The revolt in Arabia

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Title: The revolt in Arabia
Author: Snouck Hurgronje, C. (Christiaan)
Language: English
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_By C. Snouck Hurgronje_

The Holy War, Made in Germany
Mohammedanism
The Revolt in Arabia

The
Revolt in Arabia

By
Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje

Professor of the Arabic Language in the University of
Leiden; Councillor to the Dutch Ministry
of the Colonies, etc.

With a Foreword by
Richard J. H. Gottheil
Columbia University, New York

G. P. Putnam’s Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1917

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

FOREWORD

All those interested in Mohammedan affairs were much surprised to
learn, through a despatch from Cairo on June 22, 1916, that the Emir
of Mecca had revolted from Turkish overlordship. Much speculation
was indulged in regarding the causes for such an uprising and its
probable or possible outcome; for there are few parts of the habitable
globe about which the ordinary student of international affairs knows
so little as he does about Arabia. Life there has remained in much
of its mediæval primitiveness; and even scholars who are specially
concerned about Mohammedanism, and about the several hundred millions
of its devotees, are little better situated in receiving accurate
information of that which is occurring in the “Holy Land” of Arabia.

No one living knows its history better than does Professor Snouck
Hurgronje of the University of Leiden. To his vast knowledge upon all
subjects connected with Mohammedanism and gained from an extensive
reading of its literature, he has added personal observation during
the year that he spent in Mecca and Jiddah. He has been able to get
an insight into the various questions involved in its tangled history
at the present day, and to learn at first hand of the parties which
are rivals for leadership there. In the Dutch newspaper _Nieuwe
Rotterdamsche Courant_, July 14, 1916, Professor Snouck Hurgronje gave
a lucid explanation of the situation created as he saw it, by the
proclamation of the Emir. The following pages contain a translation of
these articles. I have added, as an appendix, the official proclamation
of the Shereef to the whole Moslem world as it appeared translated into
English in _The Near East_ for August 25, 1916.

Since these articles were published in Holland we have heard very
little as to what is happening in and around Mecca. News has come that
an attempt at administrative reconstruction has been made at Jiddah;
that the new Shereef has appointed a special agent at Cairo in the
person of Omar Bey al-Faruki; and that the new government has decided
to publish a weekly paper called _Elkiblah_, which is to be edited
by Fuad Effendi Khatib of Gordon College, Assuan. What is of greater
importance is the alleged assistance offered to the Emir Husain by the
Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa’ud, the head of the Wahhabites in the Nejd――the
district east of Medinah――and by the Zaidite Imam Yahyah in the Yemen
against the Turkish troops stationed there.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL.

Dec. 23, 1916.
Columbia University.

CONTENTS

PAGE
FOREWORD iii

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA 1

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA (_Continued_) 15

III

SHEREEF AND CALIPH 29

NOTE 41

APPENDIX

PROCLAMATION OF THE SHEREEF OF MECCA 43

THE REVOLT IN ARABIA

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA

How the public insists upon making a snap judgment on the significance
of passing events is shown by the haste with which speculations are
given out, speculations that are purely hypothetical because the
truth of the reports that reach us can, as yet, be verified only
approximately.

According to a Reuter despatch, the Great Shereef of Mecca has revolted
against Turkish authority and, at the head of his Arabs, has succeeded
in forcing the capitulation of the garrisons of Mecca, Jidda, Ta’if,
and Medina, and has seriously hampered the movements of Turkish troops,
menacing to him, by the destruction of a section of the railroad
from Medina to the north. Wolff’s Bureau, on the other hand, spreads
a report of the “Milli Agency”――the Turkish National Agency――that a
troop of Arabs, to whom robbery was no unaccustomed calling, had been
persuaded by their captain, he being instigated by English marines, to
bombard Mecca, that the Turkish troops had, however, speedily restored
order, and that the raiders themselves, when it was proven that their
leader had been seduced by English money to act thus basely, had
delivered the miscreant to the Turkish authorities.

If the German-Turkish statement be correct, the occurrence was
insignificant and not deserving attention. If Reuter be right in the
main point, then it is well worth while to consider what may be the
possible consequences of the Arab movement.

In either case, to comprehend the matter rightly, the political
significance of the Shereefate of Mecca should be understood and the
reading public should have a clearer idea of what the title “Grand
Shereef of Mecca” covers than is possessed by the majority.

