwertung dieses Gesichtspunktes Vorbehalten....
Der Begriff des Interesses nötigte mich, den Zweck ins Auge zu fassen,
und das Recht im subjektiven Sinn drängte mich zu dem im objektiven
Sinn, und so gestaltete sich das ursprüngliche Untersuchungsobjekt zu
einem ungleich erweiterten, zu dem des gegenwärtigen Buches: der Zweck
im Recht.... Der Grundgedanke des gegenwärtigen Werkes besteht darin,
dass der Zweck der Schöpfer des gesamten Rechts ist, dass es keinen
Rechtssatz gibt, der nicht einem Zweck, d.i. einem praktischen Motiv
seinen Ursprung verdankt.”
Footnote 23:
Was ist es, das den innersten Grund unserer politischen und socialen
Kämpfe bildet? Der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts ist wieder einmal
streitig geworden—und dieser Streit ist es, der das Herz der heutigen
Welt durchzittert und die tief inwendigste Grundlage der
politisch-socialen Kämpfe des Jahrhunderts bildet. Im Juristischen,
Politischen, Oekonomischen ist der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts der
treibende Springquell aller weitern Gestaltung, und wo sich das
Juristische als das Privatrechtliche völlig von dem Politischen
abzulösen scheint, da ist es noch viel politischer als das Politische
selbst, dann da ist es das sociale Element. Preface to _Das System der
erworbenen Rechte_ by Ferdinand Lassalle.
Footnote 24:
And before Madison’s century, Harrington had perceived its
significance. H. A. L. Fisher, _Republican Tradition in Europe_, p.
51.
Footnote 25:
Number 10.
Footnote 26:
The theory of the economic interpretation of history as stated by
Professor Seligman seems as nearly axiomatic as any proposition in
social science can be: “The existence of man depends upon his ability
to sustain himself; the economic life is therefore the fundamental
condition of all life. Since human life, however, is the life of man
in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the
social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of
maintenance are to the individual, the similar relations of production
and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore,
must be traced in the last instance those transformations in the
structure of society which themselves condition the relations of
social classes and the various manifestations of social life.” _The
Economic Interpretation of History_, p. 3.
Footnote 27:
The question of geographic distribution will be considered below,
Chap. X.
Footnote 28:
A few years ago a negro attendant at the Treasury sold a cart-load or
more of these records to a junk dealer. He was imprisoned for the
offence, but this is a small consolation for scholars. The present
writer was able to use some of the records only after a vacuum cleaner
had been brought in to excavate the ruins.
Footnote 29:
See below, p. 50.
Footnote 30:
See Curtis, _The Constitutional History of the United States_, Book I,
Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_; McMaster,
_History of the People of the United States_, Vol. I; Channing,
_History of the United States_, Vol. III.
Footnote 31:
See below, Chaps. IV and IX.
Footnote 32:
Working-men in the cities were not altogether indifferent spectators.
See Becker, _Political Parties in New York_. They would have doubtless
voted with the major interests of the cities in favor of the
Constitution as against the agrarians had they been enfranchised. In
fact, this is what happened in New York. See below, Chap. IX.
Footnote 33:
“If the authority be in their hands by the rule of suffrage,” struck
out in the Ms. See also the important note to this speech in Farrand,
_Records_, Vol. II, p. 204, note 17.
Footnote 34:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 203.
Footnote 35:
December 5, 1791. _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 126.
Footnote 36:
Roosevelt, _Gouverneur Morris_, pp. 14 ff.
Footnote 37:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 44.
Footnote 38:
Libby has shown the degree of correspondence between the rural vote on
paper money measures, designed for the relief of debtors, and the vote
against the ratification of the Constitution. _Op. cit._, pp. 50 ff.
Footnote 39:
See below, p. 205.
Footnote 40:
The landholders were able to do this largely because New York City was
the entry port for Connecticut and New Jersey. The opportunity to
shift the taxes not only to the consumers, but to the consumers of
neighboring states, was too tempting to be resisted.
Footnote 41:
For a paragraph on nascent capitalism in South Carolina, see W. A.
Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I. See the letter of Blount, Davie,
and Williamson to the governor of North Carolina, below, p. 169.
Footnote 42:
It is not without interest to note that about the time Calhoun made
this criticism of New England capitalist devices he was attempting to
borrow several thousand dollars from a Massachusetts mill owner to
engage in railway enterprise in the south.
Footnote 43:
See, however, _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 414 ff.
Footnote 44:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, pp. 442 ff.
Footnote 45:
See the picturesque description of the monetary system or lack of
system in Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_.
Footnote 46:
See below, p. 146.
Footnote 47:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 451; also see below, pp. 261–2.
Footnote 48:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 19.
Footnote 49:
W. De Knight, _History of the Currency_, p. 21.
Footnote 50:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 325.
Footnote 51:
_Ibid._, Vol, I, p. 231.
Footnote 52:
Callender, not a very reliable authority on most matters concerning
Hamilton, claims that twenty-five million dollars was made by the
funding of the public debt, and that about ten millions more was made
out of the state debt assumption process. He further declared that a
public debt of eighty million dollars had been created of which only
about thirty millions was all that was necessary. Gallatin held also
that the unnecessary debt created by the assumption act amounted to
about eleven million dollars. Callender, _A History of the United
States for 1796_, pp. 224 ff. The ethics of redeeming the debt at face
value is not here considered although the present writer believes that
the success of the national government could not have been secured
under any other policy than that pursued by Hamilton. Callender claims
that those who held it were, in large measure, speculators and that
they made huge fortunes out of the transaction. By a stroke of the pen
the federal government created capital to the amount of millions in
the hands of the holders.
Footnote 53:
_A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States_, p. 31.
Footnote 54:
Tables from Pitkin, _A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United
States_, pp. 367–368, and _An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of the United States for the Year 1795_, p. 65
Footnote 56:
Undoubtedly a large appreciation had taken place between 1787 and
1800.
Footnote 57:
“The public securities of the United States of America were a dead,
inactive kind of property, previous to the establishment of the
constitution of the new government; then they became at once the
object of avarice. They before had an existence as to value, on the
slender hope of having something done for them at some distant future
period; and obtained a motion only from the sagacity of the few, who
happened to be right in their conjectures respecting the then future
events of American financeering. Upon the adoption of the new system
of government they assumed all the properties of a rising credit, and
became an immense active capital for commerce.” James Sullivan, _An
Inquiry into the Origin and Use of Money_ (1792). Duane Pamphlets,
Library of Congress.
Footnote 58:
Tench Coxe, _A View of the United States of America_ (1795), p. 360.
Tucker, _Progress of the United States_ (1843), p. 205.
Footnote 59:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 114.
Footnote 60:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 119.
Footnote 61:
_Ibid._, Vol. III, p. 43.
Footnote 62:
“A large majority of the officers of the army of the Revolution were
in favor of the new Constitution. The Cincinnati were mostly among its
warmest advocates; and as they were organized and were, many of them,
of exalted private and public worth and could act in concert through
all the states, their influence was foreseen and feared by its
opponents.” Blair, _The Virginia Convention of 1788_, Vol. I, p. 36,
note 41.
Footnote 63:
_American Museum_, Vol. I, p. 313. Other signers were C. Pettit, J.
Ross, I. Hazlehurst, M. Lewis, T. Coxe, R. Wells, J. M. Nesbit, J.
Nixon, J. Wilcocks, S. Howell, and C. Biddle.
Footnote 64:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 9.
Footnote 65:
_American State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 66:
Carey, _American Museum_, Vol. IV, p. 348. See also Winsor, _Memorial
History of Boston_, Vol. IV, p. 77.
Footnote 67:
For illustrative evidence that the protection of manufactures and
shipping was being widely agitated previous to the adoption of the
Constitution, and that an extensive consciousness of identity of
interest was being developed among the individuals concerned, see the
articles in _The American Museum_, Vol. I, on American Manufactures;
Winsor, _Memorial History of Boston_, Vol. IV, Chap. III. See
memorials in _The American Museum_, from Philadelphia mercantile
interests (April 6, 1785), Vol. I, p. 313; from Boston merchants,
_ibid._, Vol. I, p. 320. For the merchants’ movement in New York, see
the Magazine of American History, April, 1893, pp. 324 ff.
Footnote 68:
Vol. I, p. 117.
Footnote 69:
M. Carey, _The American Museum_, for January, 1787, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 70:
The Historical Magazine (1871), Vol. IX, Second Series, pp. 157 ff.
Footnote 71:
For an interesting and novel view of the state of commerce under the
Articles of Confederation, see Channing, _History of the United
States_, Vol. III, pp. 422 ff.
Footnote 72:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 62. American Historical
Association Papers for 1891. See also the lists printed in A. M. Dyer,
_First Ownership of Ohio Lands_ (1911).
Footnote 73:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 678.
Footnote 74:
But see Madison’s view as to the chief reason for calling the
Convention, below, p. 178.
Footnote 75:
A study of the newspapers of the period shows a large number of
prominent advocates of the Constitution among the merchants and
brokers advertising in the Federalist press.
Footnote 76:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Book I, Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period_;
Marshall, _Life of Washington_ (1850 ed.), Vol. II, pp. 75 ff.