Mecca, the birth-place of the Prophet Mohammed, was not the centre
from which he extended his sovereignty over a great part of Arabia.
The capital of the realm founded by him was Medina, situated a ten-day
caravan journey to the north. Moreover, when, about twenty years after
his first appearance as Allah’s messenger, Mohammed conquered Mecca,
he did not think of transferring the seat of government thither. He
had his own good reasons for this, which we can pass over here.
Still weightier were the reasons that influenced his successors in
the administration of the theocracy of Islam from such a step. Mecca
was far too remote from the then existing centres of civilisation to
be a convenient vantage point for the world conquest considered by
Islam as its appointed task, and as a capital from which to administer
the empire which the first Caliphs were able to establish by force of
arms. Even Medina seemed unsuited for the purpose, permanently. Then,
when the Persian Empire, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain were
subjected to Islam, Arabia, regarded politically, became a remote
territory with a steadily decreasing significance.

The residence of the Caliphs was removed first to Damascus, later to
Bagdad, where they remained established for five centuries――down to
1250 A.D.

Still the Arabian peninsula, arid though it is in the main, retained
its prestige in the Moslem world, not only as the fatherland of the
conquerors, but also as the Holy Land of Islam. Mecca might be ill
adapted for a political capital, but it was, in the eyes of the
faithful, the earth’s centre, where the first human pair had walked,
where Abraham had founded the first House of God, the Kaba, where every
normal Mohammedan was bound to go once in his life to take part in the
religious festival annually celebrated there.

While Mecca had already long been a religious centre for the heathen
Arabians, after Mohammed’s death Medina was classed with it as a spot
where the foundations of Moslem theocracy were laid, where the Prophet
had built his first mosque, and where he was buried. The lieutenants
of the Caliphs in West Arabia (the Hijaz), with Medina as the first,
Mecca as the second, capital, thus had the chief sanctuaries of
Islam entrusted to their care, and they were bound to provide for
the preservation of order at the enormous international gatherings
for which the two holy cities had furnished a stage every year since
Mohammed’s death.

Truly, the task was no easy one. The inhabitants of Mecca and
Medina were, usually, at odds, and unanimous only in obstinacy and
insubordination. The nomads of the intervening district continued
to be, under Islam, the anarchists that they had been from time
immemorial. Only a very strong hand could bridle the disorders native
to the Holy Land. And a strong hand had always been lacking.

Very soon after its rise, the great empire of Islam fell asunder and
the continuous contests between the state and statelets into which
it dissolved made the central authority of the Caliph a mere fiction,
incapable of efficient exercise of power. Even the states, prominent
from their position and thus better situated to maintain order in
the Holy Land, as it was their interest to do, could not spare the
military force essential for the governor of the Hijaz (West Arabia).
Thus the holiest, the least productive, and most difficult-to-rule
portion of the Moslem Empire was practically given over to confusion as
its natural vital element, and the more vigorous Mohammedan countries
limited themselves to the protection of the pilgrim caravans which set
out from their realms for Arabia, and of su ch of their own subjects as
had settled there.

Out of the chaos in West Arabia, resulting from the disintegration
of the Islamic Empire, was born the Shereefate of Mecca. From the
extraordinarily numerous posterity of Mohammed, issue of the union
of his daughter Fatima with his nephew Ali, many remained settled
in Arabia as owners of date gardens, as robber knights at the head
of Bedouin clans, or as speculators in the gradually increasing
superstitious adoration of the Mohammedans for the Prophet’s blood.
Outside of Arabia, the descendants of Ali participated in political
revolutions on greater or lesser scale, or had their hands filled by
the governors of the Moslem lands. Their short-sighted avarice and
their common lack of political talent, however, hindered them from
carrying any important project to completion. Any success which they
achieved was always transient. The universal condition of things in
Arabia afforded the opportunity of turning a portion of the Holy
Province into a personal domain In about 1000 A.D., the heads of
certain families among the descendants of Ali began to make themselves
powerful in the Hijaz and held their ground. From 1200 A.D. to the
present time, one line of these children of Ali, that of Katada, has
succeeded in maintaining supremacy in Mecca.

The names _sharif_――anglicized as _shereef_――that is “The Noble,”
and _sayyid_ signifying “Seigneur” or “Lord,” have become, little by
little, titles of nobility throughout the entire Mohammedan world,
especially among the posterity of the Prophet. The head of the reigning
family in Mecca is “The Shereef of Mecca” _par excellence_, and the
people call him _Sayyidana_, that is “Our Master” (or Our Lord). How
far the realm of these Shereefs was extended beyond Mecca depended,
as long as the petty dynasties existed, entirely on the chances of
circumstance; the more that confusion reigned in the surrounding
Mohammedan realms and the greater the energy manifested by the ruling
head of the family, the greater the portion of the Hijaz that came
under his authority. The reverse was equally true. The defects of the
most respected race of Islam were, to a great extent, the peculiar
characteristics of the Mecca branch. They were incapable of carrying
out any great undertaking.