Footnote 77:
The Connecticut Courant, September 10, 1787.
Footnote 78:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 29.
Footnote 79:
See below, p. 109.
Footnote 80:
Elliot’s _Debates_, Vol. I, p. 95. See below, Chaps. V and VII.
Footnote 81:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 190.
Footnote 82:
See below, p. 263.
Footnote 83:
See above, p. 46 _n._
Footnote 84:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 48.
Footnote 85:
Ms. Library of Congress: _Papers of the Continental Congress_
(Memorials), No. 41, Vol. VI, p. 283. Simpson, _Eminent
Philadelphians_.
Footnote 86:
_Ibid._, No. 42, Vol. VI, p. 254.
Footnote 87:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 20.
Footnote 88:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 30.
Footnote 89:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 83.
Footnote 90:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 88.
Footnote 91:
_Division and Reunion_, p. 12.
Footnote 92:
James Monroe to James Madison. New York, September 3, 1786. “I
consider the convention of Annapolis as a most important æra in our
affairs—the eastern men be assur’d mean it as leading further than the
object originally comprehended. If they do not obtain that things
shall be arranged to suit them in every respect, their intrigues will
extend to the objects I have suggested above—Pennsylvania is their
object—upon succeeding or failing with her they will gain or lose
confidence—I doubt not the emissaries of foreign countries will be on
the ground.” _Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p.
25.
Footnote 93:
_Political Science and Constitutional Law_, Vol. I, p. 103.
Footnote 94:
_Writings of James Madison_ (1865), Vol. I, p. 246.
Footnote 95:
On the suffrage and elections in general in the eighteenth century,
see the state constitutions in the well-known collections of Poore and
Thorpe; A. E. McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen
English Colonies_; Paullin’s “The First Elections under the
Constitution,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, Vol. II; Jameson,
“Did the Fathers Vote,” New England Magazine, January, 1890; Thorpe,
_Constitutional History of the American People_; S. H. Miller, “Legal
Qualifications for Office,” _American Historical Association Report_
(1899), Vol. I; F. A. Cleveland, _Growth of Democracy_; C. F. Bishop,
_History of Elections in the American Colonies_; see below, Chap. IX.
Footnote 96:
The data on the constitutions here given are taken from Thorpe’s
collection, _Charters, Constitutions_, etc.
Footnote 97:
Senators were apportioned among the respective districts on the basis
of public taxes paid by the said districts.
Footnote 98:
_The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 414.
Footnote 99:
_Greene’s Register for the State of Connecticut_, for the Year 1786,
p. 4.
Footnote 100:
Magazine of American History, April, 1893, p. 311.
Footnote 101:
See below, p. 241.
Footnote 102:
New York Journal, June 5, 1788.
Footnote 103:
_Ibid._
Footnote 104:
McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 270.
Footnote 105:
Tench Coxe fixes the number of “taxables” in Pennsylvania at 39,765 in
1770 and 91,177 in 1793. _A View of the United States_, p. 413.
Footnote 106:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 29, note 11; for details see
McKinley, _op. cit._, pp. 40 ff.
Footnote 107:
Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I, p. 368.
Footnote 108:
_Statutes at Large_ (S.C.), Vol. IV, p. 99.
Footnote 109:
See below, p. 242.
Footnote 110:
_Ibid._, p. 167.
Footnote 111:
Some of the states selected delegates before Congress issued the call.
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 269 ff.
Footnote 112:
Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.
Footnote 113:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger B, Assumed
Debt_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger C_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger A_,
folio 136.
Footnote 114:
_Ibid._, _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 46; _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 55; and Treasury Ledgers,
_passim_. Consult Index.
Footnote 115:
It is here assumed that when a member of the Convention appears upon
the funding books of the new government he was a public creditor at
the time of the Convention. Of course, it is possible that some of the
members who are recorded as security holders possessed no paper when
they went to Philadelphia, but purchased it afterward for speculation.
But it is hardly to be supposed that many of them would sink to the
level of mere speculators. There is plenty of evidence for the
statement that many of the members did possess public paper _before_
the meeting of the Convention, but the incompleteness of the old
records prevents the fixing of the exact number. Those members who
purchased after the Convention for speculation must have had idle
capital seeking investment.
Footnote 116:
_Papers of the Delaware Historical Society_, No. XXIX (1900).
Footnote 117:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.
Footnote 118:
_History of the Bank of North America_, p. 68.
Footnote 119:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 26; and
_ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 33.
Footnote 120:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.
Footnote 121:
Delaware Mss., _Tax Lists_; Library of Congress. This was probably the
father of the member of the Convention.
Footnote 122:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Delaware_, 1777–1784, see under
date, May, 1779.
Footnote 123:
_Journal C_; _Register of Certificates_ (1777); and _Ledger C_.
Footnote 124:
_Biographia Americana_, p. 48.
Footnote 125:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 95.
Footnote 126:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office (Va.) Register of
Subscriptions_, 1791, see date March 8, 1791.
Footnote 127:
_Ibid._, _Register of Certificates of Public Debt Presented_.
Footnote 128:
_Ibid._, _Virginia Loan Office, 1791_, under date September 30, 1791.
Footnote 129:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.
Footnote 130:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Companies_, p. 83.
Footnote 131:
_Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.
Footnote 132:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, N. C., 1791–1797_, folio 75.
Footnote 133:
_The Brearley Family Genealogy_ (Library of Congress).
Footnote 134:
_Biographia Americana_, p. 49.
Footnote 135:
L. Elmer, _Constitution and Government of New Jersey_, p. 274.
Footnote 136:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register—Loan Office, N.J._, under date,
Feb. 1779.
Footnote 137:
_Ibid._, _Loan Office, N. J., Ledger_ C/2, folio 38.
Footnote 138:
_Brearley Family Genealogy_ (L. C.).
Footnote 139:
See records in Treasury for N. J. Loan Office, _passim_; also _Family
Genealogy_.
Footnote 140:
_Genealogy._
Footnote 141:
W. W. Campbell, _Life and Character of Jacob Broom_, Papers of the
Historical Society of Delaware, Vol. LI, pp. 10, 26.
Footnote 142:
_History of the Insurance Company of North America_, p. 138.
Footnote 143:
Campbell, _op. cit._, p. 26.
Footnote 144:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 67;
also _ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 67.
Footnote 145:
_Calendar Madison Correspondence_, under Broom.
Footnote 146:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. II, p. 162.
Footnote 147:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 97.
Footnote 148:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, S. C., 1791–1797_, folio 128.
The entry in the ledger notes the residence of Sarah Butler as
Charleston; there was another Sarah Butler in South Carolina at the
time, but according to the first Census she did not reside in that
city. For the evidence that Sarah Butler was the daughter of Pierce
Butler, see Salley, _South Carolina Marriages_, p. 108, for the record
of her marriage.
Footnote 149:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 93.
Footnote 150:
Madison Ms: Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1787. Library of
Congress.
Footnote 151:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 6.
Footnote 152:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Maryland, 1790–1797_, folio 98;
_Loan Office_, Penna., 1790–1791, folio 94; _Ledger C, 3% Stock_
(_Pa._), folio 54. _Alphabet to Dividend Book of Domestic Debt,
Maryland_, under “C” (book not found). Charles Carroll was also a
holder of securities. Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office,
1790–1797_, folios 157 and 226 for over $5000 worth of sixes and
threes.
Footnote 153:
Scharf, _History of Western Maryland_, Vol. I, p. 679; H. Crew,
_History of Washington_, p. 108.
Footnote 154:
_Magazine of American History_, Vol. V, p. 196.
Footnote 155:
Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. III, p. 147.
Footnote 156:
Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 150.
Footnote 157:
Simpson, _Lives of Eminent Philadelphians_ (1859 ed.), p. 693.
Footnote 158:
Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 147.
Footnote 159:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
705.
Footnote 160:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C_, 3% Stock, _Pa._, folio 231; see
also _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 170; and _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 114. The existence of this latter small
account in sixes in 1797 is the basis for the surmise above that
Clymer held also his quota of sixes. With his business acumen he might
very well have disposed of most of this stock after “taking the rise”
in 1787–1792, for he could have made more money in business than from
the interest which the government paid.
Footnote 161:
Peele, _Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians_, p. 59.
Footnote 162:
_Ibid._, p. 69.
Footnote 163:
_Ibid._, p. 69.
Footnote 164:
_Ibid._, p. 80.
Footnote 165:
_Ibid._, p. 78.
Footnote 166:
_State Papers: Public Lands_, Vol. I, pp. 104–106.
Footnote 167:
_Ibid._, p. 129.
Footnote 168:
_Ibid._, p. 118.
Footnote 169:
John Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_,
pp. 149 ff.
Footnote 170:
Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Loan Office, 1791_, folio 130.
Footnote 171:
_Ibid._, _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 208.
Footnote 172:
_Ibid._, _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6% Stock, 1790_, folio
55.
Footnote 173:
J. Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_
(1846 ed.), p. 145.
Footnote 174:
Stillé, _Life and Times of John Dickinson_, p. 14.
Footnote 175:
_Ibid._, p. 35.
Footnote 176:
_Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 747.
Footnote 177:
Stillé, p. 331.
Footnote 178:
_Ibid._, p. 327.
Footnote 179:
The Index in the Treasury Department gives the name of John Dickinson
among the security holders, but the volume referred to was not found.
Footnote 180:
Morris Ms. in the Library of Congress, _Private Letter Book_, Vol.
III, p. 160.
Footnote 181:
G. Brown, _The Life of Oliver Ellsworth_, p. 11.
Footnote 182:
Brown, _ibid._, p. 23.
Footnote 183:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledgers A, B, and
C_, folio 21 in each volume.
Footnote 184:
Consult same volumes through the Index.
Footnote 185:
Facts here are taken from his _Autobiography_, in the Magazine of
American History, Vol. VII, pp. 343 ff.
Footnote 186:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 81.
Footnote 187:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.
Footnote 188:
Volume 31, folio 346.
Footnote 189:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
706.
Footnote 190:
Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 373.
Footnote 191:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 707.
Footnote 192:
Simpson, _op. cit._, 373.
Footnote 193:
Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution_, Vol. II,
p. 294.
Footnote 194:
Maclay, _Journal_ (1890 ed.), p. 178.
Footnote 195:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.
Footnote 196:
_Ibid._, See _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44, folio 335. Also
_Ledger C, Treasury, 6%_, Vol. 42, folio 300 for small entries.
Footnote 197:
Morris Mss. in the Library of Congress: _Private Letter Book_, Vol. I,
p. 529. Marshall (a brother of John Marshall) was the confidential and
trusted agent of Morris in large transactions in land.
Footnote 198:
Bigelow, _Life of Franklin_, Vol. III, p. 470.
Footnote 199:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 62.
Footnote 200:
Bigelow, _Works_, Vol. X, pp. 206 ff.
Footnote 201:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 232.
Footnote 202:
Consult the Loan Office Records of New Hampshire in the Treasury
Department, _passim_.
Footnote 203:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C, Treasury, 6%_, Vol. 42, folio 368.
Footnote 204:
State Papers: _Public Lands_, Vol. I, p. 118.
Footnote 205:
Hammond, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XVIII, p. 790.
Footnote 206:
Sanderson, _Lives of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. I, p. 197; Austin,
_Life of Gerry_.
Footnote 207:
Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_, Vol. I, p. 230.
Footnote 208:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 356.
Footnote 209:
_Ibid._, 413.
Footnote 210:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Mass. Loan Office, Register of Certificates
of Interest Issued_ (Vellum bound), folios 15 ff.
Footnote 211:
_Ibid._, _Mass. Loan Office, Certificates for Liquidated Debt_, folios
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. This paper had evidently been bought by Gerry for
speculation.
Footnote 212:
_Ibid._, _Loan Office, Pa., 1790–1791_, folio 60.
Footnote 213:
_Ibid._, _Ledger C, 3% Stocks, Pa._, folio 37.
Footnote 214:
_Ibid._, _Massachusetts Loan Office, 1791_, Item 582; this was also
paper bought up by Gerry for speculation.
Footnote 215:
Gerry was accused by Ellsworth (_q.v._) of having turned against the
new Constitution because the Convention refused to put the old
continental paper money on the same basis as other securities. Toward
the close of the Convention, “Gerry,” says Ellsworth, “introduced a
motion respecting the redemption of the old continental money—that it
should be placed on a footing with other liquidated securities of the
United States. As Mr. Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large
quantities of this species of paper, his motion appeared to be founded
in such bare-faced selfishness and injustice, that it at once
accounted for all his former plausibility and concession, while the
rejection of it by the convention inspired its author with the utmost
rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system he had formerly
praised.” Ford, _Essays on the Constitution_, p. 174. Gerry
indignantly denied that he ever made such a motion in the Convention,
or that he held much continental money. _Ibid._, p. 127. It does not
appear in Farrand, _Records_, that any such motion was made in the
Convention; and under the circumstances it seems not unjust to remark
that Ellsworth’s charges were made with very bad grace, particularly
in view of the fact that he and members of his family and intimate
friends held considerable amounts of public securities. “Bare-faced
selfishness” was not monopolized by Gerry in the Convention.
Footnote 216:
See above, p. 49.
Footnote 217:
King, _Life and Correspondence_, Vol. I, p. 72.
Footnote 218:
A. M. Dyer, _The Ownership of Ohio Lands_, p. 68.
Footnote 219:
Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution_, Vol. II,
pp. 253 ff. See Turner, _Pioneer History of the Holland Purchase of
Western New York_, pp. 326 ff.
Footnote 220:
T. Wyman, _Genealogies and Estates of Charlestown_, Vol. I, p. 424.
Footnote 221:
To be found in the Hamilton Mss., Library of Congress.
Footnote 222:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_.
Footnote 223:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 8.
Footnote 224:
Hamilton, _Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 453.
Footnote 225:
_Ibid._, Vol. VI, p. 454; _Annals of Congress_, Vol. III, pp. 900 ff.
Footnote 226:
See below, p. 112.
Footnote 227:
Mr. Lodge calls the three investigators “inquisitors,” but this seems
like a strong word to apply to members of Congress engaged in running
down rumors relative to the official conduct of a government officer.
_Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 450 note. The impropriety of Monroe’s
action in allowing the story to escape is another matter.
Footnote 228:
The pamphlet by Hamilton in his defence is printed in the Lodge
edition, Vol. VI, pp. 449 ff.
Footnote 229:
Compare the date of the receipts on page 20 of Mr. Fox’s _A Study in
Hamilton_ with the date in the pamphlet (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 494.
Footnote 230:
_Works of Hamilton_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VIII, p. 268. Perhaps the
remnant of an old account of Hamilton on the Treasury Books in 1797
refers to this petty holding. Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E,
Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44, folio 434.
Footnote 231:
J. A. Hamilton, _Reminiscences_, p. 18.
Footnote 232:
W. Maclay, _Journal_ (1890 ed.), p. 188.
Footnote 233:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 188.
Footnote 234:
_Reminiscences of J. A. Hamilton_, p. 18.
Footnote 235:
Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Loan Office, 1791_, folio 24. See also
the volume of _N. Y. Loan Office Receipts_ in the Mss. Division of the
Library of Congress for General Schuyler’s receipts for interest on
securities. The intimate correspondence between Hamilton and General
Schuyler during the period of the formation of the Constitution was
destroyed by a son of one of the latter’s executors. American
Historical Review, Vol. X, p. 181. See Tuckerman, _Life of General
Schuyler_.
Footnote 236:
Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio
325.
Footnote 237:
PHILADELPHIA, Feby. 24^{th}, 1790.
[ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Esq.,
Secretary of the Treasury at New York.]
SIR:
I have had this day the honor of yours inclosing your power of
substitution on behalf of Mr. Church. At present the sale of stock,
and indeed every other money transaction is nearly at a stand. The
produce of the State and the sale of Bills of Exchange will alone
command it, untill we receive a supply from sea.
Mr. Constable has informed me of the purchase he had made of 20 shares
and when they appear the transfer will be compleated.
I observe what you say respecting the sale of what remains of Mr.
Church’s shares and shall do whatever may be in my power to dispose of
them, whenever I receive the certificates and your orders to make the
sale. I am, Sir, with great respect,
Y^r Obed^t Serv^t
THOS. WILLING.
_Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XXIII, p. 1.
Footnote 238:
Library of Congress: _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XX, p. 180.
Footnote 239:
_Ibid._, Vol. XX, pp. 182 ff. Lodge omits references to this
correspondence on Seton’s part, although he gives selected letters
from Hamilton to Seton. _Works of Alexander Hamilton_, Vol. VIII, pp.
231 ff.
Footnote 240:
Library of Congress: _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XXIII, p. 180.
Footnote 241:
A. M. Dyer, _The Ownership of Ohio Lands_, p. 69.
Footnote 242:
Mss. Library of Congress: _Treasury Department, 1790–1792_ (Washington
papers), folio 291.
Footnote 243:
P. 108.
Footnote 244:
_Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, Vol. I, p. 402.
Footnote 245:
Library of Congress, _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XVI, p. 126. The editor of
King’s letters says this letter is lost.
Footnote 246:
Hamilton’s _Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VIII, p. 234.
Footnote 247:
_Ibid._, Vol. VIII, p. 240, date March 14, 1792.
Footnote 248:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger B, N. Y. Office, 1790, Deferred 6%
Stock_, folio 260; also _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio
144.
Footnote 249:
T. A. Glenn, _William Churchill Houston_, pp. 71–72 (Privately
printed), copy in Library of Congress.
Footnote 250:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 97.
Footnote 251:
Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 596.
Footnote 252:
His private fortune was much impaired by the failure of Robert Morris,
for whom he had pledged his faith in several transactions. Morris
Mss., Library of Congress: _Private Letter Book_, Vol. II, pp. 193,
261, 327, 351, 414.
Footnote 253:
H. Binney, _Leaders of the Old Philadelphia Bar_, p. 83; _State
Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 81.
Footnote 254:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 93.
Footnote 255:
_Census of 1790: Heads of Families_, p. 51; consult Index.