The pilgrims, except when escorted by an imposing military force, were
pitilessly stripped of their every possession by the Shereef and his
satellites. Like the Bedouins through whose territory the _hajjis_ or
pilgrims had to pass, who counted all money and property as God-given
booty, the Shereefs considered themselves justified in making Allah’s
guests at Mecca submit to every kind of bleeding, and the latter had
no remedy.

Further, there were among the members of the noble race one quarrel
after another about their heritage, so that it was almost the normal
state of affairs for one head of two rival branches of the family to
fill the Shereefate while the other besieged Mecca or rendered the
roads thither unsafe. The stable population of Mecca were sacrificed
to this struggle for mastery; the blessings of peace were an unknown
luxury to them.

When the Hijaz was still actually governed from the political centre
of Islam, Medina was the appointed capital. For an independent local
principality, such as the Shereefate, Mecca had the advantage of not
being so accessible to the military forces of powers that might trouble
themselves about the Hijaz. Only occasionally could the Shereefs of
Mecca control Medina at the same time, as the intervening distance was
too great for the transportation facilities of the country. The alpine
city Ta’if, two or three days’ journey east of Mecca, where many people
from Mecca resorted for the summer, and the port Jidda, one to two
days’ journey to the west, ordinarily fell under the Shereef. Several
smaller ports were also included under his rule. The connection with
the interior, mainly inhabited by nomadic tribes, varied according to
the personal relations of the Shereef with the head of the Bedouin clan.

The Shereefate of Mecca differed from most of the states and
principalities into which the great Islam Empire was divided, because
it had not been developed gradually from a governorship to a condition
of greater independence, but was born, spontaneously, during a period
of confusion.

At Bagdad, as well as in other neighbouring capitals, people had
accepted the change as a _fait accompli_. The Shereefate was neither
expressly recognised nor expressly objected to as unlawful. Its
century-long existence attained, moreover, a sort of virtual legitimacy
through its acceptance by many Moslem tribes, who were represented in
the Holy City by the annual deputations of pilgrims. These visitors
were constantly exposed to ill treatment on the part of the Shereef.
Yet, in spite of that, they held to a belief that domination over the
Holy City belonged rightfully to a branch of the Holy Family. The fact
was simply accepted as irrefutable.

The chief Islam powers have always attached a certain reservation to
their tacit recognition of the Shereefs of Mecca which the latter have
found themselves forced to accept. He was never an independent ruler
and, in the long run, had to recognise the suzerainty of the protecting
states.

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA--_Continued_

It was to these accidents of origin that the Shereefate of Mecca owed
its peculiar standing. Its status was not a little enhanced by the
unique significance of the city of Mecca for the Mohammedan world at
large. From the tenth century, no one of the foremost Islam princes
possessed the machinery to keep West Arabia under an administration
even approximately orderly. On two points they were alike
determined--first, to have their names introduced into the official
prayers at the official ceremonies of Mecca, each desiring to take
precedence of the others; second, that their deputies at the annual
festivals should take rank in accordance with their pretensions. In
the prayers, the name of the Caliph was given first place, without
question, even after his power had become a phantom. The descendants
of the Prophet, wielding authority at Mecca from about the year 1000
to 1200 A.D., managed the required homage with a certain impartiality.
At their command, there were prayers, now for the official Caliph
at Bagdad and again for the heretical opposition Caliph in Egypt,
according to the puissance manifested or the bribes offered by the one
or the other. The Shereef family, ruling at Mecca from about 1200 A.D.
to the present time, were soon freed from the difficulty of choice when
an end was made of the Fatimide Caliphate in Egypt and when the Mongol
storm swept away that of Bagdad in 1258. In the centuries following
these events, the Sultans alone were mentioned in the prayers. And it
was thus, in the prayers, that there was the first formal expression of
the relation between the Shereefate and the chief power of Islam.

Egypt long held an uncontested position so that it is correct to speak
of a protectorate exercised by her Sultans over the territory of West
Arabia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The Hijaz
(West Arabia) was dependent on the Nile-land for the importation of
foodstuffs and other necessities. The Mameluke Sultans permitted the
continuance of the Shereefate and did not interfere in the endless
petty wars of succession fought by the claimants to the office. When it
became necessary, it cost the Sultans little exertion to turn the scale
in some of these contests with the help of a detachment of regular
troops, and to enforce obedience. It was always an unequal strife
between the trained soldiers of a great Moslem power and the Shereef’s
little force, consisting as it did, of a few hundred slaves, the same
number of mercenaries, and the timely aid of a few Bedouin clans.
Domestic dissension, moreover, always assured the punitory leader of
the coöperation of one party within the disturbed territory.