Footnote 256:
Appleton, _Encyclopædia of American Biography_, Vol. III, p. 426.
Footnote 257:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office, 1790–1797_, folio 14.
Footnote 258:
_Ibid._, folio 134.
Footnote 259:
Beardsley, _Life and Times of William Samuel Johnson_, pp. 8–9.
Footnote 260:
_Writings of Jefferson_ (Ford ed.), Vol. I, p. 223.
Footnote 261:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6%,
1790_, folios 10, 152, 457.
Footnote 262:
Folios 152 and 457 of above _Ledger B_.
Footnote 263:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger A_, folio
15; _Ledger B_, folio 15; _Ledger C_, folio 15. _Connecticut Loan
Office Receipts_, Library of Congress, Mss. Division.
Footnote 264:
_Ibid._, _New York Loan Office, 6% Ledger, 1791–1797_, folio 161;
_ibid._, _New York Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 107—two
entries of about $25,000 each. _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6%
Stock, 1790_, folios, 152, 457. _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44,
folio 529. There can be no question of the identity of the Robert
Charles Johnson who appears on the public security records and the
Robert Charles Johnson who was the son of William Samuel. The cross
entries between father and son in the records constitute one piece of
evidence. The residence of Robert Charles in Stratford presents
another, for that was the family place. Furthermore, the signature to
the Loan Office Receipts is the signature of Robert Charles, son of
William Samuel Johnson.
Footnote 265:
Rufus King, _Life and Correspondence_, Vol. I, 132.
Footnote 266:
_Life and Correspondence of King_, Vol. I, p. 624.
Footnote 267:
_Writings_ (Ford ed.), Vol. I, p. 223. Maclay makes some quite
uncomplimentary remarks about King, _Journal_, p. 315.
Footnote 268:
Dunlap’s Daily Advertiser, October 23, 1791.
Footnote 269:
Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Office, 6%, Ledger, 1791–1799_, folio
14. _Ibid._, _Ledger B, N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790_, folio 60;
_ibid._, _Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 14. The Treasury Index gives
a number of references to volumes not found.
Footnote 270:
See above, p. 112.
Footnote 271:
C. W. Brewster, _Rambles about Old Portsmouth_ (1859), pp. 360–361.
Footnote 272:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 233.
Footnote 273:
Batchellor, _New Hampshire State Papers_, Vol. XXI, p. 804 note.
Footnote 274:
_Ibid._, Vol. XX, p. 868.
Footnote 275:
Batchellor, _New Hampshire State Papers_, Vol. XX, p. 872.
Footnote 276:
_Journal of William Maclay_ (1890 ed.), p. 178.
Footnote 277:
Ms. Treasury Department: See _Loan Office Certificate Book_, New
Hampshire (Loan of 1777 _passim_).
Footnote 278:
_Ibid._, _New Hampshire Loan Office, Journal A_, folio 4, date March,
1791, and _passim_.
Footnote 279:
Hammond, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XVIII, p. 824.
Footnote 280:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 90.
Footnote 281:
Ms. Treasury Department: _New York Loan Office, 1791_, folio 97.
Footnote 282:
Johannis, Garrit, Abraham, John J., Henry R., and other Lansings
appear on _Ledger C, Funded 6%, 1790_, Ms. Treasury Department.
Consult Index.
Footnote 283:
L. Elmer, _The Constitution and Government of New Jersey_ (1872), pp.
57–59.
Footnote 284:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger B, N. Y. Office, Deferred 6% Stock,
1790_, folios, 72, 306, etc.
Footnote 285:
_Ibid._, _N. Y., 6%, Ledger, 1791–1797_, folio 123.
Footnote 286:
_Ibid._, _Virginia Loan Office, 1791_, under date of September 30,
1791; _Ledger A, Funded 6% Stock, 1790_, folio 123.
Footnote 287:
In a letter of February 13, 1791, Madison advises his father to fund
his Virginia certificates at Richmond: “I do not see what better you
can do with your certificates than to subscribe them to the public
fund at Richmond.” _Writings of James Madison_ (1865 ed.), Vol. I, p.
529.
Footnote 288:
_Writings_ (1865 ed.), Vol. I, p. 538.
Footnote 289:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. IV, p. 420.
Footnote 290:
_The Census of 1790—Heads of Families_, p. 168, places the number of
Martin’s slaves at 47.
Footnote 291:
Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.
Footnote 292:
See Index to _Private Letter Books_ of Robert Morris, Library of
Congress: Mss. Division.
Footnote 293:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families_, Maryland, p. 18.
Footnote 294:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office, 1790–1797_, folios,
80, 81, 194.
Footnote 295:
See below, p. 205.
Footnote 296:
Rowland, _The Life of George Mason_, Vol. I, pp. 48 ff., 55 ff.
Footnote 297:
_Ibid._, I, p. 56.
Footnote 298:
Rowland, _The Life of George Mason_, Vol. I, p. 58.
Footnote 299:
_Ibid._, I, p. 60.
Footnote 300:
_Ibid._, I, pp. 117, 154.
Footnote 301:
_Ibid._, I, p. 119.
Footnote 302:
_Ibid._, I, p. 270.
Footnote 303:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 368.
Footnote 304:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger A, Funded 6% Stock, 1790_, folio 130;
see _Loan Office Virginia, 1790–1793_, folio 132. The Index gives
references to other volumes not found, Vols. 41, 43, 45, folios 93,
15, and 18 respectively.
Footnote 305:
Elliot, _Debates_ (1836 ed.), Vol. III, pp. 528–529.
Footnote 306:
_Ibid._, p. 529.
Footnote 307:
Duyckinck, _Cyclopœdia of American Literature_ (1855 ed.), Vol. I, p.
283.
Footnote 308:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger A, Funded 6% Stock, 1790_, folio 18.
Footnote 309:
_Ibid._, _Loan Office: Register of Subscriptions, Virginia_ (1791),
see date, no folio given.
Footnote 310:
Dunlap’s Daily Advertiser, October 23, 1791.
Footnote 311:
Magazine of American History, Vol. VII, p. 104.
Footnote 312:
Steiner, _The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry_, p. 2.
Footnote 313:
_Hamilton Mss._, Library of Congress, Vol. XXIII, p. 156.
Footnote 314:
T. Montgomery, _History of the Insurance Company of North America_, p.
142.
Footnote 315:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 45, folio 22.
Footnote 316:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 8.
Footnote 317:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families, Maryland_, p. 41.
Footnote 318:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office Maryland, 1790–1797, 3%_, folios
72, 135, and other loan office records of that state, _passim_.
Footnote 319:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
701.
Footnote 320:
_The American Museum_, Vol. II, p. 248.
Footnote 321:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Pa. Loan Office Certificates, 1788_, folio
45.
Footnote 322:
_Ibid._: _Ledger C, 3% Stock, Pa._, folio 48. John F. Mifflin was a
holder of paper to the amount of several thousand dollars funded in
1790. _Ibid._, _Loan Office, Pa., 1790–1791_, folio 6; _Ledger C, 3%
Stock, Pa._, folio 6.
Footnote 323:
Roosevelt, _G. Morris_, pp. 1, 24.
Footnote 324:
_Ibid._, p. 167.
Footnote 325:
Oberholtzer, _Robert Morris_, p. 4.
Footnote 326:
_Ibid._, p. 108.
Footnote 327:
For his multifarious operations see Oberholtzer, _Robert Morris_;
Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution_, 2
vols.
Footnote 328:
Library of Congress: _Morris Mss._ Consult the Index to the three
volumes of Morris’ _Letter Books of Private Correspondence_ for
references, under “James Marshall.” Only by turning over this enormous
mass of correspondence can one gain a correct notion of the
ramifications of Morris’ interests and the number of prominent men
involved in his schemes.
Footnote 329:
_Hamilton Mss._, Library of Congress, Vol. XXII, p. 179; two minor
illustrations of his operations may be given: January 1, 1791,
$7588.78, July 1, 1792, $26,408.66. See also the enormous transactions
in the name of Willing and Morris scattered through the books of
nearly every state. Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C, 3%, Pa._,
folio 334; _Register of Certificates of Public Debt Presented: Auditor
of Treasury_; folios not given. Consult Index to holders of old
securities in the Treasury Department.
Footnote 330:
_Op. cit._, pp. 237 ff.
Footnote 331:
L. Elmer, _The Constitution and Government of New Jersey_, p. 77.
Footnote 332:
American Historical Review, Vol. III, p. 312.
Footnote 333:
_Calendar of Madison Correspondence_, Library of Congress. Mss.
Footnote 334:
Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.
Footnote 335:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families, S.C._, p. 33.
Footnote 336:
Speaking of the nature of the practice in Charleston just after the
Revolution, Charles Fraser says, in _Reminiscences of Charleston_, p.
71: “It was stated by the Duc de Liancourt, who was well acquainted
with most or all of the gentlemen named, that General Pinckney, Mr.
Rutledge, Mr. Pringle, and Mr. Holmes, made from eighteen to
twenty-three thousand dollars a year.... The extensive commercial
business of Charleston at that time opened a wide field of litigation.
Our courts were constantly employed in heavy insurance cases—in
questions of charter party, foreign and inland bills of exchange, and
in adjusting foreign claims. There was also a good deal of business in
admiralty, and, occasionally, a rich prize case.”
Footnote 337:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, S.C., 1791–1797_, folio 38. For
other entries, _Loan Office, S.C._, folio 70; a later entry of
$8721.53 in trust for Mary Pinckney, _ibid._, folio 152.
Footnote 338:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families, S.C._, p. 34.
Footnote 339:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, S.C., 1791–1797_, folio 221.
Footnote 340:
_Madison Mss._, Library of Congress, under date of March 28, 1789.
Footnote 341:
M. Conway, _Edmund Randolph_, p. 48.
Footnote 342:
_Ibid._, p. 372.
Footnote 343:
_Ibid._, p. 384.
Footnote 344:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Current Accounts, Va., 1791–1796_, folios 6,
13, 21; _Ledger B, Assumed Debt, Va._, folio 87.
Footnote 345:
_Hamilton Mss._, Library of Congress, Vol. XX, p. 57.
Footnote 346:
Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. III, p. 351.
Footnote 347:
W. T. Read, _Life of George Read_, p. 575.
Footnote 348:
_History of the Bank of North America_, p. 147.
Footnote 349:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Delaware, 1777–1784_, _passim_.
His mother and daughter bore the name of “Mary.” J. W. Reed, _The Reed
Family_, pp. 433 and 436.
Footnote 350:
_Ibid._, _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 45, folio 202. The Index gives
references to several other volumes which were not found.
Footnote 351:
Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.
Footnote 352:
Flanders, _Lives of the Chief Justices_, Vol. I, p. 551.
Footnote 353:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families, S.C._, p. 42.
Footnote 354:
When Roger Sherman resided in Park Lane and ran a store in New
Milford, Connecticut, he lost money through the depreciation of bills
of credit, and he thereupon declared a war on paper money which he
continued to the end of his days. _Proceedings of the American
Antiquarian Society, 1906–1907_, pp. 214 ff.
Footnote 355:
Sanderson, _Lives of the Signers_, Vol. II, p. 66.
Footnote 356:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office: Connecticut, Ledgers A, B, and
C, Threes and Sixes_, folio 28 in each; January, 1792.
Footnote 357:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 95.
Footnote 358:
_Census of 1790—Heads of Families, N.C._, p. 130.
Footnote 359:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 45, folio 308.
Footnote 360:
_Encyclopædia of National Biography_, Vol. I, p. 110.
Footnote 361:
_Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1791–1835_, Vol. I, pp.
290 ff.
Footnote 362:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Mass. Loan Office, 1791_, Vol. III, item No.
1284.
Footnote 363:
Sparks, _Life of Washington_, Appendix, No. IX.
Footnote 364:
W. C. Ford, _The Federalist_, p. xi, note 3.
Footnote 365:
Bancroft, _History of the Constitution_ (1882 ed.), Vol. II, p. 411.
Footnote 366:
D. Hosack, _Biographical Memoir of Hugh Williamson_, p. 18.
Footnote 367:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, N.C., 1791_, folio 3.
Footnote 368:
_Hamilton Mss._, Library of Congress, Vol. XXIV, pp. 70 ff.
Footnote 369:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 678.
Footnote 370:
Hosack, _op. cit._, p. 85.
Footnote 371:
Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 966.
Footnote 372:
Oberholtzer, _Robert Morris_, p. 108.
Footnote 373:
_History of the Insurance Company of North America_, p. 146.
Footnote 374:
_State Papers: Public Lands_, Vol. I, p. 141.
Footnote 375:
_Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 83.
Footnote 376:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C, 3% Stock, Pa._, folio 195.
Footnote 377:
Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. IV, pp. 172 ff.
Footnote 378:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office: Register of Subscriptions, Va.,
1791_, see date. Also _Ledger A, Assumed Debt, Va._, folio 32.
Footnote 379:
_Appendix to the Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Federal
Convention_ (1821, Albany).
Footnote 380:
Records of the New York Loan Office in the Treasury Department.
Footnote 381:
See above, p. 75, _n._ 3.
Footnote 382:
See above, p. 124. Livingston’s holdings are problematical.
Footnote 383:
The fact that a few members of the Convention, who had considerable
economic interests at stake, refused to support the Constitution does
not invalidate the general conclusions here presented. In the cases of
Yates, Lansing, Luther Martin, and Mason, definite economic reasons
for their action are forthcoming; but this is a minor detail.
Footnote 384:
A great deal of this valuable material has been printed in the
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vols. IV and V; a
considerable amount has been published in the letters and papers of
the eminent men of the period; but an enormous mass still remains in
manuscript form. Fortunately, such important papers as those of
Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and others are in the Library of
Congress; but they are not complete, of course.
Footnote 385:
From this point of view, the old conception of the battle at
Philadelphia as a contest between small and large states—as political
entities—will have to be severely modified. See Professor Farrand’s
illuminating paper on the so-called compromises of the Constitution in
the _Report of the American Historical Association, 1903_, Vol. I, pp.
73 ff. J. C. Welling, “States’ Rights Conflict over the Public Lands,”
_ibid._ (1888), pp. 184 ff.
Footnote 386:
_The Federalist_, No. 73.
Footnote 387:
See J. A. Smith, _The Spirit of American Government_.
Footnote 388:
See Noah Webster’s consideration of the subject of government and
property; Ford, _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, pp. 57 ff.
Footnote 389:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 203.
Footnote 390:
This view was set forth by Madison in a letter to Jefferson in 1788.
“Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is _chiefly_ to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere
instrument of the major number of the constituents. This is a truth of
great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to, and is
probably more strongly impressed upon my mind by facts, and
reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated
abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter. Wherever there
is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done,
and not less readily by a powerful and interested party than by a
powerful and interested prince.” _Documentary History of the
Constitution_, Vol. V, p. 88.
Footnote 391:
_The Federalist_, No. 48.
Footnote 392:
_Ibid._, No. 49.
Footnote 393:
_The Federalist_, No. 51.
Footnote 394:
_Ibid._, No. 51.
Footnote 395:
_Ibid._, No. 60.
Footnote 396:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_. See also the
criticisms of this work by Professor W. F. Dodd, in the American
Historical Review for January, 1913.
Footnote 397:
Number 78.
Footnote 398:
_American Historical Association Report_ (1899), Vol. I, p. 108.
Footnote 399:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, pp. 123–124.
Footnote 400:
_Ibid._, pp. 201 ff.
Footnote 401:
_Ibid._, p. 216.
Footnote 402:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 121.
Footnote 403:
_Ibid._, pp. 121–122.
Footnote 404:
Debate in Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, pp. 123–124.
Footnote 405:
See above, pp. 65 ff. The members of the Convention could not foresee
the French Revolution which was to break out just as the new federal
government was being put into operation in 1789.
Footnote 406:
It was a curious turn of fortune that this provision prevented the
agrarians and populists in 1894 from shifting a part of the burden of
taxes to the great cities of the East. Thus the _Zweck im Recht_ is
sometimes reversed.
Footnote 407:
Clark, _The Records of North Carolina_, Vol. XX, p. 778.
Footnote 408:
_The Federalist_, Number 12.
Footnote 409:
_The Federalist_, No. 4.
Footnote 410:
_Ibid._
Footnote 411:
_The Federalist_, No. 11.
Footnote 412:
Washington’s farewell address which was partially written by Hamilton
is one of the most ingenious partisan documents ever written. It, too,
has its economic interpretation.
Footnote 413:
_The Federalist_, No. 11.
Footnote 414:
_Ibid._, No. 21.
Footnote 415:
_The Federalist_, No. 43.
Footnote 416:
_Ibid._, No. 35.
Footnote 417:
See the entire letter of Blount, Spaight, and Williamson, cited above,
p. 169.
Footnote 418:
No. 11.
Footnote 419:
J. C. Welling, “States’ Rights Conflict over the Public Lands,”
_Report of the American Historical Association_ (1888), pp. 174 ff.
Footnote 420:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 371.
Footnote 421:
_Ibid._, p. 371.
Footnote 422:
There are, of course, some restrictions on Congress laid down in the
Constitution; but the powers of the national legislature are limited
and the restrictions are not of the same significance. Radical action
on the part of the national legislature was anticipated in the
structure of the government itself, but specific provision had to be
made against the assaults of popular majorities in state legislatures
on property rights.
Footnote 423:
_Writings of James Madison_ (1865), Vol. I, p. 350. This entire letter
deserves careful study by anyone who would understand the Constitution
as an economic document.
Footnote 424:
_The Federalist_, No. 44.
Footnote 425:
Ms. Library of Congress: _Treasury Department Letters, 1789–1790_
(Washington Papers), folio 297.
Footnote 426:
_The American Museum_, Vol. I, p. 118.
Footnote 427:
See below, p. 295.
Footnote 428:
Ogden _v._ Saunders, 12 Wheaton, pp. 213 ff.
Footnote 429:
_The Federalist_, No. 6.
Footnote 430:
_The Federalist_, No. 3.
Footnote 431:
_Ibid._, No. 5.
Footnote 432:
_Ibid._
Footnote 433:
_Ibid._, No. 6.