When Egypt was conquered in 1517 by Sultan Selim, Turkey,
automatically, took over the protectorate of the Holy Land. The Turkish
Sultans styled themselves, with unassuming pride, “the servants” of
both holy cities. At the same time, their garrison in Mecca was an
outward and visible sign that they did not intend to share the service
with anyone. From that epoch on, their names immediately preceded that
of the Grand Shereef in the official prayers. Later, the significance
of the honour was enhanced by the addition of the title of _Caliph_
assumed by the Turkish Sultans as sign and seal of their unrivalled
power in Islam.

The Osmans made as little effort to reform the hopelessly muddled
administration of the holy cities as their predecessors in the
Protectorate had done. By that date, the Shereefate had obtained for
more than three centuries, and no Mohammedan thought of questioning
either the legality or the desirability of the institution.

The administration methods of the Osmans were as little adapted for
permanent centralization as those of the earlier Mohammedan empire had
been. The provinces speedily assumed the character of feudal holdings,
each possessing a large measure of independence. The Pashas of Cairo,
of Damascus, of Bagdad, vied with each other for the first rank at
Mecca. From this rivalry the Shereefate profited, just as the suzerains
of the Holy Land had reaped advantage from the family disputes of the
Shereefs. In the eighteenth century, the Shereefs were not troubled
by the pressure of a heavy hand from without, but they were forced to
depend on themselves, and their inadequate equipment was a source of
danger to them when an unexpected opponent threatened to destroy their
power.

The Wahhabis of Central Arabia, roused by a puritanic zeal to protest
against what they declared was the dishonour of Islam, launched out on
a campaign of reform. This “holy war,” directed, primarily, against
the Turkish domination, succeeded in exciting a religious fervour
throughout a great part of Arabia, similar to that awakened by Mohammed
twelve centuries earlier, and, at the turn of the eighteenth into
the nineteenth centuries, these Wahhabis succeeded in obtaining the
mastery of the Holy Cities and in forcing the Shereefs to recognise
their authority. With infinite difficulty the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed
Ali, later the first Khedive, succeeded in fulfilling the mission
entrusted to him by the Sultan of Turkey and in reconquering the Holy
Land in his turn.

The then Shereef was punished for his inefficiency in repelling the
Wahhabis from his realm, by banishment, together with several members
of his family, while the head of another branch of his kinsfolk was
appointed to his vacated post. At this crisis, too, there was no talk
of abolition of the Shereefate.

* * * * *

With the expulsion of the Wahhabis from the Hijaz in 1813, begins the
latest historical phase of the Shereefate. The Protectorate exercised
by the first Khedive of Egypt down to 1840, partly in coöperation
with, partly in opposition to, Turkish authority, was completely
effective and so, as the Sultan was regularly represented in the Holy
Land by a governor sent from Constantinople, the good old tumultuous
times did not return for this free dynasty.

The understanding between the Shereefs and their protectors at Stamboul
were, however, never cordial; the aspirations and interests of the two
parties were too far asunder for that. The Sultans of Turkey considered
the Shereefate as a necessary evil that prevented them from making the
Hijaz into an ordinary _wilayet_ or province. They stationed there
military and civil officials similar to those in other _wilayets_, but
the functions of these subordinates were hampered by the unrestricted
power of the Shereef. After the Wahhabi war, this ruler was selected
by the suzerain and the rival kinsmen could no longer oust an incumbent
of the hereditary office by force of arms. They were obliged to resort
to the weapons of intrigue with the Sultan and the Sublime Porte.
Still, even with this appearance of stable administration, it was not
until 1880 that the Shereef finally relinquished as fruitless all
armed resistance to the Sultan’s deputies. The theory had been that
the Sultan was to be obeyed, but that his servants in the Hijaz were
unfaithful and could not be accepted. At Constantinople, meanwhile,
certain members of the Shereef’s family were kept in a kind of
honourable captivity, partly as hostages for the good faith of the
reigning Shereef, partly to relieve him from the burden of having
rivals in his vicinity, and also it was a convenience to have those
rivals in readiness in case the Shereef proved untrustworthy.

The Turkish governors of the Hijaz had no easy task. An energetic
Shereef would always be on the alert to reduce the governor’s authority
to the smallest measure. A weak Shereef might be submissive, but then
he was powerless to control the ill-disposed elements in his family
and make them innocuous, and often he would be sacrificed to the
wiles of the opposition. Coöperation between the two authorities for
the maintenance of peace was not dreamed of. The roads from Mecca to
Medina, to Jidda, to Ta’if, were in a chronic state of insecurity, and
it was not seldom that the rapacious Bedouins rejoiced in the secret
support of the Shereef.