Footnote 434:
_The Federalist_, No. 4.
Footnote 435:
_Ibid._, No. 6.
Footnote 436:
_Ibid._, No. 7.
Footnote 437:
A few whose views were not ascertained are omitted.
Footnote 438:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 469.
Footnote 439:
Above, p. 65.
Footnote 440:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 100.
Footnote 441:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 421.
Footnote 442:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 32.
Footnote 443:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 33.
Footnote 444:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 390.
Footnote 445:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 144.
Footnote 446:
_Ibid._, p. 529.
Footnote 447:
_Ibid._, p. 562.
Footnote 448:
_Ibid._, p. 605.
Footnote 449:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 300.
Footnote 450:
Sanderson, _op. cit._, p. 168.
Footnote 451:
_Ibid._, p. 169.
Footnote 452:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 593.
Footnote 453:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 542.
Footnote 454:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 350.
Footnote 455:
McRee, _Life and Correspondence of James Iredell_, Vol. II, pp. 161,
168.
Footnote 456:
Peele, _Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians_, p. 75. Davie’s
great collection of papers was destroyed in Sherman’s raid. _Ibid._,
p. 78.
Footnote 457:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 86.
Footnote 458:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 202.
Footnote 459:
Farrand, _Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 207.
Footnote 460:
H. J. Ford, _Rise and Growth of American Politics_, p. 113.
Footnote 461:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, pp. 57, 58, 63, 101, 108, 111.
Footnote 462:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 73.
Footnote 463:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 207.
Footnote 464:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_, pp. 71–72.
Footnote 465:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 201.
Footnote 466:
_Ibid._, pp. 362, 529, 589.
Footnote 467:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 48; Vol. III, p. 297.
Footnote 468:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, pp. 94, 99.
Footnote 469:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 204.
Footnote 470:
Scharf and Wescott, _History of Philadelphia_, Vol. I, p. 447.
Footnote 471:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 48.
Footnote 472:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 154.
Footnote 473:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 122 and pp. 73–79.
Footnote 474:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 288.
Footnote 475:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, pp. 299 ff.
Footnote 476:
Farrand, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 48.
Footnote 477:
See above, p. 70.
Footnote 478:
H. Binney, _Leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia_, p. 86.
Footnote 479:
_Ibid._, p. 87.
Footnote 480:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 66.
Footnote 481:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_, p. 29.
Footnote 482:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 439.
Footnote 483:
See below, p. 312.
Footnote 484:
_Observations on Government, Including Some Animadversions on Mr.
Adams’s Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America_, etc., published in 1787, by Livingston, under the
pen-name of “A Farmer of New Jersey.” The pamphlet is sometimes
ascribed to J. Stevens, but there is good authority for believing that
Livingston is the author. It is not inconsistent with his notions on
judicial control; see American Historical Review, Vol. IV, pp. 460 ff.
Footnote 485:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 33.
Footnote 486:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 36.
Footnote 487:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 245.
Footnote 488:
Letter to Hamilton, Library of Congress, _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XXIII,
p. 93.
Footnote 489:
_American Museum_, Vol. IV, p. 333.
Footnote 490:
Steiner, _Life and Correspondence_, p. 527.
Footnote 491:
Above, p. 156. Mr. E. W. Crecraft, of Columbia University, has in
preparation a dissertation on Madison’s political philosophy.
Footnote 492:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, pp. 214 ff.
Footnote 493:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 428.
Footnote 494:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 121.
Footnote 495:
See above, p. 128.
Footnote 496:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 205.
Footnote 497:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, pp. 202 ff.
Footnote 498:
Roosevelt, _Gouverneur Morris_, p. 140.
Footnote 499:
See _The Federalist_, No. 51.
Footnote 500:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 409.
Footnote 501:
For an example see _ibid._, p. 11, note. He also entertained
Washington during the sessions of the Convention. _American Historical
Association Report_ (1902), Vol. I, p. 92.
Footnote 502:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_, p. 37.
Footnote 503:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 474.
Footnote 504:
_Ibid._, Vol. III, p. 100.
Footnote 505:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 248.
Footnote 506:
_Madison Mss._, Library of Congress; date of March 28, 1788.
Footnote 507:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 426.
Footnote 508:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 122.
Footnote 509:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 51 and p. 218.
Footnote 510:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 136.
Footnote 511:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 200.
Footnote 512:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 409.
Footnote 513:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 582.
Footnote 514:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 249.
Footnote 515:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 211.
Footnote 516:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 364.
Footnote 517:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 48; also p. 154.
Footnote 518:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 525.
Footnote 519:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_, p. 53.
Footnote 520:
Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. IV, p. 207.
Footnote 521:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, 361.
Footnote 522:
_Ibid._, p. 72.
Footnote 523:
_Ibid._, p. 219.
Footnote 524:
_Writings_ (Sparks ed., 1848), Vol. XII, p. 222; see below, p. 299.
Footnote 525:
_Ibid._, Vol. X, p. 429.
Footnote 526:
_Ibid._, Vol. X, p. 179.
Footnote 527:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, pp. 201, 250.
Footnote 528:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 140.
Footnote 529:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 140.
Footnote 530:
Above, p. 146.
Footnote 531:
Farrand, Vol. II, 376.
Footnote 532:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 49 and passim.
Footnote 533:
_Ibid._, p. 52 and _passim_.
Footnote 534:
_Ibid._, p. 68 and _passim_.
Footnote 535:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 375; Vol. II, p. 125 and _passim_.
Footnote 536:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 98; Beard, _The Supreme Court and the
Constitution_, p. 42.
Footnote 537:
_Lectures on Law_ (1804 ed.) Vol. I, pp. 398 ff.
Footnote 538:
Beard, _The Supreme Court and the Constitution_, p. 48.
Footnote 539:
“What they [the Convention] actually did, stripped of all fiction and
verbiage, was to assume constituent powers, ordain a constitution of
government and of liberty, and demand a _plébiscite_ thereon over the
heads of all existing legally organized powers. Had Julius or Napoleon
committed these acts they would have been pronounced _coups d’état_.”
_Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law_, Vol. I, p.
105.
Footnote 540:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, p. 123.
Footnote 541:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 89.
Footnote 542:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 137.
Footnote 543:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. I, pp. 255 ff.; p. 283.
Footnote 544:
No. 40.
Footnote 545:
Harding, _The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, pp. 118–119.
Footnote 546:
The Massachusetts Centinel, January 2, 1788.
Footnote 547:
Batchellor, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XXI, pp. 151–165;
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, II, p. 141.
Footnote 548:
J. B. Walker, _A History of the New Hampshire Convention_, pp. 22 ff.
Footnote 549:
Four members are not recorded, and “there is a pretty well
authenticated tradition that a certain prominent federalist of Concord
gave a dinner party on the last day of the session at which several
members reckoned as opposed to ratification were present and
discussing the dinner when the final vote was taken.” _Ibid._, p. 43,
note.
Footnote 550:
Harding, _The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, p. 67.
Footnote 551:
Harding, _op. cit._, p. 99.
Footnote 552:
Harding, _op. cit._, p. 101.
Footnote 553:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, pp. 86–87;
Connecticut Courant, October 22, 1787.
Footnote 554:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 257.
Footnote 555:
_Debates and Proceedings of the New York State Convention_ (1905 ed.),
p. 3.
Footnote 556:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 340.
Footnote 557:
_Ibid._, p. 340; and see below, p. 244.
Footnote 558:
_State Papers: Miscellaneous_, Vol. I, p. 7. For valuable side-lights
on the opposition to the Constitution, see E. P. Smith’s essay, “The
Movement towards a Second Constitutional Convention,” in Jameson,
_Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States_, pp. 46
ff.
Footnote 559:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, pp. 46 ff.
Footnote 560:
Bancroft, _History of the Constitution of the United States_, Vol. II,
p. 250; _Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, p. 25;
_Delaware State Council Minutes_, _1776–1792_, pp. 1081–82 (_Delaware
Historical Society Papers_); Connecticut Courant, Dec. 24, 1787.
Footnote 561:
See above, p. 82.
Footnote 562:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p. 3.
Footnote 563:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 4.
Footnote 564:
_Ibid._, p. 14.
Footnote 565:
_Ibid._, p. 15.
Footnote 566:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 20. The following year [1788] when
the ratification of the Constitution was celebrated in Philadelphia,
James Wilson, in an oration on the great achievement said: “A people
free and enlightened, establishing and ratifying a system of
government which they have previously considered, examined, and
approved! This is the spectacle which we are assembled to celebrate;
and it is the most dignified one that has yet appeared on our
globe.... What is the object exhibited to our contemplation? A whole
people exercising its first and greatest power—performing an act of
sovereignty, original and unlimited!... Happy country! May thy
happiness be perpetual!” _Works_ (1804 ed.), Vol. III, pp. 299 ff.
Footnote 567:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 278; _Votes and Proceedings of the
Senate of Maryland, November Session, 1787_, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 568:
_Ibid._, p. 283.
Footnote 569:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 316. The resolution provided that
the “election shall be held in the month of March next on the first
day of the court to be held for each county, city, or corporation
respectively.” The qualifications of voters were “the same as those
now established by law.” Blair, _The Virginia Convention of 1788_,
Vol. I, p. 56–57. Only freeholders were eligible to seats in the
Convention. _Ibid._, p. 56. Hening, _Statutes at Large_, Vol. XII, p.
462.
Footnote 570:
_Laws of North Carolina_ (1821), Vol. I, p. 597; _North Carolina
Assembly Journals, 1785–98_, p. 22.
Footnote 571:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 349.
Footnote 572:
Hugh Williamson, writing to Madison on May 21, 1789, said: “Our people
near the sea-coast are in great pain on the idea of being shut out
from the Union. They say that unless they can continue in the coasting
trade without the alien duty, they must starve with their families or
remove from the state. Can no exception be made in favor of such
apparent aliens for so long a period as the first of January next?”
_Madison Mss._, Library of Congress.
Footnote 573:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 293.
Footnote 574:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, pp. 82 ff.
Footnote 575:
F. G. Bates, _Rhode Island and the Union_, pp. 192 ff.
Footnote 576:
_Ibid._, p. 197.
Footnote 577:
See below, p. 248.
Footnote 578:
See above, p. 234.
Footnote 579:
_Ibid._, p. 72.
Footnote 580:
Dodd, _The Revision and Amendment of Constitutions_; and Garner, in
The American Political Science Review, February, 1907.
Footnote 581:
McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316.
Footnote 582:
Batchellor, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XXI, p. 165.
Footnote 583:
_Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in 1788_ (1856), p. 23.
Footnote 584:
Connecticut Courant, October 22, 1787.
Footnote 585:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, p. 61.
Footnote 586:
_Delaware State Council Minutes, 1776–1792_, pp. 1080–1082.
Footnote 587:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
72.
Footnote 588:
_Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, November Session,
1787_, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 589:
Above, p. 69. Blair, _The Virginia Convention of 1788_, Vol. I, pp.
56–57. Only freeholders could sit in the Convention.
Footnote 590:
_North Carolina Assembly Journals, 1785–1789_, p. 22.
Footnote 591:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. II, p. 83.
Footnote 592:
Libby, _Geographical Distribution of the Vote on the Federal
Constitution_, p. 26, and note.
Footnote 593:
Article cited below, p. 243.
Footnote 594:
McKinley, _Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 420.
Footnote 595:
Dr. J. F. Jameson, “Did the Fathers Vote,” New England Magazine,
January, 1890.
Footnote 596:
A detailed statement of the vote in many Connecticut towns on the
members of the state convention could doubtless be compiled after
great labor from the local records described in the report on the
public archives of Connecticut, _Report of the American Historical
Association for 1906_, Vol. II.
Footnote 597:
Harding, _The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, p. 55, note 3.
The Connecticut Courant gives the number as 763, December 17, 1787.
Footnote 608:
The Journal for June 5 reports the Anti-Federalist ticket carried in
Washington County by a vote of two to one.
Footnote 609:
See below, p. 270.
Footnote 610:
See a forthcoming dissertation on this subject by Wm. Feigenbaum.
There was a threat of secession on the part of some New York City
interests in case the Constitution was defeated. Weight was given to
this threat by the news of the ratification from New Hampshire and
Virginia. The possibility of retaining New York as the seat of the new
Government was used by Jay, Hamilton, and Duane as an argument in
favor of ratification. James Madison, _Writings_, Vol. I, p. 405.
Footnote 611:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 460.
Footnote 612:
Scharf and Wescott, _History of Philadelphia_, Vol. I, p. 447.
Footnote 613:
Hartford Courant, April 28, 1788.
Footnote 614:
American Historical Review, Vol. V, p. 221.
Footnote 615:
“Appius,” To the Citizens of South Carolina (1794). Library of
Congress, Duane Pamphlets, Vol. 83.
Footnote 616:
By a careful study of local geography and the distribution of
representation this could be accurately figured out.
Footnote 617:
“The First Elections under the Constitution,” _Iowa Journal of History
and Politics_, Vol. II, pp. 3 ff.
Footnote 618:
It will be recalled that the Constitution was put into effect without
either North Carolina or Rhode Island.
Footnote 619:
See above, p. 248.
Footnote 620:
See below, p. 299.
Footnote 621:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 50 ff.
Footnote 622:
Above, Chapter V.
Footnote 623:
_Massachusetts and the Federal Constitution_ (Harvard Studies).
Footnote 624:
_Sectionalism in Virginia._
Footnote 625:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 7–8.
Footnote 626:
_Ibid._, p. 11.
Footnote 627:
Data given here are from _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 442. It
should be remembered that the figures would have been relatively
different in 1787 on account of the union of Vermont with New
Hampshire, but they are doubtless roughly correct.
Footnote 628:
Some painstaking research in the Treasury Department would produce
valuable data toward the solution of this problem.
Footnote 629:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 442 (public funds included. See p.
419).
Footnote 630:
See above for the table, p. 36.
Footnote 631:
Ms. Treasury Department: New Hampshire Loan Office Books.
Footnote 632:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 12.
Footnote 633:
_The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, p. 75.
Footnote 634:
As to the opposition in Maine, see General Knox’s view, below, p. 301.
Footnote 635:
_The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, pp. 63–66.
Footnote 636:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 451. Of course some changes in
distribution may have occurred between 1789 and 1792, but this may be
taken as approximately correct.
Footnote 637:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 443; Libby, _op. cit._, p. 107 for
the vote.
Footnote 638:
Libby, _op. cit._, for vote, p. 107; _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I.
pp. 450 and 449 for taxes lists.
Footnote 639:
The full significance of the Worcester vote and property lists would
involve an analysis of the distribution of each among the towns.
Footnote 640:
_American Antiquarian Society Proceedings_ (1911), p. 65.
Footnote 641:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Index to the Three Per Cents (Mass.)_. Gore,
Dawes, and Phillips appear on the New Hampshire Journals and other
Massachusetts Records.
Footnote 642:
The _Index_ shows several holders by the name of Davis: Jonathan,
James, Aaron, Susanna, John, Nathl., Joseph, Moses, Thomas, Saml.,
Wendell, and John G. Whether they were relatives of Caleb is not
apparent. Leonard and Nathl. Jarvis also appear on the Book. Also Mary
and Belcher Hancock.
Footnote 643:
All of these men except Wales and Warren appear on the _Index to the
Three Per Cents (Mass.)_. Wales and Warren appear on the books as
holders of old certificates (_Loan Office Certificates, 1779–1788,
Mass._); and it does not appear when or how they disposed of their
holdings.
Footnote 644:
See above, p. 75, note 3.
Footnote 645:
On September 3, 1787, the Connecticut Courant in a letter from
Philadelphia (Aug. 24) says: “One of the first objects with the
national government to be elected under the new constitution, it is
said, will be to provide funds for the payment of the national debt,
and thereby restore the credit of the United States, which has been so
much impaired by the individual states. Every holder of a public
security of any kind is, therefore, deeply interested in the cordial
reception and speedy establishment of a vigorous continental
government.”
Footnote 646:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 14.
Footnote 647:
_Ibid._, p. 113.
Footnote 648:
Towns not represented or not voting in the convention are counted
against the Constitution.
Footnote 649:
The assumed debt is taken because the Ledgers of that debt are in
excellent shape and apparently complete. They do not contain, however,
half of the security holders in that state. Several of the towns that
had no assumed debt-holders were represented in the convention by
holders of other paper. See table, p. 267.
Footnote 650:
See above, p. 15.
Footnote 651:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 423.
Footnote 652:
The sources for the information as to these securities are in the
Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, 1781–1783_ (Register of
Certificates); _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger B, Assumed Debt_;
_Ledger C, 1790–1796_; _Ledger A, 1790–1797_; _Loan Office
Certificates of 1779, etc._
Footnote 653:
No doubt a study of local economic interests in Connecticut would
yield highly important data. See, for example, the early capitalist
enterprises connected with the navigation of the Connecticut River.
_Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, 1903–1904_, p. 404.
Such local histories as E. D. Larned, _A History of Windham County_,
contain veritable mines of information on the economic interests of
men prominent in local politics.
Footnote 654:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 18. Libby here takes the vote in the New York
convention, but that did not precisely represent the popular vote.
Above, p. 244.
Footnote 655:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 425.
Footnote 656:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 59.
Footnote 657:
Those marked “C 6”, Ms. Treasury Department: _New York, 6% Funds,
1790_; “N. Y. 3” _ibid._, _3% Funds_; “R,” _New York Loan Office
Receipts_, Ms. Division, Library of Congress. Melancton Smith appears
on the Ledgers of the Connecticut Loan Office; and _N. Y. Loan Office,
1791_, folio 138, for $10,000 worth of sixes and threes.
Footnote 658:
See above, p. 107.
Footnote 659:
Not present on final vote, but see Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. II, p. 411.
Footnote 660:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 60–61. Writing on October 14, 1787, Madison
said “I do not learn that any opposition is likely to be made [to the
ratification] in New Jersey,” _Writings of James Madison_, Vol. I, p.
342.