The Shereef Aun, incumbent of the dignity from 1882 to 1905, was of the
energetic type, but he was, at the same time, an avaricious tyrant,
whose actions suggest Cæsar’s mad ambition. One governor after another
had to yield, and had to sit in his shadow. Ahmed Ratab alone succeeded
in holding on from 1892 to Aun’s death in 1905, by shutting his eyes
to the Shereef’s ill deeds and contenting himself with a share in the
profits that accrued from the malfeasance in office. Aun’s brother,
Abdullah, then living in Constantinople, was appointed his successor
but died before he began his journey to his native land. Then the
Sultan appointed Shereef Ali, a nephew of Aun, as “Amir of Mecca.” Such
was the title given to these princes by the Turkish chancery, out of
respect for a possible sensitiveness on the subject.

Both Shereef Ali and the governor, Ahmed Ratib, succumbed when the
great Turkish Revolution broke out in 1908. Ratib had to submit to
financial extortions and to exile, while the deposed Shereef settled
down in Cairo. His cousin Husein, son of Aun’s brother Ali, took his
place as Shereef. It soon became apparent that this Husein intended to
profit by the turn of events to retrieve the reputation and status of
the Shereefate.

It is well known that Arabia has contributed her share to the many
difficulties with which the Young-Turk Government has had to battle
from its inception. Thus the latter found it advisable to let the
Shereef, appointed as he was by the new _régime_, to go his own gait
and Husein made ample use of his freedom.

During the Turco-Italian War, Turkish occupation was in a disturbed
condition, especially in the southern part of Arabia and the Turkish
Government asked Shereef Husein for help in relieving the besieged
Turkish garrison of Obha in the rebellious Asir territory. With an
old-time Shereef-army, composed of slaves, mercenaries, and Bedouins,
Husein undertook a campaign which did, possibly, help secure the safe
retreat of the beleaguered Turkish garrison of Obha, but which also,
undoubtedly, tempered the Shereef’s sense of dependence on Turkish
authority.

* * * * *

The same National Turkish News Agency (Milli Agency) contradicted by
Reuter in regard to the revolt in Arabia, which it had reported as
“a quickly suppressed uprising of roving robber bands in the pay of
England”――telegraphed later that Shereef Husein was deposed and that
Shereef Ali, appointed in his stead, had already set out for Mecca.
Here the natural queries arise whether, by the “roving robber leader”
of the first Milli report, was meant Shereef Husein himself, and
whether the proposed journey of Shereef Ali will pass without incident.
Whether the newly appointed Shereef, that is the man with whose aid
the Turkish Government is to try to suppress, once for all, “robber
raiding,” is the same who was replaced by Husein, some time ago, is
not made clear in the Milli-despatch, but it is very probable that it
is. In that case, Shereef Ali must have left Cairo before the war and
betaken himself to Constantinople.

Here we have a repetition of the old game of playing off one Shereef
against another, just as it was played in the past. And the outcome
will depend on which of the two can gather the greater force of “robber
raiders” under his standard: Ali, supported by the Turks and their
friends, or Husein, aided by their opponents.

Assuredly either alternative proves the significance that a
serious revolt against Turkish authority would have under present
circumstances.

III

SHEREEF AND CALIPH

Assuming that the “robber raiders” of the Turkish-German despatch
and the Shereef of Mecca, referred to in the Reuter telegram are one
and the same person, and that, accordingly, Shereef Husein, Emir of
Mecca, has raised his standard against the Turkish domination, then the
question arises, “What does the Shereef mean by his opposition?”

Various writers on Islam have commented on the impropriety, according
to Mohammedan law itself, of the assumption of the title of “Caliph”
by the Sultan of Turkey. It was, indeed, for more than nine centuries,
regarded by the Moslem world as obligatory for the Caliphs to be able
to trace their descent from the Arabic line of Koreish, the line from
which Mohammed sprang. The pretensions advanced by the Sultans since
the sixteenth century have never been generally approved. That they
did not excite any vehement open opposition was partly owing to the
imposing puissance of the Turkish Empire at the moment when the Sultans
decorated themselves with the name, and partly to the circumstance
that the usurped dignity had no practical sequence. The Caliph added
no patch of ground to the territory that the Sultan had conquered with
the sword, and spiritual authority has never been ascribed to the
Caliph by the Moslem congregations. With the assumption of the highest
appellation that could be worn by a Moslem regent after Mohammed, these
Sultans simply announced to all Moslem princes that none of them would
be allowed to consider themselves his equal.

Such Moslems as were under Turkish authority were not affected by
the Caliphate of their Sultan. The relation of subjects to their
rulers in Mohammedan realms not subordinated to Turkey were even less
affected; and least of all did the matter signify to those followers of
Islam ruled by non-Mohammedans. These are numerous and have steadily
increased during the last centuries. An effective Caliphate, however
explained, presupposes the political unity of all the faithful.