Footnote 661:
These records are drawn principally from incomplete lists of early
certificates issued, or from some later funding books in the Treasury
Department. The real weight of securities in the New Jersey convention
must remain problematical, at least, for the present. The amounts set
down to the names above recorded are for the most part insignificant—a
few hundred or thousand dollars at the most, and often smaller. The
point, it may be repeated, is not the amount but the practical
information derived from holding even one certificate of the nominal
value of $10.
Footnote 662:
Dr. Jameson says of the records of the Delaware convention: “Neither
journal nor debates, has, I believe, ever been published,” _American
Historical Association Report_ (1902), Vol. I, p. 165.
Footnote 663:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 26 ff.
Footnote 664:
The Massachusetts Gazette, on October 19, 1787, prints a letter from
Philadelphia (dated October 5) in which the activities of speculators
in public securities are fully set forth: “Since the grand federal
convention has opened the budget and published their scheme of
government, all goes well here. Continental loan office certificates
and all such securities have risen twenty-five per cent. Even the old
emission which has long lain dormant begins to show its head. Last
week many thousand pounds’ worth of it were bought up. Moneyed men
have their agents employed to buy up all the continental securities
they can—foreseeing the rapid rise of our funds. Such men as have the
cash to spare will certainly make large fortunes.... We send our
factors to the distant towns who know nothing of the rise and buy them
cheap; for there is no buying them on reasonable terms in
Philadelphia, as the wealthy men are purchasing them to lay up. Thus
we go on—pray how is it with you?”
Footnote 665:
Ms. Treasury Department: “I,” _Index to Funded 6 C_; “JA,” _Journal A,
1790–1791_ (sixes and threes); “JB,” _Journal B_; “R,” _Register Loan
Office Certificates, 1788_; “77,” _Register Certificates of 1777_; “3
C,” _Ledger C, 3% Stock_; “LT,” _Treasury Ledger_; “M,” Miscellaneous.
Footnote 666:
_Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution._ It will be noted that
there were at least seven members of the Order of Cincinnati in the
convention, all of whom were in favor of the Constitution.
Footnote 667:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 66.
Footnote 668:
Letter, quoted in Libby, _op. cit._, p. 65.
Footnote 669:
_Sectionalism in Virginia_, pp. 6–9; p. 58.
Footnote 670:
Ambler, _op. cit._, pp. 8, 59.
Footnote 671:
_Ibid._, pp. 15–16.
Footnote 672:
Ambler, _op. cit._, pp. 48–52.
Footnote 673:
Henry not only refused to attend but opposed the adoption of the
Constitution with all his might.
Footnote 674:
_Ibid._, p. 36.
Footnote 675:
Ambler, _op. cit._, pp. 53 ff.
Footnote 676:
For an explanation of the Federalist complexion of this region see
Ambler’s explanation, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 16.
Footnote 677:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 34–35.
Footnote 678:
Voted against ratification.
Footnote 679:
This is evident from the records in the Treasury Department.
Footnote 680:
Libby, _op. cit._, pp. 38 ff.
Footnote 681:
_Ibid._, p. 42–43.
Footnote 682:
“Appius,” _To the Citizens of South Carolina_ (1794), Library of
Congress, Duane Pamphlets, Vol. 83.
Footnote 683:
See above, p. 248.
Footnote 684:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 462. In 1783 an attempt to
establish a bank with $100,000 capital was made in Charleston, S.C.,
but it failed. “Soon after the adoption of the funding system, three
banks were established in Charleston whose capitals in the whole
amounted to twenty times the sum proposed in 1783.” D. Ramsay,
_History of South Carolina_ (1858 ed.), Vol. II, p. 106.
Footnote 685:
Ms. Treasury Department: _South Carolina Loan Office Ledger_, consult
Index. No general search was made for other names.
Footnote 686:
On the subject of ratification in Georgia, Dr. Jameson says: “Nothing
of either journal or debates is known to have been printed, unless in
some contemporary newspaper outside the state; the Georgia newspapers
seem to have nothing of the sort.” _American Historical Association
Report_ (1902), Vol. I, p. 167.
Footnote 687:
This danger may have had some influence in the concessions made by the
Georgia delegates in the Convention for they were kept informed of the
Indian troubles in the summer of 1787. Force Transcripts, _Georgia
Records, 1782–1789_: Library of Congress.
Footnote 688:
Some holders of public securities are found among the opponents of the
Constitution, but they are not numerous.
Footnote 689:
_Writings_, Vol. I, p. 423.
Footnote 690:
“Address to the Freemen of America,” _The American Museum_ for June,
1787. Vol. I, p. 494.
Footnote 691:
New Hampshire Spy, November 30, 1787.
Footnote 692:
_American Museum_, July, 1788, Vol. IV, p. 85.
Footnote 693:
Above, p. 156.
Footnote 694:
McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316; below, p. 299.
Footnote 695:
Vol. II (1850 ed.), p. 99 ff.
Footnote 696:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 232. Speaking of New Hampshire,
Madison says, “The opposition [to the Constitution], I understand, is
composed precisely of the same description of characters with that of
Massachusetts and stands contrasted to all the wealth, abilities, and
respectability of the State.” _Writings_, Vol. I, p. 383.
Footnote 697:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 442.
Footnote 698:
_Report of the Manuscripts Commission of the American Historical
Association_, December 20, 1896, p. 754. A writer in the Chronicle of
Freedom (reprinted in the Massachusetts Centinel, October, 27, 1787)
complains of the dangers to the freedom of the press from the new
Constitution and continues: “One thing, however, is calculated to
alarm our fears on this head;—I mean the fashionable language which
now prevails so much and is so frequent in the mouths of some who
formerly held very different opinions;—That common people have no
business to trouble themselves about government.” The Massachusetts
Centinel (November 24, 1787) declares it to be “a notorious fact that
three of the principle enemies of the proposed constitution were heart
and hand with the insurgents last winter.”
Footnote 699:
_Life and Letters_, Vol. I, pp. 314 ff.
Footnote 700:
Harding, _The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts_, pp. 123–124.
Footnote 701:
Ford, _Essays on the Constitution_, p. 139.
Footnote 702:
Ford, _Essays on the Constitution_, pp. 144 ff.
Footnote 703:
Libby, _op. cit._, p. 58.
Footnote 704:
Connecticut Courant, May 21, 1787.
Footnote 705:
See above, p. 156.
Footnote 706:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 288. On the
antagonism in New York see some clues afforded in an article in The
Magazine of American History, April, 1893, pp. 326 ff.
Footnote 707:
Dickinson’s Fabius letters were printed after the ratification by
Delaware and were directed to the “general public” rather than
fellow-citizens in that commonwealth. Among the opponents to the
Constitution, he put “men without principles or fortunes who think
they may have a chance to mend their circumstances with impunity under
a weak government.” Ford, _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 165.
Footnote 708:
See Harding, “Party struggles over the First Pennsylvania
Constitution,” _American Historical Association Report_ (1894).
Footnote 709:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 305.
Footnote 710:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 339.
Footnote 711:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 358.
Footnote 712:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 73.
Footnote 713:
_Ibid._, p. 567.
Footnote 714:
_Ibid._, p. 367.
Footnote 715:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, pp. 568–569.
Footnote 716:
_Ibid._, pp. 569–570.
Footnote 717:
Connecticut Courant, Oct. 1, 1787.
Footnote 718:
See the valuable articles on “Maryland’s Adoption of the
Constitution,” by Dr. Steiner in the American Historical Review, Vol.
V.
Footnote 719:
Ford, _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 254.
Footnote 720:
See above, p. 205.
Footnote 721:
Maryland Journal, March 21, 1788.
Footnote 722:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 398. For the
economics of this, see above, p. 30.
Footnote 723:
P. 295.
Footnote 724:
“It is currently reported,” says the New Hampshire Spy, on December 7,
1787, “that there are only two men in Virginia who are not in debt, to
be found among the enemies to the federal constitution. Debtors,
speculators in papers, and states demagogues act consistently in
opposing it.”
Footnote 725:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 584.
Footnote 726:
_Ibid._, p. 577.
Footnote 727:
Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. III, p. 592. See W. C. Ford, “The Federal
Constitution in Virginia,” in the _Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society_ for October, 1903.
Footnote 728:
Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. IV, p. 159.
Footnote 729:
Elliot, _Debates_, Vol. IV, p. 90.
Footnote 730:
McRee, _Life and Correspondence of James Iredell_, Vol. II, pp. 216,
219.
Footnote 731:
McRee, _op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 164 note.
Footnote 732:
See W. A. Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American
Historical Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I.
Footnote 733:
Summary by T. Ford, _The Constitutionalist_ (1794), p. 21.
Footnote 734:
Ford, _op. cit._, pp. 21–22.
Footnote 735:
_Op. cit._, p. 13.
Footnote 736:
Ford, _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 379. On May 24, 1788, after
the Constitution had been approved in South Carolina, General Pinckney
wrote to Rufus King, saying, “The Anti-Federalists had been most
mischievously industrious in prejudicing the minds of our citizens
against the Constitution. Pamphlets, speeches, & Protests from the
disaffected in Pennsylvania were circulated throughout the state,
particularly in the back country.” King, _Life and Correspondence_,
Vol. I, p. 329.
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