The Caliph is the very personification of such unity and is, primarily,
the leader of Islam’s armies against the foes of the Faith, or he bears
a name bereft of all significance. In international life there is no
room for mediæval structures, and Turkey can live in peace with other
states, especially with those possessing Mohammedan subjects, only if
Caliphate pretensions be honestly put aside, even though the title
be maintained as a formal one. This was well understood by Turkish
statesmen of later times, and they either banished the Caliphate
idea in all their international discussions, or they permitted their
European colleagues, who mistakenly regarded the Caliph as a sort of
pope――a prince of the Church――to continue to entertain this false
conception as it was harmless.

Unlettered Mohammedans, who, ignorant of the modern point of view,
went on assigning an important place to the Caliphate legend in their
framework of the political system, were, however, often presented with
panislamic visions in order to retain, fictitiously, at least, what had
long vanished from real life. And these visions were often big with
ambition.

How completely at odds the Caliphate idea is with modern international
relations appeared when the Turkish Government, seduced by its alliance
with Germany, brought it to the fore, anew. The first outward and
visible sign of the renaissance of the Caliphate was the declaration
of the “Holy War,” accompanied by an appeal to all the Mohammedans
in the world to participate therein, irrespective of the political
authority they were bound to obey. Next came a series of official and
officious publications, all based on the hypothesis that the Turkish
Sultan-Caliph is the man who, under all circumstances, controls the
political policy of the Mohammedans.

Taking all these points into consideration, it becomes hardly needful
to reply to the question as to how the Shereef of Mecca might,
perhaps, try to become a rival of the Sultan Mehmed Reshad as a
pretender to the Caliphate.

A Caliphate, no matter who holds the dignity, is wholly incompatible
with modern political conditions. And this will be as true after
the present war as it was before. Only as an empty title can it be
tolerated at all.

For the rest, it can be seen, from what we have already written about
the history and the current condition of the Shereefate, that any lofty
aspirations would be especially ill adapted for local principalities.
The idea of a Caliphate of the Shereefs of Mecca has been ventilated,
more than once, by this or that European writer on Islam, but, in the
Moslem world, it has never been broached, and no one of the Shereefs
from the House of Katada――rulers in Mecca and in varying portions of
West Arabia ever since the year 1200 A.D.――ever thought of such a
thing. It is improbable that even foreign influence could prevail on
a Shereef of Mecca to attempt to gamble for the Caliphate. They all
know too well how little chance of success there would be in such an
attempt, and they feel themselves limited by tradition and by their
resources to the Hijaz.

Perhaps it is not superfluous to controvert another error into which
many fall,――the opinion, namely, that the wresting of the Hijaz from
Turkish domination would, automatically, end the Turkish Caliphate,
since the Caliph bases his claim to the title partly on his protection
of the Holy Cities. This opinion is supported by neither Mohammedan law
nor by Mohammedan history. Mecca and Medina have known periods when,
for instance, they were in the hands of the unbelieving Karmathians,
when again they submitted to the heretical Fatimide-Caliphs, when all
relations with the seat of the Caliphate were suspended, when the
Wahhabis drove the Turks from the Holy Land; on none of these occasions
did it occur to a single Moslem to question the right of the Caliph
to his dignity. The Caliphate and the Holy Land have, more than once,
existed independently of each other.

Quite apart from high political aspirations, there are reasons enough
which might have excited Husein to renounce obedience to the Turk. It
is well known that the relations between Sultan-Caliph and the Shereef
have been perfunctory and never cordial. The Shereefs have invariably
felt the protectorate as an oppressive bond, and the Turks have never
been able to appeal to the population in the name of the blessings
that they, the conquerors, have bestowed on the land. They have given
nothing and have never been in a position even to assure the safety
of the roads leading to the Holy Cities during the few weeks of the
pilgrimage. In Arabia as little as elsewhere have the Turks tried to
affiliate with the people. They are unpopular in the highest degree.

The Committee of Union and Progress, in whose hands Turkey has been
since 1908, has by no means made itself idolised by the Meccanese and
their hereditary princes. Visitors to Stamboul from Mecca, since 1908,
came away scandalized at the methods and ideals of Young Turkey. All
Mecca subsists on the pilgrimages, and the interest of all is centred
on the gains accruing to them from the _hajji_ (pilgrim), just as that
of an agricultural people is intent upon the prospects of the harvest.
The Committee that inscribed Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity on
their standards and then proceeded to adopt despotic methods in
administration, equivalent to those of Abdul Hamid, is regarded at
Mecca as the cause of Turkey’s participation in the war of which the
palpable result for the Holy Cities was the absence of pilgrims and
the restriction of the importation of foodstuffs. Even the people of
West Arabia, who had heartily accepted Turkish sovereignty as such, now
curse the present Turkish _régime_. No wonder that they were ready to
appeal to a power that was foe to Turkey’s ally, Germany! The latest
Reuter telegram, according to which trade at Jidda, is again on a
normal basis, indicates in its information one of the main causes of
the Anti-Turkish movement.

In the Great War, the Shereefate of Mecca cannot possibly take part.
The forces at its disposal are nothing more than a bodyguard, a
few mercenaries, and the contribution made by some Bedouin tribes,
difficult to hold together, undisciplined, untrained. The population of
the holy cities furnishes no elements for the formation of a military
force, and in that population, Shereef Ali, whom the Turks now wish to
use, will assuredly find some adherents. Arabia is still, as it was of
yore, hopelessly divided by conflicting interests and by century-long
feuds. It is not ready for great undertakings. But, for the moment,
a revolt in West Arabia against Turkey, under the lead of the Great
Shereef and aided by England, can cause serious trouble to the Turkish
Government, and all the more, because it is at Mecca, familiar to,
and cherished by, the entire Mohammedan world. Such a campaign, well
prepared and ably conducted, would be a master-stroke in opposition to
the attempt, made by Young Turkey under German protection, to excite
the mediæval fanaticism of Islam against other religious sects and to
use it as an incentive to strife.

However that may be, those who abominate playing with the fire of
religious hate, a measure to which the Young Turks, in the main
non-religious, have allowed themselves, to be persuaded, have no reason
to regret the Arabian uprising. All that can tend to making an end of
the unworthy noisy talk of “Caliphate” and “Holy War” may be regarded
as commanding respect.

NOTE

The following translation of the Proclamation appeared in _The Near
East_:

Since writing his monograph, Professor Hurgronje has had reason
to doubt his surmise as to the identity of the new Grand Shereef
sent by the Turkish government to Medina. Probably it is not the
Ali who succeeded to his uncle Aun and settled in Egypt after his
demission.

The proclamation is added as interesting in connection with
Professor Hurgronje’s own articles. He would have preferred to
give the Turkish proclamation as well as this, had this been
possible.

APPENDIX

PROCLAMATION OF THE SHEREEF OF MECCA

“In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.”

This is our general proclamation to all our Moslem brothers.

“O God, judge between us and our people in truth; Thou art the Judge.”

The world knoweth that the first of all Moslem princes and rulers to
acknowledge the Turkish Government were the Emirs of Mecca the Blessed.
This they did to bind together and make strong the brotherhood of
Islam, for they saw the Sultans of the House of Osman (may the dust of
their tombs be blessed, and may they dwell in Paradise!), how they were
upright, and how they carried out all the commandments and ordinances
of the Faith and of the Prophet (prayers be upon him!) perfectly.
Therefore they were obedient to them at all times.

For a token of this, remember how in A.H. 1322 I with my Arabs
helped them against the Arabs, to save Ebhah from those who were
besieging it, and to preserve the name of the Government in honour;
and remember how again in the next year I helped them with my armies,
which I entrusted to one of my sons; for in truth we were one with
the Government until the Committee of Union and Progress rose up, and
strengthened itself, and laid its hands on power. Consider how since
then ruin has overtaken the State, and its possessions have been torn
from it, and its place in the world has been lost, until now it has
been drawn into this last and most fatal war.

All this they have done, being led away by shameful appetites, which
are not for me to set forth, but which are public and a cause for
sorrow to the Moslems of the whole world, who have seen this greatest
and most noble Moslem Power broken in pieces and led down to ruin and
utter destruction. Our lament is also for so many of its subjects,
Moslems and others alike, whose lives have been sacrificed without any
fault of their own. Some have been treacherously put to death, others
cruelly driven from their homes, as though the calamities of war were
not enough. Of these calamities the heaviest share has fallen upon the
Holy Land. The poor, and even families of substance, have been made
to sell their doors and windows, yea, even the wooden frames of their
houses, for bread, after they had lost their furniture and all their
goods. Not even so was the lust of the Union and Progress fulfilled.
They laid bare all the measure of their wicked design, and broke the
only bond that endured between them and the true followers of Islam.
They departed from their obedience to the precepts of the Book.

With the connivance of the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, the
Sheikh-el-Islam, the Ulema, the Ministers, and the Notables, one of
their papers called the _Ijtihad_ published in Constantinople unworthy
things about the Prophet (The Prayer and Peace of God be upon him!) and
spoke evil of him (God forbid!). Then the Union and Progress rejected
God’s word, “A man shall have twice a woman’s share,” and made them
equal. They went further and removed one of the five corner-stones
of the Faith, even the Fast in Ramadan, by causing the soldiers in
garrison in Mecca, Medina, and Damascus to break their fast for new
and foolish reasons, taking no account of the ordinance of God saying,
“Those of you who are sick or on a journey....” Yea, they went further.
They made weak the person of the Sultan, and robbed him of his honour,
forbidding him to choose for himself the chief of his personal Cabinet.
Other like things did they to sap the foundation of the Khalifate.

For this it had been clearly our part and our necessary duty to
separate ourselves from them and renounce them and their obedience. Yet
we would not believe their wickedness, and tried to think that they
were the imaginings of evil-doers to make a division between us and the
Government. We bore with them until it was apparent to all men that
the rulers of Turkey were Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Tallaat Bey,
who were doing whatsoever they pleased. They made their guilt manifest
when they wrote to the Judge of the Sacred Court in Mecca traducing
the verses in the Surah of the Cow, and laying upon him to reject the
evidence of believers outside the Court and to consider only the deeds
and contracts engrossed within the Court. They also showed their
guilt when they hanged in one day twenty-one of the most honourable
and enlightened of the Moslems, among them Emir Omar el Jazairi, Emir
Arif el Shahabi, Shefik Bey Moayyad, Shukri Bey el Asli, Abdel Wahab,
Tewfik el Bassat, Abdel Hamid el Zahrawi, Abdel Ghani el Areisi, and
their learned comrades. To destroy so many, even of cattle, at one time
would be hard for men void of all natural affection or mercy. And if
we suppose they had some excuse for this evil deed, by what right did
they carry away to strange countries the innocent and most miserable
families of those ill-fated men? Children, old men, and delicate women
bereft of their natural protectors were subjected in exile to all
foul usage and even to tortures, as though the woes they had already
suffered were not chastisement enough. Did not God say: “No punishment
shall be inflicted on anyone for the sins of another?...” Let us
suppose they found for themselves some reason for ill-treating the
harmless families of their victims; why then did they rob them of their
properties and possessions, which alone remained to keep them from
death by famine? And if we suppose that they had also some excuse for
this evil deed, how shall we find pardon for them for their shattering
of the tomb of our most righteous and upright Lord and Brother, El
Sayed el Shereef Abdel Kader el Jezairi el Hassani, whose bones they
have polluted and whose dust they have scattered abroad?

We leave the judgment of these misdeeds, which we have touched upon so
briefly, to the world in general and to Moslems in particular. What
stronger proof can we desire of the faithlessness of their inmost
hearts to the Religion, and of their feelings towards the Arabs, than
their bombardment of that ancient House, which God has chosen for His
House, saying, “Keep my House pure for all who come to it,”――a House
so venerated by all Moslems? From their fort of Jyad, when the revolt
began, they shelled it. The first shot struck a yard and a-half above
the Black Stone. The second fell three yards short of it, so that the
flame leapt up and took hold upon the Kiswa. Which, when they saw,
the thousands and thousands of Moslems first raised a lamentable cry,
running to and fro, and then shouted in fierce anger and rushed to
save it. They had to burst open the door and mount upon the roof before
they could quench the flames. Yet a third shell fell upon the Tomb of
Abraham, and other shells fell in and about the precincts, which they
made a target for their guns, killing every day three or four who were
at prayer within the Mosque, till they prevented the people coming near
to worship. This will show how they despised His House and denied it
the honour given it by believers.

We leave all this to the Moslem world for judgment.

Yes, we can leave the judgment to the Moslem world; but we may not
leave our religion and our existence as a people to be a plaything of
the Unionists. God (Blessed be He!) has made open for us the attainment
of freedom and independence, and has shown us a way of victory to cut
off the hand of the oppressors, and to cast out their garrison from
our midst. We have attained independence, an independence of the rest
of the Ottoman Empire, which is still groaning under the tyranny of
our enemy. Our independence is complete, absolute, not to be laid
hands on by any foreign influence or aggression, and our aim is the
preservation of Islam and the uplifting of its standard in the world.
We fortify ourselves on the noble religion which is our only guide and
advocate in the principles of administration and justice. We are ready
to accept all things in harmony with the Faith and all that leads to
the Mountain of Islam, and in particular to uplift the mind and the
spirit of all classes of the people in so far as we have strength and
ability.

This is what we have done according to the dictates of our religion,
and on our part we trust that our brethren in all parts of the world
will each do his duty also, as is incumbent upon him, that the bonds of
brotherhood in Islam may be confirmed.

We beseech the Lord of Lords, for the sake of the Prophet of Him who
giveth all things, to grant us prosperity and to direct us in the right
way for the welfare of the faith and of the faithful.

We depend upon God the All-Powerful, whose defence is sufficient for us.

Shereef and Emir of Mecca,
HUSEIN.
25 Shaaban, 1334

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| Mohammedanism |
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| (_American Lectures on the History of Religions Series_) |
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Transcriber’s Note:

Page number for Chapter II in the Contents was changed from
16 to 15.

